



President: Mr. Imre HOLLAI (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 14

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (*continued*)

1. Mr. AL-ZAHAWI (Iraq): Allow me first, sir, to express my delegation's appreciation and congratulations to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA, for his presentation of the annual report [71st meeting]. The annual report of the Agency for the year 1981¹ contains reference to one of the most serious challenges to the Agency, with far-reaching implications for the Agency and the whole future of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, namely, the Israeli armed attack against the Iraqi nuclear installations in June 1981.

2. Mr. Sigvard Eklund, the former Director General of IAEA, in his statement at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, declared that IAEA, since its establishment, had not, in his opinion, been faced with a more serious matter than that of the implications of this event. He went on to say:

"The assurance provided by the safeguards activities of the Agency as an independent and objective international trustee should lead to increased confidence among States and help to diminish the sense of national insecurity, which could be one of the main motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons. In this context, an aggressive military act against a nuclear facility under the Agency's safeguards on the ground of alleged weaknesses in those safeguards cannot but undermine the credibility not only of the Agency's activities but also of the Treaty itself. Thus, the Israeli attack on 7 June was in essence an attack simultaneously also against IAEA, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the very climate of trust generated by the Treaty and its verification mechanism." [56th meeting, para. 50.]

3. The Board of Governors of IAEA, on 12 June 1981, adopted a resolution² which stated, in paragraph (g), that the Board was:

"Conscious that this military action... has shown clear disregard for the Agency's safeguards régime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and could do great harm to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

In paragraph (h), the Board of Governors also said that it was: "Gravely concerned by the far-reaching implications of such a military attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities in a member State". The Board recommended, *inter alia*, in paragraph 2, that the

General Conference "consider all the implications of this attack, including suspending the exercise by Israel of the privileges and rights of membership".

4. The General Conference of IAEA, in resolution GC/XXV/RES/381, adopted on 26 September 1981,³ considered the Israeli act of aggression against the safeguarded Iraqi installation as constituting an attack against the Agency and its safeguards régime, which is the foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex]. The Conference also decided to consider at its twenty-sixth session the suspension of Israel from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership if by that time it had not complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 487 (1981), of 19 June 1981.

5. The Iraqi delegation to the twenty-sixth regular session of the General Conference, held at Vienna last September, pointed out that Israel, by its attack and its refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 487 (1981), had violated the statute of IAEA. Iraq, and the great majority of the non-aligned members of IAEA, were not engaging in politicizing the Agency, as Israel and the United States alleged. Paragraph B of article IV of the statute stipulates that:

"In recommending and approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors and the General Conference shall determine that the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in the Agency, giving due consideration to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

6. Now, Israel and the United States might as well denounce the statute for this article, as also politicizing the Agency, for what are these criteria for membership in the Agency if not political? Furthermore, paragraph C of article IV states that:

"The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, and all members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute."

And paragraph B of article XIX of the statute, on suspension of privileges, states the following:

"A member which has persistently violated the provisions of this Statute or of any agreement entered into by it pursuant to this Statute may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors."

7. Israel has "persistently violated" the provisions of the statute by its persistent violation of the Charter of the United Nations, compliance with which is held as a condition for membership in the Agency in article IV, and by its refusal to comply with scores of Security Council resolutions, which also constitutes a persistent violation of the Charter. In committing its aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installation, Israel furthermore took the law into its own hands and passed judgement on another member State and on the Agency itself, thus clearly violating paragraph C of article IV, which stipulates the sovereign equality of all the Agency's members.

8. Thus, when the Agency is asked to judge the actions of Israel and its membership in the Agency in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, it is nonsense to say that the Agency is being politicized or that it is acting illegally. It is, in fact, acting with full legality and in accordance with the responsibilities incumbent upon it as stipulated in the Agency's statute. It was only because of the tactics of pressure and open blackmail practised by the United States delegation to the Conference that the draft resolution concerning the suspension of Israel's membership privileges was prevented from acquiring the necessary two-thirds majority vote.

9. What concerns us here and now, however, is the fact that Israel has openly threatened to repeat its armed attack against nuclear installations. In spite of Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which, *inter alia*, called upon Israel to refrain in the future from any such attack or threat thereof, Israel has not withdrawn its threat; the threat still stands. My delegation would therefore propose an amendment [A/37/L.34] to draft resolution A/37/L.29, to add the following paragraphs as operative paragraphs 3 and 4:

"*Considers* that Israel's threat to repeat its armed attack against nuclear facilities constitutes, *inter alia*, a serious threat to the role and activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the development and further promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;

"*Affirms* its confidence in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

10. The Zionist aggression against the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installation was a total renunciation of any confidence on the part of Israel in the Agency and its safeguards system. Begin's message of congratulations to IAEA on the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary, which was referred to this morning by the representative of Israel, only serves to demonstrate the monstrous hypocrisy and cynicism of the Israeli leadership.

11. As for the decision by the United States to withdraw from the Agency and to withhold its contributions to the Agency's budget and safeguards costs, one questions not only the logic of such a decision, but also its very sanity. It only goes to show that, in order to protect the arch-aggressor's presence in the Agency, the United States is ready and willing to wreck so vital a body as IAEA. What is even more disturbing and incomprehensible is that the aggressor, being thus protected, has itself done irreparable damage to the Agency and its safeguards system and

to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

12. The PRESIDENT: I should like to propose to the Assembly the following procedure in the light of the amendment just introduced by the representative of Iraq.

13. This afternoon the Assembly will continue hearing representatives who have included their names in the list of speakers for the debate on this agenda item. A number of delegations have asked that the voting be postponed. Therefore, since the amendment has just been introduced, I propose that the Assembly proceed with the debate on it tomorrow morning and then vote on it and on the draft resolution. I believe that that procedure is in conformity with rule 78 of the Assembly's rules of procedure. If there is no objection, we shall proceed in that way.

It was so decided.

14. Mr. KAHN (German Democratic Republic): On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, addressed a message to that organization in which he said:

"The International Atomic Energy Agency plays a respected role in the efforts for strengthening international security and co-operation. Its commitment to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its activities safeguarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy deserve high appreciation."

15. The report of IAEA presents a clear picture of the broad scope of the Agency's activities in 1981. I take this opportunity to congratulate the Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, and the Agency's secretariat on preparing this document.

16. The German Democratic Republic strongly supports the Agency's safeguards programme because of its important role in the strengthening of international security. Therefore my delegation welcomes the conclusion of the Director General contained in paragraph 228 of the report:

"In 1981, as in previous years, the Secretariat, in carrying out the safeguards programme of the Agency, did not detect any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material—or the misuse of facilities or equipment subject to safeguards under certain agreements—for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or to further any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device, or for purposes unknown."

That conclusion is even more important when one considers that 98 per cent of the nuclear installations located in non-nuclear-weapon States are subject to the Agency's safeguards system.

17. The safeguards system has become an important factor in the striving for disarmament and international co-operation. We share the view that the existing system should be further improved, for instance, by appointing a sufficient number of inspec-

tors, by shortening the reaction time in nuclear cases, by making the reporting system more effective and by using the latest scientific technical equipment.

18. The most reliable barrier against proliferation of nuclear weapons is the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Already, 115 non-nuclear-weapon States have demonstrated this conviction by acceding to the Treaty. My delegation welcomes the decisions of the Governments of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of Antigua and Barbuda and of Papua New Guinea, which have undertaken this important step during recent months. Despite the increase in the number of States acceding to the Treaty, some 40 countries are not yet parties to it. In this context, the military and scientific collaboration of some Western countries, in particular the United States, with Israel and South Africa has created serious dangers.

19. In this connection, my Government regards the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 36/98 and 36/86 A as a necessary pre-condition for the broadest peaceful use of nuclear energy. It will serve peace and also the goals of IAEA if decisive measures are taken to safeguard the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We consider such measures to be very urgently required because of the expected increase in the peaceful use of nuclear energy to satisfy mankind's growing needs in energy.

20. Though the Non-Proliferation Treaty obliges only the non-nuclear-weapon States to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, the Soviet Union has submitted part of its nuclear facilities used for civil purposes to the safeguards system of IAEA. My delegation considers that this step promotes good will and confidence-building. It is designed to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

21. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to make a few remarks in this context on the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which is the subject of agenda item 27.

22. The German Democratic Republic, attaching great importance to mutually advantageous international co-operation in this field, has always supported the convening of a United Nations conference dedicated to this particular purpose. It goes without saying that the experience and capabilities of IAEA should be fully used for such a conference.

23. The German Democratic Republic holds the view that, in the long run, the concerted actions of States can be successful only if, at the same time, measures are taken with the object of banning the danger of nuclear war. In view of this, the German Democratic Republic would like to emphasize that it is imperative to appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That would be an important step to avoid any use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is imperative to prohibit all nuclear tests, to come to an agreement on freezing the production and deployment of nuclear-weapon systems and to prohibit any attack on peaceful nuclear installations. These measures should also include the ensuring of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

24. We believe that a United Nations conference dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should make a contribution to strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting the universal implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

25. A special place in the activities of IAEA is occupied by the technical co-operation programme. Considerable progress has been made in furnishing technical assistance to developing countries, especially during the past three years. The German Democratic Republic attaches particular importance to that programme and will continue to participate in its implementation.

26. The German Democratic Republic holds the view that the least developed countries should receive technical assistance on a priority basis. As a donor country, the German Democratic Republic reaffirms its position regarding strict observance of the principle of voluntariness and freedom to decide in which currency the contribution is to be paid. The effectiveness of this principle has been proved by this year's report of the Director General, in which he states that there were no unused funds left in non-convertible currencies.

27. The German Democratic Republic will continue to take part in the Agency's safety programme, in which substantial progress has been made towards completion of the codes and guides of the Nuclear Safety Standards programme and the revision of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection.

28. We also regard the International Nuclear Information System as a valuable element of the international co-operation with developing countries. IAEA rightly attaches great importance to the physical protection of nuclear material. In support of these endeavours, the German Democratic Republic has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We expect that this important instrument for strengthening the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will come into force in the near future.

29. The 25 years of the organization's activities have been marked by outstanding achievements in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its control. The continuation of this development, however, depends on the ability to overcome the imperialist course of confrontation and super-armament and a return to a policy of fruitful dialogue, effective disarmament negotiations and equal international co-operation in all fields.

30. Mr. BUSTANI (Brazil): I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the report of IAEA introduced by Mr. Blix, the Director General of the Agency. His statement forms a needed supplement to that report, as it covers relevant additional information on developments in the Agency's activities in 1982 and takes note of some of the major problems which have continued to engage our closest attention.

31. Since 1982 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of IAEA, it is only natural that we should take this opportunity to appraise our successes and setbacks, as well as to explore and suggest new approaches, so that the Agency's future tasks may be better fulfilled. It is in the context of such a critical analysis

of achievements that the delegation of Brazil would like to express its views on the report.

32. The 1981 report does not differ substantially from its predecessors. In spite of the Agency's record of achievements, the imbalance between the fundamental promotional purpose of IAEA and its regulatory function continues, contradicting the spirit behind its establishment in 1957—the idea being to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of a new source of energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to encourage and assist in research on and development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

33. The continuing inadequacy of the resources devoted to technical assistance is the first point in question. In spite of appeals from many quarters addressed from this rostrum in the past, voluntary contributions are still the only reliable source of financing for technical assistance programmes, while the safeguards allocations are drawn from the regular budget and are continually increasing. At the same time, while the world economic crisis imposes ever-growing restrictive economy measures upon all countries, in particular the developing countries, the Agency seems to over-indulge in replacing much of the existing standard commercial equipment with a second generation of equipment designed specifically for safeguards purposes.

34. Under the pretext of unspecified improvements of a system which the same report recognizes to have been effective up to the present, safeguard allocations have increased in the last decade by a factor four times that of the resources of the Technical Assistance Fund. We cannot but feel disheartened when we compare the modest costs of the Programme for Technical Assistance and Co-operation—\$US 3,422,910—as set forth on page 22 of the programme budget for 1983,⁴ with the impressive sum of \$US 19,861,735 designated for the safeguards programme, as proposed on page 258.

35. It is not enough for the Agency to strengthen efforts to assist member States to find additional resources for financing because its own funds are not sufficient. Paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the aforementioned programme budget for 1983 are most revealing in the detailed account of the safeguards programme, in sharp contrast to the recommendations found elsewhere for stringent budgetary limits when technical assistance is at stake.

36. We welcome the recognition in the Agency's annual report of the need to explain and clarify existing misconceptions about the purposes and scope of Agency safeguards. We hope, however, that such clarifications will leave no doubt as to the fundamental role of the Agency and will dispel those disguised attempts to adulterate a mechanism within the United Nations system that has, as its first and foremost objective, the fostering of international co-operation for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Further, we hope that the adoption of resolution GC(XXVI)/RES/402 will lead to the necessary measures to allow technical assistance funds to increase on a more predictable basis in order to keep pace with the progress in the other main activities of the Agency.

37. It is not only the imbalance between the Agency's funds for regulatory activities and those devoted to technical assistance that causes us uneasiness. It is also the virtual skirting of the statute of the Agency and of the consensus it represents through the development of additional criteria which amount to unacceptable restrictions on technology transfer—such as the "revised guiding principles"—to developing countries, in particular to those which have rejected the discriminatory régime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This lack of a judicious choice of objectives does not contribute to strengthening the Agency's credibility or to meeting our legitimate expectations.

38. Brazil has always defended the inalienable right of all States to have access to all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without commitments other than those required by the Agency's statute or those which have been negotiated, accepted and applied on a universal basis without discrimination. We therefore find it difficult to accept all attempts to control and manipulate the development of nuclear energy in developing countries while nuclear-weapon States are free to pursue their nuclear programmes, peaceful or military, without let or hindrance.

39. It is regrettable that the report makes use of expressions or references which do not belong in the statute and depart perceptibly from its spirit. The statute does not allow any discrimination between member States, whether or not parties to a particular treaty, nor does it endorse a non-proliferation régime which does not seem to be universally acceptable and applicable. While excess capacity for destruction based on the possession and ever-growing development of nuclear weapons becomes a doctrine for the mighty few, there are assertions in the report such as the one establishing that the non-proliferation régime was "strengthened" in 1981 by the mere accession of a few developing countries to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that instrument are criticized for having failed to comply with their obligations under paragraph 4 of its article III, while, for some unknown reason, the report is remiss on the non-compliance with article VI, as if vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons were irrelevant or an esoteric concept foreign to the Agency's and our concerns.

40. It is our intention to stress our commitment to the IAEA safeguards system as embodied in its statute. This commitment has found concrete expression in the past, as the submission of our international agreements to the IAEA safeguards system testifies. This loyalty towards the word and spirit of the statute of IAEA can only strengthen our opposition, however, to a tendency, which we have been observing with mounting concern, to undermine the Agency's foremost purpose of fostering the peaceful application of atomic energy among all its members. We cannot but oppose that tendency, which is furthermore inspired by an international document which has been meeting with growing criticism from signatory and non-signatory States alike and the discriminatory character of which has been repeatedly underlined by my delegation.

41. The representative of Brazil recently stated at the 9th meeting of the First Committee—and this also applies in this context—that:

“A handful of nations... seem to assume that solemn international commitments, including those undertaken in legally binding treaties, are meant only to restrict the action of the powerless, while they themselves are placed beyond the reach of such commitments.”

42. In the past, Brazil has deplored the adoption by the Agency of criteria which are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of the statute. We now reiterate our protest. The Agency's safeguards system is based upon the consensus of its members and therefore ranks above any other similar arrangements which are not universally accepted. The adoption and application of the so-called revised guiding principles is an attempt to alter the Agency's safeguards system. As a result, requests by developing countries for technical assistance are subjected to the acceptance of specific agreements which incorporate provisions of those revised principles emanating from an instrument which does not represent the international consensus of member States. Consequently, potential beneficiaries are turned down and projects are dwarfed in their technological scope.

43. That being the case, how can we legitimately, with a clear conscience, speak of the significant role of IAEA, as past General Assembly resolutions do? How can we recognize the need for “improving the effectiveness of safeguards”, when those same safeguards, as stated in the IAEA report, allowed the secretariat to conclude that the nuclear material under Agency control is still used solely for peaceful nuclear activities or has otherwise been adequately accounted for? The need for improving IAEA safeguards can only be felt by those who, for various reasons, are bent on exerting pressure upon the peaceful nuclear programmes of developing countries or those who lack a better justification for aggressive actions. We cannot therefore endorse the conclusion that new equipment is required for safeguards purposes while technical assistance remains at the mercy of the availability of voluntary contributions and of discriminatory criteria.

44. Draft resolution A/37/L.29, dated 15 November, also contains misleading language which we think does not deserve the support of delegations. Although the delegation of Brazil did not participate directly in negotiations on the draft text, we had hoped that our points of view, which coincide with those of many other delegations, would have been taken into account by the sponsors. Because that was not done, we are now confronted with a text that lacks the balance necessary to justify its adoption by consensus, which is desirable and, I think, still possible.

45. The delegation of Brazil cannot support the draft resolution in its present form and would like to propose the following amendments, which we consider to be more in line with the language and spirit of the IAEA statute, which leaves no margin for doubt as to the basic function of the organization in the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy—technical assistance programmes being its most critical aspect.

46. The first amendment relates to the third preambular paragraph. It would replace “relevance for” by

“importance of the work of” and add “and promotional” after “technical assistance”. The second amendment would delete from the fourth preambular paragraph the words “as well as in improving the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system”. The third amendment, to operative paragraph 2, would replace “in continuing to provide” by “in strengthening” and would replace “in improving” by “in ensuring”. The purpose is to include the idea of strengthening the technical assistance programmes of the Agency and to make clear the need to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguards system of IAEA.

47. Furthermore, we should like to state that even if the fourth preambular paragraph were amended, as we suggest as a compromise, we would still have reservations about it.

48. Here, again, Brazil supports the proposal recently made at the Board of Governors for a review by the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Committee of the Agency's technical co-operation policies with a view to correcting past mistakes and rendering these principles fully consistent with the statute. We also look forward to the results of the study proposed by Argentina, to be undertaken in accordance with the resolution contained in document GOV/2098, to determine the degree of compatibility between the provisions of the safeguards agreements in force and the statute as regards the statutory legitimacy of non-explosive military applications of nuclear material subject to the Agency's safeguards system.

49. The Brazilian delegation attaches great importance to the participation of developing countries in the Agency's secretariat. In this context, training programmes for young graduates from developing countries are most welcome, inasmuch as trainees will have access to the latest advances in technical fields, will be in a position to compete more effectively for professional posts in the Agency and eventually will contribute to their national programmes the advantages of the experience acquired therein.

50. One of the outstanding results of the Agency's activities seems to be the programme to develop, for nuclear power plants, internationally agreed safety standards which are valuable not only from the point of view of strict safety considerations but also as a means of standardizing terminology. The dynamic character of such standards points to the need for a constant review exercise. It is therefore important not to phase out the Nuclear Safety Standards Programme as a result of budgetary restrictions. Activities of the Division of Nuclear Power and the Nuclear Data Section are of immense value for developing countries and for the public acceptance of nuclear energy. One of the Agency's basic functions is to respond to concerns about the possible shortcomings and dangers of this industry, which has the undeniable record of having been able to avoid any identifiable radiation-induced death or serious radiation-induced injury since the first commercial nuclear power reactor went critical.

51. The future of IAEA as an international instrument for furthering matters connected with nuclear energy depends on our capacity to agree and solve such complex political problems. The convening in 1983 of the United Nations Conference for the

Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy should pave the way for a better understanding among us. Its agenda should cover all political and economic issues relevant to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with the determination to achieve appropriate internationally agreed approaches for the transfer of technology on the basis of the directives set forth in General Assembly resolution 32/50 and the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly [*resolution S-10/2*] devoted to disarmament. IAEA would then be in a better position to fulfil its tasks and strengthen its role and functions.

52. Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation listened carefully to the statement of the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Blix, and has studied the Agency's annual report for this anniversary year. As we all know, 25 years have elapsed since the entry into force of the IAEA statute, which defined the two aspects of the task of that international organization: to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to prevent any more countries from using that energy to build nuclear weapons, the most destructive weapon of mass destruction.

53. The Soviet Union was one of the prime movers in the founding of IAEA, and it has done much to ensure that the entire history of the Agency, whose twenty-fifth anniversary is being celebrated throughout the world, could rightly be considered as a model of successful co-operation among countries with different social systems.

54. As emphasized in a message from Mr. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the participants in the twenty-sixth session of the General Conference of the Agency:

“IAEA is doing much to promote the use of nuclear energy for the economic and social development of States and to raise the living standards of peoples. The Agency's role in the development of nuclear energy is growing. IAEA is now the acknowledged international body for the co-ordination of States' efforts in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

“At a time when the danger of nuclear war is increasing, the Agency's activities have taken on special significance and meaning. The Soviet people are convinced that the Agency can and must make a weightier contribution to the elimination of the threat of nuclear catastrophe. We must do our utmost to see that nuclear energy serves only the interests of peace and never becomes a means of destroying life on earth.”

For its part, the Soviet Union is doing its utmost to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and reverse the nuclear arms race.

55. There is special significance in the adoption last year by the General Assembly, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, of the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe [*resolution 36/100*], which states that the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity. In keeping with the spirit and letter of that document, the Soviet Union unilaterally declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. If other nuclear Powers took a similar stand, this would

amount to a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and a giant step would thereby be taken towards the elimination of the threat of war, first and foremost nuclear war.

56. We feel that, in order to erect material obstacles to military threats, it is necessary to take action on various levels simultaneously, first and foremost in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, which must include banning new systems of nuclear weapons, the production of fissionable materials for new types of nuclear weapons and the accumulation of nuclear stockpiles of all types and their delivery systems, a gradual reduction in stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their systems and, finally, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

57. That is the purport of the proposal by the Soviet Union on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests [*A/37/243, annex*] which has been submitted for consideration at the current session of the General Assembly. The new Soviet proposal puts forward an array of important measures, including the conclusion of a relevant treaty, the basic provisions of which have been submitted for consideration at this session, a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, to remain in effect until the conclusion of the treaty itself, and several other measures.

58. Another item proposed by the Soviet Union at the current session [*A/37/242, annex*] draws attention to the dangers of the deliberate destruction of peaceful nuclear installations. At the same time, it calls on all States simultaneously to freeze the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and also the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of various types of nuclear weapons. This proposal reflects the concern to find a worthy solution to the central question of the nuclear age, that is, whether nuclear energy, which mankind has mastered through scientific and technological progress, will contribute to raising the living standards of peoples and satisfy their ever-growing needs in various spheres of economic and social development, or whether it is destined to turn our planet into a lifeless desert.

59. There can be but one solution to that question: nuclear energy must be used only for the good of mankind. This is also the underlying basis of the activities of IAEA, whose statute emphasizes that the Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

60. Throughout the quarter century of its existence, the Agency has achieved substantial results in carrying out its tasks. The multifaceted activities of IAEA have received broad recognition; they are designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons on our planet to erect a reliable shield to prevent the most dangerous weapon of mass destruction from falling into the hands of those forces which might wish to use it to threaten other peoples.

61. The comprehensive strengthening of the non-proliferation régime was and remains the primary task in limiting the nuclear arms race. Reliable safeguards against proliferation of these weapons are also necessary prerequisites for broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Soviet

Union supports the further strengthening of the role of the Agency in that sphere.

62. Our delegation notes with satisfaction the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, which is based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the number of whose signatories is constantly growing. However, there are still two nuclear Powers remaining outside the Treaty—China and France. We are especially concerned over the non-participation in the Treaty of countries which are located in crisis areas. This applies, first and foremost, to Israel and South Africa, whose nuclear ambitions are well known.

63. The most important area of the activities of IAEA in securing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the application of the safeguards provided for by its statute, by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and by other agreements. In 1981, as in previous years, the secretariat of the Agency did not report any violations which would indicate the diversion of any nuclear material, or the misuse of any facilities or equipment, subject to safeguards, for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or to further any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device.

64. However, IAEA continues to face important tasks in the further strengthening of the effectiveness of verification. In this connection, it is important for the Agency to concentrate its efforts on nuclear materials and installations, which represent the greatest danger from the point of view of the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. Many non-nuclear countries have advocated that, within the framework of the non-proliferation régime, not only they themselves but also the nuclear States should put under IAEA control all their peaceful nuclear installations.

65. In an effort to meet those countries halfway, the Soviet Union stated at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament⁵ its readiness, as an act of good will, to place a part of its peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards—namely, several nuclear power plants and research reactors. The Soviet Union is prepared to enter into negotiations with IAEA in order to conclude the relevant agreement.

66. Since it attaches great importance to the further development of the safeguards system, the Soviet Union participates actively in scientific and technological safeguards programmes, to which in the years 1980-1982 were allocated funds amounting to 1 million roubles. The current Soviet scientific and technological support programme for Agency safeguards involves more than 10 leading scientific research institutes in the country.

67. As the USSR stated in September of this year, it will allocate an additional 2 million roubles in national currency for use during the years 1983-1985 for the Soviet Union's programme of scientific and technical support for IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has offered 450,000 roubles for the same period for study courses and scientific field trips for the training of specialists in verification.

68. Prominent among IAEA activities is the technical co-operation programme. We note the substantial progress made in the provision of technical assis-

tance to developing countries, especially in recent years. Guided by its principled policy of technical assistance to developing countries members of IAEA, the Soviet Union has taken a decision to increase its voluntary contribution to the Agency's Technical Assistance Fund, to which it will contribute 1.7 million roubles in national currency in 1983. These funds are for the financing of scholarship holders from IAEA member States in the Soviet Union, in particular specialists from developing countries, and for the services of Soviet experts, as well as for the purchase in our country of various types of equipment, devices and installations. There are also annual allocations of additional funds for IAEA programmes for the training of specialists from developing countries.

69. IAEA devotes great attention to the work of the committee preparing recommendations on the possible establishment of an international system of guaranteed supply of nuclear materials. In our view, the system of guaranteed supply can be established only within the framework of the nuclear non-proliferation régime and should lead to a further strengthening of that régime.

70. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to and promotes in every way possible the Agency's implementation of the scientific and technical programmes which are the IAEA contribution to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world. In our country, the Conference on Nuclear Power Experience held this year by IAEA is considered to have been a positive forum. There was wide participation in that Conference, which provided a forum for an exchange of information on the use of nuclear power plants and of the positive experience accumulated in connection with Agency safeguards.

71. I should like to refer to the successful work of the International Tokamak Reactor Workshop, which has provided, on an international basis, a model Tokamak reactor, thus making it possible to develop a conceptual design device. The Soviet Union, which was the initiator of the Tokamak reactor on an international basis, believes that the experience gained by the Workshop will, as intended, make it possible, as early as 1983, to carry out further stages in the development of the future reactor, which would use a controlled thermonuclear synthesis reaction.

72. Over the historically short period of its 25 years of existence, IAEA has achieved substantial results. The reputation of the Agency in the world today is considerable, as attested to by its constantly growing membership. We welcome the entry into IAEA of yet another member, Namibia.

73. We would especially emphasize that the Agency is fulfilling an important role, since it exists not in a political vacuum but in the realities of the present-day world. As was pointed out at the previous meeting by the Director General of IAEA, the Agency's activities are directly connected with issues of international security. In this connection, we approve the decision, of which everybody is aware, by the States members of IAEA with reference to Israel, a country which, in violation of all standards of international law, has pursued a policy of aggression against other

States and brazenly attacked a peaceful nuclear research centre belonging to another State member.

74. The major areas of IAEA activity are now firmly established. Most important are the safeguarding of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, in particular verification, technical assistance to developing countries and scientific and technological programmes on nuclear and radiation security.

75. The Soviet Union is convinced that these areas of IAEA activity will be the focal-point of its concerns. We hope that the Agency will continue in future effectively to serve mankind.

76. Mr. JOHNSTON (United States of America): IAEA today faces its moment of truth. If IAEA is to survive as an institution, if it is effectively to carry out its statutory functions, it is essential that all member States and the secretariat rededicate themselves to the goals embodied in the IAEA statute. The extraneous political issues which have been permitted in recent years and months to intrude into the deliberations of the Agency jeopardize continued benefits to all Member States from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

77. The two main tasks of IAEA, as defined in its statute, are, first, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, secondly, to apply safeguards to peaceful nuclear programmes in order to detect and deter possible diversion of nuclear materials to non-peaceful applications. The introduction of unrelated political issues has put at grave risk the continued implementation of this vital mandate.

78. There are two fundamental principles on which the effective operation of IAEA and other technical agencies is based and to which the United States remains firmly committed. The first is the integrity of the technical agencies themselves—the necessity for them to carry out their well-established mandates, free from outside interference and the intrusion of extraneous political issues. The second principle is the unifying and guiding principle of the Charter of the United Nations itself: the sovereign equality of all States, large or small.

79. The idea involved is simple but is of overriding significance to the viability of the United Nations system—namely, that although certain actions by some Member States may be viewed with disfavour, the State itself should not for that reason be declared illegitimate and outside the pale of the international order to the extent that it not be permitted to join with other States under the umbrella of the United Nations or its technical agencies. This principle is, above all, vital to an agency such as IAEA, the implementation of whose mandate requires the participation of all members in its technical work—indeed, requires universality.

80. Over the years, the United States has proudly supported the progress of IAEA in developing an effective safeguards system and in helping to distribute the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy among the maximum number of member States. We are proud parents, for it was President Dwight D. Eisenhower who proposed before the Assembly in December 1953 that an international organization devoted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy be established. A few years later, IAEA was born, and the United States has

been in the forefront in providing support to shape its programmes to the benefit of all member States.

81. Over the past 25 years, we have seen the Agency make great progress in carrying out its functions. In the early years, the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, at Trieste, and the International Laboratory for Marine Radio Activity, in Monaco, were created under the IAEA umbrella. Both remain highly successful and are widely supported. Later came the International Nuclear Information System and the programme to develop nuclear safety codes of practice and safety guides for the safe operation of nuclear power-stations. These activities, which the United States helped to launch, have been of general benefit.

82. The development of IAEA regulations for the safe transport of irradiated materials, in which my country actively participated, is also an important milestone. In subsequent years, these guidelines have been incorporated into the national regulations of many countries. Further progress was made in the establishment, in collaboration with WHO, of the world-wide network of secondary dosimetry laboratories. Today, these labs play an important role in ensuring that hospitals and medical centres can monitor proper doses of radiation therapy during cancer treatment.

83. In another field, United States scientists worked closely with the joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture in pioneering the sterile insect technique. In the past year, this new method has succeeded in eradicating the Mediterranean fruit-fly from a large area of southern Mexico. Similarly, my country has worked with IAEA in developing a package of computer codes used in forecasting and planning the expansion of electrical generating systems, including all forms of energy. Today, these codes are in widespread use throughout the world.

84. Nor can we neglect to note the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in March 1970 and assigned a major safeguarding responsibility to IAEA. Today, there are 119 parties to the Treaty; this attests to the commitment of a vast majority of the international community to the proposition that the further spread of nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices would have profoundly negative consequences for world peace and stability. Many—but not all—members of IAEA are party to and share the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty, which in turn is clearly supportive of IAEA goals.

85. I cite these accomplishments and expanded responsibilities not as an exhaustive list, but as representative of the progress made by IAEA during its first quarter of a century. The value of the scientific and engineering knowledge that the planet has derived from these and other developments of IAEA is incalculable. So, too, has been the resulting transfer of technology for use by member States throughout the world. The United States has always supported and sought to create activities and programmes designed to benefit a large number of developing countries, including many which do not have nuclear facilities, in order that they, too, could participate meaningfully in the important work of IAEA. It was our premise that for the Agency to succeed in its vital mission,

it had to be responsive to the needs of all its members. We believe, in fact, that this is inherent in the basic IAEA statutory objectives.

86. Faced with the increased cost of safeguards following entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States and others developed a special financing formula to protect developing countries from an excessive burden. As a result, 36 members pay 98 per cent of the safeguards budget; last year, for example, 31 countries were assessed only \$754 each for this budget. These same countries, however, received \$16.5 million in technical assistance last year from IAEA, including projects in the nuclear field funded by UNDP. In short, there is convincing evidence that the Agency has succeeded in its efforts to be responsive to its entire membership.

87. In the face of these tangible benefits, and to their peril, IAEA has in recent years tended to become increasingly embroiled in extraneous political issues, often with North-South overtones, which are and ought to remain outside its statutory functions. Such issues divert attention from the Agency's basic purposes and erode its effectiveness through controversy and confrontation. The trend towards politicization of IAEA is clearly against the interest of its members; it culminated at the last session of the General Conference of IAEA, at which the credentials of a member State were arbitrarily and illegally rejected. The United States will not acquiesce in the violation of fundamental principles of IAEA or other agencies of the United Nations; we have thus been compelled to undertake a reassessment of the extent and nature of United States participation in IAEA. It should be clearly understood that our decision to withdraw from the Conference on 24 September of this year and to embark on this reassessment was in response to the violation of both fundamental principles which I cited earlier. The illegal rejection of a member State's credentials compromised both the integrity and the universality of the Agency. It was, furthermore, only the latest in a series of politically motivated actions which have intruded into the affairs of the Agency. We are deeply concerned that this trend, if continued, will leave the Agency unable to fulfil the dual purposes for which it was founded.

88. The United States welcomes the objectives outlined at the General Conference and reaffirmed today by the Director General. He seeks to preserve the Agency's reputation as a technical and objective body and to concentrate on areas where the Agency can make the greatest contribution. In the same spirit, we support, as a first step in restoring confidence in IAEA, the appeal contained in the draft resolution before us that it strictly implement the mandate of its statute. As Secretary of State George Shultz said on 16 October, it is essential that IAEA and other technical agencies not be undermined or destroyed by political attacks on the rights of member States. To allow this would be the ultimate disservice to all member States and to the people whom nuclear energy can so richly benefit. And that, of course, would be the greatest tragedy of all.

89. Mr. GARVALOV (Bulgaria): I should like to express the satisfaction of the Bulgarian delegation at the report of IAEA for 1981. We are grateful to the Director General for his introductory statement,

which provided us with useful additional information and with an in-depth objective analysis of the overall work of the Agency.

90. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria notes with appreciation that in 1981 IAEA, in pursuance of the objectives of its statute, undertook vigorous and all-round activities in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in fostering international co-operation in that field, as well as for the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime and the exercise of effective international control over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology.

91. The work of the Agency in 1981 is further evidence of the particularly important and effective role which the Agency has, for a quarter of a century, been playing in the field of the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the social and economic progress of countries.

92. In expressing our appreciation of the efforts of IAEA, we are well aware of the recent deterioration of the international situation in which the Agency has to carry out its functions. In this situation, it is commonly acknowledged that the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has increased. For that reason, the People's Republic of Bulgaria has been resolutely calling for the adoption of urgent measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, to curb and reverse the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and to defuse tensions and improve international relations.

93. The obligation which was assumed unilaterally by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons has that very aim. We are confident that, if the other nuclear-weapon States were to assume the same obligation, this would, in practice, mean banning the use of nuclear weapons.

94. The Bulgarian delegation attaches prime importance to the efforts of IAEA at the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. If the spreading of nuclear weapons from country to country is allowed, this will increase the threat of their use and certainly push mankind to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. That is why the removal of this threat is one of the most important tasks in the efforts to curtail the nuclear arms race and to avert the danger of a nuclear war.

95. We are also confident that the vital interests of all peoples in broad and fruitful international co-operation in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy require strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, a cornerstone of which is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A positive fact confirming this conclusion is the growing number of States parties to the Treaty.

96. At the same time, however, a matter of concern is certainly the continuing unwillingness of some States with substantial nuclear potential to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear installations under the international safeguards of the Agency. Israel and South Africa, whose aggressive policies pose a danger to world peace, continue to operate their nuclear installations outside the international IAEA safeguards. The raid on the Iraqi nuclear installation was an attack not only against Iraq but

also against the entire nuclear non-proliferation system.

97. The adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all countries without exception, as parties to the Treaty, and their acceptance of the international safeguards of the Agency are the basis for turning the principle of nuclear non-proliferation into an inviolable norm of international relations.

98. The Bulgarian delegation greatly values the efforts of the Agency further to enhance the effectiveness of the safeguards machinery established by it, which has proved to be a reliable instrument. Of course, the further increase in the number of nuclear installations and nuclear materials, as well as the variety of nuclear technologies under international control, will continue to pose certain problems well into the future. However, they can and must be overcome through the drawing up without delay of pertinent methods and procedures for safeguards and also through further strengthening their material technical basis. In this respect, the full co-operation of the members of IAEA will be of great importance.

99. While a number of countries have started to build their own nuclear energy industries, the contribution of the Agency in the development of world atomic "energetics" as a whole, and also in providing technical assistance to the developing countries in this field, is constantly growing. The Technical Assistance Fund of IAEA, made up chiefly of voluntary contributions by Agency members, has been increasing every year.

100. The report of the Agency reflects the importance which it attaches to the principles on export of nuclear materials and to the activities of the Committee on Assurances of Supply.

101. We should like also to voice our gratitude to the Agency for its efforts in the field of nuclear safety and environment protection and in the fields of food and agriculture, health care, scientific research, personnel training and exchange of scientific information. The Agency's Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, held in Vienna last September, provided an opportunity for a broad exchange of useful information in this respect.

102. I should like to point out that the People's Republic of Bulgaria, on the basis of its beneficial co-operation with other countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, as well as within the IAEA system, is successfully implementing a broad national programme in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The nuclear station called "Kozlodui" supplies 26 per cent of the total output of electricity produced in Bulgaria. My country now ranks as the world's sixth nation in relative share of electricity generated by nuclear plants. Furthermore, I note with satisfaction that throughout the eight years of its exploitation that particular power-station has been functioning safely and steadily within the projected parameters, with a high degree of utilization. On the basis of the experience in this field, my country plans to continue to develop further and expand the production of electricity-generating nuclear power facilities.

103. In conclusion, I express my delegation's confidence that IAEA, under the skilful guidance of its Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, will continue to make its valuable contribution in fostering international co-

operation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. I can assure the Assembly that in its endeavours the Agency can rely on the all-round co-operation of my country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

104. Mr. PELLETIER (Canada) (*interpretation from French*): We welcome the Director General's remarks this morning both for their candour and for their clear commitment to IAEA and its work. The Director General and the secretariat are to be congratulated for the most useful annual report we are considering today.

105. The Agency has been given a central role, under its statute, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the wide range of activities covered in the annual report underscore the importance of its many responsibilities. My Government is pleased that, despite stringent budgetary limits, the Agency continues to give appropriate priority to technical assistance, safeguards and nuclear safety. We believe that the effectiveness of those programmes will directly enhance the acceptability of nuclear power as an energy alternative.

106. The Agency is charged with the difficult task of accelerating and enlarging the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Canada is pleased to note that IAEA is improving its ability to select and evaluate projects designed to have significant social and economic impact. We have also noted with satisfaction that the Agency's technical assistance to developing countries has again increased substantially.

107. Canada considers the Agency's safeguards operations essential for the promotion of any effective, internationally agreed non-proliferation régime, and my Government will continue strongly to support these efforts. We are nevertheless concerned that, this year, the Agency has had to qualify its conclusion that nuclear material under Agency safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. If confidence is to be maintained, the Agency must continue to upgrade the effectiveness of its safeguards, taking into account the latest technological advances.

108. The Canadian Government has always made abundantly clear before the organs of all specialized agencies that it does not accept the insertion of political considerations extraneous to their mandate in their deliberations and decisions.

109. In particular, we hold the view that, given the importance of the international safeguards régime to all States without distinction and the central role which IAEA plays in administering the safeguards system, all Governments have a clear and shared interest in assuring that the environment in which the Agency operates is as co-operative and fruitful as possible. We therefore strongly support the call for all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency and to implement strictly the mandate of its statute.

110. In conclusion, I should like to join those other delegations in congratulating the Agency on this its twenty-fifth anniversary, as well as Mr. Blix who, on

1 December, will begin his second year as its Director General.

111. Mr. PRASAD (India): I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the 1981 annual report of IAEA so ably presented by Mr. Hans Blix, its Director General. I take this opportunity to assure him of India's continued support of him and the Agency in the fulfilment of the tasks assigned to it by its statute.

112. The membership of the Agency now stands at 117, with the admission of Namibia which was welcomed into our midst recently. The Agency commemorated its twenty-fifth anniversary in September this year. As we look ahead into the future, we must recognize that, in more ways than one, today the Agency stands at a crossroad. Many developments of the recent past have made this clear.

113. As a founding member of the Agency, India has always maintained that the primary function of the Agency is to promote the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and that the regulating role assumed by it is of secondary importance. We believe that the regulating responsibility is subsidiary to the fundamental goal of advancing the peaceful use of nuclear energy for development. If the Agency is to achieve the objectives enshrined in its statute, emphasis and priority must be given "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". It is necessary for all of us to address seriously the question of how the Agency should develop its activities in order to achieve this objective.

114. The universal concern at the escalation in the nuclear arms race is now being articulated more forcefully than ever before. Nevertheless, progress towards the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament has been dismally slow. The second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament this summer aroused great expectations but ended in most frustrating failure. We continue to hope that the impact of world opinion will still be able to persuade the nuclear-weapon Powers and that the day will soon come when all nuclear weapons have been finally eliminated from this planet.

115. The Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in her message to the second special session on disarmament, enunciated a five-point concrete programme of action. The second point of this programme of action has special relevance to all of us, especially to the Agency:

"as a first step towards the eventual cutting of existing stockpiles, there must be a freeze on nuclear weapons, providing for the total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons, combined with a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes."⁶

116. A freeze on nuclear weapons must necessarily consist of two inseparable elements, namely, a complete cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons and a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. Such a combined step would mean that all nuclear facilities in all countries of the world would become peaceful and, in that event, nuclear-weapon States would have no excuse or pretext for refusing to accept international safeguards on all their own nuclear establishments, which they are at

present asking the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept in the name of so-called full-scope safeguards. Only in that event could an effective and economical IAEA safeguards system be devised on the basis of objective, scientific and non-discriminatory criteria.

117. As the leader of the Indian delegation to the twenty-sixth regular session of the General Conference, Mr. Sethna, noted in his statement in September 1982, we are happy that the Director General has indicated that IAEA could exercise its verification capabilities to ensure a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Mr. Sethna expressed the hope that the forthcoming review of safeguards would be firmly based on the IAEA statute and that it would not be permitted that it be influenced by any extraneous elements.

118. The report before the Assembly contains valuable information relating to the activities of the Agency during 1981. Its opening paragraph states that:

"In 1981, the Agency continued, within stringent budgetary limits, to give priority in its programmes to technical assistance (both through the Agency's programmes as a whole and through specific technical assistance projects), safeguards and nuclear safety. All these areas of activity are relevant to the peaceful application of nuclear energy and to a wider adoption of nuclear power, the need for which arises, despite current impediments, for many countries, especially those without indigenous resources of oil and coal."

119. Our Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, stated at the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, held at Nairobi in August last, that "nuclear energy was the only power source able to meet India's demands and that, unless there was something positive to take its place, it was impossible to think of replacing it".

120. Indeed, what is applicable to India is perhaps equally applicable to many developing nations of the world. Exclusive dependence on the scarce and costly resources of coal and oil will not do. The Agency's efforts to encourage better and greater public acceptance of nuclear energy deserve to be appreciated. The Agency should be complimented on its efforts in manpower development for nuclear power programmes, which have continued to attract great interest in the developing countries. Despite budgetary constraints, useful work has been done by the Agency on the applications of radiation and isotopes in such fields as medicine, biology, food and agriculture, industry and hydrology.

121. My Government attaches special importance to the Agency's technical assistance programme, although we have strong reservations about its inequitable revised guiding principles and do not avail ourselves of any services under this programme. My Government contributed its assessed share of \$115,900 and, in addition, continues to make available 12 fellowships for the benefit of developing countries.

122. My delegation notes with regret that the annual report for 1981, while dealing with the question of safeguards, still tends to present a discriminatory picture in the treatment of some members which are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notwithstanding some amendments made

at the time of the preparation of this report, the picture presented by it continues to be distorted, particularly when the report deals with safeguarded and unsafeguarded facilities in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation has on several occasions pointed out that safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States on only certain self-selected facilities do not serve any purpose. As long as nuclear-weapons programmes in nuclear-weapon States continue unabated and unchecked, such formal safeguards can have little or no meaning, are wasteful of the meagre resources of the Agency and tend to legitimize non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the nuclear-weapon States.

123. My delegation appreciates the Agency's role in successfully organizing the Conference on Nuclear Power Experience and urges it to keep up its efforts in organizing similar conferences in future, so that all members get a chance of exchanging their experiences in a spirit of friendship and co-operation.

124. In conclusion, we trust that the Agency will make an important contribution towards the success of the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

125. Mr. JOSEPH (Australia): We are considering today the report of one of the most successful and important organizations within the United Nations system.

126. IAEA celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary this year—a quarter of a century of constructive work in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the framework of an effective international non-proliferation and safeguards régime.

127. My country believes that it has particular responsibilities in this field. We are a major producer and exporter of nuclear fuel. We already account for some 20 per cent of the world's uranium reserves outside of the Soviet Union and China, with the prospect that this percentage will be substantially increased when newly discovered deposits are fully tested and analysed. It is thus natural that Australia should give the highest priority to IAEA. The Agency and its Director General can count on our full support in the discharge of their heavy responsibilities.

128. Foremost among these responsibilities is the Agency's role in non-proliferation. The establishment of the Agency and the acceptance by member States of its statute and systems of safeguards were milestones in the global effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapons while at the same time promoting peaceful nuclear co-operation.

129. Australia accepts and attaches great importance to the Agency's role in the fields of technical assistance and co-operation. We are pleased that such assistance and co-operation continue to expand. We recognize full well the value and importance of nuclear energy and the application of nuclear energy for the economic development of developing countries. We shall continue to give full support to IAEA in this area. It is nevertheless the non-proliferation dimension of the Agency that is all important. This importance relates to the basic argument that a world containing 20 or 30 nuclear-weapon States would be

a much more dangerous place than one that contains only five.

130. The role of the Agency in non-proliferation was enhanced by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That Treaty, developed in the late 1960s, remains today the most comprehensive international instrument for averting proliferation. As such it deserves every support. It is not, of course, universal. But its very existence has helped to inhibit even non-signatories or non-ratifiers from initiating nuclear-weapons programmes. Since the Treaty was concluded, no State has sought to develop a nuclear-weapons programme openly. And it might be argued that even those tempted to do so secretly will find the going harder, costlier and thus less tempting.

131. The value of the Treaty can be expected to increase as the years roll on and more and more countries are required to look to nuclear power for domestic energy requirements. It is a fundamental necessity that in the years ahead the international régime devised to forestall nuclear-weapons proliferation remain visibly viable. I would add that the Treaty's viability will be much improved if those parties that export nuclear materials and equipment fulfil actively their responsibility to encourage positively adherence to the Treaty and to comply whole-heartedly with its terms and purpose. As the Director General said at the preceding meeting, it is necessary to demonstrate that there are real advantages in acceding to the Treaty and thereby gaining access to nuclear materials and technology under properly safeguarded arrangements.

132. We are glad that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons continues to attract new adherents. In the past year, Antigua and Barbuda, Cape Verde, Uganda and Viet Nam have adhered to the Treaty. We also note with pleasure that Bangladesh, Egypt, Guatemala and Venezuela have moved, under the Treaty, to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency. We would urge all non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty but which have not yet concluded such agreements to do so at an early date. Likewise, we welcome the recent offer by the Soviet Union to open its facilities to IAEA safeguards. Four of the nuclear-weapon States will thus now be covered by the Agency's safeguards system. Looking further down the road, we look forward to the time when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will attract universal adherence.

133. I prefaced this statement with a reference to the significance of Australia as a producer of nuclear fuel. I should add, in regard to the commercial exploitation of our uranium resources, that Australia has been assiduous in requiring the negotiation of watertight bilateral safeguards agreements. Those with EURATOM and Japan, which entered into force this year, are of particular significance, given the size and importance of their nuclear programmes and the role they play in international nuclear relations. The Australian network of bilateral nuclear safeguards and co-operation agreements now covers the major part of the international nuclear fuel cycle, providing assurances of supply within an effective non-proliferation régime.

134. Australia has also been carrying out significant responsibilities in areas of nuclear research. We have undertaken much work, for example, on the development of safe means of storing high-level radioactive waste. We are actively involved in the development of SYNROC, for the immobilization of such high-level radioactive waste. We are working jointly with IAEA and other international bodies to share the results of research. In all these areas Australia believes that it is acting as an effective and responsible member of the international community.

135. I should like now to touch on a matter which Australia regards as being of the utmost importance and central to the effective operation of IAEA. I refer to the issue of politicization of the Agency. It is a trend which has been running all too deep in recent years. It is a trend to which Australia is unequivocally opposed.

136. The views and concerns of a significant number of States were conveyed to the Director General in mid-October, shortly after the latest session of the General Conference. Australia stands by those views. The fact is that there have been actions in recent years which have created controversy and confrontation. Such activities have ranged from unacceptable actions, perceived as an attack on the safeguards system itself, to others which diminish and distort the role of the Agency by introducing into it political issues which are within the competence of other organs of the United Nations. Over the past two years, there has been a vicious circle of such events prejudicial to the Agency and undermining its aims and purposes.

137. In the circumstances, it is necessary to confirm the special nature of the Agency and to reduce the level of political controversy within it, so that full attention and priority can be given to the specialized matters for which it is responsible. Therefore, Australia wishes to join with others in a call to support and strengthen the substantive work of IAEA by upholding its technical character, as set out in its statute. Australia also urges all States to refrain from actions both outside and inside IAEA which, by one means or another, could affect the Agency's capacity to perform its responsibilities.

138. We cannot afford to lose sight of the unique and important contribution made by the Agency to international security over the past 25 years. This role has been augmented and made the more vital for more than a decade now, since the General Assembly in 1968 called overwhelmingly for the Agency to support and verify the commitments made by parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There are now well over 100 such parties, and the number continues to grow. It is evident, therefore, that there is the widest global interest, shared by countries of all groups, not only in preserving but in actively promoting the ability of the Agency to do its job without interference or disruption.

139. Finally, with regard to the draft resolution before us, I would note that the text was negotiated in close consultation with all interested delegations. Therefore, I can say that Australia will have no difficulty in supporting it as it stands. However, it follows from what I have just said about the risks of

introducing political considerations into the work of the Agency that we are less than enamoured of some of the amendments proposed earlier this afternoon. We are still considering those amendments and may well have something to say about them later in the debate.

140. Let me conclude by noting again that Australia reaffirms its commitment to the ongoing work of IAEA within the strict parameters of its mandate in the quest for a better world through the safe and peaceful development and exploitation of nuclear energy.

141. Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): The current year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of IAEA. During those years, the Agency has had a vital role in contributing, in accordance with its statute, to the strengthening of world peace and welfare. The Agency and its staff have performed the tasks entrusted to them in a devoted and professional manner. My delegation is convinced that the Agency will continue to be able to carry out its duties successfully, and in this it can count on the full support of my Government.

142. The statement by Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA, and the annual report of the Agency underline the role of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is to be noted to the Agency's credit that no illicit diversion of safeguarded nuclear material has been detected. However, the continued existence of unsafeguarded facilities in a number of countries reminds us of the present and continuing danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

143. As a means of averting that danger, we welcome the further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime by the accession of additional countries to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Thus, the Treaty is making steady progress towards universal adherence, which we believe is an indispensable element in the larger scheme of the maintenance of international peace and security, which is the main role of the Organization.

144. We also noted the positive fact that a number of supplying States have indicated their willingness to simplify some of the conditions of their nuclear exports while continuing to apply adequate non-proliferation restraints. My delegation hopes that this encouraging trend will continue in the future.

145. The Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, held at Vienna in September of this year, proved successful and useful for the member States of the Agency. The projections in the IAEA report predict that nuclear technology will provide an important source of energy in the future as well. As far as Finland is concerned, we are one of those countries in which nuclear power is a major source of energy. It provides more than a third of the total electricity production. We therefore have a vested interest in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

146. While we can all agree on the importance of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the fear of the proliferation of nuclear weapons aggravates the problems experienced in this field of international co-operation. That fear persists because some non-nuclear-weapon States have not given the international community the non-proliferation commit-

ment that others have by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty or at least by accepting equivalent safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

147. The fact that there are still States which have not placed all their nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards system is a source of great concern to the international community. We believe that the conditions for the peaceful use of nuclear energy would significantly improve by the application of the safeguards system also to those installations. Finland has believed and continues to believe that there is nothing inherently contradictory between broader co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a more effective non-proliferation régime. On the contrary—and we continue to insist on this point—we believe that those goals support each other and should be pursued in conjunction with each other.

148. The availability of adequate nuclear supplies and services on an assured and predictable basis is a justified expectation of countries, particularly those which have accepted effective non-proliferation measures. At the core of international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy we see the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply. Finland has participated actively in its work and will continue to do so.

149. We have also noted with satisfaction that IAEA has rapidly increased its technical co-operation programme with the developing countries. We welcome further the Agency's continuing work on nuclear safety and on an international plutonium storage system. We regret, however, that the whole international plutonium storage scheme now seems to be in jeopardy because of differences of opinion on some basic principles of that scheme.

150. Finland has been looking forward to the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Therefore, we cannot but regret the results of the most recent meeting of the Preparatory Committee of that Conference. We hope that the differences on the agenda and procedures can be settled. In that connection, I wish to emphasize our conviction that the method of consensus which has been traditionally applied on similar occasions should also be accepted as a basis for the work of this Conference.

151. In conclusion, I should like to express the strong conviction of my Government that all States in their work in IAEA should refrain from action that might endanger the carrying out of the primary functions of that organization as enshrined in its statute. Effective and harmonious international co-operation, which is in the general interest of the international community as a whole, can best be carried out within the framework of IAEA and in strict accordance with its statute.

152. Mr. GONZÁLEZ de LEÓN (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation would like to begin this brief statement by thanking Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of IAEA, for the submission of his first report in that capacity to the General Assembly.

153. In reading that report we became aware of the problems confronting the Agency, problems which,

though not new, have become more acute with time, owing to a protracted delay in developing that important source of energy—nuclear energy—especially in the developing countries, and owing to the excessive restrictions imposed on nuclear exchanges during the past year.

154. We noted in particular what the Director General stressed in his report, and which he underscored in his statement at the preceding meeting, as causes for the low demand for nuclear energy in 1981, that is, the slowing down of economic activity in general in relative terms, the reduced demand for electricity—and, of course, here he is referring to the industrialized countries, since the opposite is taking place in the developing countries—difficulties in obtaining financing and licences and public resistance to nuclear energy for reasons which Mr. Blix sees as deriving from security matters, the disposal of nuclear wastes and the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons.

155. I do not wish to elaborate here on the substance of those problems. There is an institutional forum for that purpose—IAEA itself—and we shall have a full opportunity to deal with this issue at the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, to be held next year. But it is worthwhile, we believe, to put forward a very brief summary of some considerations in this connection.

156. Among the reasons given by the Director General for the low demand for nuclear energy are two that perhaps cannot be remedied without considering more general factors that characterize the present international crisis. I have in mind the low level of economic activity and financing difficulties, the latter deriving from the former. I repeat that very little can be done in one field—in this case, the nuclear field—without substantially modifying the characteristics of an international economy that is increasingly inefficient. On the other hand, it is possible to tackle some of the other problems that were stressed, among them the difficulty in obtaining licences and public resistance to nuclear energy. In the view of my delegation these are two parts of one issue on which there is much room for action by IAEA.

157. The difficulty in licensing and public resistance to nuclear energy stem from the same source, namely, concern about safety, including the question of nuclear waste, in its dual aspect of the preservation of health and of the environment and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In both fields, IAEA has been accomplishing commendable work through its efforts at standardization and at physical safety through the safeguards régime. None the less, my delegation is convinced that it is possible for the Agency to expand and intensify its action if it tackles more forcefully the problem of the doubtful image that nuclear energy understandably has and if there is no further delay in the development of nuclear energy on the pretext of non-proliferation.

158. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons does not depend on control or verification measures. It is true that those verification measures dispel apprehension, but we know that it is technically impossible to prevent proliferation, at least through use for peaceful

purposes, unless everybody has the political will to do so—the providers as well as the recipients of nuclear materials or equipment. For this reason, in the view of my delegation, it is incorrect to demand that IAEA continue to strengthen its monitoring and control activities, that is, its negative function, to the detriment of the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which is a positive function and its very *raison d'être*.

159. As regards licensing difficulties, there is very little that can be done by the Agency if its members, above all the suppliers of materials, equipment and technology, try to maintain their privileges as the sole possessors of advanced technology, in a twofold monopoly of nuclear energy: in the military and now the commercial fields. This must be borne in mind both in the Committee on Assurances of Supply and at the United Nations conference scheduled for 1983.

160. My delegation regrets, moreover, that recent events have once again challenged the principle of universality of representation within the Agency. We agree with the Director General that it is necessary to preserve that universality but, if that is to be done, the determination and the sustained efforts of all its members are necessary.

161. I wish to conclude my statement by reaffirming again the complete support of my Government for the work of IAEA, as well as our confidence that in the hands of Mr. Blix that work will continue to be directed to the benefit of all mankind, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

162. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation studied with particular interest last year the annual report submitted by IAEA describing the fruitful work accomplished in the field of the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which is so vital for the development of our peoples.

163. This morning, almost a year after he assumed his responsibilities, we listened with close attention to the detailed statement made by Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA, who elaborated on the scope of that report and outlined the events that have occurred since its publication.

164. All this background information confirms that that Agency, a quarter of a century after its creation, continues to accomplish fruitful work, which should be intensified in order to make available to all nations, especially the developing countries, the benefits of nuclear energy.

165. The words with which Mr. Blix concluded his statement give us hope that it may be possible to renounce the use of nuclear energy as a means of destruction and direct it solely towards greater development and prosperity for mankind.

166. Since my country attaches particular importance to that Agency, we should not like to see its invaluable work impeded by considerations alien to its clearly technical responsibilities, which are the very reason for the success it has achieved so far.

167. In pointing out that it is a technical agency, that it regulates activities of that nature, implying responsibilities of universal interest, particularly as

regards security, we are stressing the vital need for all States, without exception, to participate in it. Therefore, like other delegations, we are concerned at the attempt that has been made to restrict the membership, which could lead to the paralysis of the Agency. We are certain that this is not the intention of the Members of the Organization and we trust, therefore, that this anomalous situation will be corrected in the near future.

168. As regards the activities of IAEA, as we have already pointed out, we consider it essential that its role in providing technical assistance to the developing countries be strengthened. In this connection, we are aware that there has been an increase in funds to finance such projects, but we are naturally concerned that a reduction in the income of UNDP might have a negative impact on the development of these co-operation activities, which are so useful in areas such as agriculture, medicine and hydrology.

169. We have also closely followed the Agency's efforts to improve the effectiveness of the safeguards régime and promote strict security standards in the use of nuclear energy, those being basic pillars of its action.

170. In this connection, I should like to recall my Government's position, as expressed by the Minister for External Relations of Chile at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. On that occasion, he said:

“... we cannot forget that the dangers which a nuclear war represents do not originate exclusively from the Powers which can now possess atomic weapons. We must also take into consideration the enormous risk involved in nuclear development on the part of any State. We therefore consider it fundamental that, in the field of disarmament, effective support should be given to IAEA in order politically to reinforce its functions of monitoring the nuclear plans of all States through the application of a system of safeguards or inspection of installations and equipment, as provided for in the regulations of that organization.

“In this regard, we must make an exception by stating that the safeguards stipulated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty do not apply to those countries which are not parties thereto, but we must state that it is necessary to encourage the widest utilization of the safeguards provided for in the relevant regulations of IAEA. These should be accepted by all States which, acting responsibly, seek to avoid the dangers of non-pacific nuclear development.”⁷

171. My country firmly believes in the significance of the technical and scientific work accomplished by IAEA. It is precisely for that reason that we are following its activities very closely and that we shall continue to afford it our fullest and most determined co-operation. In this same spirit, we support draft resolution A/37/L.29.

172. Mr. NAWAZ (Pakistan): I should like to begin by congratulating Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA, on having presented a comprehensive and important report on the activities of the Agency for 1981. We have full confidence in his devotion to the cause of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy and have no doubt that his vast experience and acknowledged expertise will enable him to enhance the resources of the Agency for the achievement of that objective.

173. The importance of nuclear energy in meeting the increased energy requirements of the world in the future is universally recognized. This is particularly true of developing societies, which must maintain a pace of socio-economic development in keeping with the aspirations of their peoples to a better life. Whether we refer to the elaborate surveys conducted by IAEA or to studies by other international bodies, such as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, the conclusion is inescapable that nuclear energy is indispensable for the future economic development of the world. We are therefore convinced that in the years ahead the importance and significance of the role of IAEA will be enhanced. This development will make it incumbent on the Agency to preserve its universal character and remain responsive to the collective needs of its membership.

174. The Director General's report presents an optimistic picture of the future development of nuclear energy. As projected in the report, it will account for 17 per cent of the world's electricity production capacity by 1985, as compared to 9 per cent at present. However, we cannot fail to notice that a substantial growth in the capacity to generate nuclear energy will take place mainly in the developed world. This will further widen the energy consumption gap and thereby the disparities in the state of development between the industrialized countries and the rest of the world, particularly those countries which are deficient in fossil fuels. In making this point, I merely wish to underline the contribution which nuclear energy can make in narrowing the energy consumption gap between the developed and the developing countries. This must not be overlooked by the Agency in its future endeavours towards promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, I wish to emphasize the need to strengthen the Agency's role in the developmental sector by augmenting the funds available to it, and the need for greater voluntary contributions.

175. A principal responsibility of the Agency lies in the field of nuclear safety, for which the Agency provides the only internationally acceptable safeguards system. Our experience shows that the IAEA safeguards system is reliable and effective, and its technological scope is so developed that it can be applied to every category of nuclear installations and facilities. We are of the firm view that this safeguards system must be protected and universalized on a non-discriminatory basis. In this assessment of the safeguards system, we are assured in the comments in paragraph 228 of the report that:

“In 1981, as in previous years, the secretariat, in carrying out the safeguards programme of the Agency, did not detect any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material—or the misuse of facilities or equipment ... to further any other military purpose ... or for purposes unknown.”

176. The report makes reference to a number of technical measures which the Board of Governors had

identified as being necessary for improving safeguards at certain on-load-refuelled reactors. I therefore wish to assure representatives of Pakistan's scrupulous observance of the existing agreements and inform them about the status of negotiations on certain additional safeguards measures proposed last year by the Agency in respect of Pakistan's nuclear reactor near Karachi.

177. This nuclear power reactor has been under the IAEA safeguards system since it became operative in 1972. It is subjected to regular safeguards inspections, and the 70 such inspections carried out so far have satisfied the Agency of Pakistan's compliance with the terms of the safeguards agreements.

178. In April 1981, the Agency informed Pakistan that because of recent progress in the development of safeguards approaches and technology it desired to propose additional safeguard's measures at the Karachi nuclear power plant, including installation and relocation of surveillance equipment, installation of fuel bundle counters and application of an underwater sealing system of spent fuel tray stacks.

179. It was also suggested that additional safeguards measures were necessary in view of the indigenously produced fuel which Pakistan had been compelled to use following the unilateral interruption of fuel supply from outside, rendering the reactor virtually inoperational. Pakistan duly notified the Agency of this development; accordingly, subsequent Agency inspections started taking into account the inventory of indigenous fuel with the full co-operation of Pakistan.

180. Detailed discussions on the Agency's report were carried out in August 1982, and agreements were reached on all the proposals with the exception of underwater sealing of spent fuel tray stacks, which was deferred by the Agency itself for technical reasons. This positive development was reported by the Director General to the Board of Governors last September, when he confirmed the realization of a substantial measure of agreement on the Agency's proposals.

181. In May 1982, the Agency expressed a desire to discuss yet another additional proposal with regard to some safeguards measures on emergency airlock. This measure was not contained in the additional proposals of April 1981, nor was it covered by the original agreements. The Agency itself has acknowledged that any movement of irradiated fuel from this emergency airlock is virtually impossible. Nevertheless, since the Agency has made the suggestion, we have agreed to expert-level discussions, which have already been scheduled and will commence in Vienna shortly.

182. The agreed additional safeguards measures have already been installed by the Agency at the Karachi plant and are working satisfactorily. Pakistan's insistence on negotiating the additional safeguards measures proposed by the Agency outside the existing agreements reflected its concern for the principle that it could not accept any unilateral proposals without discussion. The misleading criticism by certain quarters of the position taken by Pakistan is wholly unwarranted and is refuted by the positive outcome of the negotiations between the Agency and Pakistan and by the appreciation expressed by the Agency of Pakistan's co-operative attitude.

183. I take this opportunity to reiterate Pakistan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, which is the declared policy of the Government of Pakistan, and the fact that Pakistan's nuclear facilities are devoted entirely to peaceful purposes. Pakistan has been consistently advocating the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime on both a global and a regional basis and has taken several initiatives for this purpose, both unilaterally and in the international context. However, we believe that concern for nuclear non-proliferation should not militate against the inherent right of the developing countries to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

184. Unilateral restrictions on access to nuclear technology cannot prevent nuclear proliferation. In fact, these will only serve to deprive developing countries of the fruits of an essential technology. Nuclear non-proliferation can be achieved through genuine political will and consensus to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament rather than by confining the benefits of nuclear technology to a group of privileged States. In expressing these thoughts, we share the concerns of most of the developing countries of

the world for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy as we reaffirm our commitment to extend our full co-operation to IAEA.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

NOTES

¹ International Atomic Energy Agency, *The Annual Report for 1981*, (Austria, July 1982); transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/37/382 and Corr.1).

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-sixth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1981*, document S/14532.

³ See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Twenty-fifth Regular Session*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *The Agency's Programme for 1983-1988 and Budget for 1983* (GC(XXVI)/666).

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 9th meeting.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 11th meeting.