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SECURITY COUNCIL Forty-third year

Letter dated 2 June 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a statement dated 28 May 1988 by the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea denouncing Viet Nam's deceitful manoeuvre about "the withdrawal of 50,000 Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea".

I should be very grateful if you would have the above-mentioned statement circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 23 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

> (Signed) THIOUNN Prasith Permanent Representative

A/43/50.

ANNEX

Statement dated 28 May 1988 issued by the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea

In a press conference on 26 May 1988, the Hanoi authorities claimed that they would withdraw 50,000 troops out of Kampuchea from next month until the end of the year. This is their new, blatant and shameless attempt to deceive the international community. Their latest announcement is no different from their previous troop withdrawal claims.

What are the realities on the battlefield of Kampuchea?

According to reports from various fronts throughout Kampuchea and the observations of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) High Command, the Vietnamese moved, during this month of May alone, their troops from one front to another in order to resist the NADK's increasing attacks

- to dismantle their village administrative networks,
- to cut off their strategic supply lines, and
- to exert pressure on major cities.

The noticeable Vietnamese troop movements can be listed as follows:

1) At the end of April and beginning of May, Vietnamese troops of division 330 who had been withdrawn from Failin (Battambang province) and sent to Trapeang Cho and Sangkè Satorp in January and February this year, were again dispatched to South of Kraing Ponlei river from Amleang to Damnak Smach (Kompong Chhmang province) in an attempt to safeguard their crumbling village administrative committees.

The Vietnamese have also withdrawn forces from division 309 and sent them to Ponhea Loeu with the task of protecting road No 26 (Kandal province).

At the same time, they dispatched 400 troops from Kompong Speu to north-west of the capital city of Phnom Penh.

- 2) On 30 April, they sent their troops from Metoek river and the border areas to eastern Pursat, at Srang Toch, Srang Thom and Sala Kumroo.
- 3) At the beginning of May, the Vietnamese troops stationed at Longvek near highway No 5 were sent across the Tonle Sap river to resist the NADK's activities on the northern Phnom Penh front.

- 4) On 2 May, the Vietnamese sent 32 tanks from Battambang to Siemreap through highway No 6 for the protection of the city.
- 5) On 3 May, Vietnamese troops of division 330 in Samlaut (Battambang province) were sent to protect parts of road No 10 between Sdau and Snung and the railway section from Battambang city to Reang Kesei.
- 6) On 6 May, the Vietnamese mobilized their troops from Boeng Tim and Pralay Thngo (east of Battambang city), and from Ta Phde (south of Battambang city), and sent them to resist the NADK's attacks in west of Battambang city and to protect road No 10.
- 7) On 9 May, Vietnamese troops of divisions 309 and 7704 stationed on the banks of the Mongkol Borei river were sent to resist the NADK's attacks in north and south of Battambang city.
- 8) On 12 and 13 May, the Vietnamese dispatched 2,000 troops of division 7701 from Kompong Thom city to protect highway No 7 and to safeguard their village administrative committees in Damber district, east of the Mekong river (Kompong Cham province).
- 9) In mid May, they mobilized their troops from Samlaut, Pailin, Siemreap and Pursat to protect Battambang city.

They also mobilized their troops from Pursat, division 339 and Siemreap to resist the NADK's attacks in east and south of Battambang, between Koh Kralor and Phnom Veay Chap.

From mid May up to now, they have mobilized forces from here and there in order to resist the NADK's activities in south, east and north of Battambang city.

- 10) On 15 May, they dispatched forces of division 309 stationed at Kamping Puoy to the western border areas from Sala Krau to Phnom Reang (Battambang province).
- 11) On 16 May, they sent regiment 812 of division 309 and other forces from Banon, Kamping Puoy, Balang (Samlaut front) to resist the NADK's attacks at Phnom Reang, Phnom Trung Tea on road No 58.
- 12) On 17 May, they dispatched 6 truckloads of troops from Stung Treng to resist the NADK's attacks at Kratié. They also sent troops from Presh Vihear with tanks and heavy artiliery across the Mekong river to replace those troops at Stung Treng.
- 13) On 18 May, Vietnamese forces of division 330 and 339 were sent to resist the NADK's activities in Peam Ta (Pursat province, near Kampuchea-Thailand border).

- 14) On 18 May, Vietnamese troops were sent from Sisophon to protect Battambang city.
- 15) On 19 May, they mobilized 600 troops to resist the NADK's activities from south of Battambang city to Ta Phdé.
- 16) From 23 to 25 May, Vietnamese regiment 96 of division 309 was withdrawn from the Mongkol Borei river banks to south and west of Battambang city in an attempt to reopen road No 10 which has been cut off by the NADK between Treng and Pailin. Those troops are now concentrated at Sdau as they have not been able to move forward.

All the above-mentioned Vietnamese troop movements clearly show that they have been very busy in moving their troops from one front to another in an attempt to extricate themselves from their defeated situation on the battlefield and to pursue their occupation of Kampuchea.

Therefore, there is no evidence that they are ready to withdraw 50,000 troops from Kampuchea. Their latest claim about such withdrawal has, indeed, a distinct propaganda purpose. They want to mislead the international community into

- believing that they are ready to withdraw from Kampuchea, and - relaxing the pressure on them because the international community has been firm in its call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea so as to enable the people of Kampuchea to exercise their right to self-determination.

Moreover, such a deceitful claim by the Hanoi authorities about troop withdrawal can also be construed as an attempt to have the international community provide chem with food and other humanitarian supplies in order to feed their troops in Kampuchea who are facing an acute shortage of food so that they would be able to continue to occupy Kampuchea.

As a matter of fact, throughout the battlefield in Kampuchea, the fightings go on unabated and remain intense in the interior of Kampuchea as well as at the western border areas.

The above-mentioned realities undoubtedly show that the latest Vietnamese announcement to "withdraw 50,000 troops from Kampuchea" is only a deceitful propaganda like their previous "partial troop withdrawald".

Besides, in the latest Vietnamese claim, there is one most ridiculous point: the Vietnamese aggressors, who have propped up and pull the strings of their puppets Heng Samrin-Hun Sen for the past ten years, have suddenly announced that they would now serve under the command of their puppets.

The world community which, for the past nearly ten years, has been aware of the truly deceitful nature of the Vietnamese aggressors, has not been

taken by their latest manoeuvre. It will continue to exert stronger pressure on the Hanoi authorities who are now facing inextricable difficulties, on the battlefield in Kampuchea and at home, so as to prevent them from reversing the situation in their favour, until they are compelled to settle the problem of Kampuchea by political means by withdrawing totally their forces from Kampuchea and respecting the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny without any outside interference.

