



Security Council

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The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Commending the support provided by the African Union through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) now the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), by the United Nations through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) and through its agencies, funds and programmes, by the Panel of Experts on Somalia, both to Somalia and the 751 Committee, and by Somalia's bilateral partners,

Urging Somalia to continue to codify and implement weapons and ammunition management policies, including continued development of an accountable weapons distribution and tracing system for all Somali security and police institutions, *recognising* that effective weapons and ammunition management is the responsibility of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS),

Expressing support for the FGS in its efforts to reconstruct the country, counter the threat of terrorism, and stop the trafficking of weapons and ammunition, further expressing its intention to ensure the measures in this resolution will enable the FGS in the realisation of these objectives, *noting* that the security situation in Somalia continues to necessitate these measures, including strict controls on the movement of arms, but affirming that it shall keep the situation in Somalia under constant review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including any modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed, in light of the progress achieved and compliance with this resolution,

Expressing grave concern that the terrorist group Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and *further expressing* concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh,

Condemning in the strongest possible terms terrorist attacks in Somalia and neighbouring states, expressing deep concern at the loss of civilian life from these



attacks, *reiterating* its determination to support comprehensive efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and urging Somalia's leaders to work together on the fight against terrorism,

Underscoring the importance of a holistic and gender sensitive approach to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, stabilisation and reconciliation, human rights, humanitarian, development, and socioeconomic dimensions of the problem, including youth employment and the eradication of poverty, and emphasising the importance of regional and international cooperation to counter terrorism, disrupt terrorist finances and illicit financial flows, and stop arms trafficking,

Reiterating that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group, condemning terrorist groups' attempts to craft distorted narratives that are based on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of religion to justify violence and to popularise their attempts to undermine Somalia and the region, *expressing* concern over their exploitation of information and communication technologies including through the Internet, particularly social media, for terrorist purposes such as propaganda, and supporting the Government of Somalia's renewed efforts to counter Al-Shabaab's narratives,

Commending the role played by the FGS, member states, and regional organisations to suppress piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, and *urging* continued development of a Somalia-led, coordinated approach in developing Somalia's maritime governance sector, including through the formation of the Somali Navy and Coast Guard Working Group, and support of Somalia's maritime institutions,

Expressing serious concern about the humanitarian situation in Somalia, *encouraging* States to scale-up their humanitarian support to Somalia, and calling for all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and in a manner consistent with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance (United Nations General Assembly resolution [46/182](#)), including humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, the rapid and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance necessary to support persons in need across Somalia and recalling that the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) may designate individuals or entities that engage in obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Strongly condemning the deliberate targeting of civilians, including those who are humanitarian personnel, and civilian objects in situations of conflict, as well as the indiscriminate use of weapons in populated areas and their consequences for the civilian population, *calling upon* all parties to the conflict in Somalia to refrain from such practices in accordance with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law,

Expressing concern at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources in Somalia, and calling for the Somali Government authorities to continue efforts to address corruption, strengthen administrative management, improve financial transparency, make good use of public resources and continue to accelerate the pace of reform,

Noting with concern that Somalia remains one of the deadliest conflict areas for children, as outlined in the 2022 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, *further noting* with concern the high levels of recruitment of children

in armed conflict in violation of international law and high levels of abductions, with Al-Shabaab continuing to be the main perpetrator, and *urging* the Somali Government authorities to further strengthen efforts to address the “six grave violations” against children as identified by the Secretary-General, including by implementing measures in line with resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#),

Noting with concern smuggling and trafficking of weapons, military equipment and ammunition and urging the Somali Government authorities to take appropriate measures to identify smugglers and hold them accountable,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Recalls* its decisions in resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) to authorise ATMIS, and commends the renewed cooperation between all stakeholders to implement its mandate in support of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) and the National Security Architecture and empower Somalia to assume progressively greater responsibility for its own security;

2. *Emphasises* that its objective, through this resolution, is to establish a consolidated framework, drawing on the technical assessment of Somalia’s weapons and ammunition management capability ([S/2022/698](#)), and taking note of the final report of the Panel of Experts ([S/2022/754](#)) and recommendations from the United Nations Office on Drugs Crime (UNODC), to strengthen state- and peace-building in Somalia, defeat Al-Shabaab and complement the mandates of UNSOM and ATMIS, including in particular through:

(a) Supporting weapons and ammunition management and security sector reform in Somalia (pillar 1); and

(b) Degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab (pillar 2);

Pillar 1 – supporting weapons and ammunition management and security sector reform in Somalia and the partial arms embargo

3. *Emphasises* that effective weapons and ammunition management will reduce the ability of Al-Shabaab, and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region, to obtain weapons and ammunition, and reduce the threat to peace and security posed by terrorists, in Somalia and neighbouring states;

4. *Underlines* the responsibility of the Somali Government authorities to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment and their distribution, including implementation of a system which allows the tracking of such military equipment and supplies to the unit level;

5. *Calls upon* the Somali Government authorities to:

(a) further engage and cooperate on implementation of the National Weapons and Ammunition Management Strategy;

(b) establish an ammunition accounting system, and build sufficient armouries and ammunition storage areas to strengthen the capacity of stockpile management; and

(c) promote further professionalisation, training and capacity-building of Somali security and police institutions;

6. *Welcomes* the technical assessment of the weapons and ammunition management capability of Somalia (S/2022/698), commends Somalia for the progress made, especially with regards to weapons management, and endorses the technical assessment's recommendations;

7. *Welcomes* the benchmarks proposed following the technical assessment, and urges the Somali Government authorities to work together to meet them fully;

8. *Calls upon* the international community to provide additional support to develop weapons and ammunition management capacity in Somalia, with a particular focus on weapons and ammunition storage, technical assistance, and capacity building, and encourages partners to coordinate their efforts to support Somalia implement the requirements of this resolution;

9. *Reaffirms* that the Somali Government authorities, in cooperation with ATMIS, shall document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations, or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including:

- (a) recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition;
- (b) photographing all items and relevant markings;
- (c) facilitating inspection by the Panel of all military items before their redistribution or destruction; and
- (d) encourages the FGS and African Union to update and implement the Harmonised AMISOM-FGS Standard Operating Procedure on the Management of Recovered Small Arms and Light Weapons and further encourages the international community to support the FGS and AU in this regard;

10. *Decides* that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia by preventing Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region from obtaining weapons and ammunition, take the necessary measures to prevent all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, except where the beneficiary is Somalia's security and police institutions at the national and local level, who are exempt, subject to the procedures set out in paragraphs 11, 14, 15 and 18 to this resolution, or where the recipient is exempt as per paragraph 21 to this resolution;

11. *Decides* that paragraph 10 shall not apply to deliveries of weapons and military equipment, or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of Somalia's security and police institutions, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to items in Annexes A and B to this resolution, which are subject to the procedures as set out in paragraphs 14 and 15 to this resolution;

12. *Reaffirms* that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with the exemption in paragraph 11 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the recipient to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation;

13. *Confirms* its commitment to working with Somalia to ensure that the procedures set out in paragraphs 14 and 15, and Annexes A and B are lifted progressively, in light of progress made against the benchmarks set out in the technical assessment (S/2022/698);

14. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution, intended solely for the development of Somalia's security and police institutions, to provide security for the Somali people, may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification from Somalia or the State or international, regional or sub regional organisation delivering assistance;

15. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution, intended solely for the development of Somalia's security and police institutions, to provide security for the Somali people, are subject to notification to the Committee for information submitted at least five working days in advance by Somalia or the State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation delivering assistance;

16. *Reaffirms* that all notifications should include:

- (a) details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and military equipment, including serial numbers;
- (b) a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity;
- (c) proposed date and place of delivery; and
- (d) all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit, or the intended place of storage;

17. *Decides* that the Somali authorities have the primary responsibility to notify the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 14 and 15, of any deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somali security and police institutions;

18. *Decides* that where paragraphs 14 or 15 apply, Somalia or the supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation delivering the assistance shall, no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery, including the serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage;

19. *Requests* the Secretariat to produce, in consultation with the FGS and for approval by the Committee, a template form for requests for advance approval, notifications and post-delivery notifications to ensure consistency of communications;

20. *Reaffirms* its request that the Committee shares all notifications pertaining to paragraphs 14, 15 and 18, submitted to the Committee with the appropriate national coordinating body in Somalia, the Office of National Security, for their information;

21. *Decides* that paragraph 10 shall not apply to:

- (a) supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of, or use by:
 - (i) United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM);
 - (ii) the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and its strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with ATMIS; and,
 - (iii) European Union training and support activities, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of

America, as well as any other State forces that are either operating within the STP, or have a status of forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the FGS to serve the purposes of this resolution provided they inform the Committee about concluding such agreements;

(b) supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

(c) the delivery of non-lethal military equipment by States, or international, regional or subregional organisations intended solely for humanitarian or protective use; and

(d) entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels (as previously affirmed by paragraph 3 of resolution [2244 \(2015\)](#)); and

confirms it will keep all notification processes required and exemptions under review;

Pillar 2 – degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab

22. *Reiterates* that Al-Shabaab poses a threat to peace and security in Somalia, and that its terrorist and other activities pose a security threat to the region, and underscores the need to degrade Al-Shabaab through targeted sanctions and disrupting its finances, by reducing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices and by improving maritime domain awareness;

23. *Underscores* the importance of a holistic and gender sensitive approach to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, stabilisation and reconciliation, human rights, humanitarian, development, and socioeconomic dimensions of the challenge, including youth employment and the eradication of poverty;

24. *Reiterates* its commitment to support Somalia and the region to reduce this threat and decides that from the date of the adoption of this resolution the name of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia shall henceforth be known as the “Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab”;

25. *Recognises* that the security threat is complex and requires a combined, military and non-military response and, in addition to the measures in outlined in Pillar 1, which are designed to strengthen Somalia and defeat Al-Shabaab, and agrees to continue efforts to degrade Al-Shabaab and strengthen peace and security through the following measures;

2a: Targeted sanctions

26. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#) which imposed targeted sanctions and its resolutions [2002 \(2011\)](#), and [2093 \(2013\)](#) which expanded the listing criteria, and recalls its decisions in its resolutions [2060 \(2012\)](#) and [2444 \(2018\)](#), and further decides that the measures in paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#) shall also apply to individuals, and that the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 7 of that resolution shall also apply to entities, designated by the Committee as:

(a) having engaged in, or provided support for, acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threatened the peace and

reconciliation process in Somalia, or threatened the Federal Government of Somalia or ATMIS by force; and

(b) being associated with Al-Shabaab, acts and activities indicating that an individual or entity is associated with Al-Shabaab, and therefore eligible for designation by the Committee include:

- (i) participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of Al-Shabaab;
- (ii) supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to Al-Shabaab; and
- (iii) recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Shabaab or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;

27. *Reiterates* its request for Member States to assist the Panel of Experts in its investigations, and for Somali Government authorities, ATMIS and partners to share information with the Panel of Experts regarding conduct or activities, in particular by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia, where covered by listing criteria;

28. *Reaffirms* that without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of its resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;

2b: Disrupting Al-Shabaab's finances

29. *Notes* with concern Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources, to carry out terrorism and destabilise Somalia and the region, and requests the Somali Government authorities, working with international partners as appropriate, to continue to develop under FGS leadership a comprehensive plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's;

30. *Calls upon* the FGS to continue working with Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to:

- (a) identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks;
- (b) improve compliance (including enhanced Know Your Customer and due diligence procedures);
- (c) strengthen supervision and enforcement, including through increased reporting to the Central Bank of Somalia and Financial Reporting Centre in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016), as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019);
- (d) prioritise the continued development of a secure national identification system to improve financial access and compliance and counter the financing of terrorism;
- (e) improve monitoring, reporting and investigations into money laundering and terrorist financing while ensuring that financial entities transmit suspicious

transactions and large cash transaction reports in proportion with the money laundering and terrorist financing risks in Somalia, as required under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Law; and

(f) develop a plan to mitigate the risks posed by Al-Shabaab to personnel working in anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing roles within national competent authorities and the private sector;

31. *Calls upon* the FGS to improve collaboration and coordination among regulatory and law enforcement agencies and undertake coordinated and joint approaches to terrorist finance investigations and implement disruption strategies to counter-Al-Shabaab's finances and its exploitation of the licit financial system;

32. *Requests* the FGS, UNODC and the Panel to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's operations and to continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's operations and exploitation of the licit financial system;

33. *Requests* the FGS to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other States, particularly other States in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including through compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), resolution 2178 (2014), resolution 2462 (2019), and relevant domestic and international law;

2c: Somalia Charcoal Ban

34. *Reaffirms* its decision to ban the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014) hereafter "the charcoal ban";

35. *Welcomes* measures taken by the Somali Government authorities and States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, reiterates its requests that ATMIS support and assist Somalia in implementing the charcoal ban and facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports and reaffirms the importance of the efforts of the UNODC and its international partners to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia;

36. *Notes* the need to reduce the size of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo, and expresses deep concerns about the weak port control structures, lack of a capable coastguard and oversight by the Somali Government authorities of ports, including Kismayo, urges the Somali Government authorities to monitor and control existing charcoal stockpiles at export points, and requests them to consider:

(a) removing and relocating the charcoal stockpile to a central storage facility and sell the charcoal for domestic consumption;

(b) developing, with the support of the UNSOM, UNODC and UNEP as appropriate, and submitting a proposal for consideration by the Committee, for the one-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles, to include a clear plan for ensuring transparency and fiscal accountability during the disposal process, to prevent Al-Shabaab from profiting from the sale; and

(c) developing a national plan for the sustainable management of domestic charcoal production, with support from other partners, as appropriate;

2d: Reducing the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

37. *Reaffirms* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or

aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;

38. *Reaffirms* that, where an item in part I of Annex C to this resolution is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 37, the State shall notify the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and stresses the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use of the item(s), the end user, the technical specifications and the quantity of the item(s) to be shipped;

39. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including among other things items in part II of Annex C, to keep records of transactions and share information with Somalia, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that Somalia is provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

40. *Encourages* international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives;

2e: Maritime interdiction and improving maritime domain awareness

41. *Decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#), and expanded by paragraph 5 of resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) to cover IED components, until 15 November 2023;

42. *Notes* UNODC's coordination role in finalising and implementing the draft Roadmap for Enhanced Inter-Agency Cooperation to Combat Illicit Trade and its Effects Along the Kenya-Somalia Border in partnership with the Government of Kenya, and encourages Somalia to work with UNODC to develop a plan to disrupt illicit trade along Somalia's borders with Kenya and Ethiopia from which Al-Shabaab profits;

43. *Encourages* the UNODC, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, to:

(a) continue to bring together relevant States and international organisations to enhance regional cooperation on responding to illicit maritime flows and disrupt all forms of trafficking in licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities;

(b) support Somalia to improve their maritime domain awareness and enforcement, including in relation to the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade;

(c) to support the FGS with its fisheries protection and enforcement capability demonstrator project; and

(d) to engage with shipping association representatives to discuss possible ways to make these measures more implementable and propose recommendations in its next briefing to the Committee in 2023;

Panel of Experts

44. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 December 2023, the Panel of Experts, and that their mandate shall include the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018), paragraphs 32 and 35 of this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019) and further requests the Panel to include gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting, and expresses its intention to review this mandate and take appropriate action regarding any extension and modification of this mandate, including restrictions on the import of weapons and ammunition by the FGS, no later than 15 November 2023;

45. *Recalls* the importance of full co-operation between Somalia and the Panel of Experts, requests Somali Government authorities to facilitate for the Panel of Experts interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, notes the importance of the Panel of Experts carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997, and requests the Panel of Experts to continue to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the FGS in weapons and ammunition management, including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission;

46. *Reiterates* its request for Somalia, States, and ATMIS to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations, urges the Somali Government authorities to facilitate access for the Panel, on the basis of written requests to the FGS by the Panel, to all FGS armouries in Mogadishu, all FGS-imported weapons and ammunition prior to distribution, all FGS military storage facilities in Somalia National Army (SNA) sectors and all captured weaponry in Somali custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in Somali custody and access to all FGS and FMS logbooks and distribution records, in order to enable the Security Council to monitor and assess implementation of this resolution;

Reporting

47. *Requests* the following reports:

(a) from the FGS, in coordination and collaboration with FMS as appropriate, including thorough the structures of the National Security Architecture, and in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 1 March 2023 and then by 1 September 2023, reports which include:

(i) a description of the structure, composition, strength and disposition of Somalia's security and police institutions, and the status of regional and militia forces;

(ii) the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014) and para 37 of resolution 2551 (2020);

(iii) incorporating the notifications regarding the destination unit or the place of storage of military equipment upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition;

(iv) an update summarising suspicious activity documented by domestic financial institutions, and investigations and actions undertaken by the Financial Reporting Centre to counter the financing of terrorism and in a manner so as to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information;

- (v) an update on specific actions taken by Somali Government authorities to counter the financing of terrorism; and
- (vi) an update on the status of individuals designated by the Committee, where information is available;
- (b) from the Secretary-General an update on progress against each indicator set out in the benchmarks contained with the technical assessment report ([S/2022/698](#)) by 15 September 2023;
- (c) from the Panel of Experts:
 - (i) regular updates to the Committee, including a minimum of four different thematic reports;
 - (ii) a comprehensive mid-term update; and
 - (iii) for the Security Council's consideration through the Committee a final report by 1 October 2023;

and urges the Panel of Experts to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;

- (d) from the Emergency Relief Coordinator, an update on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and any impediments to its delivery by 1 October 2023;
- (e) from UNODC, an update on its work related to this resolution by 1 October 2023;
- (f) from the African Union, by 1 December 2022, an update on its preparations for the planned drawdown of 2000 ATMIS personnel by 31 December 2022 in accordance with resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#); and
- (g) from organisations and states exempted via paragraph 21.a.iii of this resolution by 15 October 2023, an update on the support provided to Somalia since the adoption of this resolution and a summary of the materiel imported to Somalia for force protection that would, in the absence of paragraph 21, need be notified to the Committee;

48. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution [1960 \(2010\)](#) and paragraph 9 of resolution [1998 \(2011\)](#), and invites the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate;

49. *Recalls* paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#), which outlined outstanding issues between Djibouti and Eritrea, reaffirms that it will continue to follow developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti and will support the two countries in the resolution of these matters in good faith, takes note of the Secretary-General's letters of 18 February 2019, 02 August 2019, 29 July 2020, 30 July 2021, and 26 July 2022 and regrets there has been no noticeable progress on the outstanding issues between them but welcomes the fact that both parties have continued to act responsibly towards each other and there have been no negative developments reported, recalls paragraph 57 of resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#) expressed its intention to keep its request for reporting from the Secretary-General under review, and decides not to seek a further update from the Secretary-General at this time;

50. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex A – Items subject to a no-objection process

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);
2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 14.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;
 - (a) Note: (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);
3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;
4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel;
6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability greater than generation 2;
7. Fixed wing, swivel wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;
8. ‘Vessels’ and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
 - (a) Note: ‘Vessel’ includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel;
9. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

Annex B – items requiring advance notification

1. All types of weapons with a calibre up to 14.7mm and associated ammunition;
2. RPG-7 and recoilless rifles, and associated ammunition;
3. Weapon sights with a night vision capability generation 2 or lower;
4. Rotor wing or helicopters specifically designed or modified for military use;
5. Body armour or protective garments, as follows:
 - (a) Hard body armour plates providing ballistic protection equal to or greater than level III (NIJ 0101.06 July 2008) or national equivalents;
6. Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
7. Communication equipment specifically designed or modified for military use.

Annex C – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components

Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology

Part I

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - (a) Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
 - (b) Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
 - (c) Nitroglycerin (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses);
2. Explosive-related goods:
 - (a) Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord);
3. “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paragraphs 1 and 2, including:

Part II

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - (a) Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
 - (b) Nitroglycol;
 - (c) Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
 - (d) Picryl chloride;
 - (e) 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT);
 2. Explosives precursors:
 - (a) Ammonium nitrate;
 - (b) Potassium nitrate;
 - (c) Sodium chlorate;
 - (d) Nitric acid;
 - (e) Sulphuric acid.
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