



安全理事会

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2022年11月21日爱尔兰常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信

谨随函转递联合国粮食及农业组织和世界粮食计划署为安全理事会成员联合编写的题为“监测存在粮食危机的冲突局势国家的粮食安全”的第十一期最新情况报告(见附件)。<sup>\*</sup>

请将本信及其附件作为安全理事会文件分发为荷。

爱尔兰常驻代表

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<sup>\*</sup> 仅以来件所用语文分发。



2022 年 11 月 21 日爱尔兰常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信的附件

## Monitoring food security in food crisis countries with conflict situations

A JOINT FAO/WFP UPDATE FOR THE MEMBERS  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (WFP)
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
ETB	Ethiopian birr
DIEM	Data in Emergencies Monitoring
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCT	Federal Capital Territory (Abuja, Nigeria)
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
FSNWG	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised explosive devices
IHL	International humanitarian law
IHRL	International human rights law
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JPA	Juba Peace Agreement
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
rCARI	Remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (WFP)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
WFP	World Food Programme

## Introduction

This is the eleventh update of the *Monitoring food security in food crisis countries with conflict situations*, a twice-yearly report on the acute food insecurity situation in countries where conflict and insecurity are primary drivers of acute food insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have jointly been producing this report for the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since June 2016.

Unanimously adopted by UNSC members, UNSC Resolution 2417 aims notably to prevent conflict-induced food insecurity and the threat of famine. The Resolution recalls all parties to their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians and sparing civilian objects. However, hunger continues to be used as a tactics of warfare by belligerents, and vulnerable populations are purposely famished for political or strategic gains.

The purpose of this update is to monitor acute food insecurity – as reported by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)/Cadre Harmonisé (CH) – in countries affected by major food crises where conflict and insecurity are driving disruption of livelihoods, needs for humanitarian assistance, and often creating constraints to humanitarian organizations in accessing affected populations.

This eleventh update, composed of two main sections, aims to inform council members in the framework of the informal briefing to be held in November 2022.

Section 1 highlights the food security situation in 20 food crisis countries and territories affected by conflict and insecurity in 2022 through key messages, visual content and country snapshots.

Section 2 includes a deep dive into the humanitarian situation created by conflict in three countries and territories of concern – Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan, as well as an additional subsection on food security implications in Myanmar.

Figure 1. Countries and territories (20) covered by this update



Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2022. *Map of the World*. Cited 4 November 2022. [www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world](http://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world)

Conflict is the main driver of acute food insecurity at severe levels, leading to hunger, often in combination with economic and climate shocks. Beyond the direct loss of lives and destructions of houses and infrastructures, conflict creates deep and long-lasting socioeconomic damages within vulnerable households and communities, and across affected countries. The protracted impact of conflict includes – but is not limited to – loss of livelihoods, supply chain disruptions, mass displacements, increased pressure on limited natural and economic resources, and decreased resilience of affected populations and food systems. Conflicts can lead or add to macroeconomic disruptions including increased public deficit and debt, reduced foreign exchange reserves, currency depreciation, growing inflation and eventually diminished capacities for social protection programmes and livelihood support. Although there is a number of other factors impacting global food and energy prices, the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine have put an upward pressure on already elevated food and energy prices on the international markets, with major effects on acute food insecurity in countries of concern considered as hotspots and food crises, as well as on operational costs of humanitarian agencies.

#### **Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate.**

According to the 2022 Global Report on Food Crisis Mid-Year Update, up to 205 million people are expected to face acute food insecurity and to be in need of urgent assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above or equivalent) in 45 countries in 2022 (GNAFC and Food Security Information Network [FSIN], 2022a) – the highest number reported in the past seven years. If additional data from latest available analysis of 2021 is included for 8 countries and territories, this number is estimated to reach up to 222 million people in 53 countries/territories covered by the 2022 Global Report on Food Crisis. These countries are Bangladesh, Liberia, Libya, Palestine, Rwanda, the Syrian Arab Republic and Syrian refugee populations in Egypt and Lebanon and accounted for 17 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2021 (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022b).

Around 45 million people in 37 countries are projected to have so little to eat that they will be severely malnourished, at risk of death or already facing starvation and death (IPC/CH Phase 4 and above) (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022a). This number includes 5.1 million people using 2021 IPC/CH estimates for Ethiopia, Liberia and Zimbabwe, as no IPC estimates were available for these countries in 2022 (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022b). Nearly one million people are projected to face Catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022, if no action is taken, 301 000 of them in Somalia, and the remaining in Afghanistan, Ethiopia for which the latest IPC data available was produced in 2021, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen.<sup>1</sup>

Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen have been identified as hunger hotspots of highest concern for October 2022 to January 2023 outlook in the *FAO-WFP Hunger Hotspots* report from September 2022 (WFP and FAO, 2022). These countries all have segments of populations identified or projected to experience starvation or death (Catastrophe/Famine, IPC/CH Phase 5), or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, as they have already critical food insecurity (Emergency, IPC/CH Phase 4) and are facing severe aggravating factors. Haiti needs to be added to this list, with for the first time having projected populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) based on the IPC analysis from October 2022 (IPC, 2022a). These countries – all of them included in the 20 countries analysed in this report – require the most urgent attention.

While the food crises profiled in the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises continue to be driven by multiple, interlinked drivers that are often mutually reinforcing, conflict/insecurity remains the main driver (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022b). According to the latest report, in 2021 more than 70 percent of the people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) worldwide were in countries where conflict/insecurity was considered the primary driver (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022b).

This update is prepared under the framework of the Global Network Against Food Crises, as part of a range of analytical products including notably the Global Report on Food Crises.

Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the Global Network Against Food Crises is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors working together to prevent, prepare for, and respond to food crises and support the Sustainable Development Goal to End Hunger (SDG 2).

On 12 September 2022, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, the Global Network Against Food Crises released the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises Mid-Year Update, available at [fightfoodcrises.net](https://fightfoodcrises.net) and [fsinplatform.org](https://fsinplatform.org).

The Global Network Against Food Crises also supported the preparation of the *FAO-WFP Hunger Hotspots* report, published in September 2022 (WFP and FAO, 2022).

<sup>1</sup> This number includes 20 000 in Afghanistan (March–May 2022 [IPC, 2022b]), 401 000 people in Ethiopia (projection July–September 2021 [IPC, 2021]) (To note: data is outdated, disaggregated data for Ethiopia were not available for 2022), 19 000 in Haiti (projection September 2022–February 2023, based on IPC analysis published in October 2022 [IPC, 2022a]), 301 000 in Somalia (projection October–December 2022, based on the IPC analysis published in September 2022 [IPC, 2022c]), 161 000 in Yemen (projection June–December 2022 [IPC, 2022d]), 87 000 in South Sudan (projection April–July 2022 [IPC, 2022e]).



## Section 1. Overview of the acute food insecurity situation

### Overview

The impact of conflicts extends throughout food systems – from reduced food production, crop destruction or theft and reduced humanitarian access, to market disruptions, food price increases and restricting access to food for vulnerable populations – compounding already poor nutritional practices and reduced access to minimum dietary diversity. Addressing food crises in conflict and insecurity contexts therefore requires action from all humanitarian-development-peace stakeholders.

### Trends in acute food insecurity (2021–2022)

*The main comparability issues between acute food insecurity estimates of late 2021 and late 2022 are highlighted in the relevant sections of this update (mainly for Nigeria and Mozambique for significant differences in populations/areas analysed; and Yemen for different period analysed). Some minor comparability issues are also flagged in the methodological notes for more information (see pp. 50-51 for more details).*

- **Major increases in IPC/CH Phase 3 and above**

From late 2021 to late 2022, five countries reported an increase of population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) by more than 1 million. The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) increased by 6.6 million (+52 percent) in Nigeria<sup>2</sup> (21 states and Federal Capital Territory [FCT]) (CH, 2022), 3.2 million (+93 percent) in Somalia (IPC, 2022a), 2 million (+91 percent) in the Niger (CH, 2022), 1.9 million (+19 percent) in the Sudan (IPC, 2022b), and 1.6 million (+9 percent) in Yemen.<sup>3</sup>

From late 2021 to late 2022, significant increases in the share of the population analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) were reported in Somalia (by almost 20 percent) (IPC, 2022a) and the Niger (by almost 10 percent) (CH, 2022).

- **Trends in IPC/CH Phase 4 and above**


From late 2021 to late 2022, the largest increases in the population in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) were recorded in Somalia, Yemen, Haiti, South Sudan, the Sudan, Nigeria (21 states and FCT), Burkina Faso and the Niger – from 208 000 people to 1.8 million people (CH, 2022; IPC, 2022c).

In Somalia, the population in Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 and above) increased by almost 290 percent and the share of population analysed facing Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 and above) increased by over 10 percent (IPC, 2022a).

<sup>2</sup> The CH analysis coverage increased from 16 states and FCT to 21 states and FCT (representing respectively 107.6 million people and 159.1 million people) between the two periods. If comparing the same 16 states and FCT, the population in CH Phase 3 and above increased from 12.8 million in June–August 2021 to 14.9 million people in June–August 2022 (CH, 2022).

<sup>3</sup> For Yemen, the increase refers to between early 2022 and late 2022 as no comparable data for the same period of 2021 is available.

Figure 2. Five countries with the largest increase in the share of the population analysed facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) between late 2021 and late 2022



Source: GNAFC, 2022, based on IPC/CH.

Notes: comparability issues exist for Yemen as no IPC analysis was available to cover late 2021 (here "late 2021" actually covers early 2022); the total country population increased between late 2021 and late 2022 in Somalia, Niger and Sudan, partly explaining the increase in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above).

## Snapshots

### Central and Southern Africa

#### Central African Republic

Acute food insecurity situation  
April–August 2022



**45%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)	EMERGENCY (IPC 4)
1.6 million	0.6 million



**-0.1 million**

OR 4% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

*To note: a new analysis was released when finalizing this report and after the cut-off date for incorporating in this issue. The results are available at <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156015/>.*

- Some 2.2 million people were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) from April to August 2022, a slight decrease from 2.3 million in the same period in 2021 – albeit with a stable number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), at 638 000 (IPC, 2022).
- There are several pockets of malnutrition across the country, especially in conflict-affected areas. The number of children affected by acute malnutrition steadily increased during the past three years (OCHA, 2021). Around 215 000 children and 98 000 pregnant and lactating women are acutely malnourished (IPC, 2021).
- Violence between armed forces and militants has intensified in 2022 and expanded geographically to the south and west (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project [ACLED], 2022). Persistent insecurity and population displacements continue to affect agricultural activities (FAO, 2022). This is partly due to the increasing use of explosive weapons, with the first use of landmines in April 2022. This trend may also impede the delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations in need of urgent food assistance (OCHA, 2022a).
- Conflict is driving massive displacements, with about 1.2 million people, or almost one-third of the population, were either internally displaced (484 000) or refugees in neighbouring countries (740 000), as of September 2022 (Cluster Protection, 2022).
- Elevated international prices for cereals and other imported goods also translated into high food prices domestically, reducing the affordability of key food staples in 2022 (FEWS NET, 2022). Meanwhile, soaring fuel prices and fuel shortages affect transportation cost exacerbating the pressure on food availability and prices in the country (OCHA, 2022b).

## Democratic Republic of the Congo

Acute food insecurity situation  
July–December 2022



**26%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+



**-0.6 million**

OR 2% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- Between July and December 2022, 26.5 million people – 26 percent of the population analysed – faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 3.8 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>4</sup> The share of the population analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) remained stable compared to 2021.<sup>5</sup> The number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) decreased by 37 percent in the same period (IPC, 2022).
- Acute malnutrition rates are high, especially in conflict affected areas. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence exceeds 10 percent in several zones of Kwango, Tshuapa, Sud Kivu and Ituri (OCHA, 2022a).
- The conflict in North Kivu and Ituri provinces intensified further in 2022 compared to 2021, leading to the new displacement of 160 000 persons (OCHA, 2022b), amounting to a total of 5.5 million internally displaced persons (IDP) (OCHA, 2022c). Military operations and persistent insecurity are creating major access constraints for humanitarian workers delivering food assistance (Assessment Capacities Project [ACAPS], 2022). Elevated global food prices and high fuel prices led to a significant increase of domestic food prices, limiting access to food, particularly for populations in conflict-affected areas where agricultural recovery remains compromised (FEWS NET, 2022). The cost of WFP's food basket increased by 26 percent year-on-year in July 2022 (WFP, 2022). Rainfall deficits in the northeast led to lower harvests in June–July (USGS, 2022).

<sup>4</sup> Peak number for 2022, differs from the peak reported in Global Report on Food Crisis 2022, as released after publication.

<sup>5</sup> There is a slight decrease in the number of food insecure people, while the prevalence in IPC Phase 3 and above among the population analysed remained stable. This is due to a revision of the total country population in 2022 – more details are available in the methodological notes on comparability issues at the end of this update.

## Mozambique

Acute food insecurity situation  
April–September 2022



**10%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)	EMERGENCY (IPC 4)
1.4 million	0.02 million



**-0.2 million**

OR 13% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

*Note on comparability between the two periods: the two periods of IPC analysis are not directly comparable due to a significantly reduced population analysed (from 18 million people or 60 percent of the country population in late 2021 to 14.5 million people or 47 percent in late 2022)..*

- During April–September 2022, 1.4 million people were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), representing a slight decrease compared to the same period last year (IPC, 2021).<sup>6</sup>
- Almost one million people are currently displaced in northern Mozambique, due to the conflict that started in Cabo Delgado province in October 2017 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2022). The violence has expanded further south in recent months, leading to new mass displacements. Throughout June, attacks have led to movement of people from areas in Cabo Delgado that were previously considered relatively stable. Following attacks in early September, an estimated 65 000 people were displaced in Nampula province (FEWS NET, 2022).
- Food prices mostly increased due to rising fuel costs, which were pushed up by soaring global crude oil prices (FEWS NET, 2022). In September 2022, annual food inflation remained high at 17.4 percent, reducing the purchasing power of already vulnerable households (Trading Economics, 2022). Moreover, extreme weather events impacted agricultural production in central and southern provinces in 2022, reducing availability and economic access (FAO, 2022).

<sup>6</sup> Peak number for 2022, as also reported in the Global Report on Food Crisis 2022, was 1.9 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between November 2021 and March 2022. Please refer to the note above on comparability between the two periods – more details on comparability issues are also available in the methodological notes at the end of this update.

## Eastern Africa

## Ethiopia

Acute food insecurity situation  
In 2022



**20%** of the population  
analysed acutely food insecure

ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE AND IN NEED OF URGENT ASSISTANCE

**20.4** million



**+2.4** million  
COMPARED TO LAST YEAR

- The acutely food insecure population in need of urgent humanitarian assistance increased by 2.4 million between 2021 and 2022 (OCHA, 2022a).<sup>7</sup> The lack of updated IPC analysis for 2022 remains a major concern. The latest available IPC projections from May 2021 projected that around 401 000 people could face starvation and death (IPC Phase 5) in Tigray between June and September 2021 (IPC, 2021).<sup>8</sup>
- The most recent data on Tigray does not ease concerns. Based on WFP's Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology,<sup>9</sup> between November 2021 and June 2022, acute food insecurity in Tigray increased from 4.6 million people to 5.4 million people. The situation in parts of northern Ethiopia remains of high concern (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- The nutrition situation in Ethiopia continued to deteriorate in 2022 with the number of acutely malnourished children admitted for treatment at record high levels, compared to the last three years (FSN WG, 2022; OCHA 2022b).
- By the end of August 2022, hostilities resumed in Tigray as well as parts of Amhara and Afar (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2022), suspending humanitarian access, amid continuing intercommunal violence in Oromia (WFP and FAO, 2022). On 2 November 2022, an agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities was signed between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Around 4.6 million people were internally displaced in the country as of August 2022 (UNHCR, 2022).
- The impact of the conflict, recurrent drought in southern and southeastern Ethiopia, and spikes in the global food prices mainly due to the war in Ukraine are driving inflation – year-on-year headline inflation stood at 30.7 percent in September 2022 (Trading Economics, 2022) – and economic deterioration. The rising cost of living will most likely impact vulnerable households, pushing those least able to cope into higher levels of acute food insecurity (WFP, 2022).

<sup>7</sup> Note: Based on HRP 2022 (OCHA, 2022a). HRP data, endorsement by government is pending. The OCHA 2022 HRP estimate for food security and livelihood People in Need estimate is mainly built on Household Economy Analysis results using survival deficit thresholds in line with IPC, and on WFP Emergency Food Security Assessment for Tigray. While this estimate is not directly comparable to IPC, it is deemed the best estimate that could be developed to assess the 2022 acute food insecurity situation in Ethiopia through a consensus-based process given available data. It compares to 18 million people acutely food insecure in need of urgent assistance reported in 2021 as per the OCHA Humanitarian Response Plan 2021 Mid-Year Review for Ethiopia (OCHA, 2021a) and the Revision of the Northern Ethiopia Response Plan 2021 (OCHA, 2021b).

<sup>8</sup> The IPC analysis released in May 2021 is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. This report has not been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia.

<sup>9</sup> According to the WFP's CARI standard methodology used to classify the household's acute food insecurity, populations that are classified as 'moderately acute food insecure' and 'severely acute food insecure' are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

## Somalia

Acute food insecurity situation  
October–December 2022



**41%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+



**+3.2 million**

OR 93% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR



- During October–December 2022, 6.7 million people were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above). The number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) almost doubled between 2021 and 2022, in large part due to the deepening drought crisis that has driven millions of people in central and southern Somalia into Emergency and even Catastrophic levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 4 and 5), following consecutive failed rainy seasons (IPC, 2022a).
- Famine (IPC Phase 5) is projected for two districts in the Bay region between October and December 2022 in the absence of a scale-up in humanitarian assistance, and several other areas in central and southern Somalia where malnutrition and mortality levels are already at alarming levels will face a Risk of Famine (IPC, 2022a).
- Acute malnutrition remains critical as GAM prevalence exceeds the emergency threshold of 15 percent for the majority of the population groups assessed, with alarmingly high levels among Baidoa and Mogadishu IDPs. More than 54 percent of the children under five years of age in Somalia are projected to be acutely malnourished through mid-2023 (IPC, 2022a).
- Armed conflict and insecurity persisted in 2022, particularly in central and southern Somalia, and drove displacement, disrupted market access and functionality, impeded households' access to livelihoods and restricted access to humanitarian assistance. Around 3 million people were internally displaced in Somalia, as of August 2022 (UNHCR, 2022).
- Somalia has seen substantial food price increases – 16.1 percent year-on-year food inflation in September 2022 (Trading Economics, 2022) – due to record-high global food prices in 2022 and other impacts of the war in Ukraine on global food and fuel supplies. Drought and failed local harvests have also driven high food prices (IPC, 2022b).

## South Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation  
April–July 2022



**63%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+



**+0.6 million**

OR 8% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (IPC 3)

**4.8 million**

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

**2.9 million**

CATASTROPHE (IPC 5)

**87 000**

*To note: a new analysis was released when finalizing this report and after the cut-off date for incorporating in this issue. The results are available at [ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155997/?iso3=SSD](https://ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155997/?iso3=SSD)*

- Between April and July 2022, a record level of 63 percent of the population were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), an increase of 8 percent since the same period in 2021. Moreover, the number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increased by about 450 000 or 18 percent, while 87 000 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, 2022).
- Malnutrition remains a concern as the number of admissions of children in health facilities for severe and moderate acute malnutrition treatment since January are higher than the past three years (IPC, 2022). During the lean season (May–August), severe acute malnutrition admissions increased by 23 percent compared to the same period last year (FSNWG, 2022).
- Violence has surged in Upper Nile state since mid-August and led to large population displacement in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states (USAID, 2022), compounding the impact of economic shocks and recurrent, large-scale flooding which already undermined food security and nutrition conditions. Overall, around 2.2 million people have been internally displaced (UNHCR, 2022), up from 1.7 million in August 2021. Multiple access constraints persist, including violence against humanitarian workers (OCHA, 2022).
- In August, fuel and food prices were high above their year-earlier levels. Fuel prices increased by 86 percent since January 2022 and the pre-Ukraine crisis situation, which contributes to limited economic access for the most vulnerable populations to food. Significant macroeconomic challenges remain, with the national currency losing 66 percent of its value against the USD year-on-year as of June 2022 (WFP, 2022).



## Sudan (the)

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–September 2022



**24%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)	EMERGENCY (IPC 4)
8.5 million	3.1 million



**+1.9 million**

OR 19% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) increased by 19 percent in June to September 2022 compared to the same period last year, reaching 11.7 million people (IPC, 2022). The highest proportion of people in the three highest phases of acute food insecurity was projected for West Darfur, North Darfur and Central Darfur (IPC, 2022).
- The nutrition situation is dire. The latest screenings in June 2022 reported a proxy-GAM rate of 13 percent overall,<sup>10</sup> exceeding the emergency threshold of 15 percent in seven states (Sudan Nutrition Sector, 2022).
- Despite progress, the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and several rebel groups has not resulted in the desired outcome. The root causes of the conflicts remain unaddressed while the political crisis in the country exacerbates local tensions (UNSC, 2022).
- As of July 2022, 3.7 million people were internally displaced (UNHCR, 2022); 177 000 people were newly displaced due to conflict between January–August 2022, including 211 000 newly displaced in Darfur alone (OCHA, 2022).
- Staple food prices remain 250-300 percent above respective prices from last year and 550-700 percent above the five-year average (FEWS NET, 2022; IPC, 2022). Heavy reliance on cereal imports, low production mostly due to below-average harvest, high transportation costs, and a shortage of foreign currency for imports, are expected to lead to further increases in food prices (IPC, 2022).

<sup>10</sup> Proxy Global acute malnutrition (GAM) by mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) is the prevalence, or proportion, of children ages 6-59 months in a given population considered severely acutely malnourished (SAM) or moderately acutely malnourished (MAM) based on their mid-upper arm circumference measurements. For more details:

[https://fscluster.org/handbook/Section\\_three\\_proxy.html](https://fscluster.org/handbook/Section_three_proxy.html)

## West Africa and the Sahel (incl. Cameroon)

## Burkina Faso

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–August 2022



**16%** of the population  
analysed in CH 3+

CRISIS (CH 3)	EMERGENCY (CH 4)
2.8 million	0.6 million



**+0.6 million**

OR 20% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- During the 2022 lean season (June–August), the share of the population analysed facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) increased from 13 percent in 2021 to 16 percent in 2022 – almost threefold the levels reported three years earlier, in 2019 (CH, 2022).
- High levels of acute malnutrition, above the national average of 9.7 percent, are reported, especially in conflict-affected areas (Ministry of Health, 2021). The nutrition situation of IDPs is also concerning with GAM prevalence above 15 percent in Gorom-Gorom and Seguenega (Ministry of Health, 2022). Moreover, an increase of 10 percent year-on-year of estimated cases of acutely malnourished children aged 6-59 months, and a 25 percent increase of pregnant and lactating women suffering from acute malnutrition were reported (IPC, 2022).
- Worsening armed conflict in 2022, mostly concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the country, have hampered agricultural activities and caused large population displacements, limiting the extent of planted area to cereal crops. As of August 2022, the number of IDPs was estimated at about 1.5 million. The majority of IDPs is concentrated in the regions of Centre-Nord and Sahel (OCHA, 2022).
- Reduced availability, high prices and low subsidized volumes of fertilizers led to severe access constraints for populations depending on farming, curbing agricultural yield expectations. Despite general conducive weather conditions, the national cereal production in 2022 is preliminarily forecast at 4.3 million tonnes, about 10 percent below the 2021 near-average level, reflecting the adverse effects of conflicts on cropping activities and low application of fertilizers (FAO, 2022).

## Cameroon

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–August 2022



**9%** of the population  
analysed in CH 3+

CRISIS (CH 3)	EMERGENCY (CH 4)
2.2 million	0.2 million



**+0.5 million**

OR 26% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- After peaking in the second quarter of 2022, the number of people facing acute food insecurity remained high in June–August with almost half a million more people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) in 2022 than during the same period a year earlier.<sup>13</sup> Eighty percent of the population facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) was in conflict-affected regions – 39 percent in the Far-North and 41 percent in the North-West and South-West regions (CH, 2022).
- Although GAM prevalence from the latest assessments are relatively low (below 10 percent) for the conflict-affected areas of Far North, North-West and South-West regions, 611 000 children and pregnant and lactating women still require nutrition treatment and prevention services in 2022 (OCHA, 2022).
- The ongoing insecurity and consequent population displacements in the Far-North, North-West and South-West regions continue to affect agricultural activities and limit farmers' access to crop growing areas and agricultural inputs (FAO, 2022). It resulted in 976 000 IDPs; 500 000 refugees and asylum seekers are also hosted in the country (UNHCR, 2022).
- The protracted socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the inflationary effect of the war in Ukraine contribute to increases in the cost of living, which prevent vulnerable populations from meeting their basic needs (WFP, 2022).
- In addition to conflict, in the Far-North, over 37 000 people were affected by floods. Humanitarian access to hard-to-reach areas has been severely hampered by the floods (OCHA, 2022).

<sup>13</sup> The peak of food insecurity in 2022 was reached in March–May with 2.9 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above, as reported in the Global Report on Food Crises 2022 Mid-Year Updated, released in September (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

## Chad

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–August 2022



**13%** of the population  
analysed in CH 3+



**+0.3 million**

OR 18% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (CH 3)

**2 million**

EMERGENCY (CH 4)

**0.1 million**

- Acute food insecurity increased to more than 2.1 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) during the lean season (June–August 2022) – an increase of 0.3 million or 18 percent compared to the same period a year earlier. Overall, 13 percent of the population analysed were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) (CH, 2022).
- The nutrition situation is still concerning as the national GAM prevalence remains at 10 percent for the past two years, with seven regions with GAM above the emergency threshold of 15 percent (Ministry of Public Health, 2022).
- Armed attacks and intensified farmer-pastoralist clashes, mostly concentrated in the Lake and Tibesti regions, have hampered agricultural activities, restricted farmers' access to the fields and caused new displacements (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2022). Due to insecurity, primarily in 2020 and 2021, the number of displaced people in Chad has reached almost 1 million refugees and IDPs (UNHCR, 2022).
- Food availability and access is likely to remain limited by conflict-related market disruptions and high food prices, exacerbated by the unfolding effects of the war in Ukraine on international trade and commodity prices (FAO, 2022). Unprecedented rainfall between July and September affecting 16 of 23 regions has caused additional needs and displacement (FEWS NET, 2022).

## Mali

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–August 2022



**8%** of the population  
analysed in CH 3+



**+0.5 million**

OR 41% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

CRISIS (CH 3)	EMERGENCY (CH 4)
1.7 million	0.2 million

- During the 2022 lean season (June–August), 1.8 million people were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) – a steep increase of 0.5 million or 41 percent compared to the same period a year earlier. Overall, 8 percent of the population analysed was in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) (CH, 2022).
- The sharp increase in acute food insecurity levels mainly reflects weather shocks, reduced cereal production in 2021, high food prices and worsening security conditions in central and northern parts of the country (FAO, 2022).
- GAM prevalence slightly increased compared to 2021, standing at 10.8 percent as of July 2022 (INSTAT, 2022). Gao region and the IDP sites in Bamako and Mopti exceeded the emergency threshold of 15 percent, while six other regions (Kayes, Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Taoudenit and Menaka) have GAM levels between 10 and 15 percent (UNICEF, 2022).
- The increasing number of violent incidents by non-state armed groups has highly constrained the delivery of humanitarian assistance and has resulted in large population displacements (FAO, 2022). Overall, more than 420 000 people are internally displaced and the country hosts almost 60 000 refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2022).
- Food availability and access are likely to remain limited due to poor security conditions, inflated food prices (50 percent above the 5-year average [FEWS NET, 2022]) and high energy prices (FAO, 2022).

## Niger (the)

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–August 2022



**18%** of the population  
analysed in CH 3+

CRISIS (CH 3)

**4 million**

EMERGENCY (CH 4)

**0.4 million**



**+2.1 million**

OR 91% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- During the lean season (June–August 2022), 4.4 million people were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) including 425 000 people in CH Phase 4 (Emergency). This represents an increase of more than 90 percent compared to the same period a year earlier. Overall, 18 percent of the population analysed were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) (CH, 2022). The sharp increase in acute food insecurity levels reflects the worsening of violence and conflict, reduced cereal outputs in 2021 and high food prices (FAO, 2022).
- GAM prevalence remains high in the Niger, especially in conflict-affected areas such as Diffa (16.2 percent) and Maradi (14.4 percent) (National Institute of Statistics, 2021).
- Persistent conflict and insecurity, mostly concentrated in the Liptako-Gourma region, Lake Chad Basin and central parts bordering Nigeria, continued to hamper agricultural activities and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and caused large population displacements (FAO, 2022).
- Almost 380 000 people are internally displaced and the country hosts another 300 000 refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2022).
- Due to the drought and the global price spikes, food prices reached high levels and even though a good harvest is starting to bring relief, prices are still above the levels of previous years (FEWS NET, 2022).

## Nigeria

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–August 2022



**12%** of the population  
analysed in CH 3+



**+6.6 million**

OR 52% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR<sup>12</sup>

- There were 19.5 million people projected to be in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 and above) between June and August 2022 (CH, 2022). This number cannot be directly compared to the figure published for the same period in 2021, as it is obtained from a geographically expanded CH analysis. A key concern remains the population facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 4), particularly in areas that remain inaccessible to humanitarian operations (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- The increase in acute food insecurity was driven by conflict and insecurity, political instability, climate shocks, high food prices and limited access to agropastoral inputs (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- In the northeast, more than 1.3 million children and 152 000 pregnant and lactating women and girls are projected to be acutely malnourished until the end of the year (IPC, 2022). Deteriorating acute malnutrition is also concerning in the northwest, with 16 local government areas out of 38 showing GAM prevalence above 10 percent (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- Conflict remains a key driver of acute food insecurity across northeast and northwest Nigeria, with the security situation continuing its gradual yet steady deterioration due to escalating hostilities between non-state armed groups, criminality and intercommunal violence. With the end of the rainy season in September, violence is likely to experience a seasonal jump, disrupting food systems, limiting access to markets and creating new rounds of displacements (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- As of July 2022, 2.5 million people were displaced in northeast Nigeria, up from 2.2 million in December 2021, on top of another 1 million in the northwest and northcentral regions as of March 2022 (IOM, 2022a, 2022b).
- As of September 2022, food inflation was up by 23 percent year-on-year (Trading Economics, 2022a). Continuing currency weakness (Trading Economics, 2022b) and rising inflation (Trading Economics, 2022c) drove up food prices.

<sup>12</sup> The CH analysis coverage increased from 16 states and FCT to 21 states and FCT, representing respectively 107.6 million people and 159.1 million people, between the two periods. If comparing the same 16 states and FCT, the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) increased from 12.8 million in June–August 2021 to 14.9 million people in June–August 2022.

## Asia and the Middle East

## Afghanistan

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–November 2022



**45%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+

CRISIS (IPC 3)

**12.9**  
million

EMERGENCY (IPC 4)

**6** million



**+0.1 million**

OR 0.4% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

- From June to November 2022, during the harvest season, 18.9 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), of which 6 million people were expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (IPC, 2022).<sup>13</sup> While the current IPC projection shows no population facing starvation or a very high rate of mortality (IPC Phase 5), the scale of severe food insecurity suggests that loss of life may already be occurring (WFP and FAO, 2022). For the first time since its introduction in the country more than a decade ago, the IPC reported that 20 000 people were facing starvation (IPC Phase 5) during the last lean season (March–May 2022) in Ghor province in Afghanistan’s Central Highlands region (IPC, 2022). The protracted impact of forty years of war on food security and livelihoods is now aggravated by the economic crisis and continuing drought (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- A total of 4.7 million children and pregnant and lactating women are expected to be acutely malnourished in 2022, a 23 percent increase compared to 2021 (OCHA, 2022).
- While overall levels of conflict remain low in 2022 compared to previous years, localized clashes between de facto authorities and armed groups continue (ACLED, 2022) causing some displacement (HDX, 2022). Overall, 3.4 million people remain internally displaced as of June 2022 (UNHCR, 2022).
- The economic crisis in the aftermath of the withdrawal of international forces and freezing of national assets in 2021 persists (HRW, 2022) compounded with the impacts of the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, leading to high food prices. By July 2022, year-on-year food inflation stood at 24.9 percent amid rising fuel prices (Trading Economics, 2022; WFP and FAO, 2022).

<sup>13</sup> Peak number for 2022, as also reported in the Global Report on Food Crises 2022, is 22.8 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between November 2021 and March 2022.





- Almost 150 000 IDPs inside and outside camps were classified as moderately to severely food insecure in June 2022, as per WFP’s CARI methodology. This number is not directly comparable to 2021 numbers, which covered a large sample of IDPs and returnees, however, the prevalence remained stable (WFP, 2022).
- The humanitarian situation in Iraq is largely a legacy of the 2014–2017 conflict. In its aftermath, food insecurity challenges remain pervasive in particular among the 1.2 million IDPs and returnees (IOM, 2022). Long-standing tensions between rival armed factions could escalate into months-long hostilities, with impacts on domestic inflation and access to food (Davidson and Kadhum, 2022).
- Undernutrition is not a major public health concern in Iraq with GAM prevalence lower than 5 percent, although child and adolescent obesity is slowly rising (Global Nutrition Report, 2022).
- Iraq’s economy depends mainly on its oil production. Due to elevated global crude oil prices – amplified by the war in Ukraine – the economic outlook for the country is positive but remains vulnerable to shocks due to structural bottlenecks (World Bank, 2022).

## Myanmar

Acute food insecurity situation  
April–September 2021



**25%** of the population  
analysed acutely food insecure

ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE

**13.2** million

*As per WFP rCARI methodology (OCHA, 2021). No comparable data for 2022 published yet.*

- In 2021, 13.2 million people were acutely food insecure during the lean season, according to WFP's Remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (rCARI) methodology (OCHA, 2021). While there is no comparable data for 2022 published yet, food insecurity is likely to increase further due to increased level of conflict and the current economic crisis.
- The armed conflict, more recently in west (Rakhine) but also in the northwest, north (Kachin) and southeast areas of the country, has been escalating in 2022 provoking unprecedented levels of displacement (WFP and FAO, 2022). Since 1 February 2021, more than one million people have been newly displaced, with almost 800 000 displaced in 2022 alone (UNHCR, 2022; WFP, 2022a). In parallel, mass demonstrations and labour strikes crippled the economy.
- The military takeover triggered a significant, ongoing depreciation of the Myanmar Kyat, resulting in price spikes, including for food, agricultural inputs and fuel. The ripple effects of the war in Ukraine and global inflation have further fuelled this trend. In August, the cost of a basic food basket had increased 52 percent year-on-year (WFP, 2022b).

## Palestine

Acute food insecurity situation  
December 2020–January 2021



**31%** of the population  
analysed acutely food insecure

ACUTELY FOOD INSECURE

**1.8** million

*Based on Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey assessment (OCHA, 2021). No data for 2022 available.*

- One-third of the Palestinian population, or 1.8 million people, were acutely food insecure in early 2021 according to the latest Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey assessment (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022). Data for 2022 or trends were not available at the time of publication.
- Protracted conflict, in combination with economic stagnation, continues to pose serious challenges to the food security and nutrition situation. In Gaza, violence escalated in August 2022, and led to the destruction of buildings and displacement of several hundred families (WFP, 2022a). This has exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities and increased already high poverty, food insecurity and unemployment levels. Intermittent clashes and escalating violence in the West Bank, resulted in civilian casualties and deaths, and negatively impacted Palestinians' livelihoods (WFP, 2022b). The conflict led to very high humanitarian access constraints in the first half of 2022.
- The Palestine Authority was already facing a fiscal crisis (UNCTAD, 2022) and the economic conditions worsened due to the war in Ukraine, leading to a further erosion of the purchasing power of Palestinians and disruption of their access to food and other essential commodities (UNCTAD, 2022).

## Syrian Arab Republic (the)

Acute food insecurity situation  
October–November 2021



**55%** of the population  
analysed acutely food insecure



*As per WFP CARI methodology. No data for 2022 available.*

- In late 2021, 12 million Syrians were estimated to be food insecure, including 2.5 million severely food insecure people based on WFP’s CARI methodology (WFP, 2022a). The number of severely food insecure includes 1.8 million displaced people living in camps that are fully dependent on food assistance (WFP, 2022a).
- Although GAM prevalence is low (< 5 percent) (WHO, 2022), around 418 000 children are acutely malnourished and require urgent treatment, most of whom live in North-west and North-east (OCHA, 2022).
- The conflict has subsided over the last two years, while the humanitarian crisis has mainly been driven by the deteriorating economic environment and constrained agricultural production due to weather anomalies and drought-like conditions (World Bank, 2022; ECHO, 2022).
- Already feeble macroeconomic conditions have deteriorated at an accelerated pace since the start of the war in Ukraine. The Syrian pound has lost 23 percent of its value year-on-year as of August 2022 (WFP, 2022b). Currency depreciation, coupled with increased international food and energy prices, has boosted inflation of essential items, with food recording an 85 percent increase year-on-year in August (WFP, 2022b). A structural lack and high prices of inputs including fuel constrained crop yields in the 2021/22 agricultural season, on top of dry conditions.

## Yemen

Acute food insecurity situation  
June–December 2022



**60%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+



*To note: a new update was released when finalizing this report and after the cut-off date for incorporating in this issue. The results are available at <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156028/>*

*No comparable data for the same period of 2021 available. Compared to early 2022, the population facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) increased by 1.6 million or 9 percent.*

- Over 19 million people were projected to experience Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and December 2022 – including 7.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 161 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, 2022a).<sup>14</sup> Of greatest concern are the 161 000 people projected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between June and December 2022, while a Risk of Famine was issued in the districts of Abs and Hayran in Hajjah governorate, under a worst case-scenario (IPC, 2022b).
- These projections were based on assumptions that humanitarian assistance would significantly reduce due to insufficient funding, conflict would intensify, and domestic economic decline would deepen. Some assumptions were disproven: the conflict in Yemen eased considerably after parties agreed on a truce from April, which was extended until October. At the same time, funding for food assistance slightly improved and major cuts in the number of beneficiaries were prevented. In light of this changing context, the IPC analysis is being updated and the outlook on food-insecurity levels is expected to be less grim (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- Acute malnutrition remains a major concern with high GAM prevalence above 10 percent in 11 out of 15 areas assessed in the South, reaching 30 percent in Hodeidah Southern Lowlands (SMART, 2021). Approximately 2.2 million children under the age of five and about 1.3 million pregnant and lactating women are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022 (IPC, 2022a).
- Continued political instability, lack of external revenues, and elevated global commodity prices compounded the depletion of foreign exchange reserves, which underpins elevated currency volatility and affects the country's capacity to import essential items.
- Yemen was already facing an economic crisis prior to the war in Ukraine. This crisis was further amplified by a shortage of foreign currency reserves and led to a depreciation of the local currency – particularly in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government (CCY, 2022). Given Yemen's dependence on imports for access to essential goods, these instabilities and elevated global prices led to shortages of staple goods and soaring food prices – 42 higher year-on-year in September 2022 in the areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government and 27 percent higher in areas controlled by Sana'a based authorities (WFP, 2022).

<sup>14</sup> An IPC update was conducted and is pending release – this report is reflecting the results of the IPC published in February 2022.

## Latin America and the Caribbean

## Haiti

Acute food insecurity situation  
September 2022–February 2023



**48%** of the population  
analysed in IPC 3+



**+0.4 million**

OR 9% COMPARED TO SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR



- Almost half the population, or 4.7 million people, are facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above). Notably, close to 1.8 million are now in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), an increase of nearly half a million people, or 37 percent, compared to the same period last year (IPC, 2022).<sup>15</sup>
- An unprecedented 19 200 people in an urban neighbourhood in Port-au-Prince are in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and in urgent need of humanitarian support. Increased gang violence in this neighbourhood has led to a wave of displacement and meant that already vulnerable residents have lost access to drinking water, food, education and health services.
- Although the national GAM prevalence is low, pockets of high levels of acute malnutrition are likely because of the rapidly deteriorating food insecurity and the worsening cholera outbreak. Nutritional screening in Cité Soleil reported 20 percent proxy-GAM rates, above the emergency threshold (UNICEF, 2022).
- Amid a persistent political stalemate and growing protests, insecurity due to gang violence has intensified in 2022 – constraining business activities, curtailing fuel and food supplies, affecting prices, and hampering people’s access to markets and essential services (Da Rin, 2022). Insecurity has complicated road access from the capital to southern areas, and recently also to the north, hampering reconstruction efforts in areas affected by the 2021 earthquake, as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2022).
- Households continue to see their purchasing power erode, as the annual inflation rate is expected to register double-digit growth for the seventh-consecutive year (IMF, 2022), reaching an increase of 75 percent year-on-year in September 2022 (World Bank, 2022). This is due to several factors, including the continuous depreciation of the Haitian Gourde, high levels of insecurity, and elevated international food and fuel prices (WFP and FAO, 2022).

<sup>15</sup> Peak number for 2022, differs from peak reported in Global Report on Food Crises 2022, as released after publication.

## Section 2. Highlighted countries of concern

This section presents an in-depth analysis of how conflict and insecurity have recently resulted in severe increases in acute food insecurity in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Somalia and the Sudan.

In Ethiopia – where no IPC data has been available since 2021 – assessments show that, inside Tigray, the number of people in acute food insecurity increased by 14 percent during 2022; millions more were food insecure in Amhara and Afar regions.

In Myanmar, a total of 13.2 million people, over 24 percent of the total population, were estimated to be facing moderate or severe levels of acute food insecurity, as per WFP’s rCARI methodology in 2022.

In Somalia, Famine (IPC Phase 5) was most likely to occur among rural residents in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts, and among displaced people in Baidoa town of Bay region in southern Somalia, between October and December 2022.

The population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in the Sudan, through to February 2023, is expected to be 2 million more than in 2021.

There has been a sharp conflict-related deterioration in food insecurity in these four countries and territories, documented humanitarian access constraints in reaching food-insecure populations, and evidence of conflict-specific food-system damage. UNSC Resolution 2417 condemns both the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. The resolution calls on parties to conflicts to grant humanitarian access. It further provides the Security Council with options for responding to situations in which access is denied. The resolution also reminds all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians. It highlights that armed conflict, violations of international law and related food insecurity can also be drivers of displacement.

Resolution 2417 stresses that “...objects necessary for food production and distribution, such as farms, markets, water systems, mills, food processing and storage sites” must not be attacked and that “...objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets...and irrigation works”,<sup>16</sup> must not be destroyed, targeted or rendered useless.

The recent evolution of the situations in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Somalia and the Sudan is particularly worrying. This section seeks to contribute to the monitoring of the implementation of Resolution 2417 in these four countries and territories. It explores some of the effects of armed conflict on food security. It does this from the perspective of protecting both civilians and the objects that are indispensable for their survival, and that represent essential components of food systems. It also does this with regard to the challenges of securing safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access. All these aspects are addressed by Resolution 2417.

<sup>16</sup> UNSC Resolution 2417 (2018), adopted by the Security Council on 24 May 2018 (S/RES/2417), para. 1.

## Conflict-related impacts referenced in Resolution 2417

For each of these countries and territories of concern, three distinct conflict-related impacts referenced in Resolution 2417 are examined:

### Impact of conflict on population movement

Mass displacement due to conflict and conflict-induced hunger continues to proliferate in crises around the world. New and existing displacement remains a major concern in Ethiopia, Myanmar, Somalia and the Sudan. Although population movement is primarily linked to violence, the inability to provide food for family members is also a clear factor in displacement. Fighting has cut off many communities from infrastructure, transport routes and markets, leaving people food insecure – particularly during lean seasons. This phenomenon has accelerated population movements in all four countries and territories of concern.

### Impact of conflict on food systems

One of the most worrying aspects of contemporary conflicts is their impact on essential food systems and objects indispensable to the survival of civilian populations.<sup>17</sup> Farms, crops, grazing pastures, fisheries, irrigation systems, livestock, mills, and food processing and storage sites are all targeted with alarming regularity. Such actions are specifically referenced in Resolution 2417. They continue to be encountered by United Nations agencies in crises around the world, including in all four countries and territories of concern.

### Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians' ability to work

Humanitarian access remains one of the most critical issues affecting aid agencies operating in complex emergencies; it underpins Resolution 2417. As in so many other contexts, obstacles to reaching people in need are significant and contribute directly to food insecurity in each of the four countries and territories examined in this section. Furthermore, constantly shifting political and security landscapes are a major source of disruption for humanitarians in protracted conflicts. There is compelling evidence of interference and disruption faced by humanitarians in all four countries and territories of concern.

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<sup>17</sup> Objects indispensable to survival are non-exhaustively defined in article 54 of Additional Protocol I (applicable in international armed conflicts) and article 14 of Additional Protocol II (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as "...foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works."



## Ethiopia


### Acute food insecurity situation

In 2022



**20.4 million people**  
in need/targeted for humanitarian  
food and livelihood assistance

Source: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2022. *Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Plan, July 2022*. <https://tinyurl.com/yhkzbtw7u>



*This analysis provides an overview of how conflict and violence contributed to rising food insecurity between January and October 2022. This represents an update from the December 2021 edition of the report, in which Ethiopia was raised.*

### Acute food insecurity situation

- The recent escalation of conflict in parts of northern Ethiopia and other regions, in particular Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia, has driven a rapid increase in food insecurity, compounding the impact of an unprecedented fifth drought affecting eastern and southern regions.
- In 2022, the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) estimated that 20.4 million people were acutely food insecure across Ethiopia as a result of conflict and drought, an increase of 2.4 million compared to last year. Of these, more than 13 million people are in northern Ethiopia. Preliminary analysis for the mid-year review of the HRP indicates deteriorating food security in the country, particularly in the drought and conflict-affected regions. Multiple areas of the country face the potential for more extreme outcomes associated with high levels of acute malnutrition and hunger-related mortality (WFP and FAO, 2022). The drought alone contributes to 9.9 million of the total number of food-insecure people (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- The last IPC analysis was conducted in 2021 and projected that around 401 000 people in Tigray faced death and starvation (IPC Phase 5) between June and September 2021. A lack of updated IPC data is a major issue, and the most recent data does not ease concerns: WFP assessments based on WFP's CARI methodology show that the number of people in acute food insecurity inside Tigray increased from 4.6 million to 5.4 million between November 2021 and June 2022; 2.8 million people (47 percent) were severely acute food insecure (WFP and FAO, 2022). It is also estimated that nearly 200 000 people were food insecure in the Western Zone of Tigray region (WFP and FAO, 2022).
- In Amhara region, more than 7 million people are food insecure and require food assistance, while in Afar region nearly 1.3 million people are in need of emergency food assistance.
- The situation in parts of northern Ethiopia remains of highest concern. This is due to the high volatility of the context in the past months and the persistence of one or more drivers of severe food insecurity, which were also highlighted by the Famine Review Committee in 2021. Adherence to the recent ceasefire agreement, and its key provisions on restoration of services and humanitarian access, are key to avoiding a further deterioration in Tigray. This is especially the case after heavy fighting since late August, restrictions on humanitarian assistance and low availability of commercial goods and services (OCHA, 2022). In addition, concerns over severe levels of acute food insecurity in Amhara, Afar, Somali and Oromia regions remain high due to continued drought, insecurity and conflict.

### Overview of conflict impact on food security

Northern Ethiopia, particularly Tigray, has witnessed widespread and severe conflict-induced food insecurity.

A “humanitarian truce” between March and August in northern Ethiopia allowed assistance to reach over 8 million people in need. However, the conflict between the Tigrayan forces and the Ethiopian National Defence Force – supported by regional security forces, local militias and Eritrean forces – resumed along several frontlines between August and November 2022 (International Crisis Group, 2022).

The impact of renewed fighting in this period has compounded the effects of nearly two years of conflict, raising concern about a potential further deterioration of already extreme levels of food insecurity. In a welcome development, on 2 November 2022, the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front signed an agreement for “a permanent cessation of hostilities”, after talks led by the African Union in South Africa. The joint agreement includes the resumption of unhindered humanitarian access, restoration of basic services and infrastructure, and reconciliation, in return for rapid disarmament of the Tigrayan forces and an interim regional administration (African Union, 2022). However, not all parties to the conflict are explicitly mentioned in the agreement or are parties to the agreement.

In other regions of Ethiopia, particularly Oromia, conflict has escalated in 2022, with reports of hundreds of civilians being killed in southwest Oromia between June and August 2022 (OHCHR, 2022; ACLED, 2022).

### Impact of conflict on population movement

In northern Ethiopia, conflict intensity significantly reduced during the short-lived “humanitarian truce” from March to August, resulting in low conflict-related displacement. Irregular population movement and displacement, however, continued, as many households searched for food and non-food resources (FEWS NET, 2022). New waves of displacement, in many cases secondary displacement, were recorded during hostilities between August and November which also lead to injuries and loss of life among civilians and destruction of their assets (OCHA, 2022).

Since the end of August 2022, hundreds of thousands of people in Tigray, Amhara and Afar have been newly displaced, with some being secondary displacements (OCHA, 2022). However, the exact number of displaced people is unclear because of access constraints, including the lack of telecommunication services in rural areas. Close to 40 000 people in Aba’la and Berhale woredas in Afar are estimated to be newly displaced due to the wave of hostilities before the November ceasefire, according to local authorities. In Amhara region, following the improvement of the security situation in North Wollo Zone, close to 100 000 people were displaced when hostilities erupted in late August. Regional authorities reported 210 000 displaced across northwestern Tigray as a result of clashes (OCHA, 2022; ACAPS, 2022).

United Nations investigations have identified that since the conflict began in late 2020, obligations under international humanitarian law to distinguish at all times between military and civilian objectives have not been met. There have also been violations of the principle of precaution, which demands constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects in the conduct of military operations (OHCHR, 2022).

In addition to internal displacement, refugee movements to the Sudan have been reported by media (Dabanga, 2022). Elsewhere in Ethiopia, high levels of violence continue to cause large-scale

displacements. In Oromia region, more than 400 000 people have been displaced across East, West, Horo Guduru, Kelem Wollega and West Showa zones, according to zonal authorities (UNFPA, 2022). As of 17 October, ongoing hostilities, particularly in the Wollega zones in Oromia, continued to lead to displacements into Amhara region (OCHA, 2022).

### Impact of the conflict on food systems

Before the conflict, the food system fed and supported the livelihoods of the vast majority of Tigray's population. The escalation of fighting prior to the November ceasefire compounded the grave impact of two years of conflict – including looting and the destruction of agricultural livelihoods in Tigray but also in neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions – amid a general deterioration of the macroeconomic situation.

During 2022, commercial supplies into Tigray remained severely restricted and insufficient, and banking, electricity, internet and telecommunication services continued to be disconnected from the rest of the country. United Nations investigations identified that, in addition to the shutting down of electricity, banking and internet, the obstruction of the import of cash, fuel and commercial goods into Tigray led to an extreme shortage of agricultural equipment and food, among other supplies. The combined effect of these measures, which are still in place, has forced much of the population in Tigray to eat less and to sell harvest and reproductive livestock, thereby increasing food insecurity (OHCHR, 2022). Referring to these obstructions, United Nations experts concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that these measures were designed to systematically deprive the civilian population of services indispensable to survival, including food (OHCHR, 2022).

Additionally, seasonal labour migration, which is a critical source of income, has remained severely curtailed due to insecurity. Food prices have remained exceptionally high, while people's purchasing power is extremely limited, having a direct impact on people's limited diets (OCHA, 2022; FEWS NET, 2022). This comes on top of the severe impact the conflict has already had on livelihoods, in particular the "destruction of farmland, compounded with reports of significant looting and destruction of existing food stocks, [which] led to a situation where an estimated 1.3 million ha of crops were damaged" since the beginning of the conflict (WFP, 2022). The severity of the impact of the conflict on livelihoods has also been confirmed by the United Nations, which noted "that there are reasonable grounds to believe that some parties to the conflict have systematically looted and destroyed objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population in both Tigray, Afar and Amhara (United Nations, 2022).

The situation in conflict-affected areas in Amhara and Afar also remains dire. While market supplies are reportedly improving as trade routes open in Amhara, households' ability to purchase food remains limited. In Afar, the large-scale loss of livestock has resulted in extremely low access to income and food (FEWS NET, 2022).

The conflict continues to severely destabilize Ethiopia's macroeconomic situation, leading to price hikes and shortages of goods. The Ethiopian birr (ETB) continues to depreciate, with 52.8 ETB to the US dollar in October 2022 compared to 49 ETB in January 2022 (Trading Economics, 2022). In an effort to stabilize the birr and increase foreign currency reserves, on 19 October 2022 the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance ordered banks to restrict the use of foreign currency to the import of essential items (Africa News, 2022). As a result, inflation remains high – especially for food. While food inflation decreased slightly in October 2022 compared to its peak of 43.9 percent in May 2022, it remains high at 31 percent – 10 percent higher than before the beginning of the conflict (Trading Economics, 2022). Increasing costs of fuel imports in particular, combined with the removal of subsidies and

insecurity, are causing higher transportation costs, which in turn drives up food prices (FEWS NET, 2022). The recent ceasefire is likely to unblock delays in negotiations over the IMF-led programme to restructure Ethiopia's growing debt (United Nations Development Programme, 2022), which has added further pressure to the macroeconomic crisis (Reuters, 2022).

### Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians' ability to work

United Nations investigations have identified that the denial and obstruction of humanitarian access to the Tigray region has been used as a method of warfare to starve civilian populations (OHCHR, 2022).

Humanitarian access to Tigray has been only intermittently allowed since the December 2021 edition of this report. Up to April 2022, the situation was so severe that OCHA referred to it as a "de facto blockade" (OHCHR, 2022). Despite restrictions being eased during the humanitarian truce between April and late August 2022, access remained constrained by bureaucratic impediments; this included limits imposed on the amount of cash authorized for humanitarian actors entering Tigray, and delays in clearances for convoys and for delivering fuel stock. With the inability to bring in sufficient and sustained levels of humanitarian supplies, cash and fuel, and with limited access to people in hard-to-reach areas, the humanitarian situation – including food insecurity in northern Ethiopia – worsened before the November ceasefire (OCHA, 2022).

With the resumption of conflict in late August 2022, humanitarian access was again stalled due to insecurity – adding to ongoing bureaucratic impediments. Relief-convoy movements – either by air or road – into Tigray remained at a complete standstill, with flights of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service suspended pending clearance. Humanitarian actors were not able to mobilize any cash to support relief operations, while lack of fuel impacted their ability to deliver much-needed aid to the population. In addition, the theft of WFP fuel stocks in August 2022 impacted operations (WFP, 2022). In several instances in northern Ethiopia, humanitarian actors' vehicles and fuel were seized by parties to the conflict. Partners were forced to suspend operations (OCHA, 2022).

Since mid-2021, humanitarian operations have been seriously impacted by measures that have completely disconnected the Tigray region from the rest of the country, including the shutting down of the electricity, internet and telecommunications, and banking services (OCHA, 2022).

The 2 November 2022 peace agreement, and a permanent cessation of hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, is a positive and welcome development. This includes the fact that its terms include the provision of unhindered humanitarian access, protection of civilians, and restoration of basic services and infrastructure. It is hoped that this will improve the situation and help to address recent challenges faced in Tigray.

Despite this development in northern Ethiopia, access constraints remain high in other parts of the country, due to conflict. For example, humanitarian actors were temporarily unable to reach those in need in Afar during September, due to the intensity of hostilities (OCHA, 2022). In Benishangul Gumuz region, access to Kamashi Zone remains blocked due to ongoing hostilities in western Oromia, which is the main route for the delivery of supplies, leaving people affected by violence without assistance (OCHA, 2022).

In 2022, Ethiopia has been classified among 15 countries worldwide where constraints to humanitarian access are “very high” (ACAPS, 2022).

## Myanmar

### Deteriorating food security situation

In 2022



**13.2 million people**  
estimated to be facing moderate or severe food insecurity in December 2021



**+1 million people**  
newly displaced since February 2021, of whom **800 000 displaced in 2022**

### Overview of conflict impact on food security and population movement

Since February 2021, armed conflict and organized violence have escalated across the country, compounded by a severe economic crisis. Violence further intensified from September 2021 onwards; in particular, violence spread through areas in the southeast and northwest, and more recently in northern and central Rakhine. Conflict has led to unprecedented levels of population displacement, which is particularly affecting the northwest and southeast. Since 1 February 2021, over 1 million people have been newly displaced, around 77 percent of the total 1 443 000 IDPs in the country (UNHCR, 2022). In addition, 48 800 people have been displaced to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2022). As of 31 October, almost 800 000 people have been displaced in 2022 alone (UNHCR, 2022). In addition, parties to the conflict have deployed landmines and hidden improvised explosive devices (IEDs), killing and injuring individuals (OCHA, 2022). Displacement occurs in rural areas, where 70 percent of the population relies on agriculture. Overall, armed conflict has led to the destruction of civilian properties, particularly homes and livelihood assets. The direct and indirect impact of the conflict has contributed to large numbers of people needing humanitarian assistance. A total of 13.2 million people, over 24 percent of the total population, were estimated to be facing moderate or severe food insecurity as per WFP’s rCARI in 2021 (OCHA, 2021). No data are available for Myanmar in 2022.

### Impact of the conflict on food systems

The escalation of conflict and the economic fallout of the military takeover in February 2021, compounding the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, have resulted in price hikes and a decline in food production. This has reduced people’s access to food, especially among agriculture-dependent communities.

The significant depreciation of the Myanmar Kyat resulted in increased import prices, including for fuel and other inputs critical to production. In addition, anti-coup strikes in banking, transport and logistics, and the public sector have caused disruptions of almost all imports and exports and trade within the country, especially in 2021. The resulting commercial shortages have led to further price surges for key commodities across the country, including for basic food commodities, agricultural inputs and fuel.

The high cost of agricultural inputs has resulted in a decline in food production (International Food Insecurity Research Institute, 2021), further driving up food prices (FAO, 2022). In 2022, 54 percent of

farmers expect a drop in their harvest, up from 45 percent in 2021. Furthermore, 47 percent of livestock keepers reported a decrease in their livestock assets, and 54 percent reported that they are facing increasing challenges in accessing animal feed. Steep price hikes, combined with job and income losses, mean many families can no longer afford enough food to eat and are slipping into food insecurity for the first time. As a result, almost one in two people are expected to be living in poverty in 2022 (International Food Insecurity Research Institute, 2021). The use of negative coping mechanisms continues to be high. Overall, 53 percent of households relied on crisis and emergency-level coping mechanisms; the proportion of households relying on emergency strategies has increased from 15 percent in 2021 to 21 percent in 2022 (WFP and FAO, 2022).

Violence and, in particular, rapid large-scale displacement, are posing an enormous threat to the livelihoods and food security of agriculture-dependent communities; these represent nearly 70 percent of the population. In 2021, 24 percent of farmers reduced the size of their planted areas and 18 percent reported a reduction in expected harvest. At the same time, incomes, especially of smallholder farmers, have declined sharply due to movement restrictions and displacement preventing agricultural production. In addition, the near paralysis of the banking sector, including of microfinance institutions widely used in the agricultural sector, have resulted in widespread limits on cash and loan availability, impacting in particular cash-constrained smallholder farmers (United States Department of Agriculture and Global Agricultural Information Network, 2021).

#### **Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians' ability to work**

Myanmar has shown a marked deterioration in humanitarian access, with a ranking of “extreme” regarding access constraints for humanitarian actors in 2021 and 2022. Myanmar also recorded the second-highest number of aid workers killed in the first half of 2022, and the third highest number of both aid workers injured and incidents of looting of humanitarian assets (ACAPS, 2022).

Ongoing armed clashes in parts of the country have resulted in a range of access constraints, impacting humanitarian operations and restricting people in need from accessing assistance. Movement restrictions, tightened bureaucratic requirements, roadblocks and checkpoints have caused delays and disruptions of humanitarian operations and the distribution of aid across the country, especially in the southeast, northwest and Rakhine. During 2022, access to affected people has been heavily constrained by new security measures and attempts to introduce parallel travel authorization processes by armed groups (OCHA, 2022). The de facto authorities in Rakhine state imposed temporary restrictions on the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations delivering assistance to several townships on 15 September, causing shortages of food, shelter and other relief items. As of 27 October, these restrictions are still in place.


Disruptions of basic operations of the State across the country, due to strikes, have also hampered humanitarian operations. Interruptions in the banking system have left humanitarian agencies periodically unable to issue payments for staff, purchase goods and distribute cash to beneficiaries (International Federation of the Red Cross, 2022).

## Somalia

### Acute food insecurity situation




Current | June–September 2022

**4.3 million people in IPC 3+**  
26 percent of the population analysed facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action



Projected | October–December 2022

**6.7 million people in IPC 3+**  
41 percent of the population analysed facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action



#### Map key – IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

- 1 – Minimal
- 2 – Stressed
- 3 – Crisis
- 4 – Emergency
- 5 – Famine
- Not analysed
- Urban settlement
- ▲ IDP/other settlement classification
- ⊞ At least 25 percent of households meet 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance
- ⊞ At least 25 percent of households meet over 50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

Source: IPC. 2022. *Multipartner technical release on Somalia 2022 post-Gu assessment and IPC analysis results*, 12 September 2022. <https://tinyurl.com/mwxb7kb7>

*This part provides an overview on how conflict and violence have contributed to rising food insecurity through different pathways in Somalia, focusing specifically on events from 2021 onwards.*

### Acute food insecurity situation

- Somalia has been witnessing a sharp increase in acute food insecurity since 2020, with significantly more people falling into acute hunger and a deepening severity in their food insecurity, reaching critical levels in 2022 (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).
- Famine (IPC Phase 5) will most likely occur among rural residents in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts, and among displaced people in Baidoa town of Bay region, between October and December 2022, without a sustained increase in humanitarian assistance. Several other areas of central and southern Somalia are projected to face an increased risk of famine between October and December, where malnutrition and mortality levels are already at alarming levels (IPC, 2022).
- Overall, between October and December 2022, 6.7 million people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Conflict, which is inducing displacement, disrupting crop production and constraining humanitarian operations, is one of the key drivers of acute food insecurity, together with drought and price increases (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

### Overview of conflict impact on food security

The long-running armed conflict between the Government of Somalia and Al-Shabaab (Geneva Academy, 2022), as well as the conflict driven by inter-clan rivalry, is a key driver of food insecurity, especially in central and southern Somalia (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022). Conflict is forcing populations to move, disrupting market access and functionality, and creating impediments to production and people's access to natural resources, livelihoods and assets (IPC, 2022); this is in addition to restricting access to humanitarian assistance.

Al-Shabaab remains a primary security threat, particularly for civilians, as the group employs indiscriminate weapons, including IEDs, and other tactics to instil fear among local populations. Sophisticated extortion and "taxation" systems on civilians are also used (OHCHR, 2021). In the last two years, the United Nations Secretary-General's various reports on the situation in Somalia have identified Al-Shabaab as the main perpetrator of grave violations of international humanitarian law, including indiscriminate and targeted attacks, civilian casualties and gross violations against children (United Nations Secretary-General [UNSG], 2022). These are all driving factors of displacement and thereby have important repercussions on food insecurity.

In 2021, delayed national elections led to several waves of political violence and new displacement, while Al-Shabaab has been constantly increasing its areas of control and frequency of attacks. High levels of armed conflict increased by 10 percent in 2021, compared to 2020 (ACLED, 2022), and levels of conflict remain high in 2022 (ACLED, 2022). For example, between February and 6 May 2022, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia recorded 428 civilian casualties (167 killed and 261 injured) – a 134 percent increase compared with the 183 civilian casualties recorded during the



previous period. As in 2021, Al-Shabaab remained the main perpetrator, responsible for 325 civilian casualties (76 percent) (UNSG, 2022).

The ongoing offensive against Al-Shabaab by the Somali National Army risks causing new spikes in insecurity in the months ahead, including destruction of civilians' assets and properties, and further displacement and fatalities. As a result, humanitarian access is likely to deteriorate further.

### Impact on population movement

Displaced people are particularly exposed to hunger as they lose access to livelihoods, assets and income-generating activities. In areas where agriculture is labour-intensive, forced displacement has severe effects on agricultural production, affecting the availability of food and causing food insecurity.

Political violence around elections and attacks by Al-Shabaab, chronic conflict between clans and associated clan militias, and border conflicts between Puntland and Somaliland, have been key drivers of displacement in Somalia over the last two years, particularly in 2021 (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022).

In 2021, heightened political tensions – in the context of a delayed electoral process and power struggles – erupted into several waves of armed violence. This led to parallel waves of displacement, especially in the first half of the year. At the same time, the electoral process led to increased Al-Shabaab attacks, mainly in locations hosting parliamentary elections (UNSG, 2022). Attacks against civilians by Al-Shabaab, as well as clashes with federal and regional armed forces or local militias, induced significant displacement (OCHA, 2021). Conflict was the main driver of displacement in 2021, displacing twice the number of people as drought. As of September 2022, 3 million people across the country had been displaced by conflict, including 538 000 newly displaced people; 544 000 new displacements occurred in 2021; the latter represents a 124 percent increase compared to 2020 (UNHCR, 2022). In April 2021, around 207 000 people were displaced during armed clashes in Mogadishu between security forces loyal to the opposition and pro-government forces (OCHA, 2021). In 2022, while drought-related displacement spiked to almost 1 million people, conflict nevertheless remained the second principal driver of displacement, accounting for over 400 000 newly displaced people (UNHCR, 2022).

### Impact of conflict on food systems

Agriculture accounts for up to 75 percent of Somalia's gross domestic product (World Bank, 2018), and employs 80 percent of the population (World Bank, 2021). This is especially the case in rural areas, including in central and southern Somalia where Al-Shabaab is active and election-related violence spiked in 2021 (Critical Threats, 2022). Conflict-induced displacement has resulted in the abandonment of agricultural land and livelihoods, and led to reduced production, compounding climate-induced agricultural output shortfalls. Additionally, due to conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali armed forces, farmers suspended cropping activities in areas like Lower and Middle Juba riverine areas, where better rainfall meant cropping conditions were slightly improved. In 2021, election-related conflict coincided with the *Gu* planting season in southcentral Somalia, reducing farmers' access to agricultural land, suspending cropping activities and disrupting the planting of sorghum cereal which makes up a considerable portion of the caloric intake of Somali people. Sorghum-cereal plantation is particularly important in 2021, given that it is one of the most drought-tolerant cereals produced in Somalia (FEWS NET, 2021).

The important role of agriculture as a livelihood source in Somalia renders seeds, livestock, water sources, pastures, tools and other equipment critical targets for armed actors. This has resulted in the

looting and destruction of agricultural assets and the illegal taxation of products (FEWS NET, 2021), putting additional pressure on households' already strained purchasing capacity, and hampering food and market access. This trend is likely to exacerbate as a result of the ongoing drought. Many areas in the Bay region that are worst affected by the drought, and where IPC 5 populations have been identified, are under Al-Shabaab control, which is likely to hamper famine-prevention operations (The New Humanitarian, 2022).

Al-Shabaab directly controls large swathes of the country, including key agricultural areas, and uses agriculture to generate local support and subservience. In addition, the group has destroyed and/or looted farmers, food transport and markets in order to extort control over clans and their communities, in particular to force them to pay illegal taxes (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022). In August 2022, Al-Shabaab militants burned and destroyed houses and a water-source borehole belonging to civilians from the Hawadle clan in Bukure village near Maxaas town (Bulo Burto, Hiraan) (ACLED, 2022). On 3 September 2022, Al-Shabaab ambushed and burned eight commercial vehicles carrying food and livestock in the vicinity of Afar Irdood village (Bulo Burto, Hiraan), killing 19 people (ACLED, 2022). In another instance, Al-Shabaab militants burned several houses, farm machinery and crops belonging to locals in Mareerey village (Balcad, Middle Shabelle) (ACLED, 2022).

Al-Shabaab has imposed siege-like conditions in some government-held towns in Hirshabelle, Jubaland and South West states, hindering overall access to the area and affecting access to humanitarian aid and commercial supplies (UNSC, 2021).

Militants reportedly torch all goods that traders try to take into besieged towns, or kill both the men and the donkeys used for transporting the goods. As a result, imported and local cereal prices have risen to record highs (FEWS NET, 2022).

Insecurity, armed conflict and the associated increase in extortion payments at illegal roadblocks are anticipated to continue to disrupt population movement, including labour and livestock migration, and trade (FEWS NET, 2021). For example, armed conflict between non-state armed groups and Somali armed forces in June 2022 forced farmers to suspend cropping activities in Jamame and Kismayo districts (FEWS NET, 2021). Insecurity and subsequent suspensions of Mogadishu port and airport operations have (FEWS NET, 2022) led to movement restrictions, disrupted imports and domestic supply chains, reduced the availability of basic commodities, and contributed to high commodity prices (OCHA, 2022).

Illegal taxation and confiscation of assets, widely practised by Al-Shabaab but also by other armed actors, is leading to localized food price increases, as traders are forced to increase travel distances to avoid roadblocks or illegal tax payments, especially to urban markets (FEWS NET, 2022). This practice is not only increasing prices, but also acts as a disincentive for farmers to produce crops. Al-Shabaab controls the main supply routes in Berdale, Diinsoor, Qansax Dheere and Xudor in Bay region (OCHA, 2021); it also levies taxes on goods at checkpoints throughout central and southern Somalia (UNSC, 2021). Market inaccessibility and taxation on farming communities enforced by al-Shabaab constrain farmers' ability to sell their produce and make a profit (FAO, 2021). The restrictions also reduce farming incentives and force those who cannot afford to pay the taxes on the goods to abandon farming (UNSC, 2020). In addition, clan-based conflicts over natural resources and land ownership in Galgaduud, Hiraan, Lower Shabelle and Mudug regions have resurfaced (FEWS NET, 2022), especially in areas affected by the ongoing drought. These conflicts will likely result in violence against civilians and will intermittently disrupt trade, population and livestock movements, and agricultural activities.

### Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarianists' ability to work

Somalia is one of 15 countries worldwide where constraints to humanitarian access in 2022 are deemed “very high”. In 2021, amid a deterioration of humanitarian access, Somalia was described as a “crisis with extreme constraints”, especially constraints resulting directly from conflict (ACAPS, 2021; ACAPS, 2022). These include movement restrictions within the country, interference by armed actors in the implementation of humanitarian response, and ongoing hostilities and insecurity (ACAPS, 2022). As a result, the ability of humanitarianists to reach people in need and to sustain operations has been constrained, and people’s ability to access basic services and life-saving assistance impeded.

Humanitarian operations in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas are hampered by hostilities, movement restrictions, poor infrastructure, and interference in aid delivery (UNSC, 2021). In June 2022, almost 900 000 people were estimated to be living within territory controlled by Al-Shabaab and remained difficult to reach (UNSC, 2022). This is a significant increase of the group’s reach compared to October 2021, when just over half a million people were estimated to be in areas it controlled (OCHA, 2021).

Siege-like conditions imposed on some population centres by Al-Shabaab have a significant impact on humanitarian operations. In addition, in some government-held towns in Hirshabelle, South West State and Jubbaland state, Al Shabaab continues to hinder the transport of humanitarian and commercial supplies. Humanitarian organizations are limited to the use of air transport to gain access to the towns, which significantly increases the cost of humanitarian activities (UNSC, 2020). While access to areas under the control of the Federal Government and allied non-state armed groups remains largely possible, this is hampered by ongoing insecurity, including the presence of IEDs along key supply routes (OCHA, 2021).

Outside of major urban centres, accessibility to some districts, particularly in southern and central regions, remains limited, largely due to insecurity along main supply routes (OCHA, 2021). Security checkpoints and unauthorized checkpoints along all major access roads in southern and central Somalia hinder safe, timely and unimpeded access (OCHA, 2021).


Territorial control by loosely allied groups shifts regularly, and chains of command and control are not always clear. This makes the operational environment complex and challenging. This complexity is driven by a multiplicity of local armed actors with varying command structures and geographical presence, rapidly changing national and regional forces, and the presence of various bilateral support missions and the African Union Mission to Somalia troops, alongside regional interventions. Establishing and maintaining relations with those who have an influence over humanitarian access is therefore challenging and uncertain. In addition, clan competition for the control of resources associated with humanitarian activities obstructs the implementation of principled humanitarian work, occasionally leading to violence and the suspension of programmes (OCHA, 2021).

The presence of non-state armed groups across parts of Jubaland, South West State, Hirshabelle, Galmudug and Puntland limits the ability of humanitarian partners to assess needs and deliver assistance in rural areas. It also restricts the ability of civilians to safely seek assistance. Violence against aid workers – including abduction and arrest, harassment, forcible seizure of assets and restrictions on road movements – by parties to conflict continues to obstruct the ability of humanitarian actors to reach people in need. A total of 194 access incidents were documented in 2021, the majority in the first half of 2021 and in southern and central Somalia. In these incidents, one humanitarian worker was killed, seven injured, one abducted and six detained (OCHA, 2021). While the reduced trend of incidents, which started in July 2021, continued in the first quarter of 2022, humanitarian access remains challenging (OCHA, 2022). While ongoing military operations against al-Shabaab reduced the group’s territorial control in September and October (Voice of America, 2022), the drought response is likely to still face access challenges in worst-affected areas and where Al-Shabaab remains in control.


# Sudan (the)

## Acute food insecurity situation

First projection | June–September 2022



Second projection | October 2022–February 2023



### Map key – IPC acute food insecurity phase classification



Source: IPC. 2022. *IPC snapshot, April 2022–February 2023*. <https://tinyurl.com/2fthu6ad>

*This part provides an overview on how conflict and violence have contributed to rising food insecurity through different pathways in the Sudan, focusing specifically on events from 2020 onwards.*

## Acute food-insecurity situation

- The food crisis across the Sudan has grown increasingly severe in the past few years. According to WFP’s Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA) – conducted the first quarter of 2022 – 34 percent of resident households, amounting to over 15 million people, are classified as food insecure. This is an increase of 7 percent compared to the same period in 2021, and higher than the past few years (WFP, 2022).

- IPC analysis similarly indicates a worsening food security situation, from 9.6 million in 2020 to 11.7 million people projected to be in IPC Phase 3 and above from June to September 2022 (IPC, 2022).
- Conflict and violence, along with a macroeconomic crisis, are key drivers of rising acute hunger. Acute food insecurity has deepened, particularly in violence hotspots; these include the Darfur region, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where violence and armed conflict have escalated to since 2020.
- During the harvest season (October–February 2023), when food availability improves, the number of people expected to be facing Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) is still almost 2 million more compared to last year (WFP and FAO, 2022).

### Overview of impact of conflict on food security

Food insecurity is worsening and hunger has been deepening across most Sudanese states. This is particularly the case in states where violence and armed conflict have flared up over the past three years: the Darfur region, South Kordofan and Blue Nile (UNSG, 2022). By June 2022, the highest prevalence of food insecurity throughout the Sudan was found in these states (WFP, 2022). CFSVA and IPC analysis indicate that West Darfur, Central Darfur, North Darfur and Blue Nile states have the highest prevalence of food insecurity and thus people in need of food assistance (IPC, 2022).

Despite some progress, the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) between the Government of the Sudan and several opposition groups has not yet resulted in the desired outcome. Multiple national and regional factors, including perceived lack of representation, continue to hamper implementation of the agreement. The root causes of the conflicts remain unaddressed; in addition, the political crisis – since the civilian-military-led transition derailed in 2021 – exacerbates local tensions (UNSC, 2022).

Darfur has witnessed intercommunal armed violence, over land access, and disputes between settled farmers and pastoralists or nomad communities. Some of this is reportedly with the involvement of Rapid Support Forces supporting militias of their tribespeople (UNSC, 2022), of Sudanese security forces, and of individuals affiliated with armed group signatories of the JPA (UNSC, 2022). West Darfur has been particularly affected by this violence, including Jebel Moon, Kireinik, Kulbus and Mornei localities (UNSC, 2022). Armed clashes have occurred in North Darfur between non-JPA signatory groups (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) and the Sudanese Armed Forces. Land disputes and issues of political representation sparked intercommunal violence in Blue Nile State between Berti and Hausa communities (UNSC, 2022; International Crisis Group, 2022). Hausa communities have been displaced to neighbouring states, including White Nile and Sennar, which might trigger future land-related tensions with host communities in those states. These displacements in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states have restricted farmers' ability to farm or work as agricultural labourers, thereby compromising food production and food availability during the upcoming harvest period.

Growing competition over resources and land ownership, triggered by cattle raiding, sparked intercommunal violence in South and West Kordofan, in addition to violence between communities and non-JPA signatory armed groups (OCHA, 2022).

### Impact of conflict on population movement

Internal displacement is closely linked to acute hunger. People who are internally displaced are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity due to loss of livelihoods, and reduced access to assets and income-generating activities. According to the Food Security Monitoring System, conducted by WFP in

the first quarter of 2022, 59 percent of IDP households were food insecure during the first quarter of 2022. Currently, people displaced by conflict and violence are concentrated in Darfur's states, which host 85 percent of the total displaced people, many of whom are long-term IDPs (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022). At the same time, the highest caseload of people facing emergency levels of food insecurity are concentrated within the wider Darfur region (IPC, 2022). CFSVA and IPC analysis identifies that the most food-insecure people are new and existing IDPs, followed by returnees and refugees (IPC, 2022).

Of the over 3 million Sudanese who are today IDPs, the vast majority fled from armed conflict or communal clashes, according to United Nations and international non-governmental organization assessments (UNHCR, 2022; IOM, 2022). As of July 2022, the United Nations counts 3.7 million people in Sudan as displaced (UNHCR, 2022).

Waves of violence and of displacements go hand in hand. The number of IDPs has increased significantly since 2021, due to increased violence and conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan, White Nile and Blue Nile (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022). Recorded violent incidents and fatalities across the Darfur region almost doubled in 2021 compared to the year before. West Darfur was particularly affected, with incidents in 2021 more than double compared to 2020 (ACLEDA, 2022). Similar trends exist in Blue Nile and the Kordofan region. In parallel, the number of IDPs fleeing from armed conflict or communal clashes has increased, rising from 1.8 million in January 2020 to 3.7 million in July 2022 (UNHCR, 2022).

This trend is continuing. As of September 2022, violence levels are already higher compared to the same time last year. In Blue Nile, violent incidents between January and September 2022 are already double those in 2021, and almost six times than in 2020. Trends in Kordofan follow similar patterns. Between January and September 2022, intercommunal conflicts and armed attacks caused the displacement of 211 133 people, including 93 779 in West Darfur, 64 814 in Blue Nile and 7 478 in West Kordofan (OCHA, 2022). By July 2022, almost the entire displaced population of the Sudan was concentrated across the four Darfur states (82 percent), South Kordofan (6 percent) and Blue Nile (4 percent). Since then, violence and displacement has significantly worsened in Blue Nile.

### Impact of conflict on food systems

Violence and armed conflict, in combination with erratic rainfalls, have had a severe impact on the agriculture sector and contributed to poor harvests and crop-production shortfalls in recent years. The total production of the main cereal crops in the 2021/22 agricultural season – coinciding with an increase in levels of violence across Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile – is estimated at 35 percent below the previous season's production, and 30 percent lower than the five-year average (WFP, 2022). Where agriculture is rainfed and labour intensive (traditional rainfed sector) – mostly in Greater Darfur region and in most of the Great Kordofan region (FAO, 2022) – the area planted with millet was more than 21 percent lower in 2021/22 compared to the previous season. In Greater Kordofan region, crop production in 2021/22 was reduced by half compared to the previous year (FAO, 2022). It is worth noting that most of the IDPs in the Darfur and Kordofan regions were farmers or were directly engaged in agricultural production in one way or another in their original areas (FEWS NET, 2011). Therefore, population movements due to conflicts had an adverse impact on the existing livelihood sources and food systems in those regions, and in the displacement areas.

In Sudan, over 60 percent of the population engage in agriculture (FAO, 2022). Clashes and insecurity caused disruptions to cultivation, as people were displaced or lost access to farming land (FEWS NET, 2022). In east Darfur alone, over 1 000 farms were destroyed due to conflict in 2021 (OCHA, 2021). The clashes across Darfur led to significant livelihood asset losses, including livestock and household food stocks, and caused widespread disruption to agricultural livelihoods, including the cultivation of

the main summer crops; this resulted in limited agricultural labour opportunities (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022; IPC, 2022). The loss of typical food and income-generating activities means people are more reliant on markets for accessing food, which makes them more vulnerable to increases in food prices; this in turn affects their food security (FEWS NET, 2022).

In the Darfur states, recent assessments highlight that insecurity and conflict continue to restrict people's access to farmlands, specifically displaced people. The impact on the 2022 planting season raises concerns about the upcoming harvest. The Panel of Expert's findings highlight some violent local dynamics around access to land, dispossession and return. The panel stresses, for example, that in 2021 numerous attacks by armed groups on IDPs – engaging in farming activities outside the camps – were reported in North Darfur. Additionally, displaced people who returned to their land to farm were forced into “unfavourable arrangements” by armed nomadic pastoralists, under which they were allowed access to the land in return for part of the harvested crops. These incidents contributed to poor harvests and household-level food insecurity (UNSC, 2022).

Outbreaks of cyclical violence were characterized by attacks against villages, resulting in the loss of lives and properties. The United Nations Sanctions Committee highlights that assaults and destruction of property and crops during the harvest season have exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation (UNSC, 2022).

In 2022, market activities and trade flows have been reduced by clashes and conflict (Global Protection Cluster, 2022). In South Kordofan, attacks against traders and trucks have increased in frequency on roads from Kadugli to other towns, affecting access to markets (FAO, 2022). Insecurity has caused delays in the transportation of crops to markets (FAO, 2022).

The presence of landmines or explosive remnants of war (ERW) inhibits agricultural production and economic activities, cutting off access to markets and farmlands. Communities are affected in all Darfur states, in South and West Kordofan and in Blue Nile (Global Protection Cluster, 2022). Blue Nile is the state with the second-highest contamination of landmines and ERW, with Kurmuk, Geissan and Bau localities particularly affected (United Nations Mine Action Service, 2022).

### Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarian workers' ability to work

The Sudan is one of 15 countries worldwide where constraints to humanitarian access in 2022 are deemed “very high”. In 2020, before the conflict intensified, humanitarian-access constraints in the Sudan ranked as “high”. Both in 2021 and in 2022, the Sudan stands out as a country where humanitarian access has deteriorated (ACAPS, 2021; ACAPS, 2022).

The Sudan witnessed restrictions in humanitarian access after the start of the West Darfur intercommunal clashes in May 2021. As a result of insecurity, humanitarian operations in West Darfur were suspended in January 2021 and only resumed in the capital Geneina in April 2021. In December 2021, WFP suspended operations for one month in North Darfur after its warehouses had been looted (WFP, 2021). In April 2022, two health facilities were looted in the Kereneik area of West Darfur, forcing humanitarian workers to suspend operations (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2022). Assessments in 2021 identified that armed opposition groups controlling areas in the Blue Nile state, Darfur regions and South Kordofan state were creating barriers to the delivery of humanitarian aid (ACAPS, 2021).

In 2022, access restrictions have reportedly significantly increased in Darfur, with West Darfur and the Jebel Marra region of Central Darfur being of particular concern (OCHA, 2022). The increased intensity of violence led to temporary suspension of humanitarian operations in some areas, preventing people in need from accessing vital services (OCHA, 2022). Between February and August

2022, 174 security incidents affecting humanitarian organizations were reported (S/2022/400; S/2022/667). Eight aid workers were killed in that period, all in the Kereneik area of West Darfur where nomads and Masalit tribes have been fighting (Aid Worker Security Database, 2022). By comparison, during the whole of 2021, three humanitarian workers were killed, also in West Darfur. Fifty incidents of violence against health care facilities and/or health workers were also reported in Sudan between January and June 2022, over three times the number in 2021 (OCHA, 2022).

Since the military coup in October 2021, interferences with the implementation of humanitarian activities have increased. Humanitarian workers have been reporting that state authorities are increasingly imposing incentives and fees, especially in Blue Nile, Central Darfur, Gedaref, North Darfur, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West Kordofan and White Nile states (OCHA, 2022; ACAPS, 2022). Additionally, despite the Transitional Government's commitment to ease legal frameworks regulating humanitarian operations, excessive bureaucratic constraints were highlighted as being a significant impediment to effective and efficient delivery of humanitarian services in 2021 (OCHA, 2022). Requests for road access were sometimes left unanswered, as was the case for instance for the road to Kauda in South Kordofan (S/2022/667). Moreover, the lack of comprehensive directives at the national level, regular communication disruptions, delays in approval of technical agreements, and unauthorized checkpoints, keep hindering the work of humanitarian workers on the ground (ACAPS, 2022). On the other hand, donors have restricted the engagement of United Nations agencies with national entities, including the transfer of project funds.

ERW or unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Darfur and Blue Nile are limiting the ability of displaced populations to access humanitarian aid, as well as the capacity of humanitarian organizations to reach beneficiaries (OCHA, 2022; OCHA, 2021). In Darfur and Kordofan, government-backed militias and other armed groups are active, which also restricts humanitarian access for vulnerable populations fearing for their personal safety. In May 2022, the An Nuhud locality of West Kordofan was inaccessible to humanitarians due to intense conflict between two tribes. In July 2022, violence in the Blue Nile region prevented NGOs access to Ganis town (ACAPS, 2022).



## Recommendations valid for all countries

To facilitate a range of preventive and accountability-oriented tools available under UNSC Resolution 2417, as well as other relevant UNSC resolutions,<sup>18</sup> the UNSC may consider the following recommendations:

1. Strongly condemn once again the unlawful denial of humanitarian access by certain parties to the conflict, including wilfully impeding relief supplies and responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations of armed conflict.
2. Continue calling on parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including by refraining from depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival including targeting, destroying or rendering useless foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets, drinking water installations and irrigation works.
3. Urge those with influence over parties to armed conflict to remind the latter of their obligation in relation to humanitarian access.
4. Call on all parties to the conflict to facilitate improved access to operational and technical humanitarian organizations, to ensure enhanced transparency regarding the humanitarian situation and ensure people in need are located and services provided.
5. Call on parties to the conflict to take measures to stop the indiscriminate use of landmines, and to record their placement and remove existing landmines, UXO and ERW from civilian areas under their control.
6. Call for, and provide support to, independent, impartial, full, prompt and effective investigations into alleged violations and abuses of IHRL and IHL by all parties to the conflict, as well as those providing support to such parties, pursuant to international standards. This includes by considering the establishment of a new, dedicated United Nations Commission of Inquiry or continuing support to the existing one. Where appropriate, call on states to take action against those responsible, in accordance with domestic and international law, with a view to reinforcing preventive measures, ensuring accountability and addressing the grievances of victims.
7. Continue to use regular Arria-formula meetings to discuss critical and deteriorating conflict-induced hunger and risk of Famine.
8. Establish an independent body of experts to collect and channel critical information, to equip and enable the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General to take preventive action.

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<sup>18</sup> UNSC Resolution 2573, "Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population", 27 April 2021, [un.org/press/en/2021/sc14506.doc.htm](https://un.org/press/en/2021/sc14506.doc.htm)

## Methods and data sources

### Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The acute food insecurity estimates provided in this update are mainly based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) scales.<sup>19</sup> These estimates indicate populations in need of urgent assistance to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition, which are classified into the three most severe phases of acute food insecurity according to the IPC/CH classification – Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

When in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), people start facing increasing malnutrition due to lack of access to food, or they are only able to access food by selling off assets or through other harmful coping strategies. People in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) face high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality due to lack of food, or resort to emergency coping strategies to mitigate large food consumption gaps. People in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) do not have any means left to access food and are facing starvation and death.

Famines should be avoided at all costs. Although further deaths can and should be prevented by urgent action, it is evident that responding to famine situations will be, de facto, a late response because many will have died by the time a famine is declared. In the countries where IPC/CH processes are in place, therefore, Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is already to be taken as indicative of an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.

Population estimates indicating Stressed conditions (IPC/CH Phase 2) are also reported where relevant, although this would require a more diverse set of actions than emergency response – ideally longer-term resilience-building and disaster risk reduction to protect livelihoods.

While the annual Global Report on Food Crises provides the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) every year, this six-month update reports on the latest figure available – in this issue, estimates are reported as of the second half of 2022, when available.

The estimates provided in this analysis for Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria (21 states and FCT), South Sudan and Yemen are the same as reported in previous issue (N° 10) of this update due to lack of updated IPC/CH analyses at the time of the analysis. For Ethiopia, as there are no new IPC analyses available for 2022, the reported figures rest on August 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan's number of people in need of food security and livelihood humanitarian assistance.<sup>20</sup>

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH as data sources on Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above). When recent IPC/CH is not available, alternative sources have been considered such as the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI), including its application to remotely collected data (rCARI), or Humanitarian Needs Overviews

<sup>19</sup> IPC provided estimates for nine countries (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen). CH estimates produced in March 2022 were used for six countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria).

<sup>20</sup> As of 2 November 2022, IPC/CH analyses were planned or under preparation, among others, for Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. The IPC released the South Sudan analysis (October 2022–July 2023), the Central African Republic analysis (September 2022–August 2023) and the Yemen update (October–December 2022) while this report was being finalized – the analyses are available at the following link: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/>

(HNOs) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs).<sup>21</sup> Populations that are classified as moderately acute food insecure and severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.<sup>22</sup>

In Section 1 the analysis builds on the latest IPC/CH acute food insecurity estimates available for 15 countries and territories as of the second half of 2022. Comparability issues exist for Yemen as no IPC analysis was available to cover late 2021 (in Section 1, late 2021 actually covers early 2022). Trends in acute food insecurity are established using comparable estimates from the same period of analysis a year earlier to take into account seasonal factors of food insecurity. The 2022 projected peak numbers as reported in the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises Mid-year Update are also indicated when the estimates covering the second half of 2022 do not already correspond to the expected peak of acute food insecurity (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

The analysis contains concise information on the main drivers of the acute food insecurity situation in these countries and territories in 2021–2022 based on a review of relevant sources, with a particular focus on conflict and insecurity.

Figure 3. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objectives
<b>Phase 1</b> None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
<b>Phase 2</b> Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
<b>Phase 3</b> Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or</li> <li>• Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.</li> </ul> URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
<b>Phase 4</b> Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or</li> <li>• Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.</li> </ul> URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.
<b>Phase 5</b> Catastrophe/ Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality). <sup>1</sup> URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

<sup>1</sup> A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC Phase 5 thresholds. If there is insufficient data for Famine classification but the available information indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the famine classification is called 'Famine Likely'. It is important to note that Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe.

Source: GNAFC and FSIN, 2022.

<sup>21</sup> For five countries and territories covered in this report – Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic – IPC/CH food security estimates are not available. Therefore, WFP provided estimates covering 2021 for the Syrian Arab Republic based on CARI methodology and for Myanmar based on rCARI; 2022 data covering IDPs inside and outside camps in Iraq based on CARI. The estimates reported for Palestine are based on the 2020 Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey covering early 2021. Estimates for Ethiopia are based on the Humanitarian Response Plan, both reported in the Global Report on Food Crises 2022.

<sup>22</sup> For Palestine, although partners of the Global Report on Food Crises validated the use of the Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey for reporting acute food insecurity in the territory in 2021, it should be noted that there are certain methodological limitations. For more information, see Technical Notes of 2022 Global Report on Food Crises (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022). For Myanmar, the WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing.

For the analysis of drivers of food insecurity in each of the countries and territories covered in the update, a wide range of secondary data sources was used to offer more details on the information provided in the IPC/CH analyses themselves, which already collate information from these various sources. These include qualitative information extracted from the key global and national early warning information systems, such as WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Monitoring, FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System and FAO's Data in Emergencies Monitoring (DIEM). It also builds on the *FAO-WFP Hunger Hotspots* reports on early warnings on acute food insecurity particularly for 2022 forecasts. Data on displacement and additional information on conflicts was provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as well as by government agencies in some countries.

Section 2 provides a more in-depth analysis of the impact of conflict on food security for four countries of particular concern.

## Food security terms

*The following glossary provides the definitions of the food security terms used in the update. The terms and definitions in this glossary have been compiled from existing glossaries and other reference material available to the public.*

The Cadre Harmonisé (CH) is a unifying tool that allows for a relevant consensual, rigorous and transparent analysis of the current and projected food and nutrition situation in West Africa and the Sahel. It allows to classify the severity of food and nutrition insecurity according to the international classification scale through an approach referring to well-defined functions and protocols.

The CH and the IPC have the same analytical framework for analysing acute food insecurity and share the same core functions that form the fundamental bases of the analytical process.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a common global scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition. It is the result of a partnership of various organizations at global, regional and country levels dedicated to developing and maintaining the highest possible quality in food security and nutrition analysis. Increasingly, the IPC is the international standard for classifying food insecurity and malnutrition in the context of emergency assessments. This report uses mainly the IPC acute food insecurity phase classification scale, which identifies populations and areas with food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as well as the need for urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect lives and livelihoods.

## IPC/CH classification terms and definitions

- **None/Minimal (IPC/CH Phase 1)**

People have stable access to food. Action is required to reduce people's vulnerability to disasters/shocks and to build resilience, so they can stay food secure.

- **Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)**

People have erratic economic access to food and are vulnerable to disasters/shocks. Action is required to improve people's stability of access to food and to reduce their vulnerability to disasters/shocks.

- **Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3)**

People are malnourished due to inadequate access to food or they only have enough food by selling off their assets or through other harmful coping strategies. Urgent action is required to protect livelihoods and increase access to food to avoid a food emergency.

- **Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4)**

People are malnourished due to lack of food or mitigate large food consumption gaps by selling off their assets or through other emergency coping strategies. Urgent action is needed to save lives. If nothing is done, people could face extreme hunger or death.

- **Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

People are malnourished due to lack of food and do not have any means left to access food. At area level, the population is in a situation of Famine (see definition below). Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) are considered as facing high levels of acute food insecurity and requiring urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition.

- **Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

Famine is the most severe phase of the IPC. It exists in areas where at least one in five households has or is most likely to experience an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or is likely to be occurring. The IPC only permits classification of Famine when all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols are met. The special protocols are the following:

- The requirement of reliable evidence on three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition and crude death rate – all of which are either currently above or projected to be above Famine thresholds (> 20 percent of households with extreme food gaps, >30 percent of children acutely malnourished and crude death rate > 2/10 000/day).
- Undergoing a famine review process to validate the classification.
- Development of IPC Famine Alert adhering to pre-determined standards.

- **Famine-likely (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

The IPC permits the classification of Famine-likely when all regular and special protocols are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for the three outcomes. Areas can be classified as Famine-likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that Famine may be occurring or will occur. When an area is classified as Famine-likely, it should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

- **Risk of Famine**

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most likely scenario, it is a scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring. It complements the Famine and Famine-likely projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated.

More information on the IPC Famine classification available at the following link:  
[ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Famine\\_Factsheet\\_2020.pdf](https://ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf)

More information on the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale at:  
[ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/resources-details/en/c/1152890](https://ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/resources-details/en/c/1152890)

## WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI)

The WFP CARI methodology is used to classify individual households according to their level of acute food insecurity. All four indicators included within the CARI approach (Food Consumption Score, reduced Coping Strategies Index, Food Expenditure Share, Livelihood Coping Strategies – Food Security) can be incorporated within IPC analysis. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator fits within the IPC analytical framework. The CARI is an analytical method designed to be an input to the IPC process. While the CARI approach is implemented through a single household survey intended to accurately measure household level food insecurity, the IPC approach built on the technical consensus among key stakeholders and consolidates wide-ranging evidence to classify severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition.

More information available at the following link:  
[wfp.org/publications/consolidated-approach-reporting-indicators-food-security-cari-guidelines](https://wfp.org/publications/consolidated-approach-reporting-indicators-food-security-cari-guidelines)

The WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing.

## Comparability issues of acute food insecurity estimates 2021-2022

This section aims to highlight where the population coverage increased or decreased by more than one million people between late 2021 and late 2022.

In Afghanistan, the population analysed in the IPC analysis slightly increased - from 97 percent of the total country population or 40.4 million people to 100 percent or 41.7 million between late 2021 and late 2022.

In the Central African Republic, the total country population estimates used in the IPC analysis was revised from 4.9 million to 5.7 million people between late 2021 and late 2022. However, the population analysed remained similar - i.e. around 4.9 million people.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the total country population estimates used in the IPC analysis was revised from 115.2 million to 109.6 million people between late 2021 and late 2022. However, the population analysed remained similar - i.e. around 103 million people.

In Haiti, the total country population estimates used in the IPC analysis was revised from 12.9 million people to 10.9 million between late 2021 and late 2022. However, the population analysed remained the same - i.e. 9.9 million people.

In Mozambique, the January 2021 IPC analysis covered 33 areas (21 rural and 12 urban areas (including Maputo city) across 11 provinces, accounting for 60 percent of the total country population, or 18.1 million people. The December 2021 analysis covered 64 districts, of which 10 were provincial capital cities, 4 were urban districts of Maputo, and 50 were rural districts, comprising 47 percent of the total country population, or 14.5 million people.

In the Niger, the population analysed by the CH increased from 22.7 million in late 2021 to 24.9 million in late 2022, reaching a full coverage – 100 percent – of the total country population (from 93 percent in 2021).

In Nigeria, the areas analysed by the CH increased from 16 states and FCT to 21 states and FCT between late 2021 and late 2022, representing respectively 107.6 million people and 159.1 million people. The coverage therefore increased from 49 percent to 72 percent of the total country population (i.e. 219.5 million people).

In Somalia, the population estimates used in the IPC analyses were revised - from 15.7 million in late 2021 to 16.4 million in late 2022. However, the population coverage remained at 100 percent between the two rounds of analysis.

In the Sudan, the population estimates used in the IPC analyses were revised from 46.6 million in late 2021 to 47.9 million in late 2022. However, the population coverage remained at 100 percent between the two rounds of analysis.

In Yemen, no IPC analysis existed for covering late 2021 – the comparison is therefore made between early 2022 and late 2022 IPC results, unlike other countries covered in this analysis.

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### Introduction

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