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INDEPENDENT META-SYNTHESIS UNDER THE
GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

DECEMBER 2021

This independent synthesis report was prepared by an external evaluation team consisting of Punit Arora (Team Leader), Reda Benkirane (Counter-Terrorism Expert) and Xiomara Chavez (Evaluation Expert) at the request of the Working Group on Resource Mobilization, Monitoring and Evaluation (RMME WG) of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and with expert inputs from the Sub-Group on Evaluation (UNODC, UNICRI, UNOCT and UNDP).

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

Abbreviation or Acronym	Full name	Abbreviation or Acronym	Full name
AML	Anti-Money Laundering	OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
CFT	Counter Financing of Terrorism	PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease-2019	SDGs	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
CT	Counterterrorism	SG	United Nations Secretary General
CTED	Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate	SO	Strategic Objective
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism	ToC	Theory of Change
FATF	Financial Action Task Force	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
GA	United Nations General Assembly	UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
GC	United Nations' Global Compact	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
GCTS	UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	UN-OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counterterrorism
IDE	In-depth Evaluation	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime
IES	UNODC's Independent Evaluation Section	UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute
IOM	International Organization for Migration	UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
IPE	Independent Project Evaluation	UNTOC	United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
ISIL (or Da'esh)	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.	VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation	WCO	World Customs Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	RMME WG	Counter-terrorism Compact: Working Group on Resource Mobilization, Monitoring & Evaluation
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner on Human rights		

Preface by the UNEG Chair

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the United Nations reform have underscored the need for heightened accountability within our United Nations system and the important role that evaluation plays in this regard. Equally gained was the importance of collective learning that focus on the realities on the ground, rather than on isolated interventions. The opportunity to work collaboratively across the UN system allowed us to put forward new and innovative modes for such collectively learning, collating evidence and sharing insights in readily digestible manner.

This report – the product of the first system-wide Meta-Synthesis of evaluation results from United Nations entities participating in the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy – is a prime example of how work can be delivered jointly and with the objective to contribute to learning and accountability at a global level. The basis for this work was laid in the launch of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in 2018 and the subsequent establishment of eight inter-agency Working Groups to operationalize coordination and coherence, including one dedicated to resource mobilisation and monitoring and evaluation. This structure has allowed for the linking of monitoring, evaluation and thematic counter-terrorism experts to identify comprehensive responses to the most pressing accountability needs – itself a best practice. Seed funding from the State of Qatar provided by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) through the Working Group, combined with in-kind contributions from UNOCT together with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the time and effort of involved Staff in the various Compact entities, have furthermore enabled this valuable report to be developed and bring to light the insights at an aggregate level of achievements of the United Nations towards implementing the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. By mainstreaming human rights and gender equality considerations in this work, the report also ensures that results relating to vulnerable and underrepresented groups are also placed at centre stage for subsequent work of Compact entities.

The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), being the primary platform that brings together the evaluation units of the United Nations system commends and welcomes these efforts. This is a highly useful report, which I am confident will facilitate learning, the sharing of experiences, reporting on results and, ultimately, help us all to enhance accountability with our United Nations system. It can be a model for future similar work and a practical first step for Compact entities towards a system-wide evaluation of the results achieved under the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Masahiro Igarashi

Director, Office of Evaluation,
Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations

UNEG Chair

External Assessments

Independent Quality Assessment

Ms. Elca Stigter, senior evaluation and criminal justice expert:

The report 'Learn Better, Together: Independent Meta-Synthesis under the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy' has been the outcome of the daunting task of conducting a meta-synthesis of evaluation reports and other oversight reports, and aggregate data on the basis of the Theory of Change developed in close cooperation with the Sub-Group on Evaluation of the Working Group on Resource Mobilization, Monitoring and Evaluation (WG RMME) of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination [Compact](#).

The meta-synthesis has followed UNEG and UNODC standards for evaluation reports; the quality assurance assessment criteria were adapted from the UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports and UNODC Evaluation Quality Assessment template (version 2020). The quality assurance process was undertaken in parallel with the drafting of the report. With an average rating of 8,4 out of 10 points, the validity of the meta-synthesis has been assessed in a positive light. The limitations given in the beginning of the report, as well as various lessons learned and recommendations at the very end, clearly offered insights into some of the challenges and obstacles encountered in conducting the meta-synthesis, as well as the tasks ahead for Global Compact entities with respect to harmonizing the M&E framework, establishing a knowledge platform, developing M&E capacity, and supporting grounded research. A full-fledged evaluation of the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy could confirm the overall direction to be taken by offering robust findings for the road ahead.

Executive Summary

Introduction and Background

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) was adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly on 8 September 2006 as part of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact to reform the UN counter-terrorism architecture. This strategy is a global instrument which seeks to enhance national, regional, and international efforts to counter-terrorism. The General Assembly reviews the Strategy every two years, making it a living document attuned to Member States' counter-terrorism priorities. To facilitate coordination of counter-terrorism work, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched The Counter-Terrorism Compact Coordination Committee in December 2018. The Committee is responsible for providing oversight and strategic level guidance to the inter-agency Working Groups on implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in accordance with the coordination and implementation frameworks outlined in the Counter-Terrorism Compact. The Committee is chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism and comprises representatives of all compact entities, as well as the Chairs and Vice-Chairs of its eight Working Groups. In July 2019, the Coordination Committee adopted its first Joint Programme of Work for 2019-2020 to guide both its work and that of its working groups. The UN Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) provides Secretariat support to the Coordination Committee.

Description and Objectives of the Study

This synthesis was commissioned by the Working Group on Resource Mobilization, Monitoring and Evaluation (WG RMME) of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, through the Sub-Group on Evaluation, in an effort to aggregate and synthesize the evaluation results and other oversight reports produced under the aegis of the GCTS. The overall goal of the synthesis was to inform policy formulation and decision-making better and ultimately guide technical assistance delivery to Member States. It encompassed all available evaluations and other relevant oversight, reviews and assessment reports produced by Global Compact en-

tities since January 2018. In line with the SG's report A/73/866 on further strengthening the evaluation framework for the UN to better assess the results of its counter-terrorism work and encourage peer-to-peer learning through the dissemination of good practices, this synthesis collated evidence from evaluations conducted by Compact entities implementing the Global Counter-Terrorism strategy. This synthesis is also useful in the context of the 2030 Agenda, which requires information beyond the individual project and programme to inform decision-making at the highest political levels.

Purpose, Scope and Methodology

As per the Theory of Change developed for this synthesis, the overall objective of the GCTS is to prevent and reduce global terrorism and its associated effects. This synthesis has three specific objectives. Specific objective 1 (SO1) pertains to Pillar I that seeks to minimize the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Specific objective 2 (SO2) pertains to Pillars II and III, which seek to strengthen the infrastructure and systems to prevent and combat terrorism. Specific objective 3 (SO3) pertains to Pillar IV, seeking to increase respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

The study followed a mixed-method, inclusive and participatory approach with adequate triangulation to arrive at credible, reliable, and unbiased findings to the extent possible. It was carried out in close collaboration with the WG RMME sub-group on evaluation consisting of UNODC, UN-OCT, UNICRI and UNDP representatives. A total of 118 documents, including mid-term and final evaluations, end of project reports, special reports, syntheses, audits, oversight, strategic reviews, and assessment reports available from Global Compact entities, among others, were reviewed and included in the content analysis. The findings were analysed using a Theory of Change developed and validated in the inception phase. This process was complemented with surveys and interviews of key informants, to the extent feasible and within the limitations outlined in the methodology section. The methodological approach, draft and final report were peer-reviewed and independently assessed by two external reviewers – contracted through the UNODC Independent Evaluation Section - to assess the validity and utility of the study.

Findings and Conclusions

Specific objective 1 seeks to minimize the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (Pillar I). Six outcomes help achieve this objective: (1) increased capacity for successful prevention and peaceful resolution of unresolved conflicts; (2) increased inculcation of a culture of peace, justice, the rule of law and human rights; (3) reduction in incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts; (4) reduced perceptions on marginalization and victimization; (5) national systems of assistance that promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families and facilitate the normalization of their lives are put in place; and (6) timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major UN summits.

Specific objective 2 seeks to strengthen the infrastructure and systems to prevent and combat terrorism (Pillars II and III). Eight outcomes undergird achievement of this objective: (1) increased international cooperation among Member-States towards prevention and reduction of terrorism; (2) increased number of Member-States that join and implement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the three protocols supplementing it; (3) increased number of Member-States who take appropriate measures to protect asylum for legitimate reasons while guarding against its abuse for terrorist activity; (4) relevant regional and subregional organizations create and/or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres; (5) Member-States implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force; (6) fair, transparent and humanitarian international travel and transport practices that are also effective at curbing opportunities for terrorism are established; (7) increased security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets such as infrastructure and public places; and (8) strengthened implementation of the international conventions and protocols related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and relevant United Nations resolutions.

Finally, Specific objective 3 seeks to increase respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Pillar IV). Three outcomes are expected to contribute towards the achievement of this objective: (1) increase in the number of MS which implement the fundamental framework for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; (2) increase in the number of MS that are parties to and implement the core international instruments on human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law; and (3) increase in number of MS that develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system for preventing and reducing terrorism.

The synthesis found adequate qualitative evidence to suggest that visible progress in achieving most of these outcomes (excepting those pertaining to human rights on which limited information was available) was being made. It found adequate evidence to conclude that the compact entities delivered a wide variety of vital technical assistance and support to Member-States. There was no evidence to suggest that any delay or cost overruns were affecting the delivery of planned outputs in any significant manner. It was readily apparent that the Compact agencies were contributing to changing knowledge and awareness of ... [counter-terrorism practices?]. There was also some evidence to suggest a behavioural change in the immediate and intermediate periods. However, not enough information was available on the long-term changes towards inculcating a culture of peace, justice, the rule of law and human rights in targeted countries.

While progress on achieving most of the outcomes envisaged in the Theory of Change was apparent, it was also evident that most of the available evidence was inadequate to assess (not to mention quantify) the extent to which these outcomes were being achieved. This is true not just concerning second-order outcomes with complex causal chains such as behavioural changes, but even with respect to the first-order outcomes such as change in knowledge and awareness.

While qualitative evidence suggested a reduction in incitement to commit terrorist acts, more definitive information was needed to assess the overall impact and specific contributions of various Compact entities. The synthesis, likewise, noted that while the reviewed reports described in general terms a high level of satisfaction with the interventions, concrete data on the outcomes and impacts (e.g., level of trust between communities, or between communities and government institutions) of these interventions was not available. Similar patterns were observable across other notable outcomes. Qualitative evidence suggested increased international cooperation among Member-States on PVE/CT. While the synthesis found adequate evidence for the promotion of international cooperation among Member-States towards PVE/CT, more evidence was needed to conclude how closely compact entities themselves collaborate with each other in supporting Member-States.

Overall, the synthesis noted evidence for success as well as areas where perceptible improvements can be made. Even more importantly, it identified large gaps in the availability of evidence that require more information to decide on the degree of success. Thus, the synthesis concluded the need for a full-fledged evaluation of the UN's global counter-terrorism strategy. Such an evaluation will also help identify evaluation capacities

and gaps in ... [available data or gaps in capacities?], including the need for investment into producing data necessary to measure change, as well as in the development of a common evaluation framework across disparate Compact entities.

Best Practices

This section synthesizes best practices identified in the reports reviewed that have relevance beyond specific projects and programmes. The findings are organized by their potential significance and not by the sheer count of observations. To some degree, they have been generalized to be relevant for 37 disparate Compact agencies (and beyond).

- 1. Multi-dimensional approaches** that combined context-specific technical assistance, capacity-building, mentorship, community empowerment, unity forums, advocacy groups, attention to religious and cultural elements, and use of multimedia messaging incorporating theatre and radio were found to be most effective at achieving their intended goals (see, for example, findings on outcome 1.3).
- 2. Partnerships:** The successful examples that stood out invariably involved leveraging partnerships to achieve either a larger or a wider impact or both. Partnering with civil society organizations, academia, the private sector, and regional bodies to go beyond traditional partnerships with the Member States and other international organizations was found to accelerate the achievement of intended results. Some of the most successful interventions found ways to leverage youth interests — e.g., arts, sports, media, informal learning, and personal relationships — to teach peace-building skills.
- 3. Critical mass:** Projects that focused on the achievement of a critical minimum number (“mass”) of participants were reported to be not just more effective, but also more sustainable.
- 4. Community service models:** Community service efforts combined with new attitudes of social responsibility generated a sense of greater belonging, hence serving the implicit goal of social cohesion. These positive models of community belonging were more effective than negative models in terms of creating sustained changes in behaviour and senses of communal obligations.

- 5. Establishing networks:** Building networks that bring together practitioners to exchange valuable information to promote collaboration emerged as a best practice for promoting sustainability.
- 6. Developing institutional infrastructure:** Projects that relied on the construction and rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure and strengthening the capacities of vulnerable groups such as young people, refugees and displaced persons were found to be more effective at preventing radicalization.
- 7. Strategic communications:** Strategic communications via social media were reported to play a vital role in preventing and countering violent extremism narrative.
- 8. Evidence-based programming:** The best-designed programmes start with robust research, pay attention upfront to implementation plans, including continuous data collection for monitoring, pursue a long-term strategy, and adjust as needed to stay on track.
- 9. Gender-responsive interventions:** Effective gender-sensitive and gender-responsive projects address the root causes of violence and discrimination against women in all spheres of life. Best practices involve mainstreaming gender into institutional policies, regulations, protocols, guidelines and communication strategies, as well as designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating programmes, policies and strategies which intentionally engage women, promote the realization of women's rights, and strengthen women's economic independence.
- 10. Monitoring and evaluation:** Using standardized surveys and shared databases across countries and organizations is a best practice for enhancing the consistency and international comparability of counter-terrorism statistics and the use of data by national governments.

Lessons Learned

The lessons presented below identified in the reviewed reports offer a synthesis from the generalizable perspective of multiple compact entities. In contrast, those relevant to individual entities are left to be covered in internal reviews of relevant entities.

- 1. Funding model:** The project-based funding model emerged as one of the most significant challenges to adopting a strategic and programmatic approach to counter-terrorism. Since the funding of counter-terrorism is not institutionalized, it is primarily dependent on donors' interests.
- 2. Beneficiaries and participants as co-creators:** Involving targeted beneficiaries (rights holders) throughout the process was identified as an important issue. Maintaining contact with them from design and implementation to follow-up monitoring and eventual evaluation needs to be incorporated in related logistics and budgetary needs assessments.
- 3. Field staff as co-developers:** Field staff should ideally be empowered to drive the design and implementation processes based on their intimate knowledge of local culture and context. At a minimum, including them in core coordination and cross-sectoral groups was found to help build a closer relationship between the field and headquarters.
- 4. Complementary interventions:** interventions significantly increase both the likelihood and sustainability of success (e.g., business loans and training, vocational training, labour market access and advocacy campaigns with literacy education).
- 5. Anticipate resistance to change:** Despite good intentions to include women (as well as youth and marginalized groups), projects often underestimate social resistance to their participation. If interventions are to make a meaningful contribution, these aspects should be addressed.
- 6. Mentoring:** The importance of mentoring key stakeholders was recognized for long-term and sustainable changes.
- 7. The instrumentalization of the religion:** The instrumentalization of religion that serves political objectives and/or legitimates violent extremism, though challenging, is clearly understudied. This is a gap in our understanding that calls for rigorous research.

- 8. Environment and risk management:** There is growing recognition of the role environment, and climate change play in disasters and radicalization (as is the case of countries in the Sahel such as Mali). Evaluators have started identifying specific lessons pertaining to risk management in this regard.
- 9. Evaluation methodologies:** Barring notable exceptions as mentioned earlier, most evaluation reports used perceptual measures such as interview and survey data, often without incorporating statistical methodologies that establish their validity and reliability. As far as feasible, Compact agencies would do well to encourage increased triangulation by incorporating objective data and methodologies, including archival and big data as well as impact evaluation and experimental designs, to validate their findings.
- 10. Evaluation capacity development:** The need for building the evaluation capacity of program/project/ organization was widely recognized. These suggestions included training in development and use of common indicators for outcomes and impacts, incorporating measurement strategies in programs and projects, and encouraging a culture of quality monitoring and evaluation.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1- A Full-fledged evaluation: While this synthesis provides a comprehensive look at information gleaned from 118 evaluation and other oversight reports, it was intended to be a building block towards a full-fledged, independent evaluation of the GCTS. Therefore, the Sub-Group on Evaluation, in coordination and cooperation with all compact entities, should raise resources to initiate such an evaluation to derive robust findings on results achieved, good practices, and lessons learned.

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 9-12 months, or once sufficient funding is available (Proposed action: Sub-Group on Evaluation of the RMME WG; in coordination and cooperation with all compact entities)

Recommendation 2- Knowledge platform: The synthesis established preliminary evidence to suggest the need for establishing a knowledge platform for sharing knowledge. It is recommended to identify, leverage, or build on already available systems (e.g., UNOCT's "Connect & Learn" platform) for sharing knowledge for disseminating relevant evaluation and oversight results to the Global CT compact entities.

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 12-18 months (Proposed action: Sub-Group on evaluation of the RMME WG)

Recommendation 3- Evaluation capacity and Common M&E Framework: The synthesis made clear the need for assessing and developing evaluation capacity among the Compact entities as well as indicated the absence of a common M&E framework of initiatives under the GCTS. It is recommended to initiate activities for (a) strengthening evaluation knowledge and capacities of internal and external stakeholders as well as (b) developing a common M&E framework for the GCTS for identifying and measuring results and impact of the work conducted by all compact entities under the GCTS.

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 12-18 months (Proposed Action: Sub-Group on Evaluation of the RMME WG)

Recommendation 4- Policy dialogue on counter-terrorism: This synthesis calls for UNOCT to contribute to equipping the international community and donor States with the knowledge base necessary for engaging in sustained and open policy dialogue on what constitutes terrorism and counter-terrorism and how best to reconcile counter-terrorism measures and humanitarian action (especially if the full-fledged evaluation validates this finding). This work should encompass all relevant CT/PVE sectors as well as the humanitarian community at both headquarters and field level.

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 24-36 months (Proposed coordination: UNOCT in coordination with all compact entities)

Recommendation 5- Grounded research: Compact entities should partner with research sectors of the United Nations and beyond to leverage existing research and to study what works and what does not. Due to the limited knowledge on how people are radicalized and driven to violent extremism, investment in research activities is essential to enlarge the intellectual horizon, stimulate critical thinking and produce new understandings and approaches on contemporary violence, asymmetrical conflicts, and peacebuilding.

Timeframe: To be initiated as feasible by individual compact entities or different Working Groups (Proposed coordination: UNOCT, UNICRI and UNODC in cooperation with all compact entities)

RECOMMENDATION 6 – Special attention to human rights issues: This synthesis found limited evidence of an increase in respect for human rights and rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against ter-

rorism. While training of criminal justice and law enforcement officials was contributing towards this goal, it also appeared that MS need tailored technical assistance for fully implementing fundamental freedoms and human rights and for consistently maintaining an effective rule of law-based national criminal justice systems. Therefore, it is recommended to identify concrete measures for strengthening technical assistance to MS, increase resources and capacity of compact entities for effective mainstreaming of human rights and fully consider the support provided by compact entities in the full-fledged evaluation (ref recommendation 1) to strengthen human rights.

Timeframe: To be initiated as feasible by individual compact entities (Proposed coordination: UNOCT/WG HR in consultation with WGRMME and the Sub-Group on Evaluation)

INTRODUCTION

01

Background and Context

Terrorism refers to the use of violence to create “terror” and fear. The personal, societal and narrative accounts of terrorism are diversified and are based on different perspectives, “representations” and “perceptions” of what is, in fact, “lived”. During the years 2000 to 2010, the fear this phenomenon generated among the public was often the main catalyst for security policies aimed at fighting terrorism around the world. But terror and fear, whether under-estimated or amplified, are emotional factors and cannot be easily measured. Perception studies on terrorism and radicalization have shown that the level of fear may often be inversely proportional to the actual level of danger.¹ The level of fear can be high in countries where the terrorist risk is rather low and its potential lethal impact relatively limited. On the contrary, in countries where terrorism and violent extremism destabilize the entire systems and impact the society at large, some studies observed that communities directly confronted with frightful events have often developed a more rational risk assessment or even desensitization to their situation.

¹ For an example of a perception study emphasizing on the “fear” of terrorism, see [“Views from around the globe: countering violent extremism.”](#) National Research Group, 2016. For the importance of taking into consideration the social perceptions, see Liat Shetret, Matthew Schwartz and Danielle Cotter, [Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism](#) in the border regions of the Sahel. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2016. UNICRI field studies provide more background information on this.

Individual victims or those indirectly affected by terrorism and violence often express their capacity to live with a certain level of risk as long as the state or other perceived authority can guarantee other aspects of their basic needs such as access to housing, food, health, education, etc. This “informal” risk assessment established by vulnerable communities indicates what kind of counter-terrorism operations are needed from the victims’ perspective, and is a reminder that the solution to terrorism and violent extremism cannot be only military and/or penal. It also shows how individuals affected by precarious and painful circumstances can reinforce their resistance and resilience to terrorism and violence, but cannot adapt to the absence of basic necessities.

This perception of danger and the risk assessment expressed in terms of representation and perception are also in line with the UN75 global consultation (January-September 2020) where the approximately one million respondents showed that immediate and long-term priorities for a safer world concern a variety of interconnected issues. This online survey, titled “The Future We Want, The UN We Need”, aimed to identify key findings and top priorities for immediate post-COVID recovery and long-term prosperity. From the perspective of this survey, terrorism was identified as a threat that may have external and internal drivers which are not necessarily ideological or religious. Thus, it is crucial to distinguish between symptoms and social, economic, and political root causes, which are often intertwined. There is much to be learned from this difference in perceptions about fear generated by terrorist activity, which may help identify interventions better and thereby more accurately address the concerns of target audiences.

Overall Concept and Design

The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy amid the UN wider strategic context

In the 21st century, terrorism remains a critical and politically highly sensitive issue, constantly evolving and rapidly mutating over time and space. When a threat evolves that rapidly, the challenge is to determine how to adequately adjust policies, strategies and programmes countering it. This is precisely the *raison d’être* of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (GCTS). This Strategy, based on four main pillars (see figure below), is itself oriented and framed around guiding principle of the UN, including the

four founding pillars of the UN2 (1945), the three pillars of the UN Reform (2017) and the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) specified in the Agenda for 2030 (for more details on the pillars of the Counter Terrorism Strategy in the framework of the guided principles and priorities of the UN, see Annex VI).




Figure 1: UNCT Coordination Committee and GCTS Architecture

² These [pillars](#) are (1) Peace and Security, (2) Human Rights, (3) Rule of Law and (4) Development.

Purpose and Scope

This synthesis was commissioned for the purpose of aggregating and analysing the results of the evaluation and other oversight reports produced under the aegis of the GCTS. It was undertaken within the framework of the Sub-Group on Evaluation of the Working Group on Resource Mobilization, Monitoring and Evaluation (WG RMME) of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.

The overall goal of the synthesis is to better inform policy formulation and decision-making and ultimately guide technical assistance delivery to the Member States. It encompasses all available evaluations and other relevant oversight and assessment reports produced by Global Compact entities since January 2018, as specified in the terms of reference.³ It is fully in line with the SG's report A/73/866 to further strengthen evaluation frameworks for the UN to better assess the results of its counter-terrorism work and encourage peer learning through the dissemination of good practices. It provides synthesized evidence from evaluations conducted by the Compact entities implementing the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, thus enabling better utilization of already available information. It is also useful in the context of the 2030 Agenda, which requires information beyond the individual project and programme to inform decision-making at the highest political levels.

The synthesis contributes to Pillar 3 of the GCTS on measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and strengthen the UN system's role in that regard. It also lays the groundwork for a strategic evaluation of the Global UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Furthermore, it offers insights into what future evaluations of counter-terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) can do to support the achievement of results envisaged in the GCTS. Lastly, it informs future work regarding the development and systematization of common monitoring and evaluation frameworks, approaches and knowledge-management systems.

3 The criteria for inclusion are discussed in the subsequent sections, especially in the methodology.




Figure 2: Type of Documents Synthesized

Methodology

This synthesis followed a mixed-method, inclusive and participatory approach with adequate triangulation to arrive at credible, reliable, and unbiased findings to the extent possible.⁴ It utilized a mixture of primary and secondary sources of data. Evaluation and oversight reports were the chief sources of data while other primary data sources included interviews and an online survey of key stakeholders. The methodological approach, draft and final report were peer-reviewed and independently assessed by two external reviewers contracted through the UNODC Independent Evaluation Section to assess the validity and utility of the study.

The synthesis began by collecting documents available from any entity or observer of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. More than 200 documents were obtained through this process. After removing duplicates and extraneous documents without much substantive value, a total of 118 documents were coded using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software, with the purpose of extracting data relevant to the achievement of objectives and outcomes identified in the Theory of Change and associated Logical Framework for the GCTS (See next sec-

⁴ Within the limitations mentioned in the next section.

tion for more details). These documents included 61 evaluations (including programme, project, organizational and thematic evaluations), 53 reviews (including special reports, strategic reviews and syntheses) and 4 audit reports. These documents were either collected from the website of global entities or obtained from representatives of WG members of the Global Compact entities. Frequency analysis was used to convert content from relevant reports into quantitative data by recording the frequency of mentions within the revised documents, as well as specifically extracting lessons learned, best practices and recommendations.

These reports came from a total of 18 different entities (see Annex III for the desk review list). Of these reports, 51 per cent were from UNDP, 12 per cent were from the UNODC, and the rest from various entities as shown in Figure 3. These reports provided information relevant to all pillars of GCTS. Of these reports, 100 covered projects that sought to minimize conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (Pillar I), followed by 61 reports on increasing respect for human rights and the rule of law as fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Pillar IV), and 41 reports on strengthening infrastructure and systems to prevent and combat terrorism (Pillars II and III). While 70 per cent of the reviewed documents used both qualitative and quantitative methods, 30 per cent relied only on qualitative methods. Regarding languages, 88 per cent of the primary sources were in English, 9 per cent in French, and 2 per cent were in Spanish.




Figure 3: Reports included in the synthesis (by compact entity N=118)

Although evaluation and other oversight reports were the primary source of information, interviews and an online survey supplemented this information. The synthesis endeavoured to conduct key informant interviews with representatives of WG members/Global Compact entities. A total of 9 online semi-structured interviews with ten interviewees (4 females and 6 males) were conducted to collect project-specific and contextual information. Interviewees (Annex IV) represented seven entities (UNDP, UNODC, ICAO, INTERPOL, UNOCT, DPO and SR/HR CT). They included a variety of stakeholders with expertise in evaluation, counter-terrorism, project management and senior management. While only a handful of entities were available for interviews, these provided rich, in-depth, qualitative information to complement information extracted from the documents.

Furthermore, an online survey via SurveyMonkey obtained feedback from a wider range of Global Compact entities. Twenty-nine respondents from 12 Global Compact Entities participated in the survey (Annex IV).

The relevant key focal points of UNODC, UNOCT, UNICRI and UNDP in the WG RMME Sub-Group on Evaluation were closely engaged throughout the process to guide the selection of evaluation reports, co-design the codebook for analysis and provide regular feedback to ensure the utility of results and deliverables.

Overall, this synthesis report collated and documented the best evidence available for the level of achievement of objectives and outcomes of the GCTS.

Limitations to the Synthesis

This synthesis primarily summarizes the findings of prior evaluation and other oversight reports. As a derivative product, the validity of the findings is thus limited by the quality and quantity of information available in these prior reports, which is partly related to the purpose various evaluations are conducted and partly to methodological variations in the way evaluations are conducted at various agencies. This report made the best use of available data and sources, including interviews and surveys, to mitigate these limitations to the extent possible.

The limited timeframe for conducting this synthesis and its implementation period adversely affected the response rate of the interviews and surveys. Although this report is primarily based on the synthesis of findings from other reports, this is not a major limitation. Nevertheless, increased participation would have helped with both increased access to other information and better triangulation of some of the findings included in this report.

THEORY OF CHANGE

02

The theory of change (ToC), presented in Figure 4, underlying UN CT Strategy was derived from the UN Global Compact Strategy (A/RES/60/288) solely for the purpose of aggregating and reporting the findings across various Global Compact Entities. Its linkages to the UN's Sustainable Development Agenda are shown in Annex VI. The synthesis team also developed a more detailed results framework associated with this ToC, which includes indicators and data sources (See Annex VII). The ToC and results framework were shared with the WG RMME for validation. It was also presented at a meeting of the Working Group on Resource Mobilization, Monitoring and Evaluation (RMME WG) in July 2021.

The ToC is discussed in the order of a logical chain from the right-side of Figure 4 (intended impacts/ultimate goals) to the left-side (outputs). To realize a vision of a “world free of terror and extremist violence”, the overall objective of the strategy is to “prevent and reduce global terrorism” (and its associated effects). The strategy specifies four areas of work to realize this objective, grouped under three specific objectives, with Pillars II and III combined for the sake of brevity due to their similar goals.

Specific objective 1 (SO1) pertains to Pillar I that seeks to minimize the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. The actions specified under this pillar aim at achieving six outcomes:

- 1.** Increased capacity for successful prevention and peaceful resolution of unresolved conflicts
- 2.** Increased inculcation of a culture of peace, justice, the rule of law and human rights

3. Reduction in incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts
4. Reduced perceptions on marginalization and victimization
5. Establish national systems of assistance that promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families and facilitate the normalization of their lives, and
6. The timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and summits.

The outputs that will help UN entities achieve these outcomes are shown in Figure 4: Theory of Change underlying the UN CT Strategy.

Specific objective 2 (SO2) pertains to Pillars II and III, which seek to strengthen the infrastructure and systems to prevent and combat terrorism. Eight outcomes undergird the achievement of these objectives, which are:

1. Increased international cooperation among Member-States towards prevention and reduction of terrorism
2. Increased number of Member-States who join and implement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the three protocols supplementing it
3. Increased number of Member-States that take appropriate measures to protect asylum for legitimate reasons while guarding against its abuse for terrorist activity
4. Relevant regional and subregional organizations create and/or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres
5. Member-States implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force
6. Fair, transparent, and humanitarian international travel and transport practices that effectively curb opportunities for terrorism.
7. Increased security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets such as infrastructure and public places, and

- 8.** Strengthened implementation of the international conventions and protocols related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and relevant United Nations resolutions.

Specific objective (SO3) seeks to increase respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Pillar IV). Three outcomes are expected to contribute towards the achievement of this objective. These are:

- 1.** Increase in the number of Member-States that implement the fundamental framework for protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.
- 2.** Increase in the number of Member-States that are parties to and implement the core international instruments on human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law, and
- 3.** Increase in number of Member-States that develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system for preventing and reducing terrorism.

As shown in Figure 4, these objectives and outcomes are interlinked and support the achievement of the overall objective. The indicators that were used for the synthesis are included in the results matrix, as is any data that is collected on the achievement of more advanced outcomes (such as changes in laws, behaviour, etc.).

Overall, this theory of change provides not just a framework for the current synthesis, but it can also serve as a basis or starting point for a potential full-fledged evaluation of the UN's global counter-terrorism strategy, including identification of evaluation capacities and development of potential evaluation frameworks across Compact entities.



Figure 4: Theory of Change underlying UN CT Strategy

Specific objectives

Overall objective

SO1: The conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism are minimized (Pillar I)

SO2: The infrastructure and systems to prevent and combat terrorism is strengthened (Pillars II & III)

SO3: Increased respect for human rights & rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Pillar IV)

Prevention and reduction in global terrorism

Vision

A world free of terror and extremist violence

Assumptions

- Adequate resources available.
- Member State continue to support UN's global CT agenda.
- External events do not significantly constrain the CT agenda.

FINDINGS

03

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1: MINIMIZING CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM

This section is organized according to the outcomes that contribute to the achievement of Specific objective 1 pertaining to Pillar I of the UN CT strategy. One-hundred of 118 reports (85 per cent) included in this meta-analysis contained evidence relevant to preventing or minimizing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Figure 5 below, summarizes the number of reports and references to key terms, included in the chart that were observed in coded documents. If an outcome had less than five references, it was left out of the graph below for the sake of brevity (though discussed in the text). The key details from the graph below are discussed at length under each outcome.




Figure 5: References to key outcomes in coded documents (Specific objective 1)

Outcome 1.1: Increased capacity for successful prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts

Seventy-three reports mentioned capacity building, and 34 reports mentioned capacity development (in total, 96 reports touched on some aspect of this outcome). These reports provided rich information on a variety of technical support, including capacity development, knowledge exchange, advisory services and networking, provided by the Compact agencies for prevention and resolution of conflicts. For instance, UNOCT's 2020 annual report specified that over 450 PVE/CT projects were being implemented by 20 United Nations entities, benefiting more than 95 Member States in all regions and addressing all priority areas recommended by the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.⁵ It also mentioned that the United Nations had supported the PVE/CT strategies and/or action plans of 25 Member States and two regional organizations.⁶ In addition to agencies such as DPO, UNODC, UNICRI and UNOCT, for which supporting Counter-Terrorism strategies is their main mandate, even primarily development-focused agencies realize the significance of peace for development. Thus, UNDP reported it supported governments and civil society organizations in 34 countries through integrated programming on livelihoods, governance and the rule of law, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity and gender equality.⁷

Since training and capacity development is a major component — a stepping stone for achieving other outcomes — of these efforts, the first step for the synthesis was to examine the evidence in this regard. The synthesis tallied that at least 164,350 persons trained across 39 training events were documented in the evaluation reports reviewed (Annex IX). These included a wide variety of participants ranging from law enforcement and judiciary to youth and religious leaders. Most of these reports only documented the outcome of such trainings in qualitative terms, meaning that overall satisfaction or knowledge change rates cannot be ascertained in quantitative terms. The impact of training and capacity development in counter-terrorism in general, is not particularly evidenced in the research

5 As the documents reviewed include a variety of reports including strategic reviews, evaluation of global programmes, and organization-wide audits and evaluations, it is not possible to ascertain how many projects are covered by these 118 reports. Any such attempt will likely result in duplicative counting in some cases and undercounting in others.

6 United Nations Global Counterterrorism Coordination Compact: 2020 Annual Report to the Secretary-General.

7 Review of UNDP's Global PVE practice, 2020.

literature⁸ nor by the studies conducted by NGOs (see Annex VIII for more on this issue). This is partly due to funding and methodological challenges such as lack of experimental, behavioural, or other data obtained at pre-defined timeframes before and after interventions.

However, qualitative evidence appeared to be positive overall. After listing some prominent examples of results achieved, notable common themes are identified in what follows:

1. A UNICRI evaluation⁹ reported that the trained 30 young leaders had started applying the skills and knowledge they have received in various ways, including by engaging their peers and local communities to spread non-violent messages and implement conflict-management initiatives and techniques.
2. A UNDP evaluation¹⁰ found the Border Management Project in the Moughataa region of Bassikounou illustrated a consistent alignment of its objectives with the priorities of the Mauritanian Government in terms of the fight against terrorism and the circulation of small arms and light weapons on the border between Mauritania and Mali. It thereby produced the expected effects and impacts in the framework for consolidating peace and security in the Sahel.
3. A UNODC evaluation¹¹ reported that a collaborative inter-agency training programme in the Philippines titled “Collaborative intelligence, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases”, was officially recognized by the Philippine Government at a speech delivered at the UN General Assembly in June 2014 for its contribution to mitigating terrorist activity in Manila and the region of Mindanao.

8 This impact is still to be evaluated particularly in African contexts where, since already many years, regional and sub-regional institutions, peacekeeping/building and security sector actors are well engaged in multilateral collaboration and cooperation (cf. Adams Oloo. “[Capacity Building and Training for Peace Operations and Conflict Resolution in East Africa](#)”, [Africa Institute of South Africa](#), AISA Policy brief Number 17, June 2010. The situation is the same in European contexts where a major side-effect of counter-terrorism is the discrimination against certain types of citizens. The question is to determine if there is enough training and capacity building for officials and national institutions to prevent and treat this negative impact of counter terrorism. Cf. Tufyal Choudhury (2021), Suspicion, discrimination and surveillance. [The impact of counter-terrorism law and policy on racialised groups at risk of racism in Europe](#). European Network Against Racism.

9 UNICRI, 2021: Mali (Dis-)Engagement and (Re-)Integration related to Terrorism (MERIT).

10 UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation of the Capacity Building Project for Border Management and Access to Security for the Fight Against Terrorism in the Hodh El Chargui region.

11 UNODC, 2016: Final Independent Project Evaluation of XAPX37: Sub-Programme on Counterterrorism, East and Southeast Asia.

4. An IOM evaluation¹² provided information on the success of intercommunity reconciliation campaigns in rural Nalewa Mada (NM) sites. It demonstrated how the Niger Community Cohesion Initiative (NCCI) programming inspired mutual trust between communities by working to resolve potential conflict. Not only had this reduced the risk of land disputes breaking out, but also it had lessened the likelihood of extremists exploiting longstanding tensions between ethnic groups.
5. A UNITAR evaluation¹³ found its trainings to be effective as they produced individual changes in behaviour related to a) positive conflict resolution and inter-personal relations; b) awareness of risks associated with forced recruitment and change in perception of former combatants; and c) changes in the narratives of violent past events in communities.

The prominent themes underlying the reports reviewed related to the importance of dialogue, mentorship, and capacity development of specific groups to understand and interact with the legal environment.

Dialogue: 96 reports mentioned the role of dialogue in improving social cohesion. For example, a UNFPA evaluation reported that there had been a marked improvement in collaboration between the communities fostered by the organization of intra- and inter-community dialogues, with the result that land conflicts were reduced, people's knowledge of the content of the peace agreement was strengthened, human rights were promoted, conflicts were reduced and social cohesion was improved.¹⁴ Similarly, a UNDP evaluation reported that dialogue was useful in youth reintegration and the establishment of social cohesion mechanisms in Bentiu and Rubkona towns in South Sudan. Dialogue complemented with religious counternarratives, literature, drama and vocational training helped dissuade people from joining violent extremist groups in Afghanistan. In that case, participants who had completed a positive transformation programme formed volunteer peace groups to understand local drivers of violent extremism. They also provided early warning of potential violence and intervened to promote social cohesion and non-violent conflict resolution.¹⁵ These examples provide rich qualitative evidence on the

12 IOM, 2020: End-line Evaluation of Niger Community Cohesion Initiative Programming.

13 UNITAR, 2021: Evaluation of the "Youth-Led Peace and Reconciliation in Colombia: A Transformational Approach."

14 UNFPA, 2020: Project for the Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (PREV) in areas at risk in Guinea, p.32.

15 UNDP, 2019: Invisible Women: Gendered Dimension of Return, Rehabilitation and Reintegration from Violent Extremism.

delivery of intended outcomes pertaining to the use of social dialogue for conflict resolution and increased social cohesion.

This observation is also supported by a vast body of field research¹⁶ which emphasizes the necessity of knowing the vernacular context of conflict situations to learn from the perceptions, representations, expectations and needs of endangered communities; many of whom have their own traditions for engaging in dialogue, promoting peace and reducing violence.¹⁷

Mentorship was recognized as another important strategy to achieve this goal. Twenty-one reports highlighted its importance. Most notably, a UNIDO evaluation¹⁸ identified that mentorship, when paired with market-based skills training, was an effective mechanism to mitigate radicalization and prevent extremism. The report mentioned that the UNIDO skills training programme in Kismayo, Somalia, produced graduates who were less likely to re-join militant groups, more easily able to integrate within their communities and felt better equipped to manage local conflict and tensions. The programme paired small-group mentorship focused on life skills and conflict minimization with vocational skills training activities.

Capacity development: Promoting understanding of the legal environment and increased trust in institutions was found to be especially useful. Thus, a UNODC evaluation¹⁹ noted that trainings helped improve institutional coordination at the national level and helped officials enhance their own trainings and training tools, while a UNDP evaluation²⁰ observed that such capacity development work led to the strengthening of the legal

16 UNDP for example produced eight national reports based on perceptions studies within endangered communities in the Sahel. See What 800 Sahelians have to say. Perception study on the drivers of insecurity and violent extremism in the border regions of the Sahel. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2016.

17 This trend in recent research is also a successful attempt of enriching while reforming security policies. It is best represented by the fecund concepts of “hybrid security” and “security in the vernacular.” Cf. Niagale Bagayoko, Eboe Hutchful & Robin Luckham (2016) Hybrid security governance in Africa: rethinking the foundations of security, justice and legitimate public authority, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 16(1): 1-32. A major finding of this study is the role of traditional methods of resolving conflicts as a desideratum in resolving the Boko Haram crisis. “As custodians of traditions and customs, traditional institutions enjoy respect and loyalty from members of their communities. This is why they have always been called upon to intervene in resolving conflicts that can lead to serious security problems in the community. Traditional methods of intelligence gathering such as informing the village or district head of any stranger in town will help in identifying members of the Boko Haram” (comment by a participant at Group Session in Abuja, June 2015).

18 UNIDO, 2017: Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) in the Horn of Africa.

19 UNODC, 2021: Final Independent Project Evaluation of GLOR35: Strengthening the legal regime against terrorism.

20 UNDP, 2020: UNDP Mid-term Evaluation of the Radicalization & Violent Extremism Prevention Program (PROPEV).

and institutional framework that was now more capable of responding to violent extremism while respecting the fundamental principles of human rights. It reinforced the capacities and skills of actors to fight against violent extremism and put in place a coordinated and effective security system in high-risk areas. Citing interviews data, a UNITAR evaluation²¹ noted that the capacity development work had strengthened understanding among police forces in countries neighbouring Mali on their specific roles and responsibilities in effectively contributing to regional and international stabilization efforts in the country.

This increased understanding, in conjunction with the rise of social media, relatedly also appears to have enabled youth to influence governments in some instances. The role of new/social media and digital (il)literacy in the radicalization and the diffusion of hate speech and violent extremist ideology is a significant element conducive to the spread or the diminution of terrorism (on this aspect of a genuine “semantic warfare”, see Annex VIII). Youth leaders from the South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCF) used social media platforms to put pressure on parties to the conflict as outside observers. After the 2016 peace deal between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) faltered, it sparked a large youth pro-peace movement through social media hashtags (#PazAlaCalle, #RespiraPaz, #LaPazesImparable and #MarchaporlaPaz) and student networks, which mobilized over 30,000 young people onto the streets of Bogota within a very short time.²²

However, barring some exceptions, few reports followed up to collect data on the actual use of capacity development or further needs assessment (See Annex IX). While the above-mentioned UNODC report noted that “a move away from one-time training events to more long-term capacity-building has been noticed in the period under evaluation, which needs to be considered in the context of available funding and different Member-States needs in CT capacity building”, this was a rare recognition of the need for a long-term strategy in capacity development as most capacity-building programs use one-off interventions without considering long-term strategies to achieving lasting changes.

The question of the temporal horizon – evaluation, impact, results of counter-terrorism activities in the long-term perspective – is a recurrent issue and a potential weakness of the current GCTS, well identified by Counter-Terrorism experts, practitioners, and researchers (also confirmed in the interviews for this review). The effect of undetermined long-term strate-

21 UNITAR, 2019: Independent Evaluation of the Sustaining Peace in Mali and the Sahel Region through Strengthening Peacekeeping Capacities Project (Phase 2).

22 UNDP, 2019: We are Here: An integrated approach to youth-inclusive peace processes.

gy and unknown duration of interventions nevertheless remains largely understudied. This is particularly critical when the CT community, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has a background of twenty years of international mobilization on an unprecedented scale (See also Annex VIII).

Overall, the synthesis found qualitative evidence for the use and usefulness²³ of capacity building efforts of the Compact agencies. However qualitative and perception-based snapshots in time are not adequate to truly understand what works and what does not. It is critical to conduct further studies on long-term strategies for lasting changes. Studies, impact evaluations and more robust monitoring, evaluations and reporting tools are urgently needed to ensure GCTS interventions are helping achieve intended results.

Outcome 1.2 Increased inculcation of a culture of peace, justice, rule of law and human rights

The promotion of a culture that values peace, justice, the rule of law and human rights was mentioned in fifty-five of the 118 reviewed reports, as one of their stated objectives. Most of these reports linked it to education, training and/or advocacy campaigns. Typical examples of work by Compact agencies in this respect include:

- A UNESCO project co-funded with UNCCT launched an integrated plan of action, proposing a multidisciplinary framework for responding to violent extremism.²⁴ It involves advocacy and programmatic actions at the global, regional, and national levels to support Member States on PVE through Global Citizenship Education, media and information literacy, and promoting an understanding on cultural diversity.
- A UNDP project in Bangladesh used a digital literacy model for preventing violence and promoting a culture of peace.²⁵ The project has built and provided access to an impressive database that can be used for research purposes and to understand terrorism and its effects.
- IOM used a slightly different approach to promoting a culture of peace. Building on the experience of South Africa, it supported the Truth

²³ Note that a product, service, or an intervention may be used but not be useful (or vice versa).

²⁴ UNOCT, 2020: Self-Evaluation Report: Prevention of VE through Youth Empowerment in Jordan, Libya, Morocco & Tunisia. The UNESCO framework is dubbed as "Empowering Youth to Build Peace: Youth 2.0 - Building Skills, Bolstering Peace."

²⁵ UNDP, 2020: Final Evaluation of Partnership for a Tolerant, Inclusive Bangladesh (PTIB) Project.

Commission in Colombia to engage with children and young people in the process of documenting victim experiences during the conflict, seeking their perspectives and recommendations for ensuring that such conflict does not happen again.²⁶ In this case, advocacy was built on the foundations of discovering truth, commonalities, and reconciliation.

- In another variation on advocacy, a DPO programme supported complementary capacity development in the justice chain in Somalia. It reportedly helped establish Ministries of Justice in the South-Central States, provided scholarships for future legal professionals, and created a policing model that received political buy-in and is now being replicated by state organizations²⁷
- Some programmes used other creative approaches for advocacy, such as establishing a theatre troop²⁸ and board games²⁹ to promote peace and enable voice for the disaffected youth who were among the most marginalized groups in their community. Yet others focused on training security forces in good citizenship, respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law, which reportedly achieved its intended goals of changing perception of human rights³⁰

As education and advocacy achieve their intended results in a sequential manner,³¹ the synthesis next examined whether the changed knowledge and/or increased awareness also led to change in behaviours regarding intended results. The synthesis found that about half of these reports stated to have achieved the second-order effect of better preparing the targeted groups to prevent, reduce and manage conflicts. A UNDP evaluation in Kyrgyzstan³² noted that the programme's integrated area-based development efforts had led to an increased potential of youth for critical thinking and conflict reduction and that 87 per cent of respondents believed that the number of conflicts was decreasing. Another UNDP evaluation³³ re-

26 UNDP, 2020: The United Nations: A Champion for Youth?

27 DPO, 2018: Review of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections.

28 UNDP, 2019: Frontlines: Youth people at the forefront of preventing and responding to Violent Extremism.

29 UNDP, 2019: Mid-term Project Evaluation: Enhancing the role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism.

30 UNDP, 2019: Security Sector Reform Project in the Union of the Comoros (RSS).

31 While the phases may sometime overlap or move in a recursive fashion, all these results need to be achieved to obtain the desired change.

32 UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation UNDP Kyrgyzstan Program "Integrated Area-based Development of Osh Province 2016-2019."

33 UNDP, 2019: Outcome Evaluation of UNDP's Crisis Prevention and Recovery Program in Lebanon.

ported that, because of capacity development, the Lebanese authorities were now better equipped to maintain internal security and law and order in accordance with human rights principles. More importantly, Lebanon was reported to be institutionalizing mechanisms to mitigate and manage conflict at the local/municipal level.

Not many reports included quantified data on the extent of these changes. To the extent quantitative data was available, it was primarily survey-based and highly positive. For example, a survey of government partners across Africa, who engaged with work on preventing violent extremism, was overwhelmingly positive: 90 per cent indicated that the resources provided had been very useful in their work on peace education.³⁴ Eighty-eight per cent of interviewees believed that awareness-raising activities on the peace agreement and cultural and sports events had positive effects and strengthened social cohesion. Further, 51 per cent of interviewees believed that the young people had taken initiatives and carried out activities in the context of promoting peace and social cohesion without the direct intervention of the project. Likewise, teachers and school officials, who had met the evaluators for their field mission assessment, confirmed that the project made it possible to institutionalize new learning into school life and extracurricular activities.³⁵ Beyond the evaluation of projects promoting training and short-term courses, the demand in education by communities affected by terrorism and violent extremism is evidenced from field studies in different countries of the Sahel.³⁶

Children's involvement and youth empowerment emerged as a prominent theme in results about this outcome. The focus on the youth and its relation to violence is based on the recognition that the young people are more likely to be enrolled as soldiers, combatants and terrorists. Empowering them, therefore, is fundamental to avoid the risk of societal fragmentation. Twenty reports appeared to accord special attention to this necessity. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission is widely considered a milestone in creating the first "child-friendly" forum to enable children to search for closure to the violence that tore their country

34 UNESCO, 2017: Review of UNESCO's Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Worldwide.

35 UNDP, 2020: EU-UNDP Project "Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Tolerance and Respect for Diversity".

36 However, some consider violence and terror to be an expression of a lack of education on one side and a divide between modern 'Western' and the traditional (religious) education on the other side. See, for example, [Perception study on the drivers of insecurity and violent extremism in the border regions of the Sahel](#). The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, UNDP, 2016.

apart. For DPO, it is no longer an isolated activity, leading to the inclusion of child protection advisers in peacekeeping missions.³⁷

A UNDP peacebuilding project in Chad,³⁸ for example, empowered community actors to initiate interventions, which led to visible changes in the behaviour of young people and their parents, as well as in their capacities for self-care. Further, other significant behavioural changes reported related to parents' perceptions of women's rights, the importance of educating girls and the appropriate age of marriage. Youth felt more empowered in the political and social decision-making processes, thanks to the execution of the project, which improved relations with law enforcement forces and social cohesion between groups of young people in the border area between Chad and Cameroon. The formation and strengthening of platforms such as peace committees, unity forums and advocacy groups reportedly transformed their roles from actors in conflicts to champions of peace and agents of positive change with skills to transform conflicts.³⁹

Methodologically, most reports used perceptual measures of outcome accomplishment regarding increased cultural value of peace, justice and rule of law. Still, some did it in a more robust manner.⁴⁰ An IOM report (see Figure 6) comparing the change in perceptions before and after the intervention was found to be an example of this more robust approach to measuring outcome change. In this project, evaluators measured changes in perception in supported and non-supported (i.e., control group without any support or intervention) groups at different times (waves) produced by the intervention. They also provided the statistical significance of their findings regarding the change in perceptions.


37 DPO, 2020: Lessons Learned Study: Child Protection – The impact of child protection advisers in peacekeeping operations.

38 UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation of the Project “Supporting Mechanisms for Consolidating Peace at the Community Level and the Inclusion of Young People in Areas Located on the Border Between Chad and Cameroon.”

39 UNDP, 2019: Final evaluation of the Beyond Bentiu Protection of Civilian Site (PoC) Youth Reintegration Strategy.

40 62 reports reported using interviews and 71 used some sort of survey. Only two reports used archival data. Thus, most reports relied on perception-based measures. While using perceptual measures is generally appropriate, it is possible to use these methods in a more robust manner. The basic measures of perceptions capture user satisfaction at single points in time (e.g., How satisfied are you with the training?). Using them more robustly require pre- and post- measurements that can be further enhanced in experimental set ups to control for other extraneous effects and establish causality. However, evaluators who are generally hired only for the specific task cannot achieve this by themselves. Projects and programmes need to collect this information on a regular basis as well to establish baseline for the evaluators.

Institutional Confidence



Percentage who express total confidence
 N=7,502; percentages calculated out of totals that include 1–2% DK/Ref.
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 for equality of means (within Programming type)
 Note: Includes controls for education & urbanity. Categories with fewer than 10 respondents omitted.

NCCI: Niger Community Cohesion Initiative; NM: Nalewa Mada Network; Non-Program: Control group.
 Source: IOM: Endline Evaluation of Niger Community Cohesion Initiative Programming

Figure 6: Change in confidence in institutions.

Related to this approach, UNDP has developed a guide for implementing a more robust approach that uses behaviour science to support PVE changes.⁴¹ This guidance is very promising but is yet to be applied.

However, in other cases, several reports were also candid in noting that, at the mid-term stage, they were yet to observe any changes. For example, a UNICRI evaluation noted that the project’s objective was to contribute to the efforts of civil society and central and local authorities in the Western Balkans to prevent radicalization, recruitment and inspiration of individuals to violent extremist ideologies and groups. However, results in terms of intermediate outcomes and impacts were not visible at the time of mid-

⁴¹ UNDP, 2021: Applying Behavioral Science to Support the prevention of violent extremism: Experiences and Lessons Learned.

term evaluation⁴² Another report mentioned that the only evidence of changes in terms of numbers of at-risk youth reached was through the workshops, which provided strong evidence of improved resilience immediately after the workshop but not about their long-term effects.⁴³ Yet another report stated that, while seven civil society organizations had received grants to carry out activities associated with trust-building and awareness-raising for reconciliation, no quantitative assessment for increased capacity was available.⁴⁴ This finding was also echoed in another evaluation of a project on community-based approaches aimed at reducing young peoples' susceptibility to radicalization and violent extremist influences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The report⁴⁵ noted that it was not able to assess the project's contribution to the outcomes. These reports faithfully acknowledged that, beyond those who received direct (or proximate to direct) support, not much evidence is discernible in terms of results in mid-to-long term changes in perception.

Overall, this synthesis finds sufficient evidence to indicate that Compact agencies are contributing to achieving the immediate outcome (promoting/inculcating a culture that values peace, justice, the rule of law and human rights). While there is also some evidence to suggest a behavioral change in the immediate and intermediate period not enough information is available about the long-term changes towards inculcating a culture of peace, justice, the rule of law and human rights in targeted countries.

Outcome 1.3: Reduction in incitement to commit terrorist acts

Twenty-six evaluation reports provided information pertinent to the outcome of reducing incitement to commit terrorist acts. A wide variety of initiatives, from the training of legal officials and supporting stronger legislation to education and development, undergird the respective missions of Compact entities in these reports. Education, advocacy and technical assistance are common measures promoting this outcome across vari-

42 UNICRI, 2018: Report: The EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence: More Progress Needed. Though the project had been in operation since 2010, the report noted that “the lack of clear, well-defined objectives, together with the absence of relevant outcome/ impact indicators at both the Initiative and project level³⁹, made it impossible to assess the results in terms of improved capacities to mitigate and prepare for CBRN risks and threats” (p. 31).

43 IOM, 2019: Strengthening Social Cohesion and Stability in Slum Populations Project (SSCOS).

44 UNDP, 2020: Assessment of UNDP Libya Results on Reconciliation and Peace Building Processes Phase One.

45 UNDP, 2019: Evaluation of Community based approaches to support youth in targeted municipalities in BiH.

ous reports. Thus, for example, the core focus of a UNDP initiative was on countering violent narratives and extremist propaganda.⁴⁶ Some qualitative evidence suggests that these initiatives contribute to a reduction in incitement to commit terrorist acts. For instance, an IOM evaluation in Niger noted that qualitative research suggested that sensitization efforts against illicit activities and radicalization pointed to decreasing rates of terrorism and criminality in program villages compared with non-program villages.⁴⁷ This echoed the findings in a UNICRI evaluation, which found that local Islamic committees in Chad, could more easily recognize behaviours and acts that could inspire or lead to violent extremist acts, after taking part in awareness raising activities.⁴⁸ Similarly, UNESCO is supporting key education stakeholders in developing policies, strategies and practices to ensure that places of learning do not become breeding grounds for violent extremism and exclusionary worldviews.⁴⁹

This is easier in cases where the links to violent extremism are explicit and better understood once new knowledge on such links is provided. This was the case in Western Balkans where, according to an IOM evaluation, there was compelling evidence for reduced social tensions and associated violent conflict against the state and local authorities after social media campaigns countering extremist narratives were implemented.⁵⁰ In some cases, activists also reportedly used their new knowledge to influence government policies on detecting radical activities.⁵¹ Another significant achievement reported in this respect was the Jakarta Declaration on Violence Extremism and Religious Education, which aims to enhance early detection and prevention by the state apparatus.⁵² The impact of such efforts will need to be assessed in due course.

Other evidence regarding this outcome of reducing incitement to commit terrorist acts which emerged from the reports reviewed, indicated that:

46 UNDP, 2017: Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach.

47 IOM, 2020: End-line Evaluation of Niger Community Cohesion Initiative Programming.

48 UNICRI, 2020: [Many Hands on an Elephant: What Enhances Community Resilience to Radicalization into Violent Extremism?](#)

49 UNESCO, 2017: Review of UNESCO's Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Worldwide.

50 IOM, 2019: Evaluation Report: Internal programme evaluation of community-based approaches to PVE in Bosnia and Herzegovina including two projects: "Community Based Approaches to Support Youth in Targeted Municipalities in BiH" and "Moving Towards Sustainable Approaches to Prevent Violent Extremism".

51 UNDP, 2019: Mid-term Evaluation: Enhancing the role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism. Regional Government Regulation (PERDA) Number 8/2018 on the Organization of Religious Life Tolerance in East Java.

52 UNDP, 2019: Mid-term Project Evaluation: Enhancing the role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism.

1. Seventeen reports discussed the role of co-option of local communities and religious bodies, which was found to be a more effective strategy than simply relying on the security forces. These reports also highlighted that security forces could not be omnipresent, and in most instances were not always trusted “because of their approach and methods”.⁵³ Similarly, in Thailand, the project was credited for promoting a developmental approach, which focused less on “hard” terrorism and more on the prevalence of fake news, hate speech and incitement to violence. This focus made the effort more politically palatable and allowed a much broader range of civil society stakeholders to support the overall effort.⁵⁴
2. Nine reports highlighted that the targeted interventions such as youth participation in the political process in Indonesia were more effective at reducing the risk of young people resorting to acts of terrorism.⁵⁵
3. Eight reports highlighted that the interventions more likely to succeed were the ones adopting culturally aware approaches (i.e., sensitive to local customs and traditions). Thus, the approach of UNICRI’s local partners in Maghreb and Sahel that incorporated Islamic values and teachings into their counter-radicalization efforts reportedly proved more effective.⁵⁶ This was also echoed in the findings of a UNDP evaluation, which suggested that incorporating dialogue and partnership between religions and cultures helped promote mutual understanding and constructive cooperation and counteract violent extremism.⁵⁷ Taking cultural and religious contexts into consideration is crucial for any successful counter-terrorism project. The research literature and studies conducted by civil NGOs massively confirmed it. Academic works also ensure that religious principle, values and teachings belong to all individuals from a given society and, consequently, constitute a matter that is subject to diverse interpretations and even manipulation for bellicose ends. Still, their most inclined interpretative outcomes are for maintaining peace and safety, respect

53 UNDP, 2019: Mid-term Evaluation of Inclusive Democratic Governance pillar/Evaluation of Tanzania PVE Project.

54 UNDP, 2020: EU-UNDP Project: Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Tolerance and Respect for Diversity.

55 *ibid.*

56 UNICRI, 2019: Preliminary Findings: Evaluation of pilot project on countering VE in Maghreb and Sahel.

57 UNDP, 2019: The Roles of Islamist Moderate Organizations in Countering VE. Note that cultural awareness refers to understanding of differences in cultural values, beliefs, and perceptions and how these might affect behavioral interventions.

of the state and the law, promotion of awareness and understanding, and encouragement of dialogue and social harmony.

4. Twenty-seven reports indicated that the multi-dimensional approaches were more effective at preventing radicalization and violent extremism. Thus, the support of economic programs, the government and the business communities to other counter-terrorism activities was reported to foster an increased confidence among former radicals about leaving their violent jihadism in the past.⁵⁸ In contrast, programmes that only dealt with single causes or outward manifestations of radicalization were found to be less successful. In Kazakhstan, for example, the government had reportedly invested significant financial resources on programmes such as shutting down extremist websites, which mostly dealt only with addressing the outwards signs of radicalization and thus had a limited impact.⁵⁹

In terms of relevant objective, albeit indirect, evidence from archival data sources regarding inciting violence, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) noted that the attacks by groups located in Sub-Saharan Africa and affiliated to Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh, sometimes also called ISIL) increased by 37 per cent between mid-March 2020 and mid-April 2020. But it could not determine whether increased violence stemmed from existing trends, shifts in terrorist or counter-terrorism approaches due to the pandemic, or both.⁶⁰ However, this was in contrast to the global data compiled by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI)⁶¹ - a benchmark for tracking trends and patterns in terrorist activity in 163 countries - which shows that terrorism worldwide has reportedly decreased by 44 per cent from its peak in 2014.

Overall, qualitative evidence available in the reports reviewed indicated some evidence for the contribution by Compact entities towards achieving intended CT/PVE results. However, very few reports provided robust quantification of medium or long-term results. In some cases, it would be impossible to do as mid-term evaluations are often carried out while the projects are being implemented. However, even long-running interventions did not provide any long-term results, which is partly due to methodological limitations in that impact evaluations are rarely carried out by the Compact entities. The concrete/quantitative examples that could be

58 UNDP, 2019: Conflict Sensitivity in Approaches to PVE, 2019.

59 UNDP: Root Causes of Radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2015.

60 CTED, 2020. The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Counter-Intelligence Violent Extremism.

61 UNDP, 2019: Amman Forum on Measuring, Monitoring and Assessing PVE.

gleaned from these reports. The case of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the Royal Malaysian Police, which reported to have foiled 25 terrorist attacks since 2013 in addition to identifying up to 22 homegrown militant groups⁶² is an example. Yet another report indicated that the project targets concerning the establishment of 20 early warning and response systems and alerting the national network of mediators to 20 potential conflicts were achieved by December 2015.⁶³

While these examples provide some qualitative information on the progress towards reduced incitement to violence, more definitive information is needed to assess the overall impact and specific contributions of various Compact entities.

Outcome 1.4: Reduced perceptions on marginalization and victimization

This outcome is covered in dedicated chapters on human rights and gender equality.

Outcome 1.5: National systems of assistance for victims of terrorism and their families put in place

Seventeen of 118 reviewed reports contained information pertinent to this outcome of putting in place national systems of assistance for victims of terrorism and their families. With some exceptions outlined in the next paragraph, limited information on the assistance to “normal” victims of terrorism was available in these reports.⁶⁴ The reintegration of former radicals and combatants, refugees and prisoners were the reports’ primary area of focus.⁶⁵

62 UNDP, 2020: Entry and Exit Points: VE in Southeast Asia.

63 UNDP, 2018: End of Project Evaluation: Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation (2015-2017), 2018.

64 With few exceptions (Southeast Asia or South America), a vast majority of these projects were in the Middle East region or Africa (especially in countries such as Niger, Nigeria, Mali and Somali).

65 Radicalization can occur for a variety of reasons such as misguided and misled youth, false propaganda, and reaction to loss of family members. Many of these radicalized youth can also be considered victims. Normal victims would be those persons, who had no role in extremist ideology, but just end up falling prey to some incident/s either because they were targeted or were at the wrong place at the wrong time.

One major initiative to “elevate the visibility of victims of terrorism, assist victims with training on media and provide a platform for cross-regional networking” appeared to be emerging in the UNCCT’s flagship Assistance to Victims portfolio, which is implemented in collaboration with civil society organizations.⁶⁶ Another exception to this general rule was the impact on children, which five reports covered. The Compact agencies appeared to be oriented towards preventing and reducing conflict while leaving assistance to the current or past victims to respective governments.

Another essential theme appeared to emphasize the role of women as “re/integrators”, as exemplified by the following statement:

“In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, women have been at the forefront of efforts to counter the political, social and cultural factors that enable violent extremism. Women are among the most powerful voices of prevention – in their homes, schools, and communities - and women’s organizations and movements have played a significant role in advocating for inclusion and tolerance. Women’s organizations also provide alternative social, educational, and economic activities for at-risk young women and men. Hence, they can uniquely help build the social cohesion needed to resist the appeal of a violent extremist group.”⁶⁷

This appears to place a unique burden on women to play the role of integrators or peacemakers when, in many cases, they are inadequately empowered or even invisible. The effects of such an approach thus need to be examined more closely and robustly. On the role of women as re/integrators, it would also be useful to determine how they contribute to or are involved in radicalization and violent extremism. A study in Mali⁶⁸ showed how marriage and progeny were used as a tangible strategy by jihadists to establish ties with local communities. Far more attention and research are needed on the dual role (victims and agents) of women (and youth) confronted with violence to better design successful projects of empowerment and healing communities.

Most interventions appeared to focus on economic support (e.g., skills development, small business creation and jobs). Some of them also con-

⁶⁶ UNOCT, 2020: Final Report of the Evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre (p.38). Based on interviews with UNCCT personnel, this report suggested that the portfolio was showing positive results.

⁶⁷ UNDP, 2016: Preventing VE through Promoting Inclusive development, tolerance & respect for diversity: A development response to addressing radicalization & VE, p.32.

⁶⁸ Gwenola Possémé-Rageau, “[Strategic alliance: the role of women in the implantation of jihadists in Mali](#),” addendum to the International Research Report, Radicalization, violence and (in) security. What 800 Sahelians Have to Say.

tained an element of psychological support to the “returnee” combatants. In Nigeria, the Allamin Foundation for Peace and Development supports female returnees and works with community leaders to reduce the stigma and reintegrate them into society.⁶⁹ This was described as a holistic community-based reintegration module. In contrast, another UNDP programme in Indonesia, run in coordination with BNPT that primarily focused on economic activities, also included a component focused on religion-based interventions. This programme aimed to provide life skills training like breeding cows, cooking, agriculture, and other skills to help them integrate into society.⁷⁰ A few interventions incorporated other innovative elements such as the use of arts-based initiatives (e.g., drama, storytelling) to promote critical thinking and resilience to exclusionary and violent rhetoric.⁷¹

An evaluation⁷² of a project jointly implemented with UNFPA mentioned that over 90 per cent of beneficiaries consider that the activities implemented within the intervention framework largely met their expectations.

While the reports described in general terms a high-level of satisfaction with the interventions to assist victims of terrorism and their families, concrete data on the outcomes and impacts of these interventions were not available. These satisfaction rates are typical of other, similar interventions. Information on the extent to which these interventions succeeded in achieving their stated objective of social rehabilitation and reintegration was also not available in the reports reviewed.


69 UNDP, 2019: Invisible Women: Gendered Dimension of Return, Rehabilitation & Reintegration from Violent Extremism.

70 UNDP, 2019: Mid-term Project Evaluation: Enhancing the role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism.

71 UNDP, 2020: Review of UNDP’s Global PVE practice.

72 UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation of supplementary funds for Japan.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2: STRENGTHENING INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS FOR PVE/CT



Note: UNTOC refers to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Figure 7. References to key outcomes in coded documents (Strategic objective 2)

Outcome 2.1: Increased international cooperation among Member States on Preventing Violent extremism

Thirty evaluation reports contained pertinent information to the outcome of increased international coordination on PVE/CT. These reports documented a variety of support provided by the Compact agencies to facilitate increased international cooperation. Some prominent themes among these examples pertained to (1) increased awareness on multi-dimensional approaches (e.g., security issues among nearly 100 participants from different continents and different institutions);⁷³ (2) the establishment of networks (e.g., regional networks on recovering stolen assets);⁷⁴ (3) building public-private partnerships such as on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes; and (4) empowerment of target groups such as youth empowerment for PVE under the Project Networks of Mediterranean Youth (NET-MED Youth) in Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.⁷⁵ In line with a previous UNODC synthesis, which had reported that 41 per cent of sampled UNODC evaluations were using regional cooperation for crime prevention,⁷⁶ this synthesis observed that about 16 reports referenced regional cooperation. However, regional networks that were found to have a highly effective and sustainable strategy were rarely used.⁷⁷ Public-private partnerships were also noted as rare, and mostly occurred in UNDP evaluations. Other UN agencies also found public-private partnerships more cumbersome and less useful.

This synthesis also found some evidence for increased collaboration among the Member States on the ground. Five reports referenced cooperation among the Member States themselves. Thus, for instance, the Tanzanian government reportedly worked closely under initiatives with the South African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) to prevent violent extremism in the country.⁷⁸ Similarly, the Government of Sudan and UNDP, came together to articulate a response to the root causes of violent extremism in Sudan and its national and region-

73 UNODC, 2017: Integrating Crime, Corruption, Drugs and Terrorism Related Issues Into Preparation of National Plans.

74 UNODC, 2017: Independent In-depth Evaluation of the Global Program against Money-laundering.

75 UNESCO, 2019: Evaluation of the Networks of Mediterranean Youth (NET-MED Youth) Project for 2014-2018.


76 UNODC, 2020: Meta-Synthesis: Prevention of Crime and Violent Extremism.

77 The reason for their non-use was not readily ascertainable from documents reviewed.

78 UNDP, 2019: Mid-term Evaluation of Inclusive Democratic Governance Pillar/Evaluation of Tanzania PVE Project.

al implications. They did so in coordination with several national, regional and global partners and in close partnership with civil society organizations. These examples are representative of the broader efforts undertaken by the Compact agencies.

Perceptions on increase or decrease of an integrated UN approach to rule of law in respondents' countries



Source: DPO: Review of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice, and Corrections 2018

Figure 8. Integration of technical assistance on rule of law across Compact agencies.

One of the key future issues of international cooperation among the Member States that emerged from interviews and documents is the need to institutionalize the funding on counter-terrorism. This is required so the strategy covers a multidimensional process of CT and does not depend on a limited number of donor states and their needs and expectations in the design of CT projects.

Another critical question on international cooperation relates to cooperation among Compact agencies themselves. While 12 reports referenced it, they did not provide much information in this regard. Only DPO's 2018 report (Figure 8) reflects inter-agency collaboration). According to the report, more than half of the respondents believed the degree of integration in UN's work on the rule of law in their countries had decreased over the past 3-5 years. The results from any study need to be interpreted cautiously. It is envisioned/anticipated that cooperation has likely increased since the launch of the Global Compact on Counter-Terrorism and other similar efforts from the highest level in the UN. However, the level of cooperation among Compact agencies should be closely monitored and examined in future studies.

Overall, the synthesis found adequate evidence for promoting international cooperation among the Member States towards PVE/CT. Still, more evidence is needed to conclude how closely Compact entities collaborate in joint efforts supporting the Member States.

Outcome 2.2: Increased number of Member States who join and implement UNTOC

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was adopted by Resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000 at the 55th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). There were 147 signatories and 190 parties to the Convention as of July 2018.⁷⁹ One 2020 UNODC evaluation⁸⁰ noted that Standard Operating Procedures for Border Liaison Officers (BLOs) were introduced to facilitate information sharing between China and its neighbouring countries. The report also mentioned that 76 locations of the BLOs network established across the Mekong Sub-region had been set up as of 2018. A human trafficking and migrant smuggling network of focal persons drawn from victim protection, police, immigration, and prosecution agencies had also been established.

The reports reviewed provided adequate information to show an increased number of Member States had joined UNTOC. However, little information was available on the degree and manner in which the convention was being implemented in practice. Compact entities may need to explore whether this is due to limited interventions on their part or simply the result of a limitation of coverage of reports for this synthesis.

79 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC).

80 In-depth Evaluation of UNODC's Regional Program for Southeast Asia, 2020.

Outcome 2.3: Increased number of Member-states that take appropriate measures to protect asylum for legitimate reasons while guarding against its abuse for terrorist activity

No evidence was available regarding this outcome in the reports reviewed.

Outcome 2.4: The creation and strengthening of counter-terrorism mechanisms

Eight evaluation reports included information relevant to this outcome. As reported earlier, the Global Terrorism Index shows a decrease in the number of terrorist incidents by 44 per cent. It also shows that 99 per cent of deaths resulting from terrorist activities in the past 17 years have been recorded in fragile and conflict-affected countries,⁸¹ while the remaining countries have witnessed a decline in terrorist violence. This evidence suggests that counter-terrorism mechanisms around the world are being strengthened.

The Compact entities appear to be contributing to the worldwide strengthening of counter-terrorism mechanisms. A 2015 UNDP report⁸² noted growing support behind the Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WBCTI), which was, in turn, supporting the Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe (PCC SEE) in creating a Counter-Terrorism Network, modelled on the EU's Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN).

Similarly, a 2019 UNDP evaluation highlighted the establishment of a new agency called National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) in Indonesia, whose role is to develop and implement policies on terrorism countermeasures.⁸³ Another UNDP study in Sudan⁸⁴ mentioned the expansion of partnerships with non-governmental organizations, universities, centres of excellence and religious centres such as the Renaissance and Civilizational Communication Forum (RCCF), the Supreme Council for the Care and Intellectual Dialogue, and the International Centre for Da'wa Studies & Training (ICDST).

81 The list of fragile and conflict-affected states is available from the World Bank site here.

82 UNDP, 2015: Root Causes of Radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

83 UNDP, 2019: Mid-term Project Evaluation Report: Enhancing the role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism.

84 UNDP, 2017: Violent Extremism in Sudan: An Evidenced-based Study.



Source: *Review of UNDP's Global Prevention of Violent Extremism Practice, 2020.*

Figure 9: Countries with UNDP PVE projects.

Since 2016, the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) of UNODC reportedly supported developing and implementing regional and national plans of action for Afghanistan, Bolivia, Iran and regional programs for the Sahel, Eastern Africa and West and Central Africa, as well as the UNDAF

Roadmap for Yemen, Mali, Philippines, Burkina Faso, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nigeria, Lake Chad Basin countries, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mozambique, Iraq, Maldives and Indonesia. A total of 22 regional and national strategies and action plans had been developed with the Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism. Global Programme assistance, which can be considered a significant achievement. The next step is to examine the implementation of the strategies and action plans.⁸⁵ A UNOCT evaluation similarly suggested the need for stronger monitoring at the field level to ascertain positive changes in attitudes and behaviours of beneficiaries.⁸⁶

Most CT/PVE projects are located in developing countries in Asia and Africa. See, for example, the UNDP projects in the map above. Islamic terrorism was found to be the chief focus across these projects. Other kinds of violent extremist acts such as state violence, right-wing or green terrorism - especially if located in the global north - do not appear to have received much, if any, attention. While this is partly related to funding and the capacity of countries in the global north to address their challenges through national initiatives, the lack of attention is mainly related to the prevalent ideological association between terrorism and Islamic terrorism. This problem of discriminate focus is also noted in the academic literature. Shuurman (2019), for example, indicated that the terrorism research is “too event-driven and too strongly tied to states’ interests” in developing policies to counter specific threats even though “the degree to which they actually pose a threat is debatable”, while others, such as state-terrorism or right-wing extremist violence, are by this same logic left un- or under-examined” (p. 464).⁸⁷ See also Annex VIII. Thus, the under-examination of these other forms of extremism does not appear to be purely a matter of funding or capacity. This observation calls for self-examination by Compact agencies as new projects and programmes are considered.

85 UNODC, 2021: Final Independent Project Evaluation of GLOR35: Independent In-depth Evaluation Strengthening the Legal Regime Against Terrorism (p.30).

86 Self-Evaluation Report: Prevention of VE through Youth Empowerment in Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.


87 Schuurman, Bart (2019). “Topics in terrorism research: reviewing trends and gaps, 2007-2016.” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 12(3): 463-480. See also Cordesman, Anthony (2018). *Terrorism: US Strategy and the Trends in Its Wars* on Terrorism. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Outcome 2.5: MSS implement comprehensive international standards on Money Laundering

Eighteen reports contained information relevant to money laundering and 40 on counter-financing terrorist activity. As part of their national risk assessment, most States have reportedly conducted a risk assessment on terrorist financing or broader money-laundering risk assessments. They have adopted a strategy for countering the financing of terrorism through formal or informal coordination. Moreover, most States reported recent revisions of their laws on countering the financing of terrorism. Similarly, an evaluation from 2017,⁸⁸ citing the 2016 annual report of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), noted that most of the 194 countries it surveyed had adopted legislation against money laundering, criminalized terrorist financing and implemented targeted financing sanctions in accordance with its standards and recommendations. The report also noted that UNODC's Global Program against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and the Financing of Terrorism (GPML) contributed to raising awareness among relevant stakeholders on the negative economic and social impact of money laundering. Furthermore, it disseminated the knowledge and expertise necessary to deal with the issue and strengthened coordination and cooperation among Member States, international organizations, and regional bodies. GPML has also built networks on anti-money laundering and recovery of stolen assets that brought together practitioners to exchange valuable information and collaborate towards assets forfeiture. The evaluation directly addressed the question of the technical assistance' usefulness for counterparts and partners and "heard clear evidence from practitioners on the value of training for their work."⁸⁹ Figure 10 below shows that GPML products (i.e., technical assistance) were used for a wide variety of purposes.

88 UNODC, 2017: Independent In-depth Evaluation of the UNODC's Global Program against Money-laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and the Financing of Terrorism (GPML).


89 Independent In-depth Evaluation of the UNODC's Global Program against Money-laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and the Financing of Terrorism (GPML), 2017, p.40.



Source: Independent evaluation of the UNODC's Global Programme against Money Laundering, 2017.

Figure 10. Self-reported uses of GPML (UNODC Global Programme against Money Laundering) products.

Stakeholders expressed appreciation for improving their knowledge, and how they now see the benefit of having a robust anti-money-laundering and counter-financing of terrorism process. The stakeholders also noted their better awareness of the norms and standards of FATF. As well as the status of and needs they have in their laws related to FATF generally and specifically related to the national risk assessment for their country. As Figure 11 shows, there has been a marked increase in the number of countries amending their terrorism financing legislation.



Source: 1267 Monitoring Committee Report on CT N2013854

Figure 11. Money-laundering legislation and humanitarian activities.

The efforts of GPML have been supported by other programmes such as those of UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch. For instance, its work on the normative and legislative changes made in Morocco's penal procedure code regarding digital investigation, terrorism financing and money laundering, mutual legal assistance, judicial cooperation and extradition, due process and human rights was cited in the evaluation reports as an example of effective work (p.33).⁹⁰

These initiatives appear to be making headway in counteracting the financing of terrorist acts and organizations, especially concerning major terrorist organizations such as ISIL (or Da'esh) and Al-Qaida. However, shortcomings are still reported in terms of the implementation of provisions governing economic resources other than financial assets and the financing of foreign terrorist fighters.⁹¹ Another notable result evident in the reports was the revision of penal codes in Viet Nam and Cambodia. At the time of the 2017 evaluation of GPML, UNODC had helped the two ASEAN countries ratify the treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and was supporting them in overcoming some legal and practical challenges. It also established mechanisms for effective collaboration on legal and judicial cooperation on drug trafficking cases. However, the evaluation also noted new and emerging challenges such as trade-based money laundering, cybercrime and the abuse of cryptocurrencies that have since become ever more prominent.

Significant progress has been made in adopting and implementing international standards on money laundering. As this is an ever-evolving field, Compact entities and Member States will need to continue adapting in response.

⁹⁰ Mid-term in-depth Evaluation of UNODC' Global Programme on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism, 2015.

⁹¹ 1267 Committee: Joint Report of the CT Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support & Monitoring Team, p.3.

Outcome 2.6: Fair, transparent and humanitarian international travel and transport practices that are also effective at curbing opportunities for terrorism

Only three reports provide information relevant to this outcome of fair, transparent and humanitarian international travel and transport practices that effectively curb opportunities for terrorism.⁹² A UNCCT evaluation in Nigeria⁹³ reported improved airport screening capability, with trained officials identifying contraband that previously would not have been intercepted. Similarly, the UNCCT-2015-37 project was reportedly raising awareness on the requirements of Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) regarding Advance Passenger Information (API) as well as determining their related Technical Assistance Needs. This resulted in Nigeria making significant progress in collecting and using API.

However, a CTED report noted that travel and trade restrictions had also impacted humanitarian organizations. The results showed that some civilian populations – including refugees and internally displaced persons seeking to flee terrorist groups – have been vulnerable to both the direct and indirect consequences of pandemic-induced travel restrictions, exacerbating marginalization and other root causes of radicalization.⁹⁴

Overall, the synthesis did not find adequate information to conclude this outcome of fair travel practices curbing opportunities for terrorism.

⁹² International Civil Aviation Organization, one of the main agencies working on this outcome, did not provide its evaluation reports. An ICAO interviewee suggested that their reports were confidential and could not be shared.

⁹³ UNCCT, 2020: Final Evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre.

⁹⁴ CTED, 2020. The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism.

Outcome 2.7: Increased security and protection of particularly vulnerable infrastructure and public places.

Thirty-six reports referenced some aspect of hard infrastructure (physical infrastructure such as electricity) or soft infrastructure (institutions such as legislative framework); however, only four provided substantive outcomes of these interventions. A 2019 UNDP evaluation⁹⁵ noted that the project had helped 57 village committees develop capabilities for border surveillance and the fight against terrorism in the region of Hodh Chargui, Mauritania. Improved communication with internal forces was enabled, as was the collaboration between the village committees, security forces and administration. A border management coordination mechanism in the Moughataa town in Mauritania was reported as fully operational, which helped provide a legal framework for the integrated border management system at the regional and local levels. The project had also helped the establishment of a National Commission and Regional Border Management Committees. For example, a regional border management committee was set up at the level of the wilaya Hodh El Charbi. The evaluation also noted improvement in the technical and logistical capacities of the border management system to control small arms and light weapons.

Another UNDP evaluation noted that the large-scale military response led by the Cameroonian, Nigerian and Niger governments considerably reduced the Boko Haram sect's operational capacities. In particular, it affected Boko Haram's hold over the territories it used as bases for living quarters and deployment of its troops.⁹⁶ Capitalizing on its success, UNDP worked with the government of Chad to develop a programme with seven strategic pillars towards a sustainable and national response to violent extremism in Chad.

The question related to the security of infrastructure around borders needs to be assessed in the nuanced context of the type of existing borders in any given territory. In the case of the Sahel region, a UNDP study conducted in 2015-2016 showed that its borders are "unnatural", "virtual", and consequently particularly "viscous" whilst the societies are based on deep ethnic solidarity across transnational groups, constantly migrating and conducting mutual knowledge and exchange. In this immense ge-

95 UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation of the Capacity building Project for Border Management and Access to Security for the Fight Against Terrorism in the Hodh El Chargui Region.

96 UNDP, 2020: Mid-term Evaluation of the Radicalization and Violent Extremism Prevention Program (PROPEV), p.91.

ographical zone, any counter-terrorism action should consider that the concept of security is likely vague and does not always constitute the primary concerns of the men and women living near borders.⁹⁷

Finally, a UNODC evaluation⁹⁸ provided evidence for increased governmental attention and investment into improving its border control infrastructure and facilities, including the provision of modern monitoring, search for and detection of equipment to combat drug trafficking and all kinds of transboundary crime efficiently.

Overall, limited information on increased security and protection of particularly vulnerable infrastructure and public places is available. The evaluation reports also do not provide much information on the achievement of outcomes in relation to the magnitude of the challenge.

Outcome 2.8: Strengthened implementation of the international conventions and protocols on CT/PVE

Thirty-seven reports referenced international cooperation, but only seven evaluations provided substantive information on the outcome of the strengthened implementation of the international conventions and protocols on CT/PVE. The CT Strategy was adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006 (Resolution A/RES/60/288) and was reaffirmed by General Assembly resolutions A/RES/62/272, A/RES/64/177 and A/RES/66/282, which called upon the Member States to become parties to the existing international conventions and protocols against terrorism. It also requested UNODC to intensify its technical assistance to the Member States for the ratification and implementation of those legal instruments.⁹⁹ By the end of 2007, 102 countries had ratified the then 12 universal legal instruments against terrorism, increasing to 169 countries and 19 universal legal instruments by the end of 2013.¹⁰⁰ As of 2021, 688 new ratifications of the universal legal instruments against terrorism have been undertaken by countries with technical assistance from the UNODC's Terrorism Preven-

97 Ibid.

98 UNODC, 2016: Final Independent Project Evaluation of TKMX57: Strengthening customs services & other law enforcement agencies in implementing border trade control, in particular strategic export/import control regimes.

99 DPO, 2018: Review of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections.

100 UNODC, 2015: Mid-term in-depth Evaluation of the Global Program on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism.

tion Branch (TPB). This implies that seventy per cent of the total number of ratifications required for the universality of the international conventions and protocols related to terrorism had been achieved by 2020, which is a three per cent increase from the 2015 baseline.^{101,102} However, TPB also noted that “universal ratification is far from achieved, particularly for those instruments that were more recently adopted in 2010 and 2014” and “even after ratification, long-term sustained efforts are required to achieve effective implementation of the provisions of these instruments.”¹⁰³

Some evidence of changes at the specific national level was also available in the reports. For example, Indonesia drafted a National Action Plan (NAP) on preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) in 2017, which was to be implemented from 2020.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, UNESCO was consulted on Lebanon’s National Strategy on PVE and its National Action Plan on PVE. UNESCO provided case studies from different countries with clear actions and recommendations which were adopted in the respective countries.¹⁰⁵ The Kosovo Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020 outlined the importance of the family institution in CT/PVE.¹⁰⁶

Overall, UNODC alone had provided a substantive briefing on the legal regime against terrorism, especially the legal aspects and obligations arising from the universal legal instruments against terrorism and the related Security Council resolutions to 16,566 criminal justice officials from some 120 countries by the end of 2013.¹⁰⁷ While reports noted the general satisfaction of stakeholders that received technical assistance in this regard, more specific information on the use of assistance was not available.

- 101** UNODC, 2021: Final Independent Project Evaluation of GLOR35: Independent in-depth evaluation Strengthening the legal regime against terrorism. Work in recent years focused primarily on promoting the universalization and effective implementation of the international legal instruments against nuclear terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment (CPPNM/A). Within the period under evaluation 17 additional Member States had ratified ICSANT, while 34 Member States had ratified CPPNM/A since 2016 (p. 27).
- 102** 2016 Comprehensive Review Background Paper for the Formal Consultation by the 1540 Committee also notes greater increases in some regions such as Africa and Eastern Europe, which previously had lower implementation rates.
- 103** <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/news-and-events/ratification-and-legislative-incorporation.html>.
- 104** UNDP, 2016. EU-UNDP Project: Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Tolerance and Respect for Diversity.
- 105** UNESCO, 2020: Evaluation of UNESCO’s Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.
- 106** UNDP, 2017: Kosovo Understanding Pull and Push factors in Kosovo.
- 107** UNODC, 2015: Mid-term in-depth Evaluation of the Global Program on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism.

Outcome 2.9: Reduced threat from nuclear, chemical, or radiological materials in terror

Five evaluation reports capture data relevant to this outcome of reducing the threat from nuclear, chemical or radiological materials in terrorism. All five had information pertinent to nuclear threats, one on chemical and two on radiological threats. A UNICRI report¹⁰⁸ concluded that the initiatives undertaken by the relevant programs were contributing to mitigating chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, but that (1) many challenges remained, and (2) accomplishments on outcomes and impacts were impossible to ascertain given weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation. It also noted that the partner countries were now more involved in the initiation and implementation of projects; cooperation between decision-makers and implementing bodies had improved; nuclear policy regimes had been strengthened; and the initiative had matured sufficiently to allow for in-depth cooperation on CBRN security. Further, ten countries from the Western Balkans and the Caucasus had effectively started focusing on implementation-related challenges, including Forensics and First Response to CBRN incidents. Following the Ebola crisis, the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence organized a workshop to identify measures for mitigating biosafety and biosecurity risks in Africa. By October 2017, 26 partner countries out of 58 (45 per cent) had finalized their needs assessment questionnaires, but only 18 of them (31 per cent) had devised national action plans.

The report highlighted that the interaction and cooperation between relevant international, regional, and sub-regional organizations (IROs) and other intergovernmental institutions and arrangements, especially those possessing non-proliferation expertise, had increased significantly. While noting this increase, the report also mentioned that only nine of the 47 States registered as assistance providers had responded to mutual assistance requests, and that in most cases the responses received had been modest, related to already ongoing assistance or subject to certain conditions, mainly of financial nature.

Similarly, the Final Evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre noted an evident increase in awareness of the International Convention for the Sup-

108 UNICRI: The European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence: More Progress Needed.

pression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). This main relevant treaty currently has 115 signatories.¹⁰⁹

A 2016 Comprehensive Review Background Paper for the Formal Consultation by the 1540 Committee provides the best evidence for increased relevant control measures. It noted an overall rise in control measures adopted since 2011 in the nuclear area while highlighting that “the increases are mostly related to national legal frameworks and are not matched in the area of enforcement measures” (p.4).

There had been a “satisfactory” increase in the number of recorded measures (15 per cent) on chemical weapons between 2011 and 2016. In 2016, 161 States had a legal framework in place prohibiting the manufacture of chemical weapons by non-State actors, compared to 135 in 2011. However, the security of chemicals in transportation and physical protection measures in facilities had not witnessed similar improvements, which were outlined as the focal areas for increased attention and collaboration.

In 2016, 116 of the 193 Member States had a specific prohibition on the possession of biological weapons by non-State actors. As in the other weapons areas, additional efforts were needed in enforcement. The report found that the weakest area for recorded legal measures to be the security, accounting, and transport of biological materials.

Overall, these reports give good indications on the focus and relevance of the interventions designed to reduce the threat from nuclear, chemical, or radiological materials in terror. These efforts also appear to deliver on the intended outcomes, such as the implementation of relevant treaties. However, future evaluations will need to assess the impact of these interventions.

109 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-15&chapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3: INCREASING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

Outcome 3.1: Increase in the number of MSS which implement the fundamental framework for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

Forty-six reports (40 per cent) contained information relevant to this outcome of strengthening the implementation of the fundamental framework for protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. Six of these reports mentioned increased awareness of the framework for the protection of human rights and/or fundamental freedoms through the training of law enforcement and criminal justice authorities, and occasionally local communities. A UNDP evaluation report on a capacity-building project described a workshop on national and international legislative and normative frameworks for border management and migration, as well as the protection and promotion of human rights. The report also described the training of regional security and justice authorities on international instruments against illicit drug trafficking, corruption, arms trafficking and migration, while promoting their respect for human rights.¹¹⁰ Another evaluation highlighted that the investigators interviewed by the evaluators said the training helped them re-evaluate their interviewing techniques of witnesses, suspects and victims. When they are dealing with suspects, investigators moved away from the “interrogative style to rapport building”.¹¹¹ This shift in attitude towards human rights was significant. Because even though human rights considerations within terrorism cases were always a component of the project, national beneficiaries had earlier expressed a level of indifference or “hostility” towards the need to respect human rights in CT investigations, prosecutions and adjudication.¹¹² As raised in another evaluation report related to

110 UNDP Final Evaluation of the Capacity building Project for Border Management and Access to Security for the Fight Against Terrorism in the Hodh El Chargui region, 2019, p.26.

111 Final Independent Project Evaluation of the “EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project II: Assisting Nigeria to Strengthen Rule of Law-based Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism”, 2018, p.22.

112 Final Independent Project Evaluation of the “EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project II: Assisting Nigeria to Strengthen Rule of Law-based Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism”, 2018, p.45

a project dealing with criminal justice systems, the integration of civil society organizations is key in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as they can play an important role keeping local and central authorities accountable.¹¹³




Figure 12. References to key outcomes in coded documents (Specific objective 3)

Consistent with Figure 12 above, a UNODC synthesis on the prevention of crime and violent extremism found that an effective approach included human rights training for security forces, law enforcement agents and all those involved in the administration of justice, in particular with regard to the prohibition of incitement to hatred.¹¹⁴ An example of this is found in Tanzania, where one project trained government officials in the justice area to provide access to legal aid to the segments of the population previously not considered. Thanks to field visits carried out during the project, the living conditions of inmates in holding cells and prisons was assessed, and interventions to improve these conditions were formulated. The report found that these improved prison conditions are a key milestone in the promotion of human rights of those in conflict with the law.¹¹⁵

Two evaluation reports highlighted increased awareness of the fundamental rights framework by developing manuals and handbooks. One evaluation pointed to the development of a handbook and a “pocketbook” about compliance with international human rights law during screening

113 Mid-term Independent Evaluation: Strengthening of Criminal Justice Systems in the Sahel in Order to Effectively Combat Drug Trafficking, Illicit Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorism and Corruption in the Region, 2017 (UNODC 10), p.10

114 Meta-Synthesis: Prevention of Crime and Violent Extremism 2020, p. VII.

115 UNDP Mid-term Evaluation of Inclusive Democratic Governance pillar/Evaluation of Tanzania PVE Project, 2019, p.21

and controlling of persons at entry and exit border posts. However, the report did not include information on the targeted audience nor a dissemination plan.¹¹⁶ Another report noted project interventions, including the development of manuals, the organization of civic education activities on active citizenship and advocacy for adopting a school curriculum on civic education.¹¹⁷ Similarly, a project in Jordan helped develop a package of material including information on media information literacy, human rights and gender. The material was used to train and coach seven civil society organizations that then gave the training in schools in a cascading model of information-sharing. During those ensuing training sessions, the civil society representatives even observed that some children were teaching their parents and peers the notions they had been taught.¹¹⁸

Another UNODC evaluation pointed out a lack of adequate attention to a human rights approach in some areas of its implementation. The programme reportedly did not promote coordination and knowledge sharing with scholars, academia or civil society organizations with interest in exploring the substantive links between money laundering and gender and human rights issues. Even those of its components that encouraged the creation of networks did not include efforts to partner with organizations promoting human rights departments or specialized UN agencies or programmes such as UN Women.¹¹⁹ Likewise, the evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre emphasized that UNCCT staff, with the exception of the human rights officers, did not adequately consider effect of counter-terrorism related programmes on the existing status of human rights protections or human rights mainstreaming.¹²⁰ Although there were some positive results in initiatives elevating the visibility of victims of terrorism, for instance, reportedly no reflection was given to a strong human-rights-mainstreaming process.¹²¹

Other evaluation reports refer to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of religious education and religious groups. One evaluation report on a project enhancing the role of religious education in countering violent extremism maintains that the project activities encouraged the implementation of human rights, especially in weaving the religious freedom of individual and community groups to-

116 Final Report of the Evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre (UNOCT),2020

117 Preliminary Findings: Evaluation of Pilot Project on Countering Violent Extremism in the Regions of Maghreb and Sahel, 2019, p.40.

118 Evaluation of UNESCO's Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, 2020, p.21


119 Independent In-depth Evaluation of the Global Program against Money-laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism, 2017, p.16.

120 Final Report of the Evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre (UNOCT),2020, p.38.

121 Final Report of the Evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre (UNOCT),2020, p.38.

gether with the freedom of self-expression.¹²² In the same line, another report mentions the Global Unity Forum held in 2018 in which interfaith groups participated to find solutions to violence in the name of religion. According to the report, the forum was intended to create fair and harmonious relationships based on respect for human rights and equality.¹²³

Development of counter-financing of terrorism mechanisms that consider impacts on humanitarian activities



Data in absolute number of Member States

Figure 13. Counterterrorism mechanisms and humanitarian activities

Another study, however, found a lack of consideration for fundamental freedoms related to humanitarian aid. As indicated in Figure 13, more than half of mechanisms (50/89=56 per cent) aimed at countering the financing of terrorism similarly did not adequately consider their potential impact on humanitarian activities.

In sum, the evaluations reviewed show that diverse and tailored support has been extended to national and regional stakeholders to strengthen the implementation of the fundamental framework for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. However, as some reports suggest, more attention needs to be given to adequately mainstreaming human rights in all aspects of programme management, including programme design, implementation, monitor-

¹²² UNDP Mid-term Project Evaluation Report: Enhancing the role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism, 2019, p.69.

¹²³ UNDP: The roles of Islamic Moderate Organizations in Countering VE, 2019, p.64.

ing and evaluation.¹²⁴ Present efforts at mainstreaming human rights are not consistent nor directly linked to expectations contained in the Global Strategy (Pillar IV). The UNDP is supporting innovative research to ascertain greater accountability for human-rights based PVE efforts, including through piloting a new approach, incorporating “what works” to address the psychological impact of violent extremism, or adopting a new risk assessment tool. Greater accountability for human-rights-based PVE efforts including monitoring and learning, should help address the factors underpinning violent extremism.¹²⁵

Outcome 3.2: Increase in the number of MSS that are parties to and implement the core international instruments on human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law

As evidenced in the report providing analytical reflections of the content, observations and recommendations of the second global meeting on preventing violent extremism held on 23-24 May 2018 in Norway, the United Nations has renewed its commitment to supporting Member States to formulate and implement national PVE policies consistent with the rule of law and international human rights standards. Accordingly, the CTITF Working Group on Promoting and Protecting Human Rights and the Rule of Law while Countering Terrorism was established to support efforts by the Member States to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law in the context of countering terrorism. In addition, the Human Rights Council (HRC) Resolution Human rights and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism urged states to ensure that “any measures taken to prevent and counter violent extremism comply with all their obligations under international law, and in particular, international human rights”.¹²⁶

Only six evaluation reports mentioned any connection to outcome 3.2. In the 2018 evaluation of a project assisting Nigeria in strengthening criminal justice responses to terrorism, training on the constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, and guidelines that translate the international obligations into domestic law, was found very effective. The training included aspects of human rights safeguards concerning investigation and

124 Ibid

125 Review of UNDP’s Global PVE practice, 2020, p.3 (UNDP IH 19)

126 UNDP, 2018: Assessing the progress made & future of development approaches to PVE.

prosecution processes, witness protection, admissibility of evidence allegedly obtained through coercion, as well as impunity for sexual and gender-based violence by terrorist groups.¹²⁷

On the other hand, UNESCO is supporting key education stakeholders in their effort to advance human rights, tolerance, mutual respect and understanding. UNESCO does so by supporting developing policies, strategies and practices aimed at ensuring that places of learning do not become breeding grounds for violent extremism.¹²⁸ The project helped develop a guide, available in several languages, aimed at preventing violent extremism through education. The guide equips policymakers with the knowledge necessary to prioritize, plan and implement actions for effective national prevention interventions.

In terms of refugee law, there is scarcely any evidence in the reports reviewed. Only one evaluation report mentions the adoption of “a repatriation policy”. This is the case of Malaysia, whereby returnees (foreign terrorist fighters who have fought with the Islamic State (IS) and return to their country of origin) face judicial proceedings and rehabilitation upon returning home. According to the evaluation, to date, 11 Malaysians have returned home. To deal with the repatriation of returnees, the government employs a raft of existing anti-terrorism laws. The treatment of returnees, the evaluation follows, “highlights the constant need for states to balance national security with the protection of human rights.”¹²⁹ Despite the importance of the implementation of instruments on refugee law, which Covid-19 has aggravated, there is not sufficient evidence to confirm that it has taken a relevant role. As mentioned in the impact of travel and trade restrictions of the Covid-19 report, “refugees and internally displaced persons seeking to flee terrorist groups – have been vulnerable to both the direct and indirect consequences of the pandemic”.¹³⁰


The reviewed reports did not provide information on the ratification status of important international human rights treaties. While this data was available from the OHCHR portal (Figure 14), it could not be readily ascertained whether and to what extent Compact entities have contributed to it.

127 UNDP, 2018: Final Independent Project Evaluation of the “EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project II: Assisting Nigeria to strengthen rule of law-based criminal justice responses to Terrorism.

128 UNESCO, 2017: Review of UNESCO’s Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Worldwide.

129 UNDP, 2020: Entry & Exit Points: VE in Southeast Asia.

130 CTED, 2020: The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Countering violent extremism.



Source: <https://indicators.ohchr.org/>

Figure 14. Status of the Ratification of 18 International Human Rights treaties.

In sum, with the current evidence, it is impossible to determine an increase in the number of the Member States that are parties to and implement the core international instruments on human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, information on some cases of success of Member States in integrating international instruments into their national law, strengthening the adoption of human rights and the rule of law to fight terrorism was evident.

Outcome 3.3: Increase in number of Member-States that develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system for preventing and reducing terrorism.

For this outcome of developing a national criminal justice system to prevent and reduce terrorism, there is scarce evidence found in the documents reviewed. A CTED report indicated that responses and actions taken by States to counter terrorism financing, demonstrated the need for further research into the integration of human rights obligations with the

investigation and prosecution of terrorism-financing offences.¹³¹ The report concluded that many States were still in need of technical assistance, training and related equipment to fully and consistently implement laws and mechanisms against terrorism financiers.

A project evaluation in South Asia reported it increased the knowledge of officials in the Philippines, improved coordination between agencies, and contributed to fewer cases being dismissed due to weaknesses in preparation.¹³² The report describes how improved collaboration was key to the first conviction under the Philippines' counter-terrorism law. The cases' lead prosecutor recognizing this in a message to UN officials in March 2015 and again this was confirmed in interviews with other stakeholders. The project also contributed to making the national criminal justice system in Viet Nam more effective and based on the rule of law. National interviewees also reported that project's AML/CFT training in 2015 contributed to the first-ever investigation of three cases. Two of them were sent to court.

According to other evaluation reports considering the ratification of international CT instruments, Member States have requested technical assistance to integrate these instruments into national legislative frameworks. Since 2016, UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch has assisted forty countries with drafting, amending and/or adopting national CT legislation. Among them, Ethiopia (2020), Chad (2020), the Maldives (2019) and Nigeria (2017), all of which have adopted legislation on CT.¹³³ Notably, Chad revised and adopted its national counter-terrorism legislation, abolishing the death penalty for terrorism-related offences.

GLOR35 was reportedly contributing to developing an effective national criminal justice system for preventing and reducing terrorism through different mechanisms based on the rule of law. These included improved investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of counter-terrorism cases, such as in Colombia (2016) and Nigeria (2018-2019); it also advanced the rights of indirect beneficiaries. In the case of Colombia, nine convictions were achieved on the financing and administration of terrorist assets. Seven of the cases could be attributed to GLOR35. In the case of Nigeria, at least 366 terrorism cases have led to convictions, and 882 cases have been

131 CTED, 2020: Joint report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities on actions taken by Member States to disrupt terrorist financing, prepared pursuant to paragraph 37 of Security Council resolution 2462.

132 UNODC, 2016. Final Independent Project Evaluation of XAPX37: Sub-Programme on Counterterrorism: East and Southeast Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism.

133 UNODC, 2021: Final In-Depth Evaluation of GLOR35 Strengthening the Legal Regime Against Terrorism.

discharged, with hearings led by project-trained defence lawyers, prosecutors, and judges.¹³⁴

Additionally, UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) had reportedly contributed to the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (UNCTITF) and the eight Working Groups of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. They were launched in 2019 to strengthen complementarity and coherence in the field of CT. TPB has continued to chair the Working Group on Countering the Financing of Terrorism with UN-OCT, and the Working Group on Legal and Criminal Justice Responses to Counter Terrorism with CTED.¹³⁵ Despite recognising its importance, Pillar IV of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy is often referenced but rarely, if ever, truly used in methodology, objectives and strategy.

Evidence shows incremental progress regarding human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. Training of criminal justice and law enforcement officials has contributed to this strategic objective; however, Member States still need technical assistance to fully implement fundamental freedoms and human rights and consistently maintain an effective and rule-of-law-based national criminal justice system.

¹³⁴ UNODC, 2021: Final In-Depth Evaluation of GLOR35 Strengthening the Legal Regime Against Terrorism.

¹³⁵ *ibid*, p. 25

Cross-cutting Issues: Gender equality and leaving no one behind

One of the major risks in the CT/PVE domain is aggravating the already precarious human rights situation of vulnerable categories of the population, especially women and the youth. As the UN Security Council has recognized the link between terrorism and vulnerable populations, Resolution S/RES/2178/2014 condemned violent extremism and called on the Member States to support efforts to adopt longer-term solutions rooted in addressing the underlying causes of radicalization and violent extremism, including by empowering youth.¹³⁶ Moreover, the UN Security Council, in Resolution 2242 on Women, Peace and Security, also recognizes the differential impact on the human rights of women and girls from/due to terrorism and violent extremism in terms of health, education and participation in public life.¹³⁷




Figure 15: References to key outcomes in coded documents (Cross-cutting issues)

Evidence from the data collected shows the importance of women's involvement in reducing VE and CT. Not only in terms of tackling structural violence against women but also empowerment of women, as their par-

¹³⁶ The Resolution provides a basis for the Secretary-General's Plan of Action released in January 2016.

¹³⁷ UNDP, 2016: Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity: A Development Response to Addressing Radicalization and Violent Extremism.

ticipation in all levels of public life is important to help reduce violent extremism. As presented in a UNDP report on misogyny in the VE context, “women often identify problems early, push back against them and bring communities together”.¹³⁸ In line with this, Figure 16 shows recommendations developed by 142 participants from 43 countries on building peace in contexts affected by violent extremism, including several points related to women’s inclusion.¹³⁹ The recommendations resulted from a global digital consultation with women-led civil society organizations and gender equality activists to hear their perspectives on the gendered dimensions of terrorism and counter-terrorism (CT). The Working Group led the consultations on Adopting a Gender-Sensitive Approach to Preventing and Countering Terrorism (Gender Working Group) of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact (UNGCTCC).

Public Statement of the consultation to the UNGCTCC on increasing CSO engagement in UN-led CT/PVE process was drafted during the consultation and approved by the participants. It includes a set of 11 recommendations on how to better address violent extremism:

1. Clearly define the terminology associated with CT/PVE and ensure evidence-based approaches
2. Invest in high quality and inclusive education
3. Invest in a culture of human rights, accountability, respect for diversity and critical thinking
4. Develop a culture of conflict prevention
5. Embrace comprehensive, inclusive and participatory approaches
6. Understand local contexts and invest in local solutions
7. Promote and protect women’s human rights
8. Promote gender equality
9. Promote women’s leadership
10. Focus on implementing human rights- based frameworks and accountability

Figure 16. Recommendations from the Outcome Report: Civil Society Voices on the Gendered Dimensions of CT/PVE

¹³⁸ UNDP, 2021: Misogyny: the Extremist Gateway?, p.1

¹³⁹ UN Women, 2021: Outcome Report Global Digital Consultation Civil Society Voices on the Gendered Dimensions of Violent Extremism and Counter-terrorism Responses.

In terms of women's participation in their communities and public life to reduce violence extremism, 19 per cent of the evaluation reports indicated either positive or negative results. A UN Women evaluation report on Kenya noted the exemplary work of women in brokering peace between warring communities.¹⁴⁰ The report, however, also pointed out that the women were not involved in decision-making processes, particularly at senior levels where strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism were designed and implemented. Similarly, a DPO report found mixed evidence and suggested that women may have been active in some peace campaigns and local governance in certain places, but not in other events and places. Nevertheless, the report still identified them as a potential force for peace.¹⁴¹

Other reports, like the UNDP final evaluation of a project in Chad and Cameroon, indicate the impact of peacebuilding projects that empower community actors. This report, for instance, highlights the changes in the behaviour young people and parents in/or between different communities. In terms of gender equality, parents' perceptions of women's rights and the importance of sending girls to school and the age of marriage and the freedom to choose spouses have significantly changed.¹⁴² Additional evidence can also be found in the 2020 UNDP report, which points out the case of Mindanao, in the Philippines, where women play a central role within the conflict as direct combatants, military leaders and peace-makers. Women's organizations play a crucial role in curtailing clan conflicts and establishing a dialogue between competing sides.¹⁴³

“Developing women's capacity to engage in economic acuity and access the formal labour market - through market-relevant skillsets and network- can enhance women's status in their communities and enable their participation in peacebuilding/ violence prevention structures. In addition, economic independence can build both young women s and their children's resistance and resilience to crime, including violent extremism, by addressing the 'pull' effects of poverty and social cohesion.

Meta-Synthesis: Prevention of Crime and Violent Extremism 2020, UNODC

140 UN-Women, 2018: Evaluation of Women Active Participation & Response to VE in Kenya.

141 DPO, 2020: Final Evaluation: Engaging Youth in Building Peaceful Communities in Mali.

142 UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation of the Project “Supporting Mechanisms for Consolidating Peace at the Community Level and the Inclusion of Young People in Areas Located on the Border Between Chad and Cameroon.”

143 UNDP, 2020: Conflicting Identities: The Nexus Between Masculinities, Femininities and Violent Extremism in Asia.

Another strategy to counter violent extremism has been engaging both youth and women through cultural and artistic activities. A UN Women report¹⁴⁴ describes the use of religious counter-narratives, literature, drama and vocational training to dissuade people from joining violent extremist groups. This resulted in local women and youth completing positive transformation programmes and forming volunteer peace groups. The report described how these groups collaborate among themselves and with local police and religious leaders to better understand drivers of VE. This helps with early detection and interventions to promote social cohesion and non-violent conflict resolutions.

Eleven per cent of the reviewed documents point out women's involvement in reducing VE and CT through diverse capacity building efforts. For instance, a UN-Women programme actively engaged women in the PVE and peacebuilding by providing entrepreneurial skills as well as psychosocial support services to develop their skillsets and expand employment opportunities towards financial independence.¹⁴⁵ It reportedly led to an increase in the number of women owning their businesses as well as leading community-based organizations focused on peacebuilding. The quote above highlights one of the lessons learned as presented in the report.

In Kenya, a project led by UN Women in partnership with the National Counter Terrorism Centre brought women victims and survivors of extremism together (as beneficiaries of the project) with implementing partners to share lessons learned, build synergies and improve relations and empathy on both sides. The forum enabled women to engage the National Counter Terrorism Centre on opportunities for future programming.¹⁴⁶ Overall, the evaluation concluded that despite the intervention's strength in attempting to integrate gender equality and human rights concerns, its components could have benefited from more detailed content of the selected topics coupled with allocation of more time and resources.

Another relevant facet on gender equality pertains to the role of women in law enforcement and as criminal justice authorities. A UN-Women report from Niger points out that to support victims of terrorism and sexual and gender based violence, five gender offices in security forces stations (gendarmes, police and military) were established to provide friendly services for women to help the victims, while 400 security forces officers were trained to protect and support women survivors of terrorism and sexual and gender based vi-

144 UN Women, 2021: Outcome Report: Civil Society Voices on the Gendered Dimensions of Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Responses.

145 UNODC, 2020: Meta-Synthesis: Prevention of Crime and Violent Extremism.

146 UN-Women, 2018: Evaluation of Women Active Participation and Response to Violent Extremism in Kenya.

olence.¹⁴⁷ Another report includes evidence of integrating a gender equality approach in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. According to the report, activities such as gender mainstreaming of women in the police and military do not just prevent a resurgence of conflict in post-conflict states, but also changes the zeitgeist so that the use of violence is unacceptable, thereby making them less vulnerable to radicalization.¹⁴⁸

Finally, there is evidence, albeit limited, in relation to gender equality and its key role with refugees and returnees in the context of violent extremism and CT. Although women's participation is not necessarily visible, as mentioned in the 2019 UNDP report, women are filling the gaps in terms of responding to the needs of returnees as peace practitioners, human rights activists, social workers, lawyers, and many others.¹⁴⁹ However, their participation reportedly raised alarms about the potential endangerment of these women despite their intentions. This appears to have resulted from a lack of clarity in policies and laws in most countries on supporting returnees - who have fought with the Islamic State (IS), in particular - and the risk of being deemed as associated with or providing material support to members of designated terrorist organizations, even though their support was vital to deradicalization and rehabilitation efforts.

The same report mentions an example of combatting the stigma of radicalization. In Nigeria, the Allamin Foundation for Peace and Development supported community leaders in reducing stigma and reintegrating female returnees into society. It also developed a holistic, community-based reintegration module, combining it with realignment of social norms in communities where Boko Haram has heavily recruited. The Foundation also supported establishment of two women's groups seeking accountability and justice for victims of enforced disappearance and survivors of mass atrocities.

Regarding the empowerment of youth, 86 reports include the term "youth". These reports focus on the involvement of youth in different capacities mainly to address the underlying causes of radicalization and violent extremism. One example of this took place in Niger, where a radio programme was produced for the young refugees from Mali stationed in camps in the Tillabery region. The programme raised awareness on the importance of collaboration between refugees and the security and defence forces, as well as the role of parents and camp chiefs in preventing the youths from joining violent extremist groups, along with the limits

147 UN-Women, 2017: Gender-sensitive Humanitarian Action and Aid to Women and Girls affected by Boko Haram Terrorism in Diffa, Niger.

148 UNDP, 2015: Root Causes of Radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

149 UNDP, 2019: Invisible Women: Gendered Dimension of Return, Rehabilitation and Reintegration from Violent Extremism.

of traditional authority over camp newcomers and peaceful cohabitation between refugee and the host populations.¹⁵⁰ In contexts in which, like the case of Niger, a significant percentage of young people live under difficult socioeconomic circumstances with high unemployment rates, extremist groups become attractive alternatives offering resources such as weapons, motorbikes, and fuel - the value of which is often more symbolic and status-related than economic.¹⁵¹

According to a UNDP review, 26 per cent of projects work with young people, religious leaders, and media organizations to counter extremist messaging by promoting diverse voices.¹⁵² Some of these projects took an innovative approach to PVE and are considered experiments. One of these cases included an arts-based initiative (integrating, for example, drama and storytelling) to promote critical thinking and resilience to exclusionary and violent rhetoric. The initiative has reached audiences of tens of millions, creating empathy towards those returning to communities after association with violent extremist groups. The report furthermore mentioned that 17 (50 per cent) of national initiatives of these UNDP PVE-specific projects prioritized the engagement of women and young people, including allocating them a leadership role in designing and delivering project activities and investing in women's potential to shape the national conversation on PVE. In another report on Sudan, for instance, a UNDP evaluation describes the formation and strengthening of platforms such as peace committees, unity forums and advocacy groups among youth to transform their roles from actors in conflicts to "champions of peace" and positive change agents with skills to transform conflicts.¹⁵³

As supported by evidence in diverse contexts, gender equality and the empowerment of women and youth is crucial to CT/ PVE. Whether having a role in preventing radicalization in their communities; in actively participating as law enforcement, criminal justice, or policy-making roles; or as leaders to respond to diverse needs in violent extremism, it is essential to integrate women and youth into future projects as well as a gender perspective into evaluation of counter-terrorism initiatives. The compliance with human rights considerations, gender equality and integration of youth needs to become a crucial indicator for measuring real progress.

150 UNCRI, 2020: Many hands on an elephant: What Enhances Community Resilience to Radicalization into Violent Extremism?

151 UNCRI, 2020: Many hands on an Elephant: What Enhances Community Resilience to Radicalization into Violent Extremism?

152 UNDP, 2020: Review of UNDP's Global PVE practice.

153 UNDP, 2019, Final Evaluation of the Beyond Bentiu Protection of Civilian Site (PoC) Youth Reintegration Strategy: Creating Conditions for Peaceful Coexistence between Youth Internally Displaced Persons, Returnees and Host Community Members, p.6.

Evidence shows that gender equality has been integrated to a certain degree in UN's counter-terrorism work. The role of women in different positions in CT and PVE has certainly been found to be crucial. Several interventions describe the contribution of women and youth to capacity-building, peacebuilding nexuses or law enforcement and policymaking. Nevertheless, future evaluations will need to assess whether the strategies to incorporate women into CT and PVE are the most effective ones – or whether they are the most effectively designed and resourced – to impact society at large.

BEST PRACTICES

04

This section synthesizes best practices identified in the reports reviewed that have relevance beyond specific projects and programmes. The findings are organized by their potential significance and not by sheer count of observations. To some degree, they have been generalized to be relevant for 37 disparate Compact agencies (and beyond).

- 1. Multi-dimensional approaches** that combined context-specific technical assistance, capacity-building, mentorship, community empowerment, unity forums, advocacy groups, attention to religious and cultural elements, and use of multimedia messaging incorporating theatre and radio for broadcasting positive messages of non-violent conflict resolution were all found to be very effective at achieving their intended goals. Twenty-five reports mentioned some variation on this theme. The most prominent examples included the UNDP and UNIDO projects mentioned previously in this synthesis (see Outcome 1.1 and 1.5), which appeared to incorporate many of these elements. Similarly, UNICRI's work with at-risk communities in the Sahel, Maghreb and Nigeria through grass-root organizations used multi-dimensional approaches in intercommunity reconciliation campaigns. This is in line with recent UNDP guidance notes which call for using comprehensive approaches,¹⁵⁴ including using insights from behavioral sciences¹⁵⁵ to detect and prevent the spread of misinformation and disinformation.¹⁵⁶

154 UNDP 2020: Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism In Africa: A Development Approach, Regional Service Centre for Africa, Annual Report 2020.

155 UNDP 2021: Applying Behavioral Science to Support the Prevention of Violent Extremism: Experiences and Lessons Learned.

156 UNDP 2021: Strengthening the Digital Dimensions of Tolerance and Inclusion in Bangladesh During the COVID-19-pandemic

- 2. Partnerships:** 78 reports referenced some element of partnerships. However, the successful examples that stood out invariably involved leveraging partnerships to achieve either a larger or a wider (e.g., more widespread or multidimensional) impact, or both. Partnering with civil society organizations, academia, the private sector and regional bodies to go beyond traditional partnerships with Member States and other international organizations was found to accelerate the achievement of intended results (although it was also found to be more cumbersome and bureaucratically challenging). Some of the most successful interventions found ways to leverage youth interests — e.g., arts, sports, media, informal learning and personal relationships — to teach peace-building skills. These activities brought together not only the youth but communities as a whole, regardless of their differences. These approaches empowered and engaged youth as full partners in CT/PVE. Similarly, partnering with local communities using community policing models was found to be most effective when residents and policemen had repeated opportunities to interact, exchange contact information, and develop mutual understanding.¹⁵⁷ Sharing lessons learned with community members who are survivors of violent extremism also helped in building community trust and partnerships.
- 3. Critical mass:** Projects that focused on the achievement of a critical mass of participants were reported to be not just more effective, but also more sustainable (e.g., the EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project). Other agencies that seek to replicate strategy should consider using a more targeted approach to make an in-depth impact on a limited number of beneficiaries (e.g., a smaller geographic area or more narrowly defined groups) in programme designing. The success of these interventions can then be leveraged as the power of an example for others.
- 4. Community service models:** Community service efforts, referenced in nine reports, combined with new attitudes of social responsibility generated a sense of greater belonging, which also served the implicit goal of social cohesion. These positive models of community belonging were more effective than negative models (e.g., “here’s how you can empower others in your community” versus “don’t be an extremist”) in terms of creating sustained changes in behaviour and senses of communal obligations. These community initiative efforts also had meaningful catalytic effects in empowering women to implement programs in the ways that

157 UNDP End of Evaluation Report: Women and Girls as Drivers of Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization, 2019.

they felt were most helpful. Enhancing the professionalism of security forces, law enforcement agencies and justice institutions, as well as ensuring effective oversight and accountability of such bodies, was found to be of particular relevance in building respect for human rights and the rule of law. Projects and programmes that seek to replicate similar efforts should consider deeper involvement of community in needs assessments and programme design.

5. **Establishing networks:** Building networks (e.g., the Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for Southern Africa) that bring together practitioners for exchanging valuable information with the aim of promoting collaboration emerged as a best practice for promoting sustainability.¹⁵⁸ By bringing together professional collaborators, these networks not only extend the reach of the projects, but also help advance agendas of common professional interest to the participants. This, in turn, makes interventions self-sustaining.
6. **Developing institutional infrastructure:** Projects such as a UNDP project on radicalization¹⁵⁹ that relied on construction and rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure and strengthening the capacities of vulnerable groups such as young people, refugees and displaced persons were found to be more effective at preventing radicalization and violent extremism. Such soft infrastructure can include strengthening legislation (as in the case of UNTOC), which can help institutionalize new practices.
7. **Strategic communications:** Strategic communications via social media were reported to play a vital role in preventing and countering violent extremist narratives and the recruitment of youths into extremist groups. Strategies such as conducting training sessions for media professionals and editors to share stories of extremist incidences responsibly and mindfully, or to share stories on positive youth behaviors, were found helpful in minimizing recruitment at the grass-roots level, and so were activities that empowered and enabled communities and victims of violent extremism to prevent further violent extremism in their communities. ICT solutions can complement such communications. In one case, ICT solutions including interactive maps, automated attendance tracking system (AATS), e-registry of new primary school entrants, and “My community policing officer”

158 UNODC, 2017. Independent In-depth Evaluation of the Global Program against Money-laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and the Financing of Terrorism (GPML).

159 UNDP Mid-term Evaluation of the Radicalization and Violent Extremism Prevention Program (PROPEV), 2020.

mobile application¹⁶⁰ were used to address at least two crucial root causes of social tensions in suburban areas: dissatisfaction with social services and low trust in state and municipal authorities.

8. **Evidence-based programming:** The best designed programmes start with robust research, pay upfront attention to their implementation plan including on continuous data collection for monitoring, pursue a long-term strategy, and adjust as needed to stay on track. This was reported to be the case, for example, in a joint IOM and UNDP project,¹⁶¹ which was reported to be based on grounded research that guided the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Within the constraints of human and financial resources and upfront investment, encouragement for programme officers to be driven by evidence-based research can help achieve the best potential results. It is also important to remember the important role high-quality data can play in evidence-based decision-making and empowerment of vulnerable people.¹⁶²
9. **Gender-responsive interventions:** Effective gender-sensitive and gender-responsive projects address the root causes of violence and discrimination against women in all spheres of life. Best practices involve mainstreaming gender balance/perspectives into institutional policies, regulations, protocols, guidelines and communication strategies, as well as designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating programmes, policies and strategies which intentionally engage women in order to promote the realization of women's rights and strengthen women's economic independence. Multi-phased and adaptive training programs were reported to be more effective for changing underlying attitudes, beliefs and behavior in ways that logically support more tolerant communities.¹⁶³
10. **Monitoring and evaluation:** Using standardized surveys and shared databases across countries and organizations is a best practice for enhancing the consistency and international comparability of counter-terrorism statistics and use of data by national Governments. An

160 UNFPA, 2020: Evaluation of GPI Project "Addressing Social Disparity and Gender Inequality to Prevent Conflicts in new Settlements in Bishkek."

161 UNDP, 2019: Beyond Bentiu Protection of Civilian Site (PoC) Youth Reintegration Strategy: Creating Conditions for Peaceful Coexistence between Youth Internally Displaced Persons, Returnees and Host Community Members.

162 <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/undataforum/blog/no-more-data-blah-blah-this-is-about-empowerment/>

163 UNDP, 2019: End of Evaluation Report: Women and Girls as Drivers of Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization. Also, UNDP, 2019: Invisible Women: Gendered Dimension of Return, Rehabilitation and Reintegration from Violent Extremism.

example of this practice is provided by Member State participation in two UNODC evaluations.¹⁶⁴ Other creative uses in M&E include hiring community liaison points for local contextual monitoring and direct engagement with beneficiaries. Given their high value and relatively low cost, an IOM audit report highly recommended the use of these liaison points.¹⁶⁵ Similarly, a training for students at the National University of Trujillo helped strengthen local evaluation capacity on Human Security, which was expected to also help replicate the success of the intervention in other communities in the immediate vicinity.¹⁶⁶

Common best practices:	# Reports
Building alliances and establishing community liaison points	4
Building trust in the community	8
Creation of spaces for youths to express their opinions and be listened to	3
Focusing on the role of municipalities and local government stakeholders in PVE	3
Local context monitoring	3
Meeting gender specific needs	4
Use of sports and culture in PVE/CVE	4
Using implementing organizations to leverage youth engagement	3
Common lessons learned:	
Focusing on partnership models as compared to viewing rightsholders as beneficiaries	5
Capacity building of community stakeholders including youth, religious leaders, women, etc.	4
Adopting a holistic approach and focusing on comprehensive projects, linking PVE to youth	10
Increased cultural sensitivity and nuanced understanding of the target context	9
Flexible funding to support different activities	6
Increased community engagement and building partnerships with community stakeholders	11
Meaningful participation of young women and marginalized youth	14
Respect for human rights	8
Use of social media and online tools to PVE/CVE	5

Figure 17. Best practices and lessons learned: Content Analysis

164 UNODC, 2014. Strengthening Criminal Justice Capacities of Central Asian Countries to Counter Terrorism in Compliance with Principles of Rule of Law’ Project (XACX50). Also, UNODC, 2015: Global Synthetics Monitoring, Analysis, Research and Trends (SMART) programme.

165 IOM Member State Audit Scheme- Consolidated Audit Summary Report, 2018.

166 UNDP: Final Report Joint Program: Strengthening Human Security and Resilience by Promoting Peaceful Coexistence in Peru, 2017.

LESSONS LEARNED AND GAPS IDENTIFIED

05

Lessons learned are general conclusions with a potential for wider application and use. These represent the documented information on the positive and negative experiences of various development interventions. They enable learning from specific experiences of certain implementers for their wider peer groups. More broadly, these reflections on the previous experiences should be treated as hypotheses to be considered and tested by others for a wider application. The lessons presented below, as identified in the reports reviewed, offer a synthesis from the generalizable perspective of multiple Compact entities, while those of relevance only to individual entities are left to be covered in internal reviews of relevant entities.

- 1. Funding model:** The project-based funding model emerged as one of the most significant challenges. Since the funding of counter-terrorism is not institutionalized, it is primarily dependent on donors' interests. It is reportedly easier to fund "harder" and short-term security issues than "softer" and longer-term solutions. This practice is also reflected at the level of national governments, which find it easier to allocate resources for short-term and forceful measures than to invest in long-term sustainable changes.¹⁶⁷
- 2. Beneficiaries and participants as co-creators:** Involving targeted beneficiaries (rightsholders) throughout the process was identified as an important issue. Maintaining contact with them from design and implementation to follow-up monitoring and eventual evaluation needs to be incorporated

¹⁶⁷ See, among others, GPML evaluation above. Assessment Of UNDP's Libya Results on Reconciliation and Peace Building also noted that Sustainability was a major drawback of many international projects in conflict-affected states around the world, which have a strong desire to 'doing something' and a lesser focus on following up for long-term effectiveness.

into related logistics and budgetary needs assessments.¹⁶⁸ Such real-time monitoring was found mutually beneficial as this enabled immediate adaptation and course correction. Five reports referred to this as using a more genuine partnership model, instead of viewing rightsholders as beneficiaries.¹⁶⁹

3. **Field staff as co-developers:** Field staff should ideally be empowered to drive the process based on their intimate knowledge of local culture and context. At a minimum, including them in core coordination and cross-sectoral groups was found to help build a closer relationship between the field and headquarters. It also better supported project development and facilitated sharing of knowledge and learning.
4. **Complementary interventions**¹⁷⁰ significantly increase both the likelihood and sustainability of success (e.g., business loans and training, vocational training and labour market access, and advocacy campaigns with literacy education).¹⁷¹ Such efforts provide both the incentives and means to adopt behavioral changes. As put succinctly in a UNDP evaluation, when youth have trained in employment skills and they work and train together in businesses and sports, tensions are reduced if not eliminated altogether.¹⁷²
5. **Anticipate resistance to change:** 14 reports contained lessons pertaining to participation of women and youth. The most significant finding of these was that, despite good intentions to include women (as well as youth and other marginalized groups), projects often underestimate social resistance to their participation. Nine of these reports thus advocated for increased cultural sensitivity and nuanced understanding of target contexts.¹⁷³ Relatedly, encouragement from

168 See, for example, the 2018 IOM audit report mentioned earlier.

169 At least one report also called for involving national institutions from the outset in the design process as otherwise their participation later cannot be guaranteed (UNDP, 2018: End of Project Evaluation: Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation 2015-2017).

170 Some reports designate this as holistic approaches. See also, UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation of the Project “Supporting Mechanisms for Consolidating Peace at the Community Level and the Inclusion of Young People in Areas Located on the Border Between Chad and Cameroon.”

171 UNDP, 2020: Final Report Evaluation of the Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme (ICRRP). See also, Final Evaluation of the Project “Supporting Mechanisms for Consolidating Peace at the Community Level and the Inclusion of Young People in Areas Located on the Border Between Chad and Cameroon” 2019.

172 UNDP, 2019: Final evaluation of the Beyond Bentiu Protection of Civilian Site (PoC) Youth Reintegration Strategy.

173 See, for example, UNDP, 2020: Assessment of UNDP Libya Results on Reconciliation and Peace Building Processes. Similarly, a UNICRI CVE report on Sahel-Maghreb observed that it was important to consider women’s social environment and make everybody aware of possibility for their participation and conditions for their doing so (e.g., no male trainers and no activities to be carried out in public spaces and family consent to participate).

core learning partners (CLPs) was found essential to help youth build their confidence and encourage their active participation, which was especially needed during the dialogues and initiatives process.¹⁷⁴ These aspects should be paid closer attention to if the projects are to make a meaningful contribution.

- 6. Mentoring:** At least nine reports highlighted the importance of mentoring in lessons learned (and at least two reports did so among best practices). A UNDP evaluation, for example, called for recognizing that long-term change requires mentorship.¹⁷⁵ Another UNDP evaluation noted that (if mentored,) youths were “genuine artisans” for peace and social cohesion.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, a UNODC global programme, managed in partnership with World Bank and IMF, was recognized for using this strategy to both support legislative changes as well as implementation and capacity development.¹⁷⁷
- 7. Role of the religion:** While several reports highlighted the importance of incorporating religion in the design of interventions, notably only one did so in the lessons learned. A UNICRI report rightfully included a rejoinder on recognizing the importance of religion to local communities in several terrorism-afflicted countries.¹⁷⁸ This report noted that the religion had an important role in the lives of people living in marginalized communities of the nine countries and that it had to be considered as an element that permeated the daily lives of community members and incorporated into the design of assistance programmes. On the flip side, reports and research presented in the findings section illustrate the danger of equating terrorism with Islamic terrorism, which, while ignoring other kinds of terrorism, likely feeds into the narrative of extremists on all sides (for some to claim victimhood and for others to persecute). The instrumentalization of religion that serves political objectives and/or legitimates violent extremism, though challenging, is clearly understudied. This is a gap in our understanding that calls for rigorous research.

174 IOM, 2019. Evaluation of Community Based Approaches to Support Youth in Targeted Municipalities in BiH and Moving Towards Sustainable Approaches to Prevention of Violent Extremism.

175 UNDP, 2021: Final Evaluation of Partnership for a Tolerant, Inclusive Bangladesh (PTIB) Project.

176 UNDP, 2019: Final Evaluation of Supplementary Funds for Japan, which noted that it was clear that if mentored, youths are genuine artisans for the consolidation of peace and social cohesion.

177 UNODC, 2017: Independent In-depth Evaluation of the UNODC’s Global Program Against Money-laundering, Proceeds of Crime, and the Financing of Terrorism (GPML).

178 UNICRI, 2020: Many Hands on an Elephant: What enhances Community Resilience to Radicalization into Violent Extremism? Findings from the project on countering radicalization and violent extremism in the regions of Sahel and Maghreb.

- 8. Environment and risk management:** There is a growing recognition of the role that environment and climate change plays in natural disasters which in turn affects radicalization (as in the case of Sahelian countries such as Mali). Evaluators have started identifying specific lessons pertaining to risk management in this regard. A UNDP report, for example, noted that with environmental disasters becoming a recurring phenomenon, especially because of climate change, this reality must be considered in project risk assessments to protect the results achieved.¹⁷⁹ This was also brought to light in the UNICRI evaluation mentioned in the previous paragraph, in the context of tribes living in the areas bordering Mali and Niger who face poverty, political and social exclusion, and security challenges, all root causes of radicalization which are exacerbated by the adverse effects of climate change.
- 9. Evaluation methodologies:** Barring notable exceptions as discussed earlier, most evaluation reports used perceptual measures such as interview and survey data, often without incorporating statistical methodologies to establish their validity and reliability. As far as feasible, Compact agencies would do well to encourage increased triangulation by incorporating quantitative as well as qualitative data and methodologies, including archival and big data as well as impact evaluation and experimental designs, to validate their findings.
- 10. Evaluation capacity development:** 50 reports suggested the need for building the evaluation capacity of programme/project organization. These suggestions included training in the development and use of common indicators for outcomes and impacts, incorporating measurement strategies in programs and projects and encouraging a culture of quality monitoring and evaluation by key monitoring and evaluation specialists (M&E). There were also suggestions for more systematic needs assessments during the programme design stage, strengthening coordination mechanisms with national statistical services to increase availability and accessibility of statistical data on patterns and trends of counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism, developing more robust M&E systems to produce reliable and up-to-date data, and coordination of monitoring activities between headquarters (HQ) and field offices.

¹⁷⁹ UNDP 2017: Final Report Joint Program: Strengthening Human Security and resilience by promoting peaceful coexistence in Peru.

CONCLUSIONS

06

This synthesis collated the findings from 118 evaluation, audit, oversight, and internal reviews on the GCTS conducted by various UN Global Compact entities in the last three years. To the extent possible, the synthesized findings were validated by interviews and surveys of key informants, as well as by regular involvement and discussions with members of the WG RMME sub-group on evaluation. Furthermore, preliminary findings from this synthesis were presented at two meetings of the entire WG RMME Group for additional validation.

One of the first steps, after a preliminary desk review, was to reconstruct a theory of change and associated logical framework for the extensive counter-terrorism work being carried out by Compact entities. GCTS provided the basis for this reconstruction, which was also validated following the procedure outlined above. This framework was used for data collection, synthesis, organization, and presentation of findings in this report. This synthesis both documents the best available evidence available for achievement (or not) of objectives and outcomes for the GCTS as well as identifies gaps that were clearly discernible at this stage.

The synthesis found adequate evidence to conclude that the Compact entities were delivering a wide variety of vital technical assistance and support to Member States. There was no evidence to suggest that delay or cost overruns were affecting delivery of planned outputs in any significant manner. It also found evidence of progress on achieving most of the outcomes (excepting those pertaining to human rights on which limited information was available) envisaged in the Theory of Change outlined above. However, it was also apparent that most of the available evidence was inadequate to assess (not to mention quantify) the

extent to which these outcomes were being achieved.¹⁸⁰ This deficiency in information for assessment was true not just with respect to second-order outcomes with complex causal chains such as behavioral changes, but even with respect to the first-order outcomes such as change in knowledge and awareness.

Thus, capacity development for preventing or minimizing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism is one of the key outcomes that most Compact entities seek. While 100 reports contained evidence relevant to this outcome, only a handful contained information that could be used to assess the extent of results in minimizing these conditions. On a smaller scale, the synthesis noted qualitative evidence for the use and usefulness of capacity building efforts of various Compact agencies, but most of it was immediate, perception-based snapshots taken right after a training event, which were inadequate to understand the usefulness of methods on a broader scale. The synthesis also noted the need for studies, impact evaluations and more robust monitoring, evaluating, and reporting tools to assess the extent to which GCTS interventions were achieving their intended results.

Similarly, the synthesis points out that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the Compact agencies are contributing to the inculcation of a culture of peace, justice, rule of law and human rights. However, it was not possible to assess whether such efforts resulted in any long-term changes in the targeted countries. While qualitative evidence suggested a reduction in incitement to commit terrorist acts, more definitive information is needed to assess overall impact and specific contributions of various Compact entities. The synthesis, likewise, noted that the reviewed reports described in general terms high levels of satisfaction with the interventions, although concrete data on the outcomes and impacts (e.g., social rehabilitation and reintegration) of these interventions was not available.

Similar patterns were observable across other outcomes. Qualitative evidence suggested increased international cooperation among Member States on PVE/CT. While the synthesis found adequate evidence for the promotion of international cooperation among Member States towards PVE/CT, more evidence was needed to conclude how closely Compact entities themselves collaborate with each other in supporting Member States.

180 While reports reviewed for this synthesis did not provide any information, interviews suggested that that the adoption of counter-terrorism measures maybe undermining the rule of law, justice, and peace efforts in some cases. This should be assessed in the full-fledged evaluation.

The synthesis also observed some variation on this theme. In general, the evidence was more apparent with respect to easier-to-monitor outcomes such as the ratification of treaties. Thus, for example, there was adequate evidence to suggest that an increased number of Member States had joined UNTOC. In fact, there were 147 signatories and 190 parties to the Convention as of July 2018. However, it was not clear to what extent each of the Member States was implementing UNTOC and with what degree of success. Similar evidence was available regarding the creation and strengthening of counter-terrorism mechanisms or regarding implementation of the comprehensive international standards on money-laundering. The synthesis noted that significant progress had been made in adopting and implementing international standards on money-laundering but, given the constant evolution of this field (e.g., emergence of cybercrime, cryptocurrencies, and trade-based money-laundering), the need for Compact entities and Member States to remain vigilant and continuously adapt in response is also evident.

In contrast, some outcomes had sparse evidence. The synthesis found no evidence on the use or abuse of asylum processes or on ensuring effective, transparent, fair, and humanitarian international travel and transport practices. It must be explicitly noted that this could be due to lack of data and participation by relevant Compact entities.

Despite identifiable data gaps, some gaps in the scope of the work being carried out by the Compact entities were also discernible. The synthesis noted that most CT/PVE projects were being carried out in developing countries in Asia and Africa. Even more significantly, Islamic terrorism was found to be the chief focus across these projects to the exclusion of other kinds of violent extremist acts such as state violence, right-wing or “green” terrorism, especially in the global north. While it is possible that this was partly related to the capacity of countries in the global north to address these challenges through internal initiatives within the respective countries, it is just as likely that it was due to the disproportionate ideological association between terrorism and Islamic terrorism (which would echo the challenges noted in academic literature). The synthesis concluded that this observation called for at the least some self-examination by Compact agencies as they undertake new projects and programmes.

On cross-cutting issues such as human rights and gender equity, the synthesis noted evidence for incremental progress in respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. Training of criminal justice and law enforcement officials was contributing to the intended results; however, Member States still needed technical assistance to maintain an effective and rule of law-based crim-

inal justice system. The synthesis noted that gender equality was being integrated to a certain degree, however more work was needed to mainstream the crucial role of women in PVE/CT. Several interventions described the involvement of women and youth through capacity-building, peacebuilding nexuses or in law enforcement and policymaking, but that future evaluations would nevertheless need to assess the degree to which the strategies to incorporate women into CT and PVE are most effectively designed and resourced to impact society at large.

Thus, overall, the synthesis noted evidence for success as well as areas where perceptible improvements can be made. Even more importantly, it identified large gaps in the availability of evidence which requires more information to assess the degree of projects' success. Thus, the synthesis concluded the need for a full-fledged evaluation of the UN's Global Counter-terrorism Strategy.

This synthesis lays the foundation for such a potential evaluation, and the Theory of Change provides a framework that can serve as the initial basis for developing the evaluation. The synthesis can also help in the identification of evaluation capacities (and gaps), as well as in the development of a common evaluation framework across disparate Compact entities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

07

While this synthesis is a retrospective accounting exercise of what has been achieved, learned, and improved in a meaningful way during the last three years or so, it also identifies what actions are needed for the immediate future. From this perspective of projecting possible ways forward, the following recommendations are proposed for the consideration of compact entities. These recommendations are arranged sequentially in the order in which they should ideally be undertaken and the management response, coordinated by the WG RMME, should be based on an inclusive process and provide dedicated responsibilities and steps for implementation.

Recommendation 1 – Full-fledged evaluation

While this synthesis provides a comprehensive look at information gleaned from 118 evaluation and other oversight reports, it was intended to be a building block towards a full-fledged, independent evaluation of the GCTS. Therefore, as a logical next step, Sub-Group on Evaluation of the RMME WG; in coordination and cooperation with all compact entities; should initiate a full-fledged independent evaluation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and related Compact to derive robust findings on results achieved, good practices, and lessons learned, also in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals.

In concrete terms, the Sub-Group on Evaluation of the RMME WG should undertake the following:

1. As a first step, and fully considering the results of the GCTS desk review by UNOCT (currently ongoing) and this Meta-Synthesis, develop a **concrete concept note and/or project proposal for the planning, implementation, and dissemination of a strategic**

evaluation, thereby ensuring a realistic budget plan and an appropriate timeline for the full evaluation process and related evaluation capacity building, as necessary.

2. The evaluation needs to **entail sufficient resources to allow for an appropriate assessment of results at national, regional, inter-regional and global level**, thereby ensuring that results are assessed from the local – e.g., through case studies - up to the global level in terms of effectiveness and impact of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Moreover, **sufficient funding is essential to ensure appropriate evaluation planning, identifying the scope for evaluation, implementation and follow-up.**
3. Once sufficient funding is secured, an evaluation that follows – as per usual practice – the norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and is fully in line with the universally recognized evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, sustainability, impact, as well as consideration of human rights and gender equality aspects, should be initiated. Such an evaluation should be conducted in an **inclusive, participatory, utilization-focused manner** and should focus on the work of compact entities towards their contribution to the results outlined in the GCTS.
4. The evaluation needs to entail a **clear process for stakeholder participation and engagement** to ensure that **all stakeholders, including compact entities and Member States, are fully engaged throughout this process.** High-level events to Member States and senior management of compact entities should be planned from the onset beginning with the launch of the evaluation itself as well as throughout various stages of the evaluation. A wide dissemination of evaluation results will be essential to ensure utilization of evaluation results across compact entities.

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 9-12 months, or once sufficient funding is available (Proposed action: Sub-Group on Evaluation of the RMME WG; in coordination and cooperation with all compact entities)

Recommendation 2 – Knowledge platform

One of the challenges that the synthesis found was the absence of a common M&E framework and knowledge management platform for sharing evaluation and other oversight reports. It was validated in interviews and the online survey that most M&E officers, and not to mention programme and project officers, found it extremely difficult to access knowledge created across 37 compact and 6 observer entities. The synthesis established preliminary evidence to suggest the need for establishing a knowledge platform for sharing knowledge. UNODC's Unite Evaluations could provide the model for developing such a system. (However, this can and should be confirmed in the full-fledged evaluation referenced above).

Therefore, it is recommended to:

- **Identify, leverage or build on already available systems (e.g., UN-OCT's "Connect & Learn" platform) for sharing knowledge for disseminating relevant evaluation and oversight results to the Global CT compact entities.**

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 12-18 months (Proposed action: Sub-Group on evaluation of the RMME WG)

Recommendation 3 – Evaluation capacity and common M&E framework

The synthesis made clear the need for assessing and developing evaluation capacity among the Compact entities as well as indicated the absence of a common M&E framework of initiatives under the GCTS. The synthesis established preliminary evidence to suggest the need for harmonizing the framework and strengthen evaluation capacity. Not only do half of the reviewed reports mention this need, as validated in interviews, the data and methodologies used in evaluation products show the need to focus on developing this capacity among programme staff and evaluators engaged by the Compact entities. Such an assessment should pay close attention to whether the entities possess capacity to assess impact on human rights and rule of law of counter-terrorism actions by UN entities and their partners.

Therefore, it is recommended to:

- **Develop a concrete project proposal/concept note for:**
 - ▶ **strengthening evaluation knowledge and capacities of internal and external stakeholders (e.g., through trainings, webinars, community of practice, etc.) as well as**
 - ▶ **developing a common M&E framework for the GCTS for identifying and measuring results and impact of the work conducted by all compact entities under the GCTS.**

This concept note/proposal should include budget requirements and clearly identify measures needed for assessing and strengthening evaluation capacity and for developing a common M&E framework, fully taking into consideration the results of this Meta-Synthesis and the full-fledged evaluation of the GCTS.

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 12-18 months (Proposed Action: Sub-Group on Evaluation of the RMME WG)

Recommendation 4 – Policy dialogue on counter-terrorism

Echoing the analysis of this report and the recommendation made in the OCHA's 2013 Independent Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action, this synthesis calls for Compact entities to equip the international community and donor States with the knowledge base necessary for engaging in sustained and open policy dialogue on what constitutes terrorism and counter-terrorism and how best to reconcile counter-terrorism measures with humanitarian action (especially if the full-fledged evaluation validates this finding). This work should encompass all relevant CT/PVE sectors as well as the humanitarian community at both headquarters and field level. This should be implemented bearing in mind recommendation no. 5 on research.

Therefore, it is recommended to:

- **Identify and implement measures to continue engaging in a sustained and open policy dialogue with the international community and donors on what constitutes terrorism and counter-terrorism.**

- **Identify measures on how to best reconcile counter-terrorism with humanitarian action, thereby encompassing all relevant CT/PVE sectors.**

Timeframe: To be initiated within the next 24-36 months (Proposed coordination: UNOCT in coordination with all compact entities)

Recommendation 5 – Grounded research

Due to the need for better understanding on how people are radicalized and driven to violent extremism, investment in research is essential to enlarge the intellectual horizon, stimulate critical thinking and advance understanding and approaches to contemporary violence, asymmetrical conflicts, and peacebuilding. As an example, going beyond stocktaking, only a limited number of experimental studies (that are the gold standard for establishing causality) have so far been undertaken.

Therefore, it is recommended for compact entities to:

- **partner with research sectors of the United Nations and beyond, including CSOs and private sector, to leverage existing research and**
- **conduct further studies on what works and what does not in the area of GCTS activities, projects, programmes, strategies on CT and PCVE.**

Timeframe: To be initiated as feasible by individual compact entities or different Working Groups (Proposed coordination: UNOCT, UNICRI and UNODC in cooperation with all compact entities)

Recommendation 6 – Special attention to human rights issues

This synthesis found limited evidence of an increase in respect for human rights and rule of law within the framework of activities that fight terrorism. While training of criminal justice and law enforcement officials was contributing towards this goal, it also appeared that Member States need specific technical assistance to ensure full respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, as well as an effective rule of law-based national criminal justice systems. Furthermore, the synthesis found that compact entities themselves need additional resources and capacity for the effective mainstreaming of UN's human rights, including gender and no-one-left-behind, agenda. Thus, any future full-fledged evaluation of the GCTS

– as well as to the extent possible every evaluation of compact entities - should consider the support provided by compact entities to strengthen human rights and gender equality as a crucial indicator of real and measurable progress and success.

Therefore, it is recommended to:

- **Identify concrete measures to strengthen technical assistance to Member States on human rights;**
- **Increase resources – through dedicated fundraising - and capacity of compact entities for the effective mainstreaming of UN’s human rights, including gender and no-one-left-behind, agenda;**
- **Fully consider the support provided by compact entities in the full-fledged evaluation of the GCTS to strengthen human rights and gender equality as a crucial indicator of real and measurable progress and success.**

Timeframe: To be initiated as feasible by individual compact entities (Proposed coordination: UNOCT/WG HR in consultation with WGRMME and the Sub-Group on Evaluation)

Annex I: Synthesis Project Brief

Independent synthesis of evaluations conducted under the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

A. General Information

Project submitted by	UNODC, UNOCT, UNICRI
Pillar supported <i>Indicate only one Pillar of the Global CT Strategy that the project primarily supports.</i>	Primarily Pillar 3: Measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard. Also cuts across all Pillars
Outcome/Output supported <i>(UNCCT 5-year Programme/ UNOCT strategic frameworks)</i>	Outcome 4: International cooperation: With UNCCT support, Member States, UN entities and other stakeholders improve their cooperation to prevent violent extremism and counter terrorism
Geographical scope <i>Indicate global, regional, or national</i>	Global
Regions or countries covered	Global
Substantive partner(s)	Sub-Group on Evaluation
Implementing partner(s)	UNODC; UNOCT; UNICRI
Main beneficiary(ies)	Compact members; Member States
Key stakeholders	Compact members; Working Group on Resource Mobilisation, Monitoring and Evaluation (WG RMME)
Timescale <i>Indicate the total planned duration of project in months. If known, include planned start-end dates.</i>	12 months (from receipt of funding until delivery of final report)

Outline business case

Include project background, context, relevant work conducted in this area and coordination that has taken place, reasons for the project in line with the project mandate and with reference to CTED recommendations and GA/SC resolutions, expected benefits from desired outcomes.

As per the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the WG RMME – in particular relating to sharing best practices and applying best practices in evaluation – UNODC, UNOCT and UNICRI in the framework of the Sub-Group on Evaluation, plan to undertake an Independent Synthesis of evaluations conducted by UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities particularly since 2018 under the UN Global Strategy to Counter Terrorism. The assessment also includes a review to what extent CTED recommendations were referred to in the analyzed evaluations.

This is fully in line with the SG’s report A/73/866 to further strengthen evaluation frameworks for the UN to better measure the results of its counter-terrorism work and, encourage the sharing of project evaluations to promote peer learning and the dissemination of good practices. Moreover, it offers aggregate evaluation results of compact entities vis-à-vis the implementation of the Global CT strategy to the extent possible.

The results of the synthesis will support Compact entities to share with a wide audience, including Member States, aggregate results, lessons learned and best practices of its work and identify possible ways forward and recommendations in strengthening common evaluation approaches, frameworks and systems.

Project goal

The broad impact or higher-level objective to which the project contributes at a national or sector level; a general statement of project purpose (e.g. ‘To contribute to...’)

The overall objective of the projects is to improve the quality delivery of technical assistance to Member States under the UN Global Strategy on Counter Terrorism through the promotion of utilization of lessons learned across entities.

To achieve such, the project will contribute to accountability and learning of the Global Compact entities in their support to Member States in preventing and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism.

Outcomes

The outcome at the end of the project/ expected benefits to the target group (e.g. ‘Increased/improved...’)

Increased stakeholders’ knowledge, awareness and application of recurring recommendations and best practices contained in evaluation reports of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities. Further, increased utility of evaluation results and contribution to evidence-based decision-making.

Increased stakeholder’s awareness of concrete requirements, mechanisms and parameters for a strategic evaluation of the Global Strategy.

<p>Outputs</p> <p><i>The quantitative or qualitative deliverables or product of undertaken activities (e.g. ‘... delivered/produced/ conducted’)</i></p>	<p>Approach/concept paper delivered;</p> <p>Synthesis review team recruited;</p> <p>Inception Report delivered;</p> <p>Data collection finalized;</p> <p>Draft Synthesis report prepared, including a dedicated chapter on requirements and mechanisms for a strategic evaluation of the UNCGTS;</p> <p>Final, fully edited and visually appealing Synthesis report produced;</p> <p>2-page Brief with key results and recommendations prepared, including identified requirements and mechanisms for a strategic evaluation of the UNCGTS;</p> <p>Presentation delivered to key stakeholders.</p>
<p>Main activities</p> <p><i>The planned activities within the project (e.g. prepare/design/procure)</i></p>	<p>In close consultation with the Sub-Group on Evaluation and on the basis of briefings on key results to the WG RMME:</p> <p>Prepare an approach/concept paper for the Synthesis, including an initial desk review list and proposed methodological approach, as well as the consultants ToRs, a work plan and clear roles and responsibilities;</p> <p>Recruit the Synthesis review team;</p> <p>Prepare an Inception report with an outline of the methodological approach to the Synthesis;</p> <p>Conduct data collection for the Synthesis, including through questionnaires to all UN agencies of the Working Group;</p> <p>Produce a draft Synthesis report;</p> <p>Produce a final, fully edited and visually appealing Synthesis report;</p> <p>Conduct an external quality assessment of the Synthesis report;</p> <p>Prepare a 2-page Brief with the key results;</p> <p>Present the results of the Synthesis to relevant stakeholders, including other Compact Working Groups.</p>
<p>Project approach</p> <p><i>Indicate the implementation modality (e.g. co-implementation, implementation by third party, procurement, etc.) and the implementation methodology (how the work is to be conducted and how the project's working methods will achieve the expected outputs and outcomes).</i></p>	<p>This project is implemented by UNODC, UNOCT and UNICRI with the support of the members of the Sub-Group on Evaluation.</p> <p>The evaluation sub-group of the RMME works as the reference group for the Synthesis evaluation and backstop the work of the consultant(s).</p> <p>The evaluation sub-group of the RMME reports on a quarterly basis its work to the Co-Chairs of the RMME working group that continuously provides overall guidance and support to the Synthesis process.</p>

Project Management Team structure and role descriptions

Indicate the members of the project management team (PM, programme management officers and assistants, consultants), oversight authority, change authority, accountability framework among project partners.

UNODC, substantive partner and project management: Mr. Emanuel Lohninger, Evaluation Officer; Ms. Katharina Kayser, Chief, Independent Evaluation Section (IES).

UNOCT, Programme Manager, Monitoring and Evaluation: Ms. Josephine Mwenda.

UNICRI, implementing partner: Mr. Odhran McCarthy; Ms. Tamara Neskovic.

In coordination and close consultation with the Evaluation Sub-Group.

4 consultants: including a core team of 1 evaluation expert and 1 expert on P/CT & P/CVE; as well as 1 senior reviewer on P/CT & P/CVE; and 1 senior external evaluation quality assurance reviewer.

Dedicated 4 work months for 1 Evaluation Officer (UNODC) and 2 work months for 1 Programme Officer (UNICRI).

Human Rights Mainstreaming¹⁸¹

Describe how human rights is integrated in the project design and how it is mainstreamed throughout the project lifecycle. Specify the key outputs/ activities dedicated to human rights.

The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards fully include human rights and gender mainstreaming, thereby ensuring that particular emphasis is placed on these topics in evaluations.

This Synthesis includes a dedicated chapter on human rights and gender equality and the analysis process will ensure that related findings, recommendations, lessons learned and best practices are identified.

Gender Mainstreaming¹⁸²

Describe how gender dimensions are integrated in the project design and how these will be mainstreamed throughout the project lifecycle. Include the gender marker for the project (0-3) based on its gender responsiveness and provide short explanation for the rating.

UNEG Norms and Standards fully include human rights and gender mainstreaming, thereby ensuring that particular emphasis is placed on these topics in evaluations.

This Synthesis includes a dedicated chapter on human rights and gender equality and the analysis process ensures that related findings, recommendations, lessons learned, and best practices are identified. Guidance documents for gender-responsive evaluations is included in the Synthesis as well for reference.

The project promotes gender equality through including a dedicated chapter on related evaluation findings in the Synthesis, contributing thereby to increased visibility of gender equality. The gender marker is assessed as 1.

The recruitment process for the Synthesis evaluation ensures that competences in human rights and gender are part of the ToR for recruitment.

181 Refer to the Human Rights Mainstreaming Guidelines for UNOCT Projects to Mainstream Human Rights in Project Design (logical framework).

182 Refer to the Gender Mainstreaming Guidelines for UNOCT Projects to Mainstream Gender in the Project Design (logical framework). Refer to the UNOCT Gender Marker Information Note to scale the project in terms of gender responsiveness (gender marker).

<p>Risks, Constraints, Assumptions</p>	<p>One of the key risks is that evaluation results are to some extent too heterogenous to allow for appropriate aggregation of data. Moreover, the quality of evaluation results may vary according to the type of evaluation. These risks are overcome by also including external reviews and assessments, as necessary and by developing a mixed-methods approach to data collection, including a survey to compact entities.</p> <p>Constraints relate to the fact that no evaluation framework is in place for evaluations which are conducted by compact members – e.g. no standard questions, scope, etc. However, the Synthesis may provide recommendations on how to further enhance the standardization of evaluation processes, systems and frameworks.</p> <p>Furthermore, the sensitivity of the topic may lead to limited access to evaluations that are available for internal use only. However, this is counteracted by aggregating results to a higher level to ensure confidentiality of individual evaluations if necessary.</p> <p>A key assumption is based on an active collaboration of all compact entities to ensure that the Synthesis includes all available information and that focal points for evaluation are identified in each entity. An active outreach through the Chair of the WG RMME was already fostered to ensure active participation.</p>
<p>Funding source</p> <p><i>Indicate the funding modality (e.g. co-funding, Trust Fund, etc.) and specify potential/interested donors if known</i></p>	<p>Seed fund for Global Compact Working Groups.</p> <p>Contribution by UNODC through dedicated work months by an Evaluation Officer, as well as the Deputy Chief and Chief of IES.</p> <p>Contribution by UNICRI through dedicated work time.</p> <p>In-kind contribution by UNOCT and evaluation Sub-Group members.</p>

Annex II: Evaluation Tools: Questionnaires And Interview Guides Survey Instrument



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

The UN needs your feedback! Thank you!
Dear colleagues,

As a member of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, we need your support to develop the first ever UN-led independent analysis of evaluation and oversight products to identify and compile findings, conclusions, recommendations, lessons learned and good practices, advancing the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Under the auspices of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, and its eight inter-agency working groups, 43 entities mobilize resources and expertise for the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288). Over the 14 years since the adoption of the Strategy, these entities have implemented a vast number of national, regional and international programmes, projects and activities, all of which yield important lessons and critical insights for the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.

By tapping into these insights and sharing experiences, the Compact entities can support one another to deliver assistance more effectively and ensure that resources are expended on strategies and initiatives that have been tried and tested with positive outcomes. Moreover, the exercise will pave the way for a potential strategic evaluation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy to be conducted by the inter-agency Working Group on Resource Mobilisation, Monitoring and Evaluation.

The identified common trends across all analyzed documents, interviews and this survey – lessons learned and good practices – will be aggregated, synthesized and shared at a strategic level for learning purposes, offering insights into evaluation capacities and approaches on counter-terrorism and PCVE, informing a potential evaluation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and, ultimately, further strengthening and better coordinating the delivery of technical assistance to Member States.

Your responses to the survey will be kept strictly anonymous. They will be reported in an aggregate form only. If you have questions or concerns about this survey, please feel free to contact us at the addresses provided below. We understand pressures on your time and have kept the survey very short. It should take no more than 20 minutes of your time.

We appreciate your feedback!

Sincerely,
Punit Arora
Independent meta-synthesis team leader
punit.arora@un.org

Emanuel Lohninger, UNODC, emanuel.lohninger@un.org
Josephine Mwenda, UNOCT, josephine.mwenda@un.org
Odhran McCarthy, UNICRI, odhran.mccarthy@un.org
Tamara Neskovic, UNICRI, tamara.neskovic@un.org



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

* 1. Name

* 2. Email



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

* 3. Which of the following UN Global Compact Entities on counter terrorism (UNGCEs or compact entities) do you currently work for?

4. Have you worked for any other compact entity?

- Yes
- No



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

5. Which other compact entities did you work for? Please select all that apply

- 1287 Committee Monitoring Team
- 1540 Committee Expert Group
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
- Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
- Department of Safety and Security (DSS)
- Department of Peace Operations (DPO)
- Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
- Department of Global Communications (DGC)
- Executive Office of the Secretary-General Rule of Law Unit (EOSG RoL)
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
- International Labor Organization (ILO)
- International Maritime Organization (IMO)
- International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA)
- Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT)
- Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
- Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism
- Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children
- United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)
- United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
- United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA)
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG CAAC)
- World Customs Organization (WCO)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
- United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC)
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

* 6. Which of the following best describes your role? Please select all that apply

- Monitoring
- Evaluation
- Planning
- Budgeting
- Programme implementation
- Audit/ oversight
- Senior management
- Other (please specify)

* 7. In the period 2018 - 2021, has your entity conducted any evaluation, audit, internal review or an assessment pertaining to countering terrorism or preventing violent extremism?

- Yes
- No

If yes, please add them here:

8. If any of these documents are not publicly available, would you agree for them to be included in this meta-synthesis on a confidential basis?

- Yes
- No



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

Assessing reports produced by your entity

Please rate the relevance and effectiveness of the evaluation, audit, oversight, internal reviews and other assessments produced by your entity.

* 9. In your assessment, how relevant are following products of your entity to UN's counterterrorism work?

	Not relevant	Partially relevant	Relevant	Very relevant	Highly relevant	NA
Evaluation reports	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Audit report	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Internal reviews	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other assessment/ oversight products	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please elaborate:

10. What is the purpose for which you consult evaluation, audit, oversight, internal reviews and other assessment reports of your entity? (Please check all that apply).

- Programme / project conception
- Planning
- Programme/ project implementation
- Data and/or research
- General reference
- Learning
- Policy design
- Fundraising
- Donor reporting
- Other (please specify)

11. What best practices and lessons can be identified from the work of your entity pertaining to preventing and countering terrorism and extremist violence, which might be useful for other compact entities to be aware of?



* 12. How often do you consult evaluation, audit, oversight, internal reviews and other assessment reports of other compact entities?

- Never
- Rarely
- Occasionally
- Sometimes
- Frequently
- N/A

Please elaborate your responses:



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

13. What is the purpose for which you consult evaluation, audit, oversight, internal reviews and other assessment reports of other compact entities? (Please check all that apply).

- Programme / project conception
- Planning
- Programme/ project implementation
- Data and/or research
- General reference
- Learning
- Policy design
- Fundraising
- Donor reporting
- Other (please specify)



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

14. When you have used the following products of other compact entities, how relevant did you find them to your work?

	Not relevant	Partially relevant	Relevant	Very relevant	Highly relevant	N/A
Evaluation reports	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Audit report	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Internal reviews	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other assessment/ oversight products	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please elaborate your responses

15. What best practices have you observed in the evaluation, audit, oversight, internal reviews and other assessment reports produced by other compact entities?

1

2

3

16. What lessons have you drawn from reading the evaluation, audit, oversight, internal reviews and other assessment reports produced by other compact entities?

1

2

3



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

UN Global Compact Entities (UNGCEs) as a whole

This question pertains to the entire work of UNGCEs, and not just evaluation reports. It seeks to identify major gaps in the UN counter-terrorism strategies that may need to be addressed going forward.

* 17. What can compact entities do to increase their impact in the domain of preventing and combatting terrorism and extremist violence? Please use the space below to make your recommendations.



Meta-synthesis of evaluations carried out by Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities

If you are open for a confidential follow up call with the independent meta-synthesis team, please complete the information below.

18. Contact information:

Time zone	<input type="text"/>
Preferred dates (in July 2021)	<input type="text"/>
Preferred times	<input type="text"/>
Phone	<input type="text"/>

19. How would you prefer to be interviewed?

- Microsoft Teams
- Zoom
- Google Meet
- Skype
- Whatsapp
- Telephone
- Email only
- Other (please specify)

Interview Guide & Questionnaire

Interview Details

Name, organization, and position

Gender

Stakeholder type

Location of interviewee

Date and time

Interviewer(s)

Mode of interview

The following interview protocol for in-person or telephonic interviews is comprehensive. Interviewers should customize and adapt questions for each interview based on the interviewee's role, time constraints, response, and level of knowledge/ familiarity with topics revealed during interviews. (Note that all interviews should start with informed consent).

Introductions:

- This is a formative synthesis with a forward-looking focus. The overarching purpose is to help Global Compact entities learn from their collective experience to date so that is undertaken going forward is as impactful and enduring as possible.
- Be assured that this is a completely confidential conversation. Only the evaluation team will have access to the interview notes, and we will never mention you by name (or title) in the synthesis report.

(Question bank: To be revised on the basis of ongoing data collection, including content analysis of documents).

1. From the perspective of your office or organization, what major outcomes are the UN Global Compact entities on counter-terrorism (UN-GCEs) expected to achieve?
2. How would you know if it is delivering those outcomes?
3. What do you expect to gain from this synthesis? What would make it most useful for you and your office/ organization? (Scoping question)

4. To what extent do you consider the evaluation/audit/assessment reports produced by your organization useful to your work? How could these be improved?
5. How frequently do you access the evaluation/audit/assessment reports of compact entities other than the one you work for? What are the barriers to accessing these reports more often?
6. Do you think there is a need for potential for evaluation capacity development? To what extent?
7. What is the purpose for which you access such reports? Do you incorporate the findings from these reports in your work? How?
8. How useful do you find these reports?
9. Would you find it useful to have an independent evaluation of the whole UN Strategy?
10. What knowledge management systems and practices have been put in place to manage organizational learning across various compact entities?
11. How is your office responding to UN Reform, UNDAF formulation and SDG Agenda 2030? What role do you visualize for your organization in this environment?
12. Describe the cooperation among various UNGCEs in the field of counter-terrorism? Which lessons learned could be drawn from this cooperation?
13. From your perspective, what are the strengths and weaknesses of various UNGCEs that you are familiar with?
14. How and to what extent do the projects incorporate human rights and gender dimensions? How satisfied are you with HRG related efforts? What could be done differently or significantly improved?
15. What new opportunities and threats are emerging that various UNGCEs should be aware of in the field of counter-terrorism?
16. For someone who does not know your organization, how would you define counter-terrorism? What kind of actions and operations do you include in this definition? What do you exclude?

- 17.** Do you consider that the evaluation/audit/assessment reports produced by your organization take into consideration the perception and feedbacks from people directly concerned and involved by your projects and programmes? If so, to which extent? If no, what could be done to fill the gap?
- 18.** What lessons can be learned on issues related to counter-terrorism from the operations conducted by your office and organization on the field?
- 19.** What is the main successful project-programme-operation in which you were personally involved? How do you explain its achievement?
- 20.** Do you perceive a tension or a difference of perception between the work done by your office and organization at the headquarter and the operations conducted on the ground?
- 21.** Do you see a difference or a divide between the representation of terrorism by decision- and policy makers and the perception of directly affected populations or communities?
- 22.** Outside your office and organization, what is the work that is the most useful to you or that inspires you the most in what is produced by other Global Compact entities?
- 23.** Can you identify instructive projects on counter-terrorism conducted by actors outside the Global Compact entities? If so, can you identify some lessons learned?
- 24.** In the fight against terrorism, do you think that occasionally and unintentionally there has been a confusion between symptoms and root causes of this phenomenon? How have your office and organization concretely contributed to distinguish between these two aspects?
- 25.** Has fight against terrorism, in some countries, left some collateral damage, especially relating to the situation of human rights in general and of women's rights in particular?
- 26.** Could you provide an example of an initiative of counter-terrorism that has reduced extreme violence among a community and that has at the same time improved the situation of human rights and gender issue?

- 27.** According to you, what should be improved, changed, or reformed within your organization to better counter terrorism and violent extremism?
- 28.** In terms of top priorities and considering the four pillars of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the pillars of UN Reform and the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, how do you see the place devoted to counter-terrorism in the future?

Annex III:

Reports included in the synthesis

Agency	Title
1267 Monitoring Committee	Joint Report of Counterterrorism Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support & Sanctions Monitoring Team
1540 Committee	2016 Comprehensive Review Background Paper for the Formal Consultation by the 1540 Committee 20 to 22 June
CIC	DPO Review of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections
CTED	The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
DPO	Final Evaluation: Engaging Youth in Building Peaceful Communities in Mali
IMO	IMO Member State Audit Scheme – Consolidated Audit Summary Report (CASR)
IMO	IMO Member State Audit Scheme – Consolidated Audit Summary Report (CASR)
IMO	Internal Oversight and Ethics Office: 2018 Annual Summary of Activities
IOM	Ex-Post Internal Evaluation of the Project: Community-Based Approach to Support Youth in a Targeted Municipality
IOM	Strengthening Social Cohesion and Stability in Slum Populations Project (SSCOS)
IOM	IOM Mid-term Evaluation Report of the Project: Prevention of Violent Extremism Through Local Voices and initiatives in the Western Balkans
IOM	Evaluation of Community Based Approaches to Support Youth in Targeted Municipalities in BiH and Moving Towards Sustainable Approaches to Prevention of Violent Extremism
IOM	Final Evaluation of the Project: Enhancing Border Management to Counter Terrorism in Burkina Faso Project
IOM	Dignity and Rights in Central Asia Final Performance Evaluation
IOM	End line Evaluation of Niger Community Cohesion Initiative Programming
OHCHR	2017-2018 Assessments of OHCHR
OHCHR	OCHA Independent Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action
OHCHR	Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Human Rights Monitoring, Reporting and Follow-up in the UN Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations
UN-Women	2021 Outcome Report: Civil Society Voices on the Gendered Dimensions of Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Responses
UN-Women	Women Active Participation and Response to Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Kenya

Agency	Title
UN-Women	Gender Sensitive Humanitarian Action and Aid to Women and Girls Affected by Bolko Haram Terrorism in Diffar, Niger
UN-Women	Final Evaluation of the Project: Anticipating and Preventing Women and Young Girls Vulnerability and Terrorism Through Empowering Community Dialogue and Education in Northern part of Cote d'voire
UNAOC	Final Reports of the 2018 EUNA Cohort: Fostering Youth Resilience to Prevent Violent Extremism and Build Sustainable Peace
UNAOC	Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2018: Schedule of Individual Trust Funds
UNDP	Final Evaluation of the Project: Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao
UNDP	Entry and Exit Points: Violent Extremism in South-East Asia
UNDP	Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment
UNDP	Violent Extremism in Sudan: An Evidence-based Study
UNDP	Conflicting Identities: The Nexus between Masculinities, Feminities and Violent Extremism in Asia
UNDP	Community-level Recommendations for Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kosovo
UNDP	Convergence Matrix of Cape Verdean Municipalities towards the MDGs
UNDP	Review of UNDP's Global PVE practice
UNDP	Design, M&E of PVE Projects in Jordan: A Baseline Assessment of PeaceGeeks Project
UNDP	Impact of Regional Dynamics of VE on Muslim Communities in Indonesia
UNDP	Root Causes of Radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
UNDP	Social Media in Africa: A Double-edged Sword for Security and Development
UNDP	Applying Behavioral Science to Support the PVE and Lessons Learned
UNDP	Youth Economy and Counterterrorism Policies
UNDP	UNDP Policy Brief: Local Drivers of VE in Central Mali
UNDP	Pesantren Community Resilience against Radicalization
UNDP	Measuring the Economic Impact of VE to Terrorism in Africa
UNDP	Invisible Women: Gendered Dimension of Return, Rehabilitation & Reintegration from VE
UNDP	Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity: A Development Response to Addressing Radicalization and VE
UNDP	Narratives of Religious Extremism in Indonesia
UNDP	Stepping out of Extremism: Eight Stories of "Hijrah" from Violence to Peacebuilding
UNDP	Conflict Sensitivity in Approaches to PVE
UNDP	The United Nations: A Champion for Youth?

Agency	Title
UNDP	We are Here: An Integrated Approach to Youth-inclusive Peace Processes
UNDP	Youth Participation in Peace Processes
UNDP	Frontlines: young people at the forefront of preventing and responding to VE
UNDP	Public Pulse Analysis on PVE in Kosovo
UNDP	As Long as They Don't Use Violence: Making Peace and Resisting VE in South East Asia
UNDP	The Roles of Islamist Moderate Organizations in CVE
UNDP	The Degree of Radicalism in Campus Mosques in 10 State Universities in Indonesia
UNDP	Policy Brief: The Climate Security Nexus and PVE
UNDP	Amman Forum on Measuring, Monitoring and Assessing PVE
UNDP	Youth Vulnerability in the Maldives
UNDP	When is Conventional Wisdom? Testing the Assumptions Behind PVE
UNDP	COVID-19 and VE in the Lake Chad region
UNDP	Misogyny: The Extremist Gateway?
UNDP	Enhancing the role of Religious Education in CVE in Indonesia
UNDP	Strengthening Community Resilience and Regional Cooperation for Prevention of Violent Extremism in Central Asia
UNDP	Cross Border Project Mid-Term Review Report
UNDP	Final Evaluation of the Partnership for a Tolerant, Inclusive Bangladesh (PTIB) Project
UNDP	Final evaluation of the Project: Beyond Bentiu Protection of Civilian Site (PoC) Youth Reintegration Strategy: Creating Conditions for Peaceful Coexistence between Youth Internally Displaced Persons, Returnees and Host Community Members
UNDP	Assessment Of UNDP Libya Results on Reconciliation and Peace Building Processes Phase One
UNDP	Final Report Evaluation of the Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme (ICRRP)
UNDP	Final Evaluation of the Project: Supporting Mechanisms for Consolidating Peace at the Community Level and the Inclusion of Young People in Areas Located on the Border Between Chad and Cameroon
UNDP	Evaluation of the Project: Joint Peace Program for the Post-Conflict Generation
UNDP	Final Report Joint Program: Strengthening Human Security and Resilience by Promoting Peaceful Coexistence in Peru
UNDP	UNDP Mid-term Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention and Mitigation During Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone 2017-2018
UNDP	UNDP End of Project Evaluation: Conflict Prevention and Peace Preservation 2015-2017
UNDP	Outcome Evaluation of UNDP's Crisis Prevention and Recovery Program in Lebanon
UNDP	Final Evaluation Report UNDP Kyrgyzstan Program: Integrated Area-based Development of Osh Province 2016-2019

Agency	Title
UNDP	UNDP Final Evaluation of Supplementary Funds for Japan in 2019
UNDP	UNDP Mid-term Project Evaluation Report: Enhancing the Role of Religious Education in Countering Violent Extremism
UNDP	UNDP Final Evaluation of the Capacity Building Project for Border Management and Access to Security for the Fight Against Terrorism in the Hodh El Chargui Region
UNDP	UNDP Security Sector Reform Project in the Union of the Comoros (RSS)
UNDP	UNDP Mid-term Evaluation of the Radicalization and Violent Extremism Prevention Program (PROPEV)
UNDP	UNDP Mid-term Evaluation of Inclusive Democratic Governance Pillar/ Evaluation of Tanzania PVE Project
UNDP	UNDP Kosovo - Understanding Pull and Push factors in Kosovo
UNDP	UNDP End of Evaluation Report: Women and Girls as Drivers of Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization
UNDP	EU-UNDP Project: Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Tolerance and Respect for Diversity
UNDP	The Mid-term Evaluation of the Project: Support for Promotion Tolerance, Civility, Citizenship in the Community Education and Prevention of Risky Behavior
UNESCO	Evaluation of UNESCO's Thematic Area of History Memory and Intercultural Dialogue for Inclusive Societies
UNESCO	Evaluation of the Networks of Mediterranean Youth (NET-MED Youth) Project 2014-2018
UNESCO	Evaluation of UNESCO's Action to Prevent Violent Extremism
UNESCO	Review of UNESCO's Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) Worldwide
UNFPA	Project for the Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (PREV) in Areas at Risk in Guinea
UNFPA	Evaluation of GPI Project: Addressing Social Disparity and Gender Inequality to Prevent Conflicts in New Settlements in Bishkek
UNFPA	Final Evaluation Report: Empowering Young Women and Men as agents in Peace Building Project, Myanmar, 2020
UNICRI	Special Report: Can the European Union Centres of Excellence Initiative Contribute Effectively to Mitigating Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risks from Outside the EU?
International alert/ UNICRI183	Dogmatism or Pragmatism? Violent Extremism and Gender in the Central Sahel
UNICRI	Special Report: The European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence: More Progress Needed
UNICRI	Preliminary Findings: Evaluation of Pilot Project on Countering Violent Extremism in Regions of Maghreb and Sahel
UNICRI	Mali (Dis-)Engagement and (Re-)Integration Related to Terrorism (MERIT)


183 Produced with the financial assistance of the European Union within the framework of a United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) projects.

Agency	Title
UNICRI	Many Hands on an Elephant: What Enhances Community Resilience to Radicalisation into Violent Extremism?
International Alert/ UNICRI184	If Victims Become Perpetrators, Factors Contributing to Vulnerability and Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Central Sahel
UNITAR	Independent Evaluation of the Youth-Led Peace and Reconciliation in Colombia: A Transformational Approach Project
UNITAR	UNITAR Independent Evaluation of the Sustaining Peace in Mali and the Sahel Region through Strengthening Peacekeeping Capacities Project (Phase 2)
UNOCT	Review of related Pillar of Global Counterterrorism Strategy
UNOCT	Final Report of the Evaluation of the UN Counterterrorism Centre (UNOCT)
UNOCT	Audit Report of United Nations Office on Counterterrorism
UNOCT	Self-Evaluation Report: Prevention of VE through Youth Empowerment in Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia
UNODC	Final Independent Project Evaluation of GLOR35: Independent In-depth Evaluation Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism
UNODC	Final Independent Project Evaluation of XAPX37: Sub-Programme on Counter-Terrorism: East and Southeast Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism
UNODC	UNODC In-depth Thematic Cluster Evaluation of Law Enforcement and Border Control in Central Asia
UNODC	Mid-term In-depth Evaluation of the Global Program on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism at UNODC
UNODC	Final Independent Evaluation of Project: EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project II: Assisting Nigeria to Strengthen Rule of Law-based Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism
UNODC	Synthesis: Prevention of Crime and Violent Extremism
UNODC	Independent In-depth Evaluation: Global Program against Money-laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism
UNODC	In-depth Evaluation: Regional Program for South East Asia
UNODC	Audit of the Management of the Global Program on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism at UNODC
UNODC	Integrating Crime, Corruption, Drugs and Terrorism Related Issues into Preparation of National Plans and Practices
UNODC	Mid-term Independent Evaluation: Strengthening of Criminal Justice Systems in the Sahel in order to Effectively Combat Drug Trafficking, Illicit Trafficking, Organized Crime and Corruption in the Region
UNODC	Final independent Project Evaluation of TKMX57: Strengthening Customs Services and other Law Enforcement Agencies in Implementing Border and Trade Control in particular, Strategic Export/Import Control Regimes under Counterterrorism related International instruments

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Annex IV: Stakeholders Contacted During the Evaluation

Number of interviewees	Organization	Sex disaggregated data
1	UNOCT	Male: 0 / Female: 1
3	UNDP	Male: 2/Female: 1
1	UNODC	Male: 1/Female: 0
1	ICAO	Male: 1/Female: 0
1	DPO	Male: 1/Female: 0
2	SR HR/CT	Male: 0/ Female: 2
1	INTERPOL	Male: 1/Female: 0
1	UNITAR	Male: 0 / Female: 1
Total: 11		Male: 6/ Female: 5



Survey respondents represented the following UNGC entities:

Annex V: UN Global Counter- terrorism Coordination Compact Entities

Members of the Global Compact

1. 1267 Committee Monitoring Team
2. 1540 Committee Expert Group
3. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
4. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
5. Department of Safety and Security (DSS)
6. Department of Peace Operations (DPO)
7. Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
8. Department of Global Communications (DGC)
9. Executive Office of the Secretary-General Rule of Law Unit (EOSG RoL)
10. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
11. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
12. International Labour Organization (ILO)
13. International Maritime Organization (IMO)
14. Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA)
15. Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT)
16. Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
17. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
18. Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth
19. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
20. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide


- 21.** Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism
- 22.** Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG CAAC)
- 23.** Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
- 24.** Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children
- 25.** United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC)
- 26.** United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- 27.** United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)
- 28.** United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- 29.** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
- 30.** United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
- 31.** United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)
- 32.** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- 33.** United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA)
- 34.** World Customs Organization (WCO)
- 35.** World Health Organization (WHO)
- 36.** United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
- 37.** United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC)

Observers of the Global Compact


- 1.** Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)
- 2.** International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- 3.** Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
- 4.** Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- 5.** United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- 6.** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

(Source: <https://www.un.org/counter-terrorism/global-ct-compact/entities>)

Annex VI. UN Development agenda and Counter-terrorism



* Top priorities and key findings identified by one million respondents to the global consultation done from January to September 2020 on the occasion of the 7th anniversary of the United Nations. <https://un75.online/>



Annex VII.

Results Matrix

This results matrix was developed by the synthesis team on the basis of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy. For detailed explanation on this, please refer to the theory of change in Figure 1.

Overall objective/ intended impact: Prevention and reduction in global terrorism.

Impact indicators: (1) The extent to which terror incidents were prevented (2) The extent to which effective action to combat terror incidents was taken (Source: Any data that captures trends over time in the evaluation reports or with the Compact agencies).

Outputs	Outcomes	Key performance indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods
Specific objective 1 (SO1): The conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism are minimized (Pillar I).				
Capacity development of the United Nations in areas such as conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding	1.1 Increased capacity for successful prevention and peaceful resolution of unresolved conflicts	Use of capacity development interventions Usefulness of capacity development interventions (as reported in the reports) Any evidence on conflict prevention and resolution	Primary: Evaluation reports Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Content analysis, data harvesting Survey analysis
Interventions aimed at encouraging dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations, cultures, peoples and religions	1.2 Increased inculcation of a culture of peace, justice, rule of law and human rights	Use of relevant interventions Usefulness of relevant interventions Any evidence on increased dialogue, respect, etc.	Primary: Evaluation reports Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Content analysis, data harvesting Survey analysis
Scaled up cooperation and assistance in the fields of rule of law, human rights and good governance				

Outputs	Outcomes	Key performance indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods
Necessary and appropriate measures in accordance with our respective obligations under international law	1.3 Reduction in incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts	Use of relevant interventions	Primary: Evaluation reports	Content analysis, data harvesting
		Usefulness of relevant interventions	Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Survey analysis
		Any evidence on reduction in incitement, etc.		
Development and social inclusion interventions, especially on youth unemployment, which could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists	1.4 Reduced perceptions on marginalization and victimization	Use of relevant interventions	Primary: Evaluation reports	Content analysis, data harvesting
		Usefulness of relevant interventions	Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Survey analysis
		Any evidence on reduction in marginalization/victimization		
Technical assistance and capacity development	1.5 National systems of assistance that promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families and facilitate the normalization of their lives are put in place.	Use of relevant interventions	Primary: Evaluation reports	Content analysis, data harvesting
		Usefulness of relevant interventions	Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Survey analysis
		Any evidence on national systems put in place with UN assistance		
	1.6 Timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and summits	(Beyond the scope of this synthesis)	(Beyond the scope of this synthesis)	(Beyond the scope of this synthesis)

Specific objective 2 (SO2): The infrastructure and systems to prevent and combat terrorism is strengthened (Pillars II & III)

Outputs	Outcomes	Key performance indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods
Advocacy, technical assistance and capacity development	2.3 Increased number of Member-States, who take appropriate measures to ensure that asylum is not abused for terrorist activity.	1. Any evidence on Member-States taking appropriate measures	Primary: Evaluation reports Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Content analysis, data harvesting Survey analysis
Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate and, where consistent with their existing mandates, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization, to facilitate the creation and/or strengthening of counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres	2.4 Relevant regional and subregional organizations create and/or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres	1. Any evidence on the creation and/or strengthening of counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres	Primary: Evaluation reports Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Content analysis, data harvesting Survey analysis
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization support Member States in complying with international norms and obligations to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism	2.5 Member-States implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money-Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force	1. Any evidence on the implementation of 40+9 FATF recommendations 2. Any evidence on reduced opportunities for money laundering and terrorist financing	Primary: Evaluation reports Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Content analysis, data harvesting Survey analysis

Outputs	Outcomes	Key performance indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods
<p>Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate work with States, at their request, to facilitate the adoption of legislation and administrative measures to implement the terrorist travel-related obligations and to identify best practices</p> <p>Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) to continue to work to strengthen the effectiveness of the travel ban</p> <p>Support for efforts and cooperation at every level, as appropriate, to improve the security of manufacturing and issuing identity and travel documents and to prevent and detect their alteration or fraudulent use</p> <p>The International Maritime Organization, the World Customs Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen their cooperation, work with States to identify any national shortfalls in areas of transport security and provide assistance, upon request, to address them</p>	<p>2.6 Effective international travel and transport practices that curb opportunities for terrorism, but are fair, transparent and humanitarian.</p>	<p>1. Any evidence on the effectiveness of travel practices from a CT perspective.</p>	<p>Primary: Evaluation reports</p> <p>Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff</p>	<p>Content analysis, data harvesting</p> <p>Survey analysis</p>

Outputs	Outcomes	Key performance indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods
<p>United Nations to support coordination in planning a response to a terrorist attack using nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons or materials, in particular by reviewing and improving the effectiveness of the existing inter-agency coordination mechanisms for assistance delivery, relief operations and victim support</p> <p>Support for the security and protection of other vulnerable targets</p>	<p>2.7 Increased security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets such as infrastructure and public places.</p>	<p>1. Any evidence on the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets such as infrastructure and public places.</p>	<p>Primary: Evaluation reports</p> <p>Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff</p>	<p>Content analysis, data harvesting</p> <p>Survey analysis</p>
<p>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, including its Terrorism Prevention Branch, in close consultation with the Counter- Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, facilitates technical assistance to Member States</p>	<p>2.8 Strengthened implementation of the international conventions and protocols related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and relevant United Nations resolutions</p>	<p>Use of support provided</p> <p>Usefulness of relevant support</p> <p>Any evidence on the implementation of international conventions and protocols</p>	<p>Primary: Evaluation reports</p> <p>Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff</p>	<p>Content analysis, data harvesting</p> <p>Survey analysis</p>
<p>International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to continue their efforts, within their respective mandates, in helping States to build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical or radiological materials, to ensure security at related facilities and to respond effectively in the event of an attack using such materials</p> <p>World Health Organization to step up its technical assistance to help States to improve their public health systems to prevent and prepare for biological attacks by terrorists</p>	<p>2.9 Reduced opportunities for the use of and danger from nuclear, chemical or radiological materials in terror</p>	<p>Use of support provided</p> <p>Usefulness of relevant support</p> <p>Any evidence on the reduction in terror threat from these materials.</p>	<p>Primary: Evaluation reports</p> <p>Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff</p>	<p>Content analysis, data harvesting</p> <p>Survey analysis</p>

Outputs	Outcomes	Key performance indicators	Data sources	Data collection methods
Specific objective (SO3): Increased respect for human rights & rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Pillar IV).				
Advocacy and support for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 60/158 of 16 December 2005	3.1 Increase in the number of Member-States, which implement the fundamental framework for the "Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism"	Increased awareness on the framework	Primary: Evaluation reports	Content analysis, data harvesting
		Use of support provided	Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Survey analysis
		Usefulness of relevant support		
		Any evidence on the implementation.		
Advocacy, technical assistance and capacity development	3.2 Increase in Member-States that are parties to and implement the core international instruments on human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law	Increased awareness on the framework	Primary: Evaluation reports	Content analysis, data harvesting
		Use of support provided	Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Survey analysis
		Usefulness of relevant support		
		Any evidence on the implementation.		
Advocacy, technical assistance and capacity development	3.3 Increase in number of Member-States that develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system for preventing and reducing terrorism	Use of support provided	Primary: Evaluation reports	Content analysis, data harvesting
		Usefulness of relevant support	Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Survey analysis
		Any evidence on the increased maintenance of the rule of law		
Strengthened operational capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council, and Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms				
	(Any other outcomes that emerge from data collection, including on facets such as need for strategic evaluation; common M&E framework for CT; identifying potential need for evaluation capacity in the area of CT		Primary: Evaluation reports	Content analysis, data harvesting
			Supplementary: Interviews and survey of project/program and evaluation staff	Survey analysis

Annex VIII: Past, Present and Future of Terrorism

Undefined notions of terrorism/counter-terrorism

There is no clear definition or shared understanding on terrorism or counter-terrorism. A shared understanding of what constitutes counter-terrorism is critical for the evaluation, assessment, audit, or reviews to assess whether a project or a programme is successful. The conceptual fuzziness around the umbrella term that covers a range of activities is not an impediment to the work, but it shows that, beyond security, military and judiciary measures easily and immediately associated to this term, it is difficult to develop a unified collective action within the Global Compact. This is a major gap, especially when considering the risk of states engaging in anti-terrorism measures with oppressive actions and threatening human rights. This omnipresent risk associated to a “misuse” of an undefined terminology was clearly identified in 2005 at the UN Economic and Social Council:

“The absence of a universal, comprehensive and precise definition of ‘terrorism’ is problematic for the effective protection of human rights while countering terrorism.” Fighting terrorism, “without defining the term, can be understood as leaving it to individual States to define what is meant by the term. This carries the potential for unintended human rights abuses and even the deliberate misuse of the term. Furthermore, there is a risk that the international community’s use of the notion of “terrorism”, without defining the term, results in the unintentional international legitimization of conduct undertaken by oppressive regimes, through delivering the message that the international community wants strong action against “terrorism” however defined.”¹⁸⁵

The sentence “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” was mentioned several times during the interviews, indicating the relativist perspective of terrorism and therefore of counter terrorism itself. The

185 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, E/CN.4/2006/98, 28 December 2005, p. 9. <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=E/CN.4/2006/98&Lang=E>

same realities associated with these terms may appear differently from different perspectives. The absence of a definition is a gap with geopolitical consequences since it is not clear whether, where and when an entity, a movement, an individual may be classified as terrorist and treated as such according to international laws, procedures, sanctions associated to it. The lack of proper definition is also an impediment to checking new threats and new forms of terrorism in this century.

Some research reports of security-oriented entities may have identified the right-wing extremism as a new emerging threat in Northern Europe and Europe: but interviews indicated that, within the current structures and funding model, it was challenging to mobilize resources to prevent or fight it. The most powerful donor states are not amenable to counter-terrorism actions by international organizations in their own sovereign space. Relatedly, aviation security, maritime security, border security, travel documents control, and immigration control, are all based on a set of standards that seek to prevent terrorist threats from abroad. These security standards are inadequate when terrorists are nationals, and the threat is intrinsically domestic.

Further, ideological lines between mainstream politics and right-wing extremism are blurrier today than they were with left-wing extremism in the 1960s and 1970s. Countries where right-wing extremism or extreme-right radicalization is taking place are usually the states that are funding counter terrorism projects in other countries. So right-wing terrorism is a major emerging threat in global north, but these states tend to underestimate this danger, and more importantly, are not used to external interventions. If no country is immune to terrorism, then the prevailing funding model is not compatible with the scrutiny of domestic affairs of donor states by international institutions engaged in counter-terrorism.

During the last 20 years, the international community has been highly vigilant about radical Islamism/Salafi-jihadi terrorism. Unlike the African and Asian states which are engaged in countering this threat, many Member States are reluctant to use the “terrorist/ism” qualification for mass-killings perpetrated by white supremacists or right-wing activists (most of them are often categorized as “lone wolves” affected by “mental illness”) and to consequently undertake strong counter terrorism measures to fight them. The dominant but undefined terminology does not necessarily allow a universal approach to the armed and political violence qualified as “terrorism” despite the effort undertook by the Security Council to specify

acts of that nature,¹⁸⁶ and may, in situation of new threats, even end-up as another North-South divide or double standard prevailing between “the West and the Rest”.

Brief history of “terrorism” in modern times

The terrorist attacks of the last 20 years are perceived and presented as a singularity in the history of political violence, and therefore their exceptionality has found a parallel in the treatment and the detainment of terrorists. However, this is not the first time in modern history that nation-states are threatened by a terrorist form of violence. First, it is important to remember that terrorism may be practiced by state actors. The first use of Terror in modern times to achieve political objectives – through laws or state of exception, arbitrary arrests, summary and massive executions – was the fact of the French state (1793-1794) during its revolutionary process which exported in Europe and beyond both its violence and its universal values of human and citizen rights. In the case of France, its revolution was the cradle of both state violent terror and the Enlightenment, the civilization project of free market, parliament democracy and equality for all citizens. This project was progressively adopted with its inherent violence in most of the European countries. In the mid-19th century, terrorism started to designate the non-state actors that were using violence against the state in an ideological reconstruction. Anarchists, nihilists, nationalists spread violence in Europe until the 20th century, and their acts – bombings, assassinations, mass shootings – were largely reported and commented in the press. The list of assassinations includes monarchs, heads of state, prime ministers, and numerous statesmen.¹⁸⁷ This historical background could be pursued all along the 20th century with the eruption of nationalism in Europe and struggles for national liberation in colonized countries, and later with the left-wing armed groups in post-war Europe, and Marxist

186 Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) call all States to cooperate in the fight against terrorism by preventing and punishing acts having the three cumulative characteristics: “(a) acts committed with the intention of causing death or serious bodily injury, or the taking of hostages; (b) for the purpose of provoking a state of terror, intimidating a population, or compelling a Government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act; and (c) constituting offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.” Ibid, p. 11.

187 Among the prominent victims of anarchist terrorism, there are the Russian Tsar Alexander II in 1881, the Empress of Austria and Queen of Hungary Sisi in 1896, the Italian King Umberto in 1901, the French President Sadi Carnot in 1894, the US President William McKinley in 1901, the Spanish Prime Ministers Antonio Cánovas del Castillo in 1897 and Eduardo Dato in 1920. Nationalist violence has also been responsible for countless attacks, the most famous being the political event that started the First World War, that is the assassination in 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo by a clandestine group of Serbian nationalists. This kind of highly symbolic and traumatic violence – killings of crowned heads and presidents by ordinary citizens in the name of an ideology – is out of reach of current globalized terrorist groups.

guerrillas in Latin America, Africa and Asia. It is heuristically important to put today's terrorism in a historical perspective with its specificities but also its continuities. It appears that today's jihadists express a form of nihilism that was dominant in Europe's 19th century. A brief history of violence and terrorism in modern times shows common patterns and ideological differentiation based on race, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion.

From the social sciences perspective, the expression "terrorist" does not present any heuristic value and does not bring a particular light to the view of the violent phenomenology associated to "armed groups", "armed dissidents", "violent rebels" or "insurgents". It does not help either to apprehend the perceptions of the communities and their own description of armed conflicts and war occurring in the territories where they live. The use of the term "terrorism" has a value from a political standpoint and is to a certain extent tactically operational in the sense that what is designated as such is immediately denigrated and denied from any legitimacy or right associated to an armed struggle and, more problematic, even a civil political life.

"Terrorist or freedom fighter" is a perspectivist proposition that is also based on historical evidence. Further, yesterday's terrorists may be tomorrow's politicians. This rule was valid in the case of the Israeli Irgoun (1931-1948), the Algerian FLN (1954-1962), the PLO (1964-1974), the South African ANC (1960-1990), the IRA (1916-2006), the Lebanese Hizbollah (1982-1991) and the Palestinian Hamas (1987-1991). However, since the events of September 11 and the "war on terror", this is no more validated in the case of the Algerian GIA, the International Al Qaida and ISIS in Iraq, Syria and West Africa. Nevertheless, the recent negotiated return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 20 years after 11 September 2001, should nuance the observation on these exceptions.

It is important to notice that some prominent Western scholars, mainly specialists of political Islam, endorse the conventional terminology on "terrorism" and integrate it even in the general frame of political scientist Samuel Huntington's theory of "civilizational clash" between the West and Islam, China, and the demographic peril of mass immigration in "senescent" Europe and North America. Although very controversial, the proposed theory of cultural and civilizational confrontation¹⁸⁸ has been very influential in the governing sphere since the unprecedented terrorist attacks of Nine-eleven. More recently, on the ideological influence of ISIS,

188 Samuel Huntington's theory was first introduced in his article *The Clash of Civilizations?*, "Foreign Affairs", vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49, before being exposed as a bestseller book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

a polemic debate was engaged by French “Islamologists” to determine whether we are witnessing a ‘radicalization of Islam-ism’ or an “Islami- zation of radicalism.” From this perspective, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in many cities of the world, some authors¹⁸⁹ have even tried to conceptualize a ‘sociology of rage and anger’ to describe what may en- courage young people to engage with terrorist groups under the fran- chise of Al Qaeda or ISIS/Daesh. This trend in the literature which puts the emphasis on “rage”, “anger” to explain contemporary violence, extremism and hatred is best represented with the magisterial thesis developed by Indian writer Pankaj Mishra¹⁹⁰. What is proposed is a unified vision on these phenomena that is the absolute opposite of the dominant theory of clash of civilizations. On the contrary, what is often perceived as a violence against the Enlightenment, modernity, the Western cultural values, etc., is a reaction by its children affected by a Rousseauist-Nietzschean resent- ment who feel excluded from the Enlightenment promise of free mar- kets, universal suffrage, educational and personal advancement. Since the French revolution, the age of Enlightenment was also an age of anger and terror. New political expressions have emerged from nationalism to terrorism, led by individuals living on the margins of the great narrative on progress, modernity, and globalization, moved by an appropriative and mimetic rivalry¹⁹¹.

In the long historical run, history of mass violence and terrorism is the hidden and “unthought” facet of the “sanitized” history of modernization. Today’s violence and terrorism correspond to another series of “shocks of modernity”, in the 19th century, this nihilist violence made of “negative solidarity” (Hannah Arendt) spread to all European countries; in the 20th century, it produced world wars, genocides, colonial carnages; in the 21st century, it affects nowadays billions of individuals in Africa and Asia. The latter shocks lack the immemorial cultural, social, and economic struc- tures as well as the welfare state able to absorb them.

189 On the violent “movements of rage”, see Glenn E. Robinson, *Global Jihad: A Brief History*, Stan- ford, Stanford University Press, 2020. For a critical review and a more nuanced appreciation on the fact that “rage does not explain everything”, see Farhad khosrokhavar, “De la rage au jihad”, *La Vie des idées*, 17 February 2021.

190 Pankaj Mishra, *The Age of Anger. A History of the Present*, Allen Lane, 2017.

191 We must return to the convulsions of that [resentment, nihilist and anarchist] period in order to understand our own age of anger. For the Frenchmen who bombed music halls, cafés and the Paris stock exchange in the late nineteenth century, and the French anarchist newspaper that issued the call to destroy the *den* (a music hall in Lyon) where the fine flower of the bourgeoisie and of commerce gather after midnight, have more in common than we realize with the ISIS-inspired young EU citizens who massacred nearly two hundred people at a rock concert, bars and restaurants in Paris in November 2015. Much in our experience resonates with that of people in the nineteenth century. German and then Italian nationalists called for a holy war more than a century before the word *jihad* entered common parlance, and young Euro- peans all through the nineteenth century joined political crusades in remote places, resolved on liberty or death. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Conflictual terminology, semantic warfare

The issue of the terminology associated with terrorism and violent extremism has been studied and is still debated in the academic world. Most social scientists, who do empirical work, field survey, and research on the ground, avoid using terms associated with terrorism. The work on legal and illegitimate violence does not acquire more meaning by using the terms terrorism/terrorist. On the contrary, what research reports often show is that it is preferable to refer neutrally to the denomination of the armed groups and/or also indicate the name given by the populations. For example, in the case of the Nigerian armed group Boko Haram, one of the most extreme and violent terrorist groups currently fought by four African armies, it is instructive to know that its usual name was given by the population of Maiduguri (northeast of Nigeria) in 2009 after hearing a speech from one of its leaders preaching and sermonizing educated but unemployed youth about the uselessness of “western education and diploma”. “Boko Haram” is a contraction of hausa (“Boko” referring to “book”, “education”) and Arabic terms (“haram” meaning “forbidden”) meanwhile the organisation’s original Arabic name is Jama’at Ahl al-Sunnah li Da’wa wa-l-Jihad, which means “Association of the People of the Sunna for Preaching and Jihad”.¹⁹²

Part of terrorism’s strategy not only relies but depends essentially on information and communication. Terrorism in modern age without relays of transmission and diffusion is inconceivable. More than anything else, it needs mass communication to show the violent and staggering acts perpetrated. A terrorist act denied of any form of communication, not covered by mainstream media and social networks completely misses its main target of creating fear and awe not only within affected communities but far beyond their surrounding socio-political environment. In today’s globalized world, with ubiquitous communication, internet and

192 All observers and experts of Boko Haram recognize that from the creation of the group until 2009, the Nigerian association was a pietistic and non-violent one. It is only after the arrest and the death of Boko Haram’s leader, Muhammad Yusuf, and many of his followers, that the group entered the cycle of armed violence. Regarding the name “Association of the People of the Sunna for Preaching and Jihad”, here again the use of the word “jihad” may be misleading for experts and researchers who are not familiar with the Islamic faith. The Arabic word “jihad” is one of the most searched word in Google and it means literally “effort”, “force”. It has no intrinsic martial connotation, even in the Quran, the sacred book of Muslims, the mention of jihad refers in most occurrences to the “effort” of spiritual, introspective, meditative nature. So asking Muslim leaders and clerics to “condemn jihad” is a complete misunderstanding (but an ideological victory for those groups who promote it in the form of “holy war”) since it would be equivalent to remove one fundamental aspect of the Islamic faith. We may say that jihadism is a modern ideological and bellicose interpretation of the religious notion of “jihad” like Islamism is a socio-political interpretation of Islam. Jihadism emerged gradually as an extremist ideology in Afghanistan during the nine-year guerrilla (1980-1989) against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

smartphones, more than ever semantic and semiotic conflicts precede and accompany terrorist acts and military operations. The most patent and tragic example of these conflicts of images, signs and languages is the case of the caricatures published in 2006 with the headline “The Face of Mohammed” by the Danish conservative newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, which resulted into violence and anger across the Muslim world in February 2006. These caricatures were reprinted in 2012 by the French satirical weekly *Charlie Hebdo* where 12 people were killed in 2015. The battlefields are now on the cyberspace around symbols, icons, signs of all sort, and countering terrorism and violent extremism or extreme violence should take into consideration the catalytic role of mass media and social networks in the diffusion of hate speech, in the ideological sway of terrorist groups, in the designation and targeting of cultural and religious minorities as “scapegoats” of violence. The fight against terrorism is also an endless battle of interpretations (what is terrorism? Jihad?), a clash over words (“Axis of evil”, “Crusade”, “War on terror”, “Allah akbar”), concepts (secularization, laicity, East and West, North and South), symbols (Bamiyan Buddhas, Palmyrian ruins) and images (Danish cartoons).

Semantic and semiotic wars are real-time and low intensity conflicts fed by social and mass media with hate, fear, and anxiety as structural emotions. Semantic and semiotics are profound and powerful stockpiles for both terrorism and counter terrorism rhetoric artilleries. Using the appropriate terminology, designing meaningful, solid, and operative concepts based on vernacular realities can contribute to a therapeutic arsenal for the prevention of terrorism and extreme violence. In order to neutralize the dangers of terminology, an alternative strategy would be to use preferably the original appellations of violent extremist groups (to not underestimate or despise the enemy), to de-penalize and de-remilitarize the polysemous (multiple meanings) religious notion of jihad (so that a civil and peaceful jihad (“spiritual effort”) against extreme violence can be legitimized), to control and if needed sanction hate speech and racist demagogic expressions in mainstream television news channels, to promote mass digital literacy – as an alternative to digital surveillance and other heavy security-oriented measures – on the responsible use of social networks, etc. In an age of universal access to information and communication, the strategic dimension of meaning and symbolism can be no more underestimated in any convincing analysis of 21st century conflict-ridden climate.

From the “war on terror” to the “fight against terrorism and violent extremism”

The bellicose trend of the “war on terror,” which was the dominant paradigm characterizing the military operations conducted mainly in Afghanistan and Iraq in early 2000s, was a decade later openly criticized within the international cooperation sphere. The launching of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (New York, 2011)¹⁹³ and other international institutions such as Hedayah (Abu Dhabi, 2012),¹⁹⁴ the International Institute of Justice and the Rule of Law (Valetta, 2014)¹⁹⁵ and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (Geneva, 2014),¹⁹⁶ were additional (p)layers in the international effort initiated by the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy in 2006. It is in this decade that progressively the terminology of “countering/preventing violent extremism” (CVE/PVE) was adopted to focus more on the root causes of terrorism than on its symptomatic phenomenology. In 2015, President Barack Obama chaired in Washington the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism with representatives of more than 60 countries, leaders of the EU and the UN. This summit represents a sort of symbolic turning point since it established for the first time and at the highest level of the international community a recognition that the “war on terror” has generated abuse of power from security forces, repression of dissenting voices that may have encouraged more terror and extremism. The official statement of the summit acknowledges:

“that intelligence gathering, military force, and law enforcement alone will not solve – and when misused can in fact exacerbate – the problem of violent extremism and reiterated that comprehensive rule of law and community-based strategies are an essential part of the global effort to counter violent extremism and, like all measures aimed at addressing the

193 “The GCTF is an informal, apolitical, multilateral counter-terrorism (CT) platform that contributes to the international architecture for addressing terrorism. The GCTF’s mission is to diminish terrorist recruitment and increase countries’ civilian capabilities for dealing with terrorist threats within their borders and regions. (...) A main objective of the Forum is to support and catalyze implementation of the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, reviewed in June 2021, and the UN CT Framework more broadly, including for instance the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism presented to the UN General Assembly in January 2016. The GCTF works closely with UN bodies to pursue this goal.” <https://www.thegctf.org/Who-we-are/Background-and-Mission>

194 “Hedayah is the premier international organization dedicated to using its expertise and experiences to countering violent extremism (CVE) in all of its forms and manifestations through dialogue, communications, capacity building programs, research and analysis”. <https://www.hedayahcenter.org/about/>

195 “The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IJJ) provides rule of law-based training to lawmakers, police, prosecutors, judges, corrections officials, and other justice sector stakeholders on how to address terrorism and related transnational criminal activities within a rule of law framework.” <https://theijj.org/about-us/>

196 GCERF is the “global fund that strengthens community resilience by supporting local initiatives to address the drivers of violent extremism”. <https://www.gcerf.org/about-us/>

terrorist threat, should be developed and implemented in full compliance with international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, as well as with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.”¹⁹⁷

In this same CVE summit statement, it was also:

“

Reaffirmed the central role of the UN in efforts to address violent extremism and the comprehensive framework that the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy offers for addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

“

A lack of empirically based research and reliable data. Coupled with strong threat narratives. Have arguably obscured the underlying causes of violent extremism. And elicited state responses that may do more harm than prevention.

Source: UNDP Entry and Exit Points: Violent Extremism in South-East Asia

This clear and unambiguous acknowledgement of “misused intelligence gathering, military force and law enforcement” signals a new approach of terrorism and counter terrorism that is taking place and implemented in various countries and regions around countless projects and programmes of radicalization and deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration of former violent extremists since then. But how can this “misuse” be identified without an evaluation or a monitoring process? The diplomatic dialog and the international encounters of the past decade have tacitly recognized that it is not possible to eradicate terrorism, it can’t be defeated by war and more generally by military, security and intelligence means, but it can be considerably diminished and finally resorbed by an engagement in a larger civil/civic fight on multiple fronts corresponding to its political, economic, social root causes. The logical outcome of this turning point unveiled in the White House CVE Summit nowadays will consist in the evaluation of how to improve, and if necessary, revise or reform the CVE strategies adopted by the international community. In the current decade, it seems almost inevitable that the international community would seek to develop mechanisms and tools of assessment in order to identify possible “misused” and “abusive” security and counter terrorism policies and operations. The next diplomatic activity on terrorism should be on the assessment of the strategies put in place to fight it and on the

197 The White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism Ministerial Meeting Statement, 19 February 2015, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/cvesummit/releases/237673.htm>

long-term impact of the projects and programmes implemented for this end. And it is in this context of ideological shift (expressed by a change in the terminology) adopted by the international community (from the “war on terror” to the “fight against terrorism and violent extremism”) that this synthesis apprehends some basic elements for a future potential evaluation of a counter terrorism strategy.

Constantly increasing in demand and influence in private companies, international and governmental institutions, public programmes, the field of evaluation with its methodology, procedures, tools, guidelines, and recommendation could enrich considerably the counter-terrorism expertise for which there should be a thorough risk assessment directly correlated with human rights and gender compliance. So, there might be an emerging new field of evaluation, the counter-terrorism evaluation, which would be designed by experts on counter-terrorism and by representatives from the civil society. It is not in the framework of the synthesis to apprehend this whole new emerging field, but the present document can at least indicate certain limitations and gaps in the evaluation studies and why is necessary to deepen critical issues, lessons learned, open questions and gaps beyond and beneath the levels of managerial, programmatic and technical expertise.

Monitoring of counter-terrorism and international humanitarian law

If we consider the role of the international community in the assessment of asymmetrical conflicts and extreme violence, it is also instructive to consider how one of the oldest, most respected, and prestigious international institutions like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – founded in 1863 and at the origin of the first Geneva convention on humanitarian right in times of war – considers terrorism and counter terrorism. On the issues of violence, armed conflicts and wars, ICRC has a kind of precedence within the international community because this organization was created long before the League of Nations (1920-1946) and the United Nations (1945) and it has been closely associated with the formulation of the Geneva Conventions (four treaties and three protocols international containing “the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war”¹⁹⁸) and the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The baseline that it articulates as international humanitarian law is the establishment of a

198 Overview of The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, 29 October 2010. <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm>

fundamental distinction between civilians and combatants in an armed conflict:

“When a situation of violence amounts to an armed conflict, there is little added value in calling such acts “terrorism”, because they already constitute war crimes under international humanitarian law (...). A crucial difference between IHL and the legal regime governing terrorism is that IHL is based on premise that certain acts of violence in war – against military objectives and personnel – are not prohibited. Any act of “terrorism”, however, is prohibited and criminal. The two legal regimes should not be blurred given the different logic and rules that apply.”¹⁹⁹

The International Committee of the Red Cross has 100'000 employees present in 100 countries that guarantee neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian work in armed conflicts. This organization is in position to and has the legitimacy to evaluate if and when counter-terrorism activities are transgressing international humanitarian law. On several occasions, ICRC has alerted on “the potential adverse effects on humanitarian action of certain counter-terrorism measures taken by States, both internationally and domestically.”²⁰⁰ It is part of the general mission of the ICRC to assess if the humanitarian right is applied when individuals suspected of terrorism are detained.

“Independent and neutral monitoring mechanisms, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, should be granted access to these individuals, so that they can assist detaining authorities in ensuring that detainees are treated humanely and in conformity with applicable international law and standards.”²⁰¹

ICRC do not hesitate to signal to the international community when “unintended consequences of counter-terrorism measures” are “limiting humanitarian assistance” and “jeopardizing the neutral, impartial and inde-

199 Challenges for IHL - terrorism: overview, 29 October 2010. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/challenges-ihl-terrorism>

200 Counter-terrorism activities must respect protections afforded by international humanitarian law. Statement to UN General Assembly Sixth Committee Meeting on “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism”, 10 October 2019. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/counter-terrorism-activities-must-respect-protections-afforded-international-humanitarian>

201 Ibid.

pendent humanitarian action”²⁰². Since humanitarian work is based on neutrality and impartiality, ICRC remains extremely vigilant about the use and misuse of the humanitarian right in risky geopolitical and conflictual contexts. ICRC is aware that the credibility associated to IHL can be lost in the eyes of civil populations when military-humanitarian interventions are blurred – like in the case of a “right” to interfere militarily on humanitarian grounds or in the ideological context of the global “war on terror” that has generalised the use of drones and other lethal weaponry in Central Asia and the Middle East. On the military side, new forms of counter terrorism and counter insurgency tactics are developed increasingly relying on artificial intelligence and unmanned systems (“flying, high-resolution video cameras armed with missiles.”). The question of their compliance with humanitarian and human rights is completely open and “unthought”, since the new warfare opposes on one side lethal algorithms (that assures “combatant immunity” while limiting “collateral damage”) to both combatants and non-combatants on the other side (with the omnipresent risk, in front of a faceless and ubiquitous adversary, of driving civilians into the arms of the terrorist enemy). Fighting militarily terrorism has imposed a new kind of nonconventional wars and asymmetrical conflicts. The new wars from afar that guarantee “surgical strikes” while “projecting power without projecting vulnerability” require new amendments in humanitarian and human rights. The combination of humanitarian and military operations in the perception of populations caught in the middle contributes to a combined “humilitarian” action that at the same time kills and saves civilians near the areas of intervention, simultaneously produce targeted assassinations, and provide care.²⁰³ It appears that nowadays not only new – AI-based – forms and of both terrorism and counter terror-

202 “In recent months the ICRC has faced several challenging situations which have delayed or blocked our ability to protect and assist people affected by conflict and violence. These have come in diverse forms, including domestic counter-terrorism legislation, criminal laws, sanctions regimes and measures, clauses in grant contracts, de-risking measures, or simply politically-motivated or security-based restrictions, or economic activities in theatres of conflict in which we operate.” Combatting terrorism should not come at the expense of humanitarian action or principles. Remarks to UN General Assembly High-Level Side Event on “Counter-terrorism Frameworks and Sanctions Regimes: Safeguarding Humanitarian Space”, 26 September 2019. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/combating-terrorism-should-not-come-expense-humanitarian-action-or-principles>

203 One of the few researches that provides a comprehensive examination on the unmanned warfare and its technical, tactical, legal, ethical and psychological implications, is the work of Gregoire Chamayou, *A Theory of the Drone*, translated by Janet Lloyd, New York, London, The New Press, 2015.

ism²⁰⁴ may undermine the application of international humanitarian law and challenge the universality of human rights in the 21st century.

Imbalance between security and human rights & gender issues

The United Nations have long integrated in their evaluation process the human rights and gender equality compliance. In 2011, a handbook was released which details step-by-step how these issues can be integrated into evaluation practice.²⁰⁵ These guidelines have been since promoted and adapted in other UN agencies' handbooks of evaluation. Despite that "all UN interventions have a mandate to address HR & GE issues", the necessity to provide a manual was a means to change real situations where "interventions do not always mainstream HR & GE" as it is stated in the UNEG handbook. Evaluation criteria to assess human rights and gender equality for the capacity of "duty-bearers" (state and non-state actors) and the benefit of "rights holders" (grassroots communities, women, youth) have been adapted from the use of the well-known evaluation criteria of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC): relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability.

During the 2010s, most of evaluation/audit/assessment reports not only took into consideration HR and Gender issues but developed detailed sections in their final report to better quantify and qualify their integration in the monitoring and evaluation process. It is nowadays a prerequisite condition of any evaluation study to mainstream human rights and gender equality. Most, if not all, recent evaluation reports related to counter-terrorism – as well as to all other UN activities – are sensitizing on these issues of global concern. "All UN evaluations address HR and GE issues", but from the perspective of future improvement of evaluation studies, the question remains to determine if counter-terrorism interventions do always mainstream HR & GE, and consequently their direct and concrete impact on the rights holders is. Beyond the HR & GE evaluation criteria and training curriculum, and considering the highly sensitive geopolitical, security military and judiciary issues at stake, the evaluation of the impact of human

204 On AI and counter terrorism, cf. the joint UNICRI-UNOCCT recent reports Algorithms and Terrorism: The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence for Terrorist Purposes, 2021, (<http://www.unicri.it/News/Algorithms-Terrorism-UNICRI-UNOCCT>) and Countering Terrorism Online with Artificial Intelligence. An Overview for Law Enforcement and Counter-Terrorism Agencies in South Asia and South-East Asia, 2021 (<http://www.unicri.it/News/-Countering-Terrorism-Online-with-Artificial-Intelligence>).

205 Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation. Towards UNEG Guidance, UNEG/G(2011)2, <http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/980>

rights and gender mainstreaming is an extremely difficult task that requires far more robust long-term data than those studied and coded in evaluation/audit/assessment reports. It is beyond the current counter terrorism evaluation reports that focus on projects designed, programmed, and implemented in a very limited time (2-3 years). However, on the other hand, there exist actors, within the United Nations, that have the capacity to assess in a systematic monitoring and a long-term perspective the “evaluability” of the respect of human rights and gender issue: UN specialized agencies, independent international institutions, NGOs, and grassroots associations can establish a monitoring based on the depth of their engagement. Their presence and their influence in the UN Global Compact Entities might guarantee that counter terrorism interventions may resolve conflictual problems and diminish violent extremism while improving the situation of human rights and gender issue.

Mainstreaming human rights and gender issue in projects and programmes does not necessarily traduce or imply real changes on the ground. For an expert working from an international observatory of human rights and gender condition who is not familiar with the evaluation approach, the systematic mentions and verification of the “prerequisite” in counter-terrorism projects may appear essentially like an inescapable “quality certification” but it is not enough to establish that the said projects promote social conditions, individual freedom, and equality in treatment in risky geopolitical contexts. One of the best practices of evaluation process developed by a Compact Entity is the one systematically applied by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for all its projects. Instead of having a centralized and homogenized evaluation procedure systematically applied to different projects, contexts and countries, the Peacebuilding Fund requires that every financed PVE project must be evaluated by the recipients. Consequently, all evaluations are done with different actors on the field, organizations, methodological approaches. In this decentralized evaluation strategy, recipients are both participants and evaluators of the projects implemented. Furthermore, their evaluation is budgeted in the project itself. This innovative approach of evaluation allows more flexibility, adaptability, autonomy, and participation from the recipients. The evaluation architecture – the peacebuilding fund’s recipients being the ones in charge of assessment – is evolutive and has the capacity to gain evaluation skills and knowledge on an empirical basis, by exploring different methods and allowing multiple ways of understanding the evaluation results²⁰⁶. It also concrete-

206 For an overview of the Peacebuilding Fund’s evaluations, consult the thematic and country reviews available online : <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund/documents/evaluations>

ly traduces in real and risky geographies the behaviour and institutional changes promoted by the Peacebuilding Fund.

This best practice reflects the didactic aspect involved in an evaluation process, where negotiation and power are in the hands of different stakeholders. In the handbook *Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation* a meaningful quotation from Joachim Theis, specialist of child protection and expert on evaluation and monitoring, is particularly highlighted:

“A rights-based evaluation is not just a technical exercise in data collection and analysis. It is a dialogue and a democratic process to learn from each other, to strengthen accountability and to change power relations between stakeholders.”²⁰⁷

For all aspects related to fragilized communities, human rights, women, and youth in contexts of conflict and violence, the evaluation cannot be reduced at a top-down verification process that reports on “good or very good” scores and results, it involves a complex relation of mutual dependency and trust, a negotiation and delegation of power between truly participating stakeholders.

207 Joachim Theis, “Rights-based Monitoring and Evaluation. A Discussion Paper”, Save the Children, April 2003. http://www.kekidatabank.be/doc_num.php?explnum_id=1979

Evaluation, stakeholders, human rights and gender equality²⁰⁸



Mainstreaming human rights and gender issue in counter terrorism evaluation reports somehow assesses the importance of these issues according to the specialization and areas of expertise of the UN Global Compact Entities. It also reflects the priorities of decision-makers and donors, the actual balance between “hard” security, military, judiciary treatments of counter terrorism and “soft” human rights, gender, socioeconomic empowerment, and development approaches. Entities working on the “soft” and no less strong and demanding methodologies may find a gap between statements, formal indications and the effective situation prevailing among fragilized communities or within oppressive regimes fully engaged in the counter terrorism mobilization. Since there is no consequent funding on human rights issues within the UN Global Compact Entities (that might holds the comparison with the funding of “harder” and “over-securitized” issues), mainstreaming human rights and gender issue appear to the UN human rights community more as a “rhetorical” and “talismatic” practice (recurrent keywords appropriately disseminated in security-oriented reports allow them to be ranked among “HR and GE” ones) than a dedicated and in-situ engagement in the fight against

²⁰⁸ Schematic table after and Inspired from Joachim Theis' illustration, Ibid.

terrorism and violent extremism. Member states have expressed on many occasions the importance to include the global civil society in their fight against terrorism, but its absence in the UN Global Compact Entities remains problematic, especially when discourses call on inclusiveness. If the civil society and NGOs are excluded, the risk is to develop human rights and gender mainstreaming in an intellectually closed and poor space where no critical assessment is made possible.

What has been confirmed in the interviews is that the most outstanding asset of the Global Compact Entities consists in the richness of approaches and expertise, the diversity of communities that constitute it. But these communities objectively don't have the same weight and influence in the access to funding, decision-making mechanism, design of projects and programmes within the UN Global Compact Entities. The human rights compliance after all remains rather weak when at the same time, security measures are in a certain manner believed to be the priority ones that can stop terrorist threats. This significant imbalance is a reality beyond the large UN counter terrorism community. Security policies are the top priorities in the international affairs since 11 September 2001, and behind large-scale military interventions conducted (in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya) with the support of the international community, the working hypothesis is that it is possible to simultaneously defeat terrorism, export and implement democracy in "fragilized" and/or "rogue" states. The assessment of the empirical evidence of this hypothetical assumption (security and democracy can be imposed by legal force, exported and therefore overcome de facto an illegitimate violence) is not attested and never required by any international terrorism monitoring centre. The research community, including the one that is working with many UN agencies (members and non-members of the UN Global Compact Entities), has considerably contributed to our understanding of some fundamental concepts such as the human rights, gender equality, development: it has the scientific ability to critically review our understanding of violence - be it (il)legal, (il)legitimate, (inter)national, extreme - and its intricate links to state, security and power relations. It is probable that our understanding of violence will considerably evolve during the 21st century as well as our shared views on development considerably progressed over time. What is important to notice here is that we assume without robust data and empirical evidence:

"First that all forms of violence are commensurate, such that it makes sense to say that 'violence' is on the increase or alternatively on the decline, globally and nationally. Second that it can be measured and fitted into causal models, on the one hand of its causes or determinants; and on the other hand of its developmental and other impacts. Third, that vio-

lence by its nature unsettles established political and social orders, and is thus inseparable from state failure or fragility and also from wider international insecurity. Fourth that violence is the polar opposite of security, just as war is the absence of peace. And fifth that violence and insecurity can be portrayed as 'development in reverse', or to put it the other way around security is an essential prerequisite of development. All of these assumptions are open to question and debate"²⁰⁹.

A certain number of hidden assumptions and premises are guiding our perception of violence as a process that is linear (more security will lead to a state of violence diminishing returns) and homogenous despite the variety of its manifestations (organized crime, jihadism, pastoral conflicts, urban riots, vigilantism, paramilitary violence, law enforcement and traditional authorities violence, electoral and political violence, ethnic cleansing, forced migration, human trafficking, domestic violence, sexual violence, etc.). The phenomenology of 21st violence is multifaceted, multicausal and eminently complex and the lack of knowledge on these dimensions within the UN Global Compact Entities can be solved only by a significant investment of the international scientific research community – especially within the United Nations, notably through its dedicated institutes – and the inclusion of the global civil society through its planetary network of NGOs and grassroots associations.

The historical moment is particularly appropriate to engage an intellectual debate on these issues of global concern. Our perception of violence must evolve since its manifestations differ radically from 20th century (two world wars, a mass genocide, and dozens of millions of deaths) to 21st century (with a myriad of non-linear, asymmetrical, and low-intensity conflicts at the horizon). If we were to compare with our apprehension of the notion of development – which is part of the core mission of the United Nations -, we may observe that it has changed from the linear and universal stages of economic development²¹⁰, a dominant paradigm in the 1960s to the human development index adopted by the UN in the 1990s. Research centres and institute of development studies on their side have contributed to criticize the conventional understandings of determined and linear development and their premises, they have encouraged the knowledge production of different schools of thought from North and South that have considerably enriched the debate which has been later

209 Robin Luckham, "Whose violence, whose security? Can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable people?", *Peacebuilding*, Volume 5, 2017 - Issue 2: Security in the Vernacular. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277009>

210 Namely 1) traditional society, 2) preconditions to take-off, 3) take-off, 4) drive to maturity, and 5) age of high mass consumption. Cf. Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge University Press, 1960.

shared with the civil society and the grassroots organizations. Those who elaborated the socioeconomic visions that became global shared views on development were above all scholars: from the classical works done by American economist (and former national security adviser to the US presidency) Walt Whitman Rostow to those elaborated by the Pakistani economist (and former finance minister) Mahbub ul Haq, we see how in a time frame of thirty years, development has meant and expressed different quests - from material prosperity to human wellbeing and ecological sustainability – as well as different focus and needs. Similarly, with a critical distance of twenty years of counter terrorism mobilization, it is timely appropriate to engage in a global intellectual debate, to stimulate research and to explore new paradigms for security, peace, and violence studies. New understandings of the contemporary violence might consequently better integrate human rights and gender issue if the Global Compact Entities could fully integrate the vast UN human rights community and progressively shift from the viewpoints of the member states actors – for whom security is a prior step conducive to peace, development, democracy – to more empirical and vernacular viewpoints reflected by the perceptions and representations of the populations concerned – whose sense of safety doesn't necessarily coincide with member states' concern but is no less essential.

Annex IX: Survey Results from the Reviewed Reports

Agency Name:	Participants	# of Participants	Satisfaction Rate (%)	Knowledge Change
UNODC	Judicial Officials	16,566	84%	N/A
UNODC	Criminal justice and law enforcement practitioners	10,993	94%	N/A
UNODC	MSs and practitioners in financial investigation	85	N/A	57%
UNODC	Citizens, UNODC staff, govt, UN agencies		N/A	94%
UNODC	Criminal justice officials, border officers, practitioners in financial management	1,083	N/A	N/A
UNODC	Security and judicial staff	500	N/A	N/A
UNODC	border control and law enforcement officers	1410	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Young people, women, members of village committees & soldiers	2,003	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Youth and adults, religious leaders, academics, Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC) staff & Joint Crisis Monitoring Centre (JCMC) staff	430	92%	N/A
UNDP	Community monitors	153	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Municipal police	143	N/A	N/A
UNICRI	Young leaders	30	91%	N/A
UNICRI	Community participants (youth, women & men)	547	N/A	N/A
UNOCT	Youth and journalists	5,012	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Women and girls, religious leaders, journalists, lawyers & other individual participants	2,095	75%	94%

Agency Name:	Participants	# of Participants	Satisfaction Rate (%)	Knowledge Change
UNITAR	Youth and other community members	423	93%	N/A
Mercy Corps	Youth, women and community leaders	50	76%	N/A
UNDP	Representatives from Air Force, Army, BIISS, CTTC, DGFI, MoFA, Navy, and police	40	N/A	N/A
IOM	Police officers, community members	12,02	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Officials representing the hakems, security forces, gendarmerie, police, guards, Customs, as well as justice actors, representatives of associations of Ulemas and Imams, young people and women	40	N/A	N/A
UN-Women	Women, girls and IDPs	100,000	N/A	N/A
UNFPA	Specialists in families in Difficult Life Situations (DLS)	53	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Christians, Muslims, youth (girls & boys), students, teachers, other community leaders	36	95%	N/A
UNDP	Young people, IDPs, returnees, refugees	1,000	68%	N/A
UNICRI	Women, men and minors, returnees including Fulanis in Mali and Mazingh in Tunisia	1,683	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Young people, other community beneficiaries (men & women)	7,560	N/A	86.70%
UNDP	Youth and other community members	7,616	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Members of the security forces	30	N/A	N/A
UNDP	Young people	3,500	N/A	N/A
UNITAR	Formal Police Units	616	93%	
IOM	Teachers, social workers and community leaders	51	N/A	100%
IOM	At risk youth	90	N/A	71%

Agency Name:	Participants	# of Participants	Satisfaction Rate (%)	Knowledge Change
UNDPO	Rule of law and human rights practitioners from DPA, DPKO, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNODC and UNOPS, as well as from the African Union. Representatives from 11 country contexts	61	36%	N/A
IOM	Police Officers	175	100%	N/A
UNCCT	All 42 member entities of the Compact		63%	N/A
UNDP	Journalists	500	N/A	N/A
			77%	N/A
			81%	N/A
UNESCO	Member States		72%	N/A
			69%	N/A
			72%	N/A
UNESCO	Govt partners		100%	N/A
UNDP	Youth	1000	N/A	50%
UNFPA	Women and girls	186	95%	N/A
Total 39 reports		164,350		

Annex X:

Synthesis team

Lead authors:

The synthesis was conducted by a team consisting of Punit Arora, Reda Benkirane and Xiomara Chavez.

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To ensure a high-quality process, report and methodology, two independent experts have reviewed the Inception Report (containing the methodology), the draft and the final report for validity and quality of findings. Both independent reviewers have confirmed the independent, high-quality Meta-Synthesis.

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