



安全理事会

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2022年5月9日爱尔兰常驻联合国代表给安理会主席的信

谨随函转递联合国粮食及农业组织和世界粮食计划署为安全理事会成员联合编写的题为“监测存在粮食危机的冲突局势国家的粮食安全”的第十期最新情况报告(见附件)。

请将本信及其附件作为安全理事会文件分发为荷。

爱尔兰常驻代表

大使

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
2022年5月9日爱尔兰常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信的附件

Monitoring food security in food crisis countries with conflict situations

A JOINT FAO/WFP UPDATE FOR THE MEMBERS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL


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Abbreviations and acronyms

CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (WFP)
CDR	Crude death rate
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CIAUD	<i>Comité International pour l'Aide d'Urgence et le Développement</i>
CNSA/MARNDR	<i>Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire/Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles, et du Développement Rural (Haïti)</i>
CONASUR	<i>Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (Burkina Faso)</i>
DIEM	Data in Emergencies Monitoring (FAO)
DNPGCA	<i>Dispositif National de Prévention et de Gestion des Crises Alimentaires (Niger)</i>
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FAOSTAT	FAO Corporate Statistical Database
FCT	Federal Capital Territory (Abuja, Nigeria)
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FRC	Famine Review Committee
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (Somalia)
FSNWG	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group
FY	Fiscal Year
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises
HDP	Humanitarian-development-peace
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-Agency Steering Committee
IDP	Internally displaced person
IHL	International humanitarian law
IHRL	International human rights law
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

IRG	Government of Yemen
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province (Nigeria)
LGA	Local Government Areas (Nigeria)
NSAG	Non-state armed group
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRM	Post-return monitoring
rCARI	Remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (WFP)
SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
SBA	Sana'a Based Authorities (Yemen)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SEFSec	Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey (Palestine)
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' region (Ethiopia)
UN	United Nations
UNHCO	United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator's Office
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Monitoring (WFP)
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

This is the tenth update of the *Monitoring food security in food crisis countries with conflict situations*, a twice-yearly report on the acute food insecurity situation in countries where conflict and insecurity are primary drivers of acute food insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have jointly been producing this report for the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since June 2016.

Unanimously adopted by UNSC members, UNSC Resolution 2417 aims notably to prevent conflict-induced food insecurity and the threat of famine. The Resolution recalls all parties to their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians and sparing civilian objects. However, hunger continues to be used as a tactics of warfare by belligerents, and vulnerable populations are purposely famished for political or strategic gains.

The purpose of this update is to monitor acute food insecurity – as reported by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)/Cadre Harmonisé (CH) – in countries affected by major food crises where conflict and insecurity are driving disruption of livelihoods, needs for humanitarian assistance, and often creating access constraints to affected populations.

This tenth update, composed of two main sections, aims to inform council members in the framework of the informal briefing to be held in May 2022.

Section 1 highlights the food security situation in 20 food crisis countries and territories affected by conflict and insecurity in 2021–2022 through key messages, visual content and country snapshots, including additional subsections on food security implications behind the Ukraine crisis both at the global and national levels.


Section 2 includes a deep dive into the humanitarian situation created by conflict in three countries and territories of concern – Mali, northern Nigeria and Yemen.

Box 1. Countries and territories covered by this update

Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, northern Nigeria, the Niger, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

Specific information on Ukraine is also included given the situation currently unfolding.

Conflict is the main driver of acute hunger, often in combination with other shocks. Beyond the direct loss of lives and destructions of houses and infrastructures, conflict creates deep and long-lasting socioeconomic damages within vulnerable households and communities, and across affected countries. The protracted impact of conflict includes – but is not limited to – loss of livelihoods, supply chain disruptions, mass displacements, increased pressure on limited natural and economic resources, and decreased resilience of affected populations and food systems. Macroeconomic disruptions due to conflicts also include increased public deficit and debt, reduced foreign exchange reserves, currency depreciation, growing inflation and eventually diminished capacities for social protection programmes and livelihood support.

Figure 1. Global acute hunger numbers from the 2022 *Global Report on Food Crises*

Source: GNAFC and FSIN, 2022.

Globally, levels of hunger continue to increase at an alarming rate. As highlighted in the 2022 *Global Report on Food Crises*, acute food insecurity increased significantly over the past six years (Figure 1). In 2021, close to 193 million people were acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) across 53 countries/territories. This included almost 40 million people facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) conditions across 36 countries (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

While the food crises profiled in the 2022 *Global Report on Food Crises* continue to be driven by multiple, integrated drivers that are often mutually reinforcing, conflict/insecurity remains the main driver. In 2021, Conflict/insecurity was the main driver around 139 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent levels of acute food insecurity across 24 countries/territories. This is a marked increase from 2020, when 99 million people in 23 countries/territories were classified in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

The most concerning trends relate to the number of people in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) as around 570 000 people faced starvation and death in 2021 in Ethiopia, southern Madagascar, South Sudan and Yemen – mostly because of conflict – in comparison with 133 000 people in 2020 in Burkina Faso, South Sudan and Yemen.¹ The situation is not expected to improve significantly in 2022 as a Risk of Famine is forecasted in two districts of Yemen under the worst-case scenario in the second half of the year.² A Risk of Famine is also warranted in certain areas of Somalia as a result of severe drought in combination with conflict and insecurity and the impact of the Ukraine crisis on global food prices. During 2022, around 329 000 people will likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in three countries – Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen.

Most of the data reported in this update as well as in the *Global Report on Food Crises 2022* do not yet take into account the impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security.

This update is prepared under the framework of the Global Network Against Food Crises, as part of a range of analytical products including notably the *Global Report on Food Crises*.

Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the Global Network Against Food Crises is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors working together to prevent, prepare for, and respond to food crises and support the Sustainable Development Goal to End Hunger (SDG 2).

On 4 May 2022, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, the Global Network Against Food Crises released the *2022 Global Report on Food Crises*, available at fightfoodcrises.net and fsinplatform.org.

¹ In Ethiopia, during the projected period (July–September 2021), there were over 401 000 people estimated to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), while in South Sudan and Yemen during the 2021 peak analysis period, there were 108 000 and 47 000 people, respectively, in this phase. During April–September 2021 in Madagascar – which was mainly affected by drought – there were nearly 14 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), though this period does not coincide with the 2021 peak period (November–December 2021).

² During June–December 2022, in Hajjah governorate, a Risk of Famine is projected under the worst-case scenario in the districts of Abs and Hayran, while further assessment was recommended in Midi and Haradh districts to ascertain the Risk of Famine. Additionally, although Al Hali and Al Hawak districts in Al Hudaydah governorate are not forecasted to be at Risk of Famine within the projection period, the analysis determined that, should a worst-case scenario apply for a protracted period beyond the projection period, these districts will likely shift into Famine.

It is paramount to note that in the immediate aftermath of the Famine Review Committee activation, the Ukraine crisis unfolded generating the need to review the scenario definition for the projected period. The risks associated with the crisis in Ukraine point to the need to re-assess the assumptions developed by the IPC analysis teams – notably the prices and supply of wheat and fuel, as well as a change in the geopolitics surrounding the Yemen conflict and possible shifts in humanitarian programming in the coming months.

Section 1. Overview of the acute food insecurity situation

Overview

The impact of conflicts extends throughout food systems – from reduced food production, crop destruction, theft and reduced humanitarian access, to market disruptions, food price increases and restricting access to food for vulnerable populations – compounding already poor nutritional practices and reduced access to minimum dietary diversity. Addressing food crises in conflict and insecurity contexts therefore requires action from all humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) stakeholders.

Trends in acute food insecurity (2021–2022)

Trends in IPC/CH Phase 4 or above in the 14 countries with available updated data between early 2021 and early 2022

By March 2022, around 28 million people were in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) across 14 countries that had IPC/CH data out of 20 countries and territories that faced major food crises because of conflict and insecurity. This represents a 17 percent increase compared to the population facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) in the same 14 countries identified a year earlier at the same period.

Trends in IPC/CH Phase 4 or above in three countries of concern (Mali, Nigeria and Yemen)

Mali, Nigeria (21 states and Federal Capital Territory [FCT]) and Yemen are expected to face significant increases in the population facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) by mid-2022 because of conflict and insecurity, among other countries flagged in this update. It is expected to increase by 29 percent in Yemen between early 2022 and June 2022, and by 110 percent in Nigeria. In Mali – where no data is available for early 2022 – it is expected to more than treble from 47 000 people in late 2021 (corresponding to the harvest period) to 157 000 people in June 2022, at the beginning of the lean season.

Major increases in acute food insecurity (2021–2022)

Major increases in IPC/CH phase 3 or above

From early 2021 to early 2022, the population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) increased by more than one million in Afghanistan, the Niger, Nigeria (21 states and FCT), Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. The highest increase was recorded in Afghanistan with 5.9 million more people year-on-year.


Between early 2022 and mid-2022, significant increases in the population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) are projected in Burkina Faso, Chad, the Niger, Nigeria (21 states and FCT), Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – from 0.8 million up to 5 million people.

Major increases in IPC/CH phase 4 or above

From early 2021 to early 2022, the largest increases in the population in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) were recorded in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – from 200 000 people to over 3.2 million people. It also increased by 83 percent in Burkina Faso and by 117 percent in the Niger.

The largest increases expected to occur between early 2022 and mid-2022 are likely to be in Burkina Faso, the Niger, Nigeria (21 states and FCT), Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – from 200 000 people to 1.65 million people. The population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is also expected to increase by 182 percent in Chad.


Figure 2. Five countries with the largest increase in numbers of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) between early 2021 and early 2022



Source: GNAFC, 2022, based on IPC/CH.

Notes: The numbers indicated above the columns in the graph refer to population facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH phase 5), for countries where such levels of acute food insecurity are estimated or forecasted. The increases between early 2021 and early 2022 in Yemen, Somalia and in Nigeria also result from increases in the population analysed (respectively by 6 percent, 28 percent and 61 percent – or from 14 states and FCT to 21 states and FCT covered in the CH analysis in the case of Nigeria).


Figure 3. Five countries with the largest increase in the share of population analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) between early 2021 and early 2022



Source: GNAFC, 2022, based on IPC/CH.

Notes: The numbers indicated above the columns in the graph refer to population facing Catastrophe (IPC/CH phase 5), for countries where such levels of acute food insecurity are estimated or forecasted.

Figure 4. Countries and territories (20) regularly covered in *Monitoring food security in food crisis countries with conflict situations*



Source of data: Global Network against Food Crises, 2022.

Source of map: United Nations. 2020. *Map of the World*. Cited 26 April 2022. un.org/geospatial/content/map-world

Box 2. Global food security risks and implications of the Ukraine crisis for food crisis countries

As the Russian Federation and Ukraine are two major suppliers of wheat, maize, barley, edible oil, fuel and fertilizers on global markets, the main risks for food crisis countries derive from their dependency to imports of food products and agricultural inputs. In terms of trade, in 2021 the Russian Federation and Ukraine supplied together close to 30 percent of wheat, around 10 percent of maize, more than 60 percent of sunflower oil and around one-fourth of barley supplies to international markets. The conflict outbreak is likely to lead to major trade flow disruptions from these two countries on international markets. Movements in international grain prices already reflect these disruptions (FAO, 2022a).

In March, the FAO Cereal Price Index averaged 170.1 points, up 24.9 points (17.1 percent) from February, marking its highest level on record since 1990. This monthly increase reflects particularly a surge in world prices of wheat and coarse grains, largely driven by conflict-related export disruptions from Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, the Russian Federation. The expected loss of exports from the Black Sea region exacerbated the already tight global availability of wheat. Significantly reduced maize export expectations for Ukraine on top of elevated energy and input costs, underpinned a 19.1 percent increase in world maize prices month-on-month (FAO, 2022b).

It is uncertain whether Ukraine will be able to plant and harvest its crops during protracted conflict. Russian access to pesticides is also uncertain, which could also negatively affect crop production. The conflict and its implications are likely to also considerably limit the export capacity of these two countries, in particular, to the detriment of economically vulnerable countries.

As of April 2022, the Ukrainian economy is expected to shrink by 45 percent this year, depending on the length and intensity of the unfolding conflict; and the Russian economy by 11 percent in 2022 (World Bank, 2022). The conflict is likely to result in damages to inland transport infrastructure and seaports in Ukraine, as well as storage and processing infrastructure. Logistics issues could exacerbate the already elevated costs of maritime transportation, compounding further on the final costs of internationally sourced food paid by importers (FAO, 2022a). After the conflict broke out, an estimated 13.5 million tonnes of wheat and 16 million tonnes of maize are frozen in the two countries – 23 and 43 percent of their expected 2021/22 exports (WFP, 2022a). In Ukraine, current damage to infrastructure is estimated in the range of USD 68–199 billion, with the potential direct damage to agriculture assets initially estimated at USD 6.4 billion (FAO, 2022c).

Food crisis countries rely largely on Russian and Ukrainian exports (notably for wheat and maize products) for their food security. Based on 2020 data available for 38 countries and territories affected by food crises, it appears that these countries received 34 percent of the total Ukrainian exports of wheat and maize products that year – i.e. 15.7 million tonnes out of a total of 46.9 million tonnes – with most of them located in Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and to a smaller extent southern and eastern Africa. Similarly, around 73 percent of the Russian wheat exports were shipped to food crisis countries in 2020 – or over 27 million tonnes out of a total of 37.3 million tonnes that year.¹

This is a major concern, in particular, for 27 countries and territories affected by major food crises,² which received around 13.4 million tonnes of the total exports of Russian and Ukrainian wheat and maize products in 2020. All these countries but three are low-income food-deficit countries. Among the largest importers, Yemen, the Sudan, Nigeria and Ethiopia were also among the ten largest food crises in terms of population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in 2020.

The lack of access to agricultural inputs (including seeds and fertilizers) also represents a significant risk for vulnerable countries, such as in West Africa and the Sahel, where low natural soil fertility means that chemical fertilizer is often essential for food production. Several countries have had fertilizer subsidy schemes in place since the Abuja fertilizer summit in 2006 and the 2008–2009 food price crisis. However, many countries in the region are

already facing constrained fiscal space and a debt crisis and do not have sufficient financial resources to absorb the shock in the context of recovery from the COVID-19-related economic crisis (WFP, 2022a).

According to the IPC Famine Review Committee conclusions on Yemen, the conflict in Ukraine will likely lead to further steep increases in fossil fuel and food prices, as the country is highly dependent on food imports including wheat, sunflower oil and other foodstuffs, and highly reliant on imports from Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In case Ukraine and the Russian Federation cannot deliver this year, a significant quantity of wheat will be missing from the global supply chain and countries like Yemen will need to resort to alternate supply channels. Longer routes and higher fuel costs will also be compounded by increased fertilizer prices in the wake of the crisis, which will also bleed into the overall price of wheat and edible oils in the global market (IPC, 2022a). In 2022, Yemen and Somalia – which also depend on over 90 percent on Russian and Ukrainian wheat imports – face a Risk of Famine depending, among other factors, on the global food prices variability following the conflict outbreak in Eastern Europe (IPC, 2022a, 2022b).

Conflict-related cost increases for wheat and pulse procurement come on top of already surging prices over the past years, which have made WFP operations 36 percent more expensive than they were on average in 2019. While the full impact on WFP's operational costs is still to be fully assessed, estimates point to increases of USD 29 million per month in the short term, through the combined effect of food and fuel price hikes. When added to pre-existing increases of USD 42 million per month (since 2019), the total additional costs facing WFP are USD 71 million monthly (WFP, 2022b).

¹ Global Network Against Food Crises calculations based on FAOSTAT data. Cited 12 March 2022. fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TM

² As per the 2021 *Global Report on Food Crises* methodology, 34 countries/territories were identified as major food crises in 2020 based on meeting one or more of the following criteria: (i) at least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent; (ii) at least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent; (iii) any area in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above; (iv) included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response-level 3. For more information, see 2021 *Global Report on Food Crises*, p. 12 (GNAFC and FSIN, 2021).

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Snapshots

Central and Southern Africa

Central African Republic (the)



In September 2021–March 2022 acute food insecurity slightly deteriorated compared to the same period last year – the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increasing by 50 percent compared to a year earlier (IPC, 2021).

From April to August 2022, corresponding to the lean season, acute food insecurity is projected to deteriorate further as 2.4 million people are expected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), and the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to increase to 690 000 people (IPC, 2021).

Between September 2021 and August 2022, nearly 214 000 children under five years of age and more than 98 000 pregnant or lactating women are expected to be acutely malnourished (IPC, 2021).

Conflict and volatile security situation, low agricultural productivity and price increases were critical drivers of food insecurity. As conflicts intensified, high insecurity, tensions and armed violence triggered new population displacements while disrupting the access to and ability to produce food. Previously spared areas were transformed into violent front. Hundreds of thousands of people throughout the country were forced to flee, reaching the highest level of displacement recorded since 2014 (OCHA, 2022b). As of 31 December 2021, the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) was approximately 692 000 (OCHA, 2022).

Moreover, the escalating situation in some localities has resulted in widespread disruption of the agricultural production and the closure of some local markets, impacting the availability and prices of food and non-food products; with the consequent 20 percent increase in the median price of the minimum food basket (IPC, 2021).

Human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations increased in numbers in 2021, and new risks arose for civilians with greater exposure to explosive devices and entire marginalized communities (OCHA, 2021). Moreover, the resilience of populations continues to erode under the burden of successive crises and economic recession, forcing nearly all people to adopt harmful coping mechanisms (OCHA, 2022).

In December 2021, humanitarian organizations had to temporarily suspend their movements throughout the northwest and west of Berbérati, the region with the most severe humanitarian needs (OCHA, 2022).

Democratic Republic of the Congo (the)



Over the period January–June 2022, an improvement in food security is expected compared to the same period in 2021; however, the situation remains critical with over 5 million people projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during this period (IPC, 2021).

In 70 health zones analysed out of 503 at national level, nearly 860 000 children under the age of five will likely be acutely malnourished in 2022; of those, more than 200 000 are expected to be severely malnourished and require urgent treatments (IPC, 2021).

Conflict and overall insecurity remained the primary triggers of food insecurity, causing the displacement of nearly 5.5 million people within the national borders from September 2019 throughout 2021 (OCHA, 2021a), the highest number across Africa. Throughout 2021, the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Maniema continued to face armed groups' activism, disrupting the free movement of people and goods and limiting household livelihoods, with North Kivu and Ituri being the most affected by violence (IPC, 2021). In addition, cases of theft perpetrated by displaced persons to cope with acute food insecurity have provoked quarrels and tensions between communities (IOM, 2021). A below-average crop production is forecast in some areas, such as in eastern regions, where ongoing conflict and displacements, coupled with restrictive measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic, affected agricultural activities and limited farmers' access to crop-growing areas and inputs (FAO, 2021, 2022).

The protracted crisis caused heavy losses, including the abandonment of land, crops' pastures and other life-sustaining assets. The country faces structural socioeconomic challenges to ensure food security and resilience of its population, as three out of four of its inhabitants lives in extreme poverty, with less than USD 1.90 per day (OCHA, 2021a).

Humanitarian access constraints remain very high after the intensification of the attacks of armed groups, particularly in the Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Tanganyika provinces. Security incidents, including armed robberies, kidnappings and attacks on humanitarian facilities, have been reported (OCHA, 2021b).

Mozambique

1.9 million people in IPC 3+ (13% of the population analysed) November 2021–March 2022	2021/2022 N/A	1.8 million in IPC 3	0.04 million in IPC 4	0 in IPC 5
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Note: Acute food insecurity data are not comparable with the year earlier due to reduced geographical/population coverage.

Considering reduced analysis coverage, the number of people acutely food insecure in need of urgent assistance decreased at country level compared to the same period a year earlier, except in Cabo Delgado where it increased by 40 percent.

Of the total population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) from November 2021 to March 2022, around 71 percent (1.32 million people) were in the four provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Nampula and Zambézia, where many of the country's IDPs are concentrated (IPC, 2021a).

By April–September, the total population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) projected at country level is expected to decrease to 1.4 million people, though it will likely remain unchanged in Cabo Delgado as a result of persisting conflict and insecurity. In this region, around 0.9 million people – or 35 percent of the population analysed – are expected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

Around 75 000 children under the age of five were estimated severely wasted in 16 analysed areas of Cabo Delgado province and were expected to suffer from acute malnutrition at least up to January 2022 (IPC, 2021b).

In November 2021–March 2022, conflict remained the main driver of acute food insecurity due to continued attacks in Cabo Delgado by non-state armed groups. The conflict in northern and central areas of Cabo Delgado since end of 2017 had a significant impact on households' food security, implying abandonment of houses and farming fields (IPC, 2021b). In total, around 900 000 people were internally displaced in the province as well as in neighbouring Nampula, Niassa and Zambézia. In 2022, violence against civilians is expected to persist along the main commercial and communication axes or in remote rural areas, and as a result, no major returns of IDPs are expected through September 2022 (IPC, 2021b).

As of late 2021, around 52 000 people were estimated to be partially accessible by humanitarian actors and 27 000 in hard-to-reach areas (OCHA, 2021).

Eastern Africa

Ethiopia

4.6 million people are food insecure in Tigray as per WFP CARI methodology
(83% of the population analysed)
November–December 2021

2021/2022



Note: No data were available for early 2022.

In Ethiopia, 18 million people are officially estimated to be in need of food assistance (OCHA, 2021a, 2021b).

Excluding the conflict-affected area of Tigray, approximately 12.8 million people are expected to need food assistance (OCHA, 2021b).³

The latest estimates available show that in Tigray alone, as per WFP CARI methodology in November–December 2021, 4.6 million people were food insecure, a sharp increase compared with pre-crisis period in October 2020, when 0.4 million people were suffering from food insecurity. In Tigray, the population has been affected by multiple shocks affecting its food, market and basic infrastructure systems. Drivers of food insecurity have compounded over time and remain severe (WFP, 2022).

The highest prevalence of food insecurity is recorded in the Northwestern, Eastern and Central zones of Tigray – the area most affected by conflict and characterized by inadequate and poor diets, decreasing income and increasing resort to negative coping strategies (WFP, 2022).

Latest estimates also indicate that 5.5 to 6.5 million people are food insecure between March and May 2022 in drought-affected areas of Southern Ethiopia (Somali, SNNP and Oromia regions) (FSNWG, 2022).

Conflict, recurrent natural hazards such as severe drought, economic shocks, including COVID-19, and pest invasions are the main drivers of acute food insecurity. Conflict areas currently include Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray.

In February, the National State of Emergency was lifted, but incidents, battles and violence continued to be reported. As of the beginning of March 2022, the situation in northern Ethiopia continued to be extremely tense and volatile. In Tigray, heavy fighting was reported in the Eastern zone, as well as continued and intensifying clashes along the borders with Afar and Amhara regions (USAID, 2022). In addition, political and intercommunal violence incidents also flared up in some parts of the Oromia region (IOM, 2022). In April 2022, the first humanitarian convoy arrived in Tigray since December 2021 following the declaration by the Government of Ethiopia of an indefinite humanitarian truce and the commitment by Tigray authorities to an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal from Afar (OCHA, 2022a; Security Council Report, April 2022).

Recent hostilities further put civilian lives at risk, increasing humanitarian needs and further displacing populations. Ethiopia has one of the world's largest internally displaced populations, and numbers increased dramatically in 2021 with the expansion of armed conflicts from Tigray to neighbouring regions. As of

³ Humanitarian Response Plan figures are not fully compatible with IPC. The figures for the rest of the country were informed by the HEA analysis, which was undertaken in August. For Tigray the food cluster maintained a figure of 5.2 million, which was already in use before the release of the IPC findings (WFP and FAO, 2022). IPC projected 4.4 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Tigray alone between July–September 2021, of which 401 000 people were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, June 2021). The June 2021 IPC analysis was not endorsed by the government.

December 2021, 4.2 million people were internally displaced across the country, double compared to late 2020 (2.1 million) (IOM, 2022).

The ongoing situation has continued to worsen the already affected economic situation, marked by shortage of liquidity and depletion of foreign currency, price increases and a decrease in the population purchasing power (WFP and FAO, 2022). Moreover, conflict and violence have hampered access to life-saving assistance for affected communities eroding food security and resilience (OCHA, 2022b). Since mid-December 2021, Tigray was unreachable by land, and humanitarian assistance has been challenging, especially in remote rural areas where lack of fuel has impacted the human response to a critical level (OCHA, 2022c).

Considering the limited flow of humanitarian and commercial supplies to the region, local production is a major source of food and livelihoods. Despite being 50 percent below the 2021 average levels, the *Meher* harvest in Tigray provided relief to rural households (70 percent of the population) as well as IDPs, most of whom are hosted by communities. The production in Tigray was sufficient to cover 8 months of the Tigray population of 6 million, based on a per capita consumption of 150 kg/annum, even with an estimated 30 percent post-harvest losses. However, the prevailing market situation is not conducive for the movement of produce from surplus areas to deficit areas due to ongoing insecurity and lack of fuel (FAO, 2022a).

The situation in the Afar area continued to worsen as some woredas were inaccessible due to the clashes, preventing humanitarian operators from accessing approximately 200 000 displaced people located in the inaccessible area (OCHA, 2022c).

In the conflict-affected Tigray and Amhara regions, current planting operations are likely to be affected by insecurity and input shortages due to market disruptions, which is likely to negatively affect the levels of the harvest starting from May (FAO, 2022b). Given the limited flow of humanitarian and commercial supplies and considering that the production of the past two *Meher* seasons in Tigray were below average, failure to access adequate inputs will result in a third consecutive poor agricultural season, which will be devastating on the lives and livelihoods of the conflict-affected population (FAO, 2022a).

In the southern half of Somali and the lowlands of Bale and Borena zones of Oromia region, all climatic conditions and rangeland resources indicators consistently indicate the persistence of a severe drought situation since early February 2022 and a significant depletion of rangeland resource. Increased resource-driven conflicts have already been observed across drought-affected areas of the East Africa region and are expected to persist if the March to May rainy season remains poor (FSNWG, 2022).

Somalia



Worsening drought is putting six areas and population groups across Somalia at Risk of Famine through June 2022 if the current April to June *Gu* season rains fail, food prices continue to rise and humanitarian assistance is not scaled up to reach the country's most vulnerable populations. The areas of concern are Hawd Pastoral of Central and Hiran, Addun Pastoral of Northeast and Central, Bay Bakool Low Potential Agro Pastoral and IDP settlements in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Dhusamareb.

Acute food insecurity in Somalia has drastically worsened since the beginning of 2022. Further and faster deterioration of the food security and nutrition situation is expected during the April to June 2022 projection period, with more than 6 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) – or 38 percent of the total population – including 1.7 million people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 81 000 people likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Urgent and timely scaling up of humanitarian assistance is required to prevent extreme food insecurity and malnutrition outcomes, including Risk of Famine (IPC, 2022a).

Around 1.4 million children under the age of five – or 44 percent of the children in Somalia – required urgent treatment, including 329 500 likely to be severely malnourished in early 2022 (FSNAU and FEWS NET, 2022a). These figures have likely increased as the nutrition situation has deteriorated significantly in most of the pastoral and agropastoral livelihood zones, and among IDPs. Acute malnutrition is already at Critical levels in many areas of central and southern Somalia, and the number of acutely malnourished children being admitted to treatment centres is rapidly increasing, with two to four-fold increases reported in some districts (IPC, 2022b).

The deteriorating food security and nutrition situation across many parts of Somalia is due to worsening, multi-season drought that has gripped the country since late 2020. The key drivers are widespread and severe water scarcity due to protracted drought, increased loss of livestock, consecutive poor or failed harvests, escalating local and imported food prices, conflict/insecurity, drought and conflict-induced population displacement and declining coping capacity of the poor and vulnerable population (IPC, 2022b).

As of November 2021, attacks by non-state armed groups (NSAG) increased by approximately 40 percent compared to levels recorded the previous year (USAID, 2022). Moreover, competition for scarce resources leads to increased local and sublocal interclan conflicts. Different clashes have been reported between January and February 2022 in the Galmund (OCHA, 2022a), Lower and Middle Shabelle (OCHA, 2022b) and Sool regions, causing further people displacement.

The Somalia situation features as one of the world's largest forcibly displaced populations with an estimated 3.8 million displaced Somalis, including 800 000 Somali refugees outside the country, and the remainder IDPs within Somalia (UNHCR, 2022).

Drought has worsened in many areas of Somalia and is putting the country on the brink of Famine. Current climate forecasts indicate increased likelihood of below-average 2022 *Gu* (April–June) season rainfall in most parts of central and southern Somalia. In northern regions where *Gu* rains are forecast to be near average, the extended impact of the ongoing drought will persist at least through mid-2022. Persistent drought condition

across most parts of the country during the dry and harsh January to March 2022 *Jillaal* season have aggravated acute food insecurity among poor and vulnerable households in most pastoral livelihoods due to water shortage, limited availability of milk and lack of saleable animals as more animals die and the body condition of remaining livestock deteriorates (FSNAU and FEWS NET, 2022b). The Risk of Famine also depends on whether food prices will continue to rise sharply and humanitarian assistance is not scaled up to reach the country's most vulnerable populations (IPC, April 2022b). Somalia is dependent on imports from Ukraine and the Russian Federation for over 90 percent of its wheat consumption, rendering the country particularly vulnerable to changes on global food markets (FSNAU and FEWS NET, 2022b).

Political instability and complex conflict dynamics have complicated humanitarian operations, though humanitarian access has improved slightly throughout 2021 (ACAPS, 2021).

South Sudan



Acute food insecurity deteriorated with respect to the same period last year when 5.8 million people – 48 percent of the population analysed – were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

Acute food insecurity levels are projected to worsen throughout the lean season from April to July 2022, with 7.74 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), of which 87 000 people likely to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in some counties of Jonglei, Lakes and Unity States and Pibor Administrative Area (IPC, 2022).

In 2022, approximately 1.34 million children under the age of five are expected to experience acute malnutrition, including close to half of them in the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity.⁴

Food insecurity is likely to deteriorate due to multiple compounding factors, including continued localized conflict, macroeconomic crisis and the impacts of COVID-19 restrictions and extreme climatic events.

The last quarter 2021 witnessed an intense period of violence in different parts of the country, especially in those areas where food insecurity is of major concern. As of February 2022, an escalation of violence was registered in Jonglei State, with several attacks reported in different areas (Bor South, Duk, Pochalla and Urur). In addition, armed conflicts increased in the Greater Equatoria states in different areas (Linya, Yei River) (WFP, 2022). The situation in the Unity State has remained volatile since the beginning of 2022, causing the displacement of around 39 000 people. Moreover, the population of Unity State has been severely affected by the 2021 flooding and continue to have unmet needs due to high humanitarian constraints. As of March, increased violence was registered in the Abyei Administrative Area related to longstanding border disputes, resulting in around 70 000 people being displaced (ACAPS, 2022). The violence in Central Equatoria raises humanitarian concerns due to the challenging operating environment (WFP, 2022).

Although limited improvement in some areas has led to spontaneous returns, populations have been forced to remain protractedly displaced (OCHA, 2022a). As of December 2021, over 2 million IDPs were registered (OCHA, 2022b), equivalent to a 25 percent increase with respect to December 2020 (OCHA, 2021). An additional 2.3 million South Sudanese remain refugees hosted in neighbouring countries.

In addition, climate change continues to impact the agricultural sectors, with the country facing prolonged flooding, with Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Jonglei states being the most affected in crop and livestock production (OCHA, 2022a).

Humanitarian access remains severely restricted. Violence, clashes and armed conflict hampered humanitarian efforts in parts of the country. The number of incidents affecting the humanitarian community is still very high (ACAPS, 2021).

⁴ Based on the results of SMART nutrition surveys, the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System (FSNMS) survey and programme admission trends.

Sudan (the)

Levels of acute food insecurity remained particularly high, with the situation likely to worsen due to the October 2021 coup and its economic repercussions, which were not taken into account at the time of the IPC analysis (WFP and FAO, 2022).⁵

In early 2021, intercommunal conflicts, high food prices, low purchasing power and seasonal floods were the main drivers of acute food insecurity (IPC, 2021). Localized conflicts persisted in 2021 and early 2022, in particular in Darfur (OCHA, 2021). In 2021, also a significant decline in cereal production contributed to the food insecurity situation (FAO, 2022).

As of January 2022, close to 3.1 million people were internally displaced – in 90 percent of cases, by conflict or intercommunal violence. Around 85 percent of IDPs were in Darfur states, most of them in a situation of protracted displacement over the past 18 years. Since August 2021, increases in internally displaced populations were reported in South Darfur, Central Darfur, Blue Nile and West Kordofan (IOM, 2022; OCHA, 2021). Around 1.1 million refugees and asylum seekers were also hosted in the country, mostly from South Sudan, Eritrea, the Syrian Arab Republic, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic (UNHCR, 2022).

After the military coup d'état on 25 October, efforts towards political transition, peace as well as macroeconomic stability continued despite considerable challenges (OCHA, 2021). In December 2021, the inflation rate remained particularly high at 318 percent despite following a decreasing trend; and as of January 2022, staple food prices had increased from 61 percent for sorghum to 217 percent for wheat flour compared to the same period a year earlier (WFP, 2022). In this context, food security is expected to deteriorate through the lean season – starting in May and ending in October (WFP and FAO, 2022).

As of mid-February, continuing hostilities and increased insecurity prevented the provision of relief to many conflict-affected people and limited humanitarian access in the entire Darfur region (USAID, 2022).

⁵ Upcoming IPC analysis to be conducted in April–May 2022.

West Africa and the Sahel (including Cameroon)

Burkina Faso



The population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) increased by over 146 000 people – 83 percent – a notable increase compared to the same period a year earlier.

The situation is expected to further deteriorate during the lean season (June–August), with 3.5 million people expected to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 628 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CH, 2022).

Analysis on acute malnutrition reveals that 699 000 children aged 6–59 months are expected to be acutely malnourished throughout 2022, an increase of 10 percent compared to the last analysis (October 2020–July 2021) and an increase in severe acute malnutrition cases of over 18 percent compared to last year (IPC, 2021).

Conflicts, compounded with erratic rainfalls, high prices and shortfall in agricultural production continue to drive acute food insecurity.

Since the end of the rainy season in October 2021, armed militant groups intensified attacks on security forces and civilians, especially in the regions of Sahel, North, Central-North, East and Boucle du Mouhoun, resulting in a continuous increase in IDPs, which reached 1.74 million as of January 2022. The Central North has the highest number with 626 602 IDPs (36 percent of total displacement), followed by the Sahel (546 385), Northern (207 096), Eastern (151 706) and Boucle du Mouhoun (57 516) regions. In addition, about 25 000 refugees, mainly from Mali, are residing in the Sahel region (CONASUR, 2022). Furthermore, the January 2022 coup is an additional factor of increasing civil insecurity and stressing the already critical food insecurity conditions (FAO, 2022).

The effect of conflict is expected to hinder farmers' access to inputs following reduced 2021 harvests. Domestic cereal production in 2021 was estimated at a below-average level due to the effects of adverse weather conditions and the civil conflict, further aggravating conditions (FAO, 2022). Attacks by NSAGs continue to impede humanitarian access, especially in the Cascades, Central-North, East, North and Sahel regions (ACAPS, 2022).

Cameroon



The acute food insecurity situation in early 2022 represents a deterioration compared to the same period in 2021 – with an increase of the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) by 240 000 people (CH, 2022).

The most affected areas – classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3) – are in the Northwest and Southwest regions affected by persisting insecurity and activities led by NSAGs, and in the Far-North region affected by the decade-long insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin area (CH, 2022).

The main drivers of acute food insecurity remain conflict/insecurity in the Far-North, Northwest and Southwest regions, as well as economic shocks deriving from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conflict particularly limited agricultural activities and production in the departments of Logone-et-Chari, Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga (Far-North region) and is likely to reduce food availability during the lean season in June–August 2022, when vulnerable households face most hardship in accessing food (CH, 2021).

Around 357 631 people were internally displaced in the Far-North (IOM, 2021). In addition, around 575 507 people were displaced from Northwest and Southwest regions (UNHCR, 2022).

Livelihoods and access to food of vulnerable households in Northwest and Southwest regions continued to be severely constrained by armed clashes, roadblocks and lockdowns (Protection Cluster, 2022). As a result, households' food stocks from the 2021 agricultural production were reduced by limited ability to cultivate fields and practice animal husbandry; their dependency on markets to access food increased as the agricultural lean season started in February, one month earlier than expected (FAO, 2022).

Food prices were abnormally high in late 2021-early 2022 in areas affected by conflict and insecurity and required close monitoring (FAO *et al.*, 2022; CH, 2021).

Humanitarian access is deteriorating significantly, notably due to increasing restrictions on movement and violence against civilians in the Northwest, Southwest and Far-North regions. As of December 2021, attacks against humanitarian workers and their property were also reported (ACAPS, 2021).

Chad



Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate significantly during the 2022 lean season (June–August), with approximately 2.1 million people expected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 101 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – reaching unprecedented levels of acute food insecurity as per CH analyses (CH, 2022).

Moreover, according to the latest IPC acute malnutrition analysis, it is estimated that in 2022 around 1.7 million children under the age of five will suffer from acute malnutrition, including around 335 000 severe cases in the areas analysed (IPC, 2021).⁶

The main acute food insecurity and malnutrition drivers are conflict/insecurity, drought and economic downturn.

The country remains affected by insecurity resulting from the insurgency of armed groups. Conflicts around the Lake Chad continue to create displacement affecting the livelihoods of both IDPs and host communities in most areas of tension, putting social cohesion and stability under pressure (WFP, 2021). As of February 2022, around 407 000 people were internally displaced, in addition to nearly 574 000 refugees mainly from the Central African Republic, Nigeria and the Sudan (UNHCR, 2022; IOM, 2021).

The combination of conflict and adverse weather has been detrimental to the agricultural sector; domestic cereal production was estimated to be lower than average in 2021, having an additional impact on the country's food security. In addition, ongoing insecurity and violence have hindered access to fields and limited the availability of labour and agricultural inputs. Despite the grain price level remaining stable as of the end of 2021, they were still about 10 percent above their year-earlier levels. (FAO, 2022).

Humanitarian access continues to be limited due to multiple attacks and incursions by armed groups, especially in Lake Province, and intercommunal violence in the eastern provinces (ACAPS, 2021).

⁶ For the purposes of the analysis, a total of five provinces and 52 departments were analysed.

Mali



Note: No data were available for early 2022.

According to the latest available analysis on acute food insecurity, around 1.2 million people were facing acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 and above) during the post-harvest period, between October and December 2021.

The situation is expected to deteriorate towards the lean season (from June to August 2022) when 1.8 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), of which around 157 000 are expected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CH, 2021).

In parallel, acute malnutrition analysis revealed that over 1.2 million children under the age of five would be acutely malnourished through August 2022, of which over 300 000 severely malnourished require urgent and adequate treatment (IPC, 2022).

Food security has significantly deteriorated since 2021, particularly in conflict-affected central and northern areas. Throughout 2021 insecurity in the northern and central areas, with expansion in the south, has generated massive displacement and disruptions of socioeconomic activities, such as reduced agricultural production, livestock removal and crop damage/looting (OCHA, 2022). As of December 2021, the total number of IDP stood at 350 110 (UNHCR, 2022); in addition, the country hosts around 53 000 refugees, mostly from the Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso (FAO, 2022).

The economic sanctions imposed at the beginning of January 2022, following the postponement of the elections by the transitional military government, are likely to curb economic activity, further worsening the already limited access to food and its availability (FAO, 2022).

Humanitarian access continues to be extremely restricted due to the activity of armed groups in the northern, central and southern regions (ACAPS, 2021).

Nigeria (21 states and the Federal Capital Territory)



The March 2022 CH analysis indicated that by June–August 2022, the population facing acute food insecurity and in need of urgent assistance (CH Phase 3 or above) is expected to reach 19.5 million people across the 21 states and Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja – reaching the highest levels recorded by the CH analysis (CH, 2022).

While there is an increase of states analysed for the March 2022 CH cycle, in March–May 2022 there was an increase of 1.3 million people facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in the 16 states and FCT compared to the same period last year (CH, 2022).

The March 2022 analysis indicated that 385 000 IDPs were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in the states of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara in March–May 2022 – an increase by 180 percent compared to the same period a year earlier (CH, 2022).

Importantly, the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is expected to reach close to 1.2 million people during the peak of the lean season from June to August 2022 (CH, 2022).

The three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe concentrated more than half of the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – projected to reach 588 000 people in June–August 2022 if humanitarian assistance is not scaled up and sustained. There are 14 Local Government Areas (LGAs) that were inaccessible or hard to reach in Borno, one each in Adamawa and Yobe (CH, 2022).

Over 1.74 million children under the age of five are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition through August 2022, the end of the lean season. This includes nearly 614 000 children severely malnourished. In addition, over 151 000 pregnant and lactating women will also likely be acutely malnourished (IPC, 2021).

The main drivers of acute food insecurity remain insecurity due to the insurgency in the northeast, and banditry, natural resources-based community clashes and criminality in northcentral and northwestern states, as well as high food prices (CH, 2022). These drivers have occasioned large influx of IDPs. In early 2022, 2.2 million IDPs were identified in six states because of the insurgency in the northeast (IOM, 2022). In addition, close to 1 million people were internally displaced in northcentral and northwestern states including Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara because of natural resources-based intercommunal clashes and conflicts, criminality and banditry, with most of them residing among host communities (IOM, 2021).

Consequently, the protracted insurgent violence in the northeast and increased insecurity in the northcentre and northwest, resulted in localized production shortfalls despite above-average crop production at the national level (FAO, 2022).

In addition, other factors are contributing to the state of food insecurity. In particular, the continuous depreciation of the naira in the parallel market, combined with speculation of impact of the Ukraine crisis will continue to drive food prices up, which were already 90–120 percent above their year-earlier levels at the beginning of 2022 in the context of the insurgency and economic shocks, including those resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic (WFP, 2022).

Humanitarian access also continues to be extremely constrained. The spread of violence, particularly in northern Nigeria, is hampering the movement of affected people from remote rural villages to areas where they have easier access to humanitarian assistance (ACAPS, 2021).

The Niger



The record-high levels of acute food insecurity are expected to further increase by June–August 2022, when 4.4 million people are expected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), with a doubling of the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) to 426 000 people (CH, 2022).

For the first time in the Niger, two departments of the Tillabery region (Abala and Ouallam) are projected in Emergency (CH Phase 4), as a result of significant insecurity on the border with Mali.

Global acute malnutrition rates are above the emergency threshold – an estimated 1.3 million children under the age of five are expected to suffer from malnutrition, including over 432 804 in severe acute malnutrition throughout 2022 (UNICEF, 2022).

Food security deteriorated significantly as a result of the insecurity situation at the border with Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, which resulted in population displacement and worsened the socioeconomic situation (WFP, 2022).

By the end of 2021, NSAG activism had intensified (UNHCR and CIAUD, 2021). As of January 2022, around 265 000 people have been displaced in Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabery regions fleeing community-based violence.

Of particular concern is also the decreased crop production due the compounded effect of erratic rainfalls and civil unrest (FAO, 2022). The final evaluations of agricultural production show a 39 percent drop in cereal production compared to the average of the last five years and a 40 percent deficit compared to the population's needs. In addition, the natural pastures in some regions are insufficient to cover the feeding of the livestock due to drought and bushfires. A fodder deficit corresponding to 46 percent of the herd's needs has been recorded for 2021, the highest rate in the last 12 years (DNP-GCA, 2022).

As of December 2021, humanitarian access constraints remained significant. Tahoua and Tillabéri regions (Burkina Faso and Mali borders), as well as Diffa and Maradi regions (bordering Nigeria) were particularly inaccessible because of the presence of NSAGs (ACAPS, 2021).

Asia and the Middle East

Afghanistan



There are 22.8 million people in acute food insecurity and urgent need of assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above) – the largest number recorded by the IPC in Afghanistan – a nearly 35 percent increase from the same period last year (16.9 million).

The number of areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to increase from 10 in November 2020–March 2021 to 32 in November 2021–March 2022 out of 45 geographical areas covered by the IPC analysis, with the remaining areas in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (IPC, 2021).

The nutritional status of children under the age of five continued to deteriorate in most parts of the country, as an estimated 4.7 million people will suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022, including 3.9 million children and 837 000 pregnant and lactating women – a 21 percent increase from 2021 (OCHA, 2022).

The accelerating humanitarian response is supporting some stabilization of economic conditions. Reflecting the currency appreciation, inflation eased, with slight declines in prices for basic household goods such as food (World Bank, 2022).

Following forty years of war, the increased conflict during the first two quarters of 2021 caused livelihood disruption and the consequent displacement of 700 000 people, mostly settled in urban centres, regional capitals and Kabul, thus placing further pressure on limited facilities in those areas bringing the total of IDPs to around 3.4 million (IPC, 2021). In addition, close to 2.2 million refugees and asylum seekers were estimated to be hosted in neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2022). Following the withdrawal of international forces and political takeover in August 2021, the humanitarian situation deteriorated considerably in the fourth quarter of 2021 and the outlook for 2022 remains profoundly uncertain (OCHA, 2022). The disruptions of public finances, services and international assistance, mainly driven by the political transition, had an enormous impact on employment, especially for women. In this context, the main food commodity prices increased significantly between June 2021 and January 2022 – from 12 to 52 percent – following the reduced 2021 harvest, strengthening international commodity prices, and the economic crisis linked to the country takeover in August (WFP, 2022; FAO, 2021). While humanitarian assistance triggered a downward pressure on prices through increased supply of basic household good (e.g. food) year-on-year inflation remained high at 32 percent as of late February – down from almost 43 percent a month earlier (World Bank, 2022). The country is also currently facing the worst drought in the last three decades, severely affecting 25 out of the 34 provinces of the country (IPC, 2021).

Humanitarian access continues to be extremely restricted. Active humanitarian organizations also face limited capacity as well as a shortage of supplies (ACAPS, 2021).

Iraq

0.6 million people acutely food insecure among IDPs and returnees as per WFP CARI methodology
 (10% of the population analysed)
 June–August 2021

2021/2022
 N/A

Note: No data were available for early 2022.

The humanitarian situation in Iraq is largely a legacy of the 2014–2017 conflict (UNICEF, 2021). The protracted conflict and its aftermath, structural challenges and the currency’s devaluation continued to maintain high levels of acute food insecurity, in particular among IDPs and returnees in 2021 and 2022.

As of December 2021, around 1.2 million people remain displaced throughout 18 governorates, of whom 180 000 are living in 26 formal camps established for IDPs, and around 5 million returnees who risk repeated and protracted displacement (IOM, 2021). As of January, the country also hosted 256 000 registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2022).

Throughout 2021, worsening security situation as well as poor opportunities for employment and access to services continue driving displacement and disrupting livelihood and food security (IOM, 2021). In late October and early December, several attacks by NSAG elements killed and injured civilians and caused the displacement of thousands of civilians, such as from the Diyala and Basrah governorates (USAID, 2021).

Humanitarian access to Iraq remains challenging, primarily due to persisting insecurity in some areas. Moreover, the presence of landmines and explosive from the past conflicts continue to hinder movements (ACAPS, 2021).

Myanmar

13.2 million people acutely food insecure as per WFP rCARI methodology⁷
 (25% of the population analysed)
 April–September 2021

2021/2022
 N/A

Note: No data were available for early 2022.

The combination of a continuing political and economic crisis, with escalating conflict since the military takeover at the beginning of 2021, and secondary impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, have disrupted livelihoods and access to essential services. It is expected to further increase acute food insecurity in the upcoming months (WFP and FAO, 2022).

Conflicts across multiple states and regions intensified since September 2021 and further deteriorated in January 2022, especially in the northwest and southeast areas causing additional loss of life, destruction of civilian property and increasing internal and cross-border displacement (OCHA, 2022a). Based on the latest available data, as of 28 March 2022, there were an estimated 904 600 IDPs, including 558 000 people newly displaced since the military takeover (OCHA, 2022b). Most IDPs suffer from high levels of food insecurity as they lost their livelihoods while fleeing conflict, making them highly dependent on humanitarian aid amid access constraints (OCHA, 2021).

In 2021, farmers faced production deficits across the country. The second FAO-WFP joint assessment revealed that nearly half of the interviewed farmers from nine states/regions reported a reduction in the area planted, due to the presence of conflict, price rises for agricultural inputs and movement constraints, resulting in a decrease in production (FAO and WFP, October 2021). The combination of high input prices, mainly of fertilizers, and labour constraints, will likely lead to low yields in 2022, and will exacerbate farmers' already below-normal agricultural productivity.

In addition, an estimated 290 000 children under the age of five are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022 – among them a staggering 49 000 children (17 percent) will suffer from severe acute malnutrition which is the most critical and deadly form of acute malnutrition. Even before the military takeover and COVID-19, Myanmar had been suffering from a high burden of child undernutrition. The prevalence of stunting is over 29 percent for children under the age of five, classified as high by the World Health Organization (WHO) and one of the most severe among the countries of Southeast Asia (OCHA, 2021). Food insecurity and malnutrition are deepening, requiring humanitarian interventions at scale to stop people slipping into more severe need, including acute malnutrition.

As of April 2022, humanitarian access to conflict-affected and displaced people remains heavily restricted and there are significant gaps in assistance to these communities despite efforts by humanitarian partners and local organizations (OCHA, 2022b). Increasing challenges are being reported by clusters around transportation of supplies into conflict areas (OCHA, 2022a).

⁷ The WFP remote-CARI (rCARI) methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. (Preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9–10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity). Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed.

Palestine

1.8 million people acutely food insecure as per the SEFSec methodology⁸
 (35% of the population analysed)
 December 2020–January 2021

2021/2022
 N/A

Note: No data were available for early 2022.

Decades of crisis, the escalation of hostilities in Gaza in May 2021, coupled with an already critical economic situation in the context of COVID-19 marked by high poverty and high unemployment, have exacerbated the humanitarian situation of the population (OCHA, 2021). The Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey (SEFsec) from which the acute food insecurity estimates are drawn was carried out before the May 2021 escalation of hostilities in the Gaza Strip – the most serious escalation since 2014 – which exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities and increased already high poverty, food insecurity and unemployment levels (OCHA, 2021).

Intermittent clashes and escalating violence continued in the West Bank and Gaza throughout 2021 and early 2022, resulting in civilian casualties and deaths (USAID, 2022; OCHA, 2022). The escalating conflict in May 2021 resulted in severe losses in the agricultural sector and damages to the food supply value chain. Several agricultural input warehouses were destroyed, causing a lack of input supply for farmers and resulting in increased cost of seeds, agrochemicals and fodder (WFP, 2021a). Food prices have increased since early October 2021, in line with increasing international prices, but also as a result of increased transportation costs and raw materials (WFP, 2021b).

Humanitarian access, in particular in the Gaza Strip, is still severely limited. Various restrictions are imposed on West Bank residents, creating challenges for humanitarian actors to access people in need and for people to access assistance (ACAPS, 2021).

⁸ Although partners of the Global Report on Food Crises validated the use of the Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec) for reporting acute food insecurity in the territory in 2021, it should be noted that there are certain methodological limitations. For more information see Technical Notes of *2022 Global Report on Food Crises* (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

Syrian Arab Republic (the)

12 million people acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance as per the WFP CARI methodology
(55% of the population analysed)
October–December 2021

2021/2022
N/A

Note: No data were available for early 2022.

Around 2.5 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure as per WFP CARI methodology, including 1.8 million living in camps and fully depending on assistance (OCHA, 2021a).

The latest acute food insecurity estimates available indicate a slight decrease compared to 12.4 million people acutely food insecure in 2020 (OCHA, 2021b).

Nearly eleven years of conflict have been devastating to the population's lives. The high levels of acute food insecurity continue to be driven by the persistence of the economic crisis, prolonged displacement and drought conditions affecting agricultural production. Since late 2019, the humanitarian situation has worsened at levels unprecedented in the country's recent history (WFP, 2021).

As of August 2021, around 6.9 million people were internally displaced and 3.3 million people returned from previous displacement (OCHA, 2022). Humanitarian access in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to be challenged by active hostilities and its consequences, global geopolitical dynamics, interferences by parties in control, and in some parts the periodic closures of border-crossings and crossing points related to COVID-19 preventative measures (OCHA, 2021a).

Yemen



Acute food insecurity and malnutrition continued to worsen in early 2022, with an 8 percent increase in the population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) compared to early 2021.

Over the projected period from June to December 2022, severity is expected to increase dramatically, with 19 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), of which 7.1 million will likely be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Most concerning is that the increasing number of people facing Catastrophe levels (IPC Phase 5) is projected to reach 161 000 over this period.

Around 2.2 million children under the age of five – of which 538 000 severely malnourished – and about 1.3 million pregnant and lactating women, are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition throughout 2022 (IPC, 2022).

During June–December 2022, in Hajjah governorate, a Risk of Famine exists under the worst-case scenario in the districts of Abs and Hayran, while further assessment was recommended in Midi and Haradh districts to ascertain the Risk of Famine. Additionally, although Al Hali and Al Hawak districts in Al Hudaydah governorate are not at Risk of Famine within the projection period, the analysis determined that, should a worst-case scenario apply for a protracted period beyond the projection period, these districts will likely shift into Famine. (IPC, 2022).

Conflict continues to be the major driver of acute food insecurity and malnutrition, combined with the economic downturn, the reduced humanitarian funding, lack of essential services and natural hazards.

Following the intensification of the conflict in 2021, violence continued to escalate in the first quarter of 2022 resulting in high civilian casualties in the Sa'dah, Al Hodeidah and Sana'a governorates (ACAPS, 2022). Between December and January 2022, continuous armed clashes were reported, especially in the Al Bayda, Marib and Shabwah governorates, generating significant additional displacement (USAID, 2022). From January 2022 to 12 March 2022, at least 4 300 households – or 25 700 people – were displaced at least once (IOM, 2022). Over 4.2 million people were estimated to be internally displaced (UNHCR, 2022). The pressure of limited resources is causing further tension between IDPs and host communities.

In addition, the price inflation and monetary depreciation, which rose sharply at the end of 2021, contributing to increased civil unrest especially in the South (WFP and FAO, 2022). A further reduction in income and food availability is also expected in the next agricultural season due to a combination of extreme climatic events and increased incidence of crop pests and livestock diseases (IPC, 2022).

The country has a high reliance on humanitarian food assistance. Thus, acute food insecurity and malnutrition are highly sensitive to humanitarian funding. The reduced funding forced aid agencies to close or dramatically reduce life-saving assistance programmes, with 28 out of the UN's 43 major programmes already scaled back or closed by January 2022 (OCHA, 2022). Currently, available assistance will cover 6.4 million people – 50 percent of targeted beneficiaries. Starting from June, planned assistance is expected to cover 2.6 million people – the equivalent of 20 percent of the targeted beneficiaries (IPC, 2022). Additionally, humanitarian access continues to be challenging across the country due to conflict, insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and civil unrest (ACAPS, 2021).

Box 4. Conflict in Ukraine and concern for its food security

The conflict outbreak is set to increase humanitarian needs in Ukraine, while deepening those of millions of people that prior to its escalation were already displaced or requiring assistance due to the more than eight-year conflict in the eastern part of the country. Humanitarian needs in neighbouring countries, where displaced populations are seeking refuge, are also set to increase.

Already in 2021, 383 000 people were facing acute food insecurity and required urgent assistance in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (OCHA, 2022).

Since the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, over 5.3 million refugees crossed into neighbouring countries, while an additional 7.7 million people are internally displaced (IOM, 2022).

The destruction of or damage to agricultural infrastructure and markets, and the disruption of food supply chains is threatening the food security of already vulnerable populations. Agriculture-based livelihoods, a key source of income for 12.6 million people – 30 percent of the population – who live in rural areas of Ukraine, are severely impacted at a critical time during the year for crop production (FAO, 2022a). FAO's preliminary assessment suggests that, as a result of the conflict, between 20 and 30 percent of the areas under winter cereals, maize and sunflower seed in Ukraine will either not be planted or remain unharvested during the 2022/23 season, with the yields of these crops also likely to be adversely affected (FAO, 2022b).

FAO and WFP are deeply concerned about the food security situation in Ukraine, including the potential for the conflict to impact planting and harvesting, especially if farmers cannot access inputs and animal feed (FAO, 2022b; WFP, 2022).

Securing food supply chains and safeguarding household-level production of nutritious foods (e.g. vegetables, livestock) will be critical to averting a food crisis. The conflict has already created significant problems in the logistics and on the food supply chains within Ukraine and at global level (FAO, 2022b).

Forthcoming assessments will highlight the needs among the most vulnerable populations and impediments facing the agriculture sector, providing more in-depth information on food security, nutrition and preferences for livelihoods support (FAO, 2022b).

As the crisis continues with no end in sight, basic necessities have become sparse and the delivery of humanitarian relief across borders is challenged by the ongoing conflict throughout the country. Supply chain routes are increasingly disrupted while humanitarian corridors are being constrained by ongoing hostilities (WFP, 2022).

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Latin America and the Caribbean

Haiti



Haiti's political and social unrest has intensified amid a deep economic crisis, exacerbating insecurity, governance vacuum, poor management of the COVID-19 pandemic and gang violence resurgence.

The outbreak of clashes since June 2021 and general insecurity continued to negatively impact the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance. In addition, gang leaders continued to exercise power over the territories under their control, defying the rule of law and committing more acts of violence and extortion. Furthermore, the recurrent clashes between gangs in the metropolitan areas of Port-au-Prince have led to population movements, especially in the areas of Cité Soleil and Martissant (OCHA, 2021; Protection Cluster Haiti, 2022).

Continued currency depreciation, accompanied by high international commodity prices, is expected to affect purchasing power negatively, leading to increases in the cost of the average food basket (CNSA/MARNDR, 2021).

In this context, irregular distribution of below-average rainfall, the impact of the August 2021 earthquake, and the flooding associated with Tropical Depression Grace in the Sud-Est adversely affected agricultural production, displaced thousands of families, disrupted humanitarian response and caused extensive damage to the already weakened food system (IPC, 2022).

Humanitarian access remained limited in some areas (Delmas, Fontamara and Martissant). Ongoing gang blockages and truck retention have hampered the transportation of fuel, affecting the flow of humanitarian assistance across the country (ACAPS, 2021).

Section 2. Highlighted countries of concern

Conflict and insecurity triggered severe deteriorations in acute food insecurity during 2021 and into 2022, with populations facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) significantly increasing in certain countries and territories. In particular, Mali, northern Nigeria and Yemen are expected to face among the largest increases of populations facing acute food insecurity during this period. The population in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) is expected to increase by 29 percent in Yemen between early 2022 and June 2022, and by 110 percent in Nigeria.

In Mali – where no data are available for early 2022 – it is expected to more than treble from 47 000 in late 2021 (corresponding to the harvest season) to 157 000 people in June 2022, at the beginning of the lean season.

There has been a sharp conflict-related deterioration in food insecurity in these three countries and territories, documented humanitarian access constraints in reaching food insecure populations and evidence of conflict-specific food system damage. UNSC Resolution 2417 condemns both the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. The Resolution calls on parties to conflicts to grant humanitarian access and provides the Security Council with options for responding to situations in which access is denied. It also reminds all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians, highlighting that armed conflict, violations of international law and related food insecurity can also be drivers of displacement.

Resolution 2417 stresses that “...objects necessary for food production and distribution, such as farms, markets, water systems, mills, food processing and storage sites” must not be attacked and that “...objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets...and irrigation works”,⁹ must not be destroyed, targeted or rendered useless.

The recent evolution of the situations in Mali, northern Nigeria and Yemen is particularly worrying. This section seeks to contribute to the monitoring of the implementation of Resolution 2417 in these three countries and territories. It explores some of the impacts of armed conflict on food security from the perspective of protecting civilians and objects indispensable for their survival that represent essential components of food systems, as well as the challenges of securing safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access, both of which are addressed by Resolution 2417.

⁹ UNSC Resolution 2417 (2018), adopted by the Security Council on 24 May 2018 (S/RES/2417), para. 1.

Conflict-related impacts referenced in Resolution 2417

For each of these countries and territories of concern – Mali, northern Nigeria and Yemen – three distinct conflict-related impacts referenced in Resolution 2417 are examined:

1. Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Mass-displacement due to conflict and conflict-induced hunger continues to proliferate in crises around the world. New and existing displacement remains a major concern in the Mali, northern Nigeria and Yemen. Although population movement is primarily linked to violence, the inability to provide food for family members is also a clear factor in displacement. Fighting has cut off many communities from infrastructure, transport routes and markets, leaving people food insecure, particularly during lean seasons. This phenomenon has accelerated population movements in all three countries and territories of concern.

2. Impact of conflict on food systems

One of the most worrying aspects of contemporary conflicts is their impact on essential food systems and objects indispensable to the survival¹⁰ of civilian populations. Farms, crops, grazing pastures, fisheries, irrigation systems, livestock, mills and food processing and storage sites are all targeted with alarming regularity. Such actions are specifically referenced in Resolution 2417 and continue to be encountered by United Nations agencies in crises around the world, including in all three countries and territories of concern.

3. Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarianists' ability to work


Humanitarian access remains one of the most critical issues affecting aid agencies operating in complex emergencies and underpins Resolution 2417. As in so many other contexts, obstacles to reaching people in need are significant and contribute directly to food insecurity in each of the three countries and territories examined in this section. Furthermore, constantly shifting political and security landscapes are a major source of disruption for humanitarianists in protracted conflicts. There is compelling evidence of interference and disruption faced by humanitarianists in all three countries and territories of concern.

¹⁰ Objects indispensable to survival are non-exhaustively defined in article 54 of Additional Protocol I (applicable in international armed conflicts) and article 14 of Additional Protocol II (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as "...foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works."




Mali

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | October–December 2021



Projected | June–August 2022



CH acute food insecurity phase classification



Source: Cadre Harmonisé, October 2021. No data was available for early 2022.

In June–August 2022, the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) is projected to reach 1.8 million people during the lean season – an almost 55 percent increase compared to 1.16 million people in late 2021 during the post-harvest season. In addition, around 4.4 million people are projected in Stressed (CH Phase 2). Between June and August 2022, around 157 000 people are expected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – more than triple the number reported in October–December 2021.

In June–August 2022, 12 areas are projected to be in Crisis (CH Phase 3) in the regions of Gao, Kayes, Mopti, Segou and Timbuktu, including all bordering areas with northern Burkina Faso and southwestern Niger.

Humanitarian access continues to be highly constrained in Gao, Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu, where several incidents have been reported.

Overview of conflict impact on food security

Since 2012, Mali has faced an increasingly multidimensional crisis, driven by an armed conflict involving the Malian Armed Forces, international forces, extremist organized armed groups, and pro-government organized armed groups or organized armed groups with political and social demands (UN, 2021a). NSAGs have relied on violence to control trafficking routes in the north, extend their territorial control and seize control over natural resources (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2017). Increasingly however, the conflict has taken on an insurgency nature, with some NSAGs expressing local and historical grievances and demands, unmet by the central authority (Guichaoua and Pellerin, 2017). Since 2012, national security forces and French-led forces, through the *Serval* and subsequent *Barkhane* operations, have attempted to curb the spread and consolidation of the presence of NSAGs across the country. However, attacks by NSAGs as well as intercommunal violence, intensified in the central and southern parts of the country. This was due to lack of an effective State presence able to tackle long-standing grievances, and aggravated by the recent withdrawal of international forces and instability marked by two military coups (UN, 2022).

Conflict features as the primary driver of high levels of acute food insecurity, with the central and northern regions consistently the most affected (GNAFC and FSIN, 2021). Available data show a clear worsening trend since 2017, when the number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of food insecurity was at 0.6 million; this rose to 1.3 million in 2020 and in 2021; in 2022, it is expected to reach 1.8 million.¹¹

The increase of food insecurity is directly linked to the conflict, but there are exacerbating factors due to drought and a shortened rainy season in 2021. These adverse climate events caused reduced harvests (OCHA, 2021a), which resulted in fewer supplies in markets and rising costs of food items, at a time when global food prices were increasing. Furthermore, access constraints and the conduct of certain parties to the conflict worsened an already fragile socioeconomic context resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The depletion or loss of livelihoods has significantly reduced households' capacity to effectively cope with shocks. This situation is being further aggravated by the conflict in Ukraine and the continuation of biting ECOWAS sanctions adopted in January 2022 (The New Humanitarian, 2022).

Impact of conflict on population movement

Civilians have been affected by direct violence (including killing and abduction) and indirect violence (such as intimidation and the use of improvised explosive devices), by all parties to the conflict (UN, 2021b). This has resulted in a continuous rise in forced displacement. At the end of 2015, there were 49 000 IDPs, while as of 7 December 2021, the internally displaced population exceeded 400 000 people – more than half being children or women and girls (UNHCR, 2021). This increase can be explained by the worsening security situation in the northern and central regions of Mali, especially Gao, Menaka, Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu regions. As of October 2021, more than 154 000 Malian refugees remained in neighbouring countries, notably Burkina Faso and Mauritania (UN, 2022).

Since 2012, there have been 11 000 civilian casualties – half of these in the past two-and-half years alone.¹² The most critical situations are in central Mali as well as in the tri-border area (Liptako-Gourma) between

¹¹ Food security data is taken from editions of the *Global Report on Food Crisis of 2017, 2020 and 2021*.

¹² Between January 2019 and November 2021, the conflict killed 6 426 people, mostly in Mopti, where intercommunal violence between Dogon and Fulani surged (ACLED, 2021).

Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. There, in October 2021 alone, 390 incidents were recorded – the highest number of incidents per month in 2021 – and 493 civilians were killed. Between 1 October and 15 December 2021, a total of 324 attacks against civilians were reported throughout the country (UN, 2022). Over 100 civilians were killed in central and southwestern Mali in the first quarter of 2022 (Human Rights Watch, 2022). More recently, between 27–31 March 2022, a massacre of civilians was committed in the village of Moura, during military operations by the FAMA (the Malian armed forces) in the area in central region of Mopti (OHCHR, 2022).

During 2021, NSAGs systematically targeted civilians in central and northern Mali, while allegations of serious violations against civilians were identified in the context of military operations. Different forms of violence against civilians occurred, including enforced disappearances, killings and injuring, as well as besieging of populations, destruction of property and looting, with NSAGs responsible for the majority of these. Recruitment and use of children remained prevalent (UN, 2022). The United Nations Commission of Inquiry identified that, between 2012 and 2020, several forms of violence against civilians committed by the main parties to the conflict amounted to serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, some of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity (UN, 2021a). All these factors have underpinned forced displacement over the years.

Impact of the conflict on food systems

The conflict and the conduct by parties to the conflict have directly reduced the ability of families to produce food or earn income to access food, as different forms of attacks on livelihoods have become a common phenomenon and have been used as a weapon of war in both central and northern Mali. These include extortion, burning huts, granaries and crops, looting or slaughtering livestock, and stealing food, money and valuables. Such attacks aim to weaken communities' access to means of subsistence and food security, as people abandon crop fields, means of production and livestock. NSAGs also aim to strengthen the grip on communities and obtain resources to finance criminal activities (Cluster Protection Mali, 2020).

In an increasingly common warfare tactic, armed groups have been besieging villages by encircling them and restricting the freedom of movement of communities, including through the use of explosive devices, especially in the centre of the country. Sieges are used against communities perceived by armed groups to support “the enemy”, often the state (Cluster Protection Mali, 2021). As a result, civilians lose access to food due to the impossibility of bringing supplies to the markets, basic social services and livelihoods. Hunger is most extreme in blockaded villages where residents missed the planting season because of sieges (The New Humanitarian, 2021). For example, in early July 2021, the locality of Songho in Bandiagarawas once again encircled by violent extremist groups, who set up a blockade around the village, preventing local farmers from accessing their fields (UN, 2021b). A similar dynamic took place in Dinangorou in the central region of Mopti, when NSAG militants accused residents of siding with the army and besieged the village for three months in 2021. The village of Farabougou (region of Mopti) faced a similar situation resulting in a significant deterioration of food security and nutrition. There, people resorted to negative coping strategies including eating crop reserves stored in granaries (The New Humanitarian, 2021). Due to the siege, villagers also missed the crucial planting season and had their livestock stolen by NSAGs. Between 2020–2021, a reduction of up to 25 percent of arable land was observed in the central region of Mali (Ministry of Rural Development, African Risk Capacity and WFP, 2021).

In northern Mali, some pastoralists have been forced to concentrate in accessible areas with their cattle, thus generating enormous pressure on these grazing lands. The intensification of the criminal economy has also

resulted in some pastoralists resorting to armed militias to protect and secure their cattle on their transhumance routes and gain access to grazing areas under the control of certain NSAGs (UNOWAS, 2018).

A recent UN Secretary-General report highlights that the increase in the use of siege tactics, added to the strategic destruction of critical infrastructure, especially bridges and telecommunication installations, and the use of improvised explosive devices, appear to be a deliberate tactic of war to further isolate communities (UN, 2022).

Insecurity has disrupted economic and trade activities, resulting in unreliable food availability in markets. It has also limited access to farmland and markets, and disrupted normal pastoralist patterns, affecting livelihoods. Movement restrictions linked to attacks and extortion on main roads, the presence of explosive devices and insecurity have reduced access of herders, farmers and traders to fields and markets (Cluster Protection Mali, 2020). Market dysfunctions are particularly common in the centre and north of Mali, mostly caused by insecurity (FEWS NET, 2022). Fragile security conditions in Liptako-Gourma region have hampered transhumance movements and access to pastoral resources in the Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, resulting in a deterioration of livestock body condition and increased likelihood of an early start of the pastoral lean season, which normally starts in April (FAO, 2022). Trading activities with Mali's neighbouring countries have also been affected, particularly Algeria and the Niger, where a drop in livestock exports has been observed. In addition, cattle thefts and excessive sales since the security deterioration from 2012 have greatly reduced (or even eliminated) animal capital of poor households with limited herd size, which further degrades precarious livelihoods (FEWS NET, 2022). Some local inter-community economic activities such as weekly fairs have been severely disrupted or even suspended by insecurity and criminal activities. The ban on the use of motorcycles in northern Mali has also had a strong impact on the mobility of people and goods as well as access to basic social services such as health (UNHCR, 2022).

Conflict has been a significant factor in the increase of prices. In terms of food prices, compared to the five-year average, prices of basic foodstuffs have risen: maize (48 percent), millet (29 percent) and sorghum (29 percent). At the regional level, the most significant increases were recorded in Ségou, Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu. The increase in the price of products is due to the disruption of supply chains in these regions because of insecurity, but also to the sharp drop in maize production in 2020/21 (following a cotton farmer's strike) (FAO, FEWS NET and WFP, 2022).

Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarians' ability to work

Access restrictions have remained significant, with concerns generated by the activities of armed groups, the presence of improvised explosive devices or mines, and a more general perception of insecurity.

Humanitarian access remains extremely constrained as a result of armed groups in the northern, central and, to some extent, the southern regions. The denial of access to essential services through the confinement and isolation of villages, and the restriction of people's movements, has become particularly common in the Mopti and Ségou regions. The recurrent establishment of roadblocks, the sabotage of telephone networks and the destruction of road infrastructure, as in the case of the bridge connecting Dogofry commune and Farabougou village, block the delivery of humanitarian assistance (ACAPS, 2021a).

Since 2019, NSAGs have widened the geographical area of their activities along the country's border regions and have intensified their attacks, making access and negotiation of access increasingly difficult and dangerous for humanitarians. In some areas, like Ansongo city in Gao region, there has been an increase in armed violence against humanitarian actors and facilities since the end of 2019. In certain areas of Mopti, access was conditional on the consent of NSAGs. In 2021, there were also 57 verified incidents of denial of humanitarian access (UN, 2022).


Humanitarian organizations are often subject to looting, intimidation, abductions, illegal detention and diversion of aid, as well as other kinds of interference in operations. Some aid operations have also been forced to focus on certain areas for intervention and recipients of aid or have been obliged to suspend their activities, violating humanitarian principles (ACAPS, 2021b). Attacks on humanitarian personnel and their equipment are frequent. Over the past six months alone, at least 33 aid workers have been kidnapped, particularly in the regions of Gao, Mopti, Ségou, and Timbuktu (ACAPS, 2021a). In the first three months of 2022, over 130 security incidents against NGOs in Mali had been recorded (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2022). In early April, national forces arrested three European nationals from a German NGO on terrorism charges, later released. The arrests were made over the course of FAMa operations targeting militant (Salafi-Jihadist) groups in Diabaly commune (Niono circle, Ségou region) (CGTN Africa, 2022). This is a first in Mali and could be an indication of the shrinking of the humanitarian space.

The capacity of private transporters used by humanitarians to transport goods in humanitarian response operations has been strongly impacted by attacks and robberies. This has caused delays and also increased costs of humanitarian response operations (OCHA, 2021b).




Nigeria (21 states and Federal Capital Territory)

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | March–May 2022



Projected | June–August 2022



CH acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Partially accessible zone
- Not analysed

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, March 2022.

Around 14.5 million people are estimated to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) between March and May 2022, including 560 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) across 21 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).

In the projection period (June–August 2022), the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) is expected to increase by 35 percent compared to the 2021 peak, the equivalent of 19.5 million people across the 21 states and FCT.

The population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is expected to reach close to 1.2 million people during the lean season in June–August, more than double compared to March–May 2022.

Fourteen local government areas (LGAs) are inaccessible/hard to reach by humanitarian assistance due to insecurity in Borno – one in Adamawa and one in Yobe. These three states contain more than half the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) estimated and projected at the country level – 588 000 people in June–August 2022.¹³ While the situation in the northwest is not as alarming as in the northeast, figures from the CH show that the food security situation is deteriorating in Katsina, Kaduna, as well as Zamfara and Sokoto states, especially amongst the internally displaced populations (CH, 2022a, 2022b).

Overview of conflict impact on food security

The conflict in Nigeria, which emerged in 2009 as a Boko Haram insurgency and the government's military response, has now expanded beyond the northeastern regions across most of northern Nigeria.

In the northeast, violence is largely driven by the ongoing insurgency of the NSAG Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which emerged from Boko Haram. In 2021, ISWAP established supremacy over Boko Haram, subsuming much of its manpower and territory.

In the northwest, violence is used by many armed groups, including herder-farmer allied groups, vigilantes, criminal gangs and NSAGs members, driven mainly by intercommunal competition over an ever-growing scarcity of resources, particularly of water and arable land, and aggravated by a lucrative illicit economy centred around banditry and cattle-rustling (International Crisis Group, 2020).

This is in the context of compounding economic and climatic drivers of food insecurity. High staple food prices and suppressed incomes persist, with many still feeling the effects of the COVID-19-linked recession, alongside stresses on host populations resulting from IDP presence (OCHA, 2022).

Conflict across northeastern Nigeria has been disrupting access to food and livelihood activities over the years, determining worsening food insecurity outcomes. This has now reached a critical point as where insecurity hampers life-saving humanitarian assistance.

A large share of the population facing critical levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 4) is concentrated in the conflict-affected northeast and northwestern states – with respectively 588 000 and 400 000 people expected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) during the lean season in June–August 2022. Amongst these, around 43 percent (423 886) are currently situated in communities inaccessible to humanitarian response due to insecurity in 16 LGAs in Borno, Madagali LGA in Adamawa and Gujba LGA in Yobe states (CH, 2022b). Of particular concern are three LGAs in Borno State (Gubio, Mobbar and Abadam) which are projected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4) from June to August 2022 (CH, 2022b).

During the lean season, out of 979 000 people located in inaccessible areas of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, around 504 000 will likely face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.

In the northwest states, the population facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) is projected to increase 15-fold between June–August 2021 and 2022 – from 26 000 people among IDPs of Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara states, to around 400 000 people, including around 29 000 IDPs in the states of Sokoto and Zamfara (CH, 2022b).

¹³ Current data on mortality rate in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe is minimal. However, in the inaccessible areas of Borno State, the mortality rate is indicative of catastrophic acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5) (CH, 2022a, 2022b).

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Incidents of violence against civilians increased significantly in 2021 compared to 2020, with 852 recorded across northern Nigeria, involving 2 665 fatalities (ACLED, 2022).¹⁴ A large majority (78 percent) of the incidents in 2021 took place in the northwest, (Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara states) and in the northcentral (Kogi, Kwara, Niger) and Taraba states.

In a parallel, correlated trend, internal displacement in the northwest has seen a sharp rise in 2021, with a total of 984 000 IDPs reported in October 2021, up from 696 000 in February 2021 (IOM, 2021a, 2021b). Intercommunal fighting was cited as the reason for displacement by 50 percent of IDPs, up from 46 percent in the previous survey in 2020. This was followed by armed banditry and kidnapping, reported by 41 percent of IDPs, up from 39 percent in 2020 (IOM, 2021b).

In the northeast, millions had to flee their homes in an effort to escape NSAG threats and direct attacks, insecurity resulting from clashes between the military and NSAGs, forced recruitment, and a loss of means for subsistence (OCHA, 2022; UNHCR, 2022). In Borno State, NSAG actors threatened and forced farmers and fishers to leave their communities, causing them to abandon their livelihood activities and heavily rely on humanitarian assistance (UNHCR, 2022). Attacks on civilians are also conducted in transit, with people routinely ambushed and robbed of cash, valuables and merchandise by armed fighters at illegal vehicle checkpoints, along major highways and supply routes (OCHA, 2021). The result has been a steady increase in IDP numbers in the region, rising to 2.17 million from December 2020 to December 2021, while some 220 000 returned to their places of origin in 2021 (IOM, 2022).

In 2019, the Nigerian army has implemented a 'super camp' strategy, where they are clustered into a smaller number of heavily fortified bases, abandoning smaller, vulnerable outposts. This has been done with a view to constraining military losses, which has been partially achieved. However, it has also had the adverse effect of exposing civilians out of LGA centres to NSAG activity, ranging from ambushes on road cargo and roadblocks for extorting payments from travellers, through to outright attacks on villages perceived as being aligned with the government (ISS, 2020).

Despite generally targeting the security forces, ISWAP still frequently conducts direct attacks on the civilian population, particularly on villages it suspects of cooperating with the government (ISS, 2020).

Conflict is affecting ongoing relocation of IDPs, a problem that is exacerbated by recent camp closures following government efforts to return displaced people to their places of origin. For example, in Borno State, IDPs are unable to return to their places of origin and are forced to move into other, already congested camps or in informal settlements where services are already overstretched or to hard-to-reach areas, where services are non-existent (OCHA, 2021). Humanitarian actors are prohibited to provide unconditional humanitarian assistance in order to encourage resilience and income-generating activities. Of concern is that populations return to areas with little to no essential services and are expected to generate revenues from agricultural activities, when they have difficulties accessing agricultural lands because of general insecurity or that their livelihoods activities are limited by counter-terrorism legislation (OCHA, 2022; Global Protection Cluster, 2022). This aggravates their vulnerability, including to attacks and increases the risk of food insecurity. Additionally, NSAGs have attacked civilians who had returned to their places of origin, forcing people again into internal

¹⁴ According to ACLED, in 2020 there were 664 incidents and 1 936 fatalities. ACLED Dashboard, Nigeria recorded incidents from March 2021 to March 2022 (ACLED, 2022).

displacement. Examples include attacks on returnees in Damasak, Gajiram and Marte in 2021 (Protection Cluster, 2021) and more recently in Dikwa. The Borno State Government closed seven IDP camps around Maiduguri in 2021, with over 103 000 IDPs being returned to their place of origin or moving to adjacent larger towns. In early April 2022, 680 households were resettled into Gwoza LGA (FEWS NET, 2022a).

Impact of conflict on food systems

The conflict has resulted in serious disruption of agricultural value chains across northern Nigeria. NSAG attacks on villages, besides killing and injuring civilians, typically involve theft and destruction of farm produce and equipment (OCHA, 2021). Farmworkers and herders fear attacks when working in their fields or when moving their livestock for grazing. Attacks on civilians are also conducted in transit, with civilians routinely ambushed and robbed of cash, valuables and merchandise by armed fighters at illegal vehicle checkpoints along major highways and supply routes (OCHA, 2021). This creates ruptures in supply chains across the region, cutting off access to local markets for producers, traders and consumers. Similarly, processors face a shortage of workers available to operate machinery.

Mass displacement of people has further reduced the labour pool and caused land to be abandoned (OCHA, 2022). In northeast Nigeria, with most IDP communities clustered in garrison towns, usually LGA centres, they lose access to their traditional sources of livelihood of crop production and fishing. Additionally, current counter-terrorism legislation in Nigeria restricts transportation of fertilizers, including by humanitarian and development organizations, and the military imposes movement restrictions (e.g. 5 km around LGA centres) and prohibits the cultivation of tall plants, making agricultural activities difficult. This leaves many farmers dependent on humanitarian aid (Protection Cluster, 2021).

In the northwest, bandits are reported to deny farmers access to their fields unless they pay levies, making it impossible for them to plant or harvest crops. This results in large-scale abandonment of farms, livestock and trade. Satellite-derived analysis on cropland change in hard-to-reach areas have shown a decrease in agriculture activities, more specifically in Mariga and Maru LGAs (WFP, 2021).¹⁵ Kidnappings drive an equally destructive effect on farming, with ransom demands forcing families, and sometimes entire communities, to sell property and take on debt. Other rural communities agree to pay taxes to NSAGs to stave off attacks, further impoverishing themselves in the process (International Crisis Group, 2021).

As NSAGs destroy markets and loot shops and warehouses, they cut off access to credit, particularly for many small-scale female traders. Meanwhile, wealthier traders are forced to slash their business volumes, to avoid travelling to suppliers on the region's increasingly dangerous roads (International Crisis Group, 2021).

¹⁵ RAM satellite-derived analysis on cropland change in hard-to-reach areas in Nigeria during 2021 agricultural season.

Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarianists' ability to work

Nigeria featured among the most challenging contexts in 2021 for humanitarian access, categorized as a situation with extreme constraints. This was partly linked to the violence inflicted by different armed groups, particularly in northern Nigeria, which inhibited the movement of affected people from remote rural villages to areas where they could access humanitarian assistance. There were further legal and illegal constraints, such as ambiguous and/or excessive bureaucratic requirements to work in certain areas, and checkpoints by Government agencies and armed groups (ACAPS, 2021a).

In 2021, NSAGs increased their attacks on humanitarian assets and personnel. This includes direct attacks on humanitarian hubs in Damasak and Dikwa towns, which saw humanitarian offices being burnt down and government facilities and hospitals destroyed, while at least seven humanitarian workers were abducted in Dikwa during these attacks. Acts of looting and the burning down of private homes and warehouses of humanitarian agencies were also carried out. There have also been reports of house-to-house searches in some locations, deliberately searching for the residences of humanitarian workers (Protection Cluster, 2021). This led to UN and other humanitarian organizations temporarily withdrawing their staff.

Beyond Damasak and Dikwa, a general spike in military-NSAG clashes and NSAG attacks, in spring 2021, prompted a reduction of humanitarian staff presence in high-risk areas such as Ngala, Monguno, Damboa, Bama and Rann LGAs, while Nganzai and Gubio LGAs saw a total suspension of third-party community volunteers (OCHA, 2022). Recent kidnapping of an INGO staff in Monguno shows that the threat is still present. Kidnapping of five INGO staff in the Far North area of Cameroon in February and bringing to the northeast for negotiation of their release in March demonstrates the connexion between the different groups proliferating across the porous borders in the Lac Chad (AfricaNews, 2022).

Besides specific localities, NSAGs also target both main supply routes and secondary roads, where they have increasingly coordinated attacks on road travellers; they frequently set up illegal vehicle checkpoints along the main supply routes linking Maiduguri-Monguno, Bama-Pulka-Gwoza, Maiduguri-Damboa and Maiduguri-Damaturu, among other roads. As a result, for many localities, staff movements rely on the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, which is costly and comes with serious capacity limitations (AfricaNews, 2022). Furthermore, high insecurity has prompted the Nigerian army to request humanitarian organizations to use military escorts to reach insecure areas. This has affected humanitarian ability to maintain a principled response, which is critical for ensuring a perception of impartiality and neutrality in providing assistance. The Nigerian army's conflicting priorities also disrupt the timely delivery of aid, with long delays reported in securing escorts for many staff and cargo movements (AfricaNews, 2022).

Increased risks to humanitarian workers result in a shrinking operational space for humanitarian activities (ACAPS, 2021b). Access to several LGAs – namely Guzamala, Kukawa, Abadam and Marte – is heavily restricted and subject to being temporarily cut off due to security threats and incidents (Haruna, 2020). According to the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), there are an estimated 1 million people in areas currently inaccessible to international humanitarian actors, an estimated 733 000 of whom are IDPs (OCHA, 2022). Households in difficult-to-access areas are reported to mainly depend on wild foods (FEWS NET, 2022b). It is not possible to carry out food security assessments in these LGAs, given an inability to collect data. However, assessments of people who have managed to leave indicate catastrophic needs, and although this cannot be extrapolated directly to the populations still in those LGAs, their condition is likely to be severe (OCHA, 2022).


The obligation to use armed escorts imposed by the authorities for all cargo movements in addition to the obligation to check trucks in military camps create administrative and logistical constraints on humanitarian operations and generate delays in delivery of assistance to populations in need in the hard-to-reach areas (OCHA, 2022).

Due to administrative constraints and insecurity, most of humanitarian movements depend exclusively on UNHAS capacities to reach some locations and states hard-to-reach. This creates enormous pressure on UNHAS flights given the size of the humanitarian operations in Nigeria and the number of actors present to contribute to the humanitarian response (OCHA, 2022).




Yemen

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | January–May 2022



Projected | June–December 2022



IPC acute food insecurity phase classification



Source: Yemen IPC Technical Working Group, March 2022.

Ongoing conflict between the internationally recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) and the de facto authority – Ansar Allah (a Zaidi Shia political and armed group also known as the Houthi movement) – escalated in 2015. Following the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sana’a, the Saudi-led coalition, intervened militarily in support of the IRG. The conflict has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis, as detailed in Issue No. 9 of the joint *FAO/WFP Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations* update in December 2021.

Due to the multiple effects of conflict, hunger continues to worsen, marked by a further deterioration of the food security situation in 2022 compared to last year. A total of 17.4 million people are by now in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), which represents an addition of over 1 million people compared to last years’ projections. Around 45 percent of 333 districts analysed are currently classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) – critical acute food insecurity, with a staggering 5.6 million people who could face hunger and death if urgent action is not taken (IPC, 2022a).

A further dramatic increase in the severity of hunger is expected in the outlook for June to December 2022, reaching a new high of 19 million people in acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) – a 9 percent increase – with a significant number of districts moving to higher IPC Phases. Within this cohort, people in critical food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) are expected to reach 7.1 million – a more than 25 percent increase. Of greatest concern is the 31 000 people facing extreme hunger levels (IPC Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine), expected to rise to 161 000 by June 2022. According to the latest IPC analysis, this is partly due to a reduction of humanitarian assistance, a likely further escalation of fighting in critical hotspots, leading to further displacement, while public services have been brought to a near-halt. For acute malnutrition, the situation is projected to deteriorate further during the period of June to September 2022. Approximately 2.2 million children under the age of five and about 1.3 million pregnant and lactating women are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in the course of the year (IPC, 2022a).

During June–December 2022, in Hajjah governorate, a Risk of Famine is projected under the worst-case scenario in the districts of Abs and Hayran, while further assessment was recommended in Midi and Haradh districts to ascertain the Risk of Famine. Additionally, although Al Hali and Al Hawak districts in Al Hudaydah governorate are not at Risk of Famine within the projection period (June–December 2022), the analysis determined that, should a worst-case scenario apply for a protracted period beyond the projection period, these districts will likely shift into Famine (IPC, 2022b).

Overall, the severity of current and projected food insecurity levels could further rise due to the effects of the conflict in Ukraine on food prices and the supply of wheat. Additionally, shifts in humanitarian programming might also occur, according to the Famine Review Committee (IPC, 2022b). This is particularly relevant for Yemen, since the country has historically been highly dependent on imported goods and, more recently, on humanitarian assistance, for the subsistence of its population.

Conflict, however, remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in Yemen. In parallel, humanitarian access continues to be challenging due to conflict, insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and civil unrest. As of December 2021, access has been intermittent in Marib, Aden, Hadramawt, Hodeidah, Hajjah and Sadah governorates, slowing aid delivery.

Impact of conflict on population movement

The conflict remains a primary driver of displacement of the civilian population and of civilian casualties in Yemen. There are currently over 4.3 million IDPs in the country (UNHCR, 2022).

The start of 2022 has seen a sharp increase in violence against civilians committed by all parties to the conflict. Since October 2021, the number of civilian casualties has nearly doubled, with a significant increase in airstrikes and resultant civilian casualties in the first months of 2022 (NRC, 2022; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2022). In January alone, 650 civilian casualties were reported, the highest toll in at least three years (ECHO, 2022). The February civilian casualty count remained above the 2021 monthly average of 209 (CIMP, 2022a). Explosive remnants of war, as well as landmines and unexploded ordnance, continued to cause high civilian casualties, especially with the expanding conflict in Al Hodeidah and the escalation in Ma'rib, resulting in an increase in the displacement of civilians in these areas (CIMP, 2022a, 2022b).

Since December 2021, over 40 000 people have been displaced at least once due to increased hostilities, the majority from Al Jawf, Al Hodeidah, Ta'izz, Shabwah and Ma'rib governorates (IOM, 2021a, 2021b, 2022a, 2022b). Hostilities in Ma'rib and Shabwah governorates alone displaced over 10 000 people in December 2021 and January 2022. Most displacements remain internal (OCHA, 2022a).

Conflict-induced displacement has gravely exacerbated already severe humanitarian needs: the abandonment of farmland, harvests and livestock hinders agricultural activities and reduces employment and income opportunities, driving destitution and negatively affecting food security (WFP and FAO, 2022). With continuously shifting frontlines and escalating hostilities, many families have been displaced several times, which in turn has reduced access to their livelihoods, commodities and services, making them unable to meet basic needs. This has negatively affected the resilience of the population, resulting in an increased adoption of negative coping strategies and reliance on humanitarian assistance (FEWS NET, 2022a; CIMP, 2022b).

Impact of conflict on food systems

Direct impacts of the protracted conflict remain a main driver of acute food insecurity. This is expected to continue throughout 2022, alongside impacts of the ongoing economic crisis.

At the household level, increased food prices, amidst reduced income and labour opportunities, are primary underlying causes of food insecurity. This is pushing poor households to resort to negative coping strategies, such as skipping meals (IPC, 2022a). During 2021, the depreciation of the Yemeni rial in the south resulted in soaring food prices, increasing the cost of the minimum food basket by 119 percent. Continued fuel shortages, among others, led to an increase of 41 percent in prices for basic commodities in the north, straining both agricultural and transportation sectors (OCHA, 2022a; FEWS NET, 2021).

Port restrictions have led to severe fuel shortages and a further increase in the price of food (IPC, 2022a). In 2022, the shortages most severely affected Sana'a Based Authorities (SBA)-controlled areas, increasing transport costs (WFP, 2022a). The increase in fuel prices is likely to further affect the provision of public services such as water and energy; livelihood activities will also be affected by the increase in fuel prices, including irrigation of crops, food processing and transportation, which will in turn influence food prices (FEWS NET, 2022a). On the other hand, agricultural inputs, being mostly imported, remain in short supply and expensive. To cope with the elevated costs, farmers have been forced to shift from irrigated to rainfed crops, which have lower yields (FAO, 2021).

The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the resulting dramatic increase of international food and fuel prices, is likely to exacerbate food inflation and shortages over the coming months – Yemen imports 42 percent of its total wheat consumption from Ukraine and the Russian Federation (IFPRI, 2022).

Ninety percent of Yemen's food is imported, and the conflict is directly impacting people's ability to produce or access food, as farms, agricultural assets, food storages or water installations, among others, continue to be directly attacked by parties to the conflict (GRC and Mwatana for Human Rights, 2021). Additionally, hostilities and shifting frontlines have resulted in the closure of main roads in areas including Al Hodeidah governorate and SBA areas, among others, leading to increased transportation costs and supply chain disruptions, which have reportedly resulted in food price increases (FEWS NET, 2021, 2022b; OCHA, 2021a). In January and February 2022 alone, there were 339 armed violence incidents (including airstrikes, shelling, landmines and other explosive ordnances) impacting civilians and destroying or damaging 196 farms and 624 houses (CIMP,

2022a, 2022b).¹⁶ Fishing activities have also been severely disrupted, with attacks reported on fishing fleets, facilities or processing centres, compounded by lack of access to coastal areas due to insecurity (IPC, 2022b).

In mid-January 2022, an airstrike severely damaged the main water reservoir in Sahar district (Sa'dah governorate) leaving approximately 130 000 people without access to safe water supplies (ACAPS, 2022; OHCHR, 2022).¹⁷ In the first months of 2022, other critical civilian infrastructure was also damaged or destroyed, such as telecommunication infrastructure, hospitals, bridges and roads (OCHA, 2022). Landmines are frequently placed on roads, and in farmland and agricultural areas. This continues to pose severe risks for civilians, causing 87 casualties in January and February 2022, and severely disrupting livelihoods reliant on agricultural production (CIMP, 2022a, 2022b).¹⁸ In February 2022, one of the main access routes to Ma'rib city, key for civilians and farmers selling goods at market and earning an income, was reported as unusable due to the presence of landmines (OXFAM, 2022).

Increasing armed violence at checkpoints and markets in Lahj governorate has impeded civilians' movement, while protests and subsequent aggression by security forces have led to the blockage of main roads and the closure of markets in Aden and Hadramawt governorates, disrupting civilians' access to food and other basic commodities (ACAPS, 2022).

Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarianists' ability to work

Yemen is highly dependent on humanitarian assistance, but there is a significant funding gap; USD 2.1 billion is required for Food Security and Agriculture under the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (OCHA, 2022b). As of 28 April 2022, USD 388.7 million has been funded, equivalent to 18.5 percent (FTS, 2022). As of March 2022, of the targeted beneficiaries of WFP, 8 million continued to receive reduced rations due to funding shortages (WFP, 2022b). A large portion of the population relies on it as the primary source of staple foods. It is estimated that in the January–May 2022 period, assistance levels are covering 6.4 million people (IPC, 2022a). However, parties to the conflict continue to obstruct and impede the delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations in need (UN, 2022).

Since the end of 2020, there have been slight improvements in humanitarian access, including the possibility of conducting humanitarian needs assessments in areas under the control of Ansar Allah, and the creation of a regular humanitarian air service flight to Ma'rib (UN, 2022).¹⁹ However, numerous obstacles remain at the time of publication, including delays in humanitarian project approvals, the interference in the beneficiary lists, and

¹⁶ See also:

OXFAM. 2022. Yemen: Rise in airstrikes and landmines add to misery for civilians in Marib after year of increased conflict, 7 February 2022: oxfam.org/en/press-releases/yemen-rise-airstrikes-and-landmines-add-misery-civilians-marib-after-year-increased; OHCHR. 2022. Press briefing notes on Yemen, 18 January 2022. ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28031&LangID=E.

¹⁷ See also: A water pump was damaged when it came under fire from light weapons in Al Haymah in At Tuhayat in Al Hodeidah governorate (CIMP Daily Alert – 9 March 2022).

¹⁸ For the impact of landmines on objects indispensable to survival and food insecurity, see also: GRC and Mwatana for Human Rights. 2021. *Starvation Makers: The use of starvation by warring parties in Yemen*. <https://starvationaccountability.org/news-and-events/the-use-of-starvation-by-warring-parties-in-yemen-as-a-method-of-warfare>.

¹⁹ Note: Griffiths also emphasized that the financial shortage facing the aid operation in Yemen, which beginning in March could force the further scaling-back or termination of food rations for eight million people and the cancellation of most UN humanitarian flights. According to Griffiths, "the scale of the current [funding] gaps are unprecedented in Yemen". securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-03/yemen-40.

restrictions on access and movement of humanitarian personnel and goods, as well as harassment, intimidation and violence against humanitarian workers (OCHA, 2021b).²⁰

Overall, humanitarian access continues to be challenging across the country, mainly as a result of conflict, insecurity and bureaucratic impediments (ACAPS, 2022). According to the results of the OCHA-led Hard-to-Reach analysis published in March 2022, an estimated 10.1 million – 49 percent – of the 20.8 million people in need across Yemen are living in areas affected by access constraints. They are located across 1 011 subdistricts, 155 districts and 16 governorates. Challenges identified in 86 percent of 2 148 subdistricts are related to bureaucratic impediments (OCHA, 2021c).

In areas under the control of de facto authorities, especially in Al Hodeidah, Hajjah and Sa'dah, bureaucratic impediments have persisted, including requests to share aid beneficiary lists, and mandate of a male guardian for Yemeni female aid workers. Independent reports indicate that families have been threatened with removal from aid beneficiary lists, if they did not allow their children to be recruited by the armed forces of the de facto authorities (UN, 2022).

Humanitarian actors continue to face threats, intimidation and arbitrary arrest and detention. Since December 2021, several UN staff and other humanitarian aid workers have been arrested and detained, including reportedly two Médecins Sans Frontières workers while travelling through Hadramout governorate (UN, 2021, 2022; Reuters 2022). Five UN staff were kidnapped in February and are still being detained by Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Abyan governorate (Aljazeera, 2022; DW, 2022; The Guardian, 2022). The UN halted its activities in Madiyah district of Abyan governorate where the captives are being held. These impediments impact the humanitarian response, affecting access to vulnerable segments of the population (ACAPS, 2021).

²⁰ Note that though referring to September-October 2021 period, the following source and information was not included in the latest WFP/FAO Briefing to the UNSC in December 2021 and OCHA has not released Humanitarian Access Snapshots since October 2021.

Recommendations

To facilitate a range of preventative and accountability-oriented tools available under UNSC Resolution 2417, as well as other relevant UNSC Resolutions,²¹ the UNSC may consider the following recommendations:

Recommendations valid for all countries

1. Strongly condemn once again the unlawful denial of humanitarian access by certain parties to the conflict, including wilfully impeding relief supplies and responses to conflict-induced food insecurity in situations of armed conflict.
2. Continue calling on parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including by refraining from depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival including targeting, destroying or rendering useless foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets, drinking water installations and irrigation works.
3. Urge those with influence over parties to armed conflict to remind the latter of their obligation in relation to humanitarian access.
4. Call on all parties to the conflict to facilitate improved access to operational and technical humanitarian organizations to ensure enhanced transparency about the humanitarian situation and ensure people in need are located and services provided.
5. Call on parties to the conflict to take measures to stop the indiscriminate use of landmines and record their placement and remove existing landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW), from civilian areas under their control.
6. Call for and provide support to independent, impartial, full, prompt, and effective investigations into alleged violations and abuses of IHRL and IHL by all parties to the conflict, as well as those providing support to such parties, pursuant to international standards, including by considering to establish dedicated UN Commission of Inquiry. Where appropriate, call upon states to take action against those responsible in accordance with domestic and international law, with a view to reinforcing preventive measures, ensuring accountability and addressing the grievances of victims.
7. Consider regular hosting of Arria-formula meetings to discuss critical deteriorating conflict-induced hunger and Risk of Famine.
8. Appoint a Special Envoy on UNSC Resolution 2417 to monitor and quickly inform the UNSC about conflict-induced food insecurity in armed conflicts, including Yemen, Nigeria and Mali, with a view to facilitating and encouraging the safe and reliable reporting of information to the UN Secretary-General within 30 days after emerging situations.
9. Establish an independent body of experts to collect and channel sensitive information and equip and enable the prospective Special Envoy on UNSC 2417, the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General to take preventative action.

²¹ UNSC Resolution 2573, “*Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population*”, 27 April 2021, un.org/press/en/2021/sc14506.doc.htm

Mali

Formally include a focused discussion on conflict-induced hunger in the agenda of the six-month briefings held by the UNSC on Mali.

Under the current 2374 UN sanction regime designation criteria, include “planning, directing or committing acts in Mali that violate international humanitarian law in relation to targeting and destruction of objects necessary for food production and distribution, such as farms, markets, water systems, mills, food processing and storage sites” and “...objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets...and irrigation works”.

Nigeria (21 states and Federal Capital Territory)

Conflict-induced food insecurity in northern Nigeria has been reported to the UNSC in recent years, including an Arria-formula meeting on the Risk of Famine in conflict-affected areas in 2017, a UNSC Presidential Statement on the threat of famine in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and northeast Nigeria, and Issue No. 8 of the joint FAO/WFP update for the members of the UNSC on *Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations*.

Include a brief and focused discussion on conflict-induced food insecurity in Nigeria, and country-specific impediments to effective humanitarian response to avert further deterioration of hunger, in relevant UNSC meetings.

Yemen

Conflict-induced food insecurity in Yemen has been reported to the UNSC in recent years, including an Arria-formula meeting on the Risk of Famine in conflict-affected areas in 2017, a UNSC Presidential Statement on the threat of famine, and Issue No. 9 the joint FAO/WFP update for the members of the UNSC on *Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations* of December 2021.

To facilitate a range of preventative and accountability-oriented tools available under UNSC Resolution 2417, as well as other relevant UNSC Resolutions,²² the UNSC may consider to:

Include in the agenda of the monthly UNSC briefing on Yemen a focused discussion on conflict-induced food insecurity and constraints to humanitarian access.

Ensure that recommendations made by the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen – the UN independent entity that investigated IHL, IHRL violations in the conflict between 2018 and 2021 – are acted upon and, where needed, specific mechanisms for follow-up are created, particularly on recommendations related to violations of international humanitarian law. This with a view to preventing further worsening of conflict-induced hunger in Yemen.

²² Including UN Security Council, “Resolution 2451 (2018),” UN Doc. S/RES/2451 (December 21, 2018), paras. 8, 10, <https://undocs.org/S/RES/2451> (2018); UN Security Council, supra note 711 at paras. 9, 14 and 19; UN Security Council, supra note 1166 at paras. 11, 14-15, 17, 18 and 28. See also Resolution 2204 (2015), supra note 1176 at para. 2; Resolution 2266 (2016), supra note 1176 at para. 2; Resolution 2342 (2017), supra note 1176 at para. 2; Resolution 2402 (2018), supra note 1176 at para. 2; Resolution 2456 (2019), supra note 1176 at para. 2; Resolution 2511 (2020), supra note 1176 at para. 2.

Consider re-establishing a UN investigative mechanism, such as the UN Group of Eminent Experts, to ensure continued independent investigations of IHL violations. Where appropriate, call upon Member States to take action against those responsible, in accordance with domestic and international law, with a view to reinforcing preventive measures, ensuring accountability and addressing the grievances of victims.

Examine the extent to which actors other than parties to the conflict are responsible for “engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten peace and security,” “planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses,” and “obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Yemen”, as well as acts falling under UNSC Resolutions 2410 and 2216, with a view to extending sanctions to all parties responsible for starvation-related conduct.

Methods and data sources

IPC and CH

The acute food insecurity estimates provided in this update are mainly based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) scales²³ or – where not available – on WFP's Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodologies.²⁴ These estimates indicate populations in need of urgent assistance to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition, which are classified into the three most severe phases of acute food insecurity according to the IPC/CH classification – Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

When in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), people start facing increasing malnutrition due to lack of access to food, or they are only able to access food by selling off assets or through other harmful coping strategies. People in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) face high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality due to lack of food, or resort to emergency coping strategies to mitigate large food consumption gaps. People in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) do not have any means left to access food and are facing starvation and death.

Famines should be avoided at all costs. Although further deaths can and should be prevented by urgent action, it is evident that responding to famine situations will be, de facto, a late response because many will have died by the time a famine is declared. In the countries where IPC/CH processes are in place, therefore, Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is already to be taken as indicative of an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.

Population estimates indicating Stressed conditions (IPC/CH Phase 2) are also reported where relevant, although this would require a more diverse set of actions than emergency response – ideally longer-term resilience-building and disaster risk reduction to protect livelihoods.

While the annual *Global Report on Food Crises* provide the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) every year, this six-month update reports on the latest figure available – in this issue, estimates are reported as of March 2022, when available.

The estimates provided in this analysis for Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Myanmar and the Sudan are the same as reported in previous issue (N° 9) of this update due to lack of updated IPC/CH analyses at the time of the analysis. For Ethiopia, as there are no new IPC analyses, the reported figures rest on the January 2022 WFP assessment (using WFP CARI methodology covering the period from mid-November to mid-December 2021).²⁵

²³ IPC provided estimates for nine countries (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen). CH estimates produced in March 2022 were used for five countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and northern Nigeria).

For Mali, the latest estimates produced in November 2021 were used due to lack of updates as of March 2022.

²⁴ For five countries and territories covered in this report – Ethiopia, Iraq, Myanmar, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic – IPC/CH food security estimates are not available. Therefore, WFP provided estimates covering 2021 for Ethiopia, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic based on CARI methodology; and for Myanmar based on rCARI. The estimates reported for Palestine are based on the 2020 SEFsec covering early 2021, as used in the *2022 Global Report on Food Crises*.

²⁵ As of 9 May 2022, IPC analyses are planned or under preparation, among others, for Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and the Sudan. The IPC released the Central African Republic update (April-august 2022) when this update was being finalized. For more details: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155567/?iso3=CAF>

Figure 5. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objective
Phase 1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
Phase 2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
Phase 3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; <i>or</i> • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
Phase 4 Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; <i>or</i> • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.
Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.) Famine and Famine Likely classifications are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement. URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

Source: GNAFC and FSIN, 2021.

Acute food insecurity projections beyond the period covering March 2022 were not available for Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Myanmar, Palestine, the Sudan, and the Syrian Arab Republic. For Palestine and Myanmar, the comparability of available estimates with IPC/CH scales is not established.²⁶

In Section 1 the analysis builds on the latest IPC/CH acute food insecurity estimates available for fourteen countries and territories as of March 2022. For the Sudan, the latest IPC projection was taken into account as covering early 2022, even though it is valid until February 2022. Trends in acute food insecurity are established using comparable estimates from the same period of analysis a year earlier to take into account seasonal factors of food insecurity. Wherever available, projected estimates for mid-2022 are also provided, despite comparability issues with the early-2022 period due to seasonality. The 2022 projected peak numbers as reported in the *2022 Global Report on Food Crises* are also indicated when neither the estimates covering March 2022 nor those covering mid-2022 already correspond to the expected peak of acute food insecurity (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022).

The analysis contains concise information on the main drivers of the acute food insecurity situation in these countries and territories in 2021–2022 based on a review of relevant sources, with a particular focus on conflict and insecurity.

²⁶ For Palestine, although partners of the *Global Report on Food Crises* validated the use of the Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec) for reporting acute food insecurity in the territory in 2021, it should be noted that there are certain methodological limitations. For more information, see Technical Notes of *2022 Global Report on Food Crises* (GNAFC and FSIN, 2022). For Myanmar, the WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. (Preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9–10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity). Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed.

For the analysis of drivers of food insecurity in each of the countries and territories covered in the update, a wide range of secondary data sources was used to offer more details on the information provided in the IPC/CH analyses themselves, which already collate information from these various sources. These include qualitative information extracted from the key global and national early warning information systems, such as WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Monitoring (VAM), FAO's Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), and FAO's Data in Emergencies Monitoring (DIEM-Monitoring). It also builds on the FAO/WFP Hunger Hotspot reports on early warnings on acute food insecurity particularly for 2022 forecasts. Data on displacement and additional information on conflicts was provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as well as by government agencies in some countries.

Section 2 provides a more in-depth analysis of the impact of conflict on food security for three countries of particular concern.

Food security terms

The following glossary provides the definitions of the food security terms used in the update. The terms and definitions in this glossary have been compiled from existing glossaries and other reference material available to the public.

The Cadre Harmonisé (CH) is a unifying tool that allows for a relevant consensual, rigorous and transparent analysis of the current and projected food and nutrition situation in West Africa and the Sahel. It allows to classify the severity of food and nutrition insecurity according to the international classification scale through an approach referring to well-defined functions and protocols.

The CH and the IPC have the same analytical framework for analysing acute food insecurity and share the same core functions that form the fundamental bases of the analytical process.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a common global scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition. It is the result of a partnership of various organizations at global, regional and country levels dedicated to developing and maintaining the highest possible quality in food security and nutrition analysis. Increasingly, the IPC is the international standard for classifying food insecurity and malnutrition in the context of emergency assessments. This report uses mainly the IPC acute food insecurity phase classification scale, which identifies populations and areas with food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as well as the need for urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect lives and livelihoods.

IPC/CH classification terms and definitions

None/Minimal (IPC/CH Phase 1)

People have stable access to food. Action is required to reduce people's vulnerability to disasters/shocks and to build resilience, so they can stay food secure.

Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)

People have erratic economic access to food and are vulnerable to disasters/shocks. Action is required to improve people's stability of access to food and to reduce their vulnerability to disasters/shocks.

Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3)

People are malnourished due to inadequate access to food or they only have enough food by selling off their assets or through other harmful coping strategies. Urgent action is required to protect livelihoods and increase access to food to avoid a food emergency.

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4)

People are malnourished due to lack of food or mitigate large food consumption gaps by selling off their assets or through other emergency coping strategies. Urgent action is needed to save lives. If nothing is done, people could face extreme hunger or death.

Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)

People are malnourished due to lack of food and do not have any means left to access food. At area level, the population is in a situation of Famine (see definition below). Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) are considered as facing high levels of acute food insecurity and requiring urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition.

Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)

Famine is the most severe phase of the IPC. It exists in areas where at least one in five households has or is most likely to experience an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or is likely to be occurring. The IPC only permits classification of Famine when all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols are met. The special protocols are the following:

- The requirement of reliable evidence on three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition (GAM) and crude death rate (CDR) – all of which are either currently above or projected to be above Famine thresholds (>20 percent of households with extreme food gaps, >30 percent of children acutely malnourished and CDR > 2/10 000/day).
- Undergoing a famine review process to validate the classification.
- Development of IPC Famine Alert adhering to pre-determined standards.

Famine-likely (IPC/CH Phase 5)

The IPC permits the classification of Famine-likely when all regular and special protocols are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for the three outcomes. Areas can be classified as Famine-likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that Famine may be occurring or will occur. When an area is classified as Famine-likely, it should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

Risk of Famine

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most likely scenario, it is a scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring. It complements the Famine and Famine-likely projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated.

More information on the IPC Famine classification available at the following link:

ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf

More information on the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale at:

ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/resources-details/en/c/1152890

WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI)

The WFP CARI methodology is used to classify individual households according to their level of acute food insecurity. All five indicators included within the CARI approach (Food Consumption Score, Food Energy Shortfall, Poverty Status, Food Expenditure Share, Livelihood Coping Indicator) can be incorporated within IPC analysis. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator fits within the IPC analytical framework. The CARI is an analytical method designed to be an input to the IPC process. While the CARI approach is implemented through a single household survey intended to accurately measure household level food insecurity, the IPC approach built on the technical consensus among key stakeholders and consolidates wide-ranging evidence to classify severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition.

More information available at the following link:

wfp.org/publications/consolidated-approach-reporting-indicators-food-security-cari-guidelines

The WFP remote-CARI (rCARI) methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. (Preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9–10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity). Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed.

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