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Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council

Supplement 2021



Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

**Repertoire of the Practice
of the Security Council**

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Introduction

The present publication constitutes the twenty-fourth supplement to the *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council*, 1946–1951, which was issued in 1954. In 2021, owing to the continued impact of the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020, the Security Council did not hold in-person meetings until 25 May 2021 and conducted its business following a hybrid model of work, alternating in-person meetings with videoconferences. In 2021, videoconferences, whether open or closed, were not considered formal meetings of the Council. While in-person meetings continued to be recorded in verbatim records, as customary, the statements delivered in open videoconferences were compiled in letters from the President of the Security Council, as further detailed in part II.

Consequently, the twenty-fourth supplement to the *Repertoire* features both meetings and open videoconferences, despite the latter not being considered meetings of the Council. It covers the proceedings of the Council from the first videoconference, held on 5 January 2021 and recorded in the corresponding letter from the President of the Security Council ([S/2021/22](#)), to the last open videoconference of the year, held on 30 December and recorded in the corresponding letters from the President ([S/2021/1107](#) and [S/2021/1116](#)), and from the 8779th meeting, held on 25 May, to the 8942nd meeting, held on 22 December. The original *Repertoire* and previous supplements may be consulted online on the website of the Security Council (www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/structure).

The *Repertoire* was mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution [686 \(VII\)](#), entitled “Ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available”. It is a guide to the proceedings of the Council and sets forth in a readily accessible form the practices and procedures to which the Council has had recourse. The *Repertoire* is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

The categories employed to arrange the material are not intended to suggest the existence of procedures or practices that have not been clearly or demonstrably established by the Council itself. The Council is at all times master of its own procedure, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, its own provisional rules of procedure, and the practice established through, inter alia, notes by the President. For ease of reference, this introduction contains a table indicating the membership of the Council during the period under review.

In recording the Council’s practice, the headings under which the practices and procedures of the Council were presented in the original volume issued in 1954 have been largely retained. Where necessary, however, adjustments have been made to better reflect the Council’s practice. For example, the studies contained in part I of the present publication are organized according to region or thematic issues in chronological order.

The *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* covers four primary areas: the application of the provisional rules of procedure, the application of Articles of the Charter, the subsidiary organs of the Council, including peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as sanctions committees and the associated panels and groups of experts, and an overview of Council activities for each item of which it is seized. From 1946 to 2007, each

Supplement to the *Repertoire*, generally covering a period of two to four years, comprised 12 chapters; from 2008 to 2017, each Supplement covered a period of two years, and comprised 10 parts. Since 2018, each Supplement, covering a period of one year, has also comprised 10 parts.

From 1946 to 2007, the 12 chapters of each Supplement covered the following topics:

Chapter I	Provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council (Articles 28, 30, 98 of the Charter; rules 1–5, 13–36, 40–67 of the rules of procedure)
Chapter II	Agenda (rules 6–12)
Chapter III	Participation in the proceedings of the Security Council (Articles 31, 32, 35 (1); rules 37–39)
Chapter IV	Voting (Article 27; rule 40)
Chapter V	Subsidiary organs of the Security Council
Chapter VI	Relations with other United Nations organs
Chapter VII	Practice relative to recommendations to the General Assembly regarding membership in the United Nations
Chapter VIII	Consideration of questions under the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (overview by agenda item)
Chapter IX	Decisions taken by the Security Council in the exercise of its other functions and powers
Chapter X	Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter
Chapter XI	Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter
Chapter XII	Consideration of the provisions of other Articles (Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5), 2 (6), 2 (7), 24, 25, 52–54, 102, 103)

From 2008 onward, the 10 parts of each Supplement covered the following topics:

Part I	Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
Part II	Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments
Part III	Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
Part IV	Relations with other United Nations organs
Part V	Functions and powers of the Security Council (Chapter V of the Charter)
Part VI	Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter
Part VII	Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)
Part VIII	Regional arrangements (Chapter VIII of the Charter)

Part IX	Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: committees, tribunals and other bodies
Part X	Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

The *Repertoire* is based on published documents of the Council. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of letters combined with figures. Council documents are indicated by a symbol that includes the year and a sequential number (e.g. [S/2021/732](#)). References to the verbatim records of meetings of the Council are given in the form [S/PV.8835](#), meetings being numbered consecutively, starting with the first meeting in 1946. As in previous recent supplements, reference is made in this Supplement only to the provisional verbatim records of Security Council meetings, as the practice of publishing the meeting records in the *Official Records* has been discontinued. As explained above, the COVID-19 pandemic continued to have an enormous impact in 2021 on the work of the Council, including on its documentation and, in particular, on the documentation created to record statements made at or submitted for open videoconferences, which were circulated in letters from the President issued, like other Security Council documents, under a symbol that includes the year and a sequential number, as described above.

The resolutions and other decisions adopted by the Council, including statements and notes by the President and relevant exchanges of letters between the President and the Secretary-General, are published in the yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. Resolutions are identified by a number followed by the year of adoption in parentheses, for example, resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#). Since 1994, references to the statements by the President on behalf of the Council are given in the form [S/PRST/2021/24](#), for example. Prior to that date, presidential statements, like other Security Council documents, were circulated under a symbol in the sequential series (e.g. [S/25929](#)).

Readers who wish to consult the full record of a meeting or the text of a Council document referred to in the *Repertoire* may do so on the official Website of the United Nations Documentation Centre (www.un.org/en/documents/). Security Council documents can be accessed on the website by selecting “Official Document System (ODS)” or one of the direct links to specific categories of documents under the heading “Security Council”. The volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions* may be accessed by symbol ([S/INF/76](#) for 2021).

Membership of the Security Council, 2021

China

Estonia

France

India

Ireland

Kenya

Mexico

Niger

Norway

Russian Federation

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Tunisia

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

United States of America

Viet Nam

Part I

Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

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Introductory note

Part I of the present Supplement to the *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* provides an overview of the proceedings of the Security Council in connection with the items of which the Council is seized that relate to its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In 2021, owing to the continued impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the Council did not hold meetings in person until 25 May and then conducted its business using a hybrid model, alternating between videoconferences and in-person meetings to ensure continuity in the Council's functioning. During the first half of the year, most of the Council's discussions were held by videoconference, while during the second half of the year the Council was able to return to the Security Council Chamber and hold in-person meetings. Beginning in June until the end of the year, Council members held nearly all meetings in person and occasionally held videoconferences. As in 2020, videoconferences in 2021, whether open or closed, were not considered formal meetings of the Council. While in-person meetings continued to be recorded in verbatim records as customary, the statements delivered in open videoconferences were compiled and issued in letters of the President of the Council.

In addition, during the first half of the year the Council continued to adopt resolutions by written procedure and statements by the President of the Council were agreed upon following a no-objection procedure, having in both cases the same status as those adopted in the Council Chamber.

As in past supplements, part I gives the immediate political context in which the consideration of the items by the Council evolved in 2021, covering the meetings and documents of the Council, including letters of the President of the Council compiling statements delivered in videoconferences. Consequently, part I features all items in connection with which meetings and/or open videoconferences were held, despite the latter not being considered meetings of the Council. Part I constitutes a framework within which the deliberations of the Council expressly related to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Council's provisional rules of procedure can be considered. For that reason, cross-references to all other relevant parts are included in the narrative sections of part I to facilitate understanding of the structure and content of the *Repertoire*.

Part I also examines the substantive aspects of the Council's practice that are not covered in other parts of the *Repertoire*. For ease of reference, the items are grouped by region, with an additional category of thematic issues. Within each region, items are listed in the order in which they were first included in the list of matters of which the Council is seized. Individual studies highlight significant developments in the Council's consideration of an item that are considered important for contextualizing the decisions taken by the Council.

In contrast with previous supplements and in the light of the hybrid method of work developed by the Council, the narrative sections in part I are followed, as relevant and appropriate, by: (a) a table comprising all procedural information relating to the item, including meetings, sub-items, documents referred to and speakers, listed in chronological order; and/or (b) a table providing a list of videoconferences held in connection with the item. In addition, to illustrate the mainstreaming of thematic issues, sections concerning the items entitled "Children and armed conflict", "Protection of civilians in armed conflict" and "Women and peace and security" are followed by an additional table setting out the relevant provisions of decisions of the Council.

Africa

1. The situation concerning Western Sahara

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting and adopted one resolution in connection with the situation concerning Western Sahara. The only meeting of the Council held under the item in 2021 was for the adoption of resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#).¹ More information on the meeting, including on speakers and outcome, is given in the table below. In addition, Council members held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).² Council members also held closed videoconferences and informal consultations of the whole to discuss the item.³

On 29 October, the Council adopted resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of MINURSO for a period of one year, until 31 October 2022.⁴ The draft resolution received 13 votes in favour (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam) and two abstentions (Russian Federation and Tunisia).⁵ By the resolution, the Council welcomed the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and urged for the constructive resumption of the political process, building on the progress of the former Personal Envoy.⁶ The Council expressed deep concern about the

breakdown of the ceasefire.⁷ In that connection, the Council expressed its full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to facilitate the negotiation process in order to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question and called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.⁸ The Council also noted with deep concern the continued hardships faced by Sahrawi refugees, their dependency on external humanitarian assistance and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as insufficient funding for those living in the Tindouf refugee camps and the risks associated with the reduction of food assistance.⁹

At the meeting,¹⁰ following the adoption of resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#) the representative of the Russian Federation explained his country's abstention, underscoring that it was based exclusively on a rejection of the resolution's wording and on an assessment of the work conducted by the penholders. He explained that during the negotiations, his country's justified comments and compromise proposals had not been taken on board and a number of constructive proposals from other Council members had been overlooked. It was for that reason that the resolution did not reflect the objective picture of what had happened on the issue of Western Sahara following the military escalation in November and would probably not be helpful in the efforts of the Personal Envoy to resume direct negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable decision that provided for the self-determination of Western Sahara. The main problem remained unsolved, which in his view was the fact that in recent years Council resolutions to extend the mandate of MINURSO had included general wording on the need to abide by the so-called "realistic" approaches or to make some compromises, replacing the internationally agreed parameters for the settlement of the Western Sahara issue. Such signals led to

¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

² The private meeting was held on 11 October in connection with the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B"; see [S/PV.8876](#) and [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 20.

³ The closed videoconference was held on 21 April (see [S/2021/1084](#)). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I. Informal consultations were held on 13 October (see [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 3).

⁴ Resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of MINURSO, see part X, sect. I.

⁵ See [S/PV.8890](#).

⁶ Resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph. See also [S/2021/851](#) and [S/2021/852](#).

⁷ Resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), fourteenth preambular paragraph.

⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 3–4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, twenty-third preambular paragraph.

¹⁰ See [S/PV.8890](#).

ambiguity, undermined trust in the Council's work and made it more difficult to resume a direct dialogue. Among the delegations voting in favour, the representative of Mexico expressed regret at the unwillingness, during the negotiations, to include in the resolution important proposals that had the backing of several delegations, particularly for more frequent briefings in the light of the significant deterioration of the situation with regard to human rights violations and the collapse of the ceasefire. The representative of Viet Nam said that his country would have liked to see a more balanced text that better reflected the situation on the ground. The representative of China hoped that in future the Council would hold more consultations on the resolution on the extension of the mandate of MINURSO in an effort to reflect the latest developments and the concerns of the various sides, so as to form a more balanced text that could contribute to mutual trust and the reaching of consensus.

Further to the adoption of the resolution, in a letter addressed to the President of the Council dated 24 November 2021, the Permanent Representative of South Africa transmitted a communiqué issued by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO).¹¹ In the communiqué, Frente POLISARIO underscored that the resolution was a major setback that would have serious consequences for peace and stability in the entire region. Frente POLISARIO further highlighted the failure of the resolution to provide any practical measures to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of MINURSO or confront the attempts by Morocco to legitimize the “colonial fait accompli” imposed by force.

¹¹ See [S/2021/981](#).

Meeting: the situation concerning Western Sahara

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8890 29 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2021/843)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/898)			Seven Council members ^a	Resolution 2602 (2021) (13-0-2) ^b

^a China, France, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, United States and Viet Nam.

^b *For*: China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; *against*: none; *abstained*: Russian Federation, Tunisia.

2. The situation in Somalia

In 2021, the Council held 10 meetings and adopted six decisions on the situation in Somalia, five of which were under Chapter VII of the Charter. Six meetings took the form of a briefing, while four were convened to adopt decisions.¹² More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in table 1 below. In addition, Council members held four open videoconferences in connection with the item in 2021, two of which were held for the announcement of the vote on resolutions.¹³ More

information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held informal consultations of the whole, closed videoconferences and informal interactive dialogues in connection with the item.¹⁴

The Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for

¹² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

¹³ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹⁴ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 5. See also [S/2021/683](#) and [S/2021/1060](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. Similarly, some informal interactive dialogues were held by videoconference. Informal interactive dialogues concerning the item were held on 20 January and 20 April.

Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia. In addition, the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General and three civil society representatives: the Chairperson of the Somali National Women's Organization, the Executive Director of the Somali Women's Studies Centre and the Executive Director of the Somali Women's Leadership Initiative. In 2021, Council members also heard a briefing by the Managing Director of the European External Action Service.

In his briefings held in connection with the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General,¹⁵ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General provided updates to the Council concerning the political developments, including the holding of elections, the security situation and the implementation of the Somali transition plan, and the humanitarian conditions in Somalia during the year.

At a videoconference held on 22 February,¹⁶ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that the political stand-off among key Somali leaders had blocked the implementation of the electoral model agreed by the President of the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member state leaders on 17 September 2020. Tensions over electoral implementation had been compounded by questions raised by some political figures over the legitimacy of the President's mandate following the expiry of his constitutional term on 8 February 2021. Despite the impasse, the Special Representative remained convinced that the consensus-based model of 17 September offered the best available option to proceed quickly to an electoral process for selecting members of Parliament, senators and a president. He therefore called for dialogue and inclusive consultations to minimize further delays in Somalia's four-year transition cycle. On the security front, Al-Shabaab continued to pose the primary threat to the security of Somalia. The beginning of 2021 had seen a new peak in the number of attacks, including more person-borne and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices targeting government officials and key figures in Somali society. The Special Representative noted that the preparatory work to advance the security transition in Somalia in 2021 had been completed. The

Council-mandated independent assessment of the security situation and the role of international partners had been submitted to the Council on 8 January 2021 and the Somali transition plan had been updated and presented by the Government of Somalia to security partners and the African Union Peace and Security Council in early February. According to the Special Representative, those were all important elements to advance the security transition in 2021 and lay the foundations for further progress in the future. The humanitarian situation remained dire with increasing food insecurity, climatic disasters, the worst desert locust infestation in decades and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

During his briefing on 25 May,¹⁷ the Special Representative provided updates on political developments, informing the Council about a return to dialogue after the earlier period of confrontation. Following the convening of a new summit between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states, discussions were centred on resolving the outstanding issues related to the implementation of the agreement of 17 September 2020. In proceeding to elections, it was crucial that the minimum 30 per cent representation of women in both houses of the federal Parliament be implemented. He called for the inclusion of women, youth and minority groups in political decision-making going forward. The security situation continued to be of grave concern, with Al-Shabaab remaining a serious threat and manifesting its ability to plan and execute complex attacks on a range of targets across Somalia. While some progress had been made in the implementation of the revised Somali transition plan, the pace had been negatively affected by the political impasse. The humanitarian situation remained dire, compounded by drought conditions, seasonal flash flooding, erratic climatic shocks and increased food insecurity. Concluding his briefing, the Special Representative underlined that it was imperative that the summit in Mogadishu yield an implementable agreement to hold elections in the shortest time possible.

On 12 August,¹⁸ the Special Representative informed the Council about the significant progress that had been made on the political front with the signing of an electoral implementation agreement on 27 May 2021 between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states. Election management bodies at the federal and state levels had been established and the elections for seats in the upper house of Parliament had begun in four of the federal

¹⁵ See [S/2021/154](#), [S/2021/485](#), [S/2021/723](#) and [S/2021/944](#).

¹⁶ See [S/2021/173](#).

¹⁷ See [S/PV.8779](#).

¹⁸ See [S/PV.8833](#).

member states. As the United Nations continued to work closely with the Office of the Prime Minister and the election management committees, the Special Representative noted that more progress was needed, including with regard to more intensive and detailed preparations for electoral security and clarity on plans to secure the quota for women. Concerning security, Al-Shabaab continued to conduct terrorist attacks and insurgent operations and there were also alarming increases in sexual violence and violations against children. The humanitarian situation remained dire with the combined impact of conflict and climate change, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, further exacerbating food insecurity.

In his last briefing of the year, held on 17 November,¹⁹ the Special Representative welcomed the recent completion of the elections for all the seats in the upper house of the federal Parliament, stating that it was encouraging that 26 per cent of the senators would be women. Elections for the House of the People had commenced and the holding of peaceful, direct local elections in three districts in Puntland in October had demonstrated the feasibility of holding one-person-one-vote elections. The Special Representative urged all stakeholders to move swiftly to conclude the remaining elections to ensure that the full Parliament was elected before the end of 2021. Tensions between the President and the Prime Minister had eased. On security, the situation continued to be volatile, with Al-Shabaab remaining a serious threat, able to maintain a high level of activities, including through the continued use of improvised explosive devices and an increase in the use of suicide bombers. The implementation of the Somali transition plan for the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces was advancing but remained behind schedule. In that context, further discussions were required to reach agreement on the strategic objectives, size and composition of a future African Union mission designed to support the security transition in Somalia in the most effective way. The humanitarian conditions remained dire, compounded by conflict, displacement and disease outbreaks, with an estimated 7.7 million Somalis expected to require humanitarian assistance in 2022.

In his quarterly briefings, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia noted that AMISOM continued to deliver on its election-related responsibilities. Following the adoption of resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#) in March, he reported at the meeting of

the Council in May²⁰ that tremendous efforts had been made in the implementation of the revised objectives and tasks. In August,²¹ he reported that AMISOM was making progress on its reconfiguration plans. Regarding the African Union's future engagement in Somalia after 2021, he informed the Council that the conclusions of an independent assessment undertaken by the African Union had been considered by AMISOM, some troop-contributing countries, the African Union Commission and the African Union Peace and Security Council. In that regard, there was an overriding consensus in favour of a joint African Union-United Nations multidimensional stabilization mission or hybrid mission as the model that would be best placed to address the post-2021 challenges. In his final briefing of the year, in November 2021,²² the Special Representative underscored that there was an absolute need for a new mission that would take over from AMISOM, whose mandate was coming to an end on 31 December 2021. In that context, he reported that the African Union Peace and Security Council had requested that the African Union Commission immediately resume consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia and relevant international partners.

In addition to the regular quarterly briefings, at a meeting held on 28 September²³ the Council heard a briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General on her visit to Somalia conducted on 12 September. According to the Deputy Secretary-General, the trip was undertaken in solidarity with calls from Somali women for full and equal participation in political life and to express the support of the international community for timely, inclusive, peaceful and credible elections. There was real concern that in the current elections to the House of the People the levels of representation of women would decrease, despite promises and stipulations in electoral agreements and commitments from all interlocutors during the visit. The challenges related to access to financial support and political networks were compounded by violence and discrimination, especially in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, where women faced added security challenges. The Deputy Secretary-General asserted that it was critical for Somalia's considerable momentum in the electoral process to continue through to the finalization of the elections to the upper house of Parliament and the start of the electoral process for the lower house, and shared the appeal of Somali leaders to the international community to keep up its sustained focus, support and partnership.

²⁰ See [S/PV.8779](#).

²¹ See [S/PV.8833](#).

²² See [S/PV.8907](#).

²³ See [S/PV.8867](#).

¹⁹ See [S/PV.8907](#).

In 2021, the Council also heard three briefings by the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#), in which she informed Council members about the Committee's activities during the reporting period. During a videoconference held on 25 February,²⁴ the Chair noted that the active engagement of the Panel of Experts with the Federal Government of Somalia had continued in 2021. At a meeting held on 14 June,²⁵ the Chair stated that the Committee was considering a recommendation by the Panel of Experts to initiate a consultative process with the Federal Government of Somalia on the requirements of the arms embargo regime. At the same meeting, the representative of Somalia stressed the importance of clearly identifying defined, practical and achievable key benchmarks for fully lifting the arms embargo on Somalia and noted that subject-matter expertise and evidence-based reporting were the best practices to be used in monitoring United Nations arms embargoes. He also welcomed the recent steps taken by the Committee to address Somalia's concerns and looked forward to a more institutionalized and transparent process and procedures in that regard. In her briefing on 20 October,²⁶ the Chair informed the Council about, inter alia, the first thematic report that the Committee had received from the Panel of Experts, focusing on weapons and ammunition management in Somalia.

In 2021, Council members focused their discussions concerning the situation in Somalia on political developments, including the conduct of elections, humanitarian conditions, human rights issues and the continued threat posed by Al-Shabaab, as well as on ways to move forward on the reconfiguration of AMISOM.

On political matters, Council members called for overcoming the impasse and urged the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to continue engaging in dialogue to move forward with elections. In that context, most Council members continued to recall the importance of ensuring an inclusive and peaceful electoral process, including through the 30 per cent quota for women in the Parliament.²⁷ In addition, some Council members

underlined the need to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Somalia.²⁸

Concerning the humanitarian situation, Council members continued to express concern over the dire conditions, which were compounded by various factors such as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-related challenges.²⁹

Several Council members also raised the issue of human rights, in particular calling for the protection of women and girls from conflict-related sexual violence and pointing to the grave violations of children's rights. In that regard, they called on Somalia to ensure that the relevant legislation was in line with international standards and obligations.³⁰ Council members also discussed the participation of women in political processes in a dedicated briefing in September.³¹ Furthermore, several Council members affirmed the importance of ensuring freedom of expression in Somalia.³²

Council members also deliberated on the security situation in Somalia, focusing on the continuing threat posed by Al-Shabaab, whose terrorist attacks continued

United States, Mexico, Estonia, Norway and India); and [S/PV.8907](#) (United Kingdom, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ireland, Russian Federation, Estonia, United States, Viet Nam, Norway, France and Mexico).

²⁸ See [S/2021/173](#) (Russian Federation and Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)); [S/PV.8779](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Russian Federation and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8833](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8907](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Russian Federation and Viet Nam).

²⁹ See [S/2021/173](#), [S/PV.8779](#), [S/PV.8833](#) and [S/PV.8907](#).

³⁰ See [S/2021/173](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway and Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)); [S/PV.8779](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Estonia, France and Ireland); [S/PV.8833](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ireland, France, Mexico, Estonia and Norway); and [S/PV.8907](#) (Ireland, Norway and Mexico).

³¹ See [S/PV.8867](#).

³² See [S/2021/173](#) (Estonia, Ireland and Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)); [S/PV.8779](#) (Norway and Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)); [S/PV.8833](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)); and [S/PV.8907](#) (Ireland).

²⁴ See [S/2021/207](#).

²⁵ See [S/PV.8796](#).

²⁶ See [S/PV.8885](#).

²⁷ See [S/2021/173](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8779](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Viet Nam, Estonia, United States, France and Ireland); [S/PV.8833](#) (United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Ireland, France,

in 2021. They also underscored the need for further progress with regard to Somalia gradually assuming full responsibility for its security by the end of 2023, in line with the conditions on the ground. With respect to the future of AMISOM, at a meeting in November³³ Council members discussed the proposal that had been endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council.³⁴ In that context, the representative of the United Kingdom held the view that the proposed model of an African Union-United Nations multidimensional stabilization mission would run counter to the idea of progressive transition to full Somali security responsibility, and instead called for reaching agreement on a joint United Nations-African Union proposal, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and donors, as requested by the Council, so as to move past the impasse and find consensus.³⁵ Speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Council and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of Tunisia underlined the importance of taking into due consideration the needs, priorities and views of the host country in defining the nature and objective of any future mission in Somalia and called for adequate, sustainable and predictable financing in that regard. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the conviction that any decisions on the African Union peacekeeping mission must be taken with due account of the view of Mogadishu, adding that it was important to avoid a security vacuum. According to the representative of the United States, a restructured African Union-led mission focused on increasing pressure on Al-Shabaab and gradually transferring security responsibility to Somali security forces was the best way forward. In that regard, he urged for renewed discussions among all stakeholders to reach an agreement. The representative of China expressed the hope that all the parties could reach a solution acceptable to all based on fully respecting the views of the host country and noted that the funds must be guaranteed before a decision was taken on the matter to avoid a security vacuum due to funding gaps. The representative of France asserted that full implementation of the Somali transition plan, with the support of all partners and, in particular, a reconfigured African Union mission, which was to take over from AMISOM as of 2022, was required for Somalia to be able to ensure its own security. He noted that the Council must draw lessons from the current model and its shortcomings in terms of strategic direction and effectiveness and stated that it was

becoming urgent to find an effective, collective and sustainable solution in terms of funding.

In 2021, under the item and in connection with AMISOM, the Council unanimously adopted three resolutions acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. On 25 February, the Council adopted resolution [2563 \(2021\)](#), in which it authorized the States members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM for a period of two weeks, until 14 March 2021, without any changes to the mandate, and to take all necessary measures to carry the mandate out.³⁶ On 12 March, the Council adopted resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), by which it authorized the States members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of 19,626 uniformed AMISOM personnel until 31 December 2021, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel, including five formed police units, as well as 70 AMISOM civilian personnel supported by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, to conduct tasks in line with the Somalia Transition Plan and the phased handover of security to Somali security forces commencing in 2021. The Council further authorized AMISOM to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate.³⁷ In the same resolution, the Council emphasized that the Federal Government of Somalia was to lead the security transition process, which was to effectively start in 2021. It also recognized the role of the African Union Peace and Security Council, took note of the request of the Peace and Security Council that the African Union Commission should finalize its independent assessment in May 2021 and urged the Peace and Security Council to mandate in May 2021 an AMISOM that would support and enable the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan and identify and implement the necessary steps in 2021 to ensure continued delivery of support to Somali security efforts in 2022, including through a reconfigured African Union mission.³⁸ Lastly, on 21 December, the Council adopted resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), in which it renewed its authorization to the States members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM for a period of three months, until 31 March 2022, without any changes to the mandate, including to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate.³⁹

With respect to UNSOM, on 30 August the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of the Mission for a

³³ See [S/PV.8907](#).

³⁴ See [S/2021/922](#).

³⁵ See [S/PV.8907](#).

³⁶ Resolution [2563 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of AMISOM, see part VIII, sect. III.

³⁷ Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), paras. 10–12.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 1–2.

³⁹ Resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

period of nine months, until 31 May 2022.⁴⁰ In addition to reiterating the existing mandate, the Council decided that UNSOM would provide support to the Federal Government and the federal member states to accelerate Somali Government-led inclusive politics, which ensured the participation of all stakeholders, including women, youth and all Somali clans.⁴¹ In addition, the Council tasked UNSOM to provide support to the Federal Government, federal member states, the Parliament, the Technical Electoral Support Team, the Federal Elections Implementation Team, the State Electoral Implementation Teams, the Electoral Dispute Resolution Committee and any other stakeholders with an agreed role in election delivery for the conduct of elections in accordance with the framework agreed on 27 May 2021.⁴² The Council further provided that UNSOM was to work closely with the United Nations country team, international financial institutions and all relevant stakeholders to ensure that international support to the Federal Government and the federal member states was conflict-sensitive and maximized policy and operational coherence.⁴³ The Council also called on the Federal Government and the federal member states to organize free, fair, credible and inclusive elections in line with the 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021 agreements without further delay and urged them to finalize outstanding preparations to that end.⁴⁴ The Council requested the Secretary-General, following consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia, to undertake a strategic review of UNSOM after the election process had concluded and after the anticipated reconfiguration of security support to Somalia, to include recommendations for clearly defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track the timely execution and achievement by UNSOM of its mandate, and initiate the development of an integrated strategic framework, and to report to the Council by the end of March 2022.⁴⁵

Concerning the sanctions measures on Somalia, on 15 November the Council adopted resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#), with abstentions by China and the Russian Federation. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reaffirmed the arms embargo and the exemptions on deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to

military activities intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institutions.⁴⁶ The Council also recalled previous decisions concerning the asset freeze, travel ban and charcoal ban measures and renewed the humanitarian exemption to the assets freeze without specifying an expiry date.⁴⁷ By the same resolution, the Council renewed the maritime interdiction of charcoal, weapons, military equipment and improvised explosive device components until 15 November 2022,⁴⁸ and reaffirmed the ban on components of improvised explosive devices.⁴⁹ In addition, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia until 15 December 2022.⁵⁰

Explaining their abstentions,⁵¹ the representatives of China and the Russian Federation expressed regret that the Council had failed to reach consensus on the Somalia sanctions regime for the third consecutive year. Specifically, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed disagreement over the retention of the paragraphs on Djibouti and Eritrea, noting that the sanctions against Eritrea had been lifted by the Council in 2018 and that the relations between the two countries posed no threat to international peace and security. In addition, she disagreed with the wording of paragraph 38, stating that it compelled the Panel of Experts to promote gender issues in all mandate areas without taking country specificities into account. According to the representative of China, the Council should have gradually modified the arms embargo measures against Somalia to help the Government enhance its security capacity and restore State authority. According to him, the text reflected an expansion through new mandates, which was inconsistent with the general direction of lifting the arms embargo on Somalia. Addressing the Council at the same meeting, the representative of Somalia also expressed regret that for the third year in a row the input of his Government had not been considered to reach consensus and stated that his Government was again going on record in seeking to lift the sanctions imposed on Somalia since 1992. He further stressed the importance of identifying clearly defined, realistic and measurable benchmarks, in consultation with the Federal Government, for the full lifting of all sanctions measures on Somalia.

⁴⁰ Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

⁴¹ Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (a).

⁴² Ibid., para. 6 (c).

⁴³ Ibid., para. 6 (n).

⁴⁴ Ibid., para. 7.

⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 18.

⁴⁶ Resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#), paras. 20–22 and 34.

⁴⁷ Ibid., paras. 35 and 37.

⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 5.

⁴⁹ Ibid., para. 9.

⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 38. For more information on the mandate of the Panel, see part IX, sect. I.

⁵¹ See [S/PV.8905](#).

Finally, concerning the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, on 3 December the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter. By the resolution, the Council renewed for a further period of three months the authorizations set out in paragraph 14 of resolution

[2554 \(2020\)](#) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.⁵²

⁵² Resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), para. 14.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Somalia

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for- against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8779 25 May 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2021/485)		Somalia ^a	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia ^b	12 Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8796 14 June 2021			Somalia		Two Council members (Ireland, ^d Kenya), invitee	
S/PV.8833 12 August 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2021/723)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Chairperson of the Somali National Women's Organization	12 Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8846 30 August 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2021/723)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/760)			Three Council members (China, Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution 2592 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8867 28 September 2021				Co-founder and Executive Director of the Somali Women's Studies Centre	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, invitee ^e	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for- against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8885 20 October 2021	Letters dated 5 October 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/847 and S/2021/849)				One Council member (Ireland) ^d	
S/PV.8905 15 November 2021	Letter dated 5 October 2021 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/849)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/950)	Somalia		Two Council members (Russian Federation, China), invitee	Resolution 2607 (2021) 13-0-2 ^f (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8907 17 November 2021	Report of the Secretary- General on the situation in Somalia (S/2021/944)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Executive Director of Somali Women's Leadership Initiative ^g	12 Council members, ^c all invitees	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for- against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8917 3 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia (S/2021/920)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/1005)	Somalia		Three Council members (Estonia, France, Ireland), invitee	Resolution 2608 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8939 21 December 2021		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/1076)	Somalia		Three Council members (France, United Kingdom, United States), invitee	Resolution 2614 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Somalia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

^b The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^d The representative of Ireland spoke in her capacity as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia.

^e The co-founder and Executive Director of the Somali Women's Studies Centre participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^f *For:* Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; *against:* none; *abstained:* China, Russian Federation.

^g The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Executive Director of the Somali Women's Leadership Initiative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2
Videoconferences: the situation in Somalia

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
22 February 2021	S/2021/173	Letter dated 24 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
25 February 2021	S/2021/193	Letter dated 25 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2563 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/188
25 February 2021	S/2021/207	Letter dated 1 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
12 March 2021	S/2021/260	Letter dated 12 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2568 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/255

3. The situation in the Great Lakes region

During the period under review, the Council held a high-level meeting on the situation in the Great Lakes region, which took the form of a debate,⁵³ and adopted one decision under the item. More information on the meeting, including on participants, speakers and outcome, is provided in table 1 below. Council members also held one open videoconference in connection with the item. More information about the videoconference is provided in table 2 below. In addition to the meeting and the open videoconference, Council members held one closed videoconference to discuss the item.⁵⁴

In connection with the two reports of the Secretary-General,⁵⁵ during his briefings to the Council the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region focused on the activities of his office in supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (Addis Ababa Framework Agreement), the progress achieved on political and security fronts and the persisting challenges, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the socioeconomic situation.

At a videoconference held on 12 April,⁵⁶ the Special Envoy told Council members that despite a difficult situation, which had been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the leaders of the Great Lakes region had maintained their commitment to the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement, as demonstrated by several political, security, judicial and economic initiatives. On the political and security front, he commended the efforts of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of his counterparts in the region, the Presidents of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, in an effort to find concerted and lasting solutions to the issue of armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁵⁷ The Special Envoy also paid tribute to the

President of Angola for his commitment, alongside his counterpart from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to bringing Rwanda and Uganda closer together in the framework of the quadripartite process.⁵⁸ He encouraged Burundi and Rwanda in their efforts to improve their relations and stated his intention to continue to play his part in helping the two countries in that regard. Despite the progress achieved, the Special Envoy expressed concern about the level of violence that continued to affect the safety of individuals, especially women and youth, adding that some countries of the region had experienced elections marred by violence and loss of life. In addition, he informed Council members about the four priorities his office was focusing on, namely: (a) continuing the Secretary-General's good offices to support the ongoing rapprochement and political dialogue in the region; (b) providing support for the operationalization of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures; (c) protecting natural resources by combating their illicit exploitation; and (d) organizing a high-level regional workshop with a view to developing a three-year regional action plan to promote transparent natural resources management. During the videoconference, Council members also heard a briefing from the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, who expressed support for the mandate of the Special Envoy. The Chair presented some of the highlights of the Commission's engagement in the region, including mobilizing support for peacebuilding and regional cooperation initiatives, promoting the role of women in peacebuilding and development in the region, collaborating with international financial institutions and regional actors and supporting cross-border cooperation in the Great Lakes region.

During the discussion, Council members⁵⁹ took note of the improvement in bilateral relations among regional countries and the positive developments in terms of regional cooperation. Council members⁶⁰ referred to the importance of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and the need to operationalize the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict

⁵³ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁵⁴ The closed videoconference was held on 12 April (see [S/2021/1084](#)). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I. See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 10.

⁵⁵ See [S/2021/306](#) and [S/2021/836](#).

⁵⁶ See [S/2021/351](#).

⁵⁷ For more information about the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see sect. 4 below.

⁵⁸ See [S/2021/351](#).

⁵⁹ China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and Viet Nam.

⁶⁰ China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United States and Viet Nam.

Resolution in the Great Lakes Region⁶¹ by formulating an action plan for its implementation.⁶² In that regard, the representative of Ireland welcomed the explicit commitments in the regional strategy to address conflict-related sexual violence and expressed the expectation to see the promotion of women's roles in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding efforts.⁶³ Similarly, the representative of Mexico underscored actions related to strengthening women's participation in mediation and peacebuilding processes. The representative of Estonia also underlined the importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all political processes and the representative of France called for redoubling of efforts to promote the full participation of women in the peace process. In addition, several Council members took note of elections that had taken place in several countries of the region⁶⁴ and the representative of Estonia called upon all stakeholders to ensure that the upcoming elections in some countries of the region remained peaceful, free and credible. Some Council members underscored the need to address root causes of conflict,⁶⁵ with many also reflecting on the illicit exploitation of natural resources as one of the key drivers of conflict in the Great Lakes region.⁶⁶

In his second briefing to the Council, on 20 October,⁶⁷ in the context of a high-level debate held at the initiative of Kenya, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,⁶⁸ the Special Envoy noted that the theme of the meeting, "Supporting the renewed commitment of the Great Lakes countries in seeking sustainable solutions to the root causes and drivers of conflict", was meaningful and timely.⁶⁹ He highlighted the ongoing political dialogue among the countries of the region and welcomed the progress made in security cooperation in order to overcome the armed groups. In that regard, he noted the launching of the Contact and Coordination Group, which was responsible for

coordinating the implementation of non-military measures to complement military operations against armed groups. Despite the progress, challenges remained, such as the upsurge in attacks by armed groups, for example in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and at Bujumbura Airport. Those negative forces remained involved in the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources, the revenues from which financed arms procurement and recruitment. The region also continued to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which was contributing to the exacerbation of pre-existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities. An action plan for the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region had been developed by the Office of the Special Envoy in July during broad consultations. Noting the positive momentum in the region, it was essential that the countries of the region implemented the bilateral agreements signed recently and that they continued, at the regional level, to fulfil the commitments made under regional and international instruments. In that spirit, the Special Envoy welcomed the upcoming important summit meetings, in particular the commitment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to host the tenth summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism in Kinshasa in December.

During the meeting, Council members also heard a briefing by the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, who stated that the region had witnessed the normalization of relations between and among Member States, as well as the organization of peaceful and credible elections in a number of countries. He further noted an increase in the participation of women in political and peacebuilding processes. The Executive Secretary then elaborated on specific aspects, including the fundamental role of peacekeeping missions in preventing the illegal exploitation of natural resources and disrupting criminal networks, as well as in reducing the criminal exploitation of natural resources, the question of ensuring long-term, sustainable national and regional coordination for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement programmes, how the region and the international community could provide support in strengthening the capacity of key State institutions to ensure the effective control and management of natural resources, and the role that all stakeholders could play to transform the productivity of natural resources in the Great Lakes region. In closing, he added that experience had demonstrated that the political, social and economic transformation of the Great Lakes region

⁶¹ See [S/2020/1168](#).

⁶² China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United States and Viet Nam.

⁶³ See [S/2021/351](#).

⁶⁴ China, India and Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).

⁶⁵ China, France, Norway and Viet Nam.

⁶⁶ Estonia, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8884](#).

⁶⁸ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 13 October 2021 ([S/2021/874](#)).

⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8884](#).

could be achieved only through enhanced ownership of practical programmes, the involvement of States members of the International Conference and reliable diplomatic, financial and technical support from the international community.

Following the briefings, several Council members⁷⁰ welcomed the adoption of an action plan for the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution and noted the importance of its implementation. In that regard, the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya stated that it was instructive that the sustainable development of natural resources was one of the priorities of the action plan to implement and operationalize the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution. The representative of France noted that the action plan for implementing the Strategy would require very strong mobilization by the States of the region and that the implementation process needed to promote transitional justice and national human rights institutions. The representative of Norway referred to the action plan as a good starting point for fostering closer regional cooperation, adding that its focus on involving key financial partners would be helpful in delivering on promises. According to the representative of Viet Nam, the action plan was an excellent platform to channel efforts to assist in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, and the representative of China called on the international community to provide the necessary financial support for its implementation. During the discussion, Council members⁷¹ also welcomed the establishment of the Contact and Coordination Group as an important step in regional efforts to use non-military solutions to address conflict. In addition, Council members⁷² discussed the importance of strengthening regional cooperation in addressing challenges in the Great Lakes region, especially the illicit exploitation of natural resources, as well as the role of regional and subregional organizations in that regard.

In addition to Council members, the representatives of Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda also took part in the debate and expressed their views on the situation in the Great Lakes region, bilateral relations,

regional cooperation and the challenges that were yet to be overcome.

At the same meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement in which it recognized the progress made in the implementation of national and regional commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and welcomed the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region presented to the Council by the Secretary-General.⁷³ In the presidential statement, the Council also underlined the importance of socioeconomic development for sustaining peace in the region, reiterated its deep concern regarding the humanitarian crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and demanded that all armed groups cease immediately all forms of violence.⁷⁴ Noting the link between justice and conflict prevention, the Council called upon the countries in the Great Lakes region to comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and urged them actively to pursue accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Council stressed that there was no purely military solution to the threat posed by armed groups and that their elimination would require an integrated and regional approach and strong political engagement by the Governments of the region, with support from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Special Envoy.⁷⁶ Recognizing the linkage between the illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources and the illegal acquisition and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in fuelling and exacerbating armed conflict in the Great Lakes region, the Council condemned the continued illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region and urged the signatory States of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, regional organizations and the international community to coordinate their efforts to undercut the economic lifelines of armed groups that benefited from those activities and prevent the exploitation of women and children in the trade of those resources.⁷⁷

⁷⁰ Mexico, Tunisia, Niger and China.

⁷¹ Kenya, Ireland, France, Estonia, Niger, Viet Nam, India and United Kingdom.

⁷² Kenya, Ireland, France, Norway, Tunisia, Estonia, Viet Nam, India and China.

⁷³ S/PRST/2021/19, second and fifteenth paragraphs.

⁷⁴ Ibid., fifth and sixth paragraphs.

⁷⁵ Ibid., seventh paragraph.

⁷⁶ Ibid., eighth paragraph.

⁷⁷ Ibid., tenth and twelfth paragraphs.

Table 1
Meeting: the situation in the Great Lakes region

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8884 20 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2021/836) Letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/874)		Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	S/PRST/2021/19

^a Kenya (President of the Council) was represented by its Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs; and Ireland was represented by its Minister for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora.

^b Angola was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was represented by the High Representative of the President of the Republic and Coordinator of the National Monitoring Mechanism.

Table 2
Videoconference: the situation in the Great Lakes region

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
12 April 2021	S/2021/351	Letter dated 14 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

4. The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In 2021, the Council held five meetings and adopted two resolutions, both under Chapter VII of the Charter, in connection with the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. More details on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, are provided in table 1 below. The Council also held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Organization Stabilization

Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).⁷⁸ In

⁷⁸ The private meeting was held on 3 December in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.8916](#) and [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 20.

2021, Council members also held one open videoconference in connection with the item. More information on the videoconference is provided in table 2 below. In addition, during the year under review Council members held informal consultations of the whole and closed videoconferences to discuss the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁷⁹ In 2021, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO.⁸⁰

In 2021, in connection with the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General,⁸¹ the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative and Head of MONUSCO, as well as briefings by civil society representatives, namely, the Executive Coordinator of Women's Solidarity for Peace and Integral Development, the Deputy Head of the Laboratory of Medical Biology at Ngaliema Clinic in Kinshasa, the Coordinator of Voice of Congolese Women, and a member of the African Women Leaders Network.⁸² Consistent with prior practice, the Council also heard briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁸³

On 30 March, in her first briefing to Council members since taking office,⁸⁴ the Special Representative explained that the electoral process of 2023 represented a new, critical stage in the process of democratic transition, institutional consolidation and stabilization in the country. In that connection, she discussed the opportunities that the political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo offered and the risks that it entailed. Among the opportunities, the Special Representative mentioned the formation of the new Government and the work of the United Nations in partnership with it to support the implementation of much-needed reforms, the process of the transition of MONUSCO to increase cooperation within the United Nations family and with other partners, and the assumption of the chairmanship of the African Union by President Tshisekedi, making it possible to demonstrate the commitment of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo and the region to silencing the guns once and for all in that part of the continent. In closing, she underlined three core tasks of MONUSCO under her leadership: (a) the deployment of good offices and political strategies to support the protection of civilians and stabilization efforts; (b) supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its regional and continental leadership to enhance peace and stability in the Great Lakes region; and (c) the implementation of the Mission's transition strategy.

In her subsequent briefing, on 7 July,⁸⁵ the Special Representative informed the Council about the joint working group set up on 5 July between the Government, MONUSCO and relevant agencies, which would support the implementation of the Government's action plan and oversee the Mission's transition process. She reported on the political and security situation in the country, stressing in that regard the importance of ensuring that the 2023 elections were held within the constitutional time frame. The state of siege declared in North Kivu and Ituri on 6 May remained in effect following parliamentary approval. The Special Representative concluded by referring to the immediate primary tasks for the United Nations concerning the need to: (a) actively support the implementation of the Government's programme of action; (b) intensify good offices encouraging the establishment of the conditions that would permit the holding of the 2023 elections on time and in a consensual manner; (c) intensify political engagement in the quest for non-military solutions to the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (d) reach an agreement with the Government on a set of conditioned benchmarks that clearly linked the Government's programme of action to the adjustment of the Mission's presence.

Addressing the Council ahead of the renewal of the mandate of MONUSCO in October,⁸⁶ the Special Representative expressed the view that the joint transition plan⁸⁷ constituted a road map that could help to guide the work of the Mission in the coming years and prepare the ground for its orderly and responsible withdrawal. In her final briefing of the year, on 6 December,⁸⁸ the Special Representative informed the Council about the joint military operations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Ugandan army against the Allied Democratic Forces in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that regard, she

⁷⁹ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 11. See also [S/2021/1032](#) and [S/2022/174](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. For more details on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁸⁰ See [S/2021/34](#) and [S/2021/35](#).

⁸¹ See [S/2021/274](#), [S/2021/587](#), [S/2021/807](#) and [S/2021/987](#).

⁸² See [S/2021/316](#), [S/PV.8813](#), [S/PV.8873](#) and [S/PV.8918](#).

⁸³ See [S/PV.8873](#) and [S/PV.8918](#).

⁸⁴ See [S/2021/316](#).

⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8813](#).

⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8873](#).

⁸⁷ [S/2021/807](#), annex.

⁸⁸ See [S/PV.8918](#).

noted that mechanisms of cooperation were being put in place to ensure the security of the United Nations peacekeepers and to allow MONUSCO to continue to support the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the protection of civilians and the neutralization of armed groups. The Special Representative also reflected on the challenges facing the Government in implementing the state of siege in North Kivu and Ituri, which had been extended for the thirteenth time, during which period there had been a 10 per cent increase in the number of violations and abuses of human rights.

During their deliberations in 2021, Council members discussed the political developments, including preparations for the 2023 elections, the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the reports of violations of human rights, the humanitarian conditions and the transition plan for the progressive drawdown of MONUSCO.

With regard to the political situation, early in the year Council members welcomed the formation of the new Government and commended the increase in the representation of women in the Council of Ministers.⁸⁹ Specifically concerning the 2023 electoral process, several Council members affirmed throughout 2021 the importance of electoral reform to ensure inclusive, credible, peaceful, free and fair elections to take place within the constitutional timeline.⁹⁰ In that context, the representative of India expressed appreciation for the progress made towards the holding of elections in 2023, welcomed the advances in women's participation in political processes and expressed hope that the Government and the opposition parties in the country would maintain the positive trajectory in the run-up to the 2023 elections.⁹¹ Similarly, the representative of Mexico welcomed the legislative progress in electoral matters and noted that it was essential for the Council to call on the various political actors to maintain an inclusive political dialogue, which clearly implied the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of political life.⁹² According to the representative of China, electoral reform was essential for the national unity of the Democratic Republic of

the Congo.⁹³ The representative of Viet Nam noted the ongoing tensions between political parties and civil society actors and called for differences to be settled through dialogue and for ensuring the participation of women in the political process.⁹⁴ At the meeting in December,⁹⁵ the representative of Kenya, speaking also on behalf of the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia, was encouraged by President Tshisekedi's commitment to holding elections in line with the constitutional timelines and welcomed the establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the promotion of freedom of expression and democratic space and the meaningful participation of women and youth in decision-making positions. The representative of Norway underlined the need for the inclusion of women at all levels and in all political and conflict-prevention processes, including in the electoral reform and the 2023 election, and the representative of Ireland expressed the view that MONUSCO should continue to engage with key actors to promote timely, transparent, inclusive and peaceful political processes.

On the security front, Council members continued to express concern over the deteriorating situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and referred to the need to tackle illicit exploitation of natural resources, continue with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and promote regional cooperation as a means of overcoming those challenges. Council members also took note of the declaration by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 6 May of the state of siege in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri. In that regard, several Council members underlined the importance of respecting human rights and ensuring humanitarian access in those areas.⁹⁶ Furthermore, some Council members voiced their concern over the increased use of improvised explosive devices.⁹⁷ Throughout the year, many Council members noted with concern the reports of grave human rights violations, in particular in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including instances of sexual and gender-based

⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8813](#) (India, Mexico, United States, Estonia, Norway, Viet Nam and Ireland).

⁹⁰ See [S/2021/316](#) (United Kingdom); [S/PV.8813](#) (Estonia, Norway, United Kingdom and France); [S/PV.8873](#) (France, Ireland, Norway and Estonia); and [S/PV.8918](#) (France, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), United States and Estonia).

⁹¹ See [S/PV.8813](#), [S/PV.8873](#) and [S/PV.8918](#).

⁹² See [S/PV.8873](#) and [S/PV.8918](#).

⁹³ See [S/PV.8873](#).

⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8873](#) and [S/PV.8918](#).

⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8918](#).

⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8813](#) (United States, Estonia, Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland and France); [S/PV.8873](#) (France, Ireland, United Kingdom, Norway and Mexico); and [S/PV.8918](#) (Ireland, Estonia and United Kingdom).

⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8813](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and Mexico).

violence against women and children.⁹⁸ Furthermore, several Council members called for greater efforts to be made to address the issue of hate speech, which they saw as contributing to intercommunal violence.⁹⁹

With respect to the humanitarian conditions, Council members continued to express concern over the dire situation and noted the multiple challenges related to, inter alia, the re-emergence of the Ebola virus disease epidemic, the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, food insecurity, displacement and the surge of violence in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, Council members noted that the humanitarian situation was further compounded by the volcanic eruption of Mount Nyiragongo in May 2021.¹⁰⁰

Concerning the reconfiguration of MONUSCO, speakers discussed the joint transition plan for the gradual withdrawal of the Mission, noting the importance of various aspects of the plan, including the benchmarks and indicators for a responsible and conditions-based transition in line with the situation on the ground, as well as the financial, logistical and technical support for its implementation.¹⁰¹ Several Council members also pointed to the need to ensure the participation of civil society, including women and youth, in the process of reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁰² Furthermore, regarding the Force Intervention Brigade, several Council members welcomed its reinforcement and noted its role in

supporting the implementation of the mandate of MONUSCO.¹⁰³

At the end of the year, on 20 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade for an additional period of one year, until 20 December 2022.¹⁰⁴ The Council reiterated the strategic priorities of MONUSCO, mandating it to focus on protecting civilians and supporting the stabilization and the strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms.¹⁰⁵ The Council also welcomed the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, as well as its action plan, and urged MONUSCO to work with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region to seek political solutions to stop the cross-border flows of armed combatants, arms and natural resources that threatened peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹⁰⁶ The Council also authorized MONUSCO to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate and requested the Secretary-General to immediately inform the Council were MONUSCO to fail to do so.¹⁰⁷ Concerning the Mission's exit strategy, the Council welcomed the transition plan on the basis of the joint strategy on the progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO endorsed by the Council in resolution [2556 \(2020\)](#).¹⁰⁸ In addition, the Council called upon MONUSCO to work closely with the United Nations country team to identify ways to address gaps in capabilities to prepare for the exit of MONUSCO and underscored the need to progressively transfer the Mission's tasks to the Government, the United Nations country team and other relevant stakeholders.¹⁰⁹

⁹⁸ See [S/2021/316](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and United States); [S/PV.8813](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), United States, Estonia and Ireland); [S/PV.8873](#) (France, Ireland, Norway, Estonia and Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); and [S/PV.8918](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland and Estonia).

⁹⁹ See [S/2021/316](#) (Estonia and France); [S/PV.8813](#) (Mexico, Viet Nam and France); [S/PV.8873](#) (Mexico, Viet Nam and Estonia); and [S/PV.8918](#) (France, United States and Viet Nam).

¹⁰⁰ See [S/PV.8813](#) (China, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), India, Mexico, Estonia, Russian Federation and Ireland). See also [S/2021/1032](#).

¹⁰¹ See [S/PV.8873](#) (France, Ireland, United States, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and Democratic Republic of the Congo); and [S/PV.8918](#) (Mexico, United States, Norway, India, Russian Federation and United Kingdom).

¹⁰² See [S/PV.8813](#) (Mexico and Ireland); [S/PV.8873](#) (Ireland, United Kingdom, Norway and Mexico); and [S/PV.8918](#) (Norway, Ireland and Estonia).

¹⁰³ See [S/PV.8813](#) (United States, Estonia, United Kingdom and France); [S/PV.8873](#) (France, United Kingdom and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8918](#) (United States, Russian Federation and United Kingdom).

¹⁰⁴ Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 22.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 24. For more information concerning the mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I. For more information on the past mandates of MONUSCO, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2010–2011, 2012–2013, 2014–2015, 2016–2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020*.

¹⁰⁶ Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 26. For more information about the situation in the Great Lakes region, see sect. 3 above.

¹⁰⁷ Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 27. For more information concerning the decisions of the Council relating to Article 42 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.

¹⁰⁸ Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 48.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 51.

In 2021, Council members also heard briefings and deliberated on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In connection with the final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in which the Group concluded that armed groups continued to operate with near impunity in eastern parts of the country,¹¹⁰ on 29 June¹¹¹ the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2582 \(2021\)](#). By that resolution, the Council renewed until 1 July 2022 the sanctions measures set out in resolution [2293 \(2016\)](#) and extended until 1 August 2022 the mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo set forth in resolution [2360 \(2017\)](#).¹¹² In 2021, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) provided briefings to the Council before and after his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 5 October,¹¹³ he provided an overview of the work of the Committee for the previous 12 months and explained that the purpose of the visit to the country was to gather first-hand accounts of the effective implementation of the sanctions measures in place. Further to the Chair's briefing, only the representatives of Ireland, China and

the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed the issue of sanctions. The representative of Ireland focused on the Group of Experts and noted that her country looked forward to the lifting of any restraints on the appointment of experts to the Committee. The representative of China said that as the drawdown of MONUSCO continued, the Government would gradually assume the main responsibility for maintaining national security and stability and the Council should actively respond to its concerns regarding the adjustment of sanctions measures to avoid their negative impact on the country's capacity-building in the area of security. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo recalled the requests made by President Tshisekedi to lift the advance notification requirements concerning the shipments of arms or related materiel for the country's armed forces and to impose "harsh and exemplary sanctions on all mafia networks" that engaged in the illegal exploitation of the country's mines. On 6 December,¹¹⁴ the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) provided an overview of his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 6 to 10 November. In his briefing, the Chair noted that in addition to gathering information about the effective application of the sanctions, the purpose of the visit was also to explore the possibility of holding consultations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with the representatives of MONUSCO, the diplomatic community and civil society groups in order to guarantee the full application of sanctions measures.

¹¹⁰ For the final report, see the letter dated 10 June 2021 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/560).

¹¹¹ See [S/PV.8807](#).

¹¹² Resolution [2582 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1, 2 and 5. For more information on the mandate of the Committee and the Group of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

¹¹³ See [S/PV.8873](#).

¹¹⁴ See [S/PV.8918](#).

Table 1
Meetings: the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8807 29 June 2021	Letter dated 10 June 2021 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/560)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/605)	Democratic Republic of the Congo		One Council member (China), invitee	Resolution 2582 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8813 7 July 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of	12 Council members, ^a all invitees	

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
	Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (S/2021/587)			MONUSCO, Deputy Head of the Laboratory of Medical Biology at Ngaliema Clinic in Kinshasa		
S/PV.8873 5 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2021/807)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Coordinator of Voice of Congolese Women	13 Council members, ^b all invitees	
S/PV.8918 6 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2021/987)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, member of the African Women Leaders Network	13 Council members, ^b all invitees	
S/PV.8936 20 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2021/987)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/1063)				Resolution 2612 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a China, Estonia, France, Ireland, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b China, Estonia, France, Ireland, India, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Niger (in his capacity as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

Table 2

Videoconference: the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Videoconference date	Videoconference record	Title	Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure
30 March 2021	S/2021/316	Letter dated 1 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

5. The situation in the Central African Republic

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings and adopted three resolutions, all under Chapter VII of the Charter, in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic. Two of the meetings were convened to adopt a decision of the

Council and the remaining two took the form of briefings.¹¹⁵ More information on the meetings,

¹¹⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held three open videoconferences in connection with the item.¹¹⁶ More information on the videoconferences is given in table 2 below. The Council held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).¹¹⁷ In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held closed videoconferences and informal consultations of the whole to discuss the item.¹¹⁸

During 2021, Council members heard three briefings on the reports of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, consistent with the four-month reporting schedule established by the Council in resolution [2387 \(2017\)](#).¹¹⁹ Two of those briefings were delivered by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA at meetings of the Council and one was delivered by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations at an open videoconference. During the period under review, Council members also heard briefings by the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security and, following the merger of the Political Department and the Peace and Security Department, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security; the African Union Special Representative and Head of the African Union Office in the Central African Republic; the Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service; and two civil society representatives: the Director of the youth-led peacebuilding organization

URU, and the President of the Conseil national de la jeunesse centrafricaine.

The briefings were focused on the political, security, economic, human rights and humanitarian situation in the country. In that regard, they served to continue to update the Council on the developments following the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic by the authorities and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6 February 2019, in particular the efforts aimed at its revitalization. They also provided updates on the joint road map adopted under the auspices of the President of Angola on 16 September 2021 by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the ceasefire declared by the President of the Central African Republic on 15 October 2021, as well as the republican dialogue launched by the Government with the political parties and key forces. The briefings were also focused on the presidential and legislative elections of 2020 and 2021 and the subsequent inauguration of Faustin Archange Touadera as President and the new Government in June 2021. A significant part of the briefings was devoted to the activities of armed groups, including the newly established Coalition des patriotes pour le changement, and their impact on security, elections and the provision of humanitarian assistance in the country. In addition, the briefings addressed the human rights situation and the efforts to fight impunity for human rights violations.

During an open videoconference held on 21 January,¹²⁰ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Constitutional Court had published the definitive result of the presidential election, validating the re-election of Mr. Touadera. The Special Representative reported that the situation on the ground remained tense owing to the continuing violence since the first round of elections as a result of the collusion of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement with some political figures, notably the former President, François Bozizé. Despite the decision of the Constitutional Court to validate the final list of candidates and reject the candidacy of Mr. Bozizé, elements of some of the 14 armed groups, signatories to the Political Agreement, had been mobilized by Mr. Bozizé to form the Coalition des patriotes with the intention of preventing the holding of elections and bringing about the fall of

¹¹⁶ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹¹⁷ The private meeting was held on 3 November in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.8895](#) and [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 20.

¹¹⁸ The closed videoconferences were held on 21 January and 24 February (see [S/2021/1014](#) and [S/2021/1060](#)). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 12.

¹¹⁹ See [S/2021/187](#), [S/PV.8802](#) and [S/PV.8882](#). The Council heard an additional briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSCA at an open videoconference held on 21 January (see [S/2021/76](#)). For the reports of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, see [S/2021/146](#), [S/2021/571](#) and [S/2021/867](#).

¹²⁰ See [S/2021/76](#). The briefing took place further to a discussion relating to an attack on MINUSCA under “Other matters” on 13 January 2021 (see [S/2021/1014](#)). For more information on deliberations of the Council under “Other matters”, see part II.

the current President, Mr. Touadera. The Special Representative said that the situation was testing the capacity of MINUSCA to carry out its key mandate to protect civilians. He expressed appreciation for the support of the Council, which had enabled the rapid deployment of troops and helicopters from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in the context of inter-mission cooperation. He also requested that the inter-mission support be extended for at least an additional two months. He cautioned that a strategy for adjusting the mandate would be needed, including a substantial increase in the strength of the Mission's uniformed components to enable it to maintain its robust posture. He recalled the proposal to raise the ceiling of authorized peacekeepers and requested the Council's authority to provide adequate logistical support to the Central African security forces. Specifically, he referred to the lifting of the restrictions on logistical support as provided for in paragraph 32 (a) (iv) of resolution [2552 \(2020\)](#) and proposed the reactivation of the bilateral commissions, in line with paragraph 6 of that resolution. Noting also the continued exploitation of mining resources by armed groups, he advocated a mandate that authorized more resources to support the national security and defence forces to support the restoration of State authority.

At an open videoconference held on 24 February,¹²¹ the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations updated Council members on the progress in combating the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement thanks to the activities of MINUSCA, but noted that the situation remained volatile and that violence continued. Despite the very fragile situation, the country was on track to conclude successfully a democratic transfer of power within the constitutional timeline, which was a major achievement. It was essential that those democratic gains be preserved by completing the electoral process and advancing a peaceful resolution to the crisis. In that regard, the reinforcements sent to MINUSCA through inter-mission cooperation continued to play a crucial role, including by providing security for the legislative elections in March, with the risk of Mission overstretch extending beyond that period. In that connection, he recalled that the Secretary-General had recommended reinforcing the military and police personnel of the Mission¹²² and underscored that the request for additional military and police capabilities was not intended as a military solution to the challenges but was rather the result of a comprehensive assessment of

the changing context on the ground and the capacity of MINUSCA.¹²³

At the same videoconference, the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security deemed the organization of the first round of combined presidential and legislative elections a welcome development and an important and necessary step for consolidating democracy and the implementation of the Political Agreement. Despite the progress, some had chosen the path of violence through the creation of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement. The Commissioner informed Council members about the attacks perpetrated by the Coalition and their impact on the provision of humanitarian assistance in the country. He commended MINUSCA, the Russian Federation and Rwanda for providing military assistance to the Central African Republic and thwarting the intentions of the Coalition of capturing Bangui. He appealed to the Council to call for an immediate end to the violence perpetrated by the Coalition and its attacks on the Bangui-Garoua economic corridor in Cameroon, condemn acts of violence and attempts to seize power by force, including by the former President, Mr. Bozizé, reaffirm its solidarity with the Government and call on all rebel groups to disarm and respect the Political Agreement.

The Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service described the three directions in which collective efforts needed to be further pursued, namely, restoring security in the country as a priority, reaching a sustainable and agreed solution to the political crisis based on a political dialogue among the Government, the opposition and civil society, and relaunching the peace and reconciliation process, with the Political Agreement as the only joint and viable framework for lasting peace.

The director of the youth-led peacebuilding organization URU focused on the impact of the conflict on women and youth, including the impact of attacks by the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement, gender-based violence and the government-imposed curfew. She also called for redoubled efforts on the part of all stakeholders, guarantors and facilitators of the agreement for the revitalization of the peace process and said that there would be no lasting peace without the effective participation of women and young people. In that regard, she stated that their contribution should not be limited to ad hoc consultations, but should be made in the context of a participatory, inclusive and active approach at all levels of decision-making.

¹²¹ See [S/2021/187](#).

¹²² See [S/2021/146](#).

¹²³ See [S/2021/187](#).

At the meeting of the Council on 23 June,¹²⁴ the Special Representative informed the Council that the President, Mr. Touadera, and the signatories of the political process had made a commitment to conclude the electoral process by holding local elections at the beginning of 2022. He welcomed the announcement by Mr. Touadera on 10 June of the holding of a republican dialogue, emphasizing that it must be inclusive to allow for the effective participation of all segments of society. The Special Representative added that the national consultations had already made it possible to consolidate the terms of reference of the republican dialogue by proposing a nine-point agenda, helping to ease political tensions. He also welcomed the new impetus that Mr. Touadera was giving to the political and peace processes, as expressed to the joint African Union-United Nations-Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)-European Union mission conducted from 2 to 5 June.¹²⁵ On the humanitarian and security fronts, he remained concerned about the negative consequences of the military counter-offensive carried out by the defence and security forces, bilateral forces and other security personnel to eliminate the guerrilla forces of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement.¹²⁶ Regarding the human rights situation, he said that it was regrettable to note that the extension of State control over its territory through the strengthening of the presence of defence and security forces and the deployment of bilateral forces and other security personnel had not had the desired effect in terms of protecting civilians, with record numbers of incidents of conflict-related sexual violence and human rights and international humanitarian law violations. Expressing his determination to implement the mandate of the Mission despite the challenges, the Special Representative underlined the need for cooperation among the conventional forces deployed in the country and MINUSCA. In reference to the additional resources approved by the Council in resolution 2566 (2021), he stated that the reinforcement would make it possible to enhance the presence of the Mission in the territory of the country, strengthen the protection of civilians and ensure the safety and security of the Blue Helmets.¹²⁷

The Council also heard a briefing by the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security,¹²⁸ in which he underscored the commitment

of the Union to the strategic partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in peacemaking and peacebuilding on the continent, as well as the value it attached to the strong cooperation with and action by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. He informed the Council concerning his visit to the country with the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the European Union and ECCAS. He emphasized the legitimacy of the President, Mr. Touadera, following his re-election and the demonstrated commitment of the international community to the outcomes of ensuring that the Central African Republic remained on track towards peace and stability. In that regard, it was essential to condemn all actions by armed groups and important that the African Union demonstrate the need to move forward on revitalizing the peace process.

The Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service shared the assessment of the European Union concerning both the progress that had been made and the major challenges still facing the country. She underscored that despite the threats posed by armed groups, constitutional order had been maintained, the electoral process had been able to proceed and a new Prime Minister had been appointed. She stressed that urgent reforms should be rapidly implemented and welcomed the announcement that a credible and inclusive national dialogue would soon be held.

At a meeting held on 18 October,¹²⁹ in the presence of the President of the Central African Republic, Mr. Touadera, the Special Representative provided a briefing to the Council in connection with the latest report of the Secretary-General.¹³⁰ He commended the Council on the visit to the Central African Republic by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic from 10 to 15 September.¹³¹ Such a visit would contribute to a constructive dialogue on the progress made by the Government towards achieving the benchmarks related to the arms embargo. It was also a political opportunity of great significance for understanding the challenges faced by the Government and to explore with it relevant solutions with a view to achieving lasting security. He underlined progress relating to the conclusion of the presidential and legislative elections, the inauguration of the new Government on 23 June and the ceasefire declared by Mr. Touadera on 15 October. In that connection, he said that sustaining the positive

¹²⁴ See [S/PV.8802](#).

¹²⁵ For more information on the visit, see [S/PV.8787](#) and sect. 6 above.

¹²⁶ See [S/PV.8802](#).

¹²⁷ See [S/PV.8802](#). See also resolution 2566 (2021), para. 1.

¹²⁸ See [S/PV.8802](#).

¹²⁹ See [S/PV.8882](#).

¹³⁰ [S/2021/867](#).

¹³¹ See [S/PV.8882](#).

momentum required the extension of the mandate of MINUSCA for electoral assistance so as to further foster the process of decentralization through the holding of local elections, while the declaration of the ceasefire would launch the operational phase of the joint road map to revitalize the peace process adopted under the auspices of the President of Angola on 16 September 2021 by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The positive complementarity of the joint road map and the Political Agreement facilitated the pooling of the efforts of the guarantors (the African Union and ECCAS) and of the States of the subregion. He also said that the ceasefire declaration of 15 October could potentially contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to the smooth holding of the inclusive republican dialogue. Regarding the military operations conducted in response to the operations by the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement in the west and centre of the country, he encouraged the Government to provide the judicial follow-up necessary with regard to the conclusions of the special investigation commission established on 4 May to investigate allegations of human rights violations and to go beyond the fight against impunity. On the renewal of the mandate of MINUSCA, he called on the Council to take into account the need to support the Central African authorities in implementing the recommendations of the strategic review of the security sector. He also noted the critical role that the mandate and the robust posture of MINUSCA were playing in making the political and peace processes credible. He stressed the need to accelerate the deployment of military and police personnel to support the Mission's operations to maintain the momentum of resolution 2566 (2021).

At the same meeting, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union recalled that the situation in the country remained volatile and highly unpredictable, despite successful elections and the inauguration of the President. He expressed particular concern about the renewed and unrelenting clashes between the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement and other armed groups. He called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to the Political Agreement, underscoring that the African Union fully welcomed the call for a ceasefire made by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and assuring the Council that the ceasefire declared by the President, Mr. Touadera, if effective, would be a game changer.

The Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations welcomed the republican dialogue and the positive political developments in the country.

He noted, however, some worrying developments concerning the security and human rights situation in the country, including the presence of bilaterally deployed and other security personnel with unclear objectives and targets. The Central African Republic remained an extremely fragile country facing an acute humanitarian crisis and the entire international community therefore must remain mobilized and united and continue to provide an urgent and appropriate response to the pressing humanitarian needs of the country and its people.

The President of the National Youth Council of the Central African Republic also provided a briefing to the Council. She spoke about the mandate entrusted to the organization in February 2019 to represent all youth leaders and the current challenges faced by youth in the country, including the need for education. She also called on the Council to lift the arms embargo on the Central African Republic to allow the State authorities to truly establish State authority and to guarantee its national integrity.

Throughout 2021, discussions in the Council focused on the topics outlined above. Council members continued to discuss the critical factors for the successful implementation and revitalization of the Political Agreement following the general elections held in 2020 and 2021, including political support from the Council, regional actors and the international community. In particular, Council members took note of the confirmation by the Constitutional Court of the re-election of Mr. Touadera as President and called on all parties to respect the decision of the Court.¹³² Some Council members welcomed Mr. Touadera's call for reconciliation,¹³³ as well as his intention to engage in dialogue with opposition groups.¹³⁴ They also expressed support for and commended the efforts aimed at revitalization or reinvigoration of the peace process,¹³⁵ the announcement of the intention to hold the republican dialogue¹³⁶ and the subsequent

¹³² See [S/2021/76](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Norway, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom and United States).

¹³³ Ibid. (India and Ireland).

¹³⁴ See [S/2021/187](#) (Ireland, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and Norway).

¹³⁵ See [S/PV.8802](#) (Viet Nam, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Norway and Estonia).

¹³⁶ Ibid. (France, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), India, China, Russian Federation, Mexico, Norway and Ireland).

preparations for the dialogue.¹³⁷ In October, Council members also welcomed the declaration of a ceasefire by Mr. Touadera on 15 October,¹³⁸ as well as the efforts by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region leading to the adoption of the joint road map under the auspices of the President of Angola on 16 September.¹³⁹

Council members addressed the challenges faced by MINUSCA in the light of the dire security situation resulting from electoral violence and the formation of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement. In that regard, the discussions among Council members focused on the need to provide MINUSCA with additional resources. Specifically, some Council members stressed the need to ensure that MINUSCA had the necessary resources to continue implementing its mandate effectively, including by strengthening its capacity through inter-mission cooperation.¹⁴⁰

During the period under review, differing views were expressed by Council members about the nature and legality of the actions of bilateral personnel operating alongside the Central African armed forces. While some members commended the assistance provided by bilateral troops in the country, including in providing security during the elections,¹⁴¹ others expressed concern regarding reports of the use of excessive force, human rights abuses and violations of the status-of-forces agreement by those forces.¹⁴² Several Council members stressed the need for increased coordination between bilaterally deployed troops and MINUSCA,¹⁴³ as well as greater clarity

about their participation.¹⁴⁴ The representative of the Russian Federation clarified that Russian instructors were present in the country at the request of the Central African Republic authorities and with the knowledge of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and they were working to enhance the professional expertise of the Central African security forces without taking part in combat operations or hostilities.¹⁴⁵

Other topics discussed during the period under review included the human rights, humanitarian and socioeconomic situation in the country, as well as the role of sanctions, including the potential for easing or lifting the arms embargo as requested by the authorities of the Central African Republic and by regional partners.

During the period under review, the Council adopted three resolutions under the item, two in relation to the mandate of MINUSCA and one concerning the sanctions measures on the Central African Republic. None of the three resolutions was adopted unanimously.

Concerning the mandate of MINUSCA, on 12 March, utilizing the written voting procedure, the Council adopted resolution 2566 (2021), with 14 votes in favour and one abstention, in which it took note of the recommendation by the Secretary-General and increased the authorized size of the MINUSCA military and police components by 2,750 and 940, respectively.¹⁴⁶ In the resolution, the Council stressed that these reinforcements were aimed at enhancing the ability of MINUSCA to perform its priority mandated tasks in the current evolving context, in particular protection of civilians and facilitation of humanitarian access, and at enabling the Mission to enhance its capacity to prevent and reverse a further deterioration in the security situation while creating space for the political process to advance. The Council also stressed that these new capabilities were not a substitute for the national authorities' primary responsibility to advance the peace process and protect the population, noting that the reinforcements should be sequenced through a phased approach and recalling the importance of cooperation between MINUSCA and the authorities of the Central African Republic in line with its

¹³⁷ See [S/PV.8882](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Viet Nam and Russian Federation).

¹³⁸ Ibid. (France, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Norway, Viet Nam, United States, Mexico, United Kingdom, Estonia, Russian Federation and China).

¹³⁹ Ibid. (Norway, Viet Nam, United Kingdom, Ireland, Russian Federation and China).

¹⁴⁰ See [S/2021/76](#) (China, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and United Kingdom).

¹⁴¹ Ibid. (Russian Federation and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8802](#) (Viet Nam and Russian Federation).

¹⁴² See [S/PV.8802](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, Norway, Ireland and Estonia); and [S/PV.8882](#) (France, Norway, United States, United Kingdom and Estonia).

¹⁴³ See [S/2021/76](#) (France, India and United States); [S/2021/187](#) (United States); [S/PV.8802](#) (India and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8882](#) (Russian Federation).

¹⁴⁴ See [S/2021/187](#) (United States); [S/PV.8802](#) (United Kingdom); and [S/PV.8882](#) (France and United States).

¹⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8802](#) and [S/PV.8882](#).

¹⁴⁶ Resolution 2566 (2021), eleventh preambular paragraph and para. 1. See also [S/2021/146](#) and resolution 2552 (2020), para. 27. For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

mandate.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, by the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure that decisions regarding the deployment of all personnel to MINUSCA adhered to a series of conditions, including to ensure the recruitment and retention of qualified uniformed personnel, to take all appropriate measures to enhance the safety and security of MINUSCA personnel and to increase the number of women in MINUSCA and that such deployment ensured the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations and the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.¹⁴⁸

Explaining its country's abstention,¹⁴⁹ the delegation of the Russian Federation noted that while it had always supported the Blue Helmets, Moscow was disappointed that the authors of the resolution decided not to mention in the text the United Nations guiding principles for emergency humanitarian assistance in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/182. The delegation underscored that the Russian Federation could not accept the policy of removing all references to the guiding principles from United Nations documents and blurring the strict parameters of humanitarian assistance, which could undermine the principle of respect for the national sovereignty of Member States. The delegation also stressed that, in the selection of contingents to be part of the MINUSCA peacekeeping force, the Secretariat must coordinate closely with Bangui and listen to the views of the people of the Central African Republic, including on the national composition of the troops and police officers to be deployed.

On 12 November, the Council adopted resolution 2605 (2021), with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions, extending the mandate of MINUSCA for a period of one year until 15 November 2022.¹⁵⁰ The Council reiterated that the mandate of MINUSCA should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks, which the Council adjusted.¹⁵¹ In that regard, the Council reiterated, with certain modifications, the four priority tasks of MINUSCA, namely: (a) the protection of civilians; (b) the provision of good offices and support to the peace process, including the implementation the Political Agreement, as well as the newly declared ceasefire; (c) the facilitation of the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and (d) the protection of United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and

goods.¹⁵² The Council excluded from the list of the Mission's priority tasks the provision and coordination of assistance in the preparation and delivery of the elections.¹⁵³ The Council also reiterated the tasks of MINUSCA in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts established in accordance with the same resolution, and made a new request, that MINUSCA provide support to the authorities in their efforts to achieve progress on the key benchmarks for the review of the arms embargo measures.¹⁵⁴

By resolution 2605 (2021), the Council condemned and expressed concern regarding all violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including by the Central African defence and security forces, and condemned attacks on the civilian population, MINUSCA peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, as well as human rights abuses and gender-based violence.¹⁵⁵ The Council expressed its readiness to consider listing individuals or entities that undermined peace and stability and violated the ceasefire for targeted measures pursuant to resolution 2588 (2021).¹⁵⁶ The Council also took positive note of the measures announced by the Government to hold accountable those responsible for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and called for concrete steps to strengthen justice institutions at the national and local levels as part of the extension of State authority in order to fight impunity.¹⁵⁷

After the vote,¹⁵⁸ explaining her country's abstention the representative of the Russian Federation indicated that a number of fundamental points expressed by the Government of the Central African Republic and disseminated in a document of the Council were not reflected in the resolution. She nonetheless trusted that the renewal of the mandate of MINUSCA would make a positive contribution to

¹⁴⁷ Resolution 2566 (2021), para. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., para. 3.

¹⁴⁹ See S/2021/258.

¹⁵⁰ Resolution 2605 (2021), para. 29.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., para. 32.

¹⁵² Ibid., para. 34.

¹⁵³ Resolution 2552 (2020), para. 31 (c). For more information on the evolving mandate of MINUSCA, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2014–2015, 2016–2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020*.

¹⁵⁴ Resolution 2605 (2021), para. 49. See also S/PRST/2019/3, seventh paragraph. For more information on the mandate of the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), see part IX, sect. 1.

¹⁵⁵ Resolution 2605 (2021), paras. 4 and 14.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 4.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., paras. 14 and 16.

¹⁵⁸ See S/PV.8902.

helping the Central African Republic authorities to stabilize the situation in the country. She noted that the constant negative background issues surrounding MINUSCA were harming the Council's reputation and undermining trust in the United Nations itself. Although the adoption of resolution 2605 (2021) was a token of trust in the Mission, the Russian Federation could not consider the work it had done to date satisfactory or competent. In that regard, she expressed her country's intention to monitor how the Mission would take advantage of the support expressed by the Council. A first step, which should have been taken before, was to take the concerns of the host country into consideration and to establish mutually respectful trust with Bangui, without which it would not be possible to fully implement the Mission's mandate.

Having also abstained, the representative of China acknowledged the difficulties that the Central African Republic had overcome, adding that the country had yet to achieve lasting peace and the continued presence of MINUSCA was still necessary. He explained that for that reason China supported the renewal of the mandate of MINUSCA and expressed hope that the Mission would engage more closely with the Government of the Central African Republic to increase mutual trust and work together with the Government to maintain peace and stability in the country. He also said that the consent of the countries concerned was an important principle to which peacekeeping operations must adhere and the reasonable suggestions of the Central African Republic had not been afforded full consideration, which was why China had abstained in the voting on the resolution.

The representative of the United States explained that his country had voted in favour of the resolution because it reinforced the Council's support for the critical work of MINUSCA, affirmed the centrality of the Political Agreement, recognized the important contributions of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to the peace process in the Central African Republic, and endorsed the unilateral ceasefire announced by the President, Mr. Touadera, on 15 October. He recalled the fact that individuals supported by the Russian Federation and invited into the country by the Government of the Central African Republic stood accused of committing egregious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law and called attention to the use of the phrase "all parties to the conflict" in the resolution, which in his country's view included those Russian contractors. He also clarified that there was no universal and unlimited international legal obligation

on States or other parties to an armed conflict to allow and facilitate "safe, rapid and unhindered" humanitarian access and that the United States disagreed with the use of the phrase "in accordance with relevant provisions of international law", contained in paragraph 52 of the resolution, where its placement suggested that safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access was required by international law, without exception.

Concerning the sanctions regime,¹⁵⁹ by resolution 2588 (2021) adopted on 29 July with 14 votes in favour and one abstention, the Council renewed until 31 July 2022 the sanctions measures in place, namely, the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban,¹⁶⁰ and expanded the list of exemptions to the arms embargo.¹⁶¹ The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 31 August 2022 and requested it to provide to the Council a final report no later than 30 June 2022.¹⁶² The Council also took note of the request by the authorities of the Central African Republic to lift the arms embargo, as well as of the support for that request expressed by the Heads of State of Angola and the Congo on behalf of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and ECCAS.¹⁶³ Recalling that the Committee had approved all exemption requests submitted by the authorities, the Council reiterated its readiness to review the arms embargo measures, through, inter alia, the suspension or progressive lifting of those measures, in the light of progress achieved on the key benchmarks.¹⁶⁴ The Council also welcomed the progress made by the authorities, along with regional and international partners, to achieve some of the key benchmarks and encouraged continued efforts aimed at reforming the security forces, implementing the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and

¹⁵⁹ For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.

¹⁶⁰ Resolution 2588 (2021), paras. 1, 3 and 4.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., para. 1 (g).

¹⁶² Ibid., paras. 6–7. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

¹⁶³ Resolution 2588 (2021), fourth preambular paragraph.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs. See also S/PRST/2019/3, seventh paragraph. By the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with MINUSCA, including the Mine Action Service, and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 15 June 2022, an assessment of the progress achieved by the authorities of the Central African Republic on the key benchmarks (resolution 2588 (2021), para. 13).

repatriation programme and operating an effective weapons and ammunition management system.¹⁶⁵

Following the adoption of the resolution,¹⁶⁶ the representative of China explained his country's abstention, underscoring that since December 2020 general elections had been successfully held in the Central African Republic and the security situation continued to improve, so there appeared to be a growing disconnect between the Council's sanctions and the evolving situation on the ground. He recalled that when the Council had imposed the arms embargo and other sanctions, the intention had been to help the country to restore national stability and normal social order, but the embargo had increasingly become an obstacle hampering the efforts of the Government to strengthen its security capabilities. He took note of the efforts made by the penholder to strive for unanimous adoption, but said that the text failed to fully respect

the wish of the Government for the lifting of the embargo. By contrast, among the Council members voting in favour of the resolution, the representatives of the United Kingdom and Norway said that the progress on benchmarks had not been sufficient. The representative of Kenya expressed appreciation for the compromise by the penholder and the members of the Council and viewed the resolution as an improvement on the preceding one in re-equipping the security forces of the Central African Republic to ensure the effective discharge of their duties. The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that the embargo, imposed in the initial stages of the conflict, complicated the efforts to rearm the security forces, which bore the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety of the citizens of the Central African Republic, while armed groups continued to replenish their weapons' stockpiles through smuggling. He encouraged Bangui to continue working to achieve the benchmarks so that, in a year's time, the Council would have every reason to lift the arms embargo.

¹⁶⁵ Resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#), seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs.

¹⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8828](#).

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in the Central African Republic

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8802 23 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic (S/2021/571)		Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union, European Union Managing Director for Africa	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8828 29 July 2021	Letter dated 25 June 2021 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/686)	Central African Republic		Six Council members ^c	Resolution 2588 (2021) 14-0-1 ^d (adopted under Chapter VII)

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	resolution 2536 (2020) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/569)					
	Letter dated 15 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/573)					
S/PV.8882 18 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic (S/2021/867)		Central African Republic	Special Representative, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, President of the Conseil national de la jeunesse centrafricaine	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^e	
S/PV.8902 12 November 2021		Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/945)	Central African Republic		Four Council members (China, India, Russian Federation, United States), invitee	Resolution 2605 (2021) 13-0-2 ^f (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b Angola was represented by its President. The African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the European Union Managing Director for Africa participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c China, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^d For: Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; against: none; abstained: China.

^e The Central African Republic was represented by its President, who participated in the meeting by videoconference. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union and the President of the Conseil national de la jeunesse centrafricaine also participated by videoconference.

^f For: Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; against: none; abstained: China, Russian Federation.

Table 2

Videoconferences: the situation in the Central African Republic

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
21 January 2021	S/2021/76	Letter dated 25 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
24 February 2021	S/2021/187	Letter dated 26 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
12 March 2021	S/2021/258	Letter dated 12 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2566 (2021) 14-0-1 ^a (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/253

^a For: China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; against: none; abstained: Russian Federation.

6. Central African region

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings in connection with the situation in the Central African region. It adopted no resolutions on the item in 2021. Both meetings took the form of briefings.¹⁶⁷ Under the item, the Council considered developments in Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon and the Gulf of Guinea. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

During the period under review, consistent with the six-month reporting period requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 10 August 2018,¹⁶⁸ the Council heard two briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA.¹⁶⁹ The Special Representative apprised the Council on the activities of UNOCA, its continued cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the United Nations Office for West

Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and its activities as the secretariat for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The Special Representative updated the Council on the political, human rights and security situation in the region. In that regard, he informed the Council on the preparations for and conduct of elections in several Central African countries and the subsequent political transitions, the continued threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Lake Chad basin, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the activities of UNOCA and the socioeconomic situation in countries in the region, and the impact of climate change on the security and prosperity of Central African countries.

In his briefing to the Council on 7 June,¹⁷⁰ the Special Representative reported that the pandemic continued to affect the activities of UNOCA, although the situation was gradually improving thanks to a combination of immunization and prevention programmes implemented by the Governments in the subregion. Central Africa remained the subregion on the African continent with the lowest number of infections and deaths from COVID-19. In that regard, he mentioned the successful convening of the fifty-first

¹⁶⁷ For more information on format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

¹⁶⁸ [S/PRST/2018/17](#), twentieth paragraph.

¹⁶⁹ See [S/2021/517](#) and [S/2021/975](#).

¹⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8787](#).

meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee by the Government of Burundi in Bujumbura on 28 May 2021, which was a testament to the resilience that Central African States had demonstrated, individually and collectively, in their efforts to promote socioeconomic recovery, maintain political stability and promote regional integration despite the constraints posed by the pandemic. On elections, the Special Representative took note of the recommendation by the ministerial segment of the Advisory Committee to develop a subregional protocol on electoral governance and democratic elections in Central Africa. Since his last briefing to the Council, elections had taken place in four countries, namely, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo and Gabon, and elections were upcoming in Sao Tome and Principe. In that regard, he encouraged the national authorities and all political stakeholders to promote continued dialogue and consensus on the conditions governing the elections. He further noted the commitment of ECCAS to promoting peace and stability in the subregion, as evidenced by the convening of two extraordinary summits of Heads of State and Government, on the situation in the Central African Republic and on Chad, on 26 December 2020 and 4 June 2021, respectively.

The Special Representative also provided information to the Council on the challenges specific to the various countries of the subregion, namely, the fragilities in Burundi, the violence in the north-west and south-west regions of Cameroon and the instability and border tensions in Chad. He also referred to the threat posed to the region by non-State armed groups, such as the increased and compounding threat posed by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin and by the Lord's Resistance Army. He added that in the Gulf of Guinea, maritime crime remained a serious threat to Central and West African States and had been high on the agenda of the last two meetings of the Advisory Committee. He concluded that Central Africa was strongly affected by the negative impact of climate change, a trend that was likely to worsen over the next few decades, hampering socioeconomic progress and exacerbating political and security tensions in the subregion.

In his briefing to the Council on 15 December,¹⁷¹ the Special Representative reported on the worsening situation related to the COVID-19 pandemic and a generally slow and asymmetric vaccination campaign in the subregion. On elections, he took note of the peaceful and orderly presidential election in Sao Tome and Principe and the preparations for the upcoming crucial elections in 2022 and 2023, including in

Angola, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. The Special Representative pledged to pursue good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to encourage inclusive and meaningful political dialogue in the countries preparing for elections, for which the Council's support would be crucial. He reported on the implementation of institutional reform in ECCAS, including through the operationalization of the newly established Committee of Permanent Representatives and the regular convening of statutory meetings. He commended ECCAS for its continued engagement in Chad and the Central African Republic. A strong ECCAS was needed to help its member States to address the many challenges facing Central Africa, including terrorism and violent extremism, particularly in the Lake Chad basin, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the weak participation of women in peace and political processes and the impact of climate change on peace and security. As in his previous briefing, the Special Representative provided information to the Council on the challenges specific to the various countries of the subregion, such as Cameroon and the continued violence in the north-west and south-west regions of the country, the Central African Republic, including the regional engagement within the framework of the road map adopted in Luanda in September 2021 to support the effective implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic,¹⁷² and Chad, where significant progress had been achieved in reaching key transitional milestones despite challenges.¹⁷³

In 2021, the Council's deliberations focused on major political and security developments, as well as on the humanitarian, human rights and socioeconomic challenges affecting the Central African region, including those resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. On the political front, Council members discussed the electoral processes taking place in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe and the assistance provided by the United Nations in that regard. Council members also deliberated on the role of the United Nations, including UNOCA and its Head, in conflict prevention and mediation throughout the Central African region. They also addressed the Office's cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union and ECCAS, as well as United Nations regional offices, in resolving conflicts, assisting countries in peace and

¹⁷¹ See [S/PV.8933](#).

¹⁷² *Ibid.* For more information, see sect. 5 above.

¹⁷³ See [S/PV.8933](#).

political processes, addressing the humanitarian and human rights challenges and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in the region. With regard to cooperation with regional actors, some Council members expressed support for the UNOCA-ECCAS joint strategic plan for 2021–2025.¹⁷⁴ Council members also addressed the situations in specific countries and, in particular: (a) post-electoral developments in the Central African Republic, including reports of violence and human rights abuses and attacks on the personnel of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic,¹⁷⁵ and the subsequent ceasefire declared by the President, Faustin Archange Touadera;¹⁷⁶ (b) clashes in Cameroon, in particular the north-west and south-west regions, including reports of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law;¹⁷⁷ (c) border tensions between the Central African Republic and Chad;¹⁷⁸ (d) progress made by Chad towards transitional milestones despite significant security challenges, and the call by the African Union for an inclusive transition and the restoration of constitutional order;¹⁷⁹ and (e) the improving human rights situation in Burundi.¹⁸⁰ Council members deliberated on the cross-border threat posed by terrorism in the Lake Chad basin and elsewhere and expressed support for action by the Multinational Joint Task Force to respond to those threats, in particular the activities of Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa

Province.¹⁸¹ Council members also expressed concern regarding the continued threats posed by organized crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.¹⁸² Some members recognized and deliberated on the adverse effects of climate change on security in the region.¹⁸³ They also continually addressed the impact of conflict and humanitarian crises on women¹⁸⁴ and the need to ensure the equal participation of women and youth in political and peace processes.¹⁸⁵

In 2021, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council dated 3 and 6 August 2021 respectively, the Council extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2024.¹⁸⁶ In renewing the mandate, the Council reiterated that, with certain modifications, the mandate would focus on four core objectives, namely: (a) monitoring political and security developments in Central Africa and carrying out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to prevent and resolve conflicts, sustain peace and advise the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on matters related to sustaining peace in Central Africa; (b) enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion, with due attention to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including human rights and gender dimensions; (c) supporting and enhancing United Nations efforts in the subregion, as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives; and (d) enhancing coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security.¹⁸⁷

¹⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8787](#) (India, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Viet Nam and Ireland).

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* (India, United States, Russian Federation, Ireland and Estonia).

¹⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8933](#) (United Kingdom, France, Viet Nam, India, Mexico, China, Ireland, United States and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)).

¹⁷⁷ See [S/PV.8787](#) (United Kingdom, China, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), United States, Norway, France, Viet Nam, Mexico and Ireland); and [S/PV.8933](#) (United Kingdom, France, Viet Nam, Mexico, China and United States).

¹⁷⁸ See [S/PV.8787](#) (United Kingdom, India, Norway, Russian Federation and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8933](#) (India).

¹⁷⁹ See [S/PV.8787](#) (United Kingdom, China, India, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), United States, France and Ireland); and [S/PV.8933](#) (United Kingdom, France, Estonia, India, Mexico, China, Ireland, United States and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)).

¹⁸⁰ See [S/PV.8787](#) (United States); and [S/PV.8933](#) (United Kingdom, China and United States).

¹⁸¹ See [S/PV.8787](#) (India); and [S/PV.8933](#) (United Kingdom, France and India).

¹⁸² See [S/PV.8787](#) (China, India, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8933](#) (Norway, Viet Nam, India, China and Russian Federation).

¹⁸³ See [S/PV.8787](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland and Estonia); and [S/PV.8933](#) (Norway, Estonia, India and Ireland).

¹⁸⁴ See [S/PV.8787](#) (Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), France and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8933](#) (Viet Nam, Ireland and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)).

¹⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8933](#) (Norway, France, Estonia, Mexico, Ireland, United States and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)).

¹⁸⁶ [S/2021/719](#) and [S/2021/720](#).

¹⁸⁷ [S/2021/719](#), annex, objectives 1–4. For more information on the mandate of UNOCA, see part X, sect. II.

Meetings: Central African region

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8787 7 June 2021	Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) (S/2021/517)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA	12 Council members, ^a invitee	
S/PV.8933 15 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA (S/2021/975)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General	12 Council members, ^a invitee	

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

7. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

During the period under review, the Council held 15 meetings and adopted seven resolutions and two statements by the President of the Council under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”. Eleven of the meetings took the form of briefings and four were convened for the adoption of a decision.¹⁸⁸ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in table 1 below. Council members also held nine open videoconferences in connection with the item, more details of which are given in table 2 below.¹⁸⁹ In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held informal consultations of the whole, closed videoconferences and an informal interactive dialogue in connection with the item.¹⁹⁰ In 2021, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative for

South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).¹⁹¹

Consistent with prior practice, the Council considered several distinct topics under the item, namely: (a) the situation in the Sudan, the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) and the drawdown and liquidation of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID); (b) relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, the situation in the Abyei Area and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); and (c) the situation in South Sudan and the mandate of UNMISS.¹⁹² The Council also discussed the work of the Committees and Panels of Experts concerning the Sudan and South Sudan and the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), by which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

¹⁸⁹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹⁹⁰ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 26. See also [S/2021/1014](#), [S/2021/1084](#) and [S/2022/174](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council and informal interactive dialogues were held in the form of closed videoconferences. An informal interactive dialogue related to the item was held on 14 April.

¹⁹¹ See [S/2021/49](#) and [S/2021/50](#).

¹⁹² For more information on the mandates of UNISFA, UNMISS and UNITAMS, see part X.

¹⁹³ For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and their respective Panels of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

In relation to the Sudan, the Council heard four briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS and two briefings by civil society representatives.¹⁹⁴ The Council also heard two briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support on the drawdown and liquidation of UNAMID.¹⁹⁵

In his briefings in 2021, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS reported on the progress and challenges in the political transition, including the military takeover on 25 October 2021, the security situation in Darfur and the activities of UNITAMS. At the open videoconference held on 9 March,¹⁹⁶ he noted that the transition had moved forward in February with the expansion of the Sovereign Council to include three armed group signatories to the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan of 2020 and the formation of a new cabinet with a broad coalition built on power-sharing among civilians, the military and armed movements. The new Government had agreed on five national priorities, namely, addressing socioeconomic conditions, implementing the peace agreement and resuming negotiations with the non-signatory armed groups, security sector reform and the protection of civilians, international relations, and advancing the democratic transition. At the same time, important milestones foreseen in the Constitutional Document of 2019 and the Juba Peace Agreement had yet to be reached, notably the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council with at least 40 per cent representation of women. The Special Representative also noted progress on the economic reform agenda with the Government's decision to float the Sudanese pound, which would unlock financial assistance, paving the way for debt relief and fostering private sector engagement. At the same videoconference, the Managing Partner of Insight Strategy Partners, a think tank in Khartoum, briefed the Council on the possible implications of the work of UNITAMS for civil society in the Sudan and the importance of the latter's buy-in during the transition period. She noted that the success of UNITAMS could not be directly tied to the Government's ability to implement the transition and that civil society could bolster support for the protection of civilians in Darfur and help to ensure the sustainability of crucial State-building exercises. She affirmed that the inclusion of civil society must be done in such a way that increased, not limited, civic

space and did not undermine the fragile and inchoate social contract between the civilian Government and the public.

At the open videoconference held on 20 May,¹⁹⁷ the Special Representative noted the adoption of legislation establishing the Peace Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Transitional Justice Commission and urged the Sudanese authorities to proceed rapidly in operationalizing those entities. He welcomed the organization of the Paris Conference by the Government of France on 17 May 2021, at which Member States had announced bilateral debt forgiveness, helping the Sudan to clear its arrears with the international financial institutions. Regarding the peace talks with non-signatory armed groups, on 28 March 2021 the Chair of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Chair of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction, had signed a declaration of principles that would form the basis of peace talks in Juba, which, as the Special Representative subsequently reported at a meeting held on 14 September,¹⁹⁸ had taken place in June without reaching an agreement on a framework for the process. At the meeting, the Special Representative expressed concern about the impact of the conflict in Ethiopia on the Sudan, including the flow of refugees, and urged all stakeholders to avoid further unnecessary escalation in the context of the tensions over the Fashaqaq border area and the stalemate over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Speaking after the Special Representative, the Regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, a regional network of civil society organizations, stated that, as was the case before the revolution in the Sudan, women were disproportionately affected by violence, the deterioration of services and the slow pace of reform. She highlighted the need to ensure women's full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership throughout the transitional Government bodies and in the ongoing peace processes and called for accountability for all violations of human rights, including gender-based violence, that had occurred before, during and after the revolution.

On 3 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2579 (2021), by which it introduced several modifications to the mandate of UNITAMS and extended it for one year until 3 June 2022, outlined priorities for the Mission during the new mandate period,¹⁹⁹ welcomed the steps taken to implement the

¹⁹⁴ See S/2021/246, S/2021/495, S/PV.8857 and S/PV.8925.

¹⁹⁵ See S/2021/246 and S/PV.8825.

¹⁹⁶ See S/2021/246.

¹⁹⁷ See S/2021/495.

¹⁹⁸ See S/PV.8857.

¹⁹⁹ Resolution 2579 (2021), paras. 1 and 4 (i)–(vi).

Constitutional Document and called upon the Government of the Sudan to accelerate the establishment of the independent commissions and the swift formation of the Transitional Legislative Council.²⁰⁰ The Council welcomed the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement and urged the signatories, with the support of UNITAMS, to ensure its swift, full and inclusive implementation.²⁰¹

At the meeting held on 10 December,²⁰² the Special Representative reported that the political transition was undergoing its greatest crisis with the military takeover of 25 October 2021 and the arrests of the Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, senior officials and political activists. The takeover had triggered widespread protests and condemnation, resulting in the death of at least 44 people and hundreds being injured as a result of the excessive use of force by security forces. Against this backdrop, the Special Representative had welcomed the 21 November 2021 political agreement between the Prime Minister and the Chair of the Sovereign Council, which could help to avoid further bloodshed and provide a positive step towards comprehensive dialogue and a return to constitutional order. He underlined the importance of reaching an inclusive political agreement on the way forward and the formation of a technocratic cabinet, as provided in the agreement of 21 November 2021. In the aftermath of those events, the Sudan's military and political leaders would have to take confidence-building measures to rebuild trust with their own domestic public, particularly the young generation, and to regain financial, economic and political support from the international community. In terms of the security situation, the Special Representative expressed deep concern at the resurgence of intercommunal conflicts and armed banditry in Darfur, Blue Nile and the Kordofans, with reports of a significant rise in the killing of civilians, destruction of property, displacements and sexual violence against women and girls. He added that the formation and deployment of the joint security-keeping force provided under the Juba Peace Agreement and the operationalization of the Government's National Plan for the Protection of Civilians should be undertaken without delay. Regarding the implementation of the UNITAMS mandate, in addition to redoubling its good offices, the Mission also continued its work on human rights and support for the protection of civilians and the permanent ceasefire mechanisms.

Regarding the drawdown and liquidation of UNAMID, at the videoconference held on 9 March²⁰³ the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support noted that, following the termination of its mandate on 31 December 2020, UNAMID was on track to complete the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian personnel other than those required for its liquidation by 30 June 2021, as provided in resolution [2559 \(2020\)](#). The Secretariat was preparing a detailed concept of operations and costing requirements for the deployment of two formed police units as guard units which, in accordance with the decision of the Council, would be responsible for the protection of UNAMID personnel, facilities and assets. At the meeting of the Council on 27 July,²⁰⁴ the Under-Secretary-General confirmed that the Secretariat had achieved the initial milestone set by the Council for the withdrawal of all UNAMID personnel and staff by 30 June 2021. The remaining liquidation process would consist of two phases, from 1 July to 30 September 2021 for the withdrawal, sale and destruction of the Mission's equipment, and from 1 October onward, the donation and associated distribution of remaining fixed and movable assets to Government institutions and non-governmental organizations. In the presidential statement adopted on 2 August marking the completion of the drawdown, the Council recognized the progress made since the Mission's deployment and expressed deep appreciation for its important contribution over a period of more than 13 years.²⁰⁵

In their discussions on the Sudan, Council members welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the Constitutional Document and the Juba Peace Agreement and encouraged further steps in that regard, particularly the establishment of the Transitional Legislative Council with at least 40 per cent women representatives and other transitional institutions. Multiple Council members also called on non-signatory armed groups to join the peace process.²⁰⁶ Council members noted their concern with the increase in intercommunal violence in Darfur, with most of them calling on the Government to swiftly

²⁰⁰ Ibid., third preambular paragraph.

²⁰¹ Ibid., fifth preambular paragraph.

²⁰² See [S/PV.8925](#).

²⁰³ See [S/2021/246](#).

²⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8825](#).

²⁰⁵ [S/PRST/2021/14](#), first and fourth paragraphs.

²⁰⁶ See [S/2021/246](#) (France, India, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/2021/495](#) (China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and United States); [S/PV.8857](#) (France, China, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8925](#) (Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Mexico, Ireland, Viet Nam and France).

implement the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians.²⁰⁷ A number of speakers also stressed the need for international debt relief and financial support²⁰⁸ and for the review of the sanctions measures imposed by the Council to alleviate the difficult socioeconomic conditions in the Sudan.²⁰⁹ Council members expressed concern regarding the tensions between the Sudan and Ethiopia over the Fashaqa border area and called on both parties to work towards a peaceful solution.²¹⁰ At the meeting held on 10 December,²¹¹ several Council members²¹² noted that the military takeover of 25 October 2021 had the potential to jeopardize the progress made in the Sudan's political transition. The representative of the United Kingdom, among others, expressed concern at the deterioration of the human rights situation with the killing of at least 43 protesters, underscored the need for freedoms of expression and assembly to be protected and welcomed the commitment of the Sudanese authorities to investigate their deaths. Some Council members²¹³ expressed the view that the political agreement of 21 November 2021 was a step towards resolving the crisis and resuming the political transition. The representative of Tunisia, speaking also on behalf of Kenya, the Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, encouraged all transitional partners to swiftly implement the political agreement in a climate of peace and national reconciliation.

²⁰⁷ See [S/2021/246](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States); [S/2021/495](#) (Estonia, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8857](#) (United Kingdom, France, United States, Estonia, Mexico, Viet Nam and Ireland); and [S/PV.8925](#) (United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway, Mexico, Ireland, Viet Nam and France).

²⁰⁸ See [S/2021/246](#) (India, Viet Nam and Sudan); [S/2021/495](#) (China, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Viet Nam and Sudan); [S/PV.8857](#) (China, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), India, Viet Nam, Ireland and Sudan); and [S/PV.8925](#) (Russian Federation, China and Sudan).

²⁰⁹ See [S/2021/246](#) (Russian Federation); [S/PV.8857](#) (China and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8925](#) (Viet Nam, Russian Federation and China).

²¹⁰ See [S/2021/246](#) (Estonia, France, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States); [S/2021/495](#) (Ireland and Mexico); and [S/PV.8925](#) (Ireland).

²¹¹ See [S/PV.8925](#).

²¹² United Kingdom, Estonia, Ireland and France.

²¹³ Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Mexico, Russian Federation and China).

Council members also heard four briefings²¹⁴ by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan on the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts. The Chair informed Council members that the Panel had submitted its final report to the Committee in December 2020, after which the Committee had addressed some of the Panel's recommendations to the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations on 25 February 2021 and had held consultations with the Sudan and regional States on 23 February 2021.²¹⁵ By resolution [2562 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a period of 13 months until 12 March 2022.²¹⁶ The Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Government, signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement, UNITAMS and the Panel of Experts, to conduct a review of the situation in Darfur, including threats to stability, implementation of the Peace Agreement and the National Plan for the Protection of Civilians, measures to tackle the proliferation of weapons, including progress on the weapons collection programme, and compliance with the measures on Darfur as recalled in paragraph 1 of the resolution.²¹⁷ The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, by 31 July 2021, a report containing recommendations for clear and well-identified benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Council to review the measures on Darfur and expressed its intention to establish clear and well-identified key benchmarks no later than 15 September 2021, with readiness to consider adjusting the measures to respond to the situation in Darfur.²¹⁸

In addition to the above, pursuant to resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#) Council members heard one briefing by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 2021 in relation to Darfur, departing from the practice of providing two briefings per year since the adoption of the resolution.²¹⁹ On 9 June, in her final briefing to the Council,²²⁰ the Prosecutor updated the Council on her first, historic visit to Darfur, 15 years since the Council referred the Darfur situation to her Office. The Prosecutor reported that the Court and the Government

²¹⁴ See [S/2021/308](#), [S/PV.8795](#), [S/PV.8856](#) and [S/PV.8924](#).

²¹⁵ See [S/2021/308](#).

²¹⁶ Resolution [2562 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.* For the report of the Secretary-General, see [S/2021/696](#). The Council did not establish benchmarks to assess the measures on Darfur in 2021.

²¹⁹ For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2004–2007 to 2020*.

²²⁰ See [S/PV.8791](#).

of the Sudan had turned a new page in their relationship and that, following the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding on 14 February 2021, her team of investigators had undertaken investigative activities in the Sudan and were preparing to go to Darfur. She informed Council members that the confirmation of charges hearing for Ali Muhammad Ali Abd al-Rahman was held from 24 to 26 May 2021 and that with almost all other suspects in the custody of the Government there was no legal impediment for their surrender to the Court.

With regard to the Abyei Area and relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, during 2021 Council members heard two briefings each by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, and one by the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel.²²¹ While the Under-Secretary-General focused on the situation in Abyei and the mandate of UNISFA, the Special Envoy and the Chairperson of the High-level Implementation Panel informed Council members about the relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and the progress on the implementation of the 2012 cooperation agreements.

At the videoconference held on 26 April,²²² the Under-Secretary-General stated that the continued rapprochement between the Sudan and South Sudan had not translated into significant improvements in the Abyei Area, where the situation remained tense, as did relations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities. Political progress had also been negatively affected by the inability of the parties to convene the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. There had been modest progress towards the seven benchmarks on the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism set out in resolution 2550 (2020), with the approval of all requested aerial and ground monitoring missions by the two Governments and their deployment of national monitors, except to team site 22 in Abu Qussa/Wunkur.²²³ Furthermore, 4 out of the 10 border crossing corridors were open and functioning. Regarding UNISFA, the Under-Secretary-General highlighted interruptions to the deployment of authorized formed police units due to non-issuance of visas by the Sudan.²²⁴

At the meeting of the Council on 27 October,²²⁵ the Under-Secretary-General presented the findings

and recommendations of the strategic review of UNISFA for a possible drawdown and exit strategy, as requested by the Council in resolutions 2550 (2020) and 2575 (2021).²²⁶ He noted that the review team had been guided by the improved relationship between the two Governments, but it had identified a significant trust deficit that remained between the communities in Abyei and had noted the existence of an important space for United Nations peacebuilding, humanitarian, recovery and development assistance.²²⁷ The review proposed two viable options regarding the future of the Mission's military component, namely, keeping the force numbers close to what they were, or a lightly reduced troop ceiling. The Under-Secretary-General stressed that the negotiations towards a political settlement concerning Abyei remained crucial building blocks towards an exit strategy for UNISFA. Furthermore, as part of defining a strategic vision for the Mission, it was important that a set of benchmarks be established in close coordination with the two Governments containing specific requirements for the inclusion of women and building upon the joint mechanisms that the parties had already established towards the settlement of the Abyei issue. The Under-Secretary-General further stated that the planning of the Secretariat towards a full replacement of the Ethiopian military contingent with a multinational one would continue at full speed.

At the videoconference held on 26 April,²²⁸ the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa stated that South Sudan and the Sudan were continuing to deepen their relationship and had agreed to form joint mechanisms for reactivating their border trade agreements. Noticeable differences remained, however, over the establishment of the joint mechanisms provided under the 20 June 2011 agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area and the resolution of the territory's final status. In terms of support for each other's peace processes, the Special Envoy highlighted the role of South Sudan in the signing of the declaration of principles between the Chair of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction in Juba on 28 March 2021. Nonetheless,

²²¹ See S/2021/408 and S/PV.8887.

²²² See S/2021/408.

²²³ Resolution 2550 (2020), para. 3.

²²⁴ See S/2021/408.

²²⁵ See S/PV.8887.

²²⁶ See the letter dated 17 September 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/805), providing the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of UNISFA requested by the Council in resolution 2575 (2021). See also resolutions 2550 (2020), para. 32, and 2575 (2021), para. 7.

²²⁷ See S/PV.8887.

²²⁸ See S/2021/408.

on 27 October,²²⁹ the Special Envoy reported that the South Sudanese mediation committee had not succeeded in bringing the Al-Hilu faction back to the negotiating table following the suspension of the talks on 15 June 2021. Furthermore, Abdul Wahid al-Nur, the leader of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid faction, continued to reject peace talks with the Government of the Sudan. In addition, the Special Envoy noted the progress made by the Sudan and South Sudan on the implementation of the 2012 cooperation agreements, particularly with the definition of a road map for their review and follow-up and the decision to reopen border crossing points.

In his briefing on 27 October, the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel provided Council members with an overview of the Panel's engagement with the Sudan and South Sudan based on the 2012 proposal for the resolution of the Abyei issue, including the proposed referendum on the status of the territory. The Chairperson noted that the main obstacles in that regard were the lack of agreement on how the referendum would be conducted and who would be eligible to vote, as well as matters pertaining to revenue sharing and economic development. He expressed hope that consensus between the two Governments could be reached and that such consensus would be consonant with the views of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities so that the agreement made would guarantee the stability of Abyei. In the meantime, he underscored the importance of the role of UNISFA in maintaining stability.

In 2021, Council members welcomed the improvement in relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and highlighted the importance of further progress on the implementation of the 20 June 2011 agreement, the resolution of the status of Abyei and dialogue between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities. Council members discussed the various operational impediments to the mandate of UNISFA, including the delays in the deployment of authorized police personnel due to the non-issuance of visas by the Sudan, the lack of agreement by the parties on the appointment of a civilian deputy Head of Mission and the safety and security of the Mission's personnel. In their statements on 27 October,²³⁰ Council members widely welcomed the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of UNISFA. Some Council members emphasized specific aspects of the process. While the representative of Ireland noted the need for careful planning and sequencing to ensure a smooth rotation towards a multinational force, the

representative of the Russian Federation observed that it was important to consider the Secretariat's proposals on the configuration of the Mission, including its national composition, in a manner that took into account the views of Khartoum and Juba. Similarly, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed the hope that the interests of the people of Abyei remained at the forefront of decision-making on the future configuration of UNISFA.

By resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#) and [2609 \(2021\)](#), both adopted unanimously, the Council twice extended the mandate of UNISFA for periods of six months to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, extended the Mission's mandate in the Abyei Area, the second time until 15 May 2022.²³¹ In between the adoption of those two resolutions, on 15 November the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2606 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNISFA for one month pending discussions among Council members on the findings and recommendations of the strategic review of the Mission.²³² By resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), noting the recommendations of the strategic review, the Council reduced the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA from 3,550 to 3,250, while maintaining the police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units.²³³ The Council expressed grave concern over developments in Gok Machar, South Sudan, including threats to the safety and security of peacekeepers, which had resulted in the death of a peacekeeper on 14 September, and urged the Government of South Sudan to intensify its outreach to the local community to facilitate the redeployment of UNISFA personnel to their previous locations.²³⁴ The Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan were called upon to provide support to UNISFA in the implementation of its mandate and the deployment of its personnel.²³⁵

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, Council members heard four briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS, two briefings by representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and three briefings by members of civil society.²³⁶ In his briefing on 3 March,²³⁷ the outgoing Special

²²⁹ See [S/PV.8887](#).

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ Resolutions [2575 \(2021\)](#) and [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1–2.

²³² Resolution [2606 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

²³³ Resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), paras. 4–5.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, seventh preambular paragraph.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

²³⁶ See [S/2021/219](#), [S/PV.8801](#), [S/PV.8859](#) and [S/PV.8931](#).

²³⁷ See [S/2021/219](#).

Representative stated that at the first anniversary of the formation of South Sudan's Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity there had been some positive steps in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 2018 with the formation of the South Sudan presidency and Council of Ministers and the delegation of power to state governors. In subsequent meetings in 2021,²³⁸ the newly appointed Special Representative highlighted additional progress, such as the inauguration of the reconstituted Parliament on 30 August, the historic appointment of women as the Speaker of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the Deputy Speaker of the Council of States, the reconstitution and appointment of members to nine state assemblies and the adoption of a bill on the constitution-making process, as well as progress on transitional justice and addressing conflict-related sexual violence.

According to the Special Representative, however, those steps were not sufficient to sustain the momentum to realize peace. In that regard, in his briefing to the Council on 15 December²³⁹ he noted that the parties had failed to reach an agreement on command ratios for the future unified security forces, which in turn had resulted in the fracturing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition. The Government bore a special responsibility to facilitate the establishment of the unified forces, including through the provision of resources. While noting the announcement by the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, that elections would take place in 2023, the Special Representative urged the Government to promote the fundamental human rights of all South Sudanese, including freedom of expression, so as to create a platform for democratic dialogue in a free and fair electoral process. He also called for further progress in the operationalization of the Parliament, in particular the establishment of the standing committees necessary to consider critical bills during the transition period.

In addition to the political process, the Special Representative also focused in his briefings on progress in the implementation of the mandate of UNMISS. Following the extension of UNMISS in March 2021, at the meeting held on 21 June²⁴⁰ he noted that UNMISS would advance a three-year strategic vision with a focus on making irreversible gains in implementing the agreed transitional benchmarks, making optimal use of uniformed personnel to enhance general security and political engagement at the grass-

roots level, and promoting greater coherence among international partners such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, the European Union, the Troika (Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States), neighbouring States and the diplomatic community in general. On 15 December,²⁴¹ he stated that, partly because of UNMISS, the number of civilian casualties attributed to localized violence in 2021 had roughly halved compared with the same period in 2020. UNMISS had continued to adapt its strategy to respond to conflict hotspots in an integrated manner, including through the flexible deployment of temporary operating bases, while also overseeing and supporting planning for the eventual redesignation of the remaining site for the protection of civilians in Malakal to a camp for internally displaced persons. He underlined that, with the broader Horn of Africa region facing complex political, security and humanitarian challenges, it remained more than ever essential to ensure that South Sudan remained stable.

Concerning the humanitarian situation in South Sudan, the representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs updated the Council on the most recent trends, in particular rising levels of food insecurity, further displacement and flooding. On 15 September,²⁴² the Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division informed Council members that the people of South Sudan faced the highest levels of food insecurity since independence in 2011, with over 60 per cent of the population being severely food insecure and 8.3 million in need of humanitarian assistance, including 1.4 million children. Some 108,000 people faced catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity at the height of the lean season, with conflict as the major driver fuelling displacement and leading to the loss of lives, assets and livelihoods and disproportionately affecting women and girls. The challenging situation had been further compounded by new emerging needs because of the subnational violence such as in Central and Western Equatoria. Meanwhile, there had been limited change in the behaviour of non-State armed groups and certain youth groups that continued to hamper humanitarian access. In her briefing on 15 December,²⁴³ the Director of the Coordination Division noted that around 300,000 people were newly displaced between March and October 2021, bringing the number of internally displaced to 2 million. The effects of climate change were also being felt, with catastrophic flooding for the third consecutive year, affecting some 835,000 people in Jonglei, Unity and Upper

²³⁸ See [S/PV.8859](#) and [S/PV.8931](#).

²³⁹ See [S/PV.8931](#).

²⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8801](#).

²⁴¹ See [S/PV.8931](#).

²⁴² See [S/PV.8859](#).

²⁴³ See [S/PV.8931](#).

Nile States. Conflict, violence directed at aid workers and their assets, operational interference, bureaucratic impediments and physical access challenges continued to affect the humanitarian response. The Director stressed the need for adequate and early funding for the humanitarian response plan, in particular to avert catastrophic food insecurity levels, for the Government and non-State actors to abide by their obligation to facilitate safe and unhindered humanitarian access and for all actors with influence to ensure the protection of civilians across the country.

Civil society briefers focused in their statements on the human rights and political situations in South Sudan. In her briefing at the open videoconference held on 3 March,²⁴⁴ the founder and National Director of the Centre for Inclusive Governance, a local non-governmental organization working on human rights, justice, peacebuilding and women's rights in South Sudan, underlined that the country's leaders must be held accountable for implementing key aspects of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in the remainder of the transitional period. As key pending tasks, she highlighted the need to reconstitute state and national legislatures and establish transitional mechanisms, constitutional and security sector reform, disarmament and demobilization, and the upholding of human rights. She called on the Council to pressure the parties to take concrete steps to ensure that the 35 per cent quota for the representation of women at all levels of governance was met and on UNMISS to join civil society in advocating the respect of fundamental rights and to support human rights defenders and civil society organizations facing intimidation in carrying out their essential work.

On 21 June,²⁴⁵ the Executive Director and co-founder of the Organization for Responsive Governance, a civil society organization based in South Sudan, stated that ineffective political leadership and a neglect of the principles that had guided the country's struggle for independence had resulted in a meltdown in all sectors, including politics, governance, security and the economy. He stressed the need for the unity Government to effectively discharge its mandate, for governance based on the principles of the struggle and for the Council to support those efforts, working jointly with IGAD, the African Union and other actors to raise the cost of wilful sabotage of peace implementation.

On 15 September,²⁴⁶ Merekaje Lorna Nanjia, a South Sudanese civil society activist, stated that the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement had been

minimal, inconsistent, intermittent and slow. Human rights violations occurred in different forms, while the provision of services and addressing youth unemployment and the exclusion of women from national processes did not seem to be national priorities. She recommended that the Council mandate UNMISS to support the implementation of key legislative reforms and an inclusive and participatory constitution-making process, facilitate the conduct of free, fair and peaceful elections, provide capacity-building and facilitation in the rule of law, justice, governance and accountability sectors, and facilitate periodic engagement between the Government and civil society or citizens groups to build confidence and support the implementation of the Agreement.

During their discussions on South Sudan, Council members welcomed the establishment of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States, state-level appointments and the Government's approval for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan. Nevertheless, they also noted the significant delays in security sector reform, the full operationalization of the Assembly and the constitution-making process, the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, women's participation in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the initial preparations and planning for elections. Some speakers underscored the need for the international community's political, financial and technical assistance to the Revitalized Agreement.²⁴⁷ Council members discussed the ongoing review of the sanctions measures concerning South Sudan against the benchmarks, with some emphasizing the negative impact of the measures on the implementation of the security provisions of the Revitalized Agreement.²⁴⁸ Other speakers rejected the notion that the delays in security sector reform, notably the graduation of the necessary unified forces, were linked to the arms embargo,²⁴⁹ with some of them inviting the Transitional Government to utilize the existing exemption procedures.²⁵⁰

In the context of rising food insecurity and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the country, speakers called on the international community to

²⁴⁷ See [S/2021/219](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); [S/PV.8801](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); [S/PV.8859](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); and [S/PV.8931](#) (South Sudan).

²⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8859](#) (Russian Federation and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8931](#) (Russian Federation, Viet Nam and China).

²⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8801](#) (United States); and [S/PV.8931](#) (United States, Mexico, Estonia, United Kingdom and France).

²⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8801](#) (United States); and [S/PV.8931](#) (United States, Estonia and United Kingdom).

²⁴⁴ See [S/2021/219](#).

²⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8801](#).

²⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8859](#).

increase humanitarian assistance for South Sudan.²⁵¹ Council members widely expressed concern regarding subnational violence in South Sudan and its impact on civilians, including violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and conflict-related sexual violence. Noting the increasing restrictions on civil space, some speakers called on the Government to ensure respect for human rights and the freedom of expression.²⁵² Council members further called on South Sudan to abide by the status of forces agreement signed with the United Nations²⁵³ and on all parties to facilitate the safe and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance.²⁵⁴

By resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year until 15 March 2022,²⁵⁵ introducing some modifications to the Mission's tasks while maintaining its composition. UNMISS was requested to advance a three-year strategic vision to prevent a return to civil war, build a durable peace and support inclusive and accountable governance and free, fair and peaceful elections in accordance with the Revitalized Agreement.²⁵⁶ In a presidential statement adopted by the Council on 27 October, the Council took note of the conclusions of an elections needs assessment mission conducted pursuant to resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#) and requested the Secretary-General to establish an integrated electoral assistance team led by UNMISS to implement the electoral assistance activities as defined in the Revitalized Agreement.²⁵⁷ In the presidential statement, the Council recognized that

conducting free and fair elections, reflecting the will of all South Sudanese and with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, youth, people with disabilities, displaced persons, refugees and members of all political groups, would be critical for a transition towards a stable, inclusive, democratic and self-reliant State.²⁵⁸ The Council further underscored that elections would need to be preceded by an inclusive and transparent constitution-drafting process.²⁵⁹

In addition to the regular briefings relating to South Sudan and UNMISS, on 15 December²⁶⁰ Council members heard a briefing by the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Viet Nam on behalf of the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), in which he provided a summary of the work of the Committee in 2021, including its discussions on the final report of the Panel of Experts of 14 April and the visit of the Chair to South Sudan from 16 to 20 November. By resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on South Sudan until 31 May 2022 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 1 July 2022.²⁶¹ The Council expressed its readiness to review the arms embargo, through, inter alia, the suspension or progressive lifting of the measures, in the light of progress on key benchmarks outlined in the resolution.²⁶²

Resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions, cast by India and Kenya. In statements submitted further to the vote,²⁶³ the delegation of India stated that the resolution had imposed certain benchmarks for the lifting or easing of the arms embargo that did not consider the positive developments in South Sudan and that some of the benchmarks were administrative in nature and disregarded the genuine challenges that the country was facing. Recalling the calls by IGAD and the African Union for the lifting of all sanctions, the delegation of Kenya affirmed that the arms embargo and targeted sanctions had not been effective tools in support of the South Sudan peace process but rather, in certain cases, counterproductive. While the resolution was an improvement on the preceding one, the

²⁵¹ See [S/2021/219](#) (China, India, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8801](#) (India, Viet Nam, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and China); [S/PV.8859](#) (India, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Viet Nam and China); and [S/PV.8931](#) (United States, India, Viet Nam and China).

²⁵² See [S/PV.8859](#) (France, Estonia and Ireland); and [S/PV.8931](#) (United States, Estonia, United Kingdom and France).

²⁵³ See [S/2021/219](#) (Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States); [S/PV.8801](#) (United States and Ireland); [S/PV.8859](#) (India); and [S/PV.8931](#) (United States and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia)).

²⁵⁴ See [S/2021/219](#) (France and Mexico); [S/PV.8801](#) (France); [S/PV.8859](#) (United States, Mexico, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Viet Nam and Norway); and [S/PV.8931](#) (Mexico, Estonia, United Kingdom and Viet Nam).

²⁵⁵ Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. 1.

²⁵⁶ Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

²⁵⁷ [S/PRST/2021/20](#), third paragraph. See also resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 27.

²⁵⁸ [S/PRST/2021/20](#), fourth paragraph.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8931](#). See also the letter dated 14 April 2021 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2021/365](#)).

²⁶¹ Resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1, 11 and 17.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, paras. 2 (a)–(e). See also the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 March 2021 providing benchmarks to assess the arms embargo on South Sudan ([S/2021/321](#)).

²⁶³ See [S/2021/518](#).

delegation of Kenya posited that more flexibility could have been extended to make the eventual lifting of the sanctions realistic and certain. Voting in favour of the resolution, the delegations of China, Saint Vincent and

the Grenadines and Viet Nam underscored the importance of reviewing the sanctions measures with a view to their future adjustment and eventual lifting.

Table 1

Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8784 3 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) (S/2021/470)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/521)			Two Council members (Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution 2579 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8791 9 June 2021			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8795 14 June 2021			Sudan		One Council member (Estonia), ^b Sudan	
S/PV.8825 27 July 2021			Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support	12 Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8829 2 August 2021						S/PRST/2021/14
S/PV.8856 14 September 2021			Sudan		One Council member (Estonia), ^b invitee	
S/PV.8857 14 September 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS (S/2021/766)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS, Regional Director of the Strategic	12 Council members, ^c all invitees ^d	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
				Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa		
S/PV.8924 10 December 2021			Sudan		One Council member (Estonia), ^b invitee	
S/PV.8925 10 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS (S/2021/1008)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	12 Council members, ^c all invitees	

^a The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^b The representative of Estonia spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

^c China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^d The Special Representative and the Regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2

Videoconferences: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
11 February 2021	S/2021/136	Letter dated 11 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2562 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII) S/2021/131
9 March 2021	S/2021/246	Letter dated 11 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
25 March 2021	S/2021/308	Letter dated 29 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
20 May 2021	S/2021/495	Letter dated 24 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Table 3

Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8887 27 October 2021	Letter dated 17 September 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/805) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2021/881)		South Sudan, Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel	12 Council members, ^a all invitees	S/PRST/2021/20
S/PV.8904 15 November 2021		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/948)				Resolution 2606 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8932 15 December 2021		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/1034)	South Sudan		One Council member (Russian Federation), invitee	Resolution 2609 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

Table 4

Videoconferences: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
26 April 2021	S/2021/408	Letter dated 28 April 2021 from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
11 May 2021	S/2021/458	Letter dated 11 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2575 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII) S/2021/450

Table 5

Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8801 21 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2021/566)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Executive Director and co-founder of the Organization for Responsive Governance	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8859 15 September 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2021/784)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Director, Operations and Advocacy Division in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, civil society activist (Merekaje Lorna Nanjia)	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8931 15 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2021/1015)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Director, Coordination Division in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	12 Council members, ^d all invitees ^e	

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b The Special Representative and the Executive Director and co-founder of the Organization for Responsive Governance participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c The Special Representative and Ms. Lorna Nanjia participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^d China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam. The representative of Viet Nam spoke twice, once in his national capacity and once on behalf of the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan.

^e The Director of the Coordination Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 6

Videoconferences: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
3 March 2021	S/2021/219	Letter dated 5 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
12 March 2021	S/2021/259	Letter dated 12 March 2021 from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2567 (2021) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII) S/2021/254
28 May 2021	S/2021/518	Letter dated 28 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2577 (2021) 13-0-2 ^a (Chapter VII) S/2021/515

^a For: China, Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; against: none; abstained: India, Kenya.

8. Peace consolidation in West Africa

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”. One of the meetings took the form of a briefing and the other was convened for the adoption of a decision.²⁶⁴ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in table 1 below. In addition, Council members held two open videoconferences in connection with the item.²⁶⁵ More information on the videoconferences is included in table 2 below.²⁶⁶ In 2021, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).²⁶⁷

On 11 January, Council members held a videoconference²⁶⁸ in connection with the item, at which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General gave a briefing in which he stressed that it was more important than ever to collaborate to apply the manifold lessons learned from the COVID-19

pandemic in terms of improving governance and delivering essential services for societies to emerge more adept, secure and resilient. With regard to the Sahel, insecurity continued to prevail and harm innocent lives and, as a result, the humanitarian situation had been further aggravated. Since his previous report to the Council in July 2020,²⁶⁹ five presidential, three legislative and two local elections had been held in West Africa and electoral management bodies had been able to maintain the electoral calendar despite the pandemic and had demonstrated impressive technical capacity to organize and conduct elections. He covered specific developments in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Niger and Mauritania.²⁷⁰ The Special Representative reiterated that in addressing the multidimensional challenges in the Sahel, UNOWAS was collaborating closely with the Group of Five for the Sahel to support the implementation of the Priority Investment Programme and the Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region. Concerning women and youth in the region, who had been hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, a joint assessment conducted by UNOWAS in collaboration with the Economic

²⁶⁴ For more information on format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

²⁶⁵ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

²⁶⁶ See [A/76/2](#), part. II, chap. 31. See also [S/2021/938](#) and [S/2021/1014](#).

²⁶⁷ See [S/2021/275](#) and [S/2021/276](#).

²⁶⁸ See [S/2021/43](#). See also [S/2021/1014](#).

²⁶⁹ See [S/2020/706](#).

²⁷⁰ See [S/2021/43](#).

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the implementation of Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) had showed progress in the areas of coordination and programming. In that regard, the Special Representative also highlighted that political will and resources to implement the various instruments, especially for education for girls, which remained a critically important lever for development, must remain a priority.

In the statements that followed the briefing, many Council members²⁷¹ expressed concern about the significant levels of violence and the resulting continued instability across the region, including terrorist activities, intercommunal conflicts and election-related violence. In that context, Council members highlighted that the international community, as well as the Council and UNOWAS, needed to support enhanced national and regional capacities and initiatives. Specifically, some Council members²⁷² highlighted the need for greater support for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Several Council members²⁷³ voiced concern about the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the region. To tackle the root causes of violence and promote regional peace and stability, Council members²⁷⁴ reiterated the need for a holistic approach and for strengthening coordination with United Nations agencies, development partners and other regional and subregional organizations. Several Council members²⁷⁵ also emphasized the importance of addressing the adverse effects of climate change on security in West Africa and the Sahel, integrating current and projected climate-related threats into all conflict-prevention efforts in the region. Welcoming the participation levels of women in political processes in the region, Council members²⁷⁶ encouraged further steps in ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation of women and youth at all levels of decision-making.

On 3 February, Council members held a videoconference to announce the adoption of a presidential statement in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to explore the feasibility of a civilian joint project between UNOWAS and relevant regional organizations, such as the Group of Five for the Sahel, ECOWAS and the African Union, with the aim of stemming the increasingly destabilizing phenomenon of intercommunal violence and preventing its recurrence in the region and encouraged support for such a project from bilateral and development partners.²⁷⁷ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to include in his next report on UNOWAS recommendations with viable options for establishing such a project, as well as for the Special Representative to provide an update on the recommendations in his next briefing. In the presidential statement, the Council condemned all forms of violence and intimidation against those participating in humanitarian operations and encouraged efforts by States in the region to ensure that perpetrators of such acts were brought to justice, as provided for by national laws and their obligations under international law.²⁷⁸ In addition, the Council expressed concern about the threat that piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea posed to international navigation, security and development in the region and welcomed the work of UNOWAS on regional cooperation in response.²⁷⁹ The Council also urged all parties to armed conflict to immediately cease attacks and threats of attacks in contravention of applicable international humanitarian law against schools, children and educational personnel, to refrain from actions that impede children's access to education and to take all feasible measures to protect schools and children.²⁸⁰ The Council welcomed the assumption by UNOWAS of the good offices functions of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau and requested specific reporting thereon, including on progress made by national stakeholders to implement the reform agenda.²⁸¹ In addition, the Council encouraged cross-pillar efforts to foster greater coherence and coordination within the United Nations system and with partners in the region and called on UNOWAS to work with all elements of the United Nations system to strengthen integrated responses to the challenges facing the region.²⁸²

²⁷¹ India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Russian Federation, United States and Viet Nam.

²⁷² France, India, Ireland and Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia).

²⁷³ Estonia, India, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

²⁷⁴ China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and United Kingdom.

²⁷⁵ Estonia, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

²⁷⁶ Estonia, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico and Viet Nam.

²⁷⁷ [S/PRST/2021/3](#), seventh paragraph.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, eighth paragraph.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, tenth paragraph.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, twelfth paragraph.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, fifteenth paragraph.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, seventeenth paragraph. For further details on the mandate of UNOWAS, see part X, sect. II.

At a meeting held on 8 July,²⁸³ Council members heard briefings by the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOWAS and by the President of the Réseau ivoirien pour la défense des droits de l'enfant et de la femme. The Special Representative presented the latest report of the Secretary-General on the activities of UNOWAS.²⁸⁴ He also reported on a regional tour he had taken, during which he had met with most of the Heads of State of the members of ECOWAS.²⁸⁵ He highlighted that the security challenges created by terrorist acts in the Liptako-Gourma region and the Lake Chad basin and by crime along the coasts of the Gulf of Guinea must be addressed from a regional perspective because the risks of a confluence between the threat coming from the sea and that coming from the Sahel were real and the main victims were the civilian populations. He reported that there had been a marked improvement in coordination among the ECOWAS action plan, the Regional Stabilization Strategy for the Lake Chad basin and the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. On the challenges linked to electoral processes, UNOWAS was striving to improve exchanges between ministers of justice, judicial cooperation and the sharing of experiences among the main actors responsible for promoting the rule of law in the region, in coordination with the ECOWAS Commission. In that context, the prospects for the elections in Cabo Verde and in the Gambia were looking more auspicious. The Special Representative further reported that the United Nations system had increased the empowerment of women and girls and the promotion of gender equality, notably through the recently established Group of Friends of Women of the Sahel, and had transformed its approach to engaging with young people as agents of change and transformation, not only as beneficiaries. In the face of persistent farmer-herder conflicts across the region, UNOWAS was collaborating with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and the Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel to identify priority areas for scaled-up United Nations action in 2021. Together with some United Nations agencies, UNOWAS had launched a United Nations regional working group on climate change, security, the environment and development with the objective of promoting United Nations synergy and a harmonized approach to working with ECOWAS.

In her briefing, the President of the Réseau ivoirien pour la défense des droits de l'enfant et de la

femme noted that inequalities and challenges persisted, despite major advances made by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and several other West African countries. In her recommendations, she proposed putting in place holistic support programmes for girls to be able to attend, stay in and complete school and adopting a multisectoral approach to resolving women's health issues so as to combat women's precarious health status and maternity-related mortality. To improve access to land ownership for women, she recommended guaranteeing legal remedies for women through better access to information and strengthened legal support. To combat gender-based violence, she proposed that a specific law should be adopted to punish violence against women, as well as a specific law to punish the perpetrators and sponsors of early and forced marriages. To improve the representation of women in decision-making bodies, she recommended that State institutions be strengthened to promote female leadership in politics and their political representation be increased through specific laws. Finally, for the safety of women in the face of the effects of climate change, she proposed that climate policies and programmes in West Africa should be made gender-sensitive and that dynamic mechanisms should be created for taking initiatives and influencing decisions, going beyond the numerical representation of women in climate policy processes.

During the deliberations, most Council members²⁸⁶ recognized the positive developments in terms of elections and democratic transitions in the region since the previous meeting in January, despite security- and election-related challenges. Many Council members²⁸⁷ also focused on combating terrorism and violence in the face of the increased terrorist attacks and increased casualties, especially among civilians and peacekeepers, and several of them²⁸⁸ underscored in addition the importance of the protection of civilians. In terms of security, some Council members²⁸⁹ also stressed that predictable and sustainable funding must be provided to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. Furthermore,

²⁸⁶ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, Russian Federation, United States, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, India, Estonia, Norway, China and France.

²⁸⁷ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, Russian Federation, United States, Viet Nam, Mexico, India, Estonia, Norway, China and France.

²⁸⁸ United States, Mexico, Estonia and Norway.

²⁸⁹ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), India and France.

²⁸³ See [S/PV.8814](#).

²⁸⁴ See [S/2021/612](#).

²⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8814](#).

Council members²⁹⁰ reiterated their concern about the humanitarian situation in the region, including the level of impunity for human rights violations and abuses as well as food insecurity. Members²⁹¹ also emphasized the need to increase assistance and contributions to humanitarian response plans and operations. To address the challenges facing the region, Council members²⁹² also highlighted the importance of a regional approach and coordination with other regional organizations and encouraged UNOWAS to support and coordinate with regional countries and organizations such as ECOWAS and the African Union. Some Council members²⁹³ reiterated their support for holistic and integrated approaches and for advancing the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel. In that connection, several Council members²⁹⁴ highlighted ensuring education as key for strong nations, greater social mobility, the long-term stability of society and combating the radicalization of young people. With regard to the impact of climate change, several Council members²⁹⁵ welcomed the work of UNOWAS and the regional working group. Council members²⁹⁶ also emphasized that climate-related threats and the fight against the effects of climate change must be taken into account in all actions and conflict prevention efforts. While welcoming the increased political representation of women in the region, some Council members²⁹⁷ reiterated the need to further ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and to address their absence in particular from cabinet tables and in national governments and parliaments.

On 17 August, the Council held a meeting to adopt a presidential statement in which it expressed concern at the deterioration of the security situation in some countries of the West Africa and Sahel region, the

growth of terrorism in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin, as well as in the wider West African region, and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and encouraged further national and regional efforts to counter those threats.²⁹⁸ The Council also expressed great concern at the violent actions of non-State actors hampering the return of State authority, basic social services and the rule of law in some areas of the region.²⁹⁹ The Council reaffirmed the importance of addressing the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism in Africa, including by ensuring national recovery and reconstruction, enhancing good governance and facilitating socioeconomic development in Africa, including through job creation and the promotion of entrepreneurship and providing education and health-care services for the promotion of the well-being of their people.³⁰⁰ The Council welcomed the feasibility assessment for a joint civilian project to address intercommunal violence in the region and the recommendations by the Secretary-General and encouraged the Secretary-General to leverage existing United Nations initiatives and mechanisms for integrated and cross-pillar actions with a view to initiating projects specifically dedicated to stemming intercommunal violence more tangibly, in close coordination with the African Union, including the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel, ECOWAS and the Group of Five for the Sahel.³⁰¹ The Council furthermore expressed grave concern over the impact of the Libyan conflict on neighbouring countries, particularly in the Sahel, and encouraged further international support and regional cooperation, as well as coordination between Libya, neighbouring countries in the Sahel and relevant United Nations bodies.³⁰² The Council welcomed the enhanced cooperation between ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States on the Gulf of Guinea and the commitment to reactivate regional coordination mechanisms for maritime safety, as well as ongoing efforts by ECOWAS to evaluate its Conflict Prevention Framework plans of action. It called for enhanced political support and engagement of the Special Representative in accompanying that process to ensure its effective and meaningful operationalization in the countries of the region.³⁰³ Finally, the Council stressed that good governance was critical for long-term peace and stability in West

²⁹⁰ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

²⁹¹ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), India and Viet Nam.

²⁹² Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Russian Federation, Mexico, India and China.

²⁹³ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Viet Nam, Mexico and China.

²⁹⁴ Ireland, Mexico, Estonia and Norway.

²⁹⁵ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, United States and United Kingdom.

²⁹⁶ Viet Nam and France.

²⁹⁷ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, Viet Nam, Estonia and Norway.

²⁹⁸ S/PRST/2021/16, third paragraph.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., fifth paragraph.

³⁰¹ Ibid., sixth paragraph.

³⁰² Ibid., eighth paragraph.

³⁰³ Ibid., ninth paragraph.

Africa and the Sahel, while reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all States in the region and

emphasizing the need to respect fully the principle of non-interference.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁴ Ibid., tenth paragraph.

Table 1

Meetings: peace consolidation in West Africa

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8814 8 July 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) (S/2021/612)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOWAS, President of the Réseau ivoirien pour la défense des droits de l'enfant et de la femme	12 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8836 17 August 2021						S/PRST/2021/16

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

Table 2

Videoconferences: peace consolidation in West Africa

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
11 January 2021	S/2021/43	Letter dated 13 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
3 February 2021	No record (see A/76/2 , part II, chap. 31)		S/PRST/2021/3

9. Peace and security in Africa

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and adopted two presidential statements. Six of the meetings took the form of briefings, while one was held for the adoption of a decision.³⁰⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is

provided in table 1 below. Council members also held two open videoconferences in connection with the item. More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held

³⁰⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

informal consultations of the whole and closed videoconferences in connection with the item.³⁰⁶

In 2021, Council members held one open videoconference and a meeting focusing on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. Council members also held a high-level open videoconference to discuss the topic of addressing the root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa, which resulted in the adoption of a presidential statement. In addition, the Council held four public meetings relating to the Tigray region in Ethiopia and two other meetings on the situation regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, in connection with which a presidential statement was adopted. More details are provided below.

In relation to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, Council members heard briefings in May and November³⁰⁷ in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General.³⁰⁸ On 18 May, Council members held an open videoconference³⁰⁹ at which they heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the Commander of the Joint Force and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission. In his briefing, the Under-Secretary-General took stock of the support that the international community, and more particularly the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), had provided over the previous months to the Joint Force as it continued to scale up its operational tempo in a more and more challenging security environment. In that regard, he said that since the Pau Summit in January 2020, the improved coordination among national armies, Operation Barkhane, the Joint Force and MINUSMA, as well as the deployment of Task Force Takuba, had enabled results to be achieved in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region. He also said that there was a need to be aware of the dire consequences of the security situation for the population, as well as the risks for the rest of West Africa, if the situation in the Sahel was not properly addressed. He underlined that the Joint Force remained a vital part of the security responses to address extremist armed groups in the region and reiterated the need for more predictable funding for the Force.

In his briefing, the Commander of the Joint Force spoke about the genesis and organization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, its work and recent progress, and the road ahead and outstanding challenges. Specifically on its logistical and financial support model, he described the complex support system by the countries integrating the Joint Force, the United Nations, the European Union and Operation Barkhane, adding that its sustainability remained fragile. He suggested that the most sustainable solution for a sustainable system of funding would be to establish a United Nations support office, funded by assessed and voluntary contributions, to provide the Joint Force with logistical, operational, tactical and strategic support. He reminded the Council of the need to redouble efforts to mobilize material and financial resources, in accordance with the commitments made by the international community, towards the eventual establishment of more permanent support.

Acknowledging the complexity of the situation in the Sahel, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission underlined in his statement that more needed to be done to address the root causes of conflicts in the Sahel through a long-term, comprehensive and integrated approach to sustaining peace and development. He described the meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission on 28 April to discuss peace and development trends in the Sahel and elaborated on the Commission's work in the region. He reported that at its meeting held on 28 April the Commission had recognized the budgetary burden caused by increased security expenditures and reduced revenue collection in several countries at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic was constraining resources and had called for greater coordination among the security, development and humanitarian actors in the region to ensure that efforts to meet programming and resource mobilization needs were effective. The Commission had also recognized that the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel remained a useful framework for ensuring proactive and effective United Nations activities in the Sahel to help to tackle the root causes and drivers of instability and violence in the region and had welcomed the continued support from the Peacebuilding Fund for cross-border investments and empowering women and youth.

During the discussion, Council members³¹⁰ commended the role of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in coordinating and mobilizing operational and strategic support for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the

³⁰⁶ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 35. In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. For more details on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

³⁰⁷ See [S/2021/484](#) and [S/PV.8903](#).

³⁰⁸ See [S/2021/442](#) and [S/2021/940](#).

³⁰⁹ See [S/2021/484](#).

³¹⁰ Estonia, India, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and Viet Nam.

Sahel. The representative of Estonia asserted that regional and national ownership of counter-terrorism efforts was crucial to their success. Several Council members³¹¹ were supportive of the consideration and establishment of a United Nations support office dedicated to providing logistical and operational support for the Joint Force. According to the representative of Chad, the support office would enable the Joint Force to resolve definitively the issue of sustainable, predictable funding so that it could focus its full attention on the fight against terrorism in order to restore security, stability and peace and create the conditions for much-needed sustainable socioeconomic development in the region. The representative of the United States stated that the Group of Five for the Sahel trust fund and bilateral support to the Joint Force represented the right approach to addressing the Sahel's security concerns, and in order to make that work all partners must honour their pledges to the Joint Force and support the individual militaries of the States members of the Group of Five that supplied troops to the regional force.

On 12 November, the Council held a meeting³¹² at which it heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and by the President of the Burkina Faso chapter of the Network on Peace and Security for Women in the Economic Community of West African States Space. In his briefing, the Under-Secretary-General reported that the situation in the region had remained extremely volatile and that the armed and security forces of the member States of the Group of Five for the Sahel were meeting the threat with determination and courage. The important decision of the States members of the Group of Five to take in hand their security challenges by creating the counter-terrorist Joint Force was a significant accomplishment, but, as noted by the Secretary-General in the assessment of support for the Joint Force,³¹³ it continued to face significant challenges. With reference to the assessment report as well as the latest report of the Secretary-General,³¹⁴ the Under-Secretary-General recalled that the Joint Force remained a vital part of a collective security response to the multiple challenges that the region faced.³¹⁵ Noting that the support model of the Joint Force was unpredictable and could not meet all of its needs, he expressed the conviction that only a dedicated support

office, funded through assessed contributions, could provide the support that the Force needed and that would enable it to become more effective and enhance the scope and reach of its work. While acknowledging that many donors and partners provided bilateral support to the member States of the Group of Five, in the light of the serious crisis unfolding in the region, a comprehensive and collective approach was needed to support a collective security initiative.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the representative of Chad elaborated on the worrisome security situation affecting the region, including terrorism, and the return of mercenaries and foreign fighters that were expelled from Libya, and affirmed that the Group of Five was a unique, relevant and beneficial initiative emanating from the States concerned. She said that it remained the only framework for action capable of providing the most appropriate solutions to the challenges that the subregion faced and added that with adequate resources commensurate with those serious challenges, the Group of Five had the capacity to eradicate the terrorist threat and bring about security and well-being for its people, to the benefit of the entire region and the world. With regard to the Joint Force, she reiterated the call to the Council to create a support office to provide it with sustainable, predictable and reliable funding.

The President of the Burkina Faso chapter of the Network on Peace and Security for Women in the Economic Community of West African States Space noted that the security crisis that prevailed in the region had exacerbated the significant gender inequality that already existed, underpinned by several sociocultural beliefs and barriers that were deeply rooted in tradition. She reported on the situation of women in the region, as well as on the initiatives by women to come together across platforms and networks at the regional level. To address the situation of women, she brought some recommendations to the attention of the Council. First, substantial technical and financial support for the development, dissemination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of national strategies and action plans for the implementation of the resolutions for women and young people must be provided. Secondly, substantial technical, material and financial support was needed for women's and young people's civil society organizations to implement long-term, positive impact projects and ensure effective and sustainable socioeconomic and political empowerment for women and girls. Thirdly, efforts must be undertaken to initiate, encourage, motivate and facilitate dialogue between armed movements and State and regional

³¹¹ India, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Russian Federation and Viet Nam.

³¹² See [S/PV.8903](#).

³¹³ [S/2021/850](#), annex.

³¹⁴ [S/2021/940](#).

³¹⁵ See [S/PV.8903](#).

authorities in order to silence the weapons in the Sahel region. Fourthly, substantial technical, material and financial support must be provided to ensure quality education and health for all in the Sahel States. Finally, substantial technical and financial support was needed for conflict prevention actions in the Group of Five region.

During the discussion, several Council members³¹⁶ supported the proposals of the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations support office for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. By contrast, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States objected to the United Nations becoming a vehicle to provide support to the regional force, expressing concern at its involvement in offensive counter-terrorism operations. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed her country's readiness to hold a substantive discussion on the proposals contained in the October letter of the Secretary-General³¹⁷ regarding increased assistance to the Joint Force through the United Nations. She added that both options, either the creation of a small advisory office at the secretariat of the Joint Force or the creation of a full-fledged support office, required a clear understanding of their timing and feasibility, effectiveness, the costs involved and the sources of funding.³¹⁸ Council members³¹⁹ also addressed the Council's recent mission to the Niger and Mali.

On 19 May, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency for the month,³²⁰ Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on addressing the root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa. At the videoconference,³²¹ Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme. In his briefing, the Secretary-General said that one year into the COVID-19 pandemic, it was clear that the crisis was feeding many of the drivers of conflict and instability and underlined that its severe impact on young people, especially in Africa, was contributing to increased risks that could be exploited by criminals and

extremists. He noted that the pandemic had also continued to deepen existing gender inequalities and threatened the hard-won gains in terms of women's full, equal and meaningful participation in all areas of social, economic and political life. Nonetheless, recovery from the pandemic also offered an opportunity to address the root causes of conflict and implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 of the African Union. He noted that equitable and sustainable vaccine roll-out worldwide was the quickest path towards a fast and fair recovery and that the United Nations was advocating everywhere for a coordinated global effort on vaccines and for measures to alleviate the debt burden that threatened to cripple the recovery in many low- and middle-income developing countries, particularly in Africa.

In his remarks, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission said that slowed economic growth, lower levels of international trade, lower demand for Africa's primary exports, rising external debt and rising inflation had created an economic situation that would have a negative impact on the socioeconomic situation in many African countries and that 20 African countries faced the risk of collapse because of the burden of debt. He emphasized the urgent need to put an end to vaccine protectionism and vaccine nationalism, which threatened to exclude low-income and fragile countries thereby endangering the socioeconomic recovery of affected African countries. The Chairperson also emphasized the need not to lose the momentum gained before the COVID-19 pandemic on the nexus between peace, security and development as expressed in Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda, which had clearly articulated long-term goals. He encouraged the Council to consider a new approach and innovative ways to fund peace in Africa, as other organs and institutions in international fields were focusing on funding African development.

In his statement, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme noted that peace, security and development were intricately linked in Africa and that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063 of the African Union would require overcoming complex legacy issues and the challenges that compounded them, among them political instability, weak governance institutions, burgeoning inequalities, a rollback on human rights, the climate emergency and the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. Building forward better would require local and global actors across the closely integrated disciplines of humanitarian response, development and peace to work together to address the

³¹⁶ France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Norway and Estonia.

³¹⁷ See [S/2021/850](#).

³¹⁸ See [S/PV.8903](#).

³¹⁹ France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), India, Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland, China, United States and Mexico.

³²⁰ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 May 2021 from the representative of China to the Secretary-General ([S/2021/420](#)).

³²¹ See [S/2021/490](#).

root causes of conflict. In that regard, he focused on three critical issues: first, the next steps regarding vaccine equity, fiscal space and the socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic; second, the opportunities around the green economy for countries and regions most affected by conflict to build forward better for people and the planet; and third, the initiatives to support State capacity, heal communities and create an inclusive future, especially for women and girls.

Following the briefings, some speakers³²² recognized that the COVID-19 pandemic had disrupted the progress of the Sustainable Development Goals, while others³²³ focused on the increase in the number of people that lived in poverty and others³²⁴ on worsened inequality. To support Africa's development and recovery from the pandemic, several speakers³²⁵ underscored the need for debt relief, some³²⁶ underscored the need to implement the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063 and others³²⁷ expressed support for the African Continental Free Trade Area. Most speakers also emphasized the need for equitable vaccine access and supported the role of the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility. Several speakers³²⁸ emphasized the need to strengthen Africa's public health system to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic and future health crises. In addition, some speakers³²⁹ recognized that the Peacebuilding Commission could play a role in supporting the recovery from the pandemic. In that regard, the representative of South Africa said that the United Nations, through its bodies such as the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council, should harmonize its engagement with the African Union and regional economic communities and

regional mechanisms on recovery and reconstruction efforts as determined by the concerned countries, which would also reduce any overlapping and duplication of effort on the ground. Recognizing that the pandemic had had a greater impact on women and girls, several speakers³³⁰ emphasized the need to place them at the heart of the COVID-19 pandemic response and recovery. In addition, several speakers³³¹ noted that the pandemic had exacerbated the root causes of conflicts. In that regard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia noted the need for the Council's approach to international security to take into consideration the COVID-19 pandemic. The representative of Hungary affirmed that the pandemic had not only created new threats to global peace and security, but also unique opportunities to improve the prospects for future cooperation.

On 19 May, the Council adopted a presidential statement, which was announced at the end of the videoconference.³³² In the presidential statement, the Council expressed grave concern about the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had caused severe socioeconomic, political, humanitarian and security repercussions and had further exacerbated existing conflict drivers in Africa.³³³ The Council stressed the need for greater support for African countries, especially conflict-affected countries, and regional and subregional organizations to recover from the pandemic and build back better in a more just, equal, equitable and inclusive manner, including through providing the necessary medical supplies, including safe and efficacious tests, treatments and vaccines, and supporting African countries in strengthening their health systems.³³⁴ The Council also welcomed the important role of the Peacebuilding Commission and emphasized the need to integrate peacebuilding and sustaining peace into efforts to build back better in Africa.³³⁵

On 8 July, the Council held a meeting³³⁶ to discuss matters related to the construction of the Grand

³²² Canada (also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand), Ethiopia, Slovakia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

³²³ France, European Union, Pakistan, Portugal and Zimbabwe.

³²⁴ France, Ireland, Norway, Belgium, Canada (also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand), Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), European Union, Japan, Pakistan, Portugal and Zimbabwe.

³²⁵ China, Tunisia, Estonia, Kenya, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, European Union, Pakistan, Rwanda and South Africa.

³²⁶ China, Viet Nam, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Portugal, Qatar, Romania and Spain.

³²⁷ China, Ireland and Canada (also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand).

³²⁸ China, Viet Nam, Ireland, Kenya, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), European Union, Italy, Japan, Peru and Qatar.

³²⁹ Canada (also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand), Peru, Republic of Korea and South Africa.

³³⁰ Viet Nam, Ireland, Niger, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries) and Peacebuilding Commission.

³³¹ Estonia, Kenya, Norway, Ethiopia, European Union, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, United Arab Emirates and Zimbabwe.

³³² See [S/PRST/2021/10](#). For more information on the procedures for the adoption of decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

³³³ [S/PRST/2021/10](#), second paragraph.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, twenty-fifth paragraph.

³³⁶ See [S/PV.8816](#).

Ethiopian Renaissance Dam by Ethiopia. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa and the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme. The representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan were invited to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

In his remarks, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General stated that although Member States had acknowledged that most aspects related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam had been addressed, the parties still had to agree on some core issues, which included a dispute-resolution mechanism and drought mitigation, in particular the filling and operation of the dam in drought years. He also said that the League of Arab States had, on 15 June 2021, adopted a resolution on the dispute that called on Ethiopia to refrain from filling the reservoir without reaching an agreement and also called on the Council to hold consultations on the matter. Ethiopia had objected to the communiqué, which it saw as an attempt to politicize and internationalize the dispute, and instead stressed its commitment to the African Union mediation. The Special Envoy requested all parties to remain engaged and to avoid making any pronouncements that would increase tensions in a region that was already subject to a series of challenges.

In her statement, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme noted that the Governments of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan had over the years made sustained efforts to enhance their cooperation relating to their transboundary water resources, highlighting in that regard the 2015 declaration of principles in which they had committed to some core principles, including cooperation, equitable and reasonable utilization, preventing the cause of significant harm and peaceful settlement of disputes. She added that consensus had not been reached regarding some critical aspects, which included arrangements for the management of protracted drought, development upstream and downstream of the Dam and a dispute resolution mechanism, and that some differences also remained regarding the scope and nature of the proposed agreement. The Executive Director also underlined that effective and cooperative water management was even more important in the context of climate change. In that connection, climate models indicated that the flow of the Nile would exhibit increasing variability up to 2040, leading to more floods and more intense droughts.

Speaking on behalf of the Chairperson of the African Union, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo informed the Council that there had been several positive developments, especially in the form of the draft agreement put together by the parties with the assistance of African Union experts. The proposals put forward indicated that 90 per cent of the technical problems had already been resolved. It remained for the parties to settle their outstanding technical and legal differences, including the nature of the agreement, the dispute resolution mechanism and waterflow management during periods of drought. In that regard, the Council, whose primary role in resolving international disputes was indisputable, should support the African Union and assist the facilitator in the quest for peace in that volatile area of the Horn of Africa.

Following the briefings, Council members encouraged the parties to avoid taking any action that could undermine negotiations and expressed support for the process led by the African Union.³³⁷ At the meeting,³³⁸ the representative of India said that transboundary water disputes should ideally be resolved through mechanisms agreed upon by the primary stakeholders and that the countries concerned should continue their bilateral engagements and cooperate fully in a focused manner with the African Union to reach a mutually acceptable, long-term solution to the relevant issues. The representatives of Mexico and France made reference to the actual and potential exacerbating effect of the dispute on the existing tensions in the region. In that regard, they emphasized the need to adopt a preventive approach and avoid the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam becoming a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. The representatives of the Niger and Mexico shared their experience of managing transboundary water resources. In that regard, the representative of the Niger said that the successful example of the management of the waters of the Niger River by any State under the authority of the Niger Basin Authority could effectively serve as a source of inspiration for an accelerated solution to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue. Similarly, the representative of Mexico offered the examples of the institutions that were devoted to implementing boundary and water treaties between Mexico and the United States and between Mexico, Belize and Guatemala as a model in future rounds of negotiations among Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan. The representative of the Russian Federation proposed that

³³⁷ For more information, see part V, sect. I.

³³⁸ See [S/PV.8816](#).

since all the interested parties were gathered in New York for the meeting, they could hold a round of negotiations, brokered by the presidency of the African Union, to resolve the differences over the Dam. He also confirmed his country's readiness to provide satellite monitoring of the filling of the reservoir in the event of a request from all participants in the trilateral negotiations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt noted that despite the tireless efforts of the Chairpersons of the African Union and international partners, the parties were again confronted by the reality of the unilateral execution of the filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam without an agreement to protect downstream communities against the dangers of the Dam. While expressing the hope of concluding a legally binding agreement that enabled Ethiopia to achieve its developmental objectives by generating hydropower expeditiously, efficiently and sustainably, he said that any agreement must be equitable, reasonable and legally binding and must include provisions to mitigate the adverse effects of the Dam. The Minister explained that Egypt had come to the Council in search of a viable path towards a peaceful, amicable and negotiated solution to the crisis and to avert the dire consequences of the parties' inability to reach a settlement on the matter. He expressed the expectation that the Council would take the necessary measures to ensure that the parties engaged in an effective process of negotiations that could yield an agreement that served the parties' collective interests. The Minister further called upon the Council to adopt the draft resolution on the question that had been circulated by Tunisia, which would reaffirm the Council's resolve to uphold its responsibility to maintain international peace and security and would send an unequivocal signal of reassurance that it remained committed to the peace and prosperity of the African continent. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan noted the benefits of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam for the Sudan in terms of flood prevention and regular flow throughout the year. Those benefits would materialize if the Dam were filled and operated in such a way that the Sudan was aware of how it was filled and operated. She indicated that her country could not accept that the filling and operating methods for the Dam, adopted unilaterally, could be used to terrorize communities of millions of Sudanese that relied mainly on river agriculture, undermine their dignity and violate their human rights. Cautioning against the Council's silence, the Minister expressed the hope that it would assume its responsibilities in maintaining regional peace and security in a preventative way by strengthening the negotiations under the auspices of the African Union

while allowing international mediators and observers to assume their role so as to facilitate the negotiations and reach an agreement in accordance with a set time frame and call on Ethiopia to abstain from any unilateral measure without prior agreement, which could pose a threat to millions of inhabitants behind the Dam. The Minister of Water, Irrigation and Energy of Ethiopia expressed the belief that it was an unfitting use of the time and resources of the Council to discuss the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. He affirmed that for the first time since its establishment, the Council was being asked to pronounce itself on a water development project. Noting that the Council was a political and security organ, the Minister said that it was unhelpful and misguided to present to a global security body an issue that required a hydrotechnical solution and requested the Council to make the meeting the last of its deliberations on the subject, underscoring that there was no subject matter as far from the mandate of the Council as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

At a meeting held on 15 September,³³⁹ the Council adopted a presidential statement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.³⁴⁰ In the statement, the Council encouraged Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan to resume negotiations at the invitation of the Chairperson of the African Union to finalize expeditiously the text of a mutually acceptable and binding agreement on the filling and operation of the Dam, within a reasonable time frame.³⁴¹ The Council also underscored that the statement did not set out any principles or precedent for any other transboundary water dispute.³⁴²

Speaking after the adoption of the presidential statement, the representative of India explained that as an upper, middle and lower riparian State, with several rivers entering and exiting its land, any discussion on matters relating to such issues in the Council were of direct interest and importance to India.³⁴³ He stated in that regard that his country's principled position, as a general rule, was that transboundary water issues did not belong in the domain of the Council. In that regard, it was important to place on record that the presidential statement did not set out any principles or precedent for the Council to intervene or adjudicate in any other transboundary water dispute.

Concerning the situation in the northern region of Tigray in Ethiopia, the Council heard two briefings

³³⁹ See [S/PV.8860](#).

³⁴⁰ See [S/PRST/2021/18](#).

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, last paragraph.

³⁴³ See [S/PV.8860](#).

each by the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and one each by the Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa.³⁴⁴

At a meeting held on 2 July,³⁴⁵ the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who said that after almost eight months of conflict, the Government of Ethiopia had on 28 June 2021 announced a unilateral ceasefire in Tigray, citing the need to address the humanitarian crisis in the region, but the Tigray Defence Forces had not yet agreed to it. She stated that a ceasefire observed by all parties would have facilitated the provision of humanitarian aid and would have been a starting point for the necessary political efforts to chart a way out of the crisis. The Under-Secretary-General also noted that the conflict in Tigray was a result of deep-rooted political grievances that could only be resolved through dialogue and a credible political process and welcomed the promise by the Government of Ethiopia to take steps to hold an all-inclusive dialogue process, which could be part of a broader effort to address Ethiopia's structural challenges, encourage reconciliation and foster consensus on the way forward for the country's transition.

In his statement, the Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator stated that the humanitarian situation in Tigray was more alarming than when he had last briefed the Council on 15 June 2021,³⁴⁶ with two million people still displaced and close to 5.2 million people still requiring humanitarian assistance.³⁴⁷ He also said that more than 1,200 cases of serious sexual and gender-based violence had been reported and more continued to emerge and that 12 humanitarian workers had been killed since the start of the conflict. Despite the challenges, humanitarian actors continued to work to reach people in desperate need. The Acting Under-Secretary-General urged all

groups to stop fighting to allow humanitarian aid to get through unimpeded and to protect civilians.

In the statements after the briefings, several Council members³⁴⁸ called for the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Tigray and Ethiopia. The representative of Norway noted that their continued presence was a threat to regional peace and security.³⁴⁹ Some Council members recognized that the Council could help to end the conflict and achieve peace.³⁵⁰ The representative of China noted that when dealing with the issue, the Council needed to carefully and prudently calibrate the timing and approach taken to ensure that whatever action it took contributed to improving the situation in Tigray, rather than having the opposite effect. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret about the format of the meeting and cautioned against using it to further destabilize an already complex situation in Tigray and weaken the political position of the federal authorities, and further emphasized that the situation in Tigray must remain an internal affair of Ethiopia and that interference by the Council would be counterproductive. The representative of Estonia noted that it was clear that the conflict in Tigray constituted a threat to international peace and security, which was why it was vital that the issue remain a priority for the Council. The representative of Ethiopia questioned the rationale of calling the public meeting and implored the Council to act with full awareness of the external challenges that Ethiopia was facing.

At a subsequent meeting on the same issue, held on 26 August,³⁵¹ the Secretary-General noted that the military confrontation, which had started 10 months earlier in the northern region of Tigray, was spreading and the level of human suffering was growing, with serious political, economic and humanitarian implications for Ethiopia and the broader region. He said that all the parties must recognize that there was no military solution and expressed the belief that there was an opportunity to address the conflict peacefully, which the parties must seize in the interest of Ethiopia. The Secretary-General emphasized the need to create the conditions for the start of an inclusive national political dialogue to address the underlying causes of the conflict and to ensure that Ethiopian voices

³⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8812](#), [S/PV.8843](#), [S/PV.8875](#) and [S/PV.8899](#).

³⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8812](#). Prior to the meeting, on 22 April the Council issued a statement to the press on Ethiopia, in which it noted with concern the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region. For more information, see [S/2021/1084](#).

³⁴⁶ On 15 June, the Council held an informal interactive dialogue on the humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (see [S/2021/1032](#)). For more information on the Council's informal interactive dialogues, see part II.

³⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8812](#).

³⁴⁸ United States, United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Estonia, India, Norway and France.

³⁴⁹ For more information on the discussion of the Council regarding threats to international peace and security, see part VII, sect. I.

³⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8812](#) (United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Mexico and Viet Nam).

³⁵¹ See [S/PV.8843](#).

directed the pathway to peace. He said that the United Nations was ready to cooperate with the African Union and other key partners to support such a dialogue and emphasized that the attention and unity of the Council would be critical in the period ahead.

Following the Secretary-General's briefing, some Council members³⁵² stated that the conflict in Tigray posed long-term consequences for the unity and stability of Ethiopia. Several Council members³⁵³ noted that the conflict also threatened the stability, peace and security of the Horn of Africa and the wider region. Most Council members expressed support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to end the conflict and welcomed the appointment of the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, as the African Union High Representative for the Horn of Africa. Echoing the Secretary-General, many Council members³⁵⁴ emphasized that there was no military solution to the conflict and that a political settlement was necessary. In that regard, the representatives of India, Kenya, also on behalf of the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia, and the Russian Federation emphasized that the dialogue should be led by Ethiopians. Most Council members³⁵⁵ argued in addition that African regional and subregional organizations had a crucial role to play in finding a political solution to end the crisis. The representative of the United States expressed deep concern about the role of Eritrea in fuelling the ongoing crisis, indicating that the presence of the Eritrean Defence Forces in Ethiopia remained a significant barrier to ceasefire negotiations and to a political resolution of the conflict. While noting that it was not possible to resolve the Tigray crisis through discussions in the Council, the representative of the Russian Federation said that it would be more effective if each Council member made its own contribution to resolving the situation, adding that the Russian Federation believed that emphasis needed to be placed on low-key diplomacy and bilateral channels of trust-based communication. The representative of United States stated instead that the trajectory of the conflict over the previous 10 months demanded continued Council action. Other Council members³⁵⁶ recalled the

importance of upholding the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. Several Council members³⁵⁷ denounced the limitations imposed on the entrance of humanitarian aid to the Tigray region and called for unfettered humanitarian access. Council members³⁵⁸ also welcomed and expressed support for the joint investigation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission into alleged atrocities committed in Tigray. The representative of Ethiopia stated that the state of affairs in his country had not transpired overnight, explaining that the genesis of the conflict dated back at least three decades. He asked for help to realize peace, including by putting pressure on the Tigray People's Liberation Front to stop its criminal advances, abandon preparations for combat and abide by the laws of the country. He added that the Front also needed to irrefutably delink itself from internal and external sponsors and affiliates. The representative of Ethiopia asked that the international community remove the actual or perceived support emanating from its side, off which the Tigray People's Liberation Front fed.

On 6 October, the Council held a third meeting on the Tigray region.³⁵⁹ At the meeting, the Council heard another briefing by the Secretary-General, who stated that up to 7 million people in Tigray, Amhara and Afar were in need of food assistance and other emergency support. An estimated 400,000 people in Tigray were living in famine-like conditions. There was a need to focus all efforts on saving lives and avoiding a massive human tragedy, which made the announcement by the Government of Ethiopia that it was expelling seven senior United Nations officials, most of them humanitarian staff, particularly disturbing. He said that the expulsion should be a matter of deep concern for all, as it related to the core of relations between the United Nations and Member States. The United Nations would continue to play its mandated role and work with the Government of Ethiopia and with local and international partners to support millions of people that needed humanitarian assistance in Tigray, Amhara and Afar and across Ethiopia, in full accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 46/182. The Secretary-General called on the Ethiopian authorities to allow the United Nations to do so without hindrance and to facilitate and enable its work

³⁵² Ireland, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

³⁵³ Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, China, Mexico and India.

³⁵⁴ Ireland, Estonia, France, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam and Mexico.

³⁵⁵ Ireland, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, China, Mexico and Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia).

³⁵⁶ Viet Nam, China and Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia).

³⁵⁷ Ireland, Estonia, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Mexico.

³⁵⁸ Ireland, Estonia, France, Norway, United Kingdom and Mexico.

³⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8875](#).

with the urgency that the situation demanded and appealed to all Council members to unify behind the efforts of the United Nations and its partners in Ethiopia.

Following the briefing of the Secretary-General, most Council members³⁶⁰ condemned or expressed regret at the decision of the Government of Ethiopia to expel eight key United Nations officials from the country. In that regard, the representative of Estonia said that the expulsion endangered the work of humanitarian aid workers in northern Ethiopia, where they already faced violence and harassment. The representative of the United States called the expulsion an affront to the Council, the United Nations and all Member States, as well as shared humanitarian principles, and stated that if calls for humanitarian access continued to go unheard, the Council should consider all tools at its disposal, including a Council resolution, to save lives and promote international peace and security. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the view that pressure that involved the Council and threats regarding the adoption of resolutions were counterproductive. The representative of Ethiopia said that it was incomprehensible that the Council would be discussing a decision of a sovereign State and added that Ethiopia truly hoped that Council members would have the insight to leave the matter to the Government of Ethiopia and the United Nations. In addition to explaining the circumstances leading to the expulsion of eight United Nations staff members, he clarified that it was not Ethiopia's primary course of action, adding that Ethiopia had on multiple occasions explained its concerns to United Nations officials. In that regard, the representative of Ethiopia explained that on 8 July 2021, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia had written a letter to the Secretariat explaining, in great detail, the misconduct by United Nations staff that required corrective measures. In response to the representative of Ethiopia, the Secretary-General took the floor for a second time.³⁶¹ He stated that he had no knowledge of any written document being provided by the Government of Ethiopia to any United Nations entity concerning any of the eight United Nations staff members who were expelled and asked the representative of Ethiopia to provide him with a copy of the document so that he could investigate what had happened within the United Nations.

On 8 November, the Council held a fourth meeting on the Tigray region,³⁶² at which it heard

briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and by the High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa. In her remarks, the Under-Secretary-General reported that Tigrayan forces had in recent days advanced southward towards Addis Ababa, in coordination with the Oromo Liberation Army, and that the Government of Ethiopia had declared a nationwide state of emergency. She said that the risk of Ethiopia descending into widening civil war was real, which would bring about a humanitarian catastrophe and consume the future of such an important country. The Under-Secretary-General also stated that the report of the joint investigation into the conflict in Tigray conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, covering the period between November 2020 and June 2021, had concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict, including the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the Eritrean Defence Forces, the Amhara Special Forces and allied militia on one side and Tigrayan forces on the other, had committed violations of international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law, including attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks that resulted in civilian casualties and extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, sexual and gender-based violence and forced displacement. She also said that the report underlined the steps that needed to be taken to ensure accountability for those acts.

In his statement, the High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa noted that since his arrival in Ethiopia, on 4 November 2021, he had met with both the Prime Minister and the President of Ethiopia, as well as with the President of the Oromia region and Tigrayan leaders. Summarizing the discussions, he stated that all the leaders in Addis Ababa and in the north agreed individually that the differences between them were political and required a political solution through dialogue. The High Representative said that this constituted a window of opportunity that could collectively be tapped into to assist the people of Ethiopia to find a lasting solution to the ongoing crisis. He urged the Council to call on the international community to rally behind the African Union-led process so as to ensure coherence and unity of purpose in its peacekeeping efforts in the Horn of Africa, in particular in Ethiopia.

³⁶⁰ Estonia, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, China, India, Viet Nam, Mexico and Russian Federation.

³⁶¹ For further information on participation, see part II, sect. VIII.

³⁶² See [S/PV.8899](#).

In the statements that followed, Council members³⁶³ referred to the Council's statement to the press adopted on 5 November 2021, in which the Council called for an immediate ceasefire and the commencement of political dialogue. At the meeting,³⁶⁴ the representatives of Ireland and Mexico expressed disappointment at the Council's failure to prevent an escalation of the crisis in Ethiopia. The representative of Mexico expressed confidence, however, that the Council had learned from past mistakes and that this time it would assume its responsibility to facilitate a political process that would lead to peace in Ethiopia. Most Council members³⁶⁵ also recognized the role of African regional and subregional organizations,

³⁶³ Ireland, China, United States and Russian Federation.

³⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8899](#).

³⁶⁵ Ireland, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Norway, Viet Nam, China, France, India, Estonia, United States, Russian Federation and Mexico.

specifically the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, for their support for mediation efforts and assisting Ethiopia to find a solution to the Tigray crisis. The representative of China called for enhanced coordination between the United Nations and the African Union to promote nationwide peace and reconciliation in Ethiopia and for the international community, and the Council in particular, to give the time and space that was needed for the African Union and others to make use of their good offices. Furthermore, several Council members³⁶⁶ expressed concern at the use of hate speech and called for an end to the incitement to violence. In addition, the representative of the United Kingdom cautioned against the use of the state of emergency as an excuse to ignore human rights and international humanitarian law.

³⁶⁶ Ireland, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), Norway, Viet Nam, United Kingdom, France, United States and Mexico.

Table 1
Meetings: peace and security in Africa

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8812 2 July 2021			Ethiopia	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	12 Council members, ^{a,b} all invitees	
S/PV.8816 8 July 2021			Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan ^c	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8843 26 August 2021			Ethiopia		Secretary-General, 12 Council members, ^a invitee	
S/PV.8860 15 September 2021					One Council member (India)	S/PRST/2021/18

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8875 6 October 2021			Ethiopia		Secretary-General, 12 Council members, ^d invitee	
S/PV.8899 8 November 2021			Ethiopia	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa	12 Council members, ^d all invitees	
S/PV.8903 12 November 2021		Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2021/940)	Chad	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, President of the Burkina Faso chapter of the Network on Peace and Security for Women in the Economic Community of West African States Space	12 Council members, ^e all invitees ^f	

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b The United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for South Asia, North Africa, the United Nations and the Commonwealth.

^c Egypt was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ethiopia was represented by its Minister of Water, Irrigation and Energy; and the Sudan was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^d China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^e China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^f Chad spoke on behalf of the Group of Five for the Sahel.

Table 2
Videoconferences: peace and security in Africa

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
18 May 2021	S/2021/484	Letter dated 20 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
19 May 2021	S/2021/490	Letter dated 21 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	S/PRST/2021/10

10. The situation in Libya

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings concerning the situation in Libya and adopted five resolutions, including two under Chapter VII of the Charter, and four presidential statements. All the meetings that were not devoted to the adoption of decisions of the Council took the form of briefings.³⁶⁷ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held seven open videoconferences in connection with the item.³⁶⁸ More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held closed videoconferences, informal consultations of the whole and informal interactive dialogues to discuss the item.³⁶⁹ In 2021, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Envoy and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).³⁷⁰

In 2021, the Council heard one briefing by the outgoing Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL and five briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Libya and Head of UNSMIL, who succeeded the Acting Special Representative in accordance with Council resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#). The briefings focused on the ongoing political, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges facing Libya and the implementation of the road map of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, including the preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. The briefings also covered the work of UNSMIL towards the implementation of the Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism, as well as efforts to support the economic reform process and improve the security and humanitarian situation across the country. Other briefers included the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya, who briefed the Council on the activities and developments relating to the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts; the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, who provided updates on the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya; the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, who reiterated to the

Council the position of the League in favour of implementing the political road map in Libya; and two female civil society representatives, the co-founder of Tamazight Women's Movement and the Khalifa Ihler Institute, and an Assistant Professor at the University of Tripoli, political activist and member of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, both of whom gave briefings on the political environment in the lead-up to the elections, with the latter being also a female parliamentary candidate. Invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure were limited to Germany and Libya.³⁷¹

During her last briefing to Council members, on 28 January,³⁷² the Acting Special Representative reported on the implementation of the outcomes of the Berlin Conference on Libya of 19 January 2020, as endorsed by the Council in resolution [2510 \(2020\)](#). While noting that the Conference had not put an immediate end to the conflict, nor halted foreign interference, she indicated that its political, military and economic tracks had produced tangible progress. A ceasefire was in place, a course had been charted for the restoration of democratic legitimacy and long-overdue economic and financial reforms were under way. She reported that the Berlin Conference had created an international umbrella for the United Nations to work directly with the Libyan parties, military officers, political forces and thought leaders to seek a "Libyan-Libyan" resolution to the conflict. She further noted that progress had been made regarding the selection of a new executive authority to govern Libya in the lead up to the national elections. The Acting Special Representative also reported on the preparations for national elections envisaged for 24 December 2021. She noted that while the guns had fallen silent, communities continued to face the repercussions of war and the convulsions related to the gross violations of human rights committed during the conflict. The situation regarding the uncontrolled proliferation of arms, ammunition and explosive ordnance continued to pose a major threat.

On 9 February, the Council adopted a presidential statement by which it welcomed the agreement reached by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum on a new unified interim executive authority charged with

³⁶⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

³⁶⁸ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

³⁶⁹ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 37, and [S/2021/1084](#).

³⁷⁰ See [S/2021/58](#) and [S/2021/59](#).

³⁷¹ At the meeting held on 3 June, 27 Member States who were co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document [S/2021/523](#) were invited to participate under rule 37 but did not speak.

³⁷² See [S/2021/97](#).

leading the country to elections.³⁷³ The Council also called upon the newly elected interim executive authority in Libya swiftly to form an inclusive Government and make the necessary preparations for presidential and parliamentary elections.³⁷⁴ The Council called on all parties to implement the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement in full, urged Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay and called for full compliance with the arms embargo by all Member States.³⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Council underlined the importance of a credible and effective Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism under United Nations auspices, welcomed the critical steps towards United Nations support for the mechanism through the swift deployment of a United Nations advance team to Libya and looked forward to receiving proposals on the tasks and scale of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism from the Secretary-General.³⁷⁶ On 12 March, the Council adopted a second presidential statement on Libya, in which it welcomed the vote of confidence by the House of Representatives to endorse the cabinet of a new unified interim Libyan government charged with leading the country up to elections.³⁷⁷ The Council also called on the forthcoming interim government to make the necessary preparations for free and fair national presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021, improve the delivery of services to the Libyan people, launch a comprehensive national reconciliation process, adhere to obligations under international humanitarian law and prioritize the full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement.³⁷⁸ The Council again called on all parties to implement the ceasefire agreement in full and urged Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay.³⁷⁹

In his first briefing to Council members, on 24 March,³⁸⁰ the new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General notified the Council that the UNSMIL leadership had returned to Libya. Addressing the political situation in the country, the Special Envoy indicated that following the selection on 5 February by

the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum of the new interim executive authority to govern Libya for the period leading up to national elections set for 24 December, the House of Representatives, on 10 March, had overwhelmingly endorsed the Government of National Unity proposed by the Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. The Special Envoy stressed the need to maintain momentum on all intra-Libyan tracks so as to fulfil the objectives and underscored that for elections to be possible in December, the necessary electoral legislation needed to be adopted by 31 July. The Special Envoy reported that on 3 March, the Secretary-General had deployed an advance team to Libya to assess possible United Nations support for the Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism. While the ceasefire agreement continued to hold, there were reports of ongoing fortifications and the setting up of defensive positions in central Libya, as well as of the continuous presence of foreign assets and elements. Despite a dramatic reduction in civilian casualties, UNSMIL continued to document killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, attacks against activists and human rights defenders, hate crimes and sexual violence.

On 16 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2570 (2021), by which it welcomed the interim Presidency Council and the interim Government of National Unity as the Government of Libya charged with leading the country up to national elections on 24 December 2021. The Council called on the interim Government of National Unity to make the necessary preparations for the elections and recalled the role of UNSMIL to provide support, including electoral support, to the Libyan transition process.³⁸¹ By the same resolution, the Council approved the proposals of the Secretary-General on the composition and operational aspects of the ceasefire monitoring component with the aim of implementing the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement in full and requested UNSMIL to provide support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism.³⁸²

On 21 May,³⁸³ the Special Envoy provided a briefing to the Council on developments regarding the

³⁷³ S/PRST/2021/4, first paragraph.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., third paragraph.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., seventh paragraph.

³⁷⁷ S/PRST/2021/6, first paragraph.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., fourth and fifth paragraphs.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., sixth paragraph.

³⁸⁰ See S/2021/292.

³⁸¹ Resolution 2570 (2021), paras. 1, 2 and 6. See also the letter dated 21 January 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/70), conveying the request of the Government of National Accord of Libya for United Nations support and technical assistance to conduct national general elections.

³⁸² Resolution 2570 (2021), para. 16.

³⁸³ See S/2021/498.

preparations for the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December, including the support provided by UNSMIL to the legal committee of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum on the legal framework for the elections. The Special Envoy also reported that on 5 April the Libyan Presidency Council had announced the establishment of a high national reconciliation commission. The ceasefire continued to hold and during the reporting period hundreds of prisoners and detainees had been released by the two sides. Progress on reopening the coastal road between Sirte and Misrata had stalled, however, as had the start of the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces, thus entrenching the division of Libya. He further noted that the Panel of Experts in its most recent report had “painted a bleak picture” of non-compliance with the arms embargo, and he emphasized that the continued presence and activities of mercenaries, foreign fighters and armed groups was a threat to the entire region. In connection with the deployment of UNSMIL monitors in support of the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism authorized by the Council by resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), he indicated that the Secretariat was planning to deploy a forward presence to Tripoli of a total of 10 monitors from existing United Nations capacities.

During a high-level meeting on the situation in Libya held on 15 July,³⁸⁴ Council members heard a briefing by the Special Envoy on the support provided by his office to facilitate the establishment of a constitutional basis for the 24 December elections. The Special Envoy indicated that institutional, political and individual interests were impeding an agreement on the necessary legal framework for holding the elections and underlined that UNSMIL continued to facilitate efforts to find common ground. He expressed regret that the ramifications of the political impasse and the risk it posed to the security and economic tracks were already beginning to manifest themselves. He also expressed his concern that even though the ceasefire agreement continued to hold, the unity of the Joint Military Commission and the implementation of the agreement could unravel if the political process remained stalled. On the deployment of an UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component in support of the Libyan-led, Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, preparations were ongoing, but as yet there was no clarity on when the Libyan component of the mechanism would be in place. The security situation was further complicated by recent attacks and a renewed terrorist threat by Al-Qaida in the Islamic

Maghreb and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh), particularly in the south, and there had been a dramatic increase in the number of migrants and refugees arbitrarily detained in official detention centres. Noting that the security, political and economic tracks were interdependent, the Special Envoy stated that positive steps were needed to avoid backsliding on all tracks.

At the same meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement in which it welcomed the Second Berlin Conference, convened on 23 June 2021, the conference conclusions and the commitment of the participants to the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process, expressed support for the interim Presidency Council and the interim Government of National Unity as the Government of Libya charged with leading the country up to presidential and parliamentary national elections on 24 December 2021, urged all relevant actors to support the full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya, and recalled its decision that all Member States should comply with the arms embargo on Libya.³⁸⁵

On 10 September,³⁸⁶ Council members heard a briefing by the Special Envoy in which he reported on his visit to Libya in July, during which he had urged major political actors and some civil society representatives to secure an agreement for protecting the electoral path and managing the post-electoral situation. He provided updates on the preparations for the elections and called on the international community to help create conditions conducive for the holding of elections by facilitating the gradual withdrawal of foreign elements from Libya. He underlined the critical importance of international and domestic observation of the electoral process. The Special Envoy also brought to the attention of the Council that, since mid-August, there had been numerous calls by the Parliament to question the Government of National Unity for lack of performance, as well as calls for a vote of no confidence against the Government in the Parliament. He cautioned that such attempts to change the interim executive so close to the date of elections could create more uncertainty and expressed dismay that the political stalemate was already casting a shadow over the security scene, with several western coastal areas experiencing sporadic conflict and fighting among various units of the security forces. The Special Envoy concluded that Libya was at a

³⁸⁴ See [S/PV.8820](#).

³⁸⁵ [S/PRST/2021/12](#), first, second, tenth and eleventh paragraphs.

³⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8855](#).

crossroads, where positive or negative outcomes were equally possible.

On 24 November,³⁸⁷ the Council heard the last briefing by the Special Envoy following his announcement that he would be stepping down from the role in December. The Special Envoy informed Council members that the final declaration agreed upon at the Paris International Conference for Libya, which was held on 12 November and co-chaired by Libya, had stressed the importance of all Libyan stakeholders committing unequivocally to the holding of free, fair, inclusive and credible presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December, as well as to the conclusions of the Second Berlin Conference of 23 June, and accepting the outcomes of the elections. He noted that the Conference had highlighted the importance of a smooth transfer of power following the announcement of the results of both the presidential and the parliamentary elections. The Special Envoy also provided updates on preparations for the elections, including developments regarding the electoral framework and the electoral calendar. He reported that the political climate in Libya remained heavily polarized, with persistent opposition to the holding of the elections on the basis of the existing legal framework and tensions rising over the eligibility of some high-profile presidential candidates, along with fears of armed confrontation or that the current framework might take the country back to authoritarianism. He warned that as the elections approached, there was a risk that entrenched political and institutional divisions would turn into confrontation. He also stressed that the fragmentation of the political context, lack of an inclusive political and electoral process, the ensuing lack of trust and consensus and continued controversies surrounding the electoral process could undermine its implementation. The Special Envoy warned that not holding the elections could deteriorate the situation in the country further and called on the international community to remain united in its support for elections and engaged in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process so as to minimize the risks of polarization and confrontation.

On the security situation, the Special Envoy reported that while the ceasefire continued to hold, the presence of foreign fighters, foreign forces and mercenaries remained a cause of grave concern. He added, nonetheless, that the 5+5 Joint Military Commission with UNSMIL support and facilitation had convened in Geneva on 8 October and had developed an action plan for the withdrawal of foreign

forces in a synchronized, phased, gradual and balanced manner, in alignment with the ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020 and Council resolutions [2570 \(2021\)](#) and [2571 \(2021\)](#), as well as the outcomes of the Berlin Conferences. He noted that the action plan had been presented at the Libya Stabilization Conference held in Tripoli on 21 October by the Government of National Unity. Subsequently, Egypt had hosted 5+5 Joint Military Commission coordination talks with Libya's southern neighbours (Chad, the Niger and the Sudan) in Cairo from 29 October to 1 November, which had concluded with an agreement on a concept for an effective communication and coordination mechanism to support the implementation of the action plan. In connection with the ceasefire, the Special Envoy announced that the first group of United Nations ceasefire monitors had been deployed to Libya on 10 October.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement by which it welcomed the Paris International Conference for Libya, the declaration issued by the participants and their commitment to the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and to supporting the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process.³⁸⁸ The Council also welcomed the Libyan Stabilization Conference convened on 21 October in Tripoli and expressed its support for parliamentary and presidential elections on 24 December, while also stressing the importance of a peaceful transfer of power in Libya following the elections.³⁸⁹ By the same presidential statement, the Council strongly urged all Libyan stakeholders to commit to accepting the election results and to respect the rights of their political opponents before, during and after the elections.³⁹⁰ The Council also recognized the important role of the good offices of UNSMIL and the Special Envoy to support dialogue and national reconciliation in the context of the elections.³⁹¹ The Council also recalled that individuals or entities that threatened the peace, stability or security of Libya or obstructed or undermined the successful completion of its political transition, including by obstructing or undermining the elections, might be designated for its sanctions.³⁹² The Council welcomed the action plan agreed to by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission on 8 October for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya and called on all relevant actors to facilitate its

³⁸⁷ See [S/PV.8912](#).

³⁸⁸ [S/PRST/2021/24](#), first paragraph.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, second and third paragraph.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, fifth paragraph.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph.

synchronized, phased, gradual and balanced implementation.³⁹³

In addition to the security, political and economic situation, the Acting Special Representative and the Special Envoy reported throughout the year on the situation of migrants and asylum seekers in Libya, violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and the economic and institutional challenges facing Libya.³⁹⁴

During the period under review, the Council also heard regular briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011). In his three briefings to the Council in 2021,³⁹⁵ the Chair reported on the activities and developments relating to the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts. In his briefings, he highlighted the implementation and violations of the sanctions regime, namely, the arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban and timebound authorizations and measures aimed at preventing the illicit export of petroleum from Libya. The Chair also reported on the exemption requests and notifications received with respect to the travel ban, assets freeze and arms embargo.³⁹⁶

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court provided briefings to the Council twice in 2021, to report on the progress and challenges relating to the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya. In her last briefing to the Council³⁹⁷ before the end of her mandate on 15 June 2021, the Prosecutor informed the Council of the engagement by her Libya team with the relevant Libyan national authorities following the discovery of multiple mass graves in the city of Tarhunah, including the team's visit to the crime scenes and meetings with prosecutorial, investigative and forensic agencies involved in the investigation. She reported that her team had also met with survivors and family members of victims of the air strike on the Hadbah Military College in Tripoli on 4 January 2020, as well as displaced persons from Benghazi and victims of the crimes committed in Tarhunah. The Prosecutor also reported on the activities of her office relating to investigations into serious crimes allegedly committed in official and unofficial detention facilities

in Libya and emphasized that the failure to execute the Court's warrants remained a major obstacle preventing her Office from seeking effective justice for the victims of atrocity crimes committed in Libya. In that connection, she informed Council members that two of the individuals who remained at large, namely, Mr. Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled and Mr. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf al-Werfalli, were reported dead, which, if confirmed, would mean that those suspects would have de facto escaped accountability. The third suspect, Mr. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, remained at large and his arrest warrant remained unexecuted.

On 23 November,³⁹⁸ the Council heard a briefing from the new Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, which was his first briefing to the Council on Libya since being sworn in on 16 June 2021. The Prosecutor emphasized that the Council's referrals, including that of the situation in Libya, were a priority for his Office and noted that the reporting period had been challenging owing to the COVID-19 pandemic and the security situation in Libya. He informed Council members that his team had not been able to travel to Libya but expressed his intention to visit the country in early 2022. He reported progress in the investigations despite the challenges encountered and indicated that his office had taken steps to further confirm or try to verify the reports of the deaths of Mr. Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled and Mr. Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf al-Werfalli. The Prosecutor also indicated that his Office had looked further into the attacks on Tripoli in April 2019, including those related to the Tarhunah mass graves, as well as the allegations of human rights abuses in detention facilities, including rape, torture and sexual and gender-based violence. He also drew attention to the excessive use of violence against migrants and their arbitrary detention.

During the period under review, the Council also heard briefings by two female civil society representatives. On 10 September,³⁹⁹ the co-founder of Tamazight Women's Movement and the Khalifa Ihler Institute emphasized the dangers of holding ill-prepared elections without a firm democratic foundation and due process. She added that if the elections did not happen or the results were disputed, the result would be a more fractured society and a violent armed conflict that could destroy the country. She further warned that the planned presidential election was at best a flawed attempt at instating democracy and at worst would leave Libya to another despotic dictatorship. She called for the mandate of UNSMIL to be more clearly defined and its role more

³⁹³ Ibid., ninth paragraph.

³⁹⁴ See [S/2021/97](#), [S/2021/292](#), [S/2021/498](#), [S/PV.8820](#), [S/PV.8855](#) and [S/PV.8912](#).

³⁹⁵ See [S/2021/498](#), [S/PV.8855](#) and [S/PV.8912](#).

³⁹⁶ For more details on the sanctions measures concerning Libya, see part VII, sect. III. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and its Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

³⁹⁷ See [S/2021/483](#).

³⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8911](#).

³⁹⁹ See [S/PV.8855](#).

effectively communicated and urged Council members to consider supporting Libya's democratic journey through a series of measures. On 24 November,⁴⁰⁰ an Assistant Professor at the University of Tripoli, political activist and member of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum expressed her concern about the 24 December elections, noting that the plan to hold parliamentary and presidential elections simultaneously was not being respected. She underlined that just weeks ahead of the elections, there was still no consensus among key stakeholders about their legal framework and no confirmation from the parties that electoral results would be accepted. That ambiguity, she added, threatened the outcome of the electoral process. She also expressed concern that if steps were not taken to strengthen the electoral environment, the elections could exacerbate geographic divisions and contribute to civil unrest. There was much more the Council could do to secure the electoral process, including by insisting that international observers should be in place ahead of the elections and by calling on UNSMIL to mediate between the parties so that differences could be addressed and basic consensus on the legal framework for the elections could be forged.

In their deliberations in 2021, Council members welcomed the progress attained in the implementation of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map and expressed support for the holding of presidential and legislative elections on 24 December 2021. Many Council members also expressed support for the request by the Secretary-General for the Council to give UNSMIL a mandate for the deployment of a ceasefire monitoring component to support the Libyan-led and Libyan owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism.⁴⁰¹ In November, several Council members welcomed the deployment of United Nations ceasefire monitors.⁴⁰² Council members called for the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces from Libya,⁴⁰³ compliance with the arms embargo,⁴⁰⁴ the

need for the unification of institutions in Libya,⁴⁰⁵ the improvement of basic services in the country,⁴⁰⁶ national reconciliation,⁴⁰⁷ full and meaningful political participation

Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8820](#) (France, Tunisia, Kenya, United States, India, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Niger, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Viet Nam, Norway, China and Mexico); [S/PV.8855](#) (United Kingdom, Niger, Tunisia, France, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, India, United States, Mexico, Viet Nam, Kenya and Ireland); and [S/PV.8912](#) (United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Niger, Ireland, Norway, Tunisia, United States, China, India, Estonia, Viet Nam and Kenya).

⁴⁰⁴ See [S/2021/97](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/292](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/498](#) (China, Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8820](#) (Kenya, India, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, Norway and Mexico); [S/PV.8855](#) (Niger, Tunisia, France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, United States, Viet Nam and Kenya); and [S/PV.8912](#) (Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, India, France, Viet Nam and Mexico).

⁴⁰⁵ See [S/2021/97](#) (United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/2021/292](#) (France, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United States); [S/2021/498](#) (Kenya, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom and United States); [S/PV.8820](#) (France, Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Viet Nam and China); [S/PV.8855](#) (Niger, France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8912](#) (India).

⁴⁰⁶ See [S/2021/97](#) (Mexico); [S/2021/292](#) (Ireland, Kenya and Norway); [S/2021/498](#) (China, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United Kingdom); [S/PV.8820](#) (United Kingdom and China); and [S/PV.8912](#) (Niger).

⁴⁰⁷ See [S/2021/97](#) (Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya, Niger and Tunisia); [S/2021/292](#) (Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and United Kingdom); [S/2021/498](#) (Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya, Niger, Norway and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); [S/PV.8820](#) (Kenya, India, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Ireland); [S/PV.8855](#) (Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, Mexico, Viet Nam, Kenya and Ireland); and [S/PV.8912](#) (Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, India and Viet Nam).

⁴⁰⁰ [S/PV.8912](#).

⁴⁰¹ See [S/2021/97](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); and [S/2021/292](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam).

⁴⁰² See [S/PV.8912](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Tunisia, United States, Estonia and Kenya).

⁴⁰³ See [S/2021/97](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/292](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/498](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico,

of women⁴⁰⁸ and addressing Libya's concerns regarding the management of its frozen assets.⁴⁰⁹ Council members expressed concern about the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country, in particular the conditions and arbitrary detention of migrants and refugees.⁴¹⁰ Some Council members further underscored the importance of ensuring that efforts undertaken for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces should include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures to prevent instability in neighbouring countries and the Sahel region.⁴¹¹ In November, most Council members welcomed the action plan of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission for the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁸ See [S/2021/292](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/2021/498](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8820](#) (United Kingdom, Estonia, Ireland, Viet Nam, Norway and Mexico); [S/PV.8855](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Viet Nam, Estonia, Kenya and Ireland); and [S/PV.8912](#) (United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Norway, Tunisia, Estonia, France and Mexico).

⁴⁰⁹ See [S/2021/97](#) (China, India and Russian Federation); [S/2021/292](#) (India and Russian Federation); [S/2021/498](#) (China, Kenya and Russian Federation); [S/PV.8820](#) (China); [S/PV.8855](#) (Kenya); and [S/PV.8912](#) (China and Kenya).

⁴¹⁰ See [S/2021/97](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/292](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and United States); [S/2021/498](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8820](#) (Kenya, Niger, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Viet Nam, Norway and Mexico); [S/PV.8855](#) (Niger, France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United States, Mexico, Viet Nam, Estonia, Kenya and Ireland); and [S/PV.8912](#) (Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Norway, Estonia, France, Viet Nam, Kenya and Mexico).

⁴¹¹ See [S/2021/97](#) (China, India, Kenya and Niger); [S/2021/292](#) (France, Kenya, Mexico, Niger and Norway); [S/2021/498](#) (China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); [S/PV.8820](#) (France, Tunisia, Kenya, India, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Viet Nam, Norway and China); [S/PV.8855](#) (Tunisia, France, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, India and Kenya); and [S/PV.8912](#) (Niger, Ireland, Norway, Tunisia, China, India and Kenya).

⁴¹² See [S/PV.8912](#) (United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Tunisia, United States, China, India, Estonia, France, Viet Nam, Kenya and Mexico).

Following the briefings by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, several Council members welcomed the activities of the Office of the Prosecutor, including the recent missions to Libya and the intention to visit Libya in early 2022,⁴¹³ and encouraged further collaboration between the Office of the Prosecutor and the Government of National Unity and all relevant stakeholders in seeking accountability for crimes committed on Libyan territory.⁴¹⁴ Some Council members expressed concern, however, about reports of recent criminal activities, including disappearances, arbitrary detentions, murder, inhumane treatment, torture, crimes against migrants and refugees and gender-based violence.⁴¹⁵ Some Council members welcomed the updates provided by the Prosecutor on the investigation of mass graves in Tarhunah.⁴¹⁶ Many Council Members expressed concern about the lack of progress in implementing the arrest warrants issued by the Court in the case of Al-Werfalli, Al-Tuhamy and Al-Qadhafi.⁴¹⁷ Some Council members recalled the importance of observing the principle of complementarity regarding the Court's investigations and national investigations and prosecution of crimes committed within Libyan territory.⁴¹⁸ The representative of Libya also noted that his country viewed the role of the Court to be complementary, especially in regard to persons outside State jurisdiction, and called for cooperation by all States with the Libyan judicial authorities in conducting investigations and handing over wanted persons to the national justice system. He also called on the International Criminal Court to prosecute human traffickers, smugglers and their cross-border networks

⁴¹³ See [S/2021/483](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger and Tunisia); and [S/PV.8911](#) (Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Niger, France, United Kingdom and Tunisia).

⁴¹⁴ See [S/2021/483](#) (Estonia, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United Kingdom); and [S/PV.8911](#) (Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Niger, Ireland, Norway, Estonia and Tunisia).

⁴¹⁵ See [S/2021/483](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, United Kingdom and United States); and [S/PV.8911](#) (Mexico, Niger, France, Ireland, United States, Norway, United Kingdom and Estonia).

⁴¹⁶ See [S/2021/483](#) (France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, United Kingdom and United States); and [S/PV.8911](#) (United States).

⁴¹⁷ See [S/2021/483](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States); and [S/PV.8911](#) (Mexico, Ireland, United States, United Kingdom and Estonia).

⁴¹⁸ See [S/2021/483](#) (France, Kenya, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia); and [S/PV.8911](#) (Mexico, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, France, Ireland, Kenya and Tunisia).

in Africa and Europe in addition to those involved inside Libya.⁴¹⁹

During his participation in Council meetings and videoconferences on Libya, the representative of Libya called on all States to abide by the conclusions of the Berlin Conference on Libya and support the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the conclusions of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, in particular the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries.⁴²⁰ He stated that harmful international interference in his country continued, that the Council remained divided and that Libya was being used as “an arena to settle scores by proxy”.⁴²¹ In that regard, he called on the Council to work to end all forms of interference in Libya.⁴²² He demanded that all foreign forces, mercenaries and armed groups who were not under State control withdraw and disarm and called for Council support in that regard, to prevent them from becoming a threat in neighbouring countries and the Sahel and to the current political process in the country.⁴²³ He welcomed the role of UNSMIL in supporting the political process and called on the United Nations to send a team to Libya to evaluate electoral support needs.⁴²⁴ In that connection, he also underlined the importance of national reconciliation⁴²⁵ and called on the Council to endorse the Libyan-owned and Libyan-led political process, including the road map to the 24 December elections, and to hold obstructionists to the electoral process accountable.⁴²⁶ Regarding the issue of sanctions, he expressed indignation about the status of Libyan funds and assets frozen pursuant to Council resolutions and objected to the manner in which some countries were taking advantage of the decision to freeze Libyan assets to the detriment of the Libyan people while also repeatedly requesting that the sanctions regime be amended.⁴²⁷

In addition to the decisions described above, on 16 April the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2571 (2021) under Chapter VII of the Charter. In that resolution, the Council decided to extend until 30 July 2022 the authorizations provided and measures imposed by resolutions 2146 (2014), 2441 (2018) and 2509 (2020).⁴²⁸ The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by resolution 1973

(2011) until 15 August 2022 and requested that the Panel closely follow and report to the Committee any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import into Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products.⁴²⁹ The Council also called on all Member States to comply fully with the arms embargo and not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbated the conflict.⁴³⁰ Following the adoption of the resolution by written procedure,⁴³¹ in statements explaining their votes,⁴³² the delegation of the Russian Federation stated that it had voted in favour of resolution 2571 (2021) to demonstrate its desire for consensus even though the Russian Federation did not see a need to include updated language on ending contacts with Libyan parallel institutions, nor did it see the sanctions aspect to the problem of illegal imports of petroleum products into Libya, and the representative of the United States stated that her country’s affirmative vote on the resolution underscored that by passing the resolution and resolution 2570 (2021), the Council was showing its support to the United Nations-facilitated political process in Libya and to the mandate of the Panel of Experts and the authorizations and sanctions measures related to illicit petroleum exports. On 3 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2578 (2021) under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it extended the authorizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, as set out in resolution 2526 (2020), for a further 12 months.⁴³³

On 15 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2595 (2021), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL until 30 September 2021.⁴³⁴ In a statement after the vote,⁴³⁵ the representative of the Russian Federation explained that his country had supported the technical resolution to extend the mandate of UNSMIL because it was aimed at giving all countries an opportunity to find a common denominator on the work of UNSMIL in the upcoming, complex stage in the political process in Libya and stressed that all of the Council’s efforts should be aimed at helping the Libyan people adhere to the timetable for the 24 December elections. By contrast,

⁴¹⁹ See S/2021/483 and S/PV.8911.

⁴²⁰ See S/2021/498.

⁴²¹ See S/2021/97.

⁴²² See S/2021/498 and S/PV.8912.

⁴²³ See S/2021/97, S/2021/292, S/PV.8820 and S/PV.8855.

⁴²⁴ See S/2021/498 and S/PV.8855.

⁴²⁵ See S/2021/97, S/2021/292 and S/PV.8820.

⁴²⁶ See S/2021/97, S/2021/292, S/PV.8820 and S/PV.8912.

⁴²⁷ See S/2021/97, S/2021/498, S/PV.8820 and S/PV.8912.

⁴²⁸ Resolution 2571 (2021), para. 2.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., paras. 3 and 12.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., para. 5.

⁴³¹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁴³² See S/2021/382.

⁴³³ Resolution 2578 (2021), para. 1.

⁴³⁴ For more information on the mandate of UNSMIL, see part X, sect. II.

⁴³⁵ See S/PV.8858.

the representative of the United States expressed disappointment in the inability of the Council to reach consensus on a new mandate for UNSMIL and expressed his country's commitment to achieving a mandate that put UNSMIL in the best position to advance preparations for the 24 December elections and to support the implementation of the ceasefire. He recalled that the independent strategic review conducted by the Secretary-General⁴³⁶ had concluded that the situation on the ground in Libya had changed since the UNSMIL mandate was last renewed and he underlined that the ceasefire agreement created an opportunity for UNSMIL to engage directly with stakeholders on the ground in Libya to move the process forward.⁴³⁷ The review had recommended that the Head of Mission be relocated to Tripoli as a matter of priority in order to increase engagement with Libyan actors, which was critical at that juncture in the political process. In closing, he called on all members of the Council to work together expeditiously to adopt a mandate that implemented the recommendations of the independent review so that UNSMIL could intensify its efforts.

Two weeks later, on 30 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2599 (2021), extending the mandate of UNSMIL until 31 January 2022. After the vote,⁴³⁸ the penholder for the draft resolution, the representative of the United Kingdom, echoed by the representative of Kenya, expressed regret that Council members had been unable to arrive at a compromise text. The representative of France expressed full support for UNSMIL and its efforts in supporting the political transition process, the implementation of the ceasefire and the preparation for the 24 December elections and indicated that the Council must restructure UNSMIL at the time of the next mandate renewal in January 2022. He emphasized that such restructuring was not a goal in and of itself. It must be a tool to strengthen the effectiveness of the work of UNSMIL. The representative of the United

States referred to the vote as an unfortunate outcome for both the Libyan people and the Council and underscored that the Council had failed to implement the recommendations from the Secretary-General's independent strategic review at a crucial time, considering the critical importance of United Nations support for the December national elections. He reiterated that the recommendations made in the report on the independent review on the leadership structure of UNSMIL reflected the Libyan conviction that locating the Head of Mission in Libya was essential, and the failure to do so then served only to undermine collective efforts to stabilize Libya. He called on the members of the Council to work together expeditiously over the following months to adopt a mandate that would offer the best approach to resolving stalemates and encouraging the political process. In the same vein, the representative of Kenya referred to the technical rollover of the mandate of UNSMIL as indicative of the failure of the Council to reach a common understanding and approach to facilitating the success of UNSMIL and stated that it represented a missed opportunity to include important elements in the mandate of the Mission, including support for Libya's national reconciliation efforts, and to take into account issues of interest to neighbouring States and the region. He said that it was disappointing that the negotiations had not yielded a consensus text. He recalled that the African voice was strong in seeking inclusion in the top leadership during the last mandate renewal and urged the Council to listen better to Africa, including by placing Africans in the leadership of peace processes in Africa. The representatives of China and the Russian Federation expressed support for discussing the adjustment of the leadership of UNSMIL after the conclusion of the electoral process.

Developments in Libya were also considered under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security".⁴³⁹

⁴³⁶ See [S/2021/716](#).

⁴³⁷ See [S/PV.8858](#).

⁴³⁸ See [S/PV.8870](#).

⁴³⁹ For more information, see sect. 34 below.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Libya

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8783 3 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council	Draft resolution submitted by 30 Member States ^a	27 Member States ^b			Resolution 2578 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	resolution 2526 (2020) (S/2021/434)	(S/2021/523)				
S/PV.8820 15 July 2021			Germany, Libya ^c	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Secretary-General of the League of Arab States	All Council members, ^d all invitees	S/PRST/2021/12
S/PV.8855 10 September 2021	Letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/716) Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL (S/2021/752)		Libya	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, co-founder of Tamazight Women's Movement and the Khalifa Ihler Institute	All Council members, ^e all invitees	
S/PV.8858 15 September 2021	Letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/716) Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL (S/2021/752)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/795)			Two Council members (Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution 2595 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8870 30 September 2021	Letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/716)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/838)			Seven Council members ^f	Resolution 2599 (2021) 15-0-0

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL (S/2021/752)					
S/PV.8911 23 November 2021			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8912 24 November 2021			Libya	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant Professor at the University of Tripoli, political activist and member of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum	All Council members, ^e all invitees ^g	S/PRST/2021/24

^a Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.

^b Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.

^c Libya was represented by the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity and Germany was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^d France was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Kenya was represented by its Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Tunisia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet and India was represented by its Foreign Secretary.

^e The representative of India spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and once in his national capacity.

^f China, France, Kenya, Tunisia, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^g The Special Envoy and the Assistant Professor at the University of Tripoli participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2

Videoconferences: the situation in Libya

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
28 January 2021	S/2021/97	Letter dated 1 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
9 February 2021	No record, (see A/76/2, part II, chap. 37)		S/PRST/2021/4

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
12 March 2021	No record, (see A/76/2 , part II, chap. 37)		S/PRST/2021/6
24 March 2021	S/2021/292	Letter dated 26 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
16 April 2021	S/2021/381	Letter dated 16 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2570 (2021) 15-0-0 S/2021/373
16 April 2021	S/2021/382	Letter dated 19 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2571 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/374
17 May 2021	S/2021/483	Letter dated 19 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
21 May 2021	S/2021/498	Letter dated 25 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

11. The situation in Mali

During the period under review, the Council held five meetings and adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in connection with the situation in Mali. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings and two were convened for the adoption of decisions.⁴⁴⁰ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held two open videoconferences in connection with the item.⁴⁴¹ More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. The Council also held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) pursuant to resolution [1353](#)

(2001).⁴⁴² In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held closed videoconferences and informal consultations of the whole.⁴⁴³ In 2021, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA.⁴⁴⁴

In 2021, the Council was briefed three times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA and once each by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and by a civil society representative. Briefings were conducted in connection

⁴⁴⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁴⁴¹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁴⁴² The private meeting was held on 7 June in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.8788](#) and [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 20.

⁴⁴³ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 38. See also [S/2021/683](#), [S/2021/1014](#), [S/2021/1084](#) and [S/2021/1032](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences.

⁴⁴⁴ See [S/2021/261](#) and [S/2021/262](#).

with the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali.⁴⁴⁵ The Council was also briefed once by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali.

On 13 January, at an open videoconference,⁴⁴⁶ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed Council members that the period under consideration had been marked by the negotiations for the establishment of the National Transition Council. He recalled that the Transition Council would serve as the national Parliament during the transition and was in charge of approving the political, institutional, electoral and administrative reforms that were crucial for the consolidation of democracy and the success of credible elections, allowing for a return to constitutional order. Despite the lack of consensus throughout the negotiations on the appointment of members of the Government and the National Transition Council, all organs of the transition were operational. With regard to security, the Special Representative emphasized that MINUSMA continued to adapt and strengthen its capacities to better respond to the two strategic priorities set forth in its mandate, adding that the Mission remained committed to supporting the Government's strategy in addressing a worrisome security environment in Mali and the region and intercommunal violence in the centre of the country. With regard to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015, he informed Council members that on 18 December 2020 the signatory parties had adopted a new revised road map of priority actions to speed up the Agreement's implementation.

On 6 April, at an open videoconference,⁴⁴⁷ the Under-Secretary-General informed Council members about a recent major attack against MINUSMA peacekeepers, which served as a reminder of the challenges facing Mali and the Sahel subregion alike. He noted that the attack had taken place against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation in central and northern Mali. Against that backdrop, the Under-Secretary-General reiterated the call of the Secretary-General to scale up and strengthen the response of the international community to the issue of terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel region. Expressing concern about ongoing destabilizing activities by militias operating along ethnic lines in central Mali, he further called on Mali's transitional Government to devise a comprehensive approach to improve the security situation in parallel with efforts to protect civilians and restore State authority and basic social services. Noting that any sustainable improvement in the security situation in Mali was predicated on the success of the political transition, the

Under-Secretary-General underlined that that would depend on the commitment of the Malian stakeholders to ensure that the transition and the key reform processes underpinning it remained inclusive, transparent and credible. He encouraged Malian political actors to work in a spirit of compromise and enact reforms aimed at creating an environment conducive to peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible elections. While the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation had remained slow, a positive momentum and a new sense of trust among the Malian parties had emerged. In that regard, he urged Malian stakeholders to build on that momentum to accelerate the redeployment and effective use of the reconstituted units of the army in the north of the country, the operationalization of the Northern Development Zone and the establishment of the territorial police. In closing, the Under-Secretary-General emphasized that the support of the international community and that of the Council remained of the utmost importance to ensure that national stakeholders lived up to their commitments.

At the meeting held on 14 June,⁴⁴⁸ the Special Representative recalled that he had, in the context of a private meeting, briefed the Council on the events leading up to 24 May 2021 when the President and Prime Minister of the National Transition Government had been overthrown. He reported that the coup had been condemned by the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), meeting in Accra on 30 May, and by the African Union Peace and Security Council, meeting in Addis Ababa on 1 June. The Special Representative noted that Colonel Assimi Goïta had been sworn in on 7 June 2021 as President of the transition and that he had on the same date signed a decree appointing Choguel Maïga as Prime Minister. The formation of a new government had been announced on 11 June. He also informed Council members that the transitional President and the Prime Minister had provided reassurances that they would respect the transitional calendar, in which it was envisaged that elections would be held by February 2022, and that neither the President nor the Prime Minister would run for office. They had also reiterated their commitment to working with the signatory armed movements to the Algiers process. It was necessary to translate those commitments into urgent and concrete action, which required the constructive contribution of all Malian stakeholders. The time had come for Malian leaders to rise above partisan politics and personal interests and work together in earnest to address the crisis in the interest of their country and its future. In that regard, the support of MINUSMA would remain critical. The Special Representative reported that following

⁴⁴⁵ See [S/2020/1281](#), [S/2021/299](#), [S/2021/519](#) and [S/2021/844](#).

⁴⁴⁶ See [S/2021/47](#).

⁴⁴⁷ See [S/2021/336](#).

⁴⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8794](#). See also [S/2021/683](#).

his assumption of duties in MINUSMA, the Mission had developed a 60-day plan, based on Malian ownership and leadership, which outlined priority action to be implemented by the end of the Mission's mandate on 30 June 2021. The Special Representative also said that MINUSMA had developed an action plan for central Mali, focusing on promoting political engagement to stabilize the centre, enhancing the protection of civilians, fostering community engagement, social cohesion and reconciliation, and facilitating the return of State administration and services.⁴⁴⁹ In closing, he underscored the need for the continued support of the Council and the broader international community, which was key for Mali not to slide into further instability with far-reaching consequences for the Sahel subregion and beyond.⁴⁵⁰

Following the Special Representative, the independent consultant, founding member and President of the Coalition des femmes leaders nord, sud et centre du Mali, underlined that the realization of the women and peace and security agenda in Mali remained dependent on strong political will and relative political and institutional stability. She said that the most recent coup showed that there was a long way to go to stabilize Mali and that without a more meaningful treatment of the root causes of the multifaceted crisis that had shaken the country since 2012, the vicious cycle of instability would continue, including the issues of inclusive and equitable governance of land and productive resources and access to justice. She focused on two points, together with recommendations: first, the observation of a marked deterioration in women's rights before and during the transition; and secondly, the priorities and challenges of the transition in relation to the women and peace and security agenda and their implications for the mandate of MINUSMA. She underlined that despite notable progress, which saw nine women from the signatory parties become members of the Agreement Monitoring Committee for the first time in six years, the overall situation of women's rights remained critical. With regard to the second point, she noted that the Council and MINUSMA had a key role to play in putting the issue of gender and the implementation of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) back at the heart of the transition's priorities. She also recommended that the Council broaden the political and operational mandate of MINUSMA beyond the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 to include reconciliation and peace efforts through political dialogue and negotiations with armed groups and, together with MINUSMA, to urgently support the transition authorities in affirming and respecting Mali's national and international commitments, particularly with

regard to the representation of women in appointed and elected posts. She called for according priority in the new MINUSMA mandate to a tightened women and peace and security agenda with precise indicators, particularly with regard to the issue of prosecuting cases of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the holistic care of survivors of such violence.

At the meeting held on 29 October,⁴⁵¹ the Special Representative expressed appreciation for the visit of the Council to Bamako, which underscored the Council's continued support for Mali and the unwavering support for MINUSMA. In reference to the mission of the Council, he noted that the situation on the ground remained extremely challenging, confronted by a context marked by increased insecurity in northern, central and parts of southern Mali and a worrisome humanitarian situation. The Special Representative referred to the various interlocutors of the Government who had highlighted during the Council's mission the deteriorating security situation as the main concern for the average Malian, along with a plea for the delivery of basic services. Similarly, local communities expressed the need for profound political and governance reforms to create the conditions for credible elections and lasting stability. In that context, he affirmed that MINUSMA remained crucial. He described the military and security response to the situation by MINUSMA and acknowledged that significant gaps remained in requirements for enabling capabilities, which were critical to ensure greater mobility and flexibility of the existing MINUSMA uniformed component. He acknowledged that the Mission was overstretched and recalled the Secretary-General's recommendation to augment its operation, including with additional assets such as attack and utility helicopters. The Special Representative also addressed the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation, noting that progress had been frustratingly slow on key provisions relating to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, institutional reforms and development in the north. He also said that the transition had reached a critical stage and elaborated on the key elements for the holding of credible elections and ensuring the return to constitutional rule. He concluded by assuring the Council that MINUSMA would continue to assess and recalibrate its approach to adapt to the evolving situation in Mali and better support the Malian people's aspirations for democracy, peace and security.

On 8 December, the Council held a meeting⁴⁵² to hear a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#). The Chair informed the

⁴⁴⁹ For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

⁴⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8794](#).

⁴⁵¹ See [S/PV.8893](#).

⁴⁵² See [S/PV.8922](#). For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.

Council about the activities of the Committee during 2021. He also reported that eight individuals were on the Committee's sanctions list pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) and that the Committee had during the period under review received one request for an exception to the ban on international travel.

In the discussions in the Council during the period under review, Council members expressed concern at the security situation in Mali. Many Council members highlighted the need to address the root causes of instability in the country and the wider Sahel region. In that regard, some Council members emphasized the need to support sustainable development,⁴⁵³ as well as to address the adverse impact of climate change.⁴⁵⁴ Most Council members recognized the contribution of MINUSMA to stabilizing the security situation in Mali, and while some underlined the need to continue its adaptation plan in order to strengthen its effectiveness in protecting civilians in central Mali,⁴⁵⁵ others emphasized the need to provide the Mission with enough resources to implement its mandate.⁴⁵⁶

Regarding the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, several Council members emphasized the need for the continued active participation of the Malian army in its counter-terrorism operations⁴⁵⁷ and called for enhanced support, including from the Council and the United Nations.⁴⁵⁸ Speakers held differing views regarding authorization under Chapter VII of the Charter in support of the Joint Force.⁴⁵⁹ While the representative of Mali reiterated his call to the Council for a robust and adapted mandate, under Chapter VII, the representatives of France

and the United States held that such a mandate was not necessary.⁴⁶⁰

Council members expressed concern at the humanitarian situation in Mali, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Some Council members expressed concern in particular at the abuse and violation of human rights and international humanitarian law in Mali,⁴⁶¹ including by the Malian army and the Joint Force.⁴⁶² In response, several Council members focused on the need to bring the perpetrators to justice.⁴⁶³ In the context of increased attacks on civilians, MINUSMA peacekeepers, the Malian army and other international forces in Mali, some Council members emphasized the need to improve the safety of peacekeepers,⁴⁶⁴ while others focused on the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes committed against peacekeepers.⁴⁶⁵

On the political front, Council members welcomed the progress in implementing the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 and emphasized the importance of its further implementation, which was key in stabilizing the situation in Mali and for achieving durable peace. Some Council members also expressed concern at the coup of 24 May 2021 that had led to the forced resignation of the transitional President and the Prime Minister of the transitional Government.⁴⁶⁶ They also expressed concern at the potential impact of the coup on

⁴⁵³ See [S/2021/47](#) (China and Ireland); [S/2021/336](#) (Mexico and Norway); and [S/PV.8794](#) (France and Norway).

⁴⁵⁴ See [S/2021/47](#) (Ireland and Norway); and [S/PV.8794](#) (Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Viet Nam and Estonia).

⁴⁵⁵ See [S/2021/47](#) (France and Ireland); [S/PV.8794](#) (Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Russian Federation).

⁴⁵⁶ See [S/2021/47](#) (India and Ireland); [S/2021/336](#) (Ireland, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8794](#) (France and Viet Nam).

⁴⁵⁷ See [S/2021/47](#) (China, France and Russian Federation); [S/2021/336](#) (China and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8794](#) (Russian Federation).

⁴⁵⁸ See [S/2021/47](#) (France, India and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); [S/2021/336](#) (France, India and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); [S/PV.8794](#) (France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), China and India); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and India).

⁴⁵⁹ For more information on the discussion, see part VII, sect. IV.

⁴⁶⁰ See [S/2021/336](#) (Mali); [S/PV.8794](#) (France, United States and Mali); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Mali). For more information on the discussion, see part VIII, sect. III.

⁴⁶¹ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/336](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8794](#) (United States, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and Estonia); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland, Estonia, United Kingdom, India and Norway).

⁴⁶² See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia); [S/2021/336](#) (Ireland and United States); and [S/PV.8794](#) (Ireland, Norway and Estonia).

⁴⁶³ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States); [S/2021/336](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and United States); [S/PV.8794](#) (United States, Norway, United Kingdom and Estonia); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland, Estonia and United Kingdom).

⁴⁶⁴ See [S/2021/47](#) (China); [S/2021/336](#) (China, India, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8794](#) (China, India and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8893](#) (India and China).

⁴⁶⁵ See [S/2021/47](#) (China, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/2021/336](#) (China, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8794](#) (China, Mexico, Ireland, Norway and India).

⁴⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8794](#) (France, Mexico, United States, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, India, Viet Nam and Estonia).

the transitional process⁴⁶⁷ and on the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.⁴⁶⁸ Some Council members further underscored the need for the meaningful, full and equal participation of women in Mali's political process⁴⁶⁹ to create a more inclusive, stable and sustainable peace.⁴⁷⁰ In addition, Council members discussed their mission to Mali and the Niger, which had allowed them to express support for MINUSMA and its personnel, hear first-hand about the challenges that Mali and the Sahel subregion were facing and listen to the concerns expressed by the transition authorities in Mali.⁴⁷¹

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions in connection with the item, one relating to the mandate of MINUSMA and one in connection with the sanctions measures concerning Mali. On 29 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, extending the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2022 and renewing its authorization to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.⁴⁷² The Council welcomed the efforts by

MINUSMA to implement its adaptation plan, expressed its full support for the continuation of the plan's implementation and requested the Secretary-General to take all appropriate measures to accelerate it, notably in generating the required assets. It encouraged Member States to contribute to the plan by providing the capabilities needed for its success, particularly air assets.⁴⁷³ The Council included support for the political transition in Mali as part of the first strategic priority of MINUSMA and reiterated the Mission's second strategic priority, which was to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a comprehensive, politically led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State presence, State authority and basic social services in Central Mali.⁴⁷⁴ In addition, the Council modified and added new elements to the existing tasks.⁴⁷⁵ The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report no later than 15 July 2021 on the progress in the implementation of the Force adaptation plan, including recommendations on the force levels and ceiling of MINUSMA uniformed personnel and how it would accompany a Government-led strategy for the centre of the country.⁴⁷⁶ On 30 August, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), extending until 31 August 2022 the asset freeze and travel ban imposed by the Council by resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#).⁴⁷⁷ The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 30 September 2022.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8794](#) (Mexico, United States, Norway, United Kingdom, India and Viet Nam).

⁴⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8794](#) (Mexico and Viet Nam).

⁴⁶⁹ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/336](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8794](#) (France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom and Estonia); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland, United States, Estonia and Norway).

⁴⁷⁰ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia and Norway); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland).

⁴⁷¹ See [S/PV.8893](#) (Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, United States, Estonia, United Kingdom, India, Russian Federation, China and Norway). For further information on the mission, see sect. 30 below.

⁴⁷² Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 17 and 20. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I. For more information on the authorization of use of force by the Council, see part VII, sect. IV.

⁴⁷³ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), twentieth preambular paragraph and para. 25.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 21. See also resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 22 and 30.

⁴⁷⁵ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 27, 30–32, 53 and 55.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

⁴⁷⁷ Resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Mali, see part VII, sect. III.

⁴⁷⁸ Resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), para. 3. For more information on the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Mali

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8794 14 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2021/519)		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the	12 Council members, ^a all invitees	

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Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
	Letter dated 1 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/520)			United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, independent consultant, founding member and President of the Coalition des femmes leaders nord, sud et centre du Mali		
S/PV.8809 29 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2021/519)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/610)			Five Council members (China, India, Niger, ^b United Kingdom, United States)	Resolution 2584 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
	Letter dated 1 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/520)					
S/PV.8844 30 August 2021	Letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/714) and S/2021/714/Corr.1)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/750)				Resolution 2590 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8893 29 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2021/844)		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Nine Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8922 8 December 2021					One Council member (Mexico) ^d	

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b The representative of the Niger spoke also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

^c China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^d The representative of Mexico spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali.

Table 2
Videoconferences: the situation in Mali

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
13 January 2021	S/2021/47	Letter dated 15 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
6 April 2021	S/2021/336	Letter dated 8 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Americas

12. The question concerning Haiti

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings, adopted one resolution and adopted one presidential statement under the item entitled “The question concerning Haiti”. Two meetings took the form of briefings, one was a private (closed) meeting⁴⁷⁹ and one meeting was convened for the adoption of a decision.⁴⁸⁰ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in table 1 below. Council members also held one open videoconference in connection with the item, more information on which is provided in table 2 below.⁴⁸¹ In addition to meetings and an open videoconference, Council members held a closed videoconference and informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.⁴⁸²

In 2021, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) gave three briefings⁴⁸³ to Council members in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General on the Mission’s

activities⁴⁸⁴ and once following the assassination of the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, on 7 July 2021.⁴⁸⁵ The Council also heard briefings by three representatives of Haitian civil society.⁴⁸⁶ At the meetings and videoconferences, Haiti was represented by its President, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In her statements to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported on the political crisis in the country involving the further postponement of legislative, municipal, local and presidential elections, the security situation in the context of increased levels of gang violence, efforts by the Government and stakeholders in Haiti to address the root causes of the crisis, and the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the earthquake of 14 August 2021.

At the open videoconference held on 22 February,⁴⁸⁷ in the presence of the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, the Special Representative stated that the institutional crisis into which the country had plunged since the Parliament had ceased to function in January 2020 risked growing deeper as relations between the executive and the judicial branches of power appeared increasingly fraught and Mr. Moïse continued to govern by decree. The efforts of part of

⁴⁷⁹ See [S/PV.8815](#).

⁴⁸⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁴⁸¹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁴⁸² See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 7. See also [S/2021/1060](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. See also [S/2021/1032](#).

⁴⁸³ See [S/2021/174](#), [S/PV.8799](#) and [S/PV.8871](#).

⁴⁸⁴ [S/2021/133](#), [S/2021/559](#) and [S/2021/828](#).

⁴⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8815](#).

⁴⁸⁶ See [S/2021/174](#), [S/PV.8799](#) and [S/PV.8871](#).

⁴⁸⁷ See [S/2021/174](#).

the opposition to unseat the President, as well as the actions taken by the executive branch in reaction to an alleged coup attempt on 7 February 2021 and to the opposition's announcement of the appointment of a Supreme Court judge as the interim Head of State, had further hardened the positions of the principal actors in the crisis. She maintained that, above all else, a minimal consensus among relevant political stakeholders would greatly contribute to creating an environment conducive to the holding of the constitutional referendum and subsequent elections. Moreover, while consensus existed among stakeholders and the general population on the need to change the country's charter, the process chosen by the Government was perceived by some as lacking legitimacy. She added that all sectors of society should be provided with the opportunity to debate and contribute to the draft text and that the Haitian people deserved the opportunity to express themselves through the ballot box in an appeased climate and actively to decide on the direction their country would take, free from the fear of intimidation and political violence. In that regard, noting that meeting the security challenges associated with the referendum and the elections represented a crucial test for the Haitian National Police, the Special Representative expressed confidence that, with strategic advice from the United Nations and support from both national authorities and international partners, the police force would continue to develop its capacity in accordance with international human rights and policing standards. She expressed deep concern, however, about the resurgence in kidnappings and the persistent impunity and lack of accountability for serious crimes, adding that the authorities must demonstrate their commitment and capacity to arrest and prosecute both criminals and perpetrators of human rights violations, as well as to take concrete actions to protect citizens. In her remarks at the open videoconference, the Director of Plurielles Haiti, a Haitian non-governmental organization, described her personal experience with insecurity in the country and the work of her organization on helping young people and communities to build independence to solve socioeconomic and environmental problems. She emphasized the importance of establishing rehabilitation centres for young prisoners, the development of social and educational programmes, strengthening controls against trafficking in illicit arms and substances, setting up support centres for victims of gang violence, establishing a call centre for and providing funding to women suffering domestic violence, providing funding for organizations that worked towards more sustainable

peace and establishing protection networks for young peacebuilders at the local level.

In his remarks after the briefers and Council members, Mr. Moïse noted the concerns expressed by the Secretary-General in his report⁴⁸⁸ regarding the fragile political environment, the security situation and financial difficulties and stated that his Government intended to make every effort to improve the sociopolitical climate to ensure that the elections were held under optimal conditions with the broadest possible participation of candidates and voters.

At the meeting held on 17 June,⁴⁸⁹ the Special Representative noted the deteriorating situation in Haiti with the postponement of the constitutional referendum, which had been scheduled to take place at the end of June 2021, following a resurgence in COVID-19 cases, inter-gang violence in Port-au-Prince and the absence of an agreement on how to resolve the deep-rooted political crisis among political leaders. Regarding the new electoral cycle, she stated that the debate over the constitutional referendum should not detract from the timely organization and holding of the overdue polls in 2021, so that an orderly democratic transfer of power to the duly elected representatives of the people could occur in February 2022. She noted that it was the duty of the Haitian authorities to end the violence, protect the population, ensure unfettered humanitarian access, provide emergency assistance to displaced persons and hold perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable. Progress had been made in the review of the national strategy to address gang violence and headway had been made by the executive in revising weapon and ammunition management legislation. Incremental progress had also occurred in the judicial realm with the instalment of the Board of the Legal Aid Council and the opening of legal aid offices in the jurisdictions of Les Cayes and Petit-Goâve, which would contribute to enhancing access to justice for the least privileged and signalled the start of a systemic push to reduce prolonged pretrial detention and overcrowding in prisons. Nonetheless, efforts to fight impunity remained woefully inadequate and the Special Representative commented that it would behove the authorities to provide judicial actors with the means required to accomplish their mission.

In her statement, Chantal Hurdicourt Ewald, a member of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association and a former member of the Haitian National Assembly from 1986 to 1987, expressed the view that the ongoing constitutional reform process was not legitimate and

⁴⁸⁸ S/2021/133.

⁴⁸⁹ See S/PV.8799.

that the full participation of civil society was required. In the absence of a parliament since January 2020, the Government could have instead drawn on the procedure used in 1986, which provided for the holding of elections and the establishment of a constituent assembly to conduct the reform process and allowed for a broad participation of the population. The sociopolitical context, with a precarious financial and security situation, was making it very difficult – if not impossible – to motivate the population to participate in any form of electoral process. People residing in underprivileged and densely populated neighbourhoods were the main victims of gang violence and the gangs were well supplied with heavy weapons and ammunition in a country, in principle, under a weapons embargo. The political marginalization of women and their exclusion from all positions of responsibility in public administration continued to perpetuate their lack of participation in the country's governance system. In closing, she noted that there was no trust in the State or political class and that, aware of the State's chronic weakness, civil society was supporting care centres and displaced populations.

Further to the private meeting held on 8 July⁴⁹⁰ following the assassination of Mr. Moïse on 7 July, on 4 October⁴⁹¹ the Special Representative provided a briefing in which she informed Council members that, already reeling from the assassination of its President, Haiti had been struck on 14 August by a devastating earthquake that had affected over 800,000 people in its south-western peninsula. The two events had led to the further postponement of the long-awaited national and local elections. After assuming office on 20 July 2021, the Prime Minister ad interim, Ariel Henry, had spared no effort to reach a political agreement with the various factions of the Haitian polity, resulting in the conclusion of an agreement on 11 September 2021 that captured key demands expressed by national stakeholders, such as the formation of a new provisional electoral council and the inclusion of the diaspora, and that foresaw the holding of elections no later than the second half of 2022. The Special Representative stated that the draft constitution submitted to the Prime Minister by the Independent Consultative Committee on 8 September 2021 should provide for further constructive and inclusive debate on ways to reshape the Haitian political system. Furthermore, she noted that Haitian citizens had unanimously condemned the assassination of Mr. Moïse and had called for a thorough investigation

that followed due process and the rule of law. The Special Representative stated that, even as relief operations were still ongoing, early recovery and the restoration of livelihoods must be strongly supported in areas affected by the earthquake. She therefore urged Member States to contribute to the flash appeal launched on 25 August to respond to the needs of those affected by the earthquake, as well as the 2021–2022 humanitarian response plan.

The Executive Director of *Policité*, a Haitian civil society organization, reported that the ongoing political crisis had deepened since the assassination, as there was no president, the acting Prime Minister had little to no popular legitimacy, the Parliament had been non-functional since 2020 and the judiciary was effectively non-functional, with courts operating three to four months a year. She recommended that elections should occur when they could be fair, not imposed by arbitrary timelines, and that the constitutional referendum be abandoned. Member States and the Council should break with traditional ways of intervening in Haiti and support nationally led initiatives to create conditions for free, fair and inclusive elections, strengthen the police, work with the judiciary to end impunity and fight corruption, and direct funding to qualified and capable civil society groups. Finally, she called on BINUH to work with civil society to promote dialogue, reforms and accountability and reduce gang violence.

In their statements at the meetings and the open videoconference held in 2021, Council members expressed concern regarding the deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situation in Haiti, including in the aftermath of the assassination of Mr. Moïse and the earthquake and tropical storm Grace in August 2021. They called on political stakeholders to engage in an inclusive dialogue to determine the way forward on the holding of peaceful, free and fair legislative and presidential elections and on the constitutional referendum, with several of their statements highlighting the importance of the participation of women⁴⁹² and youth.⁴⁹³ Council members condemned the rising levels of human rights violations and abuses and gang violence, including kidnappings and sexual and gender-based violence, with many of them urging

⁴⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8815](#). The Council issued a statement to the press on 7 July.

⁴⁹¹ See [S/PV.8871](#).

⁴⁹² See [S/2021/174](#) (Ireland, Norway and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8799](#) (Norway, Viet Nam and Ireland); and [S/PV.8871](#) (Mexico, Norway, Viet Nam, India, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia) and Ireland).

⁴⁹³ See [S/2021/174](#) (Estonia, Ireland and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8799](#) (Viet Nam and Ireland); and [S/PV.8871](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia) and Ireland).

the Government of Haiti to protect civilians and ensure security and accountability for such acts.⁴⁹⁴ Multiple Council members emphasized the need to protect women and children.⁴⁹⁵ Speakers also addressed the importance of judicial reform, strengthening the Haitian National Police and the full implementation of the national strategy on community violence reduction and the national action plan on human rights. Noting the socioeconomic and humanitarian challenges, including the impact of the earthquake, tropical storm and the COVID-19 pandemic, speakers highlighted the need for the international community to increase humanitarian assistance to Haiti.⁴⁹⁶ The representative of Norway underscored the need to prioritize disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in Haiti.⁴⁹⁷ In the lead-up to the renewal of the mandate of BINUH, the representative of China expressed the view that the existing model of United Nations support to Haiti appeared to be unsustainable and expressed the readiness of his delegation to join Council members in addressing the systemic and structural impediments to peace and development in Haiti and to consider adopting a novel approach in order to help the country.⁴⁹⁸

With regard to decisions, in the presidential statement adopted on 24 March the Council expressed deep concern regarding the protracted political, constitutional and security crises in Haiti and stressed the primary responsibility of the Government to address the underlying drivers of instability.⁴⁹⁹ The Council stressed that the democratic will of the Haitian people must be respected, urged that all preparations be made for free, fair, transparent and credible elections in 2021 and urged all political stakeholders to engage constructively to enable their organization and to ensure that they take place in a peaceful

environment.⁵⁰⁰ The Council stressed in the presidential statement the importance of an independent judiciary, urged the Government to step up its efforts against corruption and emphasized the need for an immediate and coordinated response by Haitian authorities to address the deteriorating security situation.⁵⁰¹ The Council furthermore stressed the urgency of accountability for human rights violations and noted its concern regarding the humanitarian situation, including growing food insecurity and malnutrition exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.⁵⁰² Finally, the Council encouraged continued close collaboration and coordination between BINUH and the United Nations country team in Haiti with a view to helping the Government to take responsibility to realize the long-term stability, development and economic self-sufficiency of the country.⁵⁰³

On 15 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of BINUH for a period of nine months until 15 July 2022, without introducing changes to the Mission's tasks.⁵⁰⁴ The Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of the mandate of BINUH, including whether and how it could be adjusted to address the ongoing challenges faced by Haiti, to increase the effectiveness of the Mission and its efforts to support engagement between Haitian national authorities, civil society and other stakeholders, to strengthen the rule of law and to promote respect for human rights, and to convey to the Council the findings of that assessment within six months of the adoption of the resolution.⁵⁰⁵ Furthermore, the Council condemned in the strongest terms the assassination of the President, Mr. Moïse, and urged the Government to hold the perpetrators accountable in a timely manner.⁵⁰⁶ The Council also urged all Haitian stakeholders to commit to an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue to address longstanding drivers of instability by creating a sustainable and commonly accepted framework to permit the organization of inclusive, peaceful, free, fair and transparent legislative and presidential elections as soon as technically feasible and with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women.⁵⁰⁷ At the

⁴⁹⁴ See [S/2021/174](#) (France, Ireland, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8799](#) (United States, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), Norway, United Kingdom, Viet Nam and Estonia); and [S/PV.8871](#) (United States, Norway, Estonia and France).

⁴⁹⁵ See [S/2021/174](#) (Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8799](#) (Norway and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8871](#) (Norway and Viet Nam).

⁴⁹⁶ See [S/2021/174](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia)); [S/PV.8799](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia) and India); and [S/PV.8871](#) (United States, United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), Ireland and China).

⁴⁹⁷ [S/PV.8799](#) and [S/PV.8871](#).

⁴⁹⁸ [S/PV.8799](#) and [S/PV.8871](#).

⁴⁹⁹ [S/PRST/2021/7](#), second paragraph.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, third paragraph.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, eighth and ninth paragraphs.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, twelfth paragraph.

⁵⁰⁴ Resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For further information on the mandate of BINUH, see part X, sect. II.

⁵⁰⁵ Resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), paras. 2–3.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

meeting,⁵⁰⁸ in his statement after the vote the representative of China noted that in his latest report the Secretary-General stated that the huge aid efforts made by Haiti's international partners had yet to deliver the expected results and that a novel approach was required to address the challenges that were holding Haiti back. The renewal of the mandate of the Mission provided an opportunity to discuss how to help Haiti more effectively. He specifically credited the joint efforts of China, the Russian Federation and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for substantive improvements to the text, in particular the requested

assessment, which had created an opportunity to update the Mission's mandate in the light of changing circumstances on the ground. While stating that the assessment provided an opportunity to further strengthen the mandate and effectiveness of BINUH in helping to address the ongoing challenges facing Haiti, the representative of the United States said that it was not the time for the Council to walk away from Haiti and stressed the need to ensure that the country received the assistance and support that it needed. The representative of Mexico maintained that the mandate renewal provided the mission with certainty and that the assessment would allow States to effectuate the changes necessary to make it more effective.

⁵⁰⁸ See [S/PV.8881](#).

Table 1
Meetings: the question concerning Haiti

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8799 17 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) (S/2021/559)		Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH, practising lawyer of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association and former member of the 1986–1987 Haitian Constitutional Assembly (Chantal Hudicort Ewald)	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8815 8 July 2021 (closed)			Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	12 Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8871 4 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on BINUH (S/2021/828)		Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of Pôlicité	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^d	
S/PV.8881 15 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on BINUH (S/2021/828)	Draft resolution submitted by Mexico, United States (S/2021/877)			Four Council members (China, Kenya, Mexico, United States)	Resolution 2600 (2021) 15-0-0

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b Haiti was represented by its Prime Minister ad interim.

^c China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^d Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Table 2
Videoconferences: the question concerning Haiti

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
22 February 2021	S/2021/174	Letter dated 24 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
24 March 2021	No record (see A/76/2 , part II, chap. 7)		S/PRST/2021/7

13. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings and adopted two resolutions under the item entitled “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))”. Two of the meetings took the form of a briefing and one was convened for the adoption of a decision.⁵⁰⁹ More information on the meetings is provided in table 1 below. Council members also held three open videoconferences in connection with the item. More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below.⁵¹⁰ In addition, Council members held a closed videoconference in connection with the item.⁵¹¹

In 2021, Council members heard briefings on a quarterly basis by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General.⁵¹² The Council also heard briefings by three representatives of Colombian civil society. At the meetings and videoconferences, Colombia was

represented by its Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In his statements to the Council, the Special Representative reported on the progress made on the five priorities of the Secretary-General for the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia in support of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace of 2016, namely: (a) ensuring protection and security for former combatants, conflict-affected communities and social leaders and human rights defenders; (b) ensuring the sustainability of the reintegration process; (c) consolidating the integrated presence of the State in conflict-affected areas; (d) reinforcing constructive dialogue between the parties; and (e) strengthening conditions for reconciliation.⁵¹³ In his first briefing of the year, at the open videoconference held on 21 January,⁵¹⁴ the Special Representative described the violence against former combatants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), social leaders, human rights defenders and communities as the most serious threat to peacebuilding in the country. He underlined the need to address budget shortfalls and vacancies in the Specialized Subdirectorates for Security and Protection of the National Protection Unit, which provided collective and individual close-protection schemes for former combatants, and to ensure that women former combatants had equal access to close protection. He

⁵⁰⁹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁵¹⁰ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I. See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 41.

⁵¹¹ See [S/2021/1014](#). The closed videoconference was held on 21 January. In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences.

⁵¹² [S/2020/1301](#), [S/2021/298](#), [S/2021/603](#) and [S/2021/824](#).

⁵¹³ See [S/2020/1301](#).

⁵¹⁴ See [S/2021/77](#).

also stressed that it was essential to support the Special Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney-General to bring to justice those responsible for such crimes. On the reintegration process, the Special Representative noted the promising developments concerning the purchase of land for the former territorial area for training and reintegration in Dabeiba and the Government's announcement of purchases in five additional areas by mid-February 2021. He underscored the need to ensure the same level of institutional support and productive opportunities for former combatants located outside the territorial areas, including those remaining in areas that had been or would be relocated owing to threats from illegal armed groups.

Regarding the consolidation of State presence in conflict-affected areas, the Special Representative stated that the national authorities must remain firm in the continued implementation of development programmes with a territorial focus, the National Comprehensive Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops and the comprehensive security and protection programme for communities and organizations in the territories. He underlined that sustained dialogue between the parties was fundamental to the implementation of all aspects of the Final Agreement, including through the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, and called on all actors to lend their full support to the work of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition.

On 21 April, at an open videoconference,⁵¹⁵ the Special Representative said that the meeting held on 10 March 2021 between the President of Colombia, Iván Duque Márquez, and the leader of the Comunes party, Rodrigo Londoño, was a welcome development, and encouraged the parties to continue to move forward in defining the road map for the implementation of the Final Agreement that had been agreed upon at that meeting. Regarding reintegration, he informed Council members that, as a result of the Government's efforts, 7 of the 24 former territorial areas had land and that close to 50 per cent of former combatants were participating in collective and individual projects. It was necessary to complement those efforts with other fundamental aspects of the agreement, such as the coordinated implementation of the national sectoral plans for comprehensive rural reform, and to take concrete steps to bring sustainable productive opportunities to more families in the National Comprehensive Programme for the

Substitution of Illicit Crops. It would also be necessary for the parties to accelerate the implementation of the gender measures in the agreement and for all actors to enhance the role of women's organizations in peacebuilding.

At the meeting held on 13 July,⁵¹⁶ in reference to the indictment issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Case 01, regarding hostage-taking and other serious deprivations of liberty, the Special Representative stated that the official acceptance of responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes in April 2021 by seven former FARC-EP combatants was a milestone in the peace process and a benchmark for transitional justice in the world. Furthermore, in July 2021, the Special Jurisdiction had charged 11 persons, including some army officers and a third-party civilian, with war crimes and crimes against humanity in Case 03, regarding killings and disappearances. Noting that fulfilling the rights of victims was a necessary condition for the success of the Final Agreement, the Special Representative said that the task entrusted to the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia to verify compliance with and the implementation of the sanctions imposed by the Special Jurisdiction would decisively contribute to reconciliation efforts. He also signalled that the persistence of violence and insecurity highlighted the urgent need for enhanced prevention and protection measures, as well as for additional and more solid steps to dismantle illegal organizations, bring perpetrators to justice and extend State institutions, public services and development opportunities as quickly as possible to conflict-affected communities.

On 14 October, at the last meeting of the year held under the item,⁵¹⁷ the Special Representative noted the achievements made in the implementation of the Final Agreement since its signing in 2016, adding that making progress on pending tasks and overcoming challenges to implementation depended, to a large extent, on the ability of the parties to implement all aspects of the agreement. A total of 296 men and women who had laid down their arms in good faith had lost their lives, primarily owing to actions of illegal armed groups and criminal organizations, with Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities disproportionately affected. He called for the urgent and simultaneous implementation of all provisions of the agreement pertaining to security guarantees and the better use by the Government and State entities of the mechanisms established therein, such as the National

⁵¹⁵ See [S/2021/401](#).

⁵¹⁶ See [S/PV.8818](#).

⁵¹⁷ See [S/PV.8879](#).

Commission on Security Guarantees, to devise effective measures to curb violence.

The civil society briefers in 2021 focused on the importance of inclusivity in the country's peacebuilding process, in particular from the standpoint of women, youth and indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. In her statement at the meeting held on 13 July,⁵¹⁸ the founder and Director of the Latin American foundation Viva la Vida noted that women in Colombia had made great progress in the context of resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security, and had promoted the inclusion of a gender approach in the Final Agreement. As a representative of the young people of Colombia, she made several proposals to the Council, including adding specific indicators on the implementation of the youth, peace and security agenda in the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, dedicating a section of Council meetings to youth issues from a gender perspective and for the Council to visit the country and hold consultations with youth representatives in all their diversity. She also called on the Government to increase the participation of young people in decision-making at all levels and to protect their lives, to advance investigations into cases of violence against women and young people and to develop strategies to demobilize and reintegrate youth.

At the meeting held on 14 October,⁵¹⁹ the representative of Afro-Colombian women at the Special Forum on Gender and coordinator of Butterflies with New Wings, a non-profit organization from Buenaventura, expressed concern about the lack of safety for peace signatories and leaders and that no progress had been made on the "ethnic chapter" of the Final Agreement, in particular in relation to the country's indigenous black peoples. She underlined the need for armed groups to leave the territory of indigenous black peoples, for the rights and territorial autonomy of the authorities of black and indigenous peoples to be recognized and for a specific path to be defined for reincorporating former combatants and peace signatories from those communities. The coordinator called on the Council to continue to support the communities and, above all, women, so that they could continue to make progress on the "ethnic chapter" and ensure its comprehensive implementation from an anti-racist gender perspective. At the same meeting, the youth leader of the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca expressed concern that compliance with the agreement's points on rural reform, the substitution of illicit crops, the "ethnic

chapter" and gender had been minimal, which increased inequality and violence in territories, particularly in Cauca. She underlined the need for women peacebuilders to enjoy the necessary security guarantees, for support to be provided to indigenous and Afro-Colombian women leaders and for constructive ventures and projects to be encouraged to address economic inequality. The youth leader expressed the hope that the Council would continue to urge full compliance with the Final Agreement, with particular focus on its ethnic dimension and the integral gender approach.

In their discussions in 2021, Council members noted the important achievements made since the signing of the Final Agreement in 2016, with several members expressing support for the priority implementation areas outlined by the Secretary-General as a framework for future progress.⁵²⁰ Council members noted their concern regarding the continued threats, attacks and killings of former FARC-EP combatants, human rights defenders, community and social leaders, women and indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. As a means of curbing that trend, they discussed the need for increased State presence in rural areas and the implementation of the security and protection measures envisioned under the agreement, including the public policy for the dismantling of illegal armed groups, and for ensuring accountability for those crimes. Other outstanding aspects of the agreement discussed included the purchase of land for housing and productive projects, in particular for combatants residing outside the former territorial areas, equal access to those programmes for women, rural reform, illicit crop substitution and the gender and ethnic provisions of the agreement.

Council members paid particular attention to the progress made in the work of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition. In that regard, they welcomed the acknowledgment of responsibility by former commanders of FARC-EP for crimes against humanity and war crimes before the Special Jurisdiction for Peace⁵²¹ and widely expressed support for the expansion of the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia to verify compliance

⁵¹⁸ See [S/PV.8818](#).

⁵¹⁹ See [S/PV.8879](#).

⁵²⁰ See [S/2021/77](#) (India, Ireland, Mexico and United Kingdom); [S/2021/401](#) (India, Russian Federation and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia)); [S/PV.8818](#) (India); and [S/PV.8879](#) (Mexico).

⁵²¹ See [S/PV.8818](#) (United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), Norway, United States and France).

with the sanctions measures imposed by the Special Jurisdiction.⁵²² The representative of the Russian Federation was of the view that, while some progress in the Government's commitments under the Final Agreement had been made, a great deal more needed to be done. He added that sustainable peace and reconciliation could not be achieved without the inclusion of all actors in the process, including the National Liberation Army, and would be helped by establishing relations with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.⁵²³

More generally, Council members welcomed and encouraged further dialogue between the Government and the People's Alternative Revolutionary Force political party and its successor, the Comunes party, through the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement.⁵²⁴ They took note of the nationwide protests and social unrest that took place from April to July 2021, with some members expressing concern regarding reports of human rights violations and the excessive use of force by national police forces.⁵²⁵ Looking ahead, Council members welcomed the establishment of 16 special transitional electoral districts for peace by the Government in preparation for the 2022 congressional elections to ensure the participation of historically excluded populations in conflict-affected regions.⁵²⁶ In their statements to the Council, the representatives of Colombia provided an overview of the progress and the efforts made by the

Government in the implementation of the Final Agreement, in particular in the context of its "Peace with legality" strategy launched in 2018.⁵²⁷ At the meeting held on 14 October,⁵²⁸ on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the agreement, the Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia noted that, with one third of the 15-year implementation period having elapsed, it was important not to backslide with regard to what had already been achieved.

By resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#) of 11 May and [2603 \(2021\)](#) of 29 October, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia for periods of, respectively, five months and one year, the latter until 31 October 2022.⁵²⁹ By resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), following the request of the Government of Colombia, the Council expanded the Mission's mandate to include the verification of compliance with and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.⁵³⁰ By resolution [2603 \(2021\)](#), the Council urged the parties, with the support of relevant State institutions and security forces, as well as civil society, to work together to build upon the progress made and address the ongoing challenges, in particular the continued violence in conflict-affected areas, through the comprehensive implementation of the agreement, including rural reform, inclusive political participation, its ethnic and gender provisions, and countering illicit drugs, including through crop substitution programmes.⁵³¹

⁵²² See [S/2021/77](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico and United Kingdom); and [S/2021/401](#) (China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom and Viet Nam).

⁵²³ See [S/PV.8879](#). See also [S/PV.8818](#).

⁵²⁴ See [S/2021/77](#) (Norway); [S/2021/401](#) (China, Ireland, Russian Federation and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia)); [S/PV.8818](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia) and Ireland); and [S/PV.8879](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), Ireland and France).

⁵²⁵ See [S/PV.8818](#) (United Kingdom, Norway, Russian Federation and United States).

⁵²⁶ See [S/PV.8818](#) (Mexico and Estonia); and [S/PV.8879](#) (United Kingdom, Mexico, India, Viet Nam, Russian Federation, Ireland, China and France).

⁵²⁷ See [S/2021/77](#), [S/2021/401](#), [S/PV.8818](#) and [S/PV.8879](#).

⁵²⁸ See [S/PV.8879](#).

⁵²⁹ Resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 4, and [2603 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of the Mission, see part X, sect. II.

⁵³⁰ Resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. See the letter dated 15 January to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, in which the representative of Colombia transmitted the request of the Government of Colombia for the expansion of the mandate of the Mission ([S/2021/147](#)). See also the letter dated 24 February to the President of the Council, in which the Secretary-General provided recommendations on how the additional tasks would be carried out and any implications for the configuration of the Mission ([S/2021/186](#)).

⁵³¹ Resolution [2603 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph.

Table 1

Meetings: identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8818 13 July 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2021/603)		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Founder, Director of the Latin American foundation Viva la Vida	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8879 14 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2021/824)		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, coordinator of Butterflies with New Wings and representative of Afro-Colombian women at the Special Forum on Gender, youth leader of the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8891 29 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2021/824)	Draft resolution submitted by Mexico, United Kingdom (S/2021/902)				Resolution 2603 (2021) 15-0-0

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b Colombia was represented by its Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Founder and Director of the Latin-American foundation Viva la Vida participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c Colombia was represented by its Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The coordinator of Butterflies with New Wings and the youth leader participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2

Videoconferences: identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
21 January 2021	S/2021/77	Letter dated 25 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
21 April 2021	S/2021/401	Letter dated 23 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
11 May 2021	S/2021/449	Letter dated 11 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2574 (2021) 15-0-0 S/2021/457

Asia

14. The situation in Afghanistan

During the period under review, the Council held six meetings under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”. Two meetings were convened for the adoption of a decision, three took the form of a briefing and one took the form of a debate.⁵³² More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in table 1 below. Council members also held two open videoconferences in connection with the situation in Afghanistan.⁵³³ More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. In addition, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the item.⁵³⁴

In 2021, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provided quarterly briefings in meetings and open videoconferences in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.⁵³⁵ Against the backdrop of the takeover of the country by the Taliban in August, the

Council heard additional briefings by the Special Representative and the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission at one meeting,⁵³⁶ and by the Secretary-General at another.⁵³⁷ In addition, Council members heard a briefing by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in an open videoconference⁵³⁸ and briefings by five civil society representatives in meetings and open videoconferences.⁵³⁹ A representative of Afghanistan also delivered statements in four meetings and two videoconferences.⁵⁴⁰

At the outset of 2021, on 23 March, Council members held an open videoconference.⁵⁴¹ In addition to the briefing by the Special Representative, Council members heard a briefing by the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. During her briefing, the Special Representative reported

⁵³² For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

⁵³³ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁵³⁴ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 8.

⁵³⁵ [S/2021/252](#), [S/2021/570](#), [S/2021/759](#) and [S/2021/759/Corr.1](#).

⁵³⁶ See [S/PV.8831](#).

⁵³⁷ See [S/PV.8834](#).

⁵³⁸ See [S/2021/601](#).

⁵³⁹ The Council heard briefings by the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission on 23 March (see [S/2021/291](#)); the Executive Director of the Afghan Women’s Network on 22 June (see [S/2021/601](#)); the founder of the Women and Peace Studies Organization and the co-founder and Board Chair of the Malala Fund on 9 September (see [S/PV.8853](#)); and the Director of Charmaghz on 17 November (see [S/PV.8908](#)).

⁵⁴⁰ See [S/2021/291](#), [S/2021/601](#), [S/PV.8831](#), [S/PV.8834](#), [S/PV.8853](#) and [S/PV.8908](#).

⁵⁴¹ See [S/2021/291](#).

that progress on the negotiations in Doha had slowed and that Afghans and their international partners had begun to voice understandable frustration about the lack of real outcomes. She noted that, as talks continued, many stakeholders were increasingly looking to the United Nations to play a more prominent role. She welcomed the appointment by the Secretary-General of a new Personal Envoy on Afghanistan and Regional Issues to complement the work of the United Nations on regional engagement. She acknowledged that Member States had played a vital role in coming up with new initiatives to reinvigorate the peace process, cautioning that such initiatives must be focused and coherent. In that regard, she emphasized the need to look to the future of the country and to take into account the views of all Afghans, including women, youth, ethnic minorities and victims of war. She expressed concern about the deepening humanitarian crisis, urging Member States to contribute generously to the humanitarian response plan. Concerning the security situation, the Special Representative cautioned that developments in Afghanistan did not affect only Afghans but rather the global community, giving as an example the threats posed by the cultivation of and trafficking in illegal narcotics and transnational terrorism to the stability in Afghanistan and the region. In closing, she expressed hope that real progress would be achieved by the time of the following briefing, which would be given after the proposed date for the withdrawal of international troops under the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the United States of America and the Taliban.

In her briefing, the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that, since the talks in Doha had begun, violence towards Afghans had intensified and the public had lost hope in the process. She urged the Council not to look the other way as members pushed towards a peace deal doomed to fail. She emphasized that building peace took more than a deal among elites and that it must be an inclusive national endeavour, which would include women, minorities, youth, civil society, victims, the Afghan media and religious, regional and ethnic groups. In that regard, she stressed that a minimum of 30 per cent of the participants in the talks should be women. She said that the talks should be aimed at addressing human rights and victims' rights and that any peace agreement should include a robust reparations programme, reconciliation initiatives, a truth-seeking process, memorialization and victim recognition. In closing, she said that the Council would be fulfilling its historic mandate if it ensured a process that was more likely to end the violence and deliver a just and durable peace in Afghanistan.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members and other participants reaffirmed their support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process⁵⁴² and gave their support to recent international and United Nations efforts to reinvigorate the peace process while emphasizing that all support should build upon the talks in Doha in a sustained and cohesive way.⁵⁴³ Several speakers⁵⁴⁴ welcomed the outcomes of the meeting of the extended troika held in Moscow prior to the videoconference. Commenting on the international support for the negotiations, participants⁵⁴⁵ also welcomed the Secretary-General's appointment of a new Personal Envoy on Afghanistan and Regional Issues the week prior to the videoconference. Many Member States⁵⁴⁶ called for an immediate ceasefire. Some Member States⁵⁴⁷ recalled the Council's statement to the press dated 12 March, in which it underlined that the targeted killings of civilians could constitute war crimes, and noted that they must stop.

On 22 June, Council members held a high-level open videoconference.⁵⁴⁸ In addition to the briefing by the Special Representative, Council members heard briefings by the Executive Director of UNDOC and the Executive Director of the Afghan Women's Network. In her briefing, the Special Representative reported that trends related to politics, security, the peace process, the economy, the humanitarian emergency and the COVID-19 pandemic were all negative or stagnant. She expressed regret that actions on the battlefield had been far greater than progress at the negotiating table, contrary to the hope that the withdrawal of international troops would provide the opportunity for parties to the conflict to come together and find a path to peace. On the advances by the Taliban, she noted that they were positioning themselves to try and take the provincial capitals once foreign forces had fully withdrawn, adding that the military campaign ran directly counter to the statements by the head of the Taliban Political

⁵⁴² China, France, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan and Qatar.

⁵⁴³ Kenya, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United States, Germany, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Qatar and Turkey.

⁵⁴⁴ China, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Afghanistan.

⁵⁴⁵ Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United States, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar and Turkey.

⁵⁴⁶ China, Estonia, France, India, Mexico, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey.

⁵⁴⁷ Estonia, France, India, Ireland and Germany.

⁵⁴⁸ See [S/2021/601](#).

Commission. She also reported that civilian casualties had increased by 29 per cent in the first quarter of 2021 compared with the same period the previous year, with an increase in women and children casualties. She stressed the need to put victims and their needs at the forefront of negotiations and recalled that increased conflict in Afghanistan meant increased insecurity for many other countries, near and far.

Following the Special Representative's briefing, the Executive Director of UNODC focused on the importance of a well-integrated and balanced strategy to counter the illicit drug trade as a cornerstone to achieving an Afghanistan at peace. In that regard, she elaborated on the integrated mandates of UNODC in support of the Government in relation to drugs, crime, corruption and terrorism. She expressed readiness to increase the assistance by UNODC on a series of key aspects, such as enabling more farmers to shift to viable, licit crops, making evidence-based prevention and treatment a priority, urging the Government of Afghanistan and donors to devote greater resources and increase operational capabilities to disrupt drug trafficking, ensuring that counter-narcotics responses went hand-in-hand with actions to tackle corruption, strengthening regional cooperation to protect people and ensuring that all support efforts advanced the hard-won gains made by women and girls in Afghanistan.

Council members also heard a briefing by the Executive Director of the Afghan Women's Network, who reported that, since the release of the report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team that had been shared with the Council in April, violence had increased and had claimed the precious lives of several hundreds, the majority of whom were professional women and schoolchildren and youth. She underscored that a ceasefire should not be the goal of the peace talks but that it should pave the way for the peace process. In that context, she underscored that the United Nations at the highest level, including the Council, must compel the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan to commit to a permanent ceasefire. Finally, she emphasized that a politically stable, economically empowered and self-reliant Afghanistan, where the rule of law, justice and human rights were respected and citizens' rights were protected and guaranteed, would benefit the region and the world.

Following the briefings, Council members and other participants⁵⁴⁹ expressed continued concern for

the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and condemned the increasing terrorist attacks and violence against civilians, including children, humanitarian workers, minorities and women. Several participants⁵⁵⁰ also reiterated that it was crucial to ensure that Afghanistan was not used again by terrorist groups or as a centre for illicit drug production and trafficking. A few Council members⁵⁵¹ noted that the situation in Afghanistan had reached a critical juncture as international forces were withdrawing from the country, while others⁵⁵² underscored the importance of international troops withdrawing in a responsible, orderly and coordinated manner. The representative of the United States stressed that the withdrawal of all United States troops from Afghanistan, announced by the President of the United States in April, was not a decision that had been taken lightly and that it had been made after close consultation with allies and partners. She also stressed that the commitment of the United States to the safety and security of Afghanistan endured. On the peace process, many participants⁵⁵³ noted that all relevant parties, including the Taliban, would need to constructively engage in the peace negotiations towards a political settlement and ceasefire, and some⁵⁵⁴ reiterated the need to support an inclusive process, in particular the need to ensure the meaningful participation of women in the negotiations.

On 6 August, the Council held a meeting⁵⁵⁵ at which it heard briefings by the Special Representative and the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. The Special Representative reported that the war in Afghanistan had entered a new, deadlier and more destructive phase and that, during June and July, the Taliban had achieved significant territorial gains in their campaign to capture rural areas and had begun to attack the larger cities. She provided evidence of the human toll and the civilian casualties and noted that threatening large urban areas appeared to be a strategic decision by the Taliban, who had accepted the likely carnage that would ensue. She added that the suffering caused by the war came on top of an already increasing humanitarian crisis. Recalling both the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan

⁵⁴⁹ Estonia, Ireland, United Kingdom, China, France, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Poland and Turkey.

⁵⁵⁰ Ireland, United States, France, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Islamic Republic of Iran.

⁵⁵¹ Norway, China and Tunisia.

⁵⁵² China, Mexico and Pakistan.

⁵⁵³ India, China, France, Mexico, Russian Federation, Viet Nam, Australia, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran and Kazakhstan.

⁵⁵⁴ Estonia, Ireland, India, United States, Norway, France, Kenya, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Italy, Japan, Poland and Turkey.

⁵⁵⁵ See [S/PV.8831](#).

between the United States of America and the Taliban, signed in February 2020, and the talks between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban in September 2021, she noted that there had been an expectation to see a reduction in violence, which did not happen. In reference to her contact with Afghans, she described having the impression that the population was waiting apprehensively for a dark shadow to pass over the bright futures they had once imagined. In that regard, she said that Afghans expected far greater engagement and visible support from the Council, adding that the statement to the press dated 3 August, in which the Council condemned the attack against the United Nations office in Herat and called again for an end to the violence and a resumption of a meaningful peace process, had been greatly appreciated. The Special Representative mentioned that there were several important opportunities in the near future through which words and actions could help to bring an end to the war. First, she called on the Council to issue an unambiguous statement that attacks against cities must stop. Second, she said that those countries that met with the Taliban Political Commission should insist in those meetings on a general ceasefire and a resumption of the negotiations and that a Government imposed by force in Afghanistan would not be recognized. Third, any extension of the travel ban exemption for the Taliban to travel for peace negotiations should be predicated on real progress on peace. Fourth, in the absence of a ceasefire, the Council and those States that met with the Taliban must urge them to grant humanitarian access to areas they controlled and commit to humanitarian ceasefires in contested areas. Fifth, she emphasized the need to put on notice the architects and perpetrators of the most serious violations of human rights. The Special Representative highlighted the strong support of UNAMA for greater efforts by the United Nations and the regional and international communities to find ways to hold the perpetrators accountable. Finally, she stated that the Council should give serious consideration to providing the United Nations with a mandate that would allow it to play a greater role in facilitating the negotiations.

The Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission provided a briefing about the ongoing conflict and the violations of international humanitarian law in Afghanistan. Advances by the Taliban and an escalation in violence meant that the Commission was verifying details of horrific war crimes on a daily basis. In addition to daily violations of the laws of conflict, she reported that the country's human rights gains were under attack and rapidly shrinking as the conflict expanded. She singled out as a

deeply concerning example the rights of women and girls in areas captured by the Taliban. The situation was equally concerning regarding access to information and freedom of expression. Affirming that the violence did not need to continue, she said that the Council and its members still had the leverage to stop the bloodshed of Afghans and prevent catastrophes. In that regard, she urged the Council, the United Nations and international human rights mechanisms to respond with a greater sense of urgency to the Afghan calls for civilian protection, a ceasefire, an end to the violence and a meaningful and inclusive political process. With regard to the call for a fact-finding mission to investigate the targeted killings of civilians in Afghanistan, she stressed that some of the most important things that a such a mission would offer the Afghan people included acting as a preventive mechanism and highlighting the urgency of the threat to civilians. It would also keep victims and civilians centre stage as Afghanistan headed towards a human rights and humanitarian crisis post-withdrawal, while establishing the facts, identifying perpetrators and preserving evidence with a view to ensuring accountability. As part of the fact-finding mission, remedies for victims could also be proposed and effective prevention mechanisms could be established.

Speaking ahead of the Council members, the representative of Afghanistan asked the Council and the international community to take preventive measures to avert a catastrophic situation, including the convening of a special session of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, and further requested the Council and the Secretary-General to provide support to the ongoing peace talks and the regional and international meetings in Doha. Many Council members reiterated that there was no military solution to the situation,⁵⁵⁶ and several Council members also underscored that the international community would not recognize or support a Taliban Government that came to power by force.⁵⁵⁷

At an emergency meeting held on 16 August⁵⁵⁸ the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General, who urged all parties – especially the Taliban – to exercise the utmost restraint to protect lives and to ensure that humanitarian needs could be met. He focused on two main aspects: first, on the need to speak with one voice to uphold human rights in

⁵⁵⁶ Norway, Estonia, United States, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Russian Federation, Viet Nam, Ireland, United Kingdom and China.

⁵⁵⁷ Norway, Estonia, United States and United Kingdom.

⁵⁵⁸ See [S/PV.8834](#).

Afghanistan, and second, on the need for the international community to make sure that Afghanistan was never again used as a platform or safe haven for terrorist organizations. In that regard, he appealed to the Council and the international community as a whole to stand together, work together, act together and use all tools at their disposal to suppress the global terrorist threat in Afghanistan and to guarantee that basic human rights would be respected. Looking ahead, he called for an immediate end to violence, for the rights of all Afghans to be respected and for Afghanistan to comply with all international agreements to which it was a party.

Speaking ahead of Council members, the representative of Afghanistan emphasized that mass executions of military personnel and targeted killings of civilians by the Taliban could not be allowed to happen in Kabul, which had been the last refuge for many people escaping violence and revenge attacks by the Taliban. He stressed that the Council and the Secretary-General should use every means at their disposal to call for an immediate cessation of violence and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, and that the Council and the United Nations should not recognize any Administration that achieved power through force or any Government that was not inclusive and representative of the diversity of the country. Council members⁵⁵⁹ called for an immediate ceasefire and urged all parties to seek a negotiated political settlement and national reconciliation. Council members⁵⁶⁰ also emphasized the need to protect civilians and to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access to continue to provide life-saving assistance to those in need in Afghanistan. In that context, several members⁵⁶¹ underscored that the Council needed to assume its responsibility and act to address and mitigate the consequences, including presenting a clear message and a unified front.

Two weeks later, on 30 August, the Council held a meeting⁵⁶² at which it adopted, not unanimously, resolution [2593 \(2021\)](#). In the resolution, the Council condemned in the strongest terms the deplorable attacks of August 26 near Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.⁵⁶³ The Council further demanded that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any

country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or to finance terrorist acts.⁵⁶⁴ The Council also called for strengthened efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and called on all parties to allow full, safe and unhindered access for the United Nations and all humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activity.⁵⁶⁵ After the vote, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom focused on the achievements of the resolution adopted.⁵⁶⁶ The representative of France expressed regret that the text could not garner the support of all members of the Council. She said that she had no doubt, however, that Council members all shared the same primary objective of enabling the Afghan people to regain stability and security. The representative of Ireland acknowledged that her delegation would have preferred stronger language on the respect for human rights, particularly given the situation faced by the women and girls of Afghanistan, and called on all parties to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian, refugee and human rights law. The representative of the Russian Federation explained that his country abstained in the voting because the authors of the text ignored his delegation's principled concerns. First, despite the fact that the resolution had been proposed against the backdrop of a terrible terrorist attack, the penholders had categorically refused to mention internationally recognized terrorist organizations – Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement – in the paragraph on counter-terrorism. Second, the unacceptability of the negative impacts of the evacuation of qualified Afghan specialists on the Afghan economy had not been reflected in the text. Third, the authors had ignored proposals to include references to the harmful influence of the freezing of Afghan financial assets on the economic and humanitarian situation and the vital need to provide humanitarian assistance strictly in accordance with the guiding principles of the United Nations as enshrined in General Assembly resolution [46/182](#). Explaining his country's abstention, the representative of China said that his delegation had serious doubts about the necessity and urgency of the adoption of the resolution and about the balance of its content, adding that the important and reasonable amendments that his delegation had put forward together with the Russian Federation had not been fully adopted. He added that the recent chaos in Afghanistan was directly related to the hasty and disorderly withdrawal of foreign troops and expressed hope that the countries concerned would

⁵⁵⁹ Estonia, Norway, France, United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Viet Nam and China.

⁵⁶⁰ Estonia, Norway, United States, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Mexico, Viet Nam and China.

⁵⁶¹ Norway, Ireland, Mexico and India.

⁵⁶² See [S/PV.8848](#).

⁵⁶³ Resolution [2593 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁵⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8848](#).

realize that the withdrawal did not mean an end of their responsibility but the beginning of a process of reflection and correction.

On 9 September, the Council held a meeting⁵⁶⁷ in connection with the report of the Secretary-General.⁵⁶⁸ In addition to the briefing by the Special Representative, the Council heard briefings by the founder of the Women and Peace Studies Organization and by the co-founder and Board Chair of the Malala Fund, Malala Yousafzai.⁵⁶⁹ The Special Representative reported that the population of Kabul and the people of Afghanistan were confronted with a new and worrisome reality with the fall of the capital city on 15 August, which was followed by scenes of panic and chaos at the Kabul airport. Since many names listed in a de facto Administration announced by the Taliban were on the United Nations sanctions list, the Special Representative emphasized that all Council members would need to decide which steps to take regarding the sanctions list and the impact on future engagement. She further underscored that addressing the pre-existing humanitarian crisis could not wait for political decisions regarding the removal of sanctions and that relevant mechanisms must be found quickly to allow for the United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations to provide the necessary humanitarian relief. She also drew attention to an additional looming crisis, in which billions of assets and donor funds had been frozen by members of the international community, of which the inevitable effect would be a severe economic downturn. She expressed disappointment at the lack of inclusivity of the so-called caretaker cabinet and concern about the growing number of incidents of harassment and intimidation against the national staff of UNAMA, about the credible allegations of reprisal killings of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces personnel and the detention of officials who worked for previous Administrations, and about the increasing violence used against Afghans protesting Taliban rule. With reference to the impact of the recent developments beyond the Afghan borders, the Special Representative noted the importance of the wider international community not becoming irrevocably divided, as there was now a more urgent agenda for regional and international cooperation around Afghanistan.

The founder of the Women and Peace Studies Organization explained that she, along with her local network of women peacebuilders, had been working for local peace and conflict resolution for over a decade, including to promote the ceasefire and a national peace process. She reported that women's lives had been flipped around since 15 August and that thousands of women workers in non-governmental organizations were in hiding. She said that she still believed that the Council had the power, the ability and the responsibility to mitigate that damage and put forward four immediate requests. First, she asked the Council members engaging with the Taliban caretaker Government to remember that there were some 16 million or 17 million women and girls in Afghanistan, and therefore to include them in Council members' own mediation teams and to facilitate meetings of delegations of women across different professions – peacebuilders, judges, security officers, educators, doctors, businesswomen – with the Taliban. Second, noting that thousands of women and men from civil society, media personnel, former government employees, judges and prosecutors, artists and musicians were at risk of reprisal, she asked Council members to welcome them, grant them visas and give them a chance for a productive life. Third, in the light of the looming humanitarian crisis and the gender-segregated ideology of the Taliban regime, she said that it was imperative that the United Nations ensured the protection of Afghan female aid workers and other civic professionals and community organizers, adding that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other agencies must put in place a practical and clear gender-responsive aid plan. Finally, while the Taliban had asked for the world to be patient as they took charge, she encouraged Council members to ask the Taliban to fulfil their responsibility to protect and respect all Afghans regardless of age, sex or ethnicity. She concluded by asking Council members to put aside their political differences and act as one voice in support of the people and the women of Afghanistan.

In her briefing, Ms. Yousafzai focused on the experience of girls living under extremism and terrorism and on the impact of the most recent developments on their right to education. She called on the Council to protect Afghan girls and women and the future of the nation in four ways. First, she called on the Council to send a clear and unequivocal message to the Taliban that a fundamental condition of any working relationship was upholding girls' right to education. Second, the Council must build on resolution 2593 (2021) by supporting a robust monitoring mechanism to track and monitor abuses of human rights. Third, the international community

⁵⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8853](#). See also [S/2021/785](#). While briefers and Council members participated in person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

⁵⁶⁸ [S/2021/759](#) and [S/2021/759/Corr.1](#).

⁵⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8853](#).

needed to put that same resolution into action, with a significant increase in humanitarian and development assistance to the United Nations and international organizations so as to ensure that all schools could operate safely. Lastly, she emphasized that the United Nations presence was needed in every region of Afghanistan more than ever before. In that regard, she said that a strengthened mandate and resources for UNAMA and other United Nations agencies in Afghanistan were essential.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members⁵⁷⁰ reiterated their call on all parties to allow the safe and unhindered departure of Afghans and foreign nationals who wished to leave the country, noting the Taliban's commitment, and humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian agencies and other actors providing assistance. With regard to governance, several Council members⁵⁷¹ expressed concern about the lack of inclusivity in the composition of the new interim Government announced by the Taliban. A number of Council members⁵⁷² called on the Taliban to pursue inclusive politics and an inclusive society while bearing in mind the interests of all segments of Afghan society. The representative of Afghanistan asked the Council to withhold any recognition of any Government in Afghanistan unless it was truly inclusive and formed on the basis of the free will of the people and urged Council members to draw a fundamental red line regarding the Taliban's treatment of women and girls and respect for the rights of all Afghans.

On 17 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNAMA as defined in resolution [2543 \(2020\)](#) for six months.⁵⁷³ The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a written report by 31 January 2022 on strategic and operational recommendations for the mandate of UNAMA in the light of the recent political, security and social developments, and to brief the Council on the situation in Afghanistan and the work of UNAMA every other month until 17 March 2022.⁵⁷⁴ Following the adoption of the resolution, several Council members provided explanations of their vote.⁵⁷⁵ While noting that the

collaborative effort had resulted in the renewal of the mandate of the Mission, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret that the final version of the resolution did not take into account an objective assessment of the threats in Afghanistan from ISIL/Da'esh or the long-standing drug problem. She expressed the expectation that such threats would be objectively reflected in the report of the Secretary-General to be presented to the Council in January 2022. The representative of Mexico underscored that unrestricted respect for international humanitarian law, in particular the protection of civilians, was essential and inescapable given the serious security situation that had taken shape in Afghanistan. That was why Mexico had insisted on an explicit mention of that subject. He expressed surprise that such a mention had not been included. Acknowledging that the text of the resolution did not capture all of the issues facing Afghanistan at such a time of upheaval, the representative of Ireland reiterated the central importance of upholding the country's obligations under international, humanitarian, refugee and human rights laws.

On 17 November, the Council held the last meeting of the year under the item.⁵⁷⁶ In addition to the briefing by the Special Representative, the Council heard a briefing by the Director of Charmaghz, a non-profit educational organization dedicated to children in Afghanistan. In her briefing, the Special Representative provided a general assessment of the de facto Taliban Administration based on the engagement with them over the previous three months and highlighted that formal interactions had been generally useful and constructive. However, she highlighted that the Taliban had made clear that there were limits to concessions they were willing to make on certain issues at the time and that they needed more time to clarify the policy on girls' right to education and its implementation. While the overall security situation had improved as the conflict had largely ended, UNAMA regularly received credible reports of incidents that were having an impact on the right to life and the physical integrity of Afghans. She reported that the Taliban's inability to curb the expansion of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province was another major negative development. The Special Representative further underscored that humanitarian assistance was not enough and that the international community needed urgently to find a way to provide financial support to health-care workers in State hospitals, to staff in food security programmes and eventually to teachers. She stated that the reality of the

⁵⁷⁰ Ireland, Estonia, Norway, United Kingdom, India, France, Mexico, Viet Nam and United States.

⁵⁷¹ Ireland, Norway, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), France and Mexico.

⁵⁷² Ireland, Estonia, Norway, United Kingdom, India, Russian Federation, Viet Nam and China.

⁵⁷³ Resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 5. For more information on the mandate of UNAMA, see part X, sect. II.

⁵⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8862](#).

⁵⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8908](#).

situation threatened to heighten the risk of extremism, with the continued deterioration of the formal economy providing impetus to the informal economy, including illicit drugs, arms flows and trafficking in persons. She suggested that the best way to promote stability and future international support was for the Taliban to avoid the isolation that had characterized their previous experience in power, which would require a sustained and structured policy dialogue among the Taliban de facto authorities, other Afghan stakeholders, the wider region and the international community.

In her briefing, the Director of Charmaghz called on the United Nations to work with all stakeholders in the creation of a political structure that would allow for coexistence and an end to the cycle of war in which Afghanistan had been trapped for decades. She explained that exclusion and lack of power-sharing did not work in Afghanistan and pointed out that Afghanistan had an overly centralized political structure and system that the Taliban had inherited from the previous Government. Expressing that a new political system in which all could coexist could be created only through non-violent means and negotiations involving all groups, she stressed the need for a genuine global effort to turn the current moment into a window of opportunity for long-lasting peace. To that end, she urged the United Nations and friendly neutral Governments to play a leading role in bringing all stakeholders back under a Bonn Conference model, with the aim to ensure transitional justice through the model to create a political system that was acceptable to all and inclusive of all. She also urged all rival regional Powers, including India and Pakistan, but not limited to them, to bring the best versions of themselves, setting aside their regional rivalries, to genuinely work for peace. Lastly, she urged the global

community to support local actors, non-governmental organizations and associations working in Afghanistan.

Following the briefings, several Council members⁵⁷⁷ underscored that the re-establishment of basic services, especially health care and education, was vital, and highlighted the importance of girls' access and right to education. Furthermore, Council members and other participants⁵⁷⁸ drew attention to the economic situation in Afghanistan and expressed concern about the economic challenges, including the liquidity shortage and other economic factors hampering the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. A few speakers⁵⁷⁹ also highlighted the need to release Afghan frozen assets, which should not be politicized or made conditional. Council members also condemned the increasing number of terrorist attacks,⁵⁸⁰ and expressed the expectation that the Taliban and all parties in Afghanistan would make a clean break from terrorist groups and do their utmost to counter those groups.⁵⁸¹

Developments in Afghanistan were also considered under the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts".⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁷ Norway, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), France, Ireland, United States and Mexico.

⁵⁷⁸ Viet Nam, United Kingdom, United States, Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan.

⁵⁷⁹ China and Islamic Republic of Iran.

⁵⁸⁰ Norway, Estonia, Viet Nam, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland and Mexico.

⁵⁸¹ Norway, China, France and United Kingdom.

⁵⁸² For more information, see sect. 28 below.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Afghanistan

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8831 6 August 2021			Afghanistan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Chair of the Afghanistan	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
				Independent Human Rights Commission		
S/PV.8834 16 August 2021			Afghanistan		Secretary- General, 12 Council members, ^c invitee	
S/PV.8848 30 August 2021		Draft resolution submitted by France, United Kingdom, United States (S/2021/762)			Seven Council members ^d	Resolution 2593 (2021) 13-0-2 ^e
S/PV.8853 and S/2021/785 9 September 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2021/759 and S/2021/759/Corr.1)		Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Turkey	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, founder of the Women and Peace Studies Organization, co-founder and Board Chair of the Malala Fund	12 Council members, ^f all invitees ^g	
S/PV.8862 17 September 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2021/759 and S/2021/759/Corr.1)	Draft resolution submitted by Estonia, Norway (S/2021/804)			Seven Council members ^h	Resolution 2596 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8908 17 November 2021			Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan, Tajikistan	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Director of Charmaghz	12 Council members, ^c all invitees ⁱ	

^a China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United States and Viet Nam.

^b The Special Representative and the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United States and Viet Nam.

^d China, Estonia, France, Ireland, Russian Federation, United States and United Kingdom. India (President of the Council) was represented by its Foreign Secretary.

^e *For*: Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, Russian Federation.

^f China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United States and Viet Nam. Ireland (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence.

^g The Special Representative, the founder of the Women and Peace Studies Organization and the co-founder and Board Chair of the Malala Fund participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^h China, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

ⁱ The Special Representative and the Director of Charmaghz participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2

Videoconferences: the situation in Afghanistan

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
23 March 2021	S/2021/291	Letter dated 25 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
22 June 2021	S/2021/601	Letter dated 24 June 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

15. The situation in Myanmar

During the period under review, the Council held three private meetings under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”. More information about the meetings is provided in table 1 below. In connection with the item, Council members also held one videoconference to announce the adoption of a presidential statement.⁵⁸³ More information on the videoconference is given in table 2 below. In addition, Council members held closed videoconferences in connection with the item.⁵⁸⁴

On 10 March, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it reiterated its deep concern at developments in Myanmar following the declaration of the state of emergency imposed by the military on 1 February and the arbitrary detention of members of the Government and called for their immediate release.⁵⁸⁵ The Council strongly condemned the violence against peaceful protestors and expressed deep concern at restrictions on medical personnel, civil society, journalists and labour union members. The Council called for the immediate release of all those detained arbitrarily and called for the military to

exercise utmost restraint.⁵⁸⁶ The Council also stressed the need to uphold democratic institutions and processes, refrain from violence, fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and uphold the rule of law.⁵⁸⁷ The Council further reiterated its strong support for regional organizations, in particular the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and welcomed the statements made by the Chair of ASEAN on 1 February and 2 March, in which the Chair had called on all parties to exercise utmost restraint and seek a peaceful solution through constructive dialogue and practical reconciliation in the interests of the people of Myanmar.⁵⁸⁸ The Council reiterated its support for the good offices of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar and encouraged her to maintain her efforts to engage intensively with all relevant parties in Myanmar and to visit Myanmar as soon as possible.⁵⁸⁹ The Council further noted that the situation in Myanmar had the potential to exacerbate existing challenges in Rakhine State and expressed concern that recent developments posed serious challenges for Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons within the region.⁵⁹⁰ The Council also reaffirmed its strong commitment to the

⁵⁸³ [S/PRST/2021/5](#). For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁵⁸⁴ See [A/76/2, part II, chap. 32](#). See also [S/2021/1084](#).

⁵⁸⁵ [S/PRST/2021/5](#), first paragraph. In the presidential statement, the Council also recalled its statement to the press dated 4 February.

⁵⁸⁶ [S/PRST/2021/5](#), second paragraph.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, third paragraph.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, fifth paragraph.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Myanmar.⁵⁹¹

Further to that decision, the Council held three private meetings, on 18 June, 17 August and 8 November, during which it heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, the Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Division of the Departments of Political and

Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations. In addition, the Second Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam provided briefings to the Council in his capacity as Chair of ASEAN at the 18 June meeting, invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, and in his capacity as Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar at the 17 August and 8 November meetings, invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.⁵⁹²

⁵⁹² For more information on participation in meetings of the Council, see part II, sect. VIII.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., seventh paragraph.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Myanmar

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8800 18 June 2021 (closed)				Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nationsg (ASEAN)	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8835 17 August 2021 (closed)			Brunei Darussalam	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	12 Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8898 8 November 2021 (closed)			Brunei Darussalam	Director of the Asia-Pacific Division of the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations	All Council members, all invitees ^{c,d}	

^a The Second Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam briefed the Council in his capacity as Chair of ASEAN.

^b China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^c Brunei Darussalam was represented by its Second Minister for Foreign Affairs, who briefed the Council in his capacity as Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar.

^d The representative of Brunei Darussalam participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2
Videoconference: the situation in Myanmar

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
10 March 2021	No record (see A/76/2 , part II, chap. 32)		S/PRST/2021/5

Europe

16. The situation in Cyprus

In 2021, the Council held two meetings and adopted two resolutions and one presidential statement concerning the situation in Cyprus.⁵⁹³ More information on the meetings and outcomes is given in table 1 below. In addition, Council members held one open videoconference in connection with the item.⁵⁹⁴ More information on the videoconference is given in table 2 below. The Council also held a private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).⁵⁹⁵ Council members also held a closed videoconference to discuss the situation in Cyprus.⁵⁹⁶

On 29 January, Council members held an open videoconference⁵⁹⁷ in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General,⁵⁹⁸ at which the President of the Council announced the unanimous adoption of resolution [2561 \(2021\)](#), by which the Council extended the mandate of UNFICYP for a period of six months, until 31 July 2021.⁵⁹⁹ Recalling its resolution [2537 \(2020\)](#), the Council called upon the leaders of the two Cypriot communities to consider the advice of the good offices mission of the Secretary-General regarding further ways to empower the technical committees and improve their performance, and to engage them more actively to ensure effective coordination and cooperation on health matters, particularly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and other infectious diseases.⁶⁰⁰ Regretting the lack of

progress on an effective mechanism for direct military contacts between the sides and the relevant involved parties, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the reasons behind the lack of progress and urged full engagement with the proposal to establish such a mechanism presented by UNFICYP and its timely implementation.⁶⁰¹ To that end, the Council called on the Secretary-General to report on any actions that impeded the ability of UNFICYP to fulfil its mandate and urged both sides to take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety and security of UNFICYP personnel.⁶⁰²

On 23 July, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it reaffirmed the status of Varosha as set out in previous resolutions and reiterated that any attempt to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants was inadmissible and that no actions should be carried out in relation to Varosha that were not in accordance with its resolutions.⁶⁰³ Expressing its deep regret regarding unilateral actions that ran contrary to its previous resolutions and statements, the Council condemned the announcement in Cyprus by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders on 20 July 2021 on the further reopening of a part of the fenced-off area of Varosha.⁶⁰⁴ In that regard, the Council called for the immediate reversal of that course of action, including all steps taken regarding Varosha since October 2020, while underscoring the need to avoid any further unilateral actions that were not in accordance with its resolutions and that could raise tensions on the island and harm prospects for a settlement.⁶⁰⁵ Stressing the importance of the full respect and implementation of its resolutions, including on the transfer of Varosha to United Nations administration, and of respect for the freedom of movement of UNFICYP, the Council further reaffirmed its commitment to an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement, as set out in relevant Council resolutions, and its support for the Secretary-General's efforts.⁶⁰⁶

On 29 July, at a meeting⁶⁰⁷ held in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General,⁶⁰⁸ the

⁵⁹³ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁵⁹⁴ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁵⁹⁵ The private meeting was held on 15 July in connection with the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B"; see [S/PV.8821](#) and [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 20.

⁵⁹⁶ See [S/2021/938](#) and [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 1. The closed videoconference was held on 19 January. In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences.

⁵⁹⁷ See [S/2021/99](#).

⁵⁹⁸ [S/2021/4](#) and [S/2021/5](#).

⁵⁹⁹ Resolution [2561 \(2021\)](#), para. 9. For more information on the mandate of UNFICYP, see part X, sect. I. The resolution was adopted in accordance with the procedures developed during the COVID-19 pandemic.

⁶⁰⁰ Resolution [2561 \(2021\)](#), para. 4.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*, para. 10.

⁶⁰³ [S/PRST/2021/13](#), second paragraph.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, third paragraph.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, fifth and sixth paragraphs.

⁶⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8827](#).

⁶⁰⁸ [S/2021/634](#) and [S/2021/635](#).

Council unanimously adopted resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, until 31 January 2022.⁶⁰⁹ In the resolution, the Council welcomed the work of the Secretary-General and that of his team in convening the informal five-plus-United Nations meeting between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities and the guarantor Powers held in Geneva from 27 to 29 April 2021, while noting with regret that sufficient common ground could not be found at the meeting to allow for the resumption of formal negotiations.⁶¹⁰ The Council also regretted the impact that the largely uncoordinated responses to the COVID-19 pandemic had had on bicomunal engagement.⁶¹¹ Recalling the importance of achieving an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement based on a bicomunal, bizonal federation with political equality, as set out in relevant Council resolutions, the Council expressed its full support for the Secretary-General's ongoing engagement and the agreement by the parties to convene a further round of informal talks, and reiterated the importance of the sides and all involved participants to show the necessary political will and commitment to freely negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement under the auspices of the United Nations.⁶¹²

Expressing regret for the ongoing lack of meaningful participation of women's organizations and youth in the settlement process, the Council called on the leaders of both sides to submit to the Secretary-General by 15 December 2021 an action plan, in coordination with the Technical Committee on Gender

Equality, to increase women's full, equal and meaningful participation in peace talks, and to provide direct support and encouragement to civil society organizations aimed at enhancing intercommunal contact and trust-building. In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to include that action plan in his next report on the good offices mission in Cyprus, while noting his call to ensure the inclusion of at least 30 per cent women in future delegations.⁶¹³

Welcoming the establishment of a dialogue between the sides and the United Nations resulting in the reopening of the crossing points on 4 June, the Council called on the leaders to continue cooperation and to return the crossing points to the operating status that existed prior to 29 February 2020.⁶¹⁴ The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit by 3 January 2022 a report on his good offices and encouraged the leaders of the two communities to provide written updates to the good offices mission of the Secretary-General on the actions they had taken in support of the relevant parts of the resolution, with a view to reaching a sustainable and comprehensive settlement. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit by 3 January 2022 a report on the implementation of the resolution, drawing on an analysis produced through the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System covering all components of the mission.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹³ Ibid., para. 5. For more information on the decisions of the Council containing measures in connection with the women and peace and security agenda, see sect. 27 below.

⁶¹⁴ Resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 8.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., para. 19. For more information on the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System for other missions, see part X, sect. I.

⁶⁰⁹ Resolution [2587 \(2021\)](#), para. 10.
⁶¹⁰ Ibid., third preambular paragraph.
⁶¹¹ Ibid., tenth preambular paragraph.
⁶¹² Ibid., paras. 1 and 2.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Cyprus

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8824 23 July 2021						S/PRST/2021/13
S/PV.8827 29 July 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2021/634) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/2021/635)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/687)				Resolution 2587 (2021) 15-0-0

Table 2
Videoconference: the situation in Cyprus

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
29 January 2021	S/2021/99	Letter dated 29 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2561 (2021) 15-0-0 S/2021/96

17. Items relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia

A. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 2021, the Council held three meetings, adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter and failed to adopt a draft resolution in connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Except for the meeting convened to adopt the resolution, which took the form of a debate, all other meetings took the form of a briefing.⁶¹⁶ More information on the meetings, including on the participants and speakers, is provided in table 1 below. The members of the Council also held one videoconference in connection with the item.⁶¹⁷ More information about the videoconference is provided in table 2 below. In addition, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the item.⁶¹⁸

In 2021, Council members heard briefings from the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the Officer-in-Charge of the Europe and Central Asia Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. In addition to Council members, the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina participated in the videoconference and the meeting at which briefings were heard.

On 4 May, during his briefing at the open videoconference,⁶¹⁹ the High Representative provided updates on developments in connection with his most recent report.⁶²⁰ At the outset, the High Representative recalled the commemoration of the twenty-fifth

anniversary in 2020 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) as a moment of hope and reflection for the country.⁶²¹ In that context, he referred to a set of concrete conclusions that had been adopted by the authorities of the Republika Srpska in March 2021 as part of a long-standing policy of challenging the fundamentals of the Agreement, leaving open the option for the so-called “peaceful dissolution” of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that connection, he stressed that the Agreement did not give the right to entities to secede and expressed regret about the political atmosphere and the lack of progress on reforms. The High Representative stated that, during his mandate since 2009, there had been a shift from rhetoric to action challenging the State competencies, institutions and decisions, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. The High Representative welcomed the movement around the electoral reform process but expressed regret that there was mistrust and fear among citizens and civil society of a further ethnicization of the electoral system, which would conflict not only with the implementation of the *Sejdić and Finci* group of cases, but also with the specific goals of the Agreement. In that connection, the High Representative reiterated that further ethnic or territorial divisions must not be allowed. He also expressed his disappointment that a few efforts to criminalize the glorification of war criminals and the denial of genocide before the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina had failed.

The High Representative referred to some areas in which he remained hopeful, namely the city of Mostar, Sarajevo City and Banja Luka, where new mayors of diverse backgrounds, gender, ethnicity and age had been elected. With regard to the implementation of the third national action plan for resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#), the High Representative reported that there had been some steps forward, such

⁶¹⁶ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁶¹⁷ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁶¹⁸ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 6.A. See also [S/2021/1032](#).

⁶¹⁹ See [S/2021/436](#).

⁶²⁰ [S/2021/409](#), annex.

⁶²¹ See [S/2021/436](#).

as the efforts to increase the role of women in peacekeeping missions. Announcing that the briefing could be his last to the Council, the High Representative reflected on some of the lessons of the past 12 years. He affirmed that Bosnia and Herzegovina remained *de facto* a frozen conflict, in which political leaders continued to pursue wartime goals and generate divisive narratives and nationalistic political agendas. He noted that the refusal to accept the authority of the State and to comply with the rule of law, defying or ignoring the Bosnia and Herzegovina legal and constitutional framework and not cooperating with, or actively undermining, State-level judicial and law enforcement agencies and the defiance of the authority and decisions of High Representatives were some examples of the most immediate challenges. Until there was a genuine, demonstrated commitment to peace and stability and until the durable stability and inviolability of Bosnia and Herzegovina were ensured, the international community must retain all the instruments at its disposal to address any potential threat, including the executive powers of the High Representative. While acknowledging that the growing gaps in the wider international community did not help the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region to improve, he appealed to the international community to remain united and decisive and to work together on offering solutions and solving problems.

During the discussion that followed the briefing, most Council members welcomed the holding of the 2020 local and municipal elections, especially in the city of Mostar, for the first time since 2008, as positive developments. At the same time, a majority of Council members expressed similar concerns about the country's divisive ethnic politics. In that regard, most speakers condemned the rise of nationalistic and secessionist rhetoric and the glorification of war criminals and historical revisionism. Speakers⁶²² urged all relevant parties to refrain from such narratives and focus on promoting reconciliation and on the challenges the country was facing, namely, the COVID-19 pandemic, the implementation of the necessary reforms and the strengthening of the rule of law. A number of Council members⁶²³ also expressed regret for the lack of progress in the implementation of the 5 plus 2 agenda of five objectives and two conditions, mandated by the Council, which was a requirement for the closure of the Office of the High

Representative, and called on the parties to expedite its implementation. Thanking the High Representative for his report, a number of speakers⁶²⁴ requested that the elements of implementation of the women and peace and security agenda be included in future reports. The representative of the Russian Federation, however, contended that the report of the High Representative was not balanced and did not reflect the real situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. She proposed that the Council consider the report prepared by the Republika Srpska "as a good alternative" and called for the closure of the Office of the High Representative as soon as possible, noting that the terms and criteria of the closure should reflect the realities on the ground. With regard to the mandate of the High Representative, the representative of the Russian Federation also strongly recommended that the High Representative refrain from interpreting his mandate too broadly. The representative of China encouraged the High Representative to maintain a constructive dialogue and cooperation with all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina and noted that the appointment of the High Representative should be handled in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement and past practices.

On 29 June, at the request of the Russian Federation, the Council held a meeting on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶²⁵ The Officer-in-Charge of the Europe and Central Asia Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs provided a briefing to the Council on the latest developments in the country. He stated that, while there had been progress in certain areas, concerns remained about the overall situation regarding the consolidation of peace and reconciliation, with continued practices that contributed to polarization and hindered the prospect of prosperity and stability, not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for the region. Those included persistent instances of revisionist narratives, divisive rhetoric, the denial of genocide and war crimes, the glorification of convicted war criminals and hate speech. He reported that, during a 10-day visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina earlier that month, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide had expressed concern about that trend and had called for an increased commitment to trust-building and reconciliation. He noted that, amid divisions and a lack of consensus, progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina had proved challenging over the past period and more needed to be done to advance much-needed reforms. The Officer-in-Charge also highlighted that the United Nations had

⁶²² Estonia, Kenya, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

⁶²³ France, India, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Tunisia, United States and Viet Nam.

⁶²⁴ Estonia, Ireland, Mexico and Norway.

⁶²⁵ See [S/PV.8810](#). See also [S/2021/1032](#).

been working with the Government, municipalities and civil society organizations in support of the empowerment of women and youth. With regard to the recent developments in the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council in Sarajevo related to the appointment of a new High Representative, the Officer-in-Charge stated that the United Nations was not a member of the Steering Board and therefore had not participated in the process. He also clarified that the United Nations was not a signatory to either the Dayton Peace Agreement or its annex 10.

In the discussion following the briefing, many Council members focused on a letter dated 3 June addressed to the Secretary-General⁶²⁶, in which the current High Representative, Valentin Inzko, announced the appointment of his successor, Christian Schmidt, by the Steering Board. According to the letter, Mr. Schmidt would take up his duties on 1 August 2021, upon which Mr. Inzko's resignation would become effective. While most members expressed support for the appointment of the new High Representative, in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, delegations diverged on their positions regarding the appointment procedure.⁶²⁷ Although some⁶²⁸ took note of the appointment by the Steering Board, despite the absence of consensus, others⁶²⁹ cautioned that the Council should have also been consulted in the matter. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that, as a member of the Steering Board, the Russian Federation categorically disagreed with the confirmation of that appointment. He added that it was well known that the procedure for the appointment of High Representatives that had developed over the years was logical, transparent and democratic, but that nothing of the sort had happened in the case of Mr. Schmidt. Candidates were confirmed by the Steering Board with the consent of the sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina and then approved by the Council, usually in the form of an adopted resolution. Several Member States⁶³⁰ noted that there had been little progress made in the 5 plus 2 agenda and reiterated their call on competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps to complete it for the closure of the Office of the High Representative. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina mentioned that the

requirements that needed to be met by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the closure of the Office of the High Representative had not yet been achieved. She emphasized that the process of transferring responsibility to the country's elected officials was an important one, but that it must be done when all agreed preconditions had been met. She added that the political situation in the country over the previous six months illustrated the need for the Office of the High Representative to continue its important work. In that connection, she invited all members of the Peace Implementation Council to continue to provide support to the High Representative. The representative of the Russian Federation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina made further statements at the end of the meeting.⁶³¹

On 22 July, the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution submitted by China and the Russian Federation owing to the lack of the required number of votes.⁶³² By the draft resolution, the Council would have decided, *inter alia*, to support the appointment of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as stipulated in annex 10 to the Agreement, until 31 July 2022, with the subsequent closure of the Office of the High Representative.⁶³³ By the draft resolution, the Council would have also decided that the powers of the High Representative described in the conclusion of the Peace Implementation Conference held in Bonn, Germany, in 1997 were no longer required, given the progress achieved by the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶³⁴

Before the vote, statements were made by the representatives of the Russian Federation and China.⁶³⁵ The representative of the Russian Federation contended that the High Representative's role of tutelary authority was inappropriate and was influencing the peace process in a negative way, which explained the lack of consensus regarding the appointment of the new High Representative. He maintained that the positions of certain representatives on the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council were not sufficient for the new High Representative to be appointed and noted that the Dayton Peace Agreement and the experience of the past 25 years demonstrated that the role of the Council

⁶²⁶ S/2021/597, annex.

⁶²⁷ See S/PV.8810.

⁶²⁸ France, Tunisia, Norway, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom and Estonia.

⁶²⁹ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, Viet Nam and Niger.

⁶³⁰ India, Mexico, Tunisia, Norway, United States, Kenya and Ireland.

⁶³¹ For more information on the procedures concerning the conduct of business at meetings, see part II, sect. VII.

⁶³² See S/PV.8823. See also S/2021/667.

⁶³³ S/2021/667, para. 3.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

⁶³⁵ See S/PV.8823.

in appointing a new High Representative was irreplaceable. Guided by the Council's continued involvement in the post-Dayton peace process under Chapter VII of the Charter and in the interests of strengthening peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans in general, he explained that China and the Russian Federation had decided to put before the Council the draft resolution, which was aimed at eliminating the aforementioned problems. The representative of China stated that, as the High Representative had an important bearing on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the question of whether or not the appointment procedures were just and reasonable put at stake the legitimacy of the High Representative who was thereby selected, the authority of the Council on issues related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the fundamental interests of the State and its people. He also stated that the Council played an undeniable role in the appointment of the High Representative under the Agreement, which was a long-standing and established practice for which prior appointments had set precedents, adding that to ignore that practice or to attempt to circumvent the Council would set a deplorable new precedent and have a negative impact. The representative of China also stressed that the High Representative system and the powers emanating from the Peace Implementation Conference represented a special arrangement for a specific period and that, more than 25 years after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in that country had undergone profound changes, leading to different views regarding the High Representative system. He argued that maintaining that system and the Bonn powers was no longer in line with the actual needs of the State and its people and that it did not help the country to exercise its sovereignty or achieve independence and autonomy, adding that the international community should provide assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina that was commensurate with developments on the ground. He concluded by saying that China and the Russian Federation had therefore jointly submitted the draft resolution to maintain the authority and established practices of the Council, safeguard the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and respond to the concerns and aspirations of its people.

After the vote, the representatives of the Russian Federation and China expressed regret that the draft resolution had not been adopted and that the candidate nominated for High Representative had failed to receive the Council's endorsement. They stated that the nomination therefore lacked legitimacy. In explaining their abstentions, Council members expressed full support for the Office of the High Representative and

welcomed the decision of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council to appoint Christian Schmidt as the new High Representative. Several Council members⁶³⁶ considered that the expression of support by the Council was not necessary for the decision of the Steering Board to appoint a new High Representative to take effect. In that regard, they explained that they had abstained in voting on the draft resolution as it would have constrained the powers of the High Representative and imposed a time frame for the closure of the Office of the High Representative. Many Council members⁶³⁷ stated that they had rejected the proposition in the draft resolution to prematurely consider the closure of the Office of the High Representative because not enough progress had been achieved regarding the objectives and conditions of the 5 plus 2 agenda.

On 3 November, the Council held its second biannual debate on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶³⁸ At the outset of the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter. By the resolution, the Council, inter alia, renewed the authorization of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) and the continued presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the country for a period of 12 months, starting from the date of the adoption of the resolution.⁶³⁹

In the ensuing debate, Council members welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#) and the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR-Althea and its work towards peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶⁴⁰ In that connection, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed appreciation for the efforts made by France, in its capacity as penholder on the Bosnia and Herzegovina file, and to Mexico, which held the presidency for the month, stating that the two countries had been able to lead the Council towards finding the only possible common ground and ensuring unanimous renewal of the mandate of EUFOR-Althea. The representatives of Norway and Estonia expressed regret, however, that the Council had not been able to proceed with the more substantial text, which would have allowed for the Council to reiterate its position on such elements as the European perspective and the Office of the High Representative. Delegations expressed concern about the

⁶³⁶ Ireland, United States, United Kingdom, Mexico and France.

⁶³⁷ Ireland, United States, Estonia, Norway, United Kingdom, Mexico and France.

⁶³⁸ See [S/PV.8896](#).

⁶³⁹ [Resolution 2604 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

⁶⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8896](#).

prolonged political deadlock and obstruction of State institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the escalation of divisive rhetoric, the glorification of war criminals and actions targeted at the country's Constitution. In that context, some speakers⁶⁴¹ called for the implementation of constitutional and electoral reforms that guaranteed the principle of non-discrimination and the equality of all citizens, in accordance with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, several speakers⁶⁴² emphasized the importance of the participation of women in decision-making in all its dimensions. Several participants⁶⁴³ expressed their support for the Office of the High Representative and his role in overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and thanked the

newly appointed High Representative for his most recent report.⁶⁴⁴ A number of Council members underscored, in that regard, the need for progress in the implementation of the 5 plus 2 agenda, which remained the agreed prerequisite for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.⁶⁴⁵ The representative of the Russian Federation reiterated, however, that there had been a circumvention of the Council in the appointment procedure of the new High Representative, in violation of international law and the existing practice of making such appointments by consensus, and stressed that the Office of the High Representative remained vacant. In the same vein, the representative of China also reiterated that the system of the High Representative and the Bonn powers thereof had been special arrangements of a particular time and that the international community should provide help to Bosnia and Herzegovina in ways that adapted to the evolving situation.

⁶⁴¹ France, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, United States, Kenya, Estonia, Mexico and European Union.

⁶⁴² France, Ireland, Norway, Estonia, Mexico and European Union.

⁶⁴³ Ireland, United Kingdom, Norway, United States, India and Estonia.

⁶⁴⁴ S/2021/912.

⁶⁴⁵ See S/PV.8896 (Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, Norway, India, Tunisia, Niger, Kenya and Mexico).

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8810 29 June 2021			Bosnia and Herzegovina	Officer-in-Charge, Europe and Central Asia Division, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8823 22 July 2021		Draft resolution submitted by China, Russian Federation (S/2021/667)			10 Council members ^b	2-0-13 ^c
S/PV.8896 3 November 2021		Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/913)	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees ^d	Resolution 2604 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^b China, Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam.

^c For: China, Russian Federation; against: none; abstaining: Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam.

^d The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Turkey.

Table 2
Videoconference: the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Videoconference date	Videoconference record	Title	Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure
4 May 2021	S/2021/436	Letter dated 6 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

B. Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)

In 2021, the Council held one meeting in connection with Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#), which took the form of a briefing.⁶⁴⁶ More information on the meeting, including on the participants and speakers, is given in table 1 below. The members of the Council also held one videoconference in connection with the item.⁶⁴⁷ More information on the videoconference is given in table 2 below. No decisions were adopted in connection with the item during the period under review.

In 2021, Council members heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#).⁶⁴⁸ In line with established practice, statements were also delivered by the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo during the meeting and the open videoconference.

On 13 April, at the open videoconference,⁶⁴⁹ the Special Representative stated that, despite the systemic challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, early legislative elections had been prepared and successfully conducted across Kosovo on 14 February 2021. The political turbulence that had prevailed in the previous year had made the results of the voting all the more significant for the population. He reported that the turnout for the legislative elections had been high

and that the winning party, Vetëvendosje, had received more than half of all the votes. An examination of the demographics of the voting had revealed a strong desire for change across Kosovo society, for a shift in government responsiveness to the real hopes and needs of its voters and for greater equality of opportunity, accountability and the rule of law. He reported that the new Prime Minister of Kosovo had provided assurances of his understanding of the strategic importance of advancing the dialogue with Belgrade and that the President of Serbia had highlighted the importance of the dialogue for peace and stability and had reiterated his hope for the dialogue to be intensified. The Special Representative also noted that a second woman had been elected to hold the position of President of Kosovo and that leadership by women had continued to grow overall as a result of that election. With regard to the aspirations of both Pristina and Belgrade for progress along the European path, he urged leaders to be mindful of the impact of their public statements, noting that gains to public trust in the process were as fragile as they were essential and that, with a new government in Pristina, it was expected that difficult subjects would be treated with seriousness and diligence. He informed the Council of the activities of UNMIK in engaging across multiple sectors and areas of work in accordance with its mandate, including programmes and projects to empower women and youth in politics and society, to promote innovation and catalyse civic activism and to expand multilingual education, as well as its work engaging regularly with Kosovo authorities and civil society organizations on the monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights. He also urged the authorities to make progress on clarifying the fate of missing persons by engaging with the Pristina-Belgrade Working Group on Missing Persons. He said that the new Government had an important opportunity to transform public narratives. He stated that voters in Kosovo had raised their voices for breaking with the past and expressed hope that the members of the Council would add their clear support for the

⁶⁴⁶ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁶⁴⁷ See [S/2021/1084](#). See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 6.B. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁶⁴⁸ [S/2021/332](#) and [S/2021/861](#).

⁶⁴⁹ See [S/2021/370](#).

realization of a more peaceful and prosperous future in Kosovo and the region.

In their statements, several Council members⁶⁵⁰ welcomed the February parliamentary elections and the election of the new President in Kosovo. Delegations⁶⁵¹ also welcomed the increase in the number of women participating in the elections and in the newly constituted Government, with a few members⁶⁵² reiterating the importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in decision-making processes. Most Council members called on Belgrade and Pristina to pursue dialogue to overcome their differences so as to normalize their relations and advance stability in the region⁶⁵³ and expressed support for the facilitating role of the European Union in that regard.⁶⁵⁴

With regard to the role of UNMIK, most speakers expressed support for the work of the Mission in implementing its mandate of promoting security, stability and respect for human rights in the region, with several delegations⁶⁵⁵ commending in particular its initiatives to address the challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic, in assisting the vulnerable communities and in promoting the participation of women and youth in the peace process. More specifically, the representative of the Russian Federation sustained that, as UNMIK activities remained in high demand, the Mission's budgetary and staffing capacities should be kept at current levels. He added that the frequency of open Council briefings on Kosovo should be maintained as negotiated.⁶⁵⁶ The representative of the United States, by contrast, reiterated that the Mission had long since fulfilled its original purpose and called on other Council members to "sunset UNMIK" and determine a more relevant role for the United Nations in helping Kosovo to realize its full potential.⁶⁵⁷ While expressing their recognition for the work of UNMIK, the representatives of Estonia and

the United Kingdom also expressed their support for a strategic review of UNMIK.

During the videoconference, some delegations⁶⁵⁸ expressed regret regarding the incidents that had taken place prior to the meeting with regard to the backdrop displayed by the representative of Kosovo, which had caused a delay in the start of the open videoconference.

At a meeting held on 15 October,⁶⁵⁹ the Council heard the second regular briefing of the year by the Special Representative on recent developments and the most recent report of the Secretary-General.⁶⁶⁰ He focused his remarks on the events that had taken place in northern Kosovo in late September 2021, leading to an escalation of tensions in the region and along the Kosovo-Serbia border.⁶⁶¹ He reported that, through the good offices of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported also by United States diplomacy, an agreement had been achieved to de-escalate the situation. The agreement had provided for the withdrawal of Kosovo special police units from the north and an increased presence of the Kosovo Force to establish a safe and secure environment. He nonetheless noted that the events were of deep concern and should be a warning to all members of the Council. On the Belgrade-Pristina relations, he affirmed that dialogue could and should be the mechanism used to avoid the dangers that were less often visible but were just as real as they had been during the 20 years prior and noted that, despite differences on other matters, the representatives of the international powers represented in the Council clearly shared an understanding that there was no reasonable alternative to sustained engagement in dialogue. He added that, if the vast majority of people from the various communities, including women and youth, did not feel that they were part of, or had a stake in, the processes of political discussion and negotiation, all efforts to change relations and resolve long-term tensions were destined to remain elusive. As Kosovo approached another local election in two days' time, the focus at the central and municipal levels should be on delivering on people's high expectations for change. In that connection, he urged the authorities to focus on rebuilding the bonds of trust between all the communities in Kosovo and the political leadership. He also reported on the work of UNMIK in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic and its work to promote and support trust-building among communities and the women and peace and security and the youth, peace and security agendas, adding that the Mission had helped to model the people-centred approach

⁶⁵⁰ Estonia, France, Kenya, Norway, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

⁶⁵¹ Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

⁶⁵² Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United States.

⁶⁵³ China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

⁶⁵⁴ China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

⁶⁵⁵ Estonia, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

⁶⁵⁶ See [S/2019/120](#).

⁶⁵⁷ See [S/2021/370](#).

⁶⁵⁸ China and Russian Federation. For further details on the discussion, see part II, sect. VIII.

⁶⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8880](#).

⁶⁶⁰ [S/2021/861](#).

⁶⁶¹ See [S/PV.8880](#).

and society-level engagement articulated in the Secretary-General's reform programme and his report entitled "Our Common Agenda".⁶⁶²

Following the briefing by the Special Representative and statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the representative of Kosovo, Council members discussed the latest developments as reported.⁶⁶³ Several delegations⁶⁶⁴ expressed concern at the escalation of violence in northern Kosovo in the previous weeks, and many⁶⁶⁵ took note of the interim agreement of 30 September to end the dispute. In that connection, most Council members⁶⁶⁶ emphasized that dialogue offered the only possibility for resolving outstanding issues and normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina and encouraged the parties to build on recent commitments, to advance the European Union-facilitated dialogue and implement already signed agreements. While acknowledging the meetings held in June and July 2021 between Serbia and authorities in Pristina under the auspices of the European Union, some representatives⁶⁶⁷ expressed regret that no significant progress had been made.

Most delegations reiterated their support for the work of UNMIK, expressing appreciation in particular for its humanitarian role in supporting the response of Kosovo to COVID-19, through the assistance that the

Mission provided to the most vulnerable populations. Some Council members, however, held differing views on the role of the Mission. The representative of the United States pointed out that the Mission had not played a critical role in resolving tensions in the most recent series of events between Kosovo and Serbia. He affirmed that the temporary support provided by the Kosovo Force led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had shown that other organizations could serve that role to better effect. He reiterated that UNMIK had fulfilled its purpose and should move towards its closure, urging the Council to redirect resources to where they were needed most. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed support for a review of the role and responsibilities of UNMIK, which would help it to operate more effectively and better address contemporary challenges. The representative of Norway said that, although the Mission had adapted well in meeting new challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic, her delegation would support looking at possible efficiency improvements. The representative from the Russian Federation argued, however, that the work of the Mission remained urgently needed and supported the maintenance of the agreed-upon budgetary and staffing capacity for UNMIK and the agreed frequency and format of open briefings in the Council on the issue of Kosovo. He also expressed hope that all the challenges facing the Mission would be reflected in the next report of the Secretary-General.

Following the statements by Council members, the representatives of both Serbia and Kosovo took the floor twice to make further statements.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁸ For more information on instances of speakers taking the floor more than once, see part II, sect. VIII.

⁶⁶² A/75/982.

⁶⁶³ See S/PV.8880.

⁶⁶⁴ Niger, India, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Russian Federation, China, Viet Nam, Mexico and Tunisia.

⁶⁶⁵ France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia, United States, Viet Nam, Mexico and Tunisia.

⁶⁶⁶ France, United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Estonia, United States, China, Viet Nam, Norway, Mexico and Kenya.

⁶⁶⁷ India, China, Viet Nam and Mexico.

Table 1

Meeting: Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8880 15 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (S/2021/861)		Serbia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of UNMIK, Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

^a The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference. Serbia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Table 2

Videoconference: Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
13 April 2021	S/2021/370	Letter dated 15 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

18. Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))

During the period under review, Council members held one open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))”.⁶⁶⁹ More information on the videoconference is provided in the table below.

At the videoconference, held on 11 February,⁶⁷⁰ Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

The Under-Secretary-General recalled the conclusions endorsed by the leaders of France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Paris, in which a series of steps had been outlined to stabilize the situation on the ground, including through confidence-building measures and a sustained ceasefire. She also recalled their agreement to support efforts, both under the Normandy format and by the Trilateral Contact Group, to make progress on the key security and political provisions of the Minsk agreements. In that regard, she noted that the Trilateral Contact Group had agreed to an indefinite ceasefire, which had come into force on 27 July 2020.

She indicated that, since then, the United Nations human rights monitoring mission in Ukraine had reported a significant decrease in civilian casualties from exchanges of fire, and described the release and exchange of conflict-related detainees as another encouraging development. The Under-Secretary-General stressed that, without progress on the related security and political tracks, the overall situation remained fragile. She added that the sides had made little significant progress on implementing the other agreed political and security provisions. While there was relative calm, the humanitarian situation had not improved. She also reported on how the COVID-19 pandemic had compounded the difficult socioeconomic conditions of civilians in conflict-affected areas. The Under-Secretary-General stressed that, until a sustainable political solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine was found, the risk of backsliding was real, and expressed deep concern about the increase in security incidents in several hotspots along the contact line in previous months. She recalled that, in resolution [2202 \(2015\)](#), the Council had endorsed the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements, which, together with the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Memorandum, remained the only agreed framework for a negotiated, peaceful settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

In her briefing, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office updated the Council on the work of the Trilateral Contact Group. In spite of the travel restrictions imposed after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, she reported that the Trilateral Contact Group had continued its efforts towards the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the tasks established under the Normandy format at the summit held in Paris on 9 December 2019. With regard to the

⁶⁶⁹ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 39. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁶⁷⁰ See [S/2021/159](#).

release and exchange of conflict-related detainees following the “all for all” principle, she noted that a step forward had been taken in April, when 34 prisoners had been released from detention. Concerning the agreement of the Trilateral Contact Group on additional measures to stabilize the ceasefire, the Special Representative affirmed that the number of ceasefire violations observed by the Special Monitoring Mission was still significantly lower than it had been in the first half of the previous year. She said that it was a source of great concern that progress on humanitarian and security-related issues had failed owing to political considerations, concluding that it would be difficult to maintain the relative calm on the front line if humanitarian and political issues remained blocked.

The Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission provided an update on the security situation in eastern Ukraine, recent developments concerning the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the impact of the conflict on civilians. While the overall security situation along the contact line remained volatile, he said that the agreement reached within the Trilateral Contact Group had been followed by a substantial decrease in the level of armed violence and that the Mission had observed the longest-lasting reduction in violence since it had begun systematically recording ceasefire violations. Despite commitments from the sides, newly built trench extensions and improvements to military structures had been observed on both sides of the contact line, in addition to the presence of heavy weapons and military and military-type positions in residential areas, putting civilians in harm’s way. The Chief Monitor also expressed regret that discussions in the working group on security issues of the Trilateral Contact Group had reached an impasse on a joint coordination mechanism to follow up and investigate alleged breaches of the additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire. He provided a detailed account of the heavy toll that small-arms fire, shelling and unexploded ordnance had had on the lives of civilians and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, which impeded the ability of civilians to cross the contact line between government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas. He reported that ceasefire violations continued to be observed in close proximity to several critical infrastructure sites. The Chief Monitor also stressed that freedom of movement, which was enshrined in the Mission’s mandate and the Minsk agreements, remained hampered by persistent obstructions, in particular in areas outside government control. Should that trend continue, the Mission would be increasingly constrained in its ability to monitor the situation on the

ground and to report objective and corroborated information, which otherwise could support renewed efforts at the negotiating table to maintain the ceasefire.

Following the briefing, Council members discussed the issues related to the implementation of provisions of the Minsk agreements and the continued challenges to achieving a sustainable resolution of the situation in eastern Ukraine. Council members welcomed the encouraging developments and signs of effort and commitments, in particular the consensus reached under the Normandy format at the summit held in Paris in December 2019, and reiterated the need for strict compliance with resolution 2202 (2015).

Welcoming the progress made since the summit held in Paris in 2019, in particular with regard to prisoner exchanges, the reduction in violence and the establishment of new disengagement zones, many Council members expressed deep concern about the recent spike in ceasefire violations, the issue of mine action and the socioeconomic conditions of civilians in conflict-affected areas, which were further exacerbated by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and a fragile economy.

In that connection, several delegations⁶⁷¹ addressed the agreed commitments and measures related to the ceasefire, with some⁶⁷² citing those related to unexploded ordnance, landmines and other explosive devices. While the representative of Ireland called for an end to the indiscriminate shelling of residential areas and critical civilian infrastructure and for the easing of movement restrictions to avoid exacerbating an already acute humanitarian crisis, the representative of Norway called on the parties to ensure unrestricted humanitarian access to the conflict-affected population, in line with their obligations under international humanitarian law.

Some Council members⁶⁷³ expressed concern at the restrictions on the freedom of movement of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and urged all parties to provide safe and secure access to the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea. Council members⁶⁷⁴ also expressed concern about the serious human rights violations and abuses linked to the conflict, as reported by the human rights monitoring

⁶⁷¹ Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United States, Viet Nam and Germany.

⁶⁷² Ireland, Mexico and Norway.

⁶⁷³ Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom and United States.

⁶⁷⁴ Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway and United States.

mission in Ukraine of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with one⁶⁷⁵ calling on the Russian Federation to release political prisoners and others⁶⁷⁶ calling on it to facilitate full and unrestricted access to the whole of Ukraine for the international human rights monitoring mechanisms and bodies.

On the holding of local elections, the representative of France reiterated its appeal to the Russian and Ukrainian sides to make progress on the definition of the political and security conditions for the organization of local elections, as agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government under the Normandy format at the summit held in Paris. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed agreement with regard to local elections needing to pave the way for the special status of Donbas, but stated that the Russian Federation would not support the security conditions needed to enable those elections. She also reminded the Russian Federation of its obligations to withdraw its military personnel and weapons from the territory of Ukraine. The representative of Germany, speaking to the Council as part of the Normandy format, pointed out that the Russian heavy weapons had not been withdrawn from the line of command and control, in violation of the Minsk agreements.

Member States held differing views on the origin of and the responsibilities in connection with the conflict in eastern Ukraine. While several speakers⁶⁷⁷ alleged that the Russian Federation had instigated and continued to fuel the conflict, the Russian Federation affirmed that Ukraine had occupied Ukraine and that it was waging war on its own territory.

The representative of the Russian Federation also stated that Kyiv was unwilling to observe its obligations under the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements and recalled that the Russian Federation was not mentioned as a party to the Minsk agreements. By contrast, the representative of Germany recalled the reminder by the former President of Ukraine that the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group consisted of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and OSCE. Also participating in the videoconference, the Head of Delegation of Ukraine to the Trilateral Contact Group provided an overview of practical steps taken by Ukraine to resolve the conflict and explained that, owing to the artificial obstruction of the work of the Trilateral Contact Group on the political track, there had been no progress in the consideration of the working proposals by Ukraine regarding the implementation of the political aspects of the general conclusions agreed upon under the Normandy format at the summit held in Paris. He added that there was still no adequate response from the Russian side to the actions of Ukraine on other fronts.

A number of Council members⁶⁷⁸ also reiterated their condemnation of the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and the occupation of certain territories in eastern Ukraine and called on the Russian Federation to reverse that act. Recalling General Assembly resolution 68/262, the representative of Mexico reiterated the need to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine in accordance with international law, especially the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations. In that connection, several other Council members⁶⁷⁹ also reiterated their strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

⁶⁷⁵ United States.

⁶⁷⁶ Estonia and Norway.

⁶⁷⁷ Estonia, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Ukraine and Germany.

⁶⁷⁸ Estonia, Norway and United States. For further details on the discussion, see part III, sect. I.

⁶⁷⁹ Estonia, Ireland, Norway, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

Videoconference: letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

Videoconference date	Videoconference record	Title	Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure
11 February 2021	S/2021/159	Letter dated 15 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Middle East

19. The situation in the Middle East

During the period under review, the Council held 23 meetings in relation to the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. Consistent with prior practice, most meetings held under the item took the form of a briefing.⁶⁸⁰ More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the tables below. In addition, Council members held a total of 17 open videoconferences in connection with the item.⁶⁸¹ More information on the videoconferences is given in the tables below. Under the item, both at the meetings and the videoconferences, Council members considered a variety of topics, principally, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the conflict in Yemen, the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2021, the Council also held three private meetings with countries contributing troops and police to UNDOF and UNIFIL.⁶⁸² In addition to the meetings and videoconferences, Council members held informal consultations of the whole and closed videoconferences to discuss the item.⁶⁸³

In 2021, the Council adopted a total of six resolutions in connection with the item. On 14 July, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) for one year, until 15 July 2022.⁶⁸⁴ On 25 February, the Council renewed the sanctions measures in relation to the situation in Yemen until 28 February 2022 and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen for 13 months, until 28 March 2022.⁶⁸⁵ The Council also renewed twice the

mandate of UNDOF for periods of six months each,⁶⁸⁶ and extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of 12 months, until 31 August 2022.⁶⁸⁷

During the period under review, the meetings and videoconferences in relation to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be focused on three main aspects: the implementation of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process to end the conflict; the humanitarian situation in the country, including issues related to the protection of civilians, the worsening economic crisis and humanitarian access; and the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. Briefings concerning the political process and the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic were often given during the same meeting or videoconference, whereas those on the proliferation and use of chemical weapons were given separately, in dedicated meetings and open videoconferences.⁶⁸⁸

Regarding the political process, Council members heard regular monthly briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria on the efforts to reach a political solution to the conflict.⁶⁸⁹ In that connection, in 2021, the briefings and discussions were focused on the progress of the Constitutional Committee in drafting a constitutional text and on the elements necessary for the implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), such as a lasting nationwide ceasefire, the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons, engagement with civil society representatives and women’s groups to ensure their meaningful participation in the political process and a constructive international diplomacy with key international stakeholders. In April and May, against the backdrop of the presidential election taking place in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Special Envoy said that the election was called under the auspices of the current Constitution and was not part of the political process established in resolution 2254 (2015), adding that the United Nations was not involved in the election and

⁶⁸⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁶⁸¹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁶⁸² Held in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”. For UNDOF, see [S/PV.8793](#) (10 June) and [S/PV.8920](#) (7 December); for UNIFIL, see [S/PV.8832](#) (6 August). See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 20.

⁶⁸³ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 2.B. See also [S/2021/683](#), [S/2021/938](#), [S/2021/1014](#) and [S/2021/1032](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences.

⁶⁸⁴ See resolution 2586 (2021), para. 1.

⁶⁸⁵ See resolution 2564 (2021), paras. 2 and 9.

⁶⁸⁶ See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 15.

⁶⁸⁷ See resolution 2591 (2021), para. 1.

⁶⁸⁸ For more information on the format of meetings in relation to the item, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2018* and 2019.

⁶⁸⁹ See [S/2021/75](#), [S/2021/265](#), [S/2021/418](#), [S/2021/506](#), [S/PV.8805](#), [S/PV.8841](#), [S/PV.8866](#), [S/PV.8888](#) and [S/PV.8937](#).

had no mandate to be involved.⁶⁹⁰ In that regard, he emphasized that, by the resolution, the United Nations was mandated to facilitate a political process that culminated in the holding of free and fair elections in accordance with a new Constitution, administered under United Nations supervision and held to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate.⁶⁹¹ Furthermore, the Special Envoy repeatedly stressed the importance of working towards a nationwide ceasefire as a way to address the continuing challenge posed by the Security Council-listed terrorist groups in the Syrian Arab Republic, both in the situations of relative, yet fragile, calm⁶⁹² and of escalating violence.⁶⁹³ He also reported on the progress of his engagement with the Co-Chairs of the Constitutional Committee and the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and reiterated his appeal to unblock progress on the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons. In that regard, he called on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and all other Syrian parties to carry out unilateral releases of detainees and abductees and to undertake meaningful actions on missing persons. On 27 October, after the sixth session of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva, the Special Envoy informed the Council that draft constitutional texts had been discussed but that the Co-Chairs had not been able to agree on the mechanism for progressing further on the discussion, which had led to the meeting being concluded without any points of consensus or provisional agreement by the Committee.⁶⁹⁴ On 20 December, he confirmed that he was seeking to reconvene the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned United Nations-facilitated seventh session of the Constitutional Committee as soon as understandings were in place. In that regard, he emphasized the need for a productive drafting process in accordance with the Committee's mandate.⁶⁹⁵ During his briefings, the Special Envoy highlighted a new form of constructive international diplomacy. He reported on his exploratory discussions with key States about a step-by-step approach as a way to narrow the differences among the various stakeholders and build trust to promote concrete progress.⁶⁹⁶ At the end of 2021, the Special Envoy ascertained that a great level of mistrust among the parties remained. He nonetheless

expressed hope that stakeholders would be able to define and agree on incremental, reciprocal, mutual, realistic, precise and verifiable steps that could be taken in parallel with building trust and confidence and helping to move the political process forward.⁶⁹⁷

In 2021, in addition to the briefings by the Special Envoy, four civil society representatives provided briefings to Council members concerning the political situation in the country, specifically on the topics of detainees, abductees and missing persons, the participation of women in the political process and the work of the Constitutional Committee on the implementation of resolution 2254 (2015).⁶⁹⁸

In relation to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and by the Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.⁶⁹⁹ The briefings were focused on the findings of the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of relevant resolutions, including resolution 2585 (2021), by which the Council extended the authorization for cross-border humanitarian operations.⁷⁰⁰ The briefers provided regular updates on the humanitarian conditions in different parts of the country, in particular Idlib in north-western Syrian Arab Republic and the Rukban and Hawl refugee camps, on the efforts of the cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance and on the distribution of vaccines through the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility across the country. During the year, the briefers also reported to the Council on the status of the cross-border and cross-line humanitarian deliveries in north-western Syrian Arab Republic and highlighted that cross-border assistance remained the central part of the humanitarian response.

⁶⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8937](#).

⁶⁹⁸ The Council heard briefings by a member and former Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, on 15 March (see [S/2021/265](#)); a Syrian women's rights promoter and member of the Syrian Women's Political Movement, on 25 June (see [S/PV.8805](#)); the founder and Director of Sawa for Development and Aid, on 28 September (see [S/PV.8866](#)); and the General Coordinator of the Syrian National Conference, on 27 October (see [S/PV.8888](#)).

⁶⁹⁹ See [S/2021/75](#), [S/2021/418](#), [S/2021/506](#), [S/PV.8803](#), [S/PV.8841](#), [S/PV.8861](#), [S/PV.8888](#) and [S/PV.8937](#).

⁷⁰⁰ Resolution 2585 (2021), para. 2.

⁶⁹⁰ See [S/2021/418](#) and [S/2021/506](#).

⁶⁹¹ See [S/2021/418](#).

⁶⁹² See [S/2021/265](#), [S/2021/418](#) and [S/2021/506](#).

⁶⁹³ See [S/PV.8841](#) and [S/PV.8888](#).

⁶⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8888](#).

⁶⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8937](#).

⁶⁹⁶ See [S/2021/418](#), [S/2021/506](#), [S/PV.8805](#), [S/PV.8841](#), [S/PV.8866](#), [S/PV.8888](#) and [S/PV.8937](#).

Ahead of the expiration of the humanitarian aid delivery mechanism on 10 July 2021,⁷⁰¹ the Secretary-General strongly appealed to the members of the Council to reach consensus on allowing cross-border operations as a vital channel of support for another year, underlining that a failure to extend the Council's authorization would have devastating consequences.⁷⁰² In addition to the briefings by the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Council members heard briefings in connection with the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic by the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)⁷⁰³ and by six civil society representatives in meetings and videoconferences.⁷⁰⁴

With respect to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members heard regular briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and her Deputy on progress in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. Except during the months of July and November, the Council heard monthly briefings by the High Representative in open videoconferences or public meetings,⁷⁰⁵ consistent with the practice followed in 2020.⁷⁰⁶ In her briefings, the High Representative reported on the activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and informed the Council about the work undertaken by the Declaration Assessment Team, the fact-finding mission and the Investigation and Identification Team, as well as the continuing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the work of OPCW. She reiterated the importance of resolving the remaining outstanding issues of the initial declaration of the

Syrian Arab Republic. On 6 May,⁷⁰⁷ the High Representative took note of the decision adopted at the twenty-fifth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, by which the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention were suspended, and urged the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with OPCW. Furthermore, in the last briefing for the year, on 8 December,⁷⁰⁸ she informed the Council that, in accordance with the decision adopted in April, the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic would be reinstated only once the Director-General of OPCW reported to the Executive Council that the Syrian Arab Republic had completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Executive Council decision EC94/DEC.2, which the Syrian Arab Republic had yet to complete. In June,⁷⁰⁹ in addition to the briefing by the High Representative, Council members heard a briefing by the Director-General of OPCW, who reported on the progress of the Syrian chemical weapons dossier following the issuance of the second report of the Investigation and Identification Team in April 2021, concerning the use of chemical weapons in Saraqib in 2018.

In 2021, the Council continued to focus in its meetings on three distinct areas in relation to the conflict in Yemen, namely, the political process to find a solution to the conflict, the humanitarian situation in the country and the sanctions measures in place against individuals and entities designated as engaging in or providing support for acts that threatened the peace, security and stability in Yemen.

Regarding the political process, Council members heard regular briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.⁷¹⁰ It also heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific of the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.⁷¹¹ The briefings were focused on updating the Council on the status of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa towards an inclusive political settlement and the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, including the outcomes of consultations between the parties. Against the

⁷⁰¹ See resolution 2533 (2020).

⁷⁰² See S/PV.8803.

⁷⁰³ See S/2021/315.

⁷⁰⁴ The Council heard briefings by the Syria Response Director of Save the Children on 25 February (see S/2021/206); the founder of Al Amal Fund on 29 March (see S/2021/315); the Country Director of CARE, Turkey, on 23 June (see S/PV.8803); the Secretary-General of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent on 24 August (see S/PV.8841); the Regional Director of Syria Relief and Development on 15 September (see S/PV.8861); and a paediatrician and advocate for women's and children's rights on 20 December (see S/PV.8937).

⁷⁰⁵ See S/2021/22, S/2021/109, S/2021/226, S/2021/337, S/2021/446, S/PV.8785, S/PV.8830, S/PV.8849, S/PV.8872 and S/PV.8921.

⁷⁰⁶ For more information about the practice followed in 2020, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part I, sect. 20.

⁷⁰⁷ See S/2021/446.

⁷⁰⁸ See S/PV.8921.

⁷⁰⁹ See S/PV.8785.

⁷¹⁰ See S/2021/56, S/2021/167, S/2021/266, S/2021/372, S/2021/465, S/PV.8797, S/PV.8854, S/PV.8878 and S/PV.8929.

⁷¹¹ See S/PV.8840.

backdrop of the decision of the United States to designate Ansar Allah as a foreign terrorist organization in January 2021, the Special Envoy said that he was extremely concerned about its impact on the ongoing efforts in bringing the parties together and by the humanitarian consequences. In that regard, he called for the decision to be revoked on humanitarian grounds at the earliest opportunity.⁷¹² He reiterated the call for a nationwide ceasefire, the lifting of the restrictions on the imports through the port of Hudaydah and the opening of the Sana'a International Airport. He also urged the parties to agree on the immediate and unconditional release of prisoners and detainees and to make progress on that file.⁷¹³ In December, the newly appointed Special Envoy expressed deep concern about the considerable military escalation and continued violence in Yemen, which could risk opening a new "chapter of war", underlined the importance of granting unconditional and regular access to the Special Envoy for a more comprehensive process and stated that all communication channels should be kept open in order to find a durable solution to the conflict without preconditions as a matter of priority.⁷¹⁴ Throughout the year, the briefings by both Special Envoys also highlighted the importance of the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of the inclusive peace process and integrating a gender perspective across all issues.⁷¹⁵ In 2021, the Council also heard briefings by three civil society representatives on the participation of women in the peace process, the humanitarian response plan for the country and the political and economic developments in Yemen.⁷¹⁶ Affirming that women had been excluded from formal and meaningful roles in the United Nations-led peace process and the new Government of Yemen, the founding member and Programme Manager of SOS Center for Youth Capabilities Development called for the direct participation of women as stipulated in resolution 1325 (2000).⁷¹⁷

Regarding the humanitarian situation in Yemen, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency

Relief Coordinator or his Deputy and by the Director or Deputy Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, often in conjunction with the Special Envoy. The briefers focused on the deteriorating security situation, which had deepened the humanitarian crisis in the country. They noted that the humanitarian crisis had been exacerbated by the economic collapse and the protection risks in the country, disproportionately affecting civilians, in particular children and internally displaced persons. They also emphasized the need for safe, timely and sustained humanitarian access and a renewed effort to end the conflict. Council members also heard briefings by the Executive Director of the World Food Programme on the humanitarian impact of the designation by the United States of Ansar Allah as a terrorist organization on 14 January 2021 (later reversed on 18 February),⁷¹⁸ the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme on the serious implications of the oil leakage of the floating storage and offloading unit, FSO *Safer*, for the region in the event of a significant oil spill,⁷¹⁹ and the Executive Director of UNICEF on the public health and socioeconomic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in Yemen, in particular on the lives of children and their families.⁷²⁰ The Council also heard a briefing from a civil society representative on the humanitarian situation on the ground in Yemen.⁷²¹

Council members also heard a briefing in connection with the sanctions in Yemen by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014).⁷²²

In its decisions in 2021, the Council also addressed the issues outlined above concerning the conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen and the mandates of UNDOF and UNIFIL.

In connection with the Syrian Arab Republic and against the backdrop of the expiration of the authorization for the cross-border operations mechanism, which had been last renewed on 11 July

⁷¹² See S/2021/56.

⁷¹³ See S/2021/56, S/2021/167 and S/2021/372.

⁷¹⁴ See S/PV.8929.

⁷¹⁵ See S/2021/372, S/PV.8797, S/PV.8854 and S/PV.8878.

⁷¹⁶ The Council heard briefings by a founding member and the Programme Manager of SOS Center for Youth Capabilities Development on 15 June (see S/PV.8797); the Executive Director of the Ma'rib Girls Foundation for Development on 10 September (see S/PV.8854); and a Fellow at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies on 14 October (see S/PV.8878).

⁷¹⁷ See S/PV.8797.

⁷¹⁸ See S/2021/56.

⁷¹⁹ See S/PV.8786.

⁷²⁰ See S/PV.8840.

⁷²¹ The CARE Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa gave a briefing to the Council on 16 March (see S/2021/266).

⁷²² See S/2021/167. See also S/2021/79. The same Chair also gave a briefing to the Council in the context of the end-of-year briefing by the outgoing Chairs of the various subsidiary bodies under the item "Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council" on 13 December (see S/PV.8928). For more information, see sect. 29 below.

2020 by resolution [2533 \(2020\)](#),⁷²³ the Council held a meeting on 9 July 2021 to consider a draft resolution submitted by Ireland, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States to extend the mechanism.⁷²⁴ The Council unanimously adopted resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the decisions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution [2165 \(2014\)](#), for a period of six months, until 10 January 2022, only for the border crossing at Bab al-Hawa, with an extension of an additional six months, until 10 July 2022, subject to the issuance of the Secretary General's substantive report, with a particular focus on transparency in operations, and progress on cross-line access in meeting humanitarian needs.⁷²⁵ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to include in his reports overall trends in United Nations cross-line operations, in particular on the implementation of the above-mentioned activities on improving all modalities of humanitarian deliveries inside the Syrian Arab Republic and early recovery projects.⁷²⁶ After the adoption of the resolution, several Council members took the floor, welcoming the unanimous adoption of resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#).⁷²⁷ The representative of the United States underlined that it was important that the Russian Federation and the United States had been able to come together on a humanitarian initiative that served the interest of the Syrian people. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the resolution was a major milestone in resolving the Syrian crisis, pointing to how, for the first time, the need to improve supplies across the contact lines had been emphasized and that the Council members had given the green light for the cross-border mechanism to be gradually supplemented and then replaced by supplies across the contact lines. While welcoming the unanimous adoption of the resolution, the representative of China said that it was of critical importance to enhance the monitoring of cross-border delivery to help prevent crossing points from being used in a manner that went beyond the Council's mandate. He added that there was much to improve in the draft regarding the lifting of unilateral sanctions and that his delegation expected the Council members to continue to take effective measures to eliminate the negative impact of unilateral sanctions. The representative of Mexico, while noting that her delegation would have preferred a more ambitious text to address the complex humanitarian situation in the

Syrian Arab Republic, stated that the renewal of the Bab al-Hawa crossing for 12 months would enable the continuation of humanitarian operations by adding certainty to the planning of activities and the budget. The representative of France said that the renewed mechanism was not sufficient to meet the humanitarian needs and expressed regret that the Bab al-Salam and Ya'rubiyah crossings had not reopened. Nonetheless, he added that resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#) could not be interpreted as indicating a change in the well-known position of France and reiterated that France would not fund reconstruction nor lift sanctions until a credible political process was firmly in place, in accordance with resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#). He also clarified that the resolution did not imply the transmission of data on aid recipients and humanitarian partners that were not intended to be made public.

With regard to the conflict in Yemen, on 14 July, the Council adopted resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#) concerning UNMHA, by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission for a period of 12 months, until 15 July 2022.⁷²⁸ By the resolution, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of the Mission, which included leading and supporting the functioning of the Redeployment Coordination Committee to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, the redeployment of forces and the mine action operations; monitoring the compliance of the parties with the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; working with the parties so that the security of the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa was assured by local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law; and facilitating and coordinating United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement.⁷²⁹ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to fully deploy UNMHA expeditiously, taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and called on the parties to the Hudaydah Agreement to support the United Nations, including by ensuring the safety, security, and health of UNMHA personnel and the unhindered and expeditious movement into and within Yemen of UNMHA personnel and equipment, provisions and essential supplies.⁷³⁰

Regarding the sanctions measures imposed in connection with the conflict in Yemen, on 25 February, the Council adopted resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#) under

⁷²³ Resolution [2533 \(2020\)](#), para. 2.

⁷²⁴ See [S/PV.8817](#). For the draft resolution, see [S/2021/636](#).

⁷²⁵ Resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁷²⁷ See [S/PV.8817](#) (United States, Russian Federation, Norway, India, China, Estonia, United Kingdom, Kenya, Tunisia, Mexico and France).

⁷²⁸ Resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (a)–(d). For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see part X, sect. II.

⁷³⁰ Resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

Chapter VII of the Charter, with the abstention of the Russian Federation. By the resolution, the Council renewed the sanctions measures in place until 28 February 2022 and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen for 13 months, until 28 March 2022.⁷³¹ The Council also decided that an individual listed in the annex to the resolution would be subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) and, in that regard, affirmed that sexual violence in armed conflict, or the recruitment or use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law, could constitute an act as specified in paragraph 18 (c) of resolution 2140 (2014), and therefore a sanctionable act of engaging in or providing support for acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Yemen.⁷³² In that connection, in their explanations of votes, the delegations of Estonia, Ireland, Mexico and the United States welcomed the designation of an individual engaged in violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses in Yemen, including intimidation and the use of systematic arrest, detention, torture, sexual violence and rape against politically active women.⁷³³ The delegations of Ireland and Mexico, in their joint explanation of their votes, also welcomed the inclusion of language on accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, as well as language on the participation of women in the political process. Nonetheless, they expressed regret that reference to “the equality of the sexes” was included in the resolution and emphasized that “gender equality” must form the basis of any future discussions since it was the long-established agreed language of the Council on matters of women and peace and security. Abstaining in the vote, the delegation of the Russian Federation stated in its explanation of vote that not all of its concerns had been met and that there were doubts that the resolution would be of any help in the United Nations efforts to facilitate political dialogue and promote peace in Yemen. It added that, during the consultation, the delegation of the Russian Federation had clearly pointed out several newly introduced elements that it could not agree to and had presented proposals aimed at amending the text and that some of the provisions included in the draft resolution had not

been properly discussed within the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). Noting that any sanctions regime should not become a goal in itself but rather serve the task of ending conflicts, the delegation affirmed that the body should envisage the strategic goal of reaching a comprehensive settlement in Yemen.

In 2021, the mandate of UNDOF was renewed by resolution 2581 (2021) and resolution 2613 (2021) for periods of six months each, until 31 December 2021 and 30 June 2022, respectively.⁷³⁴ In the resolutions, the Council requested UNDOF to take all appropriate steps to protect the safety, security and health of all UNDOF personnel, in line with resolution 2518 (2020), taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.⁷³⁵ The Council also requested the Secretary-General and countries contributing troops and police to seek to increase the number of women in UNDOF and to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of uniformed and civilian women at all levels and in all positions, including senior leadership positions, and to implement other relevant provisions of resolution 2538 (2020).⁷³⁶

In connection with Lebanon, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2591 (2021), extending the mandate of UNIFIL for one year, until 31 August 2022.⁷³⁷ The Council requested UNIFIL, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), to take temporary and special measures to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support for a limited period of six months, within the existing resources and without implications to the increase of the budget level. The Council added that the measures should not be considered as a precedent in the future and should be undertaken in the framework of the joint activities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL, in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces and without prejudice to the mandate and its implementation, the concept of operations and the rules of engagement of UNIFIL, while fully respecting Lebanese sovereignty and at the request of the Lebanese authorities.⁷³⁸ The Council also requested

⁷³¹ Resolution 2564 (2021), paras. 2 and 9. For more information on the sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III, and for more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

⁷³² Resolution 2564 (2021), paras. 3 and 8.

⁷³³ See S/2021/194.

⁷³⁴ Resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 15. For more information on the mandate of UNDOF, see part X, sect. I.

⁷³⁵ Resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 8.

⁷³⁶ Ibid., para. 13.

⁷³⁷ Resolution 2591 (2021), para. 1. See also sect. 22 below. For more information on the mandate of UNIFIL, see part X, sect. I.

⁷³⁸ Resolution 2591 (2021), para. 11.

UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full, equal, effective and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making, including in the security sector, and to support the implementation of the action plan on women and peace and security.

The Council further requested enhanced reporting by UNIFIL to the Council on that issue.⁷³⁹

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, information on meetings and videoconferences is set out below in six tables and under four headings, namely: (a) Syrian Arab Republic; (b) Yemen; (c) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; and (d) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

⁷³⁹ Ibid., para. 26.

Table 1

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – Syrian Arab Republic

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8785 3 June 2021	Letter dated 27 May 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/514)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8803 23 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) , 2165 (2014) , 2191 (2014) , 2258 (2015) , 2332 (2016) , 2393 (2017) , 2401 (2018) , 2449 (2018) , 2504 (2020) and 2533 (2020) (S/2021/583)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Country Director of CARE, Turkey	Secretary-General, 14 Council members, ^b all invitees	
S/PV.8805 25 June 2021			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Syrian women's rights promoter and member of the Syrian Women's Political Movement	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8817 9 July 2021		Draft resolution submitted by Ireland,	Syrian Arab Republic		11 Council members, ^c invitee	Resolution 2585 (2021) 15-0-0

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
		Norway, Russian Federation, United States (S/2021/636)				
S/PV.8830 4 August 2021	Letter dated 29 July 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/692)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic	Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8841 24 August 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021) (S/2021/735)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Secretary-General of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent	All Council members, ^d all invitees	
S/PV.8849 2 September 2021	Letter dated 30 August 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/764)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8861 15 September 2021			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Regional Director of Syria Relief and Development	14 Council members, ^e all invitees	
S/PV.8866 28 September 2021			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, founder and Director of Sawa for Development and Aid	All Council members, all invitees	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8872 4 October 2021	Letter dated 30 September 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/842)		Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8888 27 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) , 2165 (2014) , 2191 (2014) , 2258 (2015) , 2332 (2016) , 2393 (2017) , 2401 (2018) , 2449 (2018) , 2504 (2020) , 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021) (S/2021/890)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, General Coordinator of the Syrian National Conference	All Council members, ^d all invitees	
S/PV.8921 8 December 2021	Letter dated 30 November 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/989)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8937 20 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) , 2165 (2014) , 2191 (2014) , 2258 (2015) , 2332 (2016) , 2393 (2017) , 2401 (2018) , 2449 (2018) , 2504 (2020) , 2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021) (S/2021/1029)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Syrian-born paediatrician and advocate for women's and children's rights	All Council members, ^d all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations humanitarian operations in the Syrian Arab Republic (S/2021/1030)					

^a The Director-General of OPCW participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^b China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland (also on behalf of Norway, its co-penholder on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic), Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^c China, Estonia, France, India, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

^d The representative of Ireland spoke also on behalf of its co-penholder, Norway.

^e China, Estonia, France, India, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway (also on behalf of its co-penholder, Ireland), Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

Table 2

Videoconferences: the situation in the Middle East – Syrian Arab Republic

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
5 January 2021	S/2021/22	Letter dated 7 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
20 January 2021	S/2021/75	Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
3 February 2021	S/2021/109	Letter dated 5 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
25 February 2021	S/2021/206	Letter dated 1 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
4 March 2021	S/2021/226	Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
15 March 2021	S/2021/265	Letter dated 17 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
29 March 2021	S/2021/315	Letter dated 31 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
6 April 2021	S/2021/337	Letter dated 8 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
28 April 2021	S/2021/418	Letter dated 30 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
6 May 2021	S/2021/446	Letter dated 10 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
26 May 2021	S/2021/506	Letter dated 28 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Table 3
Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – Yemen

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8786 3 June 2021			Yemen	Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	All invitees	
S/PV.8797 15 June 2021			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Programme Manager of SOS Center for Youth Capabilities Development	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8819 14 July 2021	Letter dated 3 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/528)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/640)				Resolution 2586 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8840 23 August 2021			Yemen	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific of the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations,	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
				Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund		
S/PV.8854 10 September 2021			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Deputy Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Executive Director of the Ma'rib Girls Foundation for Development	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8878 14 October 2021			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Acting Assistant Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Fellow at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8929 14 December 2021			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Acting Assistant Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	

^a The Director of the Coordination Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 4

Videoconferences: the situation in the Middle East – Yemen

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
14 January 2021	S/2021/56	Letter dated 18 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
18 February 2021	S/2021/167	Letter dated 22 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
25 February 2021	S/2021/189	Letter dated 25 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2564 (2021) 14-0-1 ^a (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/194

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<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
16 March 2021	S/2021/266	Letter dated 18 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
15 April 2021	S/2021/372	Letter dated 19 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
12 May 2021	S/2021/465	Letter dated 17 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

^a *For:* China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; *against:* none; *abstaining:* Russian Federation.

Table 5

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8806 29 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/2021/516)	Draft resolution submitted by Russian Federation, United States (S/2021/599)				Resolution 2581 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8938 21 December 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/2021/994)	Draft resolution submitted by Russian Federation, United States (S/2021/1077)				Resolution 2613 (2021) 15-0-0

Table 6

Meeting: the situation in the Middle East – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8845 30 August 2021	Letter dated 4 August 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/707)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/757)				Resolution 2591 (2021) 15-0-0

20. The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

During the period under review, the Council held eight meetings in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. No decisions were adopted during the period under review. In 2021, during the meetings held under the item, the Council continued its practice of holding monthly briefings and quarterly open debates.⁷⁴⁰ More information on the meetings, including on the participants and speakers, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held a total of five open videoconferences in connection with the item. More information on the open videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. In addition to the meetings and videoconferences, Council members held closed videoconferences and informal consultations of the whole.⁷⁴¹ Under the item, whether in the context of meetings or videoconferences, Council members also considered developments in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and the Middle East region.⁷⁴²

In 2021, in most meetings and videoconferences, Council members heard briefings by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority or his Deputy. In addition, Council members heard one briefing by the Secretary-General, one by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, one by the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and one by the Acting Director of the Coordination Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Once, Council members heard briefings by two youth representatives, one from the State of Palestine and one from Israel, at the same videoconference.⁷⁴³ The Council also heard briefings by other civil society representatives, namely, the co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of Amal-

Tikva, the Planning Manager of the Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center, the Executive Director of Ir Amim, an Israeli non-profit organization, and a Palestinian political and civil society leader, Hanan Ashrawi. The Council also heard briefings by a Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University, the President of the US/Middle East Project and the Interim Vice-President and Programme Director of the International Crisis Group.

During the period under review, the Special Coordinator provided regular briefings to the Council either in person or by videoconference. In the context of his monthly briefings held in February, May, August and November, the Special Coordinator reported to Council members on the escalation of violence and hostilities in Gaza and the situation in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in cities across Israel, as well as on the ensuing consequences on the political situation and the status of the negotiations, including engagements between Israeli and Palestinian officials.⁷⁴⁴ In that regard, the Special Coordinator addressed the meetings of the Middle East Quartet and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians. The Special Coordinator also reported on the continued settlement activity, the violence throughout the occupied Palestinian territory and the severe financial and economic crisis threatening the stability of Palestinian institutions. He expressed concern at the lack of funding for UNRWA to sustain essential services and reiterated the Secretary-General’s appeal to the international community to work with the United Nations to provide robust support for a swift recovery and sustainable rebuilding aimed at supporting the Palestinian people and strengthened institutions. In his monthly briefings, the Special Coordinator also covered developments in the Golan and Lebanon. During discussions, Council members urged all parties to observe relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and condemned violations thereof, including the increased hostilities between the two parties and the continued occupation of the Palestinian territory. They called for the resumption of negotiations based on a two-State solution and for international and unified support, as well as for increased humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian civilian population, especially in Gaza. Questioning the Council’s almost exclusive focus on Israel during its monthly meetings on the situation in

⁷⁴⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

⁷⁴¹ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 2.A. See also [S/2021/683](#), [S/2021/938](#), [S/2021/1032](#) and [S/2022/174](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁷⁴² See also sect. 19 above.

⁷⁴³ The Council heard briefings by an Israeli student, Oren Gian, and a Palestinian student, Malak AbuSoud, on 26 February (see [S/2021/218](#)).

⁷⁴⁴ See [S/2021/218](#), [S/PV.8782](#), [S/PV.8847](#) and [S/PV.8913](#).

the Middle East, the representative of the United States suggested that the Council's attention under the item reflect all areas that threatened international peace and security and proposed to hold meetings on the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon more regularly, adding that Israel did not define the Middle East.⁷⁴⁵

On 16 May, Council members held a high-level open videoconference⁷⁴⁶ to discuss the escalation of violence in Israel, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The Secretary-General delivered opening remarks, followed by a briefing by the Special Coordinator. This was the third time in six days that Council members met to discuss the issue further to the briefings in closed videoconferences by the Special Coordinator on 10 and 12 May.⁷⁴⁷ The Secretary-General and the Special Coordinator called for an immediate de-escalation and a return to negotiations and urged the parties to observe and respect international law and international humanitarian law and end all violence against civilians.⁷⁴⁸ On 27 May,⁷⁴⁹ the Special Coordinator welcomed the cessation of hostilities between Palestinian militants in Gaza and Israel and commended Member States for supporting the ceasefire and urged them to focus on political solutions to the crisis and address the humanitarian needs of the people in Gaza. Council members welcomed the then-week-old ceasefire and commended Member States' efforts to end the hostilities. Council members also acknowledged the efforts of China, France, Norway and Tunisia that had led to the Council's 22 May statement to the press on the ceasefire. The representative of France explained that the ceasefire was the result of collective efforts and international pressure. He further noted that France had played its part in calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, coordinating closely with its Jordanian, Egyptian, United States and European partners and being in contact with the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian Authority. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that active discussions on the Palestinian question over the previous two weeks in the Council and in the General Assembly had shown that the international community as a whole was unanimous in its understanding of the goal of a settlement and its legal framework, underscoring that it was important to preserve such unity and translate it into action. In that regard, he urged the Council to consider the proposal to hold a ministerial meeting of the Quartet, as well as one in an expanded format, with the participation of

regional States and the Palestinians and Israelis themselves. While welcoming the fact that the Council had been finally able to adopt a press statement, the representative of Ireland said that there was no cause for self-congratulation. The inability of the Council to utter a single agreed word as the conflict raged for 11 days marked a sobering failure of collective diplomacy.

At a meeting held on 30 August,⁷⁵⁰ the Special Coordinator reported on the tensions along the Gaza perimeter that had reached a peak on 21 August, when hundreds of Palestinians had attended a rally and thrown rocks and, allegedly, improvised explosive devices. Israeli forces had fired on Palestinian protesters. On the same day, Palestinian security forces had arrested participants in a planned demonstration in Ramallah, including well-known human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and political activists. In that regard, several Council members⁷⁵¹ called on the Palestinian Authority to uphold its human rights obligations, including respect for the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly. Encouraging further dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, several Council members⁷⁵² also encouraged the parties concerned to maintain the momentum and secure progress across a wide variety of outstanding issues. Expressing his delegation's support for intra-Palestinian unity and reconciliation and encouraging Palestine and Israel to resume peace talks based on the two-State solution, the representative of China also called for the holding of a United Nations-led international peace conference to bring together the permanent members of the Council and all stakeholders in the Middle East peace process.

During a meeting held on 30 November,⁷⁵³ the Special Coordinator noted that the Ministry of Defence of Israel had announced the designation of six Palestinian non-governmental organizations as terrorist organizations on 22 October, cautioning about the potentially wide-ranging legal implications, which added to increasing pressures on civil society organizations across the occupied Palestinian territory. In her briefing, the Interim Vice-President and Programme Director of the International Crisis Group provided a series of recommendations, including a rescission of the order banning the six Palestinian civil society organizations. Several Council members⁷⁵⁴ expressed concern about the listing of the six Palestinian non-governmental organizations as terrorist

⁷⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8913](#).

⁷⁴⁶ See [S/2021/480](#).

⁷⁴⁷ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 2.A.

⁷⁴⁸ See [S/2021/480](#).

⁷⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8782](#).

⁷⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8847](#).

⁷⁵¹ United Kingdom, Norway, Mexico, Estonia and Ireland.

⁷⁵² United Kingdom, Norway, Viet Nam and France.

⁷⁵³ See [S/PV.8913](#).

⁷⁵⁴ France, Ireland, Tunisia and Mexico.

organizations by the Israeli authorities. The representative of the United Kingdom noted that, while her country maintained its own criteria for designation and continued to engage with a number of those organizations on human rights issues, the decision was ultimately a matter for the Government of Israel. In view of the resumption of the peace process, Council members⁷⁵⁵ encouraged all efforts to create favourable conditions, including strengthening the Quartet's role and taking the thirtieth anniversary of the Madrid Peace Conference as an opportunity.

On a quarterly basis, monthly briefings, whether in the form of a meeting or a videoconference, were also used to report on the implementation of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#). Consistent with prior practice, in 2021, the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) were twice submitted in writing: the eighteenth report in June and the twentieth report in December.⁷⁵⁶ During the briefings that were given in March, June, September and December,⁷⁵⁷ the Special Coordinator continued to report on the lack of progress in the implementation of the main provisions of the resolution, namely, those relating to: Israeli settlement activities; violence against civilians, including acts of terror, incitement, provocation and inflammatory rhetoric; steps and efforts to advance the peace process; and actions by all States to distinguish in their relevant dealings between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967. At the videoconference held on 25 March,⁷⁵⁸ the Special Coordinator reported that, on 5 February, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court had decided that the Court's jurisdiction extended to the occupied Palestinian territory and that the Court's Prosecutor had subsequently confirmed that her Office had initiated an investigation with respect to the situation in Palestine covering crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court alleged to have been committed since 13 June 2014. During the discussion, the representative of the Niger welcomed the decision taken by the Court to launch investigations into the allegations of crimes committed in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem since June 2014, stating that accountability was essential in order to fight impunity and pave the way for true reconciliation between the parties to the conflict. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also affirmed her country's support for the Court. During the meeting held on 24 June,⁷⁵⁹ the

Special Coordinator provided a briefing on the eighteenth report of the Secretary-General.⁷⁶⁰ He also acknowledged the formation of the new coalition Government of Israel and noted with regret the postponement of the Palestinian elections.⁷⁶¹ While several Council members⁷⁶² congratulated the new coalition Government in Israel, a few members⁷⁶³ urged the new Government to take steps to end the expansion of illegal settlements, demolitions and the threat of forced evictions and allow for legal construction for Palestinians. During the meeting held on 29 September,⁷⁶⁴ the Special Coordinator devoted his briefing to presenting the nineteenth report on the implementation of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#). He encouraged both Governments to take urgent steps to stabilize the Palestinian economy and strengthen Palestinian institutions and encouraged specifically the Palestinian Authority to resume the election process as soon as possible. Council members⁷⁶⁵ condemned all acts of violence and other breaches of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) and reiterated their call for the full implementation of the resolution, including an end to Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory and to any actions that limited the Palestinian population's access to safe drinking water. The representative of the United Kingdom urged Israel to allow for more legal avenues for Palestinian construction. Several Council members⁷⁶⁶ also stressed that it was incumbent on the Council and the international community, in particular the Quartet and partners in the region, to make efforts, including de-escalation and a resumption of negotiations, to resolve the conflict.

During the meeting held on 21 December,⁷⁶⁷ the Special Coordinator expressed continued concern that, if left unchecked, the dynamics of the unilateral actions and the severe economic crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory could also have an impact on the security situation in Gaza and undermine the cessation of hostilities in place since 21 May. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the adoption of resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#), Council members⁷⁶⁸ expressed concern at the

⁷⁵⁵ Estonia, Kenya, Viet Nam, China, France, Niger, Ireland, Tunisia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and India.

⁷⁵⁶ [S/2021/584](#) and [S/2021/1047](#).

⁷⁵⁷ See [S/2021/302](#), [S/PV.8804](#), [S/PV.8869](#) and [S/PV.8940](#).

⁷⁵⁸ See [S/2021/302](#).

⁷⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8804](#).

⁷⁶⁰ [S/2021/584](#).

⁷⁶¹ See [S/PV.8804](#).

⁷⁶² United States, Kenya, Ireland and Mexico.

⁷⁶³ Kenya and Ireland.

⁷⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8869](#).

⁷⁶⁵ Tunisia, India, Mexico, China, Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Niger and Ireland.

⁷⁶⁶ Tunisia, India, Niger and Ireland.

⁷⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8940](#).

⁷⁶⁸ Kenya, France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, Ireland, Tunisia, Norway, India, China, Mexico and Niger.

lack of implementation. In that regard, the representative of Kenya said that it was necessary to have updates on the actual efforts and operationalization mechanisms, or lack thereof, to address all violations of the provisions of resolution 2334 (2016). Moreover, in view of paragraph 11 of the resolution, he also urged a deeper analysis that was also focused on the correlation and contextualization of incidents and their short- and long-term implications for the implementation of the Middle East peace process normative framework. In addition, the representative of the Niger recalled that the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) continued to be a true test of the Council's authority and its capacity to enforce its own resolutions on Israel.

In 2021, the practice of holding quarterly open debates continued to be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and the inability to hold them in the Security Council Chamber. As a result, open videoconferences were held on 26 January and 22 April. Later in the year, quarterly open debates resumed and were held in person on 28 July and 19 October. In the context of the quarterly open debates and open videoconferences, Council members delivered statements, as did the representatives of Israel and the State of Palestine.⁷⁶⁹ In addition, in accordance with the understanding reached among Council members on the working methods during the pandemic, written statements were also submitted by Member States and other entities, later compiled in letters by the President of the Council.⁷⁷⁰ In his briefings during the quarterly open debates and videoconferences, the Special Coordinator focused on the efforts to advance the Middle East peace process, the prospect of annexation by Israel of parts of the occupied Palestinian territory, the preparations for the Palestinian elections, the continued violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the dynamics created on the ground by the pandemic.⁷⁷¹ During his briefings, he also touched upon the situations in Lebanon, the Golan and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). In addition to the Special Coordinator, other briefers addressed Council members in the context of videoconferences and meetings. In January 2021, during the first open videoconference in connection with the item,⁷⁷² the Secretary-General of the League

of Arab States provided a briefing to Council members, in which he expressed hope that the new Administration of the United States would correct the measures and policies of the former Administration and work, with the support of the international community and regional actors, to get the political process back on track. At the videoconference held on 22 April,⁷⁷³ the Acting Director of the Coordination Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provided a briefing on the humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, on behalf of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. During the open debate held on 28 July,⁷⁷⁴ the Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Territory noted that the economic impact of the escalation in May had further exacerbated the existing humanitarian crisis and severely weakened Gaza's economy. Concerning the wider region, she also addressed the role of UNDOF in monitoring the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic in the occupied Golan,⁷⁷⁵ and the situation in Lebanon at the first anniversary of the Beirut port explosion on 4 August 2020 and the tense situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).⁷⁷⁶ During the open debate held on 19 October,⁷⁷⁷ the President of the US/Middle East Project focused on three core concepts, namely, a legitimacy deficit in Palestinian politics, an accountability deficit concerning the actions of Israel and a symmetry deficit given the fundamental asymmetry between an occupying State and an occupied people. He noted that those concepts should help to guide actions and create the building blocks for new thinking and peace. He underscored that the Council must also be open to the possibility that there might be no off-the-shelf solution and that, at some stage, it might be forced to revisit its partition vote of 1947 and its historic endorsement of the two States.

During the open debates and videoconferences, Council members condemned the violence and escalation between Israel and the State of Palestine and called on them both to protect civilians, including children. Council members also called on Israel to cease the new construction plans and continued

⁷⁶⁹ See S/2021/91, S/2021/404, S/PV.8826 and S/PV.8883.

⁷⁷⁰ See S/2021/685 (in relation to S/PV.8826) and S/2021/884 (in relation to S/PV.8883). For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁷⁷¹ See S/2021/91, S/2021/404, S/PV.8826 and S/PV.8883.

⁷⁷² See S/2021/91.

⁷⁷³ See S/2021/404.

⁷⁷⁴ See S/PV.8826.

⁷⁷⁵ For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see sect. 19 above; for more information on UNDOF, see part X, sect. I.

⁷⁷⁶ For more information on UNIFIL, see part X, sect. I.

⁷⁷⁷ See S/PV.8883.

demolition and eviction. Council members reiterated their call to the international community to increase financial support for UNRWA to provide necessary humanitarian assistance, highlighting such factors as the need to address the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some Council members underscored the need to enhance building and reconstruction efforts and the economic recovery in Gaza, including to secure unimpeded humanitarian access throughout the Gaza Strip.⁷⁷⁸ Many Council members welcomed the positive signals for dialogue, including the resumption of direct contact between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in July 2021, and expressed support for meaningful negotiations. Some Council members supported the call of the President of

the Palestinian Authority to convene an international peace conference.⁷⁷⁹ Welcoming the decree of the President of the Palestinian Authority to hold legislative, presidential and Palestinian National Council elections in 2021, some Council members called on the international community and the United Nations to assist in the elections.⁷⁸⁰ Several Council members addressed Israel, urging the country to facilitate the elections and the deployment of a European mission to support the elections.⁷⁸¹

⁷⁷⁸ See [S/PV.8826](#) (India, Mexico, Viet Nam, Niger, Estonia, Ireland, United Kingdom and France); and [S/PV.8883](#) (France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Estonia, Mexico, China, United Kingdom, Tunisia, India and Viet Nam).

⁷⁷⁹ See [S/2021/91](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Russian Federation, Tunisia, China, India and Niger); and [S/2021/404](#) (Russian Federation and Viet Nam).

⁷⁸⁰ See [S/2021/91](#) (Mexico, Estonia, France, Niger and Viet Nam); and [S/2021/404](#) (China, France, Ireland, Niger, Tunisia and Viet Nam).

⁷⁸¹ See [S/2021/91](#) (Estonia, France and Viet Nam); and [S/2021/404](#) (France, Ireland, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom and Viet Nam).

Table 1

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8782 27 May 2021			Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations, Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8804 24 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) (S/2021/584)			Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	11 Council members, ^b invitee ^c	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8826 and S/2021/685 28 July 2021			Israel	Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, Executive Director of Ir Amim	All Council members, all invitees ^d	
S/PV.8847 30 August 2021				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, ^e invitee ^c	
S/PV.8869 29 September 2021				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Planning Manager of the Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center, co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of Amal-Tikva	All Council members, all invitees ^f	
S/PV.8883 and S/2021/884 19 October 2021			Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, President of the US/Middle East Project, political and civil society leader (Hanan Ashrawi)	All Council members, ^g all invitees ^h	
S/PV.8913 30 November 2021				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Interim Vice-President and Programme Director of the International Crisis Group	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8940 21 December 2021				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, invitee ^c	

^a The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the Professor of Arab Studies participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^b China, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United States and Viet Nam.

^c The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^d The Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and the Executive Director of Ir Amim participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^e India (President of the Council) was represented by its Foreign Secretary.

^f The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the Planning Manager of the Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center and the co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of Amal-Tikva participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^g Kenya was represented by its Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary.

^h The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, the President of the US/Middle East Project and Ms. Ashrawi participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2

Videoconferences: the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
26 January 2021	S/2021/91	Letter dated 28 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
26 February 2021	S/2021/218	Letter dated 2 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
25 March 2021	S/2021/302	Letter dated 29 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
22 April 2021	S/2021/404	Letter dated 26 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
16 May 2021	S/2021/480	Letter dated 18 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

21. The situation concerning Iraq

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings in relation to the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”. On 27 May, through the unanimous adoption of resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) until 27 May 2022.⁷⁸² All other meetings held under the item during the period under review took the form of a briefing.⁷⁸³ More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held a total of two open videoconferences in connection with the item.⁷⁸⁴ More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held closed videoconferences and informal consultations of the whole to discuss the item.⁷⁸⁵

In 2021, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of UNAMI on the situation concerning Iraq. In her briefings in connection with the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General,⁷⁸⁶ she provided updates to Council members on the preparation for parliamentary elections scheduled for 10 October 2021, including on the increased electoral support provided by UNAMI, pursuant to resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#). The Special Representative also continued to inform the Council regarding the relations between Baghdad and Erbil and the status of negotiations between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the federal Government. The Special Representative also reported to Council members on the status of the implementation of economic reforms by the federal Government and on the continued threat of terrorism posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh). Regarding the situation of human rights, she spoke about the persecution of protesters, the need for accountability and justice and the closure of camps for internally displaced Iraqis. The Special Representative also provided progress reports regarding the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-

⁷⁸² For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II.

⁷⁸³ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁷⁸⁴ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁷⁸⁵ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 28. See also [S/2021/1060](#) and [S/2021/683](#).

⁷⁸⁶ [S/2021/120](#), [S/2021/426](#), [S/2021/700](#) and [S/2021/946](#). See also [S/2021/93](#), [S/2021/395](#), [S/2021/689](#), [S/2021/930](#) and [S/2021/932](#).

country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives.

At a videoconference held on 16 February,⁷⁸⁷ the Special Representative reported on the financial and economic difficulties facing Iraq and on the status of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, which were to be held on 10 October 2021, four months later than originally planned. She expressed concerns over the delays in the electoral calendar and emphasized that, for credible elections to take place, it was imperative that parties, candidates and members of the media operated in a free and safe environment. The Special Representative underlined that, regardless of the response of the Council to the request from the Government of Iraq for electoral observation, the elections would be Iraqi-led and Iraqi-owned at all times. She expressed concern that transparency, justice and accountability remained largely absent throughout Iraq, including in the Kurdistan region, particularly when it came to the repression of public protests. Regarding the economic situation, while indicating that a 40 per cent increase in oil revenues since November 2020 had eased the liquidity crisis, she lamented the lack of progress in the implementation of much-needed reform measures. The Special Representative also covered other topics, including the closure of camps for internally displaced Iraqis and the issue of missing Kuwaitis and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property.

At a videoconference held on 11 May,⁷⁸⁸ the Special Representative reported on the preparations for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 10 October. While noting that all necessary laws had been adopted, she reiterated her call to all Iraqi stakeholders to uphold the integrity of the electoral process. She lamented that many members of the protest movement, of which the elections had been a central demand, continued to be persecuted with rampant impunity. Regarding the economic situation, the Special Representative noted that, after months of intense political negotiations, the Council of Representatives had approved the federal budget law for 2021. She expressed concern, however, that the budget remained heavily reliant on the oil sector and also reported that minimal progress had been made in the implementation of the white paper for economic and financial reform. Turning to the relations between Baghdad and Erbil, she indicated that, while the parties continued to express their willingness to come to the table, sustainable progress would remain elusive in the absence of institutionalized, regular and structured

dialogue. The Special Representative also expressed concern that, in the context of the upcoming elections, disagreements between the two capitals could easily be exploited to amplify divisions. She also noted that developments in the Kurdistan region over the past year had given rise to concern about the active curtailment of free expression. She made reference to the progress made on the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property and to the humanitarian situation affecting internally displaced persons. In addition, she welcomed the passing of the Yazidi Female Survivors Act, which provided for reparations to survivors and legal recognition of the atrocities against women and girls committed by ISIL/Da'esh as crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.

On 27 May, the Council adopted resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNAMI until 27 May 2022.⁷⁸⁹ In the resolution, the Council commended the efforts of the Government of Iraq to plan and execute genuinely free and fair Iraqi-led, Iraqi-owned early elections.⁷⁹⁰ Taking into account the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Council,⁷⁹¹ the Council decided that the Special Representative would: provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations team in advance of the elections in Iraq to monitor the election day and continue to assist with the election, in a manner that respected Iraqi sovereignty; engage and coordinate with and provide logistical and security support to international and regional third-party observers; and launch a United Nations strategic messaging campaign on election preparations and United Nations activities in support of the elections.⁷⁹² The Council further decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq and the Independent High Electoral Commission with efforts to plan and execute genuinely free and fair Iraqi-led, Iraqi-owned elections and referendums.⁷⁹³ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide a detailed summary report to the Council on the country's electoral process and the assistance provided by UNAMI to that process within 30 days of the conclusion of the elections.⁷⁹⁴

At a meeting held on 25 August,⁷⁹⁵ the Special Representative provided further updates on the

⁷⁸⁷ See [S/2021/152](#).

⁷⁸⁸ See [S/2021/474](#).

⁷⁸⁹ Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph.

⁷⁹¹ [S/2021/135](#), annex.

⁷⁹² Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 2 (a)–(c).

⁷⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (b) (i).

⁷⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁷⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8842](#).

preparations for the parliamentary elections scheduled for 10 October. She emphasized that the Independent High Electoral Commission had reached several milestones and that UNAMI continued to provide technical assistance whenever possible. She noted that there were five times as many United Nations personnel engaged in supporting the elections as there had been during the 2018 elections. The Special Representative reported that UNAMI was stepping up its strategic communication efforts to tackle misinformation and manage public expectations, underlining that the lack of trust in the public authorities and institutions was longstanding and widespread. The Special Representative asked the authorities, civil servants, officials, political forces, parties and candidates not to let the Iraqi people down. She said that service to the citizens – whatever their background, belief, religion, opinion or conviction – should be their first priority, and emphasized that the focus must be on solutions that represented the interests of all people. The Special Representative also reported on developments regarding the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, with a total of 30 cases of missing persons having been formally closed since November 2020.

At a meeting held on 23 November,⁷⁹⁶ the Council heard a briefing by the Special Representative, in which she focused on the electoral process and the post-electoral environment. She reported that the elections had been assessed as generally peaceful and well run, with significant technical and procedural improvements from previous recent elections. She noted that, while it was understandable that elections and their outcomes could provoke strong feelings, if allowed to give way to undemocratic impulses, such feelings could open the door to intolerable acts. She condemned in the strongest terms the assassination attempt on the Prime Minister on 7 November 2021 and underscored that under no circumstances must terrorism, violence or any unlawful acts be allowed to derail the democratic process. The Special Representative emphasized that any concerns of foul play should be addressed to the established legal channels and noted that so far there had been no evidence of systemic electoral fraud. While noting that the risk of continued political deadlock was real, the Special Representative stressed that Iraq desperately needed a Government that was able to swiftly and effectively tackle the long list of unfinished domestic business. In that regard, she concluded by stressing the importance of a sound and inclusive process for the formation of the Government. The Special Representative also reported on the progress achieved on the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country

nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, emphasizing the importance of efforts by the Government of Iraq to keep the momentum and locate the remaining missing persons. During the meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by the Coordinator of the Iraqi Women Network, a civil society feminist alliance. The Coordinator shared with the Council her growing concerns over the assassinations, kidnapping, assaults, threats of assassination against and defamation of feminist activists and human rights defenders during the protests in 2019 and 2020. She stressed that the elections and the negotiations to form a new Government were critical both to ensuring women's meaningful participation and to promoting democracy in Iraq. In that connection, she emphasized the critical role of, and need for, women as active participants in parliament and in negotiations to form the new Government. She also underscored the criticality of an enabling environment for women's engagement and increased participation. The Coordinator highlighted that a national mechanism to support the inclusion of women was critical to ensuring oversight of adequate resources for implementing the country's national action plan on resolution 1325 (2000). In that regard, she urged the Council to call upon the Government of Iraq to create a national council for women's empowerment and to allocate the necessary budget to implement the national action plan. She also urged the Council to call on the Government to ensure accountability for the killing of human rights defenders and civil society activists during the 2019 and 2020 protests.

During the period under review, Council members followed closely the electoral process in Iraq during videoconferences and meetings held in connection with the item. During their deliberations in the first half of the year, Council members emphasized the importance of the parliamentary elections to the political transition and discussed the request by the Government of Iraq for electoral assistance.⁷⁹⁷ In August, many Council members welcomed the deployment, pursuant to resolution 2576 (2021), of additional United Nations personnel to UNAMI to monitor and support the preparations for the elections in October.⁷⁹⁸ Several Council members welcomed the establishment of a higher committee to promote the participation of women in the elections and to prevent violence against women candidates.⁷⁹⁹ In November,⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁷ See [S/2021/152](#) and [S/2021/474](#).

⁷⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8842](#) (United States, Niger, Mexico, Viet Nam, France, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Kenya, United Kingdom, China, Ireland, Tunisia and India).

⁷⁹⁹ See [S/2021/474](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway and United Kingdom); and [S/PV.8842](#) (Estonia, Kenya and Ireland).

⁷⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8910](#).

Council members welcomed the orderly and generally peaceful conduct of the parliamentary elections. Council members also recognized the electoral assistance provided by UNAMI. Many Council members⁸⁰¹ stated that they looked forward to the formation of an inclusive Government that addressed the needs and aspirations of all Iraqis. Some Council members⁸⁰² also highlighted the increased participation and representation of women in the electoral process. In connection with the post-electoral security environment, Council members strongly condemned the 7 November assassination attempt against the Prime Minister and all incidents of violence during the post-election period, such as the threats against United Nations personnel and the Independent High Electoral Commission. Several Council members⁸⁰³ further encouraged all parties to address any concerns regarding the elections through the established legal channels.

Regarding the political situation, throughout the year, several Council members welcomed recent efforts to improve the relationship between the federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government,⁸⁰⁴ including the agreement on the federal budget law.⁸⁰⁵ Many Council members welcomed the adoption of the Yazidi Female Survivors Act by the Iraqi parliament.⁸⁰⁶ Several Council members also welcomed the renewed cooperation between Iraq and neighbouring countries in the region to address common issues.⁸⁰⁷ Some Council members expressed concern about the lack of accountability for violence perpetrated against protesters, activists and journalists

and called for the protection of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.⁸⁰⁸ In connection with the situation of internally displaced persons, some Council members called for the creation of conditions for safe return.⁸⁰⁹ Regarding the security situation, Council members deplored the continued activity of terrorist groups, including ISIL/Da'esh, in Iraqi territory.⁸¹⁰ Many Council members discussed the need to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq in the fight against regional and transnational threats, including terrorism.⁸¹¹ On the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, many Council members welcomed progress

⁸⁰⁸ See [S/2021/152](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Niger and Norway); [S/2021/474](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Niger, Norway and United States); [S/PV.8842](#) (United States, Niger, Mexico, France, Norway, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Kenya and Ireland); and [S/PV.8910](#) (Ireland, Norway, Niger, Estonia and Mexico).

⁸⁰⁹ See [S/2021/152](#) (France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/2021/474](#) (France, India, Norway, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8842](#) (Mexico, Viet Nam, United Kingdom, Ireland and Tunisia); and [S/PV.8910](#) (Ireland, Viet Nam and Kenya).

⁸¹⁰ See [S/2021/152](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/474](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States); [S/PV.8842](#) (United States, Niger, Mexico, Russian Federation, France, Norway, Estonia, Kenya, China, Ireland, Tunisia and India); and [S/PV.8910](#) (India, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, China, France, Niger and Kenya).

⁸¹¹ See [S/2021/152](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Viet Nam); [S/2021/474](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, Tunisia and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8842](#) (United States, Viet Nam, Russian Federation, Norway, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Kenya, China, Ireland, Tunisia and India); and [S/PV.8910](#) (India, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, China, Russian Federation, Kenya, Tunisia and Mexico). For more on information on discussions relating to the prohibition of the threat or use of force, see part III, sect. II.B.

⁸⁰⁰ See [S/PV.8910](#).

⁸⁰¹ United States, India, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, France, Russian Federation, Estonia, United Kingdom, Kenya, Tunisia and Mexico.

⁸⁰² United States, India, Ireland, Norway, Estonia, United Kingdom, Kenya, Tunisia and Mexico.

⁸⁰³ India, Norway, Viet Nam, China, France, Niger, Estonia, United Kingdom and Kenya.

⁸⁰⁴ See [S/2021/152](#) (China, India, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8842](#) (Russian Federation, France, Norway, Estonia, China, Tunisia and India); and [S/PV.8910](#) (Russian Federation, Estonia and Tunisia).

⁸⁰⁵ See [S/2021/474](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Tunisia, United States and Viet Nam).

⁸⁰⁶ See [S/2021/474](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8842](#) (Norway, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Ireland).

⁸⁰⁷ See [S/2021/152](#) (China, India, Mexico, Niger, Russian Federation and United Kingdom); [S/2021/474](#) (Niger, Russian Federation and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8842](#) (Niger, Viet Nam, Russian Federation, France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and India); and [S/PV.8910](#) (India, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, China, France, Niger, Kenya and Mexico).

in the identification and return of the remains of missing persons.⁸¹²

During his interventions in Council meetings and videoconferences in connection with the situation in Iraq, the representative of Iraq stressed the importance of United Nations electoral observation for the success of the electoral process.⁸¹³ The representative of Iraq

⁸¹² See [S/2021/152](#) (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/2021/474](#) (France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8842](#) (Niger, Mexico, Viet Nam, Russian Federation, France, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Kenya, United Kingdom, China, Ireland, Tunisia and India); and [S/PV.8910](#) (India, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, China, France, Niger, United Kingdom, Kenya, Tunisia and Mexico).

⁸¹³ See [S/2021/152](#), [S/2021/474](#), [S/PV.8842](#) and [S/PV.8910](#).

emphasized that terrorism was the greatest threat against Iraqi efforts to rebuild the country, address displacement and deliver humanitarian assistance.⁸¹⁴ The representative of Iraq also condemned the use of his country's territory to settle political scores or carry out actions under the pretext of combating terrorism and called for the respect for the principles of the Charter, including State sovereignty, good-neighbourly relations and cooperation.⁸¹⁵

In addition, developments in 2021 relating to the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant established pursuant to resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#) were dealt with under the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security".⁸¹⁶

⁸¹⁴ See [S/2021/152](#), [S/2021/474](#) and [S/PV.8842](#).

⁸¹⁵ See [S/PV.8842](#) and [S/PV.8910](#).

⁸¹⁶ For further details, see sect. 33 below and part IX, sect. III.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation concerning Iraq

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8780 27 May 2021	Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2021/395) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2522 (2020) (S/2021/426)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/503)				Resolution 2576 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8842 25 August 2021	Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2021/689) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2576 (2021) (S/2021/700)		Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	All Council members, all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8910 23 November 2021	Thirty-second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2021/930) Report of the Secretary-General on the electoral process in Iraq (S/2021/932) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2576 (2021) (S/2021/946)		Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Coordinator of the Iraqi Women Network	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

^a India was represented by its Secretary of Consular Passports and Visas and Overseas Indian Affairs of the Ministry of External Affairs.

^b The Special Representative and the Coordinator of the Iraqi Women Network participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2
Videoconferences: the situation concerning Iraq

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
16 February 2021	S/2021/152	Letter dated 18 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
11 May 2021	S/2021/474	Letter dated 14 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Thematic issues

22. United Nations peacekeeping operations

During the period under review, the Council held five meetings, including one high-level meeting, and adopted two resolutions and two presidential statements in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”. Two of the meetings took the form of an open debate, two were convened for the adoption of a decision and one took

the form of a briefing.⁸¹⁷ More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in table 1 below. In 2021, Council members also held one open videoconference

⁸¹⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

in connection with the item.⁸¹⁸ More information on the open videoconference is provided in table 2 below.

In 2021, under the item, Council members addressed how to improve the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers, accountability for acts of violence against peacekeepers, the use of technology for the protection of peacekeepers and peacekeeping transitions. The Council also held the annual briefing on the work of United Nations police components in peacekeeping operations, with a particular focus on the role of women. Council members were twice briefed by the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and once each by the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, the former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the President of the Community Development Association of the Sudan and the police commissioners of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

On 24 May, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency for the month,⁸¹⁹ Council members held an open videoconference on improving the safety and security of peacekeepers.⁸²⁰ In his briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations noted that peacekeeping operations continued to operate in complex environments, where they faced an increasing number of attacks against their personnel by hostile actors. In addition, issues related to peacekeeper safety, such as vehicle accidents and illnesses, were causing fatalities and could significantly affect the ability of peacekeepers to deliver on their mandated tasks. Building on the progress made through the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, the Under-Secretary-General emphasized that safety and security would remain one of the highest priorities as the Secretariat took forward the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative, continuing to focus on implementing resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#) on safety and security and the 2019 action plan to improve the security of United Nations peacekeepers. Noting the spike in fatalities in 2021, with 15 peacekeepers having lost their lives owing to malicious acts since January, he listed measures the Secretariat was taking to strengthen intelligence and situational awareness, enhance force protection, improve the understanding of

the nature and source of improvised explosive devices, hold casualty evacuation stress tests, improve strategic communications and strengthen the countering of disinformation, misinformation and hate speech. To complement those efforts, the Under-Secretary-General underlined the importance for Member States to deploy uniformed personnel without caveats and called for Council support in providing personnel with the requisite mindset and leadership skills, adequate equipment, qualified military intelligence and public information personnel and more female peacekeepers. He further stressed the need for the Council to support cutting the flow of explosive ordinance to prevent the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. He stated that political engagement with host nations and stakeholders would greatly contribute to enhancing safety and security and highlighted the need to provide political and technical support to ensure accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, to strengthen trauma care and occupational health and to avoid unnecessary budget cuts for United Nations Headquarters and missions.

The Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support noted that, within the common phrase “safety and security”, security remained the most highly emphasized and resourced component, although there was a relatively higher impact of safety on the lives lost and long-term injuries and illnesses of peacekeepers. He highlighted several initiatives of the Department of Operational Support in the area of security, such as the launch of the “Unite Aware” enterprise solution to support situational awareness, improving casualty evacuation procedures, setting criteria for rotations, repatriations and deployments during the COVID-19 pandemic, establishing the medical evacuation mechanism and convening a group of friends to establish principles for the vaccination against COVID-19 of uniformed personnel. In his remarks, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security stated that peacekeepers were a critical partner for the broader United Nations family in keeping personnel safe and ensuring that the Organization could operate in very insecure environments. He noted efforts to further improve the United Nations security management system, which covered civilian staff and individually deployed military and police personnel, including developing a more agile and diverse security force. Furthermore, dialogue and collaboration among Secretariat departments and with Member States was key to strengthening the safety and security of peacekeepers.

In their statements, Council members and other delegations expressed support for the safety and

⁸¹⁸ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁸¹⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 5 May ([S/2021/432](#)).

⁸²⁰ See [S/2021/501](#).

security of peacekeepers and noted that it was a central priority of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative. They discussed the need to strengthen situational awareness and intelligence, optimize the use of technology, improve the quality of training and equipment, upgrade the security of camps, ensure accountability for attacks against peacekeepers and the respect for status-of-forces agreements and strengthen medical capabilities. Several delegations further underscored the importance of addressing the risk of improvised explosive devices,⁸²¹ and enhancing the health and safety of peacekeepers, including through the provision of vaccines for COVID-19.⁸²²

On the same day, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it stressed the importance of the health and well-being of United Nations peacekeeping personnel in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and encouraged their vaccination in-theatre and prior to deployment.⁸²³ The Council underscored the need for countries contributing troops and police to ensure, where appropriate, that all peacekeepers in the field were equipped, informed and trained to mitigate the threat posed by landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than 15 December 2021, an independent strategic review of the responses of United Nations peacekeeping operations to improvised explosive devices, which would include an assessment of the capabilities and measures necessary to better mitigate that threat.⁸²⁴ The Council also reaffirmed the importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping operations at all levels and all positions and of conducting and integrating a gender analysis and gender assessments when considering the safety and security of peacekeepers.⁸²⁵

On 18 August, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#), by which it called upon the Member States hosting or having hosted United Nations peacekeeping operations to bring to justice

perpetrators and promote accountability for the killing of, and all acts of violence against, United Nations personnel, including, but not limited to, their detention and abduction.⁸²⁶ The Council requested the Secretary-General to include updates, as appropriate, on the following key tasks in his reports to the Council: (a) the progress made by the Member States in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of cases related to the killing of, and all acts of violence against, United Nations peacekeeping personnel; and (b) the measures taken by the United Nations to follow up on such cases and to assist the host States, upon their request and within mission mandates and capacities, to support efforts towards ensuring accountability for such acts.⁸²⁷ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to establish a comprehensive online database of cases related to the killing of, and all acts of violence against, peacekeepers, on capacity-building assistance offered by the United Nations and on the progress made by Member States in bringing to justice perpetrators of such acts.⁸²⁸ In addition, the Council requested each peacekeeping operation to designate a focal point for all issues related to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the killing of, and all acts of violence against, peacekeeping personnel.⁸²⁹

On the same day, at the initiative of India, which held the presidency for the month,⁸³⁰ the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping”.⁸³¹ At the outset of the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it recognized that technology had the potential to act as a force multiplier by enhancing performance, saving resources, simplifying work processes and allowing peacekeeping operations to have a deeper understanding of the environments in which they operated.⁸³² The Council encouraged better integration of existing and new technologies, especially digital technology, to enhance field support, the implementation of safety and security and the protection of civilians.⁸³³ In addition, the Council welcomed the commitment expressed by Member States to support environmentally responsible

⁸²¹ China, India, Viet Nam, Belgium, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, Republic of Korea and Switzerland.

⁸²² China, India, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Africa and Thailand.

⁸²³ [S/PRST/2021/11](#), fourth paragraph.

⁸²⁴ *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph. See the letter dated 13 December 2021 to the President of the Council, in which the Secretary-General transmitted the report of the independent strategic review on the responses of United Nations peacekeeping operations to improvised explosive devices ([S/2021/1042](#)).

⁸²⁵ [S/PRST/2021/11](#), thirteenth paragraph.

⁸²⁶ Resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#), paras. 2 and 3.

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (a)–(b).

⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

⁸³⁰ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 26 July ([S/2021/681](#)).

⁸³¹ See [S/PV.8838](#). See also [S/2021/732](#). While briefers and Council members participated in person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

⁸³² [S/PRST/2021/17](#), sixth paragraph.

⁸³³ *Ibid.*, eighth paragraph.

solutions in peacekeeping operations, and in that regard, supported efforts by the Secretary-General and countries contributing troops and police to enable missions to increase the use of renewable energy technologies, which could enhance the safety and security of personnel, mission efficiency and sustainability.⁸³⁴

In his briefing following the adoption of the presidential statement, the Secretary-General stated that United Nations peacekeeping was conceived in an analog world and that it was now essential that it fully embrace the digital world to improve the Organization's agility, foresight and responsiveness to conflicts.⁸³⁵ Given the need for a shift in peacekeeping culture, the newly developed strategy for the digital transformation of peacekeeping operations was aimed at using the opportunities offered by digital technologies to mitigate the risks they posed and promote their responsible use. According to the Secretary-General, the four objectives of the strategy were to: (a) drive technology innovation at Headquarters and in the field; (b) maximize the potential of current and new technologies to augment the capacity of missions to carry out their mandates effectively; (c) detect, analyse and address threats against civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian and political missions in a timely and integrated manner; and (d) ensure the responsible use of digital technologies by peace operations by developing clear principles and undertaking human rights due diligence. To achieve the vision of the strategy, the Secretary-General requested the active engagement and support of Member States, specifically highlighting capacity-building, training, the provision of equipment and financial contributions.

In their statements, Council members and other delegations noted that, in the face of growing and complex security challenges, the implementation of new technologies in United Nations peacekeeping operations was crucial to enhancing their performance, efficiency and effectiveness, strengthening the protection of civilians and improving the safety and security of personnel, including with respect to the threat of improvised explosive devices. Delegations broadly welcomed the new strategy for the digital transformation of peacekeeping operations, with some underlining that the implementation of new technology required adequate resources, capacity and training.⁸³⁶

⁸³⁴ Ibid., eleventh paragraph.

⁸³⁵ See [S/PV.8838](#).

⁸³⁶ See [S/PV.8838](#) (United States, China, France, Viet Nam and Ireland); and [S/2021/732](#) (Argentina, Australia, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Pakistan and Switzerland).

and others stressing the need for its integration into mission planning and mandates.⁸³⁷ While noting the potential benefits of technology, multiple participants underlined that it should be adopted in accordance with the principles of peacekeeping,⁸³⁸ the Charter of the United Nations, including the respect for the sovereignty of host States,⁸³⁹ and international human rights law and international humanitarian law.⁸⁴⁰ Some underscored the need for new technologies to be gender responsive,⁸⁴¹ while a number of participants stressed the need for them to be environmentally friendly and to promote the use of renewable energy.⁸⁴²

On 8 September, at the initiative of Ireland, which held the presidency for the month,⁸⁴³ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled "United Nations transitions".⁸⁴⁴ At the meeting,⁸⁴⁵ the Secretary-General stated that transitions involved a careful reconfiguration of the presence, strategy and footprint of the United Nations in a country. The success of transitions depended on early and sustained collaboration among field missions, host Governments, United Nations country teams and local and global partners. The Secretary-General noted that consolidating peace, building resilience and averting conflict relapse were at the heart of his prevention agenda and underlined the importance of the Action for Peacekeeping and Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiatives in transition settings. According to the Secretary-General, the Council could learn three lessons from past missions. First, political engagement needed to be sustained throughout the transition and beyond. Second, national leadership and ownership of the transition were important and, while peacekeeping operations could help put the country on the right track, only national stakeholders could keep it there

⁸³⁷ See [S/PV.8838](#) (Kenya and Norway); and [S/2021/732](#) (Bangladesh).

⁸³⁸ See [S/PV.8838](#) (China, Kenya, France and Viet Nam); and [S/2021/732](#) (Guatemala and Islamic Republic of Iran).

⁸³⁹ See [S/PV.8838](#) (China, Viet Nam and Russian Federation); and [S/2021/732](#) (Brazil, Fiji, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Rwanda).

⁸⁴⁰ [S/PV.8838](#) (United States and France); and [S/2021/732](#) (Finland, Italy, Portugal and South Africa).

⁸⁴¹ See [S/PV.8838](#) (Estonia, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Ireland); and [S/2021/732](#) (Finland, Japan and United Arab Emirates).

⁸⁴² See [S/PV.8838](#) (India, Estonia, United States, United Kingdom, France and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); and [S/2021/732](#) (Bangladesh, Ecuador, Finland, Italy, Nepal, Peru, Portugal and United Arab Emirates).

⁸⁴³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 24 August ([S/2021/756](#)).

⁸⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8851](#). See also [S/2021/783](#).

⁸⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8851](#).

over the long term. Finally, it was important to have sustainable transition financing to prevent a financial cliff at the closure of a mission that could have a huge risk to a country still taking first tentative steps towards sustainable peace and development.

In her briefing, the former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, stressed that it was important for peacekeeping interventions to be viewed as successful endeavours, not only in restoring security, but also in enabling sustainable peace. Citing Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia as an example of such a success, she added that it was critical for the peacekeeping process to be nationally owned, integrated, coherent and sustainable. According to the former President, the Council could support those important ingredients for success by including them in mission mandates and considering them in reports and briefings to the Council. Furthermore, the reports should include information on specific measurable activities undertaken with civil society organizations, women and youth groups. Other important milestones in transitions included the reform of national security and the rule of law and integrating peacebuilding early into peacekeeping intervention planning.

The President of the Community Development Association of the Sudan, a national non-governmental organization, discussed the lessons learned in the Sudan during the transition from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS). She underlined the cruciality of women's meaningful participation in the transition process, adding that UNITAMS needed to push towards enhancing the political will of all parties to implement the country's national action plan established pursuant to resolution 1325 (2000). The peacebuilding component of the Mission was indispensable to paving the way for Sudanese civil society, especially women, youth and groups affected by war, to engage in all livelihood activities, community building and reintegration during the transition period. Other forms of assistance required from UNITAMS included support for the implementation of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan, security sector reform, filling the protection gaps left by UNAMID, transitional justice, the formation of a legislature or parliament and the appointment of Government commissions. She concluded by stating that the Council should review the mandate of UNITAMS to include a protection component for the Darfur region.

In their statements, Council members and other delegations cited long-term planning and transition

strategies, the inclusion of peacebuilding and transition strategies in peacekeeping mandates, adequate resources for peacebuilding activities, integration, inclusivity and national ownership as key elements of successful transitions. The representative of Tunisia reiterated that it was important for transition strategies to be developed in close consultation with, on the one hand, national authorities, civil society organizations and all components of society, and on the other hand, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Speakers also stressed the need for gender-based approaches to transitions,⁸⁴⁶ and the involvement of women and youth, among other groups.⁸⁴⁷ The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission stressed the readiness of the Commission to strengthen its advisory role to the Council in the formation, review, drawdown and transition of peacekeeping operations.⁸⁴⁸

Following the open debate, on 9 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2594 (2021), in which it emphasized the need for peace operations to engage at the earliest possible stage in integrated planning and coordination on transitions with resident coordinators, United Nations country teams or other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the host State and other national stakeholders, including civil society.⁸⁴⁹ The Council requested the Secretary-General to plan for transitions that were integrated within the wider country-specific transition to peace and elaborate transition strategies that built towards the reconfiguration of the strategy, footprint and capacity of the United Nations presence, informed by input from stakeholders at all levels.⁸⁵⁰ The Council encouraged national Governments to develop and implement comprehensive national plans, policies or strategies to protect civilians, which included national benchmarks, in advance of peace operation transitions, and requested the Secretary-General to direct peace operations to engage with host Governments, when requested by them, in the development, implementation and monitoring of those strategies.⁸⁵¹ The Council

⁸⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8851](#) (Norway); and [S/2021/783](#) (Belgium, Ecuador, Lebanon and Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission).

⁸⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8851](#) (Tunisia, United Kingdom, Niger, Estonia and Ireland); and [S/2021/783](#) (Bangladesh, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Malta, Nepal, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates).

⁸⁴⁸ See [S/2021/783](#).

⁸⁴⁹ Resolution 2594 (2021), para. 1.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 2.

⁸⁵¹ Ibid., para. 3.

acknowledged the importance of strong coordination, coherence and cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission and requested the Secretary-General to liaise with the Commission in advance of relevant reporting to the Council, with a view to facilitating the provision of complementary and timely advice from the Commission to the Council.⁸⁵² Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to incorporate comprehensive reporting on the status of ongoing transitions of United Nations peacekeeping operations in his regular country-specific reporting on relevant missions and to provide a report on the status of transitions across relevant United Nations peace operations, including those that had transitioned within the previous 24 months, before 30 June 2022.⁸⁵³

On 10 November, the Council held the annual briefing with selected police commissioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations, focusing on women and peace and security.⁸⁵⁴ In his introductory remarks, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations stated that, as a key component of peacekeeping, United Nations police were helping to advance the seven priorities of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative and further strengthen the effectiveness of operations. In that regard, among other achievements, he highlighted the establishment of the United Nations inter-agency task force on policing to maximize the collective efforts of the United Nations system, the alignment of predeployment training by Member States with the Organization's in-mission training, efforts by the United Nations to create an enabling environment for women peacekeepers, enhanced predeployment training on zero-tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse, the refinement of the environmental management framework and the efforts to counter hate speech and to improve cooperation with host countries to enable smooth transitions. He added that the women and peace and security agenda was infused in all aspects of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative and remained the foundation for improving overall effectiveness.

The police commissioners of UNISFA and MINUSMA provided an overview of the work of the police components in the two Missions. According to the Police Commissioner of UNISFA, the Mission's efforts had resulted in a reduction in acts of criminality and human rights violations. Nevertheless, they remained hampered by the unwillingness of South Sudan to participate in the planning for the establishment of the Abyei police service, the failure of both South Sudan and the Sudan to endorse the memorandum of understanding on the handing over of

suspects and the reluctance of the Sudan to issue visas for United Nations police personnel. She recommended increasing the capacity of the police through the deployment of formed police units, in particular female members, and individual police officers and urged the Council to impress upon the two Governments the need to immediately establish the Abyei police service. The Police Commissioner of MINUSMA provided an overview of the deployment of women in the Mission's police component, noting that the gender dimension was manifested through joint patrols, co-location, training courses and education on gender issues. The visibility of women within the component, according to the Commissioner, should help the Malian population and security forces to see the skills and strengths of women and even encourage women to pursue positions traditionally considered for men only. Furthermore, the police component was developing several strategies to deal with the cultural dynamics and the limited number of women from the Malian security forces deployed in the centre and the north of the country, including: (a) strengthening the capacities of the Malian security forces; (b) including training courses carried out as part of a global project; (c) the financial empowerment of women through quick-impact projects; and (d) assistance in community policing, with the objective of inclusive management and the development of local crime prevention and security strategies.

In their remarks after the briefers, Council members highlighted the crucial role of United Nations police components and the women who served within them in protecting civilians and vulnerable groups, addressing sexual and gender-based violence, capacity-building, strengthening the rule of law, community engagement and policing and contributing to overall mission effectiveness. Speaking also on behalf of the African members of the Council, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that women's participation and leadership should include all aspects of peacekeeping, including police patrols, operations and planning, responding to the threat of small arms and light weapons, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform. While noting improvements in the representation of women in police components as part of the United Nations uniformed gender parity strategy, several speakers called for greater efforts to be made to address the systemic and structural barriers that existed in that context.⁸⁵⁵ The representative of the United States called for ensuring that women were afforded equal opportunities to excel and lead across the full spectrum of United Nations policing, including police unit commanders, of which there were very few examples.

⁸⁵² Ibid., paras. 10 and 11.

⁸⁵³ Ibid., para. 14.

⁸⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8901](#).

⁸⁵⁵ Ireland, India and Mexico.

Table 1
Meetings: United Nations peacekeeping operations

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)
S/PV.8837 18 August 2021	Protecting the protectors	Draft resolution submitted by 80 Member States ^a (S/2021/730)	65 Member States ^b			Resolution 2589 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8838 and S/2021/732 18 August 2021	Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping Letter dated 26 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/681)				Secretary- General, all Council members ^c	S/PRST/2021/17
S/PV.8851 and S/2021/783 8 September 2021	United Nations transitions Letter dated 24 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/756)			Former President of Liberia, President of the Community Development Association of the Sudan	Secretary- General, all Council members, ^d all invitees	
S/PV.8852 9 September 2021	United Nations transitions Letter dated 24 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/756)	Draft resolution submitted by 97 Member States ^e (S/2021/771)	82 Member States ^f			Resolution 2594 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8901 10 November 2021	Police Commissioners			Under Secretary- General for Peace Operations, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei	12 Council members, ^g all invitees ^h	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
					(UNISFA), Police Commissioner of the United Nations Multidimensio nal Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	
^a	Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.					
^b	Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates.					
^c	India (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for External Affairs; and Estonia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.					
^d	India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs.					
^e	Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.					
^f	Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Zimbabwe.					
^g	China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.					
^h	The police commissioners of UNISFA and MINUSMA participated in the meeting by videoconference.					

Table 2

Videoconference: United Nations peacekeeping operations

Videoconference date	Videoconference record	Title	Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure
24 May 2021	S/2021/501	Letter dated 26 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	S/PRST/2021/11

23. International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

In 2021, the Council held two meetings related to the work of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.⁸⁵⁶ The two meetings took the form of a debate,⁸⁵⁷ and no decisions were adopted by the Council under the item in 2021. More information on the meetings, including on the participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 8 June, the Council heard the first semi-annual briefings by the President of the Mechanism and by its Prosecutor,⁸⁵⁸ in which they presented the latest assessment and progress reports on the work of the Mechanism,⁸⁵⁹ submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution [1966 \(2010\)](#). At the outset, the President of the Mechanism announced that the its Appeals Chamber had just pronounced its judgment in the case against Ratko Mladić, dismissing Mr. Mladić's appeal and affirming his convictions, including for genocide, persecution and extermination, and his sentence of life imprisonment.⁸⁶⁰ The President added that, with that delivery, the Mechanism had taken another tremendous step towards the finalization of its core judicial work and that the case was a testament to what could be achieved through international justice processes when States had the will to cooperate and overcome geopolitical roadblocks. The President also provided updates with regard to the two other judgments to be issued during that month at the two branches of the Mechanism: the contempt case against Anselme Nzabonimpa and others in Arusha and the

Stanišić and Simatović retrial at The Hague. In addition, the President updated the Council on the case against Félicien Kabuga, who remained detained in The Hague following his transfer to the United Nations Detention Unit in October 2020. The President recalled that the Mechanism was mandated to carry out many other residual functions, among which was the supervision of the enforcement of sentences imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Mechanism itself. In that context, he expressed his deepest appreciation for the invaluable contribution of the 15 Member States in Africa and Europe that, in enforcing the sentence of one or more convicted persons, continued to assume significant additional responsibilities, despite the challenges brought by the COVID-19 pandemic. The President expressed hope that additional States would step forward and enter into enforcement agreements with the United Nations for that purpose. With regard to the situation of the acquitted and released persons in Arusha, the President underscored the fundamental importance that those individuals be resettled and expressed regret that a sustainable solution had yet to be found. The President also referred to his letter dated 11 May to the President of the Security Council,⁸⁶¹ in which he had informed Council members of the non-cooperation of Serbia with the Mechanism concerning the request by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to execute arrest warrants in relation to Petar Jojić and Vjerica Radeta. He added that the country's inaction not only undermined the effective administration of justice before the Mechanism, but also defied the international community by challenging the Council's authority and the Charter of the United Nations.⁸⁶²

⁸⁵⁶ For more information on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, see previous supplements covering the period 2018 to 2020; for issues considered under the item, see also previous supplements covering the period 1996 to 2007.

⁸⁵⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁸⁵⁸ See [S/PV.8790](#).

⁸⁵⁹ [S/2021/487](#), annexes I and II.

⁸⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8790](#).

⁸⁶¹ [S/2021/452](#).

⁸⁶² See [S/PV.8790](#).

The Prosecutor opened his statement highlighting the conviction of Ratko Mladić, while acknowledging the work that the Mechanism still had ahead. He updated the Council on the remaining work of the Arusha branch and its priorities, especially on the *Kabuga* case and the investigations and preparations for the commencement of his trial. With regard to the six remaining fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Prosecutor recalled that he had informed the Council a few years before that his Office was reforming and strengthening their fugitive tracking activities and that those efforts had produced results, including the arrest of Félicien Kabuga. While his Office had viable leads on all remaining fugitives, he added that the primary challenge was the lack of full and effective cooperation from Member States. Expressing determination to account for the remaining fugitives as quickly as possible, the Prosecutor said that, while his Office worked to resolve the challenges, the firm support of the Council would be vital. The Prosecutor reaffirmed that many other war crime perpetrators still needed to be held accountable for their crimes and that another strategic priority of his Office was to assist national jurisdictions prosecuting international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Prosecutor ended his briefing by updating Council members on three important developments. First, the arrest of Kabuga had brought renewed attention to continuing national efforts to prosecute alleged génocidaires, and the Rwandan authorities had achieved important results in cases referred by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda under rule 11 bis of its rules of procedure and evidence. Second, in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, new national war crime strategies were being put in place, which were important opportunities to clearly demonstrate national commitment to full accountability. Finally, the Prosecutor brought to the Council's attention the issues of genocide denial and the glorification of war criminals both in Montenegro and Serbia and in Rwanda, calling for urgent action in that regard.

The Council discussed the progress achieved by the Mechanism during the reporting period. Speakers commended the Mechanism for maintaining the continuity of its work despite the constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic on its activities. Council members noted in particular the expected delivery of three judgments during the month of June, including the judgment in the appeal case of *Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić* confirming his convictions and sentence of life imprisonment. In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that his country attached

great importance to safeguarding the rights of individuals under detention, including the right to medical assistance, a position that the Council had specifically adopted in resolution 2529 (2020). He expressed regret that no information had been found on the current state of health of Mr. Mladić and insisted that a full independent examination and certification be conducted. Moreover, his delegation expected the appointment of an independent medical expert to assess the advisability of transferring Félicien Kabuga to the facilities of the Mechanism in Arusha and his capacity to stand trial. Several Council members⁸⁶³ expressed their continuous concern about ongoing reports of the denial of crimes and the glorification of perpetrators of genocide and war criminals convicted by international criminal tribunals. Some speakers⁸⁶⁴ welcomed the Mechanism's initiatives to raise awareness among affected communities and the young generations of the legacy of the criminal tribunals and the work being done. With regard to the challenges to the implementation of the mandate of the Mechanism, most Council members called for the strengthening of efforts by Member States to provide the Mechanism with the necessary assistance, thereby fulfilling their responsibility and obligations in accordance with Council resolutions, including in the search for fugitives at large. Furthermore, some speakers⁸⁶⁵ expressed concern about the Mechanism's referral of Serbia to the Council as a result of the country's non-compliance with regard to the surrender and arrest of two individuals, urging Serbia to comply with the Mechanism's order. Council members⁸⁶⁶ also encouraged the Mechanism to continue to implement effective steps to adhere to its schedule of completion of its judicial activity and other residual functions, thereby realizing the Council's vision of a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose function and site would diminish over time. In that connection, the representative of the Niger encouraged the management of the Mechanism to step up its efforts to implement the recommendations outlined in the 2020 report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services,⁸⁶⁷ as well as those outlined in the 2018 report,⁸⁶⁸ as those recommendations had been only partially implemented.

⁸⁶³ United Kingdom, Tunisia, Mexico, France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Niger, Ireland and Estonia.

⁸⁶⁴ France, Niger and Ireland.

⁸⁶⁵ United Kingdom, Mexico, United States, France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Norway and Estonia.

⁸⁶⁶ Viet Nam, Tunisia, India, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and China.

⁸⁶⁷ S/2020/236.

⁸⁶⁸ S/2018/206.

On 13 December, the Council heard the second semi-annual briefing by the President of the Mechanism and its Prosecutor,⁸⁶⁹ in which they presented the latest progress report on the work of the Mechanism.⁸⁷⁰ The President of the Mechanism opened his remarks by stating that, during the reporting period, resolution 2529 (2020) had been largely implemented and assured the Council that the Mechanism would keep advancing that process as they prepared for the next biennial review by the Council in 2022.⁸⁷¹ More specifically, the President drew attention to certain aspects of the resolution and how the Mechanism was implementing its provisions. Most notably, he stated that, during the reporting period, the Mechanism had been able to deliver on time all three judgments that had been projected for June of that year, namely, the appeal judgment in the *Mladić* case and the trial judgments in the *Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović* case and the *Prosecutor v. Anselme Nzabonimpa et al.* contempt case. The President noted that, as a result, the core driver of the Mechanism's activities – its pending judicial caseload – had further diminished and that the Mechanism had entered a new chapter in its operations. He added that, while the current cases on the docket and other mandated functions of the Mechanism would continue for the durations indicated in the progress report, the change in the active caseload was significant, as reductions in staffing and resources were a necessary consequence of the conclusion of key activities. Referring to paragraph 4 of resolution 2529 (2020), relating to the nine acquitted or released persons living in a safe house in Arusha, the President explained that, thanks to the exceptional efforts of the Registrar of the Mechanism and the exemplary cooperation of the Niger, an agreement had been reached between the Government of the Niger and the United Nations, in which the Niger had accepted for relocation on its territory all nine individuals, and that the agreement had already been implemented with respect to eight of the nine individuals. The President also referred to paragraph 2 of the resolution, wherein the Council more generally urged States to cooperate fully with the Mechanism. In that context, he called once more on Serbia to fulfil its international obligations by arresting and transferring Petar Jojić and Vjerica Radeta to the Mechanism.

The Prosecutor updated the Council on the main developments regarding the remaining trials and appeals at the Hague and the Arusha branches, which was his Office's first strategic priority. Regarding his

second strategic priority, the Prosecutor said that his Office continued to actively search for the remaining six fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in accordance with the Council's mandate. He stressed that the success of their efforts depended on the full and effective cooperation of Member States, and more specifically, of Zimbabwe and South Africa at that time. Regarding his Office's third strategic priority, namely, to assist national jurisdictions prosecuting international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Prosecutor reported that his Office was receiving not only a high volume of requests for assistance but also requests of greater complexity and significance. As a final remark, the Prosecutor said that he once again brought to the Council's urgent attention the continued denial of crimes and the glorification of génocidaires and war criminals, which were used to prevent reconciliation, provoke hatred and destabilize peace and security and which condemned present and future generations to bear the burdens of the past.

Speakers acknowledged the progress reported in the ninth report of the Mechanism despite restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. In that connection, Council members noted the decisions in the *Mladić* case, the judgments in the *Stanišić and Simatović* and the *Nzabonimpa* cases and the progress made in the *Kabuga* case during the reporting period. The representative of Viet Nam welcomed the President's commitment to the full implementation of resolution 2529 (2020), including by providing a clear projection of timelines for the completion of the Mechanism's judicial activities and other residual functions. Echoing Viet Nam, some Council members⁸⁷² commended the Mechanism for continuing to implement effective steps to adhere to its schedule of completion, thereby realizing the Council's vision of a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size would diminish over time. The representative of China expressed hope that the Mechanism would conduct its activities in accordance with the mandate set forth in Council resolutions, respecting in particular the projected timetable and completing the judicial proceedings for outstanding cases in a timely and efficient manner, while also allocating financial resources rationally and focusing on ensuring the fulfilment of judicial activities. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the Mechanism was a temporary structure and created as such. He added that his delegation had not seen any concrete steps to bring the Mechanism's activities to a

⁸⁶⁹ See S/PV.8927.

⁸⁷⁰ S/2021/694.

⁸⁷¹ See S/PV.8927.

⁸⁷² China, Kenya, United States, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

close. Like the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, he said that the Mechanism was systematically prolonging all its trials and thereby artificially extending its existence. Given the Council's review of the activities of the Mechanism framework, he called on the leaders of the Mechanism not only to finally put together a plan for how the court would be brought to a close, but also to firmly keep to that plan. Council members commended the Government of the Niger for the assistance extended to the Mechanism regarding the nine acquitted and released persons residing in Arusha. In that connection, the majority of Council members recalled that States' cooperation with the Mechanism remained crucial for enabling the fulfilment of its mandates, in accordance with their international obligations, and called on States to assist and support the Mechanism, where needed, including in the search for fugitives at large. In a similar vein,

speakers⁸⁷³ continued to call on Serbia to comply with the arrest and surrender warrants issued in the *Jojić and Radeta* case and to condemn denials of genocide and the glorification of convicted war criminals.

During the period under review, the Council also took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judges nominated to fill the vacancies resulting from the death of one judge and the resignation of another judge of the Mechanism for the remainder of the respective terms of office.⁸⁷⁴

⁸⁷³ Estonia, United Kingdom, Ireland, United States and Norway.

⁸⁷⁴ See [S/2021/674](#), [S/2021/675](#), [S/2021/1064](#) and [S/2021/1065](#). For more information on the actions of the Council concerning judges of the Mechanism, see part IV, sect. I.D.3 and part IX, sect. IV.

Meetings: International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8790 8 June 2021			Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda, Serbia	President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor of the Mechanism	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8927 13 December 2021			Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda, Serbia	President of the Mechanism, Prosecutor of the Mechanism	All Council members, all invitees	

^a Serbia was represented by its President, who participated in the meeting by videoconference. The President and the Prosecutor of the Mechanism also participated by videoconference.

24. Children and armed conflict

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting in connection with the item entitled "Children and armed conflict". The meeting was convened for the adoption of resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#) on the protection of education in armed conflict.⁸⁷⁵ More information on the meeting, including on the participants, speakers and outcome, is provided in table 1 below. In addition, Council members held one high-

level open videoconference.⁸⁷⁶ More information on the open videoconference is provided in table 2 below.

The high-level open videoconference, held on 28 June,⁸⁷⁷ was convened at the initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency for the month,⁸⁷⁸ in connection with the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict.⁸⁷⁹ The

⁸⁷⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

⁸⁷⁶ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁸⁷⁷ See [S/2021/617](#).

⁸⁷⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 8 June ([S/2021/541](#)).

⁸⁷⁹ [S/2021/437](#).

videoconference was chaired by the President of Estonia and featured briefings by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Advocate for Children Affected by War with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and Goodwill Ambassador for Peace and Reconciliation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and an education specialist with Plan International Nigeria.⁸⁸⁰

In his remarks, the Secretary-General noted that conflict affected children particularly hard, with the start of 2021 being no exception. In 2020, almost 24,000 grave violations were committed against 19,300 children in the 21 conflict situations covered by the children and armed conflict mandate. The most prevalent violations continued to be the recruitment and use of children, the killing and maiming of children and the denial of humanitarian access to children. He expressed concern at emerging trends that showed an exponential increase in the number of children abducted and in sexual violence against boys and girls, as well as the disproportionate targeting of schools and hospitals, especially those used by girls. The Secretary-General stated that, at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the children and armed conflict mandate, its continued relevance was sadly clear and it remained a proven tool for protecting the world's children. He noted that, as a result of the work of his Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the United Nations on the ground, 17 actions plans were being implemented and at least 35 new commitments had been made by parties to conflict in 2020, while 12,300 children had been released. The agenda was central to conflict resolution and prevention and, as armed conflicts evolved and as children faced multiple threats, the framework for the protection of children must also adapt. The Secretary-General added that it was necessary to include child protection language in peace processes, to enhance data analysis, early warning and advocacy for early action and to elevate children's voices and best interests in peace processes and political decision-making. He called on the Council and all Member States to strongly support the protection of children in all ways and at all times.

In her statement, the Executive Director of UNICEF noted that the COVID-19 pandemic had magnified the challenges in the daily life of children and cited such examples as school closures, the increased risk of violence and abuse under lockdowns,

the negative impact on mental health and negative coping mechanisms, such as child marriage and labour. The United Nations had verified grave violations against more than 19,000 children in humanitarian situations in 2020, including killings or maiming, recruitment and use in fighting, abduction and sexual exploitation and abuse. The Executive Director highlighted the urgent need for support by Member States, partners and the Council in four key areas: (a) giving the protection of children the priority it deserved in the Council's decisions and deliberations; (b) ensuring a commitment by States and parties to conflict to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas; (c) securing a commitment by Member States to invest in women and girls and to prevent gender-based violence in conflict; and (d) increasing child protection capacity across the board.

The Advocate for Children Affected by War with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict observed that lasting peace was at stake when children were subjected to the six grave violations against children in armed conflict detailed in the report of the Secretary-General. He noted that those violations also had invisible impacts that lasted much longer, including losing months or years of education, social stigma and trauma. He offered concrete examples of the effects of those violations on children and explained how different organizations were working to rekindle the link between children affected by conflict and their community, providing them with skills, opportunities and the chance to heal from trauma. The Education Specialist of Plan International Nigeria, a civil society organization focusing on gender-responsive child protection and education in crises, spoke about the specific impact of grave violations against children in armed conflict, in particular on girls in the Lake Chad basin. He called on the Council to recognize and take immediate steps to: (a) address the specific targeting of girls in armed conflict; (b) address the use of girls as a weapon of war; (c) demand and pursue accountability; (d) help to make the safe and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to children a reality; and (e) uphold its commitment to mainstream child protection in conflict prevention and in conflict and post-conflict situations, with the aim of sustaining peace and preventing conflict.

In their statements, Council members and other delegations noted that, at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the introduction of the children and armed conflict agenda before the Council, much more was necessary to address violations against children. Addressing the

⁸⁸⁰ See [S/2021/617](#).

Council after the briefers, the Presidents of Estonia and the Niger underscored the importance of the protection of schools and education as an essential element of conflict prevention. Similarly, noting that one in every three children living in countries affected by conflict or disaster was out of school, the President of Ireland stated that schools should be a protected, safe shelter and space for learning and development.

In terms of trends in 2020, Council members and other delegations paid particular attention to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on children in conflict situations. Multiple delegations⁸⁸¹ stated that the pandemic had exacerbated the vulnerabilities of children to violations. In that regard, they highlighted the resulting lack of access to health and social services, increasing socioeconomic challenges, school closures and overall restrictions on the right to education. Among possible repercussions, some delegations⁸⁸² noted that school closures increased the potential for child labour, with others⁸⁸³ citing recruitment by armed groups. A number of delegations⁸⁸⁴ added that school closures had a particular impact on girls, who suffered sexual and gender-based violence and early and forced marriage, among other violations. Some⁸⁸⁵ also highlighted the disruption to the education of girls caused by the closing of schools and the obstacles preventing its resumption after the schools had reopened. Delegations⁸⁸⁶ called for gender-sensitive rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in which the interests of children were taken into account. Furthermore, many delegations⁸⁸⁷ noted the need to include and strengthen

child protection in the mandates of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. Delegations widely called for accountability against the perpetrators of violations, with some⁸⁸⁸ also highlighting the importance of independence, objectivity and transparency in the monitoring and reporting mechanism on violations against children.

On 29 October, the Council held a meeting⁸⁸⁹ at which it unanimously adopted resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#). By the resolution, the Council called on all parties to conflict to safeguard, protect, respect and promote the right to education and reaffirmed its contribution to the achievement of peace and security.⁸⁹⁰ The Council also urged Member States to develop effective measures to prevent and address attacks and threats of attacks against schools and education facilities.⁸⁹¹ While condemning the military use of schools in contravention of international law, and recognizing that use by armed forces and armed groups could render schools legitimate targets of attack, thus endangering children's and teachers' safety, the Council urged all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian character of schools and educational facilities in accordance with international humanitarian law, encouraged Member States to take concrete measures to mitigate and avoid the use of schools by armed forces and to facilitate the continuation of education in situations of armed conflict, and called upon United Nations country-level task forces to enhance monitoring and reporting on the military use of schools.⁸⁹² Noting that girls might be the intended victims of attack on education, the Council urged Member States to take steps to address the equal enjoyment by girls of their right to education.⁸⁹³ The Council emphasized the need for Member States to facilitate the continuation of education during armed conflict, including, when feasible, through distance learning and digital technology.⁸⁹⁴ Acknowledging the adverse short-, medium- and long-term negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the present and future of access to education in armed conflict for all children, it requested that measures, such as equitable global access to quality, safe, efficacious and affordable diagnostics,

⁸⁸¹ Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Mexico, Russian Federation, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Georgia, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates.

⁸⁸² Niger, France, Bulgaria and European Union.

⁸⁸³ Niger, Norway, India, France, Tunisia, Armenia, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, European Union, Guatemala, Lebanon, Malta, Poland, Qatar, San Marino and South Africa.

⁸⁸⁴ United States, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, France, Tunisia, Algeria, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Myanmar and Qatar.

⁸⁸⁵ Niger, United States, France, Mexico, Italy and Malta.

⁸⁸⁶ Niger, Kenya, Afghanistan, Argentina, Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, El Salvador, Germany, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Nepal, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Somalia and United Arab Emirates.

⁸⁸⁷ Ireland, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, Viet Nam, Mexico, Algeria, Argentina, Austria,

Belgium, Canada, Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, Chile, European Union, Fiji, Germany, Guatemala, Malta, Poland, Republic of Korea, Somalia and Turkey.

⁸⁸⁸ Norway, India, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, Chile, Dominican Republic, European Union, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia.

⁸⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8889](#).

⁸⁹⁰ Resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

⁸⁹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

⁸⁹² *Ibid.*, para. 6 (a)–(c).

⁸⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

⁸⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

therapeutics, medicines and vaccines, and essential health technologies and their components, as well as equipment for the COVID-19 response, were duly accounted for in facilitating access to education in armed conflict.⁸⁹⁵ Following the vote, the representatives of Norway and the Niger, as co-penholders, emphasized that the resolution was the first one uniquely dedicated to the protection of education in armed conflict.⁸⁹⁶ The representative of the Niger added that it was aimed at making a substantial contribution to the international normative framework, with appropriate, contextual and sustained responses at its heart. He further added that the resolution established an unequivocal link between the protection of education and international peace and security, with a strong call for a remobilization for the protection of education and to facilitate the continuation of learning in conflict contexts. The representative of India said that his delegation understood and recognized that the resolution made reference only to facilitating the continuation and protection of education in situations of armed conflict. The resolution, he said, should not be interpreted as being applicable to non-armed conflict situations. Such a narrative, he added, would be detrimental to the working of other organs of the United Nations.

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid., para. 26.

⁸⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8889](#).

In 2021, the Council addressed the children and armed conflict agenda in several of its country- and region-specific decisions and in decisions relating to thematic items. Selected provisions of decisions in which the Council explicitly referenced actions or measures concerning the agenda during 2021 are listed in table 3. In 2021, the Council, inter alia: (a) condemned and demanded the cessation of violations and abuses against children, including attacks on schools and the deprivation of access to education, and called for accountability and compliance with international instruments; (b) called for the implementation of action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict, with new emphasis on preventing and responding to sexual violence against children; (c) underscored the importance of taking into account child protection concerns in the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration processes and security sector reform; (d) requested monitoring, analysis and reporting on violations and abuses against children; (e) mandated United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions with child protection tasks; and (f) imposed or called for the imposition of measures against perpetrators of violations against children. In addition, in 2021 and further to the adoption of resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#), the Council included in its decisions provisions calling for the protection, respect and promotion of the right to education in armed conflict.

Table 1
Meeting: children and armed conflict

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8889 29 October 2021		Draft resolution submitted by 99 Member States ^a (S/2021/893)	88 Member States ^b		Three Council members (India, Niger, Norway)	Resolution 2601 (2021) 15-0-0

^a Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zambia.

^b Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Uruguay and Zambia.

Table 2

Videoconference: children and armed conflict

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
28 June 2021	S/2021/617	Letter dated 30 June 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Table 3

Selection of provisions relevant to children and armed conflict, by theme and item

	<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Condemnation and demands for the cessation of violations and abuses against children and calls for accountability and compliance with international instruments			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	25–26, 54
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	6, 11–13, 19, 54 (b)
	The situation in the Great Lakes region	S/PRST/2021/19	seventh, twelfth
	The situation in Libya	S/PRST/2021/12	fourteenth
		S/PRST/2021/24	twelfth
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	7, 15, 52–54
	The situation in Myanmar	S/PRST/2021/5	second
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021)	17, 36
		Resolution 2592 (2021)	11 (a)–(b), 14 (c)
		Resolution 2608 (2021)	20
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	10, 14
		Resolution 2609 (2021)	28
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3	fifth, twelfth
		S/PRST/2021/16	fourth
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	1–4, 6–12
	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Resolution 2615 (2021)	3
Action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	26
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	11, 29 (ii) (k)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	54

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

	<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021)	36
		Resolution 2592 (2021)	11 (b)–(c)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	14, 18 (j)
		Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (iii) (d)
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	4–5, 18
Child protection in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2021/10	eleventh
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	11, 34 (a) (v), 35 (e) (i), 46
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	19, 29 (ii) (g) and (i), 31
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2576 (2021)	4 (f)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	30 (a) (iii), 54
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2592 (2021)	11 (a) (iii) and (b)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (ii) (b)
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	13
	Cooperation between United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/PRST/2021/21	eleventh
Monitoring, analysis and reporting on violations and abuses against children			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	35 (a) (ii)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	30 (d) (ii)
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2592 (2021)	6 (i)
		Resolution 2607 (2021)	36
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	3 (d) (ii)
		Resolution 2577 (2021)	20
		Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (iii) (d)
		Resolution 2609 (2021)	29
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	6 (c), 19
Child protection mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions^a			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	34 (a) (iv), 35 (a) (ii) and (e) (i), 42, 46
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	29 (i) (c), (ii) (g), (i) and (k), 31, 42
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2576 (2021)	4 (f)

	<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	30 (a) (iii), (c) (iii) and (d) (ii), 47
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2592 (2021)	6 (i)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	3 (a) (i) and (v), 18 (j)
		Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (ii) (b) and (iii) (d)
		Resolution 2609 (2021)	30 (m)
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	22
Measures against the perpetrators of violations and abuses against children			
Country- and region-specific	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	13
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2564 (2021)	8
Calls for the protection, respect and promotion of the right to education in armed conflict			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	34 (a) (v), 46, 54
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3	ninth, twelfth
		S/PRST/2021/16	fourth, twelfth
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	3–10, 13–14, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27

^a For additional information on mandates and decisions relevant to peacekeeping and political missions, see part X.

25. Protection of civilians in armed conflict

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting and adopted one resolution in connection with the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The meeting took the form of a briefing.⁸⁹⁷ Council members also held two open videoconferences on the item.⁸⁹⁸ More information on the meeting, including on the participants and speakers, and on the videoconferences is given respectively in tables 1 and 2 below.

On 27 April, at the initiative of Viet Nam, which held the presidency for the month,⁸⁹⁹ the members of the Council held a high-level open videoconference focused on the topic of the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian

population.⁹⁰⁰ At the videoconference, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Chair of the Board of Directors of the International Peace Institute.

In their statements, the briefers reported that infrastructure and services that were essential to the survival of civilians, such as medical facilities, water infrastructure and energy systems, continued to be targeted by parties to armed conflict, including non-State armed groups, with effects that were compounded by climate change and environmental degradation and by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator expressed deep concern about the ability to protect decades of hard-won progress that had been achieved on compliance with international humanitarian law to

⁸⁹⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

⁸⁹⁸ For more information on the procedure and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁸⁹⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 6 April ([S/2021/335](#)).

⁹⁰⁰ See [S/2021/415](#).

protect civilians and the objects they relied on to survive, owing to the disrespect or undermining of international humanitarian law by both States and non-State armed groups. He expressed concern over, *inter alia*, the direct impact of conflict on food security, including the destruction of stocks and agricultural assets, and warned of the looming risk of famine in north-east Nigeria, South Sudan, Yemen and elsewhere unless urgent action was taken. He also referred to the impact that conflict had had on sanitation and health, resulting in damage to water infrastructure, and the impact of attacks against medical care in Libya, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen. Condemning the use of rape and sexual violence in pursuit of military goals and the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as well as cyberattacks and the threat they posed to essential infrastructure, the Under-Secretary-General listed three ways to strengthen the protection of civilians and objects indispensable to their survival: enhanced compliance with international humanitarian law, ensuring accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and preventing the use of explosive weapons.

In his statement, the President of ICRC warned that, without urgent action to protect essential services in conflict zones, there would be a humanitarian disaster on a vast scale. The President said that the Committee was working to prevent critical infrastructure that was “too big to fail” from collapsing, which would plunge millions into crisis. In that connection, he called on the Council to take action on five specific areas, namely, ensuring that all parties made efforts to better respect international humanitarian law, adopting an “avoidance policy” regarding the use of heavy explosive weapons in populated areas, ensuring that sanctions and counter-terrorism measures complied with international humanitarian law, adopting measures to ensure that health care and interconnected services, such as water, sanitation and electricity, were protected to safeguard against public health risks, and adopting measures to minimize the impact of military operations on the environment and dependent civilians.

In a similar vein, the Chair of the Board of Directors of the International Peace Institute deplored the fact that both deliberate and inadvertent attacks against vital human infrastructure and the natural environment remained a daily reality and underscored that it was important for the Council to remain seized of the matter. He focused on the long-term impact of armed conflict on development and peace and provided recommendations for the United Nations on such issues as prevention and the protection of critical

infrastructure, including through the Secretary-General’s good offices, as well as peacekeeping operations and country teams. He also noted that the Secretariat, at the request of the Council, could consider systematically monitoring attacks against all types of essential infrastructure and that the United Nations should continue to work with international, regional and national partners to coordinate a holistic approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction. He cautioned, however, that the United Nations could not successfully promote the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population or support reconstruction without the political will and efforts of its Member States. In that connection, he called on Council members to take the lead in respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law, including by upholding their obligation to protect objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.

During the discussion that ensued, delegations welcomed the initiative of Viet Nam to convene the open debate and prepare a resolution on the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam opened the discussion noting that, while the protection of civilians had been at the forefront of the work of the Council, more often than not, the Council’s discussions had been focused on protecting the people, with little attention paid to securing the means for their survival. He affirmed that the open debate was therefore a good opportunity for the Council to deliberate on the issue at a thematic level and that it was critical that the Council develop a comprehensive strategy to effectively protect infrastructure and objects that were critical for the survival of civilians in armed conflict, based on compliance with international humanitarian law and cooperation. In that regard, he stated that the Council should encourage and facilitate closer coordination among Member States, international organizations and humanitarian and development partners in post-conflict peacebuilding, especially in efforts to rebuild basic infrastructure and restore essential services to civilians. Delegations framed their remarks around the need for compliance with international humanitarian law and the need to hold perpetrators accountable as the increasingly complex dynamics of contemporary conflicts and threats continued to evolve. In that connection, several delegations⁹⁰¹ noted that the main challenge was not

⁹⁰¹ Estonia, Ireland, India, Mexico, Armenia, Brazil, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict) and Turkey.

the lack of existing international norms for protecting civilians in armed conflict, but the lack of implementation of and respect for such norms. More specifically, Member States⁹⁰² recalled a number of previously adopted Council resolutions on the protection of essential objects for the civilian population, including resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#), in which the Council recognized the link between hunger and conflict and condemned the use of the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. In that context, some delegations⁹⁰³ welcomed the recent amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court concerning the war crime of starvation, including in non-international armed conflict, and encouraged States parties to ratify it. Expressing great concern regarding the widespread and deliberate attacks on medical facilities, humanitarian workers and schools in various conflict areas around the world, a number of delegations⁹⁰⁴ also condemned the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, with some⁹⁰⁵ expressing support for the Irish-led initiative to adopt a political declaration to strengthen the protection of civilians from the impact of explosive weapons in urban areas. In that light, Member States also expressed their grave concern about the widespread and deliberate destruction or damage caused to schools and education infrastructure, with a number of delegations⁹⁰⁶ endorsing initiatives such as the Safe Schools Declaration of 2015 and calling on other Members to do the same.

Furthermore, several Member States⁹⁰⁷ drew attention to the increasing number of cyberattacks directed at essential infrastructure, with particular impact on health-care, electrical and water systems and causing significant damage, given the unprecedented challenges and vulnerabilities that had emerged since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In that regard,

the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia stated that, with the increasing urbanization of armed conflicts, climate change and the environmental consequences of armed conflict, new technologies could help to find ways to improve humanitarian assistance, and cybersecurity needed to be part of both conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Some Member States⁹⁰⁸ underscored the importance of making effective use of monitoring and reporting mechanisms to inform decision-making processes so as to allow for early and quick responses to any threats. While some Member States⁹⁰⁹ called on the Council to continue designating perpetrators for targeted sanctions, others⁹¹⁰ pointed to the harmful effects of unilateral sanctions and ill-designed counter-terrorism measures. In addition, a number of Member States⁹¹¹ stressed that the effective protection of civilians by peacekeeping missions required well-defined, realistic and achievable mandates and adequate resources.

At the end of the videoconference, the President of the Council announced the unanimous adoption of resolution [2573 \(2021\)](#).⁹¹² By the resolution, the Council strongly condemned attacks in situations of armed conflicts directed against civilians or civilian objects, as well as indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, resulting in the deprivation of the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival, and demanded that all parties to armed conflict immediately put an end to such practices.⁹¹³ The Council also demanded that all parties fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, including by distinguishing between civilians and combatants and military objects, taking due care to spare the civilian population and civilian objects, refraining from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to their survival and respecting and protecting humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations.⁹¹⁴ The Council also strongly condemned the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare in a number of armed conflict situations, which was prohibited by international law

⁹⁰² Ireland, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic countries) and Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict).

⁹⁰³ Norway, Austria, European Union, Liechtenstein, Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic countries) and Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict).

⁹⁰⁴ Ireland, Norway, Armenia, Austria, Costa Rica, Ecuador, European Union, Italy and Malta.

⁹⁰⁵ Ireland, Norway, Austria, Costa Rica, Italy and Malta.

⁹⁰⁶ Norway, Mexico, European Union, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

⁹⁰⁷ Estonia, Ireland, Norway, China, India, Belgium, Ecuador, El Salvador, Liechtenstein, Malta and Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic countries).

⁹⁰⁸ France, United Kingdom, Belgium, Costa Rica, El Salvador, European Union, Portugal, South Africa and Spain.

⁹⁰⁹ France, Kenya, United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Belgium and South Africa.

⁹¹⁰ Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Islamic Republic of Iran.

⁹¹¹ India, Kenya, Belgium, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, Portugal and South Africa.

⁹¹² See [S/2021/407](#) and [S/2021/410](#).

⁹¹³ Resolution [2573 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 3.

and might constitute a war crime.⁹¹⁵ The Council urged all parties to armed conflict to protect civilian infrastructure and reiterated its demand that they engage immediately in a durable humanitarian pause to facilitate the safe, unhindered and sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the equitable, safe and unhindered delivery and distribution of COVID-19 vaccination in areas of armed conflict.⁹¹⁶ It also encouraged all efforts to protect objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure that was critical to enabling the delivery of essential services in armed conflict, including by protecting civilians operating, maintaining or repairing those objects and allowing and facilitating the safe passage of equipment, transport and supplies necessary for the repair, maintenance or operation of such objects.⁹¹⁷ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to include a sub-item on the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population in his reports on the protection of civilians.⁹¹⁸

On 25 May, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency for the month,⁹¹⁹ the members of the Council held its annual debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in an open videoconference.⁹²⁰ At the videoconference, members of the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the President of ICRC and the Director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. The briefers focused their remarks on how vulnerable populations around the world continued to bear the brunt of armed conflicts owing to the lack of implementation of Council resolutions and international humanitarian law, a situation which had been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator gave a briefing on the most recent annual report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.⁹²¹ He pointed out that, despite the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire in 2020 so that the world could focus on ending the pandemic, deadly conflicts had continued in many places and new ones had emerged in others, frustrating the efforts to

control the spread of the virus and to care for the infected.⁹²² Referring to the plight of civilians in the various conflict situations around the world, the Under-Secretary-General focused his remarks on the five areas highlighted in the report, namely: the interplay between conflict and hunger and how the threat of famine had re-emerged in several areas in the previous year; the effects of using explosive weapons in populated areas and the devastating toll they inflicted on essential civilian infrastructure; the impact of conflicts on the environment, in particular in relation to water; the protection of medical care and the calls by the Secretary-General on States and armed forces to expand on the recommendations made in resolution [2286 \(2016\)](#); and ensuring that the behaviour of belligerents complied with international humanitarian law. The Under-Secretary-General also emphasized the crucial importance of accountability. He added that, as the laws and tools to protect civilians from harm in armed conflicts were already in place, it was time that all States and parties to conflict applied them.

The President of ICRC stated that global fragility was deepening owing to the converging challenges of armed conflict, the pandemic, economic downturn, rising inequality and climate change. He added that, as a result of the fragmentation and proliferation of actors, the privatization of warfare, the widespread availability of weapons and urban violence, violence within and between States and non-State armed groups was becoming even more complex. Highlighting the Committee's recent report on the systemic impacts of COVID-19 on communities shouldering the double burden of war and disease, the President stated that he would focus his briefing on the serious and compounding protection challenges that were emerging. In that regard, he said that the pandemic had intensified existing protection needs and created new concerns. He pointed out that, while the need for robust health-care systems had perhaps never been greater, health care was paradoxically under attack. Five years since the Council had adopted resolution [2286 \(2016\)](#) and called for an end to impunity for attacks on health care, ICRC had observed that, in 40 countries affected by conflict, attacks on health care had gone unabated and health-care delivery continued to be impeded owing to a disregard for international humanitarian law. He affirmed that not enough was being done to protect health-care workers and medical facilities to translate resolution [2286 \(2016\)](#) into action and that a fundamental change of behaviour of belligerents in conflicts was needed, as well as better protection for civilians and more substantive and broader support for

⁹¹⁵ Ibid., para. 4.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid., paras. 6 and 7.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid., para. 9.

⁹¹⁸ Ibid., para. 12.

⁹¹⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 14 May ([S/2021/468](#)).

⁹²⁰ See [S/2021/505](#).

⁹²¹ [S/2021/423](#).

⁹²² See [S/2021/505](#).

humanitarian action. The President called on parties to conflict to respect international law and protect civilians and allow for rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access to populations in need. He asked States to prioritize the full implementation of resolution 2286 (2016) by taking concrete steps to protect health care. He also called on Council members to act more decisively to improve their own action and leverage their special relationship with allies, partners and proxies to respect international humanitarian law. Finally, he called on States to invest in local responses and prioritize community engagement and trust-building before, during and after crises and to strengthen health, water and sanitation services and protect them at all times in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law.

Addressing the Council from a civil society perspective, the Director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit noted that the role of the media and women-led organizations had become more salient in Afghan civil society over the past two decades. She described the continued attacks on civilians and the humanitarian plight in Afghanistan and called on the Council to bring that to the direct attention of all parties to the conflict and ask for practical mechanisms to be put in place to stop the targeting of civilians during fighting. She also called on the Council to support an internationally mandated independent investigation of atrocities against civilians in Afghanistan. She added that international support for the national security forces needed to include key war-related conventions and humanitarian principles in order to maximize the protection of civilians during the military operations and to set up a mechanism that could hold violators accountable. She further stated that, while the only solution to ending the current cycle of violence and armed conflict was through peace talks, the current peace process was “in dire need of urgent boosting”. In that connection, she added that Council members had huge leverage to put stronger pressure on the Taliban and the rest of the political elites in Afghanistan to come to an agreement on a political settlement, with an immediate ceasefire as a first step.

In the ensuing discussion, Member States stressed the need for all parties to conflict to implement relevant Council resolutions and comply with international humanitarian law to protect civilians and civilian objects and to hold perpetrators accountable for grave violations, including for attacks on health

care. In that connection, a number of delegations⁹²³ expressed regret that, five years after the adoption of resolution 2286 (2016), attacks on medical facilities and personnel continued unabated. Participants⁹²⁴ further noted that the pandemic had exacerbated inequalities and harm to civilians in conflict, in particular to the most vulnerable populations, including women, children, displaced persons and disabled persons. Against that backdrop, Member States⁹²⁵ urged parties to conflict to adhere to the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire, which was reflected in resolutions 2532 (2020) and 2565 (2021), in order to address the COVID-19 pandemic and provide the necessary humanitarian assistance to civilians in need. Several delegations⁹²⁶ highlighted the role of United Nations peacekeeping missions in the protection of civilian populations, underscoring the importance of providing sufficient resources that were consistent with the mandate and the situation on the ground. At the same time, some Member States⁹²⁷ underscored the fact that the primary responsibility to protect civilians lay with national Governments.

On 16 July, at the initiative of France, which held the presidency for the month,⁹²⁸ the Council held a ministerial-level meeting on the issue of preserving

⁹²³ China, Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, European Union, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Poland, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain (also on behalf of Egypt, Japan, New Zealand and Uruguay, its co-penholders on resolution 2286 (2016)) and Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict).

⁹²⁴ France, Mexico, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, El Salvador, European Union, Georgia, Italy, Malta, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict), Turkey and Ukraine.

⁹²⁵ China, Estonia, France, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), Viet Nam, Algeria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, European Union, Indonesia, Italy, Malta, Qatar, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain (also on behalf of Egypt, Japan, New Zealand and Uruguay, its co-penholders on resolution 2286 (2016)) and Turkey.

⁹²⁶ France, India, Norway, United States, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, European Union, Fiji, Nepal, Republic of Korea, South Africa and Switzerland (on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict).

⁹²⁷ India, Norway, Viet Nam, Bangladesh, Fiji, Latvia, Portugal and South Africa.

⁹²⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 July (S/2021/618).

humanitarian space.⁹²⁹ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Director-General of ICRC and the Delegate Director for Advocacy of Action against Hunger.

The Deputy Secretary-General stated that the scale of humanitarian needs had never been greater and that the humanitarian crisis was compounded by a relentless wave of attacks on humanitarian and medical workers and the imposition of ever-narrower constraints on the humanitarian space. In that connection, she reiterated the Secretary-General's calls for the Council to take strong, immediate action to support its resolutions designed to protect civilians and the humanitarian space. Drawing on examples of security incidents affecting humanitarian organizations in numerous conflicts around the world, she said that such incidents had increased tenfold since 2001, adding that, in the five years since the Council's landmark resolution [2286 \(2016\)](#), health-care workers and patients had suffered thousands of attacks. She noted that it was becoming increasingly difficult to provide desperately needed humanitarian aid to people in need, highlighting examples of the crises in the Tigray region and Afghanistan and Yemen. While noting that humanitarian assistance had never reached so many people so quickly as a result of the efforts of the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations, she added that measures were needed to protect humanitarian actors since humanitarian needs were outpacing the capacity to meet them. The Deputy Secretary-General stressed that the Council must do everything in its power to end attacks on humanitarian personnel and assets, to ensure and promote respect for international humanitarian law and to seek accountability for serious violations in line with the numerous resolutions on the protection of civilians, medical care and humanitarian and United Nations personnel. In that regard, she outlined four main areas for action. First, the practical tools within and outside the Council to foster greater respect for international humanitarian law should be used systematically. Second, investigation and accountability were essential to preventing attacks on aid workers. Third, all Governments must protect the ability of humanitarian organizations to engage with all parties to a conflict, including non-State armed groups. Fourth, counter-terrorism measures should include clear provisions to preserve humanitarian space and ensure that humanitarian workers were not punished for doing their jobs. Fifth, the Deputy Secretary-General called on the Council to use its influence to ensure that attacks against schools and hospitals ceased

immediately, adding that Member States should review and revise their military policies and practices to ensure the protection of such facilities.

The Director-General of ICRC affirmed that the humanitarian space, or spaces, must be protected without exception. In that regard, he highlighted three of the most pressing concerns, namely, the politicization and manipulation of humanitarian aid, States resorting to armed escorts and the growing negative impact of sanctions and counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian aid. In terms of how those concerns could be resolved, the Director-General asked States, including Council members to: (a) ensure that humanitarian organizations were able to maintain close physical proximity to affected populations and sustained engagement with parties to conflict; (b) ensure that the key tenets of international humanitarian law were respected and implemented; and (c) consider and mitigate the humanitarian impact of counter-terrorism measures by putting in place well-crafted standing humanitarian exemptions.

The Delegate Director for Advocacy of Action against Hunger affirmed that the current humanitarian needs were unprecedented and that the confluence of the effects of conflicts, environmental and climate crises, social inequalities and the COVID-19 pandemic were disproportionately affecting those most in need, leading to a veritable hunger pandemic. Humanitarian organizations were facing an unprecedented decrease in humanitarian space owing to the widespread disdain for international humanitarian law by all, in particular warring parties, and the blatant instrumentalization of aid, which was increasingly threatening humanitarian work. She noted that the Council had so far been unable to prevent or reverse the narrowing of humanitarian space and that its failure to act was putting in jeopardy the lives of vulnerable people and the humanitarian workers helping them. She added that, although certain conflicts had been on the Council's agenda for years, only sparse concrete action had been taken, effectively imperilling humanitarian space. In that connection, firm, rapid and unambiguous condemnations were required, followed by ambitious measures when respect for humanitarian space was flouted. While welcoming the historic progress represented by the adoption of landmark Council resolutions, including resolution [2573 \(2021\)](#), she cautioned that those resolutions seemed to remain without effect, as they were disregarded by States and parties to conflict, who were convinced that the Council would not follow up on their implementation. That inconsistency endangered human lives and the humanitarian work and undermined the credibility of the Council. She pointed out that the

⁹²⁹ See [S/PV.8822](#).

Council continued to adopt resolutions while failing to take into account the potentially harmful and extremely serious consequences that they might have for humanitarian activities and for humanitarian and medical personnel, in particular certain counter-terrorism measures and sanctions regimes. She added that such a lack of consistency encouraged States and parties to conflict to ignore their obligations concerning humanitarian space. In conflict areas, State and non-State armed actors prevented access and instrumentalized or criminalized humanitarian assistance, preventing dialogue with parties to the conflict and gradually eroding humanitarian neutrality and space. Moreover, she said that the requirement by some donors that beneficiaries of humanitarian aid undergo screening was a red line, as it compromised the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide impartial aid. Drawing attention to instances of attacks on humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, the Niger, Sri Lanka and the Tigray region, the Delegate Director called on the Council to take action and put an end to that deadly spiral. She also called on Council members to reaffirm their unequivocal support for aid based on humanitarian principles, while ensuring that their decisions did not block the humanitarian space. She also reiterated her call on the Council to adopt a systematic humanitarian exemption, thereby excluding impartial humanitarian work from the scope of sanctions and counter-terrorism measures. Furthermore, she urged the Council to collectively and systematically condemn crimes against civilians and medical and humanitarian workers, adding that combating impunity for perpetrators must be a genuine priority for the Council. In that regard, she said that the Council must systematically demand and support national and international inquiries to ensure that such crimes did not go unpunished. In closing, she welcomed the Secretary-General's announcement of the appointment of a special adviser for the protection and strengthening of humanitarian space.

During the discussion that ensued, Council members expressed concern over increasing attacks on humanitarian workers, underscoring the need to ensure accountability for the perpetrators of such crimes in order to end the cycle of impunity that persisted in conflicts around the world. Several members⁹³⁰ also pointed to the negative impact of sanctions and counter-terrorism measures on the delivery of humanitarian aid and stressed that such policies must not hinder humanitarian workers from performing their duties or

interfere with their operations. In that connection, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico stressed that it was essential to understand in greater detail the scope of sanctions, especially in terms of unintended consequences. In the same vein, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said that there was greater need for more systematic monitoring and reporting on the impact of sanctions regimes on humanitarian actions. In that regard, she suggested that efforts to systematize reporting could be undertaken by the Secretariat and that humanitarian impact and risk assessments should precede the establishment and renewal of all sanctions regimes. A number of speakers⁹³¹ were of the view, however, that applicable Council sanctions could target those responsible for crimes against humanitarian and medical personnel, therefore serving as deterrents. In that regard, some Council members⁹³² recognized the progress achieved through resolution 2582 (2021), on the sanctions regime concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some representatives⁹³³ advocated for the lifting of unilateral sanctions altogether. A number of speakers cautioned against the politicization of humanitarian operations,⁹³⁴ and stressed the primary responsibility of States in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers.⁹³⁵ Furthermore, some members⁹³⁶ called for referring cases to the International Criminal Court when States were unwilling or unable to prosecute perpetrators. A few speakers⁹³⁷ also expressed support for the humanitarian call to action, which was aimed at strengthening accountability for those who would attack medical and humanitarian workers in the course of their work.

Throughout 2021, the Council continued the practice of hearing briefings by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict under country- and region-specific items.⁹³⁸ The Council also included

⁹³¹ France, Mexico, India, United Kingdom, Estonia, Ireland and Norway.

⁹³² France, Mexico and Norway. For more information on developments with regard to the sanctions measures concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part VII, sect. III.

⁹³³ China and Russian Federation.

⁹³⁴ Mexico, India, Niger, China and Norway.

⁹³⁵ Mexico, India, Viet Nam and China.

⁹³⁶ France, Mexico, Estonia and Norway.

⁹³⁷ France, Mexico and Ireland.

⁹³⁸ In 2021, the Council heard briefings by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 28 times at either public meetings or open videoconferences and 17 times at either private meetings or informal consultations, for a total of 45 briefings. For more information on briefings on those items prior to 2021, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part I, sect. 26.

⁹³⁰ Mexico, Kenya, United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Niger, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Norway.

protection-related provisions in most of its decisions in relation to both country- or region-specific and thematic items during 2021. The Council focused on multiple aspects and used a variety of language formulas to address the protection of civilians in its decisions. Selected provisions of those decisions are listed in table 3 below. In particular, the Council: (a) condemned all forms of attacks and abuses committed against civilians and objects indispensable to their survival, in particular against women and children and humanitarian and medical workers, including attacks against schools and education facilities;⁹³⁹ hospitals and medical facilities; (b) demanded that all parties to armed conflict ensure unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need and ensure the safety of humanitarian and medical personnel; (c) called upon all relevant parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law and called for accountability measures against perpetrators of such

crimes; (d) emphasized the primary responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations to protect civilians; (e) requested additional monitoring mechanisms and reporting arrangements in order to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict; and (f) adopted or expressed its intention to adopt targeted measures, such as sanctions, against perpetrators. In addition, the Council's practice of strengthening the mandates of United Nations peace operations with a view to protecting civilians continued to evolve. During the reporting period, the Council continued to request several missions to make the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence a specific priority and benchmark of their mandates, with particular attention on, but not limited to, women, children and internally displaced persons, including by creating a secure environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and by strengthening local community engagement and empowerment, early warning and information-sharing mechanisms.⁹⁴⁰

⁹³⁹ For more information on the decisions of the Council concerning children and armed conflict and specifically the protection of schools and education facilities, see sect. 24 above.

⁹⁴⁰ For more information on the mandates of peacekeeping and special political missions, see part X.

Table 1
Meeting: protection of civilians in armed conflict

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8822 16 July 2021	Preserving humanitarian space Letter dated 1 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/618)			Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Delegate Director for Advocacy of Action against Hunger	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, ^a all invitees	

^a France (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; India was represented by its Foreign Secretary; Kenya was represented by its Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Mexico was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Tunisia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative of the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet.

Table 2
Videoconferences: protection of civilians in armed conflict

Videoconference date	Videoconference record	Title	Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure
27 April 2021	S/2021/415	Letter dated 29 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2573 (2021) 15-0-0 S/2021/407

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
25 May 2021	S/2021/505	Letter dated 27 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Table 3

Selection of provisions relevant to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, by theme and item

	<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Condemnation and demands for the cessation of attacks and acts of violence against civilians and civilian infrastructure and humanitarian and medical personnel			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2593 (2021)	1
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	3–4, 25–26, 54
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	9, 12
	The situation in the Great Lakes region	S/PRST/2021/19	seventh
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021)	38
		Resolution 2592 (2021)	12
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2609 (2021)	28
		Resolution 2567 (2021)	9
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3	twelfth
		S/PRST/2021/16	fourth
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	1–2, 8
	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2573 (2021)	1, 4–5
Demands on parties to allow humanitarian access and ensure the safety of humanitarian and medical personnel and facilities			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2593 (2021)	3
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	52–53
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	35
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	51
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	10
		Resolution 2609 (2021)	25
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/16	twelfth
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	25
	Maintenance of international peace and security	Resolution 2565 (2021)	3–4
	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2573 (2021)	7

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Resolution 2615 (2021)	3
Calls for compliance with and accountability under applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law and relevant Council resolutions by all parties		
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021) 14, 22
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021) 6, 11–12, 19, 34
	The situation in Libya	Resolution 2570 (2021) 11
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021) 15, 36, 50
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2592 (2021) 10
		Resolution 2568 (2021) 31, 35–36
		Resolution 2607 (2021) 16
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 8–9, 15
Thematic	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2573 (2021) 2–3
Affirmation of the primary responsibility of States and parties to conflict to protect civilians		
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2566 (2021) 2
		Resolution 2605 (2021) 34 (a) (i), 35 (f) (vii)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021) 14, 30 (c) (i)
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021) 5
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 18 (d)
Thematic	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Resolution 2594 (2021) 5
	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021) 5
Requests for specific monitoring and analysis of and reporting on protection of civilians		
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021) 35 (a) (i)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021) 29 (ii) (e), 42
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021) 30 (d) (ii)
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2585 (2021) 5
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021) 17–18, 39 (iv)
		Resolution 2607 (2021) 43
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 3 (d)
		Resolution 2577 (2021) 22
		Resolution 2609 (2021) 30 (a), 34

	<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	19
	Maintenance of international peace and security	Resolution 2565 (2021)	7
	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2573 (2021)	12
	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Resolution 2594 (2021)	4
Imposition of targeted measures against perpetrators of violations against civilians in armed conflict			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2588 (2021)	5
		Resolution 2605 (2021)	5, 22
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2582 (2021)	3
		Resolution 2612 (2021)	5
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2590 (2021)	2
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	16
		Resolution 2577 (2021)	12
Inclusion of mission-specific protection mandates and benchmarks^a			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	34 (a) (i)–(iv) and (c)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	29 (i), 31, 36, 43
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	30 (b) (i) and (iii), (c) (ii)–(iii) and (d) (i)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	3 (a) and (b) (i)
		Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (iii) and (iv) (b)
		Resolution 2609 (2021)	14, 30 (j)
Thematic	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	23

^a For additional information on mandates and decisions relevant to peacekeeping and political missions, see part X.

26. Small arms

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings in connection with the item entitled “Small arms”. The first meeting took the form of a briefing, while the second was held as a high-level open debate.⁹⁴¹ More information on the meetings, including on the participants and speakers, is given in the table below.⁹⁴²

On 6 October, the Council held a meeting under the item in connection with the biennial report of the

Secretary-General.⁹⁴³ At the meeting,⁹⁴⁴ the Council heard briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Executive Secretary of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States and a Senior Researcher at Small Arms Survey. In her briefing, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs focused on the need to address the threats

⁹⁴¹ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

⁹⁴² See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 15.

⁹⁴³ [S/2021/839](#). For more information on the biennial report of the Secretary-General, which was requested by the Council in its presidential statement adopted on 29 June 2007 ([S/PRST/2007/24](#)), see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007*, chap. VIII, sect. 40.

⁹⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8874](#).

posed by illicit flows of small arms and light weapons in the context of peace operations. In that regard, she stated that the misuse, illicit transfer and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition remained a defining factor in undermining peace and security at the national, regional and global levels and had deeply aggravated situations for vulnerable populations already suffering from conflict. She commended the Council's increasing consideration of the issue of small arms in its work, including the inclusion of arms-related provisions in recent peace operation mandates, as well as the growing number of resolutions in which weapons and ammunition management and control measures for small arms and light weapons were taken into account. She also noted the Council's efforts to support States in the strengthening of national security services through adjustments to relevant arms embargoes and the employment of weapons and ammunition management as part of the benchmark assessments of arms embargoes. In that regard, she encouraged the Council to fully integrate considerations of weapons and ammunition into its work on both country-specific and thematic discussions, including addressing the arms-crime-terrorism nexus as one interrelated and multifaceted security threat that required complementary approaches and responses. The High Representative said that another dimension to consider was the nexus between sustainable development and small arms, which was firmly anchored in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Thematic discussions on such issues as children and armed conflict and the women and peace and security agenda were also important opportunities to reflect on convergence with small arms-related issues as part of the Council's programme of work. In closing, she reiterated the need for mainstreaming small arms and light weapons considerations across the work of the Council and highlighted a recommendation from the Secretary-General's report, namely, that wherever a mission was mandated to provide support to the host State in the processing of recovered weapons and the treatment of ammunition recovered from the illicit sphere, the Council should consider the establishment or designation of a dedicated component, unit or cell within the mission to support the systematic collection, centralization and analysis of small arms-related data and ensure evidence-based policymaking and programming on the ground.⁹⁴⁵

The Executive Secretary of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States gave a brief history on the

Regional Centre and described the history and work of his organization in combating the proliferation of small arms.⁹⁴⁶ In addition to elaborating on the many drivers of the proliferation of illicit weapons in the African region, he addressed four guiding questions concerning: (a) trends in the illicit circulation, proliferation and misuse of small arms in the context of peace operations and the impact of those trends in shaping the mandates of the Council; (b) the specific measures that the Council could take to prevent weapons in the possession of peacekeepers from falling into the hands of illicit armed groups; (c) how United Nations peace operations could support enhanced weapons and ammunition management; and (d) which regional or global mechanisms could be developed or strengthened to shore up the control of small arms and light weapons in conflict-affected situations. He stressed that it was important to recognize that small arms proliferation was a development issue and that it was vital to package arms control interventions within wider development programming, as there was a nexus between sustainable development and security.

The Senior Researcher at Small Arms Survey affirmed that the unchecked proliferation of arms, ammunition and explosives posed one of the greatest challenges to peacekeeping. He then offered a summary of the trends in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition based on research. He first recounted that the availability of arms to non-State armed groups, criminals and terrorists in peacekeeping contexts was often a product of historical regional conflict. He then noted that, in States and regions where the illegal use of small arms and light weapons had reached chronic and destabilizing proportions, direct interventions and operations to reduce flows were important. Lastly, he said that missions could be clear about whose responsibility it was within a peacekeeping operation to identify and disrupt flows, which required a whole-of-mission effort, with clear benchmarks and reporting requirements. In his briefing, he also addressed some of the questions posed by the Council concerning, *inter alia*, preventing losses and the connections with security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and countering terrorism, weapons and ammunition management and existing tools and mechanisms, and regional or global mechanisms to strengthen arms control in conflict-related situations. He also suggested that new technology could amplify and simplify the collection, analysis and sharing of illicit arms- and ammunition-related data, empowering law enforcement and customs officials and providing a global picture of

⁹⁴⁵ S/2021/839, para. 84.

⁹⁴⁶ See S/PV.8874.

such flows. In closing, the Senior Researcher elaborated on nine key elements that could help peacekeeping operations to mitigate the dangers associated with the proliferation of arms, ammunition and explosives.

Following the briefings, most Council members welcomed the report of the Secretary-General and the recommendations contained therein. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed support for the fact that Kenya, which held the presidency for the month, was conducting the meeting on small arms and light weapons, not as a disarmament issue, but in the context of peacekeeping operations. In that regard, he expressed the belief that the biennial reports of the Secretary-General on small arms and light weapons should devote much more attention to peacekeeping. He said that his delegation saw no backdrop for the discussion of small arms and light weapons within the Council other than peacekeeping. He added that it could hardly be considered in the context of such abstract topics as sustainable development, gender or climate change. Discussions within that framework would not bring added value, especially not in the Council, since the priority forum for the discussion of issues relating to small arms and light weapons was the General Assembly. Many speakers⁹⁴⁷ emphasized that the proliferation of and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons posed a serious threat to international peace and security. In that regard, they addressed the risks relating to the transfer and trafficking of arms and weapons to terrorists and terrorist groups in the context of peacekeeping and the impact of small arms and light weapons in exacerbating conflicts. Many Council members also called for the promotion of a gender perspective when addressing issues related to small arms and light weapons. Some Council members⁹⁴⁸ brought attention to the disproportionate impact of the proliferation of small arms on women and children, as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General. In addition, speakers emphasized the need for the effective implementation of several crucial international mechanisms intended to combat the illicit trade, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and

Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The efforts of regional organizations, such as the Silencing the Guns by 2030 initiative of the African Union, in dealing with the challenges of illicit flows of small arms and light weapons was commended by many Council members. They further called for strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations. In that context, the representative of Ireland noted that regional road maps, such as those implemented by the Economic Community of West African States and in the Western Balkans, were also making important strides. Furthermore, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also pointed out that the Caribbean Community had accelerated the implementation of the Road Map for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030.

On 22 November, at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency for the month,⁹⁴⁹ the Council held a high-level open debate under the item.⁹⁵⁰ The Council heard briefings by the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and by a member of the Governance Board of Control Arms. In his briefing, the Director of UNIDIR stated that the diversion of and trafficking in arms, including small arms and light weapons and ammunition, was a defining factor in undermining peace and security. While noting that national ownership was fundamental to effectively tackling arms diversion and trafficking, he said that success would not be achieved without international cooperation and assistance. In that regard, he elaborated on the work of UNIDIR in developing and providing tools to strengthen national ownership of weapons and ammunition management throughout their entire life cycle. Noting that weapons and ammunition management was increasingly recognized as a fundamental component of conflict prevention and actions to tackle armed violence and was increasingly reflected in resolutions adopted by the Council on arms embargoes and peace operations, he explained that, based on research conducted by UNIDIR in support of

⁹⁴⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 22 October (S/2021/892).

⁹⁵⁰ See S/PV.8909 and S/PV.8909 (Resumption 1). See also S/2021/966. While briefers and Council members participated in person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁹⁴⁷ Viet Nam, Tunisia, France, India, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, Niger and Norway.

⁹⁴⁸ Mexico, Tunisia, India, United Kingdom, Ireland, Niger and Norway.

action 21 of the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, entitled "Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament", UNIDIR had found that peace operations often gathered and had access to critical information for supporting the implementation and enforcement of arms embargoes, but did not systematically integrate conventional arms control measures into their conflict prevention and management toolbox. He explained that UNIDIR was developing arms-related risk analysis tools that could help peace operations to better integrate conventional arms control measures into their conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding efforts. Advancing a United Nations strategic approach to weapons and ammunition management, he added, could further enhance multilateral efforts to deliver peace, security, stability and development around the world.

The member of the Control Arms Governance Board recalled that her organization, which comprised 150 civil society member organizations, was created to influence the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. She outlined the various instruments, agreements and mechanisms that were at the disposal of States to detect, combat and prevent illicit trafficking in and the diversion of small arms and light weapons, including the Arms Trade Treaty, to which three of the five permanent members of the Council and six of the then elected members were States parties. To continue tackling the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, she urged the Council to prioritize the effective implementation of the established global framework and mechanisms regulating the international trade in conventional arms, to promote and seek synergies between international and regional efforts to detect, combat and prevent illicit trafficking in and the diversion of arms and to review, revitalize and develop its commitment to resolution 2220 (2015).

Following the briefings, Member States expressed their commitment to addressing the issue of the illicit

trade in small arms and light weapons and outlined their national efforts and initiatives in that regard. They emphasized the need for political will in preventing the diversion of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition in conflict situations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico noted that it was precisely in the context of the Council that serious discussions must be held on the tangible impacts of diversion and trafficking, as well as on the decisions that the organ could promote to strengthen cooperation and better implement international commitments. He clarified that the aim was not to replace but to strengthen the efforts already undertaken in other forums of the United Nations system. Many delegations stressed the importance of collective action on the implementation of arms embargoes, as well as such mechanisms as the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Tracing Instrument. Several underscored the importance of information-sharing⁹⁵¹ and the use of best practices⁹⁵² to combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Many participants stressed the importance of an effective tracing of weapons while reiterating the need to incorporate a gender dimension when addressing the issues related to small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, participants emphasized the need to strengthen the capacity of peacekeeping missions in the management of illegal flows of small arms and light weapons.

In 2021, in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", the Council adopted resolution 2616 (2021) concerning the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.⁹⁵³

⁹⁵¹ India, Tunisia, Ireland, Kenya, China, Belgium and Iraq.

⁹⁵² United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Malta and Iraq.

⁹⁵³ For further details, see sect. 34 below.

Meetings: small arms

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8874 6 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on small arms and light weapons (S/2021/839)			High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Executive Secretary of the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, Senior Researcher at Small Arms Survey	All Council members, all invitees	

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8909 , S/PV.8909 (Resumption 1) and S/2021/966 22 November 2021	The impact of the diversion and trafficking of arms on peace and security. Letter dated 22 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/892)		34 Member States ^a	Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, member of the Control Arms Governance Board, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations	All Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	

^a Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Morocco, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey and Ukraine.

^b India was represented by its Secretary of Consular Passports and Visas and Overseas Indian Affairs of the Ministry of External Affairs; and Mexico (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^c The representative of Qatar spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; the representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova and Serbia.

27. Women and peace and security

In 2021, the Council held one meeting under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, which took the form of a high-level open debate.⁹⁵⁴ More information on the meeting, including on the participants and speakers, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held one open videoconference in connection with the item.⁹⁵⁵ More information on the videoconference is given in table 2 below. In 2021, no decisions were adopted in relation to the item.

On 14 April, at the initiative of Viet Nam, which held the presidency for the month,⁹⁵⁶ the members of the Council held an open videoconference on the subject of sexual violence in conflict.⁹⁵⁷ At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by

the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Denis Mukwege, the Director of the South Sudan Women with Disabilities Network and the Senior Women’s Protection Adviser of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). In her briefing to the Council, the Special Representative underlined the evident chasm between resolutions and reality, as detailed in the annual report of the Secretary-General,⁹⁵⁸ and pointed to the chronic underreporting of wartime sexual violence due to stigma, insecurity, fear of reprisals and lack of services, which had been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic.⁹⁵⁹ She said that, while the vast majority of the United Nations-verified cases of conflict-related sexual violence in the report had involved the targeting of women and girls, reports of violence against men and boys had been recorded in almost all of the countries examined. Noting the nexus between sexual violence, conflict-driven trafficking in persons and violent extremism, she expressed concern

⁹⁵⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

⁹⁵⁵ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 16. See also [S/2021/1084](#). For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁹⁵⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 5 April ([S/2021/333](#)).

⁹⁵⁷ See [S/2021/375](#).

⁹⁵⁸ [S/2021/312](#).

⁹⁵⁹ See [S/2021/375](#).

at the intensification of entrenched, localized conflicts, including in the context of tensions over transhumance corridors in the Central African Republic and the Sudan. The Special Representative highlighted the issue of weak State presence and infrastructure, which had become all the more acute during the pandemic, and noted that sexual violence had not been prosecuted in the context of counter-terrorism trials even though it had been committed on a widespread and systematic scale by terrorist groups, leaving no legal precedent in which victims of sexual violence were recognized as legitimate victims of terrorism. Mr. Mukwege underlined that the great challenge was to effectively implement the existing normative framework and to translate the many commitments made by the Council into concrete realities for the benefit of survivors. Recalling the Secretary-General's report, he noted that, during the first 10 years of the mandate establishing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, not a single person or entity that had perpetrated acts of sexual violence had been subjected to the sanctions established by the Council for that very purpose. He expressed hope that the sanctions imposed in August 2020 on the leader of the armed *Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation* group in the Central African Republic would not remain an isolated case. In that regard, he spoke about the importance of strengthening efforts to fight impunity so that sexual crimes were not repeated. Offering examples of the suffering of women and girls with disabilities in conflict situations, the Director of the South Sudan Women with Disabilities Network urged the Council to reinforce the fact that a survivor-centred approach was, by definition, rights-based, accessible and designed in partnership with diverse women, including women with disabilities, and to urge all Governments to uphold their obligations to provide services for gender-based violence, including sexual and reproductive health services. The Senior Women's Protection Adviser of MINUSCA spoke about the social obstacles that impeded survivors from reporting violations and the lack of access to justice. In that regard, she described the steps taken by the Mission to hear victims, provide assistance and restore their sense of confidence and belief in a future where impunity would give way to justice and development.

Following the briefings, Council members and other Member States addressed a variety of issues, including the importance of justice and a rights-based approach for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, putting an end to conflicts themselves and building peaceful and resilient societies through conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation processes, and tackling the root causes of conflict-

related sexual violence, such as structural gender inequality and social norms regarding the stigmatization of survivors. Some Council members and other participants⁹⁶⁰ expressed support for the designation and use of sexual violence as a stand-alone criterion for sanctions and underlined the need to strengthen targeted measures by the Council as a way to seek accountability. Several Council members and Member States⁹⁶¹ stressed that the pandemic had not only exacerbated existing gender-based violence and inequality by impeding the access of survivors to health, justice and reparations systems, but had also demonstrated the fragility of progress made in the field of women's rights and the risk of reversing the hard-won progress. In that connection, participants⁹⁶² called for the incorporation of an inclusive, intersectional and gender-informed approach into post-pandemic recovery efforts. Some Council Members and Member States⁹⁶³ also underlined the importance of protecting women human rights defenders and peacebuilders from reprisals and targeted attacks and called for the incorporation of monitoring and early warning processes on conflict-related sexual violence and prevention mechanisms into peacekeeping and special political missions.

On 21 October, at the initiative of Kenya, which held the presidency for the month,⁹⁶⁴ the Council held a high-level open debate under the item.⁹⁶⁵ During the

⁹⁶⁰ Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Albania, Argentina, Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security), Costa Rica, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), European Union, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa and Ukraine.

⁹⁶¹ China, Estonia, India, Niger, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security), Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), El Salvador, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, South Africa, Turkey and Ukraine.

⁹⁶² India, Ireland, Mexico, Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security), Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Greece, Guatemala and Netherlands.

⁹⁶³ Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Australia, Belgium, European Union, Greece, Lebanon, Malta, Netherlands and South Africa.

⁹⁶⁴ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 13 October (S/2021/875).

⁹⁶⁵ See S/PV.8886 and S/PV.8886 (Resumption 1). See also S/2021/886. While briefers and Council members participated in person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

open debate, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security and the Legal Coordinator for the Indigenous Reservation of Tacueyo and member of the Association of Indigenous Cabildos of the North of Cauca.⁹⁶⁶ The Council also invited 35 Member States to deliver in-person statements in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, which was the highest number since the resumption of in-person meetings on 25 May 2021, and 24 Member States and other delegations participated by submitting written statements.⁹⁶⁷

During the open debate, the Secretary-General, prefacing that the power imbalance between men and women remained the most stubborn and persistent of all inequalities, stated that his commitment and call to action for human rights was at the heart of his report entitled “Our Common Agenda”⁹⁶⁸ and underlined the need to fast-track women’s full and equal participation in every aspect, including peace processes and political transitions.⁹⁶⁹ Highlighting the critical importance of increasing women’s representation across all aspects of the United Nations peace activities, he called on the Council to support the strengthening and deepening of partnerships with local women leaders to ensure their meaningful engagement in peace and political processes, to help to protect women human rights defenders and activists and to promote full gender parity in peacebuilding and political systems as countries transitioned to peace. The Secretary-General reaffirmed the importance of transforming words of support into actions across all countries under discussion in the Council. The Executive Director of UN-Women addressed the need to shift the spending paradigms to increasing funding for the women and peace and security agenda while curbing military spending and the need to support women’s meaningful participation in peace and security processes. In that connection, she called on the international community to support the participation of women in decision-making on defence and security sector expenditure and expand the use of gender-budgeting tools and programming and promoted the use of legislated quotas to increase women’s representation in politics and peace processes. The Executive Director echoed the

Secretary-General’s call for the protection of women in public life and human rights defenders from targeted violence and called on the Council to support women’s civil society organizations, condemn, investigate and punish attacks against them and review the national laws that might be constraining their civic spaces and curtailing their activities and funding. The Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission focused on the critical role of local women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding and advocated for providing female peacekeepers with the necessary tools and allowing them to pursue leadership roles in field operations. The Legal Coordinator for the Indigenous Reservation of Tacueyo, speaking on behalf of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, gave a briefing on the importance of fully implementing the peace accord in Colombia, in particular the “ethnic chapter” and the gender provisions, and addressing the crisis of violence against human rights defenders, including by ensuring adequate resources for the development of collective and territorial self-protection measures for indigenous, rural labourer and Afro-descendant communities.⁹⁷⁰

Participants in the open debate highlighted the essential need to invest in local women peacebuilders for their active participation across the peacebuilding and peacekeeping continuum, increasing the number of female peacekeepers and better equipping them with the necessary tools. Many delegations echoed the briefers’ call for protecting women human rights defenders, who were at constant risk of reprisals and intimidation.⁹⁷¹ Several Council members and Member States also noted the important role of regional and subregional mechanisms and networks of women mediators for early warning and prevention, underlining their active leadership as an integral part of sustaining peace in local communities.⁹⁷² Some participants expressed concern about the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan and the erosion of rights and the sidelining of women at the political level, urging all parties, especially the Taliban, to

⁹⁷⁰ For more information on the Council’s discussion concerning Colombia, see sect. 13 above.

⁹⁷¹ See [S/PV.8886](#) (Kenya, United Kingdom, Tunisia, China, Mexico, Estonia, Norway and Australia); and [S/2021/886](#) (Bangladesh, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Pakistan and South Africa (on behalf of the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network)).

⁹⁷² See [S/PV.8886](#) (Kenya, Viet Nam and Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security)); and [S/2021/886](#) (Chile, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, South Africa (on behalf of the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network) and Uruguay). For more information on the Council’s discussion on cooperation with regional arrangements, see part VIII, sect. I.

⁹⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8886](#).

⁹⁶⁷ See [S/2021/886](#).

⁹⁶⁸ [A/75/982](#).

⁹⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8886](#).

prioritize women's full, equal and meaningful participation in all decisions on the country's future.⁹⁷³ While affirming the significant progress made in implementing the women and peace and security agenda, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that it was extremely important to avoid duplication in the work of different bodies, such as the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, and that the Council should focus on situations that posed an imminent threat to international peace and security. He added that developing regional and national strategies or establishing national structures for the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda must be adopted only when there was an objective need arising from the existence of an armed conflict or a post-conflict settlement situation.⁹⁷⁴

During the period under review, the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security

⁹⁷³ See [S/PV.8886](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland, Mexico, Estonia, India, France, Canada (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security) and European Union); and [S/2021/886](#) (Germany, Italy, Lebanon, Netherlands and United Kingdom (on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan)). For more information on the Council's discussion concerning Afghanistan, see sect. 14 above.

⁹⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8886](#). For more information on the Council's discussion on the relations with the other principal organs of the United Nations, see part IV.

continued to meet in accordance with resolution [2242 \(2015\)](#),⁹⁷⁵ including to address the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.⁹⁷⁶

In 2021, the Council referred to issues related to women and peace and security under multiple items on its agenda. As summarized in table 3 below, the Council addressed in its decisions various measures concerning the specific implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, in particular in relation to the following categories: (a) the representation and participation of women in public affairs and decision-making, as well as in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; (b) the participation of women in peacekeeping operations, including through the appointment of women's protection and gender advisers; (c) the development and inclusion of gender mainstreaming, gender expertise and gender-sensitive responses by Member States and United Nations entities, including socioeconomic empowerment and the participation of women in security sector reforms and counter-terrorism efforts; and (d) combating sexual violence, including by monitoring, analysing and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence and its accountability mechanisms, including prosecutions of the perpetrators of sexual violence and the use of targeted sanctions.

⁹⁷⁵ Resolution [2242 \(2015\)](#), para. 5 (a).

⁹⁷⁶ See [S/2021/166](#), [S/2021/264](#), [S/2021/380](#), [S/2021/464](#), [S/2021/625](#), [S/2021/668](#), [S/2021/770](#), [S/2021/907](#) and [S/2021/1012](#).

Table 1
Meeting: women and peace and security

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8886 , S/PV.8886 (Resumption 1) and S/2021/886 21 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security (S/2021/827) Letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/875)		35 Member States ^a	Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security, Legal Coordinator for the Indigenous Reservation of Tacueyo and member of the Association of Indigenous Cabildos of the North of Cauca, Ambassador for Gender	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	

- ^a Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland and United Arab Emirates.
- ^b Ireland was represented by its Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora; Kenya (President of the Council) was represented by its Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and United Nations at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Prime Minister's Special Representative for Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet. The representative of the United Kingdom spoke in his national capacity and submitted a written statement on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan.
- ^c The representative of Australia spoke twice, once on behalf of Indonesia, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Turkey and once in his national capacity; the representative of Canada spoke twice, once on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security and once in her national capacity; the representative of South Africa spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the African Women Leaders Network; the representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the Ambassador for Gender and Diversity of the European External Action Service spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.

Table 2

Videoconference: women and peace and security

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
14 April 2021	S/2021/375	Letter dated 16 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Table 3
Selection of provisions relevant to women and peace and security, by theme and item

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>	
Representation and participation of women in political processes at all levels, including decision-making			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2593 (2021)	4
	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2021/10	twentieth
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	7, 9, 47
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	2
	The situation in the Great Lakes region	S/PRST/2021/19	seventeenth
	The question concerning Haiti	S/PRST/2021/7	fourth
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2576 (2021)	4 (e)

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
The situation in Libya	S/PRST/2021/6	fourth
	S/PRST/2021/12	third
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	5, 53
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021)	34
	Resolution 2592 (2021)	6 (a) and (d)
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	3 (c) (ii), 22
	Resolution 2579 (2021)	4 (iv), 12
	S/PRST/2021/14	fifth
	S/PRST/2021/20	fourth
Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3	fourteenth, sixteenth
	S/PRST/2021/16	fifth, eleventh

Participation of women in peacebuilding and in conflict prevention and resolution

Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	34 (b) (iii)–(iv), 47
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2561 (2021)	4 (f)
		Resolution 2587 (2021)	4 (f), 5
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	17, 29 (ii) (c), 32
	The situation in the Great Lakes region	S/PRST/2021/19	seventeenth
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2576 (2021)	4 (a)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	2, 30 (a) (v)–(vi)
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2592 (2021)	6 (d)
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	3 (c) (ii), 6, 18 (a)
		Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (i) (c) and (ii) (a)
Thematic		Resolution 2609 (2021)	21
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3	sixth
	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/PRST/2021/9	fifth, seventh
		S/PRST/2021/21	twenty-ninth, thirtieth
	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/PRST/2021/23	ninth
	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Resolution 2594 (2021)	2, 11

Socioeconomic environment for the meaningful participation and empowerment of women and funding of national programmes

Country- and region-specific	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2561 (2021)	4 (f)
		Resolution 2587 (2021)	4 (f)
	The situation in the Great Lakes region	S/PRST/2021/19	seventeenth

	<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2576 (2021)	4 (e)
Conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2566 (2021)	3 (iv)
		Resolution 2605 (2021)	27, 34 (a) (iv) and (vi), 35 (a) (ii) and (f) (vii), 47
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2561 (2021)	16
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	9–11, 29 (i) (h) and (ii) (k), 33–34
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	9, 30 (c) (iii) and (d) (ii), 47, 50, 54–56
	The situation in Myanmar	S/PRST/2021/5	second
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2564 (2021)	8, annex
		Resolution 2591 (2021)	25–26
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021)	19, 35–36
		Resolution 2592 (2021)	6 (i), 10, 14 (b)–(d)
		Resolution 2607 (2021)	14, 35, 36
Thematic	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	3 (a) (iv) and (vii)–(viii) and (d) (ii), 9, 13, 15, 18 (e) and (l), 24
		Resolution 2577 (2021)	2 (e), 20
		Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (ii) (b) and (iii) (d), 15
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3	eighth
		S/PRST/2021/16	twelfth
	Children and armed conflict	Resolution 2601 (2021)	1, 10
	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/PRST/2021/21	tenth
	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	S/PRST/2021/1	second
		Resolution 2610 (2021)	15, 105
	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Resolution 2594 (2021)	5
Role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism			
Thematic	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/PRST/2021/21	twenty-ninth
	Threats to international peace and security caused by	S/PRST/2021/1	twelfth

	Item	Decision	Paragraph
	terrorist acts	Resolution 2617 (2021)	27, 36
Gender mainstreaming, gender expertise and gender-sensitive responses			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2021/10	eleventh, twentieth
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	11, 34 (a) (iv), 35 (e) (i)–(ii), 47
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2587 (2021)	16
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	42, 46
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2591 (2021)	26
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2607 (2021)	38
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2609 (2021)	30 (a) and (l), 31
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/16	eleventh
Thematic	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Resolution 2617 (2021)	36
	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Resolution 2594 (2021)	6
		S/PRST/2021/17	eighth
Protection of women and women’s protection advisers			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2605 (2021)	34 (a) (iv)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	32–33
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	3 (a) (i)
		Resolution 2579 (2021)	3 (iii) (c)–(d)
		Resolution 2609 (2021)	21
Participation of women in peacekeeping operations			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2587 (2021)	16
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	46
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2581 (2021)	13
		Resolution 2591 (2021)	27
		Resolution 2613 (2021)	13
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021)	23
		Resolution 2609 (2021)	30 (l), 31
	The situation concerning Western Sahara	Resolution 2602 (2021)	11

	<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Thematic	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/PRST/2021/21	twenty-fifth
	United Nations peacekeeping operations	S/PRST/2021/11	thirteenth
Participation of women in the security sector and in security sector reform			
Country- and region-specific	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021)	20
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021)	30 (a) (iii), 53
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2591 (2021)	26

28. Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.⁹⁷⁷ Three of the four meetings were convened to adopt a decision and one took the form of a briefing.⁹⁷⁸ More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held three open videoconferences in connection with the item.⁹⁷⁹ More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. The Council adopted four resolutions, including three under Chapter VII of the Charter, and adopted one presidential statement.⁹⁸⁰

In 2021, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. In addition, Council members heard briefings by two civil society representatives, on 12 January by the Executive Director of the Neem Foundation, and on 19 August by the Director General of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies. Briefings during the reporting period were focused on: the resurgence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) in Iraq and the

Syrian Arab Republic and the emergence and proliferation of its affiliates and those of Al-Qaida in Africa, Asia and Europe; the countering of terrorism financing and recruitment activities; the humanitarian and security situation of thousands of individuals suspected of having links with Da’esh held in detention facilities; the increase in extreme right-wing or racially and ethnically motivated terrorism; and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Briefers and Council members also discussed how recent developments in Afghanistan affected counter-terrorism efforts in the region.⁹⁸¹

On 12 January, at the initiative of Tunisia, which held the presidency for the month,⁹⁸² Council members held a high-level open videoconference to mark the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#).⁹⁸³ The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia presided over the videoconference, during which Council members heard briefings by the Under-

⁹⁸¹ For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see sect. 14 above.

⁹⁸² A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 December 2020 ([S/2020/1315](#)).

⁹⁸³ See [S/2021/48](#). Tunisia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad; India was represented by its Minister for External Affairs; Ireland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence; Kenya was represented by its Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Estonia was represented by its Minister of Defence; Norway was represented by its Minister of Justice and Public Security; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was represented by its Minister of State with Responsibility for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade; and the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa.

⁹⁷⁷ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 21.

⁹⁷⁸ For more information on the format of meetings, including on high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

⁹⁷⁹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁹⁸⁰ Resolutions [2610 \(2021\)](#), [2611 \(2021\)](#) and [2615 \(2021\)](#) (under Chapter VII); resolution [2617 \(2021\)](#); and presidential statement [S/PRST/2021/1](#).

Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism, the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and a civil society representative. Many other Council members were represented at the ministerial level, and forty-seven delegations and entities also submitted written statements.⁹⁸⁴

During the videoconference, the Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism noted that, throughout the past two decades, the threat of terrorism had evolved and spread, with Al-Qaida having proved resilient and Da'esh able to harness social media to mobilize and recruit followers worldwide. The Under-Secretary-General further stressed that terrorists had sought to exploit disruptions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as cyberspace and new technologies, linkages with organized crime and regulatory, human and technical gaps in national capacities. The threat had become more difficult to prevent owing to the resurgence of low-cost, low-tech attacks against soft targets by lone wolves. He emphasized that the leadership of the Council remained critical to ensuring a united front against terrorism anchored in the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The Under-Secretary-General also highlighted three fundamental points to effectively prevent and defeat terrorism: international solidarity, addressing the underlying conditions and drivers that sustained and spread terrorism and engaging more and better with youth, civil society, the private sector and the scientific community. He also noted that the United Nations system was more coherent and coordinated than ever in providing support to Member States, thanks to the reform of the counter-terrorism architecture initiated by the Secretary-General in 2017.

In her briefing during the same videoconference, the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate warned against the emergence of Da'esh affiliates, including in South Asia, South-East Asia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin

and Southern and Eastern Africa, and the proliferation of extreme right-wing or racially and ethnically motivated terrorism. She further emphasized that the COVID-19 pandemic had further complicated the threat landscape. The Executive Director stressed that counter-terrorism policies should respect the rule of law and be human-rights-compliant and gender sensitive. The Executive Director of the Neem Foundation highlighted the need for Member States and civil society to come together in a spirit of cooperation in order to truly combat terrorism. She stated that, while the United Nations recognized the importance of partnership with civil society organizations and its impact on advancing mutual goals, that approach had not always been applied consistently by Member States. In that regard, she affirmed that the best chances of combating terrorism in the long term arose when Member States and civil society came together. She offered concrete examples of such partnerships, including the opportunity for Governments to work with civil society organizations that provided support to women and girls, who were disproportionately affected by insurgency and conflict. Following the briefings, Council members reflected on the evolution of the threat of terrorism and on counter-terrorism efforts implemented over the two decades since the adoption of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#). Council members also presented recommendations for future action to combat the evolving threat of terrorism at the national, regional and international levels. Some Council members⁹⁸⁵ further stressed that measures to counter terrorism must follow an approach based on human rights. Several Council members⁹⁸⁶ also emphasized the importance of preventive action and of addressing the root causes of radicalization in efforts to counter terrorism.

On the same day, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it reaffirmed that terrorism in all forms and manifestations continued to constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and expressed solidarity with countries that had suffered terrorist attacks and its support for the survivors and victims of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, committed by terrorist groups.⁹⁸⁷ The Council reaffirmed that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism complied with all their obligations under international law, in particular

⁹⁸⁴ Afghanistan, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan (on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European Union, Georgia, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Criminal Police Organization, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates.

⁹⁸⁵ Tunisia, Ireland, Estonia, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, France, Mexico and United States.

⁹⁸⁶ Tunisia, Ireland, Estonia, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, Mexico and Niger.

⁹⁸⁷ [S/PRST/2021/1](#), second and third paragraphs.

international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, noting that failure to do so contributed to increased radicalization to violence and fostered a sense of impunity.⁹⁸⁸ Furthermore, the Council expressed its concern over the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, stressing the need for Member States to act cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists from exploiting technology and communications for their acts.⁹⁸⁹ The Council underscored the importance of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, as well as cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, in particular civil society, in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism and encouraged the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and youth in that process.⁹⁹⁰ The Council highlighted the need to enhance cooperation among its various relevant committees and groups of experts and the importance of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations and forums, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant statutes of the regional and subregional organizations.⁹⁹¹

On 10 February, Council members held an open videoconference,⁹⁹² during which they heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism in connection with the twelfth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Da'esh to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.⁹⁹³ He reported that the threat posed by Da'esh to international peace and security was on the rise again and warned that, although Da'esh had not yet developed a purposeful strategy to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic, its core in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and its affiliates in other conflict zones had taken advantage of the disruption caused by the virus to step up operations.⁹⁹⁴ The Under-Secretary-General noted that the main focus of Da'esh remained resurgence in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, where the international community continued to grapple with the legacies of the group's so-called "caliphate". He reported that, tragically, the international community had made hardly any progress in addressing the situation of the thousands of individuals, mostly women and children, suspected of having links with Da'esh and held in precarious conditions in the region. He added that the dire

humanitarian and security situation in the detention facilities and displacement camps was deteriorating even further and reiterated the Secretary-General's call upon Member States for the voluntary repatriation of adults and children stranded in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Meanwhile, regional affiliates of Da'esh – across West Africa, Central Africa, Europe and Asia – continued to entrench themselves and gain autonomy and strength, which could provide Da'esh with new capabilities and options to conduct external operations. During his briefing, he also highlighted a few key examples of the work of the Office of Counter-Terrorism under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.

In her briefing to Council members during the same videoconference, the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate provided the Council with an overview of the Directorate's activities, which included: supporting the implementation by Member States of relevant Council resolutions, including in relation to dealing with returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters formerly associated with Da'esh; helping Member States to review and update their national legislation to strengthen their ability to bring terrorists to justice while protecting and promoting international law; providing guidance on countering the financing of terrorism; and deepening engagement with the technology sector to help technology companies to identify the use of their services for terrorist purposes. She stressed that Da'esh and its affiliates remained a continuing threat, adding that extreme right-wing or racially and ethnically motivated terrorism was also an increasing cause of concern. She observed that Da'esh affiliates in Africa were of particular concern, exacerbating a worsening humanitarian situation in many regions. The Executive Director also expressed concern regarding the dire situation of individuals, mostly women and children, stranded in camps and prisons in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. She also noted that technology remained a significant force multiplier for terrorist groups, through recruitment, propaganda, communication and fundraising. Following the briefings, all Council members expressed concern about the increase in the activities of terrorist groups, including Da'esh, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, and their use of the Internet and social media to incite, fundraise and recruit for terrorist activities. Some Council members⁹⁹⁵ underlined that Al-Qaida and Da'esh affiliates were also gaining ground in other regions around the world, most notably

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid., seventh paragraph.

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid., eleventh paragraph.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid., twelfth paragraph.

⁹⁹¹ Ibid., sixteenth and penultimate paragraphs.

⁹⁹² See [S/2021/140](#).

⁹⁹³ [S/2021/98](#).

⁹⁹⁴ See [S/2021/140](#).

⁹⁹⁵ China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States.

in a number of subregions on the African continent, where they were expanding recruitment and radicalization. Council members⁹⁹⁶ also expressed concern about the situation of former Da'esh associates, in particular the humanitarian situation of women and children stranded in displaced persons camps, and the repatriation of foreign fighters in detention camps. The representatives of Ireland and Mexico emphasized that the international community must do better in prosecuting crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. Several Council members⁹⁹⁷ also stressed the need to incorporate a gender perspective into counter-terrorism law and ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in counter-terrorism processes.

On 19 August, the Council held a high-level meeting,⁹⁹⁸ during which Council members heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism in connection with the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by Da'esh to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.⁹⁹⁹ The Under-Secretary-General warned that the rapidly evolving situation in Afghanistan could have far-reaching implications for peace and security around the world and informed the Council that Da'esh had expanded its presence there.¹⁰⁰⁰ He echoed the appeal by the Secretary-General for the Council to use all the tools at its disposal to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a platform or a safe haven for terrorism.¹⁰⁰¹ He reported that, globally, the threat posed by Da'esh to international peace and security had remained significant and steady over the previous six months and indicated that Da'esh had continued to exploit the disruption, grievances and development setbacks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic to regroup, recruit and intensify its activities, both online and on the ground. He noted that Da'esh had further decentralized its governance and that the additional autonomy, capacity and confidence gained by its regional affiliates could provide the group with new options, while also raising alarm about the increased threat of attacks by lone actors or small groups inspired and possibly directed remotely by Da'esh. He emphasized

that, while Da'esh remained focused on reconstituting its capabilities in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the main determinant of the future terrorist threat landscape over the medium to long term was the lack of a comprehensive solution to the situation of thousands of individuals with alleged links to Da'esh who remained in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. In that connection, he noted that the conditions in detention facilities and displacement camps in north-eastern Syrian Arab Republic had further deteriorated and said that developments in Afghanistan could further aggravate the situation in those camps, with unpredictable consequences. He further indicated that the most alarming development over the previous six months had been the spread of Da'esh in Africa, with spillover from Mali into Burkina Faso and the Niger and incursions from Nigeria into Cameroon, Chad and the Niger and from Mozambique into the United Republic of Tanzania.

During her briefing to the Council at the same meeting, the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate elaborated on the support provided by the United Nations system to Member States in addressing the threat posed by Da'esh. She reported that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism and counter-terrorism had been mixed and explained that, while in many non-conflict zones pandemic-related restrictions had continued to help suppress terrorist activities, in conflict zones, where the impact of pandemic-related restrictions was limited, the increasing interplay among terrorism, fragility and conflict had caused the terrorist threat to grow. Da'esh and its affiliates continued to pose a significant threat in West Africa, East Africa and Central Africa and Afghanistan, while simultaneously prioritizing efforts to regroup and resurge in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Executive Director expressed concern about the situation in detention camps, in particular that of women and children with presumed links to Da'esh. On the issue of terrorism financing, she said that an analysis by the Directorate suggested that terrorists and terrorist groups, including Da'esh, were exploring alternative methods of moving funds, owing to the impact of pandemic-related measures on money-transfer networks. She stated that Da'esh and its affiliates remained a significant concern and threat to international peace and security and mentioned the recent evolution of such affiliates on the African continent. In that regard, she underscored that a comprehensive, coordinated "One United Nations" approach remained crucial to developing and implementing effective counter-terrorism measures, while also addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism.

⁹⁹⁶ China, France, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

⁹⁹⁷ Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Tunisia.

⁹⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8839](#).

⁹⁹⁹ [S/2021/682](#).

¹⁰⁰⁰ For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see sect. 14 above.

¹⁰⁰¹ See [S/PV.8839](#).

At the same meeting, the Director General of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies provided his own reflections and analysis on what he referred to as the collective failure of the international community to deal with the threat of terrorism. He affirmed that the disconnect between United Nations analytical reports and United Nations political statements and actions showed that the United Nations had been unable to confront the State sponsorship of terrorism. Regarding the evolving situation in Afghanistan, he offered his perspective on the unfolding events in Kabul and called on the United Nations to declare the situation to be an urgent humanitarian crisis under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter and to undertake serious and urgent deliberation with a view to declaring Kabul a safe zone protected by a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Following the briefings, all Council members renewed their concern about the continued activities of terrorist groups, including Da'esh, and the expansion of the activities of such groups to other regions and in particular to Africa. Several Council members¹⁰⁰² stressed the importance of combating the financing of terrorist organizations. Some Council members¹⁰⁰³ expressed concern in particular about the increasing use of cryptocurrencies by Da'esh to finance terrorist activities. In connection with the evolving situation in Afghanistan, Council members¹⁰⁰⁴ expressed concern about the implications of the situation in Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism. Some Council members¹⁰⁰⁵ also underscored the need to ensure that Afghan territory did not become a safe haven for terrorists.

On 17 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2611 \(2021\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it decided that all States would continue to take the measures required by paragraph 1 of resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#) with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) as the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) in the 1988 sanctions list, and

extended for a period of 12 months, until December 2022, the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in support of the Committee.¹⁰⁰⁶

On 22 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it decided that humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan were not a violation of paragraph 1 (a) of resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#) and that the processing and payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources and the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of such assistance or to support such activities were permitted.¹⁰⁰⁷ By the same resolution, the Council requested the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to brief the Council every six months on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁰⁸ Before the vote, as penholder of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States clarified that the humanitarian exception contained in the draft resolution was to facilitate aid to the people of Afghanistan, but that it was not a blank check for any organization to disregard its international obligations.¹⁰⁰⁹ After the vote, the representative of the United States indicated that the carve-out for humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs provided by the resolution was intended to cover the activities contemplated in the United Nations Transitional Engagement Framework for Afghanistan and emphasized that the resolution included important reporting requirements for humanitarian assistance providers and for periodic updates by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to the Council. He added that such information was critical to enabling sufficient oversight to ensure that assistance was reaching the intended beneficiaries by mitigating diversion and ensuring that any future adjustments to the carve-out were based on realities on the ground. While noting that the Council had stepped up and delivered on its obligation to facilitate the humanitarian response for the people of Afghanistan, the representative of Ireland also recognized that the text could and should have been stronger in acknowledging and addressing the plight of women and girls in the country. She also said that the one-year

¹⁰⁰² United States, Tunisia, Norway, China, Ireland, France, Kenya, Viet Nam and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

¹⁰⁰³ United States, Tunisia, Norway, Mexico, Ireland and France.

¹⁰⁰⁴ India, United States, Tunisia, Norway, Mexico, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, China, Ireland, Estonia, France, Kenya, Viet Nam and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Norway, Mexico, United Kingdom, China, Viet Nam and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Resolution [2611 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

¹⁰⁰⁹ See [S/PV.8941](#).

timeline for the review of the humanitarian exemption was not intended in any way as one year of license to the Taliban. The representative of China expressed his belief that any action of the Council should genuinely promote and facilitate humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and expressed satisfaction that the final text had incorporated the views of his country. He explained his country's objections to the original draft text, which he said added to the obstacles to delivering humanitarian assistance. He also expressed hope that the confusion surrounding humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and the obstacles to its continued delivery would be cleared up once and for all. The representative of China, echoed by the representative of the Russian Federation, also called for the unfreezing of the country's overseas assets. The representative of India welcomed the provision in the resolution calling for a review of the implementation of the humanitarian carve-out after one year. The representative of France said that it had been a mistake to remove the time limit for humanitarian exemptions in the text negotiated in full transparency among Council members and expressed regret that such a modification had been made without consultation and presented as a cosmetic change. She further stressed that the provision for the review of the resolution after one year was critical and clarified that the humanitarian exemption excluded development activities. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed hope that the adopted resolution would make it possible to significantly increase the volume of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. The representative of Estonia underscored that the resolution contained mechanisms to guarantee that any exemptions would not benefit those under sanctions and instead help aid to reach the Afghan people. The representative of the United Kingdom further emphasized that the Council should continue to strike a balance between enabling life-saving aid and minimizing the risk of accrual of any benefits to individuals or entities designated on the 1988 sanctions list.

The Council adopted two other resolutions in connection with the item. On 17 December, the Council adopted resolution [2610 \(2021\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it reaffirmed the sanctions measures imposed with respect to ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and extended for 30 months the mandates of the Analytical Support and Sanctions

Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution [1904 \(2009\)](#).¹⁰¹⁰

On 30 December, the Council adopted resolution [2617 \(2021\)](#), by which it renewed the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate until 31 December 2025.¹⁰¹¹ In the explanations of vote submitted further to the adoption of the resolution,¹⁰¹² the delegation of Mexico expressed regret that two of the country's priorities had been sidelined: first, the inclusion of clear language safeguarding humanitarian assistance and international humanitarian law in the context of counter-terrorism operations, because practice had shown that those safeguards were an operational necessity for the humanitarian community; and second, the notion of perceptions of masculinity in the Directorate's cross-cutting gender agenda, because a truly holistic gender agenda must include perspectives on masculinities.¹⁰¹³ The opportunity to update the text on those two important fronts had been missed. In addition, the delegation of Mexico expressed regret about the limited time that the 15 Council members had had to negotiate the draft on a matter that was reviewed only every four years. According to the delegation of Mexico, the limited negotiation period did not allow for the necessary conditions for the presentation and thorough and timely consideration of proposals. The delegation of India welcomed the adoption of the resolution and expressed its commitment to pursuing all necessary measures in collaboration with other Member States towards the goal of zero tolerance for terrorism. As the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee for 2022, the delegation of India stated that it would make determined efforts to further enhance the role of the Committee in strengthening the multilateral response in countering terrorism, and more importantly, in ensuring that the global response to the threat of terrorism remained unambiguous, undivided and effective.

¹⁰¹⁰ Resolution [2610 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1, 63 and 98. For more information regarding the sanctions measures mandated by the Council pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. III. For more information on the mandates of the Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson, see part IX, sect. I.B.1.

¹⁰¹¹ Resolution [2617 \(2021\)](#), para. 2. For more information on the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, see part IX, sect. I.B.2.

¹⁰¹² The resolution was adopted in accordance with the written procedure developed during the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information, see part II, sect. I.

¹⁰¹³ See [S/2021/1116](#).

Table 1

Meetings: threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8839 19 August 2021	Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2021/682)			Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Director General of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8934 17 December 2021		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/1055)				Resolution 2610 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8935 17 December 2021		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/1049)				Resolution 2611 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8941 22 December 2021		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2021/1080)			Eight Council members ^c	Resolution 2615 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a India (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for External Affairs; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet.

^b The Under-Secretary-General and the Director General of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

Table 2

Videoconferences: threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
12 January 2021	S/2021/48	Letter dated 14 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	S/PRST/2021/1

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
10 February 2021	S/2021/140	Letter dated 12 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
30 December 2021	S/2021/1116	Letter dated 31 December 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2617 (2021) 15-0-0 S/2021/1107

29. Briefings

As with previous supplements, briefings by various speakers not explicitly connected to a specific item on the agenda of the Council are featured in the present section. In 2021, the Council held four such meetings. More information on the meetings, including on the participants and speakers, is provided in tables 1, 2 and 3 below. In addition, Council members held one open videoconference to hear a briefing that was not explicitly connected to a specific item on the agenda of the Council. More information on the videoconference is provided in table 4 below.

In 2021, Council members held one videoconference in connection with the item “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”.¹⁰¹⁴ On 10 March, the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden provided a briefing to Council members outlining her priorities. She explained that her first priority was to focus on the basic commitments and principles on which OSCE was founded, notably the sanctity of sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom from the threat or use of force and the right of all States to choose their own security policy path. She further noted that the Swedish chairpersonship would seek to strengthen the OSCE comprehensive concept of security, which made a clear link between security and the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, adding that the women and peace and security agenda was a guiding theme for the chairpersonship. She also noted that one of her main priorities as Chairperson-in-Office would be to seek continued engagement at the highest levels towards sustainable solutions to crises and conflicts in the region, in line with international law and with full respect for the OSCE principles and commitments. In

that regard, she reported on her engagement in the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, the Transnistrian settlement process in the Republic of Moldova and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.¹⁰¹⁵ In relation to the developments in Belarus, she stated that the offer that she and the previous Chairperson-in-Office had extended in 2020 to facilitate a genuine dialogue between the Government and the opposition still stood.¹⁰¹⁶ Turning to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chairperson-in-Office noted that the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire during the pandemic was much needed, adding that the adoption of resolutions [2532 \(2020\)](#) and [2565 \(2021\)](#) showed the importance that the Council attached to combating the pandemic and resolving conflicts. Having observed a backsliding of democracy and respect for human rights in the OSCE region during the previous year, she further announced that the Swedish chairpersonship would emphasize the right to freedom of expression and the freedom of the media, as well as other democratic rights, and would also draw on the expertise of civil society to ensure that their contributions informed all aspects of security.

During the discussion, Council members¹⁰¹⁷ pointed to the role of regional and subregional organizations and their cooperation with the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. Several Council members¹⁰¹⁸ expressed

¹⁰¹⁴ See [S/2021/256](#).

¹⁰¹⁵ For more information about the discussions relating to Ukraine, see sect. 18 above.

¹⁰¹⁶ See [S/2021/256](#).

¹⁰¹⁷ Estonia, France, India, Kenya, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia and Viet Nam.

¹⁰¹⁸ Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United States and Viet Nam.

support for the focus of the Chairperson-in-Office on the women and peace and security agenda. In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that his delegation supported the plans of the Chairperson-in-Office to promote the participation of women in economic activity, however, without a linkage to resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#), which addressed women's involvement in peace processes.

In accordance with previously established practice, the Council heard one briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice at a private (closed) meeting held on 2 November.¹⁰¹⁹

In addition, on 7 December, the Council heard the annual briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.¹⁰²⁰ During his briefing, the High Commissioner made reference to the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons in connection with many of the conflicts on the Council's agenda.¹⁰²¹ Citing the example of the Sahel, he noted a direct correlation between the climate emergency, conflict over scarce resources and forced displacement. He added that forced displacement continued to be subjected to political manipulation and, in that context, referred to the crisis on the border between Belarus and some European Union countries. The High Commissioner told the Council that humanitarian workers often faced situations that had been made more complicated by political difficulties, the existence of sanctions and other restrictions to the necessary dialogue and engagement, leaving them to work alone amid an increasing set of expectations. In that regard, he cited the examples of Myanmar, Yemen and, to a certain extent, the Sudan and Afghanistan. With regard to Afghanistan, the High Commissioner also appealed to the Council to ensure the widest scope for humanitarian exception for the sanctions regime to enable humanitarian agencies to function properly. He also warned Council members that humanitarian agencies could not replicate the role of States and that they were not a replacement for real engagement and political solutions. Referring to the politicization of humanitarian work, he noted that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic was worsening as a result of conflict, a lack of resources, the effects of sanctions and the political and economic crisis in Lebanon. Regarding Ethiopia, the High Commissioner stressed the need to impress upon the parties that they needed to respect the neutrality of United Nations

humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations working in the humanitarian field and ensure their safety. Finally, and directly related to the Council's core work, he pointed out that the growing inability of the international community to make and build peace obliged humanitarian and refugee organizations to work more frequently in situations of active conflict and rampant crisis, with rising expectations on what they could deliver, but in circumstances that, in reality, offered decreasing possibilities to actually deliver.

Following the briefing, Council members affirmed that the work on preventing and addressing root causes of conflict, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes, was important in tackling the issue of forced migration and displacement. Several speakers¹⁰²² raised climate change as a factor affecting displacement. Most Council members¹⁰²³ also noted how the COVID-19 pandemic had exacerbated the challenges faced by refugees and internally displaced persons. During the discussion, several Council members¹⁰²⁴ pointed to the need to respect the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs when addressing the issues of displacement and refugees. In response to some of the questions raised by Council members, the High Commissioner took the floor a second time.¹⁰²⁵

In 2021, Council members held two meetings under the item entitled "Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council".¹⁰²⁶ On 2 December, Council members heard a joint briefing by the Chairs of the three committees related to counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, namely, the Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).¹⁰²⁷ At the meeting, the Chairs provided an overview of the work of the three committees, noting that the three subsidiary bodies continued to attach great importance to the coordination and cooperation

¹⁰¹⁹ See [S/PV.8894](#). For more information on relations with the International Court of Justice, see part IV, sect. III.

¹⁰²⁰ See [S/PV.8919](#). The previous briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Council was given on 18 June 2020 (see [S/2020/560](#)). See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part I, sect. 30.

¹⁰²¹ See [S/PV.8919](#).

¹⁰²² Norway, Estonia, United Kingdom, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Kenya, Ireland, Tunisia and Niger.

¹⁰²³ Norway, India, Estonia, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Mexico, China, United States, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Niger.

¹⁰²⁴ India, Viet Nam, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Russian Federation and Tunisia.

¹⁰²⁵ For more information about invitees under rule 39 and their interventions, see part II, sect. VIII.B.

¹⁰²⁶ See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 22.

¹⁰²⁷ See [S/PV.8915](#).

among them and to raise awareness of Member States' obligations to effectively implement relevant Council resolutions. During the discussion, several Council members¹⁰²⁸ noted the rise of terrorism in Africa. Council members also emphasized the importance of implementing sanctions measures in the fight against terrorism,¹⁰²⁹ and conducting the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the initial timeline of which had been delayed because of the continuing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁰³⁰

Following the established practice, on 13 December, the Council heard the end-of-year briefing by the outgoing Chairs of the various subsidiary bodies who were concluding their terms in December 2021.¹⁰³¹ At the meeting, the Chairs presented the key activities undertaken during their tenure. The Chairs informed the Council about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the functioning of their respective committees and working groups, mostly in relation to their working methods and conduct of field visits. In that regard, the representative of the Niger, as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning

the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, noted that visits were essential, as they allowed the committees to obtain first-hand information on the implementation of sanctions measures and to interact in person with a wide range of stakeholders. The representative of Tunisia, as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau, addressed the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of the austerity measures implemented by the United Nations. In that context, the Chair noted that, while the good stewardship of United Nations resources must be a priority, it could not come at the expense of the efficient and meaningful work of the Council. Furthermore, several Chairs discussed the role of sanctions more broadly, with some¹⁰³² underscoring the importance of raising awareness about the objectives of the United Nations sanctions and addressing any misconceptions or misunderstandings in that regard. Other topics addressed during the briefing included the transparency of the work of the committees and the role of the panels and groups of experts.

¹⁰²⁸ Viet Nam, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, India and Niger.

¹⁰²⁹ United States, Kenya, China, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, France, Estonia and India.

¹⁰³⁰ Viet Nam, China, Tunisia, Russian Federation, Norway, Mexico, France, Estonia, United Kingdom and India.

¹⁰³¹ See S/PV.8928. For more information on the subsidiary organs, see part IX.

¹⁰³² Estonia (as Chair the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan) and Niger (as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)).

Table 1
Meeting: briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice

Meeting and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8894 2 November 2021 (closed)				President of the International Court of Justice	Council members, invitee	

Table 2
Meetings: briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council

Meeting and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8915 2 December 2021					Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in	

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
					Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) , ^a all other Council members	
S/PV.8928 13 December 2021					Chairs of eight Committees and two Working Groups ^b	

^a Before his briefing, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) delivered a joint statement on behalf of that Committee, the Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#), on the continuing cooperation among the three Committees and their respective expert bodies.

^b The Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#), the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2048 \(2012\)](#) concerning Guinea-Bissau and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations; the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1518 \(2003\)](#) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan; the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic; the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) and the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions; and the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan.

Table 3

Meeting: briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

<i>Meeting and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8919 7 December 2021			United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	All Council members, ^a invitee ^b		

^a Norway was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^b The High Commissioner participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 4

Videoconference: briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
10 March 2021	S/2021/256	Letter dated 12 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

30. Security Council mission

During the period under review, the Council dispatched one mission to the field to Mali and the Niger. The mission was comprised of representatives of all members of the Council. Following the mission, the Council held a meeting under the item entitled “Security Council mission”, at which it heard briefings by the representatives of the Council co-leading the mission. More information on the meeting, including on the participants and speakers, is given in the table below.¹⁰³³

¹⁰³³ For more information on the composition and report of the mission and on discussions relating to virtual missions given the extraordinary circumstances, see part VI, sect. II.A.

As reported during the briefing, Council members held meetings in Mali with the transitional Government, including the transitional President, the Prime Minister, the signatory armed groups of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, representatives of civil society, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations country team and other individuals engaged in the international mediation. During their visit to the Niger, Council members met with the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Niger, as well as the Force Commander of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and representatives of the United Nations country team.

Meeting: Security Council mission

Meeting and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers
S/PV.8892 29 October 2021	Briefing by the Security Council mission to Mali and the Niger (22 to 26 October 2021)	Letter dated 22 October 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/917) Report of the Security Council mission to Mali and the Niger, 23–25 October 2021 (S/2021/1106)			Three Council members (France, Kenya, Niger)

31. Items relating to non-proliferation

A. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

During the period under review, the Council held one high-level meeting in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, which took the form of a briefing.¹⁰³⁴ More information on the meeting, including on the participants and speakers, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held two open videoconferences in connection with the item.¹⁰³⁵ One of the videoconferences was devoted to the announcement

of the adoption of a resolution. More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below.¹⁰³⁶ In 2021, the Council also unanimously adopted resolution [2572 \(2021\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter.

On 30 March, Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item, focused on the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).¹⁰³⁷ At the videoconference, Council members heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on its activities during the year 2020. In his briefing, the Chair underscored that resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) remained a vital component of the global non-proliferation architecture aimed at preventing non-State actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. He highlighted that, to date, 184 Member States had submitted

¹⁰³⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

¹⁰³⁵ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹⁰³⁶ See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 25.

¹⁰³⁷ See [S/2021/325](#).

initial reports to the Committee on measures that they had taken or planned to take to comply with their obligations under the resolution, while 127 Member States had informed the Committee of their national points of contact in support of the implementation of the resolution. The Chair further informed Council members that, in accordance with resolution 1977 (2011), the Committee was conducting a comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) prior to the renewal of its mandate in April 2021, which had been delayed because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. He added that the successful completion of the review was the highest priority of the Committee. He said that a central theme of the comprehensive review was the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and that the Committee would also address its role in facilitating assistance matchmaking, its outreach activities and its collaboration with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and other United Nations bodies.

Following the briefing, many Council members¹⁰³⁸ acknowledged the continued threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including to terrorists and other non-State actors. Council members emphasized that resolution 1540 (2004) was a vital element of the global non-proliferation effort,¹⁰³⁹ and commended the progress made on its implementation.¹⁰⁴⁰ Several Council members¹⁰⁴¹ also highlighted the importance of strengthening cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Regarding the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), some Council members¹⁰⁴² noted that it was an opportunity to reflect on the mandates of the Committee and its group of experts. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the expectation that the review would be productive and enhance the effectiveness of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as well as the work of the Committee and its group of experts, adding that the resolution remained one of the few islands of stability and non-confrontation in multilateral diplomacy.

On 27 September, the Council held a high-level meeting in connection with the item under the sub-item entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the opening of the Treaty for signature.¹⁰⁴³ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and a member of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group.¹⁰⁴⁴ In her briefing, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs underlined that, because of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the norm against nuclear testing was one of the most hard-won gains of the post-Cold War era. She also noted that the Treaty was recognized as an essential element of nuclear disarmament and a building block for a world free of nuclear weapons, which was the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations. She noted that the Treaty had achieved near universal adherence and that the International Monitoring System, which provided round-the-clock, real-time monitoring of any explosive nuclear activities on Earth, was more than 90 per cent complete. The High Representative underscored that the cumulative result of those achievements was that no nuclear test conducted would ever evade the watchful eyes of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, which buttressed the strong global norm against nuclear testing. She cautioned that, despite those remarkable achievements, many challenges still lay ahead, such as the worrisome trend observed in recent years towards the modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals. The High Representative said that the best way to uphold the norm against testing was to reaffirm and enhance support for the Treaty by reinforcing its existing strengths and striving to bring about its entry into force on several fronts, namely, by empowering the youth of the world, by realizing its full potential in tandem with other processes related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and by providing support to the International Monitoring System and further strengthening the technical capabilities of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to detect activities related to nuclear testing.

¹⁰³⁸ China, Estonia, France, India, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

¹⁰³⁹ China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United Kingdom.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Viet Nam.

¹⁰⁴¹ China, France, India, Mexico, Niger, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

¹⁰⁴² Estonia, India and Mexico. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), see part IX, sect. I.B.2.

¹⁰⁴³ See [S/PV.8865](#). Since the inception of the item on 22 April 2004, this was the first meeting held under the sub-item entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”. Previously, the Council held discussions on the Treaty under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, under the sub-item entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament”. For more information regarding previous discussions on the matter, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009*, part I, sect. 39.B, and *Supplement 2016–2017*, part I, sect. 40.

¹⁰⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8865](#).

In his statement, the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization stated that the significance of the Treaty, and its twenty-fifth anniversary, must be understood within the broader context of the collective goal of universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. While there might be differing views on the best path to achieve that goal, a verifiable and enforceable ban on nuclear testing must be a core component of the legal and technical architecture of a world free of nuclear weapons. He further noted that there was near universal adherence to the Treaty's prohibition on nuclear explosions and that there had been much progress towards the universalization of the Treaty, adding that he looked forward to coordinating efforts to welcome even more States into the Treaty community.

In her remarks, the member of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group highlighted that, over the past 25 years, through the state-of-the-art International Monitoring System, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization had proved its capacity to act as a comprehensive global monitoring system, which ensured that no nuclear test explosion went unnoticed by the international community. She then offered various ways in which the Treaty could be advanced, including by promoting and encouraging the use of the data from the International Monitoring System, especially in the scientific community, by providing education to raise the necessary awareness of disarmament, by using science and diplomacy to promote the Treaty and by including the younger generation in the sphere of nuclear disarmament through dialogue, education platforms and capacity-building events.

Following the briefings, the Minister of State for European Affairs of Ireland opened the discussion by stating that the meeting was an opportunity to reflect on the successes of the Treaty over its 25 years and to renew collective efforts to pursue its entry into force and universalization. He noted that the fact that the Treaty had 185 signatories and 170 ratifying States highlighted the strong global support for the Treaty. He also endorsed the recent reiteration by the President of the United States, Joseph Biden, and the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, that nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, which was an important recognition of the futility of nuclear weapons and the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. Following the Minister of State, most speakers underscored the importance of the Treaty as

part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and emphasized the importance of its entry into force. While some speakers welcomed the recent ratifications by the Comoros and Cuba,¹⁰⁴⁵ others called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Treaty,¹⁰⁴⁶ and to take concrete steps towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.¹⁰⁴⁷

In 2021, the Council also heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) under a separate item, entitled "Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council".¹⁰⁴⁸

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2572 (2021) in connection with the item. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) until 28 February 2022 with the continued assistance of its group of experts, as specified in paragraph 5 of resolution 1977 (2011).¹⁰⁴⁹ It further decided that the Committee, while continuing its work pursuant to its mandate, would continue to conduct and complete the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and submit to the Council a report on the conclusion of the review.¹⁰⁵⁰ In its explanation of vote, the delegation of the Russian Federation expressed regret that not all the concerns that it had expressed during the work on the draft resolution had been taken into account, in particular that the Council's endorsement of the work of the Committee carried out in the context of the comprehensive review, which had been included in the preambular part of the resolution, was considered premature.¹⁰⁵¹ The delegation also expressed the hope that the compromise reached would finally allow the Committee to focus on fulfilling its main task, namely, to conduct a comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) within the established time frame and to develop, based on its results, a new long-term mandate for that subsidiary body of the Council.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Russia Federation, United Kingdom, Italy and South Africa.

¹⁰⁴⁶ United Kingdom.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ireland, Estonia, France, United Kingdom, Norway and Italy.

¹⁰⁴⁸ See S/PV.8915. For more details, see sect. 29 above.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Resolution 2572 (2021), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), see part IX, sect. I.B.2.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Resolution 2572 (2021), para. 2.

¹⁰⁵¹ See S/2021/400.

Table 1

Meeting: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8865 27 September 2021	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty		Italy, South Africa	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, member of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group	12 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam. Estonia was represented by its Deputy Foreign Minister; India was represented by its Foreign Secretary; and Ireland (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister of State for European Affairs.

^b The member of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group participated in the meeting by videoconference.

Table 2

Videoconferences: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
30 March 2021	S/2021/325	Letter dated 1 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
22 April 2021	S/2021/400	Letter dated 22 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2572 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/393

B. Non-proliferation

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”. Both meetings took the form of a briefing.¹⁰⁵² More information on the meetings, including on the participants and speakers, is given in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole.¹⁰⁵³

Under the item, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding

Affairs, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations and the representative of Ireland, as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

At a meeting held on 30 June,¹⁰⁵⁴ the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).¹⁰⁵⁵ During the briefing, the Under-Secretary-General noted that the context for the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) had improved considerably since the Council

¹⁰⁵² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

¹⁰⁵³ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 30. See also [S/2021/1032](#) and [S/2022/174](#).

¹⁰⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8811](#).

¹⁰⁵⁵ [S/2021/582](#).

had met in December 2020.¹⁰⁵⁶ She also said that diplomatic efforts in Vienna offered a critical opportunity for both the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and the resolution. The Under-Secretary-General echoed the Secretary-General's appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan, extend the waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran and once again facilitate nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan and the resolution. Following the Under-Secretary-General, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations similarly welcomed the engagement of all participants in the Plan and the declared intention of the United States to rejoin the Plan. He noted that the European Union remained fully committed to the Plan and that it was determined to continue working with the international community to preserve it. Notwithstanding his deep concern that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to accumulate low-enriched uranium in excess of the thresholds set out in the Plan, the representative of the European Union took note of the country's reaffirmed position that it was ready to return to the full implementation of the Plan. He expressed optimism that sufficient space for diplomacy would be granted in order to bring the Plan back on a path towards full implementation in the very near future. In that regard, he acknowledged that the Plan continued to be a key component of the global non-proliferation architecture that helped to reduce regional and global security risks.

The Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), thanked all Council members for unanimously approving her eleventh report¹⁰⁵⁷ and noted that talks in Vienna offered the prospect of a return to the Plan by the United States and the full and effective implementation of the agreement by all parties. Elaborating on some aspects of her report, she mentioned that, on 18 February, the United States had notified the Council (see [S/2021/158](#)) that it had withdrawn its letters of 20 August 2020 ([S/2020/815](#)), 21 August 2020 ([S/2020/822](#)) and 21 September 2020 ([S/2020/927](#)), making clear the understanding of all Council members that resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) remained in effect in all its parts.¹⁰⁵⁸ Echoing the statement made by the Secretary-

General in his report, she added that there was a new environment compared with six months prior.¹⁰⁵⁹

Some Council members¹⁰⁶⁰ expressed their regret at the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan in 2018, with several¹⁰⁶¹ welcoming the efforts of the United States to rejoin the Plan, to revitalize it and to ensure its full and transparent implementation. In that context, categorically rejecting all unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the representative of China expressed the hope that the United States would pay attention and respond positively during the negotiations. Referring to the Secretary-General's eleventh report, the representative of the United States noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued its escalatory steps, including many that exceeded the nuclear limits set out in the Plan. He added that the United States would continue to use all the tools at its disposal to counter the destabilizing activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and to promote the implementation of Council resolutions to address the proliferation by the country of conventional weapons. Several participants¹⁰⁶² also expressed concern about the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2019 to start reducing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and about its continuation of nuclear developments and ballistic missile launches. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that a real revision of the decisions taken by the previous United States Administration had not yet been seen and that all of the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to temporarily freeze its commitments had been a legitimate response to non-compliance on the part of the United States with the deal. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that it had been the United States that had violated resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), reimposed countless inhumane sanctions and pursued a maximum pressure policy on his country. In that regard, he stated that the challenges to the implementation of the Plan could not be assessed in isolation and that those challenges had arisen when the United States had unlawfully withdrawn from the Plan and waged an economic war against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Stating that, while the Plan should not be directly linked to regional security issues, the Iranian nuclear issue did have an impact on the situation in the Middle East, the representative of China reiterated the proposal made to establish a

¹⁰⁵⁶ See [S/PV.8811](#).

¹⁰⁵⁷ See [S/2021/602](#).

¹⁰⁵⁸ For additional background information on the letters submitted in 2020, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part V, sect. II.

¹⁰⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8811](#).

¹⁰⁶⁰ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland and Norway.

¹⁰⁶¹ Niger, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Kenya and Norway.

¹⁰⁶² United Kingdom, Mexico, Ireland, France, Norway, Estonia and Germany.

multilateral dialogue platform in the Gulf region as a way to encourage countries in the region to reach consensus on regional security issues through dialogue and consultation.¹⁰⁶³ Similarly, the representative of the Russian Federation also addressed regional security in the Persian Gulf as a discussion for the future, once the deal was fully restored.

At a meeting held on 14 December,¹⁰⁶⁴ the Council heard the second briefing of the year on the reports in connection with the item.¹⁰⁶⁵ In her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General noted that diplomatic efforts regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action had resumed in Vienna and that the status of the negotiations indicated that the full restoration of the Plan and the resolution would require additional effort and patience.¹⁰⁶⁶ She reiterated the Secretary-General's appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions and extend the waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran, while calling on the Islamic Republic of Iran to reverse the steps it had taken that were not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. During his briefing, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union informed the Council that, since April, all participants in the Plan and the United States had engaged in intense negotiations in Vienna to bring the Plan back on track. He noted that, while the negotiations had been paused on 20 June as a new President and Government had taken office in the Islamic Republic of Iran, they had resumed on 29 November in Vienna, with the aim of negotiating the return of the United States to the agreement and the resumption of the commitments made under the Plan by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. He noted with great regret and worry that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to expand its nuclear activities by accumulating more enriched uranium, raising serious non-proliferation concerns. Also of great concern was the country's continued lack of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. He welcomed the stated positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States and reiterated the call for all sides to be flexible and pragmatic and to step up their efforts to accelerate the process to put the Plan back on track to full implementation. The Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), thanked all Council members for the unanimous approval of her twelfth report¹⁰⁶⁷ and emphasized that

they must continue to play their part in demonstrating that resolution 2231 (2015), by which the Council had endorsed the Plan, was working as it should.¹⁰⁶⁸

During the deliberations, some Council members¹⁰⁶⁹ explicitly supported the resumption and ongoing diplomatic process in Vienna. In that context, several Council members¹⁰⁷⁰ also called on all parties to continue to engage in constructive negotiations and refrain from all activities and rhetoric that could deepen mistrust or aggravate tensions. The representative of the United States noted that the country was prepared to lift sanctions that were inconsistent with its commitments under the Plan. She said that she was convinced that, if the Islamic Republic of Iran approached talks in Vienna with urgency and good faith, an understanding on mutual return could quickly be reached and implemented. However, she stated that the continued nuclear escalations of the Islamic Republic of Iran were inconsistent with the stated goal of returning to mutual compliance with the Plan. In that regard, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran responded that the country was continuing remedial measures concurrently with the Vienna talks because the non-performance of obligations by other parties continued and that, as soon as other parties implemented all their obligations in a full, effective and verifiable manner, the Islamic Republic of Iran would immediately reverse its measures in full. He emphasized that the current Vienna talks could succeed only by engaging in negotiations with genuine political will and in good faith and by sticking to the full, effective and verifiable implementation by all sides of all commitments under the Plan, which was the most pragmatic and easily achievable solution at the earliest time.

Concerning the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), several speakers¹⁰⁷¹ found that the development and testing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and related technologies by the Islamic Republic of Iran were concerning and inconsistent with the paragraph. The representative of France stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran could not be unaware that, under its obligations under resolution 2231 (2015), it was not to carry out any activities related to ballistic missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology. In response, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran explained that the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles were completely outside of the

¹⁰⁶³ For more information on the pacific settlement of disputes, see part VI.

¹⁰⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8930](#).

¹⁰⁶⁵ See [S/2021/992](#), [S/2021/995](#) and [S/2021/1019](#).

¹⁰⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8930](#).

¹⁰⁶⁷ See [S/2021/1019](#).

¹⁰⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8930](#).

¹⁰⁶⁹ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Norway and Niger.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Viet Nam, Norway, Tunisia and Kenya.

¹⁰⁷¹ United Kingdom, Norway, Estonia and Germany.

purview of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and rejected attempts to make arbitrary and distorted interpretations of that paragraph. The representative of China underlined that parties must effectively dispense with the obstacles, including repeatedly hyping the missile launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and ensure that negotiations did not radically veer off in the wrong direction. While reaffirming the importance of giving due consideration to the concerns expressed in that regard, including regarding regional security issues, the representative of Tunisia urged all parties to refrain from all activities and rhetoric that could deepen mistrust or aggravate tensions

and to engage in good faith in dialogue and negotiations to resolve their differences. The representative of the Russian Federation believed that progress in terms of the United States returning to the full implementation of the deal would create the conditions for a positive reaction from the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the unfreezing of certain obligations that had been suspended. He shared the view that the deal contained a carefully negotiated balance of interests and must be implemented exactly in the form in which it had been approved by the Council in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), without any deletions or additions.

Meetings: non-proliferation

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8811 30 June 2021	Letter dated 16 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/578) Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/582) Letter dated 24 June 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/602)	Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran		Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8930 14 December 2021	Letter dated 1 December 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/992) Twelfth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2021/995)	Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran		Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Head of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, ^a all invitees	

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
	Letter dated 7 December 2021 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/1019)					

^a The representative of Ireland gave a briefing in her capacity as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

C. Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

During the period under review, Council members held a videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea” to announce the adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁰⁷² More information on the videoconference is given in the table below. In addition, Council members held consultations of the whole and closed videoconferences in connection with the item.¹⁰⁷³

On 26 March, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2569 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the

mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#), for a period of 12 months, until 30 April 2022. The Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intent to review the Panel's mandate and to take appropriate action regarding a further extension no later than 25 March 2022, as well as to continue to follow the work of the Panel. The Council also underscored that the Panel would carry out credible, fact-based, independent assessments, analyses and recommendations in an objective and impartial manner and in accordance with its mandate.¹⁰⁷⁴

¹⁰⁷² For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹⁰⁷³ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 33.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Resolution [2569 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1, 2, 4 and 5. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.B.

Videoconference: Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Videoconference date	Videoconference record	Title	Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure
26 March 2021	S/2021/303	Letter dated 26 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2569 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/296

32. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

During the period under review, the Council held one high-level meeting under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, which took the

form of an open debate.¹⁰⁷⁵ More information on the meeting, including on the participants and speakers, is

¹⁰⁷⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

given in the table below. In 2021, no decision was adopted in connection with the item.

On 12 October, at the initiative of Kenya, which held the presidency for the month,¹⁰⁷⁶ the Council convened a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Diversity, State-building and the search for peace”.¹⁰⁷⁷ Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the former President of South Africa and the first woman Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷⁸

During his briefing, the Secretary-General underscored that any peace would be short-lived without including a wide range of diverse voices at every step of the process and bringing all people along. He noted that one undeniable trend was the sharp increase in the number of non-State armed groups at the heart of conflicts, that there was also a rise in military coups and that many conflicts were deeply rooted in long-standing inequalities among groups. He emphasized that national institutions and laws must work for all people, that countries should consider giving more space to subnational regions and that building and sustaining peace required women, young people and the most marginalized to be involved at every step.

Participating under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure,¹⁰⁷⁹ the President of Rwanda provided a briefing, during which he emphasized that peacebuilding should be understood as an ongoing process and that the intensity and impact of conflicts could be minimized by remaining attentive to local needs and expectations. He also underscored that external advice and examples could be helpful in encouraging reflection and finding new approaches, since there was no universal template that could be transferred automatically from one context to another. Furthermore, he highlighted the growing power of social media to exploit vectors of division in society and noted that peacebuilding was deeply political and human and must take into account the emotions and memories that the various parties brought to the table.

The former President of South Africa focused, during his briefing, on the primacy of politics, meaning that conflict resolution must address the vital matter of the root causes of the conflict, not to merely silence the guns but to ensure sustainable peace. He clarified that the resolution of conflicts should not be driven simply or mainly by security considerations. He stated that his own personal experience, derived from his involvement in conflict resolution on the African continent, confirmed the centrality of the failure to properly manage diversity as one of the root causes of civil war and violent conflict. Lastly, he suggested that the Council proceed from a position of acceptance of the primacy of the political as it discharged its obligation to maintain international peace and security. Its interventions would therefore help to produce sustainable peace and contribute to State-building by addressing such challenges as the proper management of diversity.

In her briefing, the former Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Afghanistan highlighted that the women and men in her country who dedicated their lives to building peace and promoting the rule of law, justice and equality were living under harsh oppression imposed on them through the power of exclusion. She said that what was happening in Afghanistan should be of concern to all. She noted that power imbalances were at the root of conflict and inequality and mentioned two specific areas in which power structures caused particular chaos, namely, in the relationship between men and women and when directed or misdirected at minorities. With reference to the public platform that Council members enjoyed, she stated that Council members had the duty to bring in those who were different rather than to push them out and that Council members could promote the essential values of respect, compromise and dialogue. With regard to the situation in Afghanistan, she explained that the main lesson from the past 150 years of history of the country was that a durable peace and sustainable State in a multi-ethnic and diverse country required a pluralistic social and political structure. As the humanitarian crisis loomed, women and children constituted the majority of the vulnerable population. To reach them, especially given the gender discrimination ideology of those holding power in Kabul, it was imperative that the United Nations demanded the protection and inclusion of Afghan female aid workers and peacebuilders and other civic professionals and community organizations, not only the recipients but also the decision-makers.¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 6 October (S/2021/854).

¹⁰⁷⁷ See S/PV.8877. See also S/2021/868. While briefers and Council members participated in person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹⁰⁷⁸ See S/PV.8877.

¹⁰⁷⁹ For more information on participation in meetings of the Council, see part II, sect. VIII.

¹⁰⁸⁰ For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see sect. 14 above.

Some Council members¹⁰⁸¹ shared their experiences in addressing the challenges related to diversity and identity, including with regard to the management of diversity, political transition and post-conflict peacebuilding. Council members¹⁰⁸² also focused on the centrality of including all relevant actors, such as women, youth, civil society and marginalized groups, and their views in conflict prevention and resolution as well as transition and peacebuilding. Several Council members¹⁰⁸³ emphasized the need for the Council to promote human rights and to recognize and call out human rights violations, which could be a prelude to and even a driver of conflict, while some¹⁰⁸⁴ highlighted the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

Other participating Member States also shared their views on diversity, peacebuilding and sustaining peace.¹⁰⁸⁵ Some¹⁰⁸⁶ emphasized that diversity was a

strength and a driver for peace in a country, while also sometimes a source of division and conflict. Several Member States¹⁰⁸⁷ drew attention to the importance of developing strong, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions in State-building. Several participants reiterated that peacekeeping operations, working closely with national stakeholders, should include peacebuilding considerations and components to sustain peace, with some¹⁰⁸⁸ highlighting in particular the importance of such support during transitions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Member States¹⁰⁸⁹ also addressed the importance of ensuring predictable and sufficient financing for peacebuilding. Several Member States¹⁰⁹⁰ also highlighted the contribution and important role of the Peacebuilding Fund, including in addressing challenges to peacebuilding through holistic action and strengthening institutional capacity.

¹⁰⁸¹ Kenya, United States, India, Niger, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Norway and Estonia.

¹⁰⁸² United States, United Kingdom, France, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam, Norway and Ireland.

¹⁰⁸³ United States, United Kingdom, Mexico and Ireland.

¹⁰⁸⁴ United States, United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, Tunisia and Ireland.

¹⁰⁸⁵ See [S/2021/868](#).

¹⁰⁸⁶ Chile, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and Thailand.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Chile, Egypt, Japan, Malta and Nigeria.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Bangladesh, Haiti, Italy, Jordan, Nepal, Poland and South Africa.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Bangladesh, Egypt, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland and Portugal.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ecuador, Malta, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland and Portugal.

Meeting: peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Meeting and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8877 and S/2021/868 12 October 2021	Diversity, State-building and the search for peace Letter dated 6 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/854)		Rwanda	Former President of South Africa, first woman Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Afghanistan	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

^a Kenya (President of the Council) was represented by its President. India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs and Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet.

^b Rwanda was represented by its President, who participated in the meeting by videoconference. The former President of South Africa and the former Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Afghanistan also participated by videoconference.

33. Threats to international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”.¹⁰⁹¹ More information on the meetings is provided in table 1 below. In 2021, the Council adopted one resolution under the item, in which it extended the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) established pursuant to resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#) until 17 September 2022.¹⁰⁹² Council members also held one videoconference in connection with the item, more details on which are given in table 2 below.¹⁰⁹³

In 2021, under the item, Council members heard briefings on the progress made in the work of UNITAD.¹⁰⁹⁴ In that regard, the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant provided two briefings to the members of the Council in connection with the biannual reports on the activities of the Team.¹⁰⁹⁵

In an open videoconference held on 10 May,¹⁰⁹⁶ the Special Adviser informed Council members about the rapid expansion of the evidentiary holdings of UNITAD over the past six months, including significant developments in the collection of forensic evidence from mass grave sites, digital data extracted from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) hard drives and the digitization of documentary case files, in cooperation with Iraqi authorities. The Special Adviser further told Council members that initial case briefs had been completed in relation to two key investigative priorities: the mass killing of unarmed cadets and military personnel at Tikrit Air Academy in June 2014 and the attacks against the Yazidi community in the Sinjar region. With regard to the attacks in the Sinjar region, he confirmed that, based on its independent criminal investigations, UNITAD had established clear and convincing evidence that genocide had been committed

by ISIL/Da’esh against the Yazidi as a religious group. In addition, in relation to the mass killing at Tikrit Air Academy, he noted that UNITAD had concluded that those acts constituted war crimes of murder, torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity and that, based on clear and convincing evidence, a Da’esh video released in July 2015 showed that those killings constituted a direct and public incitement to commit genocide against Shia Muslims. In order to fulfil the mandate of UNITAD, he said that the Team’s work must be put before national courts to prosecute those responsible for the horrific crimes he had described. In that regard, he confirmed that UNITAD had put in place arrangements with the Iraqi judiciary allowing the Team to transfer evidence it had collected concerning financial crimes committed in support of ISIL/Da’esh activities in Iraq. He also said that, in parallel, UNITAD had sought to harness existing channels for the use of its evidence in criminal proceedings as a way to strengthen its support provided to other national authorities in response to requests for assistance.

During the same videoconference, Council members also heard a briefing by the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Nadia Murad. While acknowledging that the work of UNITAD presented opportunities for justice and that the Team was contributing evidence to a number of ongoing proceedings, she said that much work remained. She added that, with successful investigations, the Council must now prioritize and accelerate concrete action to address the findings. In that regard, she affirmed that international tribunals were needed to address the universal magnitude of ISIL/Da’esh crimes against humanity. She also referred to her earlier call to the Council to create a clear plan for prosecution and to refer the genocide to the International Criminal Court or to establish a court by treaty. She added that accountability was essential to defeating ISIL/Da’esh and formally acknowledging the trauma that survivors continued to endure.

Following the briefing, Council members expressed support for the work of UNITAD, welcomed the progress it had achieved in its investigations and acknowledged the cooperation between the Team and the Iraqi authorities. Council members¹⁰⁹⁷ also discussed the reform of the legislative framework that would enable Iraq to process the evidence collected by UNITAD. In that regard, the representative of France recalled the United Nations consistent position of

¹⁰⁹¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

¹⁰⁹² Resolution [2597 \(2021\)](#), para. 2. For more information on the establishment of UNITAD, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*.

¹⁰⁹³ See also [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 29. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹⁰⁹⁴ For more information about the situation concerning Iraq, see sect. 21 above.

¹⁰⁹⁵ [S/2021/419](#) and [S/2021/974](#).

¹⁰⁹⁶ See [S/2021/460](#).

¹⁰⁹⁷ China, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United States.

non-transmission of material in the context of legal proceedings involving the possibility of a death sentence and encouraged the Iraqi authorities to finalize the legislative framework in accordance with the highest human rights standards and principles. The representative of Ireland recalled the country's unequivocal opposition to the use of the death penalty in that context, and the representative of the United Kingdom urged collaboration to secure an evidence-sharing mechanism that provided assurances on the use of the death penalty. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the Russian Federation did not see any reason to make that sort of cooperation dependent on legislative reforms, noting that the Council had never prescribed such an approach. Several Council members¹⁰⁹⁸ also referred to the need to respect the sovereignty of Iraq, with some¹⁰⁹⁹ recalling that the Iraqi authorities were the primary intended recipients of evidence collected by UNITAD, in accordance with resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#). In his statement, the representative of Iraq noted that his Government was making legal preparations to use evidence received from UNITAD before national courts, thereby enhancing their legal and judicial capabilities. He further underscored that, after more than three years of continuous work and concerted efforts by the Government of Iraq and UNITAD, it was crucial for the Government of Iraq to obtain the results and evidence gathered by the Team and emphasized that UNITAD should operate with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory against its citizens. In that regard, he added that the Team must abide by its mandate and the periods of time specified therein, which had been extended with the approval and at the request of his Government.

On 17 September, further to the request of the Government of Iraq,¹¹⁰⁰ the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2597 \(2021\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of the Special Adviser and UNITAD for a period of one year, until 17 September 2022.¹¹⁰¹ By the resolution, the Council also requested the Special Adviser to continue to submit and present reports to the Council on the Team's activities every 180 days.¹¹⁰²

¹⁰⁹⁸ China, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

¹⁰⁹⁹ China, India, Russian Federation and Tunisia.

¹¹⁰⁰ See [S/2021/801](#).

¹¹⁰¹ Resolution [2597 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

¹¹⁰² *Ibid.*, para. 3. For more details on UNITAD, see part IX, sect. III.

At a meeting held on 2 December,¹¹⁰³ the newly appointed Special Adviser provided his first briefing to the Council in connection with his report on the activities of UNITAD.¹¹⁰⁴ He said that there was a moment of perhaps unexpected hope and noted that, through the establishment of structural case briefs addressing crimes committed against all affected communities in Iraq, through the development of detailed case files tying the actions of specific ISIL/Da'esh members to those crimes and by harnessing advanced technology to serve that purpose, a new landscape could be envisioned in which those who believed themselves to be out of reach of justice were held accountable in a court of law.¹¹⁰⁵ He announced to the Council that UNITAD had finalized its initial case brief detailing the Team's conclusion that the crimes committed by ISIL/Da'esh members at Badush Central Prison constituted crimes against humanity of murder, extermination, torture, enforced disappearances, persecution and other inhumane acts, and the war crimes of wilful killing, torture, inhumane treatment and outrage upon personal dignity. He also indicated that it was essential that those who had financially supported and profited from ISIL/Da'esh crimes were also brought to justice. That imperative, combined with a drive to understand the economic mechanisms at the heart of ISIL/Da'esh operations, had guided the work of the dedicated Financial Crimes Unit of UNITAD. Noting the enhanced engagement with the Iraqi authorities, the Special Adviser acknowledged that the work of UNITAD in implementing its mandate would not be satisfied through the collection of evidence alone or through the establishment of an archive or historical record, adding that the evidence must be put to work before the competent courts. In that regard, the Team had redoubled its efforts to share knowledge with national authorities in areas that might ultimately support the development of joint case files and the conduct of proceedings in Iraq. The Special Adviser further asserted that, by the end of 2022, UNITAD would have established a cross-cutting and comprehensive legal basis for the prosecution of ISIL/Da'esh members for international crimes committed against a broad range of communities, as well as its chemical weapons programme and financial support systems. He also underlined his commitment, at the request of the Government of Iraq, to work with all partners in establishing a domestic legal framework that allowed UNITAD to harness the evidence in prosecuting ISIL/Da'esh members in Iraq. In closing, he noted that a landmark moment had been reached in the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt, Germany, through the first-

¹¹⁰³ See [S/PV.8914](#).

¹¹⁰⁴ See [S/2021/974](#).

¹¹⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8914](#).

ever conviction of an ISIL/Da'esh member for the crime of genocide.

Following the briefing, Council members welcomed the continued progress in the Team's investigations and commended the collaboration between the Team and the Iraqi authorities. Council members also expressed support for and commended the Team's efforts in investigating the use of biological and chemical weapons by ISIL/Da'esh. In reference to the conviction of an ISIL/Da'esh member by a court in Germany, the representative of Kenya recognized the contributions made by UNITAD in that regard. Similarly, the representative of Ireland stated that the conviction was an important reminder of the Team's value in delivering justice for the victims and survivors of ISIL/Da'esh crimes, and the representative of the Niger invited all States to strengthen their cooperation with UNITAD to identify, apprehend and bring to justice all those who were suspected of committing crimes of terrorism. As in prior discussions on the

matter, several Council members¹¹⁰⁶ underscored the importance of respecting the sovereignty of Iraq in the Team's discharge of its mandate. The representative of Iraq stated that the Iraqi Parliament had completed its first reading of the draft bill establishing the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, which would make it possible for Iraq "to use the evidence related to crimes committed by Da'esh against the Iraqi people". He also underscored that his Government was following and assessing the work of UNITAD and that it was critical to establish a strategic plan together with the National Coordinating Committee in order to achieve the Team's goals, reiterating that Iraq would continue to cooperate with the Team and would provide the necessary assistance. He also noted that the use of criminal evidence beyond Iraqi jurisdiction must be subject to the agreement of the Government of Iraq.

¹¹⁰⁶ China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

Table 1

Meetings: threats to international peace and security

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8863 17 September 2021		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2021/803)				Resolution 2597 (2021) 15-0-0
S/PV.8914 2 December 2021	Letter dated 24 November 2021 from the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/974)		Iraq	Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD	All Council members, all invitees	

Table 2

Videoconference: threats to international peace and security

Videoconference data	Videoconference record	Title	Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure
10 May 2021	S/2021/460	Letter dated 12 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

34. Maintenance of international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council held eight meetings in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”. The Council adopted three resolutions, one of them under Chapter VII of the Charter, and adopted four presidential statements. More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. In addition, Council members held 10 videoconferences in connection with the item.¹¹⁰⁷ More information on the videoconferences is given in table 2 below. In addition to meetings and videoconferences, Council members also held informal consultations of the whole and closed videoconferences in connection with the item.¹¹⁰⁸

As in previous periods, a broad range of new and existing sub-items and themes were discussed in connection with the item.¹¹⁰⁹ The sub-items and themes addressed in 2021 were the following: (a) challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts; (b) implementation of resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#);¹¹¹⁰

(c) climate and security; (d) conflict and food security; (e) mine action and sustaining peace – stronger partnerships for better delivery; (f) upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system; (g) cybersecurity; (h) maritime security; (i) exclusion, inequality and conflict; (j) peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations; and (k) security in the context of terrorism and climate change.

On 6 January, at the initiative of Tunisia, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹¹¹ Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on the theme “Challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts”.¹¹¹² At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the former President of Liberia.

In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General stated that addressing the links between fragility and conflict was an essential component of international peace and security, because fragility and conflict were among the greatest obstacles to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Referring to the World Bank report entitled *Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight against Poverty*, he noted that humanitarian needs had multiplied, reaching the highest levels since the Second World War. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic had further exacerbated those trends. Noting that the climate emergency was a further driver of insecurity, he emphasized that, to break the cycle of poverty and conflict, there was a need for a more ambitious approach based on the principles of interdependence and inclusion enshrined in the Sustainable

¹¹⁰⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹¹⁰⁸ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 34.

¹¹⁰⁹ As explained in *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I, videoconferences, whether open or closed, were not considered formal meetings of the Council for all relevant purposes, including for the agenda of the Council. Therefore, topics discussed in videoconferences were not considered as formal sub-items. For more information on new sub-items and topics, see part II, sect. III.A.

¹¹¹⁰ The topics for the open videoconferences on 25 January and 17 February were “Follow-up on the implementation of resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#)” and “Implementation of resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#)”, respectively. They were consolidated as a single topic.

¹¹¹¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 28 December 2020 ([S/2020/1296](#)).

¹¹¹² See [S/2021/24](#).

Development Goals. Underscoring that the linkages between conflict and fragility had been particularly visible on the African continent, the Secretary-General advocated increased financing for prevention and peacebuilding and ensuring predictable, flexible and sustained financing for the deployment of African peace enforcement operations authorized by the Council. He also urged the Council to play a critical role in addressing the links between fragility and conflict, adding that the Council could mobilize the international community's political and financial support, spotlight critical areas of need and foster the commitment of conflict actors where needed.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission reaffirmed that the challenges of peacekeeping in fragile contexts were at the heart of the concerns of the African Union. State fragility remained a major obstacle to development in Africa, and overcoming that challenge was therefore a top priority for the African Union. He recounted the policies adopted by the African Union aimed at supporting its member States and strengthening their capacity to prevent conflicts and tensions and recalled that the African Union had focused its tireless efforts on realizing the principle of African solutions to African problems. He commended the Council's effort in adopting resolution [2457 \(2019\)](#), but acknowledged that challenges, including access to predictable and sustainable resources in support of operations initiated or led by the African Union that had a clear and robust mandate, had continued to undermine the ability of the African Union to effectively carry out its mandate. Noting that exclusion was one of the key drivers of crises and tensions, he stated that the only strategy for addressing fragility was to resolutely succeed in policies to empower women and boldly integrate young people into a genuinely inclusive synergy of those vital forces in societies.

The former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, highlighted the three keys to ending the brutal armed conflict in Liberia, namely, the desire for peace by ordinary Liberians, the robust mandate of the regional peacekeeping force and its understanding of the threats to regional security, and the subsequent international support for the final peace agreement. In addition, she said that another key was women's leadership, affirming that without the Liberian women, Liberia would not have had peace. While noting that countries were questioning the efficacy of peacekeeping operations and the costs of running them, she affirmed that she remained a strong advocate of peacekeeping. She conceded that the architecture must change, with the flexibility to respond to challenging

circumstances and in consonance with the recognition of, and support for, local capability and leadership when the warning bells rang. She concluded by noting that the United Nations, with its many entities, especially the Security Council, was established to lead the process of global development and global equity and said that it must be an active mechanism for peace and scaled-up support for the fragile nations that for too long had been left behind.

Following the briefings, speakers discussed the need to address the challenges that fragility and conflict posed in the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular in Africa, including the role of women and young people. Many speakers urged the Council to foster closer cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the African Union and subregional organizations, in tackling those challenges. Many Council members expressed concern that the COVID-19 pandemic had exacerbated existing drivers of fragility and conflict, such as climate change, terrorism and transnational organized crime.

On 25 January, Council members held a videoconference focused on the theme "Follow-up on the implementation of resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#)".¹¹¹³ At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

In her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs stated that the devastation wrought by the pandemic had deepened, with more than 2 million people dead and close to 100 million of the world's population infected. Highlighting the impact of the pandemic on peace and security, she expressed concern about the effect of COVID-19 on women and youth, as well as other populations suffering from marginalization. While noting that the pandemic had hindered diplomatic action and complicated the peacemaking efforts, she recalled that the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire had generated widespread support for, and in some instances added new momentum to, faltering peace processes, offering examples in the situations in Afghanistan, Libya, Mozambique and eastern Ukraine. Despite those positive developments, she noted that, in several other contexts, the ceasefire call had had more mixed results, such as in the situation in the South Caucasus, where large-scale hostilities in and around

¹¹¹³ See [S/2021/90](#).

Nagorno-Karabakh had broken out in September 2021. She described initiatives of the Secretary-General's special representatives, envoys and missions in adjusting to the changing reality brought about by the pandemic, combining virtual and in-person work and taking calculated risks to fulfil their mandates to advance peace processes, de-escalate crises and prevent conflict, including new tools, such as digital focus groups, that had been developed and used to broaden the inclusiveness of United Nations engagements. She also underscored that the collective and individual engagement of members of the Council and the international community would remain crucial, especially in supporting the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire and engaging with parties to conflicts and their backers to ensure that they heeded the appeal.

The Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations focused his briefing on five key issues. He first underlined the complex political situations that had continued to feel the strain of COVID-19, such as the situations in the Central African Republic, Cyprus, Lebanon and South Sudan. Second, he noted that peacekeeping missions had continued to deliver on their mandated tasks. With the collaboration of Member States, troop- and police-contributing countries and host States, missions had demonstrated adaptability, resilience and innovation. Third, peacekeeping operations had put a constant and steadfast emphasis on ensuring the safety and health of their personnel, be they military, police or civilian. Fourth, peacekeeping operations had consistently endeavoured to support host country authorities to contain the spread of COVID-19, at both the national and subnational levels. Finally, he stressed the need for the international community to turn its collective attention to managing the long-term impact of the pandemic and the role that peace operations could play. Despite all the challenges, he reaffirmed that the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and its Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations had continued to provide a framework for response and a road map for the collective efforts to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping.

The Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support reported on the various actions taken by the Department of Operational Support to allow field operations to continue to carry out their mandates, including the implementation of proactive measures to provide the field with supplies, equipment and personal protective equipment, the upgrading of medical facilities, virtual walk-throughs of duty stations, the

provision of simple but effective solutions to reduce the risk of spread, reliance on innovation to minimize exposure and contact, medical evacuations conducted by the United Nations System-Wide Task Force on Medical Evacuations in Response to COVID-19 as part of an inter-agency and system-wide effort and the establishment of regional hubs. He also reported that the Department had been tasked by the Secretary-General to coordinate a system-wide vaccination effort for all United Nations personnel and dependants worldwide.

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator provided a briefing on the humanitarian impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. He stated that almost a quarter of people who had contracted the virus across the world lived in countries facing humanitarian or refugee crises. He drew attention to the risk that the most fragile countries faced because of the lack of vaccines and the steep increase in food insecurity, resulting in multiple famines on the horizon. In terms of the response of the humanitarian system to COVID-19, he elaborated on various initiatives by humanitarian agencies to provide life-saving assistance to almost 100 million people. While the humanitarian community had managed to sustain and scale up assistance to an unprecedented level, those efforts had been outpaced by the growing scale of the crisis. The Under-Secretary-General sought the Council's help in three areas, namely, to provide immediate and generous funding for the *Global Humanitarian Overview 2021*, to strengthen the support that the international financial institutions provided to their most vulnerable members and to take urgent action to ensure that vaccines reached the most vulnerable people in the world. He also called for ensuring that COVID-19 vaccines did not get financed in the very poorest countries at the expense of other life-saving activities.

During the discussion, Council members and other participants reaffirmed their support for the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire and peaceful settlement of disputes. Many speakers emphasized the need for the international community to ensure an equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, in particular in conflict areas. They called for engagement in preventive diplomacy, notably in places where COVID-19 was exacerbating tensions that could potentially lead to the outbreak of conflict. Speakers stated that the pandemic had disrupted humanitarian aid flows and threatened development and peacebuilding gains in fragile and conflict-affected areas.

On 17 February, at the initiative of the United Kingdom, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹¹⁴ Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on the theme “Implementation of resolution 2532 (2020)”.¹¹¹⁵ At the videoconference, the members of the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Chief Executive Officer of the Gavi Alliance and the Secretary-General of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The Secretary-General underscored that the COVID-19 pandemic continued its merciless march across the world, upending lives, destroying economies and undermining the Sustainable Development Goals. He expressed concern that progress on vaccinations had been wildly uneven and unfair, with just 10 countries having administered 75 per cent of all COVID-19 vaccines and more than 130 countries not having received a single dose. He cautioned against allowing the virus to spread like wildfire in the global South, which could result in new variants and potentially threaten the effectiveness of current vaccines, thereby prolonging the pandemic significantly and enabling the virus to come back to plague the global North. He underscored the necessity of fully funding the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility and urged the Group of 20 to establish an emergency task force to prepare a global vaccination plan and coordinate its implementation and financing.

The Executive Director of UNICEF emphasized the need to ensure that vaccinations were available to everyone, including the millions of people living through, or fleeing, conflict and instability. She stated that UNICEF was proud to support the global response led by the World Health Organization, bringing its decades of experience and expertise to that massive task. As UNICEF prepared for that historic roll-out, she noted that the support of the Council was necessary. She asked the Council to join the call to ensure that everyone was included in the national vaccination plans of Member States, to ensure a global ceasefire by helping to extend the call made in resolution 2532 (2020) for a humanitarian pause for the duration of vaccine delivery and to help to restart stalled immunization campaigns for other diseases, such as measles, diphtheria and polio.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Gavi Alliance stressed the need to ensure that vulnerable at-risk populations everywhere had access to life-saving vaccines. He noted that the pandemic was more than a global health crisis. It was a significant challenge to international peace and security that could be addressed only through multilateral cooperation. He also said that epidemics and pandemics were an evolutionary certainty and that vaccines – where they existed – were a critical tool in preventing them and protecting everyone from new diseases. In that regard, he affirmed that those tools were a key investment in both national and international security. With reference to the COVAX Facility and its goal of equitable access, he said that a proposed humanitarian buffer would enable access to COVID-19 vaccines for high-risk populations in humanitarian settings. However, he noted that the humanitarian buffer was a measure of last resort and that the first resort for covering all high-risk groups was their inclusion in national vaccine plans. He asked the Council to reinforce that message so that available doses were distributed to ensure truly equitable access. He also said that it was fundamentally important for the Council to play its political role in enabling supplies to move into conflict-affected settings through neutral humanitarian actors, in accordance with international law. In closing, he asked the Council to advocate and invest in that unprecedented effort and to call on all nations to ensure the unhindered deployment of vaccines in settings affected by conflict and into the arms of all high-risk individuals, whether refugee or citizen.

The Secretary-General of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies noted that mistrust had consistently undermined COVID-19 response efforts, just as it had done during the Ebola virus disease crisis, citing examples of such instances occurring in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea. He emphasized that, during the current immunization phase of the global response, earning community trust remained crucial, especially against the backdrop of historically high levels of vaccine hesitancy. He suggested that the strong involvement of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and other local impartial organizations in vaccination activities could help to ensure that underserved, alienated or isolated communities – including those living in areas not under the control of States, as well as detainees, internally displaced persons and refugees – were not left behind. In that context, he drew attention to the efforts of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies aimed at maintaining routine immunizations

¹¹¹⁴ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 12 February (S/2021/138).

¹¹¹⁵ See S/2021/157.

in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and Pakistan, which had saved countless lives.

Following the briefings, participants underscored the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, including the role of the Council, Member States and the United Nations in ensuring the equitable distribution of vaccines, in particular to people living in conflict and fragile settings. The representative of Turkey stressed that no country could overcome the COVID-19 threat on its own. The pandemic was referred to as a threat or a risk to international peace and security by a number of delegations,¹¹¹⁶ and a threat to the sustainable development of peoples by the representative of Cuba. Participants also stressed the need to tackle misinformation leading to vaccine hesitancy. Many pointed to the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on women and children, advocating that they should be placed at the centre of the response. Some participants called for overcoming the challenges of COVID-19 with greater national, regional and international cooperation, with the United Nations playing a key coordinating role. In that context, several Member States¹¹¹⁷ emphasized the need to support peacekeeping operations, to ensure the vaccination of peacekeeping personnel and to utilize peacekeeping operations in the delivery and distribution of vaccines, in particular in conflict areas.¹¹¹⁸

On 23 February, again at the initiative of the United Kingdom, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹¹⁹ Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on the theme “Climate and security”.¹¹²⁰ At the videoconference, the members of the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General and a youth civil society representative and Chair of the Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change of the United Nations, Nisreen Elsaïm.

In his remarks, the Secretary-General noted that the climate emergency was the defining issue of the time. He emphasized that the science was clear, reaffirming the need to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C by the end of the century. He urged the international community to protect the people and communities who were being hit by climate disruption and to step up preparations for the escalating

implications of the climate crisis for international peace and security. Stating that climate disruption was a crisis amplifier and multiplier, he underscored that the impacts of the crisis were greatest where fragility and conflicts had weakened coping mechanisms, where people depended on natural capital, such as forests and fish stocks, for their livelihoods and where women did not enjoy equal rights, citing the situations in Afghanistan, West Africa and the Sahel and Darfur. He drew attention to the fact that vulnerability to climate risks was also correlated with income inequality. While stressing that much more needed to be done to address the specific risks that the climate crisis posed to peace and security, he described four priority areas. First, he highlighted the need for a greater focus on prevention through strong, ambitious climate action to get the world on track to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and prevent climate catastrophe. Second, he stressed the need for immediate actions to protect countries, communities and people from the increasingly frequent and severe climate impacts through a breakthrough on adaptation and resilience, which meant dramatically raising the level of investment. Third, the Secretary-General underscored the need to embrace a concept of security that put people at its centre, noting that the pandemic had shown the devastation that so-called non-traditional security threats could cause on a global scale. Lastly, he highlighted the need to deepen partnerships across and beyond the United Nations system by leveraging and building on the strengths of different stakeholders, including the Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, international financial institutions, regional organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia and others. In closing, he urged Council members to use their influence to ensure the success of the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and to mobilize others, including international financial institutions and the private sector, to do their part, stating that 2021 was a make-or-break year for collective action against the climate emergency.

The youth civil society representative and Chair of the Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change recalled previous Council debates on climate security risks, while noting that the Council had also included references to climate security risks in resolutions related to Somalia, the Sudan, West Africa and the Sahel, Mali and the Lake Chad basin. Stating that, after almost 14 years, the item on climate security was still valid and being discussed at the Council, she added that, for a young Sudanese person like her, not everything regarding climate change could be affiliated

¹¹¹⁶ Kenya, Niger, Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic countries) and Ukraine.

¹¹¹⁷ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, France, Russian Federation, Bangladesh, Belgium, European Union, Germany and Peru.

¹¹¹⁸ For further details on the discussion, see part VII, sect. I.

¹¹¹⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 17 February (S/2021/155).

¹¹²⁰ See S/2021/198.

with security. She recounted living in continuous insecurity owing to many factors, which had put the Sudan at the top of the list when it came to climate vulnerability. She recalled resolution 2429 (2018) on the Sudan, in which the Council had recognized the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters.¹¹²¹ Collecting data about conflict and climate change, consulting local communities and trusting in science were her key recommendations.¹¹²² In closing, she asked Member States to give more space to and listen and engage young people and urged them to stop conflicts by stopping climate change, to ensure security and secure the future.

Following the briefings, participants described their national actions and initiatives in combating the negative impact of climate change, offering various views on the related security risk. Council members highlighted that climate security concerns must be integrated into early warning and conflict prevention systems for a more effective prevention of future crises. Many delegations underlined that climate change continued to be a multiplier of existing threats to international peace and security. While many Member States stressed that the link between climate and conflict could not be more evident, including the role of the Council in dealing with the issue, others¹¹²³ signalled that there were already established mechanisms to deal with climate change, primarily, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. There were also calls by Member States for the United Nations to enhance its cooperation with regional organizations in addressing the climate crisis. To that end, many participants expressed strong support for the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in addressing climate security risks.¹¹²⁴

On 11 March, at the initiative of the United States, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹²⁵ Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on the theme “Conflict and food security”.¹¹²⁶ At the videoconference, the members of the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of Oxfam International and the Executive Director of the World Food Programme.

The Secretary-General stated that hunger and poverty combined with inequality, climate shocks, sectarian and ethnic tensions and grievances over land and resources to spark and drive conflict. While commending the enormous inroads into hunger that had been made over recent decades, he warned that the international community was facing multiple conflict-driven famines around the world, notably across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and accelerating in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Yemen. He informed the Council of his decision to establish the High-level Task Force on Preventing Famine, led by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Elaborating on the mandate of the Task Force, he stated that it would include representatives from the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and would bring coordinated, high-level attention to famine prevention and mobilize support for the most affected countries. He added that the Task Force would draw on the support of other members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and cooperate with non-governmental organizations, international financial institutions and other specialized United Nations agencies. He recalled that humanitarian access must not be impeded and that the use of famine as a method of war constituted a war crime. He urged the members of the Council to act using every means so that those responsible for those atrocious acts were held accountable and to remind the parties to conflict of their obligations in the context of international humanitarian law. He also called on Council members to use their privileged position to do everything in their power to end violence, negotiate peace and alleviate the hunger and suffering afflicting so many millions of people around the world.

The Executive Director of Oxfam International narrated the stories of people who were suffering from acute hunger in countries where conflict and insecurity stalked. Setting out a set of recommendations, she urged the Council to make good on its unanimous agreement to break the vicious cycle of conflict and food insecurity. First, the Council should deepen its work on the topic with a clear commitment for action. Second, the Council must urgently take genuine action to support the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire, while ensuring humanitarian access and the inclusion of women from the beginning of the process. Third, the Council should apply the principles it had endorsed in the abstract to the specific situations on its agenda. Fourth, it should endorse, and its members should lead, the effort to fulfil the global appeal for \$5.5 billion to meet additional needs to avert famine, especially in the light of COVID-19, and lastly, it

¹¹²¹ Resolution 2429 (2018), twenty-first preambular paragraph.

¹¹²² See S/2021/198.

¹¹²³ India, China, Russian Federation, Brazil and South Africa.

¹¹²⁴ For further details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.

¹¹²⁵ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 3 March (S/2021/217).

¹¹²⁶ See S/2021/250.

should endorse a people's vaccine for COVID-19 that was free and accessible to all.

Describing the initiatives of and the progress made by his organization in providing life-saving assistance to millions of people, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme stated that his organization's food insecurity projections for 2021 were truly shocking, citing the situations in such countries as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic and in the region of the Sahel. Noting that the Council had a moral obligation to do everything in its power to end those wars, he urged Council members to provide immediate funding to avoid multiple famines around the world and to fund the development programmes that could transform the lives of people in fragile, conflict-scarred nations and help to lay new pathways to peace.

In their statements, participants discussed the worsening food security environment, relevant obligations under international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, and challenges to mobilizing adequate and timely resources for humanitarian assistance. Many Council members recalled resolution 2417 (2018), in which the Council drew attention to the link between armed conflict and violence and conflict-induced food insecurity and the threat of famine.¹¹²⁷ Council members echoed the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire in response to the pandemic.¹¹²⁸ Some Member States¹¹²⁹ questioned the appropriateness of discussing the issue at the Council and expressed the view that the issue of food security should be dealt with by mechanisms and organs specifically mandated to address those issues.

On 8 April, at the initiative of Viet Nam, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹³⁰ Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on the theme "Mine action and sustaining peace – stronger partnerships for better delivery".¹¹³¹ At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the United Nations Development Programme Goodwill Ambassador, the Director of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the Provincial Programme Manager and Manager of Project Renew.

In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General noted that landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices maimed and killed indiscriminately. He noted that, while progress had been made, challenges had intensified. Conflict had become more urbanized, armed groups were proliferating and the use of improvised explosive devices was increasing. In that connection, he highlighted three areas for attention: first, the constant threat of explosive ordnance endangering the lives of the people serving in and protected by the United Nations missions; second, the role of mine action in advancing and underpinning durable solutions to conflict; and third, the need for increased political will and cooperation to prevent and respond to the threat of explosive ordnance. While emphasizing that mine action was a national responsibility, he underlined the need for partnerships and cooperation at the local, regional and international levels and mentioned the existing partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in reducing the threat of improvised explosive devices.

The United Nations Development Programme Goodwill Ambassador underscored that mine action was linked to the Sustainable Development Goals. In that regard, to reduce risks and build a better future for mine-affected communities, she suggested two main areas of work. First, she highlighted the need to raise awareness at the national and international levels of the role of mine action in achieving the Goals, including by highlighting evidence to engage more voices on the work and impact of mine action. Second, noting that there had been a downward trend in the financing of mine action, she stated that there was a need for financing and new partnerships to accelerate efforts.

In his statement, the Director of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining affirmed that mines and cluster munitions posed a severe threat to security and were an obstacle to lasting peace. He considered the meeting a unique opportunity to discuss mine action within the United Nations organ responsible for peace and security. He noted that the mine action sector was facing new challenges, which were relevant to the Council as well, not only because mine contamination was a threat to peace and security but also because mine action had proved to contribute significantly to peace efforts. He further reaffirmed that there could be no mine action without the contribution of all key stakeholders, including the Council.

The Provincial Programme Manager and Manager of Project Renew shared with the Council some recommendations, which, she believed, would lead to a

¹¹²⁷ Resolution 2417 (2018), para. 1.

¹¹²⁸ See S/2021/250.

¹¹²⁹ Russian Federation and Cuba.

¹¹³⁰ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 March (S/2021/284).

¹¹³¹ See S/2021/346.

more effective and efficient implementation of mine action. First, national capacity and national ownership should be increased to ensure the long-term success and sustainability of mine action results. Second, all national and international mine action stakeholders should coordinate closely at every level. Third, the international community could benefit from the experience and expertise of countries that experienced long-term impacts from explosive ordnance. Finally, she said that the involvement of women in all aspects of mine action should be promoted and increased.

Following the briefers, Council members discussed the threats and challenges posed by landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices, while noting the positive contribution of mine action to sustaining peace. The role of the Council and the support needed for the efforts of the Mine Action Service were also discussed by Member States. Many underlined the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations for the success of mine action, including the meaningful participation of women in activities relating to mine action.

On 7 May, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹³² Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on the theme “Upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system”.¹¹³³ At the videoconference, Council members heard a briefing by the President of the General Assembly.

In his opening remarks, the President of the General Assembly stated that strong and effective multilateralism, based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and justice, was the foundation for security, stability, peace and prosperity. He maintained that multilateralism played a crucial role in fostering dialogue and trust and in managing security challenges, such as terrorism and weapons proliferation. He underscored that, under the Charter, the Council was entrusted with a special responsibility in relation to international peace and security and noted that, for millions of people around the world, the Council was the face and embodiment of the United Nations, and therefore its success or failure to achieve its mandate was seen as the success or failure of the United Nations. On many occasions, the Council had been divided and unable to rise to the challenge, owing to differences among its members, in particular its

permanent members. He therefore urged all Member States, including the members of the Council, to strengthen the implementation of the Charter and formulate rules and processes that expedited justice with regard to human rights abusers and those who violated international humanitarian law. Regarding COVID-19 recovery plans and humanitarian responses, he underscored that they must be centred around human rights and the protection of civilians. Furthermore, he stressed the need to reinforce United Nations reforms, which supported an integrated approach to the current challenges.

Following the briefing, speakers discussed the development of multilateralism and the need for a collective response in tackling global challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, terrorism, climate change and other non-traditional threats, with the Council at its core. Participants elaborated on their country’s initiatives in upholding the United Nations-centred multilateral mechanism, including lessons learned and how to better consolidate the multilateral system and prevent the resurgence of unilateralism. Some Council members¹¹³⁴ reflected on the existing system of global governance and its shortcomings. Council members emphasized the need to uphold the principles and purposes of the Charter and reaffirmed the role of the United Nations in confronting current threats.¹¹³⁵

On 29 June, at the initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹³⁶ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the theme “Cybersecurity”, at which they heard a briefing by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.¹¹³⁷ Noting that advances in digital technologies continued to revolutionize human life, the High Representative pointed to the need to remain vigilant regarding the understanding of the malicious use of such technologies that could imperil the security of future generations. She reported that, regarding information and communications technology (ICT), a dramatic increase in the frequency of malicious incidents in past years had been observed, noting that efforts were underway to address them. In that regard, she recalled that two United Nations processes, an open-ended working group and a sixth group of governmental experts, both established in 2018, had recently and successfully concluded their respective work, taking important steps forward on the topic through the adoption of concrete, action-oriented recommendations.

¹¹³² A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 29 April (S/2021/416).

¹¹³³ See S/2021/456.

¹¹³⁴ China, Mexico, Niger and Russian Federation.

¹¹³⁵ For further details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.

¹¹³⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 8 June (S/2021/540).

¹¹³⁷ See S/2021/621.

At the regional level, regional organizations were also undertaking key efforts on those issues. While States carried the primary responsibility for maintaining international security, she underscored that ICT was an integral part of societies and that other stakeholders had a key role and interest, as well as a responsibility, in securing cyberspace, highlighting a series of cyberinitiatives led by the private sector, such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, led by Microsoft, the Charter of Trust, founded at the Munich Security Conference and initiated by Siemens, and the Global Transparency Initiative of Kaspersky Lab. Regarding the role of the United Nations, she stated that the Organization was ready to support States, together with other stakeholders, in promoting a peaceful ICT environment and made reference to the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation and the Secretary-General's launch of an agenda for disarmament, which placed emphasis on understanding and addressing new-generation technologies that posed possible challenges to existing legal, humanitarian and ethical norms, non-proliferation, and peace and security. Given the implications for the maintenance of international peace and security resulting from ICT threats, she said that engagement by the Council on the issue was paramount.

Following the briefing, Council members expressed concern about the consequences of cyberthreats and malicious cyberactivities on critical infrastructure and underscored the need for the international community to continue to respond to the global threats, which would ultimately threaten international peace and security. They emphasized that the fundamental provisions of the Charter should guide all States in their conduct in cyberspace and that States were obliged to adhere to the prohibition of the use of force. With reference to the group of governmental experts and the open-ended working group of the General Assembly,¹¹³⁸ participants emphasized that cyberspace was subject to international law, including the provisions of the Charter and the principle of State sovereignty.¹¹³⁹ Many participants welcomed the establishment of a new open-ended working group by the General Assembly.¹¹⁴⁰ Several¹¹⁴¹ called for a secure, stable and peaceful ICT environment, others¹¹⁴²

for bridging the digital divide and some¹¹⁴³ for the participation of women in decision-making processes and policies on cybersecurity.¹¹⁴⁴ In addition, the important role that regional organizations could exert in the field of cybersecurity was emphasized by Council members.¹¹⁴⁵

On 9 August, at the initiative of India, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹⁴⁶ Council members held a high-level open videoconference focused on the theme "Maritime security" and heard briefings by the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General and the Executive Director of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC).¹¹⁴⁷

The Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General said that maritime security was being undermined at alarming levels and called for a global and integrated response to the threats posed by maritime insecurity. She noted the existence of an international legal regime for maritime security, underpinned by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was only as strong as countries' commitment to its full and effective implementation. In that regard, she emphasized the need to translate commitment into action. She welcomed the concerted steps taken by the Council and Member States to strengthen international and regional cooperation on maritime security, in accordance with all related instruments, including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Given the clear links between global security and maritime spaces, she welcomed efforts to further galvanize support for action.

The Executive Director of UNODC described the work of her office and reported that piracy and armed robbery at sea had continued to be a major threat during the pandemic. She said that the need to tackle piracy and organized crime at sea had been increasingly recognized by the Council and by Member States. She also emphasized the need for greater concerted international efforts to target challenges and reduce vulnerabilities. In that regard, she highlighted four areas of action for consideration by the Council: (a) more effective implementation of the international legal framework and Council resolutions promoting maritime security; (b) greater political will and more resources for technical assistance and capacity-

¹¹³⁸ For the 2021 report of the working group, see [A/75/816](#).

For further details on the discussion, see part IV, sect. I.

¹¹³⁹ See [S/2021/621](#).

¹¹⁴⁰ See General Assembly resolution [75/240](#), para. 1.

¹¹⁴¹ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, Brazil, European Union, Pakistan and Qatar.

¹¹⁴² Estonia, Niger, Ireland, China, Russian Federation, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), European Union, Pakistan, Peru and South Africa.

¹¹⁴³ Ireland, Australia, Canada, European Union, Slovenia and Thailand.

¹¹⁴⁴ See [S/2021/621](#).

¹¹⁴⁵ For further details on the discussion, see part VI, sect. IV, and part VII, sect. I.

¹¹⁴⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 26 July ([S/2021/680](#)).

¹¹⁴⁷ See [S/2021/722](#).

building; (c) the strengthening of international and regional cooperation, as well as public-private partnerships, to counter the expansion of maritime crime; and (d) the need to tackle root causes and support all countries, especially affected coastal communities, in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals as part of an integrated crime prevention response.

During the discussion, participants underscored the importance of enhancing global maritime security, in particular in the context of certain areas, such as the Gulf of Guinea and the Persian Gulf. Many delegations highlighted the global threat caused by piracy and armed robbery at sea. In that regard, some¹¹⁴⁸ expressed condemnation for the attack against the merchant vessel *Mercer Street* off the coast of Oman on 29 July, which had resulted in the death of two people. Citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the legal framework on oceans and seas, participants expressed support for strengthening regional and international cooperation for maritime security. Some Council members stressed the importance of the role of the Council¹¹⁴⁹ and UNODC¹¹⁵⁰ in enhancing maritime security.¹¹⁵¹

On 7 September, at the initiative of Ireland, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹⁵² Council members held a meeting at which they heard briefings by the Chair of The Elders and an Elder Emeritus.¹¹⁵³

In her briefing, the Chair of The Elders urged Council members to use the investigative tools at their disposal under Article 34 of the Charter in preventing and responding to violent conflict. She highlighted various priority topics that, in her view, required urgent attention by the Council, notably, issues faced by women and children in Afghanistan and the Tigray region in Ethiopia, the toll of the COVID-19 pandemic on human lives, existential dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and the turmoil in Myanmar and in Israel and the State of Palestine. She underscored that, although internal political divisions had led the Council to fall short of its responsibilities in many instances, Council members should return to the fundamental basis for

their mandate and to work tirelessly to find common ground and build consensus wherever possible. In response to questions and comments raised during the discussion, she took the floor a second time to express support for Council reform.¹¹⁵⁴

The Elder Emeritus elaborated on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan, including on the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) further to the Taliban's regained control of the country. Against the backdrop of the Council's then upcoming renewal of the mandate of Mission, he stated that the Council should limit its action to a technical rollover of a sufficiently long period to provide enough time to prepare the strong mandate that UNAMA would need in the coming new phase.

Following the briefings, Council members discussed the need to ensure respect for human rights and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in several countries, in particular in Afghanistan.¹¹⁵⁵ Several Council members¹¹⁵⁶ emphasized the need for a whole-of-system approach to conflict prevention, calling on the Council to lead and coordinate such an approach with other United Nations organs. Some speakers¹¹⁵⁷ expressed support for the reform of the system, while others¹¹⁵⁸ made specific reference to the reform of the Council. In addressing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, many speakers recalled resolution 2532 (2020) and stressed the need for its effective implementation, calling for greater cooperation to bring vaccines to developing countries and conflict areas.¹¹⁵⁹

On 23 September, again at the initiative of Ireland, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹⁶⁰ the Council held a high-level meeting under the sub-item entitled "Climate and security".¹¹⁶¹ At the meeting, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the Chief Operating Officer of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre.

¹¹⁴⁸ United States, France, Norway, United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Brazil, European Union, Romania, Singapore and United Arab Emirates.

¹¹⁴⁹ Russian Federation, Viet Nam, France and Norway.

¹¹⁵⁰ Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

¹¹⁵¹ For further details on the discussion, see part VII, sect. I.B.

¹¹⁵² A concept note was circulated to Council members for information only and was not issued as a document of the Council.

¹¹⁵³ See [S/PV.8850](#).

¹¹⁵⁴ For more information about invitees under rule 39 and their interventions, see part II, sect. VIII.B.

¹¹⁵⁵ For more information on the discussion concerning the situation in Afghanistan, see sect. 14 above.

¹¹⁵⁶ United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Viet Nam.

¹¹⁵⁷ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and India.

¹¹⁵⁸ Viet Nam and France.

¹¹⁵⁹ For further details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.

¹¹⁶⁰ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 9 September ([S/2021/782](#)).

¹¹⁶¹ See [S/PV.8864](#). See also [S/2021/815](#). While briefers and Council members participated in person at the meeting, non-Council members submitted written statements. This was agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General stated that the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change showed that climate disruption caused by human activities was widespread and intensifying. He therefore called for a much bolder climate action ahead of the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In his statement, he highlighted three priorities on climate action. First, there was a need for an unambiguous commitment and credible actions by all countries to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Second, to deal with the already dire impacts of climate disruption on the lives and livelihoods of people all over the world, there was a need for a breakthrough on adaptation and resilience. Third, climate adaptation and peacebuilding could and should reinforce one another.

In her briefing, the Chief Operating Officer of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre said that, as climate change and other environmental crises gathered pace, they were touching every aspect of life and that world international peace and security was no exception. While acknowledging the Council's engagement on climate and security, she noted that the process was still too painfully slow for the vulnerable communities at the front lines of those issues. She explained that the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre was a peacebuilding organization founded in Mogadishu in the early 1990s and established in response to the armed conflict in Somalia. She added that peacebuilding goals and mediation efforts could not succeed or be sustained unless the broader environmental issues related to security were addressed, noting that the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation were changing what it took to build peace for local peacebuilders. In that regard, she said that the Council and the wider United Nations system must be receptive to bottom-up solutions and community-led processes and that it was time for policymakers to turn the ambitious agenda of climate and security into coherent policies that would guide the future of peacebuilding.

Following the briefers, speakers discussed the adverse effects and the security and humanitarian consequences of climate change and armed conflict. Some Council members¹¹⁶² underscored the need to integrate climate-related security risks into the work of the Council pertaining to conflict prevention, including the mandates of peacekeeping and special political missions. Other Council members¹¹⁶³ cautioned against

integrating climate security into the Council's agenda, adding that social and economic issues were already under the purview of other United Nations organs and mechanisms, notably, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Several Council members¹¹⁶⁴ stressed the need for the Secretary-General to include climate-related security risks in his reports to the Council, and some¹¹⁶⁵ expressed support for the appointment a special envoy of the Secretary-General on climate and security.

On 9 November, at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹⁶⁶ the Council held a high-level meeting under the sub-item entitled "Exclusion, inequality and conflict".¹¹⁶⁷ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General and an indigenous affairs expert, Lourdes Tibán Guala.¹¹⁶⁸

The Secretary-General stated that the COVID-19 pandemic had increased hardship and inequality for the poorest and most vulnerable people. He emphasized that rising inequalities were a factor in growing instability, especially in areas where basic services were lacking, such as health care, education, security and justice, and where historical injustices, inequalities and systematic oppression had created endless cycles of poverty and unfavourable conditions for entire generations. Noting that without inclusion, the puzzle of peace remained incomplete, with many gaps to be filled, the Secretary-General outlined a road map for inclusion built around four key pathways to fill those gaps: people, prevention, gender and institutions. First, he stressed the need to invest in the development of all people, equally. Second, he noted the need to strengthen the prevention agenda on multiple fronts to address different types of exclusion and inequalities. Third, he acknowledged the need to recognize and prioritize the crucial role of women in building peace. Lastly, he affirmed the need to build trust through inclusive national institutions that represented the entire population and whose action was rooted in human rights and the rule of law.

Briefing the Council from the perspective of indigenous people on peace and security, the expert on indigenous affairs outlined some issues that the Council should monitor in the future, including social

¹¹⁶² Ireland, Viet Nam, United States, Mexico, Norway and Kenya.

¹¹⁶³ India and Russian Federation.

¹¹⁶⁴ Ireland, Niger, France, Norway, Tunisia and United Kingdom.

¹¹⁶⁵ Niger, France and Tunisia.

¹¹⁶⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 15 October (S/2021/883).

¹¹⁶⁷ See S/PV.8900 and S/PV.8900 (Resumption 1). See also S/2021/935.

¹¹⁶⁸ See S/PV.8900.

inequality, social exclusion, gender exclusion, migration, corruption and the criminalization of social struggle and the prosecution of human rights defenders. She suggested that, instead of taking coercive measures or imposing economic sanctions, as it was empowered to do, the Council should provide incentives and acknowledge Member States that were working to reduce inequalities, exclusion and corruption and avoid confrontations among civil society, citizens and the State, which could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Following the briefers, participants addressed a variety of themes and underscored the need for conflict prevention, early warning systems and greater international cooperation to ensure the equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Many participants emphasized the importance of addressing factors that contributed to the drivers of conflict, such as exclusion, inequality and poverty. They also stressed the need to ensure the meaningful participation and protection of women in all aspects of conflict prevention and peace processes. Some speakers¹¹⁶⁹ expressed concern about the use of unilateral sanctions and economic measures, which could result in the exclusion of the countries and impede their development goals. Several Council members¹¹⁷⁰ also discussed the role of regional organizations in conflict prevention to maintain international peace and security. Furthermore, some Member States noted the importance of the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Council.¹¹⁷¹

On 16 November, again at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹⁷² the Council held a meeting under the sub-item entitled “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”.¹¹⁷³ Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the President of the International Court of Justice.¹¹⁷⁴

In his briefing, the Secretary-General noted that prevention did not always receive the attention it deserved, perhaps because of the difficulty in measuring the results of preventing conflict. He stated that prevention was the ultimate goal of the work of the Council and its resolutions to help countries to build peace and stability and to resolve their disputes before they escalated into armed conflicts. He added that the role of the International Court of Justice was essential in that regard. He underlined that prevention was the very reason for the existence of the United Nations and further stated that, for 76 years, the United Nations system had given the world a home for dialogue and tools and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In view of that, he had placed the agenda of prevention at the centre of his mandates for his first and second terms as Secretary-General and consistently used his good offices to seek to defuse conflicts and advance peace. He affirmed that prevention was not a political tool but a realistic path to peace. He noted that, if preventive diplomacy and development were to contribute to peace, the full support of the Council and of all Member States was necessary.

The President of the General Assembly noted that, for 76 years, the United Nations had represented the pinnacle of what concerted diplomacy could achieve in preventing global conflict. In addition to supporting humanitarian relief, he stressed the need to support preventive measures. He added that preventive diplomacy was being conducted by a broader array of actors and that sustaining peace and peacebuilding was no longer limited to traditional military peacekeeping. He also pointed out that, while global security would always be within the proper remit of the Security Council, the work done by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to build resilient and prosperous communities facilitated the work of the Security Council. In that context, he noted that revitalizing the General Assembly was one of the key elements of his “presidency of hope”, expressing the desire to not only make the Assembly more inclusive of the views and priorities of the membership, but also to strengthen cooperation between the main United Nations organs to streamline responses to global challenges, including security challenges. In that regard, he called upon the membership to work together to implement Assembly resolution [75/325](#), on the revitalization of the work of the Assembly, which encouraged regular interaction and continued coordination among the Presidents of the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

¹¹⁶⁹ Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Islamic Republic of Iran.

¹¹⁷⁰ India, Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Viet Nam and Niger.

¹¹⁷¹ See [S/PV.8900](#) (Kenya, Viet Nam and Japan); and [S/2021/935](#) (Brazil). For further details on the discussion, see part VI, sect. IV.

¹¹⁷² A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October ([S/2021/888](#)).

¹¹⁷³ See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/952](#).

¹¹⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8906](#).

The President of the Economic and Social Council gave a briefing on the work of the Economic and Social Council, including its collaboration with the other organs of the United Nations. He noted that, although interactions between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council had remained sporadic and ad hoc, it was necessary to acknowledge that the current complex challenges required more institutionalized collaboration. In that regard, he shared some practical options for strengthening inter-Council coordination that would be more visible, transparent, complementary and effective. First, he said that both Councils could build on their previous collaboration in the early 2000s. Second, he suggested drawing on the experience of the regular interactions among the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. Third, he suggested envisioning joint meetings on common themes extended to the entire membership of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. In concluding, he emphasized the need for innovative solutions to the multidimensional crises across the pillars of the Organization.

In her statement, the President of the International Court of Justice touched upon three points addressed in the declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels (Assembly resolution 67/1) regarding the interplay between the Court and other principal organs in that field. First, she affirmed that the Court welcomed efforts by the other principal organs to promote the resort by Member States to the settlement of their disputes before the Court and elaborated on the various ways in which Member States could do so, including through depositing a so-called optional clause declaration recognizing the Court's jurisdiction or through Article 36 (3) of the Charter.¹¹⁷⁵ Turning to the second point, she noted that the Assembly had recalled the ability of the relevant organs of the United Nations to request advisory opinions from the Court, which was a matter entirely in the hands of the relevant organ or specialized agency and its members and must be carefully weighed on the basis of a range of different factors and considerations. Lastly, she stated that the Assembly had reaffirmed the obligation of all States to comply with the decisions of the Court in cases to which they were parties. In reference to Article 94 (2) of the Charter, which set out a specific role for the Council in the implementation of the Court's decisions,

¹¹⁷⁵ For more information on the referral of legal disputes to the Court under Article 36 (3), see part VI, sect. IV.

she acknowledged the very limited practice under that provision. She said that it suggested that States had found it more valuable to pursue other avenues to achieve the full implementation of the judgments of the Court in their favour. In that regard, she provided examples of the Secretary-General's efforts in bringing about the implementation of the Court's decisions, adding that those demonstrated that other United Nations organs had opportunities, within their respective purviews, to contribute to the implementation of the judgments of the Court and to the promotion of peace, security and justice.

In the ensuing discussion, many delegations emphasized the need to strengthen coordination and complementarity among the principal organs of the United Nations, in accordance with their Charter mandates, to enable effective preventive diplomacy through mediation in addressing the root causes of conflict. Many also stressed the need for the participation of women in conflict prevention processes. Several speakers¹¹⁷⁶ expressed concern about the use of veto to prevent Council action in cases of mass atrocities and conflict resolution.¹¹⁷⁷

On 9 December, at the initiative of the Niger, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹⁷⁸ the Council held a high-level meeting under the sub-item entitled "Security in the context of terrorism and climate change".¹¹⁷⁹ Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Head of the Multinational Joint Task Force.¹¹⁸⁰

In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General reiterated that the climate emergency was the vital issue of the time and that the international community had no choice but to continue efforts to reach the goal of limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5°C. In the framework of an integrated approach, the Secretary-General elaborated on five areas that needed increased collective action. First, he pointed to the need to prioritize prevention and address the root causes of insecurity. Second, he said that there was an urgent need to increase investments in adaptation and resilience. Third, there was a need for better analysis and early warning systems. Fourth, the international

¹¹⁷⁶ Mexico, Estonia, Norway and Pakistan.

¹¹⁷⁷ For further details on the discussion, see part IV, sects. I–III, part V, sect. I, and part VI, sect. IV.

¹¹⁷⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 November (S/2021/988).

¹¹⁷⁹ See S/PV.8923 and S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1). See also S/2021/1026.

¹¹⁸⁰ See S/PV.8923.

community needed to promote the development of partnerships and initiatives linking local, regional and national approaches. Lastly, he noted that fighting terrorism and conflict in the context of climate disruption required sustained investment. In concluding, the Secretary-General advised that the Council and all Member States work simultaneously on peacebuilding and the effects of climate change.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission stated that, although experts could not establish a direct causal link proving that conflicts were caused by climate change, there was no doubt that deteriorating climate conditions and a lack of rainfall and subsequent droughts contributed to exacerbating social and intercommunal tensions owing to the scarcity of life-sustaining resources, in particular water and pastures. He said that the scarcity of resources, water and agrifood resources in particular fuelled intercommunal conflicts and created conditions conducive to the proliferation of non-State entities, led by terrorist groups, which influenced, disoriented, indoctrinated, intoxicated, recruited, armed and trained thousands of young people. He said that, when correlating those consequences of climate change with aggravating, frustrating factors, such as weak or poor governance, corruption, marginalization and political, social and community exclusion, it could be understood how the promotion of deviant trajectories had far-reaching consequences. He expressed disappointment at the international community's responses and concern with regard to the fight against climate change and terrorism and the interlinkages of those two devastating phenomena. In that regard, he stated that, while Africa's contribution to global pollution was minimal, its share of the investments to address the adverse effects of climate change was very small. He also expressed the complaint that, while in other parts of the world, international efforts had been mobilized to combat terrorism, efforts on that scale had been mostly denied to Africa. He expressed hope that the open debate would advance the discussion of those double standards and unethical shortfalls and above all the international community's recognition of its obligations and called on the Council to address that challenge.

The Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Head of the Multinational Joint Task Force stated that, as of the 1960s, Lake Chad had been one of the biggest freshwater lakes in the world and an exporter of agricultural products before its current predicament. However, the effects of climate variability and change, population pressure and insecurity had resulted in constant threats to food

security in the basin. To mitigate the effects of climate change and address the root causes of the insurgency, he elaborated on the initiatives that the Lake Chad Basin Commission and its partners had been conducting in the context of humanitarian and development projects aimed at restoring peoples' means of livelihood, building their resilience and restoring the environment. He described other initiatives, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force, which had been established to create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by terrorist activities. In closing, he requested the support of the United Nations to mobilize the international community to redouble its support for the region, in particular to strengthen support for the war against terrorism and other criminal activities by providing the equipment necessary to enable troops to effectively prosecute the war, and to mobilize resources for regional projects and plans.

Following the briefings, Council members highlighted their countries' initiatives in tackling the issues of climate change and terrorism. Participants discussed the nexus between security, on the one hand, and the effects of climate change and terrorism, on the other, highlighting the threats posed by those issues.¹¹⁸¹ Some Council members¹¹⁸² encouraged other members to support and co-sponsor the draft resolution put forward by Ireland and the Niger on climate and security. In that connection, other speakers¹¹⁸³ questioned the call to link the challenges of climate change with terrorism, including the presumption that the Council was the appropriate forum for such discussions. Most Member States advocated the creation of conducive conditions to enable the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and girls in addressing the challenges associated with climate change and terrorism.¹¹⁸⁴

On 13 December, the Council held a meeting under the sub-item entitled "Climate and security".¹¹⁸⁵ At the meeting, the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution sponsored by 113 Member States,¹¹⁸⁶ owing to the negative vote of a permanent member.¹¹⁸⁷ Speaking before and after the vote, Council members expressed differing views about the draft resolution. While some Council members, in particular Ireland and

¹¹⁸¹ For further details on the discussion, see part VII, sect. I.

¹¹⁸² Niger, United States, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Kenya and Tunisia.

¹¹⁸³ Russian Federation, India and Islamic Republic of Iran.

¹¹⁸⁴ For further details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.

¹¹⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8926](#).

¹¹⁸⁶ [S/2021/990](#).

¹¹⁸⁷ See [S/PV.8926](#).

the Niger as co-penholders of the draft resolution, considered that there was no doubt as to the appropriateness of the Council considering the topic, the representative of the Russian Federation explained his country's negative vote by stating that positioning climate change as a threat to international security diverted the attention of the Council from genuine, deep-rooted causes of conflict in the countries on the Council's agenda. He added that the instability of specific countries and regions was due to a range of specific reasons that differed from each other in their makeup and scale and that the fight against climate change and the adaptation to its negative consequences were a question of sustainable development. He also explained that the Russian Federation was not just rejecting the draft. He explained that his country was proposing an alternative to the one-sided approach, guided by a comprehensive approach that took different countries and regions into account. Explaining his negative vote, the representative of India said that there was no real requirement for the draft resolution except for the purpose of bringing climate change under the ambit of the Council. Instead of addressing developing countries' concerns and holding developed countries responsible for meeting their commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, he argued that it sent the wrong message, namely, that the international community was willing to be divided and sidetracked under the guise of security. He considered the draft resolution to be a step backwards from the collective resolve to combat climate change. Having abstained from the vote, the representative of China explained that the draft resolution did not address a number of important issues. He added that the Council did not need to do a political show but rather to use its unique authority to establish a monitoring mechanism and help developed countries to fulfil their obligations and ensure that their commitments were honoured. He mentioned that China, India and the Russian Federation had jointly submitted a draft resolution focusing on security issues in the Sahel region, including challenges related to climate change, and expressed hope that those present and not present would co-sponsor it. Many of the members who had voted in favour of the draft resolution expressed regret at the outcome of the vote.¹¹⁸⁸ The representative of Kenya said that his country had hoped for and advocated consensus and that, while Kenya disagreed with some of the points of the detractors of the draft resolution, they had made some important arguments that could have been included. He added that Kenya would

continue to champion efforts to advance the climate and security nexus, including as Co-Chair of the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security in 2022. Similarly, the representatives of Norway, the United Kingdom and Viet Nam said that they would continue to support further action across the United Nations, including in the Council, to combat climate change. The representative of Mexico expressed his country's disagreement with "the inappropriately named so-called right of veto", predicting that it could lead to paralysis in the Council. He said that it did not promote dialogue or debate and that, on the contrary, it hindered it. The representative of the United States accused the Russian Federation of stopping the world's most important organ from maintaining international peace and security and from taking a small, practical and necessary step to combat the impacts of climate change.

In 2021, the Council adopted three resolutions and four presidential statements in connection with the item. The decisions of the Council addressed most of the themes outlined above, having been adopted either at the meetings or in writing pursuant to the holding of the open videoconferences, as set out above. On 26 February, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2565 \(2021\)](#), recognizing efforts and measures proposed by the Secretary-General concerning the response to the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic to conflict-affected countries, in particular his appeal for an immediate global ceasefire.¹¹⁸⁹ In the resolution, the Council called for the strengthening of national and multilateral approaches and international cooperation, such as the COVAX Facility created within the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator, in order to facilitate equitable and affordable access to COVID-19 vaccines in armed conflict situations, post-conflict situations and complex humanitarian emergencies, while stressing the need to develop international partnerships, particularly to scale up manufacturing and distribution capabilities, and recognizing the role of extensive immunization against COVID-19 as a global public good for health.¹¹⁹⁰

On 8 April, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it recalled its resolution [2365 \(2017\)](#) on mine action and called on Member States and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen their efforts to implement that resolution and other relevant resolutions on mine action. In that regard, the Council emphasized the importance of mine action and the need

¹¹⁸⁸ Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Mexico and Tunisia.

¹¹⁸⁹ Resolution [2565 \(2021\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph.

¹¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 1.

to enhance international efforts in that field, in particular in situations of armed conflict.¹¹⁹¹

On 9 August, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it noted with concern the ongoing threats to maritime safety and security posed by piracy, armed robbery at sea and terrorists' travel and use of sea to conduct crimes and acts against shipping, offshore installations, critical infrastructure and other maritime interests, as well as the continuing problem of transnational organized crimes committed at sea, including illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons and illicit trafficking in firearms and other illicit activities. It also noted the deplorable loss of life and the adverse impact on international trade, energy security and the global economy resulting from such activities and, in that regard, emphasized the importance of safeguarding the legitimate uses of the oceans and the lives of people at sea, as well as the livelihoods and security of coastal communities.¹¹⁹²

On 29 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), in which it welcomed the report of the Secretary-General of 2 September,¹¹⁹³ including his observations on the plight of migrants and refugees in Libya, and condemned all acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya.¹¹⁹⁴ The Council also renewed the authorizations regarding acts of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the territorial sea of Libya as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), for a period of 12 months.¹¹⁹⁵

On 9 November, the Council adopted a presidential statement, by which it reaffirmed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and its readiness to strive for sustainable peace in all situations under its consideration.¹¹⁹⁶ Noting that exclusion and inequality might have an impact as aggravating factors in situations under its consideration, the Council reiterated its commitment to the full, equal and

meaningful participation of women and the inclusion of youth in all stages of peace, security, development and decision-making processes, while urging Governments in conflict or post-conflict situations to engage with relevant stakeholders, including civil society, women, youth and the private sector, to deliver durable solutions to immediate and long-term challenges.¹¹⁹⁷

On 16 November, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it recognized that the principal organs of the United Nations had the responsibility, within their own mandates, to contribute to the realization of the purposes established in Article 1 of the Charter.¹¹⁹⁸ The Council also expressed its continued commitment to foster interaction on a regular basis with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat, in accordance with their respective mandates under the Charter, in particular on matters relating to preventive diplomacy tools and mechanisms.¹¹⁹⁹

On 22 December, the Council adopted, not unanimously, resolution [2616 \(2021\)](#), by which it expressed grave concern that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continued to pose threats to international peace and security.¹²⁰⁰ Resolving to consider, when appropriate, during the renewal of mandates of peace operations, whether and how the peace operations could support relevant national authorities in combating the illicit transfer and diversion of arms in violation of the arms embargoes in their respective areas of operation, the Council encouraged its peace operations and relevant United Nations entities to assist in reinforcing capacities of host nation authorities and requested the Secretary-General to include further information on general trends of illicit trafficking and diversion in contravention of Council-mandated arms embargoes, as well as further recommendations on the matter, in the biennial reports pursuant to resolution [2220 \(2015\)](#).¹²⁰¹

¹¹⁹¹ [S/PRST/2021/8](#), second and third paragraphs.

¹¹⁹² [S/PRST/2021/15](#), third paragraph.

¹¹⁹³ [S/2021/767](#).

¹¹⁹⁴ Resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph and para. 1.

¹¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 3. For more information on the situation in Libya, see sect. 10 above.

¹¹⁹⁶ [S/PRST/2021/22](#), first paragraph.

¹¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, third, eighth and tenth paragraphs.

¹¹⁹⁸ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), third paragraph.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, eighth paragraph.

¹²⁰⁰ Resolution [2616 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph.

¹²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 1, 2 and 14. For more information on the Council's discussion on small arms and light weapons, see sect. 26 above and *Repertoire, Supplement 2014–2015*, part I, sect. 29. See also part VII, sect. I.B.

Table 1
Meetings: maintenance of international peace and security

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.8850 7 September 2021				Chair of The Elders; Elder Emeritus; member of The Elders and former President of Liberia; member of The Elders and former President of Mexico	All Council members, two invitees ^a	
S/PV.8864 and S/2021/815 23 September 2021	Climate and security Letter dated 9 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/782)			Chief Operating Officer of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^b invitee ^c	
S/PV.8868 29 September 2021		Draft resolution submitted by 34 Member States ^d (S/2021/825)	30 Member States ^e			Resolution 2598 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8900 , S/PV.8900 (Resumption 1) and S/2021/935 9 November 2021	Exclusion, inequality and conflict Letter dated 15 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/883)		27 Member States ^f	Expert on indigenous affairs (Lourdes Tibán Guala)	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^g all invitees ^h	S/PRST/2021/22
S/PV.8906 , S/PV.8906 (Resumption 1) and S/2021/952 16 November 2021	Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations Letter dated 19 October 2021 from the Permanent		35 Member States ⁱ	President of the General Assembly, President of the Economic and Social Council, President of the International Court of Justice	Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees ^j	S/PRST/2021/23

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
	Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/888)					
S/PV.8923, S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1) and S/2021/1026 9 December 2021	Security in the context of terrorism and climate change Letter dated 30 November 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Niger to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2021/988)		39 Member States ^k	Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Head of the Multinational Joint Task Force, Head of the Delegation of the European Union	Secretary- General, all Council members, ^l all invitees ^m	
S/PV.8926 13 December 2021	Climate and security	Draft resolution submitted by 113 Member States ⁿ (S/2021/990)	104 Member States ^o		13 Council members ^p	Not adopted 12-2-1 ^q
S/PV.8942 22 December 2021		Draft resolution submitted by 74 Member States ^r (S/2021/1075)	63 Member States ^s		Six Council members ^t	Resolution 2616 (2021) 12-0-3 ^u

^a The former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and the former President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, did not make statements.

^b Estonia and Viet Nam were represented by their Presidents. Ireland (President of the Council) was represented by its Taoiseach. France was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; India was represented by its Vice Minister, Secretary (West), in the Ministry of External Affairs; Kenya was represented by its Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Mexico and Norway were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs; the Niger was represented by its Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Tunisia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and United Nations at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and the United States was represented by its Secretary of State.

^c The Chief Operating Officer of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^d Albania, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.

^e Albania, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.

^f Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

^g Mexico (President of the Council) was represented by its President. Estonia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; India was represented by its Minister of State for External Affairs; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet.

- ^h The representative of Denmark spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the representative of the Netherlands spoke on behalf of the Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies.
- ⁱ Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Belgium, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
- ^j The President of the International Court of Justice participated in the meeting by videoconference. The representative of Azerbaijan spoke on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries; the representative of Finland spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends in Defence of the Charter of the United Nations.
- ^k Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
- ^l Estonia and the Niger (President of the Council) were represented by their Presidents. The United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet.
- ^m The Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Head of the Multinational Joint Task Force participated in the meeting by videoconference. The representative of Germany spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security; the representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union was represented by his Deputy, who spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.
- ⁿ Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chad, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay and Vanuatu.
- ^o Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chad, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Vanuatu.
- ^p China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.
- ^q *For:* Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; *against:* India, Russian Federation; *abstaining:* China.
- ^r Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Vanuatu.
- ^s Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Uruguay and Vanuatu.
- ^t China, India, Mexico, Niger, Russian Federation and Viet Nam.
- ^u *For:* Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, India, Russian Federation.

Table 2

Videoconferences: maintenance of international peace and security

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
6 January 2021	S/2021/24	Letter dated 8 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
25 January 2021	S/2021/90	Letter dated 27 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
17 February 2021	S/2021/157	Letter dated 19 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
23 February 2021	S/2021/198	Letter dated 25 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
26 February 2021	S/2021/204	Letter dated 26 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2565 (2021) 15-0-0 S/2021/195
11 March 2021	S/2021/250	Letter dated 16 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
8 April 2021	S/2021/346	Letter dated 12 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	S/PRST/2021/8
7 May 2021	S/2021/456	Letter dated 11 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
29 June 2021	S/2021/621	Letter dated 1 July 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
9 August 2021	S/2021/722	Letter dated 12 August 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	S/PRST/2021/15

35. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international

peace and security” which took the form of a briefing.¹²⁰² More information on the meeting, including on

¹²⁰² For more information on the format of meetings, including high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II, sect. II.

participants and speakers, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held four open videoconferences, including high-level videoconferences, in connection with the item.¹²⁰³ More information on the videoconferences is given in table 2 below. In addition, the Council adopted three presidential statements in connection with the item.

On 18 January, at the initiative of Tunisia, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,¹²⁰⁴ Council members held an open videoconference focused on the cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States. At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.¹²⁰⁵ The Under-Secretary-General stated that the cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States had been crucial in augmenting efforts to address various situations in the Arab world, such as in relation to Libya, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and the Persian Gulf. Noting that such cooperation had increased in recent years, she highlighted the holding of staff exchanges and workshops on mediation and peacebuilding and of capacity-building exercises on inclusive peacemaking. The Under-Secretary-General underscored that the United Nations liaison office to the League of Arab States, established in 2019, had facilitated regular contact with United Nations special envoys. She also commended the Arab Women Mediators Network, which had been established under the auspices of the League of Arab States in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, in order to enable the region to increase the participation of women in resolving conflicts and sustaining peace. The Under-Secretary-General stressed the critical role of the Council in amplifying the collective efforts of the United Nations and the League of Arab States in the Arab region. As a principal steward of Chapter VIII of the Charter, she looked to the Council to continue to support the collaborative work of the two organizations to promote peace and prosperity in the Arab region.

In his remarks, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States emphasized the commitment of the League to fully developing the relationship with the

United Nations, in conjunction with both the Council and the other bodies of the United Nations system. Since his last briefing in 2019, the Arab region had witnessed several developments that had affected its security and stability, some of which had been positive and had helped to resolve crises on the common agenda of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, while others had diminished and complicated the joint efforts of both organizations to resolve those crises and address their root causes. With conflicts continuing on a number of fronts, the pandemic had created a dangerous mix and exacted a terrible humanitarian price from the population. In addition, the Arab region continued to suffer from serious interventions in its domestic affairs by regional powers which had increased instability and prolonged and further complicated existing conflicts. In that context, the Secretary-General gave as an example the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, in which five countries were engaged in blatant military interventions, undermining the chances of a political settlement and affecting the humanitarian situation. The humanitarian, political and security consequences of the unresolved Syrian crisis would have profound implications for the region and its interactions for many years to come. He also described the engagement of the League of Arab States in other countries of the region, including Yemen and Libya, and said he looked forward to optimizing the mechanisms of consultation and coordination with the Council and with the United Nations system as a whole in relation to other issues such as the situations in the Sudan, Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Following the briefings, speakers expressed support for the presidential statement adopted on 13 June 2019,¹²⁰⁶ in which, inter alia, the Council called for further cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States.¹²⁰⁷ Speakers¹²⁰⁸ also expressed support for stronger cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States under Chapter VIII of the Charter, as well as between their special envoys, in relation to, inter alia, counter-terrorism, conflict resolution and prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In that regard, speakers¹²⁰⁹ welcomed the

¹²⁰³ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 36. See also [S/2021/1014](#). For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

¹²⁰⁴ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 December 2020 ([S/2020/1316](#)).

¹²⁰⁵ See [S/2021/66](#).

¹²⁰⁶ [S/PRST/2019/5](#).

¹²⁰⁷ See [S/2021/66](#) (Tunisia, Estonia, Mexico, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United Arab Emirates (on behalf of the Group of Arab States)).

¹²⁰⁸ Tunisia, China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United States, Viet Nam and United Arab Emirates (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).

¹²⁰⁹ Tunisia, China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Russian Federation, Viet Nam and United Arab Emirates (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).

opening of the United Nations liaison office at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo, with some¹²¹⁰ underscoring that it could serve as a catalyst for the development of cooperation between the two organizations, as well as enhance cooperation on regional security. Speakers¹²¹¹ welcomed the practice of the annual briefings by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the Council, with the representative of Mexico noting that it was valuable to identify opportunities and contribute in a balanced way to addressing the situations in the Middle East and North Africa. Speakers¹²¹² also welcomed the Ula Declaration adopted on 5 January 2021 by the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Egypt, which resulted in the reopening of borders and airspace with Qatar, with some¹²¹³ recognizing its contribution to strengthening regional stability. Lastly, speakers¹²¹⁴ noted the normalization agreements between Israel and several States members of the League of Arab States, namely, Bahrain, Morocco, the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, with some¹²¹⁵ also noting that such normalization could help to promote greater regional peace and security.¹²¹⁶

On 29 January, in connection with the item, the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which it welcomed the strong cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation between the two organizations.¹²¹⁷ In that regard, the Council supported the holding of an annual briefing by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, to further promote cooperation with the Council on matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security.¹²¹⁸ It also welcomed the opening of the United Nations liaison office to the League of Arab States and encouraged the secretariats of both organizations to promote the role of the liaison office in strengthening cooperation between them.¹²¹⁹ The Council also encouraged the holding of an annual

informal meeting between its members and the members of the Council of the League of Arab States and, whenever possible, an informal meeting between its members and representatives of the Arab Summit troika and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, on the margins of the General Assembly high-level segment.¹²²⁰

On 19 April, at the initiative of Viet Nam, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,¹²²¹ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item, focused on the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in enhancing confidence-building and dialogue in conflict prevention and resolution.¹²²² Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the former Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon. In his briefing, the Secretary-General noted that cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations had grown exponentially since 1945 and that, as at the time of the briefing, it encompassed preventive diplomacy, mediation, counter-terrorism, the prevention of violent extremism, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, the promotion of human rights, advancing the women and peace and security agenda, combating climate change and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. He also underscored that the investment by the United Nations and regional organizations in institutionalizing partnerships had translated into more effective engagements before, during and after crises, and concrete operational results. He gave examples of such engagement in a variety of countries and stated that they showed that the ability to cooperate and build on complementarities allowed the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations to support Member States more effectively in managing complex political transitions and in finding sustainable solutions to political challenges. The Secretary-General further underscored that strengthening United Nations partnerships with regional and subregional organizations was an integral part of his vision for a networked multilateralism. In reference to the biennial high-level interactive dialogue with heads of regional organizations held virtually in November 2020 and attended by representatives of 23 organizations, he noted that it had helped to institutionalize collaboration and improve cooperation in crisis contexts. He expressed his commitment to pursuing even closer

¹²¹⁰ China and France.

¹²¹¹ France, India, Mexico, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United Arab Emirates (on behalf of the Group of Arab States).

¹²¹² Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United States.

¹²¹³ Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United States.

¹²¹⁴ Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

¹²¹⁵ Ibid., Estonia, France, India and United States.

¹²¹⁶ For further details on the briefings and discussion during the videoconference, see part VIII, sect. I.

¹²¹⁷ [S/PRST/2021/2](#), fifth paragraph.

¹²¹⁸ Ibid., eleventh paragraph.

¹²¹⁹ Ibid., fifteenth paragraph.

¹²²⁰ Ibid., twelfth paragraph.

¹²²¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 25 March ([S/2021/297](#)).

¹²²² See [S/2021/394](#).

engagement to promote confidence-building and dialogue in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

In his remarks, the former Secretary-General underscored that, at the time, the international community was collectively facing a plethora of monumental challenges, which included an ongoing and deadly global pandemic, both long-standing and emerging conflict and security crises and a deepening climate emergency. Noting that some countries had prioritized nationalism and isolationism over cooperation and partnership, he underlined that the role of cooperative partnerships between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, as envisioned under Chapter VIII of the Charter, was all the more critical to helping to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. The former Secretary-General specifically recognized that regional and subregional organizations had unique and prominent roles to play in enhancing dialogue and confidence-building in conflict prevention and resolution, as well in providing early warning assessments of atrocity crimes. He urged all Council members to scale up their support for the Secretary-General's efforts in addressing the root causes of conflict. In relation to Myanmar, the former Secretary-General said that the worsening situation in the country represented a pivotal moment to showcase the utility of cooperation between the United Nations and its regional partners in maintaining peace and security and emphasized that the task ahead would require the collective and coordinated efforts of the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the wider region to avert catastrophe.

Following the briefings, speakers recognized the role and contribution of regional and subregional organizations, under Chapter VIII of the Charter, to maintaining international peace and security, such as through the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict resolution and prevention, peacebuilding, dialogue and mediation, with several speakers also highlighting the comparative advantages, such as geographical proximity and better understanding of local dynamics. They also emphasized the need to strengthen the cooperation between the United Nations, including the Council, with regional and subregional organizations in areas such as climate, peacekeeping and conflict prevention and resolution. This notwithstanding, the observer for the African Union asserted that the continued lack of clarity around the principles of non-interference and subsidiarity had posed a critical challenge to coordination among the United Nations, the African Union and regional mechanisms.

Furthermore, several delegations¹²²³ emphasized that global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the need for more international cooperation, including between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations. In that regard, some participants¹²²⁴ expressed support for the call by the Secretary-General for a global ceasefire in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and welcomed the support of regional organizations for that call. Specifically, some delegations¹²²⁵ recognized the contributions of ASEAN to maintaining peace and security, with the representative of Viet Nam citing work carried out by ASEAN with China to negotiate the establishment of a code of conduct in the South China Sea, and many¹²²⁶ citing the Association's role and efforts in addressing the crisis in Myanmar. Speakers¹²²⁷ also mentioned the contribution of the African Union to finding a solution to the situation in Tigray, with the representative of Mexico citing the easing of tensions related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the representative of Norway the situation on the border between Ethiopia and the Sudan, while the representative of the Russian Federation made reference to mediation efforts by the African Union, together with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to stabilize the domestic political situation in South Sudan. Delegations¹²²⁸ also recognized the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in promoting the political transition in Mali. In addition, the representative of France cited the role of the League of Arab States in facilitating various political processes, especially in Libya, Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Middle East, overall. In the same vein, the representative of Lebanon recalled the decisive role of the League of Arab States in concluding the Taif Accords in 1989, which ended the civil war in the country, and in the aftermath of the explosion in the

¹²²³ Viet Nam, Estonia, China, Mexico, Tunisia, Niger, Brunei Darussalam (both in its national capacity and as Chair of ASEAN), League of Arab States, African Union, Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malta, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Romania and Rwanda.

¹²²⁴ Estonia and Japan.

¹²²⁵ Viet Nam, Ireland, United States, Russian Federation, Brunei Darussalam (both in its national capacity and as Chair of ASEAN), Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and Poland.

¹²²⁶ Viet Nam, Estonia, China, Ireland, Mexico, United States, Norway, United Kingdom, France, Brunei Darussalam (both in its national capacity and as Chair of ASEAN), European Union, Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Liechtenstein, Republic of Korea and Switzerland.

¹²²⁷ Mexico, Norway and France.

¹²²⁸ Mexico, Norway, France, Ghana and Japan.

Port of Beirut. Sweden and Liechtenstein underscored the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in promoting thematic priorities such as women and peace and security, and the United States the Organization's work in ensuring the meaningful participation of women in all political processes, while others¹²²⁹ cited its role in ensuring the efforts of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, with Malta pointing to the leading role taken by OSCE in mediation efforts, such as those associated with the Trilateral Contact Group, the Minsk Group, the Geneva International Discussions and the 5 plus 2 agenda. The representative of the United States noted the role of the Organization of American States in brokering agreements to resolve territorial disputes between Belize and Guatemala, between Honduras and Nicaragua and between Costa Rica and El Salvador, as well as its participation in disarmament and demobilization in Colombia. The representative of France expressed recognition for the work of the International Organization of la Francophonie, particularly in terms of electoral observation and political dialogue, as was the case for Haiti, and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations expressed recognition for the role played by the European Union in facilitating dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. Other participants¹²³⁰ recognized various regional women's mediator and peacebuilding initiatives, such as the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa), the African Women Leaders Network, the Arab Women Mediators Network and the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry.¹²³¹

At the same meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement in connection with the item.¹²³² In the presidential statement, the Council recalled its previous relevant resolutions and presidential statements in which it had underscored the importance of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations.¹²³³ Council members recognized that regional and subregional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts, owing to their knowledge of the region,¹²³⁴ and that they were well positioned to promote confidence, trust and dialogue among concerned parties within their respective regions

and could play a role in post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development.¹²³⁵ In that regard, the Council emphasized the role of States, regional and subregional organizations, the United Nations and relevant stakeholders in promoting confidence-building measures and dialogue at various levels, while ensuring synergy, coherence and complementarity of such efforts, and requested that the Secretary-General, while presenting regular written reports on matters seized by the Council, make recommendations for further enhancing cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in promoting confidence-building and dialogue.¹²³⁶

On 10 June, the Council held a meeting focused on the cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union.¹²³⁷ At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In his remarks, the High Representative reported that the European Union was defining its next set of joint European Union-United Nations priorities on peace operations and crisis management to strengthen cooperation between the two organizations and maximize their impact. He recalled that the world was into its second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had served to underscore the fragility of a hyperglobalized and interdependent world. In that regard, he noted that the European Union was a staunch promoter of vaccine multilateralism and called on all players to lift export restrictions on vaccines and their components. Beyond the pandemic, the High Representative affirmed that climate change and biodiversity losses had reached existential levels and emphasized that the Council had an important role to play on climate and health and their links to peace and security. In the light of two major United Nations summits to be held later in the year, one in Kunming, China, and one in Glasgow, United Kingdom, and to give impetus to their success, he expressed the hope that the Council would adopt a resolution on the link between climate change and security, which was increasingly evident. He also highlighted a few concrete areas where the European Union was deeply engaged and where urgent results were needed, including in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Belarus, Ukraine and the Western Balkans.

Following the briefing, Council members recognized the European Union as an important partner to the United Nations in maintaining international peace

¹²²⁹ Ireland, United States, Norway, France, Sweden, European Union, Malta and Ukraine.

¹²³⁰ Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Peru and Portugal.

¹²³¹ For further details on the briefings and discussion during the videoconference, see part VIII, sect. I.

¹²³² [S/PRST/2021/9](#).

¹²³³ *Ibid.*, first paragraph.

¹²³⁴ *Ibid.*, third paragraph.

¹²³⁵ *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

¹²³⁶ *Ibid.*, seventh and last paragraphs.

¹²³⁷ See [S/PV.8792](#).

and security, including regarding its contributions to solving issues on the Council's agenda, with some¹²³⁸ citing its role in the Middle East peace process as a member of the Quartet, others¹²³⁹ its role in revitalizing and restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and still others¹²⁴⁰ its contribution to enforcing the United Nations arms embargo on Libya through the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean operation IRINI (Operation IRINI). Cautioning that the efforts of the European Union should not go beyond the frameworks set forth in Council mandates, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that his delegation still had questions about Operation IRINI, as one of its objectives was to assist in the fulfilment of the United Nations arms embargo on Libya. Council members¹²⁴¹ recognized the efforts made by the European Union towards peace and security and peacebuilding on the African continent, with some¹²⁴² citing its support for peace processes led by African subregional organizations, including for African-led regional peacekeeping efforts, notably, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. With regard to the European continent, Council members¹²⁴³ also discussed the human rights situation in Belarus and the situation in Ukraine. Specifically, some Council members¹²⁴⁴ addressed the occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, some¹²⁴⁵ cited the intervention of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine and some¹²⁴⁶ mentioned the military build-up near the border of Ukraine.¹²⁴⁷

On 28 October, at the initiative of Kenya, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,¹²⁴⁸ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with this item, focused

on the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union.¹²⁴⁹ During the videoconference, Council members heard a briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General. In her remarks, the Deputy Secretary-General noted that the annual report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union¹²⁵⁰ contained a number of hopeful developments, including, specifically, the growing cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations on sustainable development, elections and peace processes.¹²⁵¹ In connection with the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Our Common Agenda",¹²⁵² the Deputy Secretary-General underlined three urgent actions that required global solidarity and support, namely, to prioritize the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa through accelerated vaccine distribution, more robust national health systems and much-needed investments in preparedness; to reaffirm the focus on sustainable development, with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 of the African Union at the heart of those common efforts; and to continue securing adequate, predictable and sustainable resources that would bring to life development, peace and security mandates across Africa.¹²⁵³

Council members also heard a statement by the President of Ghana, in his capacity as Chairperson of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS.¹²⁵⁴ In reference to the security challenges affecting the African continent, the President of Ghana stated that, as acknowledged by the Secretary-General in his report entitled "Our Common Agenda",¹²⁵⁵ there was a need to re-emphasize global solidarity and find new ways of working together for the common good.¹²⁵⁶ He expressed the hope that solidarity would be renewed within the Council with regard to addressing the gaps in cooperation between the United Nations and the continental and regional arrangements of Africa. In that regard, he offered a few points for the Council's consideration. First, regular consultations were needed between the United Nations and the African Union and

¹²³⁸ India, Ireland, Tunisia, Mexico, China, France and Estonia.

¹²³⁹ United Kingdom, Russian Federation, India, Ireland, Tunisia, China and France.

¹²⁴⁰ United Kingdom, Tunisia, United States, Mexico, Norway, France, Niger and Estonia.

¹²⁴¹ Kenya, United Kingdom, India, Tunisia, United States, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Mexico, China, Norway and Niger.

¹²⁴² Kenya, United Kingdom, India, United States, China, Norway, France, Niger and Estonia.

¹²⁴³ United Kingdom, United States, Norway, France and Estonia.

¹²⁴⁴ United States, Norway and Estonia.

¹²⁴⁵ United States and Estonia.

¹²⁴⁶ France and Estonia.

¹²⁴⁷ For further details on the discussions in relation to Ukraine, see part I, sect. 18.

¹²⁴⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 18 October (S/2021/887).

¹²⁴⁹ See S/2021/941.

¹²⁵⁰ S/2021/763.

¹²⁵¹ See S/2021/941.

¹²⁵² A/75/982.

¹²⁵³ See S/2021/941.

¹²⁵⁴ In addition to hearing a briefing by the President of Ghana, Council members heard a briefing by the High Representative for the Peace Fund of the African Union. The High Representative's statement was, however, not included in the letter of the President of the Council compiling all statements.

¹²⁵⁵ A/75/982.

¹²⁵⁶ See S/2021/941.

the organs of the latter, such as the Peace and Security Council, as well as with regional economic communities such as ECOWAS. Second, the United Nations needed to enhance the wealth of experience it had in preventive diplomacy in its engagement with Africa. Third, cooperation between the United Nations and Africa needed to be a steady effort towards resolving the root causes of conflicts, within the context of sustaining peace, encompassing programmes aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflicts. Lastly, he posited that the linkage between peace and development could not be ignored.

Following the briefings, Council members¹²⁵⁷ noted the various threats and challenges faced by the African continent, including terrorism, armed conflicts and instability, as well as structural challenges such as exclusion, marginalization, absence of state authority and weak governance. Speakers also highlighted the additional impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic¹²⁵⁸ and climate change,¹²⁵⁹ with Kenya and China pointing especially to the socioeconomic and security challenges affecting the continent. In that regard, speakers¹²⁶⁰ emphasized the need for cooperation between the United Nations, on the one hand, and the African Union and African subregional organizations, on the other, to address challenges to peace and security on the continent, including in implementing the Silencing the Guns by 2030 initiative of the African Union, Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda. Specifically, Council members¹²⁶¹ emphasized the need to help Africa gain access to COVID-19 vaccines. Council members¹²⁶² also called for increased cooperation between the Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The representative of India underlined that, given that nearly 70 per cent of the mandates of resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter concerned Africa, a strong and effective partnership between the United

Nations and the African Union needed to be the foundational edifice. Council members also acknowledged the contributions of African-led peacekeeping operations to international peace and security, such as AMISOM, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force, with some¹²⁶³ emphasizing the need for adequate, predictable and sustainable support, and some¹²⁶⁴ specifically citing United Nations assessed contributions.¹²⁶⁵

On 28 October, Council members adopted a presidential statement.¹²⁶⁶ In the presidential statement, the Council commended the progress made in the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union and stressed that it should further develop into a systematic, operational and strategic partnership rooted in shared values and a strong commitment to international cooperation, adapted to the complex security challenges facing Africa.¹²⁶⁷ The Council also underscored the importance of further consolidation of United Nations-African Union cooperation through partnership in the different components of the African Peace and Security Architecture.¹²⁶⁸ Furthermore, the Council recognized that ad hoc and unpredictable financing arrangements for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter could affect the effectiveness of those peace support operations and encouraged further dialogue on options for addressing the issue.¹²⁶⁹ Lastly, the Council recognized the negative impact and unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had led to severe socioeconomic, humanitarian, political and security repercussions, including in Africa, and, *inter alia*, called upon vaccine-producing countries and the private sector to translate their commitments into actions in order to facilitate expedited access by Africa to vaccines.¹²⁷⁰

¹²⁵⁷ Kenya, Tunisia, Viet Nam, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, China, Mexico and Russian Federation.

¹²⁵⁸ Kenya, Tunisia, Viet Nam, Norway, Ireland, United Kingdom, China, Mexico and Russian Federation.

¹²⁵⁹ Kenya, Tunisia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, Ireland, United Kingdom, Estonia and France.

¹²⁶⁰ Kenya, Tunisia, Viet Nam, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, India, Ireland, United Kingdom, Estonia, China, France, Mexico and Russian Federation.

¹²⁶¹ Viet Nam, Norway, Ireland, China, France and Mexico.

¹²⁶² Tunisia, Viet Nam, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, India, Ireland, Mexico and Russian Federation.

¹²⁶³ Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, Ireland, China and France.

¹²⁶⁴ Kenya, Tunisia, India, China, France and Russian Federation.

¹²⁶⁵ For further details on the briefings and discussion during the videoconference, see part VIII, sect. I.

¹²⁶⁶ [S/PRST/2021/21](#).

¹²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

¹²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, tenth paragraph.

¹²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, twenty-fourth paragraph.

¹²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, ninth paragraph.

Table 1

Meeting: cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8792 10 June 2021	European Union			High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	All Council members, invitee	

Table 2

Videoconferences: cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
18 January 2021	S/2021/66	Letter dated 20 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
29 January 2021	No record (see A/76/2 , part II, chap. 36)		S/PRST/2021/2
19 April 2021	S/2021/394	Letter dated 21 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	S/PRST/2021/9
28 October 2021	S/2021/941	Letter dated 10 November 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	S/PRST/2021/21

Part II

Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments

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Introductory note

Part II of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council in relation to its provisional rules of procedure and relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations. Since the provisional rules of procedure are routinely applied by the Council at its formal meetings, the focus of part II is on special rather than standard application of the rules in the proceedings of the Council.

Owing to the continuing impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic on the functioning of the Council, part II includes a section devoted exclusively to the procedures and working methods developed and agreed upon by Council members since March 2020. From 1 January to 24 May 2021, the Council did not hold any meetings in the Security Council Chamber. Council members, instead, maintained the practice of holding videoconferences in open and closed formats as a means of continuing the work of the Council. From 25 May until the end of the year, while the Council conducted its meetings mostly in person in the Chamber, some of its work followed a hybrid model, alternating between in-person and virtual modalities. In 2021, videoconferences, whether open or closed, continued not to be considered formal meetings of the Council. This had a direct impact on the application of the provisional rules of procedure and on the ability of the Council to vote.

As a result, Council members also maintained the practice of adopting resolutions by written procedure, the outcome of which was announced at videoconferences and had the same legal status as those voted on in the Security Council Chamber. In addition, statements by the President were adopted following a no-objection procedure and subsequently announced at open videoconferences, and they also had the same status as those adopted in the Chamber. While Council members agreed on procedures for the adoption of draft resolutions and statements by the President, no procedure was agreed upon for procedural votes within the framework of the new working methods.

Part II is divided into 11 sections. Section I provides an overview of the procedural developments and the working methods developed and agreed upon by the members of the Council in response to the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Following previous supplements, sections II to X are divided according to the order of the relevant chapters of the provisional rules of procedure, as follows: section II, meetings and records (Article 28 of the Charter and rules 1–5 and 48–57); section III, agenda (rules 6–12); section IV, representation and credentials (rules 13–17); section V, presidency (rules 18–20); section VI, Secretariat (rules 21–26); section VII, conduct of business (rules 27, 29, 30 and 33); section VIII, participation (Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter and rules 37 and 39); section IX, decision-making and voting (Article 27 of the Charter and rules 31, 32, 34–36, 38 and 40); and section X, languages (rules 41–47). Section XI deals with the status of the provisional rules of procedure (Article 30 of the Charter).

The remaining rules are covered in other parts of the present Supplement, as follows: rule 28, concerning subsidiary organs of the Council, in parts IX and X and, concerning Security Council missions, in part VI; and rule 61, concerning relations with other United Nations organs, in part IV.

During the period under review, there were no instances of the application of rules 58 to 60 concerning the admission of new Members; the present Supplement therefore contains no material relating to those rules.

* * *

During the period under review, with the gradual improvement of the situation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the easing of corresponding health and safety restrictions, the Council progressively resumed holding in-person activities. In 2021, the Council held 164 meetings, compared with 81 in 2020, of which 150 were public (open) and 14 were private (closed). The members of the Council held 67 informal consultations of the whole in 2021, compared with 46 in 2020. In accordance with the working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, the members of the Council also held 147 videoconferences, compared with 269 in 2020, of which 90 were open and 57 were closed. Council members continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, most of the Arria-formula meetings and half of the informal interactive dialogues were held by videoconference. In addition, the Council continued to expand the practice of holding informal “wrap-up” sessions at the end of the month, most of which were held in person.

In 2021, the Council was seized of 69 items and considered 44 items, compared with 42 in 2020. Of those 44 items, 23 concerned country-specific and regional situations and 21 dealt with thematic and other issues.¹

During the period under review, the Council adopted 57 resolutions and 24 statements by the President. The Council also issued 39 notes by the President and 170 letters from the President. One draft resolution was not adopted owing to the lack of the required nine affirmative votes, while another was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member. In 2021, the continuing difficulties posed by the COVID-19 pandemic on the holding of in-person meetings, in particular during the first half of the year, as well as the absence of a mechanism to vote remotely on procedural matters, effectively impeded the ability of the Council to hold procedural votes. No procedural vote was thus held in 2021.

Aspects relating to the working methods of the Council continued to be raised and discussed by Council members, in particular at the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 16 June 2021, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” (see cases 1 and 4–6).² Participants exchanged views on the notion of agility of the Council during the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact of the remote procedures developed during the pandemic on the working methods of the Council and the progressive return to in-person activities. Discussions were also focused on how to ensure transparency, efficiency and interactivity in the work of the Council, in particular as it related to the format of Council meetings, the agenda, the role of the Council presidency, participation in Council meetings and other activities, and inclusivity and burden-sharing in the decision-making process.

On 12 July, the Council issued four notes by the President addressing different aspects of the working methods of the Council, including the keeping of a register of training opportunities by the Secretariat for the members of the Council, the role of coordinators in the permanent missions of Council members in the implementation of the working methods, monthly working methods commitments of Council presidencies and multilingualism.³ On 22 December, the Council issued a fifth note by the President on working methods in extraordinary circumstances.⁴

¹ See S/2022/10.

² See S/PV.8798 and S/2021/572.

³ See S/2021/645, S/2021/646, S/2021/647 and S/2021/648.

⁴ See S/2021/1074.

I. Procedural developments during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic

Note

In 2021, owing to the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council continued to implement and further develop the procedures and working methods established at the outset of the pandemic, in March 2020.⁵ From 1 January to 24 May 2021, the Council did not hold any in-person meetings or informal consultations of the whole and, instead, convened 135 videoconferences.⁶ With the gradual improvement of the situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic, as from 25 May 2021 until the end of 2021, the Council progressively returned to in-person activities, holding meetings in the Security Council Chamber, while continuing to convene open videoconferences. Informal consultations of the whole also resumed in person on 25 May, in the Council Chamber, followed by the alternating use of both the Chamber and the Consultations Room from 15 November.

⁵ For more information on the working methods developed by Council members in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁶ The Council held its 8778th meeting in person on 7 December 2020 (see [S/PV.8778](#)) and its 8779th meeting in person on 25 May 2021 ([S/PV.8779](#)). For more information on the meetings of the Council in 2021, see sect. II below.

In accordance with the practice established in 2020, videoconferences, whether open or closed, were not considered formal meetings of the Council, and during the first half of the year, Council members continued to adopt resolutions through a written procedure, the outcome of which was announced at videoconferences, and those resolutions had the same legal status as those voted on in the Security Council Chamber. Furthermore, the remote working methods did not provide for the holding of procedural votes, and consensus remained the norm in relation to all procedural questions.

Section I covers the practices and procedures developed by the Council in 2021 in relation to its working methods during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Working methods

In 2021, except in the month of July, each President of the Council outlined in a letter to the representatives of the members of the Council the working methods agreed upon by the members for each month, usually maintaining and building on the measures outlined in the previous months. Table 1 below lists all relevant letters from the presidency circulated in 2021 concerning the working methods during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 1

Letters from the President of the Security Council to the representatives of the members of the Council concerning working methods during the COVID-19 pandemic

Date	Symbol	Title	Presidency	Summary of working methods agreed upon
5 January 2021	S/2021/18	Letter dated 5 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Tunisia	– Combination of videoconferences and in-person meetings of the Council – Working methods reference documents: S/2020/372, S/2020/639 and S/2020/966
3 February 2021	S/2021/106	Letter dated 3 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	United Kingdom	– Combination of videoconferences and in-person meetings of the Council – Working methods reference documents: S/2020/372, S/2020/639 and S/2020/966

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<i>Date</i>	<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Summary of working methods agreed upon</i>
9 March 2021	S/2021/245	Letter dated 9 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	United States	– Videoconferences only – Working methods reference document: S/2020/372
1 April 2021	S/2021/326	Letter dated 1 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Viet Nam	– Videoconferences for majority of discussions; in-person meetings of the Council only if agreed by consensus – Working methods reference documents: S/2020/372, S/2020/639 and S/2020/966
3 May 2021	S/2021/428	Letter dated 3 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	China	– Combination of informal videoconferences and in-person meetings of the Council – Working methods reference documents: S/2020/253, S/2020/372 and S/2020/966
1 June 2021	S/2021/524	Letter dated 1 June 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Estonia	– In-person meetings in the Security Council Chamber for most discussions, and high-level meetings and other special meetings to be held in a virtual format – Working methods reference document: S/2020/372
3 August 2021	S/2021/703	Letter dated 3 August 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	India	– Majority of meetings to be held in the Security Council Chamber, except for one high-level meeting held by videoconference – Working methods reference document: S/2020/372
3 September 2021	S/2021/776	Letter dated 3 September 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Ireland	– All meetings to be held in the Security Council Chamber – Participation by non-Council members: through the submission of written statements in open debates; in person in all other meetings to which they were invited under rules 37 or 39 of the provisional rules of procedure or by the President of the Council as agreed by the Council prior to the meeting – Working methods reference document: S/2020/372
5 October 2021	S/2021/848	Letter dated 5 October 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Kenya	– Majority of Council meetings to be held in the Security Council Chamber, except for one high-level meeting held by videoconference – Working methods reference document: S/2020/372

<i>Date</i>	<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Summary of working methods agreed upon</i>
10 November 2021	S/2021/939	Letter dated 10 November 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Mexico	– All meetings of the Council to be held in the Security Council Chamber – Participation by non-Council members: through the submission of written statements in open debates; in person in all other meetings to which they were invited under rules 37 or 39 of the provisional rules of procedure or by the President of the Council as agreed by the Council prior to the meeting – Working methods reference documents: S/2020/372 and S/2017/507 and other relevant notes by the President on working methods
6 December 2021	S/2021/1013	Letter dated 6 December 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Niger	– All meetings of the Council to be held in the Security Council Chamber – Participation by non-Council members: through the submission of written statements in open debates; in person in all other meetings to which they were invited under rules 37 or 39 of the provisional rules of procedure or by the President of the Council as agreed by the Council prior to the meeting – Working methods reference documents: S/2020/372 and S/2017/507 and other relevant notes by the President on working methods

In all letters from the President of the Council outlining the working methods during the COVID-19 pandemic, it was indicated that the modalities of work were only responses to the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances related to the pandemic and that those modalities could be reviewed, revised, adjusted, suspended or discontinued, subject to agreement among all Council members. In all letters except for those dated 3 February and 1 June, it was stated that the working methods would not set a precedent for the future.⁷ Moreover, it was noted in the letters dated 5 January, 3 February, 1 April and 3 May that the decision to convene Council meetings in person rested with Council members on the basis of consensus and of guidance from the United Nations medical services and the health and safety advice of the Secretariat.⁸

At the beginning of 2021, in the letter dated 5 January,⁹ Council members agreed that in-person meetings would be held as and when it was deemed appropriate and upon the agreement of Council members. It was also provided in the same letter that meetings held in the Security Council Chamber or the Economic and Social Council Chamber would be in strict compliance with the health protocols, guidelines for physical distancing and measures laid out in the annexes to the letters from the President of the Council dated 1 July and 1 October 2020.¹⁰ Videoconferences, on the other hand, would continue to be held in accordance with the remote working methods set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020.¹¹

The Council did not hold any in-person meeting in 2021 until 25 May. Accordingly, in the letters outlining the working methods for February, March

⁷ See [S/2021/18](#), [S/2021/245](#), [S/2021/326](#), [S/2021/428](#), [S/2021/703](#), [S/2021/776](#), [S/2021/848](#), [S/2021/939](#) and [S/2021/1013](#).

⁸ See [S/2021/18](#), [S/2021/106](#), [S/2021/326](#) and [S/2021/428](#).

⁹ [S/2021/18](#).

¹⁰ [S/2020/639](#) and [S/2020/966](#).

¹¹ [S/2020/372](#).

and April 2021,¹² the holding of either all or most Council discussions was envisaged in a virtual format. After the resumption of in-person meetings on 25 May and with the easing of the health restrictions, the working methods for subsequent months provided for the holding of either most or all Council meetings in person in the Security Council Chamber.¹³ In that regard, in the letter dated 1 June,¹⁴ while envisaging that most of the meetings would be held in the Security Council Chamber, the presidency of Estonia noted that high-level and a few other special meetings were expected to be held in a virtual format, so as to enable inclusive participation, despite the constraints related to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the letter dated 3 August,¹⁵ the presidency of India stated that one high-level meeting was being planned in a virtual format, in view of international travel restrictions and quarantine guidelines. Similarly, in its letter dated 5 October,¹⁶ the presidency of Kenya noted its plan to hold the majority of Council meetings in person, with one high-level meeting in virtual format. In its letter dated 6 December,¹⁷ the presidency of the Niger expressed its intention to hold consultations in the Consultations Room of the Council, for the first time since March 2020. Consultations held in person in the Security Council Chamber had resumed on 25 May 2021.

Concerning health and safety measures, in the letters dated 1 June, 3 August, 3 September and 5 October,¹⁸ the presidencies strongly encouraged delegates and Secretariat staff attending in-person meetings to get vaccinated. Furthermore, in the letters dated 3 August, 3 September, 5 October and 6 December,¹⁹ it was noted that participants should wear masks at all times, except while delivering remarks or taking the floor.

In the letters dated 10 November and 6 December,²⁰ the presidencies of Mexico and the

Niger, respectively, established that they would each strive to return to the regular conduct of Council business, as provided in the Charter of the United Nations and in the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. The two presidencies further stated that the representatives of Member States who were not members of the Council and had been invited to participate in public meetings of the Council under rule 37 or 39 or by the presidency with the prior agreement of the Council would be allowed in the Security Council Chamber. In addition, Member States not members of the Council would continue to be able to participate in open debates through the submission of written statements. In the same letters, the presidencies also encouraged the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 August 2017²¹ and other such notes on working methods, to enhance efficiency and transparency during such an unprecedented and extraordinary time.

While not explicitly addressed in the letters from the President of the Security Council in 2021, aspects of the working methods related to the informal programme of work, adoption of the agenda, accreditation of representatives, conduct of business, participation of non-Council members, announcement of videoconferences, videoconference records, live-streaming of videoconferencing, outcomes of videoconferences, written procedure for the adoption of resolutions and statements by the President remained governed by the measures set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President to the representatives of the members of the Security Council.²²

In a note issued on 22 December,²³ the President of the Security Council indicated that, drawing on the lessons learned and recalling the temporary, extraordinary and provisional measures set out in the various letters from the President during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council committed itself to maintaining its state of readiness under all circumstances, in an effort to ensure that it could function continuously in accordance with Article 28 of the Charter.

¹² S/2021/106, S/2021/245 and S/2021/326.

¹³ See S/2021/524, S/2021/703, S/2021/776, S/2021/848, S/2021/939 and S/2021/1013.

¹⁴ S/2021/524.

¹⁵ S/2021/703.

¹⁶ S/2021/848.

¹⁷ S/2021/1013.

¹⁸ S/2021/524, S/2021/703, S/2021/776 and S/2021/848.

¹⁹ S/2021/703, S/2021/776, S/2021/848 and S/2021/1013.

²⁰ S/2021/939 and S/2021/1013.

²¹ S/2017/507.

²² S/2020/372. See also S/2020/253 and S/2020/273.

²³ S/2021/1074.

II. Meetings and records

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Council concerning meetings, publicity and the records of the Council, in relation to Article 28 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 1 to 5 and 48 to 57 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

Article 28

1. *The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.*

2. *The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.*

3. *The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.*

Rule 1

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary, but the interval between meetings shall not exceed fourteen days.

Rule 2

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council.

Rule 3

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4

Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held twice a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5

Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.

Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

Rule 48

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 49

Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to the representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

Rule 50

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 51

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 52

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives on the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence

of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 53

The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 54

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official languages as soon as possible.

Rule 55

At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a communiqué through the Secretary-General.

Rule 56

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 57


The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

The present section comprises five subsections: A. Meetings, concerning the convening of meetings pursuant to rules 1 to 5 and 48; B. Informal consultations of the whole; C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council; D. Discussions concerning meetings; and E. Records, maintained pursuant to rules 49 to 57.

During the period under review, the Council held 164 meetings, of which 150 were public (open) and 14 were private (closed). The Council also held a total of 67 informal consultations of the whole. In addition, in accordance with the working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic,²⁴ Council members held 147 videoconferences, of which 90 were open and 57 were closed. Council members also held seven informal interactive dialogues and 32 Arria-formula meetings. Figure I below shows the total number of meetings and informal consultations held from 2012 to 2021, along with the number of open and closed videoconferences held in 2020 and 2021.

²⁴ For more information on the working methods developed by the Council in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, see sect. I above and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

Figure I
Number of meetings, consultations and videoconferences, 2012–2021



A. Meetings

1. Application of rules relating to meetings

Owing to the health restrictions in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council did not hold any formal meetings from 8 December 2020 to 24 May 2021, thereby exceeding the maximum interval of 14 days between meetings established under rule 1 of the provisional rules of procedure.²⁵ During the period under review, the Council continued, on

²⁵ The last in-person meeting of the Council before the interruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was its 8778th meeting, on 7 December 2020, and the first with which it resumed meeting in person was its 8779th meeting, on 25 May 2021.

occasion, to convene more than one meeting a day, and it did so also with respect to videoconferences.

In 2021, the Council did not hold any periodic meetings pursuant to rule 4 or any meetings away from Headquarters pursuant to rule 5.

During the period under review, no communications were received from Member States requesting the Council to convene a meeting that explicitly cited rule 2 or 3 as the basis of the request. Table 2 lists two communications requesting an urgent or special meeting either explicitly or implicitly invoking Article 35 of the Charter, under which Member States or States that are not members of the United Nations may refer disputes to the Council.²⁶

²⁶ For more information on Article 35 of the Charter, see part VI, sect. I.

Table 2
Letters in which Member States requested an urgent or special meeting

<i>Letter addressed to the President of the Council^a</i>	<i>Summary</i>	<i>Meeting convened (item and date)</i>
Letter dated 22 June 2021 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/593)	Requesting the Council to take action to preserve peace and security in the region by, inter alia, convening a session on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute to discuss its impact on the peace and security of millions of people who live and survive along the Blue Nile and the main Nile in Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan	S/PV.8816 Peace and security in Africa 8 July 2021

Letter addressed to the President of the Council ^a	Summary	Meeting convened (item and date)
Letter dated 25 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/607)	Calling upon the Council to convene an urgent session on the question of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”	S/PV.8816 Peace and security in Africa 8 July 2021

^a See also [S/2021/600](#), [S/2021/613](#), [S/2021/626](#) and [S/2021/627](#).

Complaints raised by Member States concerning the application of rule 3

During a high-level open videoconference held on 16 May in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” and the escalation of hostilities in Gaza and Israel that commenced on 10 May,²⁷ the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland expressed strong support for the convening of that meeting, adding that Council members had waited too long to express themselves in an open meeting of the Council. Similarly, the representative of Pakistan expressed regret that the Council had been unable for so long to hold the meeting and take action to halt the Israeli aggression.

In a letter to the President of the Council dated 17 May,²⁸ the representatives of Angola, the Central African Republic and the Congo to the United Nations recalled the note verbale dated 19 February from the Permanent Mission of Angola by which the latter had requested the Council to convene a special meeting on the Great Lakes region during the presidency of the United Kingdom, to which no response had been received. The representatives reiterated that it was urgent and essential for the President to convene a virtual special meeting with the Heads of State of Angola and the Congo to address all issues related to the political and security situation in the Central African Republic.

2. Format

Public meetings

The Council continued to meet in public, as provided for in rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure, mainly for the purposes of: (a) hearing briefings on country-specific, regional situations or thematic issues under its consideration; (b) holding

debates on particular items;²⁹ and (c) adopting decisions.³⁰ With the easing of restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, starting in May 2021, the Council progressively returned to in-person activities, resulting in a significant increase in the number of formal meetings and corresponding decrease in videoconferences compared with 2020. In 2021, the Council held a total of 164 meetings, of which 150, or 91.5 per cent, were public, compared with 81 meetings, of which 79, or 97.5 per cent, were public, in 2020. Council members also held 147 videoconferences, of which 90, or 61.2 per cent, were open, in 2021, compared with 269 videoconferences, of which 143, or 53.2 per cent, were open, in 2020.³¹

During the period under review, Council members held 12 meetings and 17 videoconferences at which two or more Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels. A total of 22 of those meetings and videoconferences were held in connection with thematic items, and three in connection with regional and country-specific situations. In 2021, the Council held 11 videoconferences and one meeting at which more than half of the Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels. On 7 May, Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” on upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system, at which all Council members were represented at the ministerial level.³² In addition, the Council held four meetings and nine videoconferences at

²⁹ In 2021, the Council continued the practice of holding meetings from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m., with resumptions in the case of several open debates (see [S/PV.8886](#), [S/PV.8886 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8900](#), [S/PV.8900 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8906](#), [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8909](#), [S/PV.8909 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8923](#) and [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#)).

³⁰ On the formats of public meetings, see also [S/2017/507](#), annex, sect. II.C.1.

³¹ For more information on the features of open and closed videoconferences of the Council, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.B. For a list of all videoconferences held by the Council in 2021, see annex, table A.1, below.

³² See [S/2021/456](#).

²⁷ See [S/2021/480](#).

²⁸ [S/2021/491](#).

which one or more Council members were represented at the level of Head of State or Government. All four meetings and six of the nine videoconferences were presided over by Heads of State or Government.

Table 3 below lists all high-level meetings and videoconferences held in 2021 at which two or more Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels.

Table 3
High-level meetings and videoconferences

<i>Meeting or videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Sub-item/topic</i>	<i>High-level participation</i>
S/2021/24 6 January 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts	Heads of State or Government (4) Kenya (President), Niger (President), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (President) Ministerial level (7) France (Minister of State for Tourism, French Nationals Abroad and Francophonie), India (Foreign Secretary), Ireland (Minister of State for the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Foreign Affairs), Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa), Viet Nam (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/2021/48 12 January 2021	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	International cooperation in combating terrorism 20 years after the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001)	Ministerial level (8) Estonia (Minister of Defence), India (Minister for External Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Minister of Justice and Public Security), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Minister of State with responsibility for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Middle East and North Africa)
S/2021/91 26 January 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	—	Heads of State or Government (1) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs) Ministerial level (6) Estonia (Deputy Minister of State for Foreign Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs)
S/2021/157 17 February 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Implementation of resolution 2532 (2020)	Heads of State or Government (1) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs) Ministerial level (12) China (State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), France (Minister Delegate for Foreign Trade and Economic Attractiveness), India (Minister for External Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs),

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<i>Meeting or videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Sub-item/topic</i>	<i>High-level participation</i>
			Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United Kingdom (Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs), United States (Secretary of State), Viet Nam (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/2021/198 23 February 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Climate and security	Heads of State or Government (9) Estonia (Prime Minister), France (President), Kenya (President), Niger (Prime Minister), Norway (Prime Minister), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (President), United Kingdom (Prime Minister), Viet Nam (Prime Minister) Ministerial level (5) China (Special Envoy for Climate Change), India (Minister for Environment, Forests and Climate Change), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United States (Special Presidential Envoy for Climate)
S/2021/250 11 March 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Conflict and food security	Ministerial level (7) Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Minister for International Development), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Minister for Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, Rural Transformation, Industry and Labour), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)
S/2021/315 29 March 2021	The situation in the Middle East	–	Ministerial level (6) Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Norway (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United States (Secretary of State)
S/2021/346 8 April 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Mine action and sustaining peace – stronger partnerships for better delivery	Ministerial level (9) Estonia (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), India (Vice-Minister and Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet), Viet Nam (Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Meeting or videoconference record and date	Item	Sub-item/topic	High-level participation
S/2021/394 19 April 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	—	Heads of State or Government (4) Estonia (President), Kenya (President), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Viet Nam (President) Ministerial level (8) China (Special Representative of the President, State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), India (Minister for External Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)
S/2021/415 27 April 2021	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Indispensable civilian objects	Ministerial level (7) Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Norway (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Minister of State with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet), Viet Nam (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/2021/456 7 May 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system	Heads of State or Government (1) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs) Ministerial level (14) China (State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), France (Minister of State for Tourism, French Nationals Abroad and Francophonie), India (Foreign Secretary), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Niger (Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Norway (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia), United States (Secretary of State), Viet Nam (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/2021/480 16 May 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	—	Ministerial level (6) China (State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Norway (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)

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<i>Meeting or videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Sub-item/topic</i>	<i>High-level participation</i>
S/2021/490 19 May 2021	Peace and security in Africa	Addressing root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa	Ministerial level (11) China (State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), India (Minister for External Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Health), Norway (Minister of International Development), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United Kingdom (Minister for Africa at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet), Viet Nam (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/2021/601 22 June 2021	The situation in Afghanistan	–	Ministerial level (6) Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), India (Minister for External Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), Norway (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)
S/2021/617 28 June 2021	Children and armed conflict	–	Heads of State or Government (3) Estonia (President), Ireland (President), Niger (President) Ministerial level (6) India (Foreign Secretary), Norway (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Minister of State with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade), United Kingdom (Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet), Viet Nam (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8820 15 July 2021	The situation in Libya	–	Ministerial level (5) France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), India (Foreign Secretary), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)
S/PV.8822 16 July 2021	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Preserving humanitarian space	Ministerial level (6) France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), India (Foreign Secretary), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Tunisia (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)
S/2021/722 9 August 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Maritime security	Head of State or Government (4) India (Prime Minister), Kenya (President), Russian Federation (President), Viet Nam (Prime Minister)

Meeting or
videoconference record
and date

Item

Sub-item/topic

High-level participation

Ministerial level (9)

Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **France** (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), **Ireland** (Minister for Transport and Minister for Environment, Climate and Communications), **Mexico** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **Niger** (Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), **Norway** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **Saint Vincent and the Grenadines** (Minister of Finance and Economic Planning), **United Kingdom** (Secretary of State for Defence), **United States** (Secretary of State)

[S/PV.8838](#)

18 August 2021

United Nations
peacekeeping
operations

Protecting the
protectors:
technology and
peacekeeping

Ministerial level (3)

Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **India** (Minister for External Affairs), **United States** (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)

[S/PV.8839](#)

19 August 2021

Threats to
international
peace and
security caused
by terrorist acts

–

Ministerial level (2)

India (Minister for External Affairs), **United States** (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)

[S/PV.8864](#)

23 September 2021

Maintenance of
international
peace and
security

Climate and
security

Head of State or Government (3)

Estonia (President), **Ireland** (Taoiseach), **Viet Nam** (President)

Ministerial level (9)

France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), **India** (Vice-Minister, Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs), **Kenya** (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), **Mexico** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **Niger** (Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), **Norway** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **Tunisia** (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad), **United Kingdom** (Minister of State for the Commonwealth and Development, the United Nations and South Asia), **United States** (Secretary of State)

[S/PV.8865](#)

27 September 2021

Non-proliferation
of weapons of
mass destruction

Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty

Ministerial level (3)

Estonia (Deputy Foreign Minister), **India** (Foreign Secretary), **Ireland** (Minister of State for European Affairs)

[S/PV.8877](#)

12 October 2021

Peacebuilding
and sustaining
peace

Diversity, State-
building and the
search for peace

Head of State or Government (1)

Kenya (President)

Ministerial level (2)

India (Minister of State for External Affairs and Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs), **United States** (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President's Cabinet)

[S/PV.8884](#)

20 October 2021

The situation in
the Great Lakes
region

–

Ministerial level (2)

Ireland (Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora), **Kenya** (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs)

Meeting or videoconference record and date	Item	Sub-item/topic	High-level participation
S/PV.8886 and S/PV.8886 (Resumption 1) 21 October 2021	Women and peace and security	–	Ministerial level (4) Ireland (Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora), Kenya (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya), United Kingdom (Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Prime Minister’s Special Representative for Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet)
S/2021/941 28 October 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	–	Head of State or Government (5) Kenya (President), Norway (Prime Minister), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Security, Legal Affairs and Information), Tunisia (President), Viet Nam (President) Ministerial level (4) Estonia (Deputy Foreign Minister), India (Minister for External Affairs), Ireland (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), United Kingdom (Minister for Africa at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
S/PV.8900 and S/PV.8900 (Resumption 1) 9 November 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Exclusion, inequality and conflict	Head of State or Government (1) Mexico (President) Ministerial level (3) Estonia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), India (Minister of State for External Affairs), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet)
S/PV.8909 and S/PV.8909 (Resumption 1) 22 November 2021	Small arms	The impact of the diversion and trafficking of arms on peace and security	Ministerial level (2) India (Secretary (Consular, Passport and Visa Division and Overseas Indian Affairs), Ministry of External Affairs), Mexico (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8923 and S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1) 9 December 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Security in the context of terrorism and climate change	Heads of State or Government (2) Estonia (President), Niger (President) Ministerial level (1) United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet)

Private meetings

During the period under review, the Council continued to hold meetings in private, in accordance with rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure. Private meetings continued to constitute a small percentage of all Council meetings, with 14 private meetings of a total of 164 meetings (8.5 per cent) held in 2021 (see figure II).³³

As indicated in table 4 below, eight of those meetings were held with troop- and police-contributing countries under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”. In 2021, Council members also held two closed videoconferences with troop- and police-contributing countries.

³³ On the formats of private meetings, see also [S/2017/507](#), annex, sect. II.C.2.

Figure II
Public and private meetings, 2021




Figure III
Items discussed at private meetings, 2021




Table 4
Private meetings

Item	Meeting record and date
Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001) , annex II, sections A and B	S/PV.8788 , 7 June 2021 S/PV.8793 , 10 June 2021 S/PV.8821 , 15 July 2021 S/PV.8832 , 6 August 2021 S/PV.8876 , 11 October 2021 S/PV.8895 , 3 November 2021 S/PV.8916 , 3 December 2021 S/PV.8920 , 7 December 2021
The question concerning Haiti	S/PV.8815 , 8 July 2021
The situation in Myanmar	S/PV.8800 , 18 June 2021 S/PV.8835 , 17 August 2021 S/PV.8898 , 8 November 2021

Item	Meeting record and date
Recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	S/PV.8789 , 8 June 2021
Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice	S/PV.8894 , 2 November 2021

B. Informal consultations of the whole

Informal consultations of the whole are not official meetings of the Council. The members gather in private for the purpose of holding discussions and receiving briefings from the Secretariat and representatives of the Secretary-General. These meetings are normally held in the Consultations Room, adjacent to the Security Council Chamber. During the period under review, Council members also held virtual informal consultations by means of closed videoconferences.³⁴ With the progressive easing of health and safety restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, they resumed holding in-person informal consultations as from 25 May 2021 in the Security Council Chamber, followed by the alternative use of both the Chamber and the Consultations room from 15 November 2021. Frequently, informal consultations or closed videoconferences continued to be held immediately after public meetings or open videoconferences, respectively. In 2021, Council members held 67 informal consultations, compared with 46 in 2020, 135 in 2019 and 120 in 2018 (see figure I).

Pursuant to the Council's established practice, no official records of informal consultations were issued and non-members were not invited.³⁵ In accordance with the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, virtual discussions announced as closed videoconferences did not include the participation of non-members and no written statements were published.³⁶ Frequently, however, statements to the press were issued or elements to the press were read out by the President of the Council after informal consultations or closed videoconferences.

³⁴ For more information on the working methods adopted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, see sect. I above and *Repertoire*, 2020, part II, sect. I.

³⁵ According to the note by the President of 30 August 2017, newly elected members of the Council are invited to observe all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and the informal consultations of the whole for a period of three months, as from 1 October immediately preceding their term of membership ([S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 140).

³⁶ See [S/2020/253](#) and [S/2020/372](#).

C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council

During the period under review, Council members continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings.³⁷ Informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings are convened at the initiative of one or more members of the Council. These dialogues are convened with the participation of all Council members, while Arria-formula meetings are convened with the participation of all or some Council members. While the dialogues are presided over by the President of the Council, Arria-formula meetings are not. Frequently, the member or one of the members of the Council convening the Arria-formula meeting also chair it. Neither of the two types of meetings are considered formal meetings of the Council. They are not announced in the *Journal of the United Nations* or in the Council's programme of work, and no official records are prepared. Invitees to informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings include Member States, relevant organizations and individuals. In the past, Arria-formula meetings were closed to the public; more recently, however, they have been open and broadcast. Informal interactive dialogues are not open to the public or broadcast. In 2021, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council held informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings both in person and by videoconference.

Informal interactive dialogues

According to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, when it deems it appropriate, the Council may use informal dialogues to seek the views of Member States that are parties to a conflict and/or other interested and affected parties.³⁸ During the period under review, the Council held seven such dialogues, including four by videoconference.³⁹ Six

³⁷ For more information on informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings, see [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 92, 95 and 97–99.

³⁸ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 92.

³⁹ For information on the evolution of informal interactive dialogues, see *Repertoire*, *Supplements 2008–2009 to 2020*.

informal interactive dialogues held in 2021 concerned country-specific or regional situations, while one was on a thematic issue related to cooperation between the

United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, as shown in table 5.

Table 5
Informal interactive dialogues

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Participants (including non-members of the Council)</i>
20 January 2021	The situation in Somalia: electoral developments in Somalia	All Council members, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia
14 April 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan: Darfur	All Council members, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, Sudan
20 April 2021	The situation in Somalia	All Council members, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, Managing Director of the European External Action Service, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia
29 April 2021 ^a	The situation in Libya	All Council members, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), UNSMIL Mission Coordinator
28 May 2021	The situation in Libya: European Union military operation in the Mediterranean	All Council members
15 June 2021 ^a	Peace and security in Africa: Ethiopia/Tigray	All Council members, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia, Commissioner for the National Disaster Risk Management Commission of Ethiopia
22 September 2021 ^a	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security: high-level informal interactive dialogue with the troika of the summit of the League of Arab States (Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) as encouraged in presidential statement S/PRST/2021/2	All Council members, Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia

^a Held in person.

Arria-formula meetings

As provided for in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, Arria-formula meetings are used by members of the Council as a flexible and informal forum for enhancing their deliberations and contact with civil society and non-governmental organizations.⁴⁰ In accordance with the note, Council members may

invite, on an informal basis, any Member State, relevant organization or individual to participate in Arria-formula meetings.

In 2021, Council members held 32 Arria-formula meetings, the highest number since the inception of the format in 1992 and an increase from 22 in both 2019 and 2020. A total of 27 of the Arria-formula meetings were held by videoconference. In terms of publicity, 30 were open (public) and broadcast and 2 were closed

⁴⁰ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 98.

(private). Of the 30 open meetings, 27 were broadcast on United Nations Web TV, while the other 3 used other platforms.⁴¹ Four of the meetings featured one or more participants at the ministerial or higher levels. In

some instances, Council members and non-Council members transmitted concept notes, summaries and compilations of statements made by participants at those meetings. Arria-formula meetings held during the period under review are listed in table 6.

⁴¹ In 2021, the broadcasting of Arria-formula meetings on United Nations Web TV was agreed by consensus.

Table 6
Arria-formula meetings

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organizers^a</i>	<i>Summary and/or compilation of statements</i>
22 January 2021 ^b	Media freedom in Belarus ^c	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States	–
29 January 2021 ^b	Children and armed conflict, repatriation of children from conflict zones: from camps to homes, call for action	Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict	S/2021/192
24 February 2021 ^b	Upholding the collective security system of the Charter of the United Nations: the use of force in international law, non-State actors and legitimate self-defence	Mexico	S/2021/247
8 March 2021 ^b	Call to lead by example: ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in United Nations-led peace processes	Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam	S/2021/356
12 March 2021 ^b	Crimea: seven years of violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine ^c	Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States	–
17 March 2021 ^b	Follow-up to the Arria-formula discussion of 12 March 2021 on the situation in Crimea	Russian Federation	S/2021/397
19 March 2021 ^b	Religion, belief and conflict: advancing the protection of members of religious and belief groups in conflict and the role of religious actors in conflict resolution ^c	Estonia, Norway, United Kingdom, United States	S/2021/318
26 March 2021 ^b	Protecting the peacekeeper: suppressing the deployment of improvised explosive devices against peace operations	Belgium, China, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam	S/2021/411
9 April 2021 ^b	The situation in Myanmar	Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, United States	–

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organizers^a</i>	<i>Summary and/or compilation of statements</i>
16 April 2021 ^b	Protection of developing nations against political pressure: upholding the integrity of international non-proliferation regimes	Russian Federation	—
5 May 2021 ^b	Odessa seven years after: neo-Nazism and violent nationalism as drivers of conflict in Ukraine	Russian Federation	—
7 May 2021 ^b	Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on violations against children in situations of armed conflict	Belgium, Canada, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Kenya, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam	S/2021/591
12 May 2021	Delivering accountability through innovation and partnership: harnessing technology to deliver justice for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide	Iraq, Netherlands, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States	—
17 May 2021 ^b	Impact of emerging technologies on international peace and security	China, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa, United Arab Emirates	S/2021/531
2 June 2021 ^b	Circumstances of Maidan and its after-effects in Donbass	Russian Federation	S/2021/690
2 June 2021	Strengthening an integrated approach to peace and security in the Sahel through a gendered lens: launch of the Group of Friends of Women of the Sahel	Chad, Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, African Union, European Union	—
16 June 2021 ^b	The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism	Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Viet Nam	—
18 June 2021 ^b	Addressing the impact of the departure of foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya on the Sahel region	Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad (as Chair of Group of Five for the Sahel), Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Libya, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Tunisia, African Union	—
28 July 2021 ^b	Preventing terrorism and violent extremism through tackling gender stereotypes, masculinities and structural gender inequality	Estonia, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States	S/2021/717
29 July 2021 ^b	Myanmar: crisis, conflict and COVID-19 – where are we now?	United Kingdom	—
11 August 2021 ^b	Humanitarian action: overcoming challenges in situations of armed conflict and counter-terrorism operations	Kenya	—
16 September 2021 ^b	The threat to international peace and security posed by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons	Mexico	—

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<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organizers^a</i>	<i>Summary and/or compilation of statements</i>
8 October 2021 ^b	The situation in Belarus ^c	Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States	–
15 October 2021 ^b	Beyond the inconvenient truths about underdevelopment in Haiti: seeking pan-African solutions/pathways and supporting national dialogue and reconciliation	Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States	S/2022/44
18 October 2021	Sea level rise and implications for international peace and security	Dominican Republic, Estonia, Fiji, France, Germany, Guyana, Ireland, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Niger, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam	–
28 October 2021 ^b	Addressing and countering hate speech and preventing incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence on social media (closed)	Kenya, Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect	–
15 November 2021 ^b	Closing the protection gap for widows in conflict and post-conflict settings	Estonia, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Viet Nam, African Union and European Union, as Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends of Women of the Sahel	–
29 November 2021	Accountability in the Syrian Arab Republic	Belgium, Canada, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Qatar, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States	S/2021/1112
3 December 2021 ^b	Addressing challenges of children without parental care in conflict settings	Malta, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United States, Viet Nam	–
6 December 2021	Protection of education in conflict	Niger, Norway	–
20 December 2021 ^b	Preventing civilian impact of malicious cyberactivities (closed)	Estonia, United Kingdom	–
22 December 2021 ^b	Situation with national minorities and the glorification of Nazism in the Baltic and Black Sea regions	Russian Federation	–

^a The term “organizers” refers to Council members, Member States and entities involved in organizing, sponsoring or hosting the meetings in accordance with concept notes.

^b Held by videoconference.

^c High-level meeting.

Other informal meetings

Following the practice started in 2007, the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their sixth informal joint seminar and fifteenth annual joint consultative meeting, which were conducted by videoconference on 16 and 17 December, respectively.⁴² Furthermore, on 18 May, Council members held an in-person informal dialogue with the incumbent Secretary-General to discuss his candidacy to be reappointed for a second term (2022–2026).⁴³ Council members further continued to hold “sofa talks” at the level of permanent representatives, a practice initiated in 2019 for Council members to raise issues of concern to international peace and security in an informal setting.⁴⁴

D. Discussions concerning meetings

During the period under review, questions pertaining to meetings and videoconferences were raised by the representatives of New Zealand and Switzerland, writing on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 8 February.⁴⁵ While congratulating the Council and the successive presidencies since March 2020 for ensuring business continuity during the COVID-19 pandemic and adapting the working methods while ensuring minimum standards of transparency and inclusion, the Group encouraged the Council to revisit and continue to improve upon the adaptations it had made thus far. In that regard, they invited the Council, among other measures, to decide that virtual meetings were formal meetings, to include them in the Council’s programme of work and the *Journal of the United Nations*, to have the Secretariat apply normal record-keeping and to make available to the wider membership in a timely manner any documents agreed to by the Council regarding the adaptation of the working methods in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, in another letter also dated 8 February,⁴⁶ the representative of Finland transmitted the report of the eighteenth annual workshop for newly elected

members of the Council, which had been held on 12 and 13 November 2020. It was noted in the report that workshop participants had discussed, among other topics, the format of meetings and other activities of the Council, its impact on its transparency and efficiency and the use of videoconferences during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Council members and the wider membership also discussed issues pertaining to the format of meetings and other forms of informal gatherings during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” (see case 1).

Case 1

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

On 16 June, at the joint initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Permanent Representative of which chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, the Council convened an open debate under the item “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” and the sub-item “Working methods of the Security Council”.⁴⁷ According to the related concept note circulated ahead of the meeting,⁴⁸ the theme of the open debate was “Agility and innovation: lessons for the future from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic”. Members and non-members of the Council exchanged views on how to ensure agility in the work of the Council and the lessons learned from the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic. They also discussed how the format of meetings and other activities of the Council had an impact on its efficiency, effectiveness and transparency and the evolving nature of Arria-formula meetings.

Reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages of the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, several delegations stressed the need for videoconferences to be considered formal meetings of the Council to which the provisional rules of procedure of the Council would apply.⁴⁹ In that regard, the representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, stated that

⁴² See [A/76/2](#). For information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009 to 2020*. For more information on cooperation with regional and subregional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII.

⁴³ See [S/2021/683](#).

⁴⁴ See *Repertoire, Supplement 2019*, part II, sect. I.C.

⁴⁵ [S/2021/121](#).

⁴⁶ [S/2021/130](#).

⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8798](#) and [S/2021/572](#).

⁴⁸ [S/2021/527](#), annex.

⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8798](#) (Kenya, United Kingdom and United States); and [S/2021/572](#) (Austria, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council) and Republic of Korea).

formalization would allow for the participation of non-members of the Council, the possibility to vote in real time on procedural and substantive matters, provide fully for multilingualism and ensure the attendant record-keeping rather than developing temporary special measures.⁵⁰ Expressing concern that the virtual discussions did not have the status of actual meetings of the Council, as a result of which its provisional rules of procedure did not apply, the representative of the United States noted that, for almost a year and a half, the Council had effectively been unable to take any votes on procedural decisions, even when the vast majority of Council members might have supported the decisions in question. He added that the Council should be able to adopt a procedural decision establishing that virtual meetings were indeed meetings of the Council and that its provisional rules of procedure applied to them. According to the representative of the United Kingdom, without the procedural mechanisms for the resolution of disagreements, the Council had at times been unable to discuss new or existing items more substantively or to bring visibility and attention to issues in the open when needed.

Offering a different perspective, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the videoconference format worked only on a temporary basis and under extraordinary circumstances. According to the representative, as agreed when it was introduced, meetings held in the videoconference format could not be considered formal meetings procedurally, legally or logically. He added that the Council could continue to use videoconferences to convene informal meetings. Similarly, the representative of Cuba underscored the transitory nature of the working methods, which in no way constituted a precedent for the future work of the Council, as they only responded to the exceptional circumstances imposed by the health situation.⁵¹ The representative of France argued that, with the return to the Security Council Chamber, the Council also had to return to its usual working methods, in particular putting an end to virtual meetings.⁵²

More generally, multiple delegations called for a continuation of the use of videoconferences and other technological advancements in the Council beyond the COVID-19 pandemic.⁵³ The representative of Kenya said that it was important for the Council to reflect on

those working methods and formalize those that could continue to enhance its work.⁵⁴ Similarly, the delegation of Switzerland, in a statement submitted on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, saw great merit in considering the current crisis as a positive opportunity to make permanent some recent adaptations, provided that they reinforced the transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of the Council under normal circumstances.⁵⁵ The representative of Liechtenstein said that the Council had to retain the improvements in its working methods while ensuring that it did not roll back on pre-COVID-19 standards in areas where pandemic-induced progress had not been so forthcoming.

Several participants stressed the need to develop contingency plans for future extraordinary circumstances based on the new working methods.⁵⁶ The representative of Cyprus encouraged the Council to codify its default reaction to similar future crises, so as to have a ready set of working methods to fall back on if it was unable to carry out its work through the physical presence of its members.⁵⁷ The representative of Japan opined that new rules should be introduced in the Council's working methods to be better prepared for any contingency. The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, observed that there should be discussions with the Secretariat to draw lessons from the Council's experience during the pandemic and to put in place adequate contingency planning for similar future challenges. The delegation of Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, indicated that such planning could be based on, *inter alia*, proposals made by the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. In contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that there was no need to institutionalize the temporary measures.⁵⁸ According to him, in the event of a recurrence of a crisis similar to the pandemic, the Council already had a solution, as set out in the letters from the President of the Council, to which it could always return. The representative of China stated that the new measures had enriched the Council's working methods and that good practices needed to be upheld and carried forward, which would

⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁵¹ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁵² See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁵³ See [S/PV.8798](#) (Kenya and United Kingdom) and [S/2021/572](#) (Brazil, Liechtenstein, Republic of Korea, Slovakia and United Arab Emirates).

⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁵⁵ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁵⁶ See [S/PV.8798](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Kenya) and [S/2021/572](#) (Austria, Bahrain, Chile, Cyprus, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council) and Republic of Korea).

⁵⁷ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁵⁸ See [S/PV.8798](#).

help the Council to cope with future emergencies. Nevertheless, he added that the contingency *modus operandi* was only an interim measure and could not replace normal working modalities.

Members and non-members of the Council also exchanged views about the Council's working methods in general, in particular on the format of meetings and other activities of the Council and their impact on the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of its work. For example, the representative of China stated that the Council should be mindful of both efficiency and transparency and strike a balance between open and closed meetings. On behalf of the elected members of the Council, the representative of Kenya said that a healthy balance, in that regard, was needed to enhance the transparency and visibility of the Council's work and to encourage more interactivity of discussions and consensus-building. The representative of Kuwait suggested that, before deciding on the format of a meeting, the President of the Council could consult with speakers to determine whether they had certain information that they would prefer to convey to Council members confidentially.⁵⁹ The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, encouraged Council members to continue to think creatively about tailoring the format and focus of meetings to secure the best chance of a meaningful outcome from their deliberations.

Several delegations⁶⁰ expressed the view that the Council should hold more public meetings and that private meetings and informal consultations of the whole should be exceptions and not the rule. The representative of Austria asserted that, while the merit of private conversations in diplomacy could not be underestimated, inclusion and transparency of the Council towards the wider membership and the public had to be enhanced. The representative of Cyprus stated that maintaining a balance between open and private meetings was an artificial dilemma and that the sole criterion that should guide that decision was necessity, in the sense that all meetings that had no reason to be closed should be open. The representative of Singapore, while recognizing the necessity of closed meetings, argued that Member States had the right to at least know what was being discussed by the Council and when. The representatives of Bahrain, Italy and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines described the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council as

an opportunity for the Council to improve its working methods and listen to the wider membership.⁶¹

In contrast, the representative of France said that Council members should avoid an excess of public meetings to the detriment of decision-making and that too much time was spent in successively presenting the national positions of Council members and too little working on compromises and joint actions.⁶² While acknowledging the importance of public meetings, the representative noted that they tended to polarize positions and that a better balance needed to be found. The representative of the United Kingdom opined that more talking in private than in public contributed to the effectiveness of the Council and that holding lengthy meetings, using prepared statements, without moving issues forward, rarely, if ever, fulfilled the Council's mandate.

Some delegations addressed the issue of transparency in informal consultations and the evolving nature of Arria-formula meetings. The representative of Cuba called for the issuance of minutes of informal consultations.⁶³ The representatives of New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council), Ukraine and the United Kingdom called for the more frequent use of press elements after informal consultations.⁶⁴ The representative of New Zealand also said that Council members should use "any-other-business items" in informal consultations to ensure that emerging threats were addressed in a timely manner.⁶⁵ While expressing support for the convening of Arria-formula meetings and informal interactive dialogues, the representative of France stated that the priority of the Council should be to ensure effectiveness on a daily basis and that such meetings should not add to the programme of work at the expense of the time needed to deal with crises.⁶⁶ The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, stated that, in order to retain the original benefit of the Arria-formula meetings, Council members should avoid using them as a platform to influence public opinion rather than to inform Council decisions.⁶⁷ The representative encouraged Council members to use the format in a manner not to the detriment of issues on the Council's agenda, as well as to seek a balance between open and closed Arria-formula meetings. The representative of Singapore recalled that Arria-formula meetings were originally envisaged as a

⁵⁹ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁶⁰ Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Italy, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Ukraine.

⁶¹ See [S/PV.8798](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and [S/2021/572](#) (Bahrain and Italy).

⁶² See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁶³ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8798](#) (United Kingdom) and [S/2021/572](#) (New Zealand and Ukraine).

⁶⁵ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁶⁷ See [S/2021/572](#).

platform for the Council to discuss sensitive topics with the benefit of external briefers but noted that recent meetings appeared to have been more divisive than consultative. He added that the opt-out nature of those meetings, together with the recent tendency to publicize them widely in a hyperconnected social media platform, risked creating “echo chambers” that further divided the Council. In a similar vein, the representative of Liechtenstein noted that the use of Arria-formula meetings had increased significantly and sometimes in a manner that was clearly not in keeping with their original purpose, bringing “negative atmospherics” to the Council’s work or providing a forum to a small group of States for promoting narrow political interests and narratives. According to the representative, Arria-formula meetings lent important value to the Council’s work on topics for which a formal meeting was not possible, as well as enhancing the Council’s inclusivity and relevance. The representative of El Salvador stated that Arria-formula meetings provided a platform for dialogue and interaction with actors directly involved in situations that put international peace, security and stability at risk.

E. Records

During the period under review, verbatim records were issued following each public meeting of the Council, in accordance with rule 49 of the provisional rules of procedure, while communiqués were issued following private meetings, in accordance with rule 55. No questions were raised at Council meetings regarding the application of rules 49 to 57 in connection with the preparation, access to and issuance of verbatim records, communiqués or other documents.

In 2021, as part of the working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, verbatim records of videoconferences were not published.⁶⁸ However, in order to ensure the transparency of videoconferences, the President of the Council continued the practice of circulating, within 48 hours of an open videoconference, a compilation of the interventions of the briefers and the members and participating non-members of the Council who requested the inclusion of their statements in the document of the Council. Furthermore, the records and other information relating to videoconferences continued to be published on the website of the Council, while the webcasts of the statements delivered

during open videoconferences were made publicly available and archived.⁶⁹

On 21 October, following the easing of health and safety restrictions at United Nations Headquarters, the Council held its first open debate in the Security Council Chamber since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the participation of non-Council members.⁷⁰ In addition to participating in person, interested non-Council members were able to participate through the submission of written statements.⁷¹ The same approach was followed for open debates that were held thereafter in 2021.⁷² Furthermore, on the front page of the verbatim records of all in-person open debates held in 2021, whether with or without the in-person participation of non-Council members, it was indicated that, in accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Council,⁷³ which had been agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the official record of the Council would be supplemented by a compilation of statements submitted by interested non-Council members who were unable to participate in person.⁷⁴

The issue of record-keeping in the context of the remote working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic was also raised by members and non-members of the Council in their discussions. For example, during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, underscored the need for attendant record-keeping in videoconferences.⁷⁵ While expressing appreciation for the availability of videoconference recordings on the website of the Council, the representative of Brazil opined that the absence of formal records of meetings held during the COVID-19 pandemic had hampered access to those discussions.⁷⁶ Similarly, the representative of Austria opined that a lack of official records from videoconferences could have unintended long-term consequences.

⁶⁹ See S/2020/372.

⁷⁰ See S/PV.8886, S/PV.8886 (Resumption 1) and S/2021/886.

⁷¹ See S/2021/939 and S/2021/1013.

⁷² See, for example, S/2021/732, S/2021/886, S/2021/935, S/2021/952 and S/2021/1026.

⁷³ See S/2020/372.

⁷⁴ See, for example, S/PV.8798 and S/PV.8886.

⁷⁵ See S/PV.8798.

⁷⁶ See S/2021/572.

⁶⁸ See S/2020/273 and S/2020/372.

III. Agenda

Note

Section III deals with the practice of the Council concerning the agenda, in relation to rules 6 to 12 of its provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 6

The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7

The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council.

Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9

The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

Rule 10

Any item on the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11

The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.

The provisions of rule 7, paragraph 1, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

During the period under review, the Secretary-General continued the practice of distributing communications from States, organs of the United Nations or himself concerning any matter for the consideration of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and pursuant to rule 6 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. The Secretary-General also continued to draw up a provisional agenda for each meeting of the Council and to communicate the provisional agenda to the representatives on the Council, in accordance with rules 7 and 8. As provided for in the letters from the President of the Council dated 2 April and 7 May 2020,⁷⁷ presidencies worked “in the spirit of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure”, ensuring, inter alia, that the agenda was adopted at the outset of the videoconference, pursuant to rule 9, and that any other relevant rules were observed as a matter of practice, under chapter VI, entitled “Conduct of business”. No periodic meetings were held in 2021, and rule 12 was not applied. The present section is focused on the practice and discussion regarding rules 9 to 11 and is organized under the following three main headings: A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9); B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11); and C. Discussions concerning the agenda.

⁷⁷ [S/2020/273](#) and [S/2020/372](#).

A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9)

In accordance with rule 9 of the provisional rules of procedure, the first item of the agenda for each meeting of the Council is the adoption of the agenda.

Voting on the adoption of the agenda


In 2021, no objection was raised to the adoption of the agenda.

Newly introduced agenda items

During the period under review, the Council did not introduce any new items to the list of matters of which it was seized.

From 2000 to 2007, the Council added between 8 and 23 new items every year. Since 2008, however, the number of new items introduced each year has decreased significantly, with no more than three new items introduced in any given year. No new items had been introduced to the list of matters of which the Council was seized since 2019. Figure IV provides information on the number of newly introduced items per year since 2000.

Figure IV
Number of newly introduced items per year, 2000–2021



Consideration of country-specific situations under existing items of a regional nature and region-specific situations under existing thematic items

During the period under review, the Council continued the practice of using existing items of a regional nature for the consideration of evolving country-specific situations. For example, Council members continued to consider the situations in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen under the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.⁷⁸ The Council also considered

the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.⁷⁹

The Council also discussed country- and region-specific situations under thematic items. For example, under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations”, Council members deliberated on cooperation between the Council and the League of Arab States.⁸⁰ At a meeting held on 22 December under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

⁷⁸ For more information, see part I, sects. 19 and 20.

⁷⁹ For more information, see part I, sect. 9.

⁸⁰ See [S/2021/66](#).

the Council adopted resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), in which it decided that humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan were not a violation of paragraph 1 (a) of resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#).⁸¹ During the meeting, Council members discussed the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.⁸² Furthermore, Council members continued to discuss the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, established pursuant to resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#), and the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under the items entitled "Threats to international peace and security"⁸³ and "Non-proliferation",⁸⁴ respectively.

Inclusion of new sub-items under existing items

During the period under review, the Council continued the practice of adding new sub-items to existing items for the consideration of evolving general and cross-border threats to international peace and

security. As described in more detail in section I above, videoconferences, whether open or closed, were not considered formal meetings of the Council for all relevant purposes, including for the agenda of the Council and for subsequent inclusion in the summary statement of the Secretary-General on matters of which the Council is seized.⁸⁵ Accordingly, while the Secretary-General continued to notify the General Assembly of the matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security that were being dealt with by the Council in the context of meetings, he did not do so when those matters were discussed in the context of open videoconferences.⁸⁶ Similarly, videoconferences were focused on a variety of topics that were not considered as formal sub-items. Tables 7 and 8 provide a list of new sub-items and topics introduced in 2021, in chronological order of their introduction.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ For more information, see part IV, sect. I.C.

⁸⁶ See [A/76/300](#).

⁸⁷ The tables exclude cases of routine sub-items or topics relating to briefings on Council missions, briefings by the Chairs of Council committees, letters addressed to the President of the Council, reports of the Secretary-General and meetings of the Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B.

Table 7
New sub-items added to existing items at formal meetings

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>New sub-item</i>
S/PV.8822 16 July 2021	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Preserving humanitarian space
S/PV.8837 18 August 2021	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Protecting the protectors
S/PV.8838 18 August 2021	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping
S/PV.8851 8 September 2021	United Nations peacekeeping operations	United Nations transitions
S/PV.8865 27 September 2021	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
S/PV.8877 12 October 2021	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Diversity, State-building and the search for peace
S/PV.8900 9 November 2021 ^a	Maintenance of international peace and security	Exclusion, inequality and conflict
S/PV.8906 16 November 2021 ^a	Maintenance of international peace and security	Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>New sub-item</i>
S/PV.8909 22 November 2021 ^a	Small arms	The impact of the diversion and trafficking of arms on peace and security
S/PV.8923 9 December 2021 ^a	Maintenance of international peace and security	Security in the context of terrorism and climate change

^a The 8900th, 8906th, 8909th and 8923rd meetings were resumed in the afternoon of the same day (see [S/PV.8900 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8909 \(Resumption 1\)](#) and [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#)).

Table 8

New topics introduced in connection with existing items at open videoconferences

<i>Videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Topic</i>
S/2021/24 6 January 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts
S/2021/48 12 January 2021	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	International cooperation in combating terrorism 20 years after the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001)
S/2021/90 25 January 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Follow-up on the implementation of resolution 2532 (2020)
S/2021/157 17 February 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Implementation of resolution 2532 (2020)
S/2021/250 11 March 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Conflict and food security
S/2021/346 8 April 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Mine action and sustaining peace – stronger partnerships for better delivery
S/2021/415 27 April 2021	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Indispensable civilian objects
S/2021/456 7 May 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system
S/2021/501 24 May 2021	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Improving safety and security of peacekeepers
S/2021/621 29 June 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Cybersecurity
S/2021/722 9 August 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Maritime security

B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11)

During the period under review, pursuant to rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017,⁸⁸ the Secretary-

⁸⁸ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 15 and 16.

General continued to communicate each week to the members of the Council a summary statement of matters of which the Council was seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.⁸⁹ The practice of including an agenda item in the summary statement upon its adoption at a formal meeting of the Council remained unchanged. As explained above, however,

⁸⁹ See, for example, [S/2021/10/Add.1](#) and [S/2021/10/Add.2](#).

since videoconferences were not considered formal meetings of the Council, the Secretary-General did not include in his weekly summary statement matters that were discussed in open videoconferences.

In accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the preliminary annual summary statement of matters of which the Council is seized issued in January each year by the Secretary-General, identifies the items that have not been considered by the Council during the preceding three calendar years and which are therefore subject to deletion. An item is deleted unless a Member State notifies the President of the Council, by the end of February, of its request that the item be retained on the list, in which case the item will remain on the list for an additional year. If no Member State requests the item's retention on the list,

the first summary statement issued in March of that year reflects its deletion.⁹⁰

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 11 and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council continued the practice of reviewing the summary statement at the beginning of each year in order to determine whether the Council had concluded its consideration of any items.⁹¹ In 2021, of the 17 items identified for deletion in January, 3 were deleted and 14 were retained for one additional year at the request of Member States (see table 9).⁹²

⁹⁰ S/2017/507, annex, paras. 15 and 16.

⁹¹ See S/2021/10.

⁹² See S/2021/10/Add.10.

Table 9
Items proposed for deletion from the summary statement, 2021

<i>Item</i>	<i>Date of first and last consideration</i>	<i>Status in March 2021</i>
The India-Pakistan question	6 January 1948; 5 November 1965	Retained
The Hyderabad question	16 September 1948; 24 May 1949	Retained
Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General	21 February 1958; 21 February 1958	Retained
Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	18 July 1960; 5 January 1961	Retained
Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	4 January 1961; 5 January 1961	Retained
The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent	4 December 1971; 27 December 1971	Retained
Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	9 December 1971; 9 December 1971	Retained
Complaint by Cuba	17 September 1973; 18 September 1973	Retained
The situation between Iran and Iraq	26 September 1980; 31 January 1991	Retained
Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	2 October 1985; 4 October 1985	Retained
Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	21 April 1988; 25 April 1988	Retained
Letter dated 2 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	9 February 1990; 9 February 1990	Retained
The situation in Georgia	8 October 1992; 15 June 2009	Retained

<i>Item</i>	<i>Date of first and last consideration</i>	<i>Status in March 2021</i>
General issues relating to sanctions	17 April 2000; 3 August 2017	Deleted
The situation in Côte d'Ivoire	20 December 2002; 30 June 2017	Deleted
Briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	6 December 2007; 10 March 2017	Deleted
The situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	22 December 2014; 11 December 2017	Retained

Items considered at Security Council meetings

Following the deletion of 3 items in March 2021, the Council remained seized of 66 items during the review period. Of those 66 items, the Council considered 41 items at its formal meetings, of which 21 were country- or region-specific and 20 were thematic. Council members also considered 31 items in the context of open videoconferences, of which 20 were country- or region-specific and 11 were thematic.

Council members considered a total of 44 items at meetings and videoconferences held in 2021, compared with 42 in 2020. Of those 44 items, 23 addressed country-specific or regional situations and 21 addressed thematic or other issues.

Table 10 provides an overview of the items of which the Council was seized and their consideration at formal meetings of the Council and discussion at open videoconferences in 2021.

Table 10

Items of which the Council is seized and their consideration at formal meetings and discussion at open videoconferences, 2021

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>	<i>Discussed at an open videoconference</i>
Country-specific and regional situations		
Africa		
Peace and security in Africa	Yes	Yes
The situation in Burundi	No	No
Central African region	Yes	No
The situation in the Central African Republic	Yes	Yes
The situation in Côte d'Ivoire	No	No
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Yes	Yes
The situation in the Great Lakes region	Yes	Yes
The situation in Guinea-Bissau	No	No
The situation in Liberia	No	No
The situation in Libya	Yes	Yes
The situation in Mali	Yes	Yes
The situation in Somalia	Yes	Yes
Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General	No	No
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Yes	Yes

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>	<i>Discussed at an open videoconference</i>
Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No	No
Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No	No
Peace consolidation in West Africa	Yes	Yes
The situation concerning Western Sahara	Yes	No
Americas		
Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	Yes	Yes
Complaint by Cuba	No	No
Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	No	No
Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	No	No
Letter dated 2 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No	No
The question concerning Haiti	Yes	Yes
The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	No	No
Asia		
The situation in Afghanistan	Yes	Yes
The situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	No	No
The Hyderabad question	No	No
The India-Pakistan question	No	No
The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent	No	No
The situation in Myanmar	Yes	Yes
Europe		
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes	Yes
The situation in Cyprus	Yes	Yes
The situation in Georgia	No	No
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)	No	No
Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)	No	Yes
Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)	No	No

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<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>	<i>Discussed at an open videoconference</i>
Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998) , 1199 (1998) , 1203 (1998) , 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)	Yes	Yes
Middle East		
Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10409)	No	No
The situation between Iran and Iraq	No	No
The situation concerning Iraq	Yes	Yes
The situation between Iraq and Kuwait	No	No
The situation in the Middle East	Yes	Yes
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Yes	Yes
Subtotal, country-specific and regional situations	21 items	20 items
Thematic and other issues		
Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council	Yes	No
Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	No	Yes
Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice	Yes	No
Briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	No	No
Briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Yes	No
Children and armed conflict	Yes	Yes
Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly	Yes	No
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Yes	Yes
General issues relating to sanctions	No	No
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)	Yes	No
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	Yes	No
Maintenance of international peace and security	Yes	Yes
Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001) , annex II, sections A and B	Yes	No
Non-proliferation	Yes	No
Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	No	Yes
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Yes	Yes
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Yes	No
Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Yes	Yes

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>	<i>Discussed at an open videoconference</i>
Security Council mission	Yes	No
Small arms	Yes	No
The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	No	No
Threats to international peace and security	Yes	Yes
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Yes	Yes
United Nations peacekeeping operations	Yes	Yes
Women and peace and security	Yes	Yes
Subtotal, thematic and other issues	20 items	11 items
Total number of items^a	69 items	69 items
Total number of items considered	41 items	31 items

^a In 2021, the Council considered two items, entitled “Recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations” (see [S/PV.8789](#)) and “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice” (see [S/PV.8808](#)), that had not been on the list of items of which the Council was seized.

C. Discussions concerning the agenda

During the period under review, Council members discussed the agenda and matters of which the Council was seized in several meetings and videoconferences. At the open videoconference held on 20 January in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council needed to take the proper time to consider the political and humanitarian situations in the Syrian Arab Republic and return to separate meetings for each issue, as had been the Council’s practice over many years.⁹³ The representative of the Russian Federation responded that separate meetings for each issue were already included in the February 2021 programme of work of the Council. He proposed an understanding that there would be no mixing of the two files, as had often been the case in previous meetings, when political and humanitarian files on the Syrian Arab Republic had become “practically indistinguishable”, according to the statements of some Council members.

At the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the representative of China expressed concern with the

swelling of the number of items before the Council and stated that it should maintain the continuity of its work priorities and be prudent when introducing new topics for consideration.⁹⁴ The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, proposed that Council members should reflect on and have a frank discussion about the ever-increasing workload and proliferation of meetings.⁹⁵ Rather than scheduling routine meetings on every report of the Secretary-General, the Council should dedicate more resources to acute crisis situations. The delegation of Ukraine expressed the conviction that the Council should utilize its precious time more effectively, giving due attention to the issues on the agenda primarily aimed at upholding respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Member States, addressing and preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter.

Concerning the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, the representative of the United Kingdom acknowledged how far the Council had adapted to challenging circumstances, noting that there had been downsides that had affected the Council’s capacity to fulfil its mandate, including

⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁹⁵ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁹³ See [S/2021/75](#).

to face new challenges.⁹⁶ She added that, owing to the objections of a single Council member, the Council had not held formal meetings by videoconference since March 2020 and that, without the procedural mechanisms for the resolution of disagreements, the Council had not been able to discuss new or existing agenda items more substantively or bring attention to issues in the open when needed. Similarly, the representative of Japan indicated that requiring consensus for the adoption of agenda items in videoconferences hindered the Council's capacity to deal flexibly with impending issues and that his delegation saw no reason to apply different rules for agenda-setting in videoconferences.⁹⁷

At a meeting held on 20 October in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Great Lakes region", the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region highlighted the removal of Burundi from the agenda of the Council and the closure of the mission of African Union human rights observers and military experts, which reflected the serious commitment of the International Conference to deepen and consolidate democracy in the Great Lakes region.⁹⁸ The representatives of China and India underscored that the successful removal of Burundi from the agendas of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council reflected the positive trajectory of the region's development in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region.⁹⁹ Thanking Council members for having removed Burundi from the Council's agenda, the representative of Burundi stated that his country had returned to peace and security and that the Government had put in place a national programme to capitalize on peace and social stability and promote economic growth.

In 2021, the agenda of the Council was also discussed in relation to the issue of climate and security in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" (see cases 2 and 3).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁹⁷ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8884](#). The item entitled "The situation in Burundi", which was last considered by the Council at a formal meeting on 30 October 2019 (see [S/PV.8652](#)), remained in the summary statement by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Council was seized (see [S/2021/10](#)).

⁹⁹ See [S/PV.8884](#).

¹⁰⁰ For more information about discussions on the connection between climate and security and the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, see part V, sect. I.B.

Case 2 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 23 February, at the initiative of the United Kingdom, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁰¹ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and focused on climate and security.¹⁰² At the videoconference, the President of France said that the climate and security agenda needed to be structured and that it concerned prevention and effectiveness, which justified its referral to the Council and support for appointing a special envoy for climate security to coordinate all efforts. He expressed his support for having the Secretary-General report on an annual basis to the Council on the impact of climate on international security in order to foresee issues, make warnings and draft recommendations, so that the Council would be enabled to play its role. The President and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of Kenya noted that the climate and security nexus was already affecting Africa, whose files dominated the Council's agenda. The delegation of Belgium called for the mainstreaming of climate risk throughout the agenda of the Council. The delegation of Guatemala opined that, owing to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council should integrate climate security assessments into all mandated reports of situations on its agenda. The delegation of Latvia stated that integrating climate and security into the Council's agenda, including with regard to its conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, would allow for a more focused and efficient approach to many thematic issues. More specifically, the delegations of Austria, Slovenia and Spain argued for the inclusion of climate and security into the women and peace and security agenda of the Council, with El Salvador and Portugal also calling for this approach with respect to the protection of civilians and youth and peace and security agendas.

Other participants cautioned against the inclusion of climate and security as an item of the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the Council had addressed the issue of climate change in the context of its repercussions on international peace and security several times, having considered a number of country-specific cases in a range of States and regions, primarily on the African continent, where

¹⁰¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 17 February 2021 ([S/2021/155](#)).

¹⁰² See [S/2021/198](#).

climate change and natural disasters had been said to be a major threat to stability and the root cause of related problems. He added that the connection between climate and conflict could therefore only be considered with regard to concrete country- and region-specific cases. The delegation of Argentina said that there was a need to promote adequate and flexible cooperation among the various bodies of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter mandates established for the specialized agencies, funds and programmes and that such cooperation must not be carried out in such a manner as to add the issue of climate change to the agenda of the Council.

Case 3 Maintenance of international peace and security

At a meeting held on 23 September at the initiative of Ireland, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁰³ the Council convened a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and sub-item entitled “Climate and security”.¹⁰⁴ In his statement, the Taoiseach of Ireland, underlining the need to better understand the interplay between climate change and the country and regional situations on the Council’s agenda, said that the Council should invite the Secretary-General to submit a periodic report on how climate change was threatening the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁰⁵ The Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Niger, as Co-Chair of the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security alongside Ireland, said that his country considered the placement of the issue on the Council’s agenda to be timely. Similarly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia stated that the attention that the Council paid to climate

change, environmental disasters and pandemics when discussing them as items on its agenda reflected its conviction as to the need to integrate those risks into its work. The representative of Portugal opined that the influence of climate change on security should be considered throughout the Council’s horizontal agendas and that information gathered and shared by the climate security mechanism across the United Nations system was crucial to that end.¹⁰⁶

In contrast, the representative of China said that, on the basis of its mandate emanating from the Charter of the United Nations and the Council’s existing agenda, the Council needed to “get it right” in terms of the manner and extent of its engagement in discussing and addressing issues related to climate and security.¹⁰⁷ He emphasized the need for the Council to focus on climate-change-reduced risks under country-specific items and to support United Nations specialized agencies in helping countries in conflict to better meet the challenge. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the persistent and insistent attempts to advance the premise of climate change as a threat to international peace and security in the Council agenda introduced a completely unnecessary political component to an already complicated and sensitive discussion. He added that the inclusion or non-inclusion of any theme or issue on the Council’s agenda should not be a gauge of its importance or relevance. Moreover, the question of climate change would not benefit in any way from incorporation into the Council’s agenda, and yet misunderstandings and duplications would be abundant in such a scenario. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran also suggested that, instead of placing climate change security risks on its agenda, the Council should allow relevant platforms to continue considering and properly addressing the issue.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ See [S/2021/815](#).

¹⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8864](#).

¹⁰⁸ See [S/2021/815](#).

¹⁰³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 9 September 2021 ([S/2021/782](#)).

¹⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8864](#) and [S/2021/815](#).

¹⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8864](#).

IV. Representation and credentials

Note

Section IV covers the practice of the Council concerning representation and the credentials of its members, in relation to rules 13 to 17 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 13

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative on the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he takes his seat on the Security

Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the first meeting which he is invited to attend.

Rule 15

The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

Rule 16

Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representative shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

Rule 17

Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 13 of the provisional rules of procedure, the credentials of the representatives of the members of the Council were communicated to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General subsequently submitted his report to the Council pursuant to rule 15. Such reports were transmitted to the Council when there were changes in the representation of the members of the Council,¹⁰⁹ as well as when representatives of the newly elected members of the Council were designated prior to the beginning of each

term.¹¹⁰ In accordance with the letters dated 2 April and 7 May 2020 from the President of the Council, Council members continued to conduct videoconferences “in the spirit” of the provisional rules of procedure, which included ensuring that all Council members participating in a virtual discussion were represented by appropriately credentialed delegates, pursuant to rule 13.¹¹¹

No discussions regarding the interpretation and application of rules 13 to 17 arose during the period under review. However, the issue of authorization to represent a Member State was raised in two meetings and one communication in relation to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At a meeting held on 8 June under the item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”, the President of Serbia stated that the representative of the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the meeting, Sven Alkalaj, was not speaking on behalf of that country.¹¹² In that regard, the President referred to a letter from the presiding Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the Chairman said that the statement of the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have the real consent of the Presidency and that it was only a private opinion.

At a meeting held on 29 June under the item entitled “The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the representative of the Russian Federation recalled the letter from the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioned whether the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina made at the meeting reflected the position of all constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it had, according to the letter, not been agreed with all the entities of that country.¹¹³ In a subsequent remark, responding to a question from the Minister as to whether he was authorized to ask the question he had posed, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that he was fully authorized to speak on behalf of his Government and that he had submitted his credentials to the Secretary-General.

¹¹⁰ For the reports of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representatives and deputies and alternate representatives of members of the Council elected for the periods 2021–2022 and 2022–2023, see [S/2020/1318](#) and [S/2021/1111](#).

¹¹¹ See [S/2020/273](#) and [S/2020/372](#).

¹¹² See [S/PV.8790](#).

¹¹³ See [S/PV.8810](#). In a letter to the President of the Council dated 2 July, the representative of the Russian Federation transmitted a letter dated 28 June from the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by which the latter informed Council members that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bisera Turković, did not have the authorization to address the Council at its meeting scheduled for 29 June 2021 ([S/2021/624](#), annex II).

¹⁰⁹ See, for example, [S/2021/301](#), [S/2021/619](#), [S/2021/631](#) and [S/2021/1079](#).

V. Presidency

Note

Section V covers the practice of the Council concerning the monthly rotation of the presidency, the role of the President and the temporary cession of the chair by the President during the consideration of a particular question with which the Member State he or she represents is directly connected, in relation to rules 18 to 20 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 18

The presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19

The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

Rule 20

Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfilment of the responsibilities of the presidency he should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he shall indicate his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19, or his duties under rule 7.

This section comprises two subsections, namely: A. The role of the President of the Security Council (rules 18 and 19); and B. Discussions concerning the presidency of the Security Council. In 2021, there were no instances of the application of rule 20.

A. Role of the President of the Security Council (rules 18 and 19)

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 18 of the provisional rules of procedure, the presidency of the Council was held in turn for one calendar month by the members of the Council in English alphabetical order. In addition to continuing to preside over meetings of the Council, informal consultations of the whole and informal interactive dialogues, the President of the Council also presided over videoconferences held in lieu of in-person meetings. In accordance with rule 18 and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017,¹¹⁴ the President continued to perform several other functions under the authority of the Council, including: (a) briefing non-members of the Council and the media on the monthly programme of work at the beginning of the month and holding “wrap-up” sessions with non-Council members and briefings with the media at the end of the presidency; (b) representing the Council and delivering statements on its behalf, including the presentation of the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly;¹¹⁵ (c) holding monthly meetings with the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly; and (d) delivering statements or elements to the press following informal consultations of the whole or closed videoconferences or whenever Council members reached an agreement on a text.¹¹⁶

In 2021, the Council issued two notes by the President addressing the role of the presidency in the implementation of the working methods. In a note by the President issued on 21 July,¹¹⁷ Council members were encouraged to implement all provisions contained

¹¹⁴ [S/2017/507](#).

¹¹⁵ At a meeting held on 27 May (see [S/PV.8781](#)), the Council issued a note by the President (see [S/2021/500](#)), in which it indicated that it had adopted its report to the General Assembly covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2020 ([A/75/2](#)). The report was introduced to the Assembly at the 78th plenary meeting of its seventy-fifth session, on 11 June 2021, by the President of the Council for the month of June (Estonia). See also part IV, sect. I.F.

¹¹⁶ Not all statements to the press are issued as a result of informal consultations or closed videoconferences. Council presidencies referred to the practice of delivering statements and elements to the press in their respective monthly assessments (see, for example, [S/2021/683](#), [S/2021/938](#), [S/2021/1014](#), [S/2021/1032](#), [S/2021/1060](#), [S/2021/1084](#), [S/2022/174](#), [S/2022/614](#), [S/2022/707](#) and [S/2022/946](#)).

¹¹⁷ [S/2021/647](#).

in the note by the President of the Council dated 30 August 2017 and the eight notes adopted in December 2019¹¹⁸ on the working methods of the Council and, to that end, recognized the important role played by the President in facilitating and securing their implementation. Council members also recognized that the practice of circulating written monthly commitments at the beginning of the presidency could be useful to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of the Council and invited each presidency to consider preparing and broadly distributing written monthly commitments at its discretion.¹¹⁹ In another note by the President issued on the same day,¹²⁰ Council members recognized, without prejudice to the role of the experts, that those who coordinated the monthly activities of the respective missions on the Council were critical to securing the implementation of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 and all notes adopted subsequently.

All presidencies during the period under review held wrap-up sessions, by videoconference from January to April and in person from May to December 2021. In accordance with the note by the President dated 27 December 2019,¹²¹ some of the wrap-up sessions held in 2021 used the “Toledo-style” format, whereby members of the Council presented the activity of the Council for the month jointly and in an interactive manner.¹²² Council members also continued to submit, in their national capacities, monthly assessments providing an overview of the work of the Council during their presidencies.¹²³

In 2021, Council presidencies continued the practice of circulating among Council members, at the beginning of the month, written monthly commitments providing a list of priorities and measures to ensure and enhance transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in the work of the Council. Some of the priorities and measures set out in the 11 monthly working methods commitments circulated in 2021 included encouraging

briefers and speakers to limit the duration of their statements, promoting interactive discussions in informal consultations, encouraging outcome-oriented discussions, including through elements delivered to the press after consultations, and engaging and consulting with Member States concerned by the issues before the Council. In September 2021, the delegations of Ireland, Kenya and Mexico circulated a statement of shared commitments, as a “Security Council Presidency Trio for Women, Peace and Security”, to make the women and peace and security agenda a top priority during their respective presidencies in September, October and November 2021. To that end, the three presidencies committed themselves to, among other measures, striving to achieve gender parity among briefers to the Council, requesting the inclusion of gender analysis in briefings, ensuring strong representation of women civil society briefers in Council meetings, heightening the visibility of Council discussions by holding women and peace and security press stakeouts, ensuring that Council products integrated strong language on women and peace and security and reflecting highlights and recommendations on women and peace and security during the monthly wrap-up sessions with the wider membership. The commitments of the “Trio” were subsequently built upon with new joint commitments on the women and peace and security agenda submitted by the Niger, which held the presidency of the Council in December 2021, together with Norway, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Albania and Brazil, which were to hold the presidencies for the months of January, March, April, June and July 2022, respectively.

Following the procedure envisaged in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017,¹²⁴ the introduction to the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for 2020 was prepared under the coordination of the Niger, which had held the presidency of the Council for the month of September 2020, given that Germany, which had held the presidency of the Council in July 2020, left the Council at the end of 2020, and the responsibility then devolved on the Council member next in English alphabetical order not leaving the Council that year.¹²⁵

In 2021, Council presidencies continued to take the initiative of bringing to the attention of the Council emerging and evolving issues related to international peace and security by organizing meetings or open videoconferences under thematic items, sometimes adding new sub-items or proposing new topics. In most

¹¹⁸ S/2017/507, S/2019/990, S/2019/991, S/2019/992, S/2019/993, S/2019/994, S/2019/995, S/2019/996 and S/2019/997.

¹¹⁹ See S/2021/647.

¹²⁰ S/2021/646.

¹²¹ S/2019/994.

¹²² See, for example, the letter dated 26 July on the monthly assessment of the presidency of China for the month of May, which contains a reference to the wrap-up session held in person (S/2021/683).

¹²³ As at the time of writing, 10 of the 12 monthly presidencies had submitted monthly assessments for 2021: S/2021/683, S/2021/938, S/2021/1014, S/2021/1032, S/2021/1060, S/2021/1084, S/2022/174, S/2022/614, S/2022/707 and S/2022/946.

¹²⁴ S/2017/507, annex, para. 127.

¹²⁵ For more information, see part IV, sect. I.F. See also S/PV.8781.

cases, Council presidencies transmitted concept notes in their national capacities to guide the discussion.¹²⁶ In a letter dated 2 June, the representatives of Estonia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines jointly transmitted a concept note for the annual open debate on the Council's working methods,¹²⁷ held on 16 June during the presidency of Estonia, under the item entitled "Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)".¹²⁸ Furthermore, in a letter dated 4 June, the representative of China transmitted a summary of the Arria-formula meeting held during its presidency, on 17 May, on the impact of emerging technologies on international peace and security.¹²⁹

During the period under review, the role of the presidency was referred to in one communication to the Council. In a letter to the President of the Council dated 8 February,¹³⁰ the representatives of New Zealand and Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, provided Council members with recommendations on how to improve upon the adaptations made to the Council's working

methods during the COVID-19 pandemic. In that regard, among other measures, the Group invited the Council to agree to elements to be delivered to the press after every virtual meeting to enhance the transparency of its deliberations; to continue the practice of organizing, under the leadership of the presidency, virtual information and interaction sessions with Member States on the Council's programme of work (briefing on the programme of work) and on the Council's activities during the month (wrap-up session); and to display on the Council's website a President's addendum to the programme of work, containing the meetings of the subsidiary bodies and any informal Council meetings not included in the programme of work. Beyond the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, Council presidencies were also encouraged to institutionalize the practice of issuing a letter on the working methods for the month, including commitments that they would pursue to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, inclusivity and transparency of the Council's work.

B. Discussions concerning the presidency of the Security Council

In 2021, aspects of the presidency of the Council were discussed during Council meetings and open videoconferences. At an open videoconference held on 19 April in connection with the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security", the President of Kenya, highlighting the need to recognize and support regional peacekeeping organs, affirmed that the Council and, in particular, the presidencies and penholders should undertake more comprehensive consultations and build on regional efforts.¹³¹ He added that regional and subregional organizations had a greater stake in conflicts and provided proximity and insights critical in conflict resolution.

At an open videoconference held on 16 May in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question", the observer for the League of Arab States commended the efforts made by China during its presidency that month to ensure that the Council played its intended role of maintaining international peace and security in the Middle East in the wake of the situation in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.¹³²

¹²⁶ See, for example, the concept note on the sub-item "Preserving humanitarian space" (S/2021/618, annex), circulated by the representative of France prior to a meeting of the Council held on 16 July (see S/PV.8822); the concept note on the sub-item "Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping" (S/2021/681, annex), circulated by the representative of India prior to a meeting of the Council held on 18 August (see S/PV.8838); and the concept note on the sub-item "The impact of the diversion and trafficking of arms on peace and security" (S/2021/892, annex), circulated by the representative of Ireland prior to a meeting held on 22 November (see S/PV.8909 and S/PV.8909 (Resumption 1)). See also, for example, the concept note on the theme "Maintenance of international peace and security: climate and security" (S/2021/155, annex), circulated by the representative of the United Kingdom prior to the videoconference held on 23 February 2021 (see S/2021/198); the concept note on the theme "Mine action and sustaining peace – stronger partnerships for better delivery" (S/2021/284, annex), circulated by the representative of Viet Nam prior to the videoconference held on 8 April (see S/2021/346); and the concept note on the theme "Peace and Security in Africa: addressing root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa" (S/2021/420, annex), circulated by the representative of China prior to the videoconference held on 19 May (see S/2021/490).

¹²⁷ S/2021/527, annex.

¹²⁸ See S/PV.8798 and S/2021/572. An analytical summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting by the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (S/2021/860).

¹²⁹ S/2021/531, annex.

¹³⁰ S/2021/121.

¹³¹ See S/2021/394.

¹³² See S/2021/480.

At a meeting held on 21 October under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora of Ireland said that, given the agreement among Ireland, Kenya and Mexico to form a “trio” of presidencies for women and peace and security, he was especially pleased to be giving expression to their shared commitment to advancing that agenda.¹³³ The Minister also recalled that Ireland had placed women civil society briefers at the heart of its presidency in September 2021, as well as the risks faced by civil society briefers who spoke to the Council. The representative of Estonia welcomed the women and peace and security “trio” presidency and its aim to set the topic at the very centre of each discussion of the Council, including through country briefings dedicated to women and peace and security, through heightened visibility and through the systematic integration of language on women and peace and security in Council decisions.

At a meeting held on 13 December under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of the Russian Federation questioned why a draft resolution on climate and security was being put to a vote, noting that there was no consensus on the draft and that the President of the Council had received a number of letters from members and non-members of the Council in that regard.¹³⁴ He called on the President of the Council not to sow discord within the Council on such an important subject and said that it was the responsibility of the presidency to push towards effective Council decisions. The draft resolution,¹³⁵ which had been submitted by 113 Member States, was subsequently not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.¹³⁶

The role of the presidency of the Council was also referred to in greater detail during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 16 June under the item the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” (see case 4).

Case 4

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At a meeting held on 16 June, at the joint initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the

Security Council for the month, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Permanent Representative of which chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions,¹³⁷ the Council convened an open debate on its working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” and focused on the theme “Agility and innovation: lessons for the future from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic”.¹³⁸

In her briefing, the Chair of the Working Group noted that, beginning with the presidency of China in March 2020, through a series of letters built upon by successive presidencies, the Council had adapted its working methods to the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic in order to maintain its effective functioning.¹³⁹ The Council continued to convene uninterruptedly, both in person and by videoconference, to negotiate and adopt resolutions and to maintain engagement with other United Nations organs and the wider United Nations membership, particularly through monthly briefings on the programme of work and wrap-up sessions. Affirming that the Informal Working Group remained a critical framework for assessing and improving the Council’s working methods, the Chair highlighted that, under the standing agenda item of the Working Group, “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 August 2017 (S/2017/507): reflections from past presidencies and proposals for future action”, Council presidencies had been given the opportunity to reflect on the working methods during their respective months and assess some of the best practices, challenges and areas for further improvement. In her statement, the co-author of the fourth edition of *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Loraine Sievers, highlighted the critical role of the President of the Council during the pandemic and noted that the role could continue to be strengthened, not only individually, but in cooperation with other presidencies.

Members and non-members of the Council also reflected on the role of the presidency of the Council in the implementation of the Council’s working methods and in ensuring transparency vis-à-vis the wider membership, namely through the holding of wrap-up sessions and in the annual report to the General Assembly. For example, the representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, said that the monthly presidency had a

¹³³ See [S/PV.8886](#).

¹³⁴ See [S/PV.8926](#).

¹³⁵ [S/2021/990](#).

¹³⁶ For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 34.

¹³⁷ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 June 2021 ([S/2021/527](#)).

¹³⁸ See [S/PV.8798](#) and [S/2021/572](#).

¹³⁹ See [S/PV.8798](#).

particular role to play in contributing to the promotion of the transparency of the Council's work through engagement with the wider membership, the media, civil society and other stakeholders, which included giving briefings on the programme of work, conducting wrap-up sessions and producing monthly assessments. His delegation welcomed the growing practice of presidencies making and publicizing monthly commitments on the implementation of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 and the eight notes on working methods issued in 2019 and emphasized the key role of presidencies in creating and testing new practices. The representative of China called for stronger coordination between incoming and outgoing presidencies to maintain coherence and consistency in working priorities. He also highlighted that, during its presidency in May 2021, China had consulted extensively and had listened to the comments and suggestions of concerned countries and regional organizations on hotspot issues. China had also communicated and coordinated with the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as with the Secretary-General, with good results. The representative of France recalled that his delegation had established common working methods with the presidencies of Council members from the European Union, namely Estonia and Ireland.

In a written statement, the representative of Austria commended the voluntary commitment made by the presidencies of Estonia, France and Ireland to best practices concerning working methods and expressed gratitude to Council members for organizing monthly briefings on the programme of work and wrap-up sessions as widely established monthly practices.¹⁴⁰ He added that there was, nonetheless, room for improvement to render those meetings more efficient and substantial. According to the delegation of Malta, the fact that efforts had been made to ensure that the presentation of priorities at the beginning of each presidency and the wrap-up sessions at the end had continued virtually and had been very well attended during the pandemic showed that they were appreciated and were of added value to the wider membership. Similarly, the representative of Singapore stated that the monthly letters from the President of the Council on the working methods during the COVID-19 pandemic showed that the Council had been transparent in explaining its modified practices and was taking its working methods seriously. He also commended the Council for regularizing the introductory and wrap-up sessions of each presidency and for formalizing them in the monthly programme of

work. On behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, the representative of New Zealand encouraged Council Presidents to include, in the interests of transparency and visibility, all informal meetings on the monthly programme of work and to continue efforts to make the programmes as user-friendly as possible for the wider membership. The representative also encouraged the President to conduct regular engagement with other heads of principal United Nations organs. The delegation of Cyprus proposed that an informal channel be established between directly affected Member States and the Council, perhaps through its President, as a means of enhancing their access to the Council.

More specifically on wrap-up sessions, the delegation of Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, highlighted the favourable trend of addressing issues related to working methods during opening and wrap-up sessions, including with the direct participation of the Chair of the Informal Working Group, and called on the Council to keep that positive momentum and focus on the constant improvement of working methods as it moved back to the Security Council Chamber. The Group also called on the Council to continue the positive momentum towards the continued institutionalization of wrap-up sessions and to work towards the improvement of that well-established format with regard to the interactivity and substance of discussions, as well as to draw from the proposals contained in the Group's non-paper dated 14 June 2021 on wrap-up sessions. The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, encouraged Council members to be as candid and interactive as possible in the start-of-presidency briefings and end-of-presidency wrap-up sessions. Council members were also encouraged to consider other ways to keep the wider membership updated throughout the month on the Council's work and outcome documents under consideration. The delegation of Ukraine underscored the need to find ways to seek the input of Member States on issues upon which they would like Council members to reflect during such wrap-up sessions.

Recognizing the progress made by the Council in the elaboration and subsequent submission to the General Assembly of the report on its work for 2020, the delegation of El Salvador called for the continued timely publication of the assessments on the activities of each of the monthly presidencies, with an analysis of situations, including threats that could pose a risk to international peace and security. The delegation of Ukraine encouraged the timely issuance of monthly

¹⁴⁰ See [S/2021/572](#).

assessments, as they constituted a valuable source for preparing annual reports. The representative of Argentina encouraged presidencies to complete their

monthly assessments on time and to give them the serious consideration they deserved.

VI. Secretariat

Note

Section VI covers the practice of the Council concerning the functions and powers of the Secretary-General in connection with meetings of the Council, in relation to rules 21 to 26 of its provisional rules of procedure.¹⁴¹

Rule 21

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

Rule 22

The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 23

The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24

The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25

The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 26

The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

During the period under review and in accordance with previous practice, the Secretary-General and senior officials of the Secretariat continued to attend Council meetings and provide oral briefings and written reports to the Council, as requested. The Council continued to request briefings by senior officials from the Secretariat.

In 2021, the Secretariat maintained a key role in supporting the implementation of the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, including the holding of videoconferences, carrying out the written voting procedure and, as from 25 May 2021, the resumption of in-person meetings in accordance with the necessary health and safety guidelines.¹⁴²

The various functions of the Secretariat were addressed in several meetings and open videoconferences, in communications to the Council and in a note by the President regarding its working methods.

For an open videoconference held on 6 January in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on the challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts,¹⁴³ the representative of Belgium expressed support for the Council to regularly receive ad hoc briefings by the Secretariat outlining the risks for triggering or exacerbating root causes of fragility, conflict or humanitarian crises in certain countries or regions, while taking into account elements of conflict sensitivity.

For an open videoconference held on 11 March in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on conflict and food security,¹⁴⁴ the representative of Guyana, on behalf of the States members of the Caribbean Community, stated that, in order to eradicate food insecurity, the underlying causes of conflict must be addressed. She called on the Council to reinforce early warning systems established under its resolution 2417 (2018), by which the Council was to be briefed about the risk of conflict-induced famine and

¹⁴¹ For specific instances in which the Secretary-General was requested or authorized by the Council to carry out other functions in accordance with Article 98, see part VI.

¹⁴² For more information on the working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see sect. I above.

¹⁴³ See [S/2021/24](#).

¹⁴⁴ See [S/2021/250](#).

widespread food insecurity in armed conflict contexts, and to take the appropriate action to ensure peace and food security, as well as physical security. To that end, she urged the Secretariat and all Member States to closely monitor such situations and report those matters to the Council without delay.

At a meeting of the Council held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,¹⁴⁵ the representative of China expressed support for the idea of facilitating newly elected Council members in performing their duties and, with the support of the Secretariat, strengthening capacity-building, including by helping elected members familiarize themselves in advance with the work of the Council and its subsidiary organs.¹⁴⁶ The delegation of Guatemala stressed that holding consultations between the Council, the Secretariat and the countries that contributed troops and police forces, as indicated in section VIII of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 August 2017,¹⁴⁷ was paramount for the implementation of the mandates decided by the Council.¹⁴⁸ The representative of Kuwait, highlighting the importance of striking a balance between transparency and efficiency, proposed that the Secretariat, penholder or President could advise on the desirability of holding meetings on the basis of mandated reporting cycles and decide whether to hold a Council meeting that particular month. The delegation of Latvia suggested that both the Council and the Secretariat should share their responsibility in order to improve and implement procedures in order to ensure business continuity in the Council during unexpected crises. Commending the regular discussions of the Council under the leadership of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Permanent Representative of which chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, towards improving the working methods of the Council, the representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, encouraged continued discussions with the Secretariat, in order to draw lessons from the Council’s experience during the pandemic, look at improving the current circumstances and put in place adequate contingency planning for similar future challenges.

At a meeting held on 16 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Peace and security

through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”,¹⁴⁹ the representative of Norway said that, in order to facilitate early responses, the Council’s situational awareness needed to be improved. In that connection, there was a key role for the Secretariat and the United Nations system briefers to use their interactions with the Council to bring emerging issues to its attention and sound the alarm.

At a meeting held on 9 December under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Security in the context of terrorism and climate change”,¹⁵⁰ the representative of the United States said that only the Council could ensure that the security impacts of climate change were integrated into the critical work of conflict prevention and mitigation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, disaster reduction and humanitarian response. She further affirmed that it was the responsibility of the Council to ensure that it, and through it the Secretariat, had the tools and data necessary to confront one of the century’s greatest and fastest-growing threats to peace and security.

At a meeting held on 14 December under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”,¹⁵¹ the representative of the Russian Federation expressed serious concern about the illegitimate practice of the Secretariat to conduct “so-called investigations” within the framework of resolution 2231 (2015), recalling that its mandate in that area was of a purely administrative and technical character, as enshrined in the note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016.¹⁵² He noted that the entity established to facilitate resolution 2231 (2015) was not a sanctions committee and had no right to collect or analyse information, nor any authority to send requests to Member States for information.¹⁵³ The representative of the United States expressed support for the Secretariat’s continued reporting on the implementation of the measures set out in resolution 2231 (2015) and encouraged it to continue to investigate incidents for possible violations of the resolution.

In the note by the President issued on 12 July,¹⁵⁴ Council members amended paragraph 142 of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017¹⁵⁵ and invited the Secretariat to continue to take appropriate measures

¹⁴⁵ See S/PV.8798 and S/2021/572.

¹⁴⁶ See S/PV.8798.

¹⁴⁷ S/2017/507.

¹⁴⁸ See S/2021/572.

¹⁴⁹ See S/PV.8906.

¹⁵⁰ See S/PV.8923.

¹⁵¹ See S/PV.8930.

¹⁵² S/2016/44.

¹⁵³ See S/PV.8930.

¹⁵⁴ S/2021/645.

¹⁵⁵ S/2017/507.

to familiarize all members with the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, including by providing briefing materials and holding seminars before newly elected members of the Council began to attend Council meetings and, to the extent feasible, by keeping a register of available training opportunities that were being offered.

Lastly, in a letter to the President of the Council dated 8 February,¹⁵⁶ the representatives of New

Zealand and Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, and in connection with the working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, invited the Council to explore ways to enable video and/or direct participation by non-Council members in virtual open debates and expressed trust that the Secretariat would provide the necessary technological support to enable that to take place.

¹⁵⁶ S/2021/121.

VII. Conduct of business

Note

Section VII covers the practice of the Council concerning the conduct of business at its meetings, in relation to rules 27, 29, 30 and 33 of its provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 27

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 29

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council.

The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 30

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 33

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. *To suspend the meeting;*
2. *To adjourn the meeting;*
3. *To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;*

4. *To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;*

5. *To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or*

6. *To introduce an amendment.*

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

In 2021, no explicit reference was made to rules 27, 29 and 30 in the meetings of the Council. In accordance with the letters from the President of the Council dated 2 April and 7 May 2020, Council members continued to conduct videoconferences “in the spirit of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure”, including those under chapter VI, entitled “Conduct of business”.¹⁵⁷

During the period under review, the President of the Council continued, on a regular basis, to request speakers to limit their statements in Council meetings to four or five minutes in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017.¹⁵⁸ For example, at a meeting held on 9 November, before giving the floor to non-Council members, the President reminded all speakers to limit their statements to no more than four minutes and noted that the red light on the collar of the microphone would begin to flash after the time had elapsed.¹⁵⁹ Following previous practice, during the period under review, joint statements were delivered by

¹⁵⁷ See S/2020/273 and S/2020/372.

¹⁵⁸ S/2017/507, annex, para. 22. See, for example, S/PV.8886, S/PV.8886 (Resumption 1), S/PV.8900, S/PV.8900 (Resumption 1), S/PV.8906, S/PV.8906 (Resumption 1), S/PV.8909, S/PV.8909 (Resumption 1), S/PV.8923 and S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1).

¹⁵⁹ See S/PV.8900.

Council members¹⁶⁰ and by non-Council members invited to participate in Council meetings and videoconferences.¹⁶¹ Moreover, briefers were also

often encouraged to be succinct and to limit their remarks to five to seven minutes.¹⁶²

According to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, as general practices, the speaking order for meetings of the Council is established by a draw, while the President of the Council delivers his or her national statement last of all Council members.¹⁶³ However, in certain cases, the speaking order is established by the use of a sign-up sheet, and the President of the Council may make his or her national statement before the other members take the floor.¹⁶⁴ Also in certain cases, the President of the Council may adjust the list of speakers and inscribe first the delegation or delegations responsible for the drafting process, in order to allow them to make an introductory or explanatory presentation.¹⁶⁵ When an unscheduled or emergency meeting is convened, the President may adjust the list of speakers so that the delegation that requested the meeting can speak before other Council members in order to present the rationale for convening the meeting.¹⁶⁶ The President may also

¹⁶⁰ In 2021, in a number of instances, the representatives of Kenya, the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia delivered joint statements on behalf of the three African members of the Council together with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (referred to as “A3+1”) (see, for example, [S/PV.8779](#) and [S/PV.8787](#)). In several instances, Council members also delivered joint statements as co-penholders on a particular issue (see, for example, [S/2021/315](#), [S/2021/418](#), [S/2021/506](#), [S/PV.8803](#), [S/PV.8841](#) and [S/PV.8861](#)). At a meeting held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”, the representative of Kenya delivered a statement on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Council (see [S/PV.8798](#)).

¹⁶¹ For example, at a meeting held on 21 October under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security, the representative of Australia spoke on behalf of the group of countries referred to as the “MIKTA Group” (Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia) and the representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries (see [S/PV.8886](#) and [S/PV.8886 \(Resumption 1\)](#)); at a meeting held on 16 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Finland delivered a joint statement on behalf of the Nordic countries, the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends in Defence of the Charter of the United Nations and the representative of Azerbaijan delivered a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#)); and at a meeting held on 9 December under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Germany spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and the representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries (see [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#)). Non-Council members also submitted joint statements in connection with open videoconferences. For example, in connection with an open videoconference on the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” held on 22 April, the delegation of Azerbaijan submitted a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see [S/2021/404](#)); in connection with an open videoconference on the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” held on 19 May, the delegation of Canada submitted a statement also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand and the delegation Denmark submitted a statement on behalf of the Nordic countries (see [S/2021/490](#)); in connection with an open videoconference on the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” held on 25 May, the delegation of Spain submitted a statement also on behalf of Egypt, Japan, New Zealand and Uruguay, its co-penholders on resolution [2286 \(2016\)](#), and the delegation of Switzerland submitted a statement on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (see [S/2021/505](#)).

¹⁶² See, for example, [S/PV.8874](#).

¹⁶³ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 24 and 25.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* For example, at a meeting, held on 16 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Mexico (President of the Council) took the floor to deliver his national statement after the briefings by the Presidents of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice, but before the other members of the Council spoke (see [S/PV.8906](#)); and at a meeting held on 23 November under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”, the representative of Mexico (President of the Council) took the floor to deliver his national statement after the briefing by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, but before the other members of the Council spoke (see [S/PV.8911](#)).

¹⁶⁵ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 26. For example, at a meeting held on 9 July under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the United States, as a co-penholder for resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), which was adopted at the meeting, took the floor first after the vote to provide introductory remarks (see [S/PV.8817](#)); and at a meeting, held on 3 November under the item entitled “The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the representative of France, as penholder for resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), which was adopted at the meeting, took the floor first after the vote to provide explanatory remarks (see [S/PV.8896](#)).

¹⁶⁶ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 26. For example, at a meeting held on 6 October under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the representative of Ireland, having requested a Council meeting to discuss the expulsion of the United Nations leadership from Ethiopia, delivered a statement after the Secretary-General, but before the other members of the Council (see [S/PV.8875](#)).

inscribe first the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council when they present their work, as was the case on several occasions during the period under review.¹⁶⁷ In the letters from the President dated 2 April and 7 May 2020, it was established that, following general practice, the order of speakers of Council members in videoconferences during the COVID-19 pandemic would continue to be established by a draw.¹⁶⁸

Following established practice, the list of speakers was adjusted according to protocol when high-level officials were representing Council members at a meeting.¹⁶⁹ In 2021, consistent with past practice under these items and in line with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, non-members of the Council having a direct interest in the matter under consideration spoke before Council members did in meetings and videoconferences held in connection with the items entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)” and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian

question”.¹⁷⁰ In May 2021, during the presidency of China, non-members of the Council with a direct interest in the matter also spoke ahead of Council members in meetings and videoconferences held in connection with the items entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”, “The situation in the Middle East”, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, “The situation in Somalia” and “The situation in Libya”.¹⁷¹ During the high-level open videoconference held on 28 October in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the President of Ghana, in his capacity as Chair of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States, spoke before Council members did.¹⁷²

In addition to using videoconferences in lieu of in-person Council meetings, the Council continued to use videoconferencing technology to facilitate participation at its in-person meetings, a practice that had become common in recent years.¹⁷³ In 2021, Council members heard briefings by speakers participating by videoconference in 68 out of 164 meetings (41.5 per cent).

In 2021, at an open videoconference held on 23 February in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on climate and security, Sir David Attenborough provided a pre-recorded video before the videoconference was called to order.¹⁷⁴ At an open videoconference held on 8 April in connection with the same item and focused on mine action and sustaining peace, the United Nations Global Advocate for the Elimination of Mines and Explosive Hazards also addressed Council members through a pre-recorded briefing before the videoconference was called to order.¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁷ S/2017/507, annex, para. 27. For example, at a meeting held on 6 December under the item entitled “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, the representative of the Niger (President of the Council) spoke before the other members of the Council did, to give a briefing in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/PV.8918).

¹⁶⁸ See S/2020/273 and S/2020/372.

¹⁶⁹ S/2017/507, annex, paras. 29–30. For example, at a meeting held on 19 August under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the Minister for External Affairs of India (President of the Council) took the floor after the briefings but before the other Council members spoke (see S/PV.8839); at a meeting held on 23 September under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Taoiseach of Ireland (President of the Council) took the floor after the briefings but before the other Council members spoke (see S/PV.8864); and at a meeting held on 20 October under the item entitled “The situation in the Great Lakes region”, the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya (President of the Council) took the floor after the briefings but before the other Council members spoke (see S/PV.8884). For more information on high-level meetings, see sect. II.B above.

¹⁷⁰ S/2017/507, annex, para. 33. See, for example, S/2021/291, S/2021/370, S/2021/480, S/PV.8782, S/2021/601, S/PV.8834 and S/PV.8880.

¹⁷¹ See S/2021/474, S/2021/465, S/2021/480, S/2021/495, S/2021/498, S/PV.8779, S/2021/506 and S/PV.8782.

¹⁷² See S/2021/941.

¹⁷³ S/2017/507, annex, para. 60.

¹⁷⁴ See S/2021/198. See also S/2021/1060.

¹⁷⁵ See S/2021/346.

VIII. Participation

Note

Section VIII covers the practice of the Council concerning the extension of invitations to non-members of the Council to participate in meetings of the Council. Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 37 and 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council describe circumstances in which invitations can be extended to non-members of the Council to participate, without a vote, when the Council so decides.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

Rule 37

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

Rule 39

The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

During the period under review, the Council continued to invite non-members of the Council to

participate in its meetings. As explained in section I above, however, the participation of non-Council members was heavily restricted because of the technical limitations related to open videoconferences and the health and safety guidelines implemented for the holding of in-person meetings. This notwithstanding, invitations were extended by the President of the Council at the beginning of or during Council meetings, either under the “relevant provisions” of the Charter without an explicit reference to a specific Article or rule of the provisional rules of procedure, or under rule 37 or rule 39. Specifically, Member States continued to be invited under rule 37, while representatives of the Secretariat, other United Nations organs, specialized agencies, funds and programmes, regional and other intergovernmental organizations or other invitees, including representatives of non-governmental organizations and civil society, were invited under rule 39. While Member States requested invitations in letters addressed to the President of the Council, in most cases, these were not circulated as documents of the Council. In accordance with the working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, non-members of the Council continued to participate in videoconferences of the Council, “within the principles of rules 37 and 39”, if there were no objections from Council members.¹⁷⁶

During the period under review, in accordance with the notes by the President dated 30 August 2017 and 27 December 2019,¹⁷⁷ the Council invited newly elected members to observe all meetings of the Council and informal consultations of the whole, including consultations on Council outcome documents from 1 October 2021, for the three months immediately preceding their term of membership. This included open and closed videoconferences.

The present section is divided into four subsections, namely: A. Invitations extended under rule 37; B. Invitations extended under rule 39; C. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39; and D. Discussions relating to participation.

A. Invitations extended under rule 37

In accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure, all

¹⁷⁶ See [S/2020/273](#). For more information on the working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see sect. I.C above.

¹⁷⁷ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 140–141, and [S/2019/993](#).

States, whether Members of the United Nations or not, can be invited to participate in Council meetings when: (a) the interests of a Member State are “specially affected” (Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37); (b) a Member State or a non-Member State is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council (Article 32 of the Charter); and (c) a Member State of the United Nations brings a matter to the attention of the Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter (rule 37).¹⁷⁸ In accordance with the procedures and working methods of the Council developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, non-members of the Council continued to participate in videoconferences of the Council, “within the principles of rules 37 and 39”, if there were no objections from Council members.¹⁷⁹

Starting in September 2021, with the gradual improvement of the situation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic in New York City, restrictions on the in-person participation of non-Council members in Council meetings began to ease. In letters dated 3 September, 10 November and 7 December from the President of the Council,¹⁸⁰ Council members agreed that Member States that were not members of the Council and that had been invited to participate in public meetings of the Council under rules 37 or 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, or had been invited by the President as agreed by the Council prior to the meeting, would be allowed in the Security Council Chamber. In addition, non-Council members would continue to be able to participate in open debates through the submission of written statements.

¹⁷⁸ For more details on the referral of a dispute or situation to the Council by States, see sect. I.A above and part VI, sect. I.A.

¹⁷⁹ See [S/2020/253](#), [S/2020/273](#) and [S/2020/372](#). In 2021, non-members of the Council delivered statements during videoconferences of the Council at the Head of State or Government or ministerial level. For example, at an open videoconference held on 23 February in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on climate and security, Council members invited the President of Malawi, the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance and Corporate Governance of Antigua and Barbuda and the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany within the principle of rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure (see [S/2021/198](#)); and at an open videoconference held on 16 May in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the Council invited the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria within the principle of rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure (see [S/2021/480](#)).

¹⁸⁰ [S/2021/776](#), [S/2021/939](#) and [S/2021/1013](#).

Accordingly, at a meeting convened on 9 September, five Member States were invited to participate in a debate held under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan” under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, the largest number of invitees since the resumption of meetings in person on 25 May 2021.¹⁸¹ At a meeting held on 21 October under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the Council held the first open debate since 12 February 2020 with the participation in person of non-Council members under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.¹⁸² While 35 non-Council members participated in the open debate in the Council Chamber, another 23 non-Council members submitted written statements, and one Council member submitted a statement on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan.¹⁸³

In several instances, representatives of non-Council members participated in Council videoconferences in their capacity as representatives of regional and subregional organizations. During a high-level open videoconference held on 9 August in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on maritime security, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo participated under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, on behalf of his President, Chair of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union.¹⁸⁴ At private meetings held on 17 August and 8 November under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”, the Second Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam participated under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure in his capacity as Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Chair on Myanmar.¹⁸⁵ During a high-level open videoconference held on 28 October in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the President of Ghana participated under rule 37 of the provisional rules of

¹⁸¹ See [S/PV.8853](#).

¹⁸² See [S/PV.8886](#), [S/PV.8886 \(Resumption 1\)](#) and [S/2021/886](#). The last open debate with the in-person participation of non-Council members invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure was at the 8723rd meeting of the Council, held on 12 February 2020 (see [S/PV.8723](#)). The last debate with the in-person participation of non-Council members invited under rule 37 was at the 8743rd meeting of the Council, held on 11 March 2020 (see [S/PV.8743](#)).

¹⁸³ See [S/2021/886](#).

¹⁸⁴ See [S/2021/722](#).

¹⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8835](#) and [S/PV.8898](#).

procedure in his capacity as Chair of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States.¹⁸⁶ In 2021, several non-Council members, invited in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, participated in meetings by videoconference.¹⁸⁷

Despite the limitations imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic on the participation of non-Council members, in 2021, there were no changes to the procedure for extending invitations to Member States to participate in the meetings of the Council. There were also no instances wherein an invitation extended to a Member State to participate in a Council meeting was put to a vote. This notwithstanding, in 2021, Member States, including Council members, submitted various communications raising issues of concern regarding invitations pursuant to rule 37.

In a letter dated 8 July, the representative of the Dominican Republic expressed disagreement with the decision of the Council to hold its 8815th meeting, convened under the item entitled “The question concerning Haiti”, in a private format and stated that the Council should have invited the Dominican Republic to participate as the country that would be most affected if the crisis following the assassination of the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, spilled over its border.¹⁸⁸ The representative enclosed the position of the Dominican Republic on the situation in Haiti as an annex to the letter. Similarly, in a letter dated 12 July, writing in his capacity as the current Chair of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) caucus of Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, the representative of Saint Kitts and Nevis referred to an earlier letter, dated 7 July, in which he had requested to attend and speak at the same private meeting on Haiti.¹⁸⁹ In that regard, he expressed disappointment with the decision of the presidency of the Council to exclude CARICOM from the meeting. He noted that

rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure permitted the participation of Member States whose interests were specifically affected. He recalled that CARICOM was seized of the recent developments in Haiti and highlighted its willingness to play a lead role in facilitating a process of national dialogue and negotiation in that country. The representative also enclosed the written statement that he would have delivered at the meeting as an annex to the letter.

In a letter dated 6 August, the representative of Pakistan expressed regret that the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan had not been given an opportunity to participate in the 8831st meeting of the Council on the situation in that country, held on that day.¹⁹⁰ The representative noted that Pakistan had a vital stake in peace and stability in Afghanistan and had been actively engaged in facilitating the peace process in that country. He transmitted a document containing the views of Pakistan on the situation in Afghanistan as an annex to the letter. Similarly, in a letter dated 15 August, the same representative expressed his delegation’s desire to participate in, under rule 37, and deliver a statement at the meeting of the Council on Afghanistan scheduled for 16 August.¹⁹¹

In a letter to the President of the Council dated 14 October 2021, the representatives of New Zealand and Switzerland, writing on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, noted the urgency of restoring direct in-person participation by non-Council members in open debates of the Council.¹⁹² The representatives noted that open debates were intended to promote interaction between the Council and the wider membership and to inform the Council’s deliberations. According to the Group, written contributions, which had been developed as a temporary mitigating measure against the backdrop of exceptional and unprecedented circumstances brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, could not substitute for that interaction.

B. Invitations extended under rule 39

In accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, members of the Secretariat or other persons may be invited to supply the Council with information or give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

Following previous practice, an invitation under rule 39 was extended to a representative of a Member

¹⁸⁶ See [S/2021/941](#).

¹⁸⁷ For example, at a meeting held on 8 June under the item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”, the President of Serbia participated by videoconference (see [S/PV.8790](#)); at a meeting held on 12 October under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, the President of Rwanda participated by videoconference (see [S/PV.8877](#)); at a meeting held on 18 October under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, the President of the Central African Republic participated by videoconference (see [S/PV.8882](#)); and at the meeting held on 8 November under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”, the Second Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam participated by videoconference (see [S/PV.8898](#)).

¹⁸⁸ See [S/2021/637](#). See also [S/PV.8815](#).

¹⁸⁹ See [S/2021/660](#).

¹⁹⁰ See [S/2021/715](#). See also [S/PV.8831](#).

¹⁹¹ See [S/2021/729](#). See also [S/PV.8834](#).

¹⁹² See [S/2021/879](#).


State, on an exceptional basis, only if his or her participation was in a role other than that of a representative of a State, for example, as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ For example, at open videoconferences held on 12 April and 18 May in connection with the items entitled “The situation in the Great Lakes region” (see [S/2021/351](#)) and

In 2021, a total of 354 invitations were extended under rule 39, as compared with 304 in 2020 and 387 in 2019 (see figure V).

“Peace and security in Africa” (see [S/2021/484](#)), respectively, the representative of Egypt briefed Council members in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Figure V
Invitations under rule 39, 2012–2021




Of the 354 invitations under rule 39, 207 were extended in Council meetings, 142 in open videoconferences and 5 in closed videoconferences. Of the total number of invitees under rule 39, 199 were men and 155 were women. As shown in figure VI, in recent years, both the total number and the percentage of female speakers invited to Council meetings under rule 39 had increased, with the latter being 43.8 per cent in 2021, compared with 34.2 per cent in 2020.

Moreover, in 2021, as part of their monthly commitments on working methods, several Council presidencies placed specific emphasis on ensuring the participation of women briefers in Council meetings and videoconferences.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ For more information on Council presidencies, see sect. V above.

Figure VI
Invitees under rule 39, 2012–2021




For the purposes of this part of the *Repertoire*, invitations extended under rule 39 are classified according to four main categories, namely:¹⁹⁵ (a) officials of the United Nations system; (b) invitees from international organizations other than the United Nations; (c) officials representing regional intergovernmental organizations; and (d) representatives of other entities such as non-governmental organizations and civil society. As shown in figure VII, during the period under review invitations under rule 39 were most often extended to officials of the United Nations system and representatives of non-governmental organizations and

civil society. The number of civil society representatives increased from 51 in 2020 to 86 in 2021 and was the highest number of invitees under this category since 2009. In terms of sex-disaggregated data for each category, of the 214 invitations to United Nations officials, 143 (67 per cent) had been extended to men and 71 (33 per cent) to women. Of the 44 invitations to officials representing regional intergovernmental organizations, 34 (77 per cent) had been extended to men and 10 (23 per cent) to women. Of the 10 invitations to representatives of international organizations other than the United Nations, 7 had been extended to men and 3 to women. Lastly, of the 86 representatives of other entities such as non-governmental organizations and civil society, 15 (17 per cent) had been extended to men and 71 (or 83 per cent) to women, representing an increase of 26 per cent in the participation of women under this category as compared with 2020.

¹⁹⁵ In earlier supplements, separate categories had been used for invitees of the Secretariat and Council subsidiary bodies and those representing other United Nations organs, subsidiary bodies or agencies. Since the twentieth supplement, these two categories have been subsumed under the category “United Nations system”.

Figure VII
Breakdown of invitations under rule 39, by category, 2012–2021



In 2021, there were no changes to the procedure for extending invitations under rule 39 to participate in meetings of the Council. There were also no instances wherein an invitation extended to participate in a Council meeting was put to a vote. This notwithstanding, in 2021, one Council member submitted a communication in which issues of concern were raised regarding invitations (or the lack thereof) pursuant to rule 39.

In a letter to the President of the Council dated 22 February, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, unlike their Ukrainian counterparts at the negotiations of the Minsk Trilateral Contact Group, had not had an opportunity to present their views at the open videoconference held on 11 February in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security

Council (S/2014/264)”.¹⁹⁶ He enclosed their statements as an annex to the letter.

C. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39

During the period under review, the Council extended several invitations not expressly under rule 37 or rule 39 (see table 11).

Invitations to representatives of the Holy See and the State of Palestine to participate in meetings of the Council were routinely extended “in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard”, without specification of any rules.

¹⁹⁶ S/2021/168. See also S/2021/159.

Table 11
Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39

<i>Invitee</i>	<i>Meeting or videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>
Holy See	S/2021/346 , 8 April 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security
	S/2021/490 , 19 May 2021	Peace and security in Africa
State of Palestine	S/2021/404 , 22 April 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question
	S/2021/480 , 16 May 2021	
	S/PV.8782 , 27 May 2021	
	S/PV.8826 , 28 July 2021	
	S/PV.8883 , 19 October 2021	

D. Discussions relating to participation

During the period under review, when non-members of the Council were invited to participate in a meeting or videoconference, Council members generally spoke before Member States invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and before those not expressly invited under any rule, except on some occasions when parties directly involved in the matter under consideration took the floor before Council members.¹⁹⁷ The practice of the Council with regard to invitees under rule 39 was less consistent, and the order of speakers depended on whether or not they were participating to provide a briefing to the Council.

In 2021, matters concerning participation in Council meetings and videoconferences were raised on several occasions during meetings and videoconferences.

At an open videoconference held on 25 February in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the representative of the United States expressed regret that the delegation of the Russian Federation had silenced and blocked the appearance of Su’ad Jarbawi, a civil society leader from the International Rescue Committee, who had been invited to participate in the videoconference.¹⁹⁸ Responding to the assertion made by the United States, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation had nothing against the briefer in question and simply considered it would be enough to have just one civil society representative.

During an open videoconference held on 13 April in connection with the item entitled “Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)”, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia stated that he had no choice but to lodge a protest against the abuse of the videoconference format on the part of the representatives of Pristina in order to promote the symbols of the so-called statehood of Kosovo.¹⁹⁹ The Minister added that they had been warned on several occasions, including by the President of the Council at a previous meeting, that such abuses of Council meetings were unacceptable and constituted a violation of the Council’s rules on the participation of representatives of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Pristina under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. The representative of the Russian Federation drew attention to the disrespect for the Council and its decisions shown by the Kosovo Albanian representatives, who had been invited to join the meeting in their private capacity. Noting that the Council had had to postpone the open videoconference to discuss the situation because, among other reasons, the Russian Federation and the majority of the other Council members did not recognize Kosovo as an independent State, he stated that displaying the flag of the “non-recognized entity” was unacceptable. He added that the meeting had been resumed on the sole understanding that the videoconference was taking place in an informal and provisional format that was not fully covered by the Council’s rules of procedure. The representative of China said that his delegation respected the decision taken by the Council that the meeting be carried out in an informal way and added that the backdrop of the relevant party did not have any

¹⁹⁷ For more information on the order of speaking see sect. VII above.

¹⁹⁸ See [S/2021/206](#).

¹⁹⁹ See [S/2021/370](#).

special meaning. He reiterated that the goal of the discussions of the Council on the Kosovo issue was to increase mutual trust between the two sides and promote a solution within the framework of resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#) as soon as possible. In that connection, creating confrontation and problems ran contrary to the intention of the Council's discussion on the issue and was not helping its resolution. He expressed the hope that no similar incidents would be seen in the future.

During an open videoconference held on 6 May in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East", noting the inability of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to participate in the discussion that day, the representative of the Russian Federation requested the upcoming presidency to send the Director General an invitation to the next meeting on the matter, in June 2021, well in advance and to find a date that would fit into his schedule.²⁰⁰ At the meeting held on 3 June under the same item, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that that was the first time since October 2020 that the Council was meeting in person in order to discuss resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and welcomed the Director General of OPCW to the meeting.²⁰¹ He posited that such a format of interaction should become a regular one.

At a meeting held on 28 July under the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question", the representative of Israel commented that, while the participation of Ir Amim, an Israeli non-governmental organization, in the meeting reflected his country's vibrant democracy and its commitment to freedom of expression, bringing a political non-governmental organization to brief the Council on Jerusalem was absurd in terms of objectivity.²⁰² At a meeting held on 16 August under the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan", the representative of China noted that several Council members had said in their statements that they would like to see neighbours of Afghanistan and countries of the region play a greater role and expressed regret that their requests to participate in the meeting had not been granted.²⁰³

At a meeting held on 21 October in connection with the item entitled "Women and peace and security", the Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora of Ireland said that it was critical that the Council listen to a diversity of

perspectives from women leaders and human rights defenders, underlining that Ireland had placed women civil society briefers at the heart of its Council presidency.²⁰⁴ In that connection, he acknowledged the risks faced by civil society briefers and noted that Council members should ensure both the safe participation by women peacebuilders at the grass-roots level and their physical participation in the Chamber, despite the virtual working methods that had facilitated their participation in the Council. The representative of Estonia echoed the importance for the Council to hear from women activists and civil society representatives, underscoring that threats and attacks against them could not lead to their exclusion or self-censorship. The representative of Canada, speaking on behalf of the Friends of Women, Peace and Security, an informal network of 65 Member States, called upon the Council to systematically include women in all of its discussions and to fully integrate women and peace and security commitments into all of its work and outcomes, including on country-specific situations and mission mandates. Several Council members²⁰⁵ welcomed the participation of the wider membership in person in an open debate for the first time since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Participation in Council meetings was also discussed in further detail during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 16 June under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))" (see case 5).

Case 5 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))

At a meeting held on 16 June at the joint initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of which held the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions,²⁰⁶ the Council convened an open debate under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))" and the sub-item "Working methods of the Security Council" and focused on the theme "Agility and innovation: lessons

²⁰⁰ See [S/2021/446](#).

²⁰¹ See [S/PV.8785](#).

²⁰² See [S/PV.8826](#).

²⁰³ See [S/PV.8834](#).

²⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8886](#).

²⁰⁵ Kenya, Norway, Viet Nam and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

²⁰⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 June 2021 ([S/2021/527](#)).

for the future from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic”.²⁰⁷

In their statements, Council members and other delegations discussed the impact of the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic on the participation in Council meetings of invitees under rule 37 and 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. In that regard, the representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, said that as the Council had adjusted to the new reality of the pandemic, there had been more scrutiny on how it would continue executing its mandate, which had prompted calls for more transparency, including through the holding of more public meetings and wider representation by women, civil society and youth.²⁰⁸ He posited that one of the greatest challenges to operational continuity was the technological capacity of the Secretariat and the political will to ensure that virtual open debates could include the participation of the wider membership. He added that written contributions by non-Council members were not an appropriate substitution for their participation in such debates. According to the representative of Liechtenstein, in its current guise, the Council risked creating a “two-tier” system for participation in open debates, which defeated the very purpose of the format.²⁰⁹ The representative of Pakistan maintained that, by replacing the videoconference participation of non-Council members with the submission of written statements, the working methods adopted during the pandemic had undermined one of the few available channels for participation by the wider memberships on issues of international peace and security. Furthermore, the written statements were circulated as a separate compilation and not as part of the official records of the meetings. The representative of Singapore noted that, by the time the compilation of written statements was circulated, the Council would have already shifted its focus to other issues.

Multiple delegations²¹⁰ stressed the need to urgently facilitate the in-person participation of the wider membership in Council meetings. The representative of Liechtenstein encouraged Council members to explore safe modalities for in-person participation in open debates, such as timed arrivals of non-Council members and the use of the antechamber

to ensure an uninterrupted flow in the speakers’ list. As it could not be excluded that situations necessitating the use of virtual participation at meetings could emerge in the future, the delegation of Switzerland underscored the urgent need to find a solution to enable non-Council members to participate fully and directly in virtual open debates.

Notwithstanding the challenges, several Member States²¹¹ reflected upon the benefits of the use of videoconferences in facilitating both the high-level participation of Member States and a broad range of briefers, including civil society representatives. The representative of Kenya, on behalf of the elected members of the Council, suggested that a progressive approach would be to consider holding meetings that combine in-person and virtual participation to attract a wide spectrum of briefers in certain events.²¹² The representative of the United Kingdom, highlighting that the use of technology had allowed the Council to include more diverse voices from the field, including civil society, women peacebuilders and young people, echoed the view of the elected members that the Council should continue such practices. The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, encouraged the Council to continue to enable briefers to address it virtually and encouraged the inclusion and meaningful participation of civil society representatives, including women, young people and persons with disabilities, as briefers.²¹³ The representative of Slovakia indicated that briefings by videoconference enabled the Council to consider a larger pool of potential briefers and was an efficient and cost-effective solution to the logistical constraints pertaining to travel to New York. The delegation of the United Arab Emirates expressed concern with the decrease in the participation of women in the Council’s work over the past year and that, going forward, the Council and Member States should ensure adequate access and space for both the formal and informal engagement of women.

More generally, beyond participation during the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of delegations²¹⁴ addressed the need to ensure the participation of

²⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8798](#) and [S/2021/572](#).

²⁰⁸ See [S/PV.8798](#).

²⁰⁹ See [S/2021/572](#).

²¹⁰ Argentina, Austria, Brazil, El Salvador, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council), Pakistan and Singapore.

²¹¹ Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, Cyprus, Kuwait, Republic of Korea, Chile, El Salvador, Latvia, Liechtenstein, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council), Slovakia, Switzerland (on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group) and United Arab Emirates.

²¹² See [S/PV.8798](#).

²¹³ See [S/2021/572](#).

²¹⁴ Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Cyprus, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council) and Republic of Korea.

concerned Member States in Council discussions when their interests were affected. The representative of Argentina added that, as part of the transparency and inclusion that should guide the work of the Council, the participation of non-members of the Council involved in a situation that the Council was considering should, as prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations, be guaranteed. The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, underscored that that should be done in particular when the Council was making decisions, as requested in the Charter, and, in the case of Council sanctions committees, with troop- and police-contributing countries, regional and subregional organizations and concerned countries. The delegations of Cyprus and the Republic of Korea stated that the

participation of non-members should also apply to closed consultations. The delegation of Cyprus added that all Member States hosting peacekeeping operations should have a chance to offer their perspective before the Council when it discussed mandate renewals and be included in meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries. The representative of Pakistan expressed the view that the participation of the wider membership appeared to have been progressively restricted over the years and that Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, which contained calls for inviting non-members to participate in matters of direct importance to them, within the context of the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, should be fully implemented.

IX. Decision-making and voting

Note

Section IX covers the practice of the Council with regard to decision-making, including voting. Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure govern the voting in the Council. They provide that decisions on procedural matters require an affirmative vote of 9 of the 15 Council members, while decisions on substantive matters require an affirmative vote of 9 Council members, including all of the permanent members.

This section also covers rules 31, 32, 34 to 36 and 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, which govern the conduct of business with regard to voting on draft resolutions, amendments and substantive motions.

Article 27

1. *Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.*
2. *Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.*
3. *Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.*

Rule 31

Proposed resolutions, amendments and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

Rule 32

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission.

Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 34

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 35

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

If the motion or draft resolution has been seconded, the representative on the Security Council who has seconded it may require that it be put to the vote as his motion or draft resolution with the same right of precedence as if the original mover had not withdrawn it.

Rule 36

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the

order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds to or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 38

Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council.

Rule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

This section comprises five subsections, namely: A. Decisions of the Security Council; B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38; C. Decision-making by voting; D. Decision-making without a vote; and E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process.

In 2021, rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure was routinely applied in Council meetings, in particular in connection with the written voting procedure agreed upon to allow for voting due to the inability of Council members to meet in person during the COVID-19 pandemic. There were no instances of the explicit invocation of rules 32, 34 and 36.


A. Decisions of the Security Council

At its meetings during the period under review, the Council continued to adopt resolutions and statements by the President of the Council (also known as presidential statements), in addition to making procedural decisions. Decisions of the Council also took the form of notes by and letters from the President, which were not adopted at meetings but were issued as documents of the Council. In 2021, the Council continued to adopt resolutions and presidential statements in accordance with the written procedure established in the letters dated 27 March and 7 May 2020 from the President of the Council.²¹⁵

In 2021, the Council adopted a total of 57 resolutions and 24 presidential statements. Of the 57 resolutions adopted, 40 (70.2 per cent) were adopted in a meeting of the Council and 17 (29.8 per cent) through the written voting procedure. Of the 24 presidential statements adopted, 11 (45.8 per cent) were adopted at a meeting and 13 (54.2 per cent) through the written procedure. In addition, the Council issued 39 notes by the President and 170 letters from the President. In accordance with the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, the letters from the President in 2021 included: (a) records of the specific working methods agreed upon for each month; (b) compilations of the statements and interventions made by briefers, Council members and non-members of the Council during open videoconferences; and (c) records of the written procedure for the adoption of resolutions. With the return to the adoption of resolutions at formal meetings of the Council, the number of letters from the President of the Council decreased in 2021, compared with the 242 that had been issued in 2020. Figure VIII shows the total number of resolutions and presidential statements adopted and notes and letters from the President issued during the past decade (2012–2021).

²¹⁵ See [S/2020/253](#) and [S/2020/372](#).

Figure VIII
Resolutions and statements by the President adopted and notes by and letters from the President issued, 2012–2021



Multiple decisions in one meeting

In 2021, the Council continued the standard practice of adopting a single decision in a meeting, and there was no instance where more than one draft resolution was put to a vote in one meeting. Furthermore, in accordance with the written voting procedure, within 12 hours of the conclusion of the voting on a draft resolution, the President of the Council convened a videoconference to announce the outcome of the vote.²¹⁶ In several instances, announcements of the outcome of the vote for multiple decisions were made in a single videoconference.

B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38

A draft resolution may be submitted by any member of the Council. The note by the President dated 30 August 2017 provides that the members of the Council support, where appropriate, the informal arrangement whereby one or more Council members,

as penholder(s), initiate and chair the informal drafting process.²¹⁷ In accordance with the note, any member of the Council may be a penholder, and more than one Council member may act as co-penholders, when it is deemed to add value, taking into account, as appropriate, the expertise and/or contributions of Council members on the subject. In the note, Council members reaffirmed that all members of the Council should be allowed to participate fully in the preparation of, inter alia, resolutions, presidential statements and statements to the press and that the drafting of such documents should be carried out in an inclusive manner that would allow participation of all members of the Council. The members of the Council also encouraged the penholder or co-penholders, depending on the subject and the urgency of the situation on the ground, to provide reasonably sufficient time for consideration by all Council members when draft resolutions, presidential statements and statements to the press were placed under a silence procedure. In 2021, while the majority of decisions of the Council continued to be drafted by some permanent members, elected members served as

²¹⁶ Ibid. For more information on the written procedures established for the adoption of resolutions and presidential statements following the decision to suspend meetings in person in the Security Council Chamber in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, see sect. I above and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.D.

²¹⁷ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 78–82.

penholders or co-penholders in several instances.²¹⁸ Approximately 16 per cent of draft resolutions were drafted exclusively by one or more elected members.²¹⁹

²¹⁸ For example, draft resolution [S/2021/388](#) submitted by Mexico in connection with the item “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” was adopted as resolution [2572 \(2021\)](#) on 22 April; draft resolution [S/2021/402](#) submitted by Viet Nam in connection with the item “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” was adopted as resolution [2573 \(2021\)](#) on 27 April; draft resolution [S/2021/523](#) submitted by Estonia and France in connection with the item “The situation in Libya” was adopted as resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#) on 3 June; draft resolution [S/2021/636](#) submitted by Ireland and Norway in connection with the item “The situation in the Middle East” was adopted as resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#) on 9 July; draft resolution [S/2021/730](#) submitted by India in connection with the item “United Nations peacekeeping operations” was adopted as resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#) on 18 August; draft resolution [S/2021/771](#) submitted by Ireland in connection with the item “United Nations peacekeeping operations” was adopted as resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#) on 9 September; draft resolution [S/2021/804](#) submitted by Estonia and Norway in connection with the item “The situation in Afghanistan” was adopted as resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#) on 17 September; draft resolution [S/2021/825](#) submitted by Estonia and France in connection with the item “Maintenance of international peace and security” was adopted as resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#) on 29 September; draft resolution [S/2021/877](#) submitted by Mexico and the United States in connection with the item “The question concerning Haiti” was adopted as resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#) on 15 October; draft resolution [S/2021/893](#) submitted by Norway and the Niger in connection with the item “Children and armed conflict” was adopted as resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#) on 29 October; draft resolution [S/2021/902](#) submitted by Mexico and the United Kingdom in connection with the item “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))” was

Pursuant to rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with rule 37 or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussions of the Council may also submit proposals and draft resolutions, but proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a Council member. The Member States that submit a draft resolution become sponsors of the draft resolution. A draft resolution is described as a presidential text if all the Council members agree to be co-sponsors. In 2021, six presidential texts were submitted,²²⁰ compared with one in 2020 and none in 2019.²²¹

During the period under review, the Council considered a total of 59 draft resolutions, 7 of which were co-sponsored by non-members of the Council, as shown in table 12.

adopted as resolution [2603 \(2021\)](#) on 29 October; and draft resolution [S/2021/1075](#) submitted by Mexico in connection with the item “Maintenance of international peace and security” was adopted as resolution [2616 \(2021\)](#) on 22 December.

²¹⁹ In 2021, 59 draft resolutions were considered by the Council, 57 of which were adopted and 2 were not. Of the 59 resolutions submitted, 57 had at least one designated penholders and 2 did not, namely, draft resolution [S/2021/530](#) (adopted by acclamation as resolution [2580 \(2021\)](#) on the question of the recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) and draft resolution [S/2021/606](#) (adopted by consensus as resolution [2583 \(2021\)](#) under the item entitled “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice”). Of the 57 resolutions with designated penholders, 9 had been drafted exclusively by one or more elected members.

²²⁰ Resolutions [2565 \(2021\)](#), [2573 \(2021\)](#), [2580 \(2021\)](#), [2583 \(2021\)](#), [2589 \(2021\)](#), and [2594 \(2021\)](#).

²²¹ For more information on past practice concerning presidential texts, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008–2009 to Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. VIII.B.

Table 12
Draft resolutions co-sponsored by non-members of the Council

Draft resolution	Item	Meeting or videoconference record and date	Resolution	Council member sponsors	Non-Council member co-sponsors
S/2021/171	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/2021/195 26 February 2021	2565 (2021)	All Council members	100 Member States ^a
S/2021/402	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	S/2021/407 27 April 2021	2573 (2021)	All Council members	50 Member States ^b
S/2021/523	The situation in Libya	S/PV.8783 3 June 2021	2578 (2021)	3 Council members (Estonia, France, Ireland)	27 Member States ^c

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<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting or videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Council member sponsors</i>	<i>Non-Council member co-sponsors</i>
S/2021/730	United Nations peacekeeping operations	S/PV.8837 18 August 2021	2589 (2021)	All Council members	65 Member States ^d
S/2021/771	United Nations peacekeeping operations	S/PV.8852 9 September 2021	2594 (2021)	All Council members	82 Member States ^e
S/2021/825	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/PV.8868 29 September 2021	2598 (2021)	4 Council members (Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway)	30 Member States ^f
S/2021/1075	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/PV.8942 22 December 2021	2616 (2021)	11 Council members (Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States)	63 Member States ^g

^a Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

^b Angola, Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.

^c Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.

^d Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates.

^e Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Zimbabwe.

^f Albania, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine.

^g Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Uruguay and Vanuatu.

C. Decision-making by voting

According to Article 27 (2) and (3) of the Charter, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine Council members. On all other matters, that is, substantive or non-procedural matters, an affirmative vote of nine Council members is required, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

The result of a vote in the Council often does not in itself indicate whether the Council considers the matter voted upon to be procedural or substantive. For example, whether a vote is procedural or not cannot be determined when a proposal is: (a) adopted by a unanimous vote; (b) adopted by an affirmative vote of all permanent members; or (c) not adopted as a result of having failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes required. When a proposal is adopted as a result of having obtained nine or more affirmative votes, with one or more permanent members casting a negative vote, that indicates that the vote is considered procedural. Conversely, if the proposal is not adopted, the matter voted upon is considered to be substantive.

On certain occasions, in its early years, the Council found it necessary to decide, by vote, the question of whether the matter under consideration was procedural within the meaning of Article 27 (2). That procedure is known as the “preliminary question”, after the language used in the San Francisco Statement on Voting Procedure. In recent years, however, including during the period under review, there have been no instances of the Council deciding to examine the preliminary question. Furthermore, procedural motions, such as the adoption of the agenda, the extension of invitations to participate in meetings and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting, have generally been decided upon by the Council without a vote. When such motions were voted upon, the vote was considered procedural. In 2021, the Council did not vote on procedural matters.

Adoption of resolutions

During the period under review, of the 57 resolutions adopted, 48 (84.2 per cent) were adopted unanimously. A total of nine resolutions were adopted without a unanimous vote (see table 13).

Table 13
Resolutions adopted without a unanimous vote

<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting or videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
2564 (2021)	The situation in the Middle East ^a	S/2021/189 S/2021/194 25 February 2021	14 (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	1 (Russian Federation)
2566 (2021)	The situation in the Central African Republic ^b	S/2021/253 S/2021/258 12 March 2021	14 (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	1 (Russian Federation)
2577 (2021)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan ^c	S/2021/515 S/2021/518 28 May 2021	13 (China, Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	2 (India, Kenya)
2588 (2021)	The situation in the Central African Republic ^b	S/PV.8828 29 July 2021	14 (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	1 (China)
2593 (2021)	The situation in Afghanistan ^d	S/PV.8848 30 August 2021	13 (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	2 (China, Russian Federation)

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<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting or videoconference record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
2602 (2021)	The situation concerning Western Sahara ^e	S/PV.8890 29 October 2021	13 (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	2 (Russian Federation, Tunisia)
2605 (2021)	The situation in the Central African Republic ^b	S/PV.8902 12 November 2021	13 (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	2 (China, Russian Federation)
2607 (2021)	The situation in Somalia ^f	S/PV.8905 15 November 2021	13 (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	2 (China, Russian Federation)
2616 (2021)	Maintenance of international peace and security ^g	S/PV.8942 22 December 2021	12 (Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	None	3 (China, India, Russian Federation)

^a For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 19.

^b For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 5.

^c For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 7.

^d For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 14.

^e For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 1.

^f For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 2.

^g For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 34.

Draft resolutions not adopted

In accordance with Article 27 (3) of the Charter, a draft resolution on non-procedural matters is not adopted when it fails to obtain the nine affirmative votes required, or when a negative vote is cast by a permanent member. During the period under review,

there was one instance in which a draft resolution was not adopted because it failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes required and one instance when a draft resolution was not adopted owing to a negative vote cast by a permanent member (see table 14).

Table 14

Draft resolutions not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member or for lack of the requisite number of votes

<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
S/2021/667	The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina ^a	S/PV.8823 22 July 2021	2 (China, Russian Federation)	None	13 (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)

<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
S/2021/990	Maintenance of international peace and security ^b	S/PV.8926 13 December 2021	12 (Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam)	2 (India, Russian Federation)	1 (China)

^a For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 17.A.

^b For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 34.

D. Decision-making without a vote

A procedural or substantive motion may be adopted in the Council without a vote or by consensus. In 2021, there were two instances of a resolution being adopted without a vote.²²² At a private meeting held on 8 June, the Council adopted by acclamation resolution [2580 \(2021\)](#), recommending to the General Assembly that António Guterres be appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations for a second term of office from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2026.²²³ At a meeting held on 29 June under the agenda item entitled “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice”,²²⁴ the Council adopted, without a vote and by consensus, resolution [2583 \(2021\)](#), by which it was decided that the election to fill the vacancy would take place on 5 November 2021, at a meeting of the Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its seventy-sixth session.

In 2021, a total of 38 resolutions were adopted by a show of hands, and 17 were adopted in accordance with the written procedure developed during the COVID-19 pandemic.²²⁵

Statements by the President (also known as presidential statements) on behalf of the Council continued to be adopted by consensus. A total of 24 presidential statements were adopted during the period under review.²²⁶ In line with past practice, 11 of the presidential statements were adopted in meetings of the Council, while 13 presidential statements were adopted in accordance with the written non-objection procedure

and were subsequently read out by the President of the Council during open videoconferences.²²⁷

Following past practice, during the period under review, notes by and letters from the President were adopted by consensus and issued as documents of the Council. In 2021, the Council issued 39 notes and 170 letters from the President.²²⁸ As indicated in subsection A above, the majority of letters from the President (106 out of 170, or 62.4 per cent) were used to circulate compilations of interventions in open videoconferences and information on the initiation and outcome of the written voting procedure for the adoption of resolutions.

Notes and letters from the President are rarely adopted during Council meetings. During the period under review, one note by the President, concerning the adoption of the draft annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2020, was adopted during a meeting of the Council, in line with past practice.²²⁹

E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process

At a meeting held on 13 December under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and sub-item entitled “Climate and security”,

²²⁷ See [S/2020/273](#) and [S/2020/372](#).

²²⁸ For the complete list of notes by the President of the Council issued in 2021, see part I, chap. 13, of the report of the Council to the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly ([A/76/2](#)) and [www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/notes-president-2021](#). For the complete list of letters from the President of the Council issued in 2021, see part I, chap. 3, of the same report ([A/76/2](#)) and [www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/letters-exchanged-between-secretary-general-and-president-security-council-2021](#).

²²⁹ See [S/2021/500](#), adopted at the 8781st meeting (see [S/PV.8781](#)). For more information on the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.F.

²²² Resolutions [2580 \(2021\)](#) and [2583 \(2021\)](#).

²²³ See [S/PV.8789](#). For further details on the procedure, see part IV, sect. I.D.

²²⁴ See [S/PV.8808](#).

²²⁵ See [S/2020/253](#).

²²⁶ For the complete list of presidential statements adopted during the period under review, see part I, chap. 2, of the report of the Council to the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly ([A/76/2](#)).

the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by 113 Member States.²³⁰ The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention and was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.²³¹ After the vote, the representative of Ireland, expressing regret about the decision of certain countries to use their right of veto to block the adoption of the groundbreaking draft resolution, said that the Council had missed the opportunity for action. She expressed her delegation's view that the veto was an anachronism and that its use was regrettable in all circumstances. The representative of Kenya, echoing the disappointment with regard to the use of the veto, said that his delegation looked forward to the Council reforms that might one day ensure that countries disproportionately affected by climate change were represented by permanent or veto-wielding members. The representative of Mexico recalled that, since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, his delegation had disagreed with the right to veto, predicting that it could lead to paralysis in the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, said that despite the many criticisms of the veto in the Council, the result of the vote reflected an international community that was deeply divided on climate issues. He stated that the draft resolution had ignored the position of those 80 Member States that did not support it and that only the negative vote of his delegation had been able to stop the process, which was the best indication that the veto was a key piece of insurance for the Council's work.

Council members and the wider membership also discussed issues pertaining to decision-making by the Council at the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 16 June under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)" (see case 6).

Case 6

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

On 16 June, at the joint initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Permanent Representative of which chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions,²³² the Council convened an open debate under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council

(S/2017/507)" and the sub-item entitled "Working methods of the Security Council", focused on the theme "Agility and innovation: lessons for the future from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic".²³³ In their statements, Council members and other delegations focused on the importance of transparency and inclusivity in the decision-making process of the Council, the use of the veto and the impact of the remote working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Multiple delegations stressed the importance of inclusivity and a fair distribution of responsibilities for the drafting of decisions and outcomes among members of the Council.²³⁴ The representative of China said that the allocation of penholdership should be more rational and reflect shared responsibilities and collective participation.²³⁵ He expressed support for multiple Council members serving as co-penholders and encouraged non-penholders to actively contribute to the drafting of documents. Noting that the question of penholdership deserved particular attention by the Council, the representative of the Russian Federation reiterated that any member of the Council may be a penholder and that more than one Council member may act as a co-penholder. He also recalled the inadmissibility of the practice of introducing artificial deadlines into the Council's work and noted that many draft resolutions were received late without justification, which did not allow for a comprehensive expert assessment, let alone meaningful consultations. The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, urged the Council to establish the principle of a fair and equitable division of labour, including penholdership, so that the insights of all members were best leveraged.²³⁶ The representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, suggested that capacity-building for incoming members to have a clearer understanding of what chairing subsidiary bodies of the Council entailed, should also help demystify penholdership arrangements and create linkages among penholders and co-penholders.²³⁷ Moreover, in order to promote transparency and the fair and equitable distribution of work, including penholders agreeing to co-penholdership arrangements

²³⁰ S/2021/990.

²³¹ See S/PV.8926. For more information, see part I, sect. 34.

²³² A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 June 2021 (S/2021/527).

²³³ See S/PV.8798 and S/2021/572.

²³⁴ See S/PV.8798 (China, Kenya (on behalf of the elected members of the Council) and Russian Federation); and S/2021/572 (Brazil, Italy, Kuwait, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council) and Republic of Korea).

²³⁵ See S/PV.8798.

²³⁶ See S/2021/572.

²³⁷ See S/PV.8798.

with elected members who had experience to contribute, the provisions of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 regarding the selection of the chairs of subsidiary bodies had to be implemented.

Regarding transparency in decision-making, the representative of Japan indicated that, to strengthen the legitimacy of Council decisions, the process should be as transparent as possible, allowing it to take into account the different views from both inside and outside the Council.²³⁸ The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, argued that Council members should pursue innovative ways to engage with affected countries to ensure their participation, in particular when making decisions, as well as with troop- and police-contributing countries, regional and subregional organizations. Without proper coordination with the main stakeholders, the full and effective implementation of the Council's decisions would not be possible. The delegation of Ukraine noted that such engagement with concerned countries and the wider membership could certainly make the responsibilities envisaged by such decisions much more feasible. The representatives of the Republic of Korea and Slovakia also called for more involvement of troop- and police-contributing countries in the Council's decision-making process.

Several speakers discussed the use of the veto power in the Council's decision-making, with some delegations calling for limitations or restraints in its use, including, as some delegations asserted, in cases of mass atrocities.²³⁹ The representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, noted that the Council was the only United Nations organ left behind in having a truly representative composition, with the use or threat of use of the veto continuing to prevent it from acting on vital topics.²⁴⁰ The representative of France, sharing the desire to reform the Council and its working methods in order to strengthen its legitimacy and effectiveness, reiterated his delegation's call on all other members, in particular the permanent members, to join the French and Mexican initiative for the voluntary and collective suspension of the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. The representative of Cuba stated that effective procedures were required to eliminate discriminatory practices and ensure genuine

participation and democratization in the Council's work and decision-making process, including the removal of the veto power.²⁴¹ The delegation of El Salvador, while recognizing the progress made in the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly, encouraged the Council to include an analysis of the decision-making process within the Council, as well as elements that further clarified the motivations that led permanent members to use the veto. The representative of New Zealand, on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, observed that the casting of or threat of casting a veto had a significant negative impact or "cascade effect" on the working methods of the Council, including whereby working methods were not applied uniformly, consistently and to the exclusion of elected members. The delegation of Ukraine indicated that the use of the veto remained one of the most divisive issues and that its repeated uses had stained the Council's reputation almost to a point beyond repair. The delegation pointed to a "clear lack" of implementation of both the spirit and the letter of Article 27 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations and posited that a Council member should not resort to the veto but must abstain from voting when it was a party to a conflict under consideration by the Council.

Conversely, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that the issue of the veto did not pertain to working methods but was rather the cornerstone of the entire architecture of the Council and key to achieving balance in its decisions and ensuring that those decisions had a good chance of being implemented as effectively as possible.²⁴² The representative of China opined that unity among the 15 members of the Council was a show of power and strength and the source of its authority. Noting the need to duly enhance communication, accommodate each other's concerns and prioritize consensus-based decision-making, he stressed the need to avoid resorting to a vote whenever a difference arose.

Noting the challenges in decision-making under the remote working methods adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, multiple delegations underscored the urgent need to ensure that the Council was able to take decisions on both substantive and procedural matters at its meetings.²⁴³ The representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the

²³⁸ See [S/2021/572](#).

²³⁹ See [S/PV.8798](#) (Kenya (on behalf of the elected members of the Council) and France); and [S/2021/572](#) (Colombia, El Salvador, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council), Republic of Korea and Ukraine).

²⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8798](#).

²⁴¹ See [S/2021/572](#).

²⁴² See [S/PV.8798](#).

²⁴³ See [S/2021/572](#) (Latvia, Liechtenstein, New Zealand (on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council) and Switzerland (on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group)).

Council, stated that videoconferences should be considered formal meetings of the Council, where the provisional rules of procedure applied and allowed for, inter alia, the possibility to vote in real time on procedural and substantive matters.²⁴⁴ The representative of the United Kingdom noted that, without the procedural mechanisms for the resolution of disagreements, the Council had, at times during the pandemic, not been able to discuss new or existing items more substantively or bring visibility and attention to issues in the open when needed. The representative of the United States stated that, because videoconferences were not actual meetings of the Council, the provisional rules of procedure did not apply and, as a result, the Council had, effectively, been unable to take any votes on procedural grounds for almost a year and a half, even when the vast majority of Council members might have supported the decision in question. The representative of Liechtenstein noted that the Council had been unable to hold procedural votes while absent from the Security Council Chamber and that, although the frequent use of the procedural vote was a signal of a dysfunctional Council, it could also be an important way to address divisions and thus ensure that the Council was fit for purpose.²⁴⁵ The representative of New Zealand, on

behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, recommended that the Council should return fully to the provisional rules of procedure as soon as possible, in order to allow procedural votes on the scheduling of meetings and the participation of briefers. In that connection, dialogue was encouraged among Council members with a view towards considering virtual Council meetings as formal meetings. On behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, the delegation of Switzerland noted that the Council's primary objective should be to enable all aspects of the work of the Council and its subsidiary organs to be carried out, in particular voting virtually and in real time on both substantive and procedural matters, in line with Article 27 of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure. According to the delegation of Brazil, some delegations had better resources than others for the use of virtual platforms, which generated or worsened inequalities in relation to following or participating in negotiating processes. The current practices should not be an excuse to create an environment in which many delegations would be unable to engage in substantive discussions or a decision-making process on the basis of a silence procedure of a few days, if not hours.

²⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8798](#).

²⁴⁵ See [S/2021/572](#).

X. Languages

Note

Section X covers rules 41 to 47 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, which relate to the official and working languages of the Council, interpretation and the languages of meeting records and published resolutions and decisions.

Rule 41

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be both the official and the working languages of the Security Council.

Rule 42

Speeches made in any of the six languages of the Security Council shall be interpreted into the other five languages.

Rule 43

[Deleted]

Rule 44

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the languages of the Security Council. In this case, he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of those languages. Interpretation into the other languages of the Security Council by the interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Rule 45

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the languages of the Council.

Rule 46

All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the languages of the Security Council.

Rule 47

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the languages of the Council.

During the period under review, rules 41 to 47 were applied consistently in meetings of the Council. In accordance with the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, Council members continued to use a remote interpretation platform for open videoconferences, while closed videoconferences were generally conducted only in English. At an open videoconference held on 14 April in connection with the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the Director of the South Sudan Women with Disabilities Network gave a briefing to Council members in sign language, with interpretation into the six languages of the Council, as provided under rule 44 of the provisional rules of procedure.²⁴⁶

Decisions

In a note by the President issued on 12 July, recalling chapter VIII of the provisional rules of procedure, and in an effort to enhance effectiveness, involvement and inclusivity during the Council’s discussions and strengthen the Council’s overall functioning, Council members reaffirmed their commitment to prioritizing multilingualism at all times.²⁴⁷

Communications

In the annual report of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict for 2021, transmitted in a letter dated 14 December from the Chair of the Working Group to the President of the Council, it was indicated that the lack of interpretation continued to be an issue within the Working Group, as it undermined multilingualism as a core value of the Organization.²⁴⁸ Despite efforts made by the Chair, Working Group members expressed regret that the issue was further accentuated in the virtual format and that no remote interpretation platform had been used.

²⁴⁶ See [S/2021/375](#). See also [S/2021/1084](#).

²⁴⁷ See [S/2021/648](#).

²⁴⁸ See [S/2021/1039](#), annex.

Meetings

At the meeting held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”,²⁴⁹ the representative of Kenya, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, encouraged Council members to agree that videoconferences were considered formal meetings of the Council, where the same provisional rules of procedure applied, including providing fully for multilingualism.²⁵⁰ He also urged that efforts be invested to ensure that interpretation was provided, including at closed meetings, for effective participation and in line with the promotion of multilingualism. The representative of France opined that multilingualism, as a fundamental value of the organization, had been undermined as the Council had adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic and had departed from its rules of procedure. He welcomed the fact that, with the return to the Security Council Chamber, the Council had resumed holding its public meetings and consultations in all the official languages. In a written statement submitted in connection with the meeting, the delegation of El Salvador requested that the reports of the Secretary-General to the Council be issued in the six official languages, so that there was sufficient time to consult them before the debates and meetings.²⁵¹

At a meeting held on 8 December under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”, the representative of Mexico, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, said that, on 5 May, the Committee had met in a virtual format with the representatives of Mali, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal for the purpose of discussing the implementation of the sanctions regime.²⁵² Despite the extraordinary circumstances imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, that had been the first virtual meeting of a subsidiary body of the Council that had been able to count on simultaneous interpretation and a double identity check, in accordance with the principle of multilingualism and respect for safety standards. He highlighted it as an estimable advance in terms of provisional working methods in the context of the pandemic.

²⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8798](#) and [S/2021/572](#).

²⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8798](#).

²⁵¹ See [S/2021/572](#).

²⁵² See [S/PV.8922](#).

XI. Status of the provisional rules of procedure

Note

Section XI covers the deliberations of the Council concerning its provisional rules of procedure. Article 30 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Since their adoption by the Council at its first meeting, held on 17 January 1946, the provisional rules of procedure have been amended 11 times, with the last amendment being adopted in 1982.²⁵³ On 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President providing that, in line with the efforts of the United Nations and its Member States to promote the advancement of women and greater gender inclusivity and equality in their policies and practices, the members of the Council confirmed that, as a matter of existing practice, any reference to a male person in the Council's provisional rules of procedure was deemed not to be limited to male persons and also constituted a reference to a female person, unless the context clearly indicated otherwise.²⁵⁴

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

During the period under review, the question of the status of the provisional rules of procedure, including in connection with Article 30 of the Charter, was raised at the meeting held on 16 June under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)".²⁵⁵ In her briefing to the Council, the co-author of the fourth edition of *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Loraine Sievers, noted that, in recent years, the rules

had been under the shadow of a misunderstanding because their title still retained the word "provisional", with the assumption that that meant "draft" and that the rules had therefore never been adopted, but rather existed as loose guidelines that could be set aside by Council members.²⁵⁶ Ms. Sievers recalled that the provisional rules of procedure had in fact been adopted at the Council's first meeting, and the retention of the word "provisional" in the title reflected the intention by Council members to revisit the outstanding issue of the extent to which the rules should spell out the voting arrangements set out in Article 27 of the Charter. Although the misunderstanding about the legal status of the rules could be set to rest if the Council were to agree to remove the word "provisional" from the title, attending to the issue of some rules that, over the years, had become outdated would require a thorough and potentially divisive review. It was therefore important to confirm that the rules that governed the conduct of official meetings were valid and could be applied and relied upon as currently written.

In a written statement submitted in connection with the same meeting, the representative of Cuba emphasized the need for the Council to adopt a definitive text to regulate its work and put an end to the "provisional" status that its rules of procedure had enjoyed for more than 70 years, as that was essential for transparency and the necessary accountability.²⁵⁷ The representative of the Republic of Korea echoed the need to formally adopt the current provisional rules of procedure.

As described in more detail in section I above, in accordance with the letters from the President of the Council dated 2 April and 7 May 2020,²⁵⁸ it was agreed that the presidencies would work "in the spirit" of the Council's provisional rules of procedure to ensure that Council members participating in a virtual Council discussion were represented by appropriately credentialed delegates, pursuant to rule 13 of the provisional rules of procedure; that the agenda was adopted at the outset of each videoconference, pursuant to rule 9; and that any other relevant rules were observed as a matter of practice, under Chapter VI of the provisional rules of procedure.

²⁵³ The provisional rules of procedure of the Council were amended five times during the Council's first year, at its 31st, 41st, 42nd, 44th and 48th meetings, held on 9 April, 16 and 17 May and 6 and 24 June 1946; twice in its second year, at its 138th and 222nd meetings, held on 4 June and 9 December 1947; and subsequently at its 468th meeting, on 28 February 1950; 1463rd meeting, on 24 January 1969; 1761st meeting, on 17 January 1974; and 2410th meeting, on 21 December 1982. The provisional rules were issued under the symbols S/96 and S/96/Add.1, with subsequent versions being issued as revisions, the latest of which was issued under the symbol S/96/Rev.7.

²⁵⁴ See S/2019/996.

²⁵⁵ See S/PV.8798 and S/2021/572.

²⁵⁶ See S/PV.8798.

²⁵⁷ See S/2021/572.

²⁵⁸ See S/2020/273 and S/2020/372.

Annex

A. Videoconferences held by the members of the Council

<i>Date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference format and record</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Other documents</i>
5 January 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/22		
6 January 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/24		
11 January 2021	Peace consolidation in West Africa	Open S/2021/43		
12 January 2021	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Open S/2021/48	S/PRST/2021/1	
13 January 2021	The situation in Mali	Open/closed S/2021/47		
14 January 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/56		
14 January 2021	Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001) , annex II, sections A and B – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Closed		
18 January 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Open S/2021/66		
20 January 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open S/2021/75		
21 January 2021	The situation in the Central African Republic	Open/closed S/2021/76		
21 January 2021	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	Open/closed S/2021/77		
25 January 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/90		
26 January 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Open S/2021/91		
28 January 2021	The situation in Libya	Open/closed S/2021/97		
29 January 2021	The situation in Cyprus	Open/adoption S/2021/99	Resolution 2561 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/96
29 January 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Open/adoption	S/PRST/2021/2	

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<i>Date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference format and record</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Other documents</i>
2 February 2021	The situation in Myanmar	Closed		
3 February 2021	Peace and consolidation in West Africa	Open/adoption	S/PRST/2021/3	
3 February 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/109		
9 February 2021	The situation in Libya	Open/adoption	S/PRST/2021/4	
10 February 2021	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Open S/2021/140		
11 February 2021	Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)	Open S/2021/159		
11 February 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/adoption S/2021/136	Resolution 2562 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/131
16 February 2021	The situation concerning Iraq	Open/closed S/2021/152		
17 February 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/157		
18 February 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/167		
22 February 2021	The situation in Somalia	Open/closed S/2021/173		
22 February 2021	The question concerning Haiti	Open/closed S/2021/174		
23 February 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/198		
24 February 2021	The situation in the Central African Republic	Open/closed S/2021/187		
25 February 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open S/2021/206		
25 February 2021	The situation in Somalia	Open S/2021/207		
25 February 2021	The situation in Somalia	Open/adoption S/2021/193	Resolution 2563 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/188
25 February 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/adoption S/2021/194	Resolution 2564 (2021) 14-0-1	S/2021/189
26 February 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Open/closed S/2021/218		

<i>Date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference format and record</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Other documents</i>
26 February 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open/adoption S/2021/204	Resolution 2565 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/195
2 March 2021	Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001) , annex II, sections A and B – United Nations Mission in South Sudan	Closed		
3 March 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/closed S/2021/219		
4 March 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/226		
5 March 2021	The situation in Myanmar	Closed		
9 March 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/closed S/2021/246		
10 March 2021	Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	Open S/2021/256		
10 March 2021	The situation in Myanmar	Open/adoption	S/PRST/2021/5	
11 March 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/250		
12 March 2021	The situation in the Central African Republic	Open/adoption S/2021/258	Resolution 2566 (2021) 14-0-1	S/2021/253
12 March 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/adoption S/2021/259	Resolution 2567 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/254
12 March 2021	The situation in Somalia	Open/adoption S/2021/260	Resolution 2568 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/255
12 March 2021	The situation in Libya	Open/adoption	S/PRST/2021/6	
15 March 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open S/2021/265		
16 March 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/266		
23 March 2021	The situation in Afghanistan	Open S/2021/291		
24 March 2021	The question concerning Haiti	Open/adoption	S/PRST/2021/7	
24 March 2021	The situation in Libya	Open/closed S/2021/292		
25 March 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Open S/2021/302		
25 March 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open S/2021/308		

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<i>Date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference format and record</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Other documents</i>
26 March 2021	Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Open/adoption S/2021/303	Resolution 2569 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/296
29 March 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open S/2021/315		
30 March 2021	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Open/closed S/2021/316		
30 March 2021	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Open S/2021/325		
31 March 2021	The situation in Myanmar	Closed		
6 April 2021	The situation in Mali	Open/closed S/2021/336		
6 April 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open S/2021/337		
8 April 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/346	S/PRST/2021/8	
12 April 2021	The situation in the Great Lakes region	Open/closed S/2021/351		
13 April 2021	Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998) , 1199 (1998) , 1203 (1998) , 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)	Open S/2021/370		
14 April 2021	Women and peace and security	Open S/2021/375		
15 April 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/372		
16 April 2021	The situation in Libya	Open/adoption S/2021/381	Resolution 2570 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/373
16 April 2021	The situation in Libya	Open/adoption S/2021/382	Resolution 2571 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/374
19 April 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Open S/2021/394	S/PRST/2021/9	
21 April 2021	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	Open/closed S/2021/401		
22 April 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Open S/2021/404		
22 April 2021	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Open/adoption S/2021/400	Resolution 2572 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/393

<i>Date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference format and record</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Other documents</i>
26 April 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/closed S/2021/408		
27 April 2021	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Open/adoption S/2021/410 S/2021/415	Resolution 2573 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/407
28 April 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/418		
30 April 2021	The situation in Myanmar	Closed		
4 May 2021	The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Open S/2021/436		
6 May 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open S/2021/446		
7 May 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/456		
10 May 2021	Threats to international peace and security	Open/closed S/2021/460		
11 May 2021	The situation concerning Iraq	Open S/2021/474		
11 May 2021	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	Open/adoption S/2021/457	Resolution 2574 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/449
11 May 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/adoption S/2021/458	Resolution 2575 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/450
12 May 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/465		
16 May 2021	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Open S/2021/480		
17 May 2021	The situation in Libya	Open S/2021/483		
18 May 2021	Peace and security in Africa	Open/closed S/2021/484		
19 May 2021	Peace and security in Africa	Open S/2021/490	S/PRST/2021/10	
20 May 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/closed S/2021/495		
21 May 2021	The situation in Libya	Open S/2021/498		
24 May 2021	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Open S/2021/501	S/PRST/2021/11	

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<i>Date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference format and record</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Other documents</i>
25 May 2021	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Open S/2021/505		
26 May 2021	The situation in the Middle East	Open/closed S/2021/506		
28 May 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Open/adoption S/2021/518	Resolution 2577 (2021) 13-0-2	S/2021/515
22 June 2021	The situation in Afghanistan	Open S/2021/601		
28 June 2021	Children and armed conflict	Open S/2021/617		
29 June 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/621		
9 August 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	Open S/2021/722	S/PRST/2021/15	
28 October 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Open S/2021/941	S/PRST/2021/21	
30 December 2021	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Open/adoption S/2021/1116	Resolution 2617 (2021) 15-0-0	S/2021/1107

B. Resolutions adopted by the Council through the written voting procedure

<i>Resolution and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Written record of voting procedure</i>	<i>Written record of voting outcome</i>
2561 (2021) 29 January 2021	The situation in Cyprus	S/2021/99	S/2021/96
2562 (2021) 11 February 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	S/2021/136	S/2021/131
2563 (2021) 25 February 2021	The situation in Somalia	S/2021/193	S/2021/188
2564 (2021) 25 February 2021	The situation in the Middle East	S/2021/194	S/2021/189
2565 (2021) 26 February 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/2021/204	S/2021/195
2566 (2021) 12 March 2021	The situation in the Central African Republic	S/2021/258	S/2021/253
2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	S/2021/259	S/2021/254
2568 (2021) 12 March 2021	The situation in Somalia	S/2021/260	S/2021/255

<i>Resolution and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Written record of voting procedure</i>	<i>Written record of voting outcome</i>
2569 (2021) 26 March 2021	Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	S/2021/303	S/2021/296
2570 (2021) 16 April 2021	The situation in Libya	S/2021/381	S/2021/373
2571 (2021) 16 April 2021	The situation in Libya	S/2021/382	S/2021/374
2572 (2021) 22 April 2021	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	S/2021/400	S/2021/393
2573 (2021) 27 April 2021	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	S/2021/410	S/2021/407
2574 (2021) 11 May 2021	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	S/2021/457	S/2021/449
2575 (2021) 11 May 2021	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	S/2021/458	S/2021/450
2577 (2021) 28 May 2021	The situation in Libya	S/2021/518	S/2021/515
2617 (2021) 30 December 2021	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	S/2021/1116	S/2021/1107

C. Statements by the President adopted through the written procedure

<i>Presidential statement and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>
S/PRST/2021/1 12 January 2021	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	S/2021/48
S/PRST/2021/2 29 January 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/2021/66
S/PRST/2021/3 3 February 2021	Peace consolidation in West Africa	
S/PRST/2021/4 9 February 2021	The situation in Libya	
S/PRST/2021/5 10 March 2021	The situation in Myanmar	
S/PRST/2021/6 12 March 2021	The situation in Libya	
S/PRST/2021/7 24 March 2021	The question concerning Haiti	
S/PRST/2021/8 8 April 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/2021/346

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2021

<i>Presidential statement and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>
S/PRST/2021/9 19 April 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/2021/394
S/PRST/2021/10 19 May 2021	Peace and security in Africa	S/2021/490
S/PRST/2021/11 24 May 2021	United Nations peacekeeping operations	S/2021/501
S/PRST/2021/15 9 August 2021	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/2021/722
S/PRST/2021/21 28 October 2021	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	S/2021/941

Part III

Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations

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Introductory note

Part III covers the consideration by the Security Council of Articles contained in Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, namely Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) and 2 (7). Part III consists of four sections. Section I features material relating to the principle of self-determination of peoples under Article 1 (2) of the Charter. Section II covers material relevant to the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of the use of force as enshrined in Article 2 (4). Section III deals with the obligation of States to refrain from assisting a target of the Council's enforcement action as stipulated in Article 2 (5). Section IV highlights the Council's consideration of the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States, as regulated by Article 2 (7).

In 2021, Council members and other participants in Council discussions continued to deliberate on the principle of self-determination in both thematic and country-specific contexts; however, none of the discussions held were of constitutional significance. Council members addressed the application and interpretation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States at meetings and open videoconferences on cybersecurity, peace operations conducted by regional organizations, and developments in eastern Ukraine and in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. They also discussed the obligation of States to refrain from giving assistance to any State or non-State actor against which the United Nations was taking preventive or enforcement action pursuant to Article 2 (5) in connection with the situations in Libya and Yemen, as well as in the context of preventing the financing of terrorism and preventing the illegal flow of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, Council members reflected on the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) during their consideration of the situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, as well as during the discussions on technology and peacekeeping.

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decision containing explicit references to Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) or 2 (7) of the Charter. Nonetheless, part III includes Council decisions featuring language relating to the principles enshrined in those Articles. In addition, it includes explicit invocations of Articles 1 (2), 2 (4) and 2 (7) found in the correspondence addressed to the Council during the period under review.

I. Principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples under Article 1, paragraph 2

Article 1, paragraph 2

[The Purposes of the United Nations are:]

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

Note

Section I concerns the practice of the Council regarding the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enshrined in Article 1 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A features decisions relevant to the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2). Subsection B describes the references

made to the principle of self-determination in Council discussions during the reporting period. Subsection C sets out instances in which the principle of self-determination was invoked in communications addressed to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 1 (2) of the Charter in its decisions. However, language found in one Council decision, adopted in connection with the envisaged referendum in Western Sahara, is of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 1 (2) (see table 1).

Table 1

Decisions containing implicit references to Article 1 (2)

Decision and date	Provision
The situation concerning Western Sahara	
Resolution 2602 (2021) 29 October	Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (seventh preambular paragraph) Calls upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and notes the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (para. 4)

B. Discussion relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, Article 1 (2) of the Charter was not explicitly invoked in deliberations at meetings of the Council or in open videoconferences. Nevertheless, the principle of self-determination was addressed by Council members in the context of both thematic and country-specific discussions, as elaborated upon below.

During an open videoconference held on 6 January in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, with a focus on the challenges of maintaining peace

and security in fragile contexts,¹ the delegation of Azerbaijan, in a statement made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, relayed the Movement’s commitment to supporting and promoting the purposes and principles of the Charter and the principles and norms of international law, including the right to self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation and colonial or alien domination. The representative of Pakistan underscored that foreign occupation, intervention and aggression had led to the untold suffering of millions in the Muslim world and

¹ See [S/2021/24](#).

that many Muslim peoples, such as the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir and Palestine, continued to fight for their inalienable right to self-determination and the end of foreign occupation.

During an open videoconference held on 12 January in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,² the representative of Azerbaijan, speaking again on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, underscored the Movement’s opposition to attempts to equate terrorism with the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination and national liberation in order to prolong the occupation and oppression of innocent people with impunity. The representative of Libya reiterated the country’s condemnation and categorical rejection of terrorism in all its forms and regardless of its source or motivation and emphasized that an equivalence should not be drawn between terrorism and the struggle of peoples for independence and self-determination. The representative of Malaysia highlighted his delegation’s continued belief in the need to conclude the comprehensive convention on international terrorism and stressed that the draft convention must include a definition of terrorism that was all-encompassing to cover acts committed by States and non-State actors alike. In that connection, he emphasized that a distinction must be made between terrorism and the legitimate struggle of people under foreign occupation for self-determination, stressing that terrorism should not be associated with any beliefs, ethnic group or nationality.

During an open videoconference held on 19 April in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”,³ the representative of Armenia, referring to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, stated that the consolidated engagement of the internationally mandated format of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group co-chairmanship was paramount to a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of that conflict on the basis of the principles and elements developed over the years, including the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. At the same videoconference, the representative of Liechtenstein noted that conflicts relating to self-determination had accounted for around 50 per cent of armed conflicts since the 1960s, and underlined the clear necessity of addressing questions of self-determination as a potential source of conflict. He added that paying attention

to upholding the human rights of minority groups, finding appropriate forms of self-governance within a State and ensuring the engagement of relevant communities in preventing conflict in an inclusive manner were all ways in which the international community could help to address that highly prevalent, but often politically sensitive, aspect of conflict. He emphasized the importance of early engagement and dialogue by regional and subregional organizations in that regard. The representative of Pakistan recalled that, in General Assembly resolution 75/16, the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation had been requested to continue to cooperate in their common search for solutions to global problems, such as questions relating to international peace and security, disarmament and self-determination.

In a written statement submitted in connection with the meeting of the Council held on 12 October in connection with the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, with a focus on diversity, State-building and the search for peace,⁴ the representative of Liechtenstein stated that the majority of Council situations began as intercommunal tensions with roots in ethnic, racial, regional, partisan and religious differences. He underlined that communities within a country, in particular those that were in a minority within a State, must be able to benefit from governance arrangements that allowed them to flourish and that were in line with international human rights standards. His country saw the process of seeking out governance arrangements as an extension of the right of self-determination, expressed internally within a State. Applied in such a manner, expressions of self-determination could include self-governance, autonomy and devolution arrangements within a State, and as a preventive measure, with the aim of preventing internal tensions over questions of governance from developing into violent conflict. By applying a “self-determination lens” to the causes of and solutions to conflict, the United Nations could significantly strengthen its conflict prevention and resolution architecture.

Concerning country- and region-specific items, Council members often discussed the principle of self-determination. At an open videoconference held on 23 March in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”,⁵ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran said that any proposed peace plan must be realistic, comprehensive and balanced and must preserve and be built upon the past achievements of the people and Government of Afghanistan, particularly the present Constitution, the right of the people to self-determination through elections, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and of women, and the commitment to combat

² See [S/2021/48](#).

³ See [S/2021/394](#).

⁴ See [S/2021/868](#). See also [S/PV.8877](#).

⁵ See [S/2021/291](#).

terrorism. At an open videoconference held on 22 June in connection with the same item,⁶ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that preserving the past achievements of the people and Government of Afghanistan, including the Constitution, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and women, the right to self-determination of people through elections, governance system and structures derived from the Constitution, as well as the commitment to combat terrorism, must be one of the main elements of any peace process.

In addition, and consistent with past practice, Council members, other Member and observer States and entities continued to address and/or reaffirm the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people at meetings and open videoconferences held throughout the year in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.⁷ Council members also referred to the principle of self-determination in connection with the situation concerning Western Sahara and the adoption of resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#) on 29 October, in which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.⁸

⁶ See [S/2021/601](#).

⁷ See [S/2021/91](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, United Kingdom, Argentina, Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Bangladesh, Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Cuba, European Union, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia and Namibia); [S/2021/218](#) (France, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia); [S/2021/404](#) (Tunisia, Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Bangladesh, Cuba, European Union, Islamic Republic of Iran, League of Arab States, Malaysia, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Saudi Arabia and Syrian Arab Republic); [S/2021/480](#) (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad, Bangladesh, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syrian Arab Republic and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela); [S/PV.8826](#) (Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine); [S/2021/685](#) (Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Bangladesh, Senegal on behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Cuba, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Oman on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Syrian Arab Republic and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela); [S/PV.8883](#) (Permanent Observer of the Observer State of Palestine) and Niger; and [S/2021/884](#) (Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Cuba, Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Oman on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Pakistan and Qatar).

⁸ See [S/PV.8890](#) (Mexico, Russian Federation, Viet Nam and Kenya).

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2) in communications

During the period under review, one explicit reference to Article 1 of the Charter was made in a letter from the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the President of the Council in relation to the principle of self-determination enshrined in Article 1 (2).⁹ In the letter, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela emphasized that the use of structures of transnational organized crime and mercenary forces for perpetrating acts of terrorism and assassinating Heads of State and Government, overthrowing Governments and undermining the constitutional basis of States constituted a clear violation of the Charter, which established as one of its purposes, in Article 1, the development of “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.

In 2021, the principle of self-determination was invoked in numerous communications addressed to or brought to the attention of the Council, including communications from Member States relating to Western Sahara,¹⁰ the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,¹¹ Nagorno-Karabakh¹² and the India-Pakistan question.¹³ Furthermore, in an exchange of letters between the representatives of Algeria and Morocco, dated 16 and 19 July, respectively, both addressed to the President of the Council, references were made to the right of self-determination of the Kabyle people¹⁴ and the people of the chimeric republic.¹⁵ Moreover, in his reports to the Council regarding the mission of good offices in Cyprus,¹⁶ the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine¹⁷ and the situation concerning Western Sahara,¹⁸ the Secretary-

⁹ See [S/2021/688](#).

¹⁰ See [S/2021/162](#), annex; [S/2021/475](#), annex; [S/2021/698](#), annex; [S/2021/741](#), annex; [S/2021/903](#), annex; [S/2021/978](#), annex; [S/2021/979](#), annex; [S/2021/980](#), annex; and [S/2021/981](#), annex.

¹¹ See [S/2021/74](#); [S/2021/137](#), annex; [S/2021/280](#); [S/2021/285](#), enclosure; [S/2021/342](#); [S/2021/366](#); [S/2021/403](#); [S/2021/430](#); [S/2021/479](#); [S/2021/529](#); [S/2021/574](#); [S/2021/639](#); [S/2021/665](#); [S/2021/678](#); [S/2021/810](#), enclosure; [S/2021/829](#); [S/2021/904](#); [S/2021/928](#); [S/2021/1021](#); and [S/2021/1067](#).

¹² See [S/2021/30](#), annex; [S/2021/190](#), annex; [S/2021/205](#), annex I; [S/2021/269](#); [S/2021/440](#), annex; [S/2021/478](#), annex; [S/2021/671](#), annex; [S/2021/734](#), annex; [S/2021/834](#), annex; and [S/2021/962](#), annex.

¹³ See [S/2021/102](#), annex; [S/2021/575](#), annex; [S/2021/697](#), annex; [S/2021/901](#), annex; and [S/2021/1004](#), annex.

¹⁴ See [S/2021/664](#), annex, and [S/2021/666](#), annex.

¹⁵ See [S/2021/666](#), annex.

¹⁶ See [S/2021/634](#), annex II.

¹⁷ See [S/2021/749](#) and [S/2021/1047](#).

¹⁸ See [S/2021/843](#).

General made reference to the principle of self-determination. In addition, a reference to self-determination was made in the Chair's summary of the open Arria-formula meeting held on 12 March on the

situation in Crimea,¹⁹ transmitted to the President of the Council in a letter dated 22 April from the representative of the Russian Federation.

¹⁹ See [S/2021/397](#), annex.

II. Prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2, paragraph 4

Article 2, paragraph 4

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Council concerning the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A includes implicit references to Article 2 (4) in decisions adopted by the Council. Subsection B highlights discussions relating to the threat or use of force. Subsection C features explicit references to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4) in communications to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decision containing explicit references to

Article 2 (4) of the Charter. In a number of its decisions, however, the Council underlined the principles of Article 2 (4) by: (a) reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations; (b) reiterating the importance of good-neighbourliness and non-interference by States in the internal affairs of others; (c) calling for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security; and (d) calling upon parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area or occupied territories. The four themes are covered below.

Affirmation of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

In 2021, the Council stressed the prohibition of the threat or use of force against other Member States through a few of its decisions, in particular concerning the future status of Abyei and the situation in the Middle East (see table 2).

Table 2

Decisions affirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	
Resolution 2609 (2021) 15 December 2021	Reiterating that the territorial boundaries of States shall not be altered by force, and that any territorial disputes shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means, affirming the priority it attaches to the full and urgent implementation of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, and underscoring that the future status of Abyei shall be resolved by negotiations between the parties in a manner consistent with the Agreement and not by the unilateral actions of either party, and recalling prior agreements on the administration and security of the Abyei Area (third preambular paragraph)

Decision and date Provision

The situation in the Middle East

Resolution [2581 \(2021\)](#)
29 June 2021 Stressing that both parties must abide by the terms of the disengagement of forces agreement of 31 May 1974 between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire (third preambular paragraph)

See also resolution [2613 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph

Stresses the obligation on both parties to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the disengagement of forces agreement of 31 May 1974, calls upon the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation, encourages the parties to take full advantage of the liaison function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force regularly to address issues of mutual concern, as appropriate, and to maintain their liaison with the Force to prevent any escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line, as well as to support the enhancement of the Force's liaison function, and underscores that there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation, including military operations by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (para. 2)

See also resolution [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 2

Reiteration of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

During the period under review, the Council reiterated in several of its decisions the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4) of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation with regard to the situations in the Central African Republic, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes Region, Libya, South Sudan and the Sudan (see table 3). Furthermore, the Council consistently reaffirmed, in many of its decisions concerning country-specific situations, its respect for or commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of States.

Table 3

Decisions affirming the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

Decision and date Provision

The situation in the Central African Republic

Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#)
12 November 2021 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)

The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Resolution [2582 \(2021\)](#)
29 June 2021 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as all States in the region, and emphasizing the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)

See also resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph

The situation in the Great Lakes Region

[S/PRST/2021/19](#)
20 October 2021 The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all States in the region and emphasizes the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (last paragraph)

The situation in Libya

Resolution 2570 (2021)
16 April 2021

Recalling the commitment of the participants of the Berlin Conference to refrain from interference in the armed conflict or in the internal affairs of Libya and their call upon international actors to do the same (fifth preambular paragraph)

Recalls its decision that all Member States shall comply with the arms embargo, demands full compliance including by all Member States with the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by subsequent resolutions, including by ceasing all support for and withdrawing all armed mercenary personnel, and demands all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict (para. 13)

Resolution 2571 (2021)
16 April 2021

Calls for full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo, further calls upon all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict and reiterates that individuals and entities determined by the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), including the arms embargo, or assisted others in doing so, are subject to designation (para. 5)

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution 2567 (2021)
12 March 2021

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of South Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)

Resolution 2609 (2021)
15 December 2021

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)

Calls for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security

During the period under review, the Council adopted decisions in which it called upon States to

refrain from or prevent the provision of any form of support or assistance to armed groups, including through the financing of their activities, in relation to the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya (see table 4).

Table 4

Decisions calling for cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security

The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Resolution 2612 (2021)
20 December 2021

Notes that the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups requires an integrated regional approach and strong political engagement by the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to further seize on the positive regional momentum, in close coordination with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, underscores that there can be no purely military solutions to these problems, welcomes the establishment of a contact and coordination group to oversee the technical implementation of non-military measures for the neutralization of foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, bearing in mind the need to address the root causes of conflict, including the illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, and to put an end to recurring cycles of violence, as outlined in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, reaffirms that the Framework remains an essential mechanism to achieve durable peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, recalls the

Decision and date	Provision
	commitments undertaken by the region under the Framework not to tolerate or provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups, urges the signatory States, with the support of the Framework guarantors, to strengthen their collaboration in addressing appropriately and holistically the threat of all remaining foreign armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the illicit flow of weapons in the region, fully supports the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region in fulfilling his mandate to address the remaining challenges in implementation of the Framework and to promote peace and stability in the region, including through good offices, coordinated strategies and shared information with the Mission, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and other United Nations entities, and stresses the need for coordination and cooperation between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other national authorities, United Nations entities, civil society organizations and development actors to build and sustain peace, stabilize, improve the security situation and assist in restoration of State authority (para. 14)
The situation in Libya	
S/PRST/2021/4 9 February 2021	The Security Council urges Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay (fifth paragraph)
S/PRST/2021/6 12 March 2021	The Council calls upon all parties to implement the ceasefire agreement in full and urges Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay (sixth paragraph)
Resolution 2570 (2021) 16 April 2021	Calls upon all Libyan parties to ensure full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement and strongly urges all Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay (para. 12) Recalls its decision that all Member States shall comply with the arms embargo, demands full compliance including by all Member States with the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by subsequent resolutions, including by ceasing all support for and withdrawing all armed mercenary personnel, and demands all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict (para. 13)
Resolution 2571 (2021) 16 April 2021	Recalling that providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural resources in Libya may constitute acts that threaten the peace, stability and security of Libya (eighth preambular paragraph) Further reiterating its concern about activities which could damage the integrity and unity of Libyan State financial institutions and the National Oil Corporation, and stressing the need for the unification of Libya's institutions, and, in this regard, calling upon Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions outside of the authority of the Government of Libya (ninth preambular paragraph) Calls for full compliance by all Member States with the arms embargo, further calls upon all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict and reiterates that individuals and entities determined by the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), including the arms embargo, or assisted others in doing so, are subject to designation (para. 5) Calls upon all parties to implement the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement (S/2020/1043) in full and urges Member States to respect and support the full implementation of the agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without further delay (para. 6)
S/PRST/2021/12 15 July 2021	The Council strongly urges all Member States, all Libyan parties and all relevant actors to respect and support the full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay. The Council recalls

[S/PRST/2021/24](#)
24 November 2021

the role of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya in supporting the implementation of the Libyan ceasefire and that the Mission is requested to support the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism including through the swift, scalable and incremental deployment of Mission ceasefire monitors once conditions allow (tenth paragraph)

The Council emphasizes the importance of the implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay. In that regard, the Council welcomes the Action Plan agreed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Geneva on 8 October 2021 and calls upon all relevant actors to facilitate its synchronized, phased, gradual and balanced implementation. The Council therefore strongly urges all Member States, all Libyan parties and all relevant actors to respect and support the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the Action Plan including through the prompt development of timelines and a plan to monitor and verify the presence and withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries (ninth paragraph)

Calls upon parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area or occupied territories

During the period under review and consistent with past practice, the Council urged the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar, located on the border between Israel and Lebanon.²⁰

B. Discussion relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, Article 2 (4) of the Charter was explicitly invoked seven times during four open videoconferences held by Council members and three Council meetings. References to this provision were made in connection with country- and region-specific as well as thematic items.

In connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, at an open videoconference held on 26 January,²¹ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in response to the statement by the representative of Israel in connection with the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran reserved its inherent right to self-defence and to vigorously respond to any threat, including those made that day by the Israeli regime’s representative, in clear violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, requiring the Council to hold that regime accountable for such threats. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran made additional references to Article 2 (4) in written statements submitted in connection with Council

meetings held on 28 July²² and 19 October under the same item. Regarding the meeting held on 28 July, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran made reference to the “continued destabilizing measures and military adventurism of the Israeli regime” in the Middle East region, clear examples of which were the continued occupation of the Syrian Golan and parts of Lebanon, as well as the systematic violation of the sovereignty of those two countries in contravention of international law, in particular Article 2 (4). In connection with the meeting held on 19 October,²³ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that the accusations of Israel regarding “Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, whose peaceful nature [had] been verified on numerous occasions by the International Atomic Energy Agency”, were completely absurd, irrelevant and baseless. He added that the representative of Israel had explicitly threatened to use force against a State Member of the United Nations. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran further emphasized that that illegal threat constituted a gross violation of international law and the Charter, particularly its Article 2 (4), and must therefore be denounced and condemned by the Council.

In connection with the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”, at an open videoconference held on 16 February,²⁴ the representative of Mexico took note of the latest report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2522 \(2020\)](#)²⁵ and reiterated his country’s concern about the abuse of invocations of Article 51 of the Charter in the context of the fight against terrorism. He stated that the practice ran the risk of de facto broadening the exceptions to the general prohibition of the

²⁰ Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 19.

²¹ See [S/2021/91](#).

²² See [S/2021/685](#). See also [S/PV.8826](#).

²³ See [S/2021/884](#). See also [S/PV.8883](#).

²⁴ See [S/2021/152](#).

²⁵ [S/2021/120](#).

use of force, as contained in Article 2 (4), adding that such a practice was an irregularity that should not be accepted. Articulating a similar position, at a meeting held on 23 November under the same item,²⁶ the representative of Mexico reiterated his country's deep concern over the abuse of the invocation of Article 51 and stated that the practice was an aberration that undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

Concerning the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East", with a focus on Syria, at an open videoconference held on 15 March,²⁷ the representative of Mexico reiterated his country's concern about certain States abusively invoking Article 51 of the Charter to justify the use of force without the authorization of the Council. He underscored that such practice ran the risk of de facto increasing exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force, as contained in Article 2 (4).

In connection with the item entitled "Protection of civilians in armed conflict", at an open videoconference held on 25 May,²⁸ the representative of Pakistan emphasized that counter-terrorism measures did not justify setting aside the limitations of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter on the non-use of force. He added that Council resolutions on counter-terrorism did not authorize the use of force on the territory of other States without the Council's express authorization, neither did they justify compromising the requirement for proportionality in the use of force.

In addition, Article 2 of the Charter was referred to more broadly at two meetings held by the Council in 2021. Firstly, in a written statement submitted in connection with a meeting held on 12 October under the item entitled "Peacebuilding and sustaining peace",²⁹ the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Somalia underscored that it was vital that all Member States abide by international law and adhere to Article 2, namely, the core principles of sovereign equality of States and non-interference, the prohibition on the threat or use of force and the obligation to settle international disputes peacefully in preserving international peace and security. Secondly, at a meeting held on 9 December in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security",³⁰ the representative of Sri Lanka said that international legal analysis tended to focus on the principles of the Charter set out in Article 2, including

the principles applicable to the United Nations of sovereign equality and non-intervention and the duties of States, primarily the obligation to settle disputes peacefully and the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force.

In addition to the explicit references highlighted above, in 2021, Council members and other delegations discussed issues relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (4) of the Charter in relation to the situation in Ukraine in connection with the item entitled "Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)"³¹ (see case 1) and at several of its meetings held in connection with the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa" concerning developments in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (see case 2). In addition, and consistent with previous years, language that may be considered of relevance for the application and/or interpretation of Article 2 (4) was used in open videoconferences and meetings held in connection with the situations in Iraq, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic regarding respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in their internal affairs and the withdrawal of foreign forces from their territories.³²

³¹ See S/2021/159.

³² See, for example, in connection with the item entitled "The situation concerning Iraq", S/2021/152 (France, Estonia, China, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), S/PV.8842 (United States, Viet Nam, Russian Federation, Norway, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Kenya, China, Tunisia, India and Iraq) and S/PV.8910 (India, Viet Nam, China, Russian Federation, Kenya, Tunisia, Mexico and Iraq); in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East", S/2021/418 (China, India, Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, Islamic Republic of Iran and Syrian Arab Republic), S/PV.8866 (Russian Federation, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Niger and Islamic Republic of Iran), and S/PV.8888 (Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Mexico, Tunisia, Niger, Syrian Arab Republic and Islamic Republic of Iran); and in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Libya", S/2021/498 (Estonia, India, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Libya), S/PV.8855 (Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, United Kingdom, Niger, Tunisia, France, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, India, United States, Viet Nam, Kenya, Ireland and Libya) and S/PV.8912 (United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Niger, Ireland, Tunisia, United States, China, India, Estonia, Kenya and Libya).

²⁶ See S/PV.8910.

²⁷ See S/2021/265.

²⁸ See S/2021/505. For more information, see part VII, sect. IV, case 7.

²⁹ See S/2021/868. See also S/PV.8877.

³⁰ See S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1).

Concerning thematic items, Council members and other delegations addressed the need for regional organizations to respect the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter, particularly the prohibition of the use of force, at an open videoconference held on 19 April in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” (see case 3). During a high-level open videoconference held on 29 June in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, Council members and other delegations discussed the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and non-interference in internal affairs of other States in the context of cybersecurity (see case 4).

Other discussions of relevance for the interpretation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter were held in connection with various items on the Council’s agenda. Those discussions were focused on a variety of elements such as the importance of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in the fight against terrorism;³³ the prohibition of the threat or the use of force and the sovereign equality of its Member States in the context of multilateralism;³⁴ the prohibition of the use or threat of the use of force, respect for sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs in the context of maritime security;³⁵ and the threat of the use of force and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States in the context of exclusion, inequality and conflict.³⁶ At several other Council meetings and open videoconferences of a thematic

nature, reference was made to language that may be deemed of relevance for the application and interpretation of Article 2 (4).³⁷

Case 1

Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

On 11 February, Security Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the situation in eastern Ukraine.³⁸ During the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Chairperson-in-Office and the Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission. Some Council members condemned the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine³⁹ and/or the occupation or annexation of Ukrainian territories.⁴⁰ Several speakers expressed support for or underlined the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States,⁴¹ including Ukraine specifically.⁴²

The representative of France stated that France and Germany, as members of the Normandy Four,⁴³ were fully committed to the realization of a just and lasting peace and the restoration of full Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas.⁴⁴

³³ In connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, see [S/2021/48](#) (Viet Nam, Cuba, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia).

³⁴ In connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, see [S/2021/456](#) (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Secretary of State of the United States, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam and Foreign Secretary of India).

³⁵ In connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, see [S/2021/722](#) (President of the Russian Federation, Prime Minister of Viet Nam, United States, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, Cyprus, Islamic Republic of Iran and Ukraine).

³⁶ In connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, see [S/PV.8900](#) (President of Mexico, Russian Federation, China and Peru).

³⁷ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, [S/2021/24](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Russian Federation, Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Latvia, Pakistan, South Africa and Ukraine) and [S/2021/66](#) (Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, China, Russian Federation and United Kingdom); and in connection with the item entitled “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”, [S/2021/256](#) (Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, India, Kenya, Niger, Tunisia and United States).

³⁸ See [S/2021/159](#).

³⁹ Norway and United States.

⁴⁰ Estonia, Norway and United States.

⁴¹ China and Tunisia.

⁴² Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, China, Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.

⁴³ The Normandy Four (also known as the Normandy format) consists of the representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. For more information, see part I, sect. 19.

⁴⁴ See [S/2021/159](#).

The representative of the United States emphasized that, over the previous year, the Russian Federation had stepped up its efforts to destabilize Ukraine and undermine its sovereignty, adding that the United States would never recognize the attempted annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. The representative of China opposed any external interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, and the delegation of Tunisia similarly reiterated its stance based on the non-intervention in the affairs of States.

Some participants commented specifically on the need for the withdrawal of foreign forces and weapons from parts of Ukraine. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Russian Federation must withdraw its military personnel and weapons from the territory of Ukraine, adding that it was the objective of the Russian Federation to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In that regard, the representative of Estonia, who condemned the occupation of certain territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, expressed regret that the Russian Federation had neither acknowledged nor reversed its actions and had instead continued to violate the fundamental principles of international law, in particular the Charter and a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the Minsk agreements and the conclusions of the Paris summit, particularly regarding the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The representatives of Estonia, Norway and the United Kingdom all urged the Russian Federation to stop providing financial and military support to the armed formations that it backed. The representatives of Estonia and Norway also expressed concern about the presence of Russian military equipment and personnel in the non-Government-controlled areas of Ukraine. The representative of Norway explicitly condemned “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine” and called upon the Russian Federation to reverse its illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The representative of the United States, stressing that the Russian Federation must immediately cease “its aggression in eastern Ukraine and end its occupation of Crimea”, called upon the country to withdraw its forces from Ukraine and cease its support for its proxies and other armed groups. The representative of Tunisia called for the comprehensive and permanent ceasefire to be honoured, heavy weapons to be withdrawn and the Minsk agreements to be implemented fully. The representative of Germany pointed out that Russian heavy weapons had not been withdrawn from the line of command and control, in violation of the Minsk agreements, and further indicated that Russian forces remained in eastern Ukraine.

The Head of the Delegation of Ukraine to the Trilateral Contact Group recalled that, at the initiative of the Delegation, a plan of joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Minsk arrangement and containing practical proposals aimed at ending the conflict had been presented to the Group. However, the number of ceasefire violations by Russian illegal armed groups had increased significantly in January and February. He added that obstruction and blocking were becoming almost the norm for the Russian delegation in the Group and that the negotiation process was taking place against the backdrop of the “harsh reality of Russia’s ongoing aggression”. He further noted the common practice of the “illegal crossing of the non-controlled segment of the border by Russian cargo and road convoys”, which delivered weapons, ammunition and personnel to the temporarily occupied territory.

The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that, instead of implementing the Minsk arrangements, Kyiv kept “spinning tales of ongoing Russian aggression” and that Ukraine blamed “everything on that”. He added that no one had cared to provide a “shred of proof of this so-called aggression”.

Case 2

Peace and security in Africa

In 2021, the Security Council met several times to address the situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia at meetings held in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.

On 2 July, during her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed Council members about the announcement, on 28 June, of the Government of Ethiopia of a unilateral ceasefire in Tigray, citing the need to address the humanitarian crisis in the region.⁴⁵ As the Tigray Defence Forces had yet to agree to a ceasefire, she called upon them to endorse the unilateral ceasefire immediately and completely, and further called for the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Tigray, underscoring that the neighbours of Ethiopia could play a constructive role in supporting the country’s transition while respecting its sovereignty.

During the discussion, several Council members similarly called for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia,⁴⁶ and for the withdrawal of the Eritrean forces from Ethiopia.⁴⁷ The representative of

⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8812](#).

⁴⁶ Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), India and France.

⁴⁷ United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, Estonia, Norway and France.

the United States warned that further fighting posed a risk to the integrity of the Ethiopian State and to the stability of the entire region. A meaningful ceasefire deal would affirm the complete withdrawal of Eritrean troops and Amhara regional forces and that neither the internal nor the external borders of Ethiopia would be changed by force. The representative of Viet Nam said that the conflict and situation in Tigray had had certain impacts on the region that required the relevant parties to exercise self-restraint, adding that, under the circumstances, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States should always be upheld. The representative of Norway called upon neighbouring States to refrain from aggravating the situation, stressing in particular that the continued presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray was a threat to regional peace and security and must end. The representative of France called upon all parties to act responsibly by expressing without delay their commitment to a permanent cessation of hostilities and all forms of violence against the population and emphasized that the Eritrean forces must immediately leave Ethiopian territory, in accordance with the request made by Ethiopian authorities.

On 26 August, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General, who reported on the spreading military confrontation in the Tigray region and its political, economic and humanitarian consequences.⁴⁸ The Secretary-General stressed that all parties must recognize that there was no military solution and called upon foreign forces to leave the country. Many Council members addressed the need for foreign forces to cease interference in Ethiopia and withdraw from its territories. In that regard, the representative of Estonia called upon the Government of Ethiopia to request the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Tigray to ensure unfettered humanitarian access to the region and restore basic services. The representative of the United States pointed out that the Eritrean defence forces had re-entered Tigray. He further recalled reports of military alliances among armed groups in other regions, which risked sparking a wider war in Ethiopia and were eroding the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ethiopian State. Other Council members similarly called upon Eritrea to withdraw its forces from the Ethiopian territory.⁴⁹ The representatives of Ireland and Mexico called upon external or non-Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Ethiopia.

The representative of China said that his country opposed interference by external forces in the internal affairs of Ethiopia in the name of human rights and humanitarianism, expressing support for the African

Union and the countries in the region in resolving African issues in an African way. The representative of Ethiopia asserted his country's sovereign integrity as an ancient, independent African country and underscored how harmful the "saviour mentality" that sought to undermine the sovereign right and responsibility of States for their own security and the well-being of their people had proved to be in many instances, while expressing hope that the right lessons had been learned.

Case 3 Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 19 April, Security Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security".⁵⁰

Some participants⁵¹ focused their interventions on the prohibition of the use or the threat of force. In that regard, the State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China underlined that it was necessary to strive to resolve disputes peacefully whenever possible and to reject the wilful imposition of sanctions and the threat or use of force. The representative of Armenia underscored that strengthening the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations was key to addressing challenges to security, such as the threat or use of force in the face of destabilizing military build-up in violation of legally binding commitments in the field of arms control and involving foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries in conflicts.

Other participants recalled more broadly the importance of adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter, including the respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and/or the prohibition of the threat or use of force. Some discussed the aforementioned principles as they related to specific situations, including the representative of Azerbaijan, who recalled the condemnation in Council resolutions of the use of force against Azerbaijan, the reaffirmation of respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory; the delegation of Georgia,

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8843](#).

⁴⁹ France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia).

⁵⁰ See [S/2021/394](#).

⁵¹ State President of Viet Nam, President of Estonia, China, Islamic Republic of Iran and Philippines.

in relation to the ongoing illegal military aggression by the Russian Federation and subsequent occupation of certain regions of Georgia, as well as the occupation and annexation of integral parts of the sovereign territories of Ukraine; the representative of Estonia, regarding the threats of the use of military force in connection with the increased military build-up by the Russian Federation along the Ukraine border and in occupied Crimea; and the delegation of Ukraine in connection with the violation by the Russian Federation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and the illegal occupation of Ukraine's Crimea and parts of Donbas.

Case 4 **Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 29 June, Security Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, with a focus on cybersecurity.⁵²

During the videoconference, many participants addressed the applicability of the prohibition of the use and threat of force and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other States to cyberspace activities. In that regard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam, expressing support for an international framework that set out rules and norms of responsible behaviour in cyberspace, emphasized that activities in cyberspace had to comply with the principles of the Charter and international law, in particular, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of States, and non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The representative of China highlighted the need to promote security by maintaining peace and preventing cyberspace from becoming a new battlefield and abiding by the purposes and principles of the Charter, in particular the principles of sovereign equality, prohibition of the use of force, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful settlement of disputes. Countries should refrain from undertaking cyberactivities that endangered the security of other countries. The representative of Tunisia underlined the applicability of international law in addressing the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) by States and stressed in that regard the importance of respecting the principles enshrined in the Charter, including the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The delegation of Chile similarly submitted

that international law, and in particular the Charter, was applicable and essential to maintain peace and stability and promote an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful information and communications technology environment. Together with the specific principles of the Charter, in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prohibition of resorting to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, non-intervention in internal affairs of other States and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, were as indivisible in the physical as in the digital domains. The delegation of Austria emphasized that the fundamental provisions of the Charter should guide all States in their conduct in cyberspace. In particular, States were obliged to adhere to the prohibition of the use of force as the core pillar of the international security regime. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines encouraged all actors in the international community to comply, in cyberspace, with their international legal obligations including the respect of sovereignty and political independence as enshrined in the Charter. The Ambassador for United Nations Affairs and Cyber Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan said that States must not violate the sovereignty of another State by cyberoperations nor intervene in matters within domestic jurisdiction of another State by cyberoperations.

Several participants expressed concerns regarding the use of cyberspace by some States to commit acts of aggression or other acts that challenged the sovereignty of other States or interfered in their internal affairs. The Prime Minister of the Niger pointed out that the digital revolution, which had “brought us so close together by eliminating our borders”, had also opened the way to new challenges to sovereignty owing to the extraterritorial nature of laws relating to it. The delegation of Egypt indicated that, under international law and the Charter, all Member States should refrain from any act that knowingly or intentionally damaged or otherwise impaired the use and operation of the critical infrastructure of other States as well as interfering in their internal affairs. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran pointed out that cyberspace could be used to commit acts of aggression, breaches of the peace or the threat or use of force, to intervene in matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, to violate the sovereignty of States or to coerce other States. States must refrain from the threat or use of force within or through the cyberspace environment and refrain from, and prevent, the abuse of cyberspace-related supply chains developed under their control and jurisdiction to

⁵² See [S/2021/621](#).

create or assist in the development of vulnerability in products, services and maintenance compromising the sovereignty and data protection of other States. The representative of the Russian Federation said that some countries were seeking to justify unilateral pressure and sanctions against other Member States and the possible use of force against them, by distorting agreements, including on the international legal aspects of the use of ICT. It was of grave concern that several technologically advanced States were actively pursuing the militarization of the information space by promoting the concept of “preventive military cyberstrikes”, including against critical infrastructure.

The delegation of Georgia stated that cyberspace was a powerful tool for hybrid warfare and interference in the internal affairs of States, and the delegation of Ukraine similarly noted that cyberoperations against critical infrastructure and governmental agencies were a widely used method of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, including Ukraine. The delegation of Georgia accused the Russian Federation of waging hybrid warfare against Georgia and trying to undermine its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The delegation of Ukraine added that the Russian Federation used advanced technologies to achieve its own political and geopolitical objectives, namely by supporting and exacerbating conflicts in neighbouring States and conducting aggressive information wars.

Some participants deliberated on the importance of adhering to the prohibition of the use of force vis-à-vis the applicability of international law and international humanitarian law in cyberspace. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway and the delegation of Czechia underscored that the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace and ICTs did not legitimize cyberwarfare or promote the militarization of cyberspace, respectively. The delegation of Czechia stated that, on the contrary, international humanitarian law placed limits on the use of force by requiring all used means and methods of warfare in the context of armed conflict to be employed in accordance with its rules, including the principles of humanity and distinction and the rule of proportionality. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway added that any use of force by States remained governed by the Charter and the relevant rules of customary international law, and he affirmed that international disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains. Stressing that no sphere could remain outside the spectrum of international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, the representative of Ecuador underscored that this did

not mean that the militarization of cyberspace would be acceptable. The Charter prohibited the use of force, and therefore all international disputes in cyberspace should be settled by peaceful means. The delegation of the European Union emphasized that, while the European Union and its member States were of the view that international humanitarian law was fully applicable in cyberspace in the context of armed conflict, its application in cyberspace should not be misunderstood as legitimizing any use of force inconsistent with the Charter.

The International Committee of the Red Cross recalled that States had affirmed that international law applied in the ICT environment, comprising, first and foremost, the obligations of States under the Charter, in particular the prohibition of the use of force and the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means. The Committee expressed support for the view that cyberoperations during armed conflict were not happening in a “legal void” or “grey zone” but were instead subject to the established principles and rules of international humanitarian law. The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that, while the digital sphere was not unregulated, the debate as to how exactly international law could be applied to it was far from over. He recalled that the initial list of rules on responsible conduct of States in the information space had been enshrined in the resolution concerning international information security adopted by the General Assembly in 2018. He said it was unfortunate that “Western colleagues” were attempting to pick out from that list the provisions that were of the greatest benefit to them while incorrectly interpreting the applicability of international law in the digital sphere as being “automatic”, which would permit the use of force therein, and presenting their national views as though they were the product of global consensus. The representative of Pakistan stated that the Charter was unequivocal in its categorical upholding of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs of other States. While those principles should serve as a guiding star when navigating the complexities of cybergovernance, the extent, scope and nature of the applicability of international law and its interpretation in the conduct of States and their use of ICT required careful consideration.

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4) in communications

In 2021, 12 communications from Member States addressed to or brought to the attention of the Council included explicit references to Article 2 (4) of the Charter (see table 5). In addition, three communications

from Member States addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated as documents of the Council

made reference to the use of force in violation of Article 2 in relation to the situation in Cyprus.⁵³

⁵³ See [S/2021/511](#), [S/2021/718](#) and [S/2021/914](#).

Table 5

Communications addressed to the Council containing explicit references to Article 2 (4) of the Charter

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Relevant extract</i>
S/2021/72	Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	Recalling the continued threats by the Israeli regime against my country, including the recent provocative statement by the Defense Minister of that regime “to have a military option on the table”, which are in clear breach of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council must compel that regime to put an end to such unlawful threats and stop all its military adventurism and destabilizing policies and practices in the region. Yet, in conformity with its inherent right to self-defence, the Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to protect its people and vital interests, and to respond decisively to any threat or use of force against its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
S/2021/103	Letter dated 1 February 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	These threats are in gross violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations and, given the dark history of this regime in attacking regional countries, necessitate an appropriate response from the international community.
S/2021/141	Identical letters dated 12 February 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	The responsibility of the occupying power derives from international humanitarian law, which has long defined the rules on occupation, complemented by the human rights law binding any state exercising effective control over a territory. The overarching principle is that the occupying power has an obligation to ensure the well-being of the population. In full disregard for international law including in violation of the principle of non-interference by States in the internal affairs of others (Article 2 (4) of the Charter), the Russian Federation as the power exercising effective control over the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, has intensified steps towards their factual annexation, seeking full incorporation of these territories into its military, political and economic systems. The Russian Federation, as the occupying power has clear obligation to protect the local population of the occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia and bears full responsibility for violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms therein.
S/2021/223	Identical letters dated 4 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	Syria categorically rejects the attempts by the United States to justify its act of aggression on the basis of a unilateral and selective interpretation of Article 51, one that distorts the meaning and expands the scope of that Article. Syria would like to point out that Article 51 was drafted with deliberate care and includes restrictions that must be respected, in order to ensure that its provisions are not manipulated, misconstrued or interpreted in an overly broad manner and exploited to carry out acts of aggression under the pretext of self-defence, as that would spread chaos and ignite wars around the world. Syria would also like to point that the relevant general

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Relevant extract</i>
		principle and foundation of international law is found in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. It would furthermore like to point out that no sanction to use force in Syria can be found in the relevant Council resolutions, and that Iraq did not request that force should be used in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, it should be remembered that Iraq has denied that the American air strike was carried out in collaboration or coordination with it. That denial clearly refutes the claims made by the Permanent Representative of the United States that her country had carried out its attack in response to a request for assistance in addressing the terrorist threat posed by certain militias.
S/2021/623	Letter dated 2 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects the extremely arbitrary interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations by the United States in justification of its unlawful military strike, on 27 June 2021, against two locations in Syria and one location in Iraq. Iran condemns, in the strongest terms, such unlawful acts, which violate the sovereignty of two regional countries. The argument of the United States that such attacks were conducted to “deter” the Islamic Republic of Iran and the so-called “Iran-backed militia groups” from conducting or supporting further attacks on United States personnel or facilities has no factual or legal ground, as it is founded on mere fabrication as well as arbitrary interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The attacks by the United States are conducted in flagrant violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (4) of the Charter.
S/2021/706	Letter dated 4 August 2021 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	In view of the very recent provocative statements by the Israeli regime’s officials threatening to use force in gross violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, that regime must be reminded that it shall bear the consequences of all its possible adventurism and miscalculations. Warning about such threats from any source, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not hesitate to take all measures necessary to vigorously protect its people, defend its sovereignty and secure its national interests.
S/2021/758	Letter dated 27 August 2021 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	Moreover, the aforementioned explicit threats against a Member State of the United Nations constitute gross violations of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly its Article 2 (4), and therefore must not be tolerated by the international community and the Council.
S/2021/794	Letter dated 14 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	These statements constitute clear manifestations of explicit threats to conduct nuclear terrorism against the peaceful nuclear programme of a State Member of the United Nations, constituting gross violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, particularly its Article 2 (4). This is also a violation of Council resolution 2231 (2015) .

Symbol	Title	Relevant extract
S/2021/816	Letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	Turkey's new unlawful actions aiming at hindering Cyprus from exercising its legitimate rights constitute yet another severe violation of the sovereign rights of Cyprus under international law: both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and customary international law. The position of Cyprus regarding its rights to maritime zones is reflected in my previous letters addressed to you and circulated as documents of the General Assembly and of the Council. Moreover, the aforementioned Turkish conduct constitutes a threat of use of force, in breach of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations.
S/2021/872	Letter dated 13 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	Such systematic explicit and public threats by the Israeli regime against a founding member of the United Nations constitute flagrant violations of international law, particularly Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations.
S/2021/951	Letter dated 15 November 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	Yet, emboldened as a result of the inaction by the Council to hold it accountable for all its expansionist and destabilizing policies and unlawful acts committed in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, particularly its Article 2 (4), the Israeli regime's leaders have continued to explicitly threaten to use force against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its peaceful nuclear programme.
S/2021/1059	Letter dated 16 December 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	This is part of systematic public threats made by the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the number and severity of which have reached an alarming level in the year 2021. This and other threats of the Israeli regime constitute gross violations of international law, particularly Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations.

III. Obligation under Article 2, paragraph 5, to refrain from assisting the target of enforcement action

Article 2, paragraph 5

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Council with regard to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (5) of the Charter, in particular, the obligation of Member States to refrain from providing assistance to a State against which the United Nations has taken preventive

or enforcement action.⁵⁴ Subsection A features implicit references made to Article 2 (5) in the decisions of the Council, and subsection B features discussions held by the Council which may be considered relevant to the interpretation of Article 2 (5). Communications addressed to the Council in 2021 did not contain any references to Article 2 (5).

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (5)

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 2 (5) in its decisions. The Council, however, included language that may be

⁵⁴ For the practice of the Council relating to assistance by Member States to United Nations action in accordance with the Charter, see part V, sect. II (Article 25), and part VII, sects. V–VI (Articles 43, 45 and 48).

considered of relevance for the interpretation of Article 2 (5) in decisions concerning the situations in Libya,⁵⁵ Somalia⁵⁶ and South Sudan,⁵⁷ as well as in connection with the prevention of terrorism.⁵⁸

B. Discussion relating to Article 2 (5)

In 2021, Article 2 (5) was not explicitly invoked in the meetings or open videoconferences of the Council. However, implicit references that may be considered of relevance for the interpretation of Article 2 (5) were made in several meetings and open videoconferences of the Council during the period under review.

Regarding thematic items, in statements submitted for an open videoconference held on 12 January in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, with a focus on international cooperation in combating terrorism 20 years after the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001),⁵⁹ Member States recalled the obligation of States to refrain from providing any form of support, actively or passively, including through financing, to entities and individuals involved in terrorism and terrorist acts.

In addition, at a meeting held on 6 October in connection with the item entitled “Small arms”,⁶⁰ the representative of China emphasized that all countries should strictly implement the Council resolutions on arms embargoes and refrain from the transfer or sale of arms to countries subject to Council embargoes. He underlined that countries should make every effort to prevent the flow of small arms and light weapons into illegal channels and effectively shoulder the responsibility of controlling the flow of small arms and light weapons within their borders. The representative of India noted the increase in the volume and quality of the small arms arsenal acquired by terrorist organizations, indicating that they could not exist without the sponsorship or support of States.

Concerning region- and country-specific items, at open videoconferences and meetings held in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Libya” in 2021, Council members continued to stress the need to cease or refrain from all actions in violation of the arms embargo, including the provision of military support inconsistent with the embargo.⁶¹

At an open videoconference held on 18 February in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,⁶² the representative of Mexico noted the substantial increase in arms transfers to the Middle East region in recent years, stressing that the uncontrolled flow of those weapons had fuelled the violence in Yemen. Referring to the reports of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), which had consistently shown clear evidence of violations of the arms embargo and the use of increasingly sophisticated weapons and delivery systems, he urged exporting countries to seriously consider the dire consequences for the civilian population of such arms transfers, the end users of which were largely responsible for the humanitarian tragedy in Yemen. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines called upon members to cease the transfer of weapons to parties within Yemen, whether directly or through proxies or third parties, and stressed the need for other forms of assistance that enabled attacks on the different sides to stop.

On 14 December, in a meeting held in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,⁶³ the representative of the United States, condemning the intensification of Houthi cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia in preceding months, said that such provocative acts underscored the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran to end its lethal support to the Houthis, which contravened Council resolutions and enabled the reckless attacks by the Houthis. The representative of Yemen said that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to protract the war and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by violating relevant Council resolutions and the arms embargo and providing the Houthi militias with arms and military expertise, as well as various kinds of missiles, most recently Iranian weapons intercepted on their way to the Houthi militias.

⁵⁵ Resolution 2571 (2021), para. 9.

⁵⁶ Resolution 2607 (2021), paras. 9 and 20.

⁵⁷ Resolutions 2567 (2021), para. 16, and 2577 (2021), para. 7.

⁵⁸ S/PRST/2021/1, ninth paragraph, and resolutions 2610 (2021), thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-ninth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth and forty-fourth preambular paragraphs and paras. 13, 24 and 28, and 2617 (2021), sixteenth preambular paragraph and para. 28.

⁵⁹ See S/2021/48 (Prime Minister of Azerbaijan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Myanmar and Turkey).

⁶⁰ See S/PV.8874.

⁶¹ See, for example, S/2021/498 (Estonia, Niger, United Kingdom and United States); S/PV.8855 (United States); and S/PV.8911 (United States).

⁶² See S/2021/167.

⁶³ See S/PV.8929.

IV. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of States by the United Nations under Article 2, paragraph 7

Article 2, paragraph 7

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in relation to the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United

Nations. Subsection A features references to that Article in the decisions of the Council. Subsection B covers the deliberations of the Council touching upon the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7). Subsection C features references to Article 2 (7) in communications brought to the attention of the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (7)

In 2021, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 2 (7) in its decisions. Nonetheless, language used in some Council decisions under country- and region- specific as well as thematic items may be considered of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) (see table 6).

Table 6

Decisions containing implicit references to Article 2 (7), by region and country

Decision and date	Provision
Peace and security in Africa	
S/PRST/2021/10 19 May 2021	The Security Council recognizes that there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development, and that the work of the entities of the United Nations development system, in accordance with their respective mandates, through their support for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, including in Africa, contributes to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa, when reducing people's needs, addressing risks for development programming and fostering resilience, at the request of those countries and in accordance with their national ownership, plans and priorities (fifteenth paragraph)
The situation in the Great Lakes Region	
S/PRST/2021/19 20 October 2021	The Council recognizes the important role that the United Nations can play in helping the States concerned, as appropriate, upon their request and with full respect for their sovereignty over natural resources, to prevent illegal access to and trade in natural resources and to lay the basis for their legal utilization and trade with a view to promoting sustainable development, in particular through building the capacity of governments in post-conflict situations to manage their resources lawfully, transparently and sustainably. In this regard, the Council encourages the continued efforts of United Nations organizations, in accordance with their mandates, and acting in close cooperation with the regional and subregional organizations, in supporting the resource-endowed countries to transform the entire natural resource extraction continuum from illegal exploitation into a legal productive use of natural resources in order to provide legal socioeconomic opportunities with a view to contributing to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (eleventh paragraph)
The situation concerning Iraq	
Resolution 2576 (2021) 27 May 2021	Decides further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, taking into account the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Iraq to the Council on 11 February (S/2021/135), shall: ...

Decision and date	Provision
	(a) Provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations team, with additional staff, in advance of the forthcoming election in Iraq, to monitor election day with as broad a geographic coverage as possible, to continue to assist with the election, in a manner that respects Iraqi sovereignty, and report to the Secretary-General on the election process (para. 2 (a)) Requests further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2021/135), shall: ... (d) promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, in order to strengthen the rule of law and improve governance in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant established in resolution 2379 (2017) (para. 4 (d))
The situation in Libya	
S/PRST/2021/4 9 February 2021	The Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process and to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya (last paragraph) <i>See also S/PRST/2021/6 (last paragraph)</i>
S/PRST/2021/12 15 July 2021	The Council welcomes the Second Berlin Conference convened on 23 June 2021, the Conference Conclusions (S/2021/595) and the commitment of the participants to the United Nations-facilitated, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process and the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya. The Council welcomes the inclusion of Libya as a member of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya (first paragraph)
The situation in Mali	
Resolution 2584 (2021) 29 June 2021	Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, emphasizing that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability, security and protection of civilians throughout the territory of Mali, urging the Malian authorities to uphold their efforts to meet their obligations in that regard and expressing great concern at the violent and unilateral actions taken by non-State actors hampering the return of State authority and basic social services (second preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2590 (2021) 30 August 2021	Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, emphasizing that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and underscoring the importance of achieving national ownership of peace- and security-related initiatives (second preambular paragraph)
The situation in the Middle East	
Resolution 2591 (2021) 30 August 2021	Further requests the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), to take temporary and special measures, which should not be considered as a precedent in the future, to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support for a limited period of six months, within existing resources and without implications for the increase of the budget level, in the framework of the joint activities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Force and in compliance with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, and without prejudice to the mandate and its implementation, the concept of operations and rules of engagement of the Force, while fully respecting Lebanese sovereignty and at the request of the Lebanese authorities, and that such support be subject to appropriate and immediate oversight and scrutiny (para. 11)

Decision and date

Provision

Urges all parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the Force in all its operations and the access of the Force to the Blue Line in all its parts is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, condemns in the strongest terms all attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of Force personnel and all attacks on Force personnel and equipment as well as acts of harassment and intimidation of Force personnel; calls upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access of the Force to sites requested by the Force for the purpose of swift investigation, including all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line which the Force reported as a violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty (para. 16)

The situation in Somalia

Resolution [2563 \(2021\)](#)
25 February 2021 Decides to authorize the States members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia until 14 March 2021, authorizes the African Union Mission to take all necessary measures in full compliance with the obligations of participating States under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate, as set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 of its resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#) (para. 1)

Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#)
12 March 2021 Also decides that the African Union Mission in Somalia shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with the obligations of participating States under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate (para. 11)

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#)
3 June 2021 Decides that the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, as part of an integrated and unified United Nations structure, shall, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, continue to have the following strategic objectives (para. 3)

Peace consolidation in West Africa

[S/PRST/2021/3](#)
3 February 2021 The Council calls for continued national, regional and international engagement in cooperation with the countries of the region in an effort to prevent and address the peace and security challenges they face while reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries in West Africa and the Sahel. It recognizes that responsible and credible mediation by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel requires, inter alia, national ownership, the consent of the parties to a particular dispute or conflict, and respect for national sovereignty, as set out in General Assembly resolution [70/304](#) (fourth paragraph)

[S/PRST/2021/16](#)
17 August 2021 The Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the briefing held on 8 July by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, Annadif Khatir Mahamat Saleh, and expresses full support to the Special Representative in carrying out his mandate, including in his capacity as Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission. The Council recognizes that responsible and credible mediation by UNOWAS requires, inter alia, national ownership, the consent of the parties to a particular dispute or conflict, and respect for national sovereignty, as set out in General Assembly resolution [70/304](#) (first paragraph)

The Council recalls the importance of political dialogue and consensus building on key national priorities among all stakeholders as a means to achieve sustainable reconciliation. While reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all States in the region and emphasizing the need to respect fully the principle of non-interference, the Council stresses that good governance is critical for long-term peace and stability in West Africa and the Sahel. It commends the recent democratic transition in Niger and the reconciliation efforts in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo and encourages the continued pursuit of these dialogues. It further commends the good offices role provided by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel in supporting democratic practices and the leadership of the Economic Community of West African States in mediation in the region (tenth paragraph)

Table 7

Decisions containing implicit references to Article 2 (7), by thematic issue

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Maintenance of international peace and security	
S/PRST/2021/22 9 November 2021	The Security Council recognizes that there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development and that the work of the entities of the United Nations development system, in accordance with their respective mandates, through their support for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, contributes to peacebuilding and sustaining peace at the request of those countries and in accordance with their national ownership, plans and priorities (seventh paragraph)
S/PRST/2021/23 16 November 2021	The Council further recognizes the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission in supporting peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries with respect for national ownership and the countries' national priorities as an important addition to the capacity of the international community in the broad peacebuilding agenda in accordance with its mandate (eleventh paragraph)
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	
S/PRST/2021/1 12 January 2021	The Council reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and stresses that Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism (sixth paragraph)
Resolution 2617 (2021) 30 December 2021	Stressing that Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism (ninth preambular paragraph) Directs the Counter-Terrorism Committee, with the support of the Executive Directorate, to determine on an annual basis a list of Member States that the Executive Directorate should request consent to visit for the purpose of conducting assessments, and underscores that the composition of the list should take a risk-based approach that acknowledges existing gaps, emerging issues, trends, events and analysis, while also taking into account prior requests by Member States and consent previously expressed, as well as the fact that a number of Member States have never been visited, and underscores further that the Committee, with the support of the Executive Directorate, may decide, after the adoption of the list, on changes to its composition, as necessary, emphasizing transparency in planning for visits, including by making available its country visit schedule in advance of such visits, and producing ensuing reports (para. 12) Requests the Counter-Terrorism Committee to report, through its Chair, at least once per year to the Council on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with the reports by the Chairs of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and taking into account its efforts to strengthen coordination with other United Nations bodies, facilitate provision of consent from Member States for country visits and reports, and improve implementation of recommendations, and how its assessments and analytical work has contributed towards improvements in Member States' counter-terrorism efforts, and expresses its intention to hold informal consultations at least once a year on the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (para. 18)

B. Discussion relating to Article 2 (7)

During the period under review, Article 2 (7) was not explicitly invoked in the Council's deliberations. Nonetheless, during several meetings and open videoconferences, Council members discussed the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the domestic affairs of States enshrined in Article 2 (7).

Concerning country- or region-specific items, the Council addressed matters relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) at several meetings held in connection with the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa" (see case 5). In addition, Council members and other Member States addressed the role of the United Nations vis-à-vis the sovereignty of Iraq, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic, in discussions

in connection with the items entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”,⁶⁴ “The situation in Somalia”⁶⁵ and “The situation in the Middle East”, respectively.⁶⁶

Concerning thematic items, the Council discussed the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) regarding the use of new technologies in peacekeeping (see case 6). In addition, Council members addressed issues relevant for the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) in the context of the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian assistance at its meetings and open videoconferences held in connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”.⁶⁷ Council members also addressed the need for the United Nations to respect the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and the political independence and national priorities of States when coordinating peacebuilding activities in connection with the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”,⁶⁸ and in the context of preventive diplomacy in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.⁶⁹

Case 5 **Peace and security in Africa**

In 2021, the Security Council met several times to address the situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia at meetings held in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. On 2 July, during her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed Council members about the announcement by the Federal Government of Ethiopia on 28 June of a unilateral ceasefire in Tigray, citing the need to address the humanitarian crisis in the region.⁷⁰ The Under-Secretary-General offered the full expertise and support of the United Nations, including assistance to domestically driven, inclusive and comprehensive mediation and dialogue processes, and

expressed readiness to extend all the means of support at the disposal of the United Nations to help put the country back on track.

During the discussion, some Council members addressed the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) as it related to the potential involvement by the Council in the dispute. In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that politicizing the issue was unacceptable and that the situation in Tigray must remain an internal affair of Ethiopia. He added that interference by the Council in resolving the issue would be counterproductive. The representative of Viet Nam, stressing the need for compromise to be made towards a comprehensive solution for the sustained stability and development of Ethiopia, on the basis of the principles of international law and the Charter, underscored that the international community, including the Council, should support all efforts to that end, in full respect of the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. He also emphasized that, under the circumstances, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means should always be upheld. The representative of China indicated that the Tigray issue was by and large an internal affair of Ethiopia and stressed the need for the international community to respect the sovereignty of Ethiopia when providing humanitarian assistance. He further noted that, when dealing with that issue, the Council should carefully and prudently calibrate the timing and approach taken to ensure that its action contributed to improving the situation in Tigray, rather than having the opposite effect. Speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Council as well as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of Kenya reiterated their call for the Council to take careful and responsible actions that would encourage humanitarian outreach to suffering people and not to imperil the situation in Tigray. He also restated that the Council should allow Africa the space to resolve its challenges with the support of the international community and that the debate should encourage and support African solutions, meaning, in that instance, Ethiopian solutions starting in the order of the ceasefire, humanitarian delivery, dialogue, reconciliation and responsibility. He reaffirmed the respect for and commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia and emphasized that Africa would not agree at that time or in the future for the debate in the Council to be turned into a platform that undermined the people and State of Ethiopia. The representative of Ethiopia encouraged Council members to play a constructive role in supporting the Government of Ethiopia in the implementation of the

⁶⁴ See, for example, [S/2021/152](#) (France, India, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Iraq).

⁶⁵ See, for example, [S/PV.8779](#) (Russian Federation, Viet Nam and China).

⁶⁶ See, for example, [S/PV.8803](#) (India, China and Islamic Republic of Iran).

⁶⁷ See [S/2021/505](#) (President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, China, India, United Kingdom, Brazil and Ethiopia); and [S/PV.8822](#) (India, Viet Nam, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Russian Federation).

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8877](#) (Viet Nam). See also [S/2021/868](#) (Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran and Morocco).

⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8906](#) (China, Niger, Viet Nam, Russian Federation and Islamic Republic of Iran).

⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8812](#).

humanitarian ceasefire, while also noting that political pressure against Ethiopia was unacceptable and in violation of basic tenets of international law.

On 6 October, the Council held another meeting held in connection with the item, during which the Secretary-General gave a briefing on the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Ethiopia as well as on the United Nations engagement in providing humanitarian support in various regions of the country.⁷¹ Recalling that all efforts should be squarely focused on saving lives and avoiding a massive human tragedy, he found disturbing the announcement of the decision by the Government of Ethiopia to expel seven senior United Nations officials, most of them humanitarian staff. The Secretary-General assured the Council that the United Nations would continue to play its mandated role and work with the Government of Ethiopia and with local and international partners to support millions of people in need of humanitarian assistance in Tigray, Amhara and Afar and across the country, in full accordance with the Charter and General Assembly resolution [46/182](#).

During the discussion, several Council members⁷² expressed concern and disappointment regarding the decision by the Government of Ethiopia to expel United Nations staff from the country. Some Council members deliberated on the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in the context of the provision of humanitarian assistance. In that regard, the representative of China underscored that the international community should continue to provide assistance to Ethiopia while respecting the country's sovereignty and ownership. The representative of the Russian Federation, expressing regret concerning the decision by the Government of Ethiopia to expel United Nations officials, insisted that humanitarian assistance be provided fully in line with General Assembly resolution [46/182](#) and the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, as well as international law and national legislation. She stressed the vital need for credible and constructive dialogue and close cooperation with the sovereign Ethiopian authorities, which continued to cover the lion's share of all humanitarian needs in Tigray and in neighbouring regions.

Speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Council as well as Saint Vincent and the

Grenadines, the representative of Tunisia underlined the obligation of all humanitarian, United Nations and associated personnel to observe and respect the laws of the country in which they were operating, including the principle of non-interference. He further stressed the importance of humanitarian organizations upholding the core principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity in their humanitarian activities, in full respect of the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the host State, in accordance with the Charter. Nevertheless, the representative highlighted the risks of a large-scale famine, which, to a great extent, was being prevented by the aid delivered by the organizations to which the expelled individuals belonged. He added that, even within their sovereign rights, Governments should observe their domestic and international humanitarian law obligations and that the rights of the Ethiopian people to receive aid in the dire emergency were of the highest moral and legal character. The representative of Mexico, noting with concern the claims made by the Government of Ethiopia that had led to the expulsion of the United Nations officials, said that his country was convinced that the United Nations humanitarian operations were at all times guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence set out in General Assembly resolution [46/182](#). He underscored, however, that when a State or a party to a conflict consented and agreed to the provision of certain humanitarian assistance, the latter could not be subject to discretionary decisions. On the basis of that consent, the parties concerned must allow and facilitate unrestricted access for humanitarian assistance.

With respect to the involvement of the Council in the dispute, the representative of Viet Nam called upon the Ethiopian authorities and all other concerned parties to give the highest priority to the interests of their people. The international community, including the Council, should support all efforts to that end, in full respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed certainty that pressure involving the Council and threats regarding the adoption of resolutions were counterproductive. The representative of Ethiopia said that he was surprised at the convening of the Council meeting and that his country found it incomprehensible that the Council was discussing the decision of a sovereign State, which had been exercised within the domain of international law and its sovereign prerogative. The Government of Ethiopia was not under any legal obligation to provide justifications or explanations for its decisions. Citing General Assembly resolution [46/182](#), which provided that the sovereignty, territorial

⁷¹ See [S/PV.8875](#).

⁷² Ireland, Estonia, France, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, Tunisia (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), India, Viet Nam, Mexico and Russian Federation.

integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter, he emphasized that the most fundamental element of the sovereignty of States had to do with their prerogative to determine who entered, remained in and exited their territory. When appealing for support from, or to work with, the United Nations or other humanitarian operators, Ethiopia did not forgo that fundamental right.

Case 6 United Nations peacekeeping operations

On 18 August, at the initiative of India, which held the presidency for the month,⁷³ the Security Council held an open debate under the entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and the sub-item entitled “Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping”.⁷⁴ During the meeting, Council members deliberated on questions of relevance to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7).

Some participants addressed the importance of respect for the sovereignty of States and non-intervention in their internal affairs by peacekeeping missions. In that regard, the representative of China emphasized that the use of new technologies in peacekeeping operations should respect the sovereignty and will of host countries. While using technology of all kinds to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, peacekeeping missions should conduct prior consultations with host countries to ensure that the relevant technology was used in full respect for their sovereignty, upheld the purposes and principles of the Charter, including non-interference in their internal affairs, and followed the guiding principles of peacekeeping. The representative of Viet Nam encouraged Member States to continue to engage in dialogue and cooperation, including through engagement with the Secretariat, the Council and other relevant United Nations forums in order to find effective measures for the use of existing and new technology in peacekeeping while respecting the principles of peacekeeping, international law and the sovereignty of States.

The delegation of Guatemala noted that technology must be implemented by peacekeeping missions in part according to the principles of peacekeeping operations, namely, consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except for self-defence and/or defence of the mandate. The

delegation of South Africa recognized the efficacy of peacekeeping intelligence utility in the protection of civilians and enjoined the United Nations to seek the collaboration and consent of host States when undertaking such sensitive activities. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran underscored that special attention must be paid to the full respect for the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of all States and non-intervention in matters that were essentially within their domestic jurisdiction, as well as impartiality, the consent of the parties, and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The use of modern technologies should be aimed at increasing the safety and security of United Nations personnel, including peacekeepers. At the same time, their use must be considered on a case-by-case basis and must uphold the principles enshrined in the Charter, particularly the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, and also the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, especially the consent of the host State. Noting that technology should help peacekeeping missions to deliver on their mandate, measure performance and foster accountability for peacekeeping, the delegation of Rwanda similarly stressed that this should be in full respect of the host nation’s sovereignty. The delegation of Brazil, citing as an example the use of uncrewed aircraft by all stakeholders, stated that the use of new technologies must be the object of careful regulation, scrutiny and oversight to avoid the creation of situations that the deployment of peacekeeping operations sought to circumvent in the first place, including violations of national sovereignty and failure to respect the provisions of the Charter.

Some delegations focused on the use of modern technologies by peacekeeping missions to collect, store and access data. On that note, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that the introduction and use of information and digital technologies by peacekeepers must not undermine the sovereignty of the host State or its neighbours or violate the privacy of its citizens.⁷⁵ He stressed that the issue was particularly sensitive with regard to the United Nations – an organization with a unique reputation for justice and impartiality, and whose main task was to selflessly help those most in need. In a similar vein, the delegation of Fiji stated that the collection, use and protection of data in peacekeeping was a sensitive issue owing to the multinational nature of United Nations peacekeeping and that it could impinge on host country sovereignty.⁷⁶ Guidelines would need to be established and

⁷³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 26 July (S/2021/681).

⁷⁴ See S/PV.8838. See also S/2021/732.

⁷⁵ See S/PV.8838.

⁷⁶ See S/2021/732.

adhered to, by field missions and all peacekeepers, regarding the collection and protection of data. The delegation underlined that data collection in peace operations should only be used for peacekeeping purposes, with its use, protection and disposal conforming to international laws and norms and host country guidelines. The delegation of Pakistan asserted that using technology to collect, store and access data had always invoked certain sensitivities and concerns, adding that a responsible use of technology, which respected national sovereignty and addressed confidentiality concerns, could expedite the integration of cutting-edge solutions in peace operations. The delegation therefore recommended that the United Nations system explore the options for establishing an inclusive framework for the governance of new technologies, including in the peacekeeping domain. The representative of Kenya underscored the need to gain and maintain the trust of host nations by ensuring that the

information collected using modern technology was utilized only to protect the United Nations mandate, its personnel and installations, as well as civilians, and he indicated that the Council should emphasize the responsible use of technology by avoiding unnecessary deployments and ensuring strict adherence to the principles of impartiality and neutrality.⁷⁷

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7) in communications

In 2021, six communications brought to the attention of the Council included explicit references to Article 2 (7) of the Charter (see table 8).

⁷⁷ See [S/PV.8838](#).

Table 8

Communications addressed to the Council containing explicit references to Article 2 (7) of the Charter

Symbol	Title	Relevant extract
S/2021/209	Letter dated 19 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	To request the relevant organs of the United Nations to include the question of Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Arab States on their respective agendas, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of States.
S/2021/285	Identical letters dated 22 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	To request the Group of Arab States in New York to take the necessary action to transmit the present resolution to the competent United Nations bodies and have it issued as a document of the United Nations, and to request that they include the question on their respective agendas, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of States.
S/2021/352	Letter dated 13 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	In that resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been falsely accused of interfering in the internal affairs of certain Arab States, while the resolution is replete with several cases of interference in Iranian domestic affairs and thus is in gross violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations.
S/2021/417	Letter dated 30 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	Like similar resolutions adopted at previous meetings of the League of Arab States, this resolution contains series of disinformation and false accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran. We condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this Iranophobic campaign and all allegations, including on the so-called violation by Iran of Security Council resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015) . The resolution also includes certain claims, which represent clear cases of interference in the Iranian domestic affairs, in flagrant violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations, all of which are categorically rejected.

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Relevant extract</i>
S/2021/790	Identical letters dated 14 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	Request the Group of Arab States in New York to take the necessary action to transmit the present resolution to the relevant United Nations bodies and have it issued as a document of the United Nations, and to request that they include the question on their respective agendas, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 7, which prohibits interference in the internal affairs of States.
S/2021/857	Letter dated 7 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	The resolution also includes certain claims, which represent clear cases of interference in Iranian domestic affairs, in flagrant violation of international law, particularly Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations, all of which are condemned in the strongest terms and categorically rejected.

Part IV

Relations with other United Nations organs

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Introductory note

Part IV of the present supplement covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to Articles 4 to 6, 10 to 12, 15 (1), 20, 23, 24 (3), 65, 93, 94, 96 and 97 of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the relations of the Council with other principal organs of the United Nations, namely the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice. Material relating to the relations of the Council with the Secretariat is featured in part II, section VI, which deals with the administrative functions and powers of the Secretary-General in connection with meetings of the Council pursuant to rules 21 to 26 of its provisional rules of procedure. The Trusteeship Council continued to be inactive during the period under review.¹

During the period under review, the General Assembly continued to address recommendations to the Council regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council and the Assembly, in parallel and within the limitations imposed by the Charter, considered the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in the Syrian Arab Republic. In 2021, the Assembly continued to encourage the Council to immediately resume discussion on the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the country's human rights situation. In addition, the two organs collaborated on the election of judges to fill a vacancy at the International Court of Justice and two vacancies on the roster of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, consistent with the applicable provisions of the statute of the Mechanism, the provisional rules of procedure of the Council and the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

In 2021, the President of the Security Council participated in and delivered statements at sessions and events of the General Assembly. On 5 May, the President of the Council for the month (China) participated in an interactive dialogue to commemorate the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace. On 11 June, the President of the Council for the month (Estonia) participated in the plenary meeting of the Assembly to introduce the annual report of the Council. On 18 June, the President also participated in the plenary meeting of the Assembly to report on the work undertaken by the Council with regard to the appointment of the Secretary-General. The Assembly adopted a number of resolutions referring to its relationship with the Council, and the Council, for its part, continued to refer to various Assembly resolutions in its decisions.

In 2021, Council members continued to discuss the relations between the Council and the subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, in particular the Human Rights Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. During the period under review, Council members discussed enhancing coordination with the Human Rights Council and its investigative mechanisms and reaffirmed the importance of the Special Committee, in particular in improving the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel.

As described in greater detail in part II of the present supplement, in 2021, although Council members continued to hold videoconferences, in-person meetings resumed. Part IV of the supplement features relevant discussions held in the context of both meetings and videoconferences.

The Council heard a briefing by the President of the General Assembly at its seventy-fifth session during a videoconference held on 7 May in connection with

¹ The Trusteeship Council completed its mandate under the Charter in 1994 and suspended its operations on 1 November 1994. For more information see *Repertoire, Supplement 1993–1995*, chap. VI, part III.

the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system. The Council also heard a briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice at a private meeting held on 2 November.

In addition, during the review period, Council members deliberated on the importance of developing synergies among the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as with the other entities of the United Nations system. Those discussions took place primarily at an open debate of the Council held on 16 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”, which included briefings by the Secretary-General and the Presidents of the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice.

In 2021, the Council did not address any requests for information or assistance to the Economic and Social Council, nor did it make recommendations or decide on measures with regard to the judgments rendered by the International Court of Justice or request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

I. Relations with the General Assembly

Note

Section I is focused on various aspects of the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly in accordance with Articles 4 to 6, 10 to 12, 15 (1), 20, 23, 24 (3), 93, 94, 96 and 97 of the Charter of the United Nations, rules 40,² 60 and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council and Articles 4, 8, 10 to 12 and 14 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Section I is divided into eight subsections. Subsection A deals with the election by the General Assembly of the non-permanent members of the Council, in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter. Subsections B and C concern the functions and powers of the Assembly vis-à-vis Articles 10 to 12, with a particular focus on the practice and authority of the Assembly to make recommendations to the Council. Subsection D covers instances in which a decision by the Council must be taken prior to that of the Assembly under Articles 4 to 6, 93 and 97, such as the admission of new Members or the appointment of the Secretary-General and of judges to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Subsection E concerns the practices for the election of members of the International Court of Justice, requiring concurrent action by the Council and the Assembly. Subsection F covers the annual and special reports of the Council to the Assembly, in accordance with Articles 15 and 24 (3). Subsection G concerns Council relations with the subsidiary organs established by the Assembly that have played a part in the work of the Council during 2021. Subsection H features other Council practice bearing on relations with the Assembly.

² Rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure is also covered in part II, sect. IX.

A. Election by the General Assembly of the non-permanent members of the Security Council

Article 23

1. *The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.*

2. *The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.*

3. *Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.*

During the period under review, at its seventy-fifth regular session, the General Assembly elected five non-permanent members to the Council, in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter, to replace those whose terms of office were to expire on 31 December 2021 (see table 1).

Table 1
Election by the General Assembly of non-permanent members of the Security Council

Term	General Assembly decision	Plenary meeting record and date	Members elected for the term
2022–2023	75/421	A/75/PV.78 11 June 2021	Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, United Arab Emirates

B. Recommendations made by the General Assembly to the Security Council under Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. *The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.*

2. *The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.*

3. *The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.*

4. *The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.*

During the period under review, the General Assembly addressed recommendations to the Council regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. Several of these recommendations concerned the powers and functions of the Council under Articles 10 and 11 (1) of the Charter. The relevant provisions of

the resolutions of the Assembly are set out in table 2. In addition, in Assembly resolution [76/57](#), adopted under the item entitled “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa”, Member States explicitly continued to explicitly recall the provisions of Article 11 (1), in which it is stipulated that a function of the Assembly is to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms limitation.³

In connection with Article 11 (2) of the Charter, the General Assembly made recommendations to the Council with regard to specific questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security or requesting action by the Council concerning those questions. In its recommendations, in reference to items of which the Council was already seized, the Assembly continued to call upon the Council to ensure accountability, including through the consideration of a referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court and to consider the further development of sanctions in order to target effectively those who appeared to be most responsible for human rights violations. The Assembly encouraged the Council to immediately resume discussion on the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the country’s human rights situation. Concerning the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Assembly urged the Council to reauthorize the use of the border crossings of Bab al-Salam and Ya’rubiyah for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the country and to continue to consider additional crossing points. The Assembly also continued to call upon the Council to ensure accountability of those responsible for violations and abuses of international humanitarian law or human rights law in the Syrian Arab Republic. The relevant provisions of the resolutions of the Assembly are set out in table 3.

In 2021, the General Assembly did not draw the attention of the Council to any situations likely to endanger international peace and security pursuant to Article 11 (3) of the Charter.⁴

³ General Assembly resolution [76/57](#), first preambular paragraph.

⁴ For information on other referrals to the Security Council, see part VI, sect. I.

Table 2

Recommendations to the Security Council in resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security

<i>General Assembly resolution and date</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
Comprehensive review of special political missions	
76/83 9 December 2021	Encouraging enhanced exchanges of information, in an appropriate manner, among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat, making use of the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission, when relevant, on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (ninth preambular paragraph) Acknowledges the importance of strong coordination, coherence and cooperation of the Security Council and the General Assembly with the Peacebuilding Commission, and in this regard encourages the Security Council to continue to regularly request, deliberate and draw upon the specific, strategic and targeted advice of the Commission, including to assist with the longer-term perspective required for sustaining peace being reflected in the formation, review and drawdown of peacekeeping operations and special political missions mandates, in line with General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) (para. 4)
Report of the International Criminal Court	
76/5 11 November 2021	Encourages further dialogue between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, and welcomes in this regard the increased interaction of the Security Council with the Court under various formats, including the holding of open debates on peace and justice and working methods, with a special focus on the role of the Court (para. 20)
Terrorism and human rights	
76/169 16 December 2021	Encourages the Security Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to strengthen, within their mandates, the links, cooperation and dialogue with relevant human rights bodies, giving due regard to the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law in their ongoing work relating to counter-terrorism (para. 35)

Table 3

Recommendations to the Security Council in resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to specific questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security

<i>General Assembly resolution and date</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	
76/177 16 December 2021	Encourages the Security Council to continue its consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the commission of inquiry and take appropriate action to ensure accountability, including through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court and consideration of further sanctions in order to target effectively those who appear to be most responsible for human rights violations that the commission has said may constitute crimes against humanity; (para. 12) Also encourages the Security Council to immediately resume discussion on the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and invite the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to give a briefing to the Council, including on the country's human rights situation, in the light of the serious concerns expressed in the present resolution, and looks forward to its continued and more active engagement on this matter (para. 13)

Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic[76/228](#)

24 December 2021

Deplores the continued closure of the Bab al-Salam and Ya‘rubiyah border crossings for the purpose of cross-border humanitarian aid, and urges the Security Council to reauthorize the use of these border crossings and to continue to consider additional crossing points to meet humanitarian needs, considering that humanitarian needs have risen 38 per cent in north-east Syrian Arab Republic since the closing of the Ya‘rubiyah border crossing alone, according to the United Nations, emphasizes that more than 6.9 million people live in areas not under the control of the Syrian regime and 5.3 million require humanitarian assistance in the north-east and north-west, and also considers the multiplier effect of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and that the cross-border mechanism remains an indispensable tool to address the humanitarian needs of the population, including to deliver vaccines and supplies to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, which cannot be adequately reached through existing operations within the Syrian Arab Republic, in the light of the limitations of cross-line assistance (para. 20)

Emphasizes the need to ensure that all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights law are held to account through appropriate, fair and independent domestic or international criminal justice mechanisms, stresses the need to pursue practical steps towards this goal, and for that reason encourages the Security Council to take appropriate action to ensure accountability, noting the important role that the International Criminal Court can play in this regard in accordance with complementarity (para. 43)

Concerning the deliberations in the Council, during the period under review, Article 10 of the Charter was explicitly referred to twice, and Article 11 was explicitly referred to three times. All the explicit references to Articles 10 and 11 were made at an open debate held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on the theme “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”.⁵ During the debate, the representative of Kenya stated that a preventive diplomatic strategy required the Council to work in coherence with the General Assembly, as underlined in Article 11 of the Charter.⁶ At the same meeting, the representative of Malta also emphasized that ways in which the various United Nations organs could contribute to preventive diplomacy were clearly identified in the Charter, including in its Articles 10 and 11. The representative of Argentina highlighted that, in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly had broad authority to consider conflict prevention in all its aspects, develop recommendations and bring to the attention of the Council situations that may endanger international peace and security, adding that the Assembly played a central role in the preventive diplomacy architecture.⁷

Council members and non-Council members alike continued to address issues that may be considered of relevance for the application and interpretation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter in the context of the Council’s meetings and open videoconferences. In that regard, at an open videoconference held on 6 January in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on the challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines highlighted that the Security Council had to continue to play a leading role as it worked more closely with the other main organs of the United Nations system, namely the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, to foster developmental solutions to the challenges of peace and security.⁸ Furthermore, the representative of China underscored that the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the relevant regional organizations should carry out their respective functions, strengthen collaboration and forge synergies. Similarly, the representative of Slovakia expressed support for further strengthening of the ties between those bodies, as well as with civil society organizations and communities on the ground.

On 23 February, at an open videoconference held in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on

⁵ See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV/8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information on the meeting, see case 2 below.

⁶ See [S/PV.8906](#).

⁷ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

⁸ See [S/2021/24](#).

climate and security, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines indicated that the Council must engage with the General Assembly to effectively address climate and security risks across the joinder of issues touching and concerning humanitarian support, sustainable development, health pandemics, peace and security.⁹ The representative of El Salvador emphasized that greater coordination and consistency among the efforts of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council were imperative to tackle climate-related security risks.

On 19 May, at a videoconference held in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and focused on addressing root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa, the representative of Brazil emphasized the importance of stronger collaboration among the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission in the face of multifaceted challenges.¹⁰ At the same videoconference, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission underscored that peacebuilding and sustaining peace required coherence, sustained engagement and coordination among the principal United Nations organs, consistent with their mandates set forth in the Charter. In a similar vein, at a meeting held on 12 October under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” and the sub-item entitled “Diversity, State-building and the search for peace”, the representative of Mexico reiterated that the Council must strengthen dialogue with the other main bodies of the United Nations including the General Assembly, specifically to prevent development challenges and human rights violations from becoming a threat to international peace and security.¹¹ The representative of Chile indicated that the international security prevention road map must include cooperation of regional organizations and the principal bodies of the United Nations system involved in peacebuilding, including the Assembly and the Council.¹²

With regard to modalities of coordination between the General Assembly and the Council, at the annual open debate on working methods held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President (S/2017/507)”, the representative of China stated that the Council should improve communication and coordination with the Assembly

and other organs to avoid broadening its scope of consideration, when it came to cross-cutting issues.¹³

In addition, Council members and participants discussed the role of the Council and complementarity with the General Assembly concerning certain thematic or cross-cutting issues in connection with a number of items on the Council’s agenda. On 29 June, at a videoconference held in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on cybersecurity, the representative of Brazil stated that the Council should be guided first and foremost by the objective of promoting adherence to past and future recommendations adopted by the General Assembly on the issue of cybersecurity.¹⁴ The representative of Indonesia indicated that the Council must be guided by the norms and rules being deliberated upon and developed by the Assembly in that regard. The representative of Senegal highlighted that, in holding the videoconference, the Council had demonstrated its awareness regarding the threat to international peace and security stemming from the proliferation of malicious acts in cyberspace, and added that the Council was part of the Assembly’s efforts on cybersecurity, which had been ongoing and unending for over a decade.

On 8 September, at a meeting held under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and the sub-item entitled “United Nations transitions”, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines called for greater coordination, coherence and complementarity across all peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian activities undertaken through the institutional nexus involving the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, with the Peacebuilding Commission playing a bridging, convening and advisory role.¹⁵ In a written statement submitted in connection with the meeting, the representative of Colombia also emphasized that effective development, monitoring and periodic adjustment of peacekeeping mandates should be carried out through dialogue between the receiving State, the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly and regional organizations, in addition to troop- and police-contributing countries.¹⁶

⁹ See S/2021/198.

¹⁰ See S/2021/490.

¹¹ See S/PV.8877.

¹² See S/2021/868.

¹³ See S/PV.8798.

¹⁴ See S/2021/621.

¹⁵ See S/PV.8851.

¹⁶ See S/2021/783.

C. Practice in relation to Article 12 of the Charter

Article 12

1. *While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.*

2. *The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.*

Subsection C covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 12 of the Charter. Article 12 (1) limits the authority of the General Assembly with regard to any dispute or situation in respect of which the Council is exercising its functions under the Charter.

During the period under review, no reference was made to Article 12 (1) in decisions of the Council, nor did the Council request the General Assembly to make a recommendation with regard to any dispute or situation. Nonetheless, Article 12 was explicitly referred to once during the deliberations of the Council. At an open debate held on 16 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”, the representative of Morocco called for strengthening the consistency of action among different United Nations bodies, for rationalizing mandates and initiatives on cross-cutting issues and for appropriately prioritizing attention and resources, focusing on pragmatic high-impact solutions, while scrupulously respecting the mandates and prerogatives of each body in line with the Charter, in particular Article 12 (1).¹⁷

During Council meetings and videoconferences, speakers expressed views regarding the scope of the action of the General Assembly and the Council. On 16 May, at an open videoconference held in connection

with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of Indonesia echoed a statement made by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, in which the latter had voiced its determination to pursue the actions and decisions of the Assembly if the Council failed to live up to its responsibility.¹⁸ Similarly, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that the Assembly should take the necessary measures if the Council continued to be prevented from playing its role in settling the Palestinian question. The representative of South Africa also concluded that, if the Council was unable or unwilling to act, the matter must be referred to the Assembly for consideration.

In addition, and consistent with past practice, Council members and other Member States continued to address the prerogatives of the General Assembly and the Council at meetings and open videoconferences held in connection with a variety of thematic items.¹⁹

In 2021, two explicit references to Article 12 of the Charter were found in letters dated 26 April and 5 May from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council. In the first letter,²⁰ the representative indicated that the General Assembly was encroaching on the powers of the Council and had violated Article 12 in establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. In the second letter,²¹ the representative noted that the jurisdiction of the Assembly to consider matters relating to the situation in his country was never meant to extend to cross-border delivery of humanitarian assistance, which fell within the purview

¹⁸ See [S/2021/480](#).

¹⁹ See, for example, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”, [S/PV.8798](#) (Russian Federation); in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, [S/2021/198](#) (Russian Federation), [S/PV.8900](#) (Russian Federation and Islamic Republic of Iran), [S/PV.8923](#) (Russian Federation and Belarus); in connection with the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, [S/2021/868](#) (Brazil); under the item entitled “Small arms”, [S/PV.8874](#) (Russian Federation) and [S/PV.8909](#) (Ireland and Russian Federation); and under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, [S/PV.8886](#) (Russian Federation). For further information on the mandate of the Council, see part V, sect. I.

²⁰ [S/2021/406](#).

²¹ [S/2021/439](#).

¹⁷ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information, see case 2 below.

of the Council. The President of the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session had therefore violated Article 12, as he had infringed upon what was properly the exclusive mandate of the Council.

Under Article 12 (2), the Secretary-General is required to notify the General Assembly of the matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security being dealt with by the Council or with which the Council has ceased to deal. During the period under review, Council members held meetings and open videoconferences throughout the year to discuss matters of which the Council was seized. As described in further detail in part II, despite there being an official record of open videoconferences in the form of a document of the Council in which all statements, whether delivered orally or submitted in writing, were compiled, those videoconferences were not considered formal meetings of the Council for all relevant purposes, including for inclusion in the summary statement of the Secretary-General on items of which the Council is seized and the stage reached in their consideration circulated weekly to Council members in accordance with rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure.²² Accordingly, although the Secretary-General continued to notify the Assembly of the matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security that were being dealt with by the Council in the context of meetings,²³ he did not do so when those matters were discussed in the context of open videoconferences, as the notification was prepared on the basis of those weekly statements. The consent of the Council, required by Article 12 (2), is obtained through the circulation of the draft notification by the Secretary-General to the members of the Council. Following receipt of the notification, the Assembly formally takes note of it.²⁴

²² [S/2020/273](#), para. 19. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I. For information specific to matters of which the Council was seized, see part II, sect. III.B.

²³ See [A/76/300](#).

²⁴ See General Assembly decision 75/567 of 11 June 2021, in which the Assembly took note of the notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12 (2) dated 1 September 2020 ([A/75/300](#)); see also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part IV, sect. I.C. As at 31 December 2021, the Assembly had not yet taken note of the notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12 (2) dated 1 September 2021 ([A/76/300](#)).

D. Practice in relation to provisions of the Charter involving recommendations made by the Security Council to the General Assembly

Article 4

1. *Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.*

2. *The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.*

Article 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 93, paragraph 2

A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Rule 60

The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained

in the Charter and, accordingly, whether to recommend the applicant State for membership.

If the Security Council recommends the applicant State for membership, it shall forward to the General Assembly the recommendation with a complete record of the discussion.

If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, it shall submit a special report to the General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion.

In order to ensure the consideration of its recommendation at the next session of the General Assembly following the receipt of the application, the Security Council shall make its recommendation not less than twenty-five days in advance of a regular session of the General Assembly, nor less than four days in advance of a special session...

The Charter provides for joint decision-making by the Council and the General Assembly in relation to a number of matters, but requires a decision by the Council to be taken first. This is the case with respect to the admission, suspension or expulsion of Members (Articles 4 to 6), the appointment of the Secretary-General (Article 97) and the conditions under which a State that is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Article 93 (2)).²⁵ In addition, the statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals provides that the judges of the Mechanism shall be elected by the Assembly from a list submitted by the Council.²⁶

During the period under review, no questions arose concerning the conditions of accession to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. There was no reference to Articles 4, 5 or 6 and no activity with regard to the admission of new Members or the suspension or expulsion of any Member State. During the review period, the Council and the General Assembly significantly increased their collaboration on the occasion of the appointment of the Secretary-General, as described below. With regard to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal

Tribunals, the Council and the Assembly collaborated on the election of judges to fill vacancies on the roster of the Mechanism.

Membership in the United Nations: references to Articles 4 and 6

The admission of a State to membership in the United Nations and the suspension or expulsion of a Member State from the Organization are effected by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council (Articles 4 (2), 5 and 6 of the Charter). In accordance with rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure, the Council submits to the Assembly, within specified time limits, its recommendations concerning each application for membership, together with a record of its discussions in relation to the application.

During the period under review, the Council did not recommend the admission of any State for membership in the United Nations. It made no negative recommendations, which would have required the submission of a special report to the General Assembly. In addition, the Council did not recommend the suspension or expulsion of any Member State. Nonetheless, consistent with previous years, at meetings and open videoconferences in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, participants expressed support for the admission of the State of Palestine as a full Member of the Organization.²⁷ Furthermore, at the videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)” held on 13 April, the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo reiterated that Kosovo was also looking to become a Member of the United Nations at a certain point in future.²⁸

Procedure for the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General

Article 97 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council. In accordance with rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, the meetings to consider the question of the recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General are held in private, and the Council votes by secret ballot. At the end of each meeting, in accordance with rule 55, a communiqué is

²⁵ Articles 4 (3) and 69 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provide for the Council to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the conditions under which a State which is a party to the Statute but is not a Member of the United Nations may participate in electing members of the Court, and in making amendments to the Statute.

²⁶ Article 10 of the statute of the Mechanism (resolution 1966 (2010), annex 1).

²⁷ See, for example, [S/2021/91](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Cuba, Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates (also on behalf of the Group of Arab States)); [S/2021/404](#) (Cuba); and [S/2021/685](#) (Cuba).

²⁸ See [S/2021/370](#).

circulated which indicates the stage reached in the consideration of the question.

On 5 February, in line with General Assembly resolution [69/321](#) and subsequent related Assembly resolutions, the President of the Assembly and the President of the Council presented a joint letter addressed to all Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the United Nations,²⁹ which served to set in motion the process of selecting and appointing the Secretary-General in accordance with the provisions of Article 97 of the Charter and guided by the principles of transparency and inclusivity.³⁰ In the same letter, the Presidents of the Assembly and the Council noted that the term of the incumbent Secretary-General, António Guterres, would conclude on 31 December 2021 and that the Secretary-General, in a letter circulated to Member States dated 11 January,³¹ had conveyed his availability to serve a second term. In their letter, the Presidents of the Assembly and the Council called upon Member States presenting candidates to do so in a letter addressed to the Presidents of the Assembly and of the Council, and indicated that both Presidents would jointly circulate to all Member States the names of individuals submitted for consideration, upon receipt, and would offer all candidates opportunities for informal dialogues or meetings with members of their respective bodies.³² Furthermore, informal dialogues with candidates in the Assembly would be held before the Council began its selection, by May or June 2021, and could continue, if necessary, throughout the process of selection.

With reference to their joint letter dated 5 February, the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Council circulated a letter dated 24 February from the representative of Portugal, containing a letter from the Prime Minister of Portugal, in which the latter presented the candidature of Mr. Guterres for a second term as Secretary-General.³³

On 7 May, the General Assembly held an informal dialogue with Mr. Guterres with regard to the position of Secretary-General for the 2022–2026 term, which was followed, on 18 May, by an informal dialogue with Council members.³⁴ During the dialogue with Council members, Mr. Guterres presented his

vision statement on challenges and opportunities facing the United Nations, then took questions from Council members. On 3 June, the Council discussed the procedure on the selection of the Secretary-General under “Other matters”.³⁵

At a private meeting held on 8 June 2021, the Council considered the question of the recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General. The Council adopted by acclamation resolution [2580 \(2021\)](#), recommending to the Assembly that Mr. Guterres be appointed Secretary-General for a second term of office, from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2026. By a letter dated 8 June addressed to the President of the Assembly, the President of the Council informed the Assembly of the adoption of the resolution.³⁶ Acting in accordance with the Council’s recommendation, on 18 June, the Assembly, by resolution [75/286](#), appointed Mr. Guterres for a second term of office. By the same resolution, the Assembly welcomed the process of appointment of the Secretary-General and its timely conclusion, guided by the principles of transparency and inclusivity, including the organization of an informal dialogue with the incumbent as candidate for the position.

On 18 June, the President of the Council participated in the 82nd plenary meeting of the Assembly to report on the work undertaken by the Council on the appointment of the Secretary-General.³⁷

On 10 September, by its resolution [75/325](#), the General Assembly recommended that the Presidents of the Assembly and the Council, in future joint letters on the process of selection and appointment of the Secretary-General, encourage Member States to publicize the call for nominations, including with civil society and other stakeholders, with the aim of identifying potential candidates.³⁸ Furthermore, the Assembly decided that, in order to for nominations of candidates to be circulated in a joint letter by the Presidents of the Assembly and the Council pursuant to the process established in Assembly resolution [69/321](#), they must be submitted by at least one Member State, in accordance with ongoing practice. The Assembly also decided to further assess during its seventy-seventh session the process of selection and appointment of the Secretary-General, to explore possible steps to improve future processes, including the collaboration between the Assembly and the Council, consistent with Article 97 of the Charter.

²⁹ [S/2021/179](#).

³⁰ For further information on the process immediately preceding the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General, see previous supplements covering the period 2015–2020.

³¹ [S/2021/27](#).

³² See [S/2021/179](#).

³³ [S/2021/180](#), annex.

³⁴ See [S/2021/683](#).

³⁵ See [S/2021/1032](#).

³⁶ See [A/75/912](#).

³⁷ See [A/75/PV.82](#).

³⁸ General Assembly resolution [75/325](#), paras. 55–57.

Appointment of judges to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

By its resolution [1966 \(2010\)](#) of 22 December 2010, the Council established the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to carry out residual functions of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.³⁹ According to article 10 of the statute of the Mechanism, the judges of the Mechanism are elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Council. In the event of a vacancy in the roster of judges of the Mechanism, the Secretary-

General appoints judges after consultation with the Presidents of the Council and of the Assembly, for the remainder of the term of office concerned.⁴⁰

During the period under review, following the death of one of the judges of the Mechanism and the resignation of another, and pursuant to article 10 (2) of the statute of the Mechanism, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judges nominated to fill the vacancies for the remainder of the respective terms of office.⁴¹ The General Assembly subsequently concurred with the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the two judges.⁴²

For additional details on the actions taken by the Secretary-General, the Council and the General Assembly, see table 4.⁴³

⁴⁰ Ibid., annex 1.

⁴¹ See [S/2021/675](#) and [S/2021/1065](#).

⁴² See [S/2021/726](#) and [S/2021/1083](#).

⁴³ For more information concerning the Mechanism, see part I, sect. 24.

³⁹ Resolution [1966 \(2010\)](#), para. 1.

Table 4

Action taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning judges of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 2021

<i>Letter from the Secretary-General</i>	<i>Letter from the President of the Security Council</i>	<i>Council resolution and date</i>	<i>Transmittal to the General Assembly</i>	<i>Assembly decision or resolution and date</i>
S/2021/674 , transmitting the nomination of a judge to fill one vacancy on the roster of judges of the Mechanism	S/2021/675 , taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judge nominated to fill the vacancy			
S/2021/726 , transmitting a letter from the President of the Assembly concurring with the appointment of the nominated judge				
S/2021/1064 , transmitting the nomination of a judge to fill one vacancy in the roster of judges of the Mechanism	S/2021/1065 , taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judge nominated to fill the vacancy			
S/2021/1083 , transmitting a letter from the President of the Assembly concurring with the appointment of the nominated judge				

E. Election of members of the International Court of Justice

Rule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Rule 61

Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority of votes.

The election of members of the International Court of Justice requires action by the Council in conjunction with the General Assembly, with the two organs proceeding independently of one another. The procedure for the election is set out in rules 40⁴⁴ and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council; Articles 4, 8, 10 to 12, 14 and 15 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice⁴⁵ and rules 150 and 151 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure is also covered in part II, sect. IX.

⁴⁵ Articles 4, 10–12, 14 and 15 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice establish the procedure for the following: (a) the nomination of the judges by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration; (b) the majority necessary for the election of judges; (c) the number of meetings to be held for the purpose of the election of judges; (d) the holding of the joint conference in the event of more than three meetings of the Council and the General Assembly; (e) the procedure for the filling of vacancies; and (f) the term of office applied to elected judges filling out a vacancy. Article 8 provides that the two organs proceed independently.

⁴⁶ Rules 150 and 151 of the General Assembly provide that the election of the members of the International Court of Justice take place in accordance with the Statute of the Court and that any meeting of the Assembly held in pursuance of the Statute of the Court for the purpose of electing members of the Court continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority of votes.

During the period under review, the Council held an election to fill a vacancy resulting from the death of one of the judges of the Court.⁴⁷ At its 8808th meeting, held on 29 June, the Council met under the item entitled “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice”.⁴⁸ At the meeting, the Council adopted without a vote resolution [2583 \(2021\)](#), by which it decided, in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute of the Court, that the election to fill the vacancy would take place on 5 November, at a meeting of the Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its seventy-sixth session.⁴⁹ By a memorandum submitted to the Assembly and the Council, the Secretary-General outlined the composition of the Court and the voting procedure in the two organs and indicated that national groups had been invited to undertake the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court, and nominations were to be received no later than 15 September.⁵⁰ The names and curricula vitae of the candidates nominated by the national groups were transmitted in separate notes by the Secretary-General as documents of the Assembly and the Council.⁵¹

On 5 November, the General Assembly and the Council proceeded with the concurrent votes.⁵² On the first ballot, at the 8897th meeting of the Council and the 27th plenary meeting of the Assembly, Hillary Charlesworth, the candidate from Australia, obtained the requisite absolute majority of votes in both bodies and was, therefore, elected as a member of the Court for a term of office from 5 November 2021 until 5 February 2024, in accordance with Articles 2 to 4, 7 to 12, 14 and 15 of the Statute of the Court, rules 150 and 151 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly and rules 40 and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.⁵³

For details of the procedure of the election of the new member of the Court, see table 5.

⁴⁷ See [S/2021/586](#).

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8808](#).

⁴⁹ See resolution [2583 \(2021\)](#).

⁵⁰ See [A/76/337-S/2021/821](#).

⁵¹ See [A/76/338-S/2021/822](#) and [A/76/339-S/2021/823](#).

⁵² See [S/PV.8897](#) and [A/76/PV.27](#).

⁵³ See General Assembly decision 76/403.

Table 5

Concurrent election of a member of the International Court of Justice to fill an expiring vacancy

<i>Note by the Secretary-General</i>	<i>Record of Council meeting to set the date of the election</i>	<i>Council resolution deciding the election date</i>	<i>Record of Council meeting for the election</i>	<i>Record of General Assembly plenary meeting for the election</i>
S/2021/586 A/76/337-S/2021/821 A/76/338-S/2021/822 A/76/339-S/2021/823	S/PV.8808	Resolution 2583 (2021)	S/PV.8897	A/76/PV.27

F. Annual and special reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly

Article 15, paragraph 1

The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

Article 24, paragraph 3

The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Rule 60, paragraph 3

If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, it shall submit a special report to the General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion.

During 2021, the Council maintained its practice of submitting annual reports to the General Assembly pursuant to Article 24 (3) of the Charter. The annual report submitted to the Assembly covered the period from 1 January to 31 December 2020.⁵⁴ The note by the President of the Council dated 30 August 2017 contains the stipulation that the report consist of an introduction, containing an agreed concise summary prepared on behalf of the Council under the coordination of the President of the Council for the month of July.⁵⁵ However, in accordance with the same note, in the case of the member holding the presidency for the month of July ending its tenure on the Council that year, that task devolves on the member of the Council next in English alphabetical order and who

will not be leaving the Council at the end of that calendar year. In 2021, the introduction of the annual report for 2020 was therefore prepared by the delegation of Niger, as the member of the Council next in English alphabetical order after Germany and Indonesia, which had held the presidency of the Council for the months of July and August 2020, respectively, as both had left the Council at the end of 2020. In accordance with the note by the President of the Council dated 27 December 2019,⁵⁶ the report was adopted before 30 May 2021. The content of and procedure concerning the annual report were discussed in connection with the annual open debate on working methods held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” (see case 1).⁵⁷

In a letter dated 8 February addressed to the President of the Council,⁵⁸ the Permanent Representatives of New Zealand and Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, invited the Council to a wider reflection on working methods, including on how to embed relevant improvements made during the COVID-19 pandemic into regular practice so that they would continue during normal times. In that context, the Group called for institutionalizing the practice of analysing and discussing the comments and observations made by Member States during the general debate on the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly, considering that the discussion of such a report by the Assembly was an open issue on its agenda, pursuant to its resolution [51/241](#) of 22 August 1997.

The Council considered and adopted its draft annual report, without a vote, at a meeting held on 27 May.⁵⁹ During the meeting, the representative of the Niger stated that the draft provided a summary of the

⁵⁴ [A/75/2](#).

⁵⁵ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 127.

⁵⁶ [S/2019/997](#), para. (c).

⁵⁷ See [S/PV.8798](#). See also [S/2021/572](#).

⁵⁸ [S/2021/121](#).

⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8781](#). See also [S/2021/500](#).

activities and decisions of the Council for 2020, and that the report was the outcome of the collective efforts of the Council. He also expressed hope that the document would provide the Member States and other interested organizations with useful information that they might need in the course of their activities.⁶⁰

The General Assembly considered the annual report of the Council⁶¹ at the 78th and 79th plenary meetings of its seventy-fifth session, both held on 11 June 2021, under its agenda item entitled “Report of the Security Council”.⁶² The President of the Council for the month (Estonia) participated in the 78th plenary meeting of the Assembly to introduce the report.⁶³ During the discussions in the Assembly, many Member States⁶⁴ acknowledged or expressed appreciation for the improved timeline regarding the adoption and submission of the annual report of the Council in accordance with the note by the President of the Council dated 27 December 2019, by which Member States were to be allowed time for a more careful consideration and discussion of the work of the Council for the year under review.⁶⁵ Numerous Member States also called for future annual reports of the Council to be more analytical.⁶⁶ At its 79th plenary meeting, held on 11 June, the Assembly took note of the report of the Council.⁶⁷ In addition, as in previous years, the Assembly, in resolution [75/325](#), adopted under the item entitled “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, recognized the timely submission of the report of the Council to the Assembly in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter and requested the President of the Assembly to continue scheduling the plenary meeting on the report of the Council in close coordination with the President of the Council so that discussions of the report were

not conducted in a perfunctory manner.⁶⁸ No special reports were submitted by the Council to the Assembly during the reporting period.

Case 1

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))

On 16 June, at the initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Permanent Representative of which was Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions,⁶⁹ the Council held its annual open debate on its working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”.⁷⁰ During the meeting, Council members heard briefings by the Chair of the Informal Working Group, by a co-author of the fourth edition of *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Loraine Sievers, and by the Executive Director of Security Council Report. The representatives of 28 non-Council member States submitted their statements in writing.⁷¹

In the written statements submitted in connection with the meeting, Member States addressed the consideration of the annual report of the Council by the General Assembly in the context of the relationship between the two bodies. The representative of Argentina indicated that the submission of the annual report to the Assembly was one of the many interactions between the two bodies, and emphasized that the report should be sent in a timely manner so that it could be given serious consideration by the Assembly. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran indicated that the Council was responsible to the Member States, on behalf of which it acted and to which it must therefore remain accountable, which was the *raison d’être* of Article 24 (3) of the Charter, pursuant to which the Council was obliged to submit annual and special reports to the Assembly, where all Member States were represented.

⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8781](#).

⁶¹ [A/75/2](#).

⁶² See [A/75/PV.78](#) and [A/75/PV.79](#).

⁶³ See [A/75/PV.78](#).

⁶⁴ Portugal (also on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group), Costa Rica, Singapore, Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Georgia, South Africa, Austria, Canada, Chile and New Zealand (see [A/75/PV.78](#)); and El Salvador, Cyprus, Qatar, Indonesia, Italy, Bangladesh, Egypt and India (see [A/75/PV.79](#)).

⁶⁵ [S/2019/997](#).

⁶⁶ See [A/75/PV.78](#) (Portugal (also on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group), Ecuador, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Liechtenstein, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Georgia, South Africa, Austria, Canada and Chile); and [A/75/PV.79](#) (El Salvador, Ukraine, Qatar, Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Cuba, Bangladesh, Ghana, Egypt and India).

⁶⁷ See General Assembly decision 75/568.

⁶⁸ General Assembly resolution [75/325](#), paras. 22 and 23.

⁶⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 June 2021 ([S/2021/527](#)).

⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8798](#).

⁷¹ See [S/2021/572](#) (Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates).

Some participants emphasized the need for the Council to submit a more analytical annual report. The representatives of Argentina and Cuba expressed regret that the content of the annual report continued to be a factual description of the meetings, activities and decisions of the Council, lacking analytical content that would allow the wider membership to conduct an assessment of its activities. The representatives of Kuwait and New Zealand, the latter on behalf of 35 countries from all regional groups that had served as elected members on the Council over the past decade, appreciated the efforts made by the Council in the timely submission of the annual report to the General Assembly, but emphasized nonetheless that the substance of the report could be more analytical and detailed. The representative of Colombia noted that a more analytical, integrated and contextualized annual report must go beyond by incorporating the main challenges to international peace and security, as well as contributions to address them. In a similar vein, prefacing that the consideration of the reports of the Council to the Assembly remained one of the most visible aspects of interaction between the two bodies, the representative of Ukraine underscored the need for the Council to enhance the analytical perspective and forward-looking approach of reports. The representative of Brazil also agreed that the Council's annual report should be more analytical and forward-looking.

In addition, participants made suggestions on the content of the annual report. The delegation of El Salvador, recognizing the progress made by the Council in the elaboration and submission of its report to the Assembly for 2020, encouraged the members of the Council to submit future reports that contained a full, substantive and analytical account of its work and to hold open consultations before and during its drafting to take into consideration the concerns and views of the wider membership. The delegation added that the report should include an analysis on the decision-making process within the Council, including elements to clarify the use of the veto by the permanent members. Welcoming the adoption of the annual report, the representative of Latvia suggested that contingency planning considerations be included in the Council's annual report. The representative of Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, reiterated its call upon the Council to give due consideration in its annual report to the impact of the pandemic on international peace and security and the Council's work and tools, possibly through a dedicated section with an overall and cross-cutting analysis of the matter.

G. Relations with subsidiary organs established by the General Assembly

During the period under review, the Council continued to develop its relations with various subsidiary organs established by the General Assembly, namely, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Human Rights Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

During 2021, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People participated in the work of the Council. The Committee submitted written statements for two open videoconferences and two meetings concerning the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.⁷² On 29 November, on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, the President of the Council participated in the 404th meeting of the Committee.⁷³

Human Rights Council

One decision adopted by the Security Council contained a reference to the Human Rights Council. By its resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), of 20 December, the Security Council welcomed the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution [45/34](#).⁷⁴

Relations between the Security Council and the Human Rights Council were also addressed in meetings and open videoconferences. In a statement submitted for the open videoconference held on 6 January in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and focused on the challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts, the delegation of Switzerland encouraged the Security Council to integrate human rights instruments into all of its activities, from joint analysis to decision-making and accountability, and specified that those instruments included the Human Rights Council.⁷⁵ The

⁷² See [S/2021/91](#), [S/2021/404](#), [S/2021/685](#) (in connection with [S/PV.8826](#)) and [S/2021/884](#) (in connection with [S/PV.8883](#)).

⁷³ See [A/AC.183/PV.404](#).

⁷⁴ Council resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 7.

⁷⁵ See [S/2021/24](#).

representative of Denmark, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, emphasized that closer and more systematic cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as with the Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Council, including in a briefing and advisory capacity, must be ensured.⁷⁶ The representative of Slovakia also expressed support for further strengthening the ties between the Security Council and other bodies, including the Human Rights Council, as well as with civil society organizations and communities on the ground.⁷⁷

At the open videoconference convened on 15 March, in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of Estonia expressed full support for the work of investigative mechanisms, such as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, of the General Assembly, and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, of the Human Rights Council.⁷⁸ In that regard, he expressed hope that the Security Council would work more closely with those mechanisms and incorporate the matter into its agenda.

At an open videoconference held on 7 May in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia expressed support for improved information exchange between the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and its special procedures, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁷⁹ She stated that it was crucial that the Security Council took into account and considered the valuable work of the High Commissioner and the Human Rights Council in its deliberations.

In a statement submitted for the open videoconference held on 19 May under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and focused on addressing root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa, the delegation of Denmark, on behalf of the Nordic countries, called for

closer cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Council respectively.⁸⁰

In a statement submitted for a meeting held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” and focused on working methods, the representative of Slovakia asserted that the further development of more active and meaningful relationships with the Peacebuilding Commission, the Human Rights Council and other relevant bodies could increase the effectiveness of the response of the Security Council to conflicts and strengthen its role in conflict prevention and sustaining peace.⁸¹

In connection with a meeting held on 8 September under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and the sub-item entitled “United Nations transitions”,⁸² the representative of Liechtenstein submitted a statement in which he underscored that, in order to more effectively address human rights violations as part of its peace and security mandate, the Security Council must better coordinate with the human rights machinery of the United Nations, in particular the Human Rights Council, relevant special procedures mandate holders and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁸³

On 6 August, at a meeting held under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, the representative of Afghanistan asked the Council and called on the international community to take preventive measures, including the convening of a special session of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, to avert a catastrophic situation of human rights violations and the large-scale displacement of the civilian population in Afghanistan.⁸⁴

At a meeting held on 12 October under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” and under the sub-item entitled “Diversity, State-building and the search for peace”, the representative of Mexico emphasized that the Security Council must strengthen dialogue with the other main bodies of the United Nations, as well as with the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, specifically to prevent development challenges and human rights violations

⁷⁶ For more information on the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, see section II.

⁷⁷ See [S/2021/24](#).

⁷⁸ See [S/2021/265](#).

⁷⁹ See [S/2021/456](#).

⁸⁰ See [S/2021/490](#).

⁸¹ See [S/2021/572](#).

⁸² See [S/PV.8851](#).

⁸³ See [S/2021/783](#).

⁸⁴ See [S/PV.8831](#).

from becoming a threat to international peace and security.⁸⁵

On 9 November, at a meeting held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Exclusion, inequality and conflict”, the representative of Ireland stated that the Security Council must work better with other parts of the United Nations system, notably the Peacebuilding Commission, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, in order to remain credible and to meet its responsibilities.⁸⁶

At a meeting held on 16 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”, the representative of Mexico expressed the belief that coordination among the principal organs should be incorporated into their subsidiary bodies, especially the Human Rights Council, whose work was fundamental to preventive diplomacy and to sustainable peace and development.⁸⁷ At the same meeting, the representative of Ireland, highlighting that bodies and entities such as the Human Rights Council played an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security, underlined that the entirety of the human rights architecture was inextricably linked to the work of the Security Council. The representative of Norway stressed that greater interaction among the Security Council, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council was needed to facilitate early engagement and prevent conflict. The representative of Finland encouraged closer cooperation between the Security Council and other bodies, including the Human Rights Council, and emphasized that interaction and cooperation with the Human Rights Council and the wider human rights architecture were also crucial, as human rights violations were often the first sign of an emerging conflict.

In its communications of 2021, the Council also addressed its relations with the Human Rights Council. In a letter dated 2 September addressed to the Secretary-General,⁸⁸ the representatives of Ireland, Mexico and the United Kingdom transmitted the summary of the meeting of the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security held on 19 August to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. In the summary,

the co-Chairs noted that the briefers at the meeting had emphasized the importance of the participation of women in human rights monitoring, and had encouraged Security Council members to advocate the use of Human Rights Council mechanisms to monitor human rights violations, including the impact of the Taliban’s rule on the rights of women.

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

In 2021, the Security Council did not refer to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in any of its decisions. During meetings and open videoconferences, however, Council members and other participants recognized the importance of the Special Committee, in particular with regard to improving the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel. At an open videoconference held on 24 May in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the representative of Mexico stated that, in considering the issues that must be taken into account when the Council reviewed and adjusted the mandates of peace operations, the Council should make full use of the review carried out by the Special Committee, as it provided relevant information on the main challenges in ensuring the safety and security of personnel.⁸⁹ The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the question of the safety and security of peacekeepers remained as ever a focus of the Council, its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, the Special Committee and field missions, adding that the number of injuries and casualties among the blue helmets had dropped significantly in recent years thanks to coordinated efforts and consultations in those formats, as well as to the close interaction between Member States and the Secretariat.

In a statement submitted for an open videoconference held on 25 May in connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, the delegation of Canada underscored that protection mandates should be effectively matched with sufficient resources and progressive policies, including by better aligning the Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Fifth Committee.⁹⁰

At a meeting of the Council held on 18 August under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and the sub-item entitled “Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping”, the representative of Mexico reiterated that the lessons

⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8877](#).

⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8900](#).

⁸⁷ See [S/PV.8906](#).

⁸⁸ [S/2021/770](#).

⁸⁹ See [S/2021/501](#).

⁹⁰ See [S/2021/505](#).

learned from the pandemic showed that remote information-sharing could also benefit from the involvement of other actors and representatives including United Nations entities, and that those aspects must be considered in adjusting the mandates of peace operations while taking into account the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and of troop- and personnel-contributing countries.⁹¹ At another meeting, held on 10 November under the same item and focused on police commissioners, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed the conviction that the police component of peacekeeping warranted greater attention from States Members of the United Nations, both in the Council, when it came to individual country situations, and in the General Assembly.⁹² She added that the best forums for discussing general police matters were the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the Special Committee.

H. Other Security Council practice bearing on relations with the General Assembly

Special and other sessions of the General Assembly

In 2021, there were no special sessions of the General Assembly convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Council pursuant to Article 20 of the Charter. Nonetheless, the President of the Council for the month of May (China) participated in an interactive dialogue organized by the President of the Assembly held on 5 May to commemorate the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace, where he delivered a statement.⁹³

At the closing of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly, the President of the Assembly highlighted that he had held monthly coordination meetings, with combined bimonthly trilateral meetings with the President of the Council and the Secretary-General, in a bid to streamline the work of the principal organs of the United Nations and ensure mutually reinforcing efforts.⁹⁴ He reiterated that cooperation between the Assembly and the Council must be strengthened. He also emphasized that there were synergies between the two bodies that were not being exploited, for example with regard to the work of the Assembly on Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic

and the State of Palestine, which supported the work of the Council.

General Assembly decisions concerning relations with the Security Council

The General Assembly also made reference to its relations with the Council in several other decisions. In its decision 75/569 adopted on 22 June under the item entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”, the Assembly decided to reaffirm its central role concerning the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Council and other matters related to the Council.⁹⁵ The Assembly also decided to continue intergovernmental negotiations on Council reform in informal plenary meetings of its seventy-sixth session, building on the informal meetings held during its seventy-fifth session, as reflected in the letter dated 12 May from the Co-Chairs, and on the document entitled “Co-Chairs’ Elements Paper on Convergences and Divergences on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”, circulated on 29 April.

On 10 September, in its resolution 75/325 adopted under the item entitled “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, the Assembly encouraged regular interaction and continued coordination among the Presidents of the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.⁹⁶

With regard to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, on 30 June, the Assembly adopted resolution 75/291 on the seventh review of the Strategy, in which it noted with appreciation the continued contribution of the United Nations entities, including the subsidiary bodies of the Council, to the work of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities in support of the implementation of the Strategy by Member States, and noted in that regard the establishment of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Platform.⁹⁷

On the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, the General Assembly adopted resolution 76/180 on 16 December, reiterating the urgent need to ensure that all those responsible for crimes related to violations and abuses

⁹¹ See [S/PV.8838](#).

⁹² See [S/PV.8901](#).

⁹³ See <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1uz5py2e3>.

⁹⁴ See [A/75/PV.105](#).

⁹⁵ General Assembly decision 75/569.

⁹⁶ General Assembly resolution 75/325, para. 12.

⁹⁷ General Assembly resolution 75/291, thirteenth preambular paragraph.

of international law throughout Myanmar, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, were held to account through credible and independent national, regional or international justice mechanisms, while recalling the authority of the Council in this regard.⁹⁸

With respect to the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, in its resolution [76/228](#), the General Assembly expressed continued support for the work carried out by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

⁹⁸ General Assembly resolution [76/180](#), twenty-eighth preambular paragraph.

welcomed its reports and reiterated its decision to transmit those reports to the Council.⁹⁹

Security Council decisions concerning relations with the General Assembly

A number of resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Council in 2021 contained specific references to the General Assembly in connection with policy and implementation issues other than those covered in subsections A, D, E and G above, as set out in tables 6 and 7.

⁹⁹ General Assembly resolution [76/228](#), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

Table 6

Security Council decisions containing specific references to the General Assembly in connection with policy and implementation issues other than those covered in subsections A, D, E and G (thematic items)

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Maintenance of international peace and security	
Resolution 2565 (2021) 26 February 2021	Recalling its resolutions 2286 (2016) and 2532 (2020) and General Assembly resolutions 74/270 and 74/274 (first preambular paragraph)
S/PRST/2021/22 9 November 2021	The Security Council reaffirms that sustaining peace requires coherence, sustained engagement, and coordination between the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates as set out in the Charter of the United Nations (sixth paragraph)
S/PRST/2021/23 16 November 2021	The Security Council expresses its continued commitment to foster interaction on a regular basis with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat in accordance with their respective mandates under the Charter of the United Nations, in particular on matters relating to preventive diplomacy tools and mechanisms (eighth paragraph)
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	
Resolution 2610 (2021) 17 December 2021	Reiterates the need to enhance ongoing cooperation among the Committee and United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and Office of Counter-Terrorism established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/291 , as well as their respective groups of experts, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries within their respective mandates, on facilitating and monitoring technical assistance, on relations with international and regional organizations and agencies and on other issues of relevance to these bodies (para. 94)
Resolution 2617 (2021) 30 December 2021	Underscoring the central role of the United Nations in the global fight against terrorism and welcoming the seventh review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (resolution 75/291) of 2 July 2021, which affirmed the importance of integrated and balanced implementation of all four pillars of the Strategy, and expressing support for the activities of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, in accordance with resolution 71/291 of 15 June 2017, and its central role in promoting the balanced implementation of the Strategy (twelfth preambular paragraph)

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
	Stresses that the heads of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Office of Counter-Terrorism should meet regularly to discuss areas of mutual interest and the incorporation of the recommendations and analysis of the Executive Directorate into the Office's work, in particular in the implementation of technical assistance and capacity-building, and directs the Office and the Executive Directorate to draft jointly a report by 30 March 2022 setting out practical steps to be taken by both bodies to ensure the incorporation of the recommendations and analysis of the Executive Directorate into the Office's work, to be considered by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, as well as the General Assembly in the context of the Strategy review (para. 24)

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Resolution 2594 (2021) 9 September 2021	Reiterating the primary responsibility of States to protect the population throughout their territories, recognizing that reconfigurations of missions may entail increased risks for civilians, in particular for women, youth, children, persons with disabilities, and, where relevant, the need to enhance States' capacity to protect their own civilians, emphasizing the importance of security sector reform, poverty reduction measures, gender equality, human rights monitoring and reporting, the promotion of rule of law and good governance, and the extension of legitimate State authority in ensuring the protection of civilians over the longer term and in the consolidation of peace and stability, taking note of interlinkages between transitional justice, inclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, functional child protection services, national small arms and light weapons management, and organized crime and anti-corruption measures, for enhancing stability, reaffirming that development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, and recalling further General Assembly resolution 70/1, entitled "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (sixth preambular paragraph) Recognizes that peacebuilding financing remains a critical challenge, takes note of the General Assembly decision to convene a high-level meeting in the seventy-sixth session to advance, explore and consider options for ensuring adequate, predictable and sustainable financing for peacebuilding, and reiterates the importance of adequately resourcing United Nations peace operations, including during mission transitions to support the long-term stability and continuity of peacebuilding activities (para. 13)

Table 7
Security Council decisions containing specific references to the General Assembly in connection with policy and implementation issues other than those covered in subsections A, D, E and G (country- and region-specific items)

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	
Resolution 2605 (2021) 12 November 2021	Requests the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations (para. 44)
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
Resolution 2612 (2021) 20 December 2021	Requests the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations (para. 45)

Decision and date

Provision

The situation in Mali

Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#)
29 June 2021

Requests the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations (para. 58)

The situation in Somalia

Resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#)
15 November 2021

Reaffirms that without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of its resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners, including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia (para. 37)

Security Council discussions concerning relations with the General Assembly

In 2021, Council members and other participants in meetings and open videoconferences continued to address the Council's coordination and interaction with the General Assembly. On 16 November, at a meeting held under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations", and in the written statements submitted for the meeting, Council members and other participants made both explicit and implicit references to Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Charter, aside from those covered in subsections B, C and G above. During the meeting, speakers also discussed the relationship between the Council and the Assembly (see case 2).

Case 2**Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 16 November, at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁰⁰ the Council held an open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United

Nations".¹⁰¹ During the open debate, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the President of the International Court of Justice. Representatives of Council members and other participants delivered statements during the meeting. The representatives of some non-Council member States submitted their statements in writing.¹⁰²

The Secretary-General stated that the United Nations system had given the world a home for dialogue and tools and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including the twin resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Council in 2016,¹⁰³ which had served as a reminder once again that prevention must be at the heart of the collective goals of building and sustaining peace.¹⁰⁴ The President of the Assembly acknowledged that the membership of the United Nations had increasingly been calling for a more representative Security Council that worked in tandem with other United Nations organs to deliver comprehensive solutions to current and emerging security issues. He also pointed out that work done by the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to build resilient and prosperous communities facilitated the work of the Security Council. He called upon the membership to work together to implement Assembly resolution [75/325](#), in which the Assembly had encouraged regular interaction

¹⁰⁰ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October 2021 ([S/2021/888](#)). The meeting is also the subject of case 3, on the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and case 4, on the relationship between the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

¹⁰¹ See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁰² See [S/2021/952](#) (Australia, Guatemala, Italy and Republic of Korea).

¹⁰³ See Council resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#) and General Assembly resolution [70/262](#).

¹⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8906](#).

and continued coordination among the Presidents of the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. He further noted that regular coordination meetings among the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council helped to bridge differences and improve the efficiency of the work of the United Nations.

During the discussion that ensued, several speakers highlighted the importance of coordination among the principal organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination to create synergies within the United Nations system.¹⁰⁵ In that regard, the representative of Ecuador, while expressing support for the continuation of monthly meetings among the heads of the principal organs and calling for the results of those meetings to be circulated for the information of all delegations, also emphasized that the synergy among the principal organs was not limited to the close relationship among their Presidents, but instead implied an ongoing and constructive relationship on the part of all its members, including Member States.¹⁰⁶ The representative of Malaysia also underscored the importance of greater coordination and transparency between the Council and the Assembly, including with the latter's subsidiary organs, such as the Disarmament Commission, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. The representative of Bangladesh emphasized that carrying out structural preventive measures required all organs of the United Nations to perform in a coherent, coordinated and integrated manner, and expressed continued support for the Organization's focus on prevention for ending and resolving conflicts, including by bolstering the authority of the Assembly. He added that operationalizing the concept of One United Nations required coherence, coordination and complementarity among the principal organs, and that close and seamless horizontal communication among the key organs was essential. Speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the representative of Azerbaijan recalled that the Heads of State and Government of the Movement, at its eighteenth summit, had called upon the Presidents of the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council to conduct regular discussions and coordination among themselves on their respective agendas and programmes of work, in order to establish increased mutually reinforcing coherence and

complementarity among those organs, being respectful of one another's mandates, and with a view to generating a mutual understanding among them. The representative of South Africa also underscored that the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice all had the potential to play a greater role in supporting the Security Council in preventing conflict, and further emphasized the need for regular interaction, coordination and collaboration between the Council and other primary organs of the United Nations in fulfilling the Council's mandate.

With regard to specific modalities of enhanced coordination among the principal organs of the United Nations, including the General Assembly and the Council, the representative of Brazil encouraged the continued practice of holding regular dialogues between the Presidents of the Assembly and the Council, aimed at streamlining and coordinating the agendas of the two organs. The representative of Malta suggested holding annual or biannual interactive dialogues among the President of the Security Council, the President of the Assembly, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, along with representatives of civil society. The representative of Egypt stressed the importance of concerted efforts and coordination of the principal organs of the United Nations to ensure that they worked in harmony and complementarity to prevent the outbreak of conflict, in accordance with their respective mandates. He added, in that regard, that holding an annual meeting collectively among all the principal organs and the Peacebuilding Commission with a view to strengthening coordination was an idea worth considering. Emphasizing that maintaining regular communication and transparency between the Security Council and the wider membership was vital, the representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that such communication could not be limited to an annual report submitted to the Assembly. She expressed support for regular engagement on shared priorities with the incoming President of the Council and the President of the Assembly. In a statement submitted for the meeting, the delegation of Italy stated that the Council should further strengthen its relationship with the Assembly and suggested that the Assembly be more involved in preventive diplomacy by instituting regular meetings of the Council to review conflict-prone situations.¹⁰⁷

Several speakers invoked specific Council decisions concerning coordination and collaboration between the two principal organs. The representative of

¹⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8906](#) (China and Malta); and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Ecuador, Egypt and South Africa).

¹⁰⁶ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁰⁷ See [S/2021/952](#).

the United Kingdom referred to the pair of groundbreaking resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, Council resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#) and General Assembly resolution [70/262](#).¹⁰⁸ In that context, she emphasized that the resolutions explicitly acknowledged for the first time that conflict prevention was the responsibility of the entire United Nations system and envisioned a more integrated and coherent United Nations approach to preventing conflict, building on the collective recognition that development, peace and security, and human rights were interlinked and mutually reinforcing. The representative of Chile also encouraged the further development of the joint work of the two bodies, as established in resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#), and recalled that the Council, in that resolution, had emphasized that sustaining peace required coherence, sustained engagement and coordination among the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates as set out in the Charter. The representative of Ecuador voiced his country's endorsement of the sixth paragraph of the presidential statement adopted on 9 November,¹⁰⁹ in which the Security Council had reaffirmed that sustaining peace required coherence, sustained engagement and coordination among the Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates as set out in the Charter.¹¹⁰

Council members and other participants also focused on the importance of an integrated approach to preventive diplomacy, highlighting in that regard the roles of and relationship between the two organs as stated in the relevant Articles of the Charter. The representative of Tunisia recalled that, while the Charter conferred the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security upon the Council, it also attributed to the General Assembly several prerogatives in that area, including those of discussing all matters linked to international peace and security and drawing the attention of the Council to situations that might endanger international peace and security.¹¹¹ The representative of Kenya stated that a preventive diplomatic strategy required the Council to work in coherence with the Assembly, as underlined in Article 11. The representative of France stated that the Council's action in the area of preventive diplomacy must be coordinated with that of other bodies and organizations, adding that the respective missions

entrusted by the Charter to the Security Council, the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council complemented and reinforced one another. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines emphasized that the agenda-setting powers of the Assembly should be leveraged more often. The representative of Nepal stated that the Assembly should provide a normative framework and adequate resources for preventive diplomacy and hold meaningful interactions with the Council with a view to coordinating sustainable preventive and peacebuilding strategies.¹¹² The representative of Malta emphasized that the Charter clearly identified ways in which the various United Nations organs could contribute to preventive diplomacy, and referred to Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter.¹¹³ In addition, she drew attention to Article 14, which stated that the Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, and she noted that those important powers could yield even better results if triggered in a timely manner and if synergies between the Assembly and the Council were strengthened further. Referring explicitly to Articles 10 and 11, the representative of Argentina also confirmed the broad authority of the Assembly to consider conflict prevention in all its aspects, develop recommendations and bring to the attention of the Council situations that may endanger international peace and security,¹¹⁴ and said that the Assembly thereby also played a central role in the preventive diplomacy architecture. The representative of Poland, emphasizing the urgent and clear need for more coherent and sustained cooperation among the principal United Nations bodies, called for the Council's engagement in advancing proactive, integrated and forward-looking preventive diplomacy in collaboration with other bodies, such as the Assembly.

Some participants also expressed views on the complementarity between the work of the Council and that of the General Assembly, in particular in the context of conflict prevention. The representative of Brazil emphasized that the Council should engage more regularly with the Assembly, not only to enhance its effectiveness but also to avoid encroachment on the mandate of the Assembly and unnecessary duplication of work.¹¹⁵ The representative of Morocco highlighted the importance of greater coherence between the work of the different bodies, to better anticipate conflicts

¹⁰⁸ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁰⁹ See [S/PRST/2021/22](#).

¹¹⁰ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹¹¹ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹¹² See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹¹³ See [S/PV.8906](#). For more information on the explicit references to Article 10 and 11 of the Charter, see subsection B.

¹¹⁴ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹¹⁵ See [S/PV.8906](#).

and crises and overcome difficulties in adapting to the evolving nature of conflicts, so as to reinforce the capacity of the United Nations to prevent them.¹¹⁶ In that connection, he stressed the need to strengthen consistency of action among United Nations bodies, rationalize mandates and initiatives on cross-cutting issues and appropriately prioritize attention and resources, focusing on pragmatic high-impact solutions, with scrupulous respect for the mandates and prerogatives of each body and in line with the Charter, in particular Article 12 (1).¹¹⁷ Other participants focused specifically on the role of the Assembly in instances when the Council failed to fulfil its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Croatia emphasized that the Assembly should utilize its own powers to prevent conflicts and atrocity crimes more effectively and respond to them when they occurred, especially when the Council failed to do so.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the representative of Turkey recalled that the Assembly served as a critical backstop for the

¹¹⁶ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹¹⁷ For more information on the explicit reference to Article 12 (1) of the Charter, see sect. I.C.

¹¹⁸ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

maintenance of peace and security when the Council failed to fulfil its responsibility. She stressed that the relationship between the two organs was an important element of preventive diplomacy. In that context, she expected the Council and the Assembly to work together closely to advance peace and security without encroaching on each other's mandates, adding that such coordination would enhance the accountability and transparency of the Council and promote greater cohesion throughout the system. The representative of Liechtenstein expressed support for a strong and active role of the Assembly as the central deliberative and decision-making organ of the United Nations and the guardian of international law. In that regard, he emphasized that the Assembly had demonstrated in a number of instances, most notably in connection with the situations in Myanmar and the Syrian Arab Republic, that it was indeed capable of stepping in where the Council could not fulfil its role. In addition, he stated that Liechtenstein would continue to pursue initiatives aimed at underscoring the Assembly's role in upholding peace and security, including the possibility of mandating a debate every time a veto was cast in the Council, without prejudice to the outcome of such a debate.

II. Relations with the Economic and Social Council

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Note

Section II concerns the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, with a particular focus on the practice of the Security Council in relation to Article 65 of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A features decisions of the Security Council concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council. Subsection B covers the deliberations of the Council concerning its relations with the Economic and Social Council, including the participation of the President of the Economic and Social Council in a meeting of the Security Council held on 16 November 2021.¹¹⁹ Subsection C concerns communications of the Security Council containing

references to its relations with the Economic and Social Council.

A. Decisions of the Security Council concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council

During the period under review, the Security Council did not formally address any requests to the Economic and Social Council for information or assistance. However, it adopted two presidential statements that made explicit references to the Economic and Social Council, one of which also contained an explicit reference to Article 65 of the Charter of the United Nations.

In a presidential statement adopted on 9 November in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", the Security Council reaffirmed that sustaining peace required coherence, sustained engagement and coordination among the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates as set out in

¹¹⁹ See [S/PV.8906](#). The meeting was held under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security".

the Charter.¹²⁰ Furthermore, the Security Council highlighted the contribution that the Economic and Social Council could make in addressing economic, social, cultural and humanitarian issues and underlined the importance of close cooperation in accordance with Article 65.¹²¹

In a presidential statement adopted on 16 November in connection with the same item, the Security Council expressed its continued commitment to foster interaction on a regular basis with the principal organs of the United Nations, including the Economic and Social Council, with their respective mandates under the Charter, in particular on matters relating to preventive diplomacy tools and mechanisms.¹²²

B. Discussions concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council

During the period under review, there were several references made to the relations between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in the deliberations of the former, including five explicit references to Article 65.¹²³ The key discussions in that regard took place during a thematic debate held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (see case 3).

In addition, Security Council members discussed the interaction between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in the context of both region-specific and thematic items.

Discussions in relation to country- or region-specific items

In a statement submitted for the videoconference held on 19 May in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and focused on addressing root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa, the delegation of Brazil affirmed the importance of stronger collaboration among the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, in the face of multifaceted challenges.¹²⁴ The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission reiterated that peacebuilding and

sustaining peace required coherence, sustained engagement and coordination among the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates set forth in the Charter.

Discussion in relation to thematic items

At an open videoconference held on 6 January in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines emphasized that the Security Council must continue to play a leading role as it worked more closely with the other main organs of the United Nations system, namely, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, to foster developmental solutions to the challenges of peace and security.¹²⁵ The representative of China stated that the Security Council, the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the relevant regional organizations should carry out their respective functions, strengthen collaboration and forge synergies, given the various complex security risks and challenges. In a written statement submitted on behalf of the Nordic countries, the representative of Denmark underscored the importance of ensuring closer and more systematic cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as with the Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Council, including in a briefing and advisory capacity. The representative of Slovakia, in a statement submitted for the videoconference, also expressed support for further strengthening the ties between the Security Council and the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council, as well as with civil society organizations and communities on the ground.

At an open videoconference held on 11 March under the item “Maintenance of international peace and security” and focused on conflict and food security, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, Rural Transformation, Industry and Labour of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines underscored that the Security Council must also work more closely with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to foster developmental solutions that met the basic needs of people in conflict settings.¹²⁶ In a statement submitted for the videoconference, the delegation of Brazil stressed that strategies aimed purely at security

¹²⁰ [S/PRST/2021/22](#), sixth paragraph.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, final paragraph.

¹²² [S/PRST/2021/23](#), eighth paragraph.

¹²³ See [S/PV.8906](#) (President of Economic and Social Council, and Kenya); and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Malaysia).

¹²⁴ See [S/2021/490](#).

¹²⁵ See [S/2021/24](#).

¹²⁶ See [S/2021/250](#).

could not, on their own, adequately address the overwhelming majority of the situations on the agenda of the Security Council, including with regard to food security. In that connection, increased cooperation with the Economic and Social Council was clearly needed, as was greater interaction between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission.

During an open debate held on 12 October under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” and the sub-item entitled “Diversity, State-building and the search for peace”, the representative of Mexico emphasized that the Council must strengthen dialogue with other main bodies of the United Nations, including the Economic and Social Council, specifically to prevent development challenges and human rights violations from becoming a threat to international peace and security.¹²⁷ In a written statement submitted in connection with the meeting, the delegation of Chile emphasized that the international security prevention road map required a framework rooted in international law and must include the cooperation of regional organizations and of the principal bodies of the United Nations system involved in peacebuilding, including the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council.¹²⁸ The representative of South Africa stressed that coordination among bodies, such as the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council, as well as the Economic and Social Council, remained critical for peace, security, and development issues.

At an open debate held on 9 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Exclusion, inequality and conflict”, the representative of Viet Nam underscored that a coordinated approach required the Security Council to work together with other entities in the United Nations system, including the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations country teams and other development partners, in accordance with their respective mandates.¹²⁹ The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran also stressed that the constructive contribution of the United Nations to conflict prevention required coherence, sustained engagement and coordination among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates as set out in the Charter. In a written statement submitted in connection with the meeting, the delegation of Brazil indicated that, as the Security Council began to consider a broader set of issues in order to better fulfil

its mandate on peace and security, it was imperative that the cooperation between the Security Council and other United Nations bodies primarily responsible for the issue at hand become more regular and effective.¹³⁰ In that connection, increased cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council was clearly needed.

Case 3

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 16 November, at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹³¹ the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”.¹³² During the open debate, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the President of the International Court of Justice.¹³³ Representatives of Security Council members and other participants delivered their statements during the meeting. The representatives of some non-Council member States submitted their statements in writing.¹³⁴

The Secretary-General stated that prevention was the very reason for the existence of the United Nations, and highlighted the role played by its principal organs in conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes, including the work of the Economic and Social Council in addressing conflict by advancing sustainable development.¹³⁵ The President of the General Assembly stated that work done by the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to build resilient and prosperous communities facilitated the work of the Security Council. He called upon Member States to work together to implement Assembly resolution 75/325, in which the Assembly had encouraged regular interaction and continued coordination among the Presidents of the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social

¹²⁷ See [S/PV.8877](#).

¹²⁸ See [S/2021/868](#).

¹²⁹ See [S/PV.8900](#).

¹³⁰ See [S/2021/935](#).

¹³¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October 2021 ([S/2021/888](#)). The meeting is also the subject of case 2, on the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and case 4, on the relationship between the Council and the International Court of Justice.

¹³² See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹³³ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹³⁴ See [S/2021/952](#) (Australia, Guatemala, Italy and Republic of Korea).

¹³⁵ See [S/PV.8906](#).

Council. The President of the Economic and Social Council underscored that the work of that body in conflict settings and on humanitarian action was highly relevant to the maintenance of peace and security. He noted that, to date, interactions between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council had remained sporadic and ad hoc, and emphasized that the complex challenges of the day required more institutionalized collaboration. In that connection, both entities had the legal basis for inter-Council collaboration and coordination under Article 65 of the Charter, which provides that the Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist it upon its request.

The President of the Economic and Social Council further referred to the rules of procedure of that body, noting that the Security Council could request special sessions of the Economic and Social Council or propose agenda items for its consideration, and indicated that the Sahel, South Sudan and Haiti were matters addressed by both Councils and could benefit from joint and complementary approaches. He shared a series of practical options for strengthening inter-Council coordination, including furthering the collaboration between the two Councils, building on their previous collaboration of the early 2000s, when the Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa had regularly participated in the work of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on African Countries emerging from conflict; holding regular meetings of the heads of the principal organs under the Charter and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, drawing on the experience of the existing regular interactions among the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission; and extending participation in joint meetings on common themes to the entire membership of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. In closing, the President of the Economic and Social Council indicated that recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, including equitable vaccine access, was another area where the two Councils could work together in coordination with the Assembly in a complementary manner, in accordance with their respective mandates.

Following the briefings, Security Council members and participants discussed the relationship between the two organs in the context of conflict prevention. Some called for strengthened coordination and increased cooperation among principal organs of the United Nations, including among the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, in

preventive diplomacy,¹³⁶ and in the service of sustainable development.¹³⁷ The representative of France also underscored that the respective missions entrusted by the Charter to the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council complemented and reinforced one another.¹³⁸ The representative of South Africa called upon the primary organs of the United Nations to work in synergy in order to achieve the goal of preventative diplomacy, and said that the primary organs, such as the Economic and Social Council, had the potential to play a greater role in supporting the Security Council in preventing conflict.¹³⁹ Therefore, regular interaction, coordination and collaboration between the Security Council and other primary organs of the United Nations in fulfilling the Council's mandate could not be overemphasized; such activities would establish increased coherence and complementarity among those organs, respectful of each other's mandates.

The representative of Kenya stated that a preventative diplomatic strategy required the Security Council to work in coherence with the Economic and Social Council, as underlined in Article 65 of the Charter.¹⁴⁰ For the Council to effectively fulfil its mandate, it must consider and address the economic, political, and social dimensions of conflict, in coordination with the other principal organs. In a statement submitted for the meeting, the delegation of Italy expressed the belief that the Economic and Social Council could play a greater role in identifying social and economic problems likely to result in a crisis, and in developing strategies to deal with economic and social causes of conflict.¹⁴¹ In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the representative of Malaysia underscored that partnerships between special political missions mandated by the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council were critical to realizing a comprehensive approach that linked security with social and economic development in building lasting peace, and he encouraged the Security Council to make greater use of Article 65.¹⁴²

Some Member States highlighted the importance of communication between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The representative

¹³⁶ See [S/PV.8906](#) (Mexico, Niger and France); [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Poland); and [S/2021/952](#) (Italy).

¹³⁷ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Nepal and Malaysia).

¹³⁸ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹³⁹ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁴¹ See [S/2021/952](#).

¹⁴² See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

of Estonia stated that his country valued the regular exchanges between the Security Council and representatives of other principal organs of the United Nations, and emphasized that communication, both in public and private, were of vital importance.¹⁴³ The representative of Costa Rica reiterated the importance of improving the working methods of the Security Council by deepening its communication with other organs and actors, including the Economic and Social Council. Such communication should be more fluid and dynamic. The representative of Azerbaijan, speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, recalled that, at the eighteenth Summit of the Movement, its Heads of State and Government had called upon the Presidents of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council to conduct regular discussions and coordination among themselves with regard to their agendas and programmes of work to establish increased coherence and complementarity among the organs.¹⁴⁴ While recalling that each organ had a distinct and separate role and reaffirming that they must carry out only those functions and powers established in their respective mandate, he also emphasized that close cooperation and coordination among the principal organs of the United Nations was highly indispensable in order to enable the United Nations to remain relevant and capable of meeting existing, new and emerging threats and challenges. The representative of the United Arab Emirates indicated that maintaining regular communication and transparency between the Council and the wider United Nations membership was vital, and expressed support for regular engagement on shared priorities with the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as with the incoming President of the Security Council and the President of the Assembly.

Other Member States called upon the principal organs of the United Nations to maintain or increase cooperation among themselves while focusing on their respective mandates.¹⁴⁵ The representative of Chile expressed the conviction that coordination among the main organs of the United Nations, in accordance with their Charter mandates, was the best way to prevent conflicts, and recalled that the Security Council, in paragraph 2 of its resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#), had stated that sustaining peace required coherence, sustained

engagement and coordination among the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates as set out in the Charter.¹⁴⁶ The representative of China stated that the Economic and Social Council had comparative advantages in promoting economic development and advancing peace and stability, and should therefore, carry out its work while maintaining communication and cooperation. The representative of Finland, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, stated that the principal organs of the United Nations all had key roles to play in preventing conflicts and sustaining peace within their respective mandates, and encouraged closer cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The representative of Brazil expressed the firm belief that the aims of the Charter were better achieved through increased coordination, cooperation and interaction between the Security Council and the relevant organs of the United Nations, and called for more engagement between the two Councils, not only to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council but also to avoid any encroachment on its mandate and any unnecessary duplication of work.

Several Member States provided specific recommendations for the Economic and Social Council to further assist the Security Council in its work. The representative of Tunisia recalled that the Charter requested the Economic and Social Council to provide information to the Security Council and, if it so requested, to provide assistance. The representative of Malta affirmed that the Economic and Social Council could play a central role in identifying the socioeconomic drivers of conflict in specific contexts and country situations and could therefore form an integral part of a comprehensive early warning system. In that context, annual or biannual interactive dialogues could be held among the Presidents of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as with representatives of civil society, to discuss and examine emerging challenges at an early stage. The representative of Ecuador endorsed the sixth paragraph of the presidential statement adopted on 9 November,¹⁴⁷ reaffirming that sustaining peace required coherence, sustained engagement and coordination among the Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, consistent with their mandates, expressing support for the continuation of monthly meetings among the heads of the principal organs and calling for the results of those meetings to be circulated for the information of all

¹⁴³ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁴⁵ For more information on the division of labour between the principal organs of the United Nations and the need to operate within their respective mandates, see part V, sect. III, case 6.

¹⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁴⁷ See [S/PRST/2021/22](#), sixth paragraph.

delegations.¹⁴⁸ The representative of Bangladesh indicated that the United Nations needed to increase the visibility of its principal organs vis-à-vis the global community in order to demonstrate their joint cooperation and coordination on the prevention of conflict, and suggested that the Presidents of the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council organize joint media stakeouts on a quarterly basis.

C. Communications concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council

One communication circulated as a document of the Security Council during the reporting period

contained a reference to the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. In a letter dated 8 February addressed to the President of the Security Council, the delegation of Finland transmitted the report of the eighteenth annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Council, held on 12 and 13 November 2020.¹⁴⁹ As described in the report, one participant maintained that the Council should stick more closely to its priorities and work towards a better, and better defined, division of labour on issues dealt with by the Council and other organs, such as the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.

¹⁴⁹ See [S/2021/130](#).

¹⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

III. Relations with the International Court of Justice

Article 94

1. *Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.*

2. *If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.*

Article 96

1. *The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.*

2. *Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.*

Note

Section III concerns the relationship between the Council and the International Court of Justice. In accordance with Article 94 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council may make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment rendered by the Court if a party to a case

fails to perform its obligations under that judgment. Pursuant to Article 96, the Council may also request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. In addition, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, notice of any provisional measures to be taken to preserve the rights of parties may be given by the Court to the parties and to the Council.

During the reporting period, in line with the prior practice of the Council, the President of the International Court of Justice was invited to participate in a private meeting of the Council, held on 2 November.¹⁵⁰ In addition, the Council heard a briefing by the President of the Court at a meeting held on 16 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”.¹⁵¹ The election of a member of the Court held concurrently by the Council and the Assembly during the reporting period is covered in section I.E. Subsection A covers the decisions of the Council containing references to the Court. Subsection B covers the discussions held among Council members during the reporting period on the relations between the Council and the Court. Subsection C covers the communications of the Council concerning the relationship between the two organs.

¹⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8894](#).

¹⁵¹ See [S/PV.8906](#), [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) and [S/2021/952](#).

A. Decisions referring to the International Court of Justice

In the presidential statement adopted on 16 November, the Council expressed its continued commitment to fostering interaction on a regular basis with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat, in accordance with their respective mandates under the Charter, in particular on matters relating to preventive diplomacy tools and mechanisms.¹⁵² In addition, the Council emphasized the key role of the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, in adjudicating disputes among States, and also emphasized the value of the Court's work.¹⁵³

B. Discussions concerning relations with the International Court of Justice

During the period under review, reference was made in the deliberations of the Council to the role of the International Court of Justice in connection with the peaceful settlement of disputes and to the relationship between the Council and the Court. Most of the references, including two explicit references to Article 94¹⁵⁴ and one to Article 96,¹⁵⁵ as well as general references to the relationship between the Council and the Court, were made at the open debate held on 16 November under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" (see case 4).

In addition, at an open videoconference held on 6 January in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and focused on the challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts, the delegation of Azerbaijan, in a written statement submitted on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, emphasized the significant role played by the International Court of Justice in promoting and encouraging the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. In that connection, the Movement urged the Council, the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations, as well as its specialized agencies duly authorized to do so, to make greater use of the Court as a source of advisory

opinions and interpretation of international law within the scope of the activities of those entities.¹⁵⁶

In a written statement submitted for an open videoconference on "The situation in Libya" held on 28 January, the representative of Libya expressed his indignation about the state of Libyan funds and assets frozen pursuant to Council resolutions. In that regard, his Government would not stand idly by while certain countries attempted to tamper with those funds. It held the Council responsible for taking a firm stand against such attempts. If the state of affairs continued, and if the request by Libya to manage the frozen assets was blocked, Libya would be forced to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice to seek redress.¹⁵⁷

Case 4

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 16 November, at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁵⁸ the Council held an open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations". During the open debate, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, the President of the International Court of Justice and the President of the Economic and Social Council.¹⁵⁹ Representatives of Council members and other participants delivered their statements during the meeting. The representatives of some non-Council member States submitted their statements in writing.¹⁶⁰

The Secretary-General stated that prevention was vital to lasting peace and that it was the ultimate goal of the work of the Council and its resolutions to help countries build peace and stability and resolve their disputes before they escalated into armed conflicts.¹⁶¹ In that regard, he highlighted that the judicial dimension of prevention provided by the International Court of Justice was essential. The President of the

¹⁵² S/PRST/2021/23, eighth paragraph.

¹⁵³ Ibid., final paragraph.

¹⁵⁴ See S/PV.8906 (President of International Court of Justice and Brazil).

¹⁵⁵ See S/PV.8906 (Resumption 1).

¹⁵⁶ See S/2021/24.

¹⁵⁷ See S/2021/97.

¹⁵⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October 2021 (S/2021/888). The meeting is also the subject of case 2, on the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and of case 3, on the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

¹⁵⁹ See S/PV.8906 and S/PV.8906 (Resumption 1).

¹⁶⁰ See S/2021/952 (Australia, Guatemala, Italy and Republic of Korea).

¹⁶¹ See S/PV.8906.

Court indicated that it welcomed efforts by other principal organs to promote Member States resolving their disputes before the Court. Regarding the relationship between the Court and the Council, she invoked Article 36 (3) of the Charter, which states that the Council may recommend, in relation to legal disputes that endanger international peace and security, that the States involved refer the dispute to the Court. The Council had made such a recommendation for the very first case heard by the Court: the Corfu Channel case. The President of the Court also referred to the 2012 declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels, which recalled the ability of the relevant organs of the United Nations to request advisory opinions from the Court. The question of whether to seek any particular advisory opinion from the Court was entirely in the hands of the relevant organ or specialized agency and its members. The Court itself stood ready to receive any requests for advisory opinions that relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies made.

The President of the International Court of Justice further recalled Article 94 (2) of the Charter, which sets out a specific role for the Council in the implementation of the decisions of the Court. However, the limited use of that provision suggested that States had found it more valuable to pursue other avenues to achieve the full implementation of judgments of the Court. She highlighted, nonetheless, that the principal organs of the United Nations could play a positive role in that regard, citing as an example the fundamental role played by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in bringing about the implementation of the Court's 2012 judgment in the case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. United Nations organs had opportunities, within their respective purview, to contribute to the implementation of judgments of the Court and the promotion of peace, security and justice. The President encouraged Council members to consider ways in which contributions of the Court and other principal organs could be mutually reinforcing.

Several Council members and other participants saw value in enhancing interactions between the Council and the International Court of Justice. The representative of Estonia highlighted the importance of the annual discussions held by the Council with the President of the Court, adding that, more often than not, the problem was not the lack of information nor the early warning, but rather the lack of early and united action.¹⁶² The representative of Saint Vincent

and the Grenadines underlined that the mediatory and technical capacities of the Court on matters pertaining to the rule of law ought to be leveraged more often. The representative of Costa Rica reiterated the importance of improving the working methods of the Council by deepening its communication with other organs, including the Court, and indicated that such communication should be more fluid and dynamic. The representative of Poland called for the Council's engagement in advancing proactive, integrated and forward-looking preventive diplomacy, in collaboration with other organs, including the Court.¹⁶³ The representative of the United Arab Emirates similarly expressed support for greater interaction between the Council and the Court, in accordance with the Council's mandates under the Charter. The delegation of Italy expressed the belief that the Council should further strengthen its relationship with and make greater use of the Court in the peaceful settlement of disputes.¹⁶⁴

In addition, some speakers emphasized the importance of the role of the International Court of Justice in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and in upholding and promoting the rule of law through its judgments and advisory opinions.¹⁶⁵ The representative of Estonia expressed the belief that more frequent and timely referrals of cases to the Court by the Council would contribute to resolving disputes, thereby promoting international peace and security.¹⁶⁶ The representative of Azerbaijan, speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, urged the Council, the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations, as well as its specialized agencies that were duly authorized to do so, to make greater use of the Court as a source of advisory opinions and interpretation of international law within the scope of those entities' activities.¹⁶⁷

The representative of Brazil indicated that there was potential for increased cooperation between the Council and the Court, such as on requests for advisory opinions on legal issues related to both country-specific situations and thematic items addressed by the Council.¹⁶⁸ The Council could more often recommend that conflicting States submit their disputes to the

¹⁶² See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁶³ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁶⁴ See [S/2021/952](#).

¹⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8906](#) (Ireland); [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Croatia, Slovakia, Nepal, Liechtenstein, Azerbaijan (on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), South Africa and United Arab Emirates); and [S/2021/952](#) (Guatemala).

¹⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8906](#).

Court and also cooperate in the enforcement of the decisions of the Court in cases of non-compliance, taking into account Article 94 of the Charter. The representative of Malaysia emphasized that deliberations on contentious political and security issues could be more effective when they were reinforced by authoritative legal opinions, and urged the Council to seriously consider Article 96.¹⁶⁹ In addition, he called on the Council to make greater use of the International Court of Justice as a source of advisory opinions and of interpretation of relevant norms of international law, particularly regarding long-standing issues that affected international peace and security. The representative of Bangladesh underscored that, as the principal entity responsible for enforcing the decisions of the Court, the Council needed to fulfil its role in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, including by supporting monitoring mechanisms, where they existed.

Several participants also spoke about the role of the International Court of Justice in preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In that regard, the representative of Ireland underscored the Court's potential role in adjudicating disputes between States which might otherwise have led to conflict.¹⁷⁰ She added that the Court remained underutilized as a resource for the peaceful adjudication of disputes in accordance with international law and that its role in preventing conflict could be bolstered by greater interaction between the

Council and the Court. The Council should consider, where appropriate, the possibility of seeking the Court's input in the form of advisory opinions. It could also recommend that States involved in a dispute on the agenda of the Council resolve the legal aspect of the dispute before the Court. The representative of South Africa encouraged the Council to interact regularly with the Court and to draw upon the legal advisory expertise pertaining to the prevention of conflicts and the settlement of disputes that may have catastrophic implications for countries concerned.¹⁷¹ The representative of Ecuador urged the pursuit of synergies with the Court, especially in efforts aimed at the peaceful settlement of disputes, which were part of preventative diplomacy.

C. Communications concerning relations with the International Court of Justice

During the period under review, the Council continued to exchange letters¹⁷² with the Secretary-General and to receive his reports¹⁷³ on the progress of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission established to facilitate the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 on the land and maritime boundary dispute between the two countries.

¹⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁷¹ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁷² [S/2021/1069](#) and [S/2021/1070](#).

¹⁷³ See [S/2021/612](#) and [S/2021/1091](#).

Part V

Functions and powers of the Security Council

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Introductory note

Part V of the present Supplement covers the functions and powers of the Security Council, as defined in Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, and is accordingly divided into three sections. Under each section, explicit and implicit references made to those Articles in decisions, meetings, and communications of the Council during 2021 are listed. Part V also features explicit and implicit references made by participants in the context of open videoconferences held further to the procedures and working methods developed by Council members during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, despite them not being considered meetings of the Council. Case studies in sections I and II provide an overview of specific instances in which Articles 24 and 25 were discussed in meetings and open videoconferences, or which otherwise illustrate how the Council has applied or interpreted those Articles. Consistent with previous supplements, section III does not include any case studies, since there were no examples of substantive discussions on Article 26 in 2021.

As outlined in section I below, in 2021, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 24 of the Charter in its decisions, instead referring to its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” in 17 of its decisions, predominantly in connection with thematic issues such as threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, United Nations peacekeeping operations, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and children and armed conflict, as well as a number of country- and region-specific issues, such as the situation in Libya and peace and security in Africa. Article 24 was, however, invoked explicitly in two Council meetings, held under the items entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”. In addition, Council members and other participants in Council meetings and open videoconferences discussed the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in connection with a broad range of issues. As illustrated in the case studies in section I, Council members and other participants deliberated on the scope of the Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security, including with regard to emerging challenges to international peace and security such as the impact of climate change, the role of the Council in conflict prevention, including vis-à-vis other principal organs of the United Nations, and the connection between the working methods of the Council and the effective implementation of its mandate. In addition, during the discussions on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Council members exchanged views on the role of the Council with respect to the appointment of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, the mandate of the Council with regard to the developments concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was discussed during the meetings held in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. In 2021, one communication of the Council contained an explicit reference to Article 24.

As featured in section II, in 2021, the Council made an explicit reference to Article 25 in one decision, adopted in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. Article 25 was also explicitly invoked during two Council meetings held under the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”. The obligation of Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council was discussed extensively during meetings and open videoconferences held in connection with a

¹ For more details of the procedures developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II of the present Supplement, as well as *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II.

broad range of issues, including items related to non-proliferation, concerning resolutions [1540 \(2004\)](#) and [2231 \(2015\)](#). In addition, five communications of the Council contained 15 explicit references to Article 25, mostly in connection with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

As described in section III, in 2021, the Council did not refer to its responsibility to formulate plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments pursuant to Article 26 in any of its decisions. One participant in a Council meeting, however, referred to that Article explicitly on one occasion. No communications addressed to the Council in 2021 featured the Article explicitly.

I. Primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24

Article 24

1. *In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.*

2. *In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII.*

3. *The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.*

Note

Section I covers the practice of the Council concerning its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the Charter,² and is divided into two subsections. Subsection A deals with decisions adopted in 2021 that refer to the primary responsibility of the Council pursuant to Article 24. Subsection B examines references to that Article made in discussions held during Council meetings and open videoconferences.

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decision explicitly referring to Article 24. That Article was, however, expressly invoked in two Council meetings held under the items entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”. Furthermore, five explicit references to Article 24 were made in written statements submitted by delegations in connection with meetings held under the items entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” and “United Nations peacekeeping operations”. In addition, an explicit reference to Article 24 was made in one communication of the Council, namely, in the concept note for the Arria-formula meeting held on 29 November 2021, on the theme “Accountability in the Syrian Arab Republic”, annexed

to a letter dated 30 December 2021 from the representative of Estonia to the Secretary-General.³

A. Decisions referring to Article 24

During the period under review, the Council did not refer explicitly to Article 24 in its decisions. Instead, in 7 resolutions and 10 presidential statements, the Council referred to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security while taking a broad range of actions. Consistent with past practice, implicit references to Article 24 were featured mainly in preambular paragraphs of resolutions and initial paragraphs of presidential statements predominantly in connection with thematic items on the agenda of the Council.

Resolutions

In 2021, the Council implicitly referred to Article 24 in seven resolutions, in which it reiterated, reaffirmed or indicated that it was mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security while taking a broad range of actions. In one resolution, the Council expressed grave concern that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continued to undermine the effectiveness of the Council in discharging its primary responsibility.⁴ With one exception, all references in resolutions to the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security were made in connection with thematic issues, namely, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, children and armed conflict, United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council referred to its primary responsibility in connection with one country-specific item, “The situation in Libya”, in which it acted under Chapter VII of the Charter. Further information about the resolutions is provided in table 1.

Presidential statements

During the year under review, the Council adopted 10 presidential statements containing implicit references to Article 24, in which it reaffirmed, reiterated, bore in mind or indicated that it was acting

² Article 24 (3), under which the Council is required to submit annual and special reports to the General Assembly, is covered in part IV, sect. I.F.

³ S/2021/1112.

⁴ Resolution 2616 (2021), second preambular paragraph.

in accordance with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. All references in the presidential statements were in connection with thematic issues, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security, cooperation between the United Nations and regional

and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, peace and security in Africa, and threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. More details about the presidential statements are provided in table 1.

Table 1

Decisions in 2021 containing implicit references to Article 24 (1) of the Charter

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>
S/PRST/2021/1 12 January 2021	Eighteenth paragraph	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	International cooperation in combating terrorism 20 years after the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001)
S/PRST/2021/2 29 January 2021	First paragraph	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	
S/PRST/2021/8 8 April 2021	First paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	Mine action and sustaining peace: stronger partnerships for better delivery
S/PRST/2021/9 19 April 2021	Second paragraph	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	
Resolution 2573 (2021) 27 April 2021	First preambular paragraph	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	
S/PRST/2021/10 19 May 2021	First paragraph	Peace and security in Africa	Addressing root causes of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa
Resolution 2578 (2021) 3 June 2021	Sixth preambular paragraph	The situation in Libya	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2526 (2020) (S/2021/434)
S/PRST/2021/15 9 August 2021	First paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	
Resolution 2589 (2021) 18 August 2021	First preambular paragraph	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Protecting the protectors
Resolution 2594 (2021) 9 September 2021	First preambular paragraph	United Nations peacekeeping operations	United Nations transitions
S/PRST/2021/18 15 September 2021	First paragraph	Peace and security in Africa	
Resolution 2598 (2021) 29 September 2021	Fourth preambular paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	
S/PRST/2021/21 28 October 2021	Second paragraph	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>
Resolution 2601 (2021) 29 October 2021	Second preambular paragraph	Children and armed conflict	
S/PRST/2021/22 9 November 2021	First paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	Exclusion, inequality and conflict
S/PRST/2021/23 16 November 2021	Second paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations
Resolution 2616 (2021) 22 December 2021	Second preambular paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	

B. Discussions relating to Article 24

During the period under review, Article 24 was invoked both explicitly and implicitly at numerous meetings of the Council, as well as in statements delivered or submitted in the context of open videoconferences. Speakers made two explicit references to Article 24 at Council meetings held in connection with the items entitled “Peace and security in Africa”⁵ and “Maintenance of international peace and security”.⁶ In addition, there were five explicit references to Article 24 in written statements submitted by delegations in connection with two meetings held under the items entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”⁷ and “United Nations peacekeeping operations”.⁸

The case studies below illustrate the most salient discussions in 2021 with respect to the interpretation of the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, namely under the items entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (cases 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8) and “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” (case 3). In addition, during the meetings held under the item entitled “The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Council members discussed the authority of the Council to approve the appointment of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (case 4). At the meetings held in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, speakers also discussed the mandate of the

Council with regard to developments concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (case 5).

Case 1

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 23 February, at a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” convened at the initiative of the United Kingdom, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,⁹ Council members discussed the issue of climate and security.¹⁰ They heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the Chair of the Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change. All Council members spoke during the videoconference, as did the President of Malawi, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance and Corporate Governance of Antigua and Barbuda and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany. In addition, the delegations and representatives of 43 non-Council members including the International Committee of the Red Cross submitted statements in writing.

During the videoconference, Council members discussed the impact of climate change on the maintenance of international peace and security. In his remarks, the President of France noted that failure on the climate front would undermine conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. That was why France fully supported the initiative to address the issue of climate change at the level of the Council as part of its mandate to maintain international peace and security. According to the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of Kenya, the implementation of the Council’s mandate to maintain global peace and

⁵ See [S/PV.8816](#) (Egypt).

⁶ See [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

⁷ See [S/2021/572](#) (Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador and Islamic Republic of Iran).

⁸ See [S/2021/783](#) (Ecuador).

⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 17 February 2021 ([S/2021/155](#)).

¹⁰ See [S/2021/198](#). For more information on the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, see part I, sect. 34. For more information on high-level meetings and videoconferences, see part II.

security would only get more difficult with time if climate change remained on its present course. In that context, he noted that efforts must be redoubled to direct all resources and multilateral frameworks of the rules-based international order to mitigate the effects of climate change. Similarly, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines asserted that, as the primary organ for maintaining international peace and security, the Council had a responsibility to address the consequences of climate change, in line with its mandate. He added that failure to tackle the debilitating impacts of climate change through the lens of peace and security meant, in part, an abdication of the Council's duty. He acknowledged that the Council had a role to play, without encroaching on the work of the inclusive decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which he reaffirmed as the primary body dealing with climate change. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland said that climate change had many complex impacts, not least on international peace and security, which was the very business of the Council. The Special Presidential Envoy for Climate of the United States said that the climate threat was so massive and multifaceted that it was impossible to disentangle it from the other challenges that the Council faced.

In contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the connection between climate and conflict could be considered only with regard to concrete country- and region-specific cases and that there was no reason to refer to it in a generic manner and a global context. He added that not every conflict entailed threats to international peace and security with which the Council dealt. The Prime Minister of Viet Nam proposed that the Council, with its paramount mission of maintaining international peace and security, needed to galvanize the efforts of the international community through a set of measures, including upholding the principles of respect for the sovereignty, national ownership and principal responsibilities of States.

In their written contributions, delegations and representatives of non-Council members discussed the connection between the Council's mandate to maintain international peace and security and climate-related security risks. According to the delegation of Austria, the primary responsibility of the Council lay more broadly in maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including the competence to investigate any situation, such as climate change and its adverse impacts, which might

lead to international friction. Similarly, the delegation of Belgium shared the view of most Council members in demanding a more active role from the Council to address climate-related security risks, as it was the only United Nations institution with a mandate to maintain international peace and security, on which it needed to deliver. The delegation of Guatemala noted that, owing to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council should integrate climate security assessments in all mandated reports of situations on its agenda. The representative of Lebanon argued that the Council, entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, should work towards ensuring that conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches increasingly integrated climate considerations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Maldives maintained that, while everyone recognized that associating climate-related risks with international peace and security was a complex and broad challenge, the Council must solve difficult and complex issues for it to live up to its primary responsibility for international peace and security. The representative of Liechtenstein stated that addressing the climate and security nexus was a prerequisite for the Council to fulfil its mandate. The representative of Saint Lucia recalled that, since its establishment, the Council had focused predominantly on issues of war, military activity and violent conflict. However, over the years, the Council had evolved and expanded the scope of security topics, thereby proving its capability as a dynamic and evolving organ. In that context, while the climate-security connection remained complex, the Council, as the highest organ with the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, had to evolve to meet the challenges that existed.

Expressing a different view, the representative of Brazil raised concerns with the possible "securitization" of the climate agenda by the Council, stating that it should address climate change issues on a case-by-case basis in the context of concrete threats to international peace and security and refrain from seeking comprehensive one-size-fits-all formulas. A reallocation of the climate agenda to the Council would curb representativeness regarding a topic that interested the whole United Nations membership and had its own, more representative, dedicated multilateral regime. While agreeing that climate change was but one of several serious environmental challenges with potential peace and security implications, the delegation of South Africa cautioned the Council to guard against "mandate creep", whereby the Council would outpace its own resources and capacities. Moreover, where climate change was shown to be a clear contributing

factor to a threat to international peace and security, it could be appropriate for the Council to comment on that apparent link within the specific context of the countries which might be affected.

Case 2

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 7 May, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹¹ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, with a focus on upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system.¹² During the videoconference, Council members heard a briefing by the President of the General Assembly.

Addressing Council members on behalf of the 193 States Members of the United Nations, the President of the General Assembly noted that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the Council was entrusted with a special responsibility in relation to international peace and security. He added that the success or failure of the Council to achieve its mandate was seen as the success or failure of the United Nations. On many occasions, the Council had been divided and unable to rise to the challenge, mostly owing to differences among its members, in particular the permanent members. Council reform was a core interest of the United Nations and went to the heart of its legitimacy. In that context, the President of the Assembly affirmed the need for a more representative, accountable and transparent Council.

Following the briefing, several Council members expressed their views on the Council’s mandate, in particular vis-à-vis emerging challenges such as climate change. The State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China asserted that it was important to place greater emphasis on public health, counter-terrorism, climate change and other non-traditional security threats so as to eliminate the root causes of crises and cement the foundation for security, adding that the Council could play a bigger role in this context within its mandate. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia noted that, given the clear links between climate and security, the Council should also show leadership in that field. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland affirmed that the Council had unique legitimacy for the maintenance of international peace and security and pointed to the urgent need for a

concerted multilateral response to climate change – with all organs of the United Nations, including the Council, playing their role. According to the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, a firm multilateral consensus needed to be established around the nexus between international peace and security and climate change. She expressed the view that it was no longer tenable to underestimate the devastating effects of climate change and called on the Council to pronounce itself unequivocally on the matter and offer the leadership and momentum required to galvanize global action against climate change-related risks to international tranquillity and security. The Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Niger remarked that the time had come to extend the scope of the Council’s action to take into account other emerging challenges that could jeopardize international peace and security, such as cybercrime, just as it had done with the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. He added that the objective of the Council was not only to manage conflicts, but that it had a fundamental responsibility to prevent them. According to the Minister of State for Tourism, French Nationals Abroad and Francophonie, attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, the Council should not remain idle in the face of climate change. That is why France had proposed that the Secretary-General report regularly to the Council on that specific subject, so that it could put in place the necessary preventive measures.

Citing other global threats, beyond climate change, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation asserted that the permanent members of the Council bore special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. He emphasized that the United Nations must constantly adapt to ever-changing conditions, while continuing to fully respect the division of labour between the main Charter bodies and maintaining the support of all the Member States. Underscoring the importance of the principle of the sovereign equality of Member States, the Secretary of State of the United States stated that hostile actions by one State against another, including through disinformation or weaponized corruption, the undermining of free and fair elections and democratic institutions or attacks against journalists and dissidents abroad, could also threaten the international peace and security that, under the Charter, the Council was obliged to maintain.

Several Council members highlighted the connection between the need for Council reform and its legitimacy and ability to discharge its mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security.

¹¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 29 April 2021 (S/2021/416).

¹² See S/2021/456.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland noted that a reformed and more representative Council that better reflected twenty-first century global realities would have enhanced legitimacy, which was essential to delivering on its mandate to maintain international peace and security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia believed that the time had come to agree on a reform that could render the Council more democratic, representative, transparent and effective, which would bolster the legitimacy of that central organ. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam, to fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council needed to be reformed, in order to enhance transparency, democracy, representativeness and effectiveness and improve its working methods. The Foreign Secretary of India expressed the view that the Council needed to be made more representative of developing countries if it were to continue to engender trust and confidence in its ability to provide leadership to the entire world. He added that the narrow representation and privileges of a few in the primary decision-making organ of the United Nations posed a serious challenge to the Council's credibility and effectiveness.

Case 3

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At a meeting held on 16 June at the joint initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, whose Permanent Representative chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions,¹³ the Council convened an open debate under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)".¹⁴ During the meeting, Council members heard briefings by the Chair of the Working Group, the co-author of the fourth edition of *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Loraine Sievers, and the Executive Director of Security Council Report. The representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States delivered statements during the meeting, as did the representative of Kenya, who spoke on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Council. In addition, delegations of 28 non-Council members submitted statements in writing.¹⁵

Several speakers discussed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the working methods of the Council and its capacity to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁶ In that regard, the Chair of the Working Group noted that the ability of the Council to discharge its mandate had been challenged during the pandemic, as it had been unable to convene in person and interact with the wider United Nations membership. Similarly, citing specific examples of the impact of the pandemic on the Council's working methods, the Executive Director of Security Council Report asked whether the Council's innovations and its development of remote working methods and procedures had limited its ability to deliver on its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. While recognizing how far the Council had adapted to challenging circumstances through the adoption of virtual working methods, the representative of the United Kingdom noted that certain downsides had affected the Council's capacity to fulfil its mandate, including to face new challenges. In that regard, she stated that the new working methods had inhibited responsiveness, citing a lack of formal Council meetings since March 2020. The representative of the United States noted that the utilization of videoconference technologies had demonstrated to the world that the Council continued to perform its role in maintaining international peace and security during the pandemic.

More broadly, several speakers made the connection between the Council's working methods in general and its ability to discharge its mandate. The Chair of the Working Group stated that the working methods remained the foundation upon which the Council effectively discharged its mandate and that, despite formidable challenges, improving those methods and adapting them to reflect current circumstances should not waver. Noting that the Council bore the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the representative of China stated that the Council needed to constantly improve its working methods, ensure fairness and justice, embody openness and inclusiveness, further enhance its efficiency and effectiveness, and better fulfil the critical duties entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations. Speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, the representative of Kenya noted their commitment to effectively execute the Council's mandate and drive forward improvements in its methods of work. The representative of the Russian Federation asserted that any changes to the

¹³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 June 2021 (S/2021/527).

¹⁴ See S/PV.8798.

¹⁵ See S/2021/572.

¹⁶ See S/PV.8798.

working methods of the Council should be aimed at really improving the effectiveness and efficiency with which the Council carried out its primary function of maintaining international peace and security.

The representative of Kenya called for restraint on the use of the veto, especially on actions aimed at preventing or ending mass atrocity crimes, which went to the very heart of the Council's mandate. Reflecting on the effectiveness of the Council, the representative of the United Kingdom opined that the Council best fulfilled its mandate by solving problems through interactive debate, critical analysis, challenge, building consensus and making decisions that moved issues forward, which sometimes meant more talking in private rather than in public and discussing new issues that could be uncomfortable to some. With respect to efficiency, she added that lengthy meetings and the use of prepared statements rarely, if ever, fulfilled the Council's mandate. The representative of Kenya noted that targeted sanctions were an important tool for addressing threats to international peace and security and were therefore critical to the execution of the mandate of the Council. He affirmed that engagement with regional organizations spoke to the importance of Chapter VIII of the Charter in executing the mandate of the Council.

In their written statements, delegations of several non-Council members discussed the Council's working methods in the context of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, with some explicitly referring to Article 24.¹⁷ In that regard, some delegations¹⁸ referred to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the finding of innovative ways to ensure the Council's continuous functioning, thus enabling it to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Other delegations¹⁹ underscored the importance of ensuring transparency in the work of the Council as the organ entrusted with acting on behalf of the entire membership of the United Nations with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Ecuador posited that the Council acted on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 24, adding that the other side of that representation was the obligation to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations and that the responsibility set out in the Article must be carried out without exception. According to the delegation of El Salvador, the task of building back better for a more

equal, resilient and sustainable world created a space for reflection on how to ensure the strict fulfilment of Article 24 and, in particular, how to ensure prompt and effective action on the collective responsibility to maintain international peace and security. The same delegation also noted that resolutions, presidential statements and press statements were important mechanisms for carrying out the Council's principal responsibility to maintain international peace and security. According to the delegation of Guatemala, the holding of numerous Arria-formula meetings had enabled the Council to obtain truthful information and thus be more effective in its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Referring explicitly to Article 24, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that, in fulfilling its tasks, the Council had a legal, political and moral responsibility to act promptly, effectively, properly and responsibly. According to the representative of the Republic of Korea, there was wide agreement that the veto power lay at the heart of the problems that undermined the Council's abilities to fully carry out its mandate.

Case 4 **The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

At a meeting held on 29 June under the item "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina",²⁰ the Security Council heard a briefing by the Officer-in-Charge of the Europe and Central Asia Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.²¹ Following the briefing, several Council members exchanged views on the role of the Council with respect to the appointment of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to the receipt of a letter dated 3 June 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General,²² in which the current High Representative announced the appointment of his successor by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council.

The representative of the Russian Federation argued that the procedure for the appointment of the High Representative that had developed over the years involved the confirmation of candidates by the Steering Board, with the consent of the sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and approval by the Council, usually in the form of a resolution.²³ He noted that it was clear that any candidate for the position who did not have the support of the Council would lack legitimacy.

¹⁷ See [S/2021/572](#).

¹⁸ For example, Austria, Cyprus, El Salvador, Switzerland and United Arab Emirates.

¹⁹ Argentina, Brazil and Cuba.

²⁰ See [S/PV.8810](#).

²¹ For more information about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see part I, sect. 17.A.

²² See [S/2021/597](#), annex.

²³ See [S/PV.8810](#).

Similarly, the representative of China stated that the role of the Council in the appointment of the High Representative had been outlined in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement). He added that, in practice, the Council endorsed the appointment either through a resolution or in the form of a letter from the President, affirming that it had become an established practice that should continue to be respected when appointing the next High Representative. In that regard, he encouraged all parties concerned to engage in consultations to find a reasonable and feasible solution, help the High Representative to perform his duties, uphold the authority of the Security Council and contribute to maintaining peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider Western Balkans region. The representative of the Niger also pointed out the relevance of the established practice of the Council on the matter, which consisted of endorsing the appointment of the High Representative through a Council resolution, which the Council had always done by consensus in the past.

Other Council members offered a different view, according to which the decision regarding the appointment of the High Representative rested solely with the Steering Board and that the approval of the Council was not a requirement. According to the representative of the United States, based on the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in 1996, there was no determinative role for the Council in the appointment process. Concluding that the appointment of the High Representative was a closed matter as there was no requirement that the Council take action to confirm the designation, the representative expressed the view that no one was trying to undermine the Council's authority or to circumvent procedures. Similarly, the representative of Ireland expressed the view that the previous practice, whereby the Council had marked the appointment of each new High Representative, was an expression of political support, which was an important step, but not legally necessary for the decision of the Steering Board to take effect. According to the representative of the United Kingdom, it was not the case that the endorsement of the Council was required in order to finalize the appointment of the High Representative. She further noted that there was no determinative role for the Secretary-General or the Council in the appointment process and no legal requirement that the Council take action to confirm the designation of the High Representative.

On 22 July, at a meeting convened under the same item,²⁴ the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by China and the Russian Federation,²⁵ which was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.²⁶ In the draft resolution, the Council would have welcomed and agreed to the designation, by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, of Christian Schmidt as the High Representative until 31 July 2022, with the subsequent closure of his Office.

Before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the experience of the previous 25 years demonstrated that the role of the Council in appointing a new High Representative was irreplaceable, adding that the Council continued to be involved in the peace process pursuant to the Dayton Agreement, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.²⁷ Similarly, the representative of China asserted that the question of whether or not the appointment procedures of the High Representative were just and reasonable put at stake the authority of the Council on issues related to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He added that, under the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Council played an undeniable role in the appointment of the High Representative, and to ignore that practice – or worse, to attempt to force through appointments by circumventing the Council – would set a “deplorable new precedent” and have a negative impact on the process. According to the representative, China and the Russian Federation had jointly submitted the draft resolution in order to, *inter alia*, maintain the authority and established practices of the Council.

After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that they had warned that any attempts to avoid involving the Council in the process were not only illegitimate but also dangerous, adding that the post of the High Representative would remain vacant following the resignation of the current incumbent. The representative of China expressed a similar view, stating that the candidate nominated by the relevant parties had failed to receive the Council's endorsement and therefore lacked legitimacy.

Explaining their abstentions, the representatives of Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States reiterated the view that the approval of the Council was

²⁴ See [S/PV.8823](#).

²⁵ [S/2021/667](#).

²⁶ The draft resolution received 2 votes in favour (China and Russian Federation) and 13 abstentions (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam).

²⁷ See [S/PV.8823](#).

not a requirement for the appointment of the High Representative. The representative of the United Kingdom affirmed that the appointed High Representative would take up his role on 1 August 2021, regardless of action taken or not taken by the Council. Referring to the proposed draft resolution, she said that the proposals therein went beyond the previous practice of the Council and encroached upon matters that were the responsibility of the Peace Implementation Council. Similarly, the representative of Mexico noted that the draft resolution included elements that his delegation believed were not within the purview of the Council. The representative of France said that it was not up to the Council to set conditions for the appointment of the High Representative or to decide on the closure of the Office, adding that a resolution welcoming his appointment would be a welcome political statement, but not a legal requirement.

Case 5 **Peace and security in Africa**

At a meeting held on 8 July in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,²⁸ the Security Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme and the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who read out a statement by his country’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chairperson of the African Union.²⁹

During the meeting, several speakers discussed the mandate of the Council with respect to the developments concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Special Envoy recalled that, on 15 June, the League of Arab States had adopted a resolution on the dispute, in which, among other things, it called on Ethiopia to refrain from filling the reservoir without reaching an agreement and on the Council to hold consultations on the matter. He noted that Ethiopia had rejected the League’s communiqué, which it had seen as an attempt to politicize and internationalize the dispute, and had stressed its commitment to mediation by the African Union, while reiterating its plan to move forward with the second filling of the dam in July. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stated that, in order to assist in the facilitation efforts, the Council had invited the representatives of Egypt, Ethiopia and the

Sudan to continue discussions, under the auspices of the African Union and mediation by its Chairperson, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and the Charter of the United Nations. The representative of Kenya said that it was unfortunate that the issue was being discussed in the Council, whose mandate was to deal with dangers to international peace and security, and noted that his country recognized the critical importance of the principle of subsidiarity, which it recommended to the Council. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also underscored the importance of respecting the principle of subsidiarity in the matter. The representative of Mexico stated that, while the Council must focus on all matters that could potentially pose a threat to international peace and security, in this case, a preventive approach must be sought.³⁰ Moreover, as it was an issue that affected three African countries, and based on Chapter VIII of the Charter, Mexico considered it particularly important that the international community support the efforts of the African Union to bring the positions of the three countries closer together and resume negotiations.³¹ The representative of France emphasized that it was important for the meeting on the Dam to be held, because the responsibility of the Council was to prevent the prolongation of the dispute from becoming a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.

In their interventions, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and the Sudan and the Minister of Water, Irrigation and Energy of Ethiopia shared divergent views on the Council’s mandate with respect to the developments concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt stated that his delegation was driven by an enduring confidence in the capacity of the Council to discharge its duty to maintain international peace and security by taking the necessary action in relation to the question. He expressed the hope that the Council would recognize the gravity of the situation and fulfil its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, underscoring that, in executing their unique responsibility, Council members were instructed, pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, to act on behalf of the general membership of the United Nations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan stated that, having been informed of the issue and the fact that it posed a direct challenge to its mandate, the Council had been given an opportunity to shoulder its

²⁸ See [S/PV.8816](#).

²⁹ For more information about “Peace and security in Africa”, see part I, sect. 9.

³⁰ For more information about the determination of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, see part VII, sect. I.

³¹ For more information about regional arrangements and consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII.

responsibilities. In contrast, the Minister of Water, Irrigation and Energy of Ethiopia expressed the view that discussing the Dam was an unfitting use of the time and resources of the Council. He noted that the African Union was seized of the matter and was ably facilitating negotiations; it was therefore regrettable that Egypt and the Sudan had opted to bring the matter to the Council. He further noted that, for the first time since its establishment, the Council was being asked to pronounce itself on a water development project. The Council was a political and security organ, and it was unhelpful and misguided to present an issue that required a hydrotechnical solution to the global security body. The Minister also requested that the Council return the matter to the able and legitimate leadership of the African Union, adding that there was no subject matter as far from the mandate of the Council as the one in question.

At a meeting held on 15 September 2021 in connection with the same item,³² the Council adopted a presidential statement, in which, while indicating that it bore in mind its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council encouraged Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan to resume negotiations at the invitation of the Chairperson of the African Union, in order to finalize expeditiously the text of a mutually acceptable and binding agreement on the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and called upon the three countries to take forward the African Union-led process in a constructive and cooperative manner.³³ The Council further underscored that the statement did not set out any principles or precedent for any other transboundary water disputes.³⁴ Explaining his country's position with regard to the presidential statement, the representative of India expressed the view that transboundary water issues did not belong to the domain of the Council.³⁵ He added that it was therefore important to place on record, as mentioned in the last paragraph of the presidential statement, that the statement did not set out any principles or precedent for the Council to intervene or adjudicate in any other transboundary water disputes.

Case 6

Maintenance of international peace and security

At a meeting held on 7 September at the initiative of Ireland, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month, under the item entitled

“Maintenance of international peace and security”,³⁶ the Council heard briefings by the Chair of The Elders and one Elder Emeritus. During the meeting, a number of speakers shared their views on the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In her remarks, the Chair of The Elders noted that, collectively, the members of the Council had all been entrusted with a powerful mandate to act on behalf of the United Nations as the primary international body charged with maintaining international peace and security. That placed heavy responsibilities on all members of the Council, not only to reflect their immediate national interests, but also to work collectively in the global interest. In that regard, a united and purposeful Council was needed at present moment, more than ever. The Chair expressed the hope that, although the Council had already started to grapple with climate change as a security threat, it would engage more decisively and through a resolution, as climate change was a core threat to international peace and security.

During the debate, several Council members referred to the Council's responsibility to recognize and adapt to new threats to international peace and security, such as climate change. The representative of the United Kingdom asserted that in the 76 years since the Council had been entrusted with the responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the nature of the threats had evolved. She noted that the way in which the Council responded to new challenges, including climate change and COVID-19, would shape the world over the next decade and well beyond. The representative added that the Council must evolve as the threats to international peace and security evolved, that it should not self-censor and that, where there were clear emerging threats to international peace and security, it should consider them in a timely fashion. The representative of Norway said that the Council had a responsibility to adapt to changing circumstances and to develop new ways of responding to non-traditional threats to international peace and security, including climate change. According to the representative of Estonia, in order to remain relevant and fulfil its responsibility in upholding international peace and security, the Council needed to address new and emerging security threats, such as malicious cyberactivities. The representative of Kenya expressed the view that it was no longer tenable to underestimate the devastating effects of climate change as both an underlying cause and a multiplier of conflicts and insecurity globally. He therefore asked The Elders to share their views on what innovative

³² See [S/PV.8860](#).

³³ [S/PRST/2021/18](#), first, fourth and sixth paragraphs.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph.

³⁵ See [S/PV.8860](#).

³⁶ See [S/PV.8850](#).

approaches were necessary for the Council to engage with the level of seriousness needed to address the impact of the climate crisis in Africa, on small island States and on the world over. The representative of Mexico said that there had been numerous occasions when the Council had not been up to the task of fulfilling its mandate under the Charter of the United Nations, citing the example of its slow response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He noted that the paralysis of the Council during major crises undermined its authority and relevance. The representative of Tunisia observed that the Council might need to develop new working mechanisms and approaches to be able to address new challenges and, in that regard, sought the opinion of The Elders on the role that the Council could play in dealing with those new threats, especially in the absence of consensus among Council members about whether all of those threats fell within its competence. The representative of Viet Nam concurred with the view that the Council should not let new challenges to international peace and security fly under its radar. Noting that the threats to peace and security had changed since 1945, the representative of Ireland stated that climate change was the defining challenge of the current generation. Necessary systems needed to be put in place to allow the Council to take into account the adverse impacts of climate change in the delivery of its mandate. Responding to questions, the Chair of The Elders urged the Council to see climate change as a security issue and for Council members to come together around a strong draft resolution on the subject.

Some Council members underscored the importance of preventive action as a tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Norway stated that the Council had a mandate to prevent conflict, but often shied away from acting early owing to political sensitivities and a wish by States to avoid Council attention with regard to their internal affairs. This was regrettable, she added, because it reduced the ability of the Council to perform one of its most important roles. The representative of the United Kingdom, acknowledging the Council's primary responsibility for international peace and security, said that a coherent approach to conflict prevention required action by the entire United Nations system. The representative of Estonia affirmed that the main purpose of the Council was to maintain international peace and security. He added that prevention and preparedness were the key and that Council members needed to be able to find common ground quicker than before.

Several Council members stressed that the Council should act within the legal framework of the Charter in the implementation of its mandate. The representative of the Niger mentioned that the Council,

whose primary responsibility was the maintenance of international peace and security, must continue to recall the importance of the Charter, which furnished it with its tools for action, and to reaffirm its commitment thereto. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines affirmed that the bedrock principles of international law outlined in the Charter, such as the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States, must continue to serve as the centrepiece of all efforts to maintain international peace and security. Similarly, the representative of China stated that the maintenance of international peace and security was the primary responsibility of the Council under the Charter and that it was imperative for the Council to respect the sovereignty and independence of all countries and the development path chosen by their peoples of their own free will. According to the representative of Viet Nam, the Charter laid the timeless foundation for an international order that served the interests of the international community. He noted that collective and individual actions must fully abide by and uphold international law and the principles of the Charter.

Council members also addressed the mandate of the Council vis-à-vis the other principal organs of the United Nations. The representative of India recalled that the United Nations had several principal organs with clearly defined roles and functions. In that regard, issues of social and economic significance were to be dealt with primarily by the General Assembly, not the Council. He added that the tendency to burden the Council with an increasing number of global challenges, premised on their perceived connection to threats to peace and security, would be self-defeating. In taking into account the division of labour enshrined in the Charter, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the Council played a singular role in dealing with matters of international peace and security. In that regard, she expressed the conviction that, despite the breadth of its agenda, issues related to conflict resolution should always remain at the core of the Council's deliberations, while those only indirectly related to its core mandate could be addressed more appropriately within other United Nations forums.

Case 7 Maintenance of international peace and security

At a meeting held on 16 November at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,³⁷ the Council convened an open debate under the item "Maintenance of international

³⁷ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October (S/2021/888).

peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations”.³⁸ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the President of the International Court of Justice. In addition, the representatives of four non-Council members submitted statements in writing.³⁹

Following the briefings and the statements by Council members, the Council adopted a presidential statement in which it, *inter alia*, reaffirmed its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security and recognized that the principal organs of the United Nations had the responsibility, within their own mandates, to contribute to the realization of the purposes established in Article 1 of the Charter.⁴⁰

In his briefing, the President of the Economic and Social Council asserted that, while there was no disputing that the Security Council had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, conflict prevention was also at the core of the work of the United Nations and must actively involve all principal organs.⁴¹ Reflecting on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, he noted that that was one area among several where the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council could work together, in coordination with the General Assembly, in a complementary manner, in accordance with the respective mandates of the principal organs.

During the discussion, several speakers referred to the primary responsibility of the Council in maintaining international peace and security and pointed to the division of labour between the principal organs of the United Nations and the need to operate within their respective mandates. The representative of Tunisia noted that, if the Charter conferred the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Council, it also attributed to the General Assembly several prerogatives in that area. He added that Tunisia attached great importance to the role of the principal organs, each in their specific area of remit, in maintaining international peace and security. The representative of India observed that there had been recent attempts to assume work in the Council that would have been better undertaken in the

specialized agencies and organs created for that purpose. According to him, burdening the Council with an increasing number of issues distracted it from relevant issues of international peace and security and was, therefore, best avoided. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the conviction that the Council should not be distracted from its main task of maintaining international peace and security and underscored the need to step up efforts in ensuring that all United Nations bodies worked effectively, adhering to the principle of the division of labour. The representative of South Africa expressed the view that regular interaction, coordination and collaboration between the Council and other primary organs of the United Nations in fulfilling the Council’s mandate could not be overemphasized, as it would establish increased coherence and complementarity among those organs in a mutually reinforcing manner, respectful of each other’s mandates, and with a view to generating a mutual understanding among them.⁴²

Some speakers held a broader view of the mandate of the Council in maintaining international peace and security. The representative of Kenya stated that, to effectively fulfil its mandate, in coordination with the other United Nations principal organs, the Council must consider and address the economic, political and social dimensions of conflict.⁴³ The representative of France noted that the Council’s capacity to maintain international peace and security depended on its ability to anticipate risks, prepare for them and provide sustainable and credible responses focused on the needs of populations. He noted that the Council should have a comprehensive overview of the risks to international security posed by climate change, pandemics or disinformation. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said that, while continuing its leading role in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council should also adopt more creative and innovative approaches to address existing implementation gaps, which ranged from conflict prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding and across the spectrum of thematic questions concerning women and youth, climate change and environmental degradation and other fundamental challenges of sustainable development. The representative of Ireland stated that respect for human rights belonged at the Council and that the entirety of the human rights architecture was inextricably linked to the work done in the Council. The representative of Liechtenstein asserted that a human security perspective would be a much broader lens through which the Council could view its mandate, adding that climate

³⁸ See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#). For more information about the relations between the principal organs of the United Nations, see part IV.

³⁹ See [S/2021/952](#).

⁴⁰ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), second and third paras. See also sect. I.A above.

⁴¹ See [S/PV.8906](#).

⁴² See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

⁴³ See [S/PV.8906](#).

change, corruption, small arms, pandemics and human rights violations would all become relevant as and when they affected the security of individuals.⁴⁴

Several participants⁴⁵ also noted that, on some occasions, the Council had been unable to fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security owing to divisions among its permanent members.

Case 8

Maintenance of international peace and security

At a meeting held on 9 December at the initiative of the Niger, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,⁴⁶ the Council convened a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Security in the context of terrorism and climate change”.⁴⁷ During the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Chair of the African Union Commission and the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Head of the Multinational Joint Task Force.⁴⁸

In their discussions, several Council members expressed the view that addressing climate-related security issues fell within the scope of the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and called for the adoption of a draft resolution submitted by Ireland and the Niger.⁴⁹ In that regard, the President of the Niger said that it seemed imperative, in the aftermath of the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, that the Council capitalize on the various consensus reached in order to encourage strategies aimed at mitigating the effects of climate change, in accordance with its mandate to maintain international peace and security.⁵⁰ He opined that it was high time for the Council, as part of its preventive mandate, to take into account the security risks of climate change as an additional element of the peace and security architecture. Similarly, the President of Estonia expressed the view that the Council had the relevant tools and the mandate to respond to climate-related security risks and affirmed the need for a Council resolution on climate and

security. He stated that it was of the utmost importance that the Secretary-General receive a mandate to collect data and coordinate policy to that end and that regular reporting would be a major step towards developing tangible preventive measures. According to the representative of the United States, the climate crisis was a security crisis and a threat to international peace and, therefore, a threat and a crisis that the Council needed to address. She added that only the Council could ensure that the security impacts of climate change were integrated into the critical work of conflict prevention and mitigation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, disaster reduction and humanitarian response. It was the responsibility of the Council to ensure that it – and through it, the Secretariat – had the tools and data necessary to confront one of the century’s greatest and fastest-growing threats to peace and security. The representative of France noted that the environmental fight was also a fight for international peace and security, which was why it was appropriate for the Council to address the threats linked to climate change. The representative of Mexico underscored that the idea was not to address the general impact of climate change in the Council, for which there were other platforms, but to identify those situations in which climate change could have multiplier effects that affected international peace and security. The representative of Ireland said that it was clear that the threats to international peace and security had changed since the Council had first come together in 1945. She added that the Council’s responsibility to tackle them, however, had not changed, and the Council must recognize and accept its role in the fight against climate change. The representative of Norway noted that climate action depended on concerted and coordinated multilateral cooperation with its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, adding that the Council had a pivotal role to play in those efforts. Similarly, the representative of Viet Nam expressed the view that the Council had a special role to play in addressing security risks and threats, including by working closely with others to prevent conflict from happening, addressing compounding threats, including climate change and terrorism, and ensuring sustainable peace. He affirmed that the Council needed to demonstrate leadership, unity and solidarity and act swiftly in fulfilling its responsibility. The representative of Tunisia maintained that, given the current climate change-related challenges that the world faced, it was necessary to go beyond the context-based approach in addressing the situation and to include climate risks systematically in the Council’s exercise of its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

⁴⁵ Croatia, Liechtenstein and Turkey.

⁴⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 November 2021 ([S/2021/988](#)).

⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8923](#) and [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/1026](#).

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8923](#).

⁴⁹ [S/2021/990](#).

⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8923](#).

Other Council members held a different view, noting that the issue of climate change was outside of the scope of the Council's mandate. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that each country or region needed to be looked at individually, as well as in connection with factors other, and often more significant, than climate change that gave rise to socioeconomic or political stability. He added that nothing could really be helped by including the issue of climate change on the agenda of the Council, with its limited membership and very specific toolkit, but it certainly could lead to a muddling and a doubling of efforts within the United Nations. The representative of India stated that it was not appropriate to draw a separate link between security and climate change, especially when all aspects of climate change were already being dealt with holistically under the mandate of the Framework Convention. He added that any action in the Council that ignored the basic principles and provisions relating to climate change had the potential to disrupt the nature of the overall discussion on that important topic. Moreover, while his delegation recognized that climate change had affected people's lives and exacerbated conflicts in many places, viewing conflicts only through the prism of climate change presented a misleading perspective. The representative of China called on the Council to take the perspective of peace and security, in accordance with its own mandate. In that context, he noted that the principle of common but differentiated responsibility must be respected.

Among non-Council members, participants also offered their views on the Council's role in addressing climate-related security issues as part of its mandate to maintain international peace and security. For example, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran asserted that climate change was primarily an issue related to sustainable development and therefore outside the purview of the Council. He added that the Council's engagement, which lacked the requisite expertise and tools in the sphere, would be an encroachment upon the mandate of other main organs of the United Nations. The representative of Brazil cautioned against approaching climate change from a strict security angle as, in doing so, the international community might distance itself from an adequate response. He added that it was necessary to avoid duplication of work, noting the need to ensure that specific mandates and responsibilities within the United Nations system were respected. He further stated that the Framework Convention was properly equipped for discussing and addressing any specific new concerns of the parties regarding climate change issues in an inclusive and balanced manner, having a

clearly established mandate and adequate tools and mechanisms to do so. According to the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, if the practice of having the Council address the issue of climate change were to be consolidated, it would open the door to invoking issues related to climate change for the purpose of including certain countries on its agenda for purely political motivations that were not in line with those established in Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations.⁵¹ He stated that the inclusion of the climate issue on the Council's agenda would perpetuate that organ's practice of usurping functions that were not within the scope of its competence. Similarly, the representative of Belarus expressed the view that focusing on climate change would violate the principle of the division of responsibilities among the organs of the United Nations system.

By contrast, noting that the Council had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international security, the representative of Germany, on behalf of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, welcomed the Council's recognition of the effects of climate change when considering a growing number of mandates for peacekeeping and special political missions. The representative of the European Union reiterated his delegation's expression of support for the adoption of a draft resolution on climate change, describing that as an opportunity for the Council to strengthen its ability to understand and address climate-related security risks, within its mandate. Similarly, the representative of the Netherlands said that her country saw a clear role for the Council when it came to addressing the security implications that resulted from climate change, given the Council's responsibility for maintaining peace and security. The representative of Lebanon stated that, as the Council was entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, it should work towards ensuring that conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches increasingly integrated climate considerations into their strategies, which could lead to enhanced coordination with the Peacebuilding Commission. The representative of the Dominican Republic stated that the potential for the negative effects of climate change to translate into root causes of conflict was becoming increasingly clear, which was a reality that the Council, as the organ with the primary responsibility to ensure international peace and security, could not ignore.

On 13 December 2021, at a meeting convened under the same item and in connection with the

⁵¹ See [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

sub-item entitled “Climate and security”,⁵² the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by Ireland and the Niger and another 111 Member States.⁵³ The draft resolution was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.⁵⁴ Before the vote, the representative of Ireland, also on behalf of the Niger, stated that the draft resolution was about enabling the Council to address climate change with the tools it had within its mandate. She added that it was long overdue for the principal organ of the United Nations dealing with international security to take responsibility for integrating climate-related security risks across its conflict resolution, prevention and mediation work. The representative of the Russian Federation disagreed, arguing that positioning climate change as a threat to international security diverted the attention of the Council from genuine, deep-rooted causes of conflict in the countries on the Council’s agenda. He added that such an approach was convenient for countries that were actively helping those conflicts to erupt or that had undertaken military activity as a diversion from the Council’s mandate.

After the vote, several Council members expressed their views on the scope of the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the Niger stated that, owing to its responsibility to safeguard international peace and security, the Council was obligated to consider all situations that had or could potentially have an impact on global security. Observing that some had claimed that including the impacts of climate change on security on the Council’s agenda was irrelevant given that other structures were already addressing the issue, the representative asked why the Council had adopted resolutions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, when the World Health Organization existed and was more than capable of addressing the matter. The representative of India underscored that the Council was not the place to discuss climate action or climate justice and asked why a Council resolution was needed to take action on climate change when commitments to climate action had already been made under the Framework Convention. The honest answer, according to the representative, was that there was no real requirement for the draft resolution except for the purpose of

bringing climate change under the ambit of the Council. He stated that the reason for the draft resolution was to hand over the responsibility to combat climate change to an organ that did not work through consensus or reflect the interests of developing countries, in the name of preserving international peace and security. The representative of China stated that the Council was already dealing with climate issues in the context of a number of country-specific matters on its agenda and should continue to do so from the perspective of peace and security.

In contrast, the representative of Norway expressed the view that the aim of the draft resolution was to climate-proof conflict prevention and peace and security efforts, not to take on the task of other United Nations bodies. The representative of Viet Nam, while concurring that the Framework Convention remained the primary and inclusive forum for negotiating climate action, stated that a matter of such multifaceted significance required urgency and enhanced efforts, including with regard to the security dimension, and therefore did not exclude the role of the Council as the primary organ in charge of the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the United States said that, by vetoing the draft resolution, the Russian Federation had stopped the world’s most important organ for maintaining international peace and security from taking a small, practical and necessary step to combat the impacts of climate change. The representative of Tunisia said that climate change was one of the factors affecting international peace and security in many regions, including the Sahel, and that the Council must therefore take those threats into consideration in an integrated and systematic manner, as it shouldered the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. He added that, during its term on the Council, Tunisia had sought to include unconventional threats, such as climate change and pandemics, on the Council’s agenda, as those phenomena posed a threat to collective security and should therefore not be overlooked by the Council. The representative of Estonia said that the draft resolution would have ensured a more structured and systemic approach and would have created the necessary tools to enable the United Nations to do its part in preventing and resolving conflicts that were driven by the effects of climate change. He opined that there was no credible answer from the Council members that had chosen to ignore the challenges that posed a threat to international peace and security, which was the Council’s primary responsibility.

⁵² See [S/PV.8926](#).

⁵³ See [S/2021/990](#).

⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8926](#). The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour (Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam), 2 against (India and Russian Federation) and 1 abstention (China).

II. Obligation of Member States to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council under Article 25

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Note

Section II outlines the practice of the Council in relation to Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, which concerns the obligation of Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. It is divided into three subsections. Subsection A covers references to Article 25 contained in decisions of the Council, subsection B contains an examination of how the principle of Article 25 was dealt with in deliberations of the Council and subsection C features explicit references to Article 25 in communications of the Council.

In 2021, the Council adopted one decision containing an explicit reference to Article 25 of the Charter, in connection with the situation in the Middle East.⁵⁵ Article 25 was also explicitly invoked in two instances during the meetings of the Council, notably in the context of deliberations on the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”.⁵⁶ More information on the most salient discussions related to the Article is provided in subsection B, which includes case studies on the Council’s interpretation of the obligations of Member States stemming from decisions on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (case 9) and on non-proliferation in the context of the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), by which the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (case 10). In addition, during the year under review, 15 explicit references to Article 25 were made in five communications of the Council,⁵⁷ details on which are provided in subsection C.

A. Decisions referring to Article 25

In 2021, the Council adopted one decision containing an explicit reference to Article 25, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, in

relation to the Syrian Arab Republic. In the resolution, the Council underscored that Member States were obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council’s decisions.⁵⁸ In the same resolution, the Council also demanded the full and immediate implementation of all provisions of all relevant Council resolutions on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and extended, until 10 July 2022, subject to the issuance of the Secretary General’s substantive report, the authorization for United Nations agencies and their implementing parties to provide cross-border humanitarian assistance for the border crossing at Bab al-Hawa and the mandate of the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic.

B. Discussions relating to Article 25

During the year under review, Article 25 was referred to explicitly on two occasions, during Council meetings held under the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”, respectively.⁵⁹ In addition, speakers made implicit references to the obligation of Member States to accept and carry out decisions of the Council, as well as to the binding nature of those decisions, at multiple meetings held under a broad range of items. For example, during meetings held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, several speakers referred to the need for the Syrian Arab Republic to fulfil its obligations under relevant Council decisions, in particular with regard to complying with or abiding by resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) on the use of chemical weapons.⁶⁰ Similar references were made during discussions held in connection with the item “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” with several participants calling on Israel to abide by or comply with the relevant Council decisions, in particular resolution

⁵⁸ Resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), final preambular paragraph.

⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8830](#) (United Kingdom); and [S/PV.8850](#) (Niger).

⁶⁰ See, for example, [S/2021/22](#) (Norway and United States); [S/PV.8785](#) (United States and Mexico); [S/PV.8830](#) (Mexico, Ireland and Norway); [S/PV.8849](#) (United States, Estonia, Norway and United Kingdom); [S/PV.8872](#) (United States, Norway, France, Ireland, United Kingdom and Turkey); and [S/PV.8921](#) (United States, Norway, Ireland, France and Turkey).

⁵⁵ Resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), final preambular paragraph.

⁵⁶ See [S/PV.8830](#) (United Kingdom); and [S/PV.8850](#) (Niger).

⁵⁷ See [S/2021/53](#), [S/2021/639](#), [S/2021/669](#), [S/2021/718](#) and [S/2021/914](#).

2334 (2016).⁶¹ In addition, references were also made to the importance of ensuring Member States' compliance with obligations contained in resolution 1373 (2001) in the context of discussions held in connection with the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts".⁶² The case studies below illustrate some of the most salient discussions that took place in 2021 with regard to the Council's interpretation of the obligation of Member States to implement its decisions, notably in the context of discussions on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (case 9) and on non-proliferation as it pertains to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), by which the Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (case 10).

Case 9

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

On 30 March, Security Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction",⁶³ during which they heard a briefing by the representative of Mexico, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

In his remarks, the Chair of the Committee asserted that resolution 1540 (2004) remained a vital component of the global non-proliferation architecture aimed at preventing non-State actors, including terrorists, from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. He noted that, while States had made significant progress in the full implementation of the resolution, some gaps remained. He added that the Council recognized that the full and effective implementation of the resolution was a long-term task that would require continuous efforts at the national, regional and international levels. The Chair said that 184 countries had submitted initial reports providing the Committee with information on the measures that they had taken, or planned to take, to comply with their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). He underscored that the effectiveness of the practical steps

taken by States to implement the resolution was important, adding that one of the activities in that respect was for States to develop voluntary national implementation action plans, as encouraged by the Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 2325 (2016). According to the Chair, the Committee played an important role in facilitating assistance to Member States to fulfil their obligations by matching assistance requests from States with offers of assistance from States or international, regional or subregional organizations. The Chair concluded by stating that a central theme of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), which had been delayed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and was now scheduled for completion prior to the renewal of the mandate of the Committee in April 2021, was the status of the implementation of the resolution by the States Members of the United Nations.

During the discussion, Council members exchanged views on the obligations of Member States stemming from resolution 1540 (2004). The representative of Estonia noted the need to ensure that the resolution and its implementation remained effective and strong, adding that assistance and cooperation measures could help make implementation more effective. According to the representative of France, the resolution must be implemented in a very concrete way, including by securing sensitive materials and goods, strengthening border controls, setting up a legal framework to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and establishing export control mechanisms. The representative of Ireland stated that the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) would ensure that non-State actors were prevented from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. She encouraged States to continue to take their responsibilities under the resolution seriously.

The representative of the Niger stressed that national Governments had the primary responsibility for ensuring the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and called on them to take the necessary steps to strengthen their capabilities to counter the threats posed by the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. According to the representative of Norway, to achieve the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), it was important to ensure that States requiring and requesting assistance received it.

The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the view that the successful implementation of the resolution at national levels should be promoted by the efforts of the Committee to monitor and coordinate global efforts to provide technical support

⁶¹ See, for example, S/2021/404 (Mexico, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, League of Arab States and Malaysia); S/PV.8804 (Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); S/PV.8826 (Niger, China and Tunisia); S/PV.8847 (Tunisia and China); S/PV.8883 (China, Niger, Tunisia and Viet Nam); and S/PV.8913 (Ireland).

⁶² See, for example, S/2021/48 (Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Bangladesh, Brazil, Cuba, Jordan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru and Turkey).

⁶³ See S/2021/325.

to States in need, upon their request. He noted that, although the Committee functioned on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it was not mandated to force any “services” on the States Members of the United Nations, and the resolution did not restrict the sovereign right of States to define their own ways of implementing its provisions. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines echoed the views of the Chair, noting that the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) was a long-term task that would require continuous efforts at all regional and international levels. Her delegation applauded the 184 Member States that had submitted implementation reports on measures they had taken or planned to undertake in compliance with their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), as encouraged in paragraph 5 of resolution 2325 (2016). According to the representative of the United States, Member States could take forward steps even before the comprehensive review to help to promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). As an example, he cited the appointment of national “1540 points of contact”, which were an important resource for enhancing States’ interactions with the Committee and for promoting effective coordination within Member States as they sought to implement the resolution.

Case 10 Non-proliferation

On 14 December, the Security Council held a meeting under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”,⁶⁴ during which it heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations and the representative of Ireland in her capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) concerning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In her remarks, the Under-Secretary-General noted that the status of the resumed negotiations in Vienna indicated that the full restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) would require additional effort and patience. She stated that the Secretary-General had expressed the hope that, in their current negotiations, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran would mobilize the same spirit and commitment that had resulted in the Plan of Action. She added that there was no viable alternative to the full and effective implementation of both the Plan and the resolution. In her briefing, the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) noted that the Council must continue to play its part in demonstrating

that the resolution, by which the Council endorsed the Plan of Action, was working as it should. At the conclusion of her briefing, the Facilitator underscored the call to all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations, set out in paragraph 2 of the resolution, to take such actions as might be appropriate to support the implementation of the Plan of Action, including by refraining from actions that undermined the implementation of commitments thereunder.

During the discussion, Council members expressed their support for the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and called for compliance with resolution 2231 (2015). In that regard, the representative of the United States recalled that her country’s President, Joseph Biden, had been clear that he was prepared to return the United States to compliance, and to remain in compliance, so long as the Islamic Republic of Iran did the same. The representative of the United Kingdom noted that her country’s priority was to see the United States return to the agreement and the Islamic Republic of Iran return to compliance, adding that the latter’s continued development of a ballistic missile programme was inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). The representative of Viet Nam expressed the hope that all parties would continue their efforts to strengthen dialogue and negotiations to resolve differences and reaffirm their commitments to fully and effectively implementing the Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015). The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines expressed regret regarding the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan of Action in May 2018 and its subsequent decisions to reimpose sanctions and terminate waivers, as those actions ran counter to the requirements and objectives of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Plan of Action. She further expressed regret regarding the decision by the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease performing several of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan of Action and urged it to return to full compliance to fulfil the totality of its obligations. According to the representative of Ireland, speaking in her national capacity, it was imperative for the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to fully meet their commitments and ensure full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

In his remarks, the representative of France stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran could not be unaware of its obligations, under resolution 2231 (2015), not to carry out any activities related to ballistic missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology. The representative of Tunisia, renewing the call for the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

⁶⁴ See S/PV.8930.

Action and of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) by all parties, said that his delegation took note of the differences of interpretation regarding the implementation of the provisions of annex B to the resolution, in particular with regard to ballistic missile-related activities. According to the representative of Kenya, the decision by the United States to reaffirm the measures and provisions contained in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) early in 2021, and the engagement of both the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran in ongoing negotiations, were all important positive steps towards the full and effective implementation of the Plan of Action and the resolution.

According to the representative of the Russian Federation, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action contained a carefully negotiated balance of interests and must be implemented exactly in the form in which it was approved by the Council in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), without any deletions or additions. He maintained that contraventions by the United States of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including the Plan of Action, could not be considered the norm and should be rectified. He added that the Russian Federation did not share the approach set out in the report of the Secretary-General, whereby the lifting of illegal unilateral sanctions by the United States was equated with introducing exemptions from those sanctions, thus legitimizing the practice of unilateral restrictions in contravention of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view that the United States was in continuous and systematic material breach of its legal obligations under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Charter and international law. He further noted that the United States had also exerted unprecedented pressures on other States to either not implement their obligations under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) or face punishment.

C. Communications featuring Article 25

In 2021, 15 explicit references to Article 25 were made in five communications of the Council, which are listed in table 2.

In a summary of the Arria-formula meeting held on 2 December 2020 on the theme “Implementation of the 2015 Minsk Package of Measures on the settlement in Ukraine: a year since the Paris ‘Normandie’ summit”, which was annexed to a letter dated 14 January from the representative of the Russian Federation to the President of the Council,⁶⁵ it was

noted that the representative of Lugansk in the Trilateral Contact Group had clarified that, from the moment of its endorsement by the Council in its resolution [2202 \(2015\)](#), the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements had acquired the nature of a norm of international law, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, thus becoming binding.

In a letter dated 9 July addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,⁶⁶ the observer for the State of Palestine drew attention to the deteriorating situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and underscored the call for action by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 to uphold international law and implement the relevant United Nations resolutions, including resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#), in order to immediately address the critical situation on the ground. In that context, the observer referred explicitly to Article 25 in affirming that, despite the Council’s “regrettable ongoing paralysis”, States needed to uphold their obligations and commitments.

In the annex to a letter dated 20 July addressed to the Secretary-General,⁶⁷ in which the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran transmitted a letter from his country’s Minister for Foreign Affairs containing a review of the challenges experienced in the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action over the previous six years, Article 25 was explicitly referenced 11 times.

In a letter dated 6 August addressed to the Secretary-General,⁶⁸ the representative of Cyprus pointed to the violations of his country’s national airspace, the infringements of international air traffic regulations in its flight information region and the illegal use of closed ports and airports in Cyprus by Turkey during the months of April and May. In that context, the representative stated that Turkey was openly declaring that it would continue to violate Council resolutions, “in total disregard” for Article 25 of the Charter and noted that the Council must stand behind its resolutions and ensure that they had meaning. In a letter dated 29 October addressed to the Secretary-General and covering the months of June, July and August,⁶⁹ the representative of Cyprus again stated that Turkey was openly declaring that it would continue violating Council resolutions, “in total disregard” for Article 25.

⁶⁶ [S/2021/639](#).

⁶⁷ [S/2021/669](#).

⁶⁸ [S/2021/718](#).

⁶⁹ [S/2021/914](#).

⁶⁵ [S/2021/53](#).

Table 2
Communications submitted in 2021 containing explicit references to Article 25

<i>Communication record</i>	<i>Communication title</i>	<i>Topic</i>
S/2021/53	Letter dated 14 January 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the President of the Security Council	Summary of the Arria-formula meeting held on 2 December 2020 on the theme “Implementation of the 2015 Minsk Package of Measures on the settlement in Ukraine: a year since the Paris ‘Normandie’ summit”
S/2021/639	Identical letters dated 9 July 2021 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council	Agenda item 5, entitled “Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly
S/2021/669	Letter dated 20 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	Review of the challenges in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action during the past six years
S/2021/718	Letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	Violations of the national airspace of Cyprus
S/2021/914	Letter dated 29 October 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General	Violations of the national airspace of Cyprus

III. Responsibility of the Security Council to formulate plans to regulate armaments under Article 26

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Council concerning its responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, as stipulated in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations.

In 2021, the Council did not refer explicitly to that provision in any of its decisions. However, Article 26 of the Charter was expressly invoked once, during a meeting held on 22 November in connection with the item entitled “Small arms”.⁷⁰ At the meeting, the representative of Costa Rica noted that global military spending levels represented “clear evidence” that Article 26 had been, for the previous 76 years, “a dead letter in the cemetery of intentions in the Charter”.⁷¹ She urged all States to commence, without delay, the phased and intentional reduction of global military spending, which was not only feasible, but imperative. In 2021, there were no explicit references to Article 26 in any of the communications of the Council.

⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8909](#) and [S/PV.8909 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/966](#).

⁷¹ See [S/PV.8909](#).

Part VI

Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter

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Introductory note

Part VI of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of Chapter VI (Articles 33 to 38) and Articles 11 and 99 of the Charter of the United Nations. It is divided into four main sections.

Section I provides an illustration of how States brought disputes or situations to the attention of the Council during the period under review, pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter. It also provides a survey of the practice of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, under Articles 11 (3) and 99, respectively, in drawing the attention of the Council to situations which are likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Section II contains a description of investigative and fact-finding activities performed by the Council and other bodies that may be deemed to fall under the scope of Article 34, including Council missions. Section III provides an overview of the decisions of the Council taken with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes, specifically illustrating recommendations of the Council to parties to a conflict and its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General in the peaceful settlement of disputes. Section IV contains a reflection of constitutional discussions on the interpretation or application of the provisions of Chapter VI and Article 99.

As in previous supplements, the practice of the Council with respect to the pacific settlement of disputes is not discussed in an exhaustive manner in part VI, which is focused instead on selected materials aimed at highlighting the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in the decisions and deliberations of the Council. Actions with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes in the context of the United Nations field missions authorized under Chapter VII are covered in the relevant sections of parts VII and X. Joint or parallel efforts undertaken by the Council and regional arrangements or agencies in the pacific settlement of disputes are covered in part VIII.

As described in section I, during 2021, Member States brought various matters to the attention of the Council, including matters of which the Council had not been seized. That notwithstanding, the Council did not convene any meetings under a new item on its agenda. However, the Council convened one meeting pursuant to communications submitted by Member States under the existing item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” to deal with the international friction relating to the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Secretary-General continued to draw the attention of the Council to situations that were deteriorating, including with respect to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and the Syrian Arab Republic, the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic on food security in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and the international security consequences of climate change.

As featured in section II, for the first time since 2019, the Council dispatched one mission to Mali and the Niger in 2021. The Council acknowledged and deliberated on the investigative functions of the Secretary-General and the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Human Rights Council and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

As described in section III, the Council highlighted the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and sustaining peace and the inclusion therein of women, young people and all other segments of society. The

Council called upon parties to conflicts to cease hostilities and establish permanent ceasefires, fully implement peace agreements, ensure peaceful and inclusive political dialogue and transitions and engage in dialogue for the resolution of outstanding disputes. The Council recognized the good offices work of the Secretary-General, as well as that of his special representatives and envoys, in support of the implementation of peace agreements, political transitions, the resolution of outstanding disputes and efforts to end violence in conflict.

As described in section IV, during 2021, the discussions in the Council were focused on the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and addressing the root causes of conflicts, the importance of inclusivity in peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention in the context of cybersecurity. In their discussions, Council members also addressed the cooperation between the Council and the International Court of Justice in the maintenance of international peace and security and the role of the Secretary-General and his special envoys and representatives, through their good offices, in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

I. Referral of disputes or situations to the Security Council

Article 11

...

3. *The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.*

Article 35

1. *Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.*

2. *A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.*

3. *The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.*

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Note

Within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, Articles 35 (1) and (2) are generally regarded as the basis on which Member States and States that are not members of the United Nations may refer disputes to the Council. Under Articles 11 (3) and 99, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, respectively, may also bring to the attention of the Council situations that are likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

The practice of the Council in this regard is described below in three subsections. Subsection A provides an overview of the referrals of disputes or situations by States to the Council pursuant to Article 35. Subsections B and C deal with referrals to the Council by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, respectively, of matters likely to endanger international peace and security.

In 2021, the Council did not convene any meetings under a new item on its agenda. The Council did, however, convene one meeting pursuant to communications submitted by Member States under the existing item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.

No State that was not a member of the United Nations brought any dispute or situation to the attention of the Council during the period under review. Neither the General Assembly nor the Secretary-General explicitly referred to the Council any matters likely to endanger international peace and security.

A. Referrals by States

During the period under review, certain situations were referred to the Council pursuant to Article 35 (1) of the Charter by affected or concerned Member States. However, most of those situations were referred to the Council by Member States without an explicit reference to Article 35. In 2021, Article 35 was nonetheless explicitly mentioned in four communications from Member States: one each from Egypt,¹ Ethiopia² and the Sudan³ concerning developments related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and one from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela⁴ regarding the use of a network of transnational organized crime that included “Colombian and United States mercenaries for committing acts of aggression against the Republic of Haiti and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”.

With respect to developments concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,⁵ in a letter dated 22 June addressed to the President of the Council,⁶ the representative of the Sudan conveyed a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan. According to the Minister, the unilateral actions of Ethiopia in proceeding with the second filling of the dam, which it intended to carry out starting in July, without an agreement with his country, as a heavily affected downstream riparian country, represented a threat to the security of the Sudan and the region. Invoking Chapter VI of the Charter, she called upon the Council to seize itself of the matter and convene a session on

¹ See [S/2021/607](#).

² See [S/2021/613](#).

³ See [S/2021/593](#).

⁴ See [S/2021/688](#).

⁵ For more information about discussions related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, see part I, sect. 9.

⁶ See [S/2021/593](#).

the dispute to discuss its impact on peace and security in the Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia. Similarly, in a letter dated 25 June,⁷ the representative of Egypt conveyed a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, drawing the attention of the Council to recent developments. According to the Minister, the question of the dam had evolved into a situation that was causing, as stipulated in Article 34 of the Charter, international friction, the continuation of which could endanger international peace and security. He stated that his country had elected to bring the matter to the attention of the Council pursuant to Article 35 and was calling upon the Council, in the light of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to consider and take appropriate measures to ensure that the question of the dam was settled amicably and equitably and in a manner that protected and preserved security and stability in an already fragile region. He expressed support for the request made by the Sudan and called upon the Council to convene an urgent session on the question of the dam under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. In a letter dated 28 June,⁸ the representative of Ethiopia conveyed a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, stating that the reference by the Sudan to Article 35 was unwarranted and that the dam did not pose a threat to the peace and security of the countries in the region.

⁷ See [S/2021/607](#).

⁸ See [S/2021/613](#).

In addition, in a letter dated 27 July,⁹ the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expressly invoked Article 35 and requested that the Council, in accordance with the powers entrusted to it by the Charter, specifically by virtue of Article 34, to investigate the mercenary operations planned in the United States, by structures of transnational organized crime that recruited, trained and financed Colombian mercenaries for the commission of armed attacks, acts of terrorism, acts of aggression and the assassination of Heads of State and Government and high-ranking political officials, with the purpose of overthrowing Governments and undermining their constitutional bases. The representative referred in particular to the assassination of the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, on 7 July 2021, and a frustrated attempt of assassination against the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, on 3 May 2020.

In 2021, the Council did not convene any meetings under a new item further to communications from Member States. However, as shown in table 1, the Council convened one meeting under an existing item pursuant to several communications from Member States.¹⁰

⁹ See [S/2021/688](#).

¹⁰ For more information on the applicable provisional rules of procedure, see part II, sect. III.

Table 1

Communications bringing disputes or situations to the attention of the Security Council that resulted in a Council meeting and/or informal consultations of the whole, 2021

<i>Communication</i>	<i>Action requested of the Security Council</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Peace and security in Africa		
Letter dated 22 June 2021 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/593)	To take action to preserve peace and security in the region by, inter alia, convening a [Council] session on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam to discuss its impact on the peace and security of millions of people who live and survive along the Blue and main Nile in the Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia	S/PV.8816 8 July 2021
Letter dated 25 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/607)	To convene an urgent session [of the Council] on the question of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”	S/PV.8816 8 July 2021

Other communications from Member States

Member States also brought other matters to the attention of the Council. In some cases, the communications concerned matters of which the Council was not seized, although, in most cases, those communications did not result in a meeting of the Council.¹¹

In a letter dated 1 February addressed to the President of the Council,¹² the representative of Pakistan conveyed a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan in which the Minister drew the attention of the Council to the recent developments regarding the holding of local council elections by India in Jammu and Kashmir and noted, among other things, that the Council must remain seized of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and play its rightful role in averting threats to international peace and security posed by India.

In a letter dated 11 May 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General and the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Council,¹³ the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine drew urgent attention to the escalating “aggression by Israel” in Palestine, which was causing immense human suffering and aggravating tensions, risking further destabilization of the volatile situation, which posed a threat to international peace and security. The Observer stated that the Council must uphold its Charter duty to maintain international peace and security and called upon it to act with urgency to address that crisis and deepening injustice. In a letter dated 12 May addressed to the Secretary-General,¹⁴ the representative of Jordan drew attention to recent violations by Israel against the Aqsa Mosque/Haram al-Sharif and Jerusalemites, including the inhumane threat of evictions of Palestinians in Shaykh Jarrah from their homes. In the letter, the representative called upon the Council to, inter alia, act swiftly, effectively and collectively to prevent the eviction of Palestinians.

In a letter dated 3 August addressed to the President of the Council,¹⁵ the representatives of Liberia, Romania and the United Kingdom drew the attention of the Council to a “serious maritime incident” that had implications for international peace and security, namely, the attack on the merchant vessel *Mercer Street* by the Islamic Republic of Iran off the

coast of Oman using one or more unmanned aerial vehicles, resulting in the death of one British and one Romanian national, and damage to the vessel. The three representatives noted their deep concern and expressed the belief that the act must be condemned by the international community. In connection with the same issue, in a letter dated 3 August addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,¹⁶ the representative of Israel called upon the Council to unequivocally condemn and sanction the Islamic Republic of Iran and to take all necessary measures to hold the Iranian regime fully accountable for its violations of international law. In a letter dated 4 August addressed to the President of the Council,¹⁷ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the claims made in the above-referenced letters and warned about attempts to create artificial maritime “incidents” in the Persian Gulf and broader region, noting that such acts were detrimental to the security and stability of the region and must stop immediately.

B. Referrals by the Secretary-General

Article 99 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which in his or her opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Like Article 35, Article 99 does not specify the means by which the Secretary-General may bring such a matter to the attention of the Council. During the period under review, the Secretary-General did not invoke Article 99, either directly or by implication. A discussion of relevance to Article 99 is featured in case 12 below.

In 2021, the Secretary-General continued to draw the attention of the Council to situations on its agenda that were deteriorating or with respect to which he requested the Council to take urgent action.

In his letters transmitting the monthly reports of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic,¹⁸ the Secretary-General continued to note that the use of chemical weapons was intolerable and impunity for their use equally

¹¹ For more information on the applicable provisional rules of procedure, see part II, section II.

¹² See [S/2021/102](#). See also [S/2021/575](#), [S/2021/697](#), [S/2021/901](#) and [S/2021/1004](#).

¹³ See [S/2021/455](#).

¹⁴ See [S/2021/459](#).

¹⁵ See [S/2021/701](#).

¹⁶ See [S/2021/702](#).

¹⁷ See [S/2021/706](#).

¹⁸ See [S/2021/84](#), [S/2021/200](#), [S/2021/305](#), [S/2021/422](#), [S/2021/514](#), [S/2021/615](#), [S/2021/692](#), [S/2021/764](#), [S/2021/842](#), [S/2021/911](#), [S/2021/989](#) and [S/2021/1103](#).

unacceptable. He pointed to unity in the Council as essential to fulfilling the urgent obligation of accountability. Furthermore, by his letter dated 14 April addressed to the President of the Council,¹⁹ the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council the second report by the Investigation and Identification Team of OPCW on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic, on 4 February 2018. Noting that any use of chemical weapons posed a serious threat to international peace and security, he stated that it was appropriate that the report be shared with Council members, as had been the case with the first report.²⁰

During meetings and videoconferences, the Secretary-General and other senior Secretariat officials also drew the attention of the Council to the evolving situations in, among others, the Middle East, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. During an open videoconference held on 28 April in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,²¹ the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria sounded a warning to prioritize the proactive search for a settlement of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. Reporting a significant escalation of hostilities in the north-west of the country, he noted that, despite more than a year of relative calm, the developments during that month were a reminder of the potential for the situation to further disintegrate or rapidly deteriorate. A nationwide ceasefire as per resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#) was essential, as was a cooperative approach to eradicating listed terrorist groups.

At an extraordinary videoconference held on 16 May in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”,²² following the escalation of violence in Israel, Gaza and East Jerusalem, the Secretary-General stated that the Council was meeting amid the most serious escalation in Gaza and Israel in years and that the latest round of violence only perpetuated the cycles of death, destruction and despair and pushed farther to the horizon any hopes of coexistence and peace. He appealed to all parties to heed his call and stop the fighting immediately.

With regard to the situation in Ethiopia, at the meeting held on 2 July in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,²³ the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs noted that the country was at a critical juncture

and that recent developments demonstrated the need to address issues plaguing the country in a comprehensive and sustainable way. She warned that the consequences of not doing so could be disastrous. The Under-Secretary-General underlined that there was potential for more confrontations and a swift deterioration in the security situation, which was extremely concerning. At a meeting held under the same item on 26 August,²⁴ the Secretary-General reported to the Council that the military confrontation, which had started some 10 months before in the northern region of Tigray, was spreading, and that the level of human suffering was growing, with serious political, economic and humanitarian implications for Ethiopia and the broader region. Furthermore, the Secretary-General expressed deep concern over reports of horrific sexual and gender-based violence and noted other serious allegations of human rights violations and abuses against civilians. He called for an immediate end to hostilities and a lasting ceasefire, as well as unrestricted access to all areas in need. At a meeting held on 6 October,²⁵ the Secretary-General warned the Council that the crisis in Ethiopia had worsened with deeply worrisome reports of violations and human rights abuses perpetrated by all sides.

Following the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban on 1 August, during the meeting held on 16 August under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”,²⁶ the Secretary-General urged all parties – especially the Taliban – to exercise utmost restraint to protect lives and to ensure that humanitarian needs could be met. He informed the Council about chilling reports of severe restrictions on human rights throughout the country and expressed particular concern over accounts of mounting human rights violations against the women and girls of Afghanistan.

During the reporting period, Article 99 was featured explicitly in one communication to the Council. In a letter dated 8 February addressed to the President of the Council,²⁷ the representative of Finland transmitted the report of the eighteenth annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Council, held on 12 and 13 November 2020 in New York. According to the report, at the closing of the workshop, the Executive Director of Security Council Report had observed that, at times, the Council seemed reluctant to address, for example, thematic issues such as climate change and human rights, threats of

¹⁹ See [S/2021/371](#).

²⁰ See [S/2020/310](#).

²¹ See [S/2021/418](#).

²² See [S/2021/480](#).

²³ See [S/PV.8812](#).

²⁴ See [S/PV.8843](#).

²⁵ See [S/PV.8875](#).

²⁶ See [S/PV.8834](#).

²⁷ See [S/2021/130](#).

non-State actors other than terrorism, such as criminal networks, and military interventions by States or their non-State proxies. She had argued that such “blackout issues” might come to dwarf the issues that the Council was ready to address and had highlighted the need for more use to be made of Article 99 as a path forward.

C. Referrals by the General Assembly

Under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, the General Assembly may call the attention of the Council to situations that are likely to endanger international peace and security. During the period under review, the Assembly did not refer any such situations to the Council under that Article.²⁸

²⁸ For more information regarding the relations between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.

II. Investigation of disputes and fact-finding

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Note

Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. On that basis, the Council may determine whether the continuation of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 34 does not prevent the Secretary-General or other organs from performing investigative functions, nor does it limit the Council’s general competence to obtain knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation by dispatching a fact-finding or investigative mission.

Section II provides an overview of the practice of the Council relating to fact-finding and investigation in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, in three subsections. Subsection A relates to Council missions; subsection B to investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General; and subsection C to other instances of investigative functions acknowledged by the Council.

During the reporting period, the Council did not make any explicit reference to Article 34 of the Charter in its decisions. Article 34 was, however, explicitly invoked on two occasions, in Council meetings held under the items entitled “Peace and security in Africa”²⁹

²⁹ See [S/PV.8816](#) (Egypt).

and “Maintenance of international peace and security”,³⁰ respectively. In addition, seven communications to the Council in 2021 contained a total of 10 explicit references to Article 34 concerning allegations of armed attacks from Colombian territory against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the impact of internal conflict in Colombia on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the role of the Governments of Colombia and the United States in the execution of a strategy of armed aggression against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,³¹ as well as the international friction resulting from the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.³²

In 2021, for the first time since 2019, the Council dispatched one mission to the field to Mali and the Niger, more details of which are provided in subsection A below. In addition, in its decisions, the Council acknowledged the investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali and South Sudan. Consistent with recent practice, the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD), established pursuant to resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#). The Council also recognized the investigative work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali

³⁰ See [S/PV.8850](#) (Chair of The Elders).

³¹ See [S/2021/330](#); [S/2021/348](#); [S/2021/357](#); [S/2021/688](#); [S/2021/866](#).

³² See [S/2021/593](#) and [S/2021/607](#). For more information about the actions undertaken by the Council in response to communications on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, see also sect. I above.

and South Sudan. In addition, Council members deliberated on the investigative functions of the Secretary-General, the Human Rights Council in Ethiopia, Iraq and Libya, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Syrian Arab Republic.

A. Security Council missions

In 2021, the Council dispatched one mission, consisting of all 15 members, to Mali and the Niger. It was the first such mission since October 2019.³³ The mission was not explicitly charged with any investigative tasks. The objectives of the mission were, inter alia, to assess the political, security, humanitarian and development efforts carried out by the Transitional

³³ For more information, see [S/2019/825](#). See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part VI.

Government of Mali, the preparation for the holding of free and fair elections in the country, the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 and the situation in central Mali. The mission was also conducted with the objective of assessing the efforts of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to implement its mandate and the level of operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. With regard to the Niger, the objectives of the mission were, inter alia, to exchange views with the Nigerien authorities on the security, development and humanitarian situation in the Sahel and to reiterate the Council's support for international and regional efforts aimed at stabilizing the region.³⁴ Table 2 provides more information on the mission, including its terms of reference and report to the Council.

³⁴ See [S/2021/917](#).

Table 2
Security Council missions, 2021

<i>Duration</i>	<i>Destination</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>Terms of reference</i>	<i>Report</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>
23–25 October 2021	Mali, Niger	All Security Council members (co-leaders: France, Kenya, Niger)	S/2021/917 22 October 2021	S/2021/1106 4 January 2022	S/PV.8892 29 October 2021	Council mission

In addition, Council missions were referenced in communications submitted to the Council by Member States and discussed in Council meetings and open videoconferences during the period under review. In a letter dated 8 February addressed to the President of the Council,³⁵ the representative of Finland transmitted the report of the eighteenth annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Council, held on 12 and 13 November 2020 in New York. According to the report, one speaker stated that the Council's visiting missions were incredibly important to the Council's understanding of the situations on its agenda and afforded Council members an important opportunity to interact with political figures and local civil society. As there had been no Council visiting missions in 2020, one speaker noted that the travel constraints caused by the pandemic had provided members with an opportunity to consider how to make better use of such trips, adding that missions "tended to be moved from the airport to

³⁵ See [S/2021/130](#).

conference rooms and back to the airport without adequately seeing the situation on the ground". One participant further suggested that the Council consider virtual visiting missions during the pandemic.

The Council also discussed the value of and methods for enhancing Council missions during the annual open debate on its working methods held under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))" (see case 1).

Case 1 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))

At a meeting held on 16 June³⁶ at the joint initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month, and Saint Vincent and

³⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 2 June ([S/2021/527](#)).

the Grenadines, the Permanent Representative of which chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, the Council convened an open debate in connection with the item entitled “Implementation of the note of the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” and the sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”.³⁷ In her briefing, the Executive Director of Security Council Report noted that it had been 20 months since the last Council visiting mission and that some elected members were about to begin the final quarter of their Council tenures without ever having benefited from a Council field trip. Well-designed field visits could strengthen the sense of Council members of realities on the ground, the effect of their decisions and the challenges to mandate implementation. The Executive Director maintained that there was scope for the Council to derive more value from its field visits, including by considering, where possible, consolidating its own travel schedule and those of the chairs of sanctions committees, other subsidiary organs of the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission for greater coherence and effectiveness. There could also be a fresh look at the need for full-scale Council visiting missions, which tended to be extremely costly, but also brief, with packed programmes. In that context, she asked whether that would be a useful option in relation to the Sudan, following the establishment of a new mission in that country, adding that Council members who would remain in New York could, at selected moments, join those missions virtually via videoconference.

Following the briefings, several Council members discussed the utility and modalities of Council missions, with a particular focus on the impact of travel restrictions related to the pandemic. The representative of China stated that, in addressing hotspot issues, the Council should heed the views of the wider membership of the United Nations, especially the countries concerned, countries of the region and regional organizations, adding that the Council should be flexible and creative in organizing field visits. Speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, the representative of Kenya noted that the Council benefited greatly from understanding the physical setting of conflicts, which was why field visits were of great importance. That important aspect of the Council’s work had been greatly impeded by the precautionary travel restrictions necessitated by the pandemic. However, with technological creativity and advancement, visits could be carried out virtually. In that regard, the elected members urged that such virtual visits be conducted only where travel was not possible

and with the same frequency that in-person visits would have been conducted, so as to allow the Council to continue to be more agile and responsive and to contribute to its prevention mandate. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed support for the resumption of Council missions, noting that visits helped Council members not only to be heard but also to form their own impressions of what was happening on the ground and to engage with key stakeholders in any given situation on the agenda of the Council. At the same time, the lack of representation of certain States during those visits could be construed as a political signal, for which reason it would be optimal to include all Council members. With respect to virtual and hybrid visits, he asserted that they hardly allowed Council members to achieve the goals that they had set for such visits.

Several non-Council members also referred to the missions of the Council in their written submissions. The representative of Kuwait and the delegation of Ukraine called for enhanced transparency in the selection of the heads of Council’s visiting missions and in the overall conduct of field visits, respectively.³⁸ In addition, in a statement submitted on behalf of 35 former elected members of the Council, the representative of New Zealand stated that Council members should continue to explore ways to develop and enhance provisions regarding Council visiting missions in an effort to promote greater efficiency and flexibility, including utilizing different composition formats when planning visiting missions, such as sending smaller groups of Council members. The delegations of Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates submitted that the Council should explore the possibility of conducting virtual visits as a means of complementing the physical missions.³⁹ The delegation of Egypt stressed the need for the general membership of the United Nations to be informed about visits undertaken by the Council.

B. Investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General

In 2021, the investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General were acknowledged and referred to in decisions of the Council as well as during its deliberations and in communications of the Council, as detailed below.

³⁸ See S/2021/572.

³⁹ Switzerland (on behalf of the 27 members of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group) and United Arab Emirates.

³⁷ See S/PV.8798.

Decisions of the Council

In its decisions adopted in 2021, the Council acknowledged the investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali and South Sudan, and with the thematic item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”. The relevant provisions of those decisions are set out in table 3 below.

Table 3

Decisions relating to investigative and/or fact-finding activities by the Secretary-General, 2021

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	
Resolution 2605 (2021) 12 November 2021	Calls upon the Central African Republic authorities to follow up on the recommendations of the report of the Mapping Project describing serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015 (para. 24)
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
Resolution 2582 (2021) 29 June 2021	Reiterating the need for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to swiftly and fully investigate the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them and bring those responsible to justice, welcoming the work of the United Nations team, known as the Follow-On Mechanism, deployed to assist the Congolese authorities in their investigations, in agreement with the Congolese authorities, and further welcoming their continued cooperation (fifth preambular paragraph) Recalls the Secretary-General’s commitment that the United Nations will do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators of the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them are brought to justice and stresses the importance of a continued deployment by the Secretary-General of the Follow-on Mechanism, currently comprising a senior United Nations official, four technical experts and support staff, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assist with the national investigation, within existing resources (para. 9)
Resolution 2612 (2021) 20 December 2021	Welcomes the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 45/34 , recognizes the improvements in cooperation since President Tshisekedi’s election, requests the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement all the recommendations made by the team of international experts in its report, and to cooperate with the team of two international human rights experts, charged with monitoring, evaluating, providing support and reporting on the implementation by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of those recommendations, further welcomes the continued cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities’ investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and calls upon them to ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 7)
The situation concerning Iraq	
Resolution 2576 (2021) 27 May 2021	Requests further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2021/135, annex), shall: ...

(d) Promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, in order to strengthen the rule of law and improve governance in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) established in resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#) (para. 4 (d))

The situation in Mali

Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#)
29 June 2021

Reiterating, in this regard, the importance of holding accountable all those responsible for such acts and that some of such acts referred to in the paragraph above may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, taking note that, acting upon the referral of the transitional authorities of Mali dated 13 July 2012, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened on 16 January 2013 an investigation into alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012, and further taking note of the finalization of the work of the International Commission of Inquiry established in accordance with the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and as requested in resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#) (sixteenth preambular paragraph)

Calls upon the Malian parties to agree on and set up a national mechanism to follow up on the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali (para. 12)

Decides that the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) shall include the following priority tasks:

(a) *Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and to the full realization of the political transition*

....

(iv) To support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures of the Agreement, especially in its part V, including to support the operations of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the follow-up of the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry, and to help ensure the effectiveness of justice and corrections officials as well as Malian judicial institutions, particularly regarding the detention, investigation and prosecution of individuals suspected of, and sentencing of those found responsible for, terrorism-related crimes, mass atrocities and transnational organized crime activities (including trafficking in persons, arms, drugs and natural resources, and the smuggling of migrants) (para. 30 (a) (iv))

Expresses serious concerns about repeated allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the Malian Defence and Security Forces in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations, takes positive note of the measures announced by the Government of Mali in response to these allegations, and urges the Government of Mali to effectively implement these measures, notably by carrying out transparent, credible and timely investigations and holding accountable those responsible, especially as it relates to the allegations documented by the MINUSMA Human Rights Division (para. 36)

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#)
12 March 2021

Expressing grave concern at ongoing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, including the findings in the report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence to the Security Council ([S/2020/487](#)) of the use of sexual violence as a tactic by parties to the conflict against the civilian population in South Sudan, including the use of rape, sexual slavery and sexual torture for the purpose of intimidation and punishment, based on perceived political affiliation, and employed as part of a strategy targeting members of ethnic groups, and where conflict-related sexual violence and other forms of violence against women and girls have persisted after the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, as documented in the May 2020 report of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on access to health for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in South Sudan, noting that some progress was observed by South Sudanese parties through the implementation of action plans to

Decision and date	Provision
	address sexual violence in conflict, and underlining the urgency and importance of timely investigations to support accountability and the provision of assistance and protection to survivors and victims of sexual and gender-based violence (twelfth preambular paragraph) Expressing grave concern regarding the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by UNMISS and the Secretary-General, further expressing grave concern that, according to the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, released on 27 October 2015, and the reports of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, released on 23 February 2018, 20 February 2019, 20 February 2020 and 19 February 2021, war crimes and crimes against humanity may have been committed, emphasizing its expectation that these and other credible reports will be duly considered by any transitional justice mechanisms for South Sudan, including those established pursuant to the Revitalized Agreement, stressing the importance of the collection and preservation of evidence for eventual use by the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and other accountability mechanisms, and encouraging efforts in this regard (seventeenth preambular paragraph)
Threats to international peace and security	
Resolution 2597 (2021) 17 September 2021	Reaffirms its resolution 2379 (2017), by which UNITAD, headed by a Special Adviser, was established, and recalls the terms of reference approved by the Council (S/2018/119) (para. 1) Takes note of the request from the Government of Iraq contained in its letter dated 16 September 2021 (S/2021/801, annex) and decides to extend until 17 September 2022 the mandate of the Special Adviser and UNITAD, with any further extension to be decided at the request of the Government of Iraq, or any other government that has requested the Team to collect evidence of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) in its territory, in accordance with its resolution 2379 (2017) (para. 2) Requests the Special Adviser to continue to submit and present reports to the Council on the Team's activities every 180 days (para. 3)

Meetings of the Council

In 2021, during the open videoconferences held by Council members in connection with the agenda item entitled "The situation in Mali", several speakers⁴⁰ called upon the Malian authorities to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the International Commission of Inquiry for Mali.

Furthermore, at a meeting of the Council held on 8 July under the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa",⁴¹ the representative of Egypt stated that the "unrelenting unilateralism" of Ethiopia, the continued failure of negotiations and the absence at that juncture of a viable path towards a political settlement of the matter related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam had all impelled Egypt to call upon the Council to intercede expeditiously and effectively to prevent an escalation of tensions and to address the situation, which could, as stated in Article 34 of the Charter,

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

During a meeting held on 7 September under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security",⁴² speaking about the role of the Council in preventing and responding to violent conflict, the Chair of The Elders urged Council members to use the tools at their disposal, in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter. Moreover, the power of investigation should be used proactively by the Council to engage early in situations, before large-scale violence broke out and hit the international media.

Council members also discussed the investigations of the Council and the Secretary-General in connection with the mandate and work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) during the open videoconference and meeting held in connection with the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security" (see case 2).

⁴⁰ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia, India and Norway); and [S/2021/336](#) (Ireland and Norway).

⁴¹ See [S/PV.8816](#).

⁴² See [S/PV.8850](#).

Case 2**Threats to international peace and security**

On 10 May, Security Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”,⁴³ during which they heard a briefing by the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD. Presenting his sixth report on the activities of the Investigative Team,⁴⁴ the Special Adviser noted a landmark moment in its work with the completion of initial case briefs in relation to two key investigative priorities, namely, the mass killing of unarmed cadets and military personnel at Tikrit Air Academy in June 2014 and the attacks against the Yazidi community in the Sinjar region.⁴⁵ He confirmed to the Council that, on the basis of the Team’s independent criminal investigations, UNITAD had established clear and convincing evidence that genocide had been committed by ISIL (Da’esh) against the Yazidi as a religious group. The Special Adviser noted the opening of a new investigation into the development and successful deployment of chemical and biological weapons by ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq. The Team continued to support efforts by the Iraqi Council of Representatives to adopt legislation establishing a legal basis for the prosecution of ISIL (Da’esh) members and that legislation had been presented before the Parliament of the Kurdistan region to establish a court with jurisdiction over international crimes committed by ISIL (Da’esh). He indicated that much of the progress and activities carried out by UNITAD had been achieved through its use of innovation in accelerating investigations, as well as partnership with the Iraqi authorities. In that context, he acknowledged the steadfast support of the Kurdistan Regional Government and stated that the Iraqi judiciary had continued to be exemplary in its engagement with UNITAD, working with the Team as partners in the digitization of evidence and providing extensive information that had accelerated investigations.

During the discussion that followed, Council members reflected on the various aspects of the investigative work carried out by UNITAD, including its cooperation with the Iraqi authorities, the use of technology and the investigation of the use of chemical and biological weapons by ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq. The representative of the Niger asserted that the agreement reached between UNITAD and the Iraqi judiciary to share information on financial crimes committed in the context of the activities of ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq, in line

with the Investigative Team’s mandate, would undoubtedly enhance cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of those who facilitated and benefited financially from the crimes committed by the terrorist organization in Iraq. Similarly, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines recognized the role played by the Government of Iraq, particularly the judiciary, which continued to engage constructively with the Team.

The delegation of Ireland welcomed the work to develop a means of sharing evidence that complied with United Nations policies and best practices for its use in fair and independent criminal proceedings. In that regard, the representative of France recalled the consistent position of the United Nations of non-transmission of material in the context of legal proceedings involving the possibility of a death sentence. The delegation of the United Kingdom welcomed the progress on the draft legislation to provide the domestic legal basis for the prosecution of members of ISIL (Da’esh) for international crimes in Iraq but urged continued momentum and collaboration to secure an evidence-sharing mechanism that would provide assurances regarding the use of the death penalty. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the transfer of material regarding other crimes should not depend on legislative reforms and that such an approach had never been prescribed by the Council.

The representative of India welcomed the investigation of UNITAD into the development and use of chemical and biological weapons by ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq and expressed the hope that the investigation by UNITAD would provide valuable insights to help global non-proliferation efforts. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that UNITAD had taken on new tracks of investigation, such as the development and use of chemical and biological weapons by terrorists, and stated that it was important that all such episodes be duly investigated and that those responsible be held accountable, no matter where those incidents had taken place. While, in the case of Iraq, things were called by their real names, as reflected in the UNITAD report, in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, the investigations were constantly downplayed despite the abundant evidence of chemical weapon use by terrorists. The representative of France also encouraged UNITAD to continue the open investigation into the development and use against civilian populations of chemical and biological weapons by ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq between 2014 and 2016, as well as the implementation of the joint mass grave excavation strategy.

⁴³ See [S/2021/460](#). For more information on threats to international peace and security, see part I, sect. 33.

⁴⁴ See [S/2021/419](#).

⁴⁵ See [S/2021/460](#).

The delegation of Ireland welcomed the detail provided in the most recent report on the Investigative Team's approach to the investigation of sexual and gender-based crimes and the crimes against children, adding that it was noteworthy that the Gender Crimes and Children Unit had commenced an investigation on ISIL (Da'esh) crimes against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex community and had conducted interviews with survivors of sexual violence.

At a meeting held on 2 December under the same item,⁴⁶ the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD presented the seventh report on the activities of the Investigative Team,⁴⁷ including updates on key lines of investigation, such as the development and use of chemical and biological weapons by ISIL (Da'esh) and on the financial mechanisms through which it sustained its campaign of violence. The Special Adviser also reported on the deepened cooperation between UNITAD and the Iraqi authorities and underscored the importance of putting the collected evidence to work before the competent courts.⁴⁸

During the discussion, the representative of Norway welcomed the significant advancement of the dedicated Gender Crimes and Children Unit in its investigations on crimes against children, adding that it was very positive that the Unit had gathered additional evidence on the extent of the gender-based crimes of ISIL (Da'esh), including sexual slavery, rape and persecution. The representative of India emphasized that the investigations of UNITAD into the internal administration of the ISIL (Da'esh) treasury could provide valuable insights into its revenue streams and in preventing flows to ISIL (Da'esh) and its affiliates in other parts of the world. Widening the scope of financial investigations must include the external sources of funding for ISIL (Da'esh). He took note of proactive efforts of UNITAD to share its findings with the Iraqi authorities on the financial crimes of ISIL (Da'esh), which must also extend to other evidence and information collected by the Investigative Team. Despite a lapse of more than three years, UNITAD had been unable to fully service the evidentiary requirements of the Government of Iraq owing to a different interpretation of the Team's mandate. Several speakers⁴⁹ stressed the importance of handing over the evidence to the Iraqi authorities. The representative of China expressed regret that, despite more than three years of UNITAD operations, the extensive evidence

available to it had yet to yield concrete results in accountability for terrorists. The representative of the United Kingdom looked forward to seeing continued efforts to secure an evidence-sharing mechanism that would provide assurances on the use of the death penalty and ensure that the Government of Iraq could move ahead with prosecutions. The representative of Norway stated that it was important that the evidence ultimately fed into judicial processes to hold ISIL (Da'esh) members to account and stated that her delegation would have liked the report to include more information about the discussions between UNITAD and the Iraqi authorities on an arrangement for evidence-sharing.

Council members also discussed the role of technology in the investigative activities of UNITAD,⁵⁰ as well as the partnership and close cooperation between UNITAD and the Iraqi authorities in the areas of, inter alia, training, technical support and the digitization of evidence.⁵¹

Communications submitted to the Council

The Secretary-General did not undertake any new investigative action during the reporting period. With respect to ongoing investigations, in accordance with the existing practice, by his letters dated 1 May and 24 November addressed to the President of the Council,⁵² the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD transmitted to the Council his sixth and seventh reports, respectively, on the activities of the Investigative Team.

In 2021, the investigative authority of the Council and the role of the Secretary-General were discussed in several communications submitted to the Council. For example, in a letter dated 2 March addressed to the Secretary-General,⁵³ the representative of Tajikistan transmitted a joint statement by the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on ensuring comprehensive stability in the world, in which they emphasized that it was unacceptable to establish international mechanisms that duplicated the functions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and bypassed the Council. Opposition in that regard was also expressed in the

⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8914](#).

⁴⁷ See [S/2021/974](#).

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8914](#).

⁴⁹ China, Iraq, Russian Federation and Tunisia.

⁵⁰ China, Viet Nam, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

⁵¹ United Kingdom, China, Mexico, Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Norway, India, Niger, Viet Nam, France, Ireland, Tunisia, Estonia, United States and Iraq.

⁵² See [S/2021/419](#) and [S/2021/974](#). For more information, see also part I, sect. 33.

⁵³ See [S/2021/225](#).

joint statements of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States transmitted by a letter from the representative of Tajikistan dated 4 June and in letters from the representative of Belarus dated 18 November and 6 December.⁵⁴

With respect to the International Commission of Inquiry for Mali, established by the Secretary-General in 2018 and mandated to investigate allegations of abuses and serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law committed throughout the territory of Mali between 2012 and 2018, the representative of Algeria transmitted the communiqué of the forty-third session of the Follow-up Committee on the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, held in Bamako on 29 June, by a letter dated 6 July addressed to the President of the Council.⁵⁵ According to the letter, the participants in the meeting took note of the presentation by the Human Rights Division of MINUSMA on the report of the International Commission of Inquiry for Mali. They recognized the need for structured follow-up to the Commission's recommendations, in cooperation with the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the support of MINUSMA and the Follow-up Committee, as part of efforts to coordinate the

promotion of the fight against impunity with the promotion of national reconciliation.

C. Other instances of investigative functions acknowledged by the Security Council

In 2021, the investigative functions of other bodies of the United Nations were recognized and acknowledged in decisions of the Council and during deliberations in the context of meetings and videoconferences as well as in communications of the Council, as detailed below.

Decisions of the Council

During the reporting period, the Council recognized the investigative functions of other bodies of the United Nations, notably the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, in relation to the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and South Sudan.⁵⁶ Table 4 contains the provisions of Council decisions referring to such functions.

⁵⁴ See [S/2021/534](#), [S/2021/970](#) and [S/2021/1025](#).

⁵⁵ See [S/2021/628](#).

⁵⁶ For further information on relations with other United Nations organs, see part IV.

Table 4

Decisions relating to investigation and inquiry by United Nations bodies and related organizations, 2021

Decision and date	Provision

The situation in the Central African Republic

Resolution 2605 (2021) 12 November 2021	Taking note of the joint United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)-Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report of 4 August 2021 on violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed in the Central African Republic and noting with concern that violations and abuses were committed by all parties to the conflict, welcoming the response submitted by the Central African Republic authorities to address the report's findings and expressing support for the implementation of the preventive and corrective measures proposed by the Government (ninth preambular paragraph)

Calls on the Central African Republic authorities to follow up on the recommendations of the report of the Mapping Project describing serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015 (para. 24)

The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Resolution 2612 (2021) 20 December 2021	Welcomes the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 45/34 , recognizes the improvements in cooperation since President Tshisekedi's election, requests the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement all the recommendations made by the team of international experts in its report, and to

Decision and date	Provision
	cooperate with the team of two international human rights experts, charged with monitoring, evaluating, providing support and reporting on the implementation by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of those recommendations, further welcomes the continued cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and calls upon them to ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 7)
The situation in Mali	
Resolution 2584 (2021) 29 June 2021	Expresses serious concerns about repeated allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by Malian Defence and Security Forces in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations, takes positive note of the measures announced by the Government of Mali in response to these allegations, and urges the Government of Mali to effectively implement these measures, notably by carrying out transparent, credible and timely investigations and holding accountable those responsible, especially as it relates to the allegations documented by the Human Rights Division of MINUSMA (para. 36)
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	
Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Expressing grave concern at ongoing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, including the findings in the report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence to the Security Council (S/2020/487) of the use of sexual violence as a tactic by parties to the conflict against the civilian population in South Sudan, including the use of rape, sexual slavery and sexual torture for the purpose of intimidation and punishment, based on perceived political affiliation, and employed as part of a strategy targeting members of ethnic groups, and where conflict-related sexual violence and other forms of violence against women and girls have persisted after the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, as documented in the May 2020 report of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on access to health for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence in South Sudan, noting that some progress was observed by South Sudanese parties through the implementation of action plans to address sexual violence in conflict, and underlining the urgency and importance of timely investigations to support accountability and the provision of assistance and protection to survivors and victims of sexual and gender-based violence (twelfth preambular paragraph) Expressing grave concern regarding the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by UNMISS and the Secretary-General, further expressing grave concern that, according to the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, released on 27 October 2015, and the reports of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, released on 23 February 2018, 20 February 2019, 20 February 2020 and 19 February 2021, war crimes and crimes against humanity may have been committed, emphasizing its expectation that these and other credible reports will be duly considered by any transitional justice mechanisms for South Sudan, including those established pursuant to the Revitalized Agreement, stressing the importance of the collection and preservation of evidence for eventual use by the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and other accountability mechanisms, and encouraging efforts in this regard (seventeenth preambular paragraph)

Meetings of the Council

In 2021, the Council discussed the investigations of other bodies of the United Nations and related organizations, namely: (a) the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya established by the Human Rights Council to investigate human rights violations throughout Libya since the beginning of 2016; (b) the Investigation and Identification Team established by OPCW to look into the alleged use of chemical weapons in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic, on

4 February 2018, and the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic; and (c) the joint investigation by OHCHR and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission with respect to the allegations of human rights violations in Ethiopia. The investigations were discussed during open videoconferences and meetings held in connection with the items entitled “The situation in Libya” (see case 3), “The situation in the Middle East” (see case 4) and “Peace and security in Africa” (see case 5).

Case 3**The situation in Libya**

On 17 May, Security Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Libya”,⁵⁷ during which they heard a briefing by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the active investigations of her office in the country. In her remarks, the Prosecutor reaffirmed that the Court had continued to extend and enhance its network of cooperation to achieve meaningful progress in its ongoing investigations, adding that fruitful engagements with the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya had also greatly facilitated the sharing of knowledge and expertise. She reiterated the critical importance of international observers and investigators being given full access to all detention facilities in Libya and receiving full cooperation in that regard.

During the discussion, several Council members voiced their support for the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya and stressed the importance of cooperation between the Mission and all other relevant stakeholders in investigating human rights violations. The delegation of the United Kingdom encouraged the Government of National Unity of Libya to facilitate the work of the Mission, as part of its process of national reconciliation and providing accountability and justice for atrocity crimes. Stressing that the Mission must be granted full access throughout the country, the representative of the United States expressed strong support for the creation by the Human Rights Council of an international fact-finding mission to document atrocities and other human rights abuses. The representative of France stressed that the most serious crimes committed in Libya since 2011 must be investigated and prosecuted, including crimes committed by ISIL (Da’esh) and crimes against migrants and refugees. In that regard, she noted that France counted on the full cooperation of the Mission with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Condemning the deplorable killing of the lawyer, Hanan Al-Barassi, on 10 November 2020 in Benghazi, the delegation of the United Kingdom called for a full, immediate and transparent investigation, in cooperation with the Mission. The representative of Estonia welcomed the exchange of information and expertise between the Office of the Prosecutor and the Panel of Experts on Libya, the Mission, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and

encouraged the maintenance of those formats of cooperation and exchange.

On 23 November, at a meeting held in connection with the same item,⁵⁸ the representative of the United States welcomed the report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya released on 1 October 2021⁵⁹ as another marker of the importance of documentation and recalled that the Mission had interviewed more than 150 individuals and reviewed hundreds of documents on violations and abuses in Tripoli, Qanfudah and southern Libya.⁶⁰ Welcoming the adoption of Human Rights Council resolution 48/25 to extend the Mission’s mandate, he added that the Mission must be afforded the time to conduct an exhaustive review of its current and future findings. He expressed regret, however, that the extension had been granted for only 9 months rather than the customary 12 months. Also welcoming the renewal of the mandate of the Mission and stressing that the report served to highlight the importance of the Mission, the representative of the United Kingdom shared the concern of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court regarding the conclusions contained in the report and called upon the Government of Libya to support the Mission by facilitating unrestricted and unfettered access throughout the country.

At a meeting held on 24 November,⁶¹ the representative of Ireland urged the Council not to lose sight of the human rights situation, as the most recent report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya was deeply concerning. The representative of Mexico noted that the report documented serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and that it was stated therein that the proliferation of weapons had been one of the factors that had led to the deterioration of the situation in Libya. The information gathered by the Mission must be used to ensure accountability. The representative of Estonia called for the Mission to be granted full, safe and unhindered access to all Libyan territory to fulfil its mandate. In that regard, the representative of Libya stated that the Libyan specialized national institutions, especially the Office of the Attorney General of Libya, in cooperation with the Mission, were working in accordance with their mandates to conclude the necessary investigations into the crimes that had been committed over the past years in Libya, especially war crimes and crimes against humanity, to ensure accountability and end impunity.

⁵⁷ See [S/2021/483](#). For more information about the situation in Libya, see part I, sect. 10.

⁵⁸ See [S/PV.8911](#).

⁵⁹ [A/HRC/48/83](#).

⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8911](#).

⁶¹ See [S/PV.8912](#).

Case 4 The situation in the Middle East

At a meeting held on 3 June in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,⁶² the Security Council heard briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in connection with the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. In her remarks, the High Representative noted that the fact-finding mission of OPCW remained in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continued its engagement with the Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a variety of incidents. Following the issuance of its second report in April,⁶³ the Investigation and Identification Team was continuing its investigations into incidents in which the fact-finding mission had determined that chemical weapons had been or had likely been used in the Syrian Arab Republic.⁶⁴ She underscored that there was an urgent need not only to identify but to hold accountable all those who had used chemical weapons in violation of international law, adding that unity in the Council was required to re-establish the norm against chemical weapons.

In his remarks, the Director General stated that, in line with its mandate to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Investigation and Identification Team had issued its second report on 21 April, in which it had concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force had used chemical weapons in Saraqib on 4 February 2018. That established case of chemical weapons use there was in addition to the three other cases identified in the Team’s first report of April 2020. He noted that, on 21 April, the Conference of the States Parties of OPCW had decided to express grave concern at the proven cases of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic and to deprive it of certain rights and privileges in the Organisation. According to the Director General, OPCW, including the Investigation and Identification Team, as part of the Technical

Secretariat, was never a court or a tribunal and neither was the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, established by the Council in 2015 and discontinued in 2017. Through its work, however, OPCW provided the international community with materials that would assist accountability mechanism in their tasks. He stressed that the Technical Secretariat continued to deliver on all the various Syrian-related mandates under extraordinarily difficult conditions, namely, the numerous and sophisticated cyberattacks, the massive spread of disinformation about its work and the challenges imposed by the restrictions stemming from the pandemic. OPCW had delivered assistance upon the request of concerned State parties, and it was the responsibility of the international community at large, as well as OPCW and beyond – the wider United Nations – to take further measures.

During the discussion, Council members exchanged views on the methodology used in the investigations conducted by OPCW into the incidents involving the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that his country questioned the findings of the fact-finding mission on the Duma incident in April 2018 and the methodology used by the Technical Secretariat for relying on information from partisan sources, collecting evidence remotely and drawing “highly likely” conclusions based on it. He observed that the new report of the Investigation and Identification Team on the Saraqib incident did not address the concerns related to the investigation methodology. According to the representative of China, the Chemical Weapons Convention authorized only fact-finding investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons and did not authorize the identification of perpetrators. He noted that the establishment of the Identification and Investigation Team had overstepped the authorization of the Convention and had been replete with political motives and inconsistent with the technical nature of OPCW. He expressed the deep concern of China at the high degree of politicization of the Organisation’s work and the deep division among the States parties.

By contrast, the representative of the United States asserted that no amount of disinformation could negate or diminish the credibility of the evidence that had been presented by OPCW. According to the representative of the United Kingdom, despite the challenges posed by the pandemic and the intense scrutiny under which the Technical Secretariat operated, it was clear that OPCW continued to implement the duties conferred upon it objectively and professionally. Similarly, the representative of Ireland

⁶² See [S/PV.8785](#). For similar discussions, see also [S/PV.8830](#), [S/PV.8849](#), [S/PV.8872](#) and [S/PV.8921](#). For more information about the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

⁶³ See [S/2021/371](#).

⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8785](#).

stated that OPCW played an essential role as the impartial and technical body mandated by the international community to address chemical weapons. She noted that the professionalism and integrity of the staff of the OPCW was clear, and she expressed regret that some Council members continued to challenge and undermine their work without any factual basis. The representative of France held the view that the second report of the Investigation and Identification Team had been prepared completely independently and that its conclusions were clear and the evidence irrefutable. In a similar vein, the representative of Estonia affirmed that the leadership and experts of OPCW had been under intense scrutiny over the past seven years and had shown nothing less than integrity and dedication to the task of upholding the norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Several Council members stressed the need for the investigative work of OPCW to be carried out in an impartial, transparent and objective manner.⁶⁵ The representative of Kenya asserted that prompt conclusion and closure of the ongoing investigations would bring about optimism for a peaceful Syrian Arab Republic, while the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines encouraged efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of OPCW to ensure that its work was of the highest possible standard. She noted that the findings of OPCW must be able to withstand rigorous scrutiny to enable States parties to maintain confidence in its processes and that consensus-based decisions ought to be pursued to prevent further polarization and divisiveness and to promote international cooperation.

Case 5 **Peace and security in Africa**

At a meeting held on 26 August in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,⁶⁶ the Security Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General in connection with the situation in Ethiopia. The Secretary-General expressed deep concern at reports of horrific sexual and gender-based violence from survivors, including women and children, and noted that the situation was compounded by other serious allegations of human rights violations and abuses against civilians, reportedly perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. Underscoring the need for accountability, he told the Council that a joint investigation by the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission was concluding.

In the discussion, several Council members referred to the role of the joint investigation in the context of reported violations and abuse of human rights in Ethiopia. The representative of Estonia reiterated the importance of the joint investigation and noted that the perpetrators must be held accountable and brought to justice. He also expressed concern over reports of arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances of ethnic Tigrayans in Addis Ababa and called upon the Ethiopian authorities to investigate those possibly unlawful and discriminatory practices. The representative of France reiterated her country’s full support for the joint investigation into human rights violations, which must irrefutably establish the facts and whose conclusions must be followed by action. She expressed deep regret for the difficulties encountered in the collection of evidence and called upon all parties to guarantee access for the investigators. Similarly, the representative of Norway stated that the alleged atrocities, violations and abuses of international human rights and international humanitarian law must be documented and investigated and that those responsible must be prosecuted, adding that bringing perpetrators to justice was critical for prevention and deterrence. She welcomed the joint investigation by OHCHR and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, as well as the independent commission of inquiry of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, into alleged atrocities in Tigray. In that regard, she expressed the expectation that all findings would be used to ensure accountability. The representative of the United Kingdom also expressed full support for the joint investigation and affirmed that it was crucial to prospects for peace and reconciliation that the investigation be thorough and robust. According to the representative of Mexico, reports of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls, as well as grave violations against children, must be investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice. Her delegation looked forward to the results of the ongoing joint investigation.

At a meeting held on 8 November in connection with the same item,⁶⁷ the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs informed the Council that, in the report of the joint investigation by OHCHR and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission into the conflict in Tigray, published on 3 November, it was concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict, including the

⁶⁵ Viet Nam, India, China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8843](#).

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8899](#).

Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the Eritrean Defence Forces, the Amhara Special Forces and allied militia on one side and Tigrayan forces on the other, had committed violations of international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law, including attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks resulting in civilian casualties and extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, sexual and gender-based violence and forced displacement. In the report, it was also stated that war crimes and crimes against humanity might have been committed, and steps were outlined that were to be taken to ensure accountability for those acts.

In their discussion, several Council members took note of the report of the joint investigation by OHCHR and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and reflected on its findings. The representative of Norway stated that, while the report was limited in time and geographical scope, it outlined a pattern of the killing of civilians and the widespread and systematic use of sexual and gender-based violence. She underscored that incidents must be investigated and perpetrators brought to justice and that all parties to the conflict must fully respect international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The representative of the United Kingdom called upon all parties to implement the recommendations contained in the joint report, ensure accountability and prevent further suffering. The representative of France expressed the expectation that all parties would undertake credible investigations into the allegations, which were extremely serious. The representative of India welcomed the recognition and acceptance of the report by the Government of Ethiopia as an important document that could complement its ongoing efforts to address the allegations of human rights violations and abuses. He noted that the report could not serve to confirm the deliberate or wilful denial of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in Tigray or the use of starvation as a weapon of war. The representative of Estonia called for the full implementation of the recommendations of the report and ensuring accountability for the perpetrators, noting that it was up to the Government of Ethiopia to carry out its promises in that regard. The representative of the United States asserted that the geographical and chronological scopes of the report should be expanded to ensure that more recent allegations from across the region could be investigated and perpetrators held accountable. In the meantime, suspected individuals needed to be removed from active duty pending investigation, and independent bodies must be allowed to investigate and ensure accountability.

According to the representative of Ethiopia, although the Council had been made to convene over false reports alleging heinous crimes, including the use of hunger as a weapon of war, the truth had come out and the malicious accusations had been dispelled by the report of the joint investigation by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and OHCHR.

Communications of the Council

The investigative functions of other bodies of the United Nations and related organizations were also raised in several communications submitted to the Council by the Russian Federation. In a letter dated 9 July 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,⁶⁸ the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the claims made by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on 3 June during the Council meeting on the implementation of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), regarding the Syrian Arab Republic, were ambiguous and therefore required an official response. In the letter, he recalled that the mandates of the two special missions working in the Syrian Arab Republic, namely, the mission established to verify the initial declaration made by Damascus under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Declaration Assessment Team) and the mission established to investigate the possible use of chemical weapons (the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic), were the result of a bilateral agreement between the Technical Secretariat of OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic, which showed political will by assuming additional obligations beyond those under the Convention. Any suggestion that the provisions of Article IV of the Convention supposedly gave the Technical Secretariat of OPCW “special powers” to verify the initial declaration made by the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention upon accession thereto was totally inappropriate and legally null and void. He clarified that the Council had never delegated its exclusive powers of attribution under the Charter to OPCW, much less to its Technical Secretariat.

In addition, in a letter dated 30 December addressed to the Secretary-General,⁶⁹ the representative of Estonia transmitted a concept note for an Arria-formula meeting on the theme “Accountability in the Syrian Arab Republic”, in which he noted that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,

⁶⁸ See [S/2021/641](#). See also case 3 above.

⁶⁹ See [S/2021/1112](#).

established by the Human Rights Council in 2011, continued to report on gross human rights violations. In the same concept note, he asserted that the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, established by the General Assembly, was also progressing with its work to assist investigations related to prosecutions of core international crimes.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General continued to transmit the monthly reports of the Director General of OPCW submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#).⁷⁰ In addition, by his letter

⁷⁰ See [S/2021/84](#), [S/2021/200](#), [S/2021/305](#), [S/2021/422](#), [S/2021/514](#), [S/2021/615](#), [S/2021/692](#), [S/2021/764](#), [S/2021/842](#), [S/2021/911](#), [S/2021/989](#) and [S/2021/1103](#).

dated 14 April addressed to the President of the Council,⁷¹ the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council the second report by the Investigation and Identification Team of OPCW on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic, on 4 February 2018, in which the Team concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that chemical weapons were used by the Syrian Arab Air Force at that location. Finally, by his letter dated 3 May,⁷² the Secretary-General transmitted the decision entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, adopted by the Conference of the States Parties of OPCW at its twenty-fifth session, on 21 April.

⁷¹ See [S/2021/371](#).

⁷² See [S/2021/425](#).

III. Decisions of the Security Council concerning the pacific settlement of disputes

Article 33

1. *The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.*

2. *The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.*

Article 36

1. *The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.*

2. *The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.*

3. *In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.*

Article 37

1. *Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.*

2. *If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.*

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Note

Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations expressly provides the framework for parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means. According to Article 33 (2), the Council shall call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such peaceful means as provided for in Article 33 (1). The Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment for the settlement of disputes under

Article 36 (1). According to Article 36 (2) and (3), the Council should take into consideration procedures for the settlement of the dispute already adopted by the parties and that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice. Under Article 37 (2), following a referral, the Council is to decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. Article 38 provides that the Council may make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

In Section III, the decisions of the Council in 2021 are examined in connection with the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of Chapter VI of the Charter. Decisions explicitly adopted under Chapter VII have not been considered for the purposes of the present section. Subsections A to C feature decisions of the Council in which the pacific settlement of disputes was addressed in the context of, respectively: thematic issues; country-specific and regional situations; and the settlement of disputes involving the Secretary-General. In subsection D, reference is made to decisions of the Council in support of the pacific settlement of disputes by regional and subregional organizations, which are covered in detail in part VIII.

A. Decisions of the Security Council concerning thematic issues

The present subsection provides an overview of the decisions adopted by the Council on thematic issues that relate to the pacific settlement of disputes. In its decisions during the period under review, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter and emphasized the key role of the International Court of Justice in that regard. The Council underscored the need to enhance conflict prevention and resolution, for comprehensive approaches to sustaining peace efforts and the inclusion of women and young people therein. In its decisions under thematic items, the Council called for a humanitarian pause and the cessation of hostilities in the context of the pandemic and the inclusion of mine action considerations in peace agreements and ceasefires. A more detailed description of the decisions of the Council relating to these subjects is set out below.

Peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, and sustaining peace

In 2021, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the pacific settlement of disputes in conformity with the Charter, in particular Chapter VI.⁷³ The Council reiterated its commitment to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the Council emphasized the key role of the International Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes among States and the value of its work.⁷⁵

The Council recognized the need to enhance efforts in support of conflict prevention and resolution, including by the promotion of confidence-building measures and political dialogue through full engagement with concerned parties.⁷⁶ Furthermore, the Council underscored the need to redouble efforts on conflict prevention, mediation, stabilization, transition and peacebuilding.⁷⁷

The Council reaffirmed that sustaining peace should be broadly understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs and human rights of all segments of the population were taken into account, which encompassed activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the Council emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace, particularly through the prevention of conflict and

⁷³ [S/PRST/2021/9](#), fourth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 35.

⁷⁴ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), sixth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 32.

⁷⁵ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), twelfth paragraph.

⁷⁶ [S/PRST/2021/9](#), fourth paragraph.

⁷⁷ [S/PRST/2021/21](#), fifth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.

⁷⁸ [S/PRST/2021/22](#), fourth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 34.

addressing its root causes, strengthening the rule of law at the international and national levels, and promoting sustained and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development, national reconciliation and unity, including through inclusive dialogue and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable institutions, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁷⁹ The Council also emphasized that sustaining peace was a shared task and responsibility that needed to be fulfilled by the Government and all other national stakeholders, should flow through all three pillars of the engagement of the United Nations at all stages of conflict, and in all its dimensions, and needed sustained international attention and assistance.⁸⁰

The Council recognized that peacebuilding was an inherently political process aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of conflict, and that peacebuilding encompassed a wide range of political, developmental, and human rights programmes and mechanisms.⁸¹ It reiterated the need to strengthen efforts to resolve armed conflict and build sustainable peace and its conviction that the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population should be an important aspect in that regard.⁸² The Council stressed that the primacy of politics should be the hallmark of the approach of the United Nations to the resolution of conflict, including through mediation, good offices, the monitoring of ceasefires and assistance to the implementation of peace accords.⁸³ In that regard, the Council stressed the crucial role that peace operations played in the pursuit of sustainable political solutions and building peace.⁸⁴

Inclusivity in peace processes, conflict prevention and resolution, and peacebuilding

The Council reiterated its commitment to the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and the inclusion of young people in all stages of peace,

security, development and decision-making processes, in line with the women and peace and security and youth, peace and security resolutions.⁸⁵ The Council emphasized the essential role of women in the prevention, mediation and resolution of conflicts, in peacebuilding and in post-conflict situations and stressed the importance of their full, equal and meaningful participation and involvement in processes and bodies for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, as recognized in resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#).⁸⁶ The Council further emphasized that inclusivity was key to advancing national peacebuilding processes and objectives in order to ensure that the needs of all segments of society were taken into account.⁸⁷

Cessation of hostilities, ceasefire and peace agreements

In 2021, the Council recognized that armed conflicts could exacerbate the COVID-19 pandemic and that, inversely, the pandemic could exacerbate the adverse humanitarian impact of armed conflicts, as well as exacerbating inequalities, and expressed concern that the call for a general and immediate cessation of hostilities contained in its resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#) had not been fully heeded.⁸⁸ In that context, the Council demanded that all parties to armed conflicts engage immediately in a durable, extensive and sustained humanitarian pause to facilitate, inter alia, the equitable, safe and unhindered delivery and distribution of COVID-19 vaccinations in areas of armed conflict.⁸⁹ The Council further encouraged the continued inclusion of mine action in ceasefire and peace agreements where appropriate.⁹⁰

B. Recommendations of the Security Council concerning country-specific and regional situations

Article 33 (2) of the Charter provides that the Council call upon the parties to settle disputes by the means established in Article 33 (1), when deemed necessary. In addition, Article 36 (1) provides that the Council may recommend appropriate procedures or

⁷⁹ [S/PRST/2021/22](#), eleventh paragraph.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

⁸¹ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), tenth paragraph.

⁸² Resolution [2573 \(2021\)](#), fourteenth preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 25.

⁸³ Resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 22.

⁸⁴ Resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁸⁵ [S/PRST/2021/22](#), eighth paragraph.

⁸⁶ [S/PRST/2021/21](#), thirtieth paragraph.

⁸⁷ [S/PRST/2021/22](#), fifth paragraph.

⁸⁸ Resolution [2565 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁹⁰ [S/PRST/2021/8](#), seventh paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.

methods of adjustment. In Article 37 (2), it is further established that, if the Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. Article 38 provides that, without prejudice to Articles 33 to 37, the Council may make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute, if all the parties so request.

The present subsection provides an overview of the practice of the Council relating to the pacific settlement of disputes in situations specific to a country or region. In dealing with complex situations in which the Council determined the existence of a threat to international peace and security, the Council utilized the tools available under Chapter VII of the Charter in parallel with those available under Chapter VI, with a view to restoring peace and to recommending procedures or methods for the pacific settlement of disputes. The decisions featured in the present overview do not include those adopted expressly under Chapter VII, which are covered in parts VII and X. The section also does not include the wide variety of good offices, mediation and political support tasks of peacekeeping operations and special political missions specifically mandated by the Council in 2021, which are covered in part X.

During the period under review, the Council made a wide range of recommendations with regard to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes that were both inter- and intra-State in nature. As described in the overview below, the Council called for the cessation of hostilities and engagement on establishing permanent ceasefires; the full implementation of peace agreements, peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, transitions and elections; and dialogue for the resolution of longer-term outstanding disputes.

Cessation of hostilities and permanent ceasefire

In 2021, with rising levels of insecurity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council demanded that all armed groups cease violence and disband and lay down their arms. The Council welcomed the ceasefire agreement in Libya and called for its full implementation, including the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries. The Council also reiterated its call upon Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to prevent any further breaches of the ceasefire in the Golan Heights and on Israel and Lebanon to respect the cessation of hostilities, support

a permanent ceasefire and find a long-term solution to their dispute.

The Council reiterated its deep concern regarding the humanitarian crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, exacerbated by widespread insecurity including the destabilizing activities of foreign and domestic armed groups, and demanded that all armed groups cease immediately all forms of violence.⁹¹ The Council further demanded that the members of all armed groups immediately and permanently disband and lay down their arms and called for the restoration of State authority of the Government in the eastern part of the country.⁹²

With respect to the situation in the Golan Heights, the Council stressed the obligation of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 1974.⁹³ The parties were called upon to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation and to take full advantage of the liaison function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to address issues of mutual concern and to prevent any escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line.⁹⁴ Furthermore, with respect to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council called upon all parties to the domestic conflict in that country to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operations.⁹⁵

In relation to the situation in Lebanon, the Council reiterated its call upon Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the principles and elements set out in paragraph 8 of resolution 1701 (2006).⁹⁶ The Council condemned all violations of the Blue Line, both by air and ground, and strongly called upon all parties to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue Line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations

⁹¹ S/PRST/2021/19, sixth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Great Lakes region”.

For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 3.

⁹² S/PRST/2021/19, sixth paragraph.

⁹³ Resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 2, in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 19.

⁹⁴ Resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 2.

⁹⁵ Resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), ninth preambular paragraph.

⁹⁶ Resolution 2591 (2021), para. 4, in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”.

and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).⁹⁷

In connection with the situation in Libya, the Council welcomed the ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020,⁹⁸ called upon all Libyan parties to implement the agreement in full and strongly urged all Member States to respect and support that implementation, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from the country without delay.⁹⁹ The Council welcomed the Action Plan agreed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and called upon all relevant actors to facilitate its synchronized, phased, gradual and balanced implementation.¹⁰⁰

In relation to the situation in Yemen, the Council reaffirmed its endorsement of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa of 2018 and reiterated its call upon the Government of Yemen and the Houthis to work cooperatively to implement all its provisions.¹⁰¹

Peace agreements, peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, transitions and elections

In 2021, the Council emphasized the importance of political dialogue and reconciliation in addressing the deteriorating political, security and humanitarian situations in Afghanistan, Haiti and Myanmar, as well as in advancing political dialogue and allowing for sustainable reconciliation in West Africa and the Sahel. The Council welcomed the formation of an interim executive authority in Libya and called for the organization of peaceful, free, fair and credible elections with the full participation of women. The importance of peaceful, free, fair, credible and inclusive elections was also emphasized with respect to the situations in Haiti and Somalia and in West Africa and the Sahel. The Council further stressed the need for political stakeholders in the Sudan to remain committed to the political transition in that country while also calling for the implementation of peace agreements in both South Sudan and the Sudan.

⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 12.

⁹⁸ See [S/2020/1043](#).

⁹⁹ [S/PRST/2021/4](#), fourth and fifth paragraphs. See also resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph and para. 12; [S/PRST/2021/12](#), tenth paragraph; and [S/PRST/2021/24](#), ninth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Libya". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 10.

¹⁰⁰ [S/PRST/2021/24](#), ninth paragraph.

¹⁰¹ Resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East".

Finally, the Council recognized the achievements made in the implementation of the peace agreement in Colombia and called for further progress in that regard.

Against the backdrop of the takeover of the country by the Taliban in August, the Council encouraged all parties in Afghanistan to seek an inclusive, negotiated political settlement, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, that responded to the desire of Afghans to sustain and build upon the country's gains over the past 20 years in adherence to the rule of law, and underlined that all parties must respect their obligations.¹⁰²

Welcoming the progress made towards peace across Colombia since the adoption of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, the Council urged the parties to work together to build upon the progress and address challenges, in particular the continued violence in conflict-affected areas, through comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement.¹⁰³

In connection with the question concerning Haiti, the Council expressed deep concern regarding the protracted political, constitutional, humanitarian and security crises in the country and urged all political stakeholders to set aside their differences in the interest of the people of Haiti, to engage constructively to enable the organization of elections, and to ensure that elections took place in a peaceful environment.¹⁰⁴ The Council further urged all Haitian stakeholders to commit to an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue to address long-standing drivers of instability by creating a sustainable and commonly accepted framework to permit the organization of inclusive, peaceful, free, fair and transparent legislative and presidential elections as soon as technically feasible and with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Resolution [2593 \(2021\)](#), para. 4, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 14.

¹⁰³ Resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#) and [2603 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 13.

¹⁰⁴ [S/PRST/2021/7](#), second and third paragraphs, in connection with the item entitled "The question concerning Haiti". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 12.

¹⁰⁵ Resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

Addressing the political transition in Libya, the Council welcomed the agreement reached by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum on a new unified interim executive authority charged with leading the country to elections as an important milestone in the Libyan political process.¹⁰⁶ The Council further called upon the interim executive authority to agree swiftly on the formation of a new, inclusive Government and to make the necessary preparations ahead of national presidential and parliamentary elections planned for 24 December,¹⁰⁷ including arrangements to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and the inclusion of young people.¹⁰⁸ The Council further strongly urged all Libyan stakeholders to commit to accepting the election results and to respect the rights of their political opponents and called upon them to take steps to increase mutual trust and build consensus ahead of the elections, including through dialogue and national reconciliation.¹⁰⁹

Reiterating its deep concern at developments in Myanmar following the declaration of the state of emergency imposed by the military on 1 February and the arbitrary detention of members of the Government in Myanmar, the Council strongly condemned the violence against peaceful protestors, including against women, young people and children and called for the immediate release of all those detained arbitrarily.¹¹⁰ The Council expressed its continued support for the democratic transition and stressed the need to uphold democratic institutions and processes, refrain from violence, fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and uphold the rule of law. The Council encouraged the pursuance of constructive dialogue and reconciliation in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar.¹¹¹

Addressing the situation in Somalia, the Council called upon the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member States to organize free, fair, credible and inclusive elections in line with the agreements of 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021 without further delay.¹¹² The Council also called upon them to enhance, as a matter of urgency, broad-based

consultations and consensus-building on national priorities, the implementation of the national security architecture, the delivery of the Somalia Transition Plan, the delivery of further social and economic reforms, the review of the Constitution and the implementation of timely elections in line with the State-building road map set out in the agreement of 27 May.¹¹³

Regarding the situation in the Sudan, the Council called upon the Government to accelerate implementation of key provisions of the 2019 Constitutional Document and upon all stakeholders to remain committed to the transition in order for the aspirations of the Sudanese people for a peaceful, stable, democratic and prosperous future to be realized.¹¹⁴ Welcoming the steps taken to implement the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan of 2020, the Council urged the Government and the Sudanese armed group signatories to ensure its swift, full and inclusive implementation, with the support of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan.¹¹⁵ The Council welcomed the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 28 March by the Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction and urged the signatories to engage constructively to swiftly finalize a comprehensive and inclusive peace agreement. Moreover, the Council urged those who had not yet engaged in peace negotiations to do so immediately, constructively and without preconditions.¹¹⁶

Addressing South Sudan, the Council urged the South Sudanese authorities to make progress on key milestones in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 2018, including the necessary security arrangements; the establishment of the legal framework for elections; the establishment of the composition and functioning of the National Election Commission and the designation of its members; and the allocation of resources for the operating costs of the Commission and a budget for elections operations.¹¹⁷ The Council expressed grave concern regarding the increased violence between

¹⁰⁶ S/PRST/2021/4, first and second paragraphs.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., third paragraph.

¹⁰⁸ Resolution 2570 (2021), para. 2.

¹⁰⁹ S/PRST/2021/24, fifth and sixth paragraphs.

¹¹⁰ S/PRST/2021/5, first and second paragraphs, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Myanmar". For more information on the item, part I, sect. 15.

¹¹¹ S/PRST/2021/5, third paragraph.

¹¹² Resolution 2592 (2021), para. 7, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Somalia". For more information on the item, part I, sect. 2.

¹¹³ Resolution 2592 (2021), para. 8.

¹¹⁴ Resolution 2579 (2021), third preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan". For more information on the item, part I, sect. 7.

¹¹⁵ Resolution 2579 (2021), fifth preambular paragraph.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., sixth preambular paragraph.

¹¹⁷ S/PRST/2021/20, fifth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

armed groups in some parts of South Sudan and called upon the South Sudanese leaders to take immediate and effective measures to restore stability throughout the country to facilitate the preparation and conduct of free and fair elections, as stipulated in the Revitalized Agreement.¹¹⁸

In relation to West Africa and the Sahel, the Council called upon all political stakeholders to further advance national political dialogue and to take concrete steps to allow sustainable reconciliation.¹¹⁹ Welcoming the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the region in 2020, most of which had been peaceful, the Council encouraged national stakeholders with upcoming elections to work together to facilitate the preparation for, and the holding of, genuinely free and fair, credible, timely, inclusive and peaceful elections and to take all appropriate steps to prevent any forms of violence and further encouraged them to ensure a level playing field for all candidates and to work towards the full, equal and meaningful participation of women.¹²⁰ The Council also recalled the importance of political dialogue and consensus-building on key national priorities among all stakeholders as a means to achieve sustainable reconciliation and stressed that good governance was critical for long-term peace and stability in West Africa and the Sahel.¹²¹

Peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes through dialogue

The Council called for the peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes related to the situations in Cyprus, the Great Lakes region, the relations between South Sudan and the Sudan, including the Abyei Area, and between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

In that regard, the Council encouraged Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan to resume negotiations at the invitation of the Chairperson of the African Union to finalize expeditiously the text of mutually acceptable and binding agreement on the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, within a reasonable time frame¹²² and called upon the three

countries to take forward the African Union-led negotiation process in a constructive and cooperative manner.¹²³

The Council reiterated the importance of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides and all involved participants approaching the informal talks convened by the Secretary-General in the spirit of openness, flexibility and compromise and to show the necessary political will and commitment to freely negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement under the auspices of the United Nations.¹²⁴ The Council noted the easing of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and underlined that disputes should be resolved peacefully in accordance with applicable international law.¹²⁵ The Council called upon the leaders of the two communities and all involved parties to refrain from any actions and rhetoric that might damage the settlement process.¹²⁶ The Council welcomed the establishment of a dialogue between the sides and the United Nations resulting in the reopening of the crossing points on 4 June and called upon the leaders to continue cooperation in that vein and to return the crossing points to the operating status that existed prior to 29 February 2020.¹²⁷ In connection with the situation in Varosha, the Council condemned the announcement by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders on 20 July on the further reopening of a part of the fenced-off area and called for the immediate reversal of that course of action and of all steps taken on Varosha since October 2020 that could raise tensions on the island and harm prospects for a settlement.¹²⁸

Regarding the Great Lakes region, the Council welcomed the recent positive political developments, particularly the diplomatic efforts reinvigorated by the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, and the President of Burundi, Evariste Ndayishimiye, that had led to the signing of various instruments of bilateral cooperation, as well as the efforts of the President of Angola, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, in his leadership of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The Council encouraged the leaders of the region to seize the current momentum to make progress in

¹¹⁸ Ibid., seventh paragraph.

¹¹⁹ S/PRST/2021/3, fourteenth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Peace consolidation in West Africa". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 8.

¹²⁰ S/PRST/2021/3, fourteenth paragraph.

¹²¹ S/PRST/2021/16, tenth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Peace consolidation in West Africa".

¹²² S/PRST/2021/18, fourth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 9.

¹²³ S/PRST/2021/18, sixth paragraph.

¹²⁴ Resolution 2587 (2021), para. 2, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Cyprus". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 16.

¹²⁵ Resolution 2587 (2021), para. 3.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Resolution 2587 (2021), para. 8.

¹²⁸ S/PRST/2021/13, third paragraph; and resolution 2587 (2021), para. 14.

overcoming challenges to peace and sustainable development.¹²⁹

With respect to relations between South Sudan and the Sudan and the situation in the Abyei Area, the Council reiterated that any territorial disputes between States were to be settled exclusively by peaceful means and underscored that the future status of Abyei was to be resolved by negotiations between the two countries in a manner consistent with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.¹³⁰ The Council urged continued progress towards establishing temporary administrative and security arrangements and the implementation and facilitation of confidence-building measures among the respective communities in the area.¹³¹ The Council expressed concern that women remained absent from the leadership of local peace committees and called upon all parties to promote the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, including at all levels of intercommunity dialogue, to ensure a credible and legitimate process.¹³² The Council determined that South Sudan and the Sudan should demonstrate measurable progress on border demarcation.¹³³

With regard to the situation concerning Western Sahara, the Council emphasized the need to achieve a realistic, practicable, enduring and mutually acceptable political solution based on compromise.¹³⁴ The Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter.¹³⁵ The Council also called upon the parties to comply fully with the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara with regard to the ceasefire, implement their commitments to the former Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and refrain from any actions that could

undermine United Nations-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in Western Sahara.¹³⁶

C. Decisions involving the Secretary-General in the Council's efforts at the pacific settlement of disputes

While Article 99 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, the Charter does not specifically define the role of the Secretary-General in relation to matters of peace and security. The work of the Council regarding conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes has, however, required the involvement of the Secretary-General in all relevant aspects of that agenda.

During the period under review, the Council recognized the good offices work of the Secretary-General, as well as that of his special representatives and envoys, in support of efforts to end violent conflict, of peace agreements and political transitions and of the resolution of outstanding disputes.

Good offices to end violence

The Council reiterated its demand for a general and immediate cessation of hostilities in all situations on its agenda and supported the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and his special representatives and special envoys in that respect.¹³⁷ The Council requested that special representatives and special envoys of the Secretary-General, within their respective mandates, and in coordination with all relevant stakeholders, use their good offices and mediation with parties to armed conflicts to facilitate the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including vaccination in situations of armed conflict.¹³⁸

In connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council expressed strong support for the continued efforts of UNIFIL to engage with Israel and Lebanon to facilitate liaison, coordination and practical arrangements on the ground.¹³⁹ The Council urged all parties to cooperate fully with the Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as

¹²⁹ S/PRST/2021/19, third paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Great Lakes region". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 3.

¹³⁰ Resolution 2609 (2021), third preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

¹³¹ Resolution 2609 (2021), paras. 11 and 20.

¹³² Ibid., para. 21.

¹³³ Ibid., para. 3.

¹³⁴ Resolution 2602 (2021), para. 2, in connection with the item entitled "The situation concerning Western Sahara". For more information, see part I, sect. 1.

¹³⁵ Resolution 2602 (2021), para. 4.

¹³⁶ Ibid., para. 6.

¹³⁷ Resolution 2565 (2021), para. 2.

¹³⁸ Ibid., para. 13.

¹³⁹ Resolution 2591 (2021), para. 13. For more information on the mandate of UNIFIL, see part X, sect. I.

envisioned in resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).¹⁴⁰ Regarding the Golan Heights, the Council encouraged Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to take full advantage of the liaison function of UNDOF regularly to address issues of mutual concern and to prevent any escalation across the ceasefire line.¹⁴¹

With respect to the situation in Libya, the Council underlined the importance of a credible and effective Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations, welcomed the critical steps towards United Nations support for the mechanism through the swift deployment of a United Nations advance team to Libya and looked forward to receiving proposals on the tasks and scale of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism from the Secretary-General.¹⁴² The Council recalled its resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) and its decision that the United Nations Support Mission in Libya should help to achieve a ceasefire and provide appropriate support to its implementation and requested the Mission to provide support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism.¹⁴³

Good offices in support of peace agreements and political transitions

Addressing peace and security in Africa, the Council reiterated its commitment to work with the Secretary-General to pursue all possible avenues to prevent and end armed conflicts in Africa, including through addressing root causes of armed conflicts in Africa in an inclusive, integrated and sustainable manner by promoting dialogue, mediation, consultations, political negotiations and other peaceful means while enhancing humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts.¹⁴⁴

Regarding the Great Lakes region, the Council called upon the Secretary-General to continue to support the efforts of regional and subregional organizations for political efforts and finding peaceful solutions to the conflict situations in the region, including through increased political engagement of his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region. The Council reiterated its full support for the Special

Envoy of the Secretary-General in fulfilling his mandate to address the remaining challenges in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region and to promote peace and stability.¹⁴⁵

On the situation concerning Iraq, the Council commended the efforts of the Government of Iraq to plan and execute genuinely free and fair Iraqi-led and Iraqi-owned early elections and welcomed its request for further United Nations advice, support and technical assistance in that regard, including through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.¹⁴⁶

Addressing the situation in Libya, the Council called upon stakeholders to take steps to increase mutual trust and build consensus ahead of the upcoming elections, including through dialogue and national reconciliation, and recognized the important role of the good offices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Libya in that regard.¹⁴⁷

With regard to the situation in Myanmar, the Council reiterated its support to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar for her good offices and encouraged her to maintain communication and efforts to engage intensively with all relevant parties in Myanmar and to visit the country as soon as possible.¹⁴⁸

Regarding the situation in Somalia, the Council expressed its deep appreciation for support provided by the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNSOM) in Somalia to the Federal Government of Somalia, in particular with regard to, among other efforts, the development of inclusive politics and preparations for the elections in 2021, the constitutional review process, mediation and the prevention and resolution of conflicts.¹⁴⁹

Concerning the situation in West Africa and the Sahel, the Council recognized that responsible and credible mediation by the United Nations Office in

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 18.

¹⁴¹ Resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 2. For more information on the mandate of UNDOF, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁴² [S/PRST/2021/4](#), seventh paragraph.

¹⁴³ Resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), paras. 15 and 16. For more information on the mandate of UNSMIL, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁴⁴ [S/PRST/2021/10](#), tenth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.

¹⁴⁵ [S/PRST/2021/19](#), third paragraph.

¹⁴⁶ Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 21. For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁴⁷ [S/PRST/2021/24](#), sixth paragraph.

¹⁴⁸ [S/PRST/2021/5](#), fifth paragraph.

¹⁴⁹ Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 4. For more information on the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) required, inter alia, national ownership, the consent of the parties to a particular dispute or conflict, and respect for national sovereignty, as set out in the General Assembly resolution 70/304.¹⁵⁰ With regard to Guinea-Bissau, the Council welcomed the assumption by UNOWAS of the good offices functions of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, following the conclusion of its mandate on 31 December 2020, and requested specific reporting on that good offices function in the next report of the Secretary-General.¹⁵¹

Good offices in support of the resolution of outstanding disputes

Regarding Cyprus, the Council expressed full support for the ongoing engagement of the Secretary-General and the agreement by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parties to convene a further round of informal talks in the near future.¹⁵² The Council expressed regret regarding the lack of progress on an effective mechanism for direct military contacts between the sides and the relevant involved parties and urged their engagement, facilitated by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), to develop a suitably acceptable proposal on the establishment of such a mechanism and its timely implementation.¹⁵³ The Council called upon the two leaders urgently to consider the advice of the good offices mission of the Secretary-General regarding further ways to empower the technical committees and improve their performance.¹⁵⁴

With respect to the situation in the Abyei Area and relations between South Sudan and the Sudan, the Council encouraged the African Union, its High-level Implementation Panel and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa to intensify

coordinating efforts to establish temporary administrative and security arrangements for Abyei and to achieve a political solution on its status. The Council also encouraged the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to increase coordination with the African Union, the Implementation Panel and the Special Envoy on reconciliation, community sensitization and political peace processes and reiterated its request for the Secretary-General to consult with relevant parties on enhancing the role played by the Special Envoy to support the above-mentioned efforts.¹⁵⁵ The Council further welcomed the initiatives by UNISFA to support community dialogue and efforts by the Misseriya, Ngok Dinka and all other communities to strengthen intercommunal relationships and facilitate stability and reconciliation in the Abyei Area.¹⁵⁶

The Council expressed its full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara to facilitate the negotiations process to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question.¹⁵⁷ The Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith and to refrain from any actions that could undermine United Nations-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in Western Sahara.¹⁵⁸

D. Decisions involving regional arrangements or agencies

During the period under review, pursuant to Article 52 of the Charter, the Council expressed support for the crucial role of regional and subregional organizations and other arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes and encouraged them to continue with those efforts and to enhance their cooperation and coordination with the United Nations in that regard. The Council's decisions regarding joint or parallel efforts undertaken by the Council and regional organizations, arrangements or agencies in the pacific settlement of disputes during the period under review are covered in part VIII.

¹⁵⁰ S/PRST/2021/3, fourth paragraph and S/PRST/2021/16, first paragraph. See also General Assembly resolution 70/304, para. 4. For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁵¹ S/PRST/2021/3, fifteenth paragraph.

¹⁵² Resolutions 2561 (2021) and 2587 (2021), para. 2, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Cyprus".

¹⁵³ Resolutions 2561 (2021), para. 5, and 2587 (2021), para. 6.

¹⁵⁴ Resolutions 2561 (2021) and 2587 (2021), para. 4 (a). For more information on the mandate of UNFICYP, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁵⁵ Resolution 2609 (2021), para. 12.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 18.

¹⁵⁷ Resolution 2602 (2021), para. 3.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., paras. 4 and 6.

IV. Discussion on the interpretation or application of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter

Note

Section IV features the main discussions in the Security Council in 2021 with regard to the interpretation of specific provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the role of the Council and the Secretary-General in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It excludes those that concern regional organizations, which are covered in part VIII.

During the period under review, explicit references were made to Article 33,¹⁵⁹ Article 36,¹⁶⁰ Article 99¹⁶¹ and Chapter VI¹⁶² of the Charter during the Council's deliberations, although not all cases resulted in a constitutional discussion. No explicit references were made to Articles 37 or 38.

¹⁵⁹ In connection with the letter dated 13 April 2014 from the representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264), see S/2021/159 (India); in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/2021/621 (Republic of Korea); in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/2021/722 (Ukraine); and, in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8906 (Islamic Republic of Iran).

¹⁶⁰ In connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8906 (President of the International Court of Justice).

¹⁶¹ In connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8906 (Niger, France, Norway and Chile) and S/PV.8906 (Resumption 1) (Malaysia and Ukraine).

¹⁶² In connection with the question concerning Haiti, see S/2021/174 (India); in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, see S/2021/495 (Russian Federation); in connection with the protection of civilians in armed conflict, see S/2021/505 (India); in connection with the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), see S/2021/572 (Ukraine); in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/2021/621 (Japan); in connection with the peace and security in Africa, see S/PV.8816 (Mexico); in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8850 (India); in connection with the United Nations peacekeeping operations, see S/PV.8851 (President of the Community Development Association of the Sudan) and S/2021/783 (Brazil); and, in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8906 (India and Islamic Republic of Iran) and S/2021/952 (Guatemala).

The section is divided into three subsections: A. Reference to peaceful means of settlement in the light of Article 33 of the Charter; B. Referral of legal disputes to the International Court of Justice in the light of Article 36 (3) of the Charter; and C. Utilization of Article 99 of the Charter by the Secretary-General for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The section features cases in which there were relevant constitutional discussions during the period under review.

A. Reference to peaceful means of settlement in the light of Article 33 of the Charter

Article 33 of the Charter stipulates that any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should first be addressed through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means and that the Council can call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means. During the period under review, discussions with respect to Article 33 were held in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" (see cases 6, 7, 8 and 9), as described below. In addition, inclusivity in peace and security and political and peacebuilding processes was discussed in meetings held under the items entitled "Peacebuilding and sustaining peace"¹⁶³ and "Women and peace and security".¹⁶⁴

Case 6 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 29 June, at the initiative of Estonia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁶⁵ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", with a focus on cybersecurity.¹⁶⁶ During the discussion, Council members and other delegations reflected on the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention in the context of cybersecurity. In that regard, several Council members and other

¹⁶³ See S/PV.8877. See also S/2021/868.

¹⁶⁴ See S/PV.8886. See also S/2021/886.

¹⁶⁵ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 8 June (S/2021/540).

¹⁶⁶ See S/2021/621.

delegations¹⁶⁷ stressed the need for international disputes in cyberspace to be resolved by peaceful settlement. Specifically, in its written statement, the delegation of Switzerland noted that the obligation to resolve disputes by peaceful means applied to the activities of States in cyberspace. The Ambassador for United Nations Affairs and Cyber Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan highlighted that any international dispute involving cyberoperations must be settled through peaceful means pursuant to Article 2 (3) of the Charter. In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes, the powers of the Council, based on Chapters VI and VII, and the functions of the other United Nations organs should be used in disputes stemming from cyberoperations. Similarly, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized that all cyberrelated international disputes must be settled exclusively by peaceful means, on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means as stated in the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes of 1970. The delegation of Italy stated that further efforts should be dedicated to mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as to initiatives to develop cyberdiplomacy and cybermediation.

Council members and other delegations also focused on the applicability of international law to conflict prevention in cyberspace, including the purposes and principles of the Charter. The Prime Minister of Estonia held the view that international law, including the Charter in its entirety, international humanitarian law and international human rights law, applied in cyberspace. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland, States had reaffirmed that international law, particularly the Charter, provided strong, rules-based foundation for all approaches to cybersecurity. The representative of Tunisia reaffirmed the applicability of international law in addressing the use of information and communications technologies by States and stressed in that regard the importance of respecting the principle enshrined in the Charter, including the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. The representative of Australia and the delegation of Chile reaffirmed their countries' position that international law, and in particular the Charter, was applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and to promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful information and communications technology environment. The Chilean delegation added that that

position and the specific principles of the Charter, in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes, were indivisible in both the physical and digital domains. Similarly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the representative of China reiterated that the international community should abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter, including the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam stated that activities in cyberspace had to comply with the principles of the Charter and international law, in particular, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of States, and non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway noted that the affirmation of the applicability of international law to cyberspace was the cornerstone of the consensus reports of both the Group of Governmental Experts and the open-ended working group.¹⁶⁸ According to the Deputy Minister, both reports reaffirmed that international law, and in particular the Charter, was applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful information and communications technology environment. In that context, the representative of Tunisia welcomed the consensual adoption of the reports of the open-ended working group and of the Group of Governmental Experts. Both groups contributed to deepening the understanding of Member States on how international law applied and offered additional guidance on how voluntary and non-binding norms could play an important role in preventing conflicts.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, the representative of the Republic of Korea expressed support for the recommendation of the Group of Governmental Experts that a party to any international dispute, including those involving the use of information and communications technology, should first seek a solution by peaceful means, as described in Article 33 of the Charter. The delegation of Egypt also noted that, with the adoption by consensus of the final report of the open-ended working group established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/27, the United Nations had established the initial elements of a framework for conflict prevention and stability in cyberspace.

During the discussion, speakers further emphasized a multi-stakeholder approach to preventing conflicts in cyberspace. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland held the view that,

¹⁶⁷ Ireland, Viet Nam, Norway, China, Tunisia, Ecuador and European Union.

¹⁶⁸ See [S/2021/621](#). See also [A/76/135](#).

¹⁶⁹ See [S/2021/621](#).

while the contributions of civil society, technical experts, academics and the private sector had enriched past cyberdiscussions at the United Nations, their engagement to date had been far too limited. Similarly, the delegation of Mexico expressed hope that, in the future deliberations and work of the Council, the growing voices of civil society, academia and the private sector would be heard. According to the delegation of Austria, future discussions on cyberspace should be guided by a holistic, multi-stakeholder approach to ensure that those who had a role in maintaining a free, secure, open and stable cyberspace were heard and contributed to the common goals. The delegation of Chile noted that States should include all stakeholders when it came to generating policies, strategies and other initiatives aimed at preventing conflict, building common understandings and increasing cyberresilience. Similarly, the delegation of Brazil indicated that a multi-stakeholder approach was essential to identifying and combating threats as well as preventing conflict. Also calling for a multi-stakeholder approach to help prevent conflict, the delegation of Denmark, speaking also on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, suggested that the United Nations was needed as a convener and platform to establish effective cooperation between governments, civil society, academia and the private sector. Several participants¹⁷⁰ also stressed the importance of ensuring women's participation in policies and decision-making processes related to cyberspace.

Regarding the role of the Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland reiterated that Ireland valued the role of the Council in preventing conflict and promoting peace and security, including in cyberspace. Urging the Council to remain seized of that matter, the delegation of Malta also believed that the Council had an important role to play when it came to new technologies that could have an impact on international peace and security. The Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia of the United Kingdom asserted that, where malicious activity posed risks to international peace and security – by exacerbating conflict or causing humanitarian suffering – the Council must be ready to respond and should respond just as it would to threats posed by conventional means. The delegation of El Salvador encouraged the Council to continue to discuss the issue in a substantive way, leaving aside all political and/or personal interests and upholding the objective of the

prevention of new conflicts and the creation of scenarios for its development. Similarly, the representative of Indonesia stated that, in the future, the Council needed to anticipate a rise in threats in the cybersphere, as well as possible significant incidents in the information and communications technology environment that could lead to major war.

Case 7 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 7 September, the Security Council held a meeting under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.¹⁷¹ During the meeting, Council members were given a briefing by the Chair of The Elders, Mary Robinson, and the Elder Emeritus of The Elders, Lakhdar Brahimi. In her briefing, providing an overview of multiple challenges to international peace and security that fell within the Council's mandate and with regard to the role of the Council in preventing and responding to violent conflict, the Chair of The Elders urged the members of the Council to use the tools at their disposal, citing Article 34 of the Charter, and emphasized that the power of investigation should be used proactively by the Council to engage early in situations, before large-scale violence broke out.

Following the briefers, Council members discussed the role of the Council in conflict prevention. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed the view that, where there were clear emerging threats to international peace and security, the Council should consider them in a timely fashion and respond more quickly to warning signs of conflict. The Council should therefore be proactive in horizon-scanning and early warning instead of delaying until conflicts had already passed a “tipping point”. The representative of Estonia stated that prevention and preparedness were the key, instead of dealing with the consequences of conflict. Similarly, the representative of France stated that the most effective tool for addressing crises was prevention, which meant identifying tomorrow's crises and containing threats before they escalated. The representative of Norway recalled that the Council had a mandate to prevent conflict but often shied away from acting early, even when there were urgent warning signs. She said that that was regrettable because it reduced the ability of the Council to perform one of its most important roles, adding that efforts to avert conflict by peaceful means were by far the most effective way to reduce violent conflicts. Informal situational awareness briefings and fact-finding

¹⁷⁰ Ireland, Australia, Canada, European Union, Slovenia and Thailand.

¹⁷¹ See [S/PV.8850](#).

missions were positive and could be used actively by the Council to engage before conflicts erupted.

Underscoring that pushing for the political settlement of regional hotspot issues was the core mandate of the Council, the representative of China said that many such issues on the Council's agenda were at a critical stage and that it was imperative to resort to, *inter alia*, genuine multilateralism and promote, through good offices and mediation, dialogue and consultation among the parties to overcome their differences. The representative of India recalled that Article 1 of the Charter referred to collective measures to maintain international peace and security, which included actions mentioned in Chapters VI and VIII. The Charter had prescribed a trigger mechanism for collective action by the Council, and action by the Council was not the first step but the last, after exhausting all options.

A number of speakers stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines reiterated the call for a comprehensive whole-of-system approach to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding activities. In a similar vein, the representative of Norway stated that experience showed that transitions posed a risk and needed attention to prevent conflicts from re-erupting, which demanded a coordinated whole-of-United Nations approach in close collaboration with host States. The representative of India drew attention to the distressing consequences of interventions made without allowing for mediation efforts, especially at the regional level. When considering preventive diplomacy, either *suo moto* or through the recommendation of the Secretary-General, Member States had to be convinced that the decision taken by the Council was impartial and carefully considered. Only then would preventive diplomacy be effective or even accepted by all Member States.

Case 8 **Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 9 November, at a meeting convened at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁷² Council members held a high-level open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Exclusion, inequality and

conflict".¹⁷³ During the meeting, Council members were given a briefing by the Secretary-General and an indigenous affairs expert, Lourdes Tibán Guala.

In his remarks, the Secretary-General emphasized that conflict prevention was at the heart of his proposed new agenda for peace, as part of the report entitled "Our Common Agenda", in which he called upon the global community to work as one to address the roots of violent conflicts and called for countries in transition to ensure that all groups were part of the peace process.¹⁷⁴ Outlining a road map for inclusion, built around people, prevention, gender and institutions, he noted that, without inclusion, the puzzle of peace remained incomplete, with many gaps to be filled. In that context, the Secretary-General reminded Council members that, in the report, he called for a new social contract within all societies; the need to strengthen the prevention agenda on multiple fronts to address different types of exclusion and inequalities; the need to recognize and prioritize the crucial role of women in building peace; and the need to build trust through inclusive national institutions that represented the entire population. While endorsing the role of women at the centre of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in particular, he added that the United Nations was increasing the number of women peacekeepers and that more lasting and sustainable peace happened when women led and made decisions in mediation and peace processes. In her remarks, Ms. Tibán Guala stressed that indigenous people were familiar with issues concerning peace and conflict in their respective States. It was significant that the international community had recognized that women's participation was essential to achieving lasting peace and that they should have an opportunity to work even more towards achieving that goal, without neglecting the participation of indigenous women and women of African descent, among other ethnic minorities.

During the discussion that followed, Council members and other delegations reflected on the impact of exclusion on conflicts and called for more inclusive peace processes, while also emphasizing the participation of a wide range of actors, including women and young people. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia stated that it was naïve to think that it was possible to find a peaceful solution to any conflict without broad representation at the negotiating table. Exclusion and inequality, with respect to members of all vulnerable and marginalized groups,

¹⁷² A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 15 October (S/2021/883).

¹⁷³ See S/PV.8900 and S/PV.8900 (Resumption 1). See also S/2021/935.

¹⁷⁴ See S/PV.8900.

were a risk for peace and security. Working consciously and continuously towards achieving women's full, equal and meaningful participation in peace processes was key to long-lasting peace and stability. The representative of the United States held the view that inequality, marginalization and exclusion drove instability, violence, conflict and mass migration, and she underscored that ensuring the meaningful empowerment, participation and protection of women in all aspects of the peace- and security-building process was necessary for building durable and peaceful societies. In that connection, the representative of Norway noted that the promotion of inclusive political settlements in peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts should be given higher priority. Similarly, the representative of Indonesia underscored that promoting peaceful dialogue among different groups within a society was essential to build such an inclusive approach and ensure a sustainable peace.¹⁷⁵ According to the representative of the United Arab Emirates, mandates of peace operations should include perspectives from a broad range of local grass-roots actors, particularly women and youth leaders, to directly incorporate and address their needs and eliminate risks of exclusion or discrimination.¹⁷⁶ The representative of Malaysia expressed the view that the involvement of women in conflict prevention and resolution, including in political and social-economic participation, would promote stability and reduce the risk of the re-emergence of conflict. He emphasized the critical importance of international partners working closely with local stakeholders, as it was essential for international actors to fully understand the local contexts and specific societal dynamics in formulating strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. The representative of Denmark, speaking also on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, suggested that addressing the root causes and drivers of conflict, such as exclusion and inequality, must be part of prevention and peacebuilding.¹⁷⁷ The representative of Bangladesh added that the Council should invest more in implementing the women and peace and security and the youth, peace and security agendas to ensure inclusion.

Specifically on the role of young people, the representative of France emphasized that, to prevent the emergence or resurgence of conflicts, the efforts of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund must prioritize young people by supporting the implementation and promotion of the youth, peace and

security agenda.¹⁷⁸ The representative of South Africa recognized that young people were often victims of multiple and interlocking forms of discrimination that could lead to their exclusion from peacemaking and conflict prevention efforts.¹⁷⁹ In addition, while affirming that the inclusion of young people had broad benefits, he stressed the need to invest in their capabilities to contribute to greater economic growth and development, the diminishing of civil unrest and the promotion of sustainable peace. In its written statement, convinced that young people had a role to play in preventing conflict, the delegation of Jordan reminded Council members of resolution [2250 \(2015\)](#), by which the Council reaffirmed the role of young people in conflict prevention and urged Member States to facilitate an enabling environment for young people and to create policies and mechanisms that would allow them to play an effective part in peacebuilding and in strengthening a culture of peace, tolerance and respect for religions.¹⁸⁰

Case 9 **Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 16 November, at a meeting convened at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁸¹ Council members held an open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations".¹⁸² At the meeting, the Council was given a briefing by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the President of the International Court of Justice.¹⁸³ At the same meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement, reiterating its commitment to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.¹⁸⁴ The Council expressed its continued commitment to fostering interaction on a regular basis with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council,

¹⁷⁸ See [S/PV.8900](#).

¹⁷⁹ See [S/PV.8900 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁸⁰ See [S/2021/935](#).

¹⁸¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October ([S/2021/888](#)).

¹⁸² See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/952](#).

¹⁸³ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁸⁴ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), sixth paragraph.

¹⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8900 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8900](#).

¹⁷⁷ See [S/PV.8900 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat in accordance with their respective mandates under the Charter, in particular on matters relating to preventive diplomacy tools and mechanisms.¹⁸⁵

In his remarks, the Secretary-General stated that, while prevention did not always receive the attention that it deserved, it was absolutely vital to lasting peace and was the ultimate goal of the work of the Council and its resolutions to help countries build peace and stability and to resolve their disputes before they escalated into armed conflicts. He stressed the need to strengthen all the tools of preventive diplomacy for the future, as proposed in his Agenda for Peace, including stronger early warning systems and strategic foresight tools, stronger mediation capacities, expansion of the pool of women leaders to serve as envoys or mediation specialists and more joint work across the United Nations family, including the Peacebuilding Commission.

During the subsequent discussion, members and non-members of the Council stressed the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and addressing the root causes of the growing number of increasingly complex challenges to international peace and security. According to the representative of India, the peaceful settlement of disputes was key for the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of the rule of law. Adequate attention needed to be paid to the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, rather than Chapter VII becoming the ready recourse. The representative of the Niger asserted that a main function of some of the principal organs of the United Nations was the peaceful settlement of disputes, as enshrined in the Charter, which, if implemented effectively, would prevent many wars with incalculable consequences.

The representative of Finland, speaking also on behalf of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, stated that the pacific settlement of disputes, namely, political and diplomatic solutions, should always be the first option. That applied to active peace mediation in the event of a crisis or more long-term, structural work to address the root causes of conflicts. According to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a general review of the Council's practices revealed that, despite being mandated to use prevention and non-coercive means under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Council had very rarely applied that principle and had, at times, treated its Chapter VI functions as if they did not exist. In that sense, Chapter VII functions, including sanctions, must be applied only as a measure

of last resort, if necessary, and after all means of peaceful settlement of disputes had been exhausted. Citing Article 33 (1) of the Charter, the representative noted that the responsibility to settle an international dispute rested entirely with the parties concerned, and he stressed that that principle must be fully respected and strictly observed by the Council. Chapter VI functions must never be invoked for the consideration of matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States or situations whose continuation was not likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, or for violating or undermining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States. Similarly, in its written statement submitted in connection with the meeting, the delegation of Guatemala expressed the belief that the Council should previously exhaust the promotion of and good offices for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, as indicated in Chapter VI, before undertaking actions outlined in Chapter VII.¹⁸⁶

Referring to the advantages of conflict prevention, the representative of China noted that taking timely and appropriate action could have a multiplier effect in the early stages of a crisis, allowing for more to be done with less.¹⁸⁷ The representative of Argentina stated that conflict prevention was a fundamental responsibility of the Council and the United Nations system as a whole and that the Council had, in recent years, increased its engagement and flexibility to address emerging threats before they escalated and were included on the formal agenda of the Council.¹⁸⁸ Through its actions, the Council could send important signals that could help to ease violence and open a channel for dialogue between warring parties, facilitating, for example, the work of the Secretary-General or that of his special envoys in good offices missions. According to the representative of Albania, the Council had, over the years, considerably improved its work through greater engagement and flexibility in addressing emerging threats before they were placed on its formal agenda and promoting a more proactive approach to preventive diplomacy. However, he noted, for example, that it had taken the Council several months to convene an open meeting on the conflict in Ethiopia, where, unfortunately, every horrible and reprehensible act was taking place, with huge consequences for the population and bleak prospects for the country. Similarly, while welcoming the Council's increased focus on prevention, the representative of Turkey expressed the view that its

¹⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁸⁶ See [S/2021/952](#).

¹⁸⁷ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁸⁸ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

inability to take preventive action had led to the outbreak of protracted conflicts, which left Member States with little option but to safeguard their security through national measures.

Members and non-members of the Council offered a broad array of views on how the Council should prioritize and enhance its efforts on conflict prevention and utilize the tools at its disposal for that purpose. According to the representative of Estonia, preventive diplomacy needed to include being open to new topics that could be considered part of peace and security in order to make sure that the current tools of the United Nations were the most effective and that the Organization was willing to employ new tools to tackle emerging issues.¹⁸⁹ In that regard, he highlighted the need for the international community, including the Council, to take climate change more seriously; the importance of accountability and respect for the rule of law and human rights; and the need to ensure inclusivity with regard to gender equality and engage persons belonging to marginalized groups. In the view of the representative of France, the Council should take better account of global challenges that could undermine international peace and security and have a comprehensive overview of the risks to international security posed by climate change, pandemics or disinformation. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that, while the Council must continue its leading role in the maintenance of international peace and security, more creative and innovative approaches should be brought to bear to address existing implementation gaps, which ranged from conflict prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding and across the spectrum of thematic questions concerning women and young people, climate change and environmental degradation, and other fundamental challenges of sustainable development. The representative of Ireland stressed that the Council was too often in crisis-response mode and that, to address challenges such as food insecurity, poverty and gender inequality, which were often precursors to conflict, it was as critical for humanitarian, development and peace support actors to work in a coordinated manner.

More broadly, the representative of the United Kingdom recalled that, in Council resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#) and General Assembly resolution [70/262](#), it was explicitly acknowledged that conflict prevention was the responsibility of the entire United Nations system. A system-wide approach to sustaining peace was therefore critical. The representative of Viet Nam held the view that early conflict prevention also required inclusive and comprehensive solutions to address the

root causes of conflicts that might require the engagement of other organs and actors, in accordance with their respective mandates. According to the representative of Kenya, for the Council to effectively fulfil its mandate, in coordination with the other United Nations principal organs, it must consider and address the economic, political and social dimensions of conflict. The representative of Argentina argued that preventive diplomacy actions that were traditionally carried out by the Secretary-General now depended on dialogue among the principal organs, which enabled crises and conflicts to be addressed from different angles and in a cooperative manner.¹⁹⁰ Many delegations specifically highlighted the significance of the Peacebuilding Commission in conflict prevention and its advisory role vis-à-vis the Council. Stressing the need to strengthen the early warning mechanism, in particular through the exchange of information between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, the representative of Belgium said that the Commission should fully exercise its advisory role by providing short, focused, specific and actionable recommendations.

In addition to prevention, several participants emphasized the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict. The representative of China believed that an emergency response could only avert or postpone crises temporarily and that it was only by eliminating the root causes of conflict that lasting peace and stability could be achieved.¹⁹¹ Similarly, the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends in Defence of the Charter of the United Nations, was of the view that there was no “one-size-fits-all” solution to each and every situation and that the root causes and structural drivers of crisis or conflicts must be comprehensively and effectively addressed.¹⁹² The representative of Nepal noted that the root causes of conflict in most cases included, inter alia, systematic discrimination and inequality, poverty, deprivation of freedom, denial of human rights and justice and the lack of rule of law. Addressing those root causes therefore could not only avert potential conflicts but also enable the international community to achieve sustainable peace and development. Several delegations specifically underscored the relevance of

¹⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁹¹ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁹² See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8906](#).

human rights violations and abuses as early indicators and root causes of conflict.¹⁹³

Some speakers reflected on the possible limitations to the Council's work on conflict prevention. The representative of China said that a successful preventive diplomacy programme was necessarily anchored in a specific situation and owned by the parties concerned.¹⁹⁴ It could not therefore and must not become a pretext for interference in domestic affairs. Furthermore, while the early warning mechanism allowed for the early detection of major problems so that immediate action could be taken to address them, it was necessary to ensure that it did not lead to overreactions and inappropriate involvement. In a similar vein, the representative of the Russian Federation affirmed that early warning could not be based on an arbitrary combination of conflict indicators, even if they were as important as the human rights indicators or those relating to the Sustainable Development Goals.

B. Referral of legal disputes to the International Court of Justice in the light of Article 36 (3) of the Charter

Article 36 (3) of the Charter provides that, in making recommendations under Article 36, the Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. During the period under review, a discussion with respect to Article 36 (3) was held in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" (see case 10).

Case 10 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 16 November, at a meeting¹⁹⁵ convened at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,¹⁹⁶ Council members held an open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Peace and security through

preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations". In a presidential statement adopted at the meeting, the Council, inter alia, emphasized the key role of the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, in adjudicating disputes among States and the value of its work.¹⁹⁷

In his briefing, the Secretary-General noted that the United Nations system had given the world a home for dialogue and tools and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes and recalled that the judicial dimension of prevention was provided by the International Court of Justice.¹⁹⁸ In her statement, the President of the International Court of Justice welcomed efforts by the other principal organs of the United Nations to promote the resort by Member States to the settlement of their disputes before the Court. She recalled that, in addition to depositing a declaration in which the Court's jurisdiction was recognized as compulsory, the principal organs could be and had been involved in other ways in the process that led to contentious cases being submitted before the Court. In that regard, she noted that, under Article 36 (3) of the Charter, the Council might recommend, in relation to legal disputes that endangered international peace and security, that the States involved refer the dispute to the Court, such as with respect to its very first case, namely, the *Corfu Channel case, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania*.¹⁹⁹

In their statements, Council members and other delegations acknowledged the important role played by the International Court of Justice in the peaceful settlement of disputes.²⁰⁰ The representative of China recalled that the Court was the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and was dedicated to promoting the international rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. According to the representative of France, the jurisprudence of the Court contributed not only to the calming of relations between States but also to a better understanding and thus to a strengthening of international law, which was the pillar of preventive diplomacy. Speaking on behalf of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, the representative of Finland stated that the submission of a dispute to the Court should be regarded not as an unfriendly act but rather as an act to fulfil the obligation of all States to settle their international disputes peacefully. He therefore called upon States that had not yet done so to consider accepting the

¹⁹³ See [S/PV.8906](#) (United Kingdom, Ireland and Norway) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Croatia, Netherlands, Liechtenstein, Germany and Albania).

¹⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/952](#).

¹⁹⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October ([S/2021/888](#)).

¹⁹⁷ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), last paragraph.

¹⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8906](#).

¹⁹⁹ Resolution 22 (1947).

²⁰⁰ See [S/PV.8906](#).

jurisdiction of the Court. The representative of Slovakia was of the view that the success of the Council in fulfilling its responsibility relied to a great degree on the success of the Court.²⁰¹ The work of the Court and the efforts of the Secretary-General in adjudicating disputes among States were just a few of the essential components for the prevention of conflicts and, therefore, for the maintenance of international peace and security. According to the representative of Liechtenstein, by adjudicating disputes between States and upholding the rule of law at the international level, the Court provided an essential platform for the maintenance of international peace and security through the peaceful settlement of disputes. The representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that the Court played a vital role in the peaceful resolution of disputes, as evidenced by the geographical diversity and wide variety of cases before it. Furthermore, the Court contributed positively to the rule of law at the international level and played a key role in defusing tensions among States.

Delegations called for greater cooperation between the Council and the International Court of Justice in the areas of conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes, including through more frequent use by the Council of referrals of disputes to the Court under Article 36²⁰² and the Court's advisory functions under Article 96 of the Charter.²⁰³ For example, the representative of Estonia stated that more frequent and timely referrals of cases to the Court by the Council would contribute to resolving disputes and thereby promoted international peace and security.²⁰⁴ Similarly, in the view of the representative of Ireland, the Court remained underutilized as a resource for the peaceful adjudication of disputes in accordance with international law, and its role in preventing conflict could be bolstered by greater interaction with the Council. In that regard, she suggested that the Council could recommend that States with a dispute on its agenda resolve the legal aspect of their dispute before the Court. In the same vein, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that the mediatory and technical capacities of the Court on matters pertaining to the rule of law ought to be leveraged more often.

²⁰¹ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

²⁰² See [S/PV.8906](#) (Estonia, Ireland and Brazil) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Croatia).

²⁰³ See [S/PV.8906](#) (Ireland and Brazil) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Croatia, Nepal, Malaysia, Azerbaijan and South Africa).

²⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8906](#).

Regarding the advisory opinions of the Court, the representative of Malaysia said that deliberations on contentious political and security issues could be more effective when reinforced by authoritative legal opinions.²⁰⁵ He therefore urged the Council to seriously consider Article 96 of the Charter and to make greater use of the Court as a source of advisory opinions and of interpretation of relevant norms of international law, particularly with regard to long-standing issues that affected international peace and security. The representative of Brazil said that requests for advisory opinions on legal issues related to both country-specific situations and thematic items on the agenda of the Council could be made.²⁰⁶ Another area of cooperation, according to the representative, was the enforcement of the Court's decisions by the Council in cases of non-compliance, in accordance with Article 94.

C. Utilization of Article 99 of the Charter by the Secretary-General for the pacific settlement of disputes

Article 99 of the Charter stipulates that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The multiple tools available to the Secretary-General under Article 99 were discussed in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" (see case 11).

Case 11 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 16 November, at a meeting²⁰⁷ convened at the initiative of Mexico, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,²⁰⁸ Council members held an open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Peace and security through preventive diplomacy: a common objective to all the principal organs of the United Nations".

In his briefing, while noting that conflict prevention was absolutely vital to lasting peace, the Secretary-General recalled his call for a surge in diplomacy for peace to ensure that political solutions

²⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

²⁰⁶ See [S/PV.8906](#).

²⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8906](#) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/952](#).

²⁰⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 19 October ([S/2021/888](#)).

remained the first and primary option to settle disputes.²⁰⁹ That included reviews of all the tools that comprised the United Nations peace architecture and a better integration of prevention and risk assessment across United Nations decision-making. The Secretary-General highlighted the use of his good offices to defuse conflicts and advance peace in the context of multiple political crises and disputes. In that regard, he cited examples of the use of regional offices, his special envoys, special political missions and peacekeeping operations in helping to prepare for and ensuring peaceful elections and supporting political transitions. He also emphasized the importance of strengthening all the tools of preventive diplomacy for the future, as proposed in his Agenda for Peace, including stronger early warning systems and strategic foresight tools, stronger mediation capacities and expansion of the pool of women leaders to serve as envoys, mediation specialists and peacekeepers.

During the subsequent discussion, speakers shared their views on the role played by the Secretary-General in preventive diplomacy, early warning and the use of his good offices and mediation in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter. In that regard, several speakers highlighted the important early warning role of the Secretary-General in alerting the Council to any issue that might threaten international peace and security.²¹⁰ The representative of the Niger considered that anticipating crises must be at the centre of the work of the United Nations and stressed the importance of the Secretary-General bringing urgent and sensitive situations that were likely to degenerate into conflicts to the attention of the Council as soon as possible, in accordance with Article 99.²¹¹ The representative of Norway said that the Secretariat and the United Nations system briefers had a key role in using their interactions with the Council to bring emerging issues to its attention and sound the alarm. While better situational awareness might not fix political differences in the Council regarding how to resolve a conflict, it would build a common baseline of understanding and bring forward the point at which the Council first engaged. The representative of Estonia stressed the need for the international community, including the Council, to take climate change more seriously by mandating the Secretary-General to report on its impact on international security.

A number of members and non-members of the Council highlighted the role of the Secretary-General

in conflict prevention through the use of his good offices and mediation. According to the representative of Viet Nam, the Secretary-General played an important role in conflict prevention and had many time-proven tools at his disposal, especially mediation and good offices, which enjoyed broad support. Similarly, the representative of the Russian Federation said that, in the context of the increasing role of mediators in conflict prevention and resolution, the good offices missions of the Secretary-General and his special envoys continued to prove their relevance. Those missions and envoys must be ready to work impartially and independently, as well as to take innovative decisions that were not based on their previous roles and achievements. The representative of France welcomed the push for peace diplomacy of the Secretary-General, which involved the strengthening of mediation capacities and the monitoring and early warning system entrusted to the country teams or the Special Advisers to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect. The representative of China said that the key to conflict prevention was to formulate a preventive diplomacy strategy that was systematic, scientific and effective, making full use of such means as good offices and mediation, strengthening the early warning mechanism and supporting the Secretary-General in playing his unique role. The representative of Norway underscored that the integrity and independence provided by the good offices of the Secretary-General were essential tools of the United Nations system to prevent conflict through mediation.

The representative of the Netherlands indicated that the good offices of the Secretary-General could serve to strengthen the communication and coordination among the principal organs of the United Nations.²¹² The representative of Slovakia noted that the efforts of the Secretary-General in adjudicating disputes among States were just one of the essential components for the prevention of conflicts and the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Nepal acknowledged the role of the Secretary-General and his representatives in mediation, facilitation and dialogues to prevent conflict and secure peace. Member States should fully utilize the good offices of the Secretary-General to promote preventive diplomacy. The representative of Argentina recalled that the term “preventive diplomacy” had first been coined by the former Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, and that, since then, the good offices of successive Secretaries-General had contributed to the peaceful resolution of different types of conflicts, such

²⁰⁹ See [S/PV.8906](#).

²¹⁰ See [S/PV.8906](#) (Tunisia, Niger, France, Norway and Chile) and [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Malaysia).

²¹¹ See [S/PV.8906](#).

²¹² See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

as international conflicts, internal conflicts, electoral disputes and border disputes. The representative of Ukraine expressed the view that the Secretary-General should use his authority, as envisaged in Article 99 of the Charter, more often and more explicitly by proposing actionable recommendations to resolve conflict, protect civilians and ensure accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The representative of South Africa urged the Council to strengthen its interactions with regional and subregional organizations in preventive diplomacy initiatives and strive to effectively utilize the good offices of the Secretary-General, in collaboration with regional organizations.

The representative of the Niger said that the creation of United Nations regional offices, including the United Nations Office for West Africa and the

Sahel, enabled the Organization to better contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding by focusing on specific challenges affecting security in the region, including organized crime, terrorism, the effects of climate change, migration issues and poverty.²¹³ The representative of the Russian Federation stated that United Nations Headquarters and field presences had amassed a huge potential knowledge and expertise in monitoring and analysing situations in the regions and forecasting their development according to crisis scenarios. The Secretariat was a universal institution with a unique legitimacy, playing a significant role in conflict prevention. The representative of Malaysia called for the greater use of United Nations country teams and regional offices in that context.²¹⁴

²¹³ See [S/PV.8906](#).

²¹⁴ See [S/PV.8906 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

Part VII

Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)

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Introductory note

Part VII of the present Supplement deals with action taken by the Security Council with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including Articles 39 to 51. This part is divided into 10 sections, each focusing on selected material to highlight the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter by the Council in its deliberations and decisions.

Sections I to IV cover material related to Articles 39 to 42, which regulate the power of the Council to determine threats to international peace and security and to take the appropriate action in response to those threats, including the imposition of sanctions measures or the authorization of the use of force. Sections V and VI focus on Articles 43 to 47, regarding the command and deployment of military forces. Sections VII and VIII address, respectively, the obligations of Member States under Articles 48 and 49, while sections IX and X address, respectively, the practice of the Council with respect to Articles 50 and 51.

The sections contain subsections on discussions held within the Council regarding the proper interpretation and implementation of the Articles governing the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, and similar to previous periods, the Council adopted 47 per cent of its resolutions (27 out of 57 resolutions) explicitly under Chapter VII of the Charter. Most of those resolutions concerned the mandates of United Nations and regional peacekeeping missions or multinational forces and the imposition, extension, modification or termination of sanctions measures.

As discussed in section I, in 2021, while the Council did not determine the existence of any new threats to international peace and security, it reaffirmed that the situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan (including Abyei), Yemen and the former Yugoslavia constituted threats to regional and/or international peace and security.

With respect to specific countries and regions, the Council in its decisions recalled past determinations of threats to international peace and security of significance in those situations. For example, in relation to Libya, the Council reaffirmed the need to combat threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. In connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council reiterated that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, were an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continued to pose a threat to international peace and security. The Council also expressed grave concern that Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, in particular through its increased use of improvised explosive devices and exploitation of the licit financial system, and condemned the supply of weapons and ammunition to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, especially when they reached Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) and when they undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. In addition, the Council recognized that the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the region went beyond the group's conventional military action and asymmetric warfare, expressing in that regard serious concern at the ability of Al-Shabaab to generate revenue. In relation to the

situation in West Africa, the Council recalled that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constituted a threat to international peace and security. Similarly, in relation to the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, the Council recognized the increasing threat posed to peace and security in Africa by terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, especially in the most affected regions of the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Horn of Africa, and emphasized that the presence of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism could, *inter alia*, exacerbate conflicts. The Council also reiterated its concern regarding the evolving threats to peace, security and stability in parts of Africa posed by, among other things, protracted armed conflicts, proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, transnational organized crime and trafficking, illicit exploitation of natural resources, maritime insecurity and unconstitutional change of government, as well as regarding factors such as economic and social disparities and pandemics or epidemics such as those caused by outbreaks of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and the Ebola virus disease.

Under thematic items, in 2021 the Council reaffirmed its determination made in 2020 that the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. As in past practice, the Council also reaffirmed in its decisions under thematic items that terrorism, terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery, constituted threats to international peace and security. In connection with threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, the Council also reaffirmed that the illicit proceeds of drug trafficking in Afghanistan were a source of financing for terrorist groups and non-State actors that threatened regional and international security. Throughout 2021, the Council continued to address threats to international peace and security routinely discussed in the past, such as terrorism, proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, illicit trade, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, organized crime, pandemics and climate change, including the linkages between terrorism and climate change. During the reporting period, the Council also addressed threats to international peace and security in relation to activities carried out in cyberspace.

As described in section II below, in 2021 the Council adopted no decisions calling for compliance with provisional measures that might have been of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 40 of the Charter, nor were there any discussions of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 40.

As covered in section III, in the period under review the Council renewed the existing measures concerning the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen, as well as those concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities and ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida and associates. In addition to renewing the existing measures concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council expanded the listing criteria to individuals and entities involved in planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against medical personnel or humanitarian personnel. No changes were made to the measures concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon or the Sudan. As far as judicial measures were concerned, no action was taken in 2021.

As described in section IV, the Council reiterated authorizations granted prior to 2021 to United Nations peacekeeping missions and multinational forces to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter with regard to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African

Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, and the Sudan and South Sudan (including Abyei). In that regard, the Council renewed the authorization to use force to discharge the protection of civilians mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union Mission in Somalia and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Moreover, the Council reiterated the authorization granted to the French forces in the Central African Republic and Mali to take “all necessary measures” to support MINUSCA and MINUSMA, respectively, in fulfilling the mandated tasks. With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council also extended the authorization to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. In relation to the situation in Libya, the Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take “all necessary measures” when confronting migrant smugglers and in carrying out the inspection of vessels in the implementation of the arms embargo. With regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council renewed its authorization to Member States, under the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence, to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the rules and procedures governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic and, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO, to take “all necessary measures” in their defence.

As described in sections V to VIII, in the context of peacekeeping, during the period under review the Council called upon Member States to contribute troops and other assets, including aerial force enablers, while Member States called for deepening interaction and consultation by the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries. In addition, the Council frequently requested compliance with its decisions adopted under Chapter VII by States and non-State actors alike, as well as by regional and subregional organizations. As featured in section IX, Council members discussed the impact of counter-terrorism measures and sanctions on the provision of humanitarian assistance. As covered in section X, consistent with past practice, Article 51, as well as the principle of individual and/or collective self-defence, were cited abundantly in communications addressed to the Council, as well as in its discussions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I. Determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Note

Section I concerns the practice of the Council with regard to the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. It provides information regarding the determination of the existence of a threat by the Council and examines instances in which a threat was debated. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A provides an overview of the decisions of the Council relating to the determination of a “threat to the peace”. Subsection B contains a series of case studies describing some of the arguments advanced during the Council’s deliberations in connection with the determination of a threat in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter and the adoption of some of the resolutions mentioned in subsection A.

A. Decisions of the Security Council relating to Article 39

During the period under review, the Council did not determine the existence of any breach of the peace, act of aggression or new threat to international peace and security.

Continuing threats

In 2021, the Council continued to monitor the evolution of existing and emerging conflicts and situations and to determine, reaffirm and recognize the existence of continuing threats. The relevant provisions of decisions in which the Council referred to continuing threats to peace and security concerning country- or region-specific or thematic items during the period under review are set out in tables 1 and 2, respectively.

In that regard, the Council determined that, in and of themselves, the situations in Afghanistan, the

Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan, including the Abyei area and along the border between the Sudan and South Sudan, Yemen and the region of the former Yugoslavia continued to pose threats to international peace and security and/or threats to international peace and security in the respective regions.¹ In connection with the Middle East, and specifically concerning the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council determined that the devastating humanitarian situation in the country continued to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region.²

In addition, in relation to Africa and the situation in Libya, the Council expressed grave concern over the exploitation of the situation in Libya by terrorist and violent groups and reaffirmed the need to combat, in accordance with international law, including the Charter, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.³

In connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”, the Council reaffirmed

¹ Resolutions [2611 \(2021\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph, and [2615 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph (Afghanistan); [2575 \(2021\)](#), last preambular paragraph, [2606 \(2021\)](#), last preambular paragraph, and [2609 \(2021\)](#), last preambular paragraph (Abyei); [2566 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph, and [2588 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph, and [2605 \(2021\)](#), (penultimate preambular paragraph) (Central African Republic); [2582 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph and [2612 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph (Democratic Republic of the Congo); [2591 \(2021\)](#), last preambular paragraph (Lebanon); [2570 \(2021\)](#), last preambular paragraph, [2571 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph, and [2595 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph, and [2599 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph (Libya); [2584 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph, and [2590 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph (Mali); [2563 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph, [2568 \(2021\)](#) and, penultimate preambular paragraph, [2607 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph, and [2614 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph (Somalia); [2562 \(2021\)](#), seventh preambular paragraph (Sudan); [2567 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph, and [2577 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph (South Sudan); [2564 \(2021\)](#), penultimate preambular paragraph (Yemen), and [2604 \(2021\)](#), first preambular paragraph (former Yugoslavia).

² Resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph.

³ Resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), seventh preambular paragraph.

that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constituted a threat to international peace and security and further reaffirmed the need for all States to prevent and combat it by all means, in accordance with the Charter and in compliance with other obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law.⁴

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council determined that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, were an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.⁵ The Council expressed grave concern that Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through its increased use of improvised explosive devices and exploitation of the licit financial system, and condemned the supply of weapons and ammunition to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, especially when they reached Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) and when they undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region.⁶ The Council further recognized that the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the region went beyond the group's conventional military action and asymmetric warfare, expressing in that regard serious concern at Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue.⁷

In 2021, several decisions adopted in connection with thematic items also contained references to threats to international peace and security.

With respect to the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security", the Council reiterated its concern regarding the evolving threats to peace, security and stability in parts of Africa posed by, among other things, protracted armed conflicts, proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, transnational organized crime and trafficking, illicit exploitation of natural resources,

maritime insecurity and unconstitutional change of government, as well as regarding factors such as economic and social disparities and outbreaks of pandemics or epidemics such as COVID-19 and Ebola.⁸ The Council expressed its determination to enhance the effectiveness of the overall effort to respond to threats to international peace and security on a global level. The Council further recognized the increasing threat posed to peace and security in Africa by terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, especially in the most affected regions of the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Horn of Africa, and emphasized that the presence of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism could, *inter alia*, exacerbate conflicts.⁹

In relation to the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", the Council reaffirmed its determination made in 2020 that the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁰ In relation to the same item, the Council expressed grave concern that the illicit transfer and destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continued to pose threats to international peace and security.¹¹

In connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea", the Council determined that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.¹²

With regard to the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security", the Council recalled that ISIL/Da'esh continued to constitute a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, particularly those committed against women and children, and including those motivated by religious or ethnic grounds, and its recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affected all regions and Member States.¹³

⁴ S/PRST/2021/3, tenth paragraph.

⁵ Resolution 2608 (2021), penultimate preambular paragraph.

⁶ Resolution 2607 (2021), seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs.

⁷ Ibid., tenth preambular paragraph.

⁸ S/PRST/2021/21, eighth paragraph.

⁹ Ibid., thirty-second paragraph.

¹⁰ Resolution 2565 (2021), last preambular paragraph.

¹¹ Resolution 2616 (2021), second preambular paragraph.

¹² Resolution 2569 (2021), penultimate preambular paragraph.

¹³ Resolution 2597 (2021), third preambular paragraph.

In connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the Council reaffirmed that terrorism in all forms and manifestations continued to constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.¹⁴ The Council also recalled its resolution 2396 (2017) in which it expressed concern with the continued threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL/Da’esh, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and reaffirmed its resolve to address all aspects of that

threat, including terrorist acts perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters.¹⁵ In connection with the same item, the Council also determined that the situation in Afghanistan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.¹⁶ The Council further acknowledged that the illicit proceeds of drug trafficking in Afghanistan were a source of financing for terrorist groups and non-State actors that threatened regional and international security.¹⁷

¹⁴ S/PRST/2021/1, third paragraph, and resolutions 2610 (2021) and 2617 (2021), second preambular paragraph.

¹⁵ Resolution 2610 (2021), forty-third preambular paragraph.

¹⁶ Resolutions 2611 (2021) and 2615 (2021), penultimate preambular paragraph.

¹⁷ Resolution 2611 (2021), fifth preambular paragraph.

Table 1

Decisions in which the Council referred to continuing threats to the peace, by region and country, 2021

Decision and date	Provision
Africa	
The situation in the Central African Republic	
Resolution 2566 (2021) 12 March 2021	Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolutions 2588 (2021) and 2605 (2021) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</i>
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
Resolution 2582 (2021) 29 June 2021	Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolution 2612 (2021) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</i>
The situation in Libya	
Resolution 2570 (2021) 16 April 2021	Recalling its determination in its resolution 2213 (2015) that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (last preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021) (second preambular paragraph)</i>
Resolution 2571 (2021) 16 April 2021	Determining that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
The situation in Mali	
Resolution 2584 (2021) 29 June 2021	Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2590 (2021) 30 August 2021	Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph)
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	
Resolution 2562 (2021) 11 February 2021	Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (seventh preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolution 2577 (2021) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</i>

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Resolution 2575 (2021) 11 May 2021	Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei and along the border between the Sudan and South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (last preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolutions 2606 (2021) and 2609 (2021) (last preambular paragraph)</i>
The situation in Somalia	
Resolution 2563 (2021) 25 February 2021	Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (second preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolution 2614 (2021) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</i>
Resolution 2568 (2021) 12 March 2021	Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to regional and international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolution 2607 (2021) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</i>
Resolution 2607 (2021) 15 November 2021	Condemning the supply of weapons and ammunition to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, especially when they reach Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh, and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and further condemning continued illegal supply of weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive device components from Yemen to Somalia (seventh preambular paragraph) Condemning Al-Shabaab's terrorist attacks in Somalia and beyond, expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through its increased use of improvised explosive devices and exploitation of the licit financial system, and further expressing grave concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh (eighth preambular paragraph) Recognizing that the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the region goes beyond the group's conventional military action and asymmetric warfare, expressing serious concern at Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue as documented in the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (S/2021/849), welcoming the Federal Government of Somalia's efforts to strengthen the Somali financial sector to identify and monitor money-laundering risks and combat terrorist financing, noting the steps set out by the Federal Government of Somalia in the Somalia transition plan on institutional capacity-building, which seek to develop these capabilities, noting the importance of financial services in enabling Somalia's economic future, further welcoming efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Panel to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab finances, and urging engagement from the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, Somali financial institutions, the private sector and the international community to support this process (tenth preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2608 (2021) 3 December 2021	Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph)
Peace consolidation in West Africa	
S/PRST/2021/3 3 February 2021	The Security Council reaffirms that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes a threat to international peace and security and further reaffirms the need for all States to prevent and combat it by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in compliance with other obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law (tenth paragraph)

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2021

Decision and date

Provision

Europe

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#)
3 November 2021

Determining that the situation in the region of the former Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (first preambular paragraph)

Middle East

The situation in the Middle East

Resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#)
25 February 2021

Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)

Resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#)
9 July 2021

Determining that the devastating humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region (fourth preambular paragraph)

Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#)
30 August 2021

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (last preambular paragraph)

Table 2

Decisions in which the Council referred to continuing threats to the peace, by thematic issue, in 2021

Decision and date

Provision

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

[S/PRST/2021/21](#)
28 October 2021

The Security Council reiterates its concern regarding the evolving threats to peace, security and stability in parts of Africa posed by, among others, protracted armed conflicts, proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, transnational organized crime and trafficking, illicit exploitation of natural resources, maritime insecurity, unconstitutional change of government, as well as regarding factors such as economic and social disparities, pandemics or epidemics such as COVID-19 and Ebola outbreaks. The Security Council remains determined to enhance the effectiveness of the overall effort to respond to the threats to international peace and security on a global level in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other obligations of States under the international law (eighth paragraph)

The Security Council recognizes the increasing threat posed to peace and security in Africa by terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, especially in the most affected regions of the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the Horn of Africa. The Security Council emphasizes that the presence of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism may exacerbate conflicts, and contribute to undermining affected States, specifically their security, stability, governance, social and economic development. The Security Council underlines the importance of prompt and effective implementation of its resolutions related to the fight against terrorism, all sanctions measures against designated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida and their affiliates and reaffirms the importance of addressing the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism in Africa, including by ensuring national recovery and reconstruction, enhancing good governance and facilitating socioeconomic development in Africa, including through job creation, promotion of entrepreneurship and providing social services such as education and health for the promotion of the well-being of their people (thirty-second paragraph)

Maintenance of international peace and security

Resolution [2565 \(2021\)](#)
26 February 2021

Considering that the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (last preambular paragraph)

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Resolution 2616 (2021) 22 December 2021	Gravely concerned that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of life, contribute to instability and insecurity and continue to undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (second preambular paragraph)
Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	
Resolution 2569 (2021) 26 March 2021	Determining that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
Threats to international peace and security	
Resolution 2597 (2021) 17 September 2021	Recalling that ISIL/Da'esh constitutes a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, particularly those committed against women and children, and including those motivated by religious or ethnic grounds, and its recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affects all regions and Member States (third preambular paragraph)
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	
S/PRST/2021/1 12 January 2021	The Security Council reaffirms that terrorism in all forms and manifestations continues to constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed (third paragraph)
Resolution 2610 (2021) 17 December 2021	Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed, and reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the deaths of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property, and greatly undermining stability (second preambular paragraph) Recognizing that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations (third preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolution 2617 (2021) (third preambular paragraph)</i> Recalling its resolution 2396 (2017) expressing concern with the continued threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and reaffirming its resolve to address all aspects of that threat, including terrorist acts perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters (forty-third preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2611 (2021) 17 December 2021	Reiterating its support for the fight against illicit production and trafficking of drugs from, and chemical precursors to, Afghanistan, acknowledging that illicit proceeds of the drug trafficking in Afghanistan are a source of financing for terrorist groups and non-State actors that threatens regional and international security, and recognizing the threats that terrorist groups and non-State actors involved in narcotics trade, and illicit exploitation of natural resources, continue to pose to the security and stability of Afghanistan (fifth preambular paragraph) Determining that the situation in Afghanistan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, and reaffirming the need to combat this threat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in this effort (penultimate preambular paragraph)

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Resolution 2615 (2021) 22 December 2021	Determining that the situation in Afghanistan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2617 (2021) 30 December 2021	Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed, and remaining determined to contribute further to enhancing the effectiveness of the overall effort to fight this scourge on a global level (second preambular paragraph)

B. Discussions relating to Article 39

During the period under review, no explicit references to Article 39 were made during the deliberations of the Council. However, several issues regarding the interpretation of Article 39 and the determination of threats to international peace and security arose during discussions at meetings and open videoconferences in relation to both thematic and country- and region-specific items, as described below.

Marked by the continuing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, many of the discussions among Council members in 2021 focused on the linkages between health crises and security. In that regard, Council members addressed the potential for pandemics to threaten international peace and security and the implementation of resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#) on the COVID-19 pandemic at open videoconferences held in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (case 1).

In addition to pandemics, climate change was another area of focus for the Council in 2021, with an increase in dedicated discussions and references to climate change as a threat to international peace and security in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (cases 3 and 4). In connection with the same item, Council members held a high-level open videoconference on 29 June to address the threats to international peace and security in relation to activities in cyberspace (case 2).

In 2021, the Council also continued to address the threats to international peace and security considered by the Council in the past, including those posed by terrorism and the activities of terrorist groups,¹⁸ the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, including nuclear weapons,¹⁹ as well as acquisition of those weapons by terrorist groups,²⁰ the illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland, Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, Norway, Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Niger, Argentina, Australia, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Israel, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Syrian Arab Republic); [S/2021/140](#) (Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, China, Estonia, Ireland, Norway and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); and [S/PV.8839](#) (Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, India, Tunisia, Norway and Ireland); and in connection with the item entitled “Briefings by Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies of the Security Council”, [S/PV.8915](#) (Mexico (on behalf of the Chairs of the Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#)), Norway (in her capacity as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities), Kenya, Viet Nam, China, Tunisia, Ireland and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).

¹⁹ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, [S/PV.8865](#) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (also on behalf of Kenya, Niger and Tunisia), France and South Africa); and in connection with the item entitled “Briefings by Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies of the Security Council”, [S/PV.8915](#) (Kenya, Viet Nam, China and Tunisia).

²⁰ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, [S/2021/325](#) (Estonia, India and Tunisia).

¹⁸ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, [S/2021/48](#) (Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia,

weapons,²¹ sexual violence in conflict²² and illegal activities in the maritime environment, including piracy and organized crime at sea.²³

With respect to other matters related to the maritime environment, including climate change, environmental degradation, maritime pollution and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, States expressed divergent views as to whether these constituted threats to regional or international peace and security and whether they should be considered as within the Council's competence.²⁴

In 2021, the Council also continued to discuss threats to regional or international peace and security stemming from specific conflicts and situations. For example, Council members and other Member States discussed the threats posed by instability, terrorism and drug trafficking in Afghanistan,²⁵ the threat posed by the presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries in Libya,²⁶ the threat posed by the proliferation and use of

weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, in the Syrian Arab Republic²⁷ and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.²⁸

In addition, at a meeting held on 8 July under the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa", the Council considered the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with regard to water usage, security and energy in Egypt, Ethiopia, the Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa.²⁹

Case 1

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 17 February, Security Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security",³⁰ focused on the implementation of resolution 2532 (2020) on the COVID-19 pandemic. During the videoconference, Council members heard introductory remarks by the Secretary-General and briefings by the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund, the Chief Executive Officer of the Global Vaccine Alliance and the Secretary General of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In addition, written statements in connection with the videoconference were submitted by 25 Member States and the European Union.

During the videoconference, some participants addressed the COVID-19 pandemic as a threat to international peace and security. The Chief Executive Officer of the Global Vaccine Alliance underscored that the pandemic was more than a global health crisis, stating that it was a significant challenge to international peace and security that could be

²¹ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled "Small arms", [S/PV.8874](#) (Tunisia, France, Ireland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China and Niger); and [S/PV.8909](#) (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, India, Tunisia, Ireland, Hungary, Switzerland and Germany).

²² See, in connection with the item entitled "Women and peace and security", [S/2021/375](#) (India, Chile, El Salvador, Iraq, Netherlands, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Slovenia and Turkey).

²³ See, in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", [S/2021/722](#) (Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Niger, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, Tunisia, joint statement by Argentina, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa and Uruguay (members of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic), Israel, Poland and Ukraine).

²⁴ See [S/2021/722](#) (Brazil, joint statement by Argentina, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal, South Africa and Uruguay (members of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic), European Union and Germany).

²⁵ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan", [S/2021/601](#) (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran and Kyrgyzstan); and [S/PV.8908](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), India, Mexico and Islamic Republic of Iran).

²⁶ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Libya", [S/2021/498](#) (Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, India and Tunisia).

²⁷ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East", [S/2021/22](#) (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Estonia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United Kingdom); [S/2021/109](#) (Estonia, Niger, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States); [S/2021/446](#) (Ireland, Kenya, Niger, Tunisia and United Kingdom); [S/PV.8830](#) (United Kingdom, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Kenya); and [S/PV.8849](#) (United States, Tunisia, Kenya and Syrian Arab Republic).

²⁸ See, for example, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question", [S/2021/480](#) (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia, Egypt, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

²⁹ See [S/PV.8816](#). For further details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I, case 5.

³⁰ See [S/2021/157](#).

addressed only through multilateral cooperation. The Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya and the representative of the Niger recognized, respectively, the COVID-19 pandemic as an acute and a genuine threat to international peace and security. The Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya also said that the COVID-19 pandemic was indeed more than a health crisis, describing it as an existential challenge to global human and economic development and noting that it had strained humanitarian aid flows and exposed vulnerable groups, such as women and children in conflict areas, to further risks. The delegation of Sweden recalled that with the adoption of resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#), the Council had recognized the unprecedented challenges posed to international peace and security by the COVID-19 pandemic. The delegation emphasized that efforts aimed at maintaining peace and security should be included in the broader global pandemic response. The delegation of Switzerland underscored that COVID-19 continued to have an impact on international peace and security. The representative of Turkey said that the COVID-19 crisis had been devastating for millions of people across the world, with far-reaching implications for international peace and security. The representative of Brazil acknowledged that the pandemic had had an impact on global peace and underscored that his country was pleased to see the Council rise to the occasion and fulfil its constitutional authority of preserving international peace and security when it was called upon to do so.

Some delegations expressed their views on the way the COVID-19 pandemic had exacerbated or could exacerbate conflicts or other threats to international peace and security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico underscored that the pandemic was reversing, or had reversed, the development and peacebuilding gains made by the international community and could heighten instability and exacerbate conflict. The representative of Ecuador highlighted the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and pointed out that pandemics exacerbated crisis conditions on the ground, undermining peace, stability and security. The delegation of Belgium noted that the pandemic had highlighted challenges around the world and had exacerbated the inequality, fragility and human cost of conflict. The delegation further emphasized that the COVID-19 pandemic was a crisis on all fronts, including a security crisis. The delegation of Ukraine noted that the COVID-19 pandemic continued to pose substantive risks to international peace and security and had explicitly shown how dramatically the newly emerging challenge could complicate efforts to address long-lasting threats, in particular violations of

international law and bloody conflicts. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland said that the COVID-19 pandemic had highlighted the vulnerabilities of all societies to unforeseen threats. He noted that humankind was at a crossroads and how it travelled from there would have far-reaching implications for peace and security. The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany pointed out that COVID-19 was placing massive strains on every country's health-care, social, economic and security infrastructures and noted that protecting people and societies in conflict and crisis settings from the impacts of the pandemic was not just an urgent health and socioeconomic matter but an essential element of maintaining international peace and security. The representative of the Russian Federation lamented that the global COVID-19 outbreak had not spared States in a situation of armed conflict, adding that the pandemic threatened to further aggravate the already dire humanitarian consequences in those contexts. He was convinced, however, that amid a coronavirus outbreak the threat of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in armed conflicts should be considered in the context of the specific country situations before the Council.

Some participants also deliberated on how the lack of equitable access to vaccines could pose a threat to international peace and security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico pointed out that ensuring equitable and fair access to vaccines for all countries was undoubtedly the main challenge faced by the international community and, if not resolved, it was also the main threat to the security of humankind and the standing of multilateral action. The delegation of Belgium expressed concerns about the implications of inequitable access to the COVID-19 vaccine for global peace and stability in an already fragile environment. The delegation of Peru deemed that considering the COVID-19 vaccine as a global public good, as had been repeatedly requested by the Secretary-General, the World Health Organization and Peru, among many others, would help to overcome the serious crisis caused by the global pandemic and safeguard international peace and security. The delegation warned that failing to do so could create conditions conducive to future threats to international peace and security.

Case 2

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 29 June, Security Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace

and security”,³¹ focused on cybersecurity. In statements made during or submitted in connection with the videoconference, Member States³² determined that cyberoperations, cyberthreats and other malicious acts in cyberspace threatened, challenged or posed risks to international peace and security. The delegation of Latvia underscored that alongside vastly positive effects of the application of information and communications technology (ICT), Latvia was increasingly concerned about the implications of malicious and disruptive use of ICT for international peace, security, stability and human rights. The representative of Belgium noted that risks stemming from malicious activities in cyberspace were indeed growing and their impact on international peace and security was more detrimental than ever.

Some Member States expressed concern about cyberattacks perpetrated by non-State actors. On that note, the delegations of Egypt and Peru highlighted the threat to international peace and security posed by malicious use of ICT by terrorist groups, criminal organizations and other non-State actors. The delegation of Qatar stressed that the misuse of cyberspace and ICT by governmental and non-governmental actors posed a threat to national security and affected regional and international peace and security and international relations, adding that terrorist groups were using emerging digital technologies to enhance their capabilities to commit crimes. The delegation of Slovenia noted that malicious purposes in the use of ICT by State or non-State actors could undermine trust between Governments with negative implications, leading to destabilization of international peace and security.

Member States also addressed threats to international peace and security in the context of State and State-sponsored cyberactivities. The representative of Australia, while taking note of the significant progress made towards promoting international peace and stability in cyberspace, recalled that a small number of State and State-sponsored actors increasingly flouted international law and norms, despite the clear expectations set by the international community, threatening international peace and stability. The delegation of Canada pointed out that States did not always respect the framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, with some States allowing cybercriminals to operate with

impunity from their territory and others using proxies or purposely engaging in malicious cyberactivity that went against the framework. Canada had joined international partners in calling out and responding to such behaviour and the threat it posed to international peace and security. The delegation of Czechia expressed the view that the expansion of State-sponsored mass surveillance techniques through ICT, partial or complete Internet shutdowns and extensive content censorship raised serious human rights concerns. In that context, determined action to protect citizens from the arbitrary and unlawful exercise of State power in cyberspace was essential and those trends, coupled with the potential risks associated with the introduction of artificial intelligence into various facets of life, raised new security challenges and could ultimately degrade the ability to maintain international peace and security. In a joint statement submitted on behalf of the five Nordic countries, the delegation of Denmark highlighted interrelated trends that posed threats to international peace and security, including State-sponsored disruptive cyberattacks. The delegation of Germany asserted that international peace and security was coming under pressure from different sides, including by State-sponsored malicious cyberactivities for the purpose of espionage, sabotage, disinformation and destabilization or financial gain, which were damaging both international trust and cooperative mechanisms of conflict mitigation and thereby threatening security worldwide.

Multiple Member States discussed malicious activities in cyberspace that could pose threats to international peace and security, with a focus on those targeting critical infrastructure. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland indicated that malicious cyberactivity, including crippling ransomware attacks, cybercrime, intellectual property theft and the spread of disinformation and hate, as well as targeting of critical infrastructure, had surged in recent years and expressed grave concern about the threat it posed to international peace and security. The representative of Tunisia also expressed concern regarding the significant increase in recent years of malicious activities in cyberspace that could pose a serious threat to international peace and security, especially when critical infrastructures were targeted. The delegation of Germany underscored that cyberattacks, including those conducted against critical infrastructure, could constitute a threat to international peace and security and recalled that attacks on critical infrastructure in Europe and North America and cyberattacks used as a vehicle for extortion were on the rise. The representative of Indonesia emphasized that malicious cyberactivities by State and non-State actors,

³¹ See [S/2021/621](#).

³² Ireland, Norway, Tunisia, Canada, Czechia, Denmark (on behalf of the five Nordic countries), Georgia, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Switzerland and Ukraine.

in particular those aimed at critical infrastructure, could jeopardize national stability as well as international peace and security. The delegation of Morocco noted that the current context marked by the COVID-19 pandemic had exponentially and irreversibly increased exposure and vulnerability to cyberattacks and threats, including ones targeted at critical infrastructure. The delegation pointed out that such malicious operations, beyond threatening State sovereignty, had the unfortunate potential of heightening the risk of conflicts in cyberspace and causing considerable human and material damage, which was in turn likely to undermine the structure of international peace and security and present cyberattacks as a major emerging threat. The representative of Pakistan underscored that the hostile use of cybertechnologies was fast approaching the stage where it could constitute a breach of peace or a threat to international peace and security. The representative noted that the misuse and unregulated use of ICT could lead to serious implications for international peace and security in the event of a cyberattack launched on critical infrastructure. The representative of Slovakia said that the disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructure could cause serious consequences, adding that malicious cyberactivities against vital sectors and services had destabilizing effects and might ultimately threaten international peace and security. The delegation of Thailand emphasized that the uses of ICT by States and non-State actors, including terrorists for malicious purposes such as attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, not only undermined international peace and security but also affected the safety of people. The delegation of Ukraine recalled that cyberoperations against major critical infrastructure facilities and the energy, transport, oil and gas sectors were challenges and threats to international peace and security. The delegation of Turkey emphasized that malicious cyberactivities targeting critical infrastructure, terrorism, digital espionage, fraud, online child abuse and exploitation and misuse of personal data were among current threats that also posed a risk to international peace and security.

Some participants referred to cyberattacks against health-care and medical facilities as a threat to international peace and security. The delegation of Chile underscored that malicious ICT activities by persistent threat actors, including States and other actors, could pose a significant risk to international security and stability. Specifically, the delegation asserted that malicious activity against critical infrastructure that provided services domestically, regionally or globally, had become increasingly

serious, including malicious activity affecting critical information infrastructure, infrastructure providing essential services to the public, the technical infrastructure essential to the general availability or integrity of the Internet and health sector entities. The delegation of Czechia, focusing on present and emerging cyberthreats to international peace and security, took note of an alarming increase in malicious ICT activities directed against critical infrastructure delivering essential services to the public, including those targeting medical facilities, water, energy, sanitation, electoral infrastructure and the general availability of the Internet. The delegation also noted that the growing number of cyberattacks disrupting provision of health care had resulted in further loss of life, undermined the collective ability to respond to COVID-19 and ultimately threatened international peace and stability. In a joint statement submitted on behalf of the five Nordic countries, the delegation of Denmark emphasized the need for States to take action against the increasingly serious and destabilizing effects of cybercrime originating from their territory, recalling that recent ransomware attacks against the fuel supply in the United States, hospitals in Ireland and food production in Brazil, the United States and Australia had illustrated that the consequences of cybercrime had become a national security concern with possible effects on international peace and security. The delegation added that the increasing conflation of State and non-State groups further complicated the threat. The delegation of the United Arab Emirates took note of an increased trend in malicious cyberoperations targeting medical facilities, including organizations dedicated to research and vaccine development to combat COVID-19, as well as other severe incidents affecting the telecommunications, banking and public sectors and oil and natural gas installations. The delegation argued that such malicious cyberactivity against the Middle East region's critical infrastructure had the potential to spark a conflict in an already tense environment and posed a threat to international peace and security.

Case 3

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 23 September, at the initiative of Ireland,³³ which held the presidency for the month, the Security Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Climate and

³³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 9 September (S/2021/782).

security”.³⁴ The Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the Chief Operating Officer of the Mogadishu-based Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre.

Some participants considered climate change itself a threat or challenge to international peace and security.³⁵ Among them, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France stressed that the fight for the climate, far from being only environmental, was also a fight for peace and security.³⁶ The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico noted that since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, it had become clear that threats to international peace and security were genuinely multidimensional and one threat that was increasingly relevant was climate change. He asserted that it was undeniable that the effects of climate change could exacerbate, and were exacerbating, existing conflicts, as could be seen in regions such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and were having severe impacts on many countries. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia pointed out that threats to international, peace and security were no longer limited to the conventional threats of geostrategic tensions, arms races and conflicts in several regions and the world was confronted with many emerging challenges that targeted the necessities of life on the planet and future generations. He emphasized that climate change, along with environmental disasters and health pandemics, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters, which were becoming more frequent and severe, constituted the biggest challenges to countries, individually and collectively. He added that the extent to which climate change exacerbated elements of fragility and instability, which in turn raised tensions and prolonged many conflicts, especially on the African continent, could no longer be overlooked. The Minister of State for the Commonwealth and Development, the United Nations and South Asia of the United Kingdom noted that the climate crisis was posing an existential threat, not just to the environment but to common security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Education and Sport of Liechtenstein similarly underscored that climate change was not just an intensifying factor but the most significant threat to common security and called on the Council to embrace a human security paradigm, which

allowed for a perspective in which climate change itself was a cause of insecurity.³⁷

Other participants deliberated on the implications or consequences that climate change had for international peace and security. In that regard, the Chief Operating Officer of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre said in her briefing that, as climate change and other environmental crises gathered pace, they were touching every aspect of life, and world international peace and security was no exception.³⁸ The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway referred to climate change as a threat multiplier, recalling that the Council had expressed concern that the adverse effects of climate change could constitute a risk to international peace and security. The Taoiseach of Ireland noted the Council’s mandate to consider threats to international peace and security and stressed the need to move past theoretical debates and respond to the reality that climate change was exacerbating conflict globally. The Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations pointed out that heat extremes and intense rainfall, flooding and droughts would accelerate and deepen ongoing or latent vulnerabilities and instability.³⁹ He added that those developments could become new conflict drivers and that they would have severe consequences on the climate-and-security nexus, representing different types of challenges to human and State security and undermining global peace. The delegations of Latvia and Switzerland underscored that the consequences of climate change for international peace and security were profound. The delegation of Malta asserted that climate change was the most serious existential threat facing the planet and that it had direct and indirect implications for international security and stability. The delegation pointed out that the effects of climate change on global and regional security were already being felt in several parts of the world. The delegation of Spain recalled that during a previous meeting of the Council on the topic, it had been clear that not every State viewed similarly the urgent need to address the challenges related to climate change as a threat to international security. The delegation indicated that nonetheless there was clear scientific evidence on the impact of global warming leading to the loss of human lives and economic resources as well as to population displacement and social destabilization, added to which was the vicious circle in which armed conflicts, environmental degradation and humanitarian

³⁴ See [S/PV.8864](#). See also [S/2021/815](#).

³⁵ See [S/PV.8864](#) (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico); and [S/2021/815](#) (Morocco and Group of Friends on Climate and Security).

³⁶ See [S/PV.8864](#).

³⁷ See [S/2021/815](#).

³⁸ See [S/PV.8864](#).

³⁹ See [S/2021/815](#).

emergencies mutually reinforced one another. The Secretary of State of the United States said that at almost any place where threats to international peace and security were seen, climate change was making things less peaceful and less secure, making it even more difficult to respond.⁴⁰ He added that by agreeing that the issue belonged in the Council, a clear message would be sent to the international community of the serious implications that climate change had for collective security.

Several Member States challenged the notions that climate change constituted a threat to or negatively affected international peace and security. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the view that persistent and insistent attempts to advance the premise of climate change as a threat to international peace and security in the Council at all costs introduced a completely unnecessary political component to an already complicated and sensitive discussion. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that climate change was essentially related to sustainable development rather than a matter of international peace and security, since the direct correlation between climate change and security had not been proved.⁴¹ The Vice-Minister, Secretary (West) of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, while acknowledging that climate change had affected the lives of people and exacerbated conflict, stressed that to view conflicts in poorer parts of the world through the prism of climate change would serve only to present a lopsided narrative, when the reasons for the conflict were to be found elsewhere.⁴² She recalled that the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had clearly stated that the effect of climate variability on violence was contested and pointed out that while climate change could enhance conflict, it could not be determined as a reason for it. Taking note of the adverse effects of climate change on States' economies, she underlined the need to be conscious about looking at climate change as a risk to their social stability or as an issue of peace and security.

On 13 December, the Council held a meeting under the same item⁴³ to vote on a draft resolution in relation to climate and security sponsored by 113 Member States.⁴⁴ In

the draft resolution, the Council, *inter alia*, recognized that there was a strong nexus between peace and security and acknowledged that the adverse effects of climate change could potentially lead to social tension and exacerbate, prolong or contribute to the risk of future conflicts and instability and pose a key risk to global peace, security and stability.⁴⁵ The Council also expressed deep concern in the draft resolution that the impacts of climate change on small island developing States could have implications for international peace and security.⁴⁶ The Council failed to adopt the draft resolution, however, owing to the veto of a permanent member of the Council, namely, the Russian Federation.⁴⁷ Before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that positioning climate change as a threat to international security diverted the attention of the Council from genuine, deep-rooted causes of conflict in the countries concerning which the Council was seized.⁴⁸ The representative of India, explaining his delegation's vote against the draft resolution, underscored that its attempt to link climate with security really sought to obfuscate the lack of progress on critical issues under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. He wondered what could be done collectively under the proposed draft resolution that could not be achieved under the Framework Convention process, and why a Council resolution was needed to take action on climate change when there were commitments already in place on concrete climate action. The representative of India further asserted that there was no real requirement for

Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay and Vanuatu.

⁴⁵ [S/2021/990](#), ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, fourteenth preambular paragraph.

⁴⁷ The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour (Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam), two against (India and Russian Federation) and one abstention (China). For more information, see part I, sect. 34.

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8926](#).

⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8864](#).

⁴¹ See [S/2021/815](#).

⁴² See [S/PV.8864](#).

⁴³ See [S/PV.8926](#).

⁴⁴ Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chad, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

the draft resolution except for the purpose of bringing climate change under the ambit of the Council, the reason for which was so that decisions could be taken without the involvement of most developing countries and without recognizing consensus in the name of preserving international peace and security. The representative of China explained that his country had abstained because the draft had not addressed a number of issues, including that the transmission mechanism from climate change to security risks was far from clear.

Other Council members expressed regret that the draft resolution could not be adopted because it had been vetoed. Among them, the representative of Ireland asserted that climate change was compounding insecurity and increasing instability, which was a real and present threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Norway recalled that it had been 10 years since the Council had first acknowledged climate change as an emerging risk factor for global peace and security. The representative of Tunisia expressed conviction that phenomena such as climate change posed a threat to collective security and therefore should not be overlooked by the Council. The representative of Estonia stressed that the effects of climate change posed a clear and serious threat to international peace, security and stability and, in some cases, even to the existence of States.

Case 4 **Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 9 December, at the initiative of the Niger,⁴⁹ which held the presidency for the month, the Security Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Security in the context of terrorism and climate change.”⁵⁰

During the debate, several Member States determined that terrorism⁵¹ and climate change⁵² constituted threats to international peace and security. Specifically on the issue of climate change, the representative of France noted that the debate provided

another opportunity to emphasize that the fight against climate change was an environmental one as well as a fight for international peace and security, which was why it was appropriate for the Council to address threats linked to climate change.⁵³ The representative of the United Kingdom underscored that the climate crisis posed an existential threat, not only to the environment but also to common security. The representative of Guatemala emphasized that it was necessary to address the issue as a threat to international peace and security without delay and for the Council to make the discussion of measures to prevent climate change from becoming a threat to international peace and security a high priority.⁵⁴ The representative of the Republic of Korea said that climate change would increasingly pose a threat to global peace and security and emphasized that the Council, as the primary organ responsible for maintaining global peace and security, needed to be more involved in the issue. The representative of Luxembourg stated that given the undeniable link between the adverse effects of climate change and international peace and security, it was essential that the Council, peacekeeping missions and special political missions considered the security implications of climate change in their analyses and actions. The representative of Albania emphasized that there was an urgent need to increase efforts and to take concrete action to address climate change and climate-related risks in the context of international peace and security. The representative of Uzbekistan emphasized that addressing climate change was one of the important prerequisites for maintaining international peace and security.

Many speakers considered the link between terrorism and climate change in the context of international peace and security. On that note, the President of the Niger stated that the choice of the theme for the debate had been an expression of his country’s desire to see the Council establish the clear nexus that existed between peace and international security, on the one hand, and the fight against terrorism and the effects of climate change, on the other.⁵⁵ The representative of Tunisia pointed out that there was no doubt that climate change represented one of the major factors that deepened fragility and threatened stability, sometimes leading to the outbreak of conflict, fuelling tensions and violence and contributing to protracted and complicated conflicts, especially on the African continent. The representative of Japan underscored that in conflict-prone areas, human insecurity, exacerbated by such impacts of

⁴⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 November (S/2021/988).

⁵⁰ See S/PV.8923 and S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1). See also S/2021/1026.

⁵¹ See S/PV.8923 (President of Estonia, India, Tunisia, Islamic Republic of Iran and Japan); and S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1) (Egypt, Malta, Qatar, Guatemala, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Bahrain and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

⁵² See S/PV.8923 (President of Estonia, United States and Tunisia); and S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1) (Malta, Germany, Italy, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Fiji).

⁵³ See S/PV.8923.

⁵⁴ See S/PV.8923 (Resumption 1).

⁵⁵ See S/PV.8923.

climate change as environmental degradation and natural disasters, became a multiplier of risk of violent conflict. He added that terrorism and climate change both posed a serious threat to human security. The representative of Egypt stated that, given that climate change was widely recognized as a threat multiplier and a driver of conflict that affected the peace and stability of several regions globally, it was important to address the increasing connection between terrorism, climate change and security.⁵⁶ He said that both terrorism and climate change were transboundary key global challenges and that the interlinkage between the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation, on the one hand, and the conditions conducive to terrorism and extremism, on the other hand, was evident. He added that the nexus between climate change-related repercussions such as water scarcity, rising sea levels, desertification, land degradation and biodiversity loss and other conditions conducive to terrorism, including poverty and unemployment, provided fertile ground for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups. Recalling that Africa was facing unprecedented pressure owing to various extreme weather events related to climate change, he stressed that the recent rise in terrorist activities in different regions of the continent could be considered a vivid example of how terrorist organizations could exploit climate change-induced challenges to expand their activities and operations. The representative of Malta, underscoring that the threats posed by terrorism and climate change were multidimensional and threatened international peace and security, emphasized that they required a concerted global response. She added that climate change was a threat multiplier and that terrorist activity, especially in the Sahel region, could also be linked to climatic factors. In addition, when climate change was compounded with sustained population growth, floods or droughts could have an adverse impact on natural resources, thereby exacerbating competition over dwindling resources and often leading to unrest and, eventually, a vacuum for terrorist groups to exploit, which in turn could also contribute to further environmental degradation.

The representative of Italy said that the adverse effects of climate change were posing a serious threat to international peace and security and stressed the need to redouble efforts to heighten the Council's attention to the climate-security nexus and its implications with regard to terrorism. In that regard, he indicated that climate change was a threat multiplier that had negative environmental and economic

impacts, which aggravated existing social vulnerabilities and exacerbated internal conflicts. He added that such phenomena, even when not directly linked to international terrorism, contributed to creating fertile ground for violent extremism. The representative of Poland stated that climate change threatened the stability of many regions of the world, adding that it would increasingly exacerbate conflicts over natural resources, opening the way for the infiltration of vulnerable populations by terrorist organizations. The representative of Sri Lanka cautioned that the scourge of terrorism would be a persistent threat to global peace and security as long as its feeders and threat multipliers were not addressed, pointing out that climate change had established itself as one of the greatest threat multipliers. He stated that the interplay between climate change and terrorism was a critical dimension of the climate-security nexus, consisting of a cyclical and complex relationship wherein natural disasters exacerbated existing structural and social vulnerabilities and added pressure to the already tenuous relationship between resources and civil unrest. The representative of Nigeria stated that terrorism and climate change were both among the greatest threats to international peace and security and that both phenomena were capable of triggering violent conflict and insecurity, especially in communities with pre-existing tensions, weak governance and other socioeconomic challenges. He highlighted the adverse effects of climate change on communities, including loss of livelihoods, hunger, poverty, inequality and migration, which could often prompt clashes over resources that could create an enabling environment for terrorist groups to recruit and spread their extremist ideology. Given the Council's important role in maintaining international peace and security and its noteworthy efforts in combating global terrorism, he said that the meeting was an opportunity to give the highest priority to climate action and seek holistic responses to the threats that both climate change and terrorism posed to international peace and security, and suggested several ways in which that could be achieved. The representative of El Salvador said that the challenges posed by climate change and its adverse impacts generated higher rates of vulnerability and instability in the population. She warned that the situation, if not dealt with in a timely manner, could translate into violence and social and political instability, which were conducive to the development and strengthening of terrorist groups, which represented a risk to international peace and security. The representative of Ukraine underscored that the fight against terrorism and an efficient response to climate-related security risks were indispensable

⁵⁶ See [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

prerequisites for the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Morocco stated that with regard to the various environmental issues resulting from climate change, there was an increasingly clear causality between climate change and rising levels of violence and instability and the spread of the scourge of terrorism in certain regions. He added that in several regions, climate change was a threat multiplier, as it exacerbated vulnerabilities owing to a scarcity of resources. He further noted that the lack of economic resources as a result of the loss of traditional livelihoods had created fertile ground for recruitment by terrorist and armed groups, and it was therefore vital that the international community act wherever climate change posed a threat to international peace and security by creating conflict situations or security issues.

Some Member States argued that climate change did not constitute a threat to international peace and security. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that while terrorism as a serious criminal offence constituted a serious threat to international

peace and security, climate change was essentially a development issue, and indicated that there was no scientific evidence establishing a direct link between climate change and international peace and security.⁵⁷ He noted, however, that in certain conflict situations, the impacts of climate change might create an environment conducive to terrorist groups exploiting the situation and recruiting vulnerable people for their sinister terrorist purposes. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, while agreeing that in situations of armed conflict or post-conflict the adverse effects of climate change could represent an additional threat with the potential to further exacerbate the situation on the ground, expressed concern over attempts to securitize such a sensitive issue by having it addressed by the Council, which had a clear mandate to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations in cases that threatened international peace and security.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ See [S/PV.8923](#).

⁵⁸ See [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

II. Provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 40 of the Charter, regarding provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation. During the period under review, the Council did not impose any measures pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter. There was also no explicit reference to Article 40 made during the deliberations of the Council, nor was there any discussion of constitutional significance on its interpretation. Similarly, there was no explicit reference to Article 40 in any of the communications of the Council.

III. Measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,

telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Note

Section III covers the decisions and deliberations of the Council related to the imposition of measures not involving the use of force, pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter. During the period under review, the Council explicitly referred to Article 41 in the preamble of resolution [2569 \(2021\)](#) in connection with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 2021, the Council imposed no judicial measures under Article 41 of the Charter.⁵⁹ Article 41 was referenced explicitly in one communication of the Council, namely in the final report on the work of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution [1973 \(2011\)](#).⁶⁰

The present section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A contains an outline of the decisions in which the Council imposed, modified or terminated measures under Article 41 of the Charter. It is organized under two main headings, dealing with decisions on issues of a thematic and country- and region-specific nature. Subsection B covers the deliberations of the Council during 2021 and is also organized under two headings, each highlighting the salient issues that were raised in connection with Article 41 with regard to thematic or country- and region-specific items.

A. Decisions relating to Article 41

Decisions on thematic issues relating to Article 41

In 2021, the Council adopted five decisions on issues of a thematic nature concerning sanctions measures and their implementation, four of which were adopted under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”⁶¹ and one of which was adopted under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.⁶²

In resolution [2610 \(2021\)](#), adopted under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the Council emphasized that sanctions were an important tool under the Charter in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, including in support of countering

terrorism.⁶³ It further stressed that the measures imposed by resolution [2610 \(2021\)](#) were not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for civilian populations.⁶⁴ Condemning the frequent recent terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh around the world, as well as the continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international law by ISIL/Da'esh, the Council recognized the need for sanctions to reflect current threats and, in that regard, recalled paragraph 7 of resolution [2249 \(2015\)](#).⁶⁵

In resolution [2611 \(2021\)](#), adopted under the same item, the Council reiterated the need to ensure that the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) contributed effectively to ongoing efforts to bring about sustainable and inclusive peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and noted the importance of sanctions review when appropriate.⁶⁶

In resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), also adopted under the same item, the Council decided that humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan were not a violation of paragraph 1 (a) of resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#) and that the processing and payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources and the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of such assistance or to support such activities were permitted, strongly encouraged providers relying on that paragraph to use reasonable efforts to minimize the accrual of any benefits, whether as a result of direct provision or diversion, to individuals or entities designated on the sanctions list established pursuant to resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#), and further decided to review the implementation of the provision after a period of one year.⁶⁷

In resolution [2617 \(2021\)](#), also adopted under the same item, the Council encouraged the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to pursue close cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force to advance effective implementation of counter-terrorist financing recommendations, including in particular on recommendation 6 concerning the targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing.⁶⁸

In connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the

⁵⁹ For information on the activity of the Council regarding matters pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, see part IX, sect. IV.

⁶⁰ See [S/2021/229](#), [S/2021/229/Corr.1](#), [S/2021/229/Corr.2](#) and [S/2021/229/Corr.3](#).

⁶¹ For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 28.

⁶² For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 34.

⁶³ Resolution [2610 \(2021\)](#), sixteenth preambular paragraph.

⁶⁴ Ibid., seventeenth preambular paragraph.

⁶⁵ Ibid., twentieth preambular paragraph.

⁶⁶ Resolution [2611 \(2021\)](#), seventh preambular paragraph.

⁶⁷ Resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁶⁸ Resolution [2617 \(2021\)](#), para. 31.

Council adopted resolution 2616 (2021), in which it recognized the importance of building Member States' capacities to enable them to gather information on all aspects of networks that used false documentation to evade inspections and facilitate breaches of Council-mandated sanctions, including information on suspected traffickers and trafficking routes, suspected illicit financial transactions and brokering activities for, or diversion of, arms and related materiel of all types.⁶⁹ The Council also acknowledged the value of the guidance provided by sanctions committees, including through non-binding guidelines, to Member States for complying with provisions and obligations under the respective resolutions that had imposed sanctions.⁷⁰ By the same resolution, the Council encouraged regional land, air and maritime cooperation, as applicable, to detect and prevent violations of Council-mandated arms embargoes, as well as to report cases of violations in a timely manner to the corresponding sanctions committees.⁷¹ The Council also affirmed its resolve to designate, where appropriate and under applicable sanctions regimes, those individuals who had been involved in activities prohibited by Council-mandated embargoes.⁷²

Decisions on country- and region-specific issues relating to Article 41

During the period under review, as set out below, the Council renewed the existing measures concerning the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen, as well as those concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities and ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida and associates. In addition to renewing the existing measures concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council expanded the listing criteria to individuals and entities involved in planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against medical personnel or humanitarian personnel. No changes were made to the measures concerning Iraq, Lebanon, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Guinea-Bissau.

The present subsection concerning the developments in each of the sanctions regimes does not include reference to the subsidiary bodies of the Council responsible for their implementation. The decisions of the Council relating to the subsidiary

bodies are described in detail in part IX, section I.B. Decisions adopted by the Council on the establishment and history of each of the sanctions regimes are covered in previous supplements.

The categories of sanctions measures used in the present subsection, such as arms embargo, asset freeze or travel ban, are for clarification purposes only and are not intended to serve as legal definitions of the measures. In addition, developments in the sanctions measures imposed by the Council during the period under review are categorized according to the following main actions taken by the Council: "establishment",⁷³ "modification",⁷⁴ "extension",⁷⁵ "limited extension"⁷⁶ or "termination".⁷⁷

The sanctions regimes are discussed below in the order of their establishment.⁷⁸ Each of the following subsections consists of a narrative section describing the most significant developments in 2021 and a table presenting all relevant provisions of Council decisions concerning changes to a sanctions regime, according to the categories outlined above. Tables 3 and 4 provide an overview of relevant decisions adopted in 2021 by which the Council established sanctions measures or modified ones it had previously imposed.

⁷³ An action by the Council is categorized as an "establishment" when a sanctions measure is initially imposed by the Council.

⁷⁴ When a change is introduced to the measure, it is categorized as a "modification". A measure is modified when: (a) elements of the measure are terminated or newly introduced; (b) information on designated individuals or entities is modified; (c) exemptions to the measure are introduced, modified or terminated; and (d) elements of the measure are otherwise modified.

⁷⁵ An action by the Council is categorized as an "extension" when the sanctions measure concerned is not modified or terminated and the Council extends or restates the measure without specifying an end date.

⁷⁶ An action by the Council is categorized as a "limited extension" when the sanctions measure concerned is extended for a specific period of time, including a date upon which the measure will terminate unless further extended by the Council.

⁷⁷ An action by the Council is categorized as a "termination" when the Council ends the specific sanctions measure. However, if only an element of the measure is terminated, but other elements of that measure remain, the action will be categorized as a modification of the measure.

⁷⁸ For background and past practice, see previous supplements.

⁶⁹ Resolution 2616 (2021), tenth preambular paragraph.

⁷⁰ Ibid., seventeenth preambular paragraph.

⁷¹ Ibid., para. 7.

⁷² Ibid., para. 9.

Table 3

Overview of country- and region-specific decisions establishing or modifying measures pursuant to Article 41, in place or imposed in 2021

<i>Sanctions regime</i>	<i>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</i>		<i>Resolutions adopted in 2021</i>
Somalia	733 (1992)	2036 (2012)	2607 (2021)
	1356 (2001)	2060 (2012)	2608 (2021)
	1425 (2002)	2093 (2013)	
	1725 (2006)	2111 (2013)	
	1744 (2007)	2125 (2013)	
	1772 (2007)	2142 (2014)	
	1816 (2008)	2182 (2014)	
	1844 (2008)	2184 (2014)	
	1846 (2008)	2244 (2015)	
	1851 (2008)	2246 (2015)	
	1872 (2009)	2316 (2016)	
	1897 (2009)	2317 (2016)	
	1907 (2009)	2383 (2017)	
	1916 (2010)	2385 (2017)	
	1950 (2010)	2444 (2018)	
	1964 (2010)	2498 (2019)	
	1972 (2011)	2551 (2020)	
	2002 (2011)	2554 (2020)	
	2023 (2011)		
ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities	1267 (1999)	2161 (2014)	2610 (2021)
	1333 (2000)	2170 (2014)	
	1388 (2002)	2178 (2014)	
	1390 (2002)	2199 (2015)	
	1452 (2002)	2253 (2015)	
	1735 (2006)	2347 (2017)	
	1904 (2009)	2349 (2017)	
	1989 (2011)	2368 (2017)	
	2083 (2012)		
Taliban and associated individuals and entities	1988 (2011)	2255 (2015)	2611 (2021)
	2082 (2012)	2501 (2019)	2615 (2021)
	2160 (2014)	2557 (2020)	
Iraq	661 (1990)	1723 (2006)	None
	687 (1991)	1790 (2007)	
	707 (1991)	1859 (2008)	
	1483 (2003)	1905 (2009)	
	1546 (2004)	1956 (2010)	
	1637 (2005)	1957 (2010)	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1493 (2003)	1896 (2009)	2582 (2021)
	1552 (2004)	1952 (2010)	
	1596 (2005)	2136 (2014)	
	1616 (2005)	2147 (2014)	
	1649 (2005)	2198 (2015)	
	1671 (2006)	2211 (2015)	
	1698 (2006)	2293 (2016)	
	1768 (2007)	2360 (2017)	
	1771 (2007)	2424 (2018)	
	1799 (2008)	2478 (2019)	
	1807 (2008)	2528 (2020)	
	1857 (2008)		

**Part VII. Actions with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression
(Chapter VII of the Charter)**

<i>Sanctions regime</i>	<i>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</i>		<i>Resolutions adopted in 2021</i>
Sudan	1556 (2004) 1591 (2005) 1672 (2006) 1945 (2010) 2035 (2012) 2138 (2014)	2200 (2015) 2265 (2016) 2340 (2017) 2400 (2018) 2455 (2019) 2508 (2020)	2562 (2021)
Lebanon	1636 (2005)		None
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1718 (2006) 1874 (2009) 2087 (2013) 2094 (2013) 2270 (2016)	2321 (2016) 2356 (2017) 2371 (2017) 2375 (2017) 2397 (2017)	None
Libya	1970 (2011) 1973 (2011) 2009 (2011) 2016 (2011) 2040 (2012) 2095 (2013) 2146 (2014) 2174 (2014) 2208 (2015) 2213 (2015)	2238 (2015) 2259 (2015) 2278 (2016) 2292 (2016) 2362 (2017) 2441 (2018) 2509 (2020) 2510 (2020) 2526 (2020) 2542 (2020)	2570 (2021) 2571 (2021) 2578 (2021)
Guinea-Bissau	2048 (2012) 2157 (2014)	2203 (2015)	None
Central African Republic	2127 (2013) 2134 (2014) 2196 (2015) 2217 (2015) 2262 (2016)	2339 (2017) 2399 (2018) 2488 (2019) 2507 (2020) 2536 (2020)	2588 (2021)
Yemen	2140 (2014) 2204 (2015)	2216 (2015) 2511 (2020)	2564 (2021)
South Sudan	2206 (2015) 2241 (2015) 2252 (2015) 2271 (2016) 2280 (2016)	2290 (2016) 2353 (2017) 2418 (2018) 2428 (2018) 2521 (2020)	2577 (2021)
Mali	2374 (2017) 2432 (2018)	2484 (2019) 2541 (2020)	2590 (2021)

Table 4
Overview of measures pursuant to Article 41, in place or imposed in 2021

Sanctions regime	Type of measure			Ban on arms exports by target State	Ban/restrictions on workers abroad	Ban on improvised explosive device components	Business restrictions	Charcoal ban	Diplomatic/overseas representation restrictions	Embargo on natural resources	Financial restrictions	Luxury goods embargo	Natural gas embargo/restrictions	Non-proliferation measures	Oil/petroleum and petroleum products embargo/restriction	Prohibition on bunkering services/port entry	Public financial support for trade restrictions	Restrictions on ballistic missiles	Sectoral ban	Specialized teaching and technical cooperation restrictions	Transport and aviation sanctions	Trade ban on cultural goods
	Arms embargo	Asset freeze	Travel ban or restrictions																			
Somalia	X	X	X			X		X														
Taliban	X	X	X																			
ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida	X	X	X																			
Iraq	X	X																				
Democratic Republic of the Congo	X	X	X																		X	
Sudan	X	X	X																			
Lebanon ^a		X	X																			
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Libya	X	X	X	X			X				X				X	X						
Guinea-Bissau			X																			
Central African Republic	X	X	X																			
Yemen	X	X	X																			
South Sudan	X	X	X																			
Mali		X	X																			

^a Pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), the Council decided, inter alia, that States should take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. In 2021, by resolution 2591 (2021), the Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and requested the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and to include in his reporting an enhanced annex on the implementation of the arms embargo.

Somalia

In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2607 (2021), by which it reaffirmed and recalled the existing sanctions measures on Somalia and reaffirmed the partial lifting of the arms embargo and the humanitarian exemption to the assets freeze without specifying an expiry date. By the same resolution, the Council also renewed and expanded the maritime interdiction of charcoal and of weapons or military equipment by including components of improvised explosive devices until 15 November 2022. It also reaffirmed the ban on components of improvised explosive devices, first imposed by the Council by resolution 2498 (2019). Table 5 provides an overview of the changes to the measures authorized by the Council in 2021.

The Council reaffirmed the arms embargo initially imposed by the Council in paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002)⁷⁹ and the specific exemptions to the measure,⁸⁰ renewed the partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Somali security forces without specifying an expiry date⁸¹ and outlined the procedures for requests for exemptions or notification to the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992).⁸² The Council also reaffirmed the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014).⁸³ The Council further decided to renew and expand the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2022 and authorized Member States, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships such as the Combined Maritime Forces, in cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia, and further to the Government's notification to the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General's subsequent notification to all Member States, to inspect, without undue delay, in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, extending to and including the Arabian sea and the Persian Gulf, vessels bound to or from Somalia that they had reasonable grounds to believe

were in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, the charcoal ban and the ban on improvised explosive device components.⁸⁴ Recalling its decisions in resolution 1844 (2008), by which the Council imposed targeted sanctions, and in resolutions 2002 (2011) and 2093 (2013), by which the Council expanded the listing criteria, the Council reaffirmed that the asset freeze measure should not be applied to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance.⁸⁵

Expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region and noting the group's increased use of improvised explosive devices in its attacks, the Council decided that all States were to prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of annex C to resolution 2607 (2021) to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, if there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) would be used, or a significant risk they might be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices. The items in annex C to resolution 2607 (2021) included explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment and related technology.⁸⁶ The Council further decided to renew the implementation measures related to the ban on components of improvised explosive devices.⁸⁷ While noting that the security situation in Somalia continued to necessitate the measures, including strict

⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 5.

⁸⁵ Ibid., paras. 35 and 37.

⁸⁶ Ibid., eighth preambular paragraph and para. 9.

⁸⁷ The Council decided that where an item in part I of annex C was directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia, the State concerned was to notify the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer had taken place and stressed the importance that notifications should contain all relevant information (resolution 2607 (2021), para. 10). The Council also called on Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, as well as individuals and entities subject to their jurisdiction, that were involved in the sale, supply or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that could be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, to keep records of transactions and share information with the Federal Government of Somalia, the Committee and the Panel of Experts on Somalia regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states were provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials (ibid., para. 11).

⁷⁹ Resolution 2607 (2021), para. 20.

⁸⁰ Ibid., para. 21.

⁸¹ Ibid., para. 34. The Council further provided that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with the exemption in paragraph 21 were not to be resold to, transferred to or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces or the Somali security sector institution to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or subregional organization (ibid., para. 22). See also resolution 2608 (2021), para. 16.

⁸² Resolution 2607 (2021), paras. 23–33.

⁸³ Ibid., para. 6.

controls on the movement of arms, the Council affirmed that it would keep the situation in Somalia under constant review and that it would be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in resolution 2607 (2021), including any modification, possible benchmarks, suspension or lifting of the measures.⁸⁸ The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than

⁸⁸ Resolution 2607 (2021), twentieth preambular paragraph.

15 September 2022, and following completion of a technical assessment of Somalia's weapons and ammunition management capability, recommendations to improve that capability further and to articulate options for clear, well-identified and realistic benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Council in its review of the arms embargo measures.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Ibid., para. 42.

Table 5

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Somalia in 2021

Provision relating to sanctions measures	Resolution establishing measures	Resolutions adopted during the review period (paragraph)	
		2607 (2021)	2608 (2021)
Arms embargo	733 (1992), para. 5 1425 (2002), paras. 1–2 1844 (2008), para. 7	Extension (20, 22) Exemption (21, 34) Extension (35)	Exemption (16)
Asset freeze	1844 (2008), para. 3	Extension (35) Exemption (37)	
Ban on improvised explosive device components	2498 (2019), para. 26	Extension (9)	
Charcoal ban	2036 (2012), para. 22	Extension (6)	
Travel ban	1844 (2008), para. 1	Extension (35)	

Taliban and associated individuals and entities

In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2611 (2021), by which it reaffirmed the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo measures with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution 1988 (2011) as the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011).⁹⁰ The Council also decided to actively review the measures

outlined in the resolution and to consider adjustments to support peace and stability in Afghanistan.⁹¹

By resolution 2615 (2021), adopted five days later, the Council decided that humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan were not a violation of paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 2255 (2015) and that the processing and payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources, and the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of such assistance or to support such activities were permitted, and further decided to review the implementation of the provision after one year.⁹² Table 6 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

⁹⁰ Resolution 2611 (2021), para. 1. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁹¹ Resolution 2611 (2021), para. 4. For further information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

⁹² Resolution 2615 (2021), para. 1.

Table 6

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities in 2021

Provision relating to sanctions measures	Resolution establishing measures	Resolutions adopted during the review period (paragraph)	
		2611 (2021)	2615 (2021)
Arms embargo	1333 (2000), para. 5	Extension (1)	
Asset freeze	1267 (1999), para. 4 (b)	Extension (1)	Exemption (1)
Travel ban	1390 (2002), para. 2 (b)	Extension (1)	

ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

During the year under review, the Council adopted resolution 2610 (2021), by which it reaffirmed the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban with respect to ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities,⁹³ as well as the exemptions to the asset freeze and the travel ban.⁹⁴ The Council also reaffirmed the criteria for inclusion in the ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida sanctions list.⁹⁵ Table 7 provides an overview of the changes to the measures in 2021.

By the same resolution, the Council expressed increasing concern about the lack of implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015), including the insufficient level of reporting by Member States to the relevant Committee on the measures they had taken to comply with its provisions, called upon Member States to take the necessary measures to fulfil their obligation under paragraph 12 of resolution 2199 (2015) to report to the Committee interdictions in their territory of any petroleum, petroleum products, modular refineries and related material being transferred to or from

ISIL/Da'esh, Al-Qaida or Al-Nusrah Front, and called upon Member States to report also such interdictions of antiquities, as well as the outcome of proceedings brought against individuals and entities as a result of any such activity.⁹⁶ The Council further reaffirmed its decision in resolution 2396 (2017) that Member States were to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted travel to, entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of foreign terrorist fighters and individuals designated by the Committee.⁹⁷ The Council also reaffirmed its decision in the same resolution that Member States were to develop the capability to collect, process and analyse passenger name records data to ensure that such data were shared with all their competent authorities, with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating terrorist offences and related travel.⁹⁸ The Council also decided to review the measures set out in the resolution with a view to their possible further strengthening in 30 months or sooner.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Ibid., para. 16.

⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 37.

⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 38.

⁹⁹ Ibid., para. 107.

⁹³ Resolution 2610 (2021), paras. 1, 5–9, 13, 22 and 24.

⁹⁴ Ibid., paras. 1 (b), 6, 10 and 83–84.

⁹⁵ Ibid., paras. 2–4.

Table 7

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida and associates in 2021

Provision relating to sanctions measures	Resolution establishing measures	Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2610 (2021)
Arms embargo	1333 (2000), para. 5	Extension (1, 1 (c))
Asset freeze	1267 (1999), para. 4 (b)	Extension (1, 1 (a), 5–9, 13, 22, 24) Exemption (6, 10, 83, 84 (a)–(b))
Travel ban or restrictions	1390 (2002), para. 2 (b)	Extension (1, 1 (b)) Exemption (1 (b), 10, 83)

Iraq

In 2021, the Council adopted no new resolutions concerning the remaining sanctions measures on Iraq, consisting of an arms embargo, with exemptions, and an asset freeze on senior officials, State bodies, corporations and agencies of the former Iraqi regime. Pursuant to resolution 1483 (2003), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) continued to oversee the implementation of the asset freeze and maintain the lists of individuals and entities.¹⁰⁰

Democratic Republic of the Congo

In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2582 (2021), by which it renewed the sanctions measures on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, comprising an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze and restrictions on transportation and aviation, as well as the exemptions to said measures, until 1 July 2022.¹⁰¹ The Council further decided that the sanctions measures it had renewed by resolution 2582 (2021) would also apply to individuals and entities as

designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo responsible for planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against medical personnel or humanitarian personnel.¹⁰² Table 8 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In addition, in resolution 2612 (2021), by which the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council recalled that it was prepared to impose targeted sanctions under paragraph 7 (d) and (e) of resolution 2293 (2016) regarding, inter alia, human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law.¹⁰³ The Council also demanded that all armed groups cease immediately all forms of violence and other destabilizing activities and the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, and recalled in that regard that the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo could lead to sanctions under paragraph 7 (d) of resolution 2293 (2016).¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003), see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹⁰¹ Resolution 2582 (2021), para. 1.

¹⁰² Ibid., para. 3.

¹⁰³ Resolution 2612 (2021), para. 5.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., para. 13.

Table 8

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2021

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2582 (2021)</i>
Arms embargo	1493 (2003), para. 20	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Asset freeze	1596 (2005), para. 15	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Travel ban or restrictions	1596 (2005), para. 13	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Transportation and aviation sanctions measures	1807 (2008), paras. 6, 8	Limited extension (1)

Sudan

During the period under review, the Council adopted no new resolutions modifying the sanctions measures on the Sudan. However, by resolution 2562 (2021) the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, recalled the arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban measures and designation criteria established by previous resolutions and also reaffirmed the related

exemptions.¹⁰⁵ The Council further expressed its intention to regularly review the measures on Darfur in the light of the evolving situation on the ground and reports of the Panel of Experts.¹⁰⁶ In that regard, it requested the

¹⁰⁵ Resolution 2562 (2021), para. 1–2.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., para. 4. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, see part IX, sect. I.B.

Secretary-General to conduct a review of the situation in Darfur, including compliance with the measures on Darfur as recalled in paragraph 1 of the resolution, and further requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, by 31 July 2021, a report containing recommendations for clear and well-identified key benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Council to review the measures on Darfur.¹⁰⁷ The Council also expressed its intention to establish clear and well-identified key benchmarks no later than 15 September 2021, with readiness to consider adjusting measures renewed in paragraph 1 to respond to the situation in Darfur.

Lebanon

In 2021, the Council made no modifications to the sanctions measures established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005), consisting of an asset freeze and a travel ban imposed on individuals designated by the International Independent Investigation Commission or the Government of Lebanon as being suspected of involvement in the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, and 22 others.¹⁰⁸

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

During the period under review, the Council made no modifications to the sanctions measures concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) continued to oversee the implementation of the asset freeze, arms embargo, travel ban and other restrictions previously imposed by the Council in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017). By resolution 2569 (2021), acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended until 30 April 2022 the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to support the Committee.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Resolution 2562 (2021), para. 5. See, in that regard, the report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/696).

¹⁰⁸ Resolution 1636 (2005), fourth preambular paragraph and para. 3. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1656 (2005), see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹⁰⁹ Resolution 2569 (2021), para. 1. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), see part IX, sect. I.B.

Libya

In 2021, the Council adopted three resolutions with respect to the sanctions measures concerning Libya, namely, resolutions 2570 (2021), 2571 (2021) and 2578 (2021).¹¹⁰ Table 9 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In resolution 2570 (2021), the Council welcomed the interim Presidency Council and the interim Government of National Unity as the Government of Libya charged with leading the country up to national elections on 24 December 2021¹¹¹ and reaffirmed its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) would at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people.¹¹² The Council recalled its decision that all Member States were to comply with the arms embargo, demanded full compliance including by all Member States with the arms embargo imposed under resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by subsequent resolutions, including by ceasing all support for and withdrawing all armed mercenary personnel, and demanded that all Member States not intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbated it.¹¹³ It also recalled its decision that individuals or entities engaging in or providing support for acts that threatened the peace, stability or security of Libya or that obstructed or undermined the successful completion of its political transition, could be designated by the Committee for the travel ban and asset freeze measures and stressed that the Committee would consider the designation of individuals or entities who breached the arms embargo, violated the ceasefire or obstructed the successful completion of Libya's political transition.¹¹⁴

By resolution 2571 (2021), the Council extended until 30 July 2022 the authorizations provided and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolutions 2441 (2018) and 2509 (2020), to prevent the illicit export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya.¹¹⁵ In addition, the Council renewed the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze measures.¹¹⁶ The Council further reaffirmed its

¹¹⁰ For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹¹¹ Resolution 2570 (2021), para. 1.

¹¹² Ibid., para. 9.

¹¹³ Ibid., para. 13.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., para. 14.

¹¹⁵ Resolution 2571 (2021), para. 2.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., paras. 5, 9 and 11.

intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) would at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people.¹¹⁷ The Council also affirmed its readiness, *inter alia*, to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in the resolution, including their strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting,

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

as might be needed at any time in the light of developments in Libya.¹¹⁸

In resolution 2578 (2021), the Council extended the authorizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya for a further period of 12 months and requested the Secretary-General to report within 11 months on implementation of the resolution.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

¹¹⁹ Resolution 2578 (2021), paras. 1–2.

Table 9

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Libya in 2021

Provision relating to sanctions measures	Resolution establishing measures	Resolutions adopted during the review period (paragraph)	
		2570 (2021)	2571 (2021)
Arms embargo	1970 (2011), para. 9	Extension (13)	Extension (5)
Asset freeze	1970 (2011), para. 17		Extension (11)
Ban on arms exports by target State	1970 (2011), para. 10		
Business restrictions	1973 (2011), para. 21		
Financial restrictions	2146 (2014), para. 10 (d)		Limited extension (2)
Oil/petroleum embargo/restriction	2146 (2014), para. 10 (a), 10 (c)–(d)		Limited extension (2)
Prohibition on bunkering services	2146 (2014), para. 10 (c)		Limited extension (2)
Travel ban or restrictions	1970 (2011), para. 15		Extension (9, 11)

Guinea-Bissau

During the period under review, the sanctions regime for Guinea-Bissau, consisting of a travel ban, continued to remain in force, without undergoing any modifications.¹²⁰

Central African Republic

In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2588 (2021), by which it extended until 31 July 2022 the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban measures

¹²⁰ For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau, see part IX, sect. I.B

concerning the Central African Republic¹²¹ and renewed the related exemptions to those measures.¹²² Table 10 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

The Council further requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), including the Mine Action Service, and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 15 June 2022, an assessment on the progress achieved by the Central African Republic authorities on the key benchmarks on the arms embargo established by the Council in its presidential

¹²¹ Resolution 2588 (2021), paras. 1 and 3–4. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹²² Resolution 2588 (2021), paras. 1 (a)–(i) and 4.

statement dated 9 April 2019.¹²³ The Council also affirmed that it would keep the situation in the Central African Republic under continuous review and be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in the resolution, at any time as might be necessary, in the light of the evolution of the security situation in the country, the progress achieved in relation to the security sector reform process, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process and the management of weapons and ammunition.¹²⁴

Pursuant to the request of the Council in paragraph 13 of resolution 2588 (2021), the Secretary-General, in a letter to the President of the Council dated 15 June,¹²⁵ provided an update on the progress

achieved by the authorities of the Central African Republic on the key benchmarks established by the Council in the presidential statement of 9 April 2019.

In addition, in the context of the renewal of the mandate of MINUSCA, in resolution 2605 (2021) the Council recalled that individuals or entities that undermined peace and stability in the Central African Republic could be listed for targeted measures pursuant to resolution 2588 (2021).¹²⁶ It also recalled that committing acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, and then engaging in or providing support for acts that undermined the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic, could be a basis for sanction designations pursuant to resolution 2588 (2021).¹²⁷

¹²³ Ibid., para. 13; see also S/PRST/2019/3.

¹²⁴ Resolution 2588 (2021), para. 14.

¹²⁵ S/2021/573.

¹²⁶ Resolution 2605 (2021), para. 4.

¹²⁷ Ibid., para. 22.

Table 10

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Central African Republic in 2021

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2588 (2021)</i>
Arms embargo	2127 (2013), para. 54	Limited extension (1, 3) Exemption (1 (a)–(i))
Asset freeze	2134 (2014), paras. 32, 34	Limited extension (4) Exemption (4)
Travel ban or restrictions	2134 (2014), para. 30	Limited extension (4) Exemption (4)

Yemen

In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2564 (2021), by which it extended the asset freeze and travel ban established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) concerning Yemen, as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 28 February 2022 and reaffirmed the arms embargo as set out in resolution 2216 (2015).¹²⁸ By the same resolution, the Council also reaffirmed the designation criteria set out in prior resolutions¹²⁹ and decided that the individual listed in the annex to the resolution would be subject to the asset freeze and travel ban established pursuant to resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015).¹³⁰ Table 11 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

Emphasizing the importance of facilitating humanitarian assistance, the Council reaffirmed its decision that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) could, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the sanctions measures imposed by the Council in resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015) if the Committee determined that such an exemption was necessary to facilitate the work of the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations in Yemen or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of those resolutions.¹³¹ The Council also reaffirmed its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the sanctions measures in the light of developments in the country.¹³²

¹²⁸ Resolution 2564 (2021), para. 2.

¹²⁹ Ibid., paras. 6–8.

¹³⁰ Ibid., para. 3.

¹³¹ Ibid., para. 4.

¹³² Ibid., para. 15.

Table 11

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Yemen in 2021

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2564 (2021)</i>
Arms embargo	2216 (2015), paras. 14–16	Extension (2)
Asset freeze	2140 (2014), paras. 11, 13	Limited extension (2) Exemption (2)
Travel ban or restrictions	2140 (2014), para. 15	Limited extension (2) Exemption (2)

South Sudan

In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2577 (2021), by which it renewed the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban established pursuant to resolutions 2206 (2015) and 2428 (2018) concerning South Sudan, as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 31 May 2022.¹³³ By the same resolution, the Council also reaffirmed the designation criteria set out in resolution 2206 (2015).¹³⁴ Table 12 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

The Council also requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, to conduct, no later than 15 April 2022, an assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in paragraph 2 of resolution 2577 (2021).¹³⁵ The Council further expressed its readiness to review the arms embargo

measures in the light of progress achieved on the set of benchmarks and decided to keep the measures renewed in paragraph 11 of resolution 2577 (2021) concerning the assets freeze and travel ban under continuous review in the light of progress achieved implementing all provisions of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and developments related to human rights violations and abuses.¹³⁶

In addition, in the context of the renewal of the mandate of UNMISS, in resolution 2567 (2021) the Council expressed its intention to consider all appropriate measures against those who had taken actions that undermined the peace, stability and security of South Sudan and specifically underscored that individuals or entities that were responsible or complicit in attacks against UNMISS personnel and premises and any humanitarian personnel could meet the designation criteria.¹³⁷

¹³³ Resolution 2577 (2021), paras. 1 and 11.

¹³⁴ Ibid., para. 14.

¹³⁵ Ibid., para. 4.

¹³⁶ Ibid., paras. 2 and 12.

¹³⁷ Resolution 2567 (2021), para. 16.

Table 12

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning South Sudan in 2021

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2577 (2021)</i>
Arms embargo	2428 (2018), para. 4	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Asset freeze	2206 (2015), paras. 12, 14	Limited extension (11) Exemption (11)
Travel ban or restrictions	2206 (2015), para. 9	Limited extension (11) Exemption (11)

Mali

In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2590 (2021), by which it renewed the asset freeze and the travel ban established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017), as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 31 August 2022.¹³⁸ By the same resolution, the Council reaffirmed that those measures should apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017), as set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of that resolution, including for involvement in planning, directing or committing acts in Mali that violated international humanitarian law, which could include attacks against medical personnel or humanitarian personnel.¹³⁹ Table 13 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In the context of the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), in resolution 2584 (2021) the Council stressed that individuals or entities placed on the Mali sanctions list were not to benefit from any financial, operational or logistical support from United Nations entities deployed in Mali until their removal from the list and without prejudice to the exemptions set by paragraphs 2, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 2374 (2017).¹⁴⁰ The Council further recalled its readiness to respond with measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) should the Malian parties engage in hostilities in violation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, take actions that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Resolution 2584 (2021), para. 6.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., para. 3. The resolution defined the Malian parties as the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups. For more details concerning the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 11.

¹³⁸ Resolution 2590 (2021), para. 1.

¹³⁹ Ibid., para. 2.

Table 13

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Mali in 2021

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2590 (2021)</i>
Asset freeze	2374 (2017), para. 4	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Travel ban or restrictions	2374 (2017), para. 1	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)

B. Discussions relating to Article 41

The present subsection covers the discussions in the Council regarding the use of sanctions and other measures pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter. In 2021, no explicit reference to Article 41 was made in Council meetings or in open videoconferences held by Council members.

During the reporting period, the use of sanctions was discussed by Council and non-Council members in deliberations in relation to both thematic and country- or region-specific items. For example, during an open videoconference held on 14 April in connection with the item entitled “Women and peace and security” on the topic “Sexual violence in conflict”, participants discussed the inclusion of conflict-related sexual violence as a stand-alone designation criterion in Council-mandated sanctions regimes (case 5). At a meeting held on 16 July under the item entitled

“Protection of civilians in armed conflict” and the sub-item “Preserving humanitarian space”, speakers deliberated on the impact of sanctions on humanitarian operations (case 7). With respect to country-specific situations, Council members discussed the conditions for the review, modification or lifting of sanctions, with a focus on the arms embargo measures, in the context of the situation in South Sudan (case 6). In addition, Council members presented their positions on the adjustments to the arms embargo imposed on the Central African Republic (case 8). Furthermore, speakers discussed the Somalia sanctions regime (case 9) and the implementation of sanctions measures in the context of Libya (case 10). Council members also discussed the addition of a humanitarian exemption to the assets freeze imposed on Afghanistan (case 11).

Case 5**Women and peace and security**

On 14 April, Security Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Women and peace and security”¹⁴² on the topic of “sexual violence in conflict”, at which the Council heard briefings by, inter alia, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Denis Mukwege. In her briefing, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that the report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence,¹⁴³ which covered the year 2020, listed 52 parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of sexual violence in situations of which the Council was seized.¹⁴⁴ In that context, she stated that sanctions, if applied in a timely and consistent manner, could change the calculus of parties that operated on the assumption that rape was cost free, or even profitable, in the political economy of war in which women were trafficked, traded and sold. Also briefing Council members, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Denis Mukwege, reiterated his call to the international community and all States to draw a red line against the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and to punish the perpetrators and instigators of those odious crimes with blacklists, economic, financial and political sanctions and legal proceedings.

During the discussion that ensued, Council members presented their views on the use of sanctions in cases of conflict-related sexual violence. The representative of Estonia expressed support for the designation and use of sexual violence as a stand-alone criterion for sanctions and for briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to sanctions committees. According to the representative of India, sanctions regimes and other targeted measures by the Council needed to be strengthened in order to utilize their full potential to advance women’s protection from sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, including by listing individuals and entities involved in conflict-related sexual violence against women. The representative of Ireland held the view that it was necessary to examine the use of targeted sanctions, specifically the designation criteria of conflict-related sexual violence and the listing of sanctioned individuals. She noted that the Council needed to bring together its work on sanctions and gender more systematically, while also underlining that sanctions

were not the only tools of the Council for seeking accountability. The representative of Kenya stressed that sexual and gender-based violence should be incorporated as a separate listing criterion with concurrent targeted sanctions against specific perpetrators in the mandates and sanctions regimes that did not have such language. According to the representative of Mexico, the Council had the obligation to make use of all the resources at its disposal to prevent and address the scourge of sexual violence in conflict and in that regard she noted that it was essential that the sanctions committees continued to incorporate sexual violence as a criterion for imposing sanctions on perpetrators. She cautioned, however, that those measures would remain limited in scope if they were not strengthened through cooperation and information-sharing with other bodies, such as the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. The representative of Norway stressed that protection against conflict-related sexual violence must remain a key priority for the Council and the Council must make use of all means at its disposal. She further stated that sexual violence as a stand-alone designation criterion for sanctions must be applied when applicable and should be a criterion in more sanctions regimes. In that respect, the representative of Norway welcomed the recent decision by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) to list individuals on the basis of sexual violence. Similarly, the representative of the United Kingdom noted that resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#), by which the Council had imposed sanctions against Sultan Zabin, had demonstrated that the international community could and would take action against perpetrators of torture and sexual violence in conflict. The representative of Tunisia stressed that it was essential to put in place and strengthen robust national legal and judicial measures, as well as targeted United Nations sanctions that reflected the seriousness of conflict-related sexual violence crimes.

In their written statements, several delegations of non-Council members also called upon the Council to include conflict-related sexual violence as a criterion for the imposition of sanctions.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, the representative of Albania submitted that if her country was elected to the Council for the 2022–2023 term, it would work closely with all like-minded countries to support the incorporation of sexual violence as a stand-alone designation criterion in United Nations sanctions

¹⁴² See [S/2021/375](#).

¹⁴³ [S/2021/312](#).

¹⁴⁴ See [S/2021/375](#).

¹⁴⁵ Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark (on behalf of the five Nordic countries), European Union, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia.

regimes. The delegation of Argentina presented the view that sexual violence was a crime of the utmost gravity that had to be combated within legal frameworks and the use of available tools and mechanisms, including the sanctions regimes of the Council. The representative of Costa Rica encouraged referring sexual violence crimes to the International Criminal Court and noted that sanctions and judicial accountability measures must work together. Recalling that there had been no listings in any sanctions committee solely for the crime of sexual violence, the delegation of Germany asked why, when all the necessary information was available, action was not taken more often. The representative of South Africa commended the progress that the Council was making on increasingly listing and designating for targeted sanctions perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict, as evidenced by the recent listings of implicated parties in the Central African Republic and Yemen. The representative of Ukraine expressed full support for the Secretary-General's recommendation to continue to incorporate sexual violence as a stand-alone designation criterion for sanctions, including when it was used as a tool of reprisal against women in public and political life.

Case 6 **Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan** **and South Sudan**

On 21 June, the Security Council held a meeting under the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan",¹⁴⁶ at which it heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). During the discussion, speakers presented their views on the South Sudan sanctions regime, with a focus on the arms embargo measures and the related benchmarks laid out in resolution 2577 (2021).

The representative of Viet Nam reiterated his country's position that Council sanctions should be only a temporary tool for promoting conditions conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security in special situations and that they should be lifted as soon as the conditions were met. He also called on the Government of South Sudan and relevant parties to fully implement relevant Council resolutions, including resolution 2577 (2021), with a view to moving towards the lifting of sanctions measures. According to the representative of China, the Council should respond to the appeal of the African Union as

soon as possible by lifting the sanctions against South Sudan and sending a positive message.

The representative of the Russian Federation held the view that as the situation normalized in South Sudan, the Council would need to conduct a review of the current sanctions regime in force against the country. She also expressed the expectation that, with a view to easing the arms embargo, the South Sudanese authorities would manage to make significant progress in fulfilling the benchmarks established by resolution 2577 (2021).

The representative of the United States called on officials in South Sudan to work together with the Council on achieving the benchmarks set out in resolution 2577 (2021), so that the Council could consider appropriate adjustments to the sanctions regime. The representative of Ireland stated that the pace of progress in South Sudan should be greatly accelerated, including on the benchmarks incorporated into the sanctions regime in May 2021, setting out steps for the potential future lifting of the arms embargo. The representative of France recalled that in May when the sanctions regime was renewed, France had stated that it had been prepared to review the arms embargo measures. She noted that the Council had set clear conditions in that respect that had to be realized by the Government of South Sudan, with the support of UNMISS.

The representative of the United Kingdom urged the authorities of South Sudan to take action to guarantee the safety of those delivering life-saving assistance and hold perpetrators to account. He further stated that if the authorities failed to do so, the Council needed to consider new sanctions listings. Welcoming the fact that the Council had recently renewed the arms embargo, the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, the representative of the United Kingdom encouraged the Government of South Sudan to take forward tasks on the arms embargo benchmarks, including the establishment of the necessary unified forces with a genuinely unified command.

With regard to the benchmarks, the representative of South Sudan asserted that all Council members knew that South Sudan was not happy with the embargo, adding that UNMISS and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have been the best situated to negotiate the benchmarks.

¹⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8801](#).

Case 7**Protection of civilians in armed conflict**

On 16 July, at the initiative of France, which held the presidency for the month,¹⁴⁷ the Security Council held a ministerial-level meeting under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” and the sub-item “Preserving humanitarian space”.¹⁴⁸ Discussing the need for greater respect for international humanitarian law, the Deputy Secretary-General asserted that the Council had the power to impose sanctions when there were no other remedies. She added that counter-terrorism measures should include clear provisions to preserve humanitarian space. She noted that the Council had included humanitarian exemptions in its Somalia sanctions regime and said that the Secretary-General urged others to emulate those good practices. Also briefing the Council, the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross stated that the growing negative impact of sanctions and counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian aid was an issue of concern. In that regard, he said that the Council should carve out humanitarian exemptions in sanctions regimes, as it had in the case of Somalia. In addition, in her briefing the Delegate Director for Advocacy at Action against Hunger asserted that the Council continued to adopt resolutions while failing to take into account the potentially harmful and extremely serious consequences that they might have for humanitarian activities and humanitarian and medical workers, citing in that regard certain counter-terrorism measures and sanctions regimes. She noted that donors’ interpretation of sanctions regimes and counter-terrorism measures were threatening the operations of humanitarian organizations. In that context, one of the most striking examples involved the obligatory screening of those who benefited from humanitarian organizations’ work, which was an absolute red line for those organizations as it compromised their ability to provide impartial aid based solely on need. She therefore called on the Council to adopt a systematic humanitarian exemption, thereby excluding impartial humanitarian work from the scope of sanctions and counter-terrorism measures.

During the discussion, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France stressed that the Council should continue to strive to better incorporate the concerns of the humanitarian organizations into the texts it adopted. In that regard, he noted that the recent review of the sanctions regime concerning the

Democratic Republic of the Congo had led to considerable progress without undermining the usefulness of the regime, and added that the same approach could be extended to other regimes. He further stated that the Council must punish more frequently the perpetrators of and those who orchestrated attacks on humanitarian and medical workers, thereby targeting with sanctions those responsible for crimes against humanitarian workers. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, widespread sanctions and counter-terrorism measures had a negative impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. He added that it was essential to understand in greater detail the scope of sanctions, especially in terms of unintended consequences. The potential consequences had a so-called “chilling effect” and inhibited humanitarian action and it was essential that measures be taken to mitigate such impacts. Recognizing the progress achieved through resolution [2582 \(2021\)](#) on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Minister acknowledged that the sanctions approved by the Council against individuals who attacked medical or humanitarian personnel could be deterrents.

The Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Kenya noted that although the Council had made efforts to minimize the impact of its counter-terrorism and sanctions resolutions on humanitarian action, tensions persisted. The representative of the United States said that the Council must make sure that policies addressing humanitarian assistance, sanctions and counter-terrorism issues were not conflicting, but instead were mutually reinforcing and did not compromise security. She added that the United States supported discussions on how to facilitate humanitarian assistance in contexts where there were applicable Council sanctions, while seeking to ensure that Member States were fully complying with their international obligations under international humanitarian law. The representative of India noted that sanctioning individuals and entities perpetrating serious violations of international humanitarian law, especially attacks on humanitarian and medical personnel, was an effective tool for the Council to check and cease violations. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed the importance of strengthening the use of sanctions while ensuring that sanctions and counter-terrorism measures did not themselves hinder the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

According to the representative of Estonia, resolution [2417 \(2018\)](#) gave the Council the possibility of considering sanctions measures to hold individuals or entities accountable for obstructing the delivery or

¹⁴⁷ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 July ([S/2021/618](#)).

¹⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8822](#).

distribution of humanitarian assistance. The representative of Ireland asserted that the Council had a role to play in improving the protections for humanitarian actors by including designation criteria for those who obstructed or harmed humanitarian activity and actors and by providing for appropriate exemptions for humanitarian work.

The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that sanctions and counter-terrorism measures must not restrict the ability of humanitarian workers to undertake relief efforts. She noted that there was in fact greater need for more systematic monitoring and reporting on the impact of sanctions regimes on humanitarian action, adding that efforts to systematize reporting could be undertaken by the Secretariat. The representative of Norway held the view that sanctions, as vital tools to address threats to international peace and security, could serve as a deterrent and help safeguard the humanitarian space when they were directed at those who violated international humanitarian law. She added, however, that concerns raised by humanitarians about the unintended negative impact of counter-terrorism measures and sanctions must be taken into consideration and underscored that legal frameworks should include necessary safeguards and exemptions to ensure that measures did not impede the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate in line with their humanitarian mandate and international humanitarian law. During the meeting, some Council members¹⁴⁹ also mentioned the impact of unilateral sanctions on humanitarian activities.

Case 8

The situation in the Central African Republic

At a meeting held on 29 July under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”,¹⁵⁰ the Security Council adopted, with one abstention, resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#) concerning the sanctions measures on the Central African Republic.¹⁵¹ By the resolution, the Council renewed the sanctions measures imposed on the Central African Republic for one additional year.¹⁵² In addition to the existing exemptions, the Council also decided that the arms embargo should no longer apply to supplies of mortars

with a calibre of 60 mm and 82 mm ammunition specially designed for such weapons, and provision of related assistance, to the Central African Republic security forces, including State civilian law enforcement institutions, and intended solely for support of or use in the Central African Republic process of security sector reform.¹⁵³

Following the vote, several Council members expressed divergent views on the adjustments to the sanctions measures imposed on the Central African Republic.¹⁵⁴ Explaining his country’s abstention, the representative of China noted that against the backdrop of successfully held elections in the Central African Republic since December 2020 and the improved security situation, there was a growing disconnect between Council sanctions and the evolving situation on the ground. He recalled that when the Council had imposed the arms embargo and other sanctions on the Central African Republic, the intention had been to help the country to restore national stability and normal social order. He added that the arms embargo had increasingly become an obstacle hampering the efforts of the Government of the Central African Republic to strengthen its security capabilities. According to the representative of China, the lifting of the arms embargo concerned the sovereignty and security of the Central African Republic and was not only the aspiration of the people of the Central African Republic but also a common desire of the countries of the region. While taking note of the efforts made by France as the penholder to strive for unanimous adoption of the resolution, the representative of China asserted that the text had failed to fully respect the wish of the Government of the Central African Republic for the lifting of the arms embargo. He indicated that China’s constructive input had not been taken on board, which was why his country had had to abstain. He reiterated that the Council should fully lift the sanctions against the Central African Republic at an early date in the light of the changes in the situation.

The representative of the United States called on the authorities of the Central African Republic to focus on credible security sector reform and ensure that the relaxation of the arms embargo provided in resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#) did not endanger the personnel of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, United Nations staff, humanitarian workers or Central African civilians.

¹⁴⁹ Niger, China and Russian Federation.

¹⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8828](#).

¹⁵¹ The draft resolution received 14 votes in favour (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and one abstention (China).

¹⁵² Resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#), paras. 1 and 3–4.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 1 (g).

¹⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8828](#).

Expressing support for resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#), the representative of the United Kingdom underlined that the objective of the arms embargo was to prevent armed groups that continued to perpetrate violence in the Central African Republic from accessing weaponry. She noted that the United Kingdom's support for the resolution did not detract from its continued belief that a technical renewal would have been the appropriate course of action at the time. She expressed disappointment over the insistence of one or two Council members on the inclusion of the exemptions on mortars. While welcoming the progress made towards delivering on the benchmarks that the Council had set in April 2019, the representative of the United Kingdom underscored that those benchmarks for the lifting of the arms embargo had not yet been met. She therefore urged the authorities to accelerate their efforts to meet the benchmarks and to take full responsibility for ensuring effective storage and management of weapons and ammunition. Similarly, the representative of Norway stated that her country had voted in favour of resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#) because Norway believed it was crucial to preserve the sanctions regime concerning the Central African Republic. She added, however, that Norway was not in favour of easing the arms embargo at that point in time. She recalled that, as set out by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 15 June,¹⁵⁵ the authorities of the Central African Republic had made insufficient progress on the benchmarks established by the Council to assess the relevance of the arms embargo.

Explaining his vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation supported the adoption of resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#) and noted that the Council had responded to the legitimate request of the authorities of the Central African Republic to further ease sanctions.¹⁵⁶ He added that the simplified procedure stipulated in the resolution for the supply of 60 mm and 82 mm mortars for the needs of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic was another step in providing support to Central Africans. The arms embargo, imposed in the initial stages of the conflict, now complicated efforts to rearm the security forces of the Central African Republic, which bore the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety of citizens, and he encouraged Bangui to continue working to achieve the benchmarks of the arms embargo review so that, in a year, the Council would have every reason to lift it.

In his explanation of vote, the representative of Kenya expressed appreciation for the compromise by the penholder and Council members and his view that

resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#) was an improvement on the preceding one in re-equipping the security forces of the Central African Republic to ensure the effective discharge of their duties. He reaffirmed Kenya's intention to continue supporting the voice of the Central African Republic, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Economic Community of Central African States and ensuring that it was heard by the Council. In conclusion, he called on the Central African Republic to redouble its efforts to achieve the benchmarks in order to further strengthen the case for an expeditious lifting of the arms embargo.

Case 9 **The situation in Somalia**

At a meeting held on 15 November under the item entitled "The situation in Somalia",¹⁵⁷ the Security Council adopted resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) concerning the Somalia sanctions regime, with two abstentions.¹⁵⁸ Following the adoption of the resolution, some Council members and the representative of Somalia expressed regret that it was the third consecutive year that the Council had displayed a lack of consensus on the Somalia sanctions regime.

The representative of the Russian Federation expressed disagreement with the retention of paragraphs on Djibouti and Eritrea in the resolution, noting that the sanctions against Eritrea had been lifted by the Council in 2018 and that the current state of relations between Djibouti and Asmara posed no threat to international peace and security.¹⁵⁹ She further noted that those provisions were outdated and had nothing to do with the Somalia sanctions regime, adding that it would be regrettable if their preservation in the resolution were to serve the bilateral aims of individual Council members or to pressure those they disliked. In addition, she expressed disagreement over the wording of paragraph 38, which compelled panels of experts to promote gender issues in all mandate areas without taking country specificities into account.

The representative of China said that his country had always maintained that the Council should give due consideration to the latest developments in the country concerned when adopting sanctions. He further affirmed that since Somalia had demonstrated its

¹⁵⁵ [S/2021/573](#).

¹⁵⁶ See [S/PV.8828](#).

¹⁵⁷ See [S/PV.8905](#). For more information about the situation in Somalia, see part I, sect. 2.

¹⁵⁸ The draft resolution received 13 votes in favour (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and 2 abstentions (China, Russian Federation).

¹⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8905](#).

willingness and determination to independently assume responsibility for security and take ownership of its own destiny, the Council should have gradually modified the arms embargo measures, as requested by the Government of Somalia. In that context, the representative of China regretted that resolution 2607 (2021) was not adequately adjusted to reflect those objectives and failed to effectively address the concerns of the Government of Somalia. Moreover, the text reflected an expansion through new mandates, which was inconsistent with the general direction of lifting the arms embargo on Somalia. Noting that it was the third consecutive year in which the Council had been unable to reach consensus on a resolution to extend sanctions measures against Somalia, the representative of China expressed hope that all Council members could and would make their best efforts to achieve consensus in the future.

The representative of Somalia took the floor to appeal to the Council to lift the sanctions imposed on Somalia since 1992, noting that the arms embargo in Somalia was one of the longest United Nations sanctions regimes, with the widest mandate. He underscored that sanctions were a tool rather than an end and that they should be directed not against the Federal Government of Somalia, but rather against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which was a threat to peace and security in Somalia. The representative of Somalia further stated that in order to achieve success and avoid unintended consequences, the implementation of sanctions should be regularly assessed and modified to achieve the objective of defeating Al-Shabaab and restricting its financing and illegal flow of arms into Somalia.

Case 10 **The situation in Libya**

On 24 November, the Security Council held a meeting under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”,¹⁶⁰ during which several speakers discussed the sanctions regime imposed on Libya. At the meeting, the Council also adopted a presidential statement in which it, *inter alia*, recalled that individuals or entities who threatened the peace, stability or security of Libya or obstructed or undermined the successful completion of its political transition, including by obstructing or undermining the elections, could be designated for its sanctions.¹⁶¹

During the discussion, some Council members noted that sanctions could be used against actors that

undermined the electoral process in Libya.¹⁶² The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that the Council should not hesitate to use all the tools available, including sanctions, against those who attempted to undermine the electoral process in Libya. Similarly, the representative of the United States reminded those who would interfere with Libya’s elections or stoke violence that the Council could impose sanctions on anyone – Libyan or otherwise – who obstructed or undermined the elections as planned for in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map. He further added that the Council must target election spoilers to promote accountability. In a similar vein, the representative of France urged all actors to extend their full support for the electoral process led by the High National Elections Commission and to commit to accepting the election results, adding that France would strongly condemn any attempts to disrupt the election process or to call into question its results. In that regard, he recalled that the sanctions committee could designate any individual or entity that hindered the electoral process.

Several Council members¹⁶³ also emphasized the importance of strictly implementing the arms embargo on Libya. In that connection, the representative of the Niger condemned any acts of foreign interference and violations of the arms embargo and the relevant Council resolutions by some actors involved in the crisis in Libya. According to the representative of India, continued violations of the arms embargo were alarming, as repeatedly reported by the Panel of Experts on Libya.

Some speakers also discussed the asset freeze measures imposed on Libya. The representative of China stated that in the implementation of Council sanctions against Libya caution must be exercised to avoid negative impacts on the country’s economy and the well-being of the people. He further said that the Council should actively explore effective ways to use Libya’s frozen assets for the country’s reconstruction and respond in an appropriate manner to Libya’s legitimate concerns with regard to its losses as a result of the freezing of the assets. The representative of Kenya recalled that all of Libya’s frozen assets were to be preserved and eventually returned to, and for the benefit of, the people of Libya. He therefore emphasized the need to consider appropriate reviews in that respect and encouraged the implementation of the sanctions, in liaison with the authorities of Libya, and welcomed relevant discussions in that regard.

¹⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8912](#).

¹⁶¹ [S/PRST/2021/24](#), seventh paragraph.

¹⁶² See [S/PV.8912](#).

¹⁶³ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, France, Viet Nam and Mexico.

The representative of Libya called on the Council and the sanctions committee to work to fulfil their obligations and promises to preserve the Libyan assets and warn all countries not to touch them or seize them under any justification, which was in clear violation of the resolutions of the Council.

Case 11

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

At a meeting held on 22 December under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,¹⁶⁴ acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), in which it decided, inter alia, that humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan were not a violation of paragraph 1 (a) of resolution [2255 \(2015\)](#) and that the processing and payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources and the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of such assistance or to support such activities were permitted.¹⁶⁵

Prior to the vote, the representative of the United States stressed that the Council had a critical role to play in helping to address the suffering of the Afghan people and provide reassurance to United Nations and non-governmental organization implementers who were working hard to tackle the worsening humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁶ In that context, he expressed full understanding that some donors, aid organizations and financial institutions were still hesitant to deliver humanitarian assistance and undertake other activities to meet basic human needs in Afghanistan owing to the risks associated with providing direct or indirect benefits to United Nations-listed individuals who at that moment controlled certain ministries, and said that they had rightly assessed that the provision of such assistance could run afoul of United Nations sanctions against members of the Taliban and associated persons and entities. He added that through the draft resolution proposed by the United States, the Council could decide to exempt humanitarian assistance to enable more life-saving aid and other activities to meet the basic human needs of the people of Afghanistan. Specifically, the draft resolution provided an exemption from the Council’s asset freeze against listed members of the Taliban and associated entities solely for the provision of

humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan, which the Council would review in one year. He further noted that the humanitarian exception was to facilitate aid to the people of Afghanistan and was not a blank check for any organization to disregard its international obligations.

Following the vote, several Council members expressed their views on the humanitarian exemption proposed for the sanctions regime targeting the Taliban. The representative of the United States stated that the carve-out in the resolution covered urgently needed humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan. He noted that the adoption of the resolution highlighted how United Nations sanctions regimes could be flexible and adjusted to address urgent issues, such as humanitarian crises, while remaining viable tools to address threats to international security. According to the representative of Ireland, the resolution provided a much-needed and unequivocal exemption to the sanctions imposed under resolution [1988 \(2011\)](#) concerning the Taliban sanctions regime, adding that it would facilitate and accelerate the provision of vital life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. She noted, however, that the one-year timeline for the review of the humanitarian exemption was not intended in any way as one year of licence to the Taliban. The exemption was to provide support immediately to the people of Afghanistan, who were in dire need, nothing more.

The representative of China affirmed that the sanctions imposed by the Council targeted only certain individuals and entities, not the Afghan people at large. He further asserted that as long as the appropriate actions of the Council helped to clarify doubts and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan in a timely, smooth and unfettered manner, China would certainly consider them favourably. Highlighting that the original draft resolution had not facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance but had instead added to the obstacles, the representative of China was pleased that the final text incorporated the views of the Chinese side and clarified some key issues. He noted that the resolution explicitly stated that its intention was to provide clarity to ensure the continued provision of assistance in the future, that humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic humanitarian needs in Afghanistan were not in violation of the sanctions resolutions of the Council and that all related financial activities and the provision of goods and services were permitted. According to the representative of China, in the face of

¹⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8941](#).

¹⁶⁵ Resolution [2615 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8941](#). For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

fundamental changes in Afghanistan's domestic situation, the Council should seriously reconsider the existing sanctions regime against the Afghan Taliban so as to prevent any negative impact on Afghanistan's economic and social development. According to the representative of the Russian Federation, with the adopted resolution humanitarian agents and donors could continue to provide assistance without fearing restrictions and humanitarian assistance could flow through all channels to Afghanistan. For the Russian Federation, she added, that had been obvious even before. She noted, however, that even a shadow of a doubt could have led to limiting the volume of assistance and to additional suffering for the people of Afghanistan.

Several Council members emphasized the importance of preventing the diversion of funds intended for humanitarian assistance towards the Taliban or their misuse. In explaining his vote, the representative of India stated that the Council should oversee the delivery of humanitarian assistance and guard against the diversion of funds, since any diversion or misuse could be counterproductive. In that regard, he welcomed the provision in the resolution that called for a review of the implementation of the humanitarian carve-out after one year. The representative of France similarly stressed that the Council had a responsibility to ensure that humanitarian assistance would be delivered to those in need in accordance with humanitarian principles and without any diversion towards the Taliban, adding that the idea was not to restrict or condition humanitarian

assistance, but rather to be sensible in the light of decades of armed combat and Taliban collusion with Al-Qaida. She emphasized that the Council could not let the Taliban profit from the suffering of the people of Afghanistan. For that reason, it was the view of France that the removal of the time limit for humanitarian exemptions in the negotiated text had been a mistake, and so the provision for the review of the resolution one year after adoption was critical. In that connection, the representative of France indicated that the Council should review its decision on the basis of the situation on the ground. She also clarified that the humanitarian exemption excluded development activities and covered only humanitarian assistance and other activities to meet basic human needs.

The representative of Estonia affirmed that by adopting the resolution the Council had stressed that the accrual of any benefits to individuals or entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), whether as a result of direct provision or diversion, must be avoided. The mechanisms therein were established just for that – to guarantee that any exemptions would not benefit those under sanctions but would instead help aid reach those most in need, namely, the Afghan people. In her explanation of the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom asserted that the resolution would help to save lives by ensuring that the sanctions regime established under resolution 1988 (2011) posed no obstacle to the provision of humanitarian assistance and other activities that supported basic human needs in Afghanistan.

IV. Measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Note

Section IV covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 42 of the Charter, regarding the authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping

operations and multinational forces, as well as interventions by regional organizations.¹⁶⁷

During the year under review, the Council authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter with regard to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security by several peacekeeping missions and multinational forces, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia and the Sudan and

¹⁶⁷ The Council's authorization of the use of force by regional organizations is covered in part VIII. The authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping operations is covered in part X in the context of the mandates of peacekeeping operations.

South Sudan (including Abyei).¹⁶⁸ In 2021, the communications of the Council contained no explicit references to Article 42.

The present section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A outlines decisions in which the Council authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter. Subsection B covers discussions of the Council of relevance for Article 42.

A. Decisions relating to Article 42

During the reporting period, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 42 of the Charter in its decisions. That notwithstanding, the Council adopted several resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter by which it authorized peacekeeping missions and multinational forces, including those deployed by regional organizations, to use “all necessary measures” or “all necessary means”, or to take “all necessary action(s)” for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

For information on the authorization of the use of force of missions in the past, including some of the missions covered below, see previous supplements. For more information on the specific mandates of each field mission, see part X of the present Supplement.

In 2021, the Council reiterated its authorization to use force in relation to various situations and disputes. In Africa, in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council renewed the authorization to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic to take “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate within its capabilities and areas of deployment¹⁶⁹ and to the French armed forces to use “all the means” to provide operational support to the Mission when under serious threat.¹⁷⁰

Consistent with past practice in connection with the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council authorized the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take “all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate.¹⁷¹

With regard to the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Libya in violation of the arms embargo, the Council extended the authorizations

first granted in paragraphs 4 and 8 of resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” when conducting inspections of vessels and seizing of items in the course of such inspections, emphasizing that the inspections should be carried out in compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and “without causing undue delay to or undue interference with the exercise of freedom of navigation”.¹⁷² Furthermore, in connection with smuggling of migrants into, through and from Libyan territory, the Council renewed the authorizations granted in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers when carrying out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they had reasonable grounds to suspect were being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking and to seize such vessels that were confirmed as being used for such activities. The Council also reaffirmed paragraph 11 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), in which it had clarified that the authorization to use force applied only when confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers on the high seas off the Libyan coast and should not affect the rights and obligations of Member States under international law.¹⁷³

Regarding the situation in Mali, the Council, as it had in previous years, authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to take “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate¹⁷⁴ and French forces, within the limits of their capacities, also to use “all necessary means” until the end of the mandate of MINUSMA to intervene in support of the Mission when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, the Council requested MINUSMA to continue to carry out its mandate with a “proactive, robust, flexible and agile posture”.¹⁷⁶

In connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council decided that the African Union Mission in Somalia would be authorized to take “all necessary measures”, in full compliance with participating States’ obligations under international humanitarian and

¹⁶⁸ For more information on the mandates of peacekeeping operations, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁶⁹ Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 33.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 56.

¹⁷¹ Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 27.

¹⁷² Resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁷³ Resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

¹⁷⁴ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 20.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 43.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 23.

human rights law and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate.¹⁷⁷ In addition, the Council renewed, for a period of three months, the authorizations granted by paragraph 14 of resolution [2554 \(2020\)](#) to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia for which advance notification had been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General.¹⁷⁸

In connection with the situation in Abyei, the Council recalled that the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei to protect civilians, as set out in paragraph 3 of resolution [1990 \(2011\)](#), included taking the “necessary actions” to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of its source, and in that regard underlined that peacekeepers were authorized to use “all necessary means”, including force when required, in order to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.¹⁷⁹

With regard to the situation in South Sudan, the Council reiterated the authorizations to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to use “all necessary means” to perform its mandated tasks.¹⁸⁰

In Europe, with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council renewed its authorization to Member States, under the European Union Force military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence, to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸¹ The Council also authorized Member States, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO, to take “all necessary measures” in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence, respectively, and recognized the right of both EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence to take “all necessary measures” to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.¹⁸² The Council further authorized Member States, acting in accordance with annex 1-A of the Agreement for Peace, to take “all necessary measures” to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures governing

command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic.¹⁸³

In the Middle East, in connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council underlined the necessity that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had at its disposal “all necessary means” and equipment to carry out its mandate.¹⁸⁴ It also recalled its authorization to UNIFIL to take “all necessary action” in areas of deployment of its forces to ensure that its area of operations was not utilized for hostile activities, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹⁸⁵

B. Discussions relating to Article 42

During the period under review, no explicit references to Article 42 of the Charter were made at the meetings of the Council or open videoconferences held by Council members. The Council did, however, continue to discuss matters relating to the authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping missions.

For example, at the videoconference held on 19 April in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”¹⁸⁶ the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China noted that the Council must make good use of United Nations peacekeeping operations, uphold the principles of impartiality and respect the wishes and choices of the people of the countries involved, and added that enforcement operations must be authorized by the Council. In a similar vein, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that priority should be given to settling disputes by peaceful means, with any coercive measures having to be duly authorized by the Council.

During the open videoconference held on 24 May in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”,¹⁸⁷ the representative of

¹⁷⁷ Resolutions [2563 \(2021\)](#), para. 1, [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 11 and [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁷⁸ Resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), para. 14.

¹⁷⁹ Resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 14.

¹⁸⁰ Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

¹⁸¹ Resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 4.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

¹⁸⁴ Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), twenty-sixth preambular paragraph.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 22. See also, *ibid.*, twenty-eighth preambular paragraph.

¹⁸⁶ See [S/2021/394](#).

¹⁸⁷ See [S/2021/501](#).

India underscored that the Council needed to authorize carefully thought-out mandates for peacekeepers in close consultation with troop-contributing countries, since the protection of peacekeepers was as important as the protection of civilians. He further held the view that peacekeeping missions could not be a long-term response to what were fundamentally political problems and that it was for the Council to address such issues rather than burden peacekeeping missions beyond their mandate.

In the context of the videoconference held on 29 June in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”,¹⁸⁸ the representative of Liechtenstein reflected that one of the landmark achievements of the Charter was the prohibition on the use of force and noted in that regard that the use of force was prohibited except when authorized by the Council under Chapter VII or carried out in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

In his statement submitted in the context of the meeting held on 9 September in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”,¹⁸⁹ the representative of Ecuador asserted¹⁹⁰ that the success of peacekeeping operations should be based on respect for principles such as consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence and in defence of a mandate authorized by the Council.

At an open debate held on 9 December in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”,¹⁹¹ the representative of Sri Lanka¹⁹² noted that the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in domestic affairs did not prejudice action taken by the Council under Chapter VII. He further asserted that the ban on the use of force allowed for only two exceptions: self-defence and military action taken to combat threats to, and breaches of, the peace as authorized by the Council under Chapter VII. He concluded that the content of the Charter seemed to favour security, especially the collective coercive type found in Chapter VII, over the law.

A more salient deliberation on the use of force by peacekeeping operations in carrying out their protection of civilians mandates took place in the context of a videoconference held in connection with

the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” (case 12).

Case 12

Protection of civilians in armed conflict

On 25 May, Security Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”,¹⁹³ during which they heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. In addition to Council members who spoke during the videoconference, delegations of 40 non-Council members and the European Union submitted statements in writing.

During the discussion, several Council members expressed their views on the authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping operations in the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The representative of India held the view that the Council’s intervention should favour the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter to those of Chapter VII, adding that the use of force should be the measure of last resort when all diplomatic and political efforts had failed to protect civilians. According to the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, who spoke also on behalf of the three African members of the Council, Kenya, the Niger and Tunisia, efforts to enhance compliance within peacekeeping operations and national security forces must occur alongside the use of force to secure peace.

In their written statements, several non-Council members also presented their views on the use of force by peacekeeping missions in discharging their protection of civilians mandates. In that context, the representative of Argentina noted that the use of force to respond to threats of physical violence against civilians must be authorized in accordance with the applicable legal obligations, with the mandate established by the Council and with the specific rules of engagement and intervention of each mission. The representative of Brazil commended the efforts by United Nations peacekeepers in implementing protection of civilians mandates despite the additional challenges brought about by COVID-19 and reiterated the need to ensure that those mandates, when authorized, were sufficiently clear, so that peacekeepers understood precisely what was expected of them. According to the representative of Cyprus, improving

¹⁸⁸ See [S/2021/621](#).

¹⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8851](#).

¹⁹⁰ See [S/2021/783](#).

¹⁹¹ See [S/PV.8923](#) and [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/1026](#).

¹⁹² See [S/PV.8923 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

¹⁹³ See [S/2021/505](#).

the protection of civilians by the Council should focus, among other pillars, on upholding the prohibition of the use of force and on ensuring that peacekeeping operations could effectively protect civilians. The representative of Indonesia submitted that the comprehensive approach to protecting civilians, with local communities as part of that strategy, complemented the use of force and merited recognition for the essential role of peacekeepers in sustaining peace on the ground. The representative of Pakistan stated that counter-terrorism measures did not justify setting aside the limitations of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter on the non-use of force. He further noted that Council resolutions on counter-terrorism did not authorize the use of force on the territory of other

States without the Council's express authorization, and neither did they justify compromising the requirement for proportionality in the use of force. According to the representative of Slovakia, in addition to the authorization of the use of force to protect civilians, as a unique feature of United Nations peacekeeping, the unarmed approach to the protection of civilians through dialogue with parties to armed conflicts, training, monitoring and community policing highlighted the local ownership of the protection of civilians. In that regard, Slovakia recognized the progress made in the unarmed approach to the protection of civilians in Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

V. Consideration of Articles 43 to 45 of the Charter

Article 43

1. *All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.*

2. *Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.*

3. *The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.*

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Note

Under Article 43 of the Charter, all Member States undertake to make available to the Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security, armed forces, assistance and facilities in accordance with special agreements. Such agreements, to be entered into by the Council and Member States, were conceived to regulate the numbers and types of troops, their readiness and location and the nature of facilities to be provided.

No agreements under Article 43 were ever concluded, however, and in the absence of such agreements there is therefore no practice in application of Article 43. The United Nations has developed practical arrangements to carry out military operations in the absence of such agreements. In that context, the Council authorizes peacekeeping forces (under the command and control of the Secretary-General and assembled pursuant to ad hoc agreements entered into by the United Nations and Member States) and national or regional forces (under national or regional command

and control) to conduct military action. Peacekeeping operations, as well as their mandates, are covered in detail in part X of the present Supplement.

Articles 44 and 45 of the Charter contain explicit references to Article 43 and are therefore intimately linked. As with Article 43, there is no prior practice in the application of Articles 44 and 45. Nonetheless, the Council has developed, through its decisions, a practice by which to (a) call upon Member States to contribute armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, (b) consult with Member States contributing troops for United Nations peacekeeping activities and (c) call on Member States to contribute military air assets in the context of peacekeeping. Some of those decisions are also featured in section VII of the present part, which relates to Article 48, to the extent that they concern action required to carry out decisions of the Council regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, the Council in its decisions called for the provision of troops and other military assistance, including air assets, to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). While the Council did not engage in any constitutional discussion concerning Articles 43 and 45 during the reporting period, some speakers at the Council's meetings addressed the need to provide additional troops and military equipment to peacekeeping operations to ensure effective mandate implementation. Throughout 2021, the Council also adopted decisions in which it emphasized, and held meetings and videoconferences at which participants deliberated upon, the importance of consulting troop- and police-contributing countries on issues pertaining to the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Set out below is an overview of the practice of the Council during 2021 concerning the need for Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance to peacekeeping operations (subsection A) and the need for consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries (subsection B).

A. Need for Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance, including military air assets, to peacekeeping operations

In 2021, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 43 or Article 45 in its decisions or discussions, but it did call upon Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance to peacekeeping operations. In resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 12 March, the Council reiterated its call for new donors to provide support for AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment and technical assistance.¹⁹⁴ In order to strengthen the Mission's operational capabilities, fill gaps in resource requirements and enhance its force protection to carry out its mandated tasks, the Council encouraged Member States to support the African Union in mobilizing the required resources and equipment, including through uncaveated financial contributions to the AMISOM trust fund based on deliverable recommendations set out in the equipment review.¹⁹⁵

In resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 29 June, expressing its full support for the continuation of the implementation of the MINUSMA adaptation plan, the Council encouraged Member States to contribute to the plan by providing the capabilities needed for its success, particularly air assets, and urged Member States to provide to MINUSMA troops and police with adequate capabilities, predeployment and, where appropriate, in situ training, and equipment, including enablers specific to the operating environment.¹⁹⁶ The Council also noted the potential adverse effects on mandate implementation of national caveats that had not been declared and accepted by the Secretary-General prior to deployment and called on Members States to declare all national caveats, provide troops and police with the minimum of declared caveats and fully and effectively implement the provisions of the memorandums of understanding signed with the United Nations.¹⁹⁷

By resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 12 November, the Council reiterated its concern at the continuing lack of key capabilities for MINUSCA and the need to fill gaps, as well as the importance of current and future troop- and police-contributing countries providing troops and police with adequate

¹⁹⁴ Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 24 (a).

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., para. 15.

¹⁹⁶ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 25 and 46.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., para. 46.

capabilities, equipment and predeployment training to enhance the capacity of MINUSCA to operate effectively in an increasingly complex security environment.¹⁹⁸ Recognizing that the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates was the responsibility of all stakeholders and contingent upon several critical factors, including adequate resources, training and equipment, the Council urged Member States to provide troops and police that had adequate capabilities and mindset, predeployment and, where appropriate, in situ training, and equipment, including enablers specific to the operating environment.¹⁹⁹ The Council called on Member States to declare all national caveats prior to the contingent's deployment, provide troops and police with the minimum of declared caveats and fully and effectively implement the provisions of the memorandums of understanding signed with the United Nations.²⁰⁰

During the period under review, several discussions of the Council touched upon the importance of providing peacekeeping operations with adequate troops and equipment, including military air assets. For example, in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, at an open videoconference held on 24 February,²⁰¹ the representative of India expressed support for the Secretary-General's recommendation to increase the MINUSCA troop ceiling. The representative of the Niger, speaking also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia, similarly expressed support for the Secretary-General's recommendation to strengthen the capacity of MINUSCA through adjusting its troops and police forces and providing it with adequate equipment to enable it to guarantee the security of civilians and peacekeepers and ensure the maintenance of law and order. The representative of Mexico took note of the Secretary-General's proposal and stated that it deserved to be studied in depth. The representative of the United States underscored that when considering the Secretary-General's request for more troops and police, the United Nations should ensure that any reinforcements were identified and deployed according to the Organization's own best practices.

The need for providing peacekeeping operations with adequate troops and equipment was also raised at meetings and open videoconferences held in connection with the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations". In that regard, at an open

videoconference held on 24 May focused on improving the safety and security of peacekeepers,²⁰² the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations stressed the need for coordinated action by Member States, including members of the Council, in line with resolution 2518 (2020), to better address continuing gaps and shortcomings that persisted in the field. On that note, he underlined, *inter alia*, the importance of deploying uniformed personnel without caveats, particularly undeclared caveats, and explained that such caveats undermined the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers and the performance of operations. The Under-Secretary-General also called for the provision of adequate equipment, particularly armed and utility helicopters, aeromedical aviation resources, quick-reaction companies, forward medical teams, equipment to counter improvised explosive devices, including mine-protected vehicles, as well as jammers and aerial-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support recalled continuously seeking support from Member States to deploy the right capabilities, including armed and utility helicopters, aeromedical aviation resources, mine-protected vehicles and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. He further noted that the required capabilities to support the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers could be deployed by troop- and police-contributing countries under a memorandum of understanding, a letter of assist or on a bilateral basis between Member States. He expressed readiness to work with Member States flexibly to promote triangular partnerships on training, as well as co-deployments, in order to help troop- and police-contributing countries deploy units with strengthened capabilities and appropriate equipment. Numerous Member States, in their statements delivered during or submitted in connection with the videoconference, emphasized the importance of providing peacekeeping operations with adequate equipment,²⁰³ including air assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles,²⁰⁴ in order to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and their ability to respond to various threats and attacks. The delegation of Belgium indicated that improvised explosive devices were among the main threats against peacekeepers and emphasized in that regard that peacekeeping missions' capabilities should be adapted to specific high-risk operational contexts by ensuring that missions were provided with adequate and high-tech equipment, including equipment to counter

¹⁹⁸ Resolution 2605 (2021), para. 39.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 40.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ See S/2021/187.

²⁰² See S/2021/501.

²⁰³ Estonia, Mexico, Tunisia, Belgium, Denmark, El Salvador, Italy, Lebanon, Malta and Pakistan.

²⁰⁴ Estonia, Viet Nam and Belgium.

improvised explosive devices and dispose of explosive ordnance, and modern technologies, such as unarmed aerial systems, mine-protected vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and signal blocking devices. The representative of Pakistan underscored the need to address the gaps between mandates and resources, stressing that expectations outstripped resources, exposing peacekeepers to undue risks. The representative added that inadequate equipment had a direct bearing on the likelihood of casualties among peacekeepers and indicated that the remedy lied in a two-pronged approach: devising clear, focused and achievable mandates on the one hand and allocating adequate budgetary resources and equipment on the other. The representative of Portugal recalled that having appropriate equipment and making use of technological developments were some of the aspects that were vital for peacekeepers to be able to identify and assess threats and take appropriate measures to improve their situational awareness. Some Member States focused specifically on the need to provide missions with adequate medical and casualty evacuation equipment, in particular helicopters and other air assets.²⁰⁵

At a meeting held on 18 August under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and the sub-item entitled “Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping”,²⁰⁶ the representative of China stated that the use of new technologies in peacekeeping operations needed relevant support and guarantees to facilitate the effective use of new technological equipment in such operations. He added that the list of contingent-owned equipment of troop- and police-contributing countries should be updated in a timely manner and that cost effectiveness should also be taken fully into consideration to ensure proper planning. In that regard, he emphasized that Member States should pay their peacekeeping contributions in full and on time, while reimbursement for the equipment and personnel of troop- and police-contributing countries should be provided in a timely manner to ensure that peacekeeping operations could make full use of new technologies. The representative of Kenya said that troop- and police-contributing countries should be encouraged to deploy with essential equipment, for which the United Nations should be ready to reimburse accordingly. He added that countries that had the means to support such operations gratis, through the Secretariat, were encouraged to do so. In their statements submitted in

connection with the meeting,²⁰⁷ some Member States²⁰⁸ underscored the need for the provision of adequate equipment as part of efforts to advance the use of technology in peacekeeping operations. The delegation of Guatemala underscored that based on feedback from the field, the use of communication equipment in different peacekeeping missions was not balanced and equal and noted that some missions lacked adequate equipment to carry out effective communication. The delegation of South Africa noted instances where missions were underequipped, with major gaps in both equipment and training, and thus faced serious threats from armed groups, criminals and terrorists, many of whom had access to sophisticated weapons and technology. The delegation emphasized that it was therefore important that deployed uniformed personnel were well equipped with appropriate and properly fitting equipment for the threat environment.

B. Recognition of the need to consult troop- and police-contributing countries

During the period under review, the Council adopted five decisions relevant to the need to consult troop- and police-contributing countries on matters pertaining to peacekeeping.

On 29 June and 21 December, respectively, the Council adopted resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#) in connection with the situation in the Middle East. In those resolutions, the Council emphasized the importance of the Council and troop-contributing countries having access to reports and information related to the redeployment configuration of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and reinforced that such information assisted the Council with evaluating, mandating and reviewing UNDOF and with effective consultation with troop-contributing countries.²⁰⁹ The Council also urged for prompt reporting by the Secretary-General to the Council and troop-contributing countries of any actions that impeded the ability of UNDOF to fulfil its mandate.²¹⁰

In resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 29 June concerning the situation in Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure that troop-contributing countries received sufficient information relevant to up-to-date tactics, techniques and procedures in

²⁰⁵ India, United Kingdom, Guatemala and Portugal.

²⁰⁶ See [S/PV.8838](#). See also [S/2021/732](#).

²⁰⁷ See [S/2021/732](#).

²⁰⁸ Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Poland and Republic of Korea.

²⁰⁹ Resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), thirteenth preambular paragraph.

²¹⁰ Resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 6.

reducing troops casualties in an asymmetric environment before deploying to Mali.²¹¹

In resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 30 August in connection with the situation in the Middle East, the Council welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the assessment of the continued relevance of the resources and options of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for improving the efficiency and effectiveness between UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and requested the Secretary-General to continue the implementation of his detailed plan, with timelines and specific modalities, in full and close consultation with the parties, including Lebanon, the troop-contributing countries and the members of the Council, to implement recommendations and further requested him to periodically update the Council on that process.²¹²

In resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 9 September under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council recognized that the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates was the responsibility of all stakeholders and welcomed further engagement and dialogue between the United Nations, troop- and police-contributing countries and other relevant stakeholders to improve performance and inform decisions regarding mandate design.²¹³

During 2021, no explicit references to Article 44 were made during discussions of the Council. Nonetheless, several Member States highlighted the importance of cooperation and consultation by the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries, including on matters pertaining to the formulation and implementation of mandates, in connection with the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 16 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”.²¹⁴ The delegation of Cyprus proposed that Member States hosting United

Nations peacekeeping operations should have a chance to offer their perspective before the Council during discussions on mandate renewal and be included in troop-contributing country meetings.²¹⁵

The importance of consulting with troop- and police-contributing countries on matters relating to the mandates of peacekeeping operations also continued to be discussed at meetings and open videoconferences held under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”. In that regard, in statements submitted in connection with an open videoconference held on 24 May focused on improving the safety and security of peacekeepers,²¹⁶ several Member States underlined the importance of coordination among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries in ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers.²¹⁷

In statements delivered during or submitted in connection with a meeting held on 18 August under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and the sub-item entitled “Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping”, several Council members and other Member States addressed the need for consulting troop- and police-contributing countries, including as part of triangular partnerships, in the context of integrating modern technologies and associated training and equipment in peacekeeping operations.²¹⁸ The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines emphasized that it was crucial for all stakeholders, including troop- and police-contributing countries, Member States and the Secretariat, to work closely together to provide each mission with adequate resources, as well as clear, focused and actionable mandates to ensure that peacekeepers were able to discharge their duties safely and efficiently.²¹⁹ She added that enhanced triangular cooperation was essential for implementing resolutions [2436 \(2018\)](#) and [2518 \(2020\)](#), as well as other relevant outcomes that addressed peacekeeping performance and bolstered the safety and security of peacekeepers. The representative of Brazil warned that technological advancement was often a double-edged sword and indicated that the use of unmanned aircraft by peacekeeping operations merited close attention by all involved stakeholders, including the Secretariat, field missions, host nations

²¹¹ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 48.

²¹² Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 8.

²¹³ Resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), tenth preambular paragraph.

²¹⁴ See [S/PV.8798](#) (China); and [S/2021/572](#) (Brazil, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, New Zealand (also on behalf of 35 Member States previously elected as members of the Security Council: Angola, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay), Republic of Korea and Slovakia).

²¹⁵ See [S/2021/572](#).

²¹⁶ See [S/2021/501](#).

²¹⁷ China, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Malta, Nepal and Ukraine.

²¹⁸ See [S/PV.8838](#) (United States and China); and [S/2021/732](#) (Bangladesh, Japan, Nepal, Poland and Ukraine).

²¹⁹ See [S/PV.8838](#).

and troop- and police-contributing countries, both in the light of its legitimate possibilities and the potential added risks that the mishandling of new technologies could bring about.²²⁰ Other participants similarly touched upon the need to ensure cooperation with troop- and police-contributing countries in ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers. The representative of the Russian Federation recalled that crimes committed against peacekeepers, the investigation of such crimes and accountability for those responsible required special attention, and in that regard underlined the importance of cooperation from the host country, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat, which all needed to work in harmony and good faith and with the necessary level of transparency.²²¹ He expressed the view that resolution 2589 (2021), adopted that day, had removed some of the existing gaps in that area. The delegation of Guatemala commended the measures taken to improve the analysis of security initiatives, by making informed and timely decisions about the activities to be carried out and how to manage the risks faced by personnel.²²²

²²⁰ See [S/2021/732](#).

²²¹ See [S/PV.8838](#).

²²² See [S/2021/732](#).

The delegation further emphasized that that information must be transferred to the troop- and police-contributing countries promptly. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized that the policy formulation and decision-making process in all stages of peacekeeping operations, including with respect to protecting the peacekeeping forces, must be conducted with the active participation of troop- and police-contributing countries.

At a meeting held on 8 September under the same item and the sub-item entitled “United Nations transitions”,²²³ the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines underscored that regular triangular cooperation among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries was essential to ensure that all drawdowns and transitions were strategically sound. Several Member States²²⁴ that submitted written statements in connection with the meeting similarly emphasized the importance of consulting troop- and police-contributing countries when making changes to the mandates of peacekeeping missions or planning peacekeeping transitions.

²²³ See [S/PV.8851](#). See also [S/2021/783](#).

²²⁴ See [S/2021/783](#) (Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador).

VI. Role and composition of the Military Staff Committee in accordance with Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. *There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.*

2. *The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.*

3. *The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.*

4. *The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.*

Note

Section VI covers the practice of the Council under Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter regarding the Military Staff Committee, including instances in which the Council considered the role of the Military Staff Committee in planning the application of armed force and in advising and assisting the Council on the military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to either Article 46 or Article 47 in any of its decisions. Articles 46 and 47 were also not referred to in any of the Council's discussions.

In a letter dated 10 December addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Estonia transmitted an assessment of the Council's work during the presidency of Estonia in June 2021,²²⁵ in which

²²⁵ See [S/2021/1032](#), annex.

reference was made to two videoconferences held by the Military Staff Committee on 11 and 25 June.

As customary, the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly issued during the reporting period made reference to the activities of the Military Staff Committee.²²⁶

²²⁶ See [A/76/2](#), part IV. For further details on the annual report, see part IV, sect. I.F.

VII. Action required of Member States under Article 48 of the Charter

Article 48

1. *The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.*

2. *Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.*

Note

Section VII covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 48 of the Charter, regarding the obligation of all or some Member States to carry out the decisions of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 48 (2), Member States shall carry out the decisions directly, or through international organizations of which they are members. The section is focused on the types of obligations imposed on Member States pursuant to Article 48 and on the range of addressees designated by the Council to implement, or comply with, decisions adopted.

While Article 48 relates to requests to Member States to carry out action decided upon by the Council, during 2021, as in previous periods, the Council also addressed some of its pleas to "actors" or "parties", reflecting the intra-State and increasingly complex nature of many contemporary conflicts dealt with by the Council. In its requests to carry out actions, the Council also addressed "regional and subregional organizations", signalling the importance of such entities in tackling disputes and situations before the Council. Additional information on the engagement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of

international peace and security is provided in part VIII of the present Supplement.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 48 in any of its decisions. The Council, however, adopted resolutions and presidential statements in which it underlined the obligation of Member States and other entities concerned to comply with the measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter pursuant to Article 48. The present section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions of the Council requiring Member States to carry out actions in relation to measures under Article 41. Subsection B covers decisions of the Council requiring Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42. During 2021, no explicit references to Article 48 were made in communications to the Council nor was there any discussion held in relation to the interpretation or application of that Article.

A. Decisions in which the Security Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 41 of the Charter

In 2021, the Council adopted no decisions concerning judicial measures taken under Article 41. The Council, however, adopted a number of decisions under Article 41 concerning sanctions, in which it frequently requested or stressed the importance of specific measures being implemented by all Member States or all States, as well as regional organizations. The Council requested the countries specifically targeted by the measures to carry out the actions required.

In relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council urged all parties and all Member

States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic and the safety of its members.²²⁷ It further urged all Member States and all relevant United Nations bodies to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel to execute its mandate, and recalled the value of information-sharing between the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts.²²⁸ The Council also requested the authorities of the Central African Republic to report, by 15 June 2022, to the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic on the progress achieved regarding security sector reform, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process and the management of weapons and ammunition.²²⁹ In addition, the Council decided that all Member States were to continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Central African Republic of arms and related materiel of all types.²³⁰

Concerning the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Council urged all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#), in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by the Council in its relevant resolutions.²³¹

With regard to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council called for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.²³² The Council also called for enhanced cooperation between all States, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Group of Experts, encouraged all parties and all States to ensure cooperation with the Group of Experts by individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control and reiterated its demand that all parties and all States ensure the safety of its members and its support staff and

unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Group of Experts deemed relevant to the execution of its mandate.²³³

In connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) according to which all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.²³⁴

In relation to the situation in Libya, with regard to the arms embargo the Council recalled its decision that all Member States were to ensure full compliance with the arms embargo.²³⁵ Concerning the other sanctions measures, the Council called upon Member States, particularly those in which designated individuals and entities were based, as well as those in which their assets frozen under the measures were suspected to be present, to report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya on the actions taken to implement effectively the travel ban and asset freeze measures in relation to all individuals on the sanctions list.²³⁶ It also reiterated that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of all persons designated by the Committee and called upon the Government of Libya to enhance cooperation and information-sharing with other States in that regard.²³⁷ The Council urged all States, relevant United Nations bodies, including the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts on Libya, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in the relevant resolutions, in particular incidents of non-compliance, and called on UNSMIL and the Government of Libya to support the Panel's investigatory work inside Libya, including by sharing information, facilitating transit and granting access to weapons storage facilities.²³⁸ The Council also called upon all parties and all States to ensure the safety of the Panel's members and further called upon all parties and all States, including Libya and countries of the

²²⁷ Resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#), para. 9.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 12.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 1.

²³¹ Resolution [2569 \(2021\)](#), para. 6.

²³² Resolution [2582 \(2021\)](#), para. 6.

²³³ Resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 39.

²³⁴ Resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 21.

²³⁵ Resolutions [2570 \(2021\)](#), para. 13, and [2571 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

²³⁶ Resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), para. 8.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

region, to provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites that the Panel deemed relevant to the execution of its mandate.²³⁹

Concerning the situation in Somalia, the Council recalled that Member States were called upon to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that were involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices.²⁴⁰ The Council called upon the Federal Government of Somalia to continue working with Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to identify, assess and mitigate money-laundering and terrorist financing risks, improve compliance and strengthen supervision and enforcement and requested the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Panel of Experts on Somalia to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's finances and to continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's finances and exploitation of the licit financial system.²⁴¹ The Council also requested the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other Member States, particularly in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism and to submit an update on specific actions taken in that regard.²⁴² The Council reaffirmed that all States were to implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance and training related to military activities, until the Council decided otherwise.²⁴³ Noting the increase in improvised explosive device attacks undertaken by Al-Shabaab, the Council decided that all States were to prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items specified in part I of annex C to resolution 2607 (2021) to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, if there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the

item(s) would be used, or a significant risk they might be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices.²⁴⁴ The Council reiterated its request for Member States to assist the Panel of Experts in its investigations and for the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, the African Union Mission in Somalia and partners to share information with the Panel of Experts regarding conduct or activities, in particular Al-Shabaab's activities, where covered by listing criteria.²⁴⁵ In connection with anti-piracy measures, the Council called upon the Somali authorities to make all efforts to bring to justice those who were using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake criminal acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, and called upon all States to take appropriate actions under their existing domestic law, or develop legislative processes, to prevent the illicit financing of acts of piracy and the laundering of its proceeds.²⁴⁶ The Council called upon all States to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts on Somalia, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia.²⁴⁷

With regard to the situation in South Sudan, in relation to the arms embargo, the Council strongly urged all Member States to take urgent action to identify and prevent arms shipments within their territory in violation of the measures contained in resolution 2577 (2021).²⁴⁸ The Council called upon all Member States, in particular States neighbouring South Sudan, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, all cargo to South Sudan, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned had information providing reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contained items of which the supply, sale or transfer was prohibited, and decided that all Member States were to seize and dispose of such items upon discovery.²⁴⁹ The Council called upon all parties and all Member States, especially those neighbouring South Sudan, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on South Sudan and urged all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel and unhindered

²³⁹ Ibid., para. 15.

²⁴⁰ Resolution 2592 (2021), twenty-first preambular paragraph.

²⁴¹ Resolution 2607 (2021), para. 2.

²⁴² Ibid., para. 3.

²⁴³ Ibid., para. 20.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., para. 9.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 35.

²⁴⁶ Resolution 2608 (2021), paras. 7 and 17.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., para. 10.

²⁴⁸ Resolution 2577 (2021), para. 7.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., paras. 8–9.

access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel to execute its mandate.²⁵⁰

In relation to the situation in Yemen, recalling the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015), the Council called upon all Member States and other actors to comply with their obligations under the targeted arms embargo.²⁵¹ Furthermore, the Council urged all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on Yemen and further urged all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites.²⁵²

With respect to measures adopted under Article 41 for the purpose of preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism, the Council recalled its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that all Member States were to ensure that any person who participated in the financing, planning or perpetration of terrorist acts or in support of terrorist acts was brought to justice and reiterated the obligations of Member States relevant to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorism, including those set forth in resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014) and 2462 (2019).²⁵³ The Council also encouraged all Member States to more actively submit to the Committee listing requests of individuals and entities supporting Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.²⁵⁴

B. Decisions in which the Security Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council urged, called upon and requested action by a particular Member State, a designated group of Member States, all Member States and all parties in relation to measures adopted under Article 42 of the Charter.

With respect to the situation in Abyei, the Council reiterated its demand for the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to provide full support for the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

(UNISFA) in the implementation of its mandate, specifically the deployment of UNISFA personnel, including by removing any obstacles that hindered its work to protect civilians in Abyei.²⁵⁵ The Council also urged the two Governments and the local communities to take all necessary steps to ensure that Abyei was effectively demilitarized and to extend full cooperation to UNISFA in that regard.²⁵⁶ The Council further urged the two Governments to facilitate basing arrangements for UNISFA in the mission area, including Athony airport, and requested Member States and all parties to continue to take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNISFA personnel with unhindered and immediate access throughout Abyei.²⁵⁷ The Council also called upon all Member States, in particular the Sudan and South Sudan, to provide for the free, unhindered and expeditious movement, to and from Abyei and throughout the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles, aircraft and spare parts, that were for the exclusive and official use of UNISFA.²⁵⁸

Concerning the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council urged all parties in the country to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of MINUSCA, in particular by ensuring its safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of the Central African Republic to enable MINUSCA to carry out fully its mandate.²⁵⁹ The Council also called upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from the Central African Republic of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods that were for the exclusive and official use of MINUSCA.²⁶⁰

In connection with the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council reiterated its call on all parties to cooperate fully with MONUSCO and to remain committed to the full and objective implementation of the Mission's mandate and encouraged all parties to work together to enhance the safety and security of MONUSCO personnel.²⁶¹

²⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 19.

²⁵¹ Resolution 2564 (2021), eighteenth preambular paragraph.

²⁵² Ibid., para. 12.

²⁵³ S/PRST/2021/1, eighth and ninth paragraphs. For more information, see sect. III.A above.

²⁵⁴ Resolution 2610 (2021), para. 14.

²⁵⁵ Resolution 2575 (2021), para. 4, and resolution 2609 (2021), para. 7.

²⁵⁶ Resolution 2575 (2021), para. 5.

²⁵⁷ Resolution 2609 (2021), paras. 8–9.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 24.

²⁵⁹ Resolution 2605 (2021), para. 50.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 51.

²⁶¹ Resolution 2612 (2021), seventeenth preambular paragraph.

With regard to the situation in Lebanon, the Council called upon all parties to respect the cessation of hostilities, prevent any violation of the Blue Line and respect it in its entirety, and to cooperate fully with UNIFIL.²⁶² The Council urged all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL in all its operations and its access to the Blue Line in all its parts was fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement.²⁶³ The Council also called on the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access requested by UNIFIL, including to all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line which UNIFIL had reported as a violation of resolution 1701 (2006).²⁶⁴ The Council reaffirmed its call on all States to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.²⁶⁵ The Council also urged the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL.²⁶⁶

In connection with the situation in Mali, the Council called upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, that were for the exclusive and official use of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), in order to facilitate the timely and cost-effective

delivery of the logistical supply of MINUSMA.²⁶⁷ The Council also urged all parties in Mali to cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and MINUSMA in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, as well as to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of MINUSMA personnel with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Mali.²⁶⁸

The Council renewed its call upon States and regional organizations that were able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft, providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces and seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there were reasonable grounds for suspecting such use.²⁶⁹

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council strongly condemned the continued obstruction of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by the Government of South Sudan and opposition groups, including restrictions on freedom of movement, assault on UNMISS personnel and constraints on the Mission's operations.²⁷⁰ The Council also demanded that the Government of South Sudan comply with the obligations set out in the status-of-forces agreement between the Government of South Sudan and the United Nations and immediately cease obstructing UNMISS in the performance of its mandate.²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ Resolution 2584 (2021), para. 49.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 8.

²⁶⁹ Resolution 2608 (2021), para. 12.

²⁷⁰ Resolution 2567 (2021), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

²⁷¹ Ibid., para. 8.

²⁶² Resolution 2591 (2021), para. 12.

²⁶³ Ibid., paras. 15–16.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., para. 16.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., para. 20.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., para. 19.

VIII. Mutual assistance pursuant to Article 49 of the Charter

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Note

Section VIII covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 49 of the Charter, concerning mutual assistance among Member States in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Council.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 49 in any of its decisions.

However, in its decisions adopted in 2021 the Council called upon Member States to cooperate with each other or assist specific States in the implementation of measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter. The present section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions in which the Council urged cooperation among Member States with respect to measures under Article 41. Subsection B covers decisions in which the Council requested mutual assistance in relation to measures under Article 42.

In 2021, there was no constitutional discussion in the Council relating to the interpretation or application of Article 49 of the Charter. No reference to Article 49 was made in the communications received by the Council.

A. Decisions in which the Security Council requested mutual assistance in the implementation of measures under Article 41 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council called upon Member States to enhance their cooperation in implementing specific sanctions measures. The addressees of the Council's calls for mutual assistance ranged from individual Member States, in particular concerned and neighbouring States, to "all Member States", as well as regional and subregional organizations. The types of assistance requested of Member States varied greatly, from requests to share information and requests for the provision of technical assistance to requests for cooperation in carrying out inspections.

For example, with regard to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council called for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.²⁷²

In connection with the situation in Libya, the Council called upon the Government of Libya to improve the implementation of the arms embargo and upon all Member States to cooperate in such efforts.²⁷³ The Council further called upon the Government of Libya to enhance cooperation and information-sharing with other States with regard to measures taken to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of all persons designated by the Committee established

pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.²⁷⁴

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council requested the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other Member States, particularly other Member States in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including compliance with resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014) and 2462 (2019) and relevant domestic and international law.²⁷⁵

Concerning the situation in South Sudan, the Council decided that all Member States were to cooperate in efforts to seize and dispose of items for which the supply, sale or transfer was prohibited by paragraph 4 of resolution 2428 (2018).²⁷⁶

B. Decisions in which the Security Council requested mutual assistance in the implementation of measures under Article 42 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council also adopted several resolutions in which it requested cooperation among Member States in carrying out measures under Article 42 of the Charter, under which the use of force is authorized. The types of assistance requested included sharing information and capacity-building to deter various criminal acts and coordination among Member States to deter such acts.

For example, concerning the situation in Lebanon, the Council called upon Member States to urgently assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable them to perform their duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006).²⁷⁷

With respect to the situation in Libya and the question of migration, the Council reiterated its calls made in previous resolutions to "all flag States involved" to cooperate in efforts aimed at inspecting vessels suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya.²⁷⁸ The Council also reiterated previous resolutions that called upon Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, including the European Union, to

²⁷² Resolution 2582 (2021), para. 6.

²⁷³ Resolution 2571 (2021), para. 7.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 9.

²⁷⁵ Resolution 2607 (2021), para. 3.

²⁷⁶ Resolution 2577 (2021), para. 9.

²⁷⁷ Resolution 2591 (2021), twenty-ninth preambular paragraph.

²⁷⁸ Resolution 2598 (2021), para. 2. See also resolution 2240 (2015), para. 9.

cooperate with the Government of National Unity and with each other, including by sharing information to assist Libya in building capacity to secure its borders and to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through its territory and in its territorial sea.²⁷⁹

Concerning the situation in Somalia and efforts aimed at countering and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, the Council encouraged Member States to continue to cooperate with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and

armed robbery at sea, without impeding the exercise of high seas freedoms or other navigational rights and freedoms by ships of any State, and called upon Member States to assist Somalia to strengthen maritime capacity in Somalia.²⁸⁰ The Council recognized the need for Member States, international and regional organizations and other appropriate partners to exchange evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes with a view to ensuring effective arrest, prosecution of suspected and imprisonment of convicted pirates and key figures of criminal networks involved in piracy.²⁸¹

²⁷⁹ Resolution 2598 (2021), para. 2. See also resolutions 2240 (2015), 2312 (2016) and 2380 (2017), paras. 2–3.

²⁸⁰ Resolution 2608 (2021), paras. 3 and 7.

²⁸¹ Ibid., para. 10.

IX. Special economic problems of the nature described in Article 50 of the Charter

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Note

Section IX covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 50 of the Charter regarding the right of States to consult the Council with a view to resolving economic problems arising from the implementation of preventive or enforcement measures, such as sanctions, imposed by the Council.

During the period under review, the Council continued its practice of imposing targeted instead of comprehensive economic sanctions, thereby minimizing the unintended adverse impact on third States.²⁸² In 2021, none of the Council-mandated sanctions committees received formal requests for assistance under Article 50 of the Charter. The Council did not explicitly invoke Article 50 of the Charter in any of its decisions during the reporting period.

While Article 50 was not explicitly mentioned at any meeting of the Council or during the open videoconferences held by Council members during

2021, some references made by Council members and other speakers to the consequences of sanctions during meetings were of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 50.

For example, at a meeting held on 16 July under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”,²⁸³ the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico addressed the effect of widespread sanctions and counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian action and stated that it was clear that those measures had a negative impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance and that it was therefore essential to understand in greater detail the scope of sanctions, especially in terms of unintended consequences. At the same meeting, the representative of Norway noted that the concerns raised by humanitarians about unintended negative impacts of counter-terrorism measures and sanctions must be taken into consideration. She added that legal frameworks should include necessary safeguards and exemptions to ensure that sanctions and counter-terrorism measures did not impede the ability of humanitarian organizations to operate.

Similar references to the unintended consequences of sanctions measures were also made at several other meetings and videoconferences held in connection with a broad range of items, including “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,²⁸⁴ and “The situation in Somalia”.²⁸⁵

²⁸³ See [S/PV.8822](#).

²⁸⁴ See, for example, [S/2021/48](#) (Ireland); [S/PV.8839](#) (Norway); and [S/PV.8941](#) (China).

²⁸⁵ See, for example, [S/PV.8905](#) (Somalia).

²⁸² For more information on sanctions measures, see sect. III above.

X. Right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Note

Section X deals with the practice of the Security Council in relation to Article 51 of the Charter, regarding the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” in the event of an armed attack against a Member State. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers the discussions of the Council of relevance to the interpretation and application of Article 51 and subsection B covers references to Article 51 and the right to self-defence in communications addressed to the Council. The Council did not refer to Article 51 of the Charter or the right of self-defence in its decisions during the reporting period.

A. Discussions relating to Article 51

In 2021, Article 51 of the Charter was explicitly invoked 12 times during the deliberations of the Council at three Council meetings²⁸⁶ and at six open videoconferences held by Council members.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8805](#) (Mexico), in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”; [S/PV.8909](#) (Islamic Republic of Iran), in connection with the item entitled “Small arms”; and [S/PV.8910](#) (Mexico), in connection with the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”.

²⁸⁷ See [S/2021/48](#) (Mexico and Saudi Arabia (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation)), in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”; [S/2021/152](#) (Mexico), in connection with the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”; [S/2021/265](#) (Mexico and Syrian Arab Republic), in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East (Syrian Arab Republic)”;

Moreover, the right of self-defence was discussed at several meetings of the Council and open videoconferences held by Council members in relation to several thematic and country- and region-specific items on its agenda.

Discussions on thematic items

On 12 January, Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,²⁸⁸ focused on international cooperation in combating terrorism 20 years after the adoption of resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#). In a statement submitted in connection with the videoconference, the representative of Mexico underscored that the international community must make better use of the available multilateral instruments and mechanisms to address the ever-changing transnational threat posed by terrorism. He added, however, that there was also concern about the overreach involved in invoking, out of context, Article 51 of the Charter in the fight against terrorism. The delegation of Saudi Arabia, in a statement submitted on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, underlined the need to distinguish between terrorism and the exercise of the legitimate right of people to resist foreign occupation, with the distinction being duly observed in international law, international humanitarian law, Article 51 of the Charter and General Assembly resolution [46/51](#), which had endorsed that position.

On 7 May, Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”,²⁸⁹ focused on upholding multilateralism and the United Nations-centred international system. During the videoconference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico suggested that, pending reform of the Council, measures to make the Council more transparent must be considered and recalled, as an example, the proposal by Mexico to discuss the letters in which the right to legitimate self-defence was invoked in the light of Article 51 of the Charter and on which the Council seemed to take no action. At another

[S/2021/456](#) (Mexico) and [S/2021/621](#) (Japan and Liechtenstein), in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”; and [S/2021/505](#) (Pakistan), in connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”.

²⁸⁸ See [S/2021/48](#).

²⁸⁹ See [S/2021/456](#).

high-level open videoconference, held on 29 June in connection with the same item,²⁹⁰ focused on cybersecurity, the Ambassador for United Nations Affairs and Cyber Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan expressed Japan's view that when a cyberoperation constituted an armed attack under Article 51 of the Charter, States could exercise the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognized under that Article. The representative of Liechtenstein underscored that one of the landmark achievements of the Charter was the prohibition on the use of force except when authorized by the Council under Chapter VII or carried out in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. The representative noted, however, that Article 51 was increasingly being invoked as the legal basis for the use of force without the necessary legal justifications and emphasized that there was a substantive risk of that trend extending to cyberspace with the development of new technologies and State capabilities. He further stressed the need to ensure that cyberspace did not facilitate unjustified self-defence operations and that invoking Article 51 pre-emptively required evidence of the imminence of an armed attack, as well as proof of necessity and proportionality of measures taken in response.

In a statement submitted for an open videoconference held on 25 May in connection with the item "Protection of civilians in armed conflict",²⁹¹ the representative of Pakistan emphasized that counter-terrorism measures did not justify setting aside the limitations of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter on the non-use of force. He further stressed that the Council's resolutions on counter-terrorism did not authorize the use of force on the territory of other States without the Council's express authorization, and nor did they justify compromising the requirement for proportionality in the use of force.

At a meeting held on 22 November under the item entitled "Small arms"²⁹² and the sub-item entitled "The impact of the diversion and trafficking of arms on peace and security", the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized that in all efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the right of each State to manufacture, export, import and retain such weapons must be fully respected.²⁹³ He stated that that was among the requirements of exercising the inherent right to self-defence reaffirmed in Article 51 of the Charter. In a

written statement submitted in connection with the meeting, the delegation of Egypt stressed that international efforts to combat illegal trafficking in small arms and light weapons should not interfere with the right of States to meet their national security requirements and the legitimate right of self-defence.²⁹⁴

Discussions on country- and region-specific items

Council members and other Member States also addressed matters relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 51 and the right to self-defence in relation to a number of country- and region-specific items. In that regard, Member States deliberated on the right to self-defence of Israel and Palestine at several meetings and open videoconferences in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question" (case 13). In addition, at an open videoconference held on 16 February in connection with the item entitled "The situation concerning Iraq",²⁹⁵ the representative of Mexico expressed his country's concern about the abuse of invocations of Article 51 of the Charter in the context of the fight against terrorism. He added that that practice ran the risk of de facto broadening the exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force, as contained in Article 2 (4), of the Charter, an irregularity that should not be accepted. At a meeting held under the same item on 23 November,²⁹⁶ the representative of Mexico again reiterated Mexico's deep concern over the abuse of the invocation of Article 51 of the Charter in the context of the fight against terrorism. In addition to the practice running the risk of de facto broadening the exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force, as enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter and in the unwavering jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, he added that the practice was also an aberration that could not be accepted and one that undermined Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

At an open videoconference held on 15 March in connection with the item "The situation in the Middle East",²⁹⁷ focused on the Syrian Arab Republic, the representative of Mexico reiterated Mexico's concern about certain States abusively invoking Article 51 of the Charter to justify the use force without the authorization of the Council. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the Governments of some countries, mainly the United States, the United

²⁹⁰ See [S/2021/621](#).

²⁹¹ See [S/2021/505](#).

²⁹² See [S/PV.8909](#) and [S/PV/8909 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2021/966](#).

²⁹³ See [S/PV.8909](#).

²⁹⁴ See [S/2021/966](#).

²⁹⁵ See [S/2021/152](#).

²⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8910](#).

²⁹⁷ See [S/2021/265](#).

Kingdom and France, had used terrorists as an excuse to form an illegal international coalition to combat terrorism based on a distorted interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter. At a meeting held on 25 June under the same item,²⁹⁸ the representative of Mexico reiterated his country's concern about the abuse by some States of Article 51 of the Charter, which they invoked to justify the use of force in the Syrian Arab Republic, going beyond the terms of that provision so as to circumvent obtaining the express authorization of the Council.

Case 13

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

On 16 May, Security Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question"²⁹⁹ to address the escalation of violence and hostilities in Gaza. During the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, both of whom called for an immediate de-escalation and a return to negotiations and for the parties to observe and respect international law and international humanitarian law and end all violence against civilians.

In statements delivered during or submitted in connection with the videoconference condemning the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel by Hamas and other militant groups, several Council members and other delegations³⁰⁰ recognized the right of Israel to self-defence and at the same time called on Israel to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, including the principle of proportionality, when exercising its right to self-defence. The representative of Australia condemned the relentless and indiscriminate firing of rockets into Israel by Hamas and emphasized that Israel unquestionably had the right to defend itself and its people in accordance with international law and that, equally, the Palestinian people must be able to live peacefully. The representative of the Niger said that while Israel had a right to self-protection and self-defence, the Palestinians must also be recognized as having the same right,

having suffered occupation and the effects of rampant colonization for more than 54 years. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines underscored that international law against the targeting of civilians must be upheld and that those responsible for breaches of the said law should be held accountable for their crimes. She added that the right to self-defence could not cloak the wrongs of a party that had fired the first shots and was using military capabilities far beyond that of the weaker party and stressed that the Council and international law were the Palestinians' only protection.

The representative of Israel underscored that the Council could choose to unequivocally condemn Hamas's indiscriminate and unprovoked attacks, which threatened Israelis and Palestinians alike, and to support Israel's heroic efforts to defend itself and dismantle Hamas's infrastructure of terror while doing everything to minimize the number of casualties on both sides. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the State of Palestine wondered what the Palestinian people were entitled to do in order to resist Israeli policies and defend themselves, questioning whether violence was considered terrorism when committed by Palestinians and self-defence when committed by Israel. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran underscored that under the existing United States Administration, decisions were made to further shield the Israeli regime and justify Israel's crimes with the so-called legitimate right of Israel to defend itself and deny the inherent rights of the oppressed Palestinians, including their right to self-defence. He further stressed that Palestinians were under an unlawful occupation and blockade by the Israeli regime and they therefore had an inherent right to self-defence. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that it was a disgrace for the United States and certain European countries, on the pretext of self-defence, to condemn Palestinian attacks against Israel before condemning Israeli attacks against Palestinians.

At an open debate held on 28 July under the same item,³⁰¹ the representative of Estonia said that it was essential that the parties continue to respect the ceasefire and do their utmost to avoid further violence.³⁰² Stressing that the launching of incendiary balloons towards Israel was unacceptable, he further highlighted Israel's right to defend itself, while ensuring the safety and protection of the civilian population. In written statements submitted in connection with the debate,³⁰³ the representative of Costa Rica acknowledged Israel's legitimate security concerns and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to

²⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8805](#).

²⁹⁹ See [S/2021/480](#).

³⁰⁰ Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland, Estonia, United Kingdom, France, Brazil, European Union and Iceland.

³⁰¹ See [S/PV.8826](#). See also [S/2021/685](#).

³⁰² See [S/PV.8826](#).

³⁰³ See [S/2021/685](#).

the United Nations acknowledged its right to defend itself, while both stressed the need for self-defence to be exercised in a proportionate manner and in accordance with international humanitarian law. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that the unwavering support for Israel from the United States was against the inherent rights of the oppressed Palestinians, including their right to self-defence. The representative of Turkey, expressing dismay that some Member States had fallen into the trap of portraying the developments in Gaza as a mutual escalation and recalling that 278 Palestinians had been killed in May as a result of Israeli attacks on Gaza, stressed that the right to self-defence did not give carte blanche for the excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force on civilians and civilian targets. The delegation of Ukraine expressed concern at new instances of violence caused again by Hamas from the territory of Gaza and reiterated that Israel had the right to defend itself from attacks.

B. References to Article 51 and the right of self-defence in communications addressed to the Security Council

In 2021, Article 51 of the Charter was explicitly referenced in 17 communications from Member States addressed to the President of the Council or circulated as a document of the Council. Those communications concerned a variety of disputes and situations. A complete list of letters from Member States containing explicit references to Article 51 is provided in table 14 below. Explicit references to Article 51 were also found in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2522 \(2020\)](#) concerning the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq,³⁰⁴ the final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen³⁰⁵ and the letter from the representative of Mexico to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council transmitting the Chair's summary of the Arria-formula meeting convened by Mexico on the theme "Upholding the collective security system of the Charter of the United Nations: the use of force in international law, non-State actors and legitimate self-defence", held on 24 February.³⁰⁶

In addition, references to the principle of self-defence continued to be found in other communications from several Member States. In that regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted various communications in which it reserved the country's

inherent right to self-defence to respond decisively to any threat, aggressive measure or wrongful act perpetrated by the Israeli regime.³⁰⁷ In another communication, the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the country's determination to protect its people and vital interests and respond decisively to any threat or use of force against its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, in conformity with its inherent right to self-defence, and in the light of "continued threats by the Israeli regime" against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the recent "provocative statement by the Defense Minister of that regime 'to have a military option on the table'".³⁰⁸ Several communications submitted by Azerbaijan referred to a series of counteroffensive operations undertaken in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence with respect to the activities of Armenia.³⁰⁹ In another communication, Azerbaijan recalled its report submitted to the Secretary-General in 2008, in which it was pointed out that once Azerbaijan had concluded that a peaceful settlement, based on the withdrawal by Armenia from Nagorny Karabakh and surrounding areas, was unattainable, it was entitled to terminate the ceasefire and resume the exercise of self-defence.³¹⁰ Israel submitted a communication calling upon the international community to unequivocally condemn the indiscriminate attacks by terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip against Israeli civilians and population centres and to support Israel's fundamental right to self-defence.³¹¹ Subsequently, the State of Palestine submitted a communication claiming that what Israel was seeking to defend was its illegal occupation, insisting on its control of Palestinian land and Palestinian lives and, if possible, their very erasure, including of Palestinian children.³¹² The communication further deemed that this "distorted narrative of self-defence" effectively gave Israel permission to carry on with its crimes. Similarly, in a subsequent communication, the State of Palestine again denounced Israel's defamatory allegations and illegal actions as justified on security and "self-defence" pretexts without recourse for the victims.³¹³ In response to a letter dated 28 April from the representative of Azerbaijan transmitting a joint communiqué of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

³⁰⁷ See [S/2021/103](#), [S/2021/872](#) and [S/2021/1059](#).

³⁰⁸ See [S/2021/72](#).

³⁰⁹ See [S/2021/269](#), [S/2021/345](#), [S/2021/421](#), [S/2021/441](#) and [S/2021/472](#).

³¹⁰ See [S/2021/39](#).

³¹¹ See [S/2021/463](#).

³¹² See [S/2021/466](#).

³¹³ See [S/2021/904](#).

³⁰⁴ [S/2021/120](#).

³⁰⁵ [S/2021/79](#).

³⁰⁶ [S/2021/247](#).

Nuclear Weapons of 23 April,³¹⁴ the United Kingdom submitted a communication stating that it had not lowered its threshold for the possible use of nuclear weapons, recalling that the country had consistently stated that it would consider using its nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.³¹⁵ The United Kingdom added it would remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale it would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. South Africa addressed communications to the President of the Council transmitting letters from the Secretary-General of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, alleging acts of aggression by Morocco and reporting on the measures taken by Frente POLISARIO to engage the Moroccan forces in self-defence.³¹⁶ The Russian

Federation submitted a communication in connection with the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), expressing strong opposition to the assessments of the defensive needs of the Islamic Republic of Iran as “self-proclaimed”, since they were dismissive of its legitimate right to self-defence and violated the principle of common and indivisible security enshrined in outcome documents of the review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted by consensus.³¹⁷

Moreover, the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2522 (2020),³¹⁸ the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)³¹⁹ and the situation concerning Western Sahara³²⁰ contained references to the right to self-defence of Turkey, Israel and Frente POLISARIO, respectively.

³¹⁷ See S/2021/216.

³¹⁸ S/2021/426.

³¹⁹ S/2021/650.

³²⁰ S/2021/843.

³¹⁴ See S/2021/413.

³¹⁵ See S/2021/561.

³¹⁶ See S/2021/741 and S/2021/980.

Table 14

Communications from Member States containing explicit references to Article 51 of the Charter in 2021

<i>Document symbol</i>	<i>Document title</i>
S/2021/83	Letter dated 26 January 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/202	Letter dated 27 February 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/209	Letter dated 19 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
S/2021/223	Identical letters dated 4 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
S/2021/257	Letter dated 12 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/285	Identical letters dated 22 March 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
S/2021/493	Identical letters dated 21 May 2021 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council
S/2021/496	Letter dated 24 May 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/510	Letter dated 27 May 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/614	Letter dated 29 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/620	Identical letters dated 1 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the

<i>Document symbol</i>	<i>Document title</i>
	United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
S/2021/623	Letter dated 2 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/669	Letter dated 20 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
S/2021/684	Letter dated 27 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
S/2021/693	Letter dated 29 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2021/736	Letter dated 18 August 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
S/2021/790	Identical letters dated 14 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Part VIII

Regional arrangements

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Introductory note

Article 52

1. *Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*
2. *The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.*
3. *The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.*
4. *This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.*

Article 53

1. *The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.*
2. *The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.*

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.¹ While Article 52 encourages the engagement of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes prior to their referral to the Security Council, Article 53 allows the Council to utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority and with its explicit authorization. Article 54 stipulates that regional arrangements should inform the Council of their activities at all times.

¹ Chapter VIII of the Charter refers to “regional arrangements or agencies”. For the purposes of the *Repertoire*, the term “regional arrangements” is understood to encompass regional and subregional organizations as well as other international organizations.

During the period under review, in its decisions, the Council underlined the importance of the role of regional and subregional organizations and of the cooperation with them, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, to maintain international peace and security and thereby contribute to international efforts to upholding the Charter. The Council also recognized that regional and subregional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of conflicts and disputes and underlined the importance of utilizing the existing and potential capabilities of regional and subregional organizations in this regard. The Council welcomed the strong cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation between the two organizations and to promote the coherence and effectiveness of their efforts. The Council underscored the importance of further consolidation of the United Nations-African Union cooperation through partnership in the different components of the African Peace and Security Architecture. In this regard, the Security Council of the United Nations and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their sixth joint informal seminar and fifteenth annual joint consultative meeting, both conducted by way of videoconferences on 16 and 17 December 2021, respectively.² In addition to the African Union and the League of Arab States, engagement with other regional arrangements, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe featured prominently in Council discussions.

Discussions in the Council focused on various aspects of the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, including on the role of regional organizations as mediators and guarantors of peace processes, the efforts of regional organizations towards the pacific settlement of disputes and on enforcement action and peacekeeping by regional organizations. Discussions also addressed the complementary roles of the United Nations and regional organizations, the comparative advantages of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security and the need for adequate, sustainable and predictable funding for regionally led peacekeeping operations.

In connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council highlighted in its decisions the important role played by regional and subregional organizations, particularly subregional economic communities, including the Economic Community of Central African States, ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel, IGAD, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community, to prevent and end conflicts, mediate in disputes, promote reconciliation and ensure successful peace processes. The Council underlined the mediation efforts of regional and subregional organizations in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Libya, Mali, the Sudan and South Sudan, Western Sahara and Yemen, as well as the Great Lakes region, West Africa and the Sahel, and in relation to the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, the Council renewed the authorization of two existing missions, namely the African Union Mission in Somalia and the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), while the Kosovo Force led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continued to operate without any decisions having been taken

² See [S/2022/174](#) and [A/76/2](#). For more information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008–2009 to 2020*.

with respect to its mandate. The Council also recognized that ad hoc and unpredictable financing arrangements for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter could have an impact on the effectiveness of those peace support operations and encouraged further dialogue on options to address this issue.

As in previous periods, the Council authorized enforcement action by regional and subregional organizations beyond the framework of peacekeeping operations, such as in relation to Libya and Somalia, and continued to request reporting by regional organizations, particularly on the implementation of mandates of relevant regional peacekeeping operations and on cooperation with the United Nations.

The practice of the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter in 2021 is set out below in five sections. Each section covers both the decisions adopted by the Council and the discussions held during Council meetings and videoconferences. Section I examines the practice of the Council regarding cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security concerning agenda items of a thematic nature. Section II deals with the recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. Section III covers the practice of the Council relating to its cooperation with regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping. Section IV describes the practice of the Council in authorizing enforcement action by regional organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Section V refers to the reporting on the activities of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items

Note

Section I examines the practice of the Security Council in 2021 in cooperating with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, in connection with items of a thematic nature. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII and subsection B covers discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII.

A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter in five of its decisions. Those decisions were adopted under the items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”. The text of the relevant provisions is included in table 1.

Table 1
Decisions adopted in 2021 containing explicit references to Chapter VIII

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security		
S/PRST/2021/2 29 January 2021	Fourth paragraph	The Security Council expresses its appreciation for the briefings of the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, on 18 January 2021, and reiterates that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, is significant to improve collective security
S/PRST/2021/9 19 April 2021	Second paragraph	The Security Council reiterates its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recalls that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations can improve collective security
S/PRST/2021/21 28 October 2021	Second paragraph	The Security Council reiterates its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recalls that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations can improve collective security
	Fourteenth paragraph	The Security Council reaffirms the importance of further strengthening cooperation and developing an effective partnership with the African Union underpinned by mutual consultations between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council in their respective decision-making processes and common strategies for a holistic response to conflict, as appropriate, based on respective comparative advantage, transparency and accountability to address common security challenges in Africa in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VIII and the purposes and principles

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
	Seventeenth paragraph	The Security Council encourages continued development and application of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes through regional and subregional arrangements, provided that their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. The Council reiterates its support for the efforts of all relevant subregional organizations and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, in particular the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)
	Twenty-fourth paragraph	The Security Council recognizes that one major constraint facing the African Union in effectively carrying out the mandates of maintaining regional peace and security is securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources, and recognizes that ad hoc and unpredictable financing arrangements for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter may impact the effectiveness of these peace support operations, and encourages further dialogue on options for addressing this issue
	Thirty-third paragraph	The Security Council commends the efforts and progress made by African countries, the African Union, and subregional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and commends the important contribution of security initiatives in Africa, including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad basin, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Security Council stresses that United Nations institutions should work closely with the African Union, and African subregional organizations and arrangements, as well as Member States of the region, in a coordinated and coherent manner, in developing and further implementing national and regional strategies and plans of action to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism conducive to terrorism upon request, in full compliance with obligations under international law
Maintenance of international peace and security		
S/PRST/2021/22 9 November 2021	Ninth paragraph	The Security Council also recognizes that there is a need for an integrated coherent approach among relevant political, security and development actors, within and outside the United Nations system, consistent with their respective mandates, including subregional and regional organizations in line with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, to address the underlying root causes of conflict in an inclusive, integrated and sustainable manner
S/PRST/2021/23 16 November 2021	Fifth paragraph	The Security Council underlines the importance of the role of regional and subregional organizations and arrangements and of cooperation with them, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to maintaining international peace and security, contributing to international efforts to uphold the Charter

Furthermore, the Council also recognized and referred to the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security without making explicit reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter.

For example, in resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 29 October under the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, the Council underlined the importance of coordination between the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations in preventing violations and abuses against children affected by armed conflict.³

In a presidential statement issued on 29 January, in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council welcomed the strong cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation between the two organizations in the fields of conflict early warning, prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, sustaining peace, addressing root causes of conflicts, and counter-terrorism, as well as in other areas of common interest, and to promote the coherence and effectiveness of their efforts.⁴ The Council expressed support for the holding of an annual briefing of the Council by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to further promote cooperation on matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, especially at the regional level, and to consider ways to improve collective security.⁵ The Council welcomed the opening of the United Nations liaison office to the League of Arab States and emphasized the importance of intensifying the coordination between the League and the United Nations special envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General, including through the arrangement of periodic meetings, with a view to reaching a more comprehensive understanding of different crisis situations in the region and developing effective solutions through joint action where appropriate.⁶

In a presidential statement issued on 19 April in connection with the same item, the Council recognized that regional and subregional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region, which could be a benefit for their efforts to influence the

prevention or resolution of these conflicts, and underlined the importance of utilizing the existing and potential capabilities of regional and subregional organizations in this regard, including by encouraging countries in the region to resolve differences peacefully through dialogue, reconciliation, consultation, negotiation, good offices, mediation and the judicial settlement of disputes.⁷ Moreover, the Council recognized that regional and subregional organizations were also well positioned with regard to promoting confidence, trust and dialogue among concerned parties within their respective regions. The Council also recognized the desirability of promoting closer and increased operational cooperation, as appropriate, between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the fields of conflict early warning, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding and in enhancing coherence, synergy and the collective effectiveness of their efforts.⁸ The Council emphasized the role of States, regional and subregional organizations, the United Nations and relevant stakeholders in promoting confidence-building measures and dialogue at various levels while ensuring synergy, coherence and the complementarity of such efforts.⁹ The Council requested the Secretary-General, while presenting regular written reports on matters seized by the Council, to make recommendations for further enhancing cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in promoting confidence-building and dialogue.¹⁰

In a presidential statement issued on 28 October, also under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council underscored the importance of further consolidation of the United Nations-African Union cooperation through partnership in the different components of the African Peace and Security Architecture, including on early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, electoral assistance, the promotion and protection of human rights, international humanitarian law and the rule of law, the protection of civilians, including women and children, and the prevention of and response to sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.¹¹ The Council also underscored the need for strengthening and leveraging collaboration between the United Nations, the African Union and the

³ Resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

⁴ [S/PRST/2021/2](#), fifth paragraph.

⁵ *Ibid.*, eleventh paragraph.

⁶ *Ibid.*, thirteenth and fifteenth paragraphs.

⁷ [S/PRST/2021/9](#), third paragraph.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

⁹ *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, last paragraph.

¹¹ [S/PRST/2021/21](#), tenth paragraph.

regional economic communities/regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, through consultations and joint action across the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention to peacemaking and sustaining peace to peacebuilding.¹² The Council further recognized the need for greater coordination between the United Nations and the African Union in peacebuilding, including through practical means to enable local ownership, closer collaboration on operational and programmatic engagements, enhance national and continental African capacities for planning and implementing programmes and projects and address context-specific cross-border challenges and subregional dimensions of peacebuilding.¹³

In connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, in a presidential statement issued on 8 April the Council encouraged continued partnership and cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations to mitigate the threat to civilians from landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices.¹⁴ In resolution 2616 (2021), adopted on 22 December under the same item, the Council acknowledged with appreciation the efforts made by intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations, including through regional initiatives, strategies and action plans, in support of the effective implementation of arms embargoes imposed by the Council, and in capacity-building to prevent and address the illicit trade in, and the destabilizing accumulation of, small arms and light weapons, and to prevent their illicit diversion in violation of Council-mandated embargoes.¹⁵

On 24 May, in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it reaffirmed its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the partnership between the United Nations and regional as well as subregional organizations in relation to the safety and security of peacekeepers, and encouraged partnerships to support the efforts of the African Union to continue to develop policy, guidance and training to ensure the safety and security of its peacekeepers.¹⁶ In resolution 2589 (2021) of 18 August, adopted under the same item, the Council affirmed its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the partnership between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, including the

African Union, to provide capacity-building assistance to host States for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of cases of the killing of, and all acts of violence against, United Nations personnel serving in peacekeeping operations, including but not limited to their detention and abduction.¹⁷ Furthermore, in resolution 2594 (2021) of 9 September, also in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council recognized the contribution of regional and subregional organizations to peacebuilding and peacekeeping transitions, and called upon the Secretary-General to consult relevant regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, in the planning and execution of transition processes and to ensure that transition plans clearly articulated the potential roles of these organizations.¹⁸

B. Discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter

In 2021, at meetings and open videoconferences, Council members and other participants discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security in connection with a wide variety of thematic items, including “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”,¹⁹ “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”,²⁰ “Children and armed conflict”,²¹ “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,²² “Maintenance of international peace and security”,²³ “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”,²⁴ “Small arms”,²⁵ “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,²⁶ “United Nations peacekeeping operations”²⁷ and “Women and

¹⁷ Resolution 2589 (2021), para. 7.

¹⁸ Resolution 2594 (2021), para. 12.

¹⁹ See S/2021/256.

²⁰ See S/2021/66, S/2021/394, S/PV.8792 and S/2021/941.

²¹ See S/2021/617.

²² See S/PV.8798 and S/2021/572.

²³ See S/2021/24, S/2021/198, S/2021/250, S/2021/346, S/2021/456, S/2021/621, S/2021/722, S/PV.8850, S/2021/815, S/PV.8900, S/PV.8906, S/2021/952, S/PV.8923 and S/2021/1026.

²⁴ See S/PV.8877 and S/2021/868.

²⁵ See S/PV.8874 and S/PV.8909.

²⁶ See S/2021/48.

²⁷ See S/2021/501, S/PV.8851, S/2021/783 and S/PV.8901.

¹² Ibid., fifteenth paragraph.

¹³ Ibid., twenty-ninth paragraph.

¹⁴ S/PRST/2021/8, ninth paragraph.

¹⁵ Resolution 2616 (2021), twelfth preambular paragraph.

¹⁶ S/PRST/2021/11, twelfth paragraph.

peace and security”.²⁸ Discussions held in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” highlighted the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in addressing challenges to peace and security in fragile contexts (see case 1). Discussions held in relation to the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” served to highlight ways of strengthening cooperation with the League of Arab States to jointly address challenges to international peace and security in the Arab region (see case 2), the overall importance of Chapter VIII of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security and ways to enhance partnerships with regional and subregional organizations (see case 3) and cooperation with the African Union and regional economic communities in Africa (see case 4).

Case 1 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 6 January 2021, at the initiative of Tunisia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,²⁹ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”³⁰ focused on the challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts. Council members heard a briefing by the Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

Noting that the linkages between conflict and fragility were particularly visible on the African continent, the Secretary-General stated that the United Nations-African Union joint frameworks on peace and security and sustainable development had been key instruments to prevent and sustainably resolve conflicts in Africa, as well as to strengthen the resilience of States to withstand threats. He recalled that the United Nations had worked closely with the African Union and regional economic communities to address various trends in the Great Lakes and Central African regions, such as limited State authority, the continued presence and activities of armed groups, human rights violations, the illicit exploitation of natural resources and unemployment, which continued to drive instability. The Secretary-General highlighted the commitment of

the United Nations to support Agenda 2063 of the African Union and the establishment of a joint United Nations-African Union group on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063. In addition, noting that African member States had heeded the calls of the international community to respond to major crises with significant regional and global implications, he underscored that African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations required predictable, flexible and sustained financing through assessed contributions, and called on the Council to finalize its discussion on this matter.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission stated that the United Nations-African Union partnership focused on the necessary consultation and strategic mobilization process with a view to eradicating the root causes of the fragility that many African States faced in order to provide appropriate, coherent and decisive responses to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa. He added that the close consultations between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union sought to promote that objective, and that such consultations increased the common understanding of the challenges faced by the African continent and enhanced response mechanisms, including through preventive diplomacy.

In their statements, members and non-members of the Council discussed the advantages of cooperation between the United Nations, including the Council, with the African Union and other regional organizations in addressing peace and security challenges in fragile contexts, particularly in Africa. In this regard, the President of Tunisia stated that, while his country highly appreciated the important role that the African Union and subregional organizations had been playing to overcome fragility, including through the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative, the United Nations, with its broad institutional framework and responsibilities, remained a key actor in addressing the root causes of insecurity, violence and conflict in an effective and efficient way. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam underlined the need to utilize the role of regional organizations within the global governance system and promote cross-regional cooperation in the development and implementation of measures to address fragility. The Foreign Secretary of India stressed that the Council should remain respectful of the regional approach adopted by countries, in collaboration with regional organizations, to address common challenges. The representative of Belgium noted that regional organizations were important

²⁸ See [S/2021/375](#), [S/PV.8886](#) and [S/2021/886](#).

²⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 28 December ([S/2020/1296](#)).

³⁰ See [S/2021/24](#).

partners, especially in Africa, where many countries were affected by fragility and conflict. He stressed that the Council should remain alert to all early warning signs and expressed support for the Council to regularly receive ad hoc briefings by the Secretariat outlining the risks of certain countries and regions triggering or exacerbating the root causes of fragility, conflict or humanitarian crises, while taking into account elements of conflict sensitivity. He also added that this did not necessarily mean that the Council or the United Nations must take action themselves, and that other actors, such as regional or subregional organizations, could be more relevant.

The delegation of Egypt underlined that partnerships with regional and subregional organizations remained key to advancing complementarities and leveraging the comparative advantage of each organization in support of countries in states of fragility. It was the opinion of Egypt that the African Union-United Nations strategic partnership was of the utmost importance to ensuring better strategic, policy and operational coordination and coherence of efforts, including through capacity-building and financing. Similarly, the delegation of Italy stressed that partnership was a crucial element in allowing the United Nations to be more effective in managing drivers of fragility, especially in Africa. The delegation of South Africa stated that in situations of fragility, partnerships among relevant stakeholders in preventing conflicts and among the relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations and regional and subregional bodies must be harnessed and strengthened, including through closer cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. The delegation also emphasized the need to strengthen the cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission and the African Union Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. The Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines underscored the need to leverage with greater frequency the strategic advisory capacity and convening platform of the Peacebuilding Commission to mobilize multilateral partners, including regional and subregional organizations, so as to assist Member States in building institutions, strengthening capacities and addressing the challenges of fragility. Noting that changing weather patterns could contribute to fragility and drive conflict, the Minister of State for European Affairs of Ireland stated that early action to address climate change required improving coherence across the United Nations system, from the Council to the Peacebuilding Commission and United Nations country teams, as well as with regional organizations.

Case 2

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 18 January 2021, at the initiative of Tunisia, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,³¹ Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”³² on cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States. At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

In her remarks, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs stated that the close cooperation between the United Nations, including its special envoys and representatives, and the League of Arab States had been crucial in augmenting efforts to address various situations in the Arab world. She stressed the critical role of the Council in amplifying the collective efforts of the United Nations and the League in the region. She looked to the Council, as a principal steward of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to continue to support the collaborative work of the two organizations to promote peace and prosperity in the region.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members exchanged views on the country-specific and cross-border challenges to international peace and security in the Arab region that the United Nations and the League of Arab States needed to address jointly, as well how to enhance their cooperation under Chapter VIII of the Charter. In this regard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia said that strengthening and promoting cooperation between the United Nations and the League helped to enhance the common understanding of the deepest causes of the crises in the Arab region, and allowed existing conflicts to be comprehensively and permanently settled and their causes to be effectively addressed, which thereby enhanced the role of preventive diplomacy as a mechanism for maintaining international peace and security. He added that this cooperation should be strengthened in order to address shared challenges, particularly terrorism and violent extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, matters

³¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 December (S/2020/1316).

³² See S/2021/66.

related to illegal migration and the repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). The representative of Estonia encouraged United Nations agencies to seek ways to enhance coordination with the League in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, climate change and ensuring accountability for crimes against humanity. Welcoming the establishment of the United Nations liaison office to the League of Arab States, the representative of France stated that its work should further enhance concrete cooperation initiatives, particularly with regard to conflict prevention and the promotion of United Nations values in the League's member States.

The delegation of India stated that there must be greater policy synergy between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and that any United Nations peace initiative in West Asia and North Africa should take into consideration the League and other relevant stakeholders so that a unity of purpose and character could be reached through common solutions. The delegation suggested that the engagement between the two organizations focus on peacebuilding and development, especially in post-conflict scenarios. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the COVID-19 pandemic had compounded the already difficult socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in a number of Arab countries, which called for enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and the League in countering new challenges, peacekeeping and jointly preventing the escalation of conflicts in the region. Expressing the view that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should aim at upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter, especially the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference, the representative of Viet Nam stated that the Council and the League could strengthen their cooperation on the basis of regional visions and values.

In terms of specific proposals on ways to strengthen cooperation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia proposed a regular exchange of views on the current affairs in the Arab region, including through, among other formats, regular meetings between the representatives of the Secretary-General in the region and the Council of the League, and the holding of an extraordinary meeting of the Security Council at the leadership level, with the participation of the leaders of the Arab Summit Troika and the Secretary-General of the League on the margins of the General Assembly. The representative of Estonia, in addition to calling for ongoing dialogue between the respective envoys of the United Nations

and the League of Arab States, called for the exchange of relevant information and joint action to address the underlying causes of conflict. The representative of France recalled his country's proposal to hold an annual meeting of the Security Council to address issues of common concern, which would be attended by the relevant special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General and a representative of the League.

Given the significant number of issues that the Council was seized with from all over Africa and the Arab world, the representative of Kenya believed that a trilateral consultative exchange among the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Security Council could contribute to a more effective partnership and could yield even greater reach and capability in delivering the peace that the people of the League and African States craved. Such a trilateral approach could also have increased momentum in the various situations in Africa, including in Libya, the Sudan and Somalia, and with regard to counter-terrorism initiatives and operations in the Horn of Africa, the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel, as well as help to promote collective and coordinated measures to secure the maritime domain, especially in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates recommended more formal and informal consultations and meetings between the Council and members of the League, and stressed the need for this cooperation to include all stages of early warning about crises and be given high priority to prevent the onset of further crises, and include the development of ways to exchange information between the two bodies and build capacity in the area of preventive diplomacy.

Case 3 Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 19 April 2021, at the initiative of Viet Nam, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,³³ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security".³⁴ Council members heard a briefing by the Secretary-General and the former Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon.

³³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 25 March (S/2021/297).

³⁴ See S/2021/394.

In his briefing, the Secretary-General noted that cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations had grown exponentially since 1945 and encompassed preventive diplomacy, mediation, counter-terrorism, the prevention of violent extremism, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, promoting human rights, advancing the women and peace and security agenda, combating climate change and, since 2020, the response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. He underlined that the investment of the United Nations and regional organizations in institutionalizing partnerships had translated into more effective engagements before, during and after crises, with concrete operational results. The Secretary-General further underlined that strengthening such partnerships was an integral part of his vision for a networked multilateralism.

In his remarks, former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underlined that, against the backdrop of a plethora of monumental challenges faced by the international community, the role of cooperative partnerships between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, as envisioned under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, was all the more critical to helping to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. The former Secretary-General noted that as the COVID-19 pandemic continued, it was more important than ever to pursue multilateral and multi-layered solutions to security problems, borne out of robust partnerships with the United Nations, its Member States and, particularly, regional organizations, all working together. Moreover, as regional conflicts continued to both emerge and deepen, the United Nations could no longer deal with all these crises alone and the partnership approach could best bear fruit for both conflict prevention and resolution.

Following the briefings, members and non-members of the Council discussed the various aspects of and ways to strengthen the cooperation between the Council and regional and subregional organizations within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter. In that regard, several speakers³⁵ emphasized the importance of cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security and preventing and resolving conflicts. The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations was an inalienable part of the agenda of the Council. The representative of Liechtenstein underlined that the

effective work of and cooperation with regional organizations was essential to the Council's effectiveness. The representative of the Republic of Korea noted that given the intertwined and complex nature of global crises, the United Nations needed to forge more effective and stronger partnerships with regional and subregional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

A number of delegations³⁶ discussed the comparative advantages of regional and subregional organizations as the basis for their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Special Representative of President Xi Jinping, State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China expressed the opinion that the United Nations and the Council should play a useful overall coordination role and provide more assistance to regional organizations, which in turn could leverage their own advantages and help resolve regional disputes in a manner that was suited to regional realities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico recognized that, owing to their familiarity with the realities of their respective geographical areas and their experience and knowledge of local dynamics, regional organizations must be a first instance for prevention and for attention to potential conflicts and crises that could spill over a country's borders. The delegation of Malta affirmed that the local know-how and expertise of regional organizations could assist the work of the Council in conflict prevention and resolution through the regional promotion of confidence-building measures.

Speakers reflected on the complementary roles of the Council and regional and subregional organizations and the principle of subsidiarity as provided under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Some³⁷ underlined that, while the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security remained with the Council, regional and subregional organizations also had a role in that regard under Chapter VIII. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view that the Council could neither disregard the potential of regional arrangements in conflict prevention and resolution, nor could such arrangements substitute for the Council, adding that resorting to regional organizations must be considered

³⁵ India, Ireland, Argentina, Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein and Ukraine.

³⁶ Viet Nam, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, India, Ireland, Mexico, Tunisia, Norway, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, European Union, Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, International Organization of la Francophonie, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malta, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda and Ukraine.

³⁷ Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and South Africa.

as a subsidiary and complementary means for the Council in discharging its Charter-based duties. The representative added that all regional arrangements or agencies that intended to undertake activities authorized under Chapter VIII must act in full conformity with the Charter, strictly observe the principle of transparency and seriously avoid politicization and selective approaches. The Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia of the United Kingdom said that if and when national and regional efforts failed, it was the Council that had the primary responsibility to ensure international peace and security, and that when prevention failed or there was no regional consensus, it was the Council that should lead the international community. Similarly, the representative of Pakistan expressed the opinion that regional and subregional organizations in certain parts of the world had been either ineffective or unable to play any meaningful role towards resolving long-lasting and festering disputes as well as situations of foreign occupation and that, under such circumstances, the Council must discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by resolving such conflicts.

On the other hand, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that the Council was required to always lend its full support and encouragement to all regional mechanisms and refrain from any actions that could circumvent or undermine the legitimate role of regional bodies. The representative of South Africa stated that his country subscribed to the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity in addressing eruptions of conflict, further stressing that it was of paramount importance that the relevant regions were afforded an opportunity, in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter, to participate adequately in addressing conflict situations in their regions. The Permanent Observer of the African Union said that the lack of clarity on how to operationalize the principles of non-interference and subsidiarity continued to inhibit the African Union's ability to respond to and intervene in emerging crises across the continent, as Member States continued to invoke the principle of non-interference, limiting the ability of the African Union to address or prevent conflicts in a timely manner. The principle of subsidiarity, on the other hand, recognized the primacy of regional organizations in leading interventions in Member States. She added that the continued lack of clarity around these two principles had posed a critical challenge to coordination among the United Nations, the African Union and regional mechanisms. The representative of Ethiopia stated that, in responding to challenges, the

international community must always be guided by the Charter, which called for parties to resort to regional agencies or arrangements as the first step in the settlement of disputes. The representative of the Philippines stressed that one challenge for the United Nations, and particularly the Council, was knowing when to step in and when to step back, and when inputs of regional and subregional organizations should be made indispensable before any measure or resolution was put forth to that body.

Regarding specific areas and frameworks of cooperation, several speakers³⁸ discussed cooperation in the face of new challenges to international peace and security, especially the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. Regarding peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, and particularly the African Union, multiple speakers³⁹ underscored the need for adequate, sustainable and predictable funding through the United Nations. The delegation of Guatemala expressed the opinion that regional and subregional organizations could contribute to joint analysis and effective strategic planning for conducting peacekeeping missions or special political missions, allowing for strengthened coherence between their political strategies, improving coordination in peacebuilding and ensuring the coherence and the complementarity of such efforts. The delegation of Argentina recalled that both the 2015 report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations⁴⁰ and the most recent statement of commitments under the Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping initiative highlighted the need to continue improving collaboration, planning and coordination among the United Nations peace operations and those of regional and subregional entities that were authorized by the Council under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter and were present in the same theatres.⁴¹ The representative of the Niger emphasized the need for harmonizing agendas through more regular meetings, so as to establish effective and permanent coordination. The representative of Peru stressed the need for detailed information-sharing among the various entities of the United Nations system and regional and subregional organizations, and horizon-scanning through, for example, the preparation of joint reports by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and relevant regional and subregional organizations.

³⁸ Viet Nam, Mexico, Tunisia, Norway, Niger, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Peru, Poland, Portugal and Republic of Korea.

³⁹ Kenya, China, Niger, African Union, Ethiopia, Italy and Pakistan.

⁴⁰ See [S/2015/446](#).

⁴¹ See [S/2021/394](#).

Several speakers⁴² highlighted the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission in support of effective cooperation with regional organizations.

In addition, participants also highlighted the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security of specific regional arrangements, including their engagement with the United Nations and the Council. For example, the representative of Ethiopia urged closer collaboration and strategic dialogue, partnerships and more regular exchanges of views at the working level between the United Nations and the African Union in order to strengthen preventive diplomacy capacities. He added that Ethiopia had taken note of continued progress with regard to the annual consultative meeting with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, more regular exchanges of information, enhanced consultations on mandates and mandate renewals and greater collaboration between the Secretariat and the African Union Commission, including joint field visits by senior officials. Focusing on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), several speakers⁴³ discussed its efforts to resolve the situation in Myanmar, including in collaboration with the United Nations. Speakers⁴⁴ also discussed the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the United Nations (2021–2025), with the representative of Switzerland welcoming the enhanced cooperation on confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy that was provided for in the Plan. Concerning the League of Arab States, its Secretary-General invited the Council and other relevant United Nations agencies to establish strategic working partnerships with the League and its member States to lay the foundations for security, stability and sustainable development in the Arab region, given the fundamental understanding by the League of the problems that afflicted the region and the United Nations system's fundamental responsibilities with respect to peacekeeping and international security. Furthermore, the representative of Pakistan recalled that General Assembly resolution 75/16 requested the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to continue to cooperate in their common search for solutions to global problems, such as questions relating to international peace and security, and disarmament and self-determination.

⁴² Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Egypt, Peru, Republic of Korea and Romania.

⁴³ United Kingdom, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Republic of Korea and Switzerland.

⁴⁴ Brunei Darussalam, Australia, Philippines and Switzerland.

Case 4 Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 28 October 2021, at the initiative of Kenya, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month,⁴⁵ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”⁴⁶ focusing on cooperation with the African Union. Council members heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General and the High Representative for the Peace Fund of the African Union.⁴⁷

Addressing Council members in his capacity as the Chairperson of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the President of Ghana expressed the hope that solidarity would be renewed within the Council with regard to addressing the gaps in cooperation between the United Nations and the continental and regional arrangements in Africa.⁴⁸ In this context, he suggested regular consultations between the United Nations and the African Union and its organs, such as the Peace and Security Council, as well as with regional economic communities such as ECOWAS, which provided an important framework for bridging differences in the conceptual understanding of the security challenges on the continent, and for improving a harmonized understanding of the responses required to address such challenges. While acknowledging the laudable collaboration between ECOWAS and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, he suggested that more was required and more could be done if greater solidarity were shown in putting resources towards the agenda of conflict prevention. He further suggested that the cooperation between the United Nations and Africa must be a steady effort towards resolving the root causes of those conflicts, within the context of sustaining peace, and encompassing programmes

⁴⁵ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 18 October (S/2021/887).

⁴⁶ See S/2021/941.

⁴⁷ Ibid. The statement of the High Representative for the Peace Fund was not included in the letter of the President of the Council compiling all statements. For further details on the working methods developed during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic relating to the documentation of the Council, see part II, as well as *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁴⁸ See S/2021/941.

aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflicts.

In their statements, Council members discussed the complementary roles of the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations in addressing international peace and security challenges in Africa. In this regard, the representative of France underlined that the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union was an essential tool for ensuring peace and security on the African continent in accordance with the principles outlined in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Several Council members⁴⁹ highlighted the comparative advantages of the African Union and its subregional organizations. For example, the President of Tunisia stated that the familiarity of the African Union, African organizations and regional economic groups with African realities, and their ability to handle its specificities, perhaps gave them a preferential advantage when it came to assuming greater responsibilities in this area.

Council members⁵⁰ further called for and outlined various ways of strengthening the cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations in Africa. The President of Tunisia said that stepping up cooperation, partnership and complementarity between the United Nations and the African Union to manage conflicts and push forward their settlement through new mechanisms and ideas should be a strategic priority, as it could be an effective tool for meeting challenges to peace and security throughout Africa and mitigating their repercussions for the rest of the world. He expressed satisfaction with the development of consultation mechanisms between the United Nations and the African Union, including the periodic meetings between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and stressed the need to raise the level of that coordination to bring about a quantum leap in cooperative relations to higher levels of integration and role-sharing in managing conflicts and addressing their underlying causes. The President of Tunisia further expressed his belief that reinforcing coordination between the special envoys of the Secretary-General and the African Union would create more effective tools for mediating and promoting the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Security, Legal Affairs and Information of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines underscored the need to further broaden the

strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union with the systematic engagement of various subregional organizations and mechanisms on the African continent. The President of Viet Nam affirmed that the United Nations and the African Union needed to be the vanguards in jointly implementing the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative, Agenda 2063 of the African Union and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In addition, with respect to addressing the root causes of conflict, the President of Tunisia called for a comprehensive approach to peace that addressed not only the security aspect but also the developmental, social and environmental dimensions, in line with the two agendas of the two organizations. Several Council members⁵¹ also specifically discussed the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in relation to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

Regarding cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the President of Viet Nam stated that the strategic partnership between them needed to be promoted in a comprehensive and effective manner, particularly with regard to enhancing the early warning capacity of traditional and non-traditional security risks for peacekeeping missions in Africa. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Security, Legal Affairs and Information of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines noted that joint institutional engagement between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union should be pursued, in a consultative and pragmatic fashion, to address emerging and consequential challenges such as climate change and environmental degradation, while other areas for coordinated action included mine action, terrorism, piracy and organized crime. The Prime Minister of Norway said that it was a shared responsibility to strengthen the cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and recommended that they meet on a more regular basis, carry out more joint visits and that the Security Council invite representatives from the African Union and the regional economic communities to provide more frequent briefings. The representative of India observed that the African members of the Security Council could play an important role in resolving the issues that divide the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and underlined the importance of re-energizing and strengthening liaison mechanisms.

In relation to African-led peacekeeping operations, the President of Kenya underscored that the missions of both the United Nations and the African Union were

⁴⁹ Tunisia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and China.

⁵⁰ Kenya, Tunisia, Viet Nam, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, Ireland, United Kingdom, Estonia, China and France.

⁵¹ Norway, China, France and Mexico.

increasingly contending with sophisticated international terrorist groups, in addition to overseeing peace agreements, and needed greater military capacity and resources to respond effectively to the complex environment they faced. Effective peacekeeping, according to the President, required better alignment between the African-led first responders to terrorist groups and United Nations peacekeeping missions. In this context, multiple Council members⁵² underscored the need for adequate, sustainable and predictable funding for African-led missions, with the Presidents of Kenya and Tunisia and the

representatives of India and France specifically calling for the use of United Nations-assessed contributions for this purpose. The representative of the Russian Federation called instead for the use of funds from the Peace Fund of the African Union. The representative of Ireland stressed the need to deepen and strengthen cooperation between the two organizations to ensure that mission transitions took place in a responsible, coordinated and graduated manner, were responsive to the needs on the ground and respected human rights, in line with Security Council resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#).⁵³

⁵² Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, China and France.

⁵³ For further details on the adoption of resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), see part I, sect. 22.

II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

Note

Section II deals with recognition by the Council of the efforts by regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of local disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes, and subsection B covers discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 52 of the Charter in any of its decisions. The Council, however, acknowledged and expressed support for the engagement of regional and subregional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, resolution and sustaining peace, as well as the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and transitions, reconciliation processes and addressing the root causes of conflict. The Council did so in relation to a wide variety of items on its agenda, as featured in more detail in table 2. The decisions are organized in alphabetical order by item.

Table 2

Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2021/10 19 May 2021	Twenty-seventh paragraph	African Union
	S/PRST/2021/18 15 September 2021	Third, fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs	African Union
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2566 (2021) 12 March 2021	Seventh preambular paragraph	ECCAS, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
	Resolution 2605 (2021) 12 November 2021	Sixth and twelfth preambular paragraphs and para. 5	African Union, ECCAS, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021) 20 December 2021	Sixth preambular paragraph and para. 14	African Union, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, SADC
The situation in the Great Lakes region	S/PRST/2021/19 20 October 2021	Third paragraph	African Union, ECCAS, East African Community, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, SADC
The question concerning Haiti	S/PRST/2021/7 24 March 2021	Tenth paragraph	CARICOM, OAS
The situation in Libya	S/PRST/2021/12 15 July 2021	Seventh paragraph	African Union, European Union, LAS
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021) 29 June 2021	Eleventh and twelfth preambular paragraphs	ECOWAS
	Resolution 2590 (2021) 30 August 2021	Fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs	African Union, ECOWAS
The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2564 (2021) 25 February 2021	Para. 1	Gulf Cooperation Council
The situation in Myanmar	S/PRST/2021/5 10 March 2021	Fourth paragraph	ASEAN
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Sixth preambular paragraph and paras. 19 and 20	African Union, IGAD
	Resolution 2575 (2021) 11 May 2021	Fourth preambular paragraph	African Union
	Resolution 2577 (2021) 28 May 2021	Third preambular paragraph	IGAD
	S/PRST/2021/20 27 October 2021	Sixth paragraph	African Union, IGAD
	Resolution 2609 (2021) 15 December 2021	Fifth preambular paragraph and paras. 12, 20, 23 and 34	African Union
Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3 3 February 2021	Seventh and fourteenth paragraphs	African Union, ECOWAS, Group of Five for the Sahel
	S/PRST/2021/16 17 August 2021	Sixth, ninth and tenth paragraphs	African Union, ECCAS, ECOWAS

Abbreviations: ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations; CARICOM, Caribbean Community; ECCAS, Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS, Economic Community of West African States; IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development; LAS, League of Arab States; OAS, Organization of American States; SADC, Southern African Development Community.

B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the discussions among Council members, in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, focused on the good

offices and mediation efforts of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in the Central African Republic in support of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, and the engagement of the African Union and ECCAS in support of the transition process in Chad following the

death of its President, Idriss Déby Itno.⁵⁴ In relation to the Sudan and South Sudan, Council members discussed the role of the African Union in efforts to resolve the final status of the Abyei Area,⁵⁵ the work of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in support of the political transition in the Sudan,⁵⁶ and the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.⁵⁷ Discussions further highlighted the role of the African Union, the European Union and the League of Arab States in stabilizing Libya,⁵⁸ and the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo.⁵⁹ In addition, discussions in the Council also addressed the contribution of the African Union and the regional economic communities to Africa's recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for cooperation between regional and subregional organizations and the United Nations in relation to mediation and peacebuilding efforts.⁶⁰

Discussions among members and non-members of the Council covered the role of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in support of the political transition in Mali (see case 5), the engagement of the African Union and IGAD to end the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (see case 6) and the negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan under the auspices of the African Union to resolve the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (see case 7).

Case 5 **The situation in Mali**

At a meeting held on 14 June 2021, under the item entitled "The situation in Mali",⁶¹ the Security Council heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on the events in that country following the overthrow of the President and Prime Minister of the transitional Government on 24 May 2021. The Special Representative recalled that the coup had been condemned by the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and by the Peace and

Security Council of the African Union, and that both organizations suspended Mali from their respective memberships. ECOWAS had further reaffirmed the need to respect the transition time frame, including the date set for the presidential elections on 27 February 2022, and had called for the immediate appointment of a civilian Prime Minister. The Special Representative noted that the ECOWAS mediator, the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, had been actively involved in efforts to ensure the implementation of the decisions that had been taken, with the support of the local follow-up committee, of which MINUSMA was a member.

During the ensuing discussion, several Council members⁶² expressed support and commended the mediation efforts of ECOWAS and the African Union. The representative of the United States expressed support for the establishment by ECOWAS of a mechanism to monitor compliance with the transition period and the holding of presidential elections on 27 February 2022, and for the ECOWAS statement issued following its extraordinary summit on 30 May 2021, which called for the immediate release of detainees and those that were under house arrest, strict adherence to the transition period of 18 months and the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister and an inclusive Government, as well as for the transitional President, Vice-President and Prime Minister not to be candidates in the presidential election under any circumstances. The representative of the United Kingdom said that her country condemned the coup and stood ready to support the efforts of ECOWAS and the United Nations to ensure compliance with ECOWAS conditions, make progress towards elections and help ensure that human rights were protected and promoted and that the rule of law was upheld. The representative of Mexico urged regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, to exert their utmost influence on the new authorities in order to avoid further setbacks in the transition process and in the implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The representative of France recognized that the mediation efforts of ECOWAS had seen some progress, in particular the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister and the formation of a Government. Speaking on behalf of Kenya, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of the Niger expressed support for the recommendations and decisions taken at the ECOWAS summit, but added that those decisions, particularly the imposition of

⁵⁴ See [S/2021/76](#), [S/2021/187](#), [S/PV.8787](#), [S/PV.8802](#), [S/PV.8882](#) and [S/PV.8933](#).

⁵⁵ See [S/2021/408](#) and [S/PV.8887](#).

⁵⁶ See [S/2021/246](#), [S/2021/495](#), [S/PV.8857](#) and [S/PV.8925](#).

⁵⁷ See [S/2021/219](#), [S/PV.8801](#), [S/PV.8859](#) and [S/PV.8931](#).

⁵⁸ See [S/2021/292](#), [S/2021/498](#), [S/PV.8820](#) and [S/PV.8912](#).

⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8880](#).

⁶⁰ See [S/2021/490](#).

⁶¹ See [S/PV.8794](#).

⁶² France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United States, Ireland, Norway, Russian Federation, India, Viet Nam and Estonia.

sanctions, must not aggravate the situation in Mali or jeopardize the achievements of the fight against terrorism in the region.

At a meeting held on 20 October under the same item,⁶³ the representative of Ireland underscored the need for the Council to work closely with the African Union and ECOWAS to achieve progress on the political transition and a return to constitutional order. The representative of the United Kingdom underlined the need for the Council to keep the developments in Mali under close review, in the hope that the transitional authorities would deliver the timely return to constitutional rule promised to ECOWAS and to the Council, and reiterated the need to follow ECOWAS should they fail to do so. The representative of India stressed that the mediation and good offices role of regional and subregional organizations in Africa remained vital in resolving armed conflicts, political impasses and helping the countries in their political transitions, and urged the Malian transitional authorities to cooperate with ECOWAS.

Case 6 **Peace and security in Africa**

At a meeting held on 8 July 2021 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,⁶⁴ the Security Council discussed the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa and the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme. Following the briefers, reading out a statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on behalf of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chairperson of the African Union, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo noted that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which had the aim of increasing the energy supply of Ethiopia, was causing issues for its immediate neighbours, namely the Sudan and Egypt. As it held the chairpersonship of the African Union in 2021 and 2022, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had taken a series of diplomatic initiatives at the highest level which allowed for the sharing of information on the best ways to resume negotiations on an agreement that took into account the interests of all parties. He recalled that, to assist in the facilitation efforts, the Council had invited the representatives of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan to continue discussions under the auspices of the African

Union and mediation by its Chairperson, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and the Charter of the United Nations. He called on the Council, whose primary role in resolving international disputes was undisputable, to support the African Union and assist the facilitator in the quest for peace in the volatile area of the Horn of Africa.

In the subsequent discussion, several Council members recognized and expressed support for the good offices of the African Union, with several speakers⁶⁵ emphasizing the importance of the principle of subsidiarity as provided under Chapter VIII of the Charter. The representative of the Niger stressed the need to prioritize reaching a regional and African solution to the issue of the Dam. In addition, several speakers⁶⁶ emphasized that the African Union remained the best forum for finding a comprehensive agreement in this regard. The representative of Mexico held that, based on Chapter VIII of the Charter, it was particularly important that the international community supported the efforts of the African Union to bring the positions of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan closer together and resume negotiations, taking into account the proven capacity of that organization to seek African solutions to problems that affected the continent.

Council members also exchanged views on ways the United Nations and the Council could support the African Union-led negotiations. The representative of Tunisia said that it was important for the United Nations and the Council to support the African Union by sending a clear message on the issue, as part of cooperation and integration between the United Nations and regional organizations. The representative of the Russian Federation proposed that all the interested parties hold a round of negotiations in New York, brokered by the presidency of the African Union, which would be the best possible contribution of the Council to resolving the situation in the spirit of the shared principle of African solutions to African problems.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt expressed the view that, despite the highly appreciated good offices of two Chairpersons of the African Union, the African Union-led process had failed to yield the desired agreement and that the process, in this format, had reached an impasse. He called upon the Council to adopt the draft resolution circulated by Tunisia, the purpose of which was to relaunch negotiations according to an augmented format that retained and enhanced the leadership of the Chairperson of the

⁶³ See [S/PV.8893](#).

⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8816](#).

⁶⁵ Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Niger.

⁶⁶ United States, Estonia and Ireland.

African Union and which enabled international partners, including the United Nations, to use their expertise in the area to aid the three countries to conclude an equitable agreement. He added that the resolution was aimed at implementing and effectuating the outcomes of the two meetings of the Bureau of the African Union Assembly that were held on the matter, which instructed the parties to expeditiously finalize the text of a legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and called upon them not to take unilateral measures that could jeopardize that process. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan expressed hope that the Council would assume its responsibilities in maintaining regional peace and security in a preventive way by calling on the concerned parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the African Union. The Minister for Water, Irrigation and Energy of Ethiopia said that his country looked forward to continuing the African Union-led trilateral negotiations, and requested the Council to return the matter of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam to the able and legitimate leadership of the African Union.

Case 7 **Peace and security in Africa**

At a meeting held on 26 August 2021 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,⁶⁷ Security Council members heard a briefing by the Secretary-General on the situation in Tigray. During the subsequent discussion, the representatives of India and Mexico encouraged further progress with the regional mediation efforts of the African Union for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Most Council members⁶⁸ noted and welcomed the appointment of the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, as the High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa. The representative of Norway said that it was vital that States in the region, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union brought their full weight to bear in order to end the hostilities in Tigray and Ethiopia. She further underscored that the Council must lend all possible support to regional efforts. The representative of the United States welcomed the personal engagement of the Secretary-General and his leadership in initiating dialogue

towards a resolution of the conflict and encouraged him to work closely with the African Union and regional and international partners, with the full backing of the Council. The representative of China expressed hope that the United Nations and the African Union would strengthen their collaboration and jointly play a constructive role in promoting reconciliation among all Ethiopian parties through dialogue.

At a meeting held on 8 November 2021 under the same item,⁶⁹ the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa. In her remarks, the Under-Secretary-General noted that the Secretary-General had offered the High Representative the full support of the United Nations for his efforts to resolve the Tigray conflict. The High Representative urged the Council to call on the international community to rally behind the African Union-led process in order to ensure coherence and unity of purpose in the African Union peacemaking efforts in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia.

Following the briefings, several Council members⁷⁰ commended and expressed support for the mediation efforts of the High Representative. Several Council members⁷¹ called on the parties to the conflict to cooperate with the High Representative. The representative of India called upon all stakeholders to purposefully take the opportunity that was provided by the mediation efforts of the High Representative and underlined that it was important that regional initiatives led by the African Union be encouraged and actively supported by the Council. The representative of China said that the international community, and the Council in particular, should give the time and space needed for the African Union and others to make use of their good offices. The representative of Ethiopia expressed the belief that a regional solution was best-placed to support Ethiopia in getting out of the problem and that, owing to his country’s conviction to finding peaceful solutions to all disputes, it would keep engaging all well-meaning actors, the High Representative and regional leaders, and that, in the course of this process, Ethiopia hoped that it would have the understanding of the Council and its membership.

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8843](#).

⁶⁸ Ireland, France, Norway, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, China, Mexico and Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).

⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8899](#).

⁷⁰ Tunisia, France, India and Estonia.

⁷¹ India, United States and Mexico.

III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Note

Section III describes the practice of the Council in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter in the area of peacekeeping. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, and subsection B covers discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and is organized into three separate subheadings covering peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and authorized by the Council, other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and other regional missions and security forces.

1. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements authorized by the Security Council

In 2021, the Council renewed the authorization of two peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely, the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea),⁷² and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁷³ The Council also modified the mandate of AMISOM, as detailed below. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Kosovo Force, established by resolution 1244 (1999), continued to operate, and no decisions were taken with respect to its mandate.⁷⁴ Concerning the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was terminated on 31 December 2020, the

Council recognized in 2021 the progress made in the mission's drawdown in resolution 2579 (2021),⁷⁵ as well as the progress achieved in Darfur since its deployment in 2007 in a presidential statement.⁷⁶ An assessment of lessons learned from the mission's experience was circulated to the Council at the end of 2021, as requested in resolution 2559 (2020).⁷⁷

African Union Mission in Somalia

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions 2563 (2021) of 25 February, 2568 (2021) of 12 March, 2592 (2021) of 30 August, 2607 (2021) of 15 November and 2614 (2021)⁷⁸ of 21 December addressing the mandate and reconfiguration of AMISOM. In resolution 2563 (2021), the Council authorized the member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM for a period of two weeks, until 14 March 2021, without any changes to the mandate as set out in resolution 2520 (2020).⁷⁹

In terms of composition, in resolution 2568 (2021), the Council authorized the member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of 19,626 uniformed AMISOM personnel until 31 December 2021, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel, including five Formed Police Units, as well as 70 civilian personnel supported by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia to conduct tasks in line with the Somalia Transition Plan and the phased handover of security to Somali security forces commencing in 2021.⁸⁰

Concerning its mandate, the Council authorized AMISOM to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate and largely maintained the Mission's strategic objectives.⁸¹ In the resolution, the Council specifically requested AMISOM to: (a) reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and armed opposition groups with a view to enabling a stable, federal,

⁷² Resolution 2604 (2021), para. 1. In addition to the authorization of EUFOR-Althea, the Council renewed its authorization provided by paragraph 11 of resolution 2183 (2014) to maintain a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of a NATO headquarters (see resolution 2604 (2021), para. 2).

⁷³ Resolutions 2563 (2021) and 2614 (2021), para. 1, and resolution 2568 (2021), para. 10.

⁷⁴ For more information on the international security presence in Kosovo, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1996–1999*, chapter VIII, sect. F.

⁷⁵ Resolution 2579 (2021), eighteenth preambular paragraph. For information on the history and mandate of UNAMID, see previous supplements covering the period 2007–2019.

⁷⁶ See S/PRST/2021/14, first paragraph.

⁷⁷ Ibid., second and third paragraphs. See also letter dated 28 December from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, submitting the lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID (S/2021/1099).

⁷⁸ Resolution 2614 (2021), para. 1, extended the mandate of AMISOM until 31 March 2022.

⁷⁹ Resolution 2563 (2021), para. 1. See also resolution 2520 (2020), paras. 11 and 12.

⁸⁰ Resolution 2568 (2021), para. 10.

⁸¹ Ibid., paras. 11–12.

sovereign and united Somalia; (b) actively support the transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, through training and mentoring, by facilitating the handover of responsibility for security functions from AMISOM to Somali authorities in liberated areas and by conducting jointly planned and agreed operations with the Somali security forces with increasing emphasis on the operations being Somali-led; and (c) assist the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states and Somali security forces in providing security for the political process at all levels, including stabilization efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding, and by providing relevant support to Somali police and civilian authorities.⁸² The Council modified the functions of AMISOM in support of the strategic objectives by requesting the Mission to work towards the operational timetables and objectives identified within the Somalia Transition Plan, conduct jointly planned integrated operations with the Somali security forces to secure and recover areas from Al-Shabaab and allow for the transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces in these areas when appropriate; realign AMISOM sectors with the boundaries of the federal member states by the end of 2021; and provide mobile capabilities, assisting the posture of the Somali security forces to become more offensive.⁸³ Furthermore, the Council welcomed the envisaged reconfiguration of AMISOM from the beginning of 2022 to focus on enabling and supporting the Somali security forces and the protection of the United Nations in Somalia, and authorized the Mission to commence initial work to do so.⁸⁴

Regarding the way forward, the Council recognized the need for a reconfigured African Union mission from the beginning of 2022, and took note of the request of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to enable the African Union Commission to finalize its independent assessment, to be reported in May 2021.⁸⁵ The Council urged the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to mandate in May 2021 an AMISOM that supported and enabled the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan and identified and implemented the necessary steps in 2021 in order to ensure continued delivery of support to Somali security efforts in 2022, including

through a reconfigured African Union mission from 2022 that would be able to better face the changing threat posed by Al-Shabaab and armed opposition groups, and was focused on supporting and enabling the Somali security forces to take primary responsibility for security.⁸⁶

The Council requested the Secretary-General, jointly with the African Union and in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and donors, to produce a proposal on the strategic objectives, size and composition of a reconfigured African Union mission by the end of September 2021.⁸⁷ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to present options for continuing United Nations logistical support from 2022, to include continued United Nations support for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and to the Somali security forces alongside a reconfigured African Union mission, for consideration by the Council by the end of October 2021.⁸⁸ Furthermore, underlining the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and under the Council's authority, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council encouraged the Secretary-General, the African Union and Member States to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for AMISOM, bearing in mind the full range of options available to the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and to other partners, and considering the limitations of voluntary funding, in order to establish secure future funding arrangements for AMISOM.⁸⁹

In resolution 2592 (2021), the Council took note of the publication of the United Nations-mandated independent assessment in January 2021, and anticipated the publication of the African Union-mandated independent assessment.⁹⁰ In resolution 2607 (2021), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the mandate of AMISOM to support the implementation of the sanctions measures on Somalia and the work of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.⁹¹ Finally, in resolution 2614 (2021), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended

⁸² Ibid., para. 12.

⁸³ Ibid., para. 13 (a), (c)–(e) and (g).

⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 13 (k).

⁸⁵ Ibid., paras. 2 and 7. See also letter dated 2 November from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council transmitting the report of the independent assessment team on the engagement of the African Union in and with Somalia post-2021 (S/2021/922).

⁸⁶ Resolution 2568 (2021), para. 2.

⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 9. See also S/2021/858 and S/2021/859.

⁸⁸ Resolution 2568 (2021), para. 21. For more information on the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

⁸⁹ Resolution 2568 (2021), para. 25.

⁹⁰ Resolution 2592 (2021), seventeenth preambular paragraph. See also S/2021/858.

⁹¹ Resolution 2607 (2021), paras. 7, 35 and 40.

the existing mandate of AMISOM, as set out in resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), until 31 March 2022.⁹²

Operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#) of 3 November, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed its authorization of EUFOR-Althea for a period of 12 months.⁹³ The Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and stressed that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence as might be necessary.⁹⁴ The Council also authorized Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence, respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions. In addition, the Council recognized the right of EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence to take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.⁹⁵

2. Other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

In addition to AMISOM and EUFOR-Althea, the Council also referred to the role and mandates of other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the European Union training missions in the Central African Republic and Mali.

Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

In a presidential statement issued on 3 February, the Council welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel as well as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges exacerbated by terrorism and transnational organized crime in the region, including through the Joint Force of the Group of Five

for the Sahel, which continued to demonstrate increased tangible operational results.⁹⁶ In a presidential statement issued on 28 October, the Council commended the efforts and progress made by African countries, the African Union and subregional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture and, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, commended the important contribution of the Joint Force, among others.⁹⁷

In resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June, the Council welcomed the increased autonomy of the Executive Secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel and of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel as steps towards self-sufficiency, and encouraged the Group of Five for the Sahel States to ensure that the Joint Force continued to scale up its level of operation in order to demonstrate increased tangible results.⁹⁸ The Council expressed support for the support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to the Joint Force, in accordance with the conditions set out in resolutions [2391 \(2017\)](#) and [2531 \(2020\)](#) and in the technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel, through emergency evacuation of the sick or wounded and casualty evacuation, access to life-support consumables and the use of engineering plant equipment, material and enabling units.⁹⁹ The Council stressed that operational and logistical support from MINUSMA, in accordance with the conditions set out in resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#), was a temporary vital measure, and called upon the Joint Force to continue developing its own capacity to support itself.¹⁰⁰ The Council also encouraged a more robust examination of alternative support to the Joint Force with detailed and operational options of this support, and requested the Secretary-General to include these in a report to be issued no later than 30 September.¹⁰¹

The Council further requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure close coordination and information sharing, where appropriate, between MINUSMA, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and subregional organizations, including

⁹² Resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁹³ Resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For information on the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007*, chap. XII, part III.C.

⁹⁴ Resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 4. For further information on the authorization of the use of force in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.

⁹⁶ [S/PRST/2021/3](#), tenth paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2021/16](#), ninth paragraph.

⁹⁷ [S/PRST/2021/21](#), thirty-third paragraph.

⁹⁸ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 38.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 39. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁰⁰ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 40.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* See also [S/2021/850](#).

ECOWAS and the Group of Five for the Sahel, as well as to ensure adequate coordination, the exchange of information and, when applicable, support, within their respective mandates and through existing mechanisms, between MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French forces and the European Union missions in Mali.¹⁰²

European Union training missions in the Central African Republic and Mali

In resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#) of 12 November, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided that the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) included providing strategic and technical advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic to implement the national strategy on security sector reform and the national defence plan, in close coordination with, inter alia, the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic, the European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic, the African Union Observer Mission in the Central African Republic and other international partners.¹⁰³ The Council also decided that the mandate of MINUSCA included taking a leading role in supporting the Central African Republic authorities in enhancing the capacities of the Internal Security Forces, particularly its command and control structures and oversight mechanisms, and to coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training among the international partners in the Central African Republic, in particular with the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic and the European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of security sector reform.¹⁰⁴

In its resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council encouraged the European Union, notably its Special Representative for the Sahel and its European Union Training Mission in Mali and European Union capacity-building mission in Mali, to continue its efforts to support Malian authorities in security sector reform and the re-establishment of State authority and presence throughout the Malian territory.¹⁰⁵ The Council further

encouraged close coordination of these efforts with the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Force in Mali (MINUSMA) and requested the Secretary-General to enhance cooperation between MINUSMA and the European Union Training Mission in Mali and the European Union capacity-building mission in Mali, including by developing further complementarity between the missions and by exploring modalities for potential mutual support.¹⁰⁶

3. Other regional missions and security forces

In 2021, the Council also made reference in its decisions to the role and mandates of other regional missions and security forces, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique.

In a presidential statement issued on 3 February, the Council welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel as well as by the African Union and ECOWAS in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges exacerbated by terrorism and transnational organized crime in the region, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force.¹⁰⁷ In a presidential statement issued on 28 October, the Council commended the efforts and progress made by African countries, the African Union and subregional organizations in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture and, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, commended the important contribution of, inter alia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin and the SADC Mission in Mozambique.¹⁰⁸ In addition, the Council noted that the African Union was considering the establishment of a capacity within the African Standby Force as a further effort to combat terrorism in Africa, and commended the efforts by the African Union, regional economic communities and mechanisms and African member States to fully operationalize the multidimensional African Standby Force and the support of international partners in this regard.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ [S/PRST/2021/3](#), tenth paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2021/16](#), ninth paragraph.

¹⁰⁸ [S/PRST/2021/21](#), thirty-third paragraph.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., nineteenth paragraph.

¹⁰² Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 28, 32 and 41.

¹⁰³ Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 35 (d) (i). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁰⁴ Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 35 (d) (iii).

¹⁰⁵ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 44.

B. Discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, such as EUFOR-Althea,¹¹⁰ AMISOM¹¹¹ and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.¹¹² The most detailed discussions in this regard were held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” on the support of the United Nations to the counter-terrorism efforts of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (see case 8) and under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia” in relation to the reconfiguration of AMISOM after 2021 to support Somali security forces in taking over security responsibilities (see case 9).

Case 8 Peace and security in Africa

At a meeting held on 12 November 2021 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,¹¹³ the Security Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations further to the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. In his statement, the Under-Secretary-General noted the letter of the Secretary-General, dated 4 October, which presented the key findings of an assessment of the operationalization of the Joint Force and possible avenues for enhanced support carried out by the Secretariat.¹¹⁴ While noting that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) had spared no effort in support of the Joint Force within the framework of its mandate, he stated that there were limits to a support model that relied on donor financing, which was unpredictable and could not meet all of the Joint Force’s needs.¹¹⁵ The Under-Secretary-General expressed the conviction that only a dedicated support office, funded through assessed contributions, could provide the needed support. A support office, according to the Under-Secretary-General, would also provide an opportunity to scale up not only logistical and operational support, but also efforts to protect civilians, promote human rights and ensure greater coherence among military,

political and development efforts. Moreover, the Under-Secretary-General stated that a second-best option, as proposed in the letter of the Secretary-General, would be the establishment of an advisory office that would provide technical and expert assistance to the Executive Secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel in a number of cross-cutting areas, including the pooling and sharing of resources, as well as possibly assisting with efforts to strengthen institutional governance.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the representative of Chad noted that the Group of Five was a unique, relevant and beneficial initiative, emanating from the States concerned, and remained the only framework for action capable of providing the most appropriate solutions to the challenges facing the Sahel. While it was an initiative of its member States, it was also an instrument for international peace and security. The representative of Chad reiterated the call to the Council to create a support office to provide the Joint Force with sustainable, predictable and reliable funding, enabling it to focus entirely on its fundamental mission, namely, to bring security to the region in order to create a climate conducive to development.

During the discussion, Council members expressed concern regarding the security and humanitarian situation in the Sahel and underscored the importance of the mandate of the Joint Force. The representative of India stated that the operational support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force had proven insufficient and that it was therefore important that traditional peacekeeping be complemented by regional organizations to neutralize terrorist groups and entities.

Several Council members¹¹⁶ voiced their support for the proposal of the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations support office to ensure sustainable and predictable funding for the Joint Force. The representative of France stated that while the support of the European Union, African Union and West African countries to the Joint Force was substantial, it was insufficient. The United Nations had the legitimacy and capacity to provide predictable and sustainable support, including financial capacity, to organize a logistical support chain. He noted that the Secretary-General had indicated that a United Nations support office funded through assessed contributions could be operational within one year and that its cost would be limited,

¹¹⁰ See [S/2021/436](#), [S/PV.8810](#) and [S/PV.8896](#).

¹¹¹ See [S/2021/173](#), [S/2021/260](#), [S/2021/484](#), [S/PV.8779](#), [S/PV.8833](#), [S/PV.8907](#) and [S/PV.8939](#).

¹¹² See [S/2021/47](#), [S/2021/336](#), [S/PV.8794](#), [S/PV.8809](#), [S/PV.8893](#) and [S/PV.8903](#).

¹¹³ See [S/PV.8903](#). See also [S/2021/940](#).

¹¹⁴ See [S/2021/850](#).

¹¹⁵ See [S/PV.8903](#).

¹¹⁶ France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and Norway.

especially if it was decided initially to concentrate support on Force-led cross-border operations alone.

By contrast, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation had hoped that the Secretary-General, in his letter, would propose options for bilateral and multilateral support mechanisms other than just the United Nations. Furthermore, noting the fundamental concern of the United Kingdom with United Nations involvement in offensive, national counter-terrorism operations, the representative stated that his delegation did not believe that the Organization was the right vehicle to provide durable support to the Joint Force. Similarly, the representative of the United States stated that the United Nations, regardless of the mechanism, was not an appropriate vehicle to provide logistical support to the Joint Force, adding that his country looked forward to working with fellow Council members to identify additional bilateral and non-United Nations multilateral options to fill the critical gaps. Furthermore, the representative of the United States stated that the focus of the Council must remain squarely on political solutions and tying security responses to effective political strategies, including addressing problems with governance.

Other Council members¹¹⁷ underscored their willingness to hold further discussions within the Council to come up with a solution that ensured sustainable, predictable and adequate funding for the Joint Force. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that both options presented by the Secretary-General required a clear understanding of their timing and feasibility, effectiveness, the costs involved and the sources of funding.

The representative of Mexico stated that his delegation did not understand the reservations that were expressed in connection with the legitimate needs of the countries of the Group of Five for the Sahel, adding that if all terrorist acts were indeed threats to international peace and security, as was established in resolutions [1368 \(2001\)](#) and [1373 \(2001\)](#), the United Nations had a role to play in addition to bilateral efforts. The representative of India stated that for the past three years the Council had been grappling with the issue of support to regional security initiatives such as the Joint Force, and that its indecisiveness had allowed terrorist groups to expand their areas of influence.

Expressing deep concern about the attacks against civilians, including allegations of sexual violence against women and girls, reportedly

¹¹⁷ Russian Federation, India, Estonia, Ireland, China and Mexico.

committed by members of the Joint Force, the representative of Norway underlined that any support that involved the United Nations must fully comply with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy and that military operations must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Echoing this view, the representative of Ireland encouraged the Joint Force to increase efforts to gather and share information on the impact of its operations and, crucially, to differentiate national operations from those of the Joint Force. Several Council members¹¹⁸ further took note of the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in support of these efforts. The representative of Ireland stated that the greater inclusion of women, including at senior levels, could significantly enhance the effectiveness of the Joint Force's operations. The representative of Mexico argued that any Council decision concerning the Joint Force should consider the experience of MINUSMA in providing logistical support to the Joint Force so as to anticipate problems in the implementation of the Force's mandate.

Case 9 The situation in Somalia

At a meeting held on 17 November 2021 under the item entitled "The situation in Somalia",¹¹⁹ Security Council members discussed the modalities for the reconfiguration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into a new mission after 2021. In his briefing, noting that the Mission's mandate was coming to an end on 31 December 2021, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia stated that there was an absolute need for a new mission that would take over from AMISOM. To achieve that, there was a need, as a matter of urgency, to continue and conclude, in a detailed and exhaustive manner, the discussions that would shape the future mission and were relevant to its effectiveness and success.

In the discussion, speaking also on behalf of Kenya, the Niger and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of Tunisia took note of the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 7 October 2021.¹²⁰ The communiqué endorsed the report of the African Union-led independent assessment of the African

¹¹⁸ Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Ireland and United States.

¹¹⁹ See [S/PV.8907](#).

¹²⁰ See [S/2021/922](#).

Union's engagement in and with Somalia post-2021 and its first option, namely, to establish an African Union-United Nations multidimensional stabilization mission in Somalia, deployed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which would ensure predictable and sustainable multi-year financing for the future mission through United Nations-assessed contributions.¹²¹ He also said that there was a need to thoroughly address the financing challenges of any engagement of the African Union in Somalia post-2021 through the provision of adequate, sustainable and predictable financing, including access to assessed contributions. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the support for the security transition in Somalia must be both realistic and affordable and to support the progressive transition to Somali-led security. She added that the African Union-United Nations multidimensional stabilization mission model that had been endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union would not achieve that and would run counter to the idea of progressive transition to full Somali security responsibility. The representative of China said that before the Council took a decision on the post-2021 AMISOM configuration further to negotiations between Somalia, the African Union, the United Nations and other major parties, the funds needed for the operations of AMISOM must be guaranteed to avoid a security vacuum due to funding gaps. The representative of France noted the need to draw lessons from the AMISOM model and its shortcomings in terms of strategic direction and effectiveness. He also said that it was becoming urgent to find an effective, collective and sustainable solution in terms of funding.

At a meeting held on 21 December 2021,¹²² the Council adopted resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, and renewing its authorization to the members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM for a period of

three months, until 31 March 2022.¹²³ Following the adoption of the resolution, several Council members stated that they voted in favour of a three-month rollover of the mandate of AMISOM to provide additional time for an agreement on a reconfigured African Union-led mission in Somalia.¹²⁴ The representative of France welcomed the constructive approach adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in its communiqué of 7 December 2021, which confirmed the intention of the African Union to contribute to the joint report with the Secretary-General on the future of AMISOM that had been requested by the Security Council in resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#). He also said that the Council must take a decision in March 2022 to establish a reconfigured African Union mission and that, if it was prevented from doing so, this would call into question the funding of AMISOM by the European Union. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that, in resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), the Council had asked the Secretary-General to, jointly with the African Union, and in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and donors, produce a proposal on the strategic objectives, size and composition of a reconfigured African Union mission, but that more time was required to reach consensus on that proposal. She urged all stakeholders, especially the United Nations, the African Union, the Federal Government of Somalia and donors, to use the rollover period to engage in good faith to reach consensus on the way ahead. The representative of Somalia reaffirmed that the Somalia Transition Plan remained the only road map and strategic vision of his Government and the Council for a phased, conditions-based AMISOM exit strategy and recalled his country's position that it would not accept an African Union-United Nations hybrid mission, or any post-2021 security arrangements, without host State consent.

¹²³ Resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

¹²⁴ See [S/PV.8939](#) (United States, France and United Kingdom).

¹²¹ See [S/PV.8907](#).

¹²² See [S/PV.8939](#).

IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided for in Article 53 of the Charter. The present section focuses on the authorization of enforcement action by

regional and other organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations; authorizations to use force accorded by the Council to regional peacekeeping operations are covered in section III above. Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII not involving the use of force is also

covered in the present section. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements, and subsection B covers discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

In 2021, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, authorize the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

Concerning the situation in Libya, in resolution 2578 (2021), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the authorizations as set out in resolution 2526 (2020) for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to inspect vessels they had reasonable grounds to believe were carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya in order to ensure implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.¹²⁵ In resolution 2598 (2021), acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorizations to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 2240 (2015), to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya, seize those that were confirmed as being used for those purposes, and authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant smugglers or

¹²⁵ Resolution 2578 (2021), para. 1.

human traffickers in carrying out the aforementioned activities.¹²⁶

Concerning the situation in Somalia, in resolution 2608 (2021), the Council commended the efforts of the European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta and the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia.¹²⁷ In the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII, the Council decided, for a further period of three months, to renew the authorizations set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2554 (2020) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.¹²⁸

Also acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted several decisions not involving the use of force, such as requesting the support of regional and subregional organizations in implementing sanctions measures or calling for the cooperation of regional and subregional organizations with the sanctions committees and panels of experts concerning the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen, as outlined in table 3.

In addition, in connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council recognized the steps taken by the African Union to establish the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, requested the Secretary-General to continue to make available technical assistance to the African Union Commission and the Government of South Sudan in setting up the Court, and for the implementation of other aspects of chapter V of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan related to transitional justice.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Resolution 2598 (2021), para. 2.

¹²⁷ Resolution 2608 (2021), ninth preambular paragraph.

¹²⁸ Ibid., para. 14.

¹²⁹ Resolution 2567 (2021), eighteenth preambular paragraph and para. 22.

Table 3

Decisions by which the Council requested the cooperation of regional arrangements in the implementation of enforcement action

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2588 (2021) 29 July 2021	Para. 9
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Twenty-first preambular paragraph and para. 21

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>
	Resolution 2577 (2021) 28 May 2021	Para. 19
The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2564 (2021) 25 February 2021	Para. 12

B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements

In 2021, the discussions among Council members continued to address enforcement action as well as other Chapter VII measures undertaken by regional arrangements in the context of meetings and videoconferences of the Council in relation to a variety of agenda items, thematic and country- or region-specific, as described below. There was one explicit reference to Article 53 of the Charter made during a high-level open videoconference held on 19 April in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.¹³⁰ During the discussion, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that all regional arrangements or agencies that intended to undertake activities authorized under Chapter VIII of the Charter must act in full conformity with the Charter, strictly observe the principle of transparency and seriously avoid politicization and selective approaches. He stressed that such arrangements must not be abused by those members seeking to impose their will on the countries of the region concerned, both members and non-members of the regional agency concerned, adding that instead of building confidence, in practice that would lead to mistrust. He also recalled that, as stipulated in Article 53 (1) of the Charter, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies” without the authorization of the Council. Addressing the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in crisis resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that priority should be given to settling disputes by peaceful means, with any coercive measures having to be duly authorized by the Council. Similarly, the Special Representative of President Xi Jinping, State Councillor and Minister for

Foreign Affairs of China maintained that enforcement operations must be authorized by the Council.

At an open videoconference held on 13 January in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Mali”,¹³¹ the representative of the Russian Federation welcomed the fact that steps that were aimed at the restoration of constitutional rule had resulted in the lifting of the restrictions of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Mali. As Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, the representative of Mexico further expressed his delegation’s interest in maintaining close cooperation with members of the Council and in nurturing a permanent dialogue with regional organizations and neighbouring countries.¹³² Subsequently, at a meeting held on 14 June under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”,¹³³ the representative of the Niger expressed support for the recommendations and decisions taken at the extraordinary summit of ECOWAS held on 30 May 2021 following the overthrow of the President and Prime Minister of the transitional Government on 24 May 2021, but added that those decisions, particularly the imposition of sanctions, must not aggravate the situation in the country or jeopardize the achievements of the fight against terrorism in the region.

At a meeting held on 9 June under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”,¹³⁴ Council members heard the periodic briefing by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), by which the Council, acting

¹³¹ See [S/2021/47](#).

¹³² For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Mali, see part VII, sect. III.A. For more information concerning the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹³³ See [S/PV.8794](#).

¹³⁴ See [S/PV.8791](#). In 2021, the Prosecutor briefed the Council only once, departing from the practice of two briefings per year since the adoption of the resolution. For more information, see part I, sect. 7 and *Repertoire, Supplements 2004–2007 to 2020*.

¹³⁰ See [S/2021/394](#).

under Chapter VII of the Charter, referred the situation in Darfur to the Court. During the discussion, the representative of Kenya recalled the Council's invitation to the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that would facilitate the Court's work, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region under resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#).¹³⁵ She further stated that Kenya would like to hear from the Prosecutor about the status of engagement with the African Union, if any, to that end, particularly given that, under article 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Court was complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The representative of China reiterated the position that the Court should strictly adhere to the principle of complementary jurisdiction, respect in earnest the judicial sovereignty of nations, pay full attention to the legitimate demands of the Government of the Sudan and the African Union and respect the views of the Government.

At a meeting held on 6 October under the item entitled "Small arms",¹³⁶ the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations welcomed the Council's employment of weapons and ammunition management as part of the benchmark assessments of arms embargoes, and added that it was important to note that available standards and guidelines must be applied in such contexts to further improve national and regional implementation and enforcement of embargoes. At a meeting held on 14 December under the item entitled "Non-proliferation",¹³⁷ the representative of Ireland underlined the call set out in paragraph 2 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which encouraged all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including by refraining from actions that undermined implementation of commitments thereunder.

In 2021, discussions in the context of meetings and videoconferences of the Council also focused on the activities and mandate of the European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation IRINI) in Libya in connection with the items entitled "The situation in Libya", "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security" and "Maintenance of international peace and

security",¹³⁸ and Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia in connection with the items entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security", "Maintenance of international peace and security" and "The situation in Somalia".¹³⁹ In both cases, participants at those meetings and videoconferences discussed the roles of the operations in support of the arms embargoes imposed by the Council concerning Libya and Somalia, respectively.¹⁴⁰

Concerning Operation IRINI, at an open videoconference held on 28 January in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Libya",¹⁴¹ the representative of Estonia maintained that the Council had tools at its disposal to support the implementation of the arms embargo through relevant authorizations. He welcomed the efforts of Operation IRINI, which acted strictly under those authorizations, was impartial in its activities and offered an important contribution to the implementation of the sanctions regime that the Council had put in place. The representative of the Niger stated that, while his delegation welcomed the implementation of Operation IRINI, it was of the view that the Secretary-General must review the policy of disembarkation on Libyan soil of migrants and refugees intercepted at sea and expressed regret that the number of persons returned since the report of the Secretary-General had increased from 11,000 to 11,900.¹⁴² At a meeting held on 10 June under the item

¹³⁸ See, in connection with the situation in Libya, [S/2021/97](#), [S/2021/292](#), [S/2021/498](#), [S/PV.8820](#) and [S/PV.8855](#); in connection with cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, [S/PV.8792](#); and, in connection with maintenance of international peace and security, [S/2021/722](#). For more information on the establishment of Operation IRINI in Libya, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, chapter VIII, sect. IV.

¹³⁹ See, in connection with cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, [S/2021/394](#) and [S/PV.8792](#); in connection with maintenance of international peace and security, [S/2021/722](#); and, in connection with the situation in Somalia, in connection with the situation in Somalia, [S/2021/173](#) and [S/PV.8917](#). For more information on the establishment of Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009*, chapter VIII, sect. IV.

¹⁴⁰ For further details, see part I, sects. 2 and 10, as well as part VIII, sect. III, concerning the sanctions measures in place with regard to Somalia and Libya; and part IX, sect. I.B, concerning the sanctions committees established pursuant to resolutions [751 \(1992\)](#) and [1970 \(2011\)](#).

¹⁴¹ See [S/2021/97](#).

¹⁴² See [S/2020/1309](#).

¹³⁵ See [S/PV.8791](#).

¹³⁶ See [S/PV.8874](#).

¹³⁷ See [S/PV.8930](#).

entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”,¹⁴³ the representative of the Niger expressed hope that the new Operation IRINI would further contribute to the fight against breaches of the arms embargo on Libya and to combating the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean. The representative of Mexico expressed hope that Operation IRINI could soon take concrete steps in coordination with the Libyan authorities to protect the human rights and dignity of migrants in the Mediterranean. Cautioning that the efforts of the European Union should not go beyond the frameworks set forth in Council mandates, the representative of the Russian Federation underlined that his delegation still had questions about Operation IRINI, as one of its objectives was to assist in the fulfilment of the United Nations arms embargo on Libya.

Regarding Operation Atalanta, at an open videoconference held on 22 February in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”,¹⁴⁴ the Managing Director of the European External Action Service noted that the mandate of Operation Atalanta had been expanded to include the secondary executive and non-executive tasks of countering trafficking in weapons and narcotic drugs and monitoring various illegal activities at sea. With those adjustments, Operation Atalanta would support the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia and the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab and its funding streams, while at the same time maintaining its core effort to counter piracy and protect the World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable shipments to Somalia. At a meeting held on 3 December,¹⁴⁵ acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2608 (2021), renewing for a further period

of three months the authorizations set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2554 (2020) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.¹⁴⁶ In their statements after the vote, several Council members expressed regret about the length of the mandate extension provided in resolution 2608 (2021).¹⁴⁷ In that regard, the representative of France stated that the three-month extension was too brief to allow Operation Atalanta to carry out its tasks in proper conditions. She further underlined that Operation Atalanta did not just focus on combating piracy, but also contributed to cutting off the weapons trafficking that benefited Al-Shabaab and ensured security for vessels of WFP and the channelling of international humanitarian assistance to Somalia. The representative of Estonia welcomed the fact that there had been no piracy attacks in recent years on the Somali coast, which had been achieved in part thanks to the efforts of Operation Atalanta. He noted, however, that the short mandate adopted would likely adversely affect the operating conditions of Operation Atalanta and related activities. The representative of Ireland expressed concern that such a short time frame could threaten the continuation of Operation Atalanta, which conducted a crucial counter-piracy naval operation in the region. Speaking after Council members, the representative of Somalia expressed the belief that Council resolutions on piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia had successfully achieved their intended objective and stated that Somalia had given consent for a technical rollover of three months for Operation Atalanta to allow for its transition to a bilateral maritime cooperation framework within the country’s territorial waters to help with maritime security, which was the only sustainable way to preserve hard-earned gains.

¹⁴³ See S/PV.8792.

¹⁴⁴ See S/2021/173.

¹⁴⁵ See S/PV.8917.

¹⁴⁶ Resolution 2608 (2021), para. 14.

¹⁴⁷ See S/PV.8917.

V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security

Note

Section V examines the reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter. The section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, subsection B covers discussions concerning reporting

by regional arrangements and subsection C covers communications concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter

in its decisions. The Council did, however, request reporting from regional organizations on peacekeeping operations led by them, either directly or through the Secretary-General, as well as on maritime enforcement actions undertaken further to relevant resolutions of the Council, as described in further detail and summarized in table 4.

Concerning Libya, in resolution 2578 (2021), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report within 11 months on the implementation of the authorizations set out in resolution 2526 (2020) from Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.¹⁴⁸ In addition, in resolution 2598 (2021), the Council renewed the reporting requests set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2240 (2015), requiring Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations and utilizing the authority of the resolution to inform the Council within three months and every three months thereafter on the progress of actions undertaken in exercise of the authority to inspect and seize vessels and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out inspections of vessels on high seas off the Libyan coast suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya.¹⁴⁹ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report 11 months after the adoption of the resolution on its implementation.¹⁵⁰

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every three months after the adoption of resolution 2584 (2021), on the coordination, exchange of information and mutual operational and logistical support between the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French forces and European partners, including Task Force Takuba, and the European Union missions in Mali.¹⁵¹

In relation to Somalia, in resolution 2568 (2021), the Council requested the African Union to keep it informed every 90 days, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia.¹⁵² In that regard, the Council requested the African Union to report to

the Council through no fewer than three detailed written reports with specific reporting on progress on joint operations in support of the Somalia Transition Plan, progress against the Mission's revised objectives and functions, accountability measures taken to address underperformance, measures taken to protect civilians and staffing of the civilian component. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed on the implementation of the resolution through his regular reports, which had been requested in resolution 2540 (2020).¹⁵³ In addition, in resolution 2608 (2021), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it, within 11 months of the adoption of the resolution, on the situation with regard to piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including an assessment of national coast guard capabilities, as well as voluntary reports by cooperating States and regional organizations.¹⁵⁴

In connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", in resolution 2567 (2021), the Council condemned all fighting and other violations of the 21 December 2017 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access and the permanent ceasefire provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, welcomed the rapid assessment of violations by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and encouraged the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to share reports with the Council rapidly.¹⁵⁵ In the same resolution, the Council invited the African Union to share information on progress made in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan with the Secretary-General.¹⁵⁶ In resolution 2609 (2021), the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to inform it of progress in implementing the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei in one written report, no later than 15 April 2022, and to include reporting on engagement by the African Union and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on political mediation of the Abyei dispute and the Sudan and South Sudan border issues, and recommendations on the most appropriate framework, structure or organizational mandate for the region to provide support to the parties that would enable further progress in these areas. Furthermore, the Secretary-General was requested to report on the efforts that were deployed by the Special Envoy of the

¹⁴⁸ Resolution 2578 (2021), para. 2.

¹⁴⁹ Resolution 2598 (2021), para. 3. See also resolution 2240 (2015), para. 17.

¹⁵⁰ Resolution 2598 (2021), para. 3.

¹⁵¹ Resolution 2584 (2021), para. 61 (ii).

¹⁵² Resolution 2568 (2021), para. 39.

¹⁵³ Ibid., para. 41.

¹⁵⁴ Resolution 2608 (2021), para. 29.

¹⁵⁵ Resolution 2567 (2021), tenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 22.

Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa to support the African Union and help the parties to establish temporary administrative and security arrangements for Abyei and to achieve a political solution to the status of Abyei.¹⁵⁷

In 2021, the Council also continued to receive reports on the activities of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and

¹⁵⁷ Resolution 2609 (2021), para. 34.

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Kosovo Force.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ See, concerning the NATO-led Kosovo force, resolution 1244 (1999) and the corresponding reports of the Secretary-General (S/2021/579, S/2021/799, S/2021/1044 and S/2022/208); concerning EUFOR-Althea, resolution 1575 (2004) and the corresponding reports of the Secretary-General (S/2021/616, S/2021/1072 and S/2022/591); and, concerning the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, resolution 2391 (2017) and the corresponding reports of the Secretary-General (S/2021/442, S/2021/940 and S/2022/382).

Table 4

Decisions concerning the reporting of activities by regional arrangements

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
The situation in Libya	Resolution 2578 (2021) 3 June 2021	Para. 2	Secretary-General
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021) 29 June 2021	Para. 61 (ii)	Secretary-General
Maintenance of international peace and security	Resolution 2598 (2021) 29 September 2021	Para. 3	Member States (acting nationally or through regional organizations), Secretary-General
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021) 12 March 2021	Para. 39	African Union
	Resolution 2568 (2021) 12 March 2021	Para. 41	Secretary-General
	Resolution 2608 (2021) 3 December 2021	Para. 29	Secretary-General (voluntary reporting by cooperating States and regional organizations)
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Para. 22	Secretary-General, African Union
	Resolution 2609 (2021) 15 December 2021	Para. 34	Secretary-General

B. Discussions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, Article 54 of the Charter was not explicitly referenced in the discussions of the Council. Nonetheless, during meetings and videoconferences of the Council, Council members and other speakers made reference to the reporting by regional organizations of relevance for the application and interpretation of Article 54. For example, at the meeting held on 10 June under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining

international peace and security”,¹⁵⁹ the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated that the European Union was probably one of the few international actors that was regularly reporting on their efforts to help implement the Council arms embargo on Libya, which remained crucial for the country’s stability.

¹⁵⁹ See S/PV.8792.

C. Communications concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

In six letters addressed to the President of the Council, the representatives of Kuwait¹⁶⁰ and Qatar,¹⁶¹ citing Article 54 of the Charter and in their respective capacities as Chairs of the Council of the League of Arab States, transmitted the decisions of the Council of the League on a variety of peace and security issues affecting the Arab region.

Furthermore, the Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) informed the Council about the deployment of the SADC Mission in Mozambique for an initial period of three months from 15 July 2021.¹⁶²

¹⁶² See [S/2021/658](#).

¹⁶⁰ See [S/2021/790](#) and [S/2021/810](#).

¹⁶¹ See [S/2021/285](#), [S/2021/462](#), [S/2021/589](#) and [S/2021/598](#).

Part IX

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: committees, tribunals and other bodies

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The power of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs is set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part IX of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Council relating to committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, and special advisers, envoys and representatives, as well as the Peacebuilding Commission. It also includes instances of subsidiary organs that were proposed but not established, where applicable. Field-based missions, including United Nations peacekeeping and political missions, are covered in part X. Field-based missions led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII. Each subsection below provides a summary of the major developments relating to each subsidiary organ during the period covered by this Supplement.

I. Committees

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions of the Security Council adopted during 2021 concerning the establishment of committees and the implementation of and changes to their mandates, as well as their termination. Subsection A covers standing committees and subsection B covers committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The description of each committee includes the tasks of the committee, as mandated by the Council in the context of the implementation of sanctions measures such as an arms embargo, an asset freeze and/or a travel ban. Information on measures mandated by the Council pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter is provided in part VII, section III. The committees are discussed within each subsection below in the order of their establishment.

The committees of the Council consist of all 15 members of the Council. Their meetings are held in private, unless a committee itself decides otherwise, and decisions are reached by consensus. The Council has both standing committees that meet only when issues under their purview are being considered and committees established on an ad hoc basis in response to specific requirements of the Council, such as counter-terrorism or sanctions committees.

The Bureau of each committee generally consists of a Chair and a Vice-Chair, who are elected by the Council on an annual basis.¹ Since the issuance in 2012 of a note by the President of the Council on the matter, the process for the appointment of Chairs and Vice-Chairs is conducted with the participation of all Council members.² According to the note by the President of the Council dated 30 August 2017, the informal process would be undertaken in a balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way “so as to facilitate an exchange of information related to the work of the subsidiary bodies involved” and would be “facilitated jointly by two members of the Council working in full cooperation”.³ On 27 December 2019, a new note by the President was issued, according to which the Council members stressed that the “informal consultation process should take into account the need for a shared responsibility and a fair distribution of work for the selection of the Chairs among all members of the Council, bearing in mind the capacities and resources of members”.⁴

¹ For the bureaux of the committees during the period covered in the present Supplement, see [S/2021/2](#).

² See [S/2012/937](#).

³ [S/2017/507](#), paras. 111–114. It was also indicated in the note that the Council should make every effort to agree on the appointment of the Chairs for the following year no later than 1 October. Previous notes of this nature were [S/2006/507](#) and [S/2010/507](#).

⁴ See [S/2019/991](#).

A. Standing committees

During 2021, the standing committees, namely, the Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure, the Committee of Experts established by the Council at its 1506th meeting to study the question of associate membership, the Committee on the Admission of New Members and the Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters, continued to exist but did not meet.

B. Committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter

Subsection 1 deals with the committees and associated monitoring teams, groups or panels of experts (expert groups) that oversaw specific sanctions measures in 2021.⁵ Subsection 2 deals with subsidiary organs with a thematic scope, namely the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), which have broader mandates relating to terrorism and non-proliferation. Other subsidiary bodies, including the Office of the Ombudsperson, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and expert groups are discussed together with the relevant committees.

In 2021 the committees carried out their mandate of, inter alia, listing and delisting individuals and entities, granting exemptions and processing notifications, monitoring and assessing implementation and reporting to the Council. In addition to reporting by means of written reports, some Committee Chairs delivered briefings to the Council in open meetings and closed consultations. As outlined in table 1, briefings by Chairs of subsidiary organs took place under both thematic and country-specific items and briefings were delivered as joint or individual briefings, in the context of which Chairs reported at varying intervals on a variety of aspects of the work of subsidiary organs, including their mandates and/or any visits conducted by the Chairs. Owing to the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the ability of Chairs to deliver briefings to the Council in person continued to be affected, specifically during the first half of 2021, when several Committee Chairs provided briefings to Council members during open videoconferences. More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2.⁶

⁵ For information concerning the sanctions measures relevant to each of the committees, see part VII, section III.

⁶ For more information on the format of meetings and the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

Table 1
Briefings by Chairs of Security Council subsidiary organs, 2021 (meetings)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Briefing by the Chair</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Country-specific		
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)	S/PV.8795 14 June 2021
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)	S/PV.8856 14 September 2021
		S/PV.8924 10 December 2021
		S/PV.8931 15 December 2021
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)	S/PV.8873 5 October 2021
		S/PV.8918 6 December 2021
The situation in Libya	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)	S/PV.8855 10 September 2021
		S/PV.8912 24 November 2021
The situation in Mali	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)	S/PV.8922 8 December 2021
The situation in Somalia	Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)	S/PV.8796 14 June 2021
		S/PV.8885 20 October 2021
Thematic		
Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council	Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) , 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015)	S/PV.8915 2 December 2021
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001)	
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001)	S/PV.8928
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)	13 December 2021
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)	
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)	
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012)	
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)	
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)	
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)	
	Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations	
	Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions	

Table 2
Briefings by Chairs of Security Council subsidiary organs, 2021 (videoconferences)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Briefing by the Chair</i>	<i>Videoconference record and date</i>
Country-specific		
The situation in Libya	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)	S/2021/498 21 May 2021
The situation in the Middle East	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)	S/2021/167 18 February 2021
The situation in Somalia	Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)	S/2021/207 25 February 2021
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)	S/2021/308 25 March 2021
Thematic		
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	S/2021/325 30 March 2021

1. Committees overseeing specific sanctions measures

During the period under review, the total number of active committees overseeing specific sanctions measures was 14.

As described in more detail below, while many of the mandates of the committees remained largely unchanged, the Council modified some aspects of the mandates of certain committees or requested committees or expert panels to carry out specific tasks. For example, the Council expanded the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia to include gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting.⁷ In connection with the political transition process in Libya, the Council stressed that the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya should consider the designation of individuals or entities who breached the arms embargo, violated the ceasefire or obstructed the successful completion of the country's political transition.⁸ The Council reaffirmed its decision that the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) on Yemen might, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the sanctions measures imposed by the Council if the

Committee determined that such exemption was necessary to facilitate the work of the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations in Yemen.⁹ The Council reiterated its encouragement to the Panel of Experts on Mali to identify parties responsible for the potential lack of implementation of the priority measures set out in resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#) through its regular reporting and interim updates.¹⁰ The Council, in resolutions relating to the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Sudan, also requested the Secretary-General to coordinate and consult with the respective Panels of Experts when conducting reviews and assessments for identifying benchmarks or measuring progress achieved against key benchmarks for the Council's review of relevant measures.¹¹

Table 3 provides an overview of the committees, including selected categories of the main mandatory measures that they oversaw during 2021.

⁹ Resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#), para. 4.

¹⁰ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 6. See also resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#), para. 5, and resolution [2541 \(2020\)](#), seventh preambular paragraph.

¹¹ On the Central African Republic, see resolution [2588 \(2021\)](#), para. 13. On South Sudan, see resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#), para. 4. On the Sudan, see resolution [2562 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

⁷ Resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#), para. 38.

⁸ Resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), para. 14, and resolution [2571 \(2021\)](#), para. 11.

Table 3
Security Council committees responsible for oversight of specific sanctions measures, 2021

	<i>Arms embargo</i>	<i>Asset freeze</i>	<i>Travel ban or restrictions</i>	<i>Non-proliferation measures/ restrictions on ballistic missiles</i>	<i>Economic and financial restrictions</i>	<i>Petroleum related (including bunkering services)</i>	<i>Natural resources^a</i>	<i>Other^b</i>
Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)	X	X	X				X	X
Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) , 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)	X	X						
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)	X	X	X					X
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005)		X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)	X	X	X		X	X		
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012)			X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)		X	X					

^a This category refers to a variety of measures on natural resources, including charcoal, coal, iron, gold, titanium, copper, nickel, silver and zinc.

^b Including measures relating to, inter alia, transport and aviation, the ban on components of improvised explosive devices, trade restrictions and/or diplomatic restrictions.

Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

In 2021, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) remained largely unchanged.¹² More information about the work of the Committee can be found in its annual report.¹³

By its resolution 2607 (2021), the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia until 15 December 2022 and expanded its tasks to include gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting.¹⁴ Consistent with prior practice, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019), and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding any extensions to the mandate of the Panel of Experts no later than 15 November 2022.¹⁵ The Council further requested that the Panel provide regular updates to the Committee, including a minimum of four different thematic reports delivered on a quarterly basis, including one on smuggling and trafficking in weapons and military equipment, a comprehensive midterm update and a final report by 15 October 2022.¹⁶ In addition, in its resolution 2608 (2021), the Council reiterated its call upon all States to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts on Somalia, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban.¹⁷

¹² The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, which comprise an arms embargo, an asset freeze, a travel ban, a charcoal ban and a ban on components of improvised explosive devices, monitoring implementation of the measures and deciding on requests for exemptions.

¹³ S/2021/1051.

¹⁴ Resolution 2607 (2021), para. 38. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, monitoring implementation, making recommendations to improve implementation of the relevant measures and providing periodic reports.

¹⁵ Resolution 2607 (2021), para. 38.

¹⁶ Ibid., para. 41.

¹⁷ Resolution 2608 (2021), para. 10.

Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

In 2021, the Council addressed matters relating to the Committee under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.¹⁸ The mandates of the Committee, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson remained largely unchanged in 2021.¹⁹ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.²⁰ More information on the work of the Monitoring Team can be found in its reports.²¹ More information on the work of the Office of the Ombudsperson can be found in its reports for 2021.²²

In its resolution 2610 (2021), the Council stressed the important role that the Committee played in identifying cases of non-compliance with the measures reaffirmed pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) and reiterated the mandate of the Committee.²³ By the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009) for a period of 30 months from the date of expiration of its current mandate, in December 2021.²⁴ The Council also

¹⁸ For more information, see part I, sect. 28.

¹⁹ The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, monitoring the implementation of the sanctions measures, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban; deciding on requests for exemptions; designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures; and conducting periodic and specialized reviews of the entries on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list. The mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team included, inter alia, supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance with the sanctions measures, providing to the Committee information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures, assisting the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the sanctions list, assisting the Ombudsperson to the Committee in carrying out its mandate, and providing periodic reports. The mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson included, inter alia, reviewing requests from individuals and entities seeking to be removed from the sanctions list and making a recommendation to the Committee on those requests.

²⁰ S/2021/1041.

²¹ S/2021/655 and S/2022/83.

²² S/2021/122, S/2021/676 and S/2021/1062.

²³ Resolution 2610 (2021), eighteenth preambular paragraph and paras. 48–52.

²⁴ Ibid., para. 63.

recalled the mandate of the Office as set out in annex II to the resolution, and affirmed that the Ombudsperson should continue to present to the Committee observations and a recommendation on the delisting of those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities that had requested removal from the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list through the Office of the Ombudsperson, either a recommendation to retain the listing or a recommendation that the Committee consider delisting.²⁵ By the same resolution, the Council decided, in order to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate, as well as to support the Ombudsperson, to extend the mandate of the current New York-based Monitoring Team and its members, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), for a further period of 30 months from the expiration of its mandate in December 2021, under the direction of the Committee, with the responsibilities outlined in annex I to the resolution.²⁶

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)

In 2021, there were no modifications to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003). By its resolution 1518 (2003), adopted on 24 November 2003, the Council established the Committee and mandated it to continue to identify individuals and entities whose funds, other financial assets and economic resources should be frozen and transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq, in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003).²⁷ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.²⁸

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In 2021, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) remained largely unaltered.²⁹ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 6 to 10 November 2021,

regarding which he provided a briefing to the Council.³⁰ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.³¹

By its resolution 2582 (2021), the Council extended the mandate of the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) until 1 August 2022 and expressed its intention to review the Group's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 1 July 2022.³² In addition, the Council called for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, and the Group of Experts, and requested the Group of Experts to provide a midterm and a final report.³³ The Council also reaffirmed the reporting provisions set out in resolutions 2360 (2017) and 2478 (2019).³⁴ The Council recalled the Secretary-General's commitment that the United Nations would do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators of the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them were brought to justice, and stressed the importance of a continued deployment by the Secretary-General of the follow-up mechanism to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assist with the national investigation, within existing resources.³⁵

In its resolution 2612 (2021), by which the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was extended, the Council expressed its full support to the Group of Experts, called for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, MONUSCO and the Group of Experts, and requested timely information exchange between the Mission and the Group of Experts. The Council also requested MONUSCO to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo as described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2293 (2016) in cooperation with the Group of Experts.³⁶

³⁰ See S/PV.8918.

³¹ S/2021/1040.

³² Resolution 2582 (2021), para. 5. The mandate of the Group of Experts included, inter alia, supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance with the sanctions measures, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

³³ Resolution 2582 (2021), para. 6.

³⁴ Ibid., para. 7.

³⁵ Ibid., para. 9.

³⁶ Resolution 2612 (2021), paras. 22, 38–39. For more information on the mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., para. 98.

²⁷ For background information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2000–2003*, chap. V, part I.B.2.

²⁸ S/2021/1050.

²⁹ The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze, transport and customs controls and a travel ban, monitoring the implementation of the measures and deciding on requests for exemptions.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan

In 2021, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan remained unchanged.³⁷ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.³⁸

In its resolution 2562 (2021), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) was extended until 12 March 2022, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and to take appropriate action regarding the further extension of the mandate no later than 12 February 2022.³⁹ Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the Government of the Sudan, the signatories of the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) and the Panel of Experts, to conduct a review of the situation in Darfur and to provide to the Council, by 31 July 2021, a report containing recommendations for clear and well-identified benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Council to review the measures on Darfur. The Council further expressed its intention to establish clear and well-identified key benchmarks no later than 15 September 2021, and its readiness to consider adjusting the measures concerning the Sudan to respond to the situation in Darfur.⁴⁰

In its resolution 2579 (2021), the Council reiterated the mandate of UNITAMS to cooperate with the Panel of Experts in order to facilitate the work of the Panel.⁴¹

³⁷ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring the implementation of the measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures.

³⁸ S/2021/1037.

³⁹ Resolution 2562 (2021), para. 2. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

⁴⁰ Resolution 2562 (2021), para. 5. See the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 July 2021 providing a review of the situation in Darfur and benchmarks to assess the measures on Darfur (S/2021/696). The Council did not establish benchmarks in 2021. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

⁴¹ Resolution 2579 (2021), para. 16. For more information on the mandate of UNITAMS, see part X, sect. II.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005)

During the period under review, there were no changes to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005) to register and oversee the travel ban and asset freeze on individuals designated by the International Independent Investigation Commission, or by the Government of Lebanon, as suspected of involvement in the terrorist bombing in Beirut on 14 February 2005 that killed the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, and 22 others.⁴² The Committee held no meetings during 2021. As at 31 December 2021, no individual had been registered.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

During the period under review, there were no modifications to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).⁴³ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁴⁴

In its resolution 2569 (2021), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) was extended until 30 April 2022, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intent to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 25 March 2022.⁴⁵

⁴² For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007*, chap. V, part I.B.10.

⁴³ The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions, and designating individuals, entities and vessels subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising, inter alia, an arms embargo, an embargo relating to nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes, sectoral bans on coal, minerals and fuel, a ban on the export of luxury goods, a travel ban, an asset freeze, a ban on the provision of financial services and a ban on specialized teaching and training in disciplines that could contribute to prohibited activities and programmes.

⁴⁴ S/2021/1053.

⁴⁵ Resolution 2569 (2021), paras. 1–2. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included, inter alia, supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, making recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee or Member States might consider to improve implementation of the measures and providing periodic reports.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya

In 2021, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya remained unchanged.⁴⁶ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁴⁷

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolution 2571 (2021), by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Libya until 15 August 2022 and decided that the Panel's mandated tasks as defined in resolution 2213 (2015) should also apply with respect to the measures updated in resolution 2571 (2021), namely the measures aimed at preventing the illicit export of petroleum, the arms embargo, the travel ban and the assets freeze.⁴⁸ In the same resolution, the Council expressed its intent to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 15 July 2022 and requested the Panel to provide periodic reports.⁴⁹ The Council also requested that the Panel of Experts closely follow and report to the Committee any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum and directed the Committee to immediately inform all relevant Member States about notifications to the Committee from the Government's focal point regarding vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya.⁵⁰ Moreover, in its resolution 2570 (2021), adopted on the same date and focused on the Libyan political transition process, the Council stressed that the Committee should consider the designation of individuals or entities who breached the arms embargo,

violated the ceasefire or obstructed the successful completion of the political transition of Libya.⁵¹

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)

In 2021, the Council addressed matters related to the Committee under two different items of its agenda, namely: (a) "The situation in Afghanistan"; and (b) "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts".⁵²

The mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) remained largely unchanged.⁵³ The Council adopted one resolution in relation to the mandate of the Committee and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. By its resolution 2611 (2021), the Council extended for a period of 12 months, until December 2022, the mandate of the Monitoring Team in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), with further details on the mandate set forth in the annex to the resolution.⁵⁴ In the resolution, the Council also directed the Monitoring Team to gather information on instances of non-compliance with the measures imposed by resolution 2255 (2015) and to keep the Committee informed of such instances, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building. In addition, the Council encouraged Committee members to address issues of non-compliance and bring them to the attention of the Monitoring Team or the Committee and directed the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to

⁴⁶ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, gathering and analysing information on compliance, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals, entities and vessels subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, which comprise an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze and measures aimed at preventing illicit exports of petroleum.

⁴⁷ S/2021/1058.

⁴⁸ Resolution 2571 (2021), paras. 3 and 12. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, monitoring implementation, making recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, the Government of Libya or other States may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures and providing periodic reports. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Libya, see part VII, sect. III.

⁴⁹ Resolution 2571 (2021), paras. 12–13.

⁵⁰ Ibid., paras. 3–4.

⁵¹ Resolution 2570 (2021), para. 14. See also resolution 2571 (2021), para. 11.

⁵² For more information, see part I, sects. 14 and 28.

⁵³ The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions, designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, which comprised an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban, and conducting periodic and specialized reviews of the entries on the sanctions list. The Committee was supported by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.

⁵⁴ Resolution 2611 (2021), para. 2. See the annex to the resolution for a comprehensive overview of the mandate of the Monitoring Team. The mandate of the Monitoring Team included, inter alia, supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance with the sanctions measures, providing to the Committee information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures, assisting the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the sanctions list and providing periodic reports.

respond to non-compliance.⁵⁵ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁵⁶ More information on the work of the Monitoring Team can be found in its twelfth report.⁵⁷

Committee established pursuant to resolutions 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau

During 2021, no changes were made to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau. The Committee continued to oversee the implementation of the travel ban, designate individuals who met the listing criteria contained in resolution 2048 (2012) and consider and decide upon requests for exemptions from the sanctions measures. For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁵⁸

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic

In 2021, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic remained unchanged.⁵⁹ The Chair of the Committee and its members conducted a visit to the Central African Republic from 11 to 15 October.⁶⁰ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁶¹

In its resolution 2588 (2021), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts was extended until 31 August 2022, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 July 2022.⁶² Expressing concern about reports of illicit transnational trafficking networks which continued to

fund and supply armed groups in the Central African Republic, the Council continued to request the Panel, in the course of carrying out its mandate, to devote special attention to the analysis of such networks, in cooperation with other panels or groups of experts established by the Council.⁶³ The Council further reaffirmed the Committee provisions and the reporting and review provisions as set out in resolution 2399 (2018) and extended by resolution 2536 (2020).⁶⁴

In the same resolution, the Council recalled that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic had approved all exemption requests submitted by the Central African Republic authorities under the framework of the arms embargo, and reiterated its readiness to review the arms embargo measures, through, inter alia, the suspension or progressive lifting of the measures, in the light of progress achieved on the key benchmarks for the review of the arms embargo measures established in the presidential statement of 9 April 2019.⁶⁵ In that connection, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), including the Mine Action Service and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 15 June 2022, an assessment on the progress achieved by the Central African Republic on the key benchmarks.⁶⁶

In its resolution 2605 (2021), by which it extended the mandate of MINUSCA, the Council reiterated the Mission's tasks to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts, including by monitoring the implementation of sanctions measures, supporting the Panel in the collection of information on acts of incitement to violence, particularly on religious or ethnic grounds, and ensuring unhindered access and safety for the Panel of Experts.⁶⁷

⁵⁵ Resolution 2611 (2021), para. 3.

⁵⁶ S/2021/1057.

⁵⁷ See S/2021/486.

⁵⁸ S/2021/1066.

⁵⁹ The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, monitoring and discussing implementation, processing notifications, deciding on exemptions, gathering and analysing information on compliance and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

⁶⁰ See S/2021/1054.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Resolution 2588 (2021), paras. 6–7. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, monitoring implementation, providing information relevant to listing and providing periodic reports.

⁶³ Resolution 2588 (2021), para. 8.

⁶⁴ Ibid., para. 11. See also resolution 2399 (2018), paras. 26 and 41, and resolution 2536 (2020), para. 11.

⁶⁵ Resolution 2588 (2021), fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs. See also S/PRST/2019/3, seventh paragraph.

⁶⁶ Resolution 2588 (2021), para. 13.

⁶⁷ Resolution 2605 (2021), para. 36 (a)–(d). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)

In 2021, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) remained largely unchanged.⁶⁸ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁶⁹

In its resolution 2564 (2021), the Council reaffirmed its decision that the Committee could, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the sanctions measures imposed by the Council if the Committee determined that such exemption was necessary to facilitate the work of the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations in Yemen.⁷⁰ By the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 28 March 2022, requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 28 February 2022.⁷¹ The Council further directed the Panel to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Council to support the work of its sanctions committees, in particular the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 2368 (2017).⁷²

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan

In 2021, the mandates of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan remained unchanged.⁷³ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to South Sudan from 16 to 20 November 2021, regarding which

the representative of Viet Nam provided a briefing to the Council on behalf of the Chair.⁷⁴ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁷⁵

In its resolution 2577 (2021), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts was extended until 1 July 2022, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports.⁷⁶ The Council reiterated its request to the Secretariat to include the necessary gender expertise on the Panel and encouraged the Panel to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue across its investigation and reporting.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Panel, to conduct, no later than 15 April 2022, an assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks outlined in the resolution for the Council's review of the arms embargo measures.⁷⁸ In the same resolution, the Council reiterated its request to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and invited the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate.⁷⁹

In its resolutions 2567 (2021) and 2577 (2021), the Council encouraged the timely exchange of information between UNMISS and the Panel of Experts and requested the Mission to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts regarding the measures adopted in relation to South Sudan.⁸⁰

⁶⁸ The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, monitoring and discussing implementation, deciding on exemptions, gathering and analysing information on compliance and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

⁶⁹ S/2021/1056.

⁷⁰ Resolution 2564 (2021), para. 4.

⁷¹ Ibid., paras. 9–10. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, monitoring implementation, providing information relevant to listing and providing periodic reports.

⁷² Resolution 2564 (2021), para. 11.

⁷³ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

⁷⁴ See S/PV.8931.

⁷⁵ S/2021/1045.

⁷⁶ Resolution 2577 (2021), para. 17. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering, examining and analysing information on compliance and, as of 2018, information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports. Resolution 2577 (2021) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions. For more information on the outcome of the vote, see part I, sect. 7.

⁷⁷ Resolution 2577 (2021), para. 18.

⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 4.

⁷⁹ Ibid., para. 20.

⁸⁰ Resolution 2567 (2021), para. 18 (f), and resolution 2577 (2021), para. 21. For more information on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali

In 2021, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) remained unchanged.⁸¹ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2021.⁸²

In its resolution 2584 (2021), by which the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was extended, the Council encouraged the Panel of Experts to identify parties responsible for the potential lack of implementation of the priority measures set out in the resolution through its regular reporting and interim updates.⁸³ Furthermore, in its resolution 2590 (2021), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Mali was extended until 30 September 2022, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 August 2022.⁸⁴ In those two resolutions, the Council further reiterated its request to MINUSMA to assist and exchange information with the Committee and the Panel of Experts.⁸⁵

2. Other committees

During the period under review, both the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate established by resolution 1535 (2004) to support the Counter-Terrorism Committee remained active. In 2021, the Council adopted resolution 2617 (2021) deciding that the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate would continue to operate for another four years, until 31 December 2025.⁸⁶ On

4 November 2021, the Counter-Terrorism Committee held a special meeting on the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) and the establishment of the Committee.⁸⁷ In addition, the joint special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), which had been requested by the Council in its resolution 2462 (2019), took place on 18 November 2021.

During the period under review, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continued to meet, holding three in-person meetings during the year, as reported by its Chair to the Council. The Council adopted resolution 2572 (2021) in relation to the mandate of the Committee.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

On 12 January 2021, the Council issued a presidential statement recalling the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) and the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2001.⁸⁸ In the same presidential statement, the Council commended the work of the Committee and its Executive Directorate in strengthening the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and relevant subsequent resolutions by identifying capacity gaps and facilitating technical assistance to Member States.⁸⁹ The Council also underscored the importance of strong coordination and cooperation between the Executive Directorate and the Office of Counter-Terrorism, as they worked within their mandates and in their distinct roles to ensure effective United Nations engagement with Member States to improve the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.⁹⁰ The Council further reiterated the need to enhance the ongoing cooperation among the committees established pursuant to resolutions 1373 (2001), 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2253 (2015) and 1540 (2004).⁹¹ On 4 November 2021, the Counter-Terrorism Committee held a special meeting on the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001) and the establishment of the Committee. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Committee issued an outcome document.⁹² In its resolution 2462 (2019), the Council had requested a joint special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee pursuant to

⁸¹ The mandate of the Committee included, inter alia, monitoring implementation, deciding requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an asset freeze and a travel ban.

⁸² S/2021/1043.

⁸³ Resolution 2584 (2021), paras. 6 and 17.

⁸⁴ Resolution 2590 (2021), paras. 3–4. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included, inter alia, supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information, especially on non-compliance, providing information relevant to listing individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

⁸⁵ Resolution 2584 (2021), para. 31 (b), and resolution 2590 (2021), para. 3. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

⁸⁶ Resolution 2617 (2021), para. 2.

⁸⁷ See S/PV.8915.

⁸⁸ S/PRST/2021/1, first paragraph.

⁸⁹ Ibid., fourteenth paragraph.

⁹⁰ Ibid., fifteenth paragraph.

⁹¹ Ibid., sixteenth paragraph.

⁹² S/2021/986.

resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) on the subject of terrorist-financing threats and trends and on the implementation of resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#),⁹³ but the meeting was postponed owing to COVID-19 pandemic measures. The meeting was held on 18 November 2021.⁹⁴

On 30 December, the Council adopted resolution [2617 \(2021\)](#), deciding that the Executive Directorate would continue to operate for another four years, until 31 December 2025, and further deciding to conduct an interim review by 31 December 2023.⁹⁵ In the same resolution, the Council requested the Executive Directorate, in consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee, to review and make recommendations on the implementation of its own mandate within six months of the adoption of the resolution, including options to enhance transparency, efficiency and inclusivity and lessons learned from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and to submit them to the Committee for its consideration.⁹⁶ The Council further requested the Executive Directorate to assess the efforts of Member States to tackle all forms of terrorism and violent extremism, including those based on xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief, and called on the Executive Directorate to assess the implementation by Member States of the provisions in Council resolutions [2178 \(2014\)](#) and [2396 \(2017\)](#) calling for strengthened efforts to address the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters and to counter terrorist travel.⁹⁷ In the same resolution, the Council encouraged the Executive Directorate to raise awareness of the threats posed by terrorist use of unmanned aerial systems to launch attacks, or to traffic drugs and arms, as well as the importance of Member State cooperation with investigations, prosecutions, seizures and confiscations, as well as the return, restitution and repatriation of trafficked, illicitly exported or imported, stolen, looted, illicitly excavated or illicitly traded cultural property through appropriate channels and in accordance with relevant legal frameworks.⁹⁸ The Council also requested that the Executive Directorate hold consultations with women and women's organizations to inform its work, and urged the Executive Directorate, in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and other relevant United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities, to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and collect data on the drivers of radicalization to terrorism for

women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women and girls and on women's human rights and women's organizations.⁹⁹ The Council further encouraged the Executive Directorate to integrate into its work the impact of terrorism on children and children's rights, especially with regard to issues related to the families of returning or relocating foreign terrorist fighters.¹⁰⁰

Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#)

On 30 March 2021, in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction", the Council heard a briefing via videoconference by the Chair of the Committee on the activities of the Committee in promoting the full and effective implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and on the role of the Committee in facilitating assistance to Member States to fulfil their obligations under the resolution.¹⁰¹ The Chair also gave an overview of the activities of the Committee relating to the comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) prior to the renewal of the mandate of the Committee in April 2021. The Chair further informed Council members that, owing to delays caused by the pandemic, and in order for States to plan accordingly, the Committee had decided that all remaining activities related to the review, including the open consultations, should be postponed until 2021, with the exception of the process under way of revising the Committee matrices and any other activities that could be undertaken online. In addition, the Chair indicated that the Committee had made progress in the discussion on the period of the technical extension of its mandate, as well as on the contents of its programme of work.

In 2021, the Council adopted one decision relating to the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). In its resolution [2572 \(2021\)](#) of 22 April 2021, the Council noted that, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, the comprehensive review on the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) had been postponed, and decided to extend the mandate of the Committee until 28 February 2022, with the continued assistance of its group of experts.¹⁰² In the same resolution, the Council also decided that the Committee, while continuing its work pursuant to its mandate, should continue to conduct and complete the comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and submit to the Council a report on the conclusion of the

⁹³ Resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), paras. 36–37; see also [S/2020/493](#).

⁹⁴ [S/2021/1041](#), paras. 8 and 16.

⁹⁵ Resolution [2617 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 11.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 6–7.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 32–33.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 36.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 37.

¹⁰¹ See [S/2021/325](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 31.A.

¹⁰² Resolution [2572 \(2021\)](#), third preambular paragraph and para. 1.

review.¹⁰³ On 31 December, the Committee submitted the review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) for 2021, pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2325 (2016).¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ibid., para. 2.

¹⁰⁴ See S/2021/1121.

At year-end, the Committee had not agreed on its twentieth programme of work, covering the period from 1 February 2021 to 31 January 2022, as requested by resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016).

II. Working groups

Note

During the period under review, working groups of the Council continued to meet. As in the case of the committees, the working groups were composed of all 15 members of the Council and meetings were held in private unless otherwise decided. Decisions were reached by consensus. In 2021, five of the six existing working groups of the Council continued to hold meetings despite the impact of the COVID-19

pandemic on their ability to conduct those meetings in person.¹⁰⁵

Table 4 provides information on the establishment, mandate, key provisions, and chairmanship and vice-chairmanship of the informal and ad hoc working groups of the Council in 2021.

¹⁰⁵ Of 32 meetings held, 16 were by videoconference and 16 were in person. The Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004) did not meet during the period under review.

Table 4
Working Groups of the Security Council, 2021

<i>Establishment</i>	<i>Mandate</i>	<i>Chair (Vice-Chair)</i>
Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations		
Established on 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3)	To address both generic peacekeeping issues relevant to the responsibilities of the Council, and technical aspects of individual peacekeeping operations, without prejudice to the competence of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Where appropriate, to seek the views of the troop-contributing countries, including through meetings between the Working Group and the troop-contributing countries, so that their views are taken into account by the Council	Tunisia (United Kingdom)
Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa		
Established in March 2002 (S/2002/207) ^a	To monitor the implementation of recommendations contained in the presidential statement S/PRST/2002/2 and previous presidential statements and resolutions regarding conflict prevention and resolution in Africa To propose recommendations on the enhancement of cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council as well as with other United Nations agencies dealing with Africa To examine, in particular, regional and cross-conflict issues that affect the Council's work on African conflict prevention and resolution To propose recommendations to the Security Council to enhance cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution, between the United Nations and regional (Organization of African Unity [now African Union]) and subregional organizations	Kenya (Niger)

<i>Establishment</i>	<i>Mandate</i>	<i>Chair (Vice-Chair)</i>
Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004)		
Established on 8 October 2004 (resolution 1566 (2004))	To consider and submit recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, including more effective procedures considered to be appropriate for bringing them to justice through prosecution or extradition, freezing their financial assets, preventing their movement through the territories of Member States, and preventing supply to them of all types of arms and related material, and on the procedures for implementing these measures To consider the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families, which might be financed through voluntary contributions which could consist in part of assets seized from terrorist organizations, their members and sponsors, and submit its recommendations to the Council	Niger (France, India, Russian Federation)
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict		
Established on 26 July 2005 (resolution 1612 (2005))	To review the reports of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict To review progress in the development and implementation of the action plans called for in resolutions 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005) To consider other relevant information presented to it To make recommendations to the Council on possible measures to promote the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including through recommendations on appropriate mandates for peacekeeping missions and recommendations with respect to the parties to the conflict To address requests, as appropriate, to other bodies within the United Nations system for action to support implementation of resolution 1612 (2005) in accordance with their respective mandates	Norway (Niger)
Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions		
Established in June 1993 (no formal decision was taken)	To deal with issues related to documentation and other procedural questions	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Estonia)
Informal Working Group on International Tribunals		
Established in June 2000 pursuant to a proposal made by some Council members at the 4161st meeting (no formal decision was taken) ^b	To deal with a specific issue pertaining to the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and subsequently mandated to deal with other (legal) issues pertaining to the Tribunals	Viet Nam (Kenya)

^a In notes by the President of the Security Council, the Council renewed the mandate of the Working Group for periods of one year until 31 December 2011 (see S/2003/1138, S/2004/1031, S/2005/814, S/2007/6, S/2008/795, S/2009/650 and S/2010/654). From that date onward, the Ad Hoc Working Group has continued to meet without the annual renewal of its mandate.

^b See S/PV.4161.

III. Investigative bodies

Note

During the period under review, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) for 12 months until 17 September 2022.¹⁰⁶ The Council did not authorize the establishment of any new investigative bodies.

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

UNITAD formally commenced its activities on 20 August 2018.¹⁰⁷ On 1 May and 24 November 2021, the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD submitted to the Council the sixth and seventh reports on the activities of the Team, which included the completion of three case briefs in relation to the core investigative priorities, the opening of new lines of investigation and the furthering of existing investigations, strengthening cooperation with and providing training to Iraqi authorities, continuing its engagement with all elements of Iraqi society and further enhancing the Team's evidence-collection and analytical capacity.¹⁰⁸ In 2021, Council members held one

videoconference and one meeting to hear briefings by the Special Adviser on the activities of UNITAD and its progress in implementing its mandate further to its reports.¹⁰⁹

In addition, on 17 September 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2597 (2021), reaffirming resolution 2379 (2017), by which UNITAD had been established, and recalled the terms of reference approved by the Council.¹¹⁰ By the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Special Adviser and UNITAD until 17 September 2022.¹¹¹ As with previous extensions, the Council noted that any further extension of the mandate would be decided at the request of the Government of Iraq, or any other Government that had requested UNITAD to collect evidence of acts that might amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed by ISIL (Da'esh) in its territory.¹¹² In addition, the Special Adviser was requested to continue to submit and present reports to the Council on the activities of the Team every 180 days.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ See [S/2021/460](#) and [S/PV.8914](#). For additional information, see part I, sect. 33.

¹¹⁰ Resolution 2597 (2021), para. 1. For the terms of reference approved by the Council for UNITAD, see [S/2018/118](#), annex.

¹¹¹ Resolution 2597 (2021), para. 2.

¹¹² Ibid. See also resolution 2379 (2017), paras. 2–3, and the letter dated 16 September 2021 from the representative of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2021/801](#)).

¹¹³ Resolution 2597 (2021), para. 3.

¹⁰⁶ Resolution 2597 (2021), para. 2.

¹⁰⁷ [S/2018/1031](#), para. 4. For more information on the establishment and history of UNITAD, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017 to Supplement 2020*.

¹⁰⁸ See [S/2021/419](#) and [S/2021/974](#). For more information on the investigative priorities, see previous reports of the Special Advisor and Head of UNITAD ([S/2018/1031](#), [S/2019/407](#), [S/2019/878](#), [S/2020/386](#) and [S/2020/1107](#)).

IV. Tribunals

Note

In a note by the President of the Council dated 2 February 2018,¹¹⁴ the Council agreed that issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would be considered under an item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”,¹¹⁵ under which would be subsumed the earlier

consideration by the Council of issues pertaining to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.¹¹⁶ During the

the Former Yugoslavia) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) after the completion of their mandates. For more information on the activities of the Council during 2021 in connection with the Mechanism, see part I, sect. 23.

¹¹⁶ See *Repertoire, Supplement 2014–2015 to Supplement 2020*.

¹¹⁴ [S/2018/90](#).

¹¹⁵ By its resolution 1966 (2010), the Council established the Mechanism to carry out the residual functions of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (International Tribunal for

period under review, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judges nominated to fill the vacancies resulting from the death of one judge and the resignation of one judge of the Mechanism for the remainder of their respective terms of office.¹¹⁷

Developments in 2021

In an exchange of letters dated 14 July and 22 July 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,¹¹⁸ the Council took note of the

¹¹⁷ For more information on the actions of the Council concerning judges of the Mechanism, see part IV, sect. I.D.

¹¹⁸ See [S/2021/674](#) and [S/2021/675](#). See also [S/2021/726](#).

intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a judge to fill a vacancy following the death of one of the judges of the Mechanism on 17 February 2021 for the remainder of the term of office ending on 30 June 2022.

In an exchange of letters dated 13 and 16 December 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,¹¹⁹ the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a judge to fill a vacancy following the resignation of another judge of the Mechanism with effect from 17 November 2021 for the remainder of the term of office ending on 30 June 2022.

¹¹⁹ See [S/2021/1064](#) and [S/2021/1065](#).

V. Ad hoc commissions

Note

No new commissions were created during 2021. The United Nations Compensation Commission, established pursuant to resolutions [687 \(1991\)](#) and [692 \(1991\)](#) to process claims and pay compensation for losses and damage suffered as a direct result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and 1991, continued to function, without any changes to its mandate. In a letter dated 14 October 2021, the President of the Governing Council of the Compensation Commission stated that the remaining \$1.1 billion payment towards the Commission's outstanding claim award was expected to be paid in full in early 2022, which would bring the mandate of the

Commission to its conclusion. The President of the Governing Council indicated that as soon as practicable after the final payment, the Governing Council would hold a special session and adopt a final decision noting full payment of the \$52.4 billion awarded in compensation by the Commission, and that shortly after that special session, he intended to formally present the final report of the Governing Council on the work of the Commission to the Council. He further noted that a Council resolution dissolving the Compensation Commission and the Compensation Fund would also be required after the final decision of the Governing Council.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ See [S/2021/880](#).

VI. Special advisers, envoys and representatives

Note

Section VI provides a list of special advisers, envoys and representatives in whose appointment the Council has been involved and whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Special representatives appointed as heads of peacekeeping or special political missions are covered in part X and those authorized by the General Assembly are covered in part IV. Previous supplements should be consulted for information concerning special advisers, envoys and representatives whose functions have ceased.

During the period under review, the following envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General continued to exercise their functions:

- Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

- Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus
- Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)
- Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

- Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Libya

In a letter dated 1 April 2021 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Secretariat and the Government of Burundi had agreed that the Office of the Special Envoy would be closed by 31 May 2021 and that its liquidation would be completed by 30 June 2021.¹²¹ In a report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of

the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region submitted to the Council pursuant to resolution [2556 \(2020\)](#) and covering the period from 16 March to 15 September 2021, the Secretary-General confirmed that the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi had officially closed on 31 May.¹²²

Decisions of the Council acknowledging the appointment of special envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General, their mandate and any developments that occurred during the period under review are listed in table 5.

¹²¹ See [S/2021/323](#).

¹²² [S/2021/836](#), para. 23.

Table 5

Developments relating to special advisers, envoys and representatives, 2021

<i>Establishment/appointment</i>	<i>Decisions</i>
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	
S/1997/236 19 March 1997	Resolution 2602 (2021) , second, third, fourth, sixth, thirteenth and fifteenth preambular paragraphs and paras. 3 and 6
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	
S/1997/320 17 April 1997	There were no developments in 2021 ^a
S/1997/321 21 April 1997	
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	
S/2004/567 12 July 2004	Resolution 2567 (2021) , para. 3 (d) (iii)
S/2004/568 13 July 2004	
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	
S/PRST/2004/36 19 October 2004	There were no developments in 2021
S/2004/974 14 December 2004	
S/2004/975 16 December 2004	
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect	
S/2007/721 31 August 2007	There were no developments in 2021
S/2007/722 7 December 2007	

Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

Resolution 1888 (2009) 30 September 2009	Resolution 2577 (2021), para. 20
S/2010/62 29 January 2010	Resolution 2607 (2021), para. 36
S/2010/63 2 February 2010	Resolution 2605 (2021), eighteenth preambular paragraph and para. 34 (a) (vi)
	Resolution 2610 (2021), forty-fifth preambular paragraph

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

S/2018/955 24 October 2018	Resolution 2575 (2021), fourth preambular paragraph
S/2018/979 31 October 2018	Resolution 2579 (2021), para. 17
	Resolution 2609 (2021), fifth preambular paragraph and paras. 12 and 33–34

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

S/2012/469 18 June 2012	Resolution 2564 (2021), ninth preambular paragraph
S/2012/470 21 June 2012	Resolution 2586 (2021), paras. 3–4

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

S/2013/166 15 March 2013	S/PRST/2021/19, third, eighth, sixteenth, eighteenth and twentieth paragraphs
S/2013/167 18 March 2013	Resolution 2612 (2021), sixth preambular paragraph and paras. 14, 26, 29 (ii) (b) and 56

Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

Resolution 2379 (2017) 21 September 2017	Resolution 2576 (2021), para. 4 (d)
S/2018/118 9 February 2018	Resolution 2597 (2021), paras. 1–3
S/2018/119 13 February 2018	

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya^b

Resolution 2542 (2020) 15 September 2020	Resolution 2571 (2021), fourth preambular paragraph
S/2020/1217 19 November 2020	S/PRST/2021/4, ninth paragraph
S/2020/1218 15 December 2020	S/PRST/2021/6, eleventh paragraph
	S/PRST/2021/24, sixth paragraph

^a In 2021, the Council referred to the senior United Nations official in resolution 2561 (2021) (eighteenth preambular paragraph) and in resolution 2587 (2021) (seventeenth preambular paragraph).

^b For more information on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, see part X, sect. II.

VII. Peacebuilding Commission

Note

The Peacebuilding Commission was established by the Council in resolution [1645 \(2005\)](#) of 20 December 2005.¹²³ During the period under review, the Commission held a total of 29 meetings, which was a decrease in the number of Commission meetings held in 2021 compared with 2020, and produced a total of 66 outcome documents, an increase from the previous year.¹²⁴ Owing to the continuing restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the majority of the Commission's engagements in 2021 were held in a virtual format.¹²⁵ In 2021, the Commission addressed the situations in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and, for the first time, the Gulf of Guinea.¹²⁶ The Commission was also engaged on the regional situations in the Great Lakes Region, the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel.¹²⁷

Appointments to the Organizational Committee

In 2021, Kenya and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were the two elected members of the Council that were selected to participate in the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission for a term of one year, until the end of 2021.¹²⁸

¹²³ In its resolution [1645 \(2005\)](#), the Council, acting concurrently with the General Assembly, decided that the main purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission would be to, inter alia, bring together all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding to marshal the resources and advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict, and to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations. For more information, see part I, sect. 32.

¹²⁴ For the report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifteenth session, see [S/2022/89](#), paras. 3–4.

¹²⁵ [S/2022/89](#), para. 3.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 5–18.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ See [S/2021/21](#).

Developments in 2021

In 2021, consistent with past practice, the Council invited the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission to provide briefings on the activities of the Commission as described below.¹²⁹ In 2021, the Council did not hear briefings by the Chairs of the country-specific configurations of the Commission on the situations that were also on the agenda of the Council. However, the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council transmitting the Commission's advice pertaining to the renewal of the mandate of MINUSCA.¹³⁰ In that letter, the Chair expressed his readiness to provide further information and clarifications, as required, adding that the Peacebuilding Commission, through its Central African Republic configuration, would continue accompanying the Central African Republic and informing the Council on peacebuilding-related developments, as appropriate.

(i) Briefings and discussions

During a videoconference held on 12 April in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Great Lakes region”, the representative of Egypt briefed Council members in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission on the engagement by the Commission in support of peacebuilding and regional cooperation in the region.¹³¹ He elaborated on the activities of the Commission towards promoting the role of women in peacebuilding and development and indicated that the Commission would continue to advocate for the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and youth in peacebuilding in the region. The Chair also noted that the Commission had collaborated closely with international financial institutions and regional actors on efforts to address vulnerability, improve resiliency and support country responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. He also reported that the Commission had continued to assist with cross-border cooperation in the context of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the

¹²⁹ The practice of inviting the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in formal Council meetings was established in the note by the President of the Council dated 26 July 2010 ([S/2010/507](#), para. 61) and was reaffirmed in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#), para. 95).

¹³⁰ [S/2021/918](#).

¹³¹ See [S/2021/351](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 3.

Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, including for enhanced security cooperation.

During an open videoconference held on 18 May in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” on the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel,¹³² the representative of Egypt, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, informed the Council of the continued engagement of the Commission in the pursuit of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel.¹³³ He emphasized that the Commission had an important role to play in complementing the focus of the Council on peace and security by strengthening engagement with the Economic and Social Council and the development system and supporting strengthened United Nations partnerships with international financial institutions. The Chair further stressed that the Commission would continue to encourage greater system-wide coherence to tackle the root causes of violence and rebuild much-needed peace and stability in the region.

On 12 October, the Council held an open debate under the agenda item “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” focusing on diversity, State-building and the search for peace, at the initiative of Kenya, which held the presidency for the month.¹³⁴ The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission submitted a written statement for the open debate, in which he noted that the engagements by the Commission had shown that inclusivity and respect for diversity were key to building and sustaining peace.¹³⁵ Concerned over challenges in preserving hard-won peacebuilding gains around the world due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chair called for ramping up collective efforts in supporting nationally owned and led endeavours to prevent, mitigate and build back better from crises and conflicts and for the further alignment of resources and efforts of the United Nations and international financial institutions with national peacebuilding priorities, the strengthening of partnerships with regional and subregional organizations and the inclusion of all segments of society. He also emphasized that United Nations field presences had to be fully equipped to effectively work with various partners in line with national peacebuilding priorities to implement peacebuilding-related activities. He indicated that peacebuilding efforts had to be accompanied by communication strategies that utilized

new and traditional media to promote peaceful coexistence and counteract incitement, hate, hate speech, misinformation and fake news. The Chair concluded that the Commission was well positioned to continue to advise the Council, when and where relevant, including during the review of peacekeeping mandates and transitions, with a view to bringing a peacebuilding perspective that complemented the deliberations of the Council and better informed its actions.

The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission did not participate in informal interactive dialogues of Council members in 2021, a departure from recent practice.¹³⁶

(ii) Decisions

The Council referred to the Peacebuilding Commission and to its mandate in several decisions adopted under thematic as well as country- and region-specific items.

Thematic decisions

On 9 September, under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council adopted resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), in which it acknowledged the importance of strong coordination, coherence and cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, in accordance with its resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#). In that regard, the Council reaffirmed its intention to regularly request, deliberate and draw upon the specific, strategic and targeted advice of the Commission, including to assist with the longer-term perspective required for peacebuilding and sustaining peace being reflected in the formation, review and reconfiguration of peace operations.¹³⁷ In the same resolution, the Council strongly encouraged the Commission to continue fully utilizing its role to convene United Nations bodies, Member States, national authorities and all other relevant stakeholders, including regional and subregional organizations and international financial institutions, to ensure an integrated, strategic, coherent, coordinated and gender-responsive approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace and, in particular, to facilitate the development of joint objectives and priorities prior to transitions. In that connection, the Council requested the Secretary-General to liaise with the Commission in advance of relevant reporting to the Council with a view to

¹³² [S/2021/442](#).

¹³³ See [S/2021/484](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 9.

¹³⁴ A concept note was circulated in a letter dated 6 October 2021 ([S/2021/854](#)).

¹³⁵ See [S/2021/868](#).

¹³⁶ For further information on informal interactive dialogues in which the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission has participated, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2012–2013 to Supplement 2020*.

¹³⁷ Resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), para. 10.

facilitating the provision of complementary and timely advice from the Commission to the Council.¹³⁸

In its presidential statement of 9 November, in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council reiterated its support for the work of the Peacebuilding Commission, and called on the Commission to continue strengthening its advisory, bridging and convening roles in support of nationally owned priorities and efforts in the countries and regions under its consideration to enhance its efficiency and impact in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace.¹³⁹

On 16 November, in its presidential statement in connection with the same item, the Council further recognized the advisory role of the Commission in supporting peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries with respect for national ownership and the countries’ national priorities as an important addition to the capacity of the international community in the broad peacebuilding agenda, in accordance with its mandate.¹⁴⁰

Country- and region-specific decisions

Decisions of the Council with regard to country- and region-specific items also mentioned the Peacebuilding Commission.

On 12 March, under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, the Council adopted resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), in which it stressed the valuable role of the Commission in bringing strategic advice, providing observations for the Council’s consideration and fostering a more coherent, coordinated and integrated approach to international peacebuilding efforts.¹⁴¹

On 12 November, under the same item, the Council also adopted resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), in which it stressed the valuable role of the Commission, and encouraged continued coordination with the Commission and other relevant international organizations and institutions in support of the long-term peacebuilding needs of the Central African Republic, including support to the peace process, consistent with the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic.¹⁴²

On 19 May, in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the important role of the Peacebuilding Commission and emphasizing the need to integrate peacebuilding and sustaining peace into efforts to build back better in Africa.¹⁴³

On 29 June, in connection with the situation in Mali, the Council adopted resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), in which it noted the involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission on the Sahel and recognized that an integrated and coherent approach among relevant political, security and developmental actors, within and outside of the United Nations system, was critical to building and sustaining peace in Mali and the Sahel.¹⁴⁴

On 20 October, in connection with the situation in the Great Lakes region, the Council adopted a presidential statement highlighting the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission in mobilizing the support of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations for peacebuilding and regional cooperation initiatives in the broader context of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region to prevent the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of conflict.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁸ Ibid., para. 11.

¹³⁹ [S/PRST/2021/22](#), penultimate paragraph.

¹⁴⁰ [S/PRST/2021/23](#), penultimate paragraph.

¹⁴¹ Resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph.

¹⁴² Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 18.

¹⁴³ [S/PRST/2021/10](#), twenty-fifth paragraph.

¹⁴⁴ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph.

¹⁴⁵ [S/PRST/2021/19](#), ninth paragraph.

VIII. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council proposed but not established

During the period under review, there were no instances of a subsidiary organ being proposed but not established.

Part X

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2021. These field-based subsidiary organs can be divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which also covers the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peacekeeping operations and special political missions covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor missions are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each mission (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the missions are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks, which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Council. The introduction to section I includes an overview table of changes to the composition of peacekeeping operations during the reporting period (table 3).

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each mission, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous supplements to the *Repertoire*.

I. Peacekeeping operations

Note

Section I is focused on the decisions adopted by the Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2021

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 12 peacekeeping operations.¹ Six of the operations were in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe and one in Asia. The Council did not establish or terminate any operations in 2021.

Extensions of mandates

The Council extended the mandates of the following peacekeeping operations:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP),

the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended.

Mandates of peacekeeping operations: differences in scope

In 2021, the mandates of peacekeeping operations continued to vary considerably depending on their content and complexity. In that regard, the Council reauthorized the four largest missions, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS, to use all means necessary to implement their mandates, which covered a broad array of mandated tasks.² The mandates of all four missions continued to include tasks related to the protection of civilians, the protection and promotion of human rights, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment. The Council retained the implementation of peace agreements and political transitions as priorities for MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS, while MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MONUSCO remained focused on support for stabilization and the extension of State authority.

The mandates of the remaining eight peacekeeping operations stayed narrower by comparison. UNIFIL and UNISFA, as interim security forces, remained focused on observing the redeployment of forces and maintaining security within their areas of responsibility; they were reauthorized to use force in fulfilling only specific tasks such as the protection of civilians, United Nations personnel and equipment, the protection of their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, and the protection of the mission's area of responsibility.³ UNFICYP continued to support the maintenance of the ceasefire and bicomunal contacts in Cyprus, while longstanding observer missions such as MINURSO, UNDOF, UNMOGIP and UNTSO concentrated on the

¹ For Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations", see part I, sect. 22. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

² In connection with MINUSMA, see resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 20; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 33; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), paras. 27 and 29 (i) (a).

³ In connection with UNIFIL, see resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 22; and, in connection with UNISFA, see resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 14.

monitoring of ceasefires and the implementation of armistice and disengagement agreements.⁴

Mandates of peacekeeping operations: modifications

During the period under review, the Council modified the mandates of 6 of the 12 existing peacekeeping operations, with most of the changes affecting MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS. The most common changes made by the Council concerned provisions concerning the protection of civilians and early warning, the provision of support to political processes and the participation of women and other marginalized groups in those processes, and tasks related to addressing sexual and gender-based violence.

With respect to the protection of civilians, the Council decided that UNMISS and MONUSCO would adjust their postures and geographic focus in response to the changing security situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, respectively.⁵ The Council decided that MINUSMA would implement a politically led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish a State presence, State authority and basic social services in central Mali and to promote understanding of and strengthen its Mission-wide early warning and response mechanisms.⁶ UNMISS was tasked with implementing a Mission-wide early warning and response strategy that drew upon regular interaction with civilians in areas at high risk of conflict.⁷ Also as part of a protection of civilians mandate, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA would include mitigating and avoiding the use of schools by parties to the conflict and to facilitate the continuation of education.⁸

Adding to their task of supporting the implementation of existing peace agreements, the Council decided that MINUSMA would support the realization of the political transition in Mali and MINUSCA would support a newly announced ceasefire

in the Central African Republic.⁹ The political support role of UNMISS in South Sudan was expanded to include the provision of technical assistance for the implementation of the peace agreement and to coordinate the use of good offices with regional actors.¹⁰ The Council provided additional detail in the electoral support mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS in preparation for elections in, respectively, the Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan, envisaged for 2022 and 2023.¹¹

Regarding political inclusivity, the Council requested UNISFA to integrate women into peace discussions, including by providing gender advisers.¹² The Council decided that the mandate of UNMISS would include assisting all parties in the full, effective and meaningful participation of women, youth, faith groups and civil society in the peace process, in transitional government bodies and institutions, and in all conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.¹³ The Council requested MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities in ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women in the political transition.¹⁴ The Council clarified that UNIFIL assistance to the Lebanese authorities in ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women was to include the Lebanese security sector.¹⁵

Finally, the Council introduced new elements into the sexual and gender-based violence mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNIFIL and UNMISS. Specifically, the Council decided that MINUSCA and MONUSCO would include risks of conflict-related sexual violence in their data collection, threat analysis and early warning systems, and that UNMISS would respond to sexual and gender-based violence, in addition to deterring and preventing its

⁴ In connection with UNDOF, see resolutions [2581 \(2021\)](#) and [2613 \(2021\)](#), para. 15; and, in connection with MINURSO, see resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. See also, in connection with UNMOGIP, see resolutions [47 \(1948\)](#) and [91 \(1951\)](#); and, in connection with UNTSO, see resolution [48 \(1948\)](#).

⁵ In connection with UNMISS, see resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (a) (iii); and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 29 (i) (a) and (e).

⁶ See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (b) (i) and (c) (ii).

⁷ See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (a) (ii).

⁸ See resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 34 (a) (v).

⁹ In connection with MINUSMA, see resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (a) (i); and, in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 34 (b).

¹⁰ See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (c) (i) and (iv).

¹¹ In connection with MINUSMA, see resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 30 (a) (vi); in connection with UNMISS, see [S/PRST/2021/20](#), third paragraph (in particular the reference to the letter dated 15 July 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, [S/2021/661](#)); and, in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 35 (b).

¹² See resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 21.

¹³ See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (c) (ii).

¹⁴ See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 53.

¹⁵ See resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), para. 26.

occurrence.¹⁶ The Council requested MINUSMA to support the provision of medical services, sexual and reproductive health care services, psychosocial services, mental health care services, legal services and socioeconomic services to survivors of sexual violence.¹⁷ The Council mandated UNIFIL to support the implementation of the action plan on women and peace and security, including to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence, and requested UNIFIL to enhance its reporting to the Council on the issue.¹⁸

Effectiveness of peacekeeping operations

As a means of enhancing effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to implement specific capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of operations and within the existing mandates and capacities of five peacekeeping operations.¹⁹ Notwithstanding some differences between the missions, these capacities included, among others, the implementation of early warning and response strategies, confidence-building and mission mobility, protection against sexual and gender-based violence, the implementation of the women and peace and security and the youth and peace and security agendas, and taking child protection into account as a cross-cutting issue. In addition, as operational priorities, the Council specified improving peacekeeping intelligence and analysis, providing training, knowledge and equipment to counter explosive devices, implementing effective casualty and medical evacuation procedures, prioritizing mandated protection activities in decisions about the use of capacities and resources, implementing peacekeeping performance requirements and implementing the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

The Council requested several missions, the Secretary-General, Member States and host Governments to take all appropriate measures to

enhance the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel in line with resolution 2518 (2020)²⁰ and implement resolution 2589 (2021) for establishing accountability for crimes committed against peacekeepers.²¹ The Council requested the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to implement the relevant provisions of resolution 2538 (2020) on removing barriers to and improving the participation of women in peacekeeping.²² Further to the rollout of the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System as part of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus initiative to strengthen peacekeeping operations, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, utilizing data collected with the System and other strategic planning and performance measurement tools, to describe the impact of missions in order to facilitate, as necessary, a re-evaluation of missions' composition and mandates as realities on the ground may require.²³

Peacekeeping transitions

Recalling resolution 2594 (2021), the Council reiterated the importance of adequately resourcing United Nations peace operations during mission

¹⁶ In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 3 (a) (iv); in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 34 (a) (vi); and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 29 (i) (h).

¹⁷ See resolution 2584 (2021), para. 55.

¹⁸ See resolution 2591 (2021), para. 26.

¹⁹ In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 18 (a)–(n); in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 47; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 42; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 30; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 42.

²⁰ In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 18 (k); in connection with UNDOF, see resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 8; in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 45; in connection with UNIFIL, see resolution 2591 (2021), para. 17; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), paras. 8 and 9; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 41.

²¹ In connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 9; and, in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 41.

²² In connection with UNFICYP, see resolution 2561 (2021), para. 14 and 2587 (2021), para. 16; in connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), paras. 18 (h) and 23; in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 47; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 47; in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 31; in connection with MONUSCO, see resolution 2612 (2021), para. 46; in connection with UNDOF, see resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 13; and, in connection with UNIFIL, see resolution 2591 (2021), para. 27.

²³ In connection with UNMISS, see resolution 2567 (2021), para. 29; in connection with MINUSMA, see resolution 2584 (2021), para. 62 (ii); in connection with UNFICYP, see resolution 2587 (2021), para. 19; in connection with MINUSCA, see resolution 2605 (2021), para. 57; and, in connection with UNISFA, see resolution 2609 (2021), para. 34.

transitions to support the long-term stability and continuity of peacebuilding activities.²⁴ In that regard, in connection with the future drawdown and exit of MONUSCO, the Council welcomed the transition plan developed on the basis of the joint strategy on the progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO²⁵ and underscored that the Mission's exit should be based on progress towards satisfying the benchmarks and indicators set out in the plan and taking into consideration the situation on the ground.²⁶ In a presidential statement adopted on 2 August marking the completion of the drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation of Darfur (UNAMID), the mandate of which was terminated on 31 December 2020, the Council expressed its intention to consider the lessons learned from UNAMID in its ongoing work to enhance the overall effectiveness of

United Nations peacekeeping, including its approach to peacekeeping transitions.²⁷

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2021 and show the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during the reporting period. The tables include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions during previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

²⁴ See resolution 2612 (2021), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

²⁵ S/2020/1041, annex.

²⁶ Ibid., paras. 48 and 53.

²⁷ See S/PRST/2021/14, second paragraph. For more information on the mandate and termination of UNAMID, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

Table 1
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2021: Africa

Mandate	MINURSO	MONUSCO	UNISFA	UNMISS	MINUSMA	MINUSCA
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force		X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X			X	X	X
Civil-military coordination		X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral assistance	X			X	X	X
Human rights-related ^a		X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X	X	X	X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment		X			X	X
Political process		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians		X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X
Public information		X		X	X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X	X	X
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence		X	X	X	X	X

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2021

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>
Security sector reform		X			X	X
Support to military		X			X	X
Support to police	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support to sanctions regimes		X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X		X	X	X

Abbreviations: MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Table 2

Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2021: Asia, Europe and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Chapter VII			X			
Authorization of the use of force						X
Ceasefire monitoring	X	X		X	X	X
Civil-military coordination			X			
Demilitarization and arms management						X
Electoral assistance						
Human rights-related ^b		X	X			X
Humanitarian support		X	X			
International cooperation and coordination		X	X	X	X	X
Political process		X	X			
Protection of civilians						X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment						X
Public information						
Rule of law/judicial matters						
Security monitoring-patrolling-deterrence						X
Security sector reform						
Support to military						X
Support to police		X	X			

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNMOGIP</i>	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNTSO</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>
Support to sanctions regimes						
Support to State institutions			X			X

Abbreviations: UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations

As illustrated in table 3, during the period under review, the Council modified the composition of three

peacekeeping operations by increasing the number of authorized military personnel in MINUSCA and reducing it in MONUSCO and UNISFA.

Table 3
Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2021

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
MONUSCO	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 14,000 to 13,500 military personnel, while maintaining 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units, and continued to agree to a temporary deployment of up to 360 personnel of formed police units	Resolution 2612 (2021)
UNISFA	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 3,550 to 3,250 military personnel until 15 May 2022 and to maintain the authorized police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units	Resolution 2609 (2021)
MINUSCA	The Council decided to increase the Mission's military component by 2,750 (from 11,650 to 14,400) personnel and police component by 940 (from 2,080 to 3,020) personnel	Resolution 2566 (2021)

Abbreviations: MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

Africa

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The Council established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#) of 29 April 1991, in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). MINURSO was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the

repatriation of refugees and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.²⁸

In 2021, by resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#) of 29 October, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until 31 October 2022.²⁹ The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and 2 abstentions (Russian

²⁸ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous supplements covering the period 1991 to 2020.

²⁹ See resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

Federation and Tunisia).³⁰ The Council did not modify the mandate or composition of MINURSO during the period under review.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Council established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#) of 28 May 2010, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). MONUSCO was authorized to use all means necessary to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and was tasked with, inter alia, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with stabilization and peace consolidation.³¹

On 20 December, acting under Chapter VII, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), extending the mandate of MONUSCO for one year, until 20 December 2022.³²

In the same resolution, the Council strongly urged Congolese political stakeholders to spare no efforts in implementing the critical governance, security and economic reforms contained in the Government's programme of action for the period

2021–2023 and encouraged MONUSCO to continue to support, through its good offices, peaceful, transparent, inclusive and credible political processes and the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for 2023 as well as future elections.³³

In the resolution, the Council reiterated the strategic priorities of MONUSCO of protecting civilians and supporting the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms, and decided that the Mission's mandate should be implemented on the basis of a prioritization of tasks, with the protection of civilians to be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources.³⁴ The Council largely reiterated the priority tasks of MONUSCO, adding new language regarding the protection of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In addition, it elaborated on the Mission's exit strategy and transition plan, as detailed below.

In connection with the protection of civilians, the Council decided that MONUSCO would take all measures necessary to ensure effective, timely, dynamic and integrated protection of civilians under threat of physical violence within the provinces of its current deployment, with a specific focus on Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, including by means of good offices.³⁵ The Council also decided that targeted offensive operations would be carried out through a reconfigured and effective force Intervention Brigade that included combat units from additional troop-contributing countries functioning as quick reaction forces, including through a mobile, flexible and robust posture.³⁶ The Council further decided that, in working with the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Mission would leverage the capacities and expertise of the technical assistance team deployed by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to strengthen and support the country's judicial system with a view to investigating and prosecuting all those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the country.³⁷

Concerning sexual and gender-based violence, the Council called on MONUSCO to continue to work closely with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at both the strategic and

³⁰ See [S/PV.8890](#). In explanation of its vote, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the resolution did not reflect the objective picture of what had happened on the issue of Western Sahara following the military escalation in November and would probably not be helpful in the efforts of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara to resume direct negotiations. In recent years, Council resolutions to extend the Mission's mandate had included wording that replaced the internationally agreed parameters for the settlement of the Western Sahara issue with general wording on the need to abide by "the so-called realistic" approaches or to make some compromises. Such signals had led to ambiguity, undermined trust in the Council's work and made it more difficult to resume a direct dialogue. For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 1, "The situation concerning Western Sahara".

³¹ For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous supplements covering the period 2010 to 2020. For more information on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 4.

³² See resolution [2612 \(2021\)](#), para. 22.

³³ *Ibid.*, paras. 1 and 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 24 and 25.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (i) (a).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (i) (e).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (i) (f).

operational levels and requested the Mission to accelerate the coordinated implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence and post-conflict situations.³⁸

In addition to reiterating the Mission's mandate on security sector reform, the Council decided that MONUSCO would continue its support to the Government, through the Mine Action Service, in enhancing the capacities of the Congolese security forces by, among other things, offering advice, training and capacity development in managing weapons and ammunition, countering improvised explosive devices and disposing of explosive ordnance.³⁹

The Council expanded the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandate of MONUSCO to include good offices, advice and assistance, particularly in North and South Kivu and Ituri provinces, in close cooperation with the United Nations country team, for the implementation of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme of the Government.⁴⁰

With regard to issues that were not among the Mission's priorities, the Council urged MONUSCO to work with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region to seek political solutions to stop the cross-border flows of armed combatants, arms and natural resources.⁴¹ Regarding the effectiveness of the Mission, the Council set out 16 substantive and operational activities for the Secretary-General to implement in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations within the limits of its mandate and area of operation and in line with existing United Nations guidelines and regulations.⁴²

On the topic of the exit strategy, the Council welcomed the transition plan developed on the basis of the joint strategy on the progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO,⁴³ endorsed in resolution 2556 (2020), and requested the Mission to withdraw from Tanganyika Province by mid-2022 and to consolidate its footprint in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, the three provinces where active conflict persisted, while pursuing its good offices and institutional strengthening work at the national level, including by ensuring the continuation of an early

warning and rapid response system.⁴⁴ The Council encouraged the Secretary-General to discontinue, where appropriate, tasks in support of the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms that could be responsibly and sustainably assumed by other stakeholders, and to streamline MONUSCO accordingly.⁴⁵

By resolution 2612 (2021), the Council reduced the Mission's authorized troop ceiling from 14,000 to 13,500 military personnel and maintained the ceiling of 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units.⁴⁶ In the same resolution, the Council reiterated its approval of the temporary deployment of up to 360 personnel of formed police units, provided that those personnel were deployed in replacement of military personnel, as proposed by the Secretary-General in 2019⁴⁷ and approved by the Council that same year,⁴⁸ and invited the Secretariat to consider further reductions in the military deployment and area of operations in the light of the positive evolution of the situation on the ground, in particular in the regions where the threat posed by armed groups was no longer significant, in line with the joint strategy.⁴⁹

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution 1990 (2011) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area, signed on 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary to, inter alia, protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect

³⁸ Ibid., paras. 33 and 34.

³⁹ Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (f).

⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (g).

⁴¹ Ibid., para. 26.

⁴² Ibid., para. 42.

⁴³ S/2020/1041, annex. See also S/2021/807.

⁴⁴ See resolution 2612 (2021), para. 48.

⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 51.

⁴⁶ Ibid., para. 23.

⁴⁷ See S/2019/905.

⁴⁸ Resolution 2502 (2019), para. 23.

⁴⁹ See resolution 2612 (2021), para. 23.

civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and ensure security in the Abyei Area. By resolution 2024 (2011) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.⁵⁰

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions 2575 (2021) of 11 May, 2606 (2021) of 15 November and 2609 (2021) of 15 December, concerning UNISFA. By resolutions 2575 (2021) and 2606 (2021), the Council extended the Force's mandate for periods of six and one month, respectively.⁵¹ By resolution 2609 (2021), it extended the mandate, with some modifications, for a further period of five months, until 15 May 2022.⁵²

In resolution 2575 (2021), the Council took note of the letter dated 1 April from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council,⁵³ which contained a report on joint consultations between the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa with the Governments of the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as with other relevant stakeholders, to discuss an exit strategy for UNISFA and develop options for its responsible drawdown and exit as requested in resolution 2550 (2020).⁵⁴ With regard to the way forward, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than 30 September, a strategic review of UNISFA in which he would assess recent political developments between and within the Sudan and South Sudan, make detailed recommendations for further reconfiguration of the mission and establish a viable exit strategy in which he should prioritize the safety and security of civilians living in Abyei, account for stability of the

region and include an option for an exit strategy not limited by the 2011 agreements.⁵⁵

In resolution 2609 (2021), the Council took note of a letter dated 17 September from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council containing the findings of the strategic review.⁵⁶ The Council subsequently decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA from 3,550 to 3,250 military personnel until 15 May 2022 and to maintain the authorized police ceiling at 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units and expressed its intention to keep under review the recommendations contained in the letter.⁵⁷

In addition to reiterating the existing tasks of UNISFA, the Council requested the Mission to collaborate with the United Nations country teams in the Sudan and South Sudan, in consultation with the host Governments and the local communities, to engage with local communities on peacebuilding initiatives, including with regard to conflict prevention and mitigation, and the rule of law. In that regard, the Council welcomed the development of an integrated rule of law support strategy in close coordination with the host Governments and local communities, and strongly encouraged all parties to cooperate with UNISFA on the establishment of the Abyei Police Service.⁵⁸ The Council expressed concern that women remained absent from the leadership of local peace committees and requested UNISFA to integrate women into peace discussions and to assist those efforts by, *inter alia*, providing for gender advisers in Abyei where their expertise was urgently needed.⁵⁹

Regarding the Mission's effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to implement 16 substantive and operational activities in the planning and conduct of UNISFA operations within the

⁵⁰ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous supplements covering the period 2011 to 2020. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

⁵¹ See resolutions 2575 (2021), paras. 1 and 2, and 2606 (2021), para. 1.

⁵² See resolution 2609 (2021), paras. 1 and 2.

⁵³ S/2021/322.

⁵⁴ In the letter, the Secretary-General noted that the consultations in question had been inconclusive and that, given the separate engagements with the parties and their different positions on the future of UNISFA, it had not been possible to formulate options that would have been minimally acceptable to the parties.

⁵⁵ See resolution 2575 (2021), para. 7. See also resolution 2550 (2020), para. 31.

⁵⁶ S/2021/805, cited in resolution 2609 (2021), eleventh preambular paragraph. The strategic review contained a proposal to reconfigure UNISFA in three main areas: (a) gearing the operation towards fostering the conditions for the final stage of the negotiations on a political settlement; (b) establishing a new, lighter and more responsive posture consolidated around the areas of the security challenges; and (c) enhancing the focus on peacebuilding with a view to facilitating a rapprochement between the communities. The Secretary-General further recommended two options for the reconfiguration of the Mission's military component.

⁵⁷ See resolution 2609 (2021), paras. 4 and 5.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 21.

limits of the mandate and area of operation and in line with existing United Nations guidelines and regulations.⁶⁰

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

By resolution [1996 \(2011\)](#) of 8 July 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, and protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, establish the rule of law and strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all means necessary to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.⁶¹

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council adopted resolutions [2567 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March and [2577 \(2021\)](#) of 28 May and adopted a presidential statement concerning UNMISS on 27 October.⁶² By resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year, until 15 March 2022.⁶³

In the resolution, the Council took note of the findings of the independent strategic review of UNMISS,⁶⁴ which it had requested in resolution [2514](#)

[\(2020\)](#),⁶⁵ and decided that the Mission's mandate would be designed to advance a three-year strategic vision to prevent a return to civil war in South Sudan, build durable peace at the local and national levels, and support inclusive and accountable governance and free, fair and peaceful elections in accordance with the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed in 2018.⁶⁶

In that context, the Council introduced several modifications to the tasks of UNMISS, mainly related to the protection of civilians and the Mission's support for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process. Also in the area of protection of civilians, the Council added a new task for UNMISS to use technical assistance and capacity-building to support the Government in restoring and reforming the rule of law and justice sector in order to strengthen the protection of civilians, combat impunity and promote accountability, including by investigating and prosecuting gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, and human rights violations and abuses.⁶⁷ The Council added that, to deter violence against civilians, the work of UNMISS should include the implementation of a Mission-wide early warning and response strategy drawing on regular integration with civilians, including with community liaison assistants.⁶⁸ The Council reiterated that it was the Mission's responsibility to maintain the public safety and security of and within protection of civilians sites and added that, where such sites were redesignated, UNMISS would maintain a flexible posture linked to threat analysis, contingency plans and the ability to scale up its presence and protection if the security situation deteriorated.⁶⁹ The Council decided that UNMISS would promptly and effectively engage any actor that was credibly found to be preparing attacks or engaged in attacks against civilians and in camps for internally displaced persons.⁷⁰ In addition to deterrence and prevention as provided for in resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), the Council decided that UNMISS would respond to sexual and gender-based violence within its capacity and areas of deployment.⁷¹

Regarding the role of UNMISS in supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process, the Council decided that the Mission

⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 30.

⁶¹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous supplements covering the period 2011 to 2020. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I., sect. 7.

⁶² [S/PRST/2021/20](#).

⁶³ See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

⁶⁴ See [S/2020/1224](#). The independent strategic review of UNMISS resulted in the conclusion that the four pillars of the UNMISS mandate remained valid overall. Nonetheless, a number of adjustments were recommended to enhance the Mission's impact. Given developments in the country, it was noted that there was an increased need for UNMISS to focus its political engagement on providing support for the implementation of the peace process and extend its technical assistance to the creation or strengthening of the governance bodies outlined in the Revitalized Agreement and the creation of bodies and legislation that would support credible elections. In implementing the four pillars of its mandate, UNMISS would have to ensure that its activities were accompanied by political engagement. It was further recommended that the authorized military strength be decreased from 17,000 to 15,000.

⁶⁵ See resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), para. 39.

⁶⁶ See resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 3 (a) (vii).

⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 3 (a) (ii).

⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 3 (a) (iii).

⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 3 (a) (x).

⁷¹ Ibid., para. 3 (a) (iv).

would use technical assistance to support mechanisms of the Revitalized Agreement and coordinate its good offices with relevant regional actors.⁷² The Council decided that the mandate of UNMISS would include assisting all parties in the full, effective and meaningful participation of women, youth, faith groups and civil society in the peace process, transitional government bodies and institutions, and all conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.⁷³

In resolution 2567 (2021), the Council decided that UNMISS, in addition to its role in the protection of civilians and the political process, should support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and consistent with United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance.⁷⁴

With respect to the Mission's effectiveness, the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement 14 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of UNMISS operations.⁷⁵ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct and provide to the Council, no later than 15 July, a needs assessment that included security, procedural and logistical requirements for creating an enabling environment for elections in South Sudan.⁷⁶

In the presidential statement adopted on 27 October,⁷⁷ the Council took note of the conclusion of the needs assessment mission and requested the Secretary-General to establish an integrated electoral assistance team led by UNMISS, consistent with resolution 2567 (2021), to implement electoral assistance activities set forth in the assessment,⁷⁸ in support of the elections roadmap detailed in the Revitalized Agreement.⁷⁹

In resolution 2577 (2021), the Council reiterated its request to UNMISS to assist the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and that Committee's Panel of Experts, within the Mission's mandate and capabilities.⁸⁰

Regarding the Mission's configuration, in resolution 2567 (2021), the Council decided to maintain the overall force levels of UNMISS and expressed its readiness to consider adjustments to those levels and capacity-building tasks depending on security conditions on the ground and the implementation of priority measures related to the protection of civilians, security sector reform, ending obstructions to UNMISS, the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, the reconstitution of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the Council of States, and the initiation of a constitution-making process by the Government and all relevant actors, as outlined in paragraph 7 of the resolution.⁸¹

By an exchange of letters dated 4 and 10 February between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,⁸² as a temporary request under emergency circumstances, the Council approved the final extension by two months of the temporary redeployment of two infantry companies and two military utility helicopters from UNMISS to MINUSCA, which continued to be counted against the authorized ceiling on military and civilian personnel of UNMISS.⁸³

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution 2100 (2013) of 25 April 2013, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter

⁷² Ibid., para. 3 (c) (i) and (iv).

⁷³ Ibid., para. 3 (c) (ii).

⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 3 (b) (i).

⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 18 (a)–(n).

⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 27.

⁷⁷ S/PRST/2021/20.

⁷⁸ S/2021/661, annex.

⁷⁹ See S/PRST/2021/20, third paragraph. In S/2021/661, the Secretary-General transmitted a summary of the key findings and recommendations of the needs assessment team and noted that the United Nations should provide assistance in two phases. In the first phase, in the immediate term, the United Nations would continue to support the peace process through awareness-raising, engagement, good offices, technical advice and assistance for the establishment of an electoral framework for credible elections whose results would be accepted. In the second phase, in the medium to long term (until end of

December 2023), technical assistance could be included regarding legal and procedural matters, operations, electoral security, information technology and database management, external relations, media training, and voter and civic education.

⁸⁰ See resolution 2577 (2021), para. 21.

⁸¹ See resolution 2567 (2021), paras. 4 and 7.

⁸² S/2021/126 and S/2021/127.

⁸³ The Council initially approved the temporary redeployment for a two-month period by an exchange of letters dated 22 and 23 December 2020 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council (S/2020/1290 and S/2020/1291) to assist MINUSCA in reinforcing security in critical areas while maintaining the security of Bangui. See *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

of the United Nations. The Council authorized MINUSMA to use all means necessary to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice and cultural preservation.⁸⁴

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2584 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June and [2590 \(2021\)](#) of 30 August concerning MINUSMA. By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of MINUSMA by one year, until 30 June 2022.⁸⁵

By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council amended the primary strategic priority of MINUSMA by adding support for the political transition in Mali to the existing primary strategic priority of MINUSMA to support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, concluded in 2015, and reiterated that the Mission's second strategic priority was to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a comprehensive politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State authority, the presence of the State and basic social services in central Mali.⁸⁶

Stressing that MINUSMA should implement its mandate on the basis of a prioritization of tasks, the Council made several adjustments to the Mission's priority and other tasks as defined in the resolution. Specifically, the Council expanded the Mission's existing priority task of supporting the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation to include support for the full realization of the political transition.⁸⁷ The Council requested MINUSMA to assist the authorities in ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women in the political transition.⁸⁸ The Council specified that the electoral assistance role of MINUSMA would from that point onwards include assisting the Malian authorities in the holding of presidential elections with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women and the inclusion of youth, refugees and internally displaced persons,

noting that presidential elections were scheduled to take place on 27 February 2022.⁸⁹

With regard to the priority task of supporting the stabilization and restoration of State authority in central Mali, the Council decided that MINUSMA would support Malian authorities in agreeing on and implementing a politically-led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish the State's presence, State authority and basic social services in central Mali, ensuring strengthened coordination between civilian and military components of the Mission as well as coordination with local and regional communities, groups and military and civilian authorities.⁹⁰ The Council also decided that the Mission would support the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces to central Mali on the basis of clear, coherent and dynamic planning, strengthened information and intelligence-sharing.⁹¹ In addition, MINUSMA was to increase efforts to improve coordination between its civil, military and police components.⁹² Regarding the protection of civilians, MINUSMA was to strengthen and promote the understanding of the mission-wide early warning and response mechanisms, as part of its support for Malian authorities in anticipating, deterring and responding to threats to civilians, notably in northern and central Mali.⁹³

As regards the Mission's other, non-priority tasks, the Council authorized MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices, as well as with weapons and ammunition management,⁹⁴ a task that the Mission was last authorized to undertake by resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#).⁹⁵ In resolutions [2584 \(2021\)](#) and [2590 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to assist and exchange information with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to the same resolution.⁹⁶ In resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council authorized the Mission to assist in raising awareness of the roles and mandates of the Committee and the Panel.⁹⁷

⁸⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2012 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 11.

⁸⁵ See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 17.

⁸⁶ Ibid., para. 21.

⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 30 (a).

⁸⁸ Ibid., para. 53.

⁸⁹ Ibid., para. 30 (a) (vi).

⁹⁰ Ibid., para. 30 (b) (i) and (ii).

⁹¹ Ibid., para. 30 (b) (i) and (ii).

⁹² Ibid., para. 27.

⁹³ Ibid., para. 30 (c) (ii).

⁹⁴ Ibid., para. 31 (c).

⁹⁵ See resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#), para. 39 (b).

⁹⁶ See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 31 (b) and resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

⁹⁷ See resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 31 (b).

Concerning other security presences in Mali and the Sahel, in resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure adequate coordination between MINUSMA and European partners, including Task Force Takuba, and to use the convening of regular meetings of the Instance de coordination au Mali as a platform to assist Mali in getting an encompassing view of the actions undertaken by the various security presences in the country.⁹⁸ With regard to cross-cutting issues, the Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to support efforts to prevent sexual violence related to the conflict in the country including by supporting the provision of medical services, sexual and reproductive health-care services, psychological services, mental health-care services, legal services and socioeconomic services to all survivors of sexual violence.⁹⁹ The Council maintained all other Mission tasks without modification.

With regard to the effectiveness of MINUSMA, the Council outlined 15 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations for the Secretary-General to implement in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations.¹⁰⁰

The Council decided to maintain the composition of MINUSMA during the reporting period.¹⁰¹ However, in the light of the growing insecurity and the rise in physical violence against civilians in central Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, no later than 15 July, a report on the progress of implementation of the force adaptation plan of 2019 and to make recommendations on the force levels and ceiling of MINUSMA uniformed personnel, and expressed its intent to discuss the Mission's force level on the basis of that proposal.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 32.

⁹⁹ Ibid., para. 55.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., para. 47.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., para. 18.

¹⁰² Ibid., para. 19. In [S/2021/657](#), the Secretary-General recommended an increase of 2,069 uniformed personnel, consisting of 1,730 military personnel, 300 formed police unit personnel and 39 individual police officers, with the aim of enhancing the Mission's ability to protect civilians in central Mali and create further space for the peace process in the north.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#) of 10 April 2014, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. MINUSCA was authorized to use all means necessary to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation strategies.¹⁰³

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2566 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March, [2588 \(2021\)](#) of 29 July and [2605 \(2021\)](#) of 12 November concerning MINUSCA. By resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of MINUSCA for one year, until 15 November 2022.¹⁰⁴

At the beginning of 2021, in resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), the Council expressed grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in the Central African Republic¹⁰⁵ and decided to increase the Mission's military component by 2,750 personnel (from 11,650 to 14,400) and the police component by 940 personnel (from 2,080 to 3,020),¹⁰⁶ as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 16 February.¹⁰⁷ The Council stressed that the reinforcements were aimed at enhancing the ability of MINUSCA to perform its priority tasks in an evolving context, in particular to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian access, and to enhance the Mission's capacity to prevent and reverse a further deterioration of the security situation while creating space for the political process to advance.¹⁰⁸ The Council noted that the reinforcements should be sequenced through a phased approach and requested the Secretary-General to review implementation, performance and necessity ahead of each phase as part of his reports to the Council and to include in the report to be

¹⁰³ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2014 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Central African Republic, see part I, sect. 5.

¹⁰⁴ See resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 29.

¹⁰⁵ See resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), second preambular paragraph.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., para. 1.

¹⁰⁷ [S/2021/146](#).

¹⁰⁸ See resolution [2566 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

issued on 11 October a proposal on the overall reconfiguration of the MINUSCA force.¹⁰⁹ The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour (China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and 1 abstention (Russian Federation).¹¹⁰

On 12 November, the Council adopted resolution 2605 (2021), by which it amended the mandate of MINUSCA. Like resolution 2566 (2021), this resolution was not adopted unanimously; it received 13 votes in favour (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam) and 2 abstentions (China and the Russian Federation).¹¹¹ In the resolution, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA was designed to advance a multiyear strategic vision to create the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to national reconciliation and durable peace through the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic of 6 February 2019 and the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping.¹¹² The Council recalled that the Mission's mandate should be implemented on the basis of a prioritization

of tasks.¹¹³ The priority tasks were largely reiterated, with few modifications: protecting civilians; providing good offices and supporting the peace process and the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation; facilitating the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and protecting United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods.¹¹⁴

In terms of modifications concerning the protection of civilians, the Council decided that the Mission's mandate would include supporting the authorities of the Central African Republic in preventing, mitigating and responding to the threat posed by explosive ordnance.¹¹⁵ The Council expanded the Mission's mandate for the protection of women and children to include the provision of assistance to women and children affected by armed conflict, including by deploying protection advisers, child protection advisers, women protection advisers and civilian and uniformed gender advisers and focal points, as well as by holding consultations with women's organizations and providing support to women's participation in early warning mechanisms.¹¹⁶ The Council mandated MINUSCA to take concrete measures to mitigate and avoid the use of schools by armed forces and deter the use of schools by parties to the conflict, and to facilitate the continuation of education in situations of armed conflict.¹¹⁷ The Council reiterated its request to MINUSCA to take fully into account child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the authorities in ensuring that the protection of children's rights was taken into account, including through quality education provided in a safe environment in conflict areas in order to end and prevent violations and abuses against children.¹¹⁸ The Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA would include supporting the implementation of the joint communiqué of the Government of the Central African Republic and the United Nations on the prevention of and the fight against conflict-related sexual violence and to take into account the concerns in question throughout the activities of all Mission components. The Council also included in the Mission's mandate the task to ensure, in cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, that risks of conflict-related

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., para. 2.

¹¹⁰ See S/2021/258. Explaining the abstention, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed disappointment that the authors of the resolution had decided not to mention in the text the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance, as they should have done, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/182, and stressed that, in the selection of contingents to be part of the Mission's force, the Secretariat must coordinate closely with Bangui and listen to the views of the people of the Central African Republic. For more information on the Council discussions under the item entitled "The situation in the Central African Republic", see part I, sect. 5.

¹¹¹ See S/PV.8902. The representative of the Russian Federation indicated that a number of fundamental points expressed by the Government of the Central African Republic had not been reflected in the resolution. She added that, although the adoption of the resolution was a token of trust in the Mission, the Russian Federation could not consider the work that MINUSCA had done satisfactory or competent and announced that her delegation would monitor how the Mission would take advantage of the support expressed by the Council. The representative of China regretted that the reasonable suggestions of the Central African Republic had not been afforded full consideration in the resolution.

¹¹² See resolution 2605 (2021), para. 31.

¹¹³ Ibid., para. 32.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., para. 34.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., para. 34 (a) (iii).

¹¹⁶ Ibid., para. 34 (a) (iv).

¹¹⁷ Ibid., para. 34 (a) (v).

¹¹⁸ Ibid., para. 46.

sexual violence were included in the Mission's data collection, threat analysis and early warning system.¹¹⁹

Concerning the Mission's good offices and support for the peace process, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA would include continuing the Mission's role in that regard, including in support of the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the ceasefire, and to take active steps in support of the authorities in the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation on the basis of the roadmap adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in Luanda on 16 September.¹²⁰ The Council further specified that the Mission would need to ensure that its political and security strategies promoted a coherent process, particularly in support of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, which connected national peace efforts with the ongoing efforts to monitor the ceasefire, and to promote the participation of women and gender equality.¹²¹ In addition, MINUSCA was tasked with providing technical expertise to the authorities of the Central African Republic in their engagement with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.¹²²

In terms of the Mission's other tasks, the Council decided that the assistance of MINUSCA to the republican dialogue and the 2022 elections would include good offices, security support, operational support, logistical support and, as appropriate, technical support, and coordination with the United Nations Development Programme regarding international electoral assistance.¹²³ MINUSCA was tasked with supporting the authorities of the Central African Republic in safeguarding State institutions and addressing the cross-border illicit trade in natural resources.¹²⁴ The Council mandated MINUSCA to ensure appropriate oversight of the progressive redeployment of vetted members of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic or of the Internal Security Forces engaged in joint operations with MINUSCA and the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law, and emphasized that those efforts were to be carried out in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces and contingent on a determination by MINUSCA of the compliance by the

recipients with the Status of Forces Agreement, human rights law and international humanitarian law.¹²⁵

The Council reiterated that MINUSCA was to support the authorities of the Central African Republic in implementing an inclusive and progressive programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, adding that such a programme was to be gender-sensitive, and authorized the Mission to support, in consultation and coordination with international partners, temporary and voluntary cantonment sites in support of community-based socioeconomic reintegration while paying specific attention to the needs of children associated with armed forces and groups and women combatants.¹²⁶ MINUSCA was tasked with coordinating the support provided by multilateral and bilateral partners, including the World Bank and the Peacebuilding Commission, with regard to disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.¹²⁷ Regarding support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law, and as part of the urgent temporary measures, on an exceptional basis, without creating a precedent and without prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations, the Mission was authorized to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity, and to pay particular attention in that regard to those violating the ceasefire or the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation.¹²⁸

In resolution 2605 (2021), the Council reauthorized MINUSCA to assist the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, and requested the Mission to provide support to the authorities of the Central African Republic in their efforts to achieve progress on the key benchmarks for the review of the arms embargo measures, established in the presidential statement of 9 April 2019.¹²⁹ The Council made the request in addition to an earlier request, reiterated in resolution 2588 (2021), that MINUSCA report on how the exemption of supplies of non-lethal equipment and the provision of assistance intended solely for support of or use in the country's security sector reform was contributing to that security sector reform.¹³⁰

¹¹⁹ Ibid., para. 34 (a) (vi).

¹²⁰ Ibid., para. 34 (b) (i).

¹²¹ Ibid., para. 34 (b) (iii).

¹²² Ibid., para. 34 (b) (vii).

¹²³ Ibid., para. 35 (b).

¹²⁴ Ibid., para. 35 (c) (i).

¹²⁵ Ibid., para. 35 (c) (iii).

¹²⁶ Ibid., para. 35 (e) (i).

¹²⁷ Ibid., para. 35 (e) (iv).

¹²⁸ Ibid., para. 35 (f) (iii).

¹²⁹ Ibid., para. 36 (a) and para. 49, and [S/PRST/2019/3](#), seventh paragraph. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, see part IX, sect. I.

¹³⁰ See resolution 2588 (2021), para. 1 (b).

Regarding the effectiveness of MINUSCA, in resolution 2605 (2021), the Council requested the Secretary-General to fully implement 16 substantive and operational capacities and existing obligations in the planning and conduct of the Mission's operations.¹³¹

By an exchange of letters dated 4 and 10 February between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,¹³² as a temporary request under emergency circumstances brought about by the election-related violence in the Central African Republic since

¹³¹ See resolution 2605 (2021), para. 42.

¹³² S/2021/126 and S/2021/127.

mid-December 2020, the Council approved the final extension by two months of the temporary redeployment of two infantry companies and two military utility helicopters from UNMISS to MINUSCA, which continued to be counted against the authorized ceiling on military and civilian personnel of UNMISS.¹³³

¹³³ The Council had initially approved the temporary redeployment for a two-month period by an exchange of letters dated 22 and 23 December 2020 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council (S/2020/1290 and S/2020/1291) to assist MINUSCA in reinforcing security in critical areas while maintaining the security of Bangui. See *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. I.

Asia

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution 39 (1948). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution 91 (1951), decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire

in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. In 2021, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946–1951*, and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952 to 2020.

Europe

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. In the interest of preserving international peace and security, UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.¹³⁵

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions 2561 (2021) of 29 January and 2587 (2021) of 29 July concerning UNFICYP. The Council

extended the mandate of the mission twice for a period of six months each time, the second time until 31 January 2022.¹³⁶

During the period under review, the Council did not modify the mandate or composition of UNFICYP. By resolution 2561 (2021), the Council reiterated its request that UNFICYP take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, and requested the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the number of women in UNFICYP and ensure their full, equal and meaningful participation in all aspects of its operations, including senior leadership positions, and to implement other relevant provisions of resolution

¹³⁵ For further information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous supplements covering the period 1964 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Cyprus, see part I, sect. 16.

¹³⁶ See resolutions 2561 (2021), para. 9, and 2587 (2021), para. 10.

2538 (2020). The request was again reiterated in resolution 2587 (2021).¹³⁷

In resolution 2587 (2021), the Council regretted the lack of progress on an effective mechanism for direct military contacts between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides and the relevant involved parties, and urged engagement by the sides and parties, facilitated by UNFICYP, to develop a suitably acceptable proposal on the establishment of such a mechanism, and its timely implementation.¹³⁸

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Council on

¹³⁷ See resolutions 2561 (2021), para. 14, and 2587 (2021), para. 16.

¹³⁸ See resolution 2587 (2021), para. 6.

10 June 1999, by resolution 1244 (1999), under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.¹³⁹ In 2021, the Council did not adopt any decisions relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIK, see previous supplements covering the period 1996 to 2020.

¹⁴⁰ For more information on Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999), see part I, sect. 17.B.

Middle East

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution 50 (1948), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the establishment of UNTSO, the Council has assigned it different tasks without formally changing its mandate, including the supervision of the General Armistice, the supervision of the armistice following the Suez war, the supervision of the armistice between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai, and the supervision of the truce between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, in collaboration with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), respectively.¹⁴¹

In 2021, the Council did not make changes to the composition or mandate of UNTSO, which remained open-ended. By resolutions 2581 (2021) of 29 June and 2613 (2021) of 21 December concerning the mandate

of UNDOF, the Council encouraged the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on recommendations from the 2018 independent review of UNDOF to improve mission performance and implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.¹⁴²

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution 350 (1974), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces, in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.¹⁴³

In 2021, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions 2581 (2021) of 29 June and 2613 (2021) of 21 December concerning UNDOF. The Council extended the mandate of the mission twice for a period

¹⁴¹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNTSO, see *Repertoire 1946–1951* and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

¹⁴² See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 12.

¹⁴³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous supplements covering the period 1972 to 2020.

of six months each time, the second time until 30 June 2022.¹⁴⁴

The Council did not make changes to the mandate or composition of UNDOF during the period under review. In resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), taking into account the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the Council reiterated its request to UNDOF to take all appropriate steps to protect the safety, security and health of all UNDOF personnel, in line with resolution 2518 (2020), within existing capacities and resources.¹⁴⁵ The Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries to seek to increase the number of women in UNDOF and ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of uniformed and civilian women at all levels and in all positions, including senior leadership positions, and to implement other relevant provisions of resolution 2538 (2020).¹⁴⁶ In resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), the Council reiterated its encouragement to the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on the recommendations emanating from the 2018 independent review to improve mission performance and the implementation of the mandate of UNDOF.¹⁴⁷

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. By resolution 1701 (2006), to address the continuing hostilities in Lebanon, the Council expanded the mandate of UNIFIL to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities; accompanying and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces; extending its assistance to help to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; and assisting the Government of

Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel.¹⁴⁸

In 2021, by resolution 2591 (2021) of 30 August, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNIFIL for one year, until 31 August 2022.¹⁴⁹ The resolution was adopted further to the letter dated 4 August from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council recommending the extension of the mandate of the mission.¹⁵⁰

In resolution 2591 (2021), the Council reiterated the overall mandate of UNIFIL and made several additions. The Council expressed concern about the strong negative impact of the social, economic and humanitarian crises in Lebanon on the capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces, and requested UNIFIL, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), to take temporary and special measures, without prejudice to the mandate and its implementation, and the concept of operations and rules of engagement, to support and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces with the provision of relevant additional non-lethal material (fuel, food and medicine) and logistical support.¹⁵¹ The support would be provided for a limited period of six months, within the existing resources and without implications to the increase of the budget level, as part of the joint activities undertaken by the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.¹⁵² The Council added that the support should not be considered as a precedent, that it should be provided with full respect Lebanese sovereignty and at the request of the Lebanese authorities, and that it should be subject to appropriate and immediate oversight and scrutiny.¹⁵³

The Council reiterated its request to UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full, equal, effective and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making in all efforts for the maintenance and

¹⁴⁴ See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 15. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

¹⁴⁵ See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 8.

¹⁴⁶ See resolution 2613 (2021), para. 13.

¹⁴⁷ See resolutions 2581 (2021) and 2613 (2021), para. 12. See S/2018/1088, which provides an overview of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mission's mandate.

¹⁴⁸ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous supplements covering the period 1975 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question and the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sects. 19 and 20.

¹⁴⁹ See resolution 2591 (2021), para. 1.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., sixth preambular paragraph. See also S/2021/707.

¹⁵¹ See resolution 2591 (2021), thirtieth preambular paragraph and para. 11.

¹⁵² Ibid., para. 11.

¹⁵³ Ibid., para. 11.

promotion of peace and security, including in the security sector.¹⁵⁴

The Council welcomed the constructive role played by the tripartite mechanism in facilitating coordination and in de-escalating tensions, again encouraged UNIFIL to implement, in close coordination with the parties, measures to further reinforce the capacities of the tripartite mechanism and

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 26.

urged the parties to make a systematic, constructive and expanded use of the tripartite mechanism, including the subcommittee on the marking of the Blue Line and additional ad hoc subcommittees, as recommended in the report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL dated 1 June 2020 (S/2020/473).¹⁵⁵ The Council maintained the composition of UNIFIL during the reporting period.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 13 and penultimate preambular paragraph.

II. Special political missions

Note

Section II is focused on the decisions adopted by the Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions,¹⁵⁶ as well as the changes to their mandates.¹⁵⁷

Overview of special political missions during 2021

In 2021, the Council oversaw 12 special political missions. Five were based in Africa, three in the Middle East and two each in the Americas and Asia. Their nature varied from regional offices such as the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), missions with limited mandates to monitor and support the implementation of ceasefires and peace agreements such as the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), to larger assistance missions such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), the United Nations Assistance

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

Newly established special political missions, terminations and extensions of mandates

The Council did not establish new or terminate existing special political missions during the period under review. The Council extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), UNAMA, UNAMI, UNITAMS, UNOCA, UNMHA, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. The mandates of BINUH, UNAMA, UNSMIL and UNSOM, were extended for shorter periods of time compared with previous years without any modification or specific listing of their tasks. While the UNSOM mandate was shortened in duration, the Council did modify its content. The mandate of UNOWAS was renewed in 2020 for a period of three years, until 31 January 2023,¹⁵⁸ while the mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon remained open-ended.

Mandates of special political missions: differences in scope

In 2021, for most special political missions, the Council prioritized mandate tasks related to good offices and technical support for the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and national and local-level reconciliation, and political transitions involving elections and constitutional review processes. The Council underlined the importance of strengthening good governance and the capacity of national institutions to deliver basic services and implement reform agendas, including justice and

¹⁵⁶ Special political missions described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions, such as offices of special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms, are covered in parts VII and IX of the present Supplement.

¹⁵⁷ For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping operations or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

¹⁵⁸ See S/2019/1009 and S/2020/85. See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part X, sect. II.

security sector reform, as well as of providing support for the promotion and protection of human rights, and of ensuring accountability. As part of those priorities, most missions were mandated to coordinate and support the mobilization of humanitarian and development assistance among a broad spectrum of United Nations, international, regional and subregional partners and stakeholders. Gender mainstreaming, including ensuring the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in political decision-making, as well as the protection of children, were the most common cross-cutting element of mandates.

Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to monitor and analyse emerging threats to peace and security, support the strengthening of local capacities for conflict prevention and management and early warning, promote inclusive political dialogue and reform processes and improve governance, provide electoral support and help to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues and challenges such as transnational organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, illicit trafficking, transhumance and conflicts between farmers and herders, and the security implications of climate change. The mandates of BINUH and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia placed particular emphasis on, respectively, capacity-building of national justice and rule of law institutions and the political, economic and social reincorporation of former members of armed groups. UNMHA further retained its relatively narrow mandate to oversee and facilitate the implementation of ceasefire arrangements.

Mandates of special political missions: modifications

In 2021, the Council modified the mandates of seven missions, namely UNAMI, UNITAMS, UNOCA, UNOWAS, UNSMIL, UNSOM and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. Specifically, the Council expanded the roles of UNITAMS, UNSMIL and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia to support the implementation of peace and ceasefire agreements in Colombia, Libya and the Sudan. In that regard, after the signing of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan, concluded between the Government of the Sudan and several Sudanese armed groups on 3 October 2020, the Council decided that UNITAMS would support the implementation of the Juba Agreement, including its ceasefire arrangements and monitoring mechanisms, and to provide expanded advisory and capacity-building support to the Joint Security-Keeping Force envisaged

thereunder.¹⁵⁹ UNSMIL was tasked with supporting the implementation of the Libyan ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020 and its monitoring mechanisms, including by deploying ceasefire monitors.¹⁶⁰ At the request of the Government of Colombia, the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia was expanded to include the verification of compliance with and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace as provided for in the Colombian peace agreement.¹⁶¹

The Council strengthened the electoral support mandates of UNAMI and UNSOM in preparation for the presidential and parliamentary elections in, respectively, Iraq and Somalia. Specifically, UNSOM was tasked with supporting the conduct of elections in accordance with the framework agreed by the Somali parties on 27 May and to continue efforts towards inclusive and transparent one-person, one-vote elections at the levels of the federal member states and the districts in preparation for holding such elections at the federal level in 2025.¹⁶² In preparation for the Iraqi national election scheduled for 10 October, the Council decided that UNAMI would provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations election monitoring team to for monitoring on election day and to continue to assist with the election in a manner that respected Iraqi sovereignty.¹⁶³ That task included launching a strategic messaging campaign to educate, inform and update Iraqi voters on election preparations and United Nations activities in that regard.¹⁶⁴

Mandates of special political missions: cross-cutting issues

The Council placed significant emphasis on the inclusion and participation of women, youth and other marginalized groups in political and decision-making processes. For example, the Council decided that UNSOM should engage with the federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to ensure the participation in Somali-led politics of all stakeholders, including women, youth and all Somali clans.¹⁶⁵ UNAMI, as part of its priority task of providing advice, support and assistance for inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation, was tasked with taking into account civil society input, with the full, equal meaningful

¹⁵⁹ See resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (ii) and (iii) (b).

¹⁶⁰ See resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), paras. 15 and 16.

¹⁶¹ See resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁶² See resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (c).

¹⁶³ See resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 2 (a).

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (c).

¹⁶⁵ See resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (a).

participation of women.¹⁶⁶ As part of broader subregional efforts in Central Africa, UNOCA was given a mandate to develop, in consultation with Member States, regional partners, civil society networks and local communities, including women and young people, integrated strategies for supporting national efforts to sustain peace and prevent conflicts in the region, and to undertake early warning and analysis, including from a gender perspective.¹⁶⁷

Several missions were given new tasks related to emerging peace and security issues such as the impact of climate change and the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, among other things. For example, UNAMI was requested to advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on the adverse impact of climate change and to promote, support and facilitate the coordination and delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance, notably to respond to the pandemic.¹⁶⁸ Similarly, the Council added an additional element to the role played by UNSOM in promoting cooperation to maximize the use of development financing in Somalia to include issues related to climate change, drought and the safe, effective and equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.¹⁶⁹ UNOCA was given a mandate to support United Nations efforts, as well as regional and subregional efforts, to address the impact of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security such as those related to terrorist groups, the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes, natural disasters, illicit trafficking in natural resources and wildlife, and farmer-herder dynamics.¹⁷⁰ More broadly with regard to peacebuilding, the Council specified that UNITAMS and UNSOM were to work with international financial institutions in the mobilization and coordination of

development assistance,¹⁷¹ while UNOCA was given a mandate to support subregional efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Goals.¹⁷² The Council called on UNOWAS to work with all elements of the system at headquarters, including continued engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission and, in West Africa and the Sahel, the regional collaborative platform in West Africa and the Sahel.¹⁷³

Mandate reviews

Regarding the future of special political missions, the Council requested the Secretary-General to review the mandates of four special political missions, namely BINUH, UNAMA, UNMHA and UNSOM, and to submit recommendations on ways to adjust the mandate to the situation on the ground, on benchmarks to track progress in mandate implementation and on ways to increase mission effectiveness, depending on the mission.¹⁷⁴

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2021, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the period under review; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

¹⁷¹ In connection with UNITAMS, see resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), para. 3 (iv) (a); in connection with UNSOM, see resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (n).

¹⁷² See [S/2021/719](#), annex, objective 4 (e), and [S/2021/720](#).

¹⁷³ See [S/PRST/2021/3](#), penultimate paragraph.

¹⁷⁴ In connection with UNMHA, see resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), para. 8; in connection with UNSOM, see resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 18; in connection with UNAMA, see resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 5; in connection with BINUH, see resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), paras. 2 and 3.

¹⁶⁶ See resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 4 (a).

¹⁶⁷ See [S/2021/719](#), annex, objective 1 (b) and (c), and [S/2021/720](#).

¹⁶⁸ See resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 4 (b) (iv) and (c) (i).

¹⁶⁹ See resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), para. 6 (m).

¹⁷⁰ See [S/2021/719](#), annex, objective 3 (a), and [S/2021/720](#).

Table 4
Mandates of special political missions, 2021: Africa

Mandate	UNOCA	UNSMIL	UNSOM	UNOWAS	UNITAMS
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring		X			X
Civil-military coordination					

**Part X. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council:
peacekeeping operations and special political missions**

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNSMIL</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>UNOWAS</i>	<i>UNITAMS</i>
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X		X
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights-related ^a	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support		X		X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security	X		X	X	
Mission impact assessment					
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians					X
Public information				X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform			X	X	X
Support to military			X		X
Support to police			X		X
Support to sanctions regimes		X			X
Support to State institutions		X	X		X

Abbreviations: UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Table 5
Mandates of special political missions, 2021: Americas, Asia and Middle East

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
Chapter VII							
Ceasefire monitoring	X						X
Civilian-military coordination			X				
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X			X		X
Electoral assistance		X	X		X		
Human rights-related ^a		X	X		X		
Humanitarian support			X		X		
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Protection of civilians			X				
Public information					X		
Rule of law/judicial matters	X	X	X		X		
Security monitoring – patrolling – deterrence							X
Security sector reform					X		
Support to police		X					
Support to sanctions regimes							
Support to State institutions			X		X		

Abbreviations: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Africa

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.¹⁷⁵ The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance. UNOCA was subsequently mandated to promote efforts to address emerging security and cross-border threats, to incorporate gender perspectives in the implementation of its mandate and to take into consideration in its activities climate and

ecological change and natural disasters on the stability of the Central African region.¹⁷⁶

In 2021, by an exchange of letters dated 3 and 6 August between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the Council extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2024.¹⁷⁷

In extending the mandate, the Council adjusted the Office's objectives and mandate tasks. The Council took note of the draft mandate for UNOCA submitted by the Secretary-General, which contained the following amended objectives to be pursued by UNOCA in close collaboration with relevant subregional and regional partners and relevant United Nations entities: (a) monitor political and security developments in Central Africa and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General in order to prevent and resolve conflicts, to help sustain peace and to advise the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on sustaining peace issues in Central Africa; (b) enhance subregional capacities for

¹⁷⁵ S/2009/697 and S/2010/457.

¹⁷⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2008 to 2020.

¹⁷⁷ S/2021/719 and S/2021/720. For more information on the situation in the Central African region, see part I, sect. 6.

conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion, with due attention to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including human rights and gender dimensions; (c) support and enhance United Nations efforts in the subregion, as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives; and (d) enhance coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security.¹⁷⁸

Under the first objective, the mandate would continue to include the task of performing good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General, and would be expanded with the tasks of preventing and resolving conflicts and undertaking regular early warning and analysis of, and reporting on, the situation in the countries of the subregion and regional trends, including from a gender perspective.¹⁷⁹ In addition, UNOCA was newly tasked with developing, in consultation with Member States, regional partners, civil society networks and local communities, including women and young people, integrated strategies for supporting national efforts to sustain peace and prevent conflicts in the region, and rally international and regional support for such strategies.¹⁸⁰

Under the second objective, efforts by UNOCA to enhance the capacity of subregional actors, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States, for conflict prevention, mediation and peace consolidation, would henceforth include advancing human rights and inclusive peace and democratic processes.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, the mandate would include building partnerships with civil society, including women's and youth groups, and supporting subregional civil society networks, in particular the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa.¹⁸² The mandate of UNOCA was modified specifically to include cooperation with the African Union and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in addition to cooperation with other regional and subregional organizations and mechanisms.¹⁸³

Regarding the third objective of supporting United Nations efforts in the subregion and regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, UNOCA was tasked with rallying subregional support for the peace process in the Central African Republic,

in close cooperation with MINUSCA.¹⁸⁴ The mandate was further expanded to include promoting good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, management and resolution initiatives in Central Africa.¹⁸⁵ With respect to the Office's role in promoting, supporting and advocating United Nations, regional and subregional efforts to address the impact of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security, the mandate was adjusted to include threats related to terrorist groups in the Lake Chad basin region and the Sahel region, the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters, illicit trafficking in natural resources and wildlife, and farmer-herder dynamics.¹⁸⁶ The mandate was also modified to include promoting and supporting, as appropriate, regional and subregional efforts to address the root causes of and achieve solutions to forced displacement.¹⁸⁷

Finally, under the existing fourth objective of enhancing coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security, UNOCA was tasked with supporting United Nations country teams in helping to address structural conflict prevention efforts at the country level, including through contributions to common country assessments, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks and relevant sustaining peace strategies.¹⁸⁸ The mandate was further adjusted to include the task of enhancing collaboration and coordination with UNOWAS in strengthening United Nations, regional and international efforts to address cross-cutting and cross-border challenges to peace and security, and establishing a clear division of labour between it and other United Nations entities in the subregion.¹⁸⁹ Finally, UNOCA was tasked with advocating for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and helping to leverage the role of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and other regional actors to that effect.¹⁹⁰

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council

¹⁷⁸ See [S/2021/719](#), annex.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., objectives 1 (a) and (b).

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., objective 1 (c).

¹⁸¹ Ibid., objective 2 (a).

¹⁸² Ibid., objective 2 (c).

¹⁸³ Ibid., objective 2 (d).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., objective 3 (c). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see sect. I above.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., objective 3 (d).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., objective 3 (a).

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., objective 3 (b).

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., objective 4 (c).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., objective 4 (a) and (d).

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., objective 4 (e).

established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.¹⁹¹

In 2021, the Council adopted resolutions [2570 \(2021\)](#) and [2571 \(2021\)](#) of 16 April, [2595 \(2021\)](#) of 15 September and [2599 \(2021\)](#) of 30 September concerning UNSMIL. In addition, the Council addressed the mandate of UNSMIL in an exchange of letters dated 29 December 2020 and 4 February 2021 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,¹⁹² and in a statement by the President adopted on 15 July.¹⁹³ Departing from the prior practice of one-year extensions, the Council, by resolutions [2595 \(2021\)](#) and [2599 \(2021\)](#), extended the mandate for periods of 15 days and four months, respectively, the second time until 31 January 2022.¹⁹⁴

During the period under review, the Council expanded the mandate to include the provision of support for the ceasefire agreement concluded on 23 October 2020. In the course of the exchange of letters, the members of the Council, as they examined the Secretary-General's recommendations for an amendment to the Mission's mandate concerning ceasefire support, requested that the Secretary-General establish and deploy swiftly an advance team to Libya, security conditions and COVID-19 pandemic requirements permitting, as proposed by the Secretary-General.¹⁹⁵ In the letter from the President of the Council to the Secretary-General of 4 February, the members of the Council conveyed that they would welcome reporting on the preparations undertaken by the advance team, as well as practical proposals, following coordination with the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, for amending the Mission's mandate, including with regard to the tasks and scale of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism, as soon as possible and no later than 45 days from the date of the letter. On 19 March, as requested by the Council, the Secretary-General submitted a progress report,¹⁹⁶ in which he outlined the developments regarding the Libyan-led

and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism that had transpired since his report of 19 January.¹⁹⁷ The report contained an update on the advance team's work, its mandate and terms of reference, and the consultations it had undertaken with Libyan and international stakeholders.

In resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), the Council took note of the progress report of the Secretary-General and approved his proposals concerning the composition and operational aspects of the ceasefire monitoring component as set out in his letter of 7 April.¹⁹⁸ The Council recalled resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) and its decision therein that UNSMIL was to help to achieve a ceasefire and provide appropriate support for its implementation.¹⁹⁹ The Council requested the Mission to provide support to the 5+5 Joint Military Commission and the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, including through the facilitation of confidence-building measures and the scalable and incremental deployment of ceasefire monitors once conditions allowed.²⁰⁰ Recalling resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#), the Council underscored the Mission's role in supporting the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 24 December.²⁰¹

The Council expressed its intention to review the progress made towards the deployment of UNSMIL ceasefire monitors ahead of the renewal of the Mission's mandate on 15 September; it requested that, as part of the independent strategic review of UNSMIL, previously requested in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#), the ceasefire monitoring component of the Mission be considered, and that the Secretary-General consult the Council about any increase in the initial maximum number of ceasefire monitors set out in his letter of 7 April.²⁰²

In the presidential statement adopted on 15 July, the Council welcomed efforts by UNSMIL to encourage the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum to

¹⁹⁷ [S/2021/62](#).

¹⁹⁸ [S/2021/353](#).

¹⁹⁹ See resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), para. 15.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 16.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, para. 20. See also [S/2021/716](#), annex, in which the Independent Expert who conducted the independent strategic review recommended, inter alia, that the good offices of the Mission be intensified; that the Head of Mission be relocated to Tripoli from Geneva; that the Mission return to its previous configuration consisting of a Special Representative instead of a Special Envoy, to be supported by two Deputy Special Representatives; that an immediate surge capacity be put in place to reinforce the Mission; and that women and child protection advisers be deployed swiftly.

¹⁹¹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous supplements covering the period 2010 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Libya, see part I, sect. 10.

¹⁹² [S/2020/1309](#) and [S/2021/110](#).

¹⁹³ [S/PRST/2021/12](#).

¹⁹⁴ See resolutions [2595 \(2021\)](#) and [2599 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁹⁵ [S/2020/1309](#) and [S/2021/110](#).

¹⁹⁶ [S/2021/281](#).

develop proposals for a free, fair and inclusive electoral process, and recalled the Mission's role in supporting the ceasefire.²⁰³

By resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of UNSMIL as set out in resolution 2542 (2020) and resolution 2570 (2021), paragraph 16, without reiterating the content and without further modification.²⁰⁴ After the vote on resolution 2595 (2021), the representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States exchanged views regarding the ongoing discussions on the Mission's future mandate in the light of the findings of the independent strategic review and the elections scheduled for 24 December.²⁰⁵ In their statements following the vote on resolution 2599 (2021), Council members expressed differing views on whether the recommendations emanating from the review should be implemented before or after the elections.²⁰⁶

As regards matters other than the Mission's support for the ceasefire, the Council, by resolution 2571 (2021), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations, reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) and called on the Mission and the Government of Libya to support the Panel's investigatory work inside Libya.²⁰⁷

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

By resolution 2102 (2013) of 2 May 2013, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) with the mandate, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and State-building; to assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help to build the capacity of the federal

Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the strengthening of justice institutions; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.²⁰⁸

In 2021, the Council adopted resolutions 2568 (2021) of 12 March and 2592 (2021) of 30 August concerning UNSOM. By resolution 2592 (2021), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNSOM for a period of nine months, until 31 May 2022, a shorter extension than the 12 months provided for in resolution 2540 (2020).²⁰⁹

By resolution 2568 (2021), the Council extended its authorization for the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and called on the federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, AMISOM, UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia and international partners to increase coordination and collaboration, including by establishing a joint fusion cell for the planning and delivery of integrated strategic operations led by the Government; to conduct joint analysis, joint integrated planning, operational coordination and joint performance assessments; and to extend the joint fusion cell into the AMISOM sectors.²¹⁰

By resolution 2592 (2021), the Council renewed the existing mandate of UNSOM as set out in resolution 2158 (2014) with some modifications. With regard to the political process, the Council reiterated that it was the Mission's task to support the federal Government and federal member states in accelerating Somali-led inclusive politics, which ensured the participation of all stakeholders, including women, youth and all Somali clans.²¹¹ The Mission's was to support inter- and intraclan reconciliation at the local, regional and national levels, including through the national reconciliation framework.²¹² The Council expanded the Mission's electoral assistance tasks to include providing support for the conduct of elections in accordance with the implementation framework agreed by the federal Government and federal member states on 27 May to the technical electoral support

²⁰³ See S/PRST/2021/12, eighth and tenth paragraphs.

²⁰⁴ See resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), para. 1.

²⁰⁵ See S/PV.8858.

²⁰⁶ See S/PV.8870. For more information on the discussions after the vote on resolutions 2595 (2021) and 2599 (2021), see part I, sect. 10.

²⁰⁷ See resolution 2571 (2021), para. 14. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Panel of Experts on Libya, see part IX, sect. I.

²⁰⁸ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous supplements covering the period 2013 to 2020. For more information on the situation in Somalia, see part I, sect. 2.

²⁰⁹ See resolution 2592 (2021), para. 1.

²¹⁰ See resolution 2568 (2021), para. 4 (b). For more information on AMISOM, see part VIII, sect. III.

²¹¹ See resolution 2592 (2021), para. 6 (a).

²¹² Ibid., para. 6 (b).

team, the Federal Elections Implementation Team, the state electoral implementation teams and the Electoral Dispute Resolution Committee, all having been newly established, as well as to the federal Government, federal member states, the Somali Parliament and any other stakeholders with an agreed role in election delivery.²¹³ The Council decided that the Mission would continue to support efforts to make progress towards the objective of universal suffrage elections, provide good offices, technical and operational support to the constitutionally mandated electoral management bodies for the conduct of free, fair, inclusive and transparent one-person, one-vote elections at the federal member state and district levels, in preparation for holding such elections at the federal level in 2025.²¹⁴ In addition, the Council decided that UNSOM would provide technical advice and capacity-building assistance to support the federal Government and federal member states in their efforts to enable the full, equal and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making, in the context of elections and peacebuilding and reconciliation processes, as envisaged in the Somali Women's Charter.²¹⁵ The Council also decided that the Mission would continue its advocacy for increased investment in the women and peace and security agenda and to support the federal Government and federal member states in their efforts to enable the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Somalis, including, among other groups, all Somali clans in peace and reconciliation efforts, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and elections, and increasing participation and empowerment of civil society, minority communities and other marginalized groups at all decision-making levels.²¹⁶

The Council decided that the support provided by UNSOM for security sector reform would include the integration of regional forces, the transition of the Somali Police Force to a federal police service and the development of a supporting legal framework and support for the military, police and civilian components of AMISOM in enabling Somalia to take full responsibility for its security in the future with the aim of Somalia taking the lead in 2021 and achieving full responsibility by the end of 2023.²¹⁷ By resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), the Council adjusted the Mission's role in promoting cooperation with relevant partners, with a view to making maximum use of development financing in Somalia, including in response to climate

change, flooding, drought, locusts and the COVID-19 pandemic, including the safe, effective and equitable distribution of vaccines.²¹⁸ The Council further mandated UNSOM to work closely with the United Nations country team, international financial institutions and all relevant stakeholders to ensure that international support to the federal Government and federal member states was conflict-sensitive and served to maximize policy and operational coherence on the basis of a shared understanding of risks and opportunities for peace and development.²¹⁹

Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General, following consultations with the federal Government, to undertake a strategic review of UNSOM after the election process had concluded and after the anticipated reconfiguration of security support to Somalia, to include in his review recommendations for clearly defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track the Mission's timely execution and achievement of its mandate, to initiate the development of an integrated strategic framework and to report to the Council by the end of March 2022.²²⁰

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa. The Council mandated UNOWAS to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, and human rights and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and management initiatives. The mandate of UNOWAS was subsequently modified and

²¹³ Ibid., para. 6 (c).

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., para. 6 (d).

²¹⁶ Ibid., para. 6 (d) and (e).

²¹⁷ Ibid., para. 6 (f).

²¹⁸ Ibid., para. 6 (m).

²¹⁹ Ibid., para. 6 (n).

²²⁰ Ibid., para. 18.

was most recently extended for a period of three years, from 1 February 2020 to 31 January 2023.²²¹

In 2021, the Council adopted two presidential statements concerning UNOWAS, one on 3 February and one 17 August.²²²

In the presidential statement adopted on 3 February, the Council welcomed the assumption by UNOWAS of the good offices functions of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, following the conclusion of its mandate on 31 December 2020, and requested specific reporting on that function.²²³ The Council recognized the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on food security on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, stressed the need for long-term strategies and encouraged UNOWAS to continue to integrate those elements into its activities.²²⁴ The Council also encouraged cross-pillar efforts to foster greater coherence and coordination with the United Nations system as well as with partners in the region to implement the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel, and to help to enhance the regional implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063 of the African Union. In that connection, the Council called on UNOWAS to work with all elements of the United Nations system, at headquarters as well as in West Africa and the Sahel, in particular with the Regional Collaborative Platform, to strengthen integrated responses to the challenges facing the region.²²⁵

Subsequently, in the presidential statement adopted on 17 August, the Council commended the recent democratic transition in the Niger and the reconciliation efforts undertaken in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, encouraged the continued pursuit of those dialogues and commended the good offices role played by UNOWAS in supporting democratic practices and the leadership role played by ECOWAS in mediation in the region.²²⁶ The Council also commended the efforts of the countries of the region to advance the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in political processes, welcomed the Secretary-General's reporting on this issue and encouraged

UNOWAS to continue its gender-sensitive reporting.²²⁷ Welcoming the ongoing efforts by ECOWAS to evaluate the plans of action for the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, the Council called for enhanced political support and engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel in accompanying that process to ensure its effective and meaningful operationalization in the countries of the region.²²⁸

United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan

By resolution 2524 (2020) of 3 June 2020, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) for an initial period of 12 months, in the context of the drawdown and exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).²²⁹ The Council decided that UNITAMS, as part of an integrated and unified United Nations structure in the Sudan, would have four strategic objectives, namely to assist the political transition in the Sudan, progress towards democratic governance, in the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; to support peace processes and the implementation of future peace agreements; to assist peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, in particular in Darfur and Blue Nile and South Kordofan (Two Areas); and to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

In 2021, by resolution 2579 (2021) of 3 June, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNITAMS for one year, until 3 June 2022, and introduced several adjustments.²³⁰ Specifically, the Council amended the Mission's second strategic objective of supporting peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements to include the implementation of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan concluded between the Government of the Sudan and several Sudanese armed groups on 3 October 2020.²³¹ The Council decided that

²²¹ For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see previous supplements covering the period 2016 to 2020. For more information on peace consolidation in West Africa, see part I, sect. 8.

²²² S/PRST/2021/3 and S/PRST/2021/16, respectively.

²²³ See S/PRST/2021/3, fifteenth paragraph.

²²⁴ Ibid., thirteenth paragraph.

²²⁵ Ibid., seventeenth paragraph.

²²⁶ See S/PRST/2021/16, tenth paragraph.

²²⁷ Ibid., eleventh paragraph.

²²⁸ Ibid., ninth paragraph.

²²⁹ See resolution 2524 (2020), para. 1. For more information on the history of the establishment of UNITAMS, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*. For more information on the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", see part I, sect. 7.

²³⁰ See resolution 2579 (2021), para. 1.

²³¹ Ibid., para. 3 (ii).

UNITAMS would provide scalable support for the implementation of the Agreement and any future peace agreements, including support for ceasefire arrangements and monitoring mechanisms, for the provisions concerning power-sharing, landownership and usage, accountability and transitional justice, for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and for the safe and effective management and storage and security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles.²³² In addition, UNITAMS was tasked with providing good offices and support for ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government and Sudanese armed groups.²³³

In resolution 2579 (2021), the Council added further elements to the strategic objectives of UNITAMS of assisting in the political transition in the Sudan; assisting in matters related to peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law; and supporting the mobilization of economic and development assistance and the coordination of humanitarian and peacebuilding assistance.²³⁴ Concerning the Mission's assistance to the political transition, the Council decided that UNITAMS would use its good offices to assist in the Sudanese transition, including national efforts to meet the timelines set for it, and to provide technical assistance for the establishment and functioning of the Transitional Legislative Council.²³⁵ Regarding the Mission's role in support of peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, the Council tasked UNITAMS with providing expanded advisory and capacity-building support to the Sudanese Police Force and the Joint Security-Keeping Force envisaged in the Juba Peace Agreement, including through United Nations advisers, working in close cooperation with the United Nations country team.²³⁶ UNITAMS was to support the Government of the Sudan in developing measurable benchmarks for the implementation of the national plan for the protection of civilians and, in doing so, was to emphasize transparency and inclusive procedures; in addition, the Mission was to support the Government in strengthening the promotion of human rights, in particular in conflict-affected areas.²³⁷

Under the Mission's strategic objective of supporting the mobilization and coordination of assistance, the Council tasked UNITAMS with

supporting coordination with international financial institutions and donors to optimize resources in support of the Government's national priorities.²³⁸ The Mission's support for the coordination of humanitarian assistance was expanded to include support for the Government's facilitation efforts and the mobilization of humanitarian financing.²³⁹ The Council also requested UNITAMS and its integrated United Nations country team partners to finalize the Sudan peacemaking, peacebuilding and stabilization programme and ensure that its implementation was sequenced and prioritized in line with the strategic objectives, and that it was reflective of available resources and personnel;²⁴⁰ the Council also requested UNITAMS and its integrated United Nations country team partners to establish an integrated strategic framework within 60 days of the adoption of the resolution, 3 June.²⁴¹ In terms of regional support to the Sudan, the Council encouraged UNITAMS, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity in their efforts, including through a United Nations-African Union senior level coordination mechanism.²⁴²

Importantly, in line with its strategic objectives and support to the Government's national priorities, the Council decided that UNITAMS should prioritize six areas during its mandate period ending on 3 June 2022: (a) ceasefire monitoring in Darfur; (b) implementation of the Government's national plan for the protection of civilians; (c) ongoing and future peace negotiations between the Government and armed groups; (d) inclusive implementation of the power sharing provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement; (e) the constitution-drafting process; and (f) advisory and capacity-building support to the Sudanese Police Forces and the justice sector.²⁴³ In addition, the Council took note of the benchmarks and indicators submitted by the Secretary-General to track the Mission's progress, requested UNITAMS, in consultation with the United Nations country team and the Government, to identify qualitative indicators to complement the existing indicators that were quantitative in nature.²⁴⁴

²³⁸ See resolution 2579 (2021), para. 3 (iv) (a).

²³⁹ Ibid., para. 3 (iv) (c).

²⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 10.

²⁴¹ Ibid., para. 6.

²⁴² Ibid., para. 18.

²⁴³ Ibid., para. 4 (i)–(vi).

²⁴⁴ Ibid., para. 7. See also S/2021/470, annex I, which contains the benchmarks and associated indicators designed to measure progress in the delivery of the nine strategic priorities across the four pillars of the Mission's mandate in line with resolution 2524 (2020).

²³² Ibid., para. 3 (ii) (b).

²³³ Ibid., para. 3 (ii) (a).

²³⁴ Ibid., 3 (ii)–(iv).

²³⁵ Ibid., para. 3 (i) (a) and (b).

²³⁶ Ibid., para. 3 (iii) (b).

²³⁷ Ibid., para. 3 (iii) (c) and (d). See also S/2020/429 and S/2021/984.

Americas

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace of 24 November 2016 between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP.²⁴⁵

In 2021, by resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#) of 11 May and [2603 \(2021\)](#) of 29 October, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Verification Mission for periods of, respectively, five weeks and one year, the second time until 31 October 2022.²⁴⁶ In both instances, the Council acknowledged a request of the Government of Colombia for the Mission's extension.²⁴⁷

By resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), following the request of the Government of Colombia,²⁴⁸ to support the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement, the Council expanded the Mission's mandate to include the verification of compliance with and implementation of the sentences issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to individuals determined to have acknowledged, in detail and completely, the truth and their responsibility before the Judicial Panel for Acknowledgement of Truth, Responsibility and Determination of Facts and Conduct in line with the sentencing framework established under the Final Agreement.²⁴⁹ The Council further decided that the tasks of the Verification Mission in

that regard would be those described in the letter dated 24 February from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council²⁵⁰ and would include verifying the fulfilment by sentenced persons of the terms of their sentences as well as the establishment by Colombian State authorities of the conditions necessary for doing so.²⁵¹ The Council further stated that the Mission would adopt a strategic and inclusive approach to such verification, as described in the letter from the Secretary-General, and took note of the proposal contained therein that monitoring be focused on overall trends in compliance and select individual cases.²⁵²

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

By resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) of 25 June 2019, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). BINUH was mandated to advise the Government of Haiti in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; preserving and advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and promoting and protecting human rights. BINUH was further tasked with assisting the Government in planning and executing free, fair and transparent elections; reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police; developing an inclusive approach to reduce community violence; addressing human rights abuses and violations and complying with international human rights obligations; improving penitentiary administration management and oversight of prison facilities; and strengthening the justice sector.²⁵³

In 2021, the Council adopted a presidential statement on 24 March,²⁵⁴ and adopted resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#) of 15 October concerning BINUH. By that resolution, the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of

²⁴⁵ For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see previous supplements covering the period 2016 to 2020. For more information on the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)", see part I, sect. 13.

²⁴⁶ See resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 4, and [2603 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

²⁴⁷ See resolutions [2574 \(2021\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph, and [2603 \(2021\)](#), eighth preambular paragraph.

²⁴⁸ See [S/2021/147](#).

²⁴⁹ See resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

²⁵⁰ [S/2021/186](#), in which the Secretary-General made his recommendations regarding the expanded mandate of the Verification Mission made further to a request dated 30 January from the Council (see [S/2021/100](#)).

²⁵¹ See resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see previous supplements covering the period 2019 to 2020. For more information on the question concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 12.

²⁵⁴ [S/PRST/2021/7](#).

BINUH in accordance with resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of nine months, until 15 July 2022 without any modifications.²⁵⁵ The Council departed from its previous practice of granting one-year extensions, which it had been following since the mission's establishment in 2019.

In resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of the BINUH mandate, including whether and how the mandate could be adjusted to address the ongoing challenges faced by Haiti; increase the effectiveness of the mission and its efforts to support engagement between Haitian national authorities, civil society and

²⁵⁵ Resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

other stakeholders; strengthen the rule of law; promote respect for human rights; and convey the findings within six months following the adoption of the resolution.²⁵⁶

In the presidential statement adopted on 24 March 2021 and in resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), the Council reiterated its encouragement to continue close collaboration and coordination between BINUH, the United Nations country team, regional organizations and international financial institutions with a view to helping the Government to take responsibility for realizing the long-term stability, sustainable development and economic self-sufficiency of the country.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Ibid., paras. 2 and 3.

²⁵⁷ [S/PRST/2021/7](#), twelfth paragraph and resolution [2600 \(2021\)](#), para. 4.

Asia

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution [1401 \(2002\)](#) of 28 March 2002 with the core mandate to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001, as well as to promote national reconciliation and rapprochement through its good offices and manage all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.²⁵⁸

In 2021, by resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#) of 17 September, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMA as defined in resolution [2543 \(2020\)](#) for a period of six months, until 17 March 2022, which was shorter than the previous mandate extension of one year.²⁵⁹

In resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), following the takeover of the country by the Taliban in August, the Council stressed the critical importance of a continued presence of UNAMA and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes across Afghanistan and called upon all Afghan and international parties to coordinate with the Mission in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of

United Nations and associated personnel throughout the country.²⁶⁰ The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a written report by 31 January 2022 on strategic and operational recommendations for the Mission's mandate, in the light of the recent political, security and social developments.²⁶¹

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,²⁶² at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.²⁶³

²⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 4. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 14.

²⁶¹ Resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

²⁶² [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#).

²⁶³ For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see previous supplements covering the period 2007 to 2020.

²⁵⁸ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2000 to 2020.

²⁵⁹ Resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

Middle East

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#), in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.²⁶⁴ Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.²⁶⁵

In 2021, by resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#) of 27 May, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNAMI for one year, until 27 May 2022.²⁶⁶

The Council commended the efforts by the Government of Iraq to plan and execute free and fair Iraqi-led and owned elections that were inclusive, credible and participatory, and welcomed the request by the Government for further United Nations electoral advice, support and technical assistance in that regard.²⁶⁷ Taking into account the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq dated 11 February,²⁶⁸ the Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, as well as the Mission, would provide a strengthened, robust and visible United Nations team with additional staff in advance of the country's election planned for 10 October, monitor proceedings on election day and continue to assist with the election in a manner that respected Iraqi sovereignty.²⁶⁹ The Council also decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would engage with, encourage, coordinate with and provide logistical and security support to international and regional third-party observers invited by the Government and would launch a United Nations strategic messaging campaign to educate, inform and

update Iraqi voters on election preparations as well as on United Nations activities in support of elections in advance of and on election day.²⁷⁰ The Council further requested that the Secretary-General provide a detailed summary report on the electoral process in Iraq and on the Mission's assistance to that process within 30 days of the conclusion of the elections.²⁷¹

The Council largely reiterated the remaining tasks of UNAMI with several additions. Specifically, the Council requested the Special Representative and UNAMI to take into consideration civil society input, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, when providing advice, support and assistance to the Government and the people of Iraq on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.²⁷² Similarly, the Council requested that the Special Representative and UNAMI advise and assist the Government in ensuring the full, equal, and meaningful participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making, including in the context of elections, and the promotion of women's economic empowerment, by supporting the implementation of the national action plan on women and peace and security.²⁷³

The Council also requested that the Special Representative and UNAMI further assist the Government with facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation on a variety of issues, including the adverse impacts of climate change,²⁷⁴ and the coordination and delivery of medical assistance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁷⁵ The Council asked the Special Representative and UNAMI to note the importance of treating children affected by armed conflict primarily as victims and support the implementation of the conclusions of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.²⁷⁶ In addition, the Council requested the Special Representative and UNAMI to encourage both the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to implement fully their budget agreement concluded in 2021 and to negotiate agreements on other outstanding issues.²⁷⁷ Finally, the Council expressed its intention to review

²⁶⁴ [S/2003/715](#).

²⁶⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous supplements covering the period 2003 to 2020. For more information on the situation concerning Iraq, see part I, sect. 21.

²⁶⁶ Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph.

²⁶⁸ [S/2021/135](#), annex.

²⁶⁹ Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 2 (a).

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (b) and (c).

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, para. 3. See also [S/2021/700](#).

²⁷² Resolution [2576 \(2021\)](#), para. 4 (a).

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (e).

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (b) (iv).

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (c) (i).

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (f).

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (g).

the mandate and reporting cycle of UNAMI by 27 May 2022 or sooner if so requested by the Government of Iraq.²⁷⁸

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.²⁷⁹ The Office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.²⁸⁰ The Special Coordinator was tasked with coordinating the work of the United Nations in the country and representing the Secretary-General on all political aspects of the Organization's work. The Special Coordinator was also responsible to ensure that the activities of the United Nations country team in Lebanon were well coordinated with the Government of Lebanon, donors and international financial institutions. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the Office.²⁸¹

United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

The Council established the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) by resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#) of 16 January 2019 to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa as set out in the Stockholm Agreement. UNMHA succeeded the work of an

advance team which was established by resolution [2451 \(2018\)](#) of 21 December 2018 and deployed to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement.²⁸² UNMHA was mandated to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces; to work with the parties so that security was assured by local security forces; and to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement.²⁸³

In 2021, by resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#) of 14 July, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of UNMHA for a period of one year, until 15 July 2022.²⁸⁴

In the resolution, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of the Mission without any modifications. The Council requested the Secretary-General to fully deploy UNMHA expeditiously, taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and called on the parties to the Hudaydah Agreement to support the United Nations.²⁸⁵ In that connection, the Council demanded an end to the hindrances to the movement of UNMHA personnel in Hudaydah Governorate, particularly in conflict-affected districts, and expressed support for the efforts by UNMHA to reactivate the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its joint mechanisms to implement the Hudaydah Agreement and to meet the access needs of all parties and be equally responsive to their requests.²⁸⁶ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council a further review of UNMHA at least one month before the mandate of UNMHA was due to expire.²⁸⁷

²⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 6.

²⁷⁹ [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

²⁸⁰ See [S/2000/718](#).

²⁸¹ For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous supplements covering the period 2004 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, see part I, sect. 20.

²⁸² See resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

²⁸³ For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see previous supplements covering the period 2019 to 2020. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

²⁸⁴ Resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 5.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 8. See also [S/2021/528](#), containing the review of UNMHA requested by the Council in resolution [2534 \(2020\)](#), prior to the extension of the Mission's mandate by resolution [2586 \(2021\)](#).

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