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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

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Letter dated 1 June 1988 from the Permanent Representative
of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information a document entitled "The situation in Kampuchea at the end of April 1988", consisting of excerpts from the communiqué of the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea on the military results of the tenth dry season (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 23 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative

* A/43/50.

ANNEX

The situation in Kampuchea at the end of April 1988

(Excerpts from the communiqué of the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea on the military results of the tenth dry season)

As a result of the increasingly effective activities of the national resistance forces in dismantling the Vietnamese-set-up village administrative networks deep inside and throughout the country and exerting mounting and constant pressure on main cities and strategic supply lines, the situation in Kampuchea has developed as follows:

(1) On the battlefield along the western border of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese have been compelled to move a noticeable number of their forces from that area to the interior of Kampuchea in an attempt at defending and reinforcing their village and commune administrative networks which had successively been dismantled by the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). This development has enabled the NADK to broaden supply lines and to send more and more reinforcements and supplies to the interior. Therefore, the strategy of Viet Nam aimed at sealing off the western border of Kampuchea and preventing the NADK from sending units to fight the Vietnamese forces in the interior of Kampuchea has totally failed.

(2) The strategy of Viet Nam, to muster its forces in an attempt to wipe out the NADK forces in the interior of Kampuchea has also failed. Not only has the Vietnamese enemy been unable to fulfil its objective but, during this tenth dry season, it has been attacked more forcefully throughout the country by the NADK. The Vietnamese aggressors have proved themselves unable to resist the attacks of the national resistance forces. They have been forced to mobilize their troops from one battlefield to another, in order to resist the NADK's attacks to dismantle their village administrative networks.

(3) The Khmer soldiers forcibly enlisted and sent by the Vietnamese enemy to the western border have fled their ranks in squad, platoon and company, up to the battalion level, in a greater number than during the previous dry seasons.

They have either returned to their villages or joined the NADK. In the latter case, as soon as they arrive at the NADK's camp they eagerly co-operate with the national resistance forces in fighting back the Vietnamese aggressors. This is a new development which has emerged during the tenth dry season. The causes for their flight are numerous: lack of food and medicines, malaria, tortures and killings and maltreatments by the Vietnamese enemy.

Furthermore, thanks to the activities of the NADK spreading all over the country, the Vietnamese aggressors have been facing greater difficulties in enlisting new Khmer soldiers. In comparison with last year, in terms of regular forces, only 20 to 30 per cent could be enlisted to make up the losses resulting from desertions. However, when they reached the border, more and more Khmer soldiers, both old and fresh conscripts, desert.

The Vietnamese enemy's plan to set up a Khmer army as an auxiliary force for its occupying troops has been basically thwarted.

(4) The Vietnamese-installed village and commune administrative apparatus in all parts of the country have been dismantled and wiped out.

(5) As the village administrative apparatus is dismantled, the Vietnamese enemy is unable to round up the Kampuchean people for its K-5 plan as before.

During this tenth dry season, throughout the country, in comparison with the previous dry season, the Vietnamese enemy could round up and send only a small number of Kampuchean civilians (approximately 5 to 10 per cent) to the K-5 forced labour plan.

(6) The Vietnamese strategy to supply its occupying forces locally by plundering rice from the Kampuchean people to feed its army has also, to a large extent, been defeated.

During this dry season, as a result of the NADK's attacks on village administrative networks, the Vietnamese enemy could levy only 30 to 40 per cent of its needed rice. It has been compelled to import 30,000 metric tons of rice through Kompong Som sea-port to feed its army. That is the reason why its forces stationed at the western border are now short of food, causing the decline of its morale.

(7) As another result of the attacks on villages throughout the country, Vietnamese supply lines, both main and local, have been disrupted and cut off. National roads Nos. 6, 5 and 4 cannot be used by the Vietnamese enemy at its will. As for local supply routes, from cities to its strongholds, such as roads Nos. 10, 68, 69, 12, etc., they have been also repeatedly cut off.

(8) Thanks to close co-operation between the NADK and the Kampuchean people in their effective attacks against the Vietnamese enemy's village administrative networks throughout the country, a greater number of Kampuchean people living under the Vietnamese yoke have been freed. Thousands of villages have been liberated.

At present, the local population is freely moving both within and outside its villages to carry out its daily activities. Previously, the population had been restricted and forced by the Vietnamese aggressors to stay inside villages in accordance with their policy of starving the Kampuchean people to death.

(9) Because of the NADK's attacks to wear down and destroy its living forces, inflicting upon it a daily increasing number of killed and wounded, and because of malaria and lack of food, the morale of the Vietnamese enemy has been declining further.

That is the reason why more Vietnamese soldiers, both stationed at the western border and inside Kampuchea, have deserted their ranks. The more the Vietnamese war of occupation in Kampuchea drags on, the less the Vietnamese soldiers have hope to gain victory in Kampuchea. Furthermore, news from home is not encouraging

either. Viet Nam is plagued with economic and social problems; the living conditions of the Vietnamese people have been worsening and the people have lost confidence in the Hanoi leadership.

In conclusion, during this past tenth dry season, the military situation of the struggle carried out by the NADK and the Kampuchean people has developed more favourably than in the past one. The NADK have been more active in their fight against the Vietnamese enemy, particularly in their attacks on village administrative networks, which enabled the military situation to reach this important stage. It becomes clear to all that, during this tenth dry season, the Vietnamese enemy was at its wit's end.

It becomes more obvious at the end of this tenth dry season that the Vietnamese enemy cannot escape their final defeat on the military field.

Considering their difficult situation at home and on the international arena, the Vietnamese aggressors will undoubtedly and in a not too distant future face an utter failure on the battlefield of Kampuchea.

However, despite this extreme difficult situation, the Vietnamese aggressors, true to their expansionist nature, are very stubborn on the battlefield and still refuse to give up their ambition to annex Kampuchea.

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This favourable development of the situation in the tenth dry season has been the result of several factors, the most outstanding of which can be listed as follows:

- (a) The NADK have been imbued with, and implementing more effectively, the military strategy of attacking the village administrative apparatus in accordance with the new five- and seven-fighting methods of the guerrilla warfare and the Kampuchean people's war;
- (b) The Kampuchean people throughout the country, in rural as well as in urban areas, have been participating more actively in the struggle against the Vietnamese enemy, through various forms more effectively and enthusiastically in every part of the country;
- (c) Khmer soldiers, militiamen, as well as village and commune administrative civil servants enlisted by force to serve the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea have become increasingly irritated with the Vietnamese occupation. They have been co-operating with the NADK through different means in fighting the Vietnamese enemy, both on the western border battlefield and in the interior;
- (d) The tripartite resistance forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea have been strengthening their co-operation on the military field as well as on the international arena;

(e) More and more friendly countries all over the world have been firmly supporting the Kampuchean people's struggle.

