

**Security Council**

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Identical letters dated 14 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the attached document, entitled “Update on the inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue”, submitted by the Government of Haiti as requested by the Security Council in its resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#) of 15 July 2022 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Antonio **Rodrigue**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**Annex to the identical letters dated 14 October 2022 from the
Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

**Update on the inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue, submitted
by the Government of Haiti at the request of the Security Council**

I. Background

1. In its resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#) of July 2022, the Security Council requested the Government of Haiti to provide an update to the Council by 17 October 2022 on the inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue which should help in reaching an urgent agreement on a sustainable, time-bound and commonly accepted framework for a political process led by Haitians to permit the organization of inclusive, peaceful, free, fair and transparent legislative and presidential elections as soon as security conditions and logistical preparations permit.
2. After the adoption of the resolution, the political climate and security environment in Haiti changed considerably. For several months, the Thor oil terminal at the southern entrance to the capital experienced a great deal of difficulty in collecting and distributing fuel through the usual channels, owing to the action of gangs that were controlling the neighbourhood and diverting tanker trucks. Since 12 September 2022, it is the Varreux oil terminal, the largest in the country, that is being blocked by other armed gangs. All attempts by law enforcement officers to open the road leading to the terminal have been met by gunshots from armed gangs with high-calibre firearms.
3. This situation has led to a fuel shortage and has had catastrophic consequences for the country. Hospitals have had to close their doors or to scale down their activities considerably; potable water is no longer flowing from taps, as pumping stations have ceased operating owing to a lack of fuel; public transportation has come to a standstill; and the supply of food to cities is becoming difficult and risks rapidly aggravating the humanitarian crisis.
4. Taking advantage of the elimination of the government fuel subsidy, some opponents to the Government have launched movements that have led to looting of private shops and businesses, charitable and religious organizations and food depots of United Nations agencies, vandalism and destruction of school and university infrastructure, and targeted attacks against members of the Government and political figures, who have endured attacks against their properties and persons.
5. Schools have not been able to open their doors and more than 4 million children have been stuck at home for more than six weeks, as their parents agonize about taking the risk to let them go out. Dozens of schools in Artibonite Department have been vandalized or destroyed.
6. There has also been a resurgence of cases of cholera, none of which had been recorded for more than three and a half years. The first confirmed cases were found in areas controlled by gangs and in a prison.
7. Haiti urgently needs the support of a special armed force to assist the national police in addressing the humanitarian crisis by neutralizing the armed gangs in order to ensure seamless fuel distribution and facilitate the resumption of operations.
8. It is against this unstable and dangerous backdrop that the update requested in the above-mentioned resolution is being presented.

II. Government commitments

9. On 20 July 2021, the day when he took power, which came a few days following the odious assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, Prime Minister Ariel Henry made a public statement that he was making a commitment to the nation that he was going to set out on a mission, beginning the following day, to meet with the representatives of all segments of the population, in an effort to build the broadest possible consensus around the country's future.

10. The process was aimed at reconciling the nation with itself, healing wounds, reducing social and political divides, and jettisoning the mistrust that was preventing Haitians from working together for their collective well-being.

III. Measures taken and results obtained

11. In keeping with his commitment, the Prime Minister started holding a series of meetings with political parties, civil society actors, the private sector, trade unions, women's movements, human rights organizations, churches of different faiths, voodoo practitioners and people's organizations.

12. Following those multiple meetings and discussions, a draft memorandum of understanding was prepared on the basis of recommendations from the various parties. The document was circulated to the different actors for their opinions, comments and recommendations.

Results obtained

13. Six weeks after the Prime Minister made his commitment, a political agreement for peaceful and effective governance of the interim period was signed with hundreds of organizations. That agreement made it possible to reshuffle the Government and to broaden the participation of several political and civil society organizations.

14. Before having the agreement published in *Le Moniteur*, the official gazette, the Prime Minister wanted to wait for other organizations with other initiatives to express their views and to join the process.

15. Even after the official publication of the agreement, the Prime Minister decided to continue holding discussions in good faith with certain parties that had not signed the 11 September agreement, including the Montana Group. Each time, he faced intransigence from those who wanted power to be handed over to them at any cost and who wanted the provisional President and Prime Minister whom they had chosen to take over, an option which has no legal basis. The lasting solution is to create the conditions for the people of Haiti to be able to choose the country's leaders in free, inclusive, honest and transparent elections.

IV. Other dialogue initiatives

A. Initiative of the academic sector/private sector/religious sector troika

16. With the Prime Minister's initiatives failing to produce any results, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) decided to kickstart informal meetings between the various protagonists who were reluctant to meet. Following two meetings, these key actors elected to continue their discussion among Haitians, without the participation of BINUH. They entrusted a trio composed of one representative from the private sector, one representative of the academic sector, and

one representative of the religious sector with the task of trying to reconcile the positions of the various protagonists of the political crisis.

17. The Government approved the process and provided the necessary logistics to ensure that Haitians themselves took full ownership of the work, without external interference. The troika met with many political and civil society actors. Unfortunately, some actors, such as the Montana Group, considered by the international community to be indispensable to the process, did not respond to the invitations extended to them. It should be noted that many in the international community wrongly believe that the Montana Group is the sole representative of Haitian civil society in all its diversity, when in fact it is composed of traditional politicians who want power, and nothing but power and, above all, without going through elections.

18. The members of the troika did not see themselves as mediators, but rather as facilitators. They did not seek to reconcile antagonistic positions or to negotiate a memorandum of understanding. At the end of their process, they presented a report summarizing the positions of the various parties, without proposing any concrete alternative.

B. Commission for dialogue on the 11 September agreement

19. As has usually been the case in the efforts to achieve a negotiated inter-Haitian solution, the Prime Minister, after multiple unsuccessful meetings with the leaders of the Montana Group that were always organized at his request, surprised everyone by once again taking the initiative to visit one of the Group's leaders at home, in the umpteenth attempt to resolve the differences.

20. On the Prime Minister's initiative, a round of negotiations began between the signatories of the 11 September agreement and the representatives of the Montana Group. After three formal meetings and numerous other informal discussions and exchanges of proposals for an understanding, the Montana Group representatives left the negotiating table. Once again, these compatriots showed their intransigence by demanding acceptance of the provisional President of the Republic chosen by them, without going through regular elections. This position is irreconcilable with that of the signatories to the 11 September agreement and of the Prime Minister, who believe that, in order to put our democratic institutions permanently back on track, it is important to create the conditions necessary for the Haitian people to choose their leaders through free, inclusive and transparent elections as soon as possible.

21. In response, the Prime Minister decided to resume the conversation with other political, civil society and private sector actors. He established a representative commission of signatories to the 11 September agreement and gave them the task of engaging in discussions with all the other protagonists, since in the interim, a variety of groups had been set up, and various agreements had been signed. It was therefore necessary to meet all those making proposals and ascertain to what extent they would be willing to expand the consensus of 11 September 2021.

22. That initiative seemed promising and the discussions were productive. It did not, however, go beyond the content of the report and the proposal to organize a major summit with a view to concluding a national agreement, another seemingly more pragmatic initiative having emerged.

C. National compromise

23. More recently, an initiative by Haitian civil society figures, with the support of BINUH, raised high hopes. At their invitation, a meeting took place between the representatives of the signatories to the 11 September agreement and the representatives of the Montana Group, during which national experts made a presentation on the alarming economic, political and social situation in the country. They drew attention to the urgent need to reach a political compromise in order to tackle the numerous challenges that we face.

24. After that first plenary meeting, a process of shuttling between the main actors ensued in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting positions and agree on a compromise text.

25. Concessions were made on both sides. However, disagreements emerged within the Montana Group, some sticking to their intransigent position, while others were more open to dialogue and to seeking an agreement. With the help of experts in conflict resolution made available by BINUH, a compromise was about to be signed with the group led by the person chosen by the Montana Group as provisional President. A date was even set. However, at a joint meeting with the Prime Minister and members of the private sector to present the compromise and secure their support, that person backtracked at the last moment. According to various press outlets, he had received serious threats.

26. The Prime Minister, as he has done from the beginning, has not closed the door and has continued to engage in dialogue. He has not given up hope of convincing those who remain recalcitrant to set aside their egos and overcome their differences in the interests of the country.

D. Dialogue with the private sector

27. In order to bring the Haitian family together around a shared national project, the Prime Minister believed it was essential to involve the private sector in the discussions on the country's future. Too often the private sector has been disregarded in efforts to resolve political crises, even though it is a vital actor in national life.

28. Discussions began on the relationship between entrepreneurs and the State and on tax compliance. The private sector representatives recognized the need to make an effort on this issue. They made a public commitment to pay their taxes and customs duties regularly, provided that everyone was treated equally and that no one enjoyed undue privileges.

29. They expressed their support for the customs reforms undertaken by the Government, as a result of which customs revenues have more than doubled since the first month. It is worth noting that the Treasury loses more than \$6 million on average because of customs fraud.

30. In the discussions, the Prime Minister focused on the contribution they could make to building the consensus that is vital for a sustainable solution to the political, humanitarian and social crisis. The aforementioned national compromise document was shared with them.

31. They are aware that, without a national covenant, there will be no economic development and they will not be able to implement their plans for the next 20 or 30 years. The two main groups of entrepreneurs with whom the Prime Minister is holding discussions seem to want to support the initiative openly and would be willing to sign the compromise document alongside political actors and civil society.

32. The discussions have slowed down because of the current negative climate, but they should resume in the coming days.

V. Future prospects in the light of the recent situation

33. Haiti is currently facing major political, economic, social and security challenges. The humanitarian crisis in the country should serve to make all actors aware of the need to prioritize the best interests of the public.

34. Our democratic institutions have collapsed. It is imperative to rebuild them as quickly as possible and to put the country back on the path of democracy and respect for the rule of law. The only solution is to arrive at an agreement among Haitians to better rebuild our institutions.

35. Otherwise, it is the armed gangs and their backers who will take control of and rule our country. The assistance of a special armed force, which the Government has requested from the international community, should, if approved quickly, make it possible to put an end to insecurity and create the conditions necessary to start afresh.

36. The international community's support would be greatly appreciated in our pursuit of a lasting solution negotiated by Haitians. The Caribbean Community and the International Organization of la Francophonie have been approached in this regard.

37. Whatever happens, once a climate of security has been restored, we will have to proceed, alongside those members of political parties, civil society and the private sector who so wish, to the organization of elections to choose leaders to whom we will have to hand over power in the near future, as soon as the minimum conditions are in place.
