



安全理事会

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2022年10月10日安全理事会关于索马里的第751(1992)号决议所设
委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信

我谨代表安全理事会关于索马里的第751(1992)号决议所设委员会并根据安全理事会第2607(2021)号决议第41段，随信转递索马里问题专家小组的最后报告。

委员会提请安全理事会成员注意本信及报告并将它们作为安理会文件分发给为荷。

安全理事会关于索马里的
第751(1992)号决议所设
委员会主席

费加尔·迈森(签名)

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2022 年 9 月 1 日索马里问题专家小组给安全理事会关于索马里的第
751(1992)号决议所设委员会主席的信

谨根据安全理事会第 2607(2021)号决议第 41 段，随信转递应在 2022 年 10 月 15 日之前提交给安理会的索马里问题专家小组的最后报告。

协调员/武器专家

艾哈迈德·希米什(签名)

武装团体专家

约翰·彼得·黑曾伯格(签名)

武装团体/自然资源专家

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伊雷妮·拉奇蒂伊雷娜(签名)

财务专家

马修·罗斯博顿(签名)

摘要

青年党仍然是索马里和平、安全与稳定的最直接威胁。尽管索马里和国际部队一直在努力遏制青年党的行动能力，该团体在索马里开展复杂、不对称袭击的能力却始终没有减弱。此外，青年党 2022 年对埃塞俄比亚和肯尼亚的跨境攻势突出体现了该团体长期以来蓄意扩大对外攻击能力，并突显了其区域野心。在本报告所述期间，青年党继续控制索马里中部和南部的大片地区，甚至对部署了安全部队的地区施加影响，使安全部队难以清空和掌控青年党控制的城镇。通过这种方式，青年党继续拥有行动自由，得以开展伏击和安放简易爆炸装置，阻碍索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州公共服务和行政机构的部署。

索马里问题专家小组对青年党资金状况的调查继续帮助国际社会了解该团体的收入基础，包括在牲畜和财产等若干部门的种类繁多的勒索手法。专家小组评估认为，青年党依然有强大的财务状况，能够维持其叛乱行动。此外，青年党继续展示其创收能力，并在没有实际控制的地区、特别是在摩加迪沙等大型城市中心对企业和个人施加控制。这源自青年党对个人或社区的暴力威胁，以及该团体的金融架构没有遭遇持续的压力。专家小组没有收到报告表明索马里联邦政府及其金融机构在其安全部队传统军事行动之外尝试遏制青年党勒索战略。

推出了一种身份生物鉴别系统，以处理反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为的问题。尽管这是朝着改进了解客户制度的正确方向迈出的重要一步，但缺乏适足的监测、报告和调查能力及做法可能继续阻碍反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为部门的进展。需要采取全面的多机构办法来阻断青年党的资金。

对从青年党缴获的简易爆炸装置、武器和弹药的分析表明，该团体继续获取不间断非法供应，因为缴获的一些弹药的制造年份近在 2020 年。查明这些武器和弹药的确切来源和监管链对专家小组来说仍然是一个挑战，因为专家小组的大多数追查请求均无结果，其中一些物品可能使用仿制标记和序列号。迄今为止，专家小组查明的唯一路线仍是经由邦特兰的海上走私。

索马里联邦政府继续在制定武器和弹药管理流程方面取得进展，但处理从青年党缴获的武器的程序仍待落实。适当处理和分析缴获的武器对于查明流散风险和非法走私网络至关重要，这是制定潜在阻断技术的关键。

尽管委员会在索马里武器禁运和执行流程内制定了与部分解除禁运有关的强有力文书，但专家小组继续发现在索马里参与行动或培训的会员国存在不遵守现象。

在人道主义危机不断加深的背景下，索马里冲突各方、特别是青年党并未努力为人道主义行动提供便利。青年党控制的大部分地区仍然禁止人道主义工作者出入，而该团体利用宣传机器吹嘘自己对旱灾的应对并抹黑索马里境内的国际和当地人道主义救援行动体。

由于青年党在拜州和巴科勒州实施无情的经济封锁并使用滥杀滥伤武器，平民的生命和财产不断受到攻击，特别是当索马里冲突各方在平民居住区爆发冲突时。虽然青年党对涉及针对平民的违反国际人道法行为仍然负有最大责任，但也发生了联邦和州安全部队违反国际人道法和侵犯人权事件，特别是在邦特兰和加尔穆杜格。专家小组注意到，没有对这些违规事件进行调查。特别是青年党招募和绑架儿童，以及其他严重侵害儿童行为、包括性暴力继续构成索马里冲突的一个显著特点。

专家小组记录了 2018 年以来首次违反木炭禁令从索马里大规模出口木炭事件。尽管拥有木炭目的地市场的会员国采取措施，而且包括海上联合部队、欧洲联盟海军阿塔兰塔行动以及联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室(毒品和犯罪问题办公室)等国际行为体持续监测海上木炭交易情况，索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州限制大规模木炭出口的能力仍然存在差距。

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* 仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

一. 引言

A. 背景

1. 本报告载有专家小组 2021 年 12 月 16 日至 2022 年 9 月 7 日期间的调查结果。¹ 附件 1 概述了索马里制裁制度、任务、专家小组的任命以及在本报告所述期间访问的国家。

B. 方法

2. 专家小组努力确保符合安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组 2006 年 12 月的报告(见 S/2006/997)以及秘书长关于信息敏感性、分类和处理的公报(ST/SGB/2007/6)中建议的标准。证据标准和核查流程包括:

- (a) 尽可能从多个来源收集关于事件和主题的信息;
- (b) 尽可能从对事件有第一手了解的来源收集信息;
- (c) 确定信息模式的一致性,并将现有知识与新信息和新趋势进行比较;
- (d) 获取实物、照片、音频、视频和(或)文件证据,为收集的信息提供支持;
- (e) 酌情分析卫星图像。

3. 此外,根据非正式工作组的上述报告第 28 段,专家小组在报告起草过程中,视需要向所有各方提供了审阅、评论和回应的机会。

4. 专家小组承诺保持和促进与索马里联邦政府的关系,以确保在按照适用的方法标准框架履行调查任务时的合作和透明度。

二. 威胁索马里和平、安全和稳定的行为

A. 青年圣战运动(青年党)

青年党成员和结构的最新情况

5. 专家小组继续更新关于青年圣战运动(青年党)(SOe.001)结构的信息并查明潜在的领导层变动,以加深对该团体的了解。艾哈迈德·迪里耶,又名谢赫·艾哈迈德·乌马尔·阿布·乌拜达(SOi.014),继续担任青年党埃米尔。2022 年 7 月 8 日,青年党下属媒体在宰牲节庆祝活动期间发布了他的最新音频信息,其中谈到索马里的人道主义和政治问题,警告向非洲联盟驻索马里过渡时期特派团(非索过渡特派团)派遣部队的非洲国家,并表示该团体不承认索马里联邦政府为合法政府。² 2022 年 6 月中旬,大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国第四频道播放了对据

¹ 专家小组继续开展 S/2021/849 号文件中介绍的所有未尽调查。

² 青年党领导人引用美国在阿富汗的损失作为对非索过渡特派团的警告,并在 2022 年 7 月 8 日的宰牲节演讲中召集作战人员, <https://calamada.com/daawoamiirka-mujaahidiinta-oo-jeediyay-kalimad-muhiim-ah/>。

报青年党副领导人马哈德·卡拉特(SOi.020)的采访，他在采访中警告说，该团体仍然强大和团结，并谈及在青年党治下生活的诸多好处。³ 虽然一些非政府组织撰文阐述应该寻求与青年党对话，⁴ 但卡拉特在采访中排除了与索马里联邦政府谈判的想法。

6. 专家小组继续收集关于名单所列人员的补充信息，供委员会用来更新制裁名单。⁵ 专家小组 2021 年报告(S/2021/849)第 8 段和附件 2.1 指出，18 名列名的青年党行动人员中有 8 名疑似活跃。2022 年 2 月 18 日，该运动的发言人阿里·穆罕默德·拉格(SOi.021)也被列名。

7. 2022 年 7 月下旬，专家小组注意到，埃塞俄比亚声称已消灭若干青年党行动人员，包括 Fuad Mohamed Khalaf，又称 Fuad Shongole (SOi.005)。然而，2022 年 8 月 4 日，Shongole 在一段音频信息中否认了其死亡传言。⁶ 专家小组还注意到，根据谢赫在青年党控制城镇吉利卜发布的一段自拍视频，索马里兰的著名伊斯兰学者 Adan Abdirahman Warsame Sune 据报于 2022 年 3 月 15 日加入青年党。⁷

青年党在索马里的袭击

8. 青年党在本报告所述期间发动袭击的模式表明，该团体在索马里大部分地区、包括摩加迪沙都有存在和行动能力。如专家小组先前报告的那样，青年党的势力范围超出了其实际控制区。⁸ 此外，专家小组没有记录该团体在本报告所述期间在索马里实施不对称攻击的能力出现任何显著下降。

9. 在本报告所述期间，青年党展示了实施大规模复合式袭击的能力。然而，青年党的大多数袭击是使用不同类型的简易爆炸装置、自杀爆炸和间接火力袭击的小规模袭击，使其继续在实地和媒体保持存在。

青年党使用简易爆炸装置

10. 专家小组注意到，与 2021 年相比，2022 年简易爆炸装置活动没有重大或可持续的变化。具体而言，索马里的简易爆炸装置威胁在过去一年里并未大幅减少，自 2020 年以来，简易爆炸装置造成的伤亡人数逐年增加。2021 年，669 名索马

³ Jamal Osman “Inside Al-Shabaab: The extremist group trying to seize Somalia”，可查阅：<https://www.channel4.com/news/inside-al-shabaab-the-extremist-group-trying-to-seize-somalia>。

⁴ International Crisis Group, “Considering Political Engagement with Al-Shabaab in Somalia” Africa Report No. 309, 21 June 2011.

⁵ 见 www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials。

⁶ Somali Dispatch, “Sheikh Fu’ad Shongole dismisses rumors of his death”, 4 August 2022。可查阅：<https://www.somalidispach.com/latest-news/sheikh-fuad-shongole-dismisses-rumors-of-his-death/>。

⁷ <https://goobjoog.com/english/missing-somaliland-cleric-traced-to-al-shabaab-hotbed/>。

⁸ 见 S/2018/1002，第 83 段。

里人死于简易爆炸装置和战争遗留爆炸物，高于 2020 年的 501 人。⁹ 在 2022 年的头六个月里，已有至少 855 名人员伤亡¹⁰ 源自简易爆炸装置。¹¹

11. 此外，专家小组注意到，车载简易爆炸装置活动没有出现重大或可持续的变化。不过，2022 年上半年的此类事件致死人数是 2021 年下半年的两倍多。2022 年 1 月至 6 月，专家小组记录了 8 起车载简易爆炸装置事件，造成 209 人伤亡。¹² 车载简易爆炸装置事件所致伤亡人数的大幅增加主要源自青年党对 Ceel Baraf 的袭击，更多详情见下文第 17 段。据报，仅在这次袭击中，青年党就使用了三个车载简易爆炸装置。

12. 在本报告所述期间，使用人体携带简易爆炸装置或自杀式炸弹背心仍是一个令人关切的问题。青年党依靠此类装置破坏选举进程以及向新政府的过渡。然而，专家小组注意到，2022 年 5 月 15 日选举周期结束后，人体携带简易爆炸装置事件有所减少，这些事件造成的伤亡人数大幅下降。2022 年第二季度，专家小组记录了 2 起人体携带简易爆炸装置事件，而第一季度为 5 起。人体携带简易爆炸装置事件所致伤亡人数从 2022 年第一季度的 113 人下降到第二季度的 44 人。

13. 截至 2022 年 8 月初，随着向新政府过渡的完成，青年党继续使用车载和人体携带简易爆炸装置袭击政府官员。在第三季度的头三个星期，专家小组记录了 1 起车载简易爆炸装置事件和 2 起人体携带简易爆炸装置事件。2022 年 7 月 17 日，一个车载简易爆炸装置袭击了希尔谢贝利州行政当局使用的一家大型酒店。2022 年 7 月 27 日，青年党使用一个人体携带简易爆炸装置袭击了下谢贝利州马尔卡的县专员 Abdullahi Ali Waafow。¹³ 2022 年 7 月 29 日，青年党在拜多阿发动自杀式袭击，杀害了西南州司法部长哈桑·易卜拉欣·卢格布尔及其儿子和其他数人。¹⁴

青年党袭击政府房地

14. 2022 年 7 月 17 日，青年党成员使用一个车载简易爆炸装置对希尔谢贝利州乔哈尔的努尔杜布酒店发动自杀式袭击，造成 5 人死亡，10 多人受伤，其中包括现任和前任联邦和州部长。¹⁵ 该酒店毗邻总统府，是事实上的州政府总部。

15. 2022 年 3 月 23 日，青年党对希尔谢贝利州贝莱德文的地方政府总部发动自杀式袭击，杀害了反对派议员阿米娜·穆罕默德·阿卜迪，当时她正在竞选以保

⁹ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 4 月。

¹⁰ 这一伤亡数字包括平民、索马里武装部队成员以及非索过渡特派团部队。

¹¹ 联合国机密报告，2020 年、2021 年、2022 年。

¹² 联合国机密报告，2022 年 1 月至 7 月。

¹³ Omar Faruk (Associated Press), “Suicide bombing in Somalia kills 11 including local official”, *The Washington Post*, 27 July 2022.

¹⁴ “Somali Prime Minister condemns killing Southwest state minister of justice”, *Hiiraan Online*, 30 July 2022.

¹⁵ “Car bomb kills five at Somalia hotel: police”, *The Defense Post*, 18 July 2022, 可查阅：<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/07/18/car-bomb-somalia-hotel/>。

住自己在人民院的席位。随后，一名自杀炸弹手驾驶一辆满载炸药的汽车冲向聚集在地方医院救助第一次袭击中受伤者的人群。发生这些袭击的同一天，青年党对亚丁阿德国际机场所在的哈拉内营地发动袭击，2名伪装成机场工人的枪手在试图进入基地大门时遭到安全部队的拦阻。¹⁶ 至少6人在那次袭击中丧生。

复合式袭击

16. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组注意到青年党发动了4次复合式袭击。第一次发生在2022年2月中旬，青年党对相距14公里的两个不同地点同时发动袭击。青年党对贝纳迪尔州 Kadha 的一个警察局发动了一次袭击，对贝纳迪尔州 Darusalam 的 Heliwa 县专员住所发动了另一次袭击。在两次袭击中，青年党对周边的安全哨所发动了更多袭击，以阻止快速反应部队的部署。¹⁷ 这些双重袭击清楚表明该团体的持续意图、行动自由和在摩加迪沙外围发动袭击的能力，使索马里安全部队难以应对青年党在贝纳迪尔州以及下谢贝利州和中谢贝利州构成的威胁。

17. 第二次复合式袭击发生在2022年5月3日，青年党袭击了位于摩加迪沙以北约130公里的 Ceel Baraf 的一个布隆迪部队驻守的非索过渡特派团前沿行动基地。在这次袭击中，首先引爆了一个自杀式车载简易爆炸装置，随后发动徒步攻击，造成至少几十名布隆迪人伤亡。青年党声称击毙173名布隆迪士兵的说法是夸大其词。

18. 2022年8月19日，青年党对索马里摩加迪沙哈亚特酒店发动了协同的自杀式袭击。¹⁸ 这次袭击持续近30个小时，是该团体历史上最长的酒店围攻，造成至少21人死亡，100多人受伤。¹⁹ 青年党用两个自杀式车载简易爆炸装置发起围攻，然后派一个突击队突破外围防守进入酒店。据亲伊斯兰媒体报道，当安保和紧急救援人员抵达现场时，据报第三名自杀炸弹手袭击了应急响应人员。²⁰ 这是该团体自2021年1月袭击 Afrik 酒店以来在首都发动的首次酒店袭击，袭击采用了类似的作案手法，造成9人死亡。²¹

19. 关于2022年7月青年党在埃塞俄比亚的越境攻击信息，见下文第21段。

间接火力袭击

20. 在过去两年里，索马里平均每月大约发生6起迫击炮袭击。这些袭击的目标大多是非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(非索特派团)营地和摩加迪沙的哈拉内营地。

¹⁶ 见 <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-surge-in-somalia-s-suicide-attacks-change-of-tactics-experts-say/6503450.html>。

¹⁷ 见 <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-on-mogadishu-police-stations-leave-at-least-5-dead/6444293.html>。

¹⁸ 见 <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/world/africa/somalia-hotel-attack-shabab.html?>。

¹⁹ 见 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62621205>。

²⁰ 见 <https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HayatHotel.jpg>。

²¹ 见 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/31/somalias-al-shabab-rebels-attack-hotel-in-the-capital-city>。

2022 年的许多迫击炮袭击发生在摩加迪沙，可能是青年党试图破坏选举进程。2021 年 11 月 27 日，青年党向拜多阿的非索特派团保护区方向(联合国大院也在该处)发射了几枚迫击炮弹。有 5 枚迫击炮弹落在保护区内。没有人员伤亡报告。青年党声称对这次袭击负责，并表示目标是邻近的西南州总统府和拜多阿机场地区。当日恰逢拜多阿举行人民院选举的第一天。²² 2022 年 4 月 14 日，据报多枚疑似迫击炮弹落在摩加迪沙亚丁阿德国际机场的 Afisyoni 地区。袭击的目标是新议员预定宣誓就职的一个地区。²³ 2022 年 4 月 17 日，青年党在索马里议会的一次联合会议期间发动迫击炮袭击，造成至少 6 人受伤。²⁴

青年党的区域能力

埃塞俄比亚

21. 专家小组向委员会提交的中期最新情况报告指出，青年党试图通过在埃塞俄比亚增加招募和培训活动来扩大影响范围。初步估计大约有 100 至 250 名作战人员，²⁵ 专家小组获得的进一步信息表明，青年党在埃塞俄比亚的存在规模接近 1 000 名作战人员。²⁶

22. 2022 年 7 月 21 日，青年党在埃塞俄比亚境内发起了第一次多日攻势，袭击了至少三个、可能是四个埃塞俄比亚-索马里边境城镇。青年党声称占领了 Aato 和 Yeed 这两个城镇，据报杀害了埃塞俄比亚特别警察的若干成员，该警察是设在埃塞俄比亚索马里民族州的一支准军事部队。然而，这些袭击可能旨在转移注意力，目的是让分成多个小组的约 500 名青年党作战人员从其他城镇进入埃塞俄比亚。²⁷ 2022 年 7 月 25 日，青年党在埃塞俄比亚索马里民族州谢贝利区的 Feerfeer 县发动了第二次入侵，此地与索马里的希兰州和加尔古杜德州接壤。²⁸

23. 专家小组怀疑，青年党策划这一攻势已有数月之久，甚至可以追溯到 2021 年。例如，2022 年 5 月，青年党在索马里西南部至少 10 次用路边简易爆炸装置袭击埃塞俄比亚车队。在上述 10 次袭击中，8 次专门针对在边境城镇与索马里国民军或埃塞俄比亚军事基地之间行驶的车队。²⁹ 此外，在同一个月，埃塞俄比亚

²² 在拜多阿与消息人士的约谈，2022 年 1 月。

²³ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 4 月。

²⁴ 见 <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-claims-mortar-attack-on-somali-parliament/6534121.html>。

²⁵ 在内罗毕和摩加迪沙与安全官员的约谈，2022 年 4 月。

²⁶ 在内罗毕与安全官员的约谈，2022 年 7 月。

²⁷ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 7 月。

²⁸ 在索马里与安全官员的约谈，2022 年 7 月。

²⁹ 见 <https://radiorisaala.com/255712-2/>；另见 <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16397/Ciidamo-Xabashi-ah-oo-weeraro-jidgal-ah-iyo-qaraxyo-lagula-beegsaday-deegaanno-katirsan-Bakool-Warbixin>；另见 <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16423/Ciidamo-Itoobiyaan-ah-oo-lagu-weeraray-deegaanno-katirsan-Gedo-iyo-Bakool>，另见 <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16438/Ciidamo-Itoobiyaan-ah-oo-qaraxyo-lagula-beegsaday-duleedka-Ceelbarde>。

安全部门两次拦截了试图向该国走私武器的青年党成员，突出表明该团体可能努力于 2022 年 7 月的入侵建立补给线。³⁰

24. 青年党的跨境攻势突出体现了该团体长期以来蓄意扩大外部攻击能力，并突显了其区域野心。虽然最近的入侵不一定导致持续的叛乱活动，但青年党意识到埃塞俄比亚在多条战线上面临越来越大的威胁，可能会利用其势头进一步鼓动索马里民族州的反政府不满情绪，将自己打造为被控侵犯人权的埃塞俄比亚特别警察的更可行替代者。³¹

肯尼亚

25. 青年党继续在肯尼亚构成重大威胁，在边界地区对肯尼亚安全服务设施和平民实施打了就跑的袭击。2022 年，青年党在肯尼亚至少发动了 7 次袭击，所有袭击都与专家小组在 2020 年指出的模式一致。³² 也就是说，该团体以特定的个人为目标，包括“非当地人”和安全部队，同时使用滥杀滥伤武器，特别是简易爆炸装置。

26. 2022 年 1 月，青年党发动了 2 次简易爆炸装置袭击，一次发生在拉穆县基温加，另一次发生在曼德拉县阿拉伯-曼德拉高速公路沿线，造成 11 名平民死亡。³³ 同月，该团体在拉穆县 Milihoi 地区袭击了一支警察巡逻队，打死 4 名警察。³⁴ 该团体还声称对 2022 年 3 月 11 日发生在拉穆县一个建筑工地的袭击事件负责，袭击造成 5 人死亡。³⁵

27. 另外，专家小组注意到，2022 年 2 月 18 日，据信是青年党武装分子的武装男子绑架了曼德拉县菲诺的一名医务人员。³⁶ 除了这一新的绑架事件外，2019 年 4 月 12 日，2 名古巴医生在肯尼亚曼德拉附近被绑架，至今下落不明。³⁷ 这名医务人员和另外 2 名被绑架者被带到索马里，他们被确认为“当地人”，后被安然无恙地释放。

³⁰ 见 <https://sonna.so/en/2022/05/12/ethiopian-forces-foils-al-shabaab-attempt-tp-smuggle-arms-to-the-country/>; https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2022/May/186044/al_shabaab_members_captured_attempting_arms_smuggle_to_ethiopia.aspx。

³¹ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/ethiopia-police-unit-unlawfully-killing-people-must-be-stopped/>; 另见 S/2019/858，脚注 139。

³² 见 S/2020/949，第 55-58 段。

³³ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 1 月。

³⁴ 同上。

³⁵ “Three workers injured in Mandera IED attack”, 14 March 2022, *The Star* (Nairobi).

³⁶ “We hope he’s safe, says family of abducted Mandera clinician”, 21 February 2022. *The Star* (Nairobi).

³⁷ Reuben Kyama and Elisabeth Malkin “Cuban doctors abducted in Kenya, and officials point to Al-Shabaab”, 12 April 2019, *The New York Times*.

青年党与其他基地组织附属成员的关系

28. 专家小组未能证实青年党与刚果民主共和国或莫桑比克境内其他伊斯兰暴力团体之间存在任何具体关联或新关联的说法。然而，专家小组注意到青年党发布了宣传材料，表明该团体对基地组织的忠诚。2022年7月7日，索马里总统哈桑·谢赫·马哈茂德在土耳其表示，索马里联邦政府有“证据表明青年党筹集的资金被用于资助莫桑比克和尼日利亚境内的恐怖主义组织，其中一些被交给基地组织”。³⁸ 然而，专家小组没有发现支持这一说法的任何证据。另外，一个会员国向专家小组报告，其情报部门掌握青年党与也门阿拉伯半岛基地组织之间加强合作的信息；然而，专家小组尚未证实这一说法(更多信息见下文第82段)。

青年党中的妇女

29. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组约谈了来自西南成员州拜州和巴科勒州的女性青年党投诚者。通过这些约谈，获得了关于妇女在青年党中所起作用的更多信息。具体而言，女性投诚者告诉专家小组，虽然妇女通常被降为辅助角色，但她们充当天课收集者、伊斯兰学校教师和传教士以及监狱警卫，为青年党的治理系统做出了贡献。此外，妇女还通过为青年党作战人员充当厨师和清洁工、储存武器以及充当间谍来支持该团体的战斗活动。³⁹

30. 专家小组约谈的女性青年党投诚者对青年党控制区严峻的经济和人道主义局势、除药店和伊斯兰学校外普遍缺乏卫生和教育设施及其对生活行为的严格控制表示遗憾。然而，她们不断提到，保护子女不被招募及其在青年党行动中失去丈夫是促使她们投诚的一个关键因素。投诚者改造方案以及政府控制区内家庭或亲属的支持是受访者提到的重要拉动因素。

B. 索马里境内的伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国派系

31. 索马里境内的伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)派系仍有意在索马里开展行动。然而，据专家小组判断，该团体仅在邦特兰开展行动。尽管伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里分支据报参与了2022年1月24日针对摩加迪沙巴卡拉市场一名商人车辆的简易爆炸装置袭击，但专家小组未能证实该团体的说法。

32. 另外，2022年7月下旬，伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里分支发布了一个新的阿姆哈拉语宣传视频，重点是埃塞俄比亚，主要介绍来自该国的新兵参加一个身份不明的训练营，可能位于邦特兰。⁴⁰ 2019年，该团体宣布将发布阿姆哈拉语的圣战材料，可能意在支持埃塞俄比亚境内的招募。⁴¹ 该团体早在2017年就表示，其一些成员来自埃塞俄比亚。专家小组没有掌握任何信息，表明伊黎伊斯兰国-索马里

³⁸ 见 <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-financing-a-qaeda-groups-in-mozambique-and-nigeria-president>。

³⁹ 2022年2月至4月，与女性青年党投诚者进行了约谈。

⁴⁰ <https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1553452770526740482>。

⁴¹ 见 https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_under-pressure-militants-somalia-look-ethiopia/6174166.html。

分支在埃塞俄比亚境内开展活跃的行动，但认为该团体 2022 年 7 月的宣布时间与青年党侵入埃塞俄比亚-索马里边境的时间重合，可能并非巧合。

财务

33. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组继续调查伊黎伊斯兰国索马里分支的资金流动情况，并发现一个从索马里延伸到南非的金融便利化网络。具体而言，2021 年 8 月，阿卜迪里扎克·穆罕默德·阿卜迪·吉马勒被捕后，专家小组开始更多地了解他过去代表伊黎伊斯兰国进行的金融交易。吉马勒此前也曾为青年党工作，在 2019 年至 2020 年转账 400 000 美元，⁴² 并被控利用一家名为 Heeryo 贸易企业的公司在索马里和南非的身份不明人员之间转移资金。⁴³ 此外，目前在摩加迪沙服刑 15 年的吉马勒与索马里境内的伊黎伊斯兰国派系领导人、位于邦特兰的 Bilal Al-Sudani 保持联系。⁴⁴ 2022 年 2 月，专家小组致函索马里联邦政府和南非共和国，要求提供更多信息，但尚未收到回复。

C. 索马里联邦政府与联邦成员州之间的关系

针对“先知的信徒”开展的军事行动

34. 从 2021 年底到约 2022 年 5 月，索马里联邦政府援助的加尔穆杜格州部队与“先知的信徒”发生了几次冲突。前总统阿卜杜拉希·穆罕默德·法马约领导的索马里联邦政府避免将“先知的信徒”成员编入国家安全机构，而“先知的信徒”最近试图在选举期间在加尔穆杜格增强影响力的努力也遭到抵制。具体而言，2022 年 5 月下旬，“先知的信徒”与加尔穆杜格州部队在杜萨马雷卜发生冲突后，加尔穆杜格武装部队法院对“先知的信徒”的 18 名成员发出逮捕令。⁴⁵ 尽管“先知的信徒”领导层在 2021 年向专家小组表示愿意与索马里联邦政府达成协议，以便前者的民兵抗击青年党，但在前总统法马约任期的后半段没有举行此类讨论。与此同时，青年党利用加尔穆杜格的安全真空，在该州加强了对地方和政府安全部队的袭击，同时可能觊觎加尔穆杜格与埃塞俄比亚的边界地区，以扩展其领土野心。2022 年 6 月初，索马里总统哈桑·谢赫·马哈茂德宣布，其政府打算对青年党发动进攻，并指出了加尔穆杜格州部队在索马里联邦政府对青年党采取的未来任何军事行动中的重要性。⁴⁶

⁴² 见 <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/is-somalia-financier-slapped-with-15-year-imprisonment-by-military-court>。

⁴³ 同上。

⁴⁴ 邦特兰警方提供的信息。

⁴⁵ 见 <https://goobjoog.com/english/gamudug-military-court-issues-arrest-warrant-for-18-members-of-alhu-sunna-waljamaa/>。

⁴⁶ 见 <https://hiiraan.com/news4/2022/Jun/186472/hassan-sheikh-mohamud-urges-galmudug-to-lead-the-fight-against-al-shabaab.aspx>。

D. 安全部门

厄立特里亚训练的索马里新兵可能回返

35. 专家小组在 2021 年最后报告(S/2021/849)中重点指出，前总统领导的索马里联邦政府可能招募了多达 5 000 名索马里人，并在厄立特里亚接受未具体说明的军事训练。⁴⁷ 2022 年 7 月，总统前往厄立特里亚，看望上述新兵，并制定将他们送回索马里的计划。士兵返回时间表仍不明朗，索马里联邦政府打算如何将这新兵编入现有的索马里安全结构的计划尚未可知。安全理事会第 2628(2022)号决议强烈敦促索马里优先执行《索马里过渡计划》，该计划确立了部队组建的三个基准，第一个基准包括在 2022 年 12 月前招募 3 850 名新生力量。

打击青年党的军事行动

36. 自 2022 年 5 月索马里选举日历结束以及美利坚合众国决定再次向索马里派兵以来，索马里领导的打击青年党的军事行动有所增加。正如专家小组在 2021 年最后报告(S/2021/849)中报告的那样，与选举相关的事件突显了索马里国民军内部的分歧；然而，总统最近的声明表明，索马里联邦政府作出了打击青年党的新承诺。

37. 例如，自 2022 年 6 月以来，索马里国民军的达纳卜部队对青年党展开了至少 14 次进攻行动。⁴⁸ 此外，美国从 2022 年 6 月至 8 月发动了 4 次动能空袭，这是自美国宣布再次向索马里派出美国军人以来的第一次。⁴⁹

三. 青年党的资金

38. 青年党继续向索马里的企业和个人无情征税。专家小组一直详述青年党在索马里境内的勒索策略的成效。该团体能够在索马里全境实施勒索战略，包括在并未直接控制的地区，而无需显著改变方法，部分原因是索马里联邦政府在本报告所述期间未对青年党金融架构施加任何实质性压力。

39. 在目前的任务期间，调查表明青年党的勒索系统仍然稳固。漫长的选举周期导致政府减少了对抑制该团体的关注，从而为青年党继续猖獗开展非法征税和勒索活动提供了空间。该团体的财务状况依然健康，创造了足够的收入来维持叛乱

⁴⁷ 见 S/2021/849，第 45 段。

⁴⁸ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 1 月至 8 月，以及与索马里政府官员的约谈，2022 年 6 月。

⁴⁹ <https://africom-web-app.azurewebsites.net/pressrelease/34456/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>; <https://africom-web-app.azurewebsites.net/pressrelease/34612/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia-and-analysis-of-media-reports-june-july-2022>; <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/34660/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>; and <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/34670/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>。

活动。专家组注意到，有报道称，2022年5月，索马里特种部队在下谢贝利州的 Leego 和 Jameo 地区开展了更多活动，摧毁了青年党的勒索中心。⁵⁰

A. 资金流

40. 青年党的国内创收继续源自侧重于不同经济领域的四个主要非法征税制度。它们是农业、车辆、商品和牲畜。青年党还继续在这些地区采取多样化的勒索方法。

检查站收入

41. 专家组在 2021 年的报告中重点指出了青年党通过在索马里各地的检查站网络创收。⁵¹ 检查站网络仍然健全，是青年党收入的一个不可或缺的来源。该团体继续试图扩大这一网络，专家组在 2022 年 5 月注意到，青年党在希兰州贝莱德文镇东北约 50 公里处设立了一个新的检查站，以便对车辆及其在主要供应路线运输的商业货物进行勒索。⁵² 该团体根据沿途卡车运输的牲畜或商业货物类型，对每辆卡车收取 300 至 1 200 美元的初始非法税率。⁵³ 该团体继续为其勒索行为迅速开具收据。专家组收到 2022 年 2 月从基斯马尤前往多布里的一部车辆的收据，其中显示为所载商业货物(商品)支付了 975 美元，该车被归类为满载一般商品。⁵⁴ 同一辆车的第二张收据显示，为该车的实际通行支付了 450 美元(车辆)。青年党向驾驶一辆单轴 10 轮卡车将商业货物运送了约 245 公里的卡车司机共收取了 1 425 美元现金。附件 2(绝密)载有青年党收据的例子。

42. 2022 年 7 月 17 日，在美国空中支援下，索马里国民军的达纳卜特种部队打击了位于下朱巴州毗邻基斯马尤的 Labakuus 村的一个青年党检查站，⁵⁵ 该检查站用于对通行的商业车辆非法征税。在这次行动中，至少打死 4 名武装分子，抓获 1 名武装分子，并缴获了各种武器和金融作案工具。⁵⁶ 在专家组 2021 年的最后报告中，这一检查站被记录为青年党 100 多个检查站网络中的一个站点。⁵⁷

对住宅物业非法征税

43. 该团体使用的另一种非法征税方法是对住宅物业征税，专家组在西南州阿夫戈耶发注意到这种情况。根据向住户分发的通知，每户得知征税标准如下：石

⁵⁰ 见 <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/amid-eid-celebrations-sna-destroys-al-shabaab-extortion-centers>。

⁵¹ 见 S/2021/849，第 54-58 段。

⁵² 联合国机密报告，2022 年 5 月。

⁵³ 同上。

⁵⁴ 专家组在本任务期间获得的青年党收据。

⁵⁵ 见 <https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2022/July/government-forces-killed-five-al-shabaab-militants>。

⁵⁶ 见 https://mobile.twitter.com/1_Danab_media/status/1548759241904750592。

⁵⁷ 见 S/2021/849，附件 3.1(绝密)，位于索马里基斯马尤 Yaaq Bulle 附近的检查站，检查站在 Labakuus。

头房子 150 美元，多层房子 300 美元，铁皮房子 100 美元。住户被告知，“如收到此通知，请在 24 小时内回复”，并收到了“如要了解更多的信息或投诉”可联系该团体的电话号码。附件 3 载有该法令及其英文译本。

44. 专家小组记录了 2022 年 5 月在中谢贝利州乔哈尔和马哈代县一些村庄对住户非法征税情况。首先是对当地企业非法征税，这些企业被勒令披露财富，并按 2.5% 的税率缴税。⁵⁸ 然后，该团体对每个住户征收 30 美元的统一税率，无论收入和家庭规模如何。⁵⁹

勒索摩加迪沙新开发的房产

45. 青年党还对摩加迪沙地区内正在施工的建筑物和财产的业主进行勒索。与摩加迪沙地区的开发商和业主的约谈显示，当施工进行时，该团体会打电话给业主，提出非法征税要求，通常是该团体所知开发项目最终价值的 25%。⁶⁰ 然后，业主在摩加迪沙郊外 Qoryooley 与该团体举行会议，谈判商定最后数额。在谈判后，一家开发商向该团体支付了 10 000 美元现金，用于价值 170 000 美元的房产开发。⁶¹

向青年党付款的理由

46. 专家小组在其任务期间经常提出的一个问题是，个人和企业为何继续向青年党支付勒索款项。主要原因是政府没有向个人和企业提供安保，使他们能够拒绝青年党。⁶² 由于青年党的行动人员和线人网络以及高渗透率，个人和企业无法举报或识别该团体。⁶³ 在摩加迪沙，青年党通过制造恐惧来强硬地勒索企业和个人，而无须在军事上控制该市。2021 年，金融报告中心设立了一条举报青年党勒索行为的匿名举报热线。然而，由于上述安全顾虑，这条热线几乎无人使用。⁶⁴

47. 专家小组注意到，在城市和农村地区，对青年党勒索要求的一些零星抵制立即遭遇后果。2022 年 6 月，在贝纳迪尔东南部 Sheikh Ibrahim 市场的 Tabelaha，一家企业拒绝向青年党付款，导致一个简易爆炸装置在企业房舍内被引爆。⁶⁵

48. 专家小组收到来自加尔穆杜格州 Baxdo 的报告，当地牧民在当前旱灾压力下拒绝了青年党的勒索要求，结果该团体在 2022 年袭击社区、绑架和杀害牧民并抢掠牲畜。

⁵⁸ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 5 月和 6 月。

⁵⁹ 同上。

⁶⁰ 业主不知道是谁向青年党透露了开发项目价值。

⁶¹ 与索马里开发商、情报人员和官员的约谈，摩加迪沙，2022 年 7 月。

⁶² 与被青年党勒索的个人进行的系列约谈。

⁶³ 同上。

⁶⁴ 在摩加迪沙与政府官员的约谈，2022 年 7 月。

⁶⁵ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 6 月。

49. 在治理良好、长老和部族建立了包容性行政机构的农村地区，青年党较难实施勒索战略。在索马里南部和中部，包括摩加迪沙，建立一个团结、强化的安全部门是制止青年党残酷勒索民众和企业的关键。

B. 资金的储存和转移

50. 青年党在如何转移资金和利用现有最有效手段，即现金、移动货币、汇款运营商和银行方面采取了务实的方法。该团体行动人员开设银行账户来存储和提取他们得到的资金，并利用移动货币系统支付费用和分发部分工资。然而，现金是该团体调动资金的最主要方式，大部分勒索资金都以现金收取，而且存取款都是以现金进行。该团体对现金的依赖是索马里联邦政府、私营部门和合作伙伴可以打击的一个领域，以达到阻断目的。

51. 专家小组看到，该团体为避免引起当局怀疑和向索马里金融报告中心举报而作了一些初步努力。⁶⁶ 一个用于存入摩加迪沙勒索活动资金的银行账户显示，每天从不同银行连续提取了 9 500 美元现金。将金额保持在 10 000 美元的报告限额以下可避免触发创建大额现金交易报告并发送给金融情报部门。⁶⁷ 然而，被勒索人员存入账户的存款往往超过 10 000 美元，无论如何都会触发报告。

C. 支出

52. 人力资源是青年党的持续开支。专家小组调查了青年党在下谢贝利州向低级别作战人员支付的工资，所记录的收入为每月 60 至 100 美元。级别较高的财务人员工资较高，所记录的月收入为 150 至 250 美元。⁶⁸ 专家小组没有发现关于青年党高层收入的资料；然而，索马里联邦政府最近发布的反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为国家风险评估报告指出，青年党埃米尔每月收入为 25 000 美元。⁶⁹

53. 青年党估计有 5 000 至 10 000 名作战人员，⁷⁰ 考虑到 75% 的低级别行动人员和 25% 的中级行动人员的平均工资分别为 75 美元和 200 美元，该团体每月仅维持工资发放就需要 531 250 至 100 万美元。

54. 专家小组在本报告所述期间查明，青年党分发了一份题为“住户普查”的表格。专家小组记录了在下谢贝利州分发的这些表格。这些表格由政治和省级事务部分发，据专家小组了解，财务部门利用这一信息向个人及其家庭征收相关税款。该文件收集了关于家庭状况和财富的详细资料，包括家庭收入来源、子女人数、技能和教育、资产、牲畜数量和海外汇款。专家小组没有掌握该文件的总体分发程度。然而，这份文件突出体现了该团体用来收集家庭和住户信息的方法，该团体用这些信息来评估勒索数额。附件 4 载有一份普查表格副本。

⁶⁶ 根据反洗钱/打击资助恐怖主义行为法，银行必须向金融报告中心汇报超过 10 000 美元的交易。

⁶⁷ 专家小组审查的青年党账户交易模式，2022 年 3 月。

⁶⁸ 与青年党前人员、处理投诚者的索马里情报人员的约谈和专家小组审查的联合国机密报告。

⁶⁹ 见 <https://frc.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NRA-Report-2022.pdf> (第 106 页)。

⁷⁰ 见 <https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujahideen-al-shabaab> and <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-08/somalia-5.php>。

四. 公共和私营部门财务管理

55. 索马里继续努力达到国际货币基金组织(基金组织)重债穷国倡议的完成点。2022年5月15日的索马里选举刚好在5月17日该倡议最后期限之前举行,意味着索马里联邦政府勉强避免了倡议进程可能脱轨的情况。⁷¹ 大多数倡议触发因素和结构性基准均已步入正轨,预计将于2023年年中前完成。⁷² 然而,有些触发因素取决于索马里议会通过的法案,这些法案由于最近选举而被推迟。⁷³ 一旦达到完成点,索马里的外债应从56%下降到6%,该国将可能被归类为“中等债务压力风险”。⁷⁴

56. 随着重债穷国倡议进程取得积极进展,财政部宣布2022年预算为9.18亿美元,高于2021年分配的6.71亿美元。⁷⁵

57. 2022年7月,索马里中央银行向两家国际银行——土耳其的 Ziraat Katilim 和埃及的 Banque Misr——颁发牌照,使其成为在索马里设立分行的首批外国银行。⁷⁶ 就国内金融竞争以及利用代理行和国际收支服务而言,这对索马里来说是一个积极的步骤。

A. 身份证件

58. 索马里金融业有效遵守“了解客户”制度⁷⁷的一个障碍是缺乏国家身份证件。公共和私营部门实体都认为,这是处理青年党资金问题的一个障碍。⁷⁸ 该国缺乏国民身份证件被反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为国家风险评估列为三个最高级别脆弱性之一。⁷⁹ 在全球范围内,索马里没有国民身份证的人口比例最高,2018年,77%的人口没有官方的个人身份证明。⁸⁰ 专家小组2020年的报告重点指出了青年党在开设银行账户前不久获取个人身份证件的做法。⁸¹ 青年党能够通过开

⁷¹ 见 <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/03/07/pr2262-imf-staff-completes-mission-to-discuss-reviews-of-extended-credit-facility-to-somalia>。

⁷² 与索马里财政部举行的会议,摩加迪沙,2022年7月。

⁷³ 这些包括定向金融制裁法和颁布相关条例。

⁷⁴ 与世界银行官员的约谈,2022年3月。

⁷⁵ 见 <https://mof.gov.so/index.php/publications/appropriation-act-2022-budget-draft>。

⁷⁶ 见 <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-04/foreign-banks-issued-licenses-in-somalia-for-the-first-time>。

⁷⁷ “了解客户”是银行通过护照等身份证件确认客户身份的业务程序。

⁷⁸ 专家小组在2021年报告中报告的与金融报告中心、索马里银行家协会、财政部和私营部门的约谈,见 S/2021/849,第73段。

⁷⁹ 见 <https://frc.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NRA-Report-2022.pdf>。

⁸⁰ 见世界银行,2018年身份识别促进发展数据集,可查阅: <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/identification-development-global-dataset>。

⁸¹ 见 S/2020/949,第30段。

设和操作银行账户来颠覆索马里金融体系是因为目前没有集中的个人身份数据库。个人可从州市办公室获得身份证件，发放标准各不相同。⁸²

59. 身份识别系统目前的脆弱性使金融机构更难有效开展“了解客户”行动以及遵守反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为条例。据一个金融实体向专家小组报告，一些个人为了开设银行账户，有时出示显示不同姓名的三份不同的身份证件，私营机构很难处理这种情况。⁸³ 政府官员向专家小组指出，因此，国民身份证件必须具备生物鉴别功能，以减少篡改风险。⁸⁴ 在索马里兰，政府向大多数民众发放了有效的身份证，今后可与其他政府服务关联起来。⁸⁵

60. 虽然这将是向前迈出的重要一步，但如果不对洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为进行全面监测、报告和调查，单凭生物鉴别身份证件无法解决目前在阻断青年党资金方面的缺陷。采用多机构办法查明模式、分享信息和冻结资产是关键所在。金融报告中心就尚未对青年党的资金状况进行重大调查。

B. 洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为国家风险评估

61. 2022 年 5 月，索马里金融报告中心发布了一份长达 120 页的国家风险评估文件，以查明、评估和了解索马里境内洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为国家风险，并提出协调行动以确保有效化解风险。⁸⁶ 报告坦率描述了索马里金融部门目前的脆弱性。⁸⁷ 该报告涵盖 18 个领域，为每个行业领域提出了多项建议。⁸⁸

62. 国家风险评估指出，索马里无法加快对洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为的调查，因为机构之间的互动脱节，而且金融报告中心和其他机构内部缺乏调查能力。曾起诉资助恐怖主义者的唯一法院是军事法庭，该法庭针对资助者和其他青年党行动人员提供了某种形式的司法。然而，索马里军事法庭有时被控没有达到独立和公正的国际公平审判标准，并在其管辖范围之外运作。⁸⁹

63. 一些索马里国内机构反对发布国家风险评估，认为该文件过于宽泛，建议过多。⁹⁰ 该报告也没有得到索马里议会下院国家反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为委员会的核可，但得到了财政部长的核可。

⁸² 一名政府官员向专家小组指出，他们一天可拿到 20 份不同的出生证明，摩加迪沙，2022 年 7 月。

⁸³ 2022 年 3 月与索马里金融机构高管的约谈。

⁸⁴ 索马里中央银行正与世界银行合作，为金融部门建立一个电子核查系统。

⁸⁵ 2022 年 5 月专家小组对索马里兰的访问。

⁸⁶ 根据金融行动特别工作组建议 1，评估风险并采用基于风险的方法。

⁸⁷ 关于资助恐怖主义行为，报告指出，“青年党的魔爪伸向国家经济系统的每个领域，包括司法系统和国家情报部门。这使青年党得以行使权力，创造收入和维持控制”。

⁸⁸ 在摩加迪沙与金融报告中心主任的约谈，2022 年 7 月。

⁸⁹ 见 <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-fears-somalia-s-military-court-judge-says-/6397204.html>。

⁹⁰ 2022 年 7 月在摩加迪沙与政府官员的约谈。

C. 国内征税

64. 索马里联邦政府继续发展自身的征税系统，因为增加国内税收是当务之急。⁹¹ 然而，部族动态可能使政府征税工作复杂化，因为纳税人怀疑掌权部族会将过多的资源用于自己的部族。自 2019 年签署《国家收入法》以来，国内收入已从 2019 年的 1.42 亿美元增加到 2022 年的约 2.5 亿美元。今后，国内创收努力将侧重于银行、哈瓦拉和电信业，以增加收入。⁹² 税务机关仍然缺乏资源，无法发现、防止和有效执行税法。此外，该国的大多数经济活动是非正式活动，意味着青年党的勒索系统将继续有效运作。⁹³ 随着国内税收的增加，与青年党针对财政状况本已拮据的民众的财政资源争夺也在加剧，在这种情况下，索马里联邦政府、青年党和商界之间的紧张关系可能愈演愈烈。

D. 正规银行部门内的信息共享

65. 当银行发现或知悉青年党的银行账户时会进行调查，银行最终将关闭账户。首先，银行会以书面形式提醒账户持有人，将在一定时间内关闭账户。银行内部正在查明一些可疑账户是一个积极的步骤。然而，这一流程的缺陷是没有与任何其他实体共享此信息。采取这一独立行动的原因是，银行不愿与政府金融机构和其他私营机构分享这一信息，因为担心可能导致青年党对银行房地和雇员进行报复性袭击。目前，银行之间没有安全共享信息的具体机制，⁹⁴ 索马里没有制定数据保护法。最近的索马里反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为国家风险评估指出，银行和汇款局仍未报告与洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为风险相称的可疑交易报告和大额现金交易报告。

E. 移动货币

66. 在索马里，移动货币的获取和使用对人口和经济至关重要。超过 70% 的人口使用移动货币服务，索马里超过三分之二的支付通过移动货币平台进行，占该国国内生产总值的 36%。⁹⁵ 特别是对于无法使用正规金融系统的个人⁹⁶ 以及中小企业而言，使用移动货币对获得进一步资金和增长意义重大。⁹⁷ 然而，专家小组

⁹¹ 同上。

⁹² 与财政部长的约谈，摩加迪沙，2022 年 7 月。

⁹³ 据索马里洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为国家风险评估报告，60% 的经济是非正规经济，见 <https://frc.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NRA-Report-2022.pdf>。

⁹⁴ 索马里中央银行 2022 年 7 月提供的信息。

⁹⁵ 见世界银行报告，<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975231536256355812/pdf/replacement-public-somalia-economic-update-3-final.pdf> 以及索马里国际风险评估，第 84 段。

⁹⁶ 只有 15% 的索马里人能够使用正规金融系统。

⁹⁷ Abdinur Ali Mohamed, Mohamed Ibrahim Nor, “Assessing the effects of the mobile money service on small and medium sized enterprises: study on EVC-Plus Services in Somalia”, *American Journal of Industrial and Business Management*, Vol.11 No.5 (May 2021).

在 2020 年和 2021 年报告中重点指出，青年党在本任务期间继续使用移动货币。对青年党和向该团体进行支付者而言，移动货币都是最快捷、最方便的转账形式。

67. 一些移动货币供应商对每日交易设置了上限以减轻一些风险，其他供应商则没有设置交易上限。⁹⁸ 移动货币钱包还可连接到个人和企业银行账户，提供资金互操作性和无限转账额。

68. 对行业的监管仍在继续，并由索马里中央银行负责。其官员认为，对该部门进行全面监管是当务之急。两家最大的移动货币运营商已获牌照，2020 年初向一家支付服务供应商 Hormuud 电信发放了首个牌照。⁹⁹ 中央银行正在实施一个两阶段监管流程。第一个阶段涉及制定一个强有力的监管框架。目前的持牌实体在发照之日起 24 个月内须遵守 44 项具体监管要求，据中央银行预计，到 2023 年第三季度将实现完全合规。¹⁰⁰ 第二阶段涉及确保移动货币运营商实现完全互操作性。¹⁰¹

69. 索马里中央银行需要资源来监管索马里移动货币部门。据世界银行报告，每月的移动货币交易数估计为 1.55 亿笔，价值约 27 亿美元，¹⁰² 随着继续执行条例，中央银行需要监控和调查的交易数量庞大。

70. 在移动货币行业中，出于了解客户目的查明消费者仍然困难，因此篡改风险很高。使用移动货币服务仅需一张显示个人姓名和出生日期的移动电话用户识别卡。

71. 私营金融部门继续开发系统以获取国际认证，Hormuud 电信于 2022 年 1 月获得了全球移动通信系统协会移动货币认证，这是索马里首例，也是全球 17 个获此认证的供应商之一。¹⁰³

索马里联邦政府、联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室及专家小组资金阻断计划

72. 第 2607(2021)号决议第 2 段请索马里联邦政府、联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室(毒品和犯罪问题办公室)及专家小组继续就青年党的资金情况交换信息，并继续与利益攸关方合作制定计划以阻断青年党的资金及其对合法金融系统的利用。

73. 联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室于 2021 年向金融报告中心提供了初步为期 12 周的阻断规划方法课程。此阻断规划方法可用作确定当前阻断差距和机会的基础。

⁹⁸ 根据 2019 年《移动货币条例》第 24 条，索马里中央银行可对移动货币供应商设置交易限制。

⁹⁹ 索马里中央银行 2022 年 7 月提供的信息。

¹⁰⁰ 这将超过最初的 24 个月宽限期。

¹⁰¹ 索马里中央银行 2022 年 7 月提供的信息。

¹⁰² 见世界银行 <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975231536256355812/pdf>。

¹⁰³ 全球移动通信系统协会证书副本已与专家小组分享，并于 2022 年 3 月存档，另见 <https://gsmamobilemoneycertification.com/certified-mmmps/>。

然而，只有金融报告中心的代表参与了阻断规划方法。这一流程应该是一个多机构办法，以扩大阻断成果范围。附件 5 载有关于开展培训活动的资料。

74. 专家小组从索马里联邦政府及毒品和犯罪问题办公室收到关于阻断计划状况的最新资料，但由于其任务授权的调查性质以及当前流程侧重于能力建设，专家小组并不是该进程的积极参与者。

五. 武器禁运

75. 专家小组继续分析和追查索马里和国际部队缴获的武器和弹药以及分析该团体下属媒体的宣传素材，以此监测青年党所用武器的演变情况。专家小组的目的是查明这些武器和弹药的来源，以及参与向青年党、索马里的伊黎伊斯兰国以及其他武装团体和民兵非法供应上述武器弹药的网络。青年党在宣传中声称，其武器和弹药是从索马里国民军和国际部队缴获的。然而，如下文所述，青年党很可能主要利用走私网络来建立军火库。

A. 青年党使用的武器和弹药

在青年党宣传视频中观察到的武器

76. 在青年党发布的一段视频中，¹⁰⁴ 显示了该团体在索马里的“卡西姆·里米”训练营，¹⁰⁵ 专家小组注意到，使用了突击步枪和小型机枪，多与中国制造的 56-1 式、56-2 式和 80 式(苏式 PKM 7.62×54 的一个版本)特征相似，还使用了 2005 年制造的保加利亚 PG-7 M 子弹(见附件 6)。

追查从青年党缴获的武器和弹药

77. 虽然非索特派团和后来的非索过渡特派团已开始定期向专家小组提供关于从青年党缴获的武器的宝贵信息，但索马里联邦政府尚未就索马里国民军行动期间据报缴获的若干武器分享信息。非索特派团和非索过渡特派团分享了一份清单，其中包括 55 件有可识别序列号的武器、9 支无标记的步枪、5 个火箭榴弹发射器以及 7.62x39 小武器弹药的字样标记。

从索马里安全部队缴获或流散的突击步枪

78. 专家小组查明，1 支手枪和 12 支突击步枪的序列号与交付给索马里联邦政府的武器序列号相符或非常接近，上述武器占缴获武器的约 20%。更多详情见附

¹⁰⁴ 从脸书帐户下载的媒体；专家小组不分享链接，以免传播暴力极端主义媒体。

¹⁰⁵ 被伊黎伊斯兰国(达伊沙)和基地组织制裁委员会列名的也门和前半岛基地组织领导人(QDi.282)。

件 7。专家小组注意到，这些武器中有 3 件印有国家情报和安全局标记，2 件印有索马里国民军标记，5 件印有青年党标记。¹⁰⁶

近年制造的弹药

79. 专家小组从非索过渡特派团收到 2022 年 4 月 27 日该特派团在索马里下朱巴州的一次行动中从青年党作战人员缴获的 7.62x39 口径小武器弹药照片。专家小组注意到，一些弹药是最近制造的，见下图，附件 8 载有其他较老字样的详情。¹⁰⁷ 专家小组向波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那、中国、罗马尼亚和俄罗斯联邦发函进行追查。专家小组还致函非索过渡特派团，询问其特遣队是否使用印有这些字样的弹药筒。

80. 专家小组获悉，印有 SADU 09 字样的弹药筒出口到一个西非国家和美国，而印有 RSD 18 字样的弹药筒则于 2018 年和 2019 年交付给美国陆军部。专家小组致函美国，要求提供资料，说明这批弹药是否供应给美国、索马里或在索马里开展行动的国际部队。












81. 中国告知专家组，“由于弹药筒上的标记特征有限，我们无法确认所要求的信息。与此同时，我们认为，由于子弹生产工艺简单，仿制可能性很大”。专家小组认为，弹药筒字样标记仍是联合国大会 2005 年为支持《从各个方面防止、打击和消除小武器和轻武器非法贸易的行动纲领》而通过的《使各国能够及时可靠地识别和追查非法小武器和轻武器国际文书》的一个可靠工具。¹⁰⁸ 安理会在第 2220(2015)号决议第 11 段中敦促会员国，除其他外，与协助制裁委员会的专家组分享有关非法转让、不利于稳定地积累或滥用小武器和轻武器的信息。

¹⁰⁶ 专家小组在审查了从青年党缴获的武器后注意到，该团体有自己的标记。具体而言，该团体使用“XSH”（青年党）作为其武器标记。专家小组观察到 5 种流通标记：XSH-43337；XSH-43361(15003386)；XSH-43359(60013158)；XSH-43354(15005828)；XSH-14058(563526021)。

¹⁰⁷ 生产年份：波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那(2019 年)；中国(2009、2015、2017、2019 和 2020 年)；罗马尼亚(2018 年)；俄罗斯联邦(2015、2018 和 2019 年)。

¹⁰⁸ A/CONF.192/15。更多背景信息，见 <https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/>。

图
通过《行动纲领》后生产的 7.62x39 弹药筒字样

			
811 20 中国 2020	811 19 中国 2019	IK 19 波斯尼亚和 黑塞哥维那: 2019	3 19 俄罗斯联邦 2019
			
RSD 18 罗马尼亚 2018	3 18 俄罗斯联邦 2018	811 17 中国 2017	311 17 中国 2017
			
811 15 中国 2015	7.62x39 15 俄罗斯 2015 ^a	61 09 中国 2009	

^a 与 Klimovsk 专业弹药厂的标记一致, 见 <https://forum.cartridgecollectors.org/t/solved-identified-7-62x39-mm-klimovsk-russia/22495>。

青年党使用重武器

82. 一个会员国向专家小组通报, 也门的阿拉伯半岛基地组织与索马里的青年党之间合作最近有所增加。来文方告知专家小组, 也门的阿拉伯半岛基地组织目前收留了大约 80 名青年党作战人员, 参加爆炸物制造、军事管理和重型武器使用方面的培训课程。同一来文方告知专家小组, 来自也门的同等数量的半岛基地组织作战人员目前在索马里与青年党并肩作战。然而, 来文方没有提供任何证据支持这一说法。专家小组将监测由于这一可能的事态发展而发生的战术或所用武器的变化。

可能从也门向索马里走私“巴松管”和“梅蒂斯”反坦克制导导弹

83. 专家小组收到的情报显示, 存在从第三国经也门向索马里走私反坦克制导导弹及其发射器的情况。专家小组从邦特兰安全部门获得了走私武器的照片, 其中包括三枚反坦克制导导弹和两个发射器。发射器的标记与 9П135 和 9П135M 型

反坦克制导导弹发射器的标记相似，而反坦克制导导弹的标记与 9M115“梅蒂斯”的标记相似，见附件 9。据也门问题专家小组报告，胡塞武装普遍收到了 9M113 Konkurs 和 9M133 Kornet 的反坦克制导导弹变型版本。由于 9M11 “巴松管”和 9M115 “梅蒂斯”反坦克制导导弹在第 2216(2015)号决议规定的武器禁运之前是也门武库的一部分，这些导弹可能是被也门军火贩运者交付给索马里。专家小组致函俄罗斯联邦，请其协助确认这些导弹及其发射器是否已供应给也门。

使用 107 毫米火箭弹或 63 型

84. 专家小组注意到，2022 年 6 月 9 日，在总统选举期间，摩加迪沙一个居民区遭到 7 枚 107 毫米火箭弹袭击。据国际部队评估，火箭弹是从相距 13 公里的附近地点发射的，距离亚丁阿德国际机场约 10 公里，是 107 毫米火箭弹的射程。如果青年党打算袭击议会开会选举总统的 Afisyoni 地区，则火箭弹落在了不到预定目标 3.5 公里的地方。

从非洲联盟驻索马里过渡时期特派团缴获的重型武器

85. 青年党还从非索过渡特派团的 Ceel Baraf 基地缴获了 1 个 ZU-23 毫米迫击炮发射器和 2 个 120 毫米迫击炮发射器。专家小组获悉，青年党在 2022 年 6 月 17 日袭击 Baxdo 期间，对位于杜萨马雷卜的索马里国民军基地和非索过渡特派团基地发射了同样的迫击炮弹，该团体在复合式袭击中使用这一战术以阻止快速反应部队的移动。上述袭击后来于 2022 年 6 月 19 日被当地民兵击退，青年党遭受巨大损失并被缉获车载简易爆炸装置，见下文第 106 段。

B. 索马里联邦政府遵守部分解除武器禁运义务的情况

武器和弹药管理

86. 专家小组参加了 2022 年 3 月 19 日和 20 日在摩加迪沙举行的武器和弹药管理会议。2022 年 7 月 20 日，专家小组与联合国评估小组¹⁰⁹ 一道，自 2018 年 8 月 25 日以来首次访问了哈拉内中央军械库。虽然没有时间对手写日志进行彻底分析，但专家小组评估，武器和弹药接收和分发的记录和登记流程已经建立。专家小组审查了表格和日志，其中显示，在国防军司令的领导下，向索马里国家安全部队所有单位(即：索马里国民军、索马里警察部队、国家情报和安全局及看守部队)进行了集中接收和分发。安理会第 2607(2021)号决议第 39 段请专家小组向委员会提出关于如何支持索马里联邦政府管理武器和弹药、包括努力设立全国轻小武器委员会的建议。一旦完成向新政府的过渡，专家小组将在一份专题报告中提交这一资料，并纳入索马里联邦政府的意见。

87. 专家小组注意到，在实体安全和储存管理措施方面取得了重大进展。通过实地访问，专家小组观察到哈拉内中央军械库进行了重新配置，以更安全的方式储

¹⁰⁹ 安理会在第 2607(2021)号决议第 42 段中，请秘书长不迟于 2022 年 9 月 15 日，在完成对索马里武器和弹药管理能力的技术评估后，向安理会提出进一步改进这一能力的建议，并就如何订立清晰明确和现实的基准阐述各种可选方案。

存弹药，以及在杰济 TUKSOM 营地附近的亚丁阿德国际机场外修建了一个新的弹药储存设施。地雷行动司和光环信托组织在支持这一努力方面发挥了重要作用。

88. 专家小组在现场观察到，贝纳迪尔的索马里警察部队持有的共计 6 000 多件武器上已有标记，尽管一些较小的单位存在一些遗漏。¹¹⁰ 专家小组还注意到支点数据库投入运作，有助于清楚了解向索马里警察部队部署武器的情况。如专家小组中期报告所述，尚未开始对朱巴兰和邦特兰的索马里警察部队、索马里国民军部队、国家情报和安全局以及看守部队持有的武器进行标识。

89. 同样，关于在索马里管理追回的轻小武器的标准作业程序尚未落实。¹¹¹ 非索特派团和现在的非索过渡特派团已经定期与专家小组分享从青年党缴获的武器和弹药的资料和照片。关于非索特派团在 2019 年初至 2022 年 3 月从青年党缴获的 600 多件武器和其他军用物品的初步信息不包括完整标记和序列号，否则专家小组本可据此向制造国提出适当的追查请求。¹¹² 如上文第 77 段所述，非索过渡特派团后来分享的信息有助于更好的分析和追查。专家小组已与非索过渡特派团商定，定期更新缴获武器的情况。

90. 专家小组还记录了索马里联邦政府和索马里安全部队下属媒体的报告，其中表示，2021 年 10 月至 2022 年 8 月 28 日，600 多名青年党行动人员被消灭或投诚(见附件 10)。据专家小组评估，由于这些行动，可能已从青年党缴获了 600 多件武器。专家小组感到遗憾的是，尽管多次提出书面和口头要求，但索马里联邦政府没有提供显示缴获的武器和弹药标记或序列号的任何信息。专家小组亦未看到任何证据，表明这些武器是否已被放入索马里国家安全部队的武器库，并作了适当的标记、记录和登记。

91. 索马里联邦政府建立了一个新的缴获武器数据库，目前的配置是接受关于武器、弹药和简易爆炸装置及其部件的数据。该系统是在冲突军备研究所的支助下建立的，旨在成为一个中央资源库，索马里安全部队的多个分支以及非索过渡特派团可潜在作出贡献并从中受益，促进信息交流和分析流程。目前，索马里联邦政府已将非索过渡特派团传输给索马里联邦政府的缴获武器信息和图片输入数据库。

关于武器和弹药交付的通知

92. 自专家小组于 2021 年 9 月 6 日提交 2021 年最后报告(S/2021/849)以来，从土耳其向索马里联邦政府交付了 3 批武器和弹药。附件 11(绝密)显示了通知详情，包括与这几批货物有关的通知详情。

¹¹⁰ 专家小组考察的一个索马里警察特种部队储存了不到 12 支这些步枪；所有步枪均无标记。

¹¹¹ 2021 年 6 月 29 日，非索特派团和索马里联邦政府国家安全办公室商定了标准作业程序。

¹¹² 只有分享了照片的一把步枪可用于追查目的以确定来源。

93. 自 2013 年部分解除武器禁运以来，专家组和联合核查小组继续更新索马里联邦政府正式进口的武器和弹药相关综合数据库。¹¹³ 根据这一数据库，自 2013 年以来，联邦政府正式接收了约 27 000 件武器和 8 010 万发弹药，包括约 70 000 发 RPG-7 子弹。¹¹⁴

94. 在本报告所述期间，除来自中国的卡车和车辆外，没有收到军事装备交付的通知。索马里联邦政府最初告知专家组，虽然这些车辆交付给索马里国民军，但它们具有与商用车辆类似的特征，因此不应被视为第 2607 (2021) 号决议附件 B 所述“专为军事用途设计或改装的陆地车辆”。专家组指出，这一定义可能会被误解。¹¹⁵

95. 在与专家组的会谈中，索马里联邦政府国防部和联邦政府总统国家安全顾问办公室的官员表示沮丧，认为武器禁运继续阻碍索马里努力为其安全部队配备重型武器和空中资产以有效打击青年党。然而，专家组没有注意到索马里联邦政府向安全理事会索马里问题委员会提出关于核准进口重型装备的任何请求。保加利亚于 2021 年 1 月 13 日提交了核准重型装备的最新请求，并于 2021 年 1 月 19 日被联邦政府暂停。¹¹⁶ 如此前所述，专家组正在等待联邦政府对时任国防国务部长据称未与索马里有关机构协商而与保加利亚中间商签订交易的预期审计结果(S/2021/849，第 94 段)。专家组感到关切的是，该部长签署的最终用户证书将位于下谢贝利州与青年党争夺的 Qoryooley 镇列为储存地点。¹¹⁷ 专家组感到担忧的是，在未经适当的正式核准和审查的情况下处理最终用户证书。

可能在未通知的情况下交付巴伊拉克塔尔

96. 专家组注意到，有迹象表明，可能未请求核准就将土耳其制造的巴伊拉克塔尔 TB2 型无人驾驶作战飞机交给了索马里。2022 年 7 月 6 日，¹¹⁸ 社交媒体发布了一架飞机的图片，这架飞机在摩加迪沙上空飞行，其特征与巴伊拉克塔尔 TB2 的独有特征相似。根据机密报告，上述无人驾驶作战飞机于 2021 年 12 月 6 日由两架土耳其空军空客 A400M 交付给摩加迪沙。¹¹⁹ 专家组在社交媒体上看到据称是索马里军官在土耳其接受巴伊拉克塔尔 TB-2 训练的照片。¹²⁰ 专家组

¹¹³ S/2021/849，第 91 段。

¹¹⁴ 基于索马里联邦政府和联邦成员州提交给委员会的通知，以及索马里联邦政府武器和弹药管理协调人及联合核查小组提供的信息。

¹¹⁵ 这一措辞可以解释为比“第一类：作战坦克”和“第二类：联合国常规武器登记册的装甲战车”更广泛。见 <https://www.unroca.org/categories>。

¹¹⁶ S/2021/849，第 92-94 段。

¹¹⁷ 专家组在保加利亚会晤了中间商，并在摩加迪沙会晤了国防国务部长。后者声称，与索马里主管部门讨论了这笔交易。

¹¹⁸ 见 https://twitter.com/Free_Somaliweyn/status/1544776089070776320；另见 2022 年 7 月 20 日的推文，<https://twitter.com/MIGX999/status/1549842458669944840?t=mpvbDLvCvDiYdkW3uMQPRw&s=08>。

¹¹⁹ 另见 <https://mobile.twitter.com/DailyJubba/status/1469443855296704519>。

¹²⁰ 见 https://m.facebook.com/WararIyoWarbixino/posts/733913153816849?locale2=so_SO&_rdr&_

致函土耳其和索马里联邦政府，要求澄清此事，并提供资料，说明两架 A400M 在未通知安全理事会索马里问题委员会的情况下交付的货物性质，但尚未收到索马里的答复。土耳其告知专家小组，没有向索马里当局交付任何类型的无人驾驶作战飞机，所涉系统是土耳其分配用于在索马里打击恐怖主义的武器。由于土耳其在武器禁运中没有得到豁免，专家小组认为，向索马里交付这些系统不符合武器禁运。专家小组注意到，土耳其从未公开报告在索马里进行任何空袭。如其此前报告所述，专家小组已经提出索马里境内发生的不明无人机空袭的情况(见 S/2021/849，第 126 和 127 段)。

标准化通知模板

97. 专家小组向委员会提交了一份更新的《第 2 号执行援助通知》：“与部分解除索马里武器禁运有关的程序性核准和通知要求摘要”，供其核准。委员会于 2022 年 5 月 31 日核准了该《通知》，其中包括核准请求、预先通知和交付后通知的模板。¹²¹

C. 会员国和国际组织遵守武器禁运的情况

对国际部队用于保护部队的长期豁免

98. 安全理事会第 2607(2021)号决议第 34 段重申，武器禁运除其他外不适用于为以下各方供应武器或军事装备：联索援助团；非索特派团；¹²² 仅在非洲联盟最新的战略行动构想下并与非索特派团合作和协调运作的非索特派团战略伙伴以及欧洲联盟索马里培训团。专家小组注意到，长期豁免名单中没有具体提到其他国际实体，包括设在摩加迪沙的土耳其 TURKSOM 军事训练中心、欧洲联盟索马里能力建设特派团、¹²³ 英国部队索马里 TANGHAM 行动¹²⁴ 和美国驻索马里部队。¹²⁵ 专家小组注意到，土耳其、联合王国和欧洲联盟索马里能力建设团就这些实体所用武器和弹药向委员会提出的通知可能不属于更新的《第 2 号执行援助通知》所解释的武器禁运程序性要求范畴。从字面上讲，如果此类实体被视为非索过渡特派团的战略伙伴，完全根据最新的非洲联盟战略行动构想运作，则不需要通知。否则，关于索马里的武器禁运没有规定如何向这些实体提供武器和弹药。

遵守向索马里联邦政府以外的索马里安全部门机构交付武器的规定

邦特兰安全部队

99. 2021 年 12 月在索马里邦特兰博萨索镇发现邦特兰安全部队成员在冲突期间发射的迫击炮弹残余物后，专家小组正在调查一起遵守案件。(另见下文第 123 段)。

¹²¹ 2022 年 5 月 31 日核准，见 www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/notices。

¹²² 由非索过渡特派团取代。

¹²³ <https://www.eucap-som.eu/>。

¹²⁴ <https://twitter.com/ukforcersomalia>。

¹²⁵ 美国总统于 2022 年 5 月 16 日授权，见 <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3033345/us-to-resume-small-persistent-presence-in-somalia/>。

残留物显示了与 2009 年至 2014 年在美国制造的弹药类似的特征标记，详情见附件 12。¹²⁶

100. 120 毫米迫击炮和 60/81 毫米迫击炮分别是第 2607(2021)号决议附件 A 和附件 B 的一部分。因此，向被视为索马里安全部门机构的邦特兰安全部队交付此类武器弹药，需要供应国或国际、区域或次区域组织向委员会提出核准请求和通知。专家小组已致函美国，索要关于美国是否已通知并供应了这些武器的信息。

邦特兰海事警察部队

101. 专家小组在 2020 年报告中重点指出，阿拉伯联合酋长国在没有任何通知的情况下，向驻扎在邦特兰博萨索的邦特兰海事警察部队交付了军事装备。¹²⁷ 2021 年 8 月 13 日，一个会员国向委员会提交了核准向邦特兰海事警察部队交付武器的请求。委员会告知该会员国，如果该国向委员会确认已向索马里联邦政府通报这一通知，并将提前至少五个工作日向委员会通报交付情况，委员会随时准备审议这一通知。一家代理这批货物的公司与专家小组接洽，提供了提交核准请求所需的所有文件，包括 2022 年 2 月 15 日由邦特兰总统和联邦政府国内安全部长共同签署的最终用户证书。这份由联邦政府官员签署的最终用户证书可以作为联邦政府知悉通知的证据。发出通知的会员国告知专家小组，它没有核准出口许可证，因此通知和相关交付已被终止。

朱巴兰安全部队

102. 专家小组注意到朱巴兰安全部队在接受美国训练的达纳卜支持下使用配备现代装备包的小武器的照片，这些武器的特征从未向委员会通报。¹²⁸ 专家小组正在进行调查，以查明这些武器的标记和序列号，以便追查来源和查明潜在违规行为。

索马里私营保安公司使用的武器

103. 专家小组注意到安保细节录像，为加尔穆杜格总统提供的一位近身保护陪同人员配备的冲锋枪特征类似于瑞士或美国的 B&T 公司(前称 Brügger & Thomet)生产的 APC-9 K 高级警用卡宾枪。¹²⁹ 录像没有提供足够的细节来追查武器。专家小组在委员会数据库中找不到关于向索马里交付 APC-9 的任何通知。若干私营保安公司在索马里开展业务，为驻索马里的国际组织提供房地安保或护送。专家小组收到的资料显示，私营保安公司由索马里联邦政府或联邦成员州颁发许可证，并进口武器或在当地获取武器。¹³⁰ 索马里目前的武器禁运没有关于向私营保安公司交付武器的规定。

¹²⁶ 制造商是亚利桑那州东卡姆登市的 Day 和 Zimmerman 公司；亚利桑那州 Pine Bluff 市的 Pine Bluff Arsenal 公司以及宾夕法尼亚州莫斯科市的 Pocal 公司(现为 Nammo Pocal 公司)。

¹²⁷ S/2020/949，第 107-108 段。

¹²⁸ <https://twitter.com/GaroweOnline/status/1517154595251781633?t=jl3o2xfubQ1QPhAwgFqCqg&s=09>。

¹²⁹ <https://twitter.com/SomaliaWeapons/status/1472694783546216453>。

¹³⁰ 与在索马里经营的两家私营保安公司的董事总经理的约谈。

D. 武器非法流入索马里

海上扣押

104. 2021年12月20日, 专家小组检查了美国“风暴”号和“台风”号军舰在海上从一艘无国籍道船上扣押的一批武器和弹药。¹³¹ 这批货物包括1406支突击步枪, 其特征类似于中国制造的56-1式。对步枪序列号的分析表明, 这些序列号几乎均匀分布在两批140000个工厂序号中(第1批从61000000至61130000, 第2批从62000000至62130000)(见附件13.1)。这批货物还包括220000个7.62x54口径的小机枪弹药筒, 其中大部分的特征和标记与中国第71国营工厂生产的弹药筒相似(见附件13.2)。中国对专家小组追查请求的答复表示, 难以根据提供的信息确定步枪和弹药是否在中国制造。开展检查的索马里问题专家小组与也门问题小组进行了联合调查, 并约谈了在也门羁押的船员。据船员们通报, 这批货物的目的地是也门。专家小组注意到, 非索过渡特派团报称, 2022年3月22日缴获了一支序列号为61129414的步枪。这一序列号与美国扣押的一支序列号为61129726的56-1式步枪序列号相差312(见附件7)。因此, 从青年党缴获的武器很可能与美国扣押的武器属同一来源, 而且是运往索马里的货物。

向索马里走私武器

105. 专家小组收集的信息继续证实也门与索马里邦特兰和加尔穆杜格沿岸海域之间的走私模式。2022年6月25日, 两艘道船在海上遭遇恶劣天气后在邦特兰班达尔贝拉抛锚。2022年6月29日, 专家小组约谈了被索马里警方羁押的一些道船船员, 其中大部分是也门人。他们声称来自海斯, 货物在祖巴卜装船。两个地方都在也门政府下属部队的控制之下。货物的目的地是索马里加尔穆杜格的霍比奥, 很可能是交付给已知的青年党供应网络(见附件14)。专家小组收到的航拍图像显示, 2021年10月25日, 在可能隶属于走私网络的武装人员保护下, 一批货物在霍比奥卸货。根据安全理事会第2607(2021)号决议第41段的要求, 专家小组的任务是向委员会提交一份关于武器和军事装备走私和贩运问题的专题报告。本报告的内容载于附件15。

E. 简易爆炸装置组件禁令

青年党使用的简易爆炸装置

自制炸药

106. 2022年6月17日, “先知的信徒”的当地民兵缴获了一个内置35个黄色塑料油桶的车载简易爆炸装置, 里面填满了黑色自制炸药。¹³² 这与从青年党缴获的以木炭作为自制炸药成分的若干简易爆炸装置相符。专家小组尚未获得法证分析结果, 以确定青年党是否使用木炭自制炸药, 或木炭是否与其他助燃剂一起

¹³¹ <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2882679/us-navy-seizes-1400-assault-rifles-during-illicit-weapons-interdiction/>。

¹³² 这相当于600至700千克炸药, 因为每个容器装有17至20千克自制炸药。

用作可燃物。¹³³ 通过这一法证分析，可以查明关键的化学产品，而禁止此类产品可以阻断青年党制造自制炸药。¹³⁴

简易爆炸装置中使用的电子组件

107. 青年党主要使用两个电子组件来武装和引爆部署在索马里的简易爆炸装置电雷管。即用于通过遥控启动简易爆炸装置的学习代码接收器和通过目标受害者产生的振动而启动的作为开关的摩托车警报器(见附件 16)。使用这一先进系统后，该团体可以更换传压板，并在预定目标接近时遥控启动简易爆炸装置。

108. 联合国与专家小组分享的数据显示，大多数学习代码接收器和摩托车警报器的特征与中国制造的产品类似。专家小组致函中国，分享了所发现组件的标记，以查明向索马里出口这些组件的相关潜在网络。中国回应说，该国主管部门无法根据专家小组提供的信息作出答复。

向索马里出口爆炸物及相关材料和技术

109. 专家小组继续监测索马里进口商用爆炸物和相关材料的情况。2022 年，第二批 165 吨硝酸铵燃油于 3 月 5 日运抵邦特兰加尔卡德港，用于该港的建设。土耳其出口公司与专家小组分享了这批货物的所有细节，其中还包括 6 150 个非电雷管和 150 个电雷管。由于雷管被列入第 2607(2021)号决议附件 C 第一部分，土耳其根据同一决议第 10 段向委员会提交了一份通知。索马里联邦政府也提交了同样的通知，尽管第 2607(2021)号决议并未要求其这样做。

六. 阻挠人道主义援助

110. 在整个任务期间，在索马里的人道主义界就日益恶化的旱灾危机和迫在眉睫的饥荒发出的呼吁更加令人震惊。在编写本报告时，人道主义报告表明，索马里有 710 万人粮食无保障，918 000 人离开家园流离失所，寻找粮食、水和牧场，各州有 34 个县的民众面临灾难性的粮食无保障状况。¹³⁵ 在这一人道主义危机不断加深的同时，据专家小组记录，人道主义援助准入限制不断恶化，原因包括青年党在希尔谢贝利和拜州的活动以及“先知的信徒”与索马里国民军-加尔穆杜格部队在加尔穆杜格州、特别是杜萨马雷卜的冲突，而专家小组在索马里中南部其他地区未发现人道主义援助准入状况出现重大变化。在青年党夺取 Ceel Baraf 以

¹³³ 早在 13 世纪，木炭就与硝石和硫磺一起被用来制造炸药。自从 1869 年诺贝尔发明炸药以来，木炭被用作可燃物，与硝化甘油和硝酸钠或硝酸钾混合作为助燃剂。在这种情况下，木炭约占混合物的 8-15%；爆炸物文献，未向公众披露。

¹³⁴ 这些广泛民用的化学产品包括硝酸铵；硝酸钾和硝酸脲以及用于硝化的硫酸和硝酸，见《第 3 号执行援助通知》，可查阅：<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/notices>。

¹³⁵ 根据人道主义报告，这是索马里人口的一半，是联合国 2011 年宣布索马里饥荒时粮食不安全危机规模的两倍。见 International Rescue Committee, “Unnatural disaster in East Africa” 可查阅：<https://www.rescue.org/report/watchlist-crisis-alert-unnatural-disaster-east-africa-0>。另见联合国人道主义事务协调厅，索马里：旱灾应对和饥荒预防-第 8 号情况报告(截至 2022 年 6 月 30 日)，可查阅：<https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-drought-response-and-famine-prevention-situation-report-no-8-30-june-2022>。

及 Hansheikh 前沿行动基地关闭之后，人道主义消息人士向专家小组表示关切，认为更多的非索过渡特派团基地可能失守，从而给人道主义工作者接触民众带来更多挑战。¹³⁶

111. 青年党继续在索马里南部和中部的关键地点和主要供应线上扩大检查站网络、实施封锁以及使用暴力和威胁，从而限制包括救济和人道主义援助在内的货物和人员进出和流通。¹³⁷ 此外，专家小组注意到该团体利用宣传媒体和下属渠道散播不利于救援人员的负面信息。¹³⁸

青年党阻挠人道主义援助

112. 在向委员会提交的中期最新情况报告以及第三次专题报告中，专家小组重点指出了青年党如何迅速动员应对旱灾。通过成立一个旱灾救济委员会¹³⁹ 并利用其宣传渠道，该团体似乎决心显示权威，赢得支持，化解批评并进一步表功。2022 年 1 月至 4 月，青年党宣传媒体似乎描绘了一个意在自主有效应对危机的组织形象。¹⁴⁰ 然而，在 2022 年第二季度期间，专家小组注意到，青年党媒体对该团体向受旱灾影响民众分发救济物资的报道变得零星，可能表明旱灾造成的人道主义挑战超出了青年党的能力。¹⁴¹

113. 尽管旱灾影响到青年党控制的地区，但该团体没有改变对人道主义组织的敌对立场，并动用宣传媒体部门“卡塔伊布新闻”打击国际救援努力。在 2022 年 7 月 10 日发布的信息中，青年党埃米尔指责人道主义组织利用“反复出现的旱灾和贫困作为对付索马里穆斯林的武器”。¹⁴² 尽管发出了这一信息，但专家小组注意到，青年党允许生活在其控制区的民众迁移到政府控制区以获得人道主义救济，这与该团体在 2011 年旱灾期间采取的以往做法相反。¹⁴³

¹³⁶ 与人道主义行动体的约谈，2022 年 6 月和 7 月，以及联合国机密报告，2022 年 7 月。

¹³⁷ 与人道主义行动体和安全消息人士的约谈，2022 年 1 月至 7 月。

¹³⁸ 见 <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/shabaab-leader-cites-u-s-losses-in-afghanistan-as-warning-to-atmistrallies-fighters.html>(内容仅向订户提供)。

¹³⁹ 见 <http://calamada.com/hoggaanka-al-shabaab-oo-guddi-usameeyay-abaaraha-kana-hadlay-khilaafka-ka-dhex-jira-madaxda-df/>;<https://somalimemo.info/articles/15746/Hoggaanka-Al-Shabaab-oo-Guddi-Usameeyay-Abaaraha-Kana-hadlay-Khilaafka-Ka-dhex-Jira-Madaxda-DF>。

¹⁴⁰ 见 for example, <https://calamada.com/sawirro-magaalada-xarardheere-iyo-guddiga-gurmadka-abaaraha-shabaabul-mujaahidiin/>; <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16239/Deegaano-ka-Tirsan-Gobolka-Sanaag-oo-Laga-Sameeyey-Gurmad-Raashiin-Qeybin-ah-SAWIRO>; <https://calamada.com/gurmad-raashin-qeybin-ah-oo-laga-fuliyay-deegaanka-damaay-ec-sh-hoose-sawirro/>; <https://calamada.com/sawirro-dadku-saamoobay-abaaraha-oo-gurmad-raashin-qeybin-ah-loogu-sameeyay-deegaanno-hoostaga-luuq-iyodooloo/>。

¹⁴¹ 与军方消息人士的约谈，2022 年 3 月。

¹⁴² 见“Not equal are the Evil and the good”, an address by Sheik Abu Ubeydah Ahmed Omar, transcript available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/documents/jihadist-threat/1597-site-shabaab-eadadha1443/file.html>(内容仅向订户提供)。

¹⁴³ 对青年党宣传媒体的分析，2022 年 4 月至 6 月。

针对人道主义工作者的袭击

114. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组观察到，针对人道主义工作者的袭击次数有所减少，专家小组在提交委员会的 2021 年最后报告中也看到这一趋势。¹⁴⁴ 专家小组没有记录 2022 年直接袭击非政府组织工作人员的事件。然而，专家小组约谈的安全和人道主义消息人士称，这一趋势主要源于在整个选举期间持续的冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行导致人道主义人员行动次数减少，而并非安全状况改善的结果。¹⁴⁵

115. 与上述分析一致，持续动荡的安全环境、特别是青年党使用简易爆炸装置的袭击、设立新检查站和加强对政府控制城镇的封锁以及索马里国民军支持的加尔穆杜格部队与“先知的信徒”之间的冲突，对人道主义行动产生了连带影响。在希尔谢贝利州的贝莱德文，青年党分别于 2022 年 2 月 19 日和 2022 年 3 月 23 日对选举候选人发动了两次自杀式袭击，3 名本国人道主义工作者遇害。¹⁴⁶ 2022 年 5 月，在青年党袭击位于 Ceel Baraf 的非索过渡特派团基地，以及非索过渡特派团撤离中谢贝利州 Hansheikh 的前沿行动基地后，青年党控制了 Mataban 和贝莱德文之间的 Bacda 村，掌控了这条重要的人道主义后勤路线，巩固了在希尔谢贝利的存在。该团体设立了新检查站，对沿途通行车辆收取 800 至 900 美元。因此，摩加迪沙-乔哈尔-马哈迪轴线和马塔班-贝莱德文公路沿线的人道主义车队和物资受到影响。¹⁴⁷ 2022 年 5 月，“先知的信徒”成员与加尔穆杜格/索马里国民军部队在杜萨马雷卜发生冲突，造成平民伤亡，民用建筑物受损，人道主义活动中断。在这些冲突中，专家小组于 2022 年 5 月 13 日注意到，索马里国民军部队短暂占领了一个国际非政府组织的房舍，并将大院用作防御阵地。¹⁴⁸

七. 违反国际人道法和人权法

A. 青年党对生命与人身施加的暴力

116. 由于索马里的选举日历持续到 2022 年年中，青年党保持了与选举有关的针对平民的高节奏袭击，显然企图破坏选举进程，并广泛违反国际人道法。¹⁴⁹ 这些袭击包括定点清除选举代表、候选人、政府当权者和官员以及部落长老。2022 年

¹⁴⁴ 见 S/2021/849，第 132 段。

¹⁴⁵ 与人道主义消息人士的约谈及联合国机密报告，2022 年 1 月至 6 月。

¹⁴⁶ 与人道主义消息人士的约谈，2022 年 1 月至 4 月以及涵盖 2022 年 1 月至 3 月的联合国机密报告。

¹⁴⁷ 与人道主义消息人士的约谈，2022 年 6 月以及联合国机密报告，2022 年 7 月。

¹⁴⁸ 人道主义和安全报告，2022 年 5 月。

¹⁴⁹ 对 2022 年 1 月至 6 月联合国机密报告的分析。

第一季度的事件更加激烈，¹⁵⁰ 但这些类别的平民在选举结束后仍面临风险。¹⁵¹ 为了实施这些袭击，青年党采用手枪暗杀，特别是在摩加迪沙，同时采用滥杀滥伤的手段和方法，特别是简易爆炸装置和自杀式袭击，造成大量平民伤亡。青年党于 2022 年 2 月 19 日对平民发动了最致命的袭击，造成 150 多人伤亡，包括 48 人死亡，其中包括直言不讳的女议员 Amina Mohamed Abdi。¹⁵²

117. 在与处于封锁的政府控制城镇接壤的地区，青年党继续严格限制经济和生计活动，并使用威胁和暴力惩罚反抗该团体权威的人。¹⁵³ 在当前旱灾和国际危机的背景下，这一战略导致商品价格上涨，使本已严峻的人道主义局势雪上加霜。¹⁵⁴ 2022 年 2 月以来，该团体在西南成员州拜州 Dinsor 多次袭击军事基地和非索特派团/非索过渡特派团基地，并以威胁和实际暴力对民众施加越来越大的压力。¹⁵⁵ 这导致民众于 2022 年 3 月暂时撤离该镇，迁至拜多阿或周围村庄，其中一些村庄处于青年党控制之下。¹⁵⁶ 当平民开始返回 Dinsor 时，青年党要求他们领取“耕作许可证”，以便照料他们的农场，否则禁止进出 Dinsor(见附件 17)。专家小组记录了 7 起不同的事件，在这些事件中，青年党在 Dinsor 周边的村庄以违抗禁令为由伤害平民，或毁坏或没收平民财产。¹⁵⁷

118. 专家小组注意到，在 Dinsor 安全事件加剧的同时，新任命的青年党省长 Mohamed Omar Mohamed 于 2022 年 1 月左右抵达。¹⁵⁸ 专家小组一直认为他是青年党团体的领导人，对专家小组证实的 2020 年和 2021 年 Tosweyne 地区的若干事件负责，包括强迫流离失所、企图招募儿童加入青年党和绑架。¹⁵⁹

青年党利用旱灾的影响巩固影响力

119. 青年党展现出适应能力和机会主义倾向，继续利用气候变化的影响，巩固其影响力，扰乱平民的安全及其经济权利。据专家小组观察，该团体分别于 2022 年 2 月底和 3 月初对乔哈尔和基斯马尤的企业实施封锁。专家小组约谈的消息人

¹⁵⁰ 2022 年 1 月至 3 月，针对包括政府文职官员在内的平民的袭击占青年党实施的袭击总数(392 起)的 22%，2022 年 4 月至 6 月，这一比例降至青年党实施的袭击总数(479 起)的 12%。与安全消息人士的约谈以及联合国机密报告，2022 年 4 月和 7 月。

¹⁵¹ 对媒体和联合国机密报告的分析，2022 年 4 月至 6 月。

¹⁵² 媒体和联合国机密报告，2022 年 2 月。

¹⁵³ 人道主义报告，2022 年 2 月至 7 月。

¹⁵⁴ 见 2022 年 1 月至 7 月期间索马里联合市场和供应链最新情况报告。

¹⁵⁵ 与本地消息人士的约谈，2022 年 2 月。在此期间，青年党用迫击炮袭击了位于 Dinsor 的非索特派团/非索过渡特派团基地，造成 12 名平民伤亡，其中包括妇女和儿童。与 Dinsor 县副专员的约谈，2022 年 3 月。

¹⁵⁶ 见 <https://somalimemo.info/articles/15985/Maamulkii-iyo-Shaqalihii-DFS-ee-degmada-Diinsoor-oo-Raxan-Raxan-Isu-Soo-Dhiibaya-SAWIRO>。

¹⁵⁷ 与 Dinsor 本地消息人士的约谈，2022 年 3 月至 4 月。

¹⁵⁸ 与当地消息人士的电话约谈，2022 年 2 月和 3 月。

¹⁵⁹ 见 S/2021/849，附件 5.1；S/2020/949，附件 7.2。

士称，Adan Yabal 的青年党地方领导人在乔哈尔 Hantiwadaag 市场召集企业主，以征收新税，支持该团体的抗旱能力。¹⁶⁰ 为了惩罚试图阻止企业参会的希尔谢贝利当地行政当局和未参会人士，青年党下令关闭主要市场三天。

120. 2022 年 3 月 15 日，专家小组收到来自基斯马尤的报告，表示青年党对进出基斯马尤的货物流动实施封锁。¹⁶¹ 消息人士提到，该团体希望迫使基斯马尤的企业降低大米和糖等基本商品价格，这些商品价格在前几周有所上涨。由于这一封锁，基斯马尤的木材、牛奶、蔬菜以及来自该镇周边村庄和农村地区的其他货物短缺。

121. 专家小组还约谈了来自拜州 Toosweyne 地区流离失所 Bananey 社区成员，他们于 2022 年 4 月与青年党进行谈判，以便返回自己的土地。¹⁶² 2020 年至 2021 年，青年党袭击了几个村庄并绑架了 6 名传统长老，此后，Bananey 社区从 Toosweyne 大规模流离失所。由于旱灾，巴尔达莱流离失所者社区的人道主义状况恶化，青年党主动要求就其回返进行谈判，试图向社区强加条件，包括效忠该团体和纳税。

122. 2022 年 6 月，在拜州 Qansax Dhere 县，专家小组记录了青年党毁坏贝纳迪尔附近供水点的情况，据报是企图阻止国家安全部队获得供水。¹⁶³ 该团体还控制了拜州 Bur hakaba 县 Buula Fulay 地区的供水点，并开始向当地牧民社区征收用水税。¹⁶⁴

B. 邦特兰州武装部队在博萨索安全危机期间违反国际人权法

123. 在本报告所述期间，博萨索的安全危机升级，发生了几起武装对抗事件，涉及三个不同的州武装部队，即一方是邦特兰安全部队，另一方是德尔维希部队和邦特兰海事警察部队人员。博萨索的平民在这些紧张局势中首当其冲，在 2021 年 12 月的危机高峰期间，至少有 19 名平民死亡，其中包括 5 名儿童，120 多人受伤，平民财产遭到严重破坏，人口大规模流离失所。

124. 危机始于 2021 年 11 月 24 日，当时，邦特兰总统赛义德·阿卜杜拉希·德尼任命阿明·哈吉·哈伊尔担任邦特兰安全部队的新司令，接替穆罕默德·奥斯曼·阿卜杜拉希·迪亚诺将军。当迪亚诺拒绝交出邦特兰安全部队指挥权时，部落首领进行干预以调解争端，但他们的提议被邦特兰行政当局拒绝。这一僵局导致邦特兰安全部队出现派系纷争，该部队是一支美国训练、装备和支助至 2021 年 2 月的精英部队，负责打击索马里叛乱团体，特别是青年党和伊黎伊斯兰国-索马

¹⁶⁰ 与当地和安全消息人士的约谈，2022 年 3 月。联合国机密报告，2022 年 3 月。

¹⁶¹ 与基斯马尤当地消息人士的约谈，2022 年 3 月。与安全消息人士的约谈，2022 年 4 月。

¹⁶² 与本地消息人士的约谈，2022 年 4 月、5 月和 6 月。

¹⁶³ 与安全消息人士的约谈，2022 年 6 月。

¹⁶⁴ 同上。

里分支。尽管重新作出了调解努力，但在编写本报告时，紧张局势仍在酝酿，例如，2022年6月和7月记录了零星武装暴力事件。

125. 专家小组调查了2021年12月21日至23日邦特兰安全部队、德尔维希和邦特兰海事警察部队成员之间的武装对抗。根据受害者和证人陈述以及收集的证据，专家小组有合理的理由认为，冲突各方违反国际人权法，滥杀滥伤地过度使用武力。附件18载有专家小组调查的更多详情。

C. 武装冲突中严重侵害儿童行为

126. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组继续记录了武装冲突中严重侵害儿童事件，包括武装行为体(主要是青年党)招募和使用儿童、杀害和残害、袭击医院以及性暴力和性别暴力。

127. 专家小组注意到，招募儿童仍然是索马里境内最经常发生的严重侵害儿童行为，占有已核实案件的31.9%。¹⁶⁵ 此外，青年党¹⁶⁶ 仍然是招募儿童事件的主要施害者(177起案件，78.9%)。¹⁶⁷ 该团体也是绑架儿童事件(194起经核实案件中的192起)的主要施害者，¹⁶⁸ 人道主义报告指出，此类事件与招募密切相关。¹⁶⁹ 专家小组对招募儿童模式的调查突出表明，社区对青年党招募的应对机制包括付给该团体赎金或将儿童送到政府控制区，通常与亲戚团聚。因此，受旱灾影响的社区失去生计可能导致招募儿童和(或)孤身未成年人流离失所情况增加。¹⁷⁰ 专家小组注意到，在2022年为寻找水、食物和牧场而迁移的918 000名境内流离失所者中，80%以上是妇女和儿童。

128. 专家小组注意到，2022年1月至3月，在驻索马里的联合国国家监测和报告任务组记录的儿童死亡人数中，约有一半是爆炸性武器(迫击炮、简易爆炸装置、未爆弹药等)造成的。这些武器在平民居住区使用时从本质上是滥杀滥伤的，因此交战各方必须认真评估相称和区分原则。¹⁷¹ 2022年3月8日，非索特派团部队与青年党武装分子在青年党控制的Qoryoley县Siigale Degta村发生冲突，该村位于下谢贝利州Marka镇以北约20公里处。可能是非索特派团指挥的乌干达部队为反击青年党迫击炮射击而发射的3枚迫击炮弹落在民用建筑物内，造成人员伤亡。专家小组注意到，青年党下属媒体报道了这一事件，用于对非索特派团/非索过渡特派团和整个外国部队进行负面宣传。经专家小组与当地和人道主义消息人

¹⁶⁵ 2022年1月至3月有225起案件，而驻索马里的联合国国家监测和报告任务组共核对了705起事件。

¹⁶⁶ 对秘书长年度报告和秘书长2006年至2020年索马里境内儿童与武装冲突问题报告的数据分析。

¹⁶⁷ 2022年1月至3月期间驻索马里的联合国国家监测和报告任务组。

¹⁶⁸ 同上。

¹⁶⁹ 与秘书长关于索马里境内儿童与武装冲突问题的第六次报告(S/2022/397)比较。

¹⁷⁰ 另见 Somali Young Doctors Association and Somalia Child Protection Area of Responsibility “Summary Report on Child Protection Assessment”; September 2021。可查阅：https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cadale_child_protection_assessment_report_soyda_october_2021.pdf, p 23。

¹⁷¹ 见 <https://www.un.org/disarmament/explosive-weapons/>。

士核实，至少有 3 人被打死，即 2 名女童及其母亲，7 人受伤，其中包括 6 名儿童。¹⁷² 2022 年 4 月 11 日，专家组向非索过渡特派团发出正式函件，要求提供事件详情以及非索过渡特派团袭击后评估详情。在编写本报告时，尚未收到答复。当地消息人士向专家组报告说，在事件发生的同一天晚上，青年党武装分子袭击了 Siigale Degta，对其指控与非索过渡特派团合作的村民进行报复，绑架了 24 名男子和 9 名妇女。专家组调查的详细情况见附件 19。

129. 专家组还记录了青年党作战人员占领加尔穆杜格一家医院的事件。¹⁷³ 2022 年 6 月 17 日，在对索马里国民军和加尔穆杜格部队发动未遂复合式袭击后，青年党攻占了加尔穆杜格 El-Bur 的一家医院，命令包括营养不良儿童和孕妇在内的所有病人离开医院，并强迫医务人员治疗 80 名受伤的青年党作战人员。经专家组与当地和人道主义消息人士证实，几天后，当地居民试图重新开放医院，但被青年党阻止。

130. 驻索马里的联合国国家监测和报告任务组核对了 2022 年 1 月至 3 月 64 起涉及儿童幸存者的性暴力事件。专家组与人道主义消息人士的约谈侧重于当前旱灾危机对儿童影响的性别方面。¹⁷⁴ 随着受旱灾影响社区的人道主义状况恶化，人道主义行为体担心这将对妇女和女童产生负面影响，使其进一步遭受性别暴力，例如早婚和强迫婚姻，包括与青年党成员结婚。其他形式的性暴力和性别暴力，特别是强奸和性剥削，也可能由于流离失所和丧失生计而增加。专家组注意到，据儿童保护行为体记录，获得性暴力幸存者专项服务、心理健康和社会心理支持的儿童人数有所增加。¹⁷⁵

D. 冲突中的性暴力

131. 在本报告所述期间，向专家组报告的 69 起性暴力事件突出表明，部族间冲突与妇女和女童遭受性暴力之间存在关联，特别是在加尔穆杜格，并突显了边缘化群体或少数群体中妇女和女童的脆弱性(见上文第 128 段)。这与专家组先前的观察一致。¹⁷⁶

132. 专家组在 2021 年最后报告¹⁷⁷ 中重点指出，案件报告不足构成有效处理与索马里冲突有关的性暴力的障碍。据专家组约谈的人道主义消息人士称，报告不足在 2022 年仍是一个令人关切的问题，源自若干因素，包括持续不安全状况、担心报复、性暴力幸存者污名化、施害者不受惩罚以及司法系统薄弱。

¹⁷² 与当地和人道主义消息人士的约谈，2022 年 4 月和 6 月。联合国机密报告，2022 年 3 月。

¹⁷³ 联合国机密报告以及与当地和人道主义消息人士的约谈，2022 年 6 月。

¹⁷⁴ 与人道主义消息人士的约谈，2022 年 4 月、5 月和 6 月。

¹⁷⁵ 联合国机密报告，2022 年 6 月。

¹⁷⁶ S/2021/849，附件 5.3。

¹⁷⁷ 同上。

133. 虽然选举进程延长使相关的立法和政策举措暂停，但 2022 年 7 月任命新内阁是索马里重申对 2013 年关于制止冲突中性暴力的联合公报承诺的机会。¹⁷⁸

八. 自然资源

A. 实施木炭禁令

134. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组记录了自 2018 年以来索马里首次重大木炭出口。¹⁷⁹ 尽管拥有木炭目的地市场的会员国采取措施，而且包括海上联合部队、欧洲联盟海军部队阿塔兰塔行动以及毒品和犯罪问题办公室等国际行为体持续监测海上木炭贸易情况，索马里限制大规模木炭出口的能力仍然存在差距。

库存分析

135. 应索马里朱巴兰邦总统办公室的邀请，专家小组于 2022 年 9 月 5 日至 7 日访问了基斯马尤，会见了地方当局和木炭利益攸关方，并视察了基斯马尤及其周边地区的木炭库存。这次视察使专家小组得以更新¹⁸⁰ 基斯马尤及其周边五个地区的木炭数量，估计共有 516 386 袋或 12 900 公吨木炭(见附件 20.1)。毒品和犯罪问题办公室分享并同意这一评估。

136. 根据上述估计数，当前库存在国际市场上可能价值约 1 200 万美元。¹⁸¹ 朱巴兰当局和木炭业主代表要求专家小组协助确定请安全理事会一次性豁免木炭出口禁令的方式。这将使他们得以出口当前库存，并清理基斯马尤及其周边指定地区(见附件 20.1)。专家小组认为，一次性部分解除木炭出口禁令——由委员会制定出口程序要求，包括核准请求和出口通知——有助于委员会和专家小组今后对木炭禁令进行监测，并提高任何木炭相关收入的透明度。

对“福克斯”轮的调查。

137. 2022 年 1 月 25 日，索马里联邦政府与专家小组分享文件，指控“福克斯”轮(IMO 9108659)从基斯马尤港¹⁸² 非法出口 4 425 公吨木炭。¹⁸³ 2022 年 4 月 14 日，阿曼当局通知专家小组，“福克斯”轮于 2022 年 1 月 22 日在塞拉莱沿岸海域发生紧急情况。2022 年 5 月 28 日至 6 月 1 日，专家小组前往塞拉莱港，对该船进行检查并约谈船员和阿曼官员(见附件 20)。

¹⁷⁸ 可查阅：<https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/joint-communic%C3%A9-federal-republic-somalia-and-united-nations-prevention-sexual>。

¹⁷⁹ S/2019/858 和 S/2019/858/Corr.1，第 169 段。

¹⁸⁰ 专家小组先前评估认为，基斯马尤和布尔加博储存地点准备出口的木炭数量在 15 000 至 22 500 吨之间。

¹⁸¹ 按每吨 1 000 美元计算，见 <https://www.indexbox.io/blog/wood-charcoal-price-per-ton-april-2022/>。

¹⁸² 2022 年 1 月 25 日索马里联邦政府的正式公文，专家小组存档。

¹⁸³ 专家小组上一次记录大量出口木炭的时间是 2018 年，当时一艘货船将 4 750 吨木炭从基斯马尤运往伊拉克的霍尔祖贝尔港。

138. 2022年7月下旬，专家小组前往摩加迪沙，并按照提供回应机会的义务会见了 Sitti 贸易公司的业主，该公司在索马里联邦政府向专家小组提供的文件中被列为 2022 年 1 月出口货物的收货人。业主承认，仍在阿曼沿岸海域的“福克斯”号上的木炭是在索马里基斯马尤装货的。

139. 2022年7月下旬，专家小组致函阿曼政府，表示准备就《第 1 号执行援助通知》与阿曼合作。安全理事会第 2607(2021)号决议“鼓励进一步制定索马里国家木炭政策，旨在对国内木炭使用建立可持续管理，以解决库存处置问题”。在这方面，专家小组告知索马里联邦政府，它随时准备开始从联邦政府、朱巴兰当局和其他利益攸方收集有关基斯马尤及其周边木炭库存的信息和意见，并在随后的报告中向委员会提供备选方案。

九. 建议

140. 专家小组建议，安全理事会在即将推出的关于索马里制裁制度的决议中：

(a) 注意到在推进青年党资金阻断计划方面的延误，请索马里联邦政府审查相关做法，评估在其领导下制定一项旨在阻断青年党筹资的全面计划的可行性，同时向安全理事会关于索马里的第 751(1992)号决议所设委员会表明在支持制定和执行此类计划方面的需求；

(b) 在关于武器禁运长期豁免的一节中，列入在最新的《索马里过渡计划》范围内运作的战略伙伴及与索马里联邦政府就培训和指导索马里部队问题签署了部队地位协定或谅解备忘录的战略伙伴，如欧洲联盟索马里能力建设团、TURKSOM、英国 Tangham 行动和美国驻索马里部队，以及联邦政府向委员会指明的任何新伙伴；

(c) 列入提及安全理事会第 2020(2015)号决议的措辞，鼓励会员国协助专家小组追查从青年党以及其他武装团体和民兵缴获的武器和弹药，以便专家小组查明途径，阻断向上述行为体进行供应的非法网络；

(d) 列入相关措辞，鼓励会员国防止向索马里移交青年党简易爆炸装置所用电子物品，包括学习代码接收器和摩托车警报器，并可要求在其境内制造此类物品的工厂确定技术方案，避免这些组件被轻易用于简易爆炸装置；

(e) 列入相关措辞，扩大安全理事会第 1844(2008)号决议中制裁列名标准，以便纳入“计划、指挥、支持或实施涉及对索马里城镇进行经济封锁的行为”；

(f) 列入一次性部分解除木炭禁令，以便清理专家小组确定的库存，但需遵循程序要求，包括核准请求和通知委员会，以及在下一个任务期内出口上述木炭。

141. 专家小组建议委员会：

(a) 鼓励索马里联邦政府改进对洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为的监测、报告和调查，同时确保金融实体根据反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为法的要求，按照索马里洗钱和资助恐怖主义行为的报告，提交可疑交易和大额现金交易报告；

(b) 鼓励会员国支持索马里联邦政府迅速开发一个安全的国家身份识别系统，包括政府颁发的生物鉴别身份证件，此类证件应由国家或地方当局颁发并符合反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为的标准；

(c) 鼓励非索过渡特派团及其战略伙伴采取各种安全措施，打击青年党的司法法院系统和检查站网络并进行拦截和扣押，以阻断青年党的非法现金收取和资金便利化/流动；

(d) 鼓励索马里联邦政府努力改进监管和执法机构之间的协作与协调，并鼓励采取协调一致的联合办法，对恐怖主义资金开展调查；

(e) 请索马里联邦政府与专家小组分享：

(一) 一份获准进口静态和移动保护所需武器、弹药以及军事装备的索马里境内持证私营保安公司清单；

(二) 一份在索马里境内经营的上述私营保安公司目前持有的武器、弹药和军事装备的最新清单，包括型号、弹药标记和武器序列号；

(f) 请索马里联邦安全局、非索过渡特派团以及在索马里开展行动的国际部队，包括英国、埃塞俄比亚、土耳其和美国部队及欧洲联盟能力建设团和欧洲联盟培训团，向专家小组提供显示目前所用弹药字样标记的照片，以便专家小组有效追查从青年党缴获的武器；

(g) 在与索马里联邦政府协商后，澄清索马里联邦政府以外的索马里安全部门机构的含义并编制一份清单，并确定各种机制以便联邦政府了解或监督向这些安全部门机构交付武器、弹药和装备的情况，包括发放最终用户证书并相应更新《第 2 号执行援助通知》；

(h) 致函裁军事务厅：

(一) 重点指出专家小组在本报告所述期间向会员国提交武器和弹药追查请求时遇到的挑战，因为制造国提供了信息，表示第三方为掩盖来源会仿制或复制武器标记、序列号和弹药字样；

(二) 要求为《使各国能够及时可靠地识别和追查非法小武器和轻武器的国际文书》和《从各个方面防止、打击和消除小武器和轻武器非法贸易的行动纲领》确定更好的方法，协助所有联合国专家小组有效查明与各自任务有关的武器走私网络。

(i) 回顾安全理事会第 2607(2021)号决议第 14 段所述索马里根据国际法承担的义务，敦促索马里联邦政府责成相关机关调查博萨索和杜萨马雷卜的冲突，酌情起诉应对违反国际人道法和人权法行为负责的个人，并邀请联索援助团在其任务和能力范围内向索马里联邦政府当局就这些任务提供咨询和支助；

(j) 鼓励索马里联邦政府扩大向需要援助人员提供人道主义援助的渠道，并为此继续努力确保主要供应路线的安全，守住前沿行动基地；

(k) 更新《第 1 号执行援助通知》，列入关于会员国在根据安全理事会有关决议拦截疑似从索马里运送木炭的船只之前或之后可采取步骤的建议，同时考虑到从“福克斯”轮一案中吸取的经验教训；

(l) 鼓励索马里联邦政府制定一份疑似参与走私武器、简易爆炸装置相关材料 and 木炭的道船清单，并将此清单转递给联邦成员州和国际部队。

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Annex 1: Mandate and appointment of the Panel

The mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (“the Panel”) is contained in paragraph 38 of Security Council resolution 2607 (2021). The Panel’s mandate includes the tasks as set out in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018), which referred to tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018) as they relate to Somalia.

In accordance with paragraph 41 of resolution 2607 (2021), the Panel provided the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia with a midterm update on 28 April 2022. The Panel also submitted three thematic reports to the Committee on 23 March, 24 June, and 19 July 2022. The fourth thematic report on smuggling and trafficking of weapons and military equipment will be submitted after drafting this report.


The Panel, which is based in Nairobi, Kenya, was appointed by the Secretary-General in his letter S/2021/1108, dated 16 December 2021. During the mandate, the Panel travelled to France, Germany, Somalia, the Sultanate of Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States in order to conduct meetings with officials and confidential sources. Within Somalia, the Panel travelled to Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bosaso, Kismayo, and Hargeisa,

Lastly, General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/254 regarding the 16-day advance booking of tickets, has resulted in a Secretariat policy of requiring a prior notice of 25 calendar days for any Panel travel, with waivers to the rule granted only under exceptional circumstances. Due to the unique nature of the Panel’s work within the UN system, which requires significant flexibility in meeting with existing sources, as well as identifying new ones, satisfying this travel requirement is often challenging.

Annex 2: Al-Shabaab financial receipts (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 3: Al-Shabaab notice for domestic property payments

Figures 1 and 2: An Al-Shabaab notice indicating taxation rates for domestic properties in Afgoye on the left with accompanying translation on the right.¹



Source: Confidential

ISLAMIC PROVINCE OF AL SHABAAB

May piece, mercy and blessings be upon you!

After the above greetings:
Notice, Notice, Notice

You are being informed as follows:

Sno.	House	Value
1.	Stone house	\$150
2.	Story house	\$300
3.	Iron sheet house	\$100

Thank you

If you receive this, respond it within 24 hours.
For more information or complaint, please contact me through the following
telephone: 01 [REDACTED]


Governor: Sh. Ab [REDACTED]

Signature of the governor (Wali): _____

¹ All translations completed by an official Panel provider.

Annex 4: Al-Shabaab information collection forms

Figure 1: An Al-Shabaab form titled “census to households” with accompanying translation.



Source: Confidential

OFFICE OF POLICY AND PROVINCES

CENSUS FORM

Date: _____ Serial NO: 10 [REDACTED]

Father of the Household: _____ Age: _____ Tel: _____

Tribe: _____ Clan: _____ Sub-clan: _____

Mother of the Household: _____ Tel: _____

Number of Children: _____ Male: _____ Female: _____

No.	Name of the Child	Age
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		

A. Health of the Child

Number of healthy children: _____ Number of disabled children: _____

Number of children abroad: _____ Number of children in the Country: _____

B. Level of Education

No.	Illiterate	Quran	Primary	Secondary School	University

No.	Name of those with Skills	Type of skill
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		

Province: _____ District: _____ Village: _____

If the mother has other children, number of children: _____

If there are other households, their number: _____

Source of the livelihood of the household 1. Business: _____ Type of Business: _____

Asset: _____ 2. Farm Number of Hectares: _____ Owned: _____ Leased: _____

3. Livestock keeping: Camel: _____ Cattle: _____ Goats: _____

4. Remittance from abroad 5. Salaried 6. Casual work

C. Who is the breadwinner of the Household.

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

Clan Elder: _____ Tel: _____

Annex 5: Activities delivered under the financial disruption plan

Following the disruption planning methodology meeting in 2021, UNODC designed and delivered operational analysis training to the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) of Somalia from 20 to 23 March 2022 in Mogadishu. The training covered topics including: the data collection cycle, analysis, and dissemination. The Panel's Finance Expert delivered a session on Al-Shabaab financial methodologies.

UNODC commenced mentoring of the FRC in early 2022 to assist the analysts with specific cases. This support continues to be provided through case-based mentoring, including cases that involve human trafficking, with the goal to work with the Attorney General's office to move these cases towards a judicial finish.

A senior level briefing to the FGS, originally planned for September 2021, was postponed due to election delays. The briefing is being rescheduled with the new administration.

Due to budget constraints and a lack of available funds, UNODC support to the FGS, and in particular the Financial Reporting Centre, through its Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism will end in mid-August 2022.

Annex 6: Weapons observed in Al-Shabaab propaganda footage

Figure 1: Assault rifles with characteristics similar² to Chinese manufactured model 56-1 rifle



Source: Video on Qasim Al Rimi training camp, 10 July 2022

Figure 2: Al Hisba fighter carrying rifle with characteristics similar to Type 56-2



Source: Al-Shabaab associated media, Eid Adha, 9 July 2022.

Figure 3: Rifle with characteristics similar to Meridian Defence Corporation MDC-47 "VOLK"



Source: Al-Shabaab associated media, Eid Adha, 9 July 2022.

² Without proper tracing of markings and serial numbers, "Characteristics similar to" doesn't intend to identify the origin of the weapons.

Figure 4: Small machine gun with characteristics similar to Chinese model Type 82



Source: Video on Qasim Al Rimi training camp, 10 July 2022

Figure 5: RPG round with characteristics similar to Bulgarian PG-7M manufactured in 2005



Source: Video on Qasim Al Rimi training camp, 10 July 2022

Annex 7: Tracing of weapons captured by AMISOM from Al-Shabaab between 2019 and April 2022

The Panel compared markings and serial numbers of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab with serial numbers of all known weapons in the JVT database.³ Four weapons (rows 1 to 4 in table below with serial numbers 6884, 58201808, 18110 and 404803) were found to have been owned by SNA soldiers. Nine weapons (rows 5 to 13 with serial numbers 12967, 69549, 411212, 2865, 48014325, 60013158, 60006094, 3054 and 60012023) though not known in the JVT database have serial numbers very close to a weapon within that database. The Panel believes that these nine weapons are very likely part of shipments donated to the FGS but the serial number might have been wrongly recorded. One weapon in row 14 with serial number 17104861 is 4500 apart from the closest serial number (17109361) within the database. The latter is part of a shipment donated by Uganda to the FGS in 2013. The weapon could have been captured by Al-Shabaab from a Ugandan contingent of AMISOM.

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
1	Apr 22	1		6884	0	6884	SO-XDS-2017	1600	SNA	2017	Djibouti
2	Jan 22	1		58201808	0	58201808	SO-XDS 2015		SNA		
3	2019	1		18110	0	18110		3000	SNA	2014	UAE
4	Oct 21	1	56-2	404803	0	404803			SNA	2013	Ethiopia
5	2022	1		12967	1	12966		6000	SNA	2017	China
6	Mar 21	1		69549	4	69545		6000	SNA	2017	China
7	Sep 19	1		411212	5	411207			SNA	2013	Ethiopia
8	2019	1		2865	6	2859		200	PSF	2013	Yemen
9	2019	1		48014325	7	48014332		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
10	Nov 21	1		60013158	36	60013194	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
11	Sep 19	1		60006094	76	60006170	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
12	2019	1	AB	3054	170	AB 3224		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
13	Oct 21	1		60012023	247	60012270	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
14	Feb 21	1	56-1	17104861	4500 ⁴	17109361		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
15	Mar 22	1		61129414	312	61129726 ⁵					
16	2019	1	UPDF 56	5403264 ⁶							
17	2019	1		167553							
18	2019	1	ry	2522							

³ For background on JVT database, see Annex 4.2: Weapons and ammunition management of S/2021/849.

⁴ Beyond numbers of weapons donated.

⁵ Serial number of Assault rifle Type 56-1 seized by US on 20 December 2021, see Annex 13, table 13.1, page 2.

⁶ Weapons starting from row 16 could not be linked to weapons database known to the Panel and their tracing is not conclusive.

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
19	2019	1	BP	2916							
20	2019	1	IC	12052							
21	2019	1	EB	4093							
22	2019	1	V	2299							
23	2019	1		502							
24	2019	1	AX	2546							
25	2019	1	83LC	7406							
26	2019	1	00	2299							
27	2019	1	00	5372							
28	2019	1	FMP	133650							
29	2019	1		36038858							
30	2019	9		No marking							
31	Sep 19	1	PM	1451							
32	Sep 19	1	S-AY	1512							
33	Sep-19	1	TFG AMG	4384							
34	Sep 19	1		No marking							
35	May 20	1	G3 C	56421							
36	May 20	1		372624							
37	May 20	1		636093							
38	May 20	1	G3 A3	6050185							
39	May 20	1	G3-	ry-rryns D							
40	Mar 21	1	D	17403							
41	May 21	1	56-2	722634							
42	Jun 21	1		7260306							
43	Oct 21	1	56-1	62779							
44	Nov 21	1		15005828							
45	Nov 21	1	386 56	3526021							
46	Dec 21	1		3463							
47	Mar 22	1		63071650							

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
48	Apr 22	1	M70B1	1984							
49	Apr 22	1		110992							
50	Apr 22	1		384801							
51	Apr 22	1		431596							
52	Apr 22	1	M70B1	431712							
53	Apr 22	1	56	626685							
54	Apr 22	1	EM	1701146							
55	Apr 22	1		66769998							
56	Apr 22	1	1955								
Total		64	Total serial								

Annex 8: Headstamps of cartridges captured from Al-Shabaab during the reporting period and earlier mandates

			
811 20 China 2020	811 19 China 2019	IK 19 Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2019	3 19 Russia 2019
			
RSD 18 Romania 2018	3 18 Russia 2018	811 17 China 2017	311 17 China 2017
			
811 15 China 2015	7.62x39 2015 Russia ⁷	60 09 China 2009	323 03 ⁸ Romania 2003
			
539 99 Russia 1999	71 99 China 1999	27 84 ⁹ Egypt 1984	270 78 Ukraine 1978
			
351 78 China 1978	10 78 Bulgaria 1978	10 76 Bulgaria 1976	211 76 China 1976

⁷ Consistent with marking of Klimovsk Specialized Ammunition Plant, see <https://forum.cartridgecollectors.org/t/solved-identified-7-62x39-mm-klimovsk-russia/22495>.


⁸ Headstamp identified in the Panel's report S/2017/924.

⁹ Headstamp identified in the Panel's report S/2019/858.

			
61 76 ¹⁰ China 1976	61 74 China 1974	270 73 Ukraine 1973	31 71 China 1971
			
60 66 Kyrgyz Republic 1966			

Source: Panel

The Panel sent tracing requests for ammunition manufactured since 2005 in line with record -keeping requirements in the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) in 2005.¹¹ The result of the tracing requests is as follows:

Markings	Last known custodian	Reply to tracing request
IK 19	Igman d.d. Konjic, Donje Polje 42, Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019)	Pending
811 15, 811 17, 811 19, 811 20 311 17	Factory 811, China (2015, 2017, 2019 and 2020) Factory 31, China (2017)	“Based on the analysis of specialized agencies, such weapons and ammunition referred to in the letter are not difficult to imitate, but it's hard to identify whether they are made in China with the information provided.”
RSD 18	Department of the Army, USA (2018) ¹²	Pending
3 18	JSC the Ulyanovsk Cartridge Works, Russia (2018)	Pending
 2015	Klimovsk Specialized Ammunition Plant, Russia (2015). ¹³	Pending

¹⁰ Headstamp identified in the Panel's S/2019/858.

¹¹ <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/International-Tracing-Instrument-six-official-languages.pdf>.

¹² Manufactured by Uzina Mecanica Sadu, Gorj, Romania.

¹³ See <https://forum.cartridgecollectors.org/t/klimovsk-7-62-x-39mm-carton/17493> and <https://new.kspz.ru/product/9-h-39-mm-patron-ohotnichij/>.

Annex 9: ATGM 9M115 “METIS” and ATGM launchers 9П135 and 9П135M potentially smuggled from Yemen to Al-Shabaab

The Panel received from the Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF) information on smuggling cases, including pictures of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and their launchers. PMPF assessed that the weapons systems were smuggled from a third country to Yemen via Somalia. The Panel identified that those items have characteristics similar to the following:

- i. Two ATGM launchers **9П135** (with markings as **9П135010000 03-86-MK 4244**) and **9П135M** (with markings as **9П135M 1 07-86-MK 6155**) capable of launching 9M11 “FAGOT” and 9M115 “METIS” ATGM, see figures 9.1 and 9.2 below; and
- ii. Three **ATGM 9M115 “METIS”** with markings as **9M115 08-86 1703 08-86 0568-06-86**, see figures 9.3 and 9.4 below.

PMPF assessed that the ATGMs and launchers were smuggled from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Yemen via Somalia, and were intended for the Houthis in Yemen, based on the information that ATGMs are not used in Somalia. However, the Panel of Experts on Yemen has indicated in a number of its final reports that the Houthis have generally received ATGM variants of 9M113 Konkurs and 9M133 Kornet. As 9M11 “FAGOT” and 9M115 “METIS” ATGM were part of Yemen’s arsenal before the arms embargo was imposed by resolution 2216 (2015) on Yemen, the Panel of Experts on Somalia considers that these missiles could have been diverted by Yemeni arms traffickers for delivery to Somalia. Sources informed the Panel of Experts on Somalia that AQAP in Yemen is currently hosting fighters from Al-Shabaab for training on the use of heavy weapons. As the Puntland coast has been allegedly used for smuggling weapons from Yemen to armed groups in Somalia, the Panel of Experts on Somalia is investigating whether AQAP Yemen is trying to supply ATGMs to Al-Shabaab in Somalia.¹⁴ The Panel of Experts on Somalia sent a tracing request to the Russian Federation to identify whether those items have been delivered to Yemen by the Russian Federation before the imposition of the targeted arms embargo on Yemen.

Figure 1: ATGM launchers 9П135 and 9П135M smuggled to or via Somalia



Source: PMPF, Puntland, Somalia

¹⁴ A number of cases have been recorded, see annex 15 on smuggling of weapons to Somalia.

Figure 2: Markings and serial numbers on the two launchers



Figure 3: ATGM 9M115 "METIS" smuggled to or via Somalia



Source: PMPF, Puntland, Somalia

Figure 4: ATGM 9M115 "METIS" with markings as 9M115 08-86 1703 08-86 0568-06-86



Source: PMPF, Puntland, Somalia

Annex 10: Reported defection and neutralization of Al-Shabaab operatives by FGS media from October 2021 to August 2022

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Defected	Source
1	04-Oct-21	Janaale, L. Shabelle	10	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1444951933773623296
2	04-Oct-21	Mahas, Hiiraan	7	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1444951398932787201
3	06-Oct-21	Janaale, L. Shabelle	3	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1445839389943373830
4	09-Oct-21	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS defects ¹⁵	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1446818577827381254
5	17-Oct-21	Wajid, Bakool	1	AS leader defects ¹⁶	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1449695357210959874
6	20-Oct-21	Wajid, Bakool	4	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1450789493703839747
7	28-Oct-21	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS defects ¹⁷	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1453745113365159937
8	06-Nov-21	Buulamareer, L. Shabelle	2	AS neutralized	https://mobile.twitter.com/SNAForce/status/1456907862781878276
9	10-Nov-21	Awdheegle, L. Shabelle	22	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1458341468750422018
10	12-Nov-21	Qoryoley, L. Shabelle	1	AS defects ¹⁸	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1459252824424992773
11	12-Nov-21	Afurur, Puntland	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1459139790184587270
12	14-Nov-21	Xudur, Bakool	11	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1459967754375737351
13	15-Nov-21	Mogadishu	3	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1460278191973675010
14	23-Nov-21	Afgoye	3	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1463055441219534851
15	28-Nov-21	Wajid, Bakool	3	AS defect	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1464939607255142407
16	02-Dec-21	Mogadishu	15	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1466302739349135363
17	03-Dec-21	Bula Hajji, L. Juba	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1466682868118216705
18	12-Dec-21	Gambarey, L. Shabelle	5	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470000888068685824
19	13-Dec-21	Operation Spider	7	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470458576300916738

¹⁵ Adan Shiniyow Ibrahim.

¹⁶ Mohamed Kulow Ali.

¹⁷ Abdi Rahman Ali Hussein.

¹⁸ Mohamed Hassan, aka Abu Ali, head of the Al-Shabaab court in Kuntuwarey.

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Defected	Source
20	13-Dec-21	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470412686592823297
21	14-Dec-21	Sham, L. Shabelle	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470809464500588546
22	30-Dec-21	Baidoa, Bay	6	AS defect	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1476526294456274948
23	09-Jan-22	Bariire, L. Shabelle	25	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1480278705230471168
24	10-Jan-22	Barawe, L. Shabelle	1	AS defects ¹⁹	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1480560382611701761
25	18-Jan-22	Mubarak, L. Shabelle	13	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1483410216712556549
26	23-Jan-22	Guricel, Hiiraan	6	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1485133351841378308
27	26-Jan-22	Dhusamareb	20	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1486294865977749511
28	28-Jan-22	Balcad, M. Shabelle	28	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1486993557810552832
29	06-Feb-22	Sanguni, Kismayo	7	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1490358412831559680
30	22-Feb-22	Fidow, Hiiraan	60	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1496180394332495880
31	25-Feb-22	Bariire L. Shabelle	29	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1497205384217436165
32	27-Feb-22	Bal'ad, M. Shabelle	5	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1497957120431513604
33	01-Mar-22	Yontoy, L. Juba	10	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1498659821721169920
34	01-Mar-22	Xudur, Bakool	5	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1498582956423663617
35	09-Mar-22	Jamaame, L. Juba	16	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1501473404863533062
36	13-Mar-22	AAIA, Mogadishu	2	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1506563625032601603
37	17-Mar-22	Kismayo area	7	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1504556184463941640
38	17-Mar-22	Halgan, Hiiraan	2	As defect ²⁰	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1504424633910636546
39	26-Mar-22	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS defects	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1507714917914271748
40	27-Mar-22	Af-urur, Bari, Puntland	12	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1508011173702258695
41	27 Apr 22	Garbaharey	1	AS arrested ²¹	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1507986853038899200
42	3 Apr 22	Wasil, Mudug	9	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1510593929682554881

¹⁹ Adan Gurow Isak.

²⁰ Abdifitah Ibrahim Mohamud and Osman Ibrahim Daud.

²¹ Hassan Abdi Muhammed (Guleed).

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Source Defected	Source
43	9 Apr 22	Luq, Gedo	2	AS defect ²²	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1512742201054449664
44	14 Apr 22	Baidoa	1	AS defects ²³	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1514356762731851787
45	18 Apr 22	Jubaland	1	AS defects ²⁴	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1516124706390392834
46	29 Apr 22	South West	1	AS defects ²⁵	https://twitter.com/GaroweOnline/status/1519971668378234880?t=wUBw94ihbl52517YIRG5g&s=09
47	17 May 22	Baidoa	5	AS defect	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1526630774300192769
48	22 May 22	Marka	1	AS arrested ²⁶	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1528133923544473612
49	27 May 22	War-Ise, M. Shabelle	9	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1530125803148673024
50	31 May 22	Berhani, Kismayo	4	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1531733474260004864
51	3 Jun 22	Yaq-Halul	10	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1532700531063414786
52	4 Jun 22	Tiyeglow, Bakool	1	AS neutralized ²⁷	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1533025638105464833
53	6 Jun 22	Toratorow, L. Shabelle	6	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1533718246121160704
54	8 Jun 22	Baidoa	1	AS defects ²⁸	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1534494103475474434
55	13 Jun 22	Qabdho, Mataban, Hiiraan	12	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1536252031442329604
56	14 Jun 22	Wanlaweyn, L. Shabelle	1	AS neutralized ²⁹	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1536621776343650304
57	16 Jun 22	Jameeco. L Shabelle	1	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1537480464293941248
58	17 Jun 22	Bahdo, Galmudug	70	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1537685810639683584
59	22 Jun 22	Berhani	4	AS neutralized ³⁰	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1539660142022922240
60	24 Jun 22	Lafoole	2	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1540344173106176002

²² Mohamed Tawane and Deqow Ibrahim

²³ Mohamed Mohamud Fanah

²⁴ Abshir cusmaan jiirow

²⁵ Isse Omar Derow.

²⁶ Aweys Mayow in charge of making explosives.

²⁷ Mohamud Nur Ga'al, (Sheikh Al-Sima).

²⁸ Mustaf Ishak Ali (Mutaf).

²⁹ Hassan Suleiman Ali.

³⁰ IED captured.

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Defected	Source
61	2 Jul 22	Ali-Fool-Dhere, Shabelle	M.40	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1543259654947586050
62	6 Jul 22	Banaadir	5	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1544673659792539648
63	12 Jul 22	Bukure, Mahas, Hiiraan	25	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1546904877003165696
64	15 Jul 22	Afgoye	1	As neutralized ³¹	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1547989276117241857
65	17 Jul 22	Jubba valey	2	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1548603510450683904
66	17 Jul 22	Labi-Kus, Kismayo	4	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1548757427482394626
67	30 Jul 22	Tosweyne, Bardale, Bay	3	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1553325358061178880
68	2 Aug 22	Baidoa	1	AS defects ³²	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1554429788911198208
69	3 Aug 22	Bukure, Mahas, Hiiraan	30	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1554520743798575104
70	14 Aug 22	Mahas, Hiiraan	13	AS neutralized ³³	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1558866334506778627
Total			623	28 defectors	

³¹ Moalim Hashi.

³² Ibrahim Moallim Yusuf.

³³ Including senior operative Mohamed Weheliye Wasuge.

**Annex 11: Notifications to the 751 Committee on Somalia of consignments of weapons and ammunition during the current and the previous mandate
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 12: Ammunition potentially delivered to Puntland Security Force (PSF) without complying with the procedural requirements of the Somalia arms embargo regime

The Panel has investigated the use of mortar shells on civilians and civilian objects inside Bosaso during clashes from 21 to 23 December 2021. These clashes were triggered following a decision, on 24 November 2021, by President Said Abdullahi Deni of Puntland to appoint Brigadier General Mohamed Amin Abdullahi Haji Khair as Director of PSF in replacement of General Mohamud Osman Abdullahi (Diyano).³⁴ The latter with the support of his family members contested the decision considering and opposed the handover of authority over PSF to the new Director, see figure 12.1.³⁵ The Panel met in Bosaso with Asad Diyano the former Director of PSF who admitted that their remaining forces within PSF opposed an attack by forces loyal to President Deni for political motives and against the will of clan elders representing Bosaso. He informed that about 150 fighters have left PSF and were working in a newly constituted unit.³⁶ The Panel understands that the US is no longer supporting the PSF and once the financial package offered dries up, lack of salaries could transform the unpaid fighters into militiamen with possible acts that could threaten the peace and security in the area.³⁷

The Panel met with General Mohamed Amin whose new force called Puntland Intelligence Security Force (PISF) was working closely with PMPF. Both PMPF and PISF directors informed the Panel that the force remaining under Diyano is working against national authority.³⁸ According to unconfirmed information, the remaining force under Diyano is renamed Puntland Security Commando Force (PSCF).³⁹

This investigation has a human rights dimension as well as an arms embargo compliance angle. The Panel is investigating, within its mandate, to identify potential non-compliance with the arms embargo procedures for delivery of arms and ammunition to Puntland Security Forces (PSF) should the unit be considered as an SSSI other than those of the FGS.⁴⁰ As such, delivery of weapons, ammunition and military equipment included in annex A and B of resolution 2607 (2021) to PSF, requires a request of approval and a notification to the Committee by the supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organization.

The Panel obtained pictures of remnants of 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm mortars, allegedly fired by PSF during the clashes,⁴¹ with markings of characteristics similar to those found in the United States ammunition lot numbering and ammunition data cards (MIL-STD-1168). From the markings, the Panel identified types of mortars used and years of manufacture between 2008 and 2014, see table 12.1 below with details in figure 12.2. 120 mm mortars and 60/81 mm mortars are part of annex A and annex B of resolution 2607 (2021), respectively. The Panel could not identify in the Committee's database any notification or request of approval for delivery of such items to PSF. The Panel send a letter to the United States requesting information whether ammunition with similar markings has been supplied to Puntland and to confirm the last known beneficiary security units of those items as well as information on the EUC related to such supply. A reply is still pending.

Table 1: Identification of mortars fired in Bosaso

Marking	Type	Year of production	Manufacturer
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³⁴ <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-puntland-president-s-move-to-fire-psf-boss-sparks-munity>.

³⁵ PSF has been since its constitution under the leadership of the Diyano family with Osman Abdullahi Diyano as the first Director, replaced in 2010 by his son Asad Osman Diyano as director till 2018 when he stepped down as candidate for Puntland presidential election giving his place to his brother Mohamed Osman Diyano.

³⁶ The initial strength of PSF was about 500 fighters according to Asad Diyano.

³⁷ Asad was hoping that the unit could be assimilated as a Danab unit potentially under the direct authority of FGS.

³⁸ Following negotiations with clan elders, President Deni reinstated Gen. Mohamud Osman Diyano.

³⁹ Asad informed the Panel that he heard about this appellation but has not seen any official document.

⁴⁰ It is to be noted that Asad, the former PSF Director informed the Panel that PSF has never been under the authority of Puntland Government and never benefited from its support as it was funded and equipped by the United States to fight Al-Shabaab and ISIL Somalia.

⁴¹ The pictures were provided by Puntland security services with location of impacts indicating the origin of firing as PSF locations, see figure 12.3. The Panel sent a letter to Puntland requesting information on units equipped with mortars, a reply is still pending.

DAE 10H001-012	Practice 60 mm mortar round	2010	DAE: Day & Zimmerman Inc Lone Star/Camden Operations; East Camden, Arizona, USA
PB 10L 106-001	81 mm illuminator mortar round	2010	PB: Pine Bluff Arsenal; Pine Bluff, Arizona, USA
POL08L308-005	120 mm mortar ignition cartridge M1020	2008	POL: Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)
POL 09G502-008	81 mm mortar ignition cartridge M299	2009	
POL13A308-002	120 mm mortar ignition cartridge M1020	2013	
NPL14J402-004	60 mm mortar ignition cartridge M702	2014	NPL: Probably Nammo Pocal, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA

Source: Panel based on analysis of pictures provided by Puntland security services.

Figure 1 PSF press statement contesting the change of PSF leadership



PRESS STATEMENT

Date: 26th Nov, 2021

In regards to the events that unfolded in the past couple of days PSF HQ have released the following statements:

1. The officers and officials of the PSF are committed to fight terrorism and the enemies of Puntland.
2. The work and administration of the PSF has been interfered without any accordance with the existing laws and constitutional clauses with regards to the co-operation between the PSF and the Government. This harassment and interference of ongoing works has been going on for a long time and for that we have been patient.
3. At this time our comrades in the other Puntland armed forces are being asked to join an operation that's objective is to harm and attack PSF soldiers in their HQ. They will not attack us nor will we harm them either.
4. The PSF will not take orders from those who worked with the enemy yesterday. Instead we will continue to defend our people and our land.
5. The PSF and its officers are well trained and sufficient for the security of their people insha'Allah
6. The PSF is a non-partisan military organization and has never worked on politics, be it multiparty system or otherwise. Instead the latest decisions and interferences made by the Puntland government has been wholly **politically motivated**.



contact@psf.so

Source: <https://twitter.com/PSFForces/status/1464268796848447488>.

Figure 2: Pictures of ignition cartridges of mortars recovered


Picture	Marking	Manufacturer
	NPL14J402-004	Probably Nammo Pocal, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA
	POL 09G502-008	Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)
	POL08L308-005	Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)
	POL13A308-002	Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)

Figure 3: Mortar firing base and points of impacts within Bosaso during elements between 21 and 23 December 2021



Source: Panel based on information provided by Puntland security services.

Annex 13.1: Assault rifles with characteristics similar to Type 56-1 seized by US forces from a smuggling dhow

Figure 1: Sample of the 1406 Type 56-1 assault rifles inspected



Source: Panel

Figure 2: Model Type 56-1 seized



Source: Panel

Figure 3: Marking: 7.62mm Type 56-1; logo (26 inside a triangle); 16 – CN; Serial 61103920



Source: Panel

Figure 4: Samples of serial numbers identified (highlighted in the list at table 1)

16- 61089552	16 - 61104554	16- 6110747
17 - 62039574	17 - 62107561	17 - 62118520

Table 1.1: Page 1, Serial number 500 riffles of batch 1 (ordered from 61000281 to 61092896)

61000281	61069857	61080410	61083815	61085043	61086169	61087239	61088540	61089708
61000312	61069929	61080494	61083834	61085051	61086191	61087247	61088553	61089712
61000329	61070065	61080603	61083868	61085055	61086218	61087264	61088557	61089759
61000532	61070096	61080605	61083955	61085120	61086231	61087302	61088598	61089762
61003234	61070115	61080696	61083995	61085138	61086255	61087341	61088607	61089788
61003990	61070459	61080700	61083995	61085146	61086256	61087390	61088620	61089789
61006237	61070739	61080701	61084073	61085159	61086303	61087401	61088623	61089834
61008996	61070987	61080702	61084102	61085171	61086354	61087612	61088647	61089851
61008997	61071206	61080706	61084118	61085197	61086360	61087718	61088678	61089854
61017588	61071235	61080729	61084145	61085224	61086373	61087720	61088687	61089907
61038339	61071356	61080735	61084154	61085324	61086389	61087733	61088766	61089919
61040462	61071380	61080800	61084157	61085338	61086435	61087764	61088773	61089923
61044380	61071429	61080983	61084158	61085341	61086441	61087779	61088790	61090161
61047341	61071528	61081219	61084160	61085367	61086449	61087810	61088793	61090272
61048624	61071574	61081227	61084195	61085383	61086450	61087833	61088815	61090305
61054712	61071661	61081429	61084197	61085399	61086513	61087847	61088830	61090375
61056959	61071710	61081520	61084227	61085412	61086519	61087866	61088839	61090402
61057023	61071778	61081740	61084232	61085438	61086520	61087878	61088874	61090421
61058956	61071842	61081745	61084259	61085442	61086530	61087882	61088877	61090423
61058993	61071883	61082092	61084290	61085457	61086574	61087888	61088884	61090426
61059684	61071921	61082501	61084367	61085471	61086579	61087901	61088909	61090432
61059750	61071941	61082512	61084370	61085485	61086583	61087918	61088939	61090470
61059843	61076830	61082644	61084387	61085489	61086608	61087923	61088952	61090660
61060000	61077703	61082658	61084394	61085498	61086652	61087994	61088966	61090747
61064156	61077743	61082672	61084396	61085505	61086676	61087995	61088980	61090776
61064654	61077920	61082701	61084502	61085531	61086759	61088009	61088991	61090854
61064776	61078217	61082836	61084557	61085545	61086776	61088076	61088994	61090909
61064793	61078580	61082940	61084590	61085555	61086787	61088086	61088999	61090932
61064932	61078599	61082950	61084593	61085565	61086863	61088155	61089042	61091130
61064940	61078706	61083018	61084603	61085631	61086888	61088165	61089078	61091189
61065027	61078717	61083155	61084649	61085644	61086903	61088222	61089081	61091225
61065028	61078831	61083203	61084675	61085695	61086908	61088232	61089126	61091255
61065056	61079022	61083338	61084694	61085704	61086963	61088235	61089188	61091409
61065073	61079227	61083339	61084709	61085713	61086997	61088245	61089419	61091542
61066799	61079238	61083345	61084727	61085744	61087011	61088250	61089433	61091611
61066924	61079255	61083381	61084737	61085751	61087015	61088256	61089440	61091765
61066959	61079331	61083434	61084747	61085752	61087016	61088267	61089496	61091950
61067478	61079400	61083484	61084756	61085782	61087018	61088356	61089537	61091952
61067752	61079412	61083516	61084798	61085829	61087029	61088360	61089552	61091958
61068078	61079422	61083529	61084801	61085864	61087047	61088415	61089554	61092150
61068251	61079463	61083562	61084827	61085937	61087075	61088417	61089565	61092155
61068335	61079567	61083582	61084833	61085942	61087090	61088437	61089566	61092239
61068422	61079627	61083586	61084907	61085943	61087093	61088461	61089585	61092248
61068914	61079979	61083611	61084938	61085992	61087116	61088462	61089592	61092392
61069419	61080066	61083656	61084956	61086008	61087127	61088463	61089616	61092429
61069424	61080118	61083688	61084971	61086032	61087145	61088468	61089663	61092515
61069613	61080186	61083749	61084991	61086064	61087169	61088475	61089666	61092531
61069704	61080237	61083777	61085010	61086097	61087189	61088479	61089694	61092617
61069718	61080361	61083781	61085026	61086156	61087229	61088510	61089695	61092688
61069749	61080395	61083785	61085034	61086156	61087237	61088521	61089703	61092896

Note: highlighted serial numbers are of pictures at Figure 13.4

Table 1.2: Page 2, Serial number 500 rifles of batch 1 (ordered from 61092957 to 61106708)

61092957	61095093	61096704	61098189	61099640	61101086	61102986	61104190	61105212
61092961	61095106	61096726	61098201	61099641	61101089	61103025	61104241	61105222
61093098	61095140	61096727	61098264	61099665	61101103	61103040	61104246	61105258
61093257	61095200	61096740	61098325	61099688	61101117	61103148	61104259	61105278
61093258	61095224	61096755	61098327	61099741	61101121	61103184	61104287	61105294
61093293	61095226	61096762	61098341	61099746	61101160	61103201	61104305	61105295
61093342	61095276	61096768	61098486	61099764	61101164	61103211	61104332	61105388
61093364	61095279	61096796	61098553	61099798	61101172	61103216	61104333	61105450
61093487	61095442	61096801	61098565	61099811	61101182	61103217	61104336	61105452
61093520	61095514	61096803	61098566	61099829	61101270	61103221	61104350	61105466
61093545	61095516	61096866	61098587	61099884	61101347	61103254	61104357	61105507
61093564	61095538	61096869	61098598	61099894	61101493	61103271	61104375	61105551
61093583	61095571	61096911	61098604	61099903	61101552	61103282	61104380	61105554
61093595	61095627	61096926	61098620	61100026	61101573	61103289	61104385	61105560
61093678	61095628	61096941	61098692	61100032	61101586	61103339	61104475	61105569
61093732	61095632	61097009	61098715	61100033	61101602	61103440	61104485	61105570
61093734	61095711	61097019	61098770	61100074	61101617	61103446	61104487	61105572
61093756	61095758	61097027	61098807	61100180	61101661	61103458	61104494	61105575
61093770	61095770	61097050	61098819	61100259	61101670	61103467	61104502	61105593
61093900	61095773	61097067	61098832	61100272	61101747	61103518	61104529	61105684
61093901	61095804	61097072	61098850	61100311	61101758	61103546	61104550	61105694
61093907	61095847	61097096	61098946	61100361	61101882	61103557	61104554	61105725
61094000	61095904	61097114	61098972	61100432	61101890	61103568	61104558	61105731
61094004	61095915	61097164	61099017	61100437	61101909	61103587	61104571	61105774
61094127	61095916	61097167	61099037	61100481	61102027	61103605	61104573	61105778
61094237	61095958	61097169	61099097	61100528	61102029	61103631	61104624	61105788
61094290	61096093	61097172	61099133	61100591	61102039	61103637	61104632	61105793
61094364	61096110	61097183	61099144	61100616	61102060	61103640	61104670	61105880
61094484	61096147	61097245	61099210	61100636	61102082	61103712	61104675	61105885
61094515	61096154	61097249	61099215	61100650	61102114	61103722	61104677	61105890
61094545	61096157	61097285	61099222	61100669	61102122	61103733	61104733	61105897
61094562	61096161	61097314	61099259	61100672	61102150	61103734	61104762	61105972
61094650	61096188	61097333	61099338	61100680	61102182	61103738	61104768	61106000
61094702	61096227	61097335	61099382	61100703	61102191	61103794	61104770	61106065
61094705	61096322	61097338	61099389	61100751	61102200	61103857	61104780	61106075
61094712	61096351	61097384	61099431	61100756	61102207	61103894	61104781	61106097
61094745	61096392	61097450	61099449	61100774	61102213	61103920	61104843	61106177
61094784	61096407	61097647	61099496	61100776	61102217	61103955	61104869	61106181
61094804	61096417	61097648	61099500	61100801	61102227	61103965	61104910	61106185
61094813	61096447	61097672	61099521	61100809	61102325	61103989	61104918	61106199
61094831	61096450	61097703	61099534	61100934	61102483	61104035	61104997	61106205
61094912	61096451	61097746	61099536	61100939	61102502	61104038	61105007	61106225
61094978	61096522	61097884	61099557	61100971	61102533	61104040	61105010	61106233
61094980	61096529	61097888	61099578	61100975	61102543	61104041	61105037	61106241
61094987	61096553	61097905	61099579	61100977	61102581	61104042	61105053	61106368
61095048	61096556	61097931	61099588	61100991	61102600	61104102	61105175	61106372
61095050	61096570	61097972	61099591	61100997	61102641	61104106	61105180	61106402
61095073	61096571	61098092	61099608	61101006	61102666	61104111	61105200	61106490
61095081	61096597	61098104	61099614	61101027	61102730	61104120	61105202	61106654
61095088	61096617	61098109	61099618	61101073	61102785	61104173	61105205	61106708

Note: highlighted serial numbers are of pictures at Figure 13.1.4

Table 1.3: Page 3, Serial number 48 rifles of batch 1 (ordered from 61106729 to 67707218)

61106729	61108825	61111233
61106809	61108864	61111458
61106810	61108873	61111515
61106811	61108940	61111549
61107040	61108965	61111574
61107049	61108967	61111654
61107067	61108995	61111715
61107072	61109003	61111721
61107073	61109004	61111729
61107118	61109062	61111733
61107119	61109255	61111746
61107129	61109343	61111887
61107131	61109401	61111897
61107194	61109423	61111898
61107225	61109426	61111901
61107267	61109472	61111924
61107282	61109579	61111950
61107317	61109590	61111958
61107364	61109591	61111960
61107470	61109621	61111962
61107540	61109630	61112049
61107590	61109770	61112092
61107611	61109906	61120049
61107613	61109989	61120256
61107619	61110053	61120275
61107656	61110121	61120369
61107809	61110235	61120374
61107820	61110239	61120482
61107836	61110244	61120500
61107852	61110253	61120509
61107855	61110288	61120536
61107856	61110292	61120556
61107871	61110311	61120557
61107887	61110363	61120576
61107903	61110378	61120668
61107920	61110492	61120677
61107932	61110547	61120753
61108070	61110595	61120754
61108133	61110726	61127101
61108145	61110822	61129726 ⁴²
61108443	61110840	61129872
61108454	61110842	61130877
61108461	61110867	61131427
61108476	61110870	61131568
61108491	61110879	61131596
61108593	61110883	61132070
61108594	61111041	61132296
61108599	61111092	61132473
61108643	61111102	
61108801	61111176	

⁴² Close to serial **61129414** of rifle seized by ATMIS from Al-Shabaab on April 2022, see Ser 46 at table of annex 7.

Table 1.4: Page 4, Serial number 358 riffles of batch 2 (ordered from 62000168 to 62132135)

62000168	62017344	62027089	62036967	62041683	62094557	62115493	62129506
62000267	62017435	62027208	62037160	62041752	62094573	62115622	62129645
62000281	62017673	62027470	62037166	62041786	62094721	62115635	62129842
62000328	62018213	62027643	62037172	62041802	62094839	62115669	62129856
62000424	62018214	62027689	62037357	62041878	62094861	62115996	62130195
62000430	62018247	62027719	62037397	62041943	62094890	62116728	62130688
62000431	62018296	62027956	62037535	62041951	62095105	62117216	62131184
62000492	62018563	62028020	62037558	62042080	62096748	62117528	62132135
62000569	62018802	62028061	62037789	62042192	62100651	62117930	
62000717	62019013	62028083	62037862	62042213	62101188	62117973	
62000965	62019157	62028517	62038077	62042226	62101741	62118035	
62000971	62019229	62028613	62038130	62042493	62101747	62118042	
62001226	62019302	62028675	62038167	62042603	62101961	62118122	
62001282	62019320	62028847	62038190	62042819	62102108	62118258	
62001490	62019332	62028918	62038272	62043030	62102136	62118263	
62001519	62019354	62028927	62038486	62043098	62102343	62118389	
62001538	62019446	62029309	62038514	62043115	62102531	62118520	
62001635	62019538	62029427	62038793	62043137	62102532	62118632	
62001660	62019540	62029501	62038818	62043147	62102587	62118649	
62002159	62019549	62029597	62038864	62043168	62102593	62118831	
62002421	62019567	62029599	62038991	62043319	62102633	62118899	
62002474	62019599	62029665	62039198	62043591	62102692	62119060	
62006044	62019665	62029760	62039261	62044073	62102711	62119085	
62006097	62019678	62029917	62039312	62044207	62102719	62119237	
62006106	62019698	62030476	62039574	62046797	62103343	62119370	
62006122	62019728	62031151	62039757	62047742	62103427	62119381	
62006152	62019770	62031295	62039766	62064746	62107561	62122100	
62006164	62019842	62031516	62039793	62068225	62109763	62123208	
62006175	62019966	62031595	62040028	62068417	62110053	62123672	
62006179	62020053	62031601	62040040	62068497	62110170	62123674	
62006217	62020242	62032046	62040041	62068506	62110192	62123694	
62006253	62020273	62032107	62040164	62068529	62110198	62123723	
62006318	62020551	62032570	62040190	62068826	62110216	62123738	
62007914	62020642	62032943	62040345	62068970	62110236	62123834	
62008220	62020787	62033097	62040385	62069138	62110322	62123848	
62008368	62020826	62033141	62040386	62069773	62110424	62124006	
62009420	62020840	62033876	62040560	62079440	62110437	62126045	
62010092	62020985	62034639	62040569	62082117	62110513	62126757	
62010893	62023538	62035391	62040719	62085790	62110529	62127387	
62011121	62023659	62035848	62040728	62089528	62110594	62127628	
62011850	62023801	62035948	62040781	62090745	62110863	62127835	
62011890	62025004	62036074	62040838	62092334	62110893	62128055	
62012925	62025221	62036081	62040852	62093141	62111124	62128063	
62014240	62025477	62036124	62041004	62093513	62111698	62128096	
62016955	62025775	62036189	62041017	62093862	62112450	62128590	
62017001	62026034	62036274	62041046	62093958	62112609	62128636	
62017041	62026106	62036337	62041051	62094016	62115287	62128912	
62017241	62026109	62036425	62041084	62094333	62115290	62129032	
62017269	62026112	62036716	62041235	62094382	62115458	62129101	
62017270	62026290	62036942	62041371	62094492	62115490	62129282	

Note: highlighted serial numbers are of pictures at Figure 13.1.4

Table 2: Distribution of 1048 serial numbers of Type 56-1 with marking 16-CN

Serial numbers			Total markings	Total seized	Percentage seized
61000000	to	61009999	10,000	9	0.09
61010000	to	61019999	10,000	1	0.01
61020000	to	61029999	10,000	0	0
61030000	to	61039999	10,000	1	0.01
61040000	to	61049999	10,000	4	0.04
61050000	to	61059999	10,000	8	0.08
61060000	to	61069999	10,000	29	0.29
61070000	to	61079999	10,000	42	0.42
61080000	to	61089999	10,000	318	3.18
61090000	to	61099999	10,000	251	2.51
61100000	to	61109999	10,000	311	3.11
61110000	to	61119999	10,000	48	0.48
61120000	to	61129999	10,000	19	0.19
61130000	to	61139999	10,000	7	0.07
Total			140,000	1048	0.75

Table 3: Distribution of 358 serial numbers of Type 56-1 with marking 17-CN

Serial numbers			Total markings	Total seized	Percentage seized
62000000	to	62009999	10,000	37	0.37
62010000	to	62019999	10,000	42	0.42
62020000	to	62029999	10,000	45	0.45
62030000	to	62039999	10,000	54	0.54
62040000	to	62049999	10,000	48	0.48
62050000	to	62059999	10,000	0	0
62060000	to	62069999	10,000	10	0.1
62070000	to	62079999	10,000	1	0.01
62080000	to	62089999	10,000	3	0.03
62090000	to	62099999	10,000	18	0.18
62100000	to	62109999	10,000	20	0.2
62110000	to	62119999	10,000	48	0.48
62120000	to	62129999	10,000	28	0.28
62130000	to	62139999	10,000	4	0.04
Total			140,000	358	0.26

Annex 13.2: Ammunition 7.56x54 mm cartridges seized by US forces from a smuggling dhow

Figure 13.2.1 Ammunition cans with black paint to disguise the markings



Source: Panel

Figure 2: Markings on ammunition cans with markings: 11/ 86 10 (Bulgaria)




Source: Panel

Figure 3: Markings on ammunition cans with markings: 46/69-25 ; 52-77-71 (China)



Source: Panel

Figure 4: Headstamps of ammunition 7.62 x 54 seized



Source: Panel

Annex 14: Weapons smuggling dhows landed in Bandarbeyla, Puntland

Figure 1: Dhow known as “Boat Oman” captured by Somali security forces



Source: Puntland police

Figure 2: Wrecked dhow



Annex 15: Elements of thematic report on weapons smuggling

During the mandate the Panel gathered information on cases of weapons smuggling to Somalia for the purpose of compiling a thematic report on smuggling and trafficking on weapons and military equipment, as requested by paragraph 41 of resolution 2607 (2021). Analysis of reports of both the Panel of Experts on Somalia and on Yemen, as well as information from cases during the reporting period, indicate three methods of smuggling used in the illicit supply of arms, ammunition, and IED components and products. These methods include smuggling through regular airports and seaports of entry in Somalia; smuggling by sea with large vessels mooring or drifting along Somalia's coast; and smuggling by dhow, mainly from Yemen. While smuggling through regular ports remains anecdotic and hard to corroborate,⁴³ the Panel confirmed smuggling by sea along coastal areas where maritime security is almost non-existent. There was no report from Member States of interdiction at sea, of dhows smuggling weapons, ammunition, or IED components destined for Somalia during the reporting period.⁴⁴

A. Smuggling by vessels mooring along the Somali coast

The Panel continues to follow suspicious movements of vessels of interest along the coast of Somalia. The Panel had noted, in 2020 and 2021, three cases of suspicious vessels mooring at a distance between 500 and 2,000 metres from the coast where Al-Shabaab or smuggling networks are active. Figure 1 shows the locations of these suspicious activities.

B. Smuggling by dhows beaching along the Somali coast

During the reporting period, the Panel received information on two cases of dhows smuggling weapons to Hobyo port in Galmudug on 25 October 2021⁴⁵ and at Bandarbeyla in Puntland on 25 June 2022.

Unloading of suspicious cargo on 25 October 2021 in Hobyo, Galmudug

The Panel received information and aerial imagery showing the unloading of suspicious cargo from a dhow in Hobyo on 25 October 2021. The imagery showed armed militia providing security during the unloading of the dhow, see figure 2. The Panel has unconfirmed information that a smuggling network was active in that area.⁴⁶

Neutralization of two dhows smuggling weapons and ammunition on 25 June 2022 in Bandarbeyla, Puntland

The smuggling case of 25 June 2022 involved two dhows carrying weapons and ammunition from Dhubab, Yemen, and destined for Hobyo, Galmudug, allegedly for networks supplying Al-Shabaab.⁴⁷ The dhows made it to Bandarbeyla, Puntland, due to weather conditions preventing them to reach their initial destination. One dhow was stuck in the beach and the second was captured by Puntland security services. The cargo comprised small arms, boxes of ammunition, rocket propelled grenades and barrels of fuel. The Panel was not able to inspect the seized items and received information from Puntland security services that the cargo of one dhow was looted by locals as there were not enough security forces to take control of the two dhows.

On 29 June 2022, the Panel interviewed some members of the crew of the dhows who were under Somali police custody in Bosaso. The captain of one dhow, Abdu Ismail Sayfi, claimed that the crew comprised two Somalis and five Yemenis mostly from Hays⁴⁸ and that the cargo was loaded in Dhubab⁴⁹ on 24 June 2022. Both localities are under the control of forces affiliated with the Government of Yemen. The captain claimed that he received instructions from Mohamed Essaghir to unload the cargo in Hobyo and then proceed to Mogadishu to take other

⁴³ The case of smuggling of charcoal by MV FOX from Kismayo without being reported by Somali and international security forces is an illustration on the possibility of using regular ports for illicit activities.

⁴⁴ The only reported seizures at sea were by the United States with the interdiction on 20 December 2022 of a dhow carrying weapons and ammunition (see <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2882679/us-navy-seizes-1400-assault-rifles-during-illicit-weapons-interdiction/>) and the interdiction, on 18 January 2022, of a dhow carrying 40 tons of urea fertilizer (see <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2908216/us-navy-interdicts-stateless-vessel-previously-caught-smuggling-weapons/>). Both dhows had Yemen as a destination.

⁴⁵ The information was received after the submission of S/2021/849.

⁴⁶ The arrival of this cargo coincided with reports of mobilization and building-up of ASWJ militias prior to fighting with FGS and Galmudug forces around Dhusamareb.

⁴⁷ According to information received from Puntland intelligence services.

⁴⁸ Coordinates 13°55'51"N, 43°28'43"E, about 30 km East of al Khawkhah port.

⁴⁹ Yemeni port at Bab Al Mandab straight, coordinates 12°56'36"N, 43°24'35"E.

cargo back to Yemen. Two Yemeni crewmembers identified themselves as Bassem Mohamed Omar Al Zahaari and Ali Mohamed Omar Al Zahaari.⁵⁰ The Panel shared the names and pictures of the crew with Yemen and requested their authorities to share the identification of the dhows, personal identification of the crew, and whether any of them is affiliated with AQAP or other armed groups in Yemen. A reply is still pending.

C. Update of smuggling networks active in Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland coastal areas

Smugglers neutralized or known to intelligence service in Puntland during the reporting period

The Panel received information that Puntland security services arrested in Bosaso, on 28 June 2021, an arms smuggler under the name of Ahmed Mohamed Nur in possession of 10,000 cartridges (7.62x39) for AK-47 rifles. The received information also included a phone number and coordinates in his GPS with stored coordinates of waypoints along the coast of Bari, as well as in Yemen.

Update on smuggling networks in Galmudug and Puntland

The Panel also received names and phone numbers of smugglers and individuals supporting them in Somalia and Yemen. The Panel identified phone numbers that were part of call data records (CDR) of phone numbers known to be owned by individuals associated with smuggling networks and ISIL operatives in Puntland.⁵¹ Figure 15.3 shows the connection between the major actors while the details of these networks will be included in the confidential thematic report on smuggling.

Known beaches and ports used by smuggling networks in Galmudug and Puntland

The Panel updated the list of suspicious activity in order to identify trends and patterns, as well as beaches used for unloading and potential routes likely used to supply Al-Shabaab with weapons and ammunition. Table 1 gives the names and coordinates of beaches that have been used and where smuggling activities have been reported. Figure 4 shows the location of these beaches, as well as areas where Al-Shabaab and FGS and FMS forces are present.

⁵⁰ Pictures of these individuals will be in the confidential thematic report on smuggling.

⁵¹ Details of these networks are included in confidential annexes of S/2016/919, S/2017/924 and S/2018/1002 and in Panel's archives including information analyzed and shared with the Panel by C4ADS.

Figure 1: Suspicious mooring of vessels close to areas controlled by Al-Shabaab




Figure 2: Unloading of suspicious cargo under armed guard in Hobyo, 25 October 2021





Unloading of the dhow at Hobyo anchorage

Source: Confidential
Nature of the cargo

Source: Confidential
Armed militia providing security for unloading operations

Source: Confidential

Figure 3: Links between identified smugglers operating in Galmudug and Puntland⁵²



⁵² Full names and phone numbers will be in the thematic report on smuggling.

Table 1: Main beaches identified in Galmudug and Puntland


Date	Locality	Coordinates	Activity reported
25 Jun 22	Bandarbeyla	N 9°29', E 50°48'	2 dhows intended to Hobyo landed with arms and ammunition
25 Oct 21	Hobyo	N 5°20', E 48°32'	Dhow unloads suspicious cargo ⁵³
7 Jun 20	Habo (Xabo)	N 11°47', E 50°31'	Suspicious cargo unloaded from a dhow
15 May 20	Mareero	N 11°19', E 49°17'	Weapons from Al-Mukallah Umu Bahri 2012
15 May 20	Illig	N 7°46', E 49°50'	Tanker vessel took smuggling personnel
10 Apr 20	Buru'	N 11°28', E 49°41'	Weapons from Yemen to ISIL ⁵⁴
18 Apr 20	Laasqoray	N 11° 9', E 48°11'	Weapons from Al Mukalla
23 Mar 20	Dhurbo	N 11°38', E 50°21'	Umu Bahri 2020, weapons from Al-Mukha, Yemen
26 Feb 20	Faah (Fax)	N 4°49', E 48° 9'	Foreigners disembark from a dhow
27 Dec 19	Berbera	N 10°26', E 44°58'	Transfer of weapons to Dhows for the Houthis
9 Dec 17	Alula	N 11°58', E 50°45'	Suspicious cargo from 3 dhows
Jan 17	Dufttenli	N 11°15', E 48°20'	
Oct 15	Maydh	N 10°58', E 47° 4'	Weapons and ammunition delivered ⁵⁵

⁵³ See figure 15.2

⁵⁴ Allegedly coordinated by Abdi Dhoofaaye and Isse Yulux.

⁵⁵ See paragraph 122 and confidential annex 8.5 S/2016/919.

Figure 4: Smuggling beaches and potential smuggling routes used by Al-Shabaab



Annex 16: Electronic components in IEDs used by Al-Shabaab

The Security Council, in paragraph 9 of resolution 2607 (2021), noting the increase in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) attacks undertaken by Al-Shabaab, decided that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices. Part I of annex C includes inter alia “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paras. 1 & 2. of the same part.

The Panel with the support of UNMAS gathered information on items and products used by Al-Shabaab to manufacture and operate the IEDs. The Panel noted that most of the IEDs captured by FGS and international forces used mainly two electronic components:

- (i) Learning Code Receivers (LCR): an electronic relay activated via a remote control by the IED operator;
- (ii) Motorcycle (MC) alarm: a switch activated by vibrations produced by the intended victim, figures 1 and 2 show how these items are wired.

The Panel has gathered information on these two types of items in order to trace their origin and their supply chain, see table 1 below and figures 1 to 6. The Panel noted a seizure of a large quantity of LCR by the FGS at Mogadishu airport, probably at the end of 2021, see figures 7 and 8. Figure 9 shows a seizure by the SNA of five IEDs with explosive in sections of 13 inch steel tube with batteries, MC, LCR and remote control.

Table 1: Identification of electronic components found on captured IEDs

Item type	Items captured	Manufacturer of items or components
LCR	66609613, 66609690 to 66609699 and 66609705	Henan Honest IOT Technology Co. Ltd ⁵⁶
MC	Name scratched probably Yamaha	Relays by KE YONG ⁵⁷
MC	LTM	

Figure 1: Illustration of wiring

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 2: Sketch of wiring of LCR and MC in IED

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

⁵⁶ With address at NO C7E3, The National University Science Park; Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone, Zhengzhou, Henan Province, China (<http://en.honestdz.com/contact/contact.aspx>)

⁵⁷ By Ningbo Zhenhai District Chengbeizhang Keyong Hardware Factory with address at No.331, Hongnan, Nanhong Village, Jiaochuan Sub-District Ningbo, Zhejiang, China.

Figure 3: Learning code receiver model Honest number 66609613 found in captured IED



Source: Confidential UN report.

Figure 4: LCR probably Yamaha




Source: Confidential UN report.

Figure 5 LCR LTM



Source: United Nations.

Figure 6: KEYONG relays found in MCs



Source: Confidential UN report.

Figure 7: LCR type Honest seized at Mogadishu airport at the end of 2021



Source: Somali TV channel

Figure 8: LCR type Honest seized at Mogadishu airport at the end of 2021



Source: Somali TV channel

Figure 9: Five IEDs with explosives in sections of 13 inch steel tube with batteries, MC, LCR and remote controls



Source: <https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FPa1KuKXoAIZ8i8?format=jpg&name=medium>.

Annex 17: Farming permits issued by Al-Shabaab to the population

Figure 1: An Al-Shabaab farming permit (*warqadda fasaxa beerah*) issued on (*taariikh*) 24-9-1443 (in the Islamic calendar), which corresponds to 25 April 2022 (in the Gregorian calendar) in Diinsor District (*Degmada Diinsoor*) to an individual from the Dabare clan living in the area of Diinsor. The form contains the name of the farmer (*Magaca*), age (*Da'da*), telephone number (*Tel*), clan (*Qabiilka*), location of the farm (*Deegaan*), the name of the clan elder/chief (*Malaag*) responsible for the farmer (*Mas'uulka majmuucada*), and his telephone number (*Telkiisa*). Image redacted for security reasons.

The image shows a document titled "WARQADDA FASAXA BEERAH" (Farming Permit) issued in the "DEGMADA DIINSOOR" district. The document is filled out with handwritten information, with several fields redacted with black boxes for security reasons. The visible information includes:

- Title:** WARQADDA FASAXA BEERAH
- District:** DEGMADA DIINSOOR
- Date (Taariikh):** 24 / 9 / 1443
- Name (Magaca):** [Redacted]
- Age (Da'da):** 50
- Telephone (Tel):** [Redacted]
- Clan (Qabiilka):** dabare
- Location (Deegaan):** [Redacted]
- Clan Elder/Chief (Malaag):** [Redacted]
- Mas'uulka majmuucada:** [Redacted]
- Telkiisa:** [Redacted]
- Signature (Saxiixa):** [Redacted]

Source: Confidential


Annex 18: Clashes between AMISOM/SNA and Al-Shabaab result in civilian casualties and trigger Al-Shabaab retaliatory attack

In paragraph 16 of resolution 2607 (2021), the Security Council called upon all parties to the conflict in Somalia to comply with international humanitarian law and urged them to continue conducting prompt and full investigations when reports of civilian casualties resulting from military operations arise.

The Panel received reports of civilian casualties arising from clashes between AMISOM/SNA forces and Al-Shabaab on 8 March 2022 on the outskirts of Janale, Lower Shabelle.⁵⁸ The SNA and AMISOM maintain a presence in Janaale since the town was liberated from Al-Shabaab in March 2020. However, Al-Shabaab reportedly remains present in the area near Ugunji (1°52'24"N, 44°43'21"E).⁵⁹

The Panel conducted interviews with eight civilians, including victims and relatives of victims, from Siigale Degta, a village located four kilometres from Ugunji along the main road connecting Janaale to Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle. The Panel also examined publicly available material about the incident, and corroborated the information gathered with a variety of sources, including humanitarian and human rights organisations.

Figure 1: Location of Siigale Degta, Lower Shabelle (1°51'14.0"N 44°42'30.2"E)



Source: The Panel, using Google Maps

On 8 March 2022, between 60 to 80 armed Al-Shabaab militants engaged in clashes with AMISOM and SNA forces in the surroundings of Siigale Degta. The inhabitants of Sigaale interviewed by the Panel acknowledged that the militants had been gathering around the village since the previous day, and that Al-Shabaab had visited Siigale regularly to collect illegal taxes from the population. However, they categorically excluded a permanent presence of the group in Siigale.⁶⁰

The Panel's investigations found that at least two girls and their mother were killed, and seven civilians were injured, including six children. The Panel confirmed that five of the injured civilians were evacuated to Mogadishu for treatment on 9 March 2022.

Witnesses interviewed by the Panel reported the firing of mortars during the clashes. A woman told the Panel: "bullets and bombs were landing in our village, there was a lot of noise. I saw two houses burning. The bombs were fired from AMISOM side. People were fleeing or hiding where they could". Medical sources confirmed to the Panel that three survivors, including

⁵⁸ Confidential security report, 9 March 2022, on file with the Panel.

⁵⁹ See S/2021/849, Annex 5.1.

⁶⁰ In its 2021 final report, S/2021/849, Annex 5.1 the Panel reported that the regional Al-Shabaab administration for Lower Shabelle had moved from Janaale to Ugunji, 7 kilometres northeast of Janaale (coordinates 1°52'24"N, 44°43'21"E) following an SNA military operation to liberate Janaale in March 2020.

two children, evacuated to Mogadishu, had suffered multiple blast injuries consistent with the reported use of mortars during the Sigaale Degta clashes.⁶¹

While its investigation could not establish a clear responsibility for the civilian casualties, the Panel considers that the use of explosive weapons, which are inherently indiscriminate, such as mortars, demands a careful assessment of the principles of proportionality and distinction by the fighting parties when used in areas inhabited by civilians.⁶² For example, global data from Action on Armed Violence indicates that over the last decade, when mortars were used in populated areas, 97.6% of those killed or injured were civilians.⁶³ Moreover, the Panel notes that about half of the child deaths recorded by the United Nations Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting in Somalia for the period January to March 2022 (18 out of 41, i.e. 44%) were the result of explosive weapons (mortars, IEDs, unexploded ordnances, etc). Accordingly, the Panel sent an official communication to AMISOM/ATMIS on 11 April 2022, requesting details of the incident and of AMISOM/ATMIS post-strike assessment. A response was still pending at the time of writing of this report.

Figures 2 and 3: Damaged homes in Sigaale Degta with characteristics similar to impact by mortar rounds



Source: Al-Shabaab media

Al-Shabaab retaliates against the population of Sigaale Degta and uses the incident for propaganda against AMISOM/ATMIS

After being confronted by AMISOM/SNA forces, Al-Shabaab withdrew from Sigaale Degta but returned to the village later the same day. Al-Shabaab accused the community of spying and collaborating with AMISOM and killed at least one man and abducted 33 villagers, including nine women. The whereabouts of the abducted villagers remain unknown at the time of writing of this report.⁶⁴

This kind of attack is not uncommon for Al-Shabaab, particularly when the group suffers losses following military operations. For example, in its 2021 final report, the Panel documented how communities living near “liberated areas” were particularly exposed to retaliatory attacks from the group.⁶⁵ These incidents underscore the protection needs of the civilian population, which extend beyond the immediate outcomes of military operations against Al-Shabaab.

The Panel further noted that the Sigaale Degta incident was leveraged by Al-Shabaab-affiliated media for propaganda against AMISOM/ATMIS and foreign forces in general.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Interviews with victims and medical sources in Mogadishu, June and August 2022.

⁶² See <https://www.un.org/disarmament/explosive-weapons/>.

⁶³ See <https://aoav.org.uk/2021/an-anatomy-of-a-mortar-attack-global-trends/>.

⁶⁴ Interviews with eight members of the community of Sigaale Degta, June and July 2022.

⁶⁵ See S/2022/754, Annex 5.1.

⁶⁶ See <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16170/SAWIRRO-AlShabaab-oo-u-Gurmaday-dad-ay-duqeeyeen-ciidanka-Uganda>.

Annex 19: FGS and FMS’s failure to investigate allegations of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law perpetrated by their security forces

Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2607 (2021) “calls upon the FGS and FMS to enhance civilian oversight of their security apparatus, to continue to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, and to investigate and, as appropriate, prosecute individuals responsible for violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, and in this context recalls the importance of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to Somali security forces and AMISOM”.

During the reporting period, the Panel noted two different incidents of armed clashes involving elements of the Somalia Security Forces, and particularly special units trained by international partners to fight the threat of extremist groups. Initial reports received by the Panel indicated that these clashes resulted in civilian casualties, including children, the substantial destruction of civilian property, and displacement of people.

For example, from 21 to 23 December 2021, Puntland security forces clashed in Bosaso, firing mortars, and reportedly exchanging fire in indiscriminate fashion. Reports emerged of mass casualties, displacement, and damage to civilian buildings.

Additionally, the Panel received reports of clashes in and around Dhusamareb on 13 May 2022 between ASWJ, a militia group, and SNA special operations forces, including Danab and Gorgor. The Panel’s sources reported that the premises of an NGO were temporarily occupied and used as a defensive position by Somali forces. These clashes reportedly resulted in one civilian death and four injuries, as well as damage to civilian property.

The Panel noted that neither the FGS nor FMS authorities pursued an investigation, in either of the abovementioned cases, into possible violations of international humanitarian and human rights law perpetrated by members of its state armed forces or other armed actors. The Panel further noted that the victims of these clashes did not receive reparations for their losses.

Panel’s investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights law in Bosaso⁶⁷

A background of the security crisis in Bosaso is provided in annex 12.

Tension in Bosaso began to build in late-November 2021, when mediation attempts by elders and traditional leaders failed.⁶⁸ In early-December 2021, the Panel started noting several media reports alerting of a mobilization of both Puntland Security Forces (PSF) elements and Puntland government forces⁶⁹ arriving in Bosaso, and received allegations of recruitment of militias by the PSF from the Bari region. On 21 December 2021, clashes between PSF elements and Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) /Darwish forces started in Bosaso. Sources interviewed by the Panel consistently reported that no warning or order to evacuate was given to the population of Bosaso prior to the commencement of the clashes.⁷⁰

Parties involved in the clashes blamed each other for the suffering inflicted on the civilian population of Bosaso – see figure 6. On 22 December 2021, the region’s security minister, Abdisamad Mohamed Galan, announced a cease-fire after

⁶⁷ The Panel visited the areas affected by the December clashes between PSF and PMPF/Darwish forces during a mission in Bosaso from 17 to 21 July 2022. It conducted interviews with six civilians, including two women, who were victims or relatives of victims of the clashes, met with the Governor of Bari region, the Commander of the Darwish in Bosaso, the PMPF Commander and Director General, and two community leaders involved in mediation efforts. The Panel examined publicly available material about the incident and received confidential security, civil society and medical reports. The Panel corroborated the information collected with two independent sources, namely an international and a national human rights organisation. The Panel sent an official communication to Puntland on 30 July 2022, requesting details of the incident. A response was still pending at the time of writing of this report.

⁶⁸ See Somali Wire, Issue 280, 30 November 2021, available on subscription only.

⁶⁹ See <https://twitter.com/Maregonline/status/1465789760434327560?t=F-G8dLdX358p8zLVvXLF9A&s=03>.

⁷⁰ Interviews with local sources in Bosaso, July 2022.

intervention from traditional elders, scholars and business leaders.⁷¹ However, heavy clashes broke out again, including mortar shelling, and continued intermittently until 23 December 2021, as evidenced by media reports,⁷² and the continuous influx of injured civilians to the local hospitals and witnesses and victims' accounts gathered by the Panel.⁷³

The Panel verified that at least 19 civilians were killed, including five children, and over 120 were injured, including 14 children.⁷⁴ Medical sources mentioned to the Panel that most of the patients had suffered either gunshot wounds or injuries from explosive weapons, consistent with the use of mortar shells reported by all sources interviewed by the Panel. The director of Ayaan Hospital, which suffered extensive damage during the clashes, reported to the Panel that patients, including women who had just delivered and their babies, had to be evacuated overnight as the hospital was continuously hit in the crossfire, including by mortar shells.⁷⁵ One witness interviewed by the Panel reported that he could not take his son to the hospital due to fear of being caught in the crossfire. The Panel noted reports from several media and independent sources about the mass displacement of population from Bosaso. A human rights source based in Bosaso mentioned to the Panel that at least 10,000 households were displaced by the clashes.⁷⁶

The Panel corroborated, through on-site visits and reports from different sources, that civilian properties, including a private hospital providing free maternal health care, were extensively damaged. Estimates compiled by civil society representatives state the damages exceed \$1 million.⁷⁷ Sources interviewed in July 2022 further mentioned to the Panel that they had not received compensation or reparations for their losses. The Panel observed marks on civilian buildings consistent with the reported use of mortars and heavy machine guns. The affected buildings were not concentrated in one specific area. Instead, the pattern of shooting appeared random and extended to a vast perimeter. See Annex 12 for a detailed assessment of the weapons used during the clashes.

Figures 1 and 2: Damage to Ayaan Hospital from the December clashes in Bosaso.



Source: Ayaan Hospital

⁷¹ See

https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2021/Dec/184896/puntland_says_it_is_ready_for_talks_to_end_the_conflict_in_bossaso.aspx.

⁷² See <https://www.mtv Somali.com/fighting-erupts-again-in-bossaso-this-evening/>.

⁷³ Interview with medical and local sources in Bosaso, July 2022. See also media reports, <https://www.mtv Somali.com/pictures-civilians-flee-as-conflicts-erupts-again-overnight-in-bossaso-puntland/>.

⁷⁴ Interview with medical sources and Emergency service reports on file with the Panel. A medical source told the Panel that between 21 to 23 December 2021 one hospital registered 63 injured patients, mostly civilians, including 14 children. However, the source also mentioned that these were only partial figures, as the emergency service could not cope with the influx of injured people and register all entries.

⁷⁵ Ayaan hospital is located between the Presidential palace and the PSF headquarter. The Director of Ayaan estimated the damage to the hospital at US \$55,000. Report on file with the Panel.

⁷⁶ See <https://www.mtv Somali.com/pictures-civilians-flee-as-conflicts-erupts-again-overnight-in-bossaso-puntland/>

⁷⁷ Report on file with the Panel.

Figures 3 and 4: Mortar damage to the roof of a civilian house (left); and an RPG impact point on the wall of a civilian house (right).



Source: Panel

Based on the analysis of information gathered, the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the state agents involved in the 21 to 23 December 2021 clashes in Bosaso violated article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights⁷⁸, which protects the right to life against arbitrary deprivation. Specifically, the Panel considers that the state agents involved in the December 2021 clashes in Bosaso did not respect the principles governing the use of lethal force, including for law enforcement purpose, notably necessity, proportionality, and precaution.⁷⁹ Further, Paragraph 1 of article 6 of the Covenant lays the foundation for the obligation of States parties to provide effective remedies and reparation to all victims of violations of the right to life, implying an obligation to investigate allegations of excessive use of force with lethal consequences and, where appropriate, prosecute such incidents.⁸⁰ The Panel considers that no effective remedies and reparation to the victims of the Bosaso incident were provided.

In its assessment of “arbitrariness”, the Panel makes reference to paragraph 12 of the Human Rights Committee general comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, to the 1979 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and to the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Somalia has ratified and is a state party to the Covenant since 1990.

⁷⁹ According to para 13 of the Human Rights Committee general comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the right to life, states parties are expected to take all necessary measures intended to prevent arbitrary deprivations of life by their law enforcement officials, including soldiers charged with law enforcement missions. See also the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, A/HRC/26/36, 1 April 2014, paras 59–73.

⁸⁰ See para 27 of the Human Rights Committee general comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life.

⁸¹ The 1979 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979. In para 1 of the same resolution, the Assembly decided to

Article 3 of the 1979 Code of Conduct stipulates that law enforcement officials may use force ‘only when strictly necessary’. The accompanying official commentary emphasizes that any use of force by law enforcement officials should be ‘exceptional’. While it is commendable that the parties firstly attempted with non-violent means to resolve the stand-off on the PSF leadership, the agreement reached in March 2022 demonstrates that adherence to negotiation attempts could have avoided the loss of human life and the material destruction that occurred in December 2021.

With reference to the assessment of proportionality, and particularly on the deployment of mortars,⁸² RPGs and machine guns with impact showing random shooting in urban populated areas of Bosaso, the Panel considers that their use was apparently disproportionate as to the legitimate objective to be achieved.⁸³

According to 1990 Basic Principle 5(b), whenever lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials must ‘minimize damage and injury’ and ‘respect and preserve human life’. The Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that all parties engaged in the December 2021 clashes in Bosaso failed to act in a manner consistent with the need to minimize the risk posed to human life, including by failing to issue a warning to the population and breaking a publicly announced ceasefire.

‘transmit it to Governments with the recommendation that favourable consideration be given to its use within the framework of national legislation or practice as a body of principles for observance by law enforcement officials’. The Basic Principles were adopted by the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August to 7 September 1990. In its Resolution 45/166, adopted without a vote on 18 December 1990, the UN General Assembly welcomed the Basic Principles and invited governments to respect them (§4).

⁸² See <https://www.un.org/disarmament/explosive-weapons/>

⁸³ Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 5(a).

Figure 5: Statement of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator on the humanitarian impact of the December 2021 clashes in Bossaso



STATEMENT

Statement by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Mr. Adam Abdelmoula, on the situation in Bossaso, Puntland State

Mogadishu, 23 December 2021- I am extremely concerned about the impact of ongoing hostilities in Bossaso, Puntland State, on civilians.

With the fighting in Bossaso town continuing into a third consecutive day, more than half of the city's population has reportedly been displaced from their homes. According to humanitarian partners and local authorities, some 40 per cent of 70,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) hosted in Bossaso town are also reported to have experienced secondary displacement.

The closure of shops has limited the possibility of vulnerable people, including IDPs and drought-affected communities, to redeem their vouchers for basic supplies.

I am further concerned that fighting has negatively affected the ability of humanitarian partners to reach the displaced people who are in urgent need of humanitarian and protection assistance.

I urge all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and to ensure unfettered access for humanitarian workers to all people in need of assistance.

Source: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/statement-deputy-special-representative-secretary-general-un-resident-and-0>

Figure 6: PSF statement issued on 22 December 2021. The statement denounces two days of aggressive attacks from the Puntland Government which refused to submit to the decision of elders called to mediate the dispute regarding the PSF leadership.



WAR-MURTIYEED

Date: 22/12/2021

Assalamu calaykum,

Waxaa nalagusoo qaaday oo aan iska difaacnay muddo labo beri ah weeraro gardaro ah oo lagu jabiyey xeerarkii sharciga ahaa oo dhan, oo u dhaxeeyay PSF iyo Dowladda Puntland, waxay diideen gartii si wadajir ah aan ugu dhiibanay Isimadda iyo go'aank-oodii.

Intaasna kuma aysan ekaane weerar iyo barakicin bulsho bay sameeyeen, dhinacayagu marna ma hurinayn colaadda iyo dhibaataaynta shacabkeena.

Waxaan aad uga xunnahay dhibta bulshadeenna soo gaartay, runtii raali kama nihin wixii sameeyayna way qaadayaan masuuliyadooda.

Ciidanka PSF waxay u taaganyihiin la dagaalanka argagixisadda, amni daradda iyo cid kastoo ku lug leh.

Dadkii ayagu argagixisadda ka tirsanaa ee aan bulshadeenna ka difaacaynay, haatana ku gabanaya xasaanadda dowladda marnaba nama eedayn karaan, Puntland naba-deeda iyo horrumarkeeda geed walba waan u harsannay, waana kasi shaqeyn doonaa eebbe idinklis.

IDINKA ALLE GUUL

PSF



contact@psf.so

Annex 20: Charcoal stockpiles in Kismayo

On 6 September 2022, following an invitation by the Office of the President of the Jubbaland State of Somalia, the Panel visited Kismayo to meet with Jubbaland authorities, as well as with representatives of businesspersons who have equity in the charcoal stockpiles in and around the city. In the invitation, the Office of the President expressed the desire to discuss with the Panel solutions to the existing charcoal stockpiles harvested prior to the imposition of the ban by the Security Council in 2013, which they claim have had negative environmental effects, at times causing harm to the local community's health.

During the visit, the Panel was able to inspect and take pictures of stockpiles in three locations inside and around Kismayo: areas 1, 2 and 3N in figure 1 below. The Panel could not inspect area 3S and area 4 due to security reasons. The pictures taken allowed the Panel to assess the volume of charcoal in coordination with UNODC using satellite images from 7 September 2022. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show pictures of 26 charcoal piles in areas 1, 2 and 3N, while pile 1B doesn't contain charcoal. The volume of seven piles 3F, 3G, 3H, 3I, 4A, 4B and 4C was assessed using satellite images and comparing piles from other pictures. Figure 1 gives the characteristics of charcoal bags, each of 50 Kg size but containing 25 kg of charcoal. Table 1 shows the number of bags per each pile and area, for a total of 516, 386 bags or 12,900 metric tonnes of charcoal.

The Panel met with eight individuals presented by Jubbaland authorities as members of the Kismayo association of charcoal owners (KACO). They indicated to the Panel that they were representing four groups constituted by hundreds of rural families who own numbers of sacks of charcoal. They claim that these groups own 1.2 million bags of charcoal that they harvested before the imposition of the charcoal ban by the Security Council. They informed the Panel that they were looking for modalities to request to the Security Council a one-time waiver to the ban on charcoal to allow the export of the current stockpiles and clean-up of the designated areas in and around Kismayo. Reportedly, they have agreed with Jubbaland authorities, particularly the Mayor of Kismayo, to use a portion of the proceeds to clean up the city from the effects of the charcoal, support projects to plant trees for reforestation, and contribute to create environmental awareness on the effects of de-forestation. They welcome the support of relevant UN agencies and guaranteed that should the waiver be granted, they would be fully transparent allowing the Panel to monitor the export process.

The Panel met with representatives of the office of the President of the Jubbaland State of Somalia and with the Mayor of Kismayo who asserted that Al-Shabaab is not currently benefiting from the charcoal business or from any other business that is transacted in Kismayo. They informed the Panel that the charcoal stockpiles are a source of challenges to the community in term of risks of fire hazard, impact on the environment, and unpaid rent by charcoal owners for land occupancy. They indicated to the Panel that Jubbaland is willing to cooperate with the FGS and relevant UN agencies to find lasting and sustainable solutions to the charcoal accumulated in Kismayo before the imposition of the ban. The Panel has informed the FGS before and after the visit on its intent and the outcomes of the discussions.

The Panel welcomes the cooperation by Jubbaland authorities and charcoal stakeholders in relation to the assessment and monitoring of charcoal stockpiles. The Panel believes that a one-time suspension of the ban on charcoal by the Security Council submitted to procedural requirement by the Committee, including a request of approval and notification of export, could have multiple beneficial effects. These include an efficient monitoring of the ban on charcoal and a political climate for cooperation between Jubbaland and the FGS to allow further development of Somalia's National Policy on Charcoal for the sustainable management of domestic charcoal use in line with paragraph 7 of resolution 2607 (2022).

Figure 1: Locations of stockpiles




Figure 2: Types and dimensions of charcoal bags (50 Kg size containing 25 Kg of charcoal)



Source: Panel for all pictures in this annex

Table 1: Estimates number of bags in the three stockpiles locations

Serial	site	Number of bags in length	Number of bags in width	Number of bags in height	Total bags.
1	1A	25	20	16	8000
2	1B				0
3	1C	20	20	15	6000
4	1D	20	20	20	8000
5	1E_1	40	20	23	18400
6	1E_2	30	30	23	20700
7	1F	30	40	20	24000
8	1G	20	40	20	16000
9	1H	20	30	20	12000
10	1I	20	30	20	12000

Serial	site	Number of bags in length	Number of bags in width	Number of bags in height	Total bags.
11	1J	20	30	20	12000
12	1K	20	30	20	12000
13	1L	20	30	20	12000
14	1M	20	30	20	12000
15	1N	20	30	20	12000
Total bags Area 1					185100
16	2A	7	11	18	1386
17	2B	20	30	20	12000
18	2C	20	15	23	6900
19	2D	20	30	19	11400
20	2E	30	40	20	24000
21	2F	25	30	20	15000
22	2G	20	30	21	12600
Total bags Area 2					453486
23	3A	20	30	20	12000
24	3B	20	30	20	12000
25	3C	40	30	20	24000
26	3D	40	30	20	24000
27	3E	40	30	20	24000
28	3F*	20	20	20	8000
29	3G*	40	30	20	24000
30	3H*	40	30	20	24000
31	3I*	40	30	20	24000
Total bags Area 3					176 000
32	4A*	40	40	20	32000
33	4B*	40	30	20	24000
34	4C*	40	20	20	16000
Total bags Area 4					72 000
Total bags					516 386

Source: Panel and UNODC

*: area with no pictures taken by the Panel

Figure 3: Stockpiles area 1






Figure 4: Stockpiles area 2







Figure 5: Stockpiles area 3N



Figure 6: Stockpiles area 3S



Figure 7: Stockpiles area 4



Annex 21: Violation of the Somalia charcoal ban by MV Fox

On 25 January 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) shared information with the Panel concerning allegations of violations of the charcoal ban by a vessel MV FOX (IMO 9108659). The information included: i) a cargo manifest and ii) a certificate of clearance for the MV FOX. According to these documents, the MV FOX, a cargo vessel, carried 4,425 metric tons of charcoal from Kismayo and was destined for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see figures 20.1 to 20.7 below).

The Panel noted that the MV FOX sailed from the Port of Zanzibar, Republic of Tanzania, on 2 January 2022 with its Automatic Identification System (AIS) off until it reached Salalah port, Sultanate of Oman, on 22 January 2022.

On 14 April 2022, Omani authorities informed the Panel that the MV FOX had an emergency on 22 January 2022, near the Port of Salalah. As a result, the Omani authorities assisted in the evacuation of the ship's crew and subsequently discovered that there were approximately 4,425 metric tons of charcoal in the vessel's hull. Further, Omani authorities discovered that captain Mohamad Mostafa Besso (Syrian national) and his assistant, Ammar Khader Safiya (Syrian national), falsified records of the ship's route.

The Panel travelled to the Port of Salalah, Sultanate of Oman, from 28 May to 1 June 2022, to inspect the vessel and conduct interviews with the crew and Omani officials. The Panel received extensive cooperation from Omani authorities in Salalah. The visit allowed the Panel to gather evidence and make the following findings:

- i. The MV FOX had not called to any port nor been in the territorial waters of South Africa in 2022 and hence the shipping documents claiming the origin of the charcoal as South Africa are counterfeit;
- ii. The MV FOX called to the port of Kismayo on 6 January 2022 at 11H50 and left that port on 12 January 2022 at around 7H30 UTC;
- iii. The MV FOX when it reached Salalah had black colour paint on its IMO number and its name "FOX", keeping the name "LOME", its port of origination, visible. This was likely an attempt by the crew to conceal the vessel's identity from potential witnesses while loading the charcoal in Kismayo.

The Panel noted from the shipping documents that the consignee of the charcoal was Sitti General Trading. The Panel has information that Sitti General Trading is registered in Djibouti and owned and managed by Mr. Bashir Khalif Musse (see figure 20.). This individual was mentioned in paragraph 6, annex 12.2.2 of the Panel's 2017 final report (S/2017/924) for his role in using false documents to export charcoal from Somalia.⁸⁴

In accordance with its obligation to offer an opportunity to reply, the Panel met in Mogadishu on 20 July 2022 with Mr. Bachir Khalif Muse, whose companies - Sitti General Trading L.L.C. and Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics Services L.L.C were, respectively, the charter party for the MV FOX and the consignee of the charcoal onboard the vessel. Mr. Bachir admitted that the charcoal on board the MV FOX originated from Somalia and was loaded in Kismayo port. The Panel also gave opportunity to reply to all other individuals and entities listed in the table below (table 20.1) due to their involvement or the link to the MV Fox case.

The captain of MV Fox Mohammad Mustafa Besso maintained that the vessel took the charcoal from Richards Bay, South Africa. On the companies from South Africa, see Table 20.1, the Panel got information that those entities never existed in that country and documents used in their names, including stamps and signatures were falsified. The Panel also corresponded with the owner of the vessel MV Fox to offer him an opportunity to reply to its findings.

In June 2022, the Panel provided a thematic report to the 751 Somalia Committee of the Security Council on the violation of the charcoal ban by MV FOX. In its report the Panel highlighted possible options for reducing risks of further illegal shipments of charcoal through possible solutions of the management of charcoal stockpiles in southern Somalia. The Panel presented options to the Committee with regard to current charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo.

⁸⁴ See paragraph 6, annex 12.2.2 of S/2017/924.

Table 1: Individuals and entities involved in or with links to the MV FOX case

Name	Place of business/Identity	Link
Bashir Khalif Musse	Djibouti national; business in Dubai	Owner and Director of Sitti General Trading; signed the charter agreement of the MV FOX
Sitti General Trading L.L.C.	Djibouti registered; business in Dubai, license (533917)	Consignee of the charcoal Same business address as Bushra Bachir
Mariam Barreh Omar	Djibouti national	Director Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics Services L.L.C
Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics Services L.L.C.	Djibouti registered Business in Dubai, license (894208)	Party to the charter agreement of the MV FOX Same business address as Sitti
Ncokumane General Trading L.L.C.	Richards Bay, South Africa	Alleged shipper of the charcoal
Godana Shipping Services L.L.C	Unknown	Agent of the MV FOX
MV FOX	Registered in Togo	Carried the charcoal
Omar Faris Al Shamari	Iraqi national	Director
Oscar Middle East Ship Management	Dubai	Owner MV FOX
Mohamad Mustafa Besso	Syrian national	Captain MV FOX

Figure 1: Bill of Lading allegedly issued by Godana on behalf of the MV FOX's captain

Page 2

CODE NAME "GODANA SERVICE" EDITION 01/1994

Shipper
NKOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.
 12 DWARF RUSH, BRACKENHAM,
 RICHARDS BAY, 3900,
 Tel: + 27 35789 0802
 SOUTH AFRICA

BILL OF LADING B/L No. 01
 TO BE USED WITH CHARTER-PARTIES
 Reference No.

Consignee
SITTI GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
 AL NOKHITHA BLDG, OFFICE NO. 222,
 P.O BOX: 80367, HAMRIYAH PORT
 Tel: +971 4 2699015
 DUBAI- U.A.E

Notify address
SITTI GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
 AL NOKHITHA BLDG, OFFICE NO. 222,
 P.O BOX: 80367, HAMRIYAH PORT
 Tel: +971 4 2699015
 DUBAI- U.A.E


Vessel **Port of loading**
MV FOX **RICHARDS BAY,**
SOUTH AFRICA

Port of discharge
FUJAIRAH OR RAS AL KHAIMAH OR KHALIFA PORT ABUDHABI,
U.A.E.

Shipper's description of goods **Gross weight**
177,000 BAGS CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS **4,425.00 METRIC TONS**
PACKING: IN BAGS
HS CODE: 440200

NON
NEGOTIABLE

CLEAN ON BOARD
FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY
 (of which on deck at Shipper's risk, the Carrier not
 being responsible for loss or damage howsoever arising)

Freight payable as per CHARTER-PARTY FREIGHT ADVANCE Received on account of freight: days hours. Time used loading days hours.	SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or to near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above. Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown. IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of the tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void. FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF
Freight payable at AS PER CHARTER PARTY	Place and date of issue RICHARDS BAY, SOUTH AFRICA 07.01.2022
Number of original B/L THREE (3)	Signature GODANA SHIPPING SERVICES L.L.C. AS AGENT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE MASTER OF MV FOX CAPT. MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESSO 

Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 2: Commercial invoice allegedly issued by Ncokumane General Trading

NCOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.

COMMERCIAL INVOICE

Invoice No. SB/740-K/22

Date 07/01/2022


SHIPPER:
NCOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.
 12 DWARF RUSH, BRACKENHAM
 RICHARDS BAY-SOUTH AFRICA
 TEL: +27 35789 0802

CONSIGNEE:
SITTI GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.
 AL NOXHITHA BLDG, OFFICE NO. 222,
 P.O BOX: 80367, HAMRIYAH PORT
 DUBAI- U.A.E
 TEL: +971 4 2699015

DESCRIPTION	QTY	GROSS WEIGHT (MT)	NET WEIGHT (MT)	UNIT PRICE (USD/MT)	TOTAL AMOUNT (USD)
CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS PACKING: IN BAGS HS CODE: 440200 INVOICING: ON ACTUAL WEIGHT BASIS	177,000 BAGS	4,425.00	4,425.00	250.00	1,106,250.00
TOTAL	177,000 BAGS	4,425.00	4,425.00		1,106,250.00
TOTAL AMOUNT IN WORDS: USD ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ONLY					



DELIVERY TERM	: CFR LO KHALIFA PORT ABUDHABI, U.A.E.	PAYMENT TERMS	: 100% CASH IN ADVANCE
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	: SOUTH AFRICA	MODE OF TRANSPORT	: BY VESSEL
VESSEL NAME	: MV FOX	VOYAGE NO.	: 7/2022
PORT OF LOADING	: RICHARDS BAY, SOUTH AFRICA	PORT OF DISCHARGE	: KHALIFA PORT ABUDHABI, U.A.E.

FOR, NCOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.
AUTHO.SIGNATORY






Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 3: Customs document allegedly issued by South African customs via Godana

TRANSIRE-FOR A DESTINATION IN THE REPUBLIC			DA 4
Port of issue- Richards Bay		Date: 07.01.2022	Transire number:
1. Customs code	38618		28
2. Name of ship	MV FOX		
3. Vessel official registration number	9108659		
4. Nationality and port of registry	TOGO	LOME	
5. Name and nationality of master	MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESSO // SYRIAN		
6. Name and nationality of owners	OSCAR DUBAI SHIPPING S.A // HONDURAS		
7. Date and time of arrival	1400 HRS 04.01.2022		
8. Nature of voyage	COMMERCIAL		
9. Expiry date of safety certificate	19 MAY 2022		
10. Expiry date of this transire			
11. Where from (all places to be mentioned in the order called at)			
ZANZIBAR			
12. Nature of cargo and tonnage thereof for this place			
NIL			
13. Where bound (all places to be mentioned in order of intended voyage)			
KHALIFA PORT, ABU DHABI – U.A.E.			
14. Nature and tonnage of cargo taken from this place			
LADEN 4 425 MT CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS			
15. Have any goods ex-customs and excise warehouses, goods on which a drawback of customs and exciseduty is due on export, imported goods on which duty has not been paid and excisable goods, exported or removed in bond to a place outside the Republic			
NO			
16. Intended date and time of departure			
1700 HRS 07.01.2022			
I declare that the above-mentioned particulars, and the particulars shown on the enclosures hereto, are true and correct			
 SHIP'S AGENTS Capacity SIMPHIVE NZUZA Name		 SHIP'S OPERATOR Rank Myeza Inspctr	
Customs officer (name)		Signature	

Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 4: Certificate of clearance for the FOX allegedly issued by South African customs via Godana

CERTIFICATE OF CLEARANCE FOR SHIPS FOR A DESTINATION OUTSIDE OF THE REPUBLIC		ORIGINAL DA 3 DATE 07 01 2022
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 	Port of	RICHARDS BAY 38618
	Name of ship	MV FOX Voy No. 7/2022
	Nationality and Port of Registry	TOGO LOME
	Registered mass (net)	3701
	Name and nationality of master	MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESSO SYRIAN
Name and nationality of owners	OSCAR DUBAI SHIPPING S.A	HONDURAS
Where bound (all places to be mentioned in order of intended voyage)	KHALIFA PORT, ABU DHABI – U.A.E.	
State whether laden or in ballast	LADEN 4,425.00 MT CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS	
The above-mentioned ship has been duly entered and cleared for the places mentioned.		
 07/01/2022 Controller of Customs and Excise		

Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 5: Masking of the name of the vessel by black colour paint. On the left, the vessel's name and IMO number are masked in January 2022. On the right, the vessel's name is repainted, as of May 2022.



Source: Omani maritime safety services, January 2022.



Source: Panel, 29 May 2022.

Figure 6: Charter agreement between Oscar Middle East Management LLC and Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics services LLC

PLACE & DATE : 20/12/2021 - DUBAI ,UAE

- M.V FOX
- OWNERS: OSCAR MIDDLE EAST SHIP MANAGEMENT L.L.C
- CHARTS: BUSHRA BACHIR SHIPPING & LOGISTIC SERVICES L.L.C
- UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
- LAST RICE CARGO: CEMENT / CEMENT /
- VESSEL POSITION : PORT PAKISTAN,
- ALL NEGOTIATIONS AND TERMS TO REMAIN STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL AND RESTRICTED TO BOTH OWNERS AND CHARTERERS ONLY.
- THE OWNERS CONFIRM AND GUARANTEE THAT THE VESSEL'S HOLDS AND HATCHES ARE CLEAN 100 % WATER TIGHT CLEAR, WASHED AND DRIED CONDITION, FREE OF LOOSE RUST FLAKES/SCALES, INSECTS AND RESIDUES AND/OR ODOURS AND THE VESSEL IS FULLY FITTED AND SUITABLE TO LOAD, CARRY AND DISCHARGE THE CARGOES.


-ULD OR HOSE TEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY AN INSPECTION COMPANY AT CHARTERER AT LOAD PORT RICHARD BAY /SOUTH AFRICA AND SHOULD THE HATCHES FOUND LEAKY, FOAM TO BE APPLIED BY OWNERS TO SEAL ALL HATCHES PROPERLY TO THE INSPECTION COMPANY SATISFACTION.

- OWNERS TO GUARANTEE BOTH SEAWORTHINESS AND CARGO WORTHINESS OF THE VESSEL.
- SHOULD VESSEL BE REJECTED BY CHARTERS ' SURVEYOR, THEN ALL TIME LOST FROM HOLDS FAILING TILL MASTER NOTIFICATION THAT HOLDS RECTIFIED, LAY TIME SHOULD NOT COUNT.
- OWNS WARRANT THAT THE VESSEL IS FULLY COVERED WITH A P&I CLUB FOR THE DURATION OF THIS C/P.
- OWNERS/CHARTERS CONFIRM FIXTURE RECAP DETAILS TO BE TOP P&C.
- OWNS GUARANTEE TT VESSEL'S HOLDS CLEAN/DRY BEFORE ARRIVAL VESSEL'S HOLDS TO BE PROPERLY SWEEPED, DRIED, CLEANED FREE OF ANY RESIDUES OF PREVIOUS CARGOES AND RUST SCALES, HOLD CLOSING SYSTEM BEING IN PERFECT WORKING CONDITION WITH WATERTIGHT HATCHES AND VESSEL TO BE IN EVERY RESPECT READY TO LOAD THE INTENDED



Source: Confidential

Figure 7: Mapping of individuals and entities with links to the charcoal ban violation



Source: Panel based on documents in annexes above.

Annex 22: List of acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AAIA	Aden Adde International Airport
ADN	Advance Delivery Notification
AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANFO	Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama
ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CBS	Central Bank of Somalia
eKWC	Electronic Know-Your-Customer
EUC	End User Certificate
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
EUTM in Somalia	European Union Training Mission in Somalia
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	federal member states
FRC	Financial Reporting Center
GSMA	Global System for Mobile Communications Association
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
HME	Home-Made Explosive
IAN	Implementation Assistance Notice
ID	Identification
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ITI	International Tracing Instrument
JVT	Joint Verification Team
Km	Kilometre
KYC	Know-Your-Customer
LCR	Learning Code Receiver
LCTR	Large Cash Transactions Report
MC	Motorcycle
MMO	Mobile Money Operators
ML	Money Laundering
ML/TF	Money Laundering Terrorist Financing
MTB	Money Transfer Bureau
MTO	Money Transfer Operators
MV	Merchant Vessel
NAMLC	National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NISA	National Intelligence and Security Agency
NRA	National Risk Assessment
ONSA	Office of the National Security Adviser
PBIED	Person- Borne Improvised Explosive Device
PDN	Post-Delivery Notification
PMPF	Puntland Maritime Police Force

PoA	Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects
PSF	Puntland Security Force
PSSM	Physical Security and Stockpile Management Measure
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SME	Small and Medium sized Enterprise
SNA	Somali National Army
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPF	Somali Police Force
SSSI	Security Sector Institutions other than those of the FGS
STR	Suspicious Transaction Report
TF	Terrorist Financing
UCAV	Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
XSH	Harakat Al-Shabaab
YPOC	Yellow Plastic Oil Container
