



UN/SA COLLECTION

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 18th MEETING

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 18: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

Question of Montserrat (A/37/23/Part V and Add.3; A/AC.109/722)

1. Mr. ADAHAMI (Syrian Arab Republic), Rapporteur of the Special Committee of 24, introduced the chapter of the report of the Special Committee relating to the question of Montserrat (A/37/23 (Part V) and Add.3).

1a. He said that the Special Committee, at the invitation of the Government of the United Kingdom, had dispatched a visiting mission to Montserrat, consisting of the representatives of the Ivory Coast, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela. The visit to the Territory had encompassed the period from 23 to 27 August. The Special Committee had considered the visiting mission's report (A/AC.109/722) and had decided to adopt its conclusions and recommendations. The Special Committee had also decided to submit for the consideration of the General Assembly a draft resolution which had been prepared by its Chairman and was set out in paragraph 18 of the relevant chapter of its report. By adopting the draft resolution, the General Assembly would reaffirm the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) and would commend the conclusions and recommendations of the visiting mission to the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, and to the Government of Montserrat, for appropriate action. He hoped that the draft resolution would receive the serious attention and full support of the Committee.

AGENDA ITEM 97: QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR (continued)

Hearing of petitioners (A/C.4/37/3/Add.5, A/C.4/37/3/Add.10, A/C.4/37/8 and Add.1-4)

2. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Utrecht (Permanent People's Tribunal) took a place at the petitioners' table.

3. Mr. UTRECHT (Permanent People's Tribunal) said that, in June 1981, the Permanent People's Tribunal had arrived at the verdict that the invasion of East Timor by the military Government of Indonesia in December 1975 had constituted an act of senseless and brutal aggression against a genuinely independent State, the Democratic Republic of East Timor, which had unquestionably existed as a State as of November 1975, when FRETILIN had proclaimed its independence, and had effectively controlled virtually the entire territory of the former Portuguese colony at the time of that proclamation. The Indonesian authorities currently controlled only about 20 per cent of East Timor and had accordingly been obliged to use brute force to maintain their control over the State.

(Mr. Utrecht, Permanent People's Tribunal)

4. The verdict of the Permanent People's Tribunal had been confirmed by many foreign observers and agencies, including journalists, politicians, diplomats, the International Red Cross, Amnesty International and the Bishop of Dili, who had concluded that the military invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had been marked from the beginning by uninterrupted oppression, brutality, deportation, murders and famine. A staff writer of The Philadelphia Inquirer, Mr. Rod Nordland, had confirmed, in an article published in the spring of 1982, the horrible facts of the situation prevailing in East Timor and, in particular, the deliberate policy of depopulating the countryside in order to deprive FRETILIN of support among the people. Amnesty International, for its part, had told the United States Congress that it had accumulated a large amount of evidence indicating a persistent pattern of human rights violations in East Timor since December 1975. Contrary to the allegations by Mr. Whitlam to the effect that only Mr. Nordland had reported negatively on the Indonesian occupation, other journalists and newspapers had also described the dramatic situation which existed in East Timor. The Boston Globe had recounted the terrible practice of pager betis (the placing of unarmed Timorese in front of Indonesian troops), as well as the disastrous consequences of that practice, in particular, the abandonment of agriculture, suffering, hunger and malnutrition throughout the territory.

5. After seven years of Indonesian military occupation, it appeared that the Indonesian armed forces were not in a position to establish full control over the territory because of various weaknesses, notably the absence in Indonesia of popular support for the occupation of East Timor. The Indonesian army was splintered between the financially comfortable military elite of Jakarta generals, itself divided into numerous conflicting factions, and the vast majority of lower echelons who were the victims of impoverishment at the grass-roots level of Indonesian society, notwithstanding the efforts undertaken by the Minister of Defence to improve the living conditions of the troops.

6. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia), speaking on a point of order, requested the petitioner to confine himself to the item on the agenda, namely, the so-called "question of East Timor" instead of launching into defamatory allegations on issues totally foreign to the purposes of the Fourth Committee. The petitioner was abusing the privilege which had been granted him, and the delegation of Indonesia hoped that the Chairman would call the petitioner to order as otherwise it would be obliged to intervene once again.

7. The CHAIRMAN asked the petitioner to limit himself to the agenda item, which was the question of East Timor.

8. Mr. UTRECHT (People's Permanent Tribunal) said that he merely wanted to point out the reasons why the Indonesian army was not in a position to establish control over the entire territory of East Timor, since that explained the failure of the Indonesian occupation. Because the Indonesian army was present in East Timor, it was essential to describe its methods of operation; otherwise the report on the question would make no sense. It appeared that the Indonesian army had not been ready to carry on a war in East Timor and that nearly 60 per cent of its troops did not support the war.

9. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia), speaking once again on a point of order, said that the petitioner did not seem to have understood the Chairman's request and was continuing to deal with issues unrelated to the question under consideration.
10. The CHAIRMAN again called the petitioner to order and enjoined him to speak to the subject on which he had been invited to make a statement, namely, the question of East Timor.
11. Mr. UTRECHT (People's Permanent Tribunal) said that certain battalions of the Indonesian army had refused duty in East Timor and that the general staff was able to dispatch only special forces or new inexperienced recruits. In other words, the Indonesian army did not have the troops needed for the effective occupation of East Timor.
12. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia), speaking again on a point of order, reiterated that the petitioner continued to deviate from the subject and to launch into digressions about the Indonesian army instead of keeping to the question of East Timor.
13. The CHAIRMAN reminded the petitioner that he must keep to the subject on which he had been authorized to speak and not introduce matters irrelevant to the debate.
14. Mr. UTRECHT (Permanent People's Tribunal) said that despite the modern military equipment, including aircraft, provided by Indonesia's Western allies, and despite the devastating bombing inflicted on East Timor, the Indonesian army was not large enough to mount an effective occupation of the bombed areas of East Timor. Apart from those purely military setbacks, the vast majority of the inhabitants of East Timor were so consumed with hatred for the Indonesian invaders that some of the former supporters of APODETI had recently turned against the Indonesian occupiers. In addition to the military problems he had referred to, Indonesia was confronted with an increasingly difficult economic situation because its balance-of-payments deficit was growing and the foreign aid which had undoubtedly financed Indonesia's crimes against humanity was dwindling. For all those reasons, the Indonesians were going to be faced with insurmountable problems in financing the economic development of East Timor. On the other hand, contrary to Mr. Whitlam's assertions, East Timor had sufficient wealth to develop into an independent State.
15. The Indonesian military occupation was likely to be accompanied by even more brutal repression than in the past, because, although the Indonesian army lacked adequate means to occupy the whole territory of East Timor, it could still annihilate the remaining population with the help of its aircraft, which was being modernized, before world opinion realized what was happening, as had been the case in the massacre of nearly 500,000 innocent Indonesian civilians by the army following its military coup of October 1965.
16. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia), speaking on a further point of order, said that the last sentence had no connection with the matter under discussion, and he asked for it to be excluded from the summary record of the meeting.

17. Mr. UTRECHT (Permanent People's Tribunal) suggested that the United Nations should agree to give de jure recognition to the independence of East Timor, a decision that was supported not only by the Permanent People's Tribunal, but also by a sizeable number of countries. Such recognition would be the sole guarantee of keeping the peace, not only in East Timor and Indonesia but also in the entire South-East Asia and Pacific region. It would hardly be realistic to recognize the so-called sovereignty of Indonesia over East Timor, since the Jakarta régime had shown that it could maintain such sovereignty only by force. Unlike FRETILIN, which, at the time of independence, had controlled virtually the entire territory of the former Portuguese colony, Indonesia could not claim the support of the Maubere people, nor of its own population.

18. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia), speaking on yet another point of order, expressed indignation at the petitioner's statements which concerned matters relating to the internal affairs of Indonesia, and again accused him of abusing his privilege.

19. Mr. UTRECHT (Permanent People's Tribunal) said that it would be scandalous to abandon the population of East Timor to Indonesia, a country which was not fit to govern the Territory because it was guilty of countless crimes there.

20. Mr. Utrecht withdrew.

21. At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Manusama took a place at the petitioners' table.

22. Mr. MANUSAMA said that an explanation of the real nature of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 was to be found in a document published by the Information Office of the Government of Malaysia when that country also had been threatened by Indonesia's imperialist policies in 1965. The document, entitled "The territory of the Indonesian state", dealt with discussions at the meeting of the Investigating Committee for preparation of Indonesia's Independence and revealed Indonesia's policy of expansion. It related that, at the first meeting of the Investigating Committee, the Indonesian nationalist leader Mr. Yamin had stated that the guiding principle was that the areas which should be included in Indonesian territory were those which had given birth to Indonesian peoples: the motherland of a people would be transformed into the territory of a State. He had further said that following that principle would mean unifying not only the people of Indonesia but all the territories under the Indonesian State, without any enclaves. Since East Timor had been inhabited since time immemorial by Indonesians, it should be integrated into Indonesia. Because of its geographical situation between other island groups of Indonesia and the Pacific Ocean and between Asia and Australia, East Timor held an important position and was a gateway to the Pacific. He had also stated that Portuguese East Timor and North Borneo formed enclaves which should not be allowed to remain in the territory of the Indonesian State; they would therefore have to come under the control of and complete the entity of the State of Indonesia.

(Mr. Manusama)

23. It was clear from that document why the Indonesian Government had sent its armed forces to Portuguese Timor in December 1975. The military intervention had not, as the Indonesian Government would have people believe, been the result of a request from the majority of the population of East Timor; it had been part of Indonesia's imperialist and expansionist policy. The United Nations, and in particular, the Fourth Committee, should therefore not accept the Indonesian allegations.

24. Furthermore, the United Nations, through the General Assembly and the Security Council, had adopted a number of resolutions condemning Indonesian military aggression against East Timor, recognizing the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, and calling upon Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces from the Territory without delay, in order to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercise their right of self-determination and independence. He was profoundly grateful to the United Nations for those resolutions, but, without underestimating their importance and their great value he was deeply concerned about the further development of the question, and his concern was based on what had eventually happened in cases similar to that of East Timor. In that connection, the result of two votes on the question of East Timor in the Fourth Committee were disquieting. In the first vote, on 11 December 1975, the Fourth Committee had adopted the draft resolution by 69 votes to 11, with 38 abstentions. Five years later, in November 1980, a similar resolution had been adopted by only 58 votes to 35, with 42 abstentions. There had thus been an alarming drop in the number of countries supporting East Timor's right to self-determination. Moreover, the United States of America, which had abstained in 1975, had voted against the draft resolution submitted in 1980, thus giving further cause for anxiety. It was therefore extremely important for the General Assembly to take a clear decision at its current session to keep the problem of East Timor on its agenda until it had been solved.

25. However, despite the great importance of such a decision, it was not in itself enough. In his opinion, an effective and lasting solution to the problem of East Timor could not be achieved unless the Fourth Committee dealt with it in a broader context. It was, in fact, only one aspect of the post-war decolonization process in Indonesia, and a problem could not be solved by dealing with only one aspect of it and neglecting the others.

26. Consequently, referring to a letter from the Chairman of the delegation of the Republic of Sumatra to the Special Committee of 24, he suggested that the Fourth Committee should consider the possibility of reopening the question of the decolonization of Indonesia. In so doing, the Committee would be helping to find a definitive solution to the problem of East Timor and would thus be contributing to the progressive development of international law.

27. Mr. Manusama withdrew.

28. Mr. HUTCHENS (Australia) said that he was speaking in response to certain statements made by some of the petitioners on the question of East Timor. He wished at the outset to emphasize that, although several of the petitioners were Australian citizens, none had spoken on behalf of the Australian Government. He therefore wished to restate his country's position on the matter.

29. In January 1978, his Government had decided to accept East Timor as a part of Indonesia, although it remained critical of the means by which integration had been achieved. It had considered it unrealistic to continue to refuse to recognize that East Timor was a part of Indonesia. It had, nevertheless, made clear at the time its opposition to Indonesia's use of force.

30. Australia had supported United Nations involvement in finding a solution to the problem that had developed in East Timor following the Indonesian intervention in December 1975. It had supported the efforts by the Security Council to reach a solution, including the dispatch of a special envoy of the Secretary-General. It had voted against resolutions on East Timor since 1978, believing that they did not reflect a realistic appreciation of the situation in East Timor. The fact was that East Timor was now a province of Indonesia, and it was ignoring reality to refuse to recognize the fact. Those genuinely concerned with the well-being of the people of East Timor, as his Government was, would do better to concentrate on helping the province by contributing to its development. His country, as one of the petitioners had said, had contributed more than any other country to relief efforts in the province. It had donated more than \$6 million to East Timor since 1975. It had indicated to the Indonesian Government its willingness to continue to provide assistance, and had been the major contributor to UNICEF's new programme in the province. His Government also attached considerable importance to the reunification of families separated by events, and had done what it could to contribute to progress in that area.

31. Mr. MONTEIRO (Portugal) said that he wished to return to some points made by Mr. Whitlam, a petitioner who had spoken at an earlier meeting. His delegation was well aware of the ethical distance between Portugal's and Mr. Whitlam's standpoints on the equality of all men, whatever their race, and the right to self-determination of all peoples, whatever their numerical size or level of development.

32. The draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.4/37/L.8) did not seek to maintain what Mr. Whitlam had described as the legal fiction of Portugal as the administering Power of East Timor. Portugal's legal status in that regard had been indisputably established by many General Assembly resolutions. The process of decolonization that Portugal had initiated in 1974 and completed the following year had allowed five countries to become independent. The only exception was East Timor, because of the invasion and occupation of the Territory by Indonesian military forces. Portugal had reacted immediately, demanding the urgent convening of the Security Council on 8 December 1975, and the Council had unanimously adopted resolution 384 (1975) condemning the Indonesian invasion. Since 1974, Portugal had always maintained that the process of self-determination in the Territories under its administration should come about by exclusively peaceful means. It had,

(Mr. Monteiro, Portugal)

therefore, always supported moves by the international community to allow the people of East Timor to defend their legitimate rights. Being unable, because of the Indonesian aggression, to fulfil its responsibilities as the administering Power of the Territory, his country was asking the United Nations to find means of reaching a peaceful collective solution to the problem.

33. In referring to the events of 1974 and 1975, Mr. Whitlam had stressed the Portuguese authorities' inability to act, while maintaining that Portugal had sought to give the people of East Timor an opportunity freely to determine their future. If the civil war was now indeed over and conditions in the Territory had improved, as Mr. Whitlam alleged, it would seem that the time had come to allow the people of East Timor the opportunity freely to decide on their future without foreign interference. The United Nations was pursuing that objective in various regions of the world; his country was pursuing the same objective, and his delegation hoped that the draft resolution on East Timor would be endorsed at the current session of the General Assembly by a substantial majority.

34. Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia), speaking on a point of order, expressed his delegation's displeasure and indignation at the statement made by Mr. Manusama. To his country's deep regret and despite its express disapproval, the Fourth Committee had agreed to give an audience to the renegade. As his delegation had anticipated, Mr. Manusama had abused the privilege extended to him and, instead of speaking on East Timor as he should have done, had simply used the Territory's problems as an excuse for vilifying Indonesia. What Indonesia had been subjected to at the current meeting could happen to other countries in the future; the Committee should therefore be more cautious in granting petitioners permission to address it.

AGENDA ITEM 18: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (continued)

- (a) REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
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AGENDA ITEM 96: INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (continued)

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AGENDA ITEM 12: REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (continued)

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AGENDA ITEM 101: OFFERS BY MEMBER STATES OF STUDY AND TRAINING FACILITIES FOR INHABITANTS OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued) (A/37/3 (Part II), A/37/23 (Part III), (Part III/Add.1) and (Part III/Add.2), A/37/23 (Part V) and (Part V/Add.1-3), A/37/113, A/37/177 and Add.1-3, A/37/333, 436, 501, 538, 539, 568, 570/Rev.2 and 602; A/C.4/37/2 and Add.1, A/C.4/37/6 and Corr.1, A/C.4/37/L.5, L.6/Rev.1, L.7, L.8, L.9, L.10, L.11 and L.12; A/AC.109/682-686, 687 and Add.1-3, 688, 689, 691-695, 697, 698, 700, 708, 711, 713-715, 720 and 722; A/AC.109/L.1421 and L.1446 and Add.1)

35. Mr. OGNIMBA (Congo) said that decolonization was without question the area of activity in which the United Nations had been most effective. That would be a source of satisfaction were it not for the fact that the Organization's efforts were being confronted, on the one hand, with the obstinate determination of certain Powers to maintain colonialism in various parts of the world under the falsest of pretences and, on the other hand, with the unexpected attitude of certain countries, themselves former victims of the harshest colonialism, who had since become oppressors. Colonialism was a scourge condemned by all peoples who valued justice, peace and freedom. It must therefore be resolutely abolished, to make way for sustained co-operation among peoples and greater understanding and solidarity.

36. His delegation was following the discussion on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples from that perspective. In connection with the small Territories, it wished to remind the Committee that it was a member of the Special Committee on decolonization and as such had been in a position to ascertain the willingness of certain Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee so as to enable a better assessment of the

(Mr. Ognimba, Congo)

situation existing in the colonial Territories to be made and thereby facilitate the process of decolonization. At the same time, it regretted the systematic refusal of the administering Power of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to lend any assistance to the Special Committee. It urged all the administering Powers without exception, to work closely with the competent United Nations bodies so as to facilitate the process that would lead colonial peoples towards national sovereignty. It reaffirmed the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and independence. Factors such as the size of a Territory, its geographical location, the size of its population or the supposedly limited extent of its natural resources should not serve as pretexts for preventing the people of such a Territory from exercising their right to independence.

37. The question of East Timor was a cause of great concern to his delegation in that connection for it concerned the fate of a brave people determined to exercise their rights. Indonesia, one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, had become bogged down in a hopeless situation which had earned it the condemnation of those countries that were devoted to peace and justice. The time had therefore come for it to identify itself again with its own prestigious past as an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist country and rediscover the path of dialogue to achieve a just solution to the problem. His delegation, for its part, felt that the struggle of the people of East Timor, represented by FRETILIN, was a legitimate struggle deserving of the support of the United Nations.

38. In Western Sahara, a people had been struggling for several years to gain recognition of its right to existence, to self-determination and to independence. The problem in that Territory, which Africa's enemies had used to divide OAU's ranks, was a problem of incomplete decolonization. His delegation had already expressed its views on what it held to be the only possible way to arrive at a just and lasting solution to that conflict, which was tearing the countries of the Maghreb apart. Morocco had played a leading role in the history of the decolonization of the African continent, a role which history would recognize. Nevertheless, that country's friends, at a time when the African continent was striving to complete the process of decolonization, must have the courage to tell it that the course it had chosen to stifle the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara was mistaken and profitless. The struggle of the Saharan people under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO would, because it was legitimate, inevitably triumph. For that reason the Congo, appealing to the wisdom of the Moroccan Government, called upon it to enter into sincere and fraternal negotiations with the Frente POLISARIO so as to settle the fratricidal conflict once and for all.

39. His delegation had been pleased to learn that OAU would be holding a summit conference within the next few days. It viewed that as a proof of African wisdom and of an awareness on the part of African leaders of the higher interests of their peoples. The lesson to be drawn from the crisis within OAU was that Africa must thenceforward remain united so as to triumph in the hard continuing struggles to liberate Namibia and the other peoples of southern Africa and to wage, alongside the other third-world nations the decisive battle to establish a new international economic order.

40. Mr. CARTER (Barbados) said that, ever since his country had achieved its independence in 1966 and been admitted to the United Nations, it had been unshakably committed to upholding the principles of self-determination set forth in the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. The report of the Special Committee each year reminded the international community that, whatever the conditions prevailing in the Non-Self-Governing Territories, the ultimate decision determining their future rested with the people of those Territories and that the administering Powers had the responsibility to educate them with regard to the options available.

41. Barbados was particularly concerned over the situation of the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean and eagerly awaited the day when they could be welcomed to the roster of free nations.

42. The right to self-determination and independence was being systematically denied in three Territories, and he wished to express his country's position with regard to them. The Territories in question were Namibia, Western Sahara and East Timor.

43. Namibia, which always seemed to have freedom and independence within its grasp, was always seeing its hopes dashed by some new delaying tactic of the racist South African régime and by the failure of the Western Group of Five to keep their promise to use their good offices to bring South Africa to reason. Now the granting of a loan of over \$1 billion to South Africa had given the apartheid régime another reprieve. That was all the more regrettable in that refusal to grant that loan might have provided the additional pressure upon the racist régime that would have allowed Namibia to achieve independence in a peaceful manner. The only option now was armed struggle, and it would go on inevitably until victory was won. Barbados would continue to contribute to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and to show its support for Namibians by offering them study and training facilities. He called on all Member States to increase their contributions to the Programme and on the developed countries to bring their actions into line with their words.

44. With regard to Western Sahara, Barbados supported the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to solve the question and hoped that those efforts would before long bring positive results.

45. Barbados was also particularly concerned over the situation in East Timor, which had been occupied by Indonesia since 1975. His delegation had listened attentively to the statements of the petitioners on the sufferings being experienced by the population of the Territory and requested that its name be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/37/L.8 on East Timor. It also wished to join in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.4/37/L.7 on the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa.

46. Mr. JEICHANDE (Mozambique) said that by supporting the struggle of the Sahraoui people his country was simply conforming to the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the twenty-second anniversary of which would be marked on 14 December.

47. The debate on the question of Western Sahara was taking place at a time when the Sahraoui people had just scored an important diplomatic victory, namely, the admission of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic as the fifty-first member of the Organization of African Unity.

48. It was nevertheless alarming to see that forces from outside Africa continued to support the Kingdom of Morocco, even though that country was waging a war against the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic in violation of General Assembly resolution 36/46. In that resolution, the General Assembly had appealed to the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, to observe a cease-fire in accordance with the decisions of OAU and its Implementation Committee. He invited the Moroccan Government to negotiate a cease-fire with the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic and establish relations of good-neighbourliness with it. If the peoples of that region eliminated that trouble spot, they might turn their efforts towards the joint struggle against zionism, which was the sworn enemy of the Arab and Palestinian peoples.

49. It was clear that the imperialist forces were using the armed conflict between Morocco and the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic to try to paralyse and destroy OAU. It was known that the targets of the imperialist forces were the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States. Unable to destroy those organizations, imperialism was seeking to corrupt them or obstruct their normal functioning.

50. He reaffirmed his delegation's active solidarity with the heroic cause of the Sahraoui people who were struggling to maintain their independence and territorial integrity.

51. Mr. CASSANDRA (Sao Tome and Principe) said that over the past seven years the Committee had repeatedly heard testimony on the genocidal policy carried out by the Indonesian military forces. That situation could not be allowed to continue. Urgent steps must be taken to settle the question of East Timor by upholding the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

52. His delegation called upon the Government of Indonesia to negotiate with the leaders of the national liberation movement of East Timor, FRETILIN, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976).

53. The failure of Morocco, which planned to annex Western Sahara, to implement United Nations resolutions concerning that Territory and the inability of the United Nations to take effective action against Morocco had dealt a severe blow to the principle of self-determination and encouraged other violations of the principle of national sovereignty. However, despite the massive military aid which it received, Morocco had suffered a military and diplomatic defeat at the hands of the people of Western Sahara, who were struggling for independence under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO.

(Mr. Cassandra, Sao Tome and Principe)

54. If it were true, as Morocco had stated at the Nairobi summit conference in June 1981, that Morocco was prepared to hold a referendum on Western Sahara, it was difficult to understand why that country had decided to introduce radar and sophisticated weapons into the region. That action ran counter to General Assembly resolution 36/46, in which the General Assembly had urged Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO to observe an immediate cease-fire, enter into negotiations and facilitate the holding of a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara, in accordance with OAU decisions. His Government rejected violence as a means of solving disputes, but it must be recognized that in the circumstances the armed struggle being waged by the Frente POLISARIO was legitimate, since it was Morocco that had declared war on the Sahraoui people.

55. The admission of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic to OAU was the result of eight years of armed struggle. If the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic had chosen to refrain from attending the thirty-ninth ministerial meeting and the nineteenth OAU summit meeting at Tripoli, it was because its leaders, showing great maturity, wanted above all to preserve the unity of OAU and establish a climate favourable to an open discussion of all the issues facing that organization, including the question of Western Sahara.

56. His delegation hoped that all States members of OAU would work for the success of the next summit of the organization, which Morocco and its allies were working to bring down. It was important that the question of East Timor and the question of Western Sahara should be settled, not only for the sake of the populations of those Territories but also for the sake of all who lived under the threat of annexation throughout the world.

57. Mr. JANI (Zimbabwe) said it was ironic that, while African countries were struggling for the emancipation of the Namibian and South African peoples, they were having to appeal to a member of OAU to respect the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That member was Morocco and the people in question were the people of Western Sahara, who had not yet exercised their right to independence. Despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Morocco was maintaining its claim to Western Sahara, which it intended to annex.

58. The alleged historical ties cited by Morocco to justify its claims of territorial sovereignty not only did not preclude the application of the principle of self-determination, but did not constitute a valid argument in the light of the fact that from 1912 to 1956 parts of Morocco and Western Sahara had been subject to the control of another colonial Power, Spain, whose influence they had experienced.

59. Any other formula for settling the conflict in Western Sahara than that recommended by the African Heads of State at Nairobi, namely, the observation of a cease-fire, the conclusion of a peace agreement and the holding of a general referendum, was indeed an exercise in futility. Some countries had claimed not to know who the parties to the conflict were, on the pretext that the African Heads of State had not mentioned them by name. That self-imposed myopia concealed the

(Mr. Jani, Zimbabwe)

specific intention to observe the fact that the parties to the conflict were Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO as the representative of the Sahraoui people. With whom did Morocco intend to negotiate a cease-fire if it refused to admit that the Frente POLISARIO was an indispensable element in the conclusion of any lasting and peaceful solution to the crisis? More than half the States that had endorsed the cease-fire and referendum at Nairobi had already recognized the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic. In so doing, they had clearly identified the parties to the conflict.

60. He wished to remind some Members of the United Nations of the dangers of increasing military aid to Morocco, whose territorial integrity was not even threatened. Far from bringing peace, such aid would only perpetuate the conflict. In conclusion, he once again called upon the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, to enter into negotiations, thereby enabling the OAU Implementation Committee to carry out its mandate as soon as possible.

61. Mr. DENICHIN (Bulgaria) recalled that it was on the initiative of the Bulgarian delegation that, 15 years earlier, the General Assembly had decided to include in its agenda the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations".

62. It was his delegation's firm belief that the principles enshrined in resolution 1514 (XV) should serve as guidelines for the activities of those agencies and institutions in the field of decolonization.

63. His delegation noted with satisfaction that a number of organizations were implementing a wide range of programmes aimed at improving the economic and social situation of colonial peoples. UNESCO, UNIDO, FAO, ILO, UNICEF, UPU and WHO, in particular, had actively committed themselves to the principles of resolution 1514 (XV) and to the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid and had achieved commendable results in that field.

64. In particular, he wished to welcome the positive trend towards increasing involvement of the national liberation movements recognized by OAU in the activities of the specialized agencies on matters relating to their territories, as well as the strengthening of co-operation with OAU. The trend towards withholding all kinds of support and assistance from the apartheid régime was equally important. Some agencies had in fact terminated their relations with Pretoria in response to the consistent appeals of the General Assembly. The importance of that measure could hardly be contested since the continuation of material and political support for South Africa helped to perpetuate its illegal colonialist policy of repression and aggression.

(Mr. Denichin, Bulgaria)

65. It was precisely for those reasons that his delegation had always devoted close attention to the relations of the World Bank, and the IMF in particular, with South Africa. It was thanks to the assistance afforded it by those two organizations that South Africa was able to prolong its war of aggression against the peoples of southern Africa. In 1976-1977, the IMF had lent South Africa \$US 464 million and, over the same period, the country had increased its defence expenditures by \$US 450 million!

66. It was important to note in that connection that the IMF had consistently accorded Pretoria more favourable treatment than other countries whose economic and financial situation had been far worse. The Fund had also always come to the rescue of South Africa by granting it loans whenever its economy slowed down as a result of the strains placed on it by its wars of aggression and its occupation of Namibia. The exorbitant loan which South Africa had requested from the IMF and which the Fund's Board of Governors had approved a few days previously, despite the international outcry, was a striking example of that policy of support for the apartheid régime.

67. During the lengthy debates on that loan in both the Special Committee of 24 and the Fourth Committee, several delegations had claimed that the IMF's loans were "apolitical". The Fund's attitude to Pretoria provided the strongest evidence to the contrary.

68. It should also be recalled that, thanks to the fact that it held the largest percentage of votes in the Fund, the United States strongly influenced the latter's policy. According to certain sources, the United States had consistently opposed loans to countries with which it had political differences, using "technical grounds" as a pretext. At the same time, it had consistently supported the granting of large loans on very favourable terms to Pretoria, in spite of the latter's racist and colonialist policy. The aid rendered by the IMF to South Africa was a highly political expression of support for the illegal racist régime and an extension of Washington's own policy of support for Pretoria.

69. In that connection, he wished to express appreciation for the great amount of extremely useful work done by the Special Committee of 24 on that item.

70. His delegation attached great importance to the Special Committee's decision to send a high-level mission to the IMF in an effort to influence it to review its policy towards South Africa, especially in view of the Fund's persistent refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions.

71. His country reaffirmed its principled support for the just struggle of colonial peoples, in particular the Namibian people, as well as for the resistance of other peoples in the area against Pretoria's racist policy. The day was near when colonialism would be totally eradicated from the face of the earth. He hoped that all the specialized agencies and international institutions within the United Nations system would make a substantial contribution towards that objective.

72. Miss AL-MULLA (Kuwait) said that the admission of new members to the United Nations over the past two decades stood to the credit of the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee of 24 and that that success must encourage the international community to persevere on the course set by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

73. Over 20 years after its adoption, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was as relevant as ever with regard to the right of non-self-governing peoples to choose their own destiny, and the responsibility of administering Powers to make them fully aware of that right. Her delegation would state its position more fully at a later stage with regard to Namibia, the most blatant case of the denial of that right. With regard to the loan granted to South Africa by the International Monetary Fund, her delegation believed that, instead of adhering to strict rules, the Fund should have let itself be guided by humanitarian considerations. The countries which had played a decisive role in the granting of that loan knew what the loan meant for Namibia, which was occupied illegally by South Africa. The Fund would do well to follow the example of other specialized agencies which took into consideration the needs and legitimate aspirations of peoples. With regard to the small Non-Self-Governing Territories, in particular the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, their use for military purposes was in complete contradiction with the spirit of resolution 1514 (XV). The administering Powers must prevent the military, economic and other exploitation of those islands and allow indigenous populations to develop their natural resources and take control of them. The Powers administering those Territories all too often tended, in their own interest, to develop a single source of revenue instead of developing the islands' potential and diversifying their economy. For instance, fisheries and agriculture could be developed in Bermuda, which was almost totally dependent on tourism. In that connection, the importance of the reports which the administering Powers transmitted to the Special Committee of 24, and the role of visiting missions in publicizing the situation in those Territories, could not be over-emphasized.

74. Mr. CABRAL (Guinea-Bissau) referring to the question of East Timor, said that by devoting two meetings to hearing petitioners whose statements had enriched the debate on the question, the Fourth Committee had in some measure rediscovered its historical vocation: that of contributing to the liberation of peoples. The Committee's consideration of the question of East Timor in the face of opposition from the Indonesian Government accorded with the principles of the Charter, since what was at stake was the restoration of a people's most legitimate rights. That was why the statements of petitioners on such a serious question were absolutely essential to a knowledge of the problems under consideration.

75. In the case of East Timor, there could be no doubt that Indonesia had been guilty of armed aggression and an act of annexation in contravention of the principles of the Charter. In defiance of General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541 (XV), the Djakarta authorities were preventing a people from freely choosing its own destiny. That attitude had been condemned by the Security Council and by the international community as a whole.

(Mr. Cabral, Guinea-Bissau)

76. If the question of East Timor was still under consideration, that was because the Timorese people's desire for freedom had not been crushed and the Indonesian Government was incapable of crushing it. The people of East Timor rejected their territory's occupation by Indonesian armed forces, even if those forces built roads and schools, and were opposed to Indonesian annexation because they were demanding that their inalienable right to determine their own destiny, under the leadership of their liberation movement FRETILIN, be respected.

77. The international community's responsibility in the face of the tragedy of the people of East Timor was tremendous. Immediate action must be taken to end the suffering inflicted on that people. Draft resolution A/C.4/37/L.8 now before the Committee showed the course to follow by advocating a global settlement of the problem of East Timor which took account of the freely expressed wishes of the population of the Territory.

78. Mr. KHWAJA WASIUDDIN (Bangladesh) said that his country was deeply committed to the cause of decolonization and reaffirmed its faith in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Bangladesh had consistently supported the struggle of oppressed peoples throughout the world to shake off the yoke of imperialism, colonialism and racism.

79. Although some 20 years had passed since the adoption of the historic Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV), by which the General Assembly had expressed its determination to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations, colonialism persisted in various parts of the world, especially in southern Africa, where the racist Pretoria régime continued to oppress the Namibian people and to occupy Namibia illegally, in defiance of the Charter.

80. The international community should not tolerate any longer the intransigence and dilatory tactics of the racist régime of South Africa. It must act decisively, since any further delay in the implementation of United Nations resolutions would only increase the suffering of the Namibian people. In that connection, the Special Committee described in its report (A/37/23, (Part V)) the current efforts to solve the remaining problems. In examining the situation in the Non-Self-Governing Territories, the Special Committee had identified the problems with which they were confronted and the administrative measures which should be taken to facilitate the speedy implementation of the Declaration on decolonization.

81. On the question of information on Non-Self-Governing Territories, his delegation was satisfied with the reports of the Secretary-General and the Special Committee. It hoped that the administering Powers would continue to be asked to provide information on the economic, social and educational conditions in those Territories.

(Mr. Khwaja Wasiuddin, Bangladesh)

82. His delegation regretted that the question of East Timor was still being considered by the Fourth Committee. It was convinced that the process of decolonization had been completed and that the people of East Timor had exercised their right of self-determination in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Government of Indonesia had accepted East Timor as one of its provinces and was making every effort to assure its development. The political status of East Timor having been affirmed, his delegation viewed any discussion of the matter in the Fourth Committee as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Indonesia. Accordingly, it believed that the item should not be included in the agenda of the General Assembly.

83. With regard to the question of Western Sahara, Bangladesh had consistently supported the initiatives taken by the Organization of African Unity and hoped that OAU would be able to bring about a speedy solution not only in the case of Western Sahara but also in respect of other problems relating to Africa and international peace and security.

84. Bangladesh recognized the vital role which the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa played in the process of decolonization. The people of the region had been deprived of a satisfactory education because of the colonial system prevailing there, which had compelled some of them to leave their countries. It was encouraging to note that the international community was providing voluntary financial assistance and scholarships to the refugees of southern Africa to enable them to pursue their education. The Programme would, however, require additional financial support, and he hoped that the developed countries would make a particular effort to provide it. Bangladesh had offered a number of scholarships to Namibian students through the Commonwealth Secretariat.

85. It was essential that all countries should unite their efforts to eradicate the vestiges of colonialism and apartheid and that the United Nations should work relentlessly towards the speedy and effective implementation of all its resolutions on decolonization.

86. Mr. MUSTAFFA MOHAMED (Malaysia) reaffirmed his Government's full support for the efforts of the United Nations to assist all Non-Self-Governing Territories to achieve independence. As was stated in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), no territory or people should be deprived of its fundamental freedom or its inalienable right to self-determination.

87. In resolution 1541 (XV), the General Assembly recognized that a colonial people could exercise its right of self-determination in various ways: in accordance with principle VI, it could choose to become a sovereign independent State, to associate freely with an independent State or to integrate with an independent State. The political, social, economic and cultural situation differed in each territory and a variety of processes of achieving self-rule and independence were required. Decolonization need not necessarily conform to any rigid procedure, so long as the right of self-determination was not prejudiced.

(Mr. Mustaffa Mohamed, Malaysia)

88. It was in that context that the Malaysian delegation questioned the inclusion in the Committee's agenda of the so-called item "Question of East Timor". That item should never have been placed on the agenda. Unfortunately, the Committee was once again indulging itself in an unnecessary debate on a territory which had acceded to independence six years earlier and had chosen integration with Indonesia.

89. Malaysia remained convinced that the process of decolonization of East Timor had been completed in accordance with resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). The people of East Timor had freely and overwhelmingly expressed their desire to gain independence through integration with Indonesia. East Timor had therefore been formally accepted as a province of Indonesia on 17 July 1976. Any effort by the Committee to impose any other procedure constituted a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia and would not serve the interests of the people of East Timor.

90. For the betterment of the East Timorese, who had suffered hardships under colonialism in the past, Indonesia had undertaken various development and rehabilitation programmes. In May 1982, the Indonesian Red Cross had concluded an agreement with UNICEF concerning a project to provide basic services to children and mothers and their families in East Timor. In the same month, the people of East Timor had participated freely in the Indonesian general elections, in which four East Timorese had been elected to the national Parliament; the election testified to the genuine desire of the East Timorese to be part of Indonesia.

91. In that connection, his delegation expressed its strong objection at the lack of objectivity in the Secretariat's working paper on the so-called question of East Timor (A/AC.109/715). It regretted the failure of the working paper to take account of the positive efforts made by the Indonesian Government to improve the situation in East Timor. It therefore associated itself with the views expressed by the Permanent Representative of Indonesia in document A/C.4/37/6.

92. Since the decolonization of East Timor was no longer an issue to be settled, the Committee should put an end to its unnecessary debates on the item, which it should remove once and for all from its agenda.

93. Mr. HADDAOUI (Morocco), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he was addressing the delegations of the Congo, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Zimbabwe, all of which had referred to the question of Western Sahara at the current meeting.

94. Morocco was unable to comply with the appeal made to it by the Congolese delegation, namely to negotiate with an organization which represented itself alone. The Organization of African Unity had already decided to organize a referendum on self-determination so that the populations of the Territory could express themselves freely, and Morocco had accepted that decision.

(Mr. Haddaoui, Morocco)

95. The representative of Mozambique had referred in his statement to the twenty-second anniversary of resolution 1514 (XV); it was significant, however, that he had omitted any mention of the right of peoples to self-determination or the decisions of OAU and the scheduled referendum. He had spoken of a "State" which he regarded already as a member of OAU, whereas everyone knew that OAU had been paralysed because of that matter.

96. It should be added that, by coincidence, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe were sponsors of draft resolution A/C.4/37/L.6 on the question of Western Sahara. The draft resolution embodied objectives which bore no relationship to the principles upheld by the Fourth Committee, seeking as it did to impose a "State".

97. The very delegations which had spoken on the question of Western Sahara had also violated the decisions of OAU. That organization had already reached a decision and proposed a solution to settle the matter. An Implementation Committee had been set up to organize a referendum on self-determination. Instead of criticizing Morocco, it would be more sensible to allow the Implementation Committee to achieve its goals.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.