



## 2022年1月25日也门问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

也门问题专家小组成员谨随信转递专家小组根据第2564(2021)号决议第10段编写的最后报告。

报告于2021年12月23日提交给了安全理事会第2140(2014)号决议所设委员会，委员会于2022年1月21日审议了该报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和报告并将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

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## 安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设也门问题专家小组的最后报告

### 摘要

在本报告所述期间，冲突各方继续为巩固对领土和人口的控制而战斗。2021 年 9 月和 10 月，胡塞武装接连占领了马里卜市周围以及贝达和夏卜瓦的几个区。11 月西海岸联合部队(联合部队)的撤离使胡塞武装控制了荷台达省的几个重要地区。

在本报告所述期间，各方采取了一些破坏《斯德哥尔摩协议》和《利雅得协议》的措施。在也门支持合法性联盟(联盟)和联合部队都没有向根据《斯德哥尔摩协议》设立的重新部署协调委员会或联合国支助荷台达协议特派团(荷台达协议支助团)告知他们要撤出荷台达地区的意图。胡塞武装还阻碍荷台达协议支助团执行任务。南方过渡委员会单方面任命军事和安保人员以及也门政府任命公务员的行为破坏了《利雅得协议》。在执行《协议》的军事和政治条款方面的进展有限。

也门政府未能向马里卜的部落战斗人员提供足够的军事支持，导致胡塞武装获得了对该市周边战略地区的控制权。由于南方过渡委员会和也门政府难以获得必要资源，以确保提供基本服务、缓解当前的经济危机和定期支付工资，因此在其控制的地区出现了大规模公众示威。2021 年下半年南方过渡委员会附属部队之间的军事内讧以及多起严重的安全事件，使人们对南方过渡委员会在其控制区维持秩序的能力产生了怀疑。

相比之下，胡塞武装控制区的安全局势保持相对稳定，没有发生严重挑战胡塞武装政治权威的状况。胡塞武装继续通过开展系统性的运动，包括组织成人和儿童夏令营和文化课程，确保民众遵守其意识形态，并获取民众对其事业和冲突的支持。胡塞武装继续维持对政治上活跃的妇女和职业妇女实施性暴力和镇压的政策，在 2021 年 2 月安全理事会对苏丹·萨利赫·艾达·艾达·扎宾(YEi.006)作出指认之后仍然如此。

军事方面，胡塞武装继续对沙特阿拉伯进行空中和海上袭击。靠近边界的目标仍然面临最大风险，胡塞武装通常使用无人机和短程火箭弹对这些目标进行组合式袭击。胡塞武装还继续使用更远程的无人机、巡航导弹和弹道导弹，深入沙特阿拉伯内部进行攻击。在红海，水上简易爆炸装置被用于袭击在沙特阿拉伯港口停泊的高船，在有几次袭击中，目标距离也门海岸超过 1 000 公里。这些袭击主要服务于政治目的，即胡塞武装想迫使利雅得接受对他们有利的政治解决方案。这与在也门境内使用导弹和无人机进行的袭击形成了鲜明反差——也门境内的袭击往往以达到最大杀伤力为目的。

大多数类型的无人机、水上简易爆炸装置和短程火箭都是在胡塞武装控制区组装的，使用的是当地现有的材料以及通过欧洲、中东和亚洲的复杂中间商网络从国外购买的商业部件，如发动机和电子器件。

2021年2月和5月，美利坚合众国海军在阿拉伯海的道船上查获了两批武器，其中包括大量小武器和轻武器；从集装箱发射的线导反坦克导弹；以及光学瞄准具等辅助设备。专家小组对缴获的武器进行检查后发现，这些武器的标识和技术特征与专家小组对前几次缴获武器的记录一致，这表明在阿拉伯海上用道船运输补给品是一种常用模式。

冲突摧毁了也门的经济。由于该国高度依赖基本商品和食品进口，在不属于胡塞武装控制的地区，也门里亚尔的迅速贬值导致零售价格面临严重的通货膨胀压力。这使得大部分人越来越无法获得食品。由于该国存在平行的权力体系，经济制度和机构出现了系统性分裂。这继而导致经济状况和人民生活条件进一步恶化。一些人利用贫困造成的局面来实现自己的政治目标，这有时导致也门各地发生内乱，从而对该国的和平、安全和稳定构成严重威胁。

胡塞武装采用多种方法敛财和维持活动，特别是通过使用或威胁使用暴力以及胁迫性的监管做法。这些做法包括非法向石油和电信等高收入经济部门征收费用和税款，以及没收个人和实体的资产与资金。分裂的政治、监管和金融机构所产生的下游影响使经济环境受到禁锢并面临严峻挑战。除非认真解决宏观经济形势问题，否则冲突的政治解决方案只会变得更加复杂，区域和平愿景将变得更加遥不可及。

胡塞武装目前对马里卜的进攻给平民百姓、特别是境内流离失所者带来了可怕后果。在本报告所述期间发生了多起针对境内流离失所者营地的袭击事件，给本已脆弱的营地居民带来了恐惧和伤亡，同时迫使更多人流离失所。马里卜市和塔伊兹市这些人口稠密地区也遭到多次炮击，导致平民死伤。

胡塞武装滥用地雷(特别是在西海岸)，对平民构成了持续威胁，对生命、安全和健康造成了悲剧性的影响。这个问题如果不解决，将产生长期后果。

在发生违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为时，有罪不罚是常态而非例外。任意逮捕和拘留、强迫失踪、酷刑和虐待等违法行为普遍存在，且各方都实施了此类行为。移民仍然特别容易成为虐待和违反国际人权法行为的受害者。胡塞武装在其控制的地区内，以拘留和司法系统为手段镇压一切反对意见或其认为的异议，特别针对记者、妇女和宗教少数群体进行镇压。而在胡塞武装控制区以外，司法系统仍然薄弱，运转不良，且基本上被安全部队所漠视。联盟的空袭也继续造成平民伤亡。

违反国际人道法和国际人权法行为的受害者几乎得不到任何支助。被任意拘留多年的人在获释时常已一无所有，失去了房屋也丢掉了工作。妇女的情况尤其如此，除了创伤之外，她们还必须面对被拘留带来的社会污名。此外，经过多年的任意逮捕、拘留和强迫失踪之后，有很多也门人下落不明。失踪者的家人处于困境之中，他们寻找家属下落的努力几乎得不到任何一方的支持。

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\* 附件仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

## 一. 引言

1. 本报告是根据第 2564(2021)号决议第 10 段向安全理事会提交的，所涉期间为 2020 年 12 月 6 日至 2021 年 12 月 5 日，其中载有专家小组 2021 年 1 月 25 日最后报告(S/2021/79)所述调查工作的最新结果。
2. 专家小组遵守了第 2564(2021)号决议第 14 段的规定，该段涉及安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组建议的最佳做法和方法(S/2006/997)。专家小组着力遵守关于透明度、客观性和信息来源、书面证据、对可核实的独立消息来源进行确证以及提供答辩机会的标准。<sup>1</sup> 根据第 2564(2021)号决议第 11 段，专家小组与分析支助和制裁监测组及索马里问题专家小组保持了合作。
3. 专家小组在上一次最后报告中报告了沙特存款机制的实施情况。鉴于专家小组在上次报告发表后收到的补充资料，专家小组对该报告第九.B 节、附件 28 和表 1 中的相关案文以及第 161 段所载建议进行了全面审查。本报告的结论更新并取代上次报告的上述部分结论。
4. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组先后前往埃及、德国、伊拉克、沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国以及也门的亚丁和西海岸一些地点。<sup>2</sup> 专家小组对区域内各国缴获的武器以及导弹、无人机和水上简易爆炸装置的残骸进行了检查。
5. 冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行继续影响专家小组的旅行和案件调查能力。专家小组注意到，一些个人和实体只在面对面的情况下分享敏感信息。由于与疫情有关的限制，专家小组不得不远程起草报告，这对进程产生了不利影响。专家小组的区域专家于 2021 年 7 月 31 日辞职；在编写本报告时，这一职位尚未被填补。
6. 专家小组会见了也门政府高级成员，包括副总统和总理，以及南方过渡委员会的领导人，包括主席。专家小组还利用访问西海岸的契机会见了地方当局成员、民族抵抗力量高级代表、巨人旅和帖哈麦地区领导人。专家小组还会见了沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的高级官员。
7. 专家小组发出了 147 封正式信函，其中 94 封发给 21 个会员国，53 封发给 36 个组织、实体和公司。截至 2021 年 12 月 17 日，68 封信函仍待答复(见附件 3)。

## 二. 影响和平、安全与稳定的事态发展

8. 也门冲突必须结合对其在区域内角色的分析加以理解，它涉及到胡塞武装军事行动对沙特阿拉伯和更广泛区域安全构成的威胁，以及区域政治动态对寻求和平解决的努力所产生的影响。

<sup>1</sup> 关于专家小组的方法和答辩机会的更多信息载于附件 1。

<sup>2</sup> 也门境内各主要地点的拼写均遵循附件 2 中的联合国地理信息系统地图所用拼写。

9. 对沙特阿拉伯来说，由于边界线长且难以控制、社会和经济联系紧密以及曼德海峡的重要战略意义，也门的冲突不仅关乎遏制外部威胁，也关乎恢复合法政府的权威，以有利于双边关系。阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪政府需要利雅得持续提供军事、资金和政治支持。然而，沙特阿拉伯正越来越寻求从战争中退出，这是因为，除其他外，战争的成本高昂而且不受国内民众的欢迎。

10. 与沙特阿拉伯不同，阿拉伯联合酋长国在也门的作用更难理解。阿拉伯联合酋长国与也门没有共同边界，两国之间的经济和社会联系较少。2018 年签署《斯德哥尔摩协议》之前，阿拉伯联合酋长国曾领导西海岸的打击胡塞武装行动，此后于 2019 年正式撤离了大部分军事力量，但仍是联盟的一部分并开展反恐行动。尽管如此，该国主要通过向西海岸联合部队提供政治、资金和军事支持，以及向南方过渡委员会提供政治支持，维持着在也门的巨大政治影响力。

11. 对胡塞武装的外部支持情况则不太清楚。至少自 2015 年以来，伊朗伊斯兰共和国一直是该运动的政治盟友，并向萨那派驻“大使”。伊朗是少数承认胡塞武装为也门合法政府的联合国会员国之一。

12. 区域内另一个与胡塞武装保持正式联络渠道的国家是与也门接壤的阿曼。两国人民之间存在紧密的社会和经济联系。阿曼对冲突持中立立场，并接待胡塞武装的高级谈判代表。陆上商业往来仍然活跃。虽然过境点由也门政府控制，但有证据表明，阿曼境内的个人和实体继续经由陆路向胡塞武装提供其武器系统(见第 69 和 70 段)所需的部件以及其他军事装备(见第 67 段)。

13. 在本报告所述期间，也门国内的政治、安全、军事、经济和人道主义局势进一步恶化。由南方过渡委员会代表和哈迪政府代表组成的联合政府于 2020 年 12 月 26 日宣誓就职。经过数月谈判后组建的这届政府是《利雅得协议》的最重要成就。然而，联合政府未能实现其所有目标，即南方过渡委员会附属军队撤出亚丁、共同对抗胡塞武装、稳定货币以及增加政府收入。<sup>3</sup> 举例而言，也门政府和南方过渡委员会对后者是否已将所有军事单位撤出亚丁持不同意见(见附件 6)；胡塞武装夺得了大量领土；也门里亚尔对美元汇率在宣布(政府成立)当天为 720，此后不断贬值，到 2021 年 12 月初跌破了 1 700。

14. 在本报告所述期间，签字双方都采取了破坏《利雅得协议》的措施(见第 15 和 34 段)。<sup>4</sup> 联合政府成立仅三个月后，抗议者冲进了 Masheeq 区总理府邸，此后总理和一些高级政府官员被迫离开了亚丁。<sup>5</sup> 这一事件发生后，也门政府和南方过渡委员会与 2021 年中旬组成了谈判小组，试图重振《利雅得协议》并使总理及其内阁能够返回亚丁。在总理缺席的情况下，南方过渡委员会在其主席艾达

<sup>3</sup> 见 [www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east](http://www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east)。

<sup>4</sup> 2021 年 6 月和 10 月专家小组在利雅得与南方过渡委员会谈判团队和也门政府谈判团队进行的讨论。

<sup>5</sup> 虽然也门政府指责南方过渡委员会策划了这些抗议活动，但该委员会的参与没有 2019 年 8 月时那么明显，当时该委员会副主席 Hani Ali Salem Binbrek 公开呼吁攻占总统府(见 S/2020/326，第 29 段)。

鲁斯·祖贝迪于 2021 年 5 月返回亚丁后<sup>6</sup> 采取了更多措施，以确立对各机构的控制权。2021 年 6 月，南方过渡委员会通知专家小组，它在联盟的帮助下控制了马雍/丕林岛。<sup>7</sup> 经过沙特阿拉伯的长期谈判，总理于 2021 年 9 月 28 日回到亚丁。

15. 南方过渡委员会与政府之间的政治关系仍然紧张，政府指责该委员会的好战言论使已经明显的紧张关系进一步升级。南方过渡委员会指责政府发动“服务战”，即拒绝让该委员会控制下的民众获得公共服务。<sup>8</sup> 2021 年 6 月，沙特阿拉伯表示，南方过渡委员会政治和媒体言论的升级及其后的政治和军事任命决定，都不符合双方之间此前达成的协议。<sup>9</sup> 沙特阿拉伯并不经常公开挑出其中一方加以指责。

16. 专家小组注意到，《斯德哥尔摩协议》和《利雅得协议》的谈判都发生在危机时期——包括联合部队在 2018 年挺进荷台达市，以及南方过渡委员会和也门政府在 2019 年公开交战——因此谈判受到时间制约。这两项协议中的措辞都较宽泛，为冲突各方在解读时产生重大分歧留出了空间。因此，协议本身只是进一步谈判其执行工作的起点，而执行工作目前已陷入停滞。2021 年 11 月联合部队从荷台达撤军，破坏了已经被削弱的《荷台达协议》。虽然《利雅得协议》2021 年在实现阿比扬局部停火方面取得了部分成功，但其他目标的实施仍未完成。

### 三. 威胁也门和平、安全和稳定的武装团体活动

17. 在整个报告所述期间，胡塞武装和联盟支持的也门政府军继续为控制马里卜市而战。9 月和 10 月期间，胡塞武装接连占领了贝达、夏卜瓦和马里卜省的多个地区，目的是包围马里卜市(见地图 1 和附件 4)。随着该市的陷落成为一种真实的可能性，反胡塞武装阵营开始重新部署并结成新的战略联盟(见第 31 段以及附件 4 和 5)。10 月和 11 月期间，联盟和联合部队都展开了前所未有的重新部署和撤离行动(见第 18-20 段)。

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
<sup>6</sup> 见 <https://en.smanews.org/south-arabia/president-al-zubaidi-returns-to-aden-the-capital/>。

<sup>7</sup> 2021 年 6 月在利雅得会见南方过渡委员会的谈判团队。马雍岛又名丕林岛，是曼德海峡中的一个很小的岛屿。

<sup>8</sup> 2021 年在利雅得与南方过渡委员会代表团进行的讨论。

<sup>9</sup> 见 <https://twitter.com/SPAregions/status/1410734209367363592?s=19>。

地图 1  
2021 年 9 月至 10 月期间胡塞武装取得的军事进展



#### A. 2021 年 11 月西海岸联合部队撤离荷台达

18. 2021 年 11 月 10 日或 11 日前后，联合部队各旅开始撤离荷台达海岸线西北部一带的阵地。据联盟和联合部队称，这是预先计划好的国家军事战略，<sup>10</sup> 旨在加强夏卜瓦和马里卜阵线。<sup>11</sup> 11 月 12 日和 13 日，胡塞武装控制了撤出地区(见地图 2)。<sup>12</sup> 11 月 14 日前后，联盟发动空袭以防止胡塞武装进一步挺进，据报这是《斯德哥尔摩协议》签署以来联盟在该地区首次作战。<sup>13</sup>

19. 撤军对平民的人道主义状况产生了不利影响。民事和军事当局提前 24 小时接到撤离通知，因此没有足够的时间将弱势民众撤离这些地区。<sup>14</sup> 苏丹政府告知专家小组，胡塞武装在获得对撤出地区的控制权后，据称实施了 54 起违反国际人道法的罪行；大多数发生在 2021 年 11 月 12 日那天。<sup>15</sup> 截至 11 月 14 日，联

<sup>10</sup> 声明见附件 5。

<sup>11</sup> 机密消息来源。

<sup>12</sup> 据报胡塞武装对此始料未及，最初没有足够的部队来占领这些地区。

<sup>13</sup> 见 [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift)。

<sup>14</sup> 据报很难重新组织有关单位。一些联合部队战斗人员被打死。

<sup>15</sup> 专家小组还收到了来自多个来源的信息，但尚未能进行调查。



联合国报告称，由于撤军，800 多个家庭流离失所。<sup>16</sup> 和平帖哈麦运动和帖哈麦抵抗组织谴责了撤军行为(见附件 5)。至少有一个旅拒绝在该旅成员家属安全撤离之前从其所在地撤离。专家小组认为，联合部队和联盟本应采取适当措施，确保平民和伤员的安全，特别是确保面临胡塞武装报复风险的平民能够及时撤离。

20. 联合部队指出，撤军是根据《斯德哥尔摩协议》的重新部署计划(见附件 5)进行的。<sup>17</sup> 然而，撤军行动并未经与也门政府<sup>18</sup> 或根据《协议》负责监督重新部署工作的重新部署协调委员会协调。<sup>19</sup> 无论是负责促进执行《协议》的荷台达协议支助团，<sup>20</sup> 还是曾于 11 月 10 日访问穆哈的秘书长也门问题特使，都没有得到通知。

21. 由前任特使调解达成的《斯德哥尔摩协议》在联合部队中不受欢迎。例如，民族抵抗力量认为该协议阻碍了他们在荷台达取得胜利。民族抵抗力量和帖哈麦抵抗组织都对《协议》在没有他们参与的情况下签署感到不满。<sup>21</sup> 更加令他们感到沮丧的是联合国无法在马里卜达成阻止胡塞武装挺进的协议，如《斯德哥尔摩协议》在 2018-2019 年阻止了联合部队向荷台达挺进那样。<sup>22</sup>

22. 《荷台达协议》未能实现一些重要目标，这体现在：发生了多起违反停火事件；对撤离港口的情况存在争议；胡塞武装尽管作出了承诺，但仍单方面在荷台达使用来自也门中央银行的收入。<sup>23</sup> 胡塞武装通过控制荷台达协议支助团观察员的行动，进一步阻止支助团充分执行任务。胡塞武装还用《协议》作为保护高价值军事目标的工具(见第 49 段和附件 36)。2020 年 3 月，在胡塞武装据称杀害了一名与也门政府有关联的重新部署协调委员会联络官后，重新部署协调委员会中的也门政府代表团不再参加该委员会的联合机制。<sup>24</sup>

<sup>16</sup> 见 [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update\\_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast\\_20211114-final.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast_20211114-final.pdf)。

<sup>17</sup> 联合部队的一名代表告诉专家小组，胡塞武装计划在占领马里卜市后对荷台达的 Al-Faza 发起军事行动。在占领由联合部队控制的这一狭长地带后，胡塞武装将能有效切断驻扎在 Al-Faza 北部的 13 个旅的供给来源。

<sup>18</sup> 联合部队的一名代表说，联合国支助荷台达协议特派团(荷台达协议支助团)和也门政府都没有被告知，原因是担心这两者都会泄露消息；也就是说，联合部队不希望胡塞武装知道撤军的消息。

<sup>19</sup> 见 [www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837](http://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837)。也门政府证实了这一信息。联合部队领导人是也门政府向重新部署协调委员会派出的代表团的成员。

<sup>20</sup> 见 [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860](https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860)。

<sup>21</sup> 见 <https://2dec.net/news47583.html>、<https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2/>。

<sup>22</sup> 专家小组与联合部队、也门政府和来自马里卜的个人进行的讨论。见 <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2/>。

<sup>23</sup> 与也门政府、联合部队和帖哈麦领导人进行的讨论。见 <https://republicanyemen.net/archives/27167/>、<https://almahriah.net/video/6536>。

<sup>24</sup> 重新部署协调委员会中的也门政府附属小组要求荷台达协议支助团对杀人事件进行调查，并要求荷台达协议支助团将其办公室转移到一个中立地区，因为他们目前在胡塞武装控制的地区。也门政府告知专家小组，它继续单方面与荷台达协议支助团会面；上一次会议是在 2021 年 6 月 7 日(见 S/2021/79，第 12 段)。

23. 继撤离西海岸之后，联合部队从胡塞武装手中夺回了荷台达和西塔伊兹省的一些地区(见附件 4)。联盟也通过空袭支持了其中一些行动。<sup>25</sup>

24. 还有一些巨人旅成员前往亚丁和阿比扬，据报目的是加强夏卜瓦的兵力(见附件 4 和 5)。联合部队还没有部署到马里卜。<sup>26</sup>

地图 2

截至 2021 年 12 月 1 日的控制区变化情况



资料来源：也门政府。

注：深红色区域是 2021 年 11 月的事件后据说已被胡塞武装占领的地区。

<sup>25</sup> 见 <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3305871/arab-coalition-says-supporting-yemeni-forces-west-coast-outside-areas-stockholm>。

<sup>26</sup> 联合部队的代表。巨人旅第 3 旅成员在马里卜作战，但据也门政府称，他们是以个人身份作战(见第 38 段)。

25. 也门政府似乎没有一项国家层面的打击胡塞武装军事战略。在西海岸和也门南部的战线，联合部队和南方过渡委员会是抵御胡塞武装的主要力量。协调不同反胡塞武装派别之间军事行动的是联盟，而不是也门政府。例如，2021 年，南方过渡委员和联合部队都告诉专家小组，阿拉伯联合酋长国或联盟与也门政府协调联合军事行动(见附件 5)，<sup>27</sup> 他们没有收到过也门政府或国防部的指示。<sup>28</sup>

26. 目前不清楚政府可在多大程度上独立于联盟自主作出军事决定。不同联盟成员的优先事项也相互竞争，这显然影响了也门的军事和政治格局(见 S/2021/79，第 28 段)。联盟、也门政府的一些官员和一些部落领导人表示，他们担心国防部的腐败或也门改革集团党对军队和高级官员的影响力，会影响国民军和附属部落部队获得的支持及其表现。<sup>29</sup>

## B. 西海岸武装团体

27. 自 2019 年以来，联合部队在很大程度上维持对胡塞武装的防御态势。在本报告所述期间，西海岸联合部队将自己定位为西海岸以外地区的相关行为体，提出要在马里卜作战，并向夏卜瓦派遣旅级部队(见附件 5)。2021 年 11 月，它在荷台达和西塔伊兹开展了进攻行动。<sup>30</sup> 2021 年南方过渡委员会附属部队出现了一定程度的瓦解(见第 35 段)，相比而言，联合部队内部的冲突很少，且持续时间较短，对平民的影响有限。<sup>31</sup> 联盟在本报告所述期间对也门政府和南方过渡委员会表现出更为明显的不满，特别是由于它们没有能力执行《利雅得协议》，而与此同时，联合部队逐渐成为联盟的更可靠伙伴，这一点从联盟协调联合部队在 2021 年 11 月撤军一事中可见一斑。<sup>32</sup> 也门政府与联合部队之间也存在互利关系，后者保卫西海岸不受胡塞武装的侵入，并通过与也门政府结盟获得一定合法性。

28. 2020 年底，西海岸的所有武装团体经过重组后，接受民族抵抗力量的塔里克·萨利赫和巨人旅的 Abu Zara Al-Mahrami 的双重领导。<sup>33</sup> 2021 年 3 月，萨利赫创建了民族抵抗力量政治局(见附件 5)。专家小组在 2021 年 8 月访问克哈和穆

<sup>27</sup> 阿拉伯联合酋长国在 2021 年 10 月表示，它对南方过渡委员或联合部队的领导人没有行动控制权，并称这些部队的活动与它们的领导人直接相关。

<sup>28</sup> 2021 年 8 月专家小组在亚丁和西海岸与军事领导人进行的讨论。另见对总统办公室主任的采访，可查阅 <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>。

<sup>29</sup> 2021 年 10 月在利雅得举行的会议。也门改革集团党否认对也门政府和军队施以控制。

<sup>30</sup> 塔伊兹军官和联合部队。见 <https://2dec.net/news47596.html> 和 <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>。

<sup>31</sup> 最值得一提的冲突是巨人旅第 3 旅和 Abu Zara Al-Mahrami 之间的冲突，原因是后者决定更换第 3 旅领导人(见第 38 段)。

<sup>32</sup> 2021 年 11 月的撤军是联盟在没有通知也门政府情况下负责的最重要军事调遣。关于南方过渡委员会，见第 15 段。

<sup>33</sup> 不同于 2019 年的情况，当时不同的部队指挥官处于平等地位。见 [www.aremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139](http://www.aremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139) 和附件 5 的附录 4。

哈时可以看到萨利赫对地方当局的影响力。<sup>34</sup> 萨利赫向地方当局提供财政激励、人道主义和发展援助，并保证其安全。<sup>35</sup> 萨利赫之所以能这样做，是因为阿拉伯联合酋长国为他提供支持，<sup>36</sup> 使他得以顶替缺席的中央政府。萨利赫的这方面活动进一步侵蚀了也门政府在西海岸的权威。

29. 一些帖哈麦领导人认为，民族抵抗力量和巨人旅是他们地区的局外人。<sup>37</sup> 他们对帖哈麦武装部队被并入这两个实体感到不满，并表示这是萨利赫和阿拉伯联合酋长国为削弱帖哈麦军事领导而采取的行动。<sup>38</sup> 2021 年 11 月的撤军进一步加剧了紧张局势，因为胡塞武装目前控制了更多的帖哈麦土地，并在此过程中对帖哈麦民众实施了暴行(见附件 5)。一些帖哈麦军事和政治领导人在整个报告所述期间与专家小组会晤时表示，如果继续在当地政治和军事决策中被边缘化，他们不排除使用武力的选项，还提到了南方过渡委员会在亚丁使用武力的例子。<sup>39</sup>

30. 在专家小组 2021 年 8 月访问西海岸期间，地方当局表示，削弱他们的权威并阻碍他们开展发展活动的主要因素是联合部队非法征收收入(见图一)，以及巨人旅部队继续占领公共建筑。在穆哈，联合部队收取的收入没有存入也门中央银行。<sup>40</sup> 巨人旅的 Al-Mahrami 和帖哈麦第 1 旅前旅长 Ahmed Al-Kawkabani 告诉专家小组，他们占领一些公共建筑的原因是为了把守这些建筑，或为部队提供临时基地，直到联盟为他们安排其他地点。西海岸的个人进一步声称，联合部队无法阻止小型武器、化肥和燃料通过西海岸走私到胡塞武装控制区，这进一步削弱了当地机构的权威，使当地民众和战斗人员感到不满。

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<sup>34</sup> 地方当局对这种影响力的描述并不总是正面的，比如有人担心如果开展萨利赫没有批准的活动会遭到报复。

<sup>35</sup> 会见西海岸穆哈当局。另见 <https://2dec.net/news47897.html>。

<sup>36</sup> 与地方当局的机密讨论。另见 <https://2dec.net/last47928.html> 和 <https://2dec.net/last47939.html>，涉及阿拉伯联合酋长国通过民族抵抗力量提供了 80 000 剂 COVID-19 疫苗。阿拉伯联合酋长国告知专家小组，它在西海岸提供发展和人道主义援助。

<sup>37</sup> 2021 年与埃及、沙特阿拉伯和也门的军事和政治领导人举行的会议。另见 [www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region](http://www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region)。

<sup>38</sup> 同上；另见 <https://almahriah.net/local/5952>。

<sup>39</sup> 2021 年 11 月前举行的会议。

<sup>40</sup> 机密消息来源。巨人旅告诉专家小组，征收收入是基于与当局达成的一项协议，收到的资金被用于发展。

图一

西海岸联合部队在 al Dhubab 检查站开具的燃料“入境费”收据



资料来源：机密(经专家小组作保密处理)。

### C. 西海岸联合部队和南方过渡委员会之间的关系

31. 南方过渡委员会和民族抵抗力量在 2021 年 8 月告诉专家小组，双方之间没有重要的军事合作。<sup>41</sup> 然而，由于马里卜可能落入胡塞武装手中，2021 年 10 月，双方暗示准备组成反对胡塞武装的统一战线(见附件 1 和 5)。<sup>42</sup>

32. 相比之下，一些巨人旅部队在 2019 年与南方过渡委员会一起对也门政府作战。<sup>43</sup> 2021 年期间，巨人旅使用南方过渡委员会控制的设施，并在亚丁设有一个军营(见第 38 段)。在联盟内部，阿拉伯联合酋长国继续保持对萨利赫、Al-Mahrami 和祖贝迪的重要影响力。到目前为止，这种影响力避免了不同力量之间的严重冲突。<sup>44</sup>

### D. 南方过渡委员会附属武装团体

33. 专家小组在 2021 年 8 月访问时明显看到，也门政府在亚丁没有有效的军事或安全存在。南方过渡委员会及其附属部队控制着该省。值得注意的是，专家小组与地方当局的会议是在南方过渡委员会官员在场的情况下举行的。南方过渡委员会表示，尽管高级政府官员缺席且财政支持有限，它仍然维持着该省的正常运转。

<sup>41</sup> 例如，2021 年 9 月，专家小组访问了位于亚丁的民族抵抗力量伤员营地，这些伤员表示，他们在南方过渡委员会人员中感到不安全，因为大多数伤员来自北方。

<sup>42</sup> 见 <https://2dec.net/news46965.html> 和 <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter>。

<sup>43</sup> Al-Mahrami 在与专家小组的讨论中表示，他部队的目标是保持中立，不希望卷入也门政府和南方过渡委员会的冲突。

<sup>44</sup> 阿拉伯联合酋长国告诉专家小组，该国“与上述各方有着良好关系，但它对这些各方的影响力有限，并侧重于推进和平进程”，该国“正在努力减少因意见冲突导致的任何武装升级”。

34. 南方过渡委员会表示，它的所有军事和安全部队都已于 2021 年并入政府部队；<sup>45</sup> 也门政府对此予以否认。<sup>46</sup> 祖贝迪需要南方过渡委员会的武装力量继续存在，以实现他建立独立南方的政治野心。<sup>47</sup> 这可能会阻碍这些部队根据《利雅得协议》的设想实现完全整合。南方过渡委员会称，也门政府在 2021 年期间单方面任命公务员，从而破坏了《协议》。<sup>48</sup> 也门政府回应称，根据《协议》，与南方过渡委员会协商的要求仅限于特定省份的省长和安全局局长的任命事项。因此，虽然《协议》可能防止了也门政府和南方过渡委员会之间的军事升级，<sup>49</sup> 但它并不是南方政治危机的可持续解决方案。

35. 南方过渡委员会自 2019 年控制亚丁以来，其权威已被大大削弱。在本报告所述期间发生的军事内讧和严重的安全事件使人们对南方过渡委员会在其控制区提供安保的能力产生质疑。例如，自 2021 年 6 月以来发生了 3 起重大的简易爆炸装置爆炸事件，南方过渡委员会战斗人员之间也发生冲突，造成了平民伤亡。<sup>50</sup> 南方过渡委员会仍然很难获得必要的资源，以确保提供基本服务，缓解经济危机，并确保定期向其战斗人员支付工资。自 2019 年以来，阿拉伯联合酋长国对南方过渡委员会控制区的支助似乎明显减少，而沙特阿拉伯继续主要通过也门政府提供财政支助。

## E. 胡塞武装控制区的事态发展

### 1. 军事事态发展

36. 在本报告所述期间，胡塞武装继续统治其地盘，没有遭到任何重大的政治或军事反对，同时取得了重要的军事进展。胡塞武装完全控制了贝达，并向荷台达、马里卜和夏卜瓦各地挺进(见附件 4)。与也门其他地区相比，胡塞武装控制区的

<sup>45</sup> 见附件 6。

<sup>46</sup> 然而，两者都声称控制着夏卜瓦尼和哈德拉毛精锐部队。2021 年 8 月和 11 月与也门政府和南方过渡委员会进行的讨论。

<sup>47</sup> 例如，2021 年 3 月祖贝迪说：“马里卜的陷落……可能会加快南北双方进行国际会谈的进程。它可能会导致这样一种局面，即南方过渡委员会基本上控制南方，而胡塞武装控制北方大部分地区。在这种情况下，在各控制方之间进行直接谈判是有意义的。”见 [www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists)。他还继续主张建立一个独立的南方(见 [www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58))。

<sup>48</sup> 见 <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2746991/yemen's-hadi-appoints-new-head-shura-council-attorney-general-cabinet-secretary>。


<sup>49</sup> 到目前为止，该协议阻止了在阿比扬、亚丁和夏卜瓦发生严重对抗。发生了一些局部冲突，例如 2021 年 10 月阿拉伯联合酋长国撤离阿拉姆营地后，南方过渡委员会附属的夏卜瓦尼精锐部队与也门政府在夏卜瓦发生冲突。

<sup>50</sup> 简易爆炸装置的袭击目标是省长和两名记者，有一个简易爆炸装置被放置在亚丁国际机场外。有人将这些事件归咎于胡塞武装。见 [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed)、[www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car-bombing-in-aden](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car-bombing-in-aden) 以及 [www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport](http://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport)。

安全局势稳定(见第 35 段)。胡塞武装得益于、有时也加剧了不受其控制地区的不稳定局势(见第 37-40 段)。<sup>51</sup> 胡塞武装继续从战略上削弱对手。

37. 在本报告所述期间,专家小组记录了 4 起导弹和无人机袭击西海岸和南部地区的事件,这些袭击或以破坏重要的政治举措为目的,或加剧了反胡塞武装阵营内部的混乱。<sup>52</sup> 2020 年 12 月 30 日,亚丁国际机场遭到导弹袭击,当时新联合政府搭乘的飞机刚刚着陆(见附件 7)。组建新政府是《利雅得协议》的最重要成就,如果当时航班没有晚点,很可能会有更多的政府代表死伤,令几个月来的谈判遭遇挫折。这次袭击的时机也具有象征意义,因为在目睹南方过渡委员会和也门政府长达两年的战争后,政府的回归令民众感到希望。2021 年 9 月 11 日,穆哈港遭到五架无人机和两枚导弹的袭击。当时,一个政府委员会正在那里视察,以监督该港口转为民用的有关工作,此前多年它一直被军队独占。这一转变将是联合部队与政府关系正常化的一个重要里程碑,同时为西海岸的民用进口开辟另一个港口(见附件 8)。11 月 10 日,穆哈的一些军事基地被导弹击中,也门问题特使定于当日对西海岸进行首次访问(见地图 3 和附件 8)。

地图 3  
穆哈港袭击



<sup>51</sup> 南方过渡委员会表示,当胡塞武装发动“匿名”袭击时,人们会对是谁所为产生猜测,从而造成反胡塞武装力量之间的进一步不信任。

<sup>52</sup> 第 114-117 段和附件 35 记录了胡塞武装在塔伊兹和马里卜实施的造成平民伤亡的其他袭击事件。

38. 8月29日，拉赫季的 Anad 营地遭到导弹和一架无人机袭击。<sup>53</sup> 这次袭击据报导致巨人旅第3旅中约90人伤亡。<sup>54</sup> 该旅通常驻扎西海岸，在与巨人旅领导人 Abu Zara Al-Mahrami 发生分歧后，当天正在 Anad 进行训练。这次针对第3旅的袭击令人怀疑 Al-Mahrami 和胡塞武装有勾结，<sup>55</sup> 但 Al-Mahrami 对此予以否认。<sup>56</sup> 第3旅的一些成员在袭击事件后离开，他们称已不再信任 Al-Mahrami。

39. 除11月10日的袭击外，胡塞武装未声称对第37和38段中记录的袭击负责(见附件7和8)。<sup>57</sup> 也门其他武装团体具有实施这些袭击的相关能力或动机的可能性不大。重要的是，据报在所有4次袭击中，导弹都是从胡塞武装控制的塔伊兹发射的。<sup>58</sup> 专家小组获悉，在其中至少两次袭击中，与也门政府有关联的塔伊兹军事轴心向联盟发出了预警。在8月29日的袭击发生前，在目标地区上空发现无人侦察机，因此预料到将发生袭击。<sup>59</sup>

40. 专家小组还获悉，2021年期间，在亚丁国际机场和穆哈港等关键设施上空都观察到无人侦察机。也门境内的反胡塞武装力量没有手段阻止无人机或导弹进入其领空。控制上述4个遇袭地点的南方过渡委员会和联合部队表示，在阿拉伯联合酋长国部队撤离他们所在地区后，他们不再拥有有效的防空系统，专家小组2020年10月在马里卜也听到了同样的抱怨。一个联盟成员告诉专家小组，它无法将防空系统送到也门，因为这将违反最终用户协议。如果这些系统部署到位，可能会减少平民伤亡和对基础设施的破坏(见第114-117段)。

## 2. 政治和文化动态

41. 胡塞武装继续通过开展系统性的运动，确保民众遵守其意识形态，并获取当地对冲突的支持。在此过程中，他们专门针对弱势群体。例如，专家小组记录了另外9起案件，在这些案件中，胡塞武装分子针对在政治或职业领域活跃的、对胡塞武装观点持反对意见的妇女，对她们进行拘留、折磨、残害、性侵犯或压制。在这些及其他案件中，胡塞武装继续以声称妇女“卖淫”为借口，(a) 减少社区对前被拘留者的支持和接受，(b) 阻止她们进一步积极参与社区活动，(c) 确保她们不威胁胡塞政权(见附件9)。为此，胡塞武装拍摄和保存性暴露视频，并继续将这

<sup>53</sup> 消息来源见附件5。

<sup>54</sup> 见 [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base)。

<sup>55</sup> 专家小组2021年与第3旅成员的对话。

<sup>56</sup> 2021年12月与专家小组的通信。

<sup>57</sup> 关于11月10日的袭击，胡塞武装称其向目标方向发射了导弹(见附件8)。胡塞武装声称对2019年 Anad 基地遭到的另一次袭击负责(见 <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-ap-top-news-houthis-international-news-jamal-khashoggi-92f491d2794440afaf53967fceb0c1b9>)。

<sup>58</sup> 见附件7和8。塔伊兹军事领导人提供了关于2021年8月和11月袭击的信息。

<sup>59</sup> 专家小组约谈了一些战斗人员，事件发生时他们在营地，并且看到了无人机。他们说，尽管多次向联盟发出呼吁，但没有采取任何措施来疏散部队或拦截无人机。南方过渡委员会军事指挥官 Abu Tahir 向专家小组证实，他们方面也发出了警告，但他们没有手段作出应对。战斗人员说，尽管他们处于危险之中，但仍被指示留在营地内。巨人旅领导层否认事先知道有无人机或获悉了塔伊兹军事公报。



些视频作为对付这些妇女的任何反抗的筹码。这些措施也对其她女性领导人产生了威慑作用。对表达政治观点的妇女的压制行为增加，影响了妇女参加解决冲突的相关决策进程的能力，因此对也门的和平、安全和稳定构成了威胁(见 S/2020/326，第 21 段和附件 5)。<sup>60</sup> 专家小组约谈的女性前被拘留者能够获得的社会心理、经济或保护方面的支持措施有限，因此一些人已回到胡塞武装控制区内的家人身边(见附件 9)。<sup>61</sup>

42. 面向儿童和成人的夏令营和文化课程是胡塞武装战略的一部分，旨在为其意识形态争取支持、鼓励人们加入战斗并激励部队的积极性(见附件 10)。一些成人参加这些文化课程是因为他们认同意识形态，但其他人则是为了不失去就业福利或人道主义援助，或者因为担心不参加会遭到报复。例如，两名拒绝参加这些课程的妇女被逮捕并强奸(见附件 10)。

43. 专家小组调查了胡塞武装在多所学校和一个清真寺举办的夏令营，这些夏令营被胡塞武装用来在儿童中传播自己的意识形态、鼓励儿童战斗、提供基本军事训练或招募他们参加战斗(见图二和三)。在这些夏令营中，针对特定群体的仇恨言论和暴力得到鼓励。孩子们被要求喊出胡塞武装的口号：“打倒美国，打倒以色列，诅咒犹太人，伊斯兰胜利”。一个夏令营班教年仅 7 岁的儿童如何清洗武器和躲避火箭弹(见附件 10 和 11)。专家小组还记录了一起对接受军事训练的儿童实施性暴力的案件。专家小组收到了 10 起案件的资料，在这些案件中，胡塞武装以文化课程招生为借口带儿童去打仗，或者把儿童从教室带到战场上。专家小组还记录了 9 起案件，在这些案件中，家庭和教师能否获得人道主义援助，完全取决于家中子女是否参加了战斗，或者教师是否教授胡塞武装课程。这些调查结果详见附件 10。

图二

夏令营中使用的学习材料(左)和使用这些书籍的夏令营学员(右)



资料来源：马西拉电视台(左)和机密(右)(见 [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88))。

<sup>60</sup> 另见安全理事会第 2467(2019)号决议。

<sup>61</sup> 关于为性别暴力受害者提供的支持，见第 2467(2019)号决议，特别是第 14、16(a)和 16(d)段。

图三  
2019 年 8 月参加暑期学校毕业典礼的儿童和嘉宾



资料来源：马西拉电视台(见 [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88))。

注：嘉宾包括总理阿卜杜勒·阿齐兹·本·哈卜图尔、穆罕默德·阿里·胡塞和卫生部长 Taha Mutawkkel。

44. Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi 少将(见图五)作为国防部长，有责任确保儿童不被招募到胡塞武装中。Yahyah al Houthi(见图四)作为教育部长，也有责任确保学校和夏令营不被用于宣传暴力、仇恨和激进化，或招募儿童。有关这些人的进一步信息见附件 10 和 11。

图四  
Yahyah al Houthi 参观夏令营



资料来源：[www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)。

图五

Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi 少将(右二)




资料来源: [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence)。

#### 四. 海事安全

45. 自 2020 年 12 月以来, 专家小组记录了 5 次商船遇袭、几次可疑船只驶近<sup>62</sup>和一次在也门周围水域发现载有武装人员的小船事件(见地图 4)。与上次报告所述期间亚丁湾有 3 艘商船遇袭的情况相比, 在本报告期间, 重点目标区域再次转移到红海, 在那里发生了 4 次袭击。

地图 4

2020 年 12 月以来的海事安全事件



<sup>62</sup> 报告的至少两起可疑船只驶近事件后来被证明是也门海岸警卫队不符合国际程序的示意行为。

46. 红海局势的特点是水上简易爆炸装置袭击增加。被成功击中的不是行驶中的船只，而是停泊在沙特阿拉伯海上石油设施上的船只，其中一些距离也门超过 1 000 公里。在某些情况下，袭击者部署了一种更大型的新式装置，它由两台舷外发动机提供动力，因此油耗率远高于上一代只有一个发动机的“河豚”装置。考虑到前述距离，几乎可以肯定，这些装置先由一艘“母船”拖到距离目标较近的位置，再从“母船”发射。

47. 第一次袭击发生在 2020 年 12 月 14 日，三台水上简易爆炸装置袭击了吉达港。其中两台装置以海军基地为目标，损坏了一艘沙特军舰，另一台则击中了沙特阿美石油公司海运码头上悬挂新加坡国旗的 *BW Rhine* 号油轮(国际海事组织：9341940)(见图六)。撞击和随后的爆炸穿透了吃水线处的船体。它还引起了一场大火，燃烧了大约一个小时。虽然没有人员受伤的报告，但造成了重大的物资和后续经济损失(见附件 12)。

图六

*BW Rhine* 号油轮上的大火



资料来源：机密。

48. 2021 年 4 月 27 日，在延布炼厂码头附近发生了一起涉及两台水上简易爆炸装置的类似袭击事件，悬挂新加坡国旗的 *Torm Hermia* 号油轮(国际海事组织：9797993)当时停泊在该码头(见图七)。该船的船员证实，沙特阿拉伯海军在距离该船约 1.4 海里处拦截了一台水上简易爆炸装置。沙特阿拉伯证实了这次袭击。在延布港以南约 30 海里处发现了第二台装置(见附件 13)。专家小组认为，也门海岸与延布之间的距离太远，无法只靠水上简易爆炸装置完成行动，因此很可能用到了一艘“母船”。

图七  
2021 年 4 月 27 日袭击中使用的水上简易爆炸装置



资料来源：机密。

49. 在本报告所述期间，从胡塞武装控制区直接发射水上简易爆炸装置的频率大大增加。专家小组从多个来源获悉，装置组装后从荷台达和萨利夫港口发射。联盟通常能够拦截此类装置，并往往以空袭胡塞武装控制区内的组装地点的方式予以回击，这促使荷台达协议支助团于 2021 年 7 月呼吁双方保持克制，因为“[威胁]重要援助入境点的行动”构成“违反《荷台达协议》”。<sup>63</sup> 专家小组正在调查《协议》所涵盖的地区是否被用来发射此类装置，并已要求联盟和荷台达协议支助团提供补充信息。据联盟称，截至 2021 年 10 月 31 日，胡塞武装自冲突开始以来共发射了 92 台此类装置。

50. 专家小组还记录了无人机袭击商船事件。2021 年 7 月 30 日，悬挂巴哈马国旗的 *Alberta* 号油轮(国际海事组织：9486922)在吉赞港受损(见附件 14)。无人机在船头上空爆炸。从甲板上找到的玻璃纤维碎片显示出与 Qasef 型中程无人机一致的技术特征，胡塞武装经常使用该型号的无人机攻击沙特阿拉伯南部目标。没有人员受伤的报告，损坏程度相对较轻。然而，这一事件表明停泊的船只仍然易受攻击，在也门附近的港口尤其如此。

51. 另一起无人机袭击事件发生在阿曼湾，目标是悬挂利比里亚国旗的 *Mercer Street* 号油轮(国际海事组织：9539585)。该船第一次遭到袭击是在 2021 年 7 月 29 日上午，当时船长报告说，相隔 30 分钟发生了两次“无人机袭击”，但都没有击中。该船随后于当日晚间再次遇袭，当时第三架无人机撞击了舰桥顶棚，船体受损严重，包括船长在内的两人受伤(见附件 15)。

<sup>63</sup> 见 [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hudaydah/status/1412009048862568450](https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1412009048862568450)。

52. 初始报告显示，这次袭击可能来自也门。<sup>64</sup> 因此，专家小组审查了可公开获得的信息，并从几个会员国收到了关于这起事件的保密信息。所使用的无人机似乎是专家小组此前记录的三角翼无人机(见 S/2020/326，第 57 段和附件 15)的升级款。考虑到胡塞武装控制区与袭击地点之间的距离超过 1 700 公里，要成功袭击一艘以巡航速度行驶的船只，可能需要一个空中或海上中继系统。因此，这次袭击很可能是另一个行为体所为，因为据专家小组所知，胡塞武装没有获得此类系统的渠道。不过，这次袭击表明，无人机技术发展得很快，而胡塞武装似乎也能获得这一技术(见第 60 段)，因此也门周边水域发生类似袭击的可能性更高了。

53. 在靠近也门的国际水域发生的第二次袭击涉及悬挂伊朗伊斯兰共和国国旗的 *Saviz* 号普通货船(国际海事组织: 9167253)，该船于 2021 年 4 月 6 日停泊在红海南部距离也门海岸西北方向约 115 海里处时发生爆炸。据伊朗伊斯兰共和国塔斯尼姆通讯社报道，损坏该船的是潜水员固定到船体上的水下爆破弹。<sup>65</sup> 至少自 2017 年以来，*Saviz* 号的所在位置一直未变，因此有人指控该船的作用是支持区域内的军事行动。<sup>66</sup> 伊朗伊斯兰共和国告知专家小组，该船被指派打击海上海盗活动，这次遇袭与也门冲突无关。

54. 专家小组继续收到关于胡塞武装在红海南部部署水雷的报告，水雷位置在胡塞武装控制的三个港口以东的不同岛屿附近，此外还收到有水雷漂浮在沙特阿拉伯边界附近水域的报告。据联盟称，从冲突开始到 2021 年 10 月 31 日，累计发现并销毁了 205 枚水雷。专家小组正在调查关于胡塞武装在荷台达、萨利夫和拉斯伊萨港的特定地点储存并从三个港口出发部署水雷的指控，如果属实，这将构成违反《斯德哥尔摩协议》。

## 五. 军火以及定向军火禁运的执行情况

55. 根据第 2216(2015)号决议第 14 至 17 段，专家小组继续重点开展一系列监测和调查活动，以确定是否有任何违反定向军火禁运的行为，包括向委员会和安全理事会列名的个人和实体或为这些个人和实体的利益直接或间接供应、出售或转让军火的行为。根据专家小组的评估，所有忠于萨那当局的军事和准军事部队都在这一定义的涵盖范围内。


56. 在本报告所述期间，胡塞武装继续对沙特阿拉伯进行空袭(见地图 5)。靠近也门与沙特阿拉伯边界的目标风险最大，胡塞武装通常使用中程 Qasef-2K 无人机和 Badr 型火箭弹对这些目标进行组合式袭击。胡塞武装还继续使用远程 Samad 型无人机、Quds 型巡航导弹和佐勒菲卡尔弹道导弹，深入沙特阿拉伯内部进行攻击。

<sup>64</sup> 见 <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/08/10/Senior-Pentagon-official-says-Iran-backed-Mercer-Street-attack-came-from-Yemen>。

<sup>65</sup> 见 [www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources](http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources)。

<sup>66</sup> 见 <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/04/07/-Mother-ship-command-center-The-Iranian-ship-Saviz-attacked-in-Red-Sea>。

地图 5  
自 2020 年 12 月 30 日以来的导弹和无人机袭击



57. 边境地区的袭击每周都发生几次。较长距离的行动不太频繁，往往是一波接一波发生，即胡塞武装在同一行动中向多个目标发射数架无人机和多枚导弹。大部分袭击使用当地制造的无人机和 Badr 火箭弹。袭击的频率表明，胡塞武装很容易从国外采购这些武器的部件。

58. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组获悉 1 次巡航导弹袭击和 3 次经证实的长程弹道导弹袭击。这些数字与往年一致，表明胡塞武装仍难以从国外采购先进导弹系统。据联盟称，从冲突开始到 2021 年 10 月 31 日，累计向沙特阿拉伯境内目标发射 781 架无人机和 409 枚弹道导弹。

59. 胡塞武装在本报告所述期间的袭击目标包括民用基础设施，如吉达的沙特阿美公司油库(见附件 16)和艾卜哈国际机场(见附件 17)。这些袭击主要服务于政治目的，即胡塞武装想迫使利雅得接受对他们有利的政治解决方案。这与在也门境内使用导弹和无人机进行的袭击形成了鲜明反差——2020 年 12 月 30 日亚丁国际机场袭击事件(见附件 7)证明，也门境内的袭击往往以达到最大杀伤力为目标，也门政府缺乏有效的防空手段则加剧了这一情况。

## A. 胡塞武装的新武器系统

60. 2021年3月11日，胡塞武装向媒体展示了新的武器系统(见附件18)。<sup>67</sup> 展品包括一架携带两枚火箭弹、据称射程达2 000公里的新型 Samad-4 无人机，以及一架名为 Rujum 的短程六角直升机。后者似乎由中国的 YD6-1000S 改装，可投掷六枚小型迫击炮弹。此外，他们还展示了一款名为 Waed 的三角翼无人机，它似乎是2019年所记录型号的升级款(见图八)。<sup>68</sup> 该款无人机似乎有更大的翼展，航程可能更长。从视觉上看，垂直稳定器的形状是最明显的设计差异。2020年9月，社交媒体上发布了在马里卜阿拉姆前线发现的看似是受损 Waed 无人机的图片。<sup>69</sup> Waed 无人机似乎能够携带先进的传感器系统，在数据中继系统的协助下，可以在几百公里的距离内进行遥控，大大增加了对移动目标的威胁(见第52段和附件15)。<sup>70</sup>

图八

展会上的 Waed 无人机(左)和马里卜附近的疑似 Waed 残骸(右)



资料来源: Almasirah.net(左)和<https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168>(右)。

61. 据报告，在马里卜战线还首次部署了“358”地对空导弹，<sup>71</sup> 据称该导弹在2021年7月被用来拦截一架无人侦察机(见图九)。<sup>72</sup> 它的速度相对较低，意味着对战机不构成重大威胁，但可能对较慢的飞机有效。

<sup>67</sup> 见 <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/12/21/2468309/-حوزه-جدید-در-حوزه-دستاورد های جدید-از-دستاورد های جدید-تا-موشک-های-سعی-قاصم-2-و-قدس-2-فیلم-دفاعی-از-پیاده های جدید-تا-موشک-های-سعی-قاصم-2-و-قدس-2-فیلم>。

<sup>68</sup> 见 S/2020/326，第57段和附件15。

<sup>69</sup> 见 <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168>。

<sup>70</sup> 由于无线电遥控受到视线的限制，胡塞武装掌握的其他航程较长的无人机系统使用预先设定的全球定位系统坐标来寻找目标。这意味着，一旦发射，这些无人机的航线无法调整。

<sup>71</sup> 见 S/2021/79，第81段和附件13。

<sup>72</sup> 见 <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>。



图九  
 据称在马里卜附近发现的“358”地对空导弹残骸



资料来源: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>。

## B. 查缴

62. 2021年2月10日17时01分,美国温斯顿·丘吉尔号驱逐舰在索马里海岸以东约70海里处观察到两艘道船试图转运货物(见图十和地图6)。第一艘是Shu'ai号道船,它于2021年2月11日11时05分被拦截,但发现货舱是空的,5小时后将其释放。第二艘是较大型的Jelbut号道船,它于大约14时被拦截。船上载有3752支56-1式突击步枪、198挺PKM型通用机枪、82挺德什卡重机枪的部件、50支AM-50赛义德反器材步枪(连同50个RG-004A1光学瞄准镜)和90个火箭榴弹(RPG-7)发射器(见附件19)。

图十  
 2021年2月10日两艘道船企图转运货物



资料来源: 机密。

63. 专家小组获得的证据表明，这些道船的船员是也门国民(见附件 21)。据一个会员国称，Jelbut 号道船的船员说他们此前被告知于 2021 年 1 月驶往伊朗伊斯兰共和国的贾斯克港取货，船上找到的导航装置坐标<sup>73</sup> (见附件 19，图 19.20)似乎能证实这一说法。然而，小组无法独立核实这一信息，也无法检查货物，因为据报该批货物已被处置。根据现有图像，突击步枪和一些通用机枪的技术特征和标记与中国制造的武器一致，反器材步枪(及相关瞄准具)和火箭榴弹发射器则可能来自伊朗。伊朗伊斯兰共和国告知专家小组，它与涉事道船和被缴武器之间没有任何联系。专家小组还注意到，绿色塑料包装与前几次拦截时发现的塑料包装相似(见图十一和表 1；S/2021/79，附件 14，图 14.6；以及 S/2019/83，附件 16，第 7 段)，表明来源相同。

图十一  
塑料包裹的 56-1 式突击步枪




资料来源：机密。

<sup>73</sup> 专家小组只收到了附件 19 图 19.20 中的地图所示信息。不过，专家小组注意到，打击跨国有组织犯罪全球倡议题为“伊朗的指纹？追踪索马里境内的 56-1 式突击步枪”的报告中提供了关于该船轨迹的更详细资料，可查阅 <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/iran-firearms-somalia>。

64. 第二次缴获发生在 2021 年 5 月 6 日 17 时左右, 当时美国蒙特利号导弹巡洋舰在巴基斯坦海岸以南约 114 海里处的阿拉伯海上拦截了一艘 Shu'ai 号道船(见地图 6)。专家小组获得的证据表明, 这艘道船的船长也在 2021 年 2 月 11 日扣押的 Shu'ai 号道船上(见附件 21)。再次发现一些武器用绿色塑料包裹, 专家小组在其他拦截行动中也记录过这种情况(见表 1; S/2021/79, 附件 14, 图 14.6; 以及 S/2019/83, 附件 16, 第 7 段)。专家小组获得了据称在船上找到的一个导航装置的坐标, 表明 2021 年 5 月 4 日时该船处于接近贾斯克港的位置(见附件 20, 图 20.44)。<sup>74</sup> 专家小组无法独立核实这一信息, 并指出, 全球定位系统装置上的坐标本身并不构成该船位置的确凿证据。

地图 6

2018-2021 年期间查缴小武器和轻武器、反坦克制导导弹和瞄准具的情况



65. 2021 年 8 月, 专家小组检查了这批货物, 其中包括 2 556 支 56-1 式突击步枪、192 挺 PKM 型通用机枪、100 支 85 式狙击步枪、52 支 AM-50 赛义德反器材步枪、35 支 AKS-74U 突击步枪和 194 个 RPG-7 发射器(见附件 20)。56-1 式突击步枪、狙击步枪和 19 挺 PKM 型机枪的技术特征和标记与中国制造的武器一致。大部分由建设兵工厂(国家 26 厂)在 2016 年至 2017 年期间制造。在其余的机

<sup>74</sup> 专家小组注意到, 在 2020 年 6 月 24 日被扣押的载有武器的 Bahri-2 号道船上发现的导航装置中也有贾斯克港的坐标(见 S/2021/79, 附件 15 中的图 15.20)。

枪中，有 164 挺的技术特征和标记与伊朗伊斯兰共和国制造的机枪一致，有 6 挺产自保加利亚，还有 3 挺的产地不明。AKS-74U 突击步枪的技术特征和标记与 1980 年代末在图拉武器厂(位于现在的俄罗斯联邦)制造的步枪一致。AM-50 反器材步枪和 RPG-7 发射器的技术特征和标识与伊朗伊斯兰共和国生产的一致。专家小组还记录了几个其特征与伊朗伊斯兰共和国制造一致的 Ghadir 步枪瞄准镜，以及白俄罗斯制造的 POSP 型光学瞄准具。伊朗伊斯兰共和国告知专家小组，这些机枪和步枪瞄准镜不是伊朗的产品，而且该国认为，“不应仅凭外观，或[这些]装备的标记或技术特征与伊朗公司的产品相似，就得出关于来源地的结论”。除小武器和轻武器外，该道船还载有 50 枚从集装箱发射的线导反坦克导弹，其技术特征与 1978 年至 1999 年期间在现在的俄罗斯所在地区生产的不同版本的 9M111 和 9M113 导弹一致。这些导弹被包在塑料管中，这与专家小组在以往海上查缴(见图十二和表 1，以及 [S/2020/326](#)，附件 20，图 20.1)中观察到的情况一样，表明来源相同。

图十二  
反坦克制导导弹包装



资料来源：机密。

66. 专家小组没有收到关于被缴武器的保管链的答复。俄罗斯联邦表示，该国军事实体不向也门提供武器；保加利亚告知专家小组，没有关于这些机枪的记录；中国尚未做出答复。<sup>75</sup> 伊朗伊斯兰共和国表示没有向也门出售、出口或转让武器。

<sup>75</sup> 前几年，中国告知专家小组，缴获的 56-1 式突击步枪没有出口到也门。然而，这并不排除这些武器被出口到第三国的可能性。

关于 POSP 瞄准具，白俄罗斯告知专家小组，这些瞄准具在 2016 年 6 月至 2018 年 4 月期间出口到伊朗伊斯兰共和国，<sup>76</sup> 而且伊朗伊斯兰共和国提供了一份最终用户证书，声明将完全将它们用于国防和武装部队后勤部的需要。伊朗伊斯兰共和国告知专家小组，瞄准具由该国的军事单位使用，没有被再出口、转让或出售。除一些明显的例外情况外，<sup>77</sup> 武器的组成情况显示出一种共同的供应模式(见表 1)，即在阿拉伯海上用道船将可能来自政府库存的武器运到也门和索马里<sup>78</sup> (见 S/2021/79，第 72 至 76 段)。专家小组继续与索马里问题专家小组合作进行调查。

67. 专家小组正在调查 7 个 RU90/120G 热成像武器瞄准具的保管链，它们于 2021 年 6 月 22 日在阿曼和也门之间的 Shahn 过境点被缴获(见图十三和附件 22)。这些瞄准具由中国-伊朗合资企业 Rayan Roshd Afzar 制造，<sup>79</sup> 在以往缴获的武器中也曾出现(见 S/2021/79，第 88 段和附件 14)。伊朗伊斯兰共和国告知专家小组，被缴获的瞄准具并非该国制造。这一事件表明，少量军事装备也继续通过陆路进入也门。<sup>80</sup>

图十三

在 Shahn 过境点缴获的 RU90/120G 热成像武器瞄准具



资料来源：机密。

<sup>76</sup> 这是白俄罗斯出口到伊朗伊斯兰共和国的光学瞄准具自 2018 年以来第 5 次被缴获(见表 1)。

<sup>77</sup> 这些例外包括 AKS-74U 突击步枪和 85 式狙击步枪。

<sup>78</sup> 仍不清楚索马里犯罪网络在这个供应网络中的作用。有充分证据表明在索马里沿海有武器转运发生，其中一些武器最终出现在索马里黑市上。然而尚不清楚这些武器是先运到也门，然后再贩运回非洲之角，还是其中一些武器直接从道船卸到索马里海岸。

<sup>79</sup> 见 [www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world](http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world)。

<sup>80</sup> 据悉，Shahn 过境点的上一次这类缴获行动发生在 2019 年 3 月 20 日，涉及小武器和轻武器弹药和迫击榴弹引信。

表 1

2018 年以来专家小组记录的缴获小武器和轻武器、反坦克制导导弹和瞄准具的情况

	56-1 式 突击步枪	RPG-7 发射器	AM-50 反器材 步枪	PKM 机枪	德什卡 重机枪	来自 白俄罗斯的 光学瞄准具	Ghadir 步枪 瞄准镜	Rayan Roshd Afzar 瞄准具	反坦克 制导导弹 (不同类型)
亚丁湾, 2018 年 6 月 28 日	X <sup>a</sup>								
亚丁, 2018 年 12 月 10 日	X	X					X		
亚丁湾, 2019 年 11 月 25 日									X <sup>a</sup>
亚丁湾, 2020 年 2 月 9 日							X	X	X <sup>a</sup>
亚丁湾, 2020 年 4 月 17 日	X <sup>a</sup>		X	X			X	X	
亚丁湾, 2020 年 6 月 24 日	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
亚丁湾, 2021 年 2 月 11 日	X <sup>a, b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>		X <sup>b</sup>		
阿曼湾, 2021 年 5 月 6 日	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X			X	X	X <sup>a</sup>
Shahn 边界, <sup>c</sup> 2021 年 6 月 22 日								X <sup>b</sup>	


资料来源: 专家小组和会员国。

<sup>a</sup> 物项的包装类似。<sup>b</sup> 物项未经专家小组检查。<sup>c</sup> Shahn 是阿曼和也门之间的一个主要边界过境点(见地图 6)。

### C. 保管链调查

68. 胡塞武装利用复杂的中间商网络来掩盖保管链, 继续从欧洲和亚洲的公司采购武器系统的关键部件(见地图 7)。下文所述的四个案例采用的便是第 2511(2020)号决议第 8 段规定的这一模式。多个会员国一再告知专家小组, 根据国家法律, 这些部件既不是武器, 也不是两用物品。但专家小组认为, 由于这些部件具有军事用途, 出口管制和海关主管部门需要特别警惕, 防止违反定向武器禁运。

地图 7  
胡塞武装的供货网



69. 专家小组调查了德国 BD Sensors 公司制造的 30.600G OEM 压力变送器的保管链，该压力变送器是 2020 年 11 月 23 日袭击吉达时使用的 Quds 型巡航导弹的部件之一(见附件 16)。专家小组的记录上还记录了类似的压力变送器，都是之前导弹的部件，通过这些变送器追踪到了伊朗伊斯兰共和国和土耳其(见 S/2021/79，第 79-80 段)。该变送器是阿曼的一家商业公司购买的，该公司是 2020 年 7 月，即袭击发生前四个月，经中国进口的。这家阿曼公司是代表自称代表也门一家公司的 1 个人进口的该变送器(见附件 23)。专家小组迄今未能确定变送器是否确实是从阿曼出口到也门的(这意味着 Quds 巡航导弹是由胡塞武装制造的)，或者有可能是出口到了另一个国家，最后落到了也门。这是近年来第二次胡塞武装系统的部件从中国的供应商追踪到了阿曼的商业公司(见 S/2021/79，第 77 段)。<sup>81</sup>

70. 专家小组还调查了日本雅马哈公司生产的 6 台 E75BEHD 舷外发动机的保管链，专家小组的记录显示，在 2020 年 12 月 14 日袭击吉达港时使用的 3 台水载简易爆炸装置的碎片中发现了这些发动机(见附件 12)。专家小组能够确定，这些发动机于 2020 年 3 月 9 日通过阿曼的另一家商业公司出口到了雅马哈在也门的

<sup>81</sup> 关于无人机部件货物于 2018 年 12 月 2 日抵达萨拉拉后的保管链问题，阿曼主管部门仍未作出答复。

总经销商 Dawood 贸易公司。专家小组与 Dawood 贸易公司取得了联系，要求提供有关这些发动机保管链的信息，目前尚未得到答复。

71. 专家小组调查了德国 3W-Modellmotoren 公司制造的 3W-110i B2 两缸旋转发动机的保管链，专家小组于 2020 年 10 月在马里卜省的一架胡塞武装无人机的碎片中检查到了该发动机(见图十四)。专家小组获得的证据(见附件 24)显示，该发动机是中国境内的 1 个人于 2018 年 1 月 25 日通过淘宝网电子商务平台订购的。收到这一订单后，德国一家公司通过另一家中介机构：德国一家航模零售商向制造商订购了这些发动机，据报，该发动机于 2018 年 3 月出口到了中国。专家小组联系了中国，要求提供有关买方身份和发动机保管链的信息；目前尚未得到答复。

图十四

在马里卜省检查的 3W-110i B2 发动机



资料来源：专家小组。

72. 专家小组进一步调查了荷兰 AMT 公司制造的 Titan 燃气轮机发动机的保管链，2020 年，专家小组将其记录为“358”地对空导弹的一部分(见 S/2021/79，第 81 段和附件 13)。这些发动机于 2017 年 3 月 10 日和 2019 年 6 月 6 日出口到了中国香港。根据专家小组获得的最终用户证书，这些发动机是一家飞机公司采购的，据中国称，该公司于 2014 年停止运营，因此不可能进口了这些发动机。专家小组发现，最终用户证书是由一家中国香港公司 HSJ Electronic(HK)提交的，该公司是序列号为 7023 的发动机的收货人，而其他 3 台发动机则交付给了另一家中国香港公司 Vista Automation & Communication。根据可公开查阅的记录，HSJ Electronic(HK)和 Vista Automation & Communication 这两家公司为同一人所有(见附件 25)。中国尚未就发动机保管链问题做出回应。



## 六. 金融和经济问题

### A. 经济问题

#### 1. 概述

73. 专家小组审查了与也门经济有关的各种问题，这些问题对也门的和平、安全和稳定构成威胁。七年多来，也门一直卷入冲突，使也门经济受到重创。在非胡塞武装控制区，也门里亚尔对美元迅速贬值，食品价格上涨，更多人陷入了极端贫困。<sup>82</sup> 由于也门大约 90% 的基本商品依靠进口，主要由进口价格上涨引发的通货膨胀压力仍然很大。根据也门中央银行的数据，2020 年食品价格平均通货膨胀率超过 30%。<sup>83</sup> 2020 年实际国内生产总值收缩了约 8.5%，世界银行预计 2021 年总体通胀将继续迅速加速，预计为 45%，而 2020 年为 35%。<sup>84</sup>

#### 2. 对和平、安全和稳定构成潜在威胁的经济问题

74. 经济形势不断恶化导致非胡塞武装控制区的民众感到沮丧、困苦，心生怨恨，为进一步的社会动荡和冲突提供了肥沃的温床。普通人的耐心消磨殆尽，这些地区的民众抗议、示威和骚乱事件越来越多就证明了这一点，<sup>85</sup> 人们走上街头，抗议汇率飙升、食品价格上涨、拖欠工资、电力短缺和普遍贫困等问题。一些政治团体试图从中渔利。

75. 艾达鲁斯·祖拜迪领导的南方过渡委员会经济委员会与南方货币兑换协会举行了多次会议，在也门中央银行或也门政府其他实体没有参与的情况下，讨论了可通过哪些措施缓解汇率波动带来的经济挑战。<sup>86</sup> 批评人士认为，南方过渡委员会的这种行为是对也门中央银行和也门政府管控银行和外汇公司的挑战，是也门政府和南方过渡委员会之间当前更大的权力斗争的一部分。<sup>87</sup>

76. 也门政治制度和经济的脆弱性继续受到威胁，危及该国的和平、安全与稳定。也门政府和胡塞武装有意识地、有系统地分裂也门的经济体系和机构，导致两个地区出现了单独的中央银行、海关和税务主管部门、金融情报部门、电信主管部门以及单独的经济、贸易、银行、关税、税收法律和政策(见附件 26)。

<sup>82</sup> 见 [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021)。

<sup>83</sup> 也门中央银行季报：经济与货币发展，第 4 期(2021 年 9 月)。2020 年的年通货膨胀率估计在 25% 左右，高于 2019 年 10% 的估计平均水平。

<sup>84</sup> 见 [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1)。

<sup>85</sup> 根据 Intelyse 的数据，截至 2021 年 9 月 27 日，亚丁、夏卜瓦、阿比扬、索科特拉、拉赫季和哈德拉毛当月记录爆发了 54 次示威，见 <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-key-message-update-protests-intensify-south-due-further-sharp-depreciation>。

<sup>86</sup> 见 [www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225](http://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225)。在专家小组与南方过渡委员会经济委员会举行会议期间，经济委员会表示，举行这些会议是为了改善局面。

<sup>87</sup> 在 2021 年 8 月 21 日专家小组与南方过渡委员会经济委员会在亚丁举行的会议上，经济委员会澄清说，由于也门政府和也门中央银行没有做好他们的工作，导致也门里亚尔崩盘，基本商品价格上涨，他们不得不进行干预。

77. 国际社会应注意到这场经济危机的严重性，采取具体措施，防止也门进一步分裂，否则可能会导致不可逆转的既成事实。在政治和安全局势没有迅速改善的情况下，今后的经济前景似乎很暗淡，增加了该国的不稳定性。<sup>88</sup>

## B. 被指认的个人及其网络控制财政资源情况

78. 专家小组调查了在安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议下实施的制裁制度指认的个人，或代表其或按其指示行事的个人或实体或由其所拥有或控制的实体违反第 2140(2014)号决议直接或间接拥有或控制的资金、其他金融资产和经济资源。据称，他们采用以下方法为其活动提供资金：

- (a) 没收个人和实体的资产和资金；
- (b) 接受跨界来源提供的资金；
- (c) 从事黑市交易，对进口燃料和其他商业活动非法收费；
- (d) 伪造、走私及贩运麻醉药品、毒品和精神药物、流通券、古董和古物；
- (e) 征收非税收入和天课；
- (f) 征收关税和其他税款。

79. 下文将详细审查其中一些资金来源。

### 1. 没收阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪和其他人的资金

80. 2021年6月27日，萨那的阿马纳专门刑事法院院长向塔德蒙银行发出了一份备忘录，通知他们，阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪被指控“损害也门共和国独立”等罪名成立，以阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪的名字存放在3个特定银行账户中的冻结资金已被法院没收。<sup>89</sup>

81. 该法院进一步指示塔德蒙银行将这些资金转到萨那也门中央银行的特定账户，在检察官的监督下管理。塔德蒙银行告知专家小组，它认为这种转账违反了第 2140(2014)号决议。因此，塔德蒙银行通知萨那也门中央银行行长和专门的刑事起诉机构负责人，称其无法转移这些资金。专家小组收到的资料显示，截至 2021 年 11 月 17 日，塔德蒙银行还没有将这些资金转给萨那也门中央银行。专家小组认为，冻结和没收这些账户可能侵犯人权和违反国际人道法。<sup>90</sup>

<sup>88</sup> 见 [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021)。

<sup>89</sup> 专家小组认为，考虑到本案的政治性质，萨那的阿马纳专门刑事法院是在阿卜杜勒马利克·胡塞(YEi.004)的控制或指示下行事。

<sup>90</sup> 见《世界人权宣言》第十七条；2004年《阿拉伯人权宪章》第三十一条(可查阅 <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/551368?ln=en>)；《1949年8月12日内瓦四公约关于保护非国际性武装冲突受难者的附加议定书》(第二议定书)第4条第2款(g)项；红十字国际委员会，习惯国际人道法数据库规则 50 和 52。

82. 专家小组的调查进一步显示，法院还下令将某些实体存放在一家银行的资金和资产转入萨那也门中央银行的指定账户，但这家银行没有转移任何相关资金和资产。专家小组仍在调查此事(见附件 27)。

## 2. 没收塔德蒙银行的资金

83. 萨那也门中央银行于 2021 年 6 月 28 日，即塔德蒙银行向中央银行表示无法转移阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪被没收资金的同一天，发布了一份通知，指示在胡塞武装控制区运作的所有机构和外汇公司冻结塔德蒙银行存放在他们那里的所有资金和余额，并立即将这些资金和余额转到萨那也门中央银行(见附件 28)。塔德蒙银行报告说，没有在任何外汇公司或机构开立任何账户。专家小组认为，萨那也门中央银行下令没收在其控制范围内经营的银行的资金和余额的这种报复行为，对银行部门的平稳运营以及也门的经济和稳定产生了不利影响。

## 3. 电信部门的收入

84. 尽管冲突不断，但也门的电信业继续大幅增长，并成为了胡塞武装当局的主要收入来源。在胡塞武装控制区运营的公司面临着政策不确定、征收非法规费和手续费、敲诈和资产被没收等问题。发放许可证时故意把有效期缩短，给公司的运营带来不确定性。<sup>91</sup> 专家小组正在调查胡塞武装对主要电信公司即 MTN、Sabafon、也门电信公司和 Y Telecom 的控制程度(见附件 29)。萨那也门电信公司否认被胡塞武装接管，并表示其管理层是在当前冲突发生之前任命的。但也门政府声称将也门电信公司的总部迁到了亚丁，并将该公司置于了自己的控制之下。萨那也门电信公司表示，这一迁址从未正式通知过，因此，根据公司法，也门电信公司并不承认这一迁址。2020 年，Sabafon 公司 80% 的股东决定将 Sabafon 公司总部迁至亚丁。阿卜杜勒·梅斯弗·沙伊尔是阿卜杜勒马利克·胡塞(YEi.004)的亲密伙伴，他在控制 Sabafon 的管理层方面发挥了重要作用。<sup>92</sup>

85. 专家小组正在调查胡塞武装是否已经有效控制了国家最高域“.ye”，以及他们是否正在使用萨那也门电信公司购买的“带宽管理系统”。控制域名和非法使用电信工具可能会使胡塞武装有能力监测和拦截流量，审查内容，关闭互联网，禁止社交媒体网站和个人短信服务，监测对手的私人通信，以及封锁全国各地的域名。据称，胡塞武装利用这一设备监测对手的数据、信息、文本、语音和视频流量。萨那的也门电信公司向专家小组澄清说，“也门法律要求互联网服务供应商过滤某些违反法律和伊斯兰教义的内容，他们这样做的目的是保护儿童免受任何不当内容的影响，不存在非法使用”。<sup>93</sup>

<sup>91</sup> 专家小组从机密来源得到的信息是，电信部每年从萨那的电信公司收取 1 320 万美元的续约费，考虑到频率费和管理费，胡塞武装每年从 MTN 和 Sabafon 获取的总收入约为 2 200 万美元。

<sup>92</sup> 也门政府给专家小组的信和机密信息来源。2019 年 7 月 29 日，阿卜杜勒·梅斯弗·沙伊尔(萨利赫·梅斯弗·萨利赫·沙伊尔(YEi.007)的兄弟)被任命为萨那 Sabafon 公司的总裁(见 S/2020/326，附件 26)。

<sup>93</sup> 2021 年 12 月 17 日萨那也门电信公司给专家小组的信。

86. 专家小组正在调查 Al Mahara 的也门海关当局扣押萨那一家电信公司进口的电信设备的案件，该公司未获得也门政府电信和信息技术部的许可或批准。

87. 也门政府告诉专家小组，政府已经扣押了许多电信设备货物，而且有几十批这样的货物通过走私网络落到了胡塞武装的手中。专家小组继续进行调查。电信服务对平民百姓来说至关重要，电信部门采取的任何措施都不应给平民百姓带来任何不利后果(见附件 29)。

#### 4. 燃料进口黑市及非法收费

88. 2020 年 6 月之前，荷台达港是也门进口燃料的主要港口(48%)；此后，燃料进口格局发生了重大变化。2021 年 4 月和 5 月，抵达荷台达港的燃料进口份额已降至 8%<sup>94</sup> (见附件 31)。也门政府称，<sup>95</sup> 2021 年 4 月至 5 月期间，通过陆路向胡塞武装控制区运送的燃料量约为每天 10 000 吨，占进口到也门燃料的 65%，而 2021 年 1 月至 3 月的供应量为 6 000 吨，<sup>96</sup> 呈上升趋势。各种消息来源称，胡塞武装制造一种燃料的人为稀缺性，迫使商人在胡塞武装经营的黑市上售卖，并从销售中收取非法费用。根据也门政府提供的信息，胡塞武装在燃料进口方面收取的官方收入(即通过荷台达港的海关和其他税收)超过 700 亿也门里亚尔。<sup>97</sup>

89. 专家小组收到的信息是，虽然关税是在非胡塞武装控制区的第一个进口港口收取的，但胡塞武装在其陆地海关站向贸易商非法收取额外费用和关税。<sup>98</sup> 对许多人而言，向胡塞武装控制区供应燃料这笔买卖非常有利可图，而终端消费者却要付出代价：也门政府提高了经其控制港口进口燃料的海关收费；据称，南方过渡委员会也通过亚丁港向进口商收取每升进口燃料约 12 也门里亚尔的费用；<sup>99</sup> 进口商和贸易商抓住这个机会致富(见附件 31)。专家小组获悉，燃料价格上涨对国际人道主义组织的执行伙伴产生了不利影响。

#### 5. 伪造本票

90. 专家小组在其 2018 年 1 月 26 日报告(S/2018/594)第 142 至 144 段和附件 53 以及其 2019 年 1 月 25 日报告(S/2019/83)第 125 段中提到一个案件，涉及 2017 年 5 月 25 日在政府控制的焦夫地区截获了一辆卡车，内载有价值 350 亿也门里亚尔(相当于 1.4 亿美元)、在也门境外印刷的本票。专家小组援引这一案例说明胡

<sup>94</sup> 见也门政府的新闻稿，可查阅 [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405)。

<sup>95</sup> 同上。

<sup>96</sup> 见 <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>。

<sup>97</sup> 见 [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405)。

<sup>98</sup> 例如，一个进口商说，2021 年 2 月以来，胡塞武装可从每升燃料中收取 37 也门里亚尔。

<sup>99</sup> 专家小组从一个进口商处获悉，早些时候，南方过渡委员会要求他们每升支付 7 也门里亚尔，但自 2021 年 4 月起，涨到了每升 12 也门里亚尔，这笔钱存入了亚丁一家外汇公司的指定账户(出于安全考虑，本报告不能透露细节)。然而，在专家小组 2021 年 8 月 21 日在亚丁与南方过渡委员会经济委员会举行会议期间，经济委员会澄清说，这笔钱是地方税。

塞武装是如何试图通过印刷本票并将其带入也门用作法定货币来解决现金短缺问题的。

91. 德国美因法兰克福地区法院于 2018 年 3 月判定居住在德国的伊朗国民 Reza Heidari 有罪，判处其 7 年徒刑。2021 年，专家小组收到了关于此案的进一步资料和证据，以及 2020 年 5 月 15 日的上诉判决书副本，其中确认了对他参与此案的五年监禁判决。专家小组仍在调查此事。

### C. 沙特存款

92. 专家小组在其前一份最后报告中报告了沙特存款机制的执行情况。报告发表后收到的信息使得对其中数据有了新的认识。因此，专家小组更新了那份报告，指出在进行最后评估之前，第九.B 节、附件 28 和表 1 中与之有关的案文以及该报告第 161 段所载建议可以忽略不看。因此，专家小组进行了审核，审核的全部内容见附件 32。

93. 审核期间，专家小组与所有相关的利益攸关方进行了互动，并审议了从这些利益攸关方那里收到的最新信息，包括专家小组上一次最后报告提交后所进行交易的信息。专家小组经审核发现，进口商自己利用沙特存款的好处，通过市场利率和也门中央银行实施沙特存款机制时采用的信用证利率之间的差额，获得了总额为 3.7027 亿美元的巨额好处。专家小组经审核发现，沙特存款机制在实施方面存在缺陷，有可能使进口商能够留出预先提供给他们的好处，而不是将好处转给消费者。

94. 根据附件 32 所详述的专家小组掌握的信息和证据，专家小组的最后审核未发现确凿证据来证实关于腐败、洗钱或精英把持的指控。

### D. 监测旅行禁令和资产冻结措施

95. 2021 年 2 月 25 日，安全理事会通过了第 2564(2021)号决议，指认了萨那刑事调查局局长苏丹·萨利赫·艾达·扎宾(YEi.006)。据某媒体报道，2021 年 4 月 5 日，内政部宣布扎宾因绝症去世。<sup>100</sup> 专家小组尚未收到任何证实他死亡的证据。

## 七. 违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为

96. 在也门，违反和践踏国际人道法和国际人权法的行为是系统性的，所有各方都有实施这些行为，而且绝大多数都没有受到惩罚。司法系统薄弱，在也门发布命令或裁决的少数任意逮捕和/或拘留案件中，当局和安全部队基本上无视这些裁决。<sup>101</sup> 因此，司法机构无法履行防范侵犯人权行为的预防和保护职能。<sup>102</sup>

<sup>100</sup> 见 [www.ypagency.net/354210](http://www.ypagency.net/354210)。

<sup>101</sup> 专家小组记录了 3 起当局无视释放被拘留者命令的案件(关于司法机构成员遭到的攻击，见 S/2021/79，第 130-131 段)。在本报告所述期间，专家小组又调查了 3 起案件。

<sup>102</sup> 见《世界人权宣言》第八条和《公民及政治权利国际公约》第二条。

97. 在本报告所述期间，任意逮捕和拘留记者和人权维护者以及威胁他们的情况仍然很普遍，影响了他们记录和报告侵权行为的能力(见附件 34)。<sup>103</sup>

98. 受害者不仅求助渠道极少，而且几乎得不到任何援助；那些被任意拘留以及/或遭酷刑和/或眼见资产被掠夺的人往往最后一无所剩。不断受到威胁导致大多数人无法返回家园。对于家庭主要经济支柱失踪或被拘留的家庭来说也是如此。在这两种情况下，妇女都特别脆弱(见第 41 段)。

99. 冲突持续使得司法和补救机制的创建推迟。确保保护记录侵权行为的人并保存他们的档案至关重要。

## A. 归咎于联盟的行为和事件

### 1. 联盟发动的空袭

100. 专家小组调查了联盟 2021 年发动的 6 次空袭：(a) 1 月 16 日在马里卜省的 Mahliyah；(b) 2 月 28 日在荷台达省的 Hawak；(c) 3 月 7 日在萨那的 Thawrah；(d) 5 月 10 日在贝达省的 Rada'；(e) 3 月 21 日在荷台达省的萨利夫；(f) 9 月 18 日在夏卜瓦省的 Markhah al-Ulya。这些事件造成 12 名平民死亡，包括 2 名儿童和 1 名妇女，13 人受伤，包括 3 名儿童和 3 名妇女。专家小组结束了对涉及 1 月 16 日和 2 月 28 日空袭案件的调查(见附件 33)。

101. 2020 年和 2021 年，沙特阿拉伯向专家小组提供了向 10 起事件的受害者支付赔偿金的细节，<sup>104</sup> 包括专家小组调查的 2016 年 8 月 15 日哈杰医院遇袭事件。<sup>105</sup>

### 2. 阿拉伯联合酋长国的拘留案件

102. 专家小组调查了涉及阿拉伯联合酋长国驻也门人员的任意逮捕和拘留、强迫失踪和酷刑案件。专家小组收到的证据表明，2018 年至 2021 年期间，有 3 人在阿拉伯联合酋长国部队控制的下列地点被拘留：夏卜瓦省 Balhaf；穆卡拉 Rayyan 机场；哈德拉毛省 Dubbah 油港和 Ash Shihr；以及塔伊兹的穆哈港(见附件 34)。阿拉伯联合酋长国在给专家小组的信中否认了阿联酋国民在拘禁他人期间违反国际人道法和国际人权法的指控。

<sup>103</sup> 另见 S/2021/79，第十一.E 节。

<sup>104</sup> 专家小组尚未能核实此事。

<sup>105</sup> 见 S/2018/193，附件 49 的附录 C。其他事件的发生日期是：2015 年 5 月 2 日、7 月 2 日和 11 日、8 月 30 日和 9 月 9 日，2016 年 9 月 10 日、2017 年 12 月 19 日、2019 年 5 月 21 日和 2020 年 8 月 6 日。

103. 阿拉伯联合酋长国告知专家小组，与拘留有关的违反国际人道法和国际人权法行为的指控已提交联合事件评估小组处理。<sup>106</sup> 联合事件评估小组证实，虽然他们在 2018 年 3 月调查了一起涉及 6 艘渔船和约 90 名渔民的拘留案件，但他们的任务范围内不涉及反恐活动。

104. 此外，阿拉伯联合酋长国表示，根据也门政府 2015 年底发布的决定，2015 年 12 月至 2020 年 7 月，<sup>107</sup> 阿联酋与亚丁安全主任沙拉勒·阿里·沙耶少将在联盟反恐行动方面进行了合作。在上述期间，专家小组记录了几起归咎于沙耶少将或其部队违反国际人道法和国际人权法的案件。<sup>108</sup>

## B. 也门政府的拘留案件

105. 专家小组调查了政府部队在哈德拉毛省、马里卜省、夏卜瓦省和塔伊兹任意逮捕和拘留的 18 起案件；1 起案件涉及 1 名妇女(见附件 34)。在塔伊兹，1 起案件涉及第 170 旅，包括 1 名平民在拘留期间死亡的案件，<sup>109</sup> 1 起案件涉及第 22 “Mika” 旅。夏卜瓦省的大多数任意逮捕和拘留案件似乎都是出于政治动机，因为记录在案的 7 起案件中有 5 起涉及南方过渡委员会成员或支持者，包括 1 名未成年人。

## C. 南方过渡委员会控制区的拘留案件

106. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组调查了 16 起隶属于南方过渡委员会的武装团体在亚丁、拉赫季和索科特拉的任意逮捕和拘留案件，包括 2 名记者的案件(见附件 34)。

107. 其中 3 起案件涉及反恐部队在南方过渡委员会在亚丁的大院内一个非官方监狱拘留人员的指控。<sup>110</sup>

108. 特别值得关注的是，有 2 起案件的人员是在拉赫季的 Tawr al-Bahah 地区第 9 旅控制的检查站被枪杀的。

<sup>106</sup> 专家小组调查了阿拉伯联合酋长国官员在也门在拘留方面违反国际人道法和国际人权法的几起案件。见 S/2021/79，第 127 段；S/2020/326，第 100-101 段；S/2019/83，第 142 段；S/2018/594，第 166-172 段；S/2018/193，第 132-134 段。2018 年 12 月，阿拉伯联合酋长国在给专家小组的信中否认有任何参与也门境内违反国际人道法或国际人权法的行为，并指出，阿联酋部队在也门的任何营地没有拘留设施，也没有被拘留者。阿联酋还告诉专家小组，当时所有逮捕行动和随后的程序都是由也门政府承担的。2021 年 7 月，阿拉伯联合酋长国告知专家小组，这封信的内容仍然适用。

<sup>107</sup> 2020 年 3 月至 12 月期间，沙耶少将不在亚丁。阿拉伯联合酋长国表示，自从沙耶少将不再担任亚丁安全主任之后，就没有和他打过交道。

<sup>108</sup> 见 S/2021/79，第 132 段和附件 32；S/2020/326，第 100-101 和 105-108 段及附件 28；S/2019/83，第 158 段及附件 41；S/2018/594，第 180-181 段及附件 65。

<sup>109</sup> 专家小组收到的证据表明，这名未成年人被枪杀，身上有遭到暴力袭击的痕迹。

<sup>110</sup> 北纬 12°46'32.1，东经 44°59'18.9”。

109. 在亚丁，被控参与袭击清真寺和神职人员的 14 名人员目前正在被起诉。专家小组收到的证据表明，其中至少有 10 人在拘留期间遭到过酷刑，并被迫在供状上签字；主审法官无视这些证据。

110. 专家小组还收到证据表明，自 2016 年以来在亚丁失踪的 3 名男子一度被关押在曼苏拉监狱，随后被监狱主管部门移交给了反恐部队。<sup>111</sup>

111. 2021 年 2 月，司法机构成员开始在南部也门罢工，抗议司法委员会内部的腐败指控。8 月，专家小组获悉，几名被拘留者因罢工未能获释，司法部门同意每周恢复工作两次。但每周工作两天无法处理完积压案件。因此，许多被拘留者的拘留期继续延长，或者审判推迟。

112. 记录的索科特拉的 3 起案件涉及批评南方过渡委员会的平民。他们被短期逮捕，没有人受到正式指控(见附件 34)。

#### D. 西海岸联合部队的拘留案件

113. 专家小组调查了海斯、克哈和穆哈发生的 6 起违反国际人道法和国际人权法的案件；4 起案件涉及民族抵抗力量，2 起案件涉及第 1 和第 7 巨人旅(见附件 34)。1 起案件涉及 1 名未成年人，被拘了近两年。在这些涉及 4 至 23 个月拘留的案件中，受害者都没有被送交司法或其他公正机构。民族抵抗力量告诉专家小组，由于敌对行动，海斯的法庭未开庭。

#### E. 归咎于胡塞武装的事件

##### 1. 对平民使用爆炸物

##### (a) 炮击

114. 专家小组调查了胡塞武装在马里卜省和塔伊兹人口居住区滥用爆炸物的 8 起事件，据称这些事件造成 33 人死亡，包括 8 名儿童，另外 51 人受伤，包括 11 名儿童(见附件 36)。<sup>112</sup>

115. 2021 年初以来，马里卜省周围的激烈战斗给平民带来了严重后果。有几次袭击使用了炮弹等爆炸装置，击中了境内流离失所者营地，造成平民伤亡，民用物体被毁。还导致许多已经几次流离失所的人再次流离失所，使他们的需求增加且变得更加脆弱。2 月 8 日至 17 日期间，Zawr 营地至少遭到了两次袭击，其中胡塞武装不仅袭击了营地，还埋下了地雷；2 月 19 日至 21 日，Sawabin 营地和 Haylan 营地至少遭到两次攻击；3 月 16 日至 4 月 4 日，Milh 营地遭到 5 次攻击，Tawasul 营地 2 次，Khair 营地 2 次，Dhat al-Ra'营地 1 次，Suwaydah 营地 1 次。<sup>113</sup>

<sup>111</sup> 专家小组查阅了曼苏拉监狱长与亚丁安全主任在 2020 年 11 月至 2021 年 1 月之间的信函往来。信中未具体写明移交日期。

<sup>112</sup> 尽管从多个来源收到了资料，但专家小组无法确定一些案件受害者的确切人数。

<sup>113</sup> 专家小组收到了马里卜省主管部门和也门政府的报告，进行了访谈，并收到了能直接进入营地的当地来源提供的视频、图片和报告。专家小组注意到了 2021 年 4 月 26 日也门常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信(S/2021/405)。



116. 这些案件表明，胡塞武装继续无视区分原则和保护平民原则。专家小组注意到，至少在马里卜省的 1 起事件中使用了无人机(见图十五)。根据专家小组的分析，胡塞武装无人机的准确性很高。

117. 对远离交战前线的塔伊兹和马里卜省居民区进行系统攻击，可被视为是旨在向平民人口散布恐怖行为，这是国际人道法所禁止的行为(见附件 36)。<sup>114</sup>

图十五

马里卜省袭击中使用的无人机的碎片



资料来源：保密。

(b) 地雷、简易爆炸装置和未爆弹药

118. 胡塞武装存在普遍和系统滥用地雷和简易爆炸装置的情况。2016 年以来，专家小组记录了这一情况对平民造成的毁灭性影响(见 S/2021/79, 第 140-142 段；S/2020/326, 第 115-117 段；S/2018/193, 附件 43 和 44)。

119. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组收集了关于这一问题的大量证据，特别是在 8 月访问受影响最严重的地区之一西海岸期间。专家小组的调查结果载于附件 35。

<sup>114</sup> 见《1949 年日内瓦四公约第二附加议定书》第十三条第二款；和红十字国际委员会，习惯国际人道法数据库规则 2。

## 2. 拘留

120. 专家小组调查了 17 起案件，涉及 50 名胡塞武装当局在拘留方面违反国际人道法或国际人权法行为(包括性暴力和酷刑)的受害者。<sup>115</sup> 受害者中有 6 名记者和 11 名妇女(见附件 34)。<sup>116</sup>

121. 2019 年以来，专家小组调查了一起涉及 10 人的案件，<sup>117</sup> 其中包括 1 名因胡塞武装最高政治理事会主席萨利赫·萨马德于 2018 年 4 月被杀而被捕的未成年人。他们在 2018 年 9 月至 10 月期间被捕，并被关押在一个秘密地点。他们的家人没有任何关于他们下落的消息，直到 2019 年 4 月 17 日他们出现在了电视上，由阿明·阿里·艾哈迈德·扎巴拉法官主持的审判开始。<sup>118</sup> 专家小组收到的证据表明，他们受到了酷刑并被迫在供状上签字。虽然庭审期间提到了这一点，但没有采取任何措施。其中 1 人据称因酷刑于 2019 年 8 月 7 日在拘留期间死亡。专家小组还收到了许多违反被拘留者司法保证的证据：不仅他们的供词是通过酷刑获得的，并被用作对他们不利的证据，而且在他们没有接触到律师的情况下就开始审判。他们的律师不得不几次要求查阅证据。被告几次无法在开庭前会见律师。律师接到庭审通知的时间很短，几乎没有时间准备。2020 年 8 月 24 日，被拘者都被判处了死刑，上诉维持了死刑判决。<sup>119</sup> 9 人全部被公开处决。他们的家属在行刑前一天才得到通知。由于许多人的家人住在荷台达，因此，无法及时前往萨那。

122. 专家小组继续调查 4 名记者被判处死刑但仍被拘在萨那的案件。<sup>120</sup> 根据收到的资料，在本报告所述期间曾讨论将他们纳入囚犯交换计划，但没有结果。

## 3. 招募儿童

123. 专家小组收到了一份由胡塞武装招募、2020 年在战场上阵亡的 1 406 名儿童的名单。专家小组还收到了一份由胡塞武装招募、2021 年 1 月至 5 月期间在战场上阵亡的 562 名儿童的名单。<sup>121</sup> 他们的年龄在 10 至 17 岁之间，其中相当多的人在阿姆兰、达玛、哈杰、荷台达、伊卜、萨达和萨那遇害(见附件 10)。

<sup>115</sup> 主要见《日内瓦四公约》共同第 3 条；《1949 年日内瓦四公约第二附加议定书》第四、五和六条；以及红十字国际委员会，习惯国际人道法数据库规则 90、93、98、100、123 和 125。

<sup>116</sup> 见 S/2020/326 第 22 和 118 段以及 S/2021/79 第 137 段。

<sup>117</sup> 证据包括来自至少 6 个不同来源(其中包括受害者亲属)的面谈、报告和法庭文件。

<sup>118</sup> 见 [www.Almanar.com.lb/5135682](http://www.Almanar.com.lb/5135682)。

<sup>119</sup> 根据专家小组收到的资料，上诉法官是：Abdul Hafeez Abdul Razzaq Al Mahbashi、Hammoud Ahmed Al-Qulaisi 和 Muhammad Lotf Al-Zubayri。

<sup>120</sup> 见 S/2021/79 第 147 段。

<sup>121</sup> 这两份名单是由一个保密来源和也门政府依据胡塞武装的公开媒体公告编制。专家小组还收到一份报告，其中载有 640 名儿童的姓名。专家小组随时愿意与委员会分享这些名单。

#### 4. 基于宗教原因的迫害和歧视

124. 专家小组记录了胡塞武装控制区系统迫害犹太人的情况。大多数犹太人在前总统阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫领导下开始迫害犹太人之后几年离开了也门，但在胡塞武装领导下对犹太人的迫害变本加厉。专家小组知道，约有 7 名犹太人仍在也门，其中 1 人尽管 2019 年 7 月发布了释放他的命令，但仍被拘。专家小组还记录了 2 起因宗教信仰被胡塞武装拘留的基督徒的案件(见附件 34)。

125. 尽管许多巴哈教派的教徒已被驱逐出也门，但针对他们的司法程序依然有效；<sup>122</sup> 目标之一是完成对他们的资产和财产的查封。阿卜杜勒马利克·胡塞(YEi.004)在 2021 年 3 月的一次演讲中指责“美国人为破坏伊斯兰教正试图在也门创建巴哈教、艾哈迈德教，宣传无神论”，<sup>123</sup> 表示支持这一有系统的迫害政策。<sup>124</sup>

#### 5. 袭击平民

126. 专家小组调查了胡塞武装 2021 年 1 月在塔伊兹的希马地区几个村庄对平民的袭击。根据收到的资料、报告和证词，袭击造成 13 人死亡，包括 1 名儿童，47 人受伤，包括 7 名儿童和 7 名妇女，257 人被捕，包括 14 名儿童，约 150 个家庭流离失所。<sup>125</sup> 至少有 3 所学校遭胡塞武装突袭，胡塞武装将学校用于了军事目的和拘留之用。希马地区之前在 2017 年 12 月和 2019 年 4 月遭到过袭击。

127. 2021 年 9 月底，胡塞武装包围了马里卜省的阿卜迪耶县，封锁了道路，导致平民几个星期粮食和药品短缺。<sup>126</sup> 专家小组收到资料称，59 名男子在此期间被胡塞武装逮捕，<sup>127</sup> 还收到证词称，通信天线被毁，使得很难了解有关情况的信息。

#### F. 归咎于阿拉伯半岛基地组织的行为

128. 2021 年 6 月 14 日，5 名也门政府调查员在靠近贝达边界的夏卜瓦省的 Kura 被阿拉伯半岛基地组织绑架，这是该团体控制区。该组织发布了一段被拘留者的视频，要求也门政府用阿拉伯半岛基地组织成员交换这些人。被拘者于 2021 年 7 月 5 日获释。

#### G. 土地纠纷

129. 土地和财产纠纷是也门长期存在的问题。但多年的冲突削弱了解决冲突的制度，特别是司法和安全机制，卷入纠纷的武装团体和帮派的力量增强。过去几

<sup>122</sup> 见 S/2021/79，第 139 段。

<sup>123</sup> 见 <https://web.archive.org/web/20210310212347/https://www.almasirah.net/post/181849>。

<sup>124</sup> 见 S/2021/79，第 139 段；S/2019/83，第 154 段；S/2018/193，第 149 段。

<sup>125</sup> 专家小组从当地来源和非政府组织收到了包括图片、报告和视频在内的资料。

<sup>126</sup> 这主要是由于商业物项受阻。根据专家小组收到的资料，世界粮食计划署按最初计划于 9 月初和 10 月底向大约 15 000 人分发了粮食。

<sup>127</sup> 据新闻报道，11 月 4 日有 52 人获释。见 <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3162733.htm> 和 <https://twitter.com/abdulqadernord/status/1456239360844632068>。

年土地价格也有所上涨。因此，土地纠纷引发的暴力事件增多，平民的土地和住房被武装团体夺走，他们变得更加脆弱。

130. 专家小组调查了一个案件来说明这一问题。2021年8月10日，塔伊兹的Bi'r Bashah发生了一起土地纠纷案，这块土地属于Al-Harq家族，却被隶属于也门政府第145旅Majid Al-Araj领导的一个团体给占了。纠纷导致Majid Al-Araj、他的1名手下和Al-Harq家的4名男子被杀，另有1人受伤。随后，隶属于Al-Araj的一个团体袭击了Al-Harq的住房，当时在场的有妇女和儿童。Al-Harq家族的3名成员被捕：2名未成年人和1名年轻人，其中这名年轻人在被拘期间死亡。塔伊兹军方告诉专家小组，他们进行了干预，以确保该地区的安全，2名拒捕的嫌疑人被打死，另有9人被拘。

## H. 移民

131. 2021年3月7日，萨那的移民和护照归化局拘留所发生了一起事件，导致约45名移民死亡，另有202人受伤。<sup>128</sup>

132. 根据收到的资料，先是警卫和因拘留条件而绝食的移民之间发生争执，之后安全部队进行了干预，并将催泪弹扔进了移民反锁的机库。结果，这个过于拥挤、通风不良的建筑发生了火灾，机库只有一扇门。<sup>129</sup> 据胡塞当局称，当天拘留所有862名移民，事发时有358人在机库。<sup>130</sup> 根据收到的资料，胡塞当局没收了受害者的手机，包括在医院，试图阻止此事传出去。

133. 胡塞武装就此事公开指责国际移民组织，说该组织未能遣返移民，导致过度拥挤。<sup>131</sup> 此外，根据收到的资料，一群移民在事件发生后发表声明表示，发生火灾是由于移民之间的打斗，<sup>132</sup> 但这份声明是胡塞武装当局对移民领袖施压后发布的。

134. 当地媒体报道，胡塞武装当局展开调查，导致11人被捕。<sup>133</sup> 专家小组收到的证据显示，事件发生后有4人被拘。大约四个月后，这些人在调查得出结论认为火灾是一起事故，他们没有犯下任何罪行后被释放。<sup>134</sup>

135. 2021年7月至9月，胡塞武装在焦夫开展“安全运动”，逮捕了700多名移民，其中一些人被强行驱逐出胡塞武装控制区，而其他人则被拘。

<sup>128</sup> 专家小组从多个来源获悉，约有28人在被送往医院后因伤势过重死亡。据也门负责调查据称侵犯人权情况的国家委员会统计，受害者人数为400人(见 [www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf](http://www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf))。

<sup>129</sup> 专家小组收到了国际人道主义组织、当地非政府组织和个人提供的资料。

<sup>130</sup> 见 [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005)。

<sup>131</sup> 见 [www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212](http://www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212)。

<sup>132</sup> 专家小组收到了声明副本。

<sup>133</sup> 见 [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005)。

<sup>134</sup> 专家小组手中有这些文件的副本。

## 八. 阻碍运送和分发人道主义援助物资

136. 据报，2020 年底以来，在人道主义准入和人道主义组织在胡塞武装控制区进行方案评估的可能性方面取得了一些进展。世界粮食计划署在遭到萨那当局长期阻挠后，仍在实施一项生物识别项目，以保障人道主义援助物资的安全。还创建了定期向马里卜提供人道主义空运服务。<sup>135</sup>

137. 但在胡塞武装控制区有效提供人道主义援助仍然面临许多障碍：副协议审批拖延，要求提供受益人名单细节，施压影响执行伙伴的选择或方案设计，限制进入和不让走动，包括对女性人员任意安排“男子”陪护，<sup>136</sup> 以及骚扰人道主义工作人员。地方当局往往通过在检查站阻挡卡车或威胁人道主义人员来试图强行加上自己的要求。专家小组还记录了一些案例，在这些案例中，如果谁家拒绝让其子女加入胡塞武装，就会受到威胁，说把他们的名字从受益人名单上删掉(见附件 10)。

138. 专家小组收到的证据表明，胡塞武装虐待、骚扰和持续阻挠一个特定的人道主义组织，迫使该组织改变政策。虐待行为包括人身暴力、任意逮捕和拘留、拒发签证或不让入境、驱逐高级工作人员、限制人员和用品的流动以及干扰服务提供方的活动和选择(见附件 37)。

139. 除了 2021 年 11 月被捕的 2 名联合国雇员外，<sup>137</sup> 专家小组的记录还显示，胡塞当局逮捕和拘留了另外 3 名人道主义人员。

140. 媒体的反联合国活动仍在进行中。这不仅对人道主义活动不利，而且还带来了额外的安全风险(见 S/2021/79，第 48 段和附件 7 和 8)。

141. 在也门南部，政府当局的软弱无力使得地方行为体可以强行加上自己的要求。人道主义组织的安全风险也在增加。专家小组记录了 5 起人道主义人员或货物在检查站受阻的事件，以及 3 起人道主义组织的车辆在阿比扬和塔伊兹被不明身份者劫持事件。

142. 2020 年 4 月，在也门南部，1 个人道主义组织的一些活动因对一些政府工作人员的激励措施存在分歧而暂停数月。

<sup>135</sup> 见 S/2021/79，第三节。

<sup>136</sup> 这项规定禁止女性在没有男性家庭成员陪同的情况下出行。这项规定限制了人道主义组织女雇员履行职责的可能性，如果不遵守，她们将被逮捕和拘留。

<sup>137</sup> 见 <https://apnews.com/article/science-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-nations-yemen-fl38d377483ac1e1d106b131c9676286>。

## 九. 建议

143. 专家小组建议安全理事会在下一份决议中：

(a) 呼吁南方过渡委员会和也门政府不要采取破坏《利雅得协议》的行动，并表示打算对参与这些行为者实施制裁；

(b) 呼吁胡塞武装、也门政府、联合部队和联盟不要采取破坏《斯德哥尔摩协议》的行动，并表示打算对参与这些行为者实施制裁；

(c) 呼吁冲突各方不要利用教育、宗教和公共机构煽动对任何群体或民族的仇恨或暴力，并表示打算对这些行为的责任人实施制裁；

(d) 呼吁冲突各方不要利用学校、夏令营和清真寺招募儿童，并表示打算对这些行为的责任人实施制裁；

(e) 促请会员国加大力度，打击通过陆路和海路走私武器和部件的行为，确保执行定向武器禁运；

(f) 促请会员国就专家小组在武器系统内记录的出口商用部件被列名个人所用问题，加强尽职调查措施(见 S/2021/79，附件 19 和 20)，并向委员会报告；

(g) 促请冲突各方采取措施，防止也门经济，包括银行和金融机构进一步崩离析，并表示打算对这些行为的责任人实施制裁；

(h) 促请冲突各方确保追究其部队违反国际人道法和国际人权法行为的责任，并立即向受害者提供补救和支持；

(i) 促请会员国、冲突各方和其他相关利益攸关方考虑为也门创建过渡时期司法机制；

(j) 回顾第 2474(2019)号决议，促请冲突各方采取一切适当措施，积极寻找据报失踪人员，创建适当渠道，使得能够与失踪人员家人沟通，并考虑创建向这些人员家人提供支助的机制；

(k) 促请胡塞武装采取措施，停止滥用地雷，记录地雷的放置情况，清除其控制下平民区的现有地雷。

144. 专家小组建议安全理事会在也门问题月度会议议程中重点讨论：

(a) 如附件 9 所述，也门女性被拘留者面临的挑战；将这些妇女纳入今后的过渡时期司法举措，并考虑让也门政府和也门其他相关利益攸关方参与这一讨论；

(b) 利用教育、宗教和公共机构传播仇恨言论、鼓励暴力和招募儿童，并考虑让也门政府和也门其他相关利益攸关方参与这一讨论。

145. 专家小组建议委员会考虑：

(a) 与会员国讨论是否有可能按照第 2467(2019)号决议第 17 段的规定，设立一个性暴力幸存者专用基金，其中包括也门的幸存者；

(b) 与《关于常规武器和两用物品及技术出口控制的瓦森纳安排》接触，将胡塞武装的导弹、无人机和水载简易爆炸装置使用的商业部件列入其两用物品和技术清单；

(c) 鼓励冲突各方和包括国际调解人在内的其他相关利益攸关方采取措施，防止也门经济进一步分崩离析，包括让银行和金融机构参与和平进程；

(d) 鼓励会员国支持也门负责调查据称侵犯人权情况的国家委员会，特别是在保护其档案方面，包括为此创建境外数字备份，同时促请冲突各方与委员会合作；

(e) 与冲突各方和国际调解人接触，将问责、司法和补救措施纳入和平进程；

(f) 鼓励会员国通过为排雷人员组织培训课等方式，向也门的排雷活动提供更多支持。

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## **Annex 1     Methodology**

1. The Panel used satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also used commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

## Appendix A 'The opportunity to reply' methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity<sup>1</sup> in a Panel's public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the 'opportunity to reply'.
2. The Panel's methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
  - (a) Providing an individual with an 'opportunity to reply' should be the norm.
  - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
    - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation.
    - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources.
    - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members.
    - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field.
    - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

## **Appendix B      Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses**

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, [S/2006/997](#), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

- (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
- (b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
  - (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims.
  - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavor to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations.
  - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixelation distortion:
    - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
    - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
  - (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident.
  - (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and

- international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
- (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced.
  - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area.
  - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody.
  - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates.
  - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities.
  - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.
  - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim.
  - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates.
  - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (xx) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
  - (xxi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from

detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture.

- (xxii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.
  
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
  - (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained.
  - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
  
- (e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:
  - (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
  - (ii) Interviews with people and organization providing assistance to these children.
  - (i) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.
  
- (f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt".
  
- (f) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel's standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian

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home, or in violations associated with children.

- (g) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.
3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.
  4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.





### Annex 3 Summary of Panel correspondence

**Table 3.1**

Correspondence with Member States

<i>Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December/Comments</i>
Belarus	2		
Bulgaria	1		
People's Republic of China	4	4	
Canada	1	1	
France	2	1	
Gabon	1		
Germany	1		
Greece	1		
India	1		
Islamic Republic of Iran	8		
Japan	1		
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	23	8	
Oman	7	5	
Russian Federation	2		
Somalia	1	1	
Sweden	1	1	
Syria	1		
Turkey	1	1	
United Arab Emirates	3	1	One was a partial response.
United Kingdom	1	1	Engagement ongoing in respect of response.
United States of America	8		
Yemen	23	15	One was a partial response.
<b>Total (21)</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>39</b>	

**Table 3.2**

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December</i>
Sana'a based ministry of foreign affairs	5	5	1
Sana'a based central bank of yemen	1	1	1
Southern Transitional Council	2	1	1
National Resistance Forces Guards of the Republic	5	2	1
Puntland	1	1	
<b>Total (5)</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	

**Table 3.3**  
Correspondence with international and regional organizations

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>
World Food Programme	1	
United Nations High Commission for Refugees	1	
International Organization for Migration	1	
United Nations Children's Fund	1	
World Health Organization	1	1
UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	1	
<b>Total (6)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>

**Table 3.4**  
Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities


<i>Commercial company</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters</i>
Aurum Ship Management FZC	1	1
Al Mantab Logistics Company (SFZ) LLC	1	
Al Talib Shipping Company LLC	1	1
BCD & ME GmbH	1	1
Dawood Group of Companies, Sana'a	1	1
Hayel Saeed Group	3	
Carl Walther GmbH	1	
Central Bank Yemen (Aden)	4	
International Smart Digital Interface Company LLC	2	
Lonca Paz. Mak. San. Tic. A.S.	1	1
MTN Group	1	1
OHI Marine LLC	1	
Sabafon, Aden	1	1
Sabafon, Sana'a	1	1
Stamos Steam Ship Co	1	
Swaid & Sons for Exchange Co	1	1
Tadhamon Bank	2	
Tele Yemen, Sana'a	2	
Tele Yemen, Aden	1	1
TORM A/S	1	
Walbro LLC	1	
Zodiac Maritime Ltd	1	
Al Yah Satellite Communications Company P.T.S.C (Yahsat)	1	
Y Telecom	1	1
Yemen Net	1	1
<b>Total (25)</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>12</b>

## Annex 4 Battle for Ma'rib and Shabwah in 2021

1. The hostilities which escalated in the first half of 2020 have continued throughout 2021.<sup>2</sup> The Houthis made significant territorial gains, including in areas in the Governorates of Al Baydah, Shabwah, Ma'rib, and Al Hudaydah. While the Government of Yemen, the Coalition air forces, and the West Coast Joint Forces (WCJF) have engaged in both offensive and defensive operations<sup>3</sup> (see map 4.1 and table 4.1), the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has mostly been defensive in its battles against the Houthis.

Map 4.1

### Houthi military gains in September-October 2021 around Ma'rib City



*Source:* Panel

2. Despite support from the Coalition and some local tribes, the Government of Yemen has not been able to maintain all its front lines against the Houthis (Table 4.1). Like in 2020, the Houthis largely focused on increasing hostilities on the Ma'rib frontlines, despite significant human casualties, in 2021. They have been conducting a war of attrition by continuously sending reinforcements to the multiple battle fronts; targeting civilian and military infrastructure with short-range missiles and UAVs; as well as targeting government-allied tribes, for example, in the encirclement in Al Abdiya.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In 2019, the Panel reported that the frontlines remained relatively stable (paragraph 11, S/2020/326).

<sup>3</sup> For example, this includes areas in Maqbanah, Hays and Al Ain and Hess Junction, Ta'izz. Information from military sources.

<sup>4</sup> The encirclement started around 23 September 2021, after the Houthis successfully cut the last supply line, when it took over Harib in Ma'rib. The encirclement lasted until approximately mid-October 2021 and had significant negative consequences for the civilians affected and for the overall conflict. Some individuals fighting in the Jebel Murad area stated that this had an impact also on the fighting in Jabal Murad, as the tribal fighters wanted to prevent a similar encirclement in their areas.

3. With the unexpected fall of Al Juba, bordering Ma'rib city, and Jebel Murad in late October 2021, there was some significant repositioning of the conflict parties. At the time of writing, Ma'rib city is one of the last strongholds of the Government after the STC took control of Aden in 2019.<sup>5</sup> In Al Hudaydah and in Ta'izz, the West Coast Forces and Government Forces are concerned that should Ma'rib fall, they would be the next target.<sup>6</sup> For the STC, if Shabwah falls, their potential source of financial revenue from petroleum resources and their ambitions of self-governance would be adversely affected. Additionally, the Houthis would have better access to Southern areas of Yemen through Shabwah. The Houthis would also be in a stronger negotiating position. Thus, for all members of the anti-Houthi forces, the possible fall of Ma'rib and Shabwah presents an existential threat.

4. Therefore, in response to this threat, the Coalition and the WCJF began significant political and military repositioning from September to November 2021, focusing primarily on curbing Houthi advances into their territories, as shown in Table 4.1 for Yemeni forces and Table 4.2 for Coalition forces. The Coalition confirmed that their movements were necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>7</sup> The Government informed the Panel that they were not given advanced notice of the movements of the WCJF.

Table 4.1

**Main areas of battles between the Government of Yemen, WCJF, and the Houthis**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Timing</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Al Bayda	23 September 2021	The Houthis announce that they took full control of Al Bayda. <sup>8</sup>	The Houthis justified the takeover as a move to combat AQAP. <sup>9</sup> The capture of Al Bayda enabled the Houthis to intensify its efforts on the Ma'rib frontlines.
Ma'rib	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	Houthis have reportedly taken control of eight of the 14 districts of Ma'rib Governorate, with four districts under their partial control. <sup>10</sup> Both sides are sending reinforcements for fighting around Jebel Al Balaq, which borders the heavily populated and government-controlled city of Ma'rib. The fall of areas in Harib, <sup>11</sup> Jebel Murad <sup>12</sup> and Al Juba <sup>13</sup> were significant defeats for the Government in this period.	The defeats in Ma'rib are attributed to tribal divisions within the Murad tribe, inadequate provision of weapons to tribal allies, and the need to avoid a catastrophic situation such as Al Abdiya. <sup>14</sup> Through the movements in Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz (see below), some anti-Houthi forces are attempting to consolidate their positions to reinforce and fight Houthis in Ma'rib and Shabwah. Tareq Saleh and the Government of Yemen on the one hand; and the STC and Tareq Saleh on the other hand, seem willing to temporarily set aside their differences, and to consolidate their efforts to fight the

<sup>5</sup> <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/dam-will-break-if-houthi-rebels-take-marib-yemeni-official>.

<sup>6</sup> Discussions with representatives of the WCJF and Ta'izz military forces.

<sup>7</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08); <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>8</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون).

<sup>9</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون).

<sup>10</sup> According to some sources, 8 of the 14 districts in Ma'rib are under Houthi control and 4 partially (Serwah, Madghel, Raghwan, and Al-Joubah). Marib city and Alwadi are under the control of the Government of Yemen and affiliated forces. Information updated as at 15 November 2021.

<sup>11</sup> Around 22 September 2021. The attack reportedly came from Shabwah's Al Ain district.

<sup>12</sup> Around 26 October 2021.

<sup>13</sup> Around 25 October 2021, the capital of the district fell to the Houthis, but as of 15 November 2021 the fighting is still ongoing.

<sup>14</sup> Discussions with Murad and other civilian, military and tribal figures in Ma'rib.

Shabwah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September, the Houthis took control of areas in Bayhan, Ain and Usaylan in Shabwah.	Houthis. <sup>15</sup> However, the STC may be using the circumstances to push the Government for more political concessions. <sup>16</sup>
Al Hudaydah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September 2021, there was an exchange of control of territories between the Giants brigades and the National Resistance. Around	The battle for these areas in Shabwah was won by the Houthis, with minimal resistance from the Government of Yemen. This had led to the fear that should Houthis decide to advance to Shabwah's oil rich areas, they would be able to do so with relative ease. There were attempts by some units of the Giants brigades to reinforce Shabwah through Abyan. <sup>17</sup> A united front of anti-Houthi forces in Shabwah is adversely affected by: 1) The current political infighting in Shabwah; <sup>18</sup> 2) the unpopularity of the pro-Islah Governor with the STC, UAE, and consequently some West Coast armed groups, <sup>19</sup> and 3) the fact that for the STC, control of Shabwah remains an important element in the fulfilment of their aspirations. These movements appear to be linked to the military setbacks in Ma'rib. <sup>23</sup> WCJF and the Coalition came under criticism for the November 2021 withdrawal. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stated that

<sup>15</sup> Statements made by the Political Bureau of the National Resistance (PBNR) on 28 October 2021 (see <https://2dec.net/news46965.html>); and STC statement stating that they will fight alongside the National Resistance forces to fight the Houthis (see <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter>). In the PBNR, which Saleh chaired, it was stated "the political bureau renewed its call for all political components and national forces to unite in the defense arenas of the republic, for the parties to open a new page in their relations with each other, and for all to direct their weapons and political and media discourse against houthi militias." The spokesperson of STC said "we welcome any efforts in the STC to unite to confront houthi militias along the frontlines in the south and Yemen, and we express our readiness to partner with the national resistance and support it... and keep its threat away from our country and the region, while affirming our commitment to our southern national objectives." PBNR informed the Panel that Saleh also offered to fight with GoY in Ma'rib, this was confirmed by GoY to the Panel. Additionally, see interview with Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185> and the Director of the Office of President Hadi confirming the offer made by Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>.

<sup>16</sup> For example, STC's President has stated his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the Houthis should Ma'rib fall: In an interview published in March 2021, he stated that "The fall in Marib would have serious consequences, not just at humanitarian level but it might accelerate the process towards internationally convened talks between the North and the South. It could lead to a situation where the STC are largely in control of the South and the Houthis control most of the North. In that case, it would make sense to have direct talks between the parties that are in control." (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists>). On 9 November 2021, the STC also threatened withdrawal from the Riyadh Agreement, unless their demands were met from the Government side. <https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=2206>.

<sup>17</sup> Reportedly, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Brigades were deployed to Abyan. Confidential military sources and officials of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>18</sup> In November 2021, Sheikh Awad Mohammed bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki held meetings in Shabwah calling, amongst others, for the dismissal of the Governor Mohammed Saleh Bin Adio. The former, reportedly a well-respected GPC member, appears to be challenging the authority of the Governor, reportedly an Islah party member. He returned to Shabwah in November 2021, after reportedly living 6 years in the UAE (<https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15894#Shabwa>). His return comes in the backdrop of the escalating tensions between the Governor and GPC, Governor and the STC and some tribes, as well as the Governor and the UAE (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). The Governor in 2021, continued his calls on the UAE personnel to vacate Belhaf (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). In October 2021, after a discussion involving Saudi Arabia, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE left Ataq airport and Al Alam camp, but UAE personnel are reportedly still present in Belhaf (table 4.2). According to local sources, there were reported clashes in Al Alam after the departure of the Coalition forces, between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and the Government of Yemen forces affiliated to the Governor.

<sup>19</sup> Local confidential sources. See tweet from Governor at <https://twitter.com/Mbinadeow/status/1430157247439687694>, See also <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-war-uae-balhaf-seaport-clash-government> and <https://debriefer.net/en/news-26767.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Panel discussions with military sources.

		11 November 2021, <sup>20</sup> the WCIJ reportedly moved 13 brigades <sup>21</sup> from 14 locations <sup>22</sup> along the coastal line. Around 12 November 2021, the Houthis occupied these areas and opened the Sana'a-Al Hudaydah road.	“the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces” is in line with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts. <sup>24</sup> Yet, the Yemeni Government stated that they did not have advance notice of this withdrawal. <sup>25</sup>
Ta'izz	September 2021 – 20 November 2021	On 19 November 2021, the WCJF confirmed having captured the Al Adin-Hess junction, which connects Ibb with the Al Hudaydah supply route for the Houthis, <sup>26</sup> as well as other locations in Western Ta'izz.	This was an important victory for the WCJF who had suffered significant reputational damage for the 11 November 2021 withdrawal. Unlike in Shawbah, in Ta'izz, the WCJF and the Ta'izz Military Axis, as well as the political leadership have at times set aside their differences to meet and discuss joint strategies <sup>27</sup> .

*Sources:* Panel based on various sources.<sup>28</sup>

4. The Coalition also undertook redeployments during this period at Table 4.2, which according to them were also necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>29</sup>

Table 4.2

**Significant Coalition movements in October and November 2021**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Comments</i>
9 November 2021	Al Bureika Base in Aden	Significant troop reductions reported. <sup>30</sup>
31 October 2021	Ataq Airport in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces reported. <sup>31</sup>
26 October 2021	Al Alam Camp in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces. Clashes between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and pro-Government forces followed, which resulted in the latter taking control of the camp. <sup>32</sup>
October and November 2021	Several small military camps in Mahra	Redeployment and consolidation of Coalition forces at Al Ghaydah airport. <sup>33</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The Panel notes that different dates between 10 – 12 November are referred to as dates when the withdrawal began, by different interlocutors.

<sup>21</sup> Source: representatives of the WCJF.

<sup>22</sup> Source: representatives of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

<sup>25</sup> See paragraph 20 of the main report.

<sup>26</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/241049>, <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>. Confirmed by military sources.

<sup>27</sup> The last meeting was in October 2021, according to military sources.

<sup>28</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen and military sources, local authorities, and civil society from Al Baydah, Ma'rib, Shawbah, al Hudaydah, and Ta'izz.

<sup>29</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08); <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>30</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

<sup>31</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>32</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>33</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

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16 November 2021

Khalidiyah Camp in  
Hadramawt

Complete withdrawal of  
Coalition forces reported.<sup>34</sup>

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**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/240827>.

<sup>35</sup> The Panel has requested KSA for more information on its withdrawals, a response is pending.

## Annex 5 Developments on the West Coast

### I. Developments relating to Tareq Saleh<sup>36</sup>

1. In 2021, Tareq Saleh was one of the most powerful Yemeni military leaders on the non-Houthi controlled West Coast, and his brother, Ammar Saleh, the most powerful security and intelligence figure in the same area.<sup>37</sup> On 25 March 2021, Tareq Saleh announced the establishment of a “Political Bureau of the National Resistance” (PBNR).<sup>38</sup> This is the political wing of the existing military entity under Saleh, which is also known as the Guards of the Republic. According to information received by the Panel from individuals close to Tareq Saleh, he resented the fact that he was effectively excluded from the negotiations leading up to the Stockholm Agreement. This situation may have been a contributing factor in the formation of the PBNR.<sup>39</sup>
2. Tareq Saleh’s ascension into political and military power have been largely facilitated by:
  - a. The lack of authority exercised by the central Government on the West Coast, which has failed to integrate all the various armed groups on the West Coast into the National Army, except for some Giant Brigades (paragraph 6).
  - b. The inability of the Government of Yemen to provide adequate health care to the wounded fighters, or to pay regular salaries to local West Coast civil service, security, and military officials, letting them to seek this support elsewhere.
  - c. Direct humanitarian and reconstruction support by the UAE that comes through the National Resistance for communities on the West Coast, rather than to the central Government, (paragraph 4 and 10).
  - d. The reliance of local authorities and civilians on ‘humanitarian assistance’<sup>40</sup> provided by the National Resistance humanitarian unit, which further increases the dependence of local authorities on Tareq Saleh to provide for populations in their localities (figure 5.1).
  - e. Access to wide-reaching intelligence networks of Ammar Saleh, which allows Tareq Saleh to counter security threats in the area. This has created a space in which it has become difficult for individuals to criticize Tareq Saleh or the National Resistance openly.<sup>41</sup>
3. Tareq Saleh is also providing financial incentives to local authorities, as well as security support.<sup>42</sup> The Panel noted that the same Government leaders that spoke out against Tareq Saleh

<sup>36</sup> In this annex, in order to prevent reprisals against individuals, the Panel will not indicate the sources of information, where such may have a potentially negative impact on those sources. Sources for this section include members of the Government of Yemen and its armed and security forces, the Yemeni Coast Guard on the West Coast, Political Bureau of the National Resistance, Tihama Resistance, Tihama political leaders, Tihama Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, Tihama National Council, and other Tihama and West Coast human rights activists, National Resistance Forces, Giant Brigades, civil society, and local authorities in Ta’izz and Hudaydah Governorates.

<sup>37</sup> Ammar Saleh used to be the Deputy of the National Security Bureau under Ali Abdullah Saleh effectively from 2002 to 2012.

<sup>38</sup> <https://t.co/BK0o6B9Kij> / Twitter.

<sup>39</sup> Tareq Saleh was excluded from various peace initiatives, including the Stockholm Agreement and the Riyadh Agreement, and the formation of the Unity Government in December 2020. In an interview, Saleh said, “(t)he political office was created as a result of the ongoing political situation in Yemen and the developments that have occurred. We, on the West Coast, need a political entity that represents us in any upcoming negotiations, for it to be another voice that represents the Yemeni people outside of any religious political parties.” See <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>40</sup> The Panel cannot confirm if assistance provided by the National Resistance is intended or distributed in an impartial, indiscriminate, or neutral manner and without pre-conditions.

<sup>41</sup> Multiple confidential sources who received threats.

<sup>42</sup> As incentives, unlike salary payments, are not regular and depends on maintaining favor with the paying authority, some individuals informed the Panel that they could not act independently to carry out their functions, when these actions were inconsistent with what was required by the WCJF.



in 2019 and 2020, adopted a more submissive attitude in 2021, as they adjusted to the realities on the ground.

Figure 5.1

### National Resistance's humanitarian unit providing support on the West Coast



**Source:** <https://2dec.net/news47950.html> (right) (showing mobile clinics on the West Coast, note the ambulance has the name of the national resistance); <https://2dec.net/news47897.html> (left) (showing a convoy of humanitarian assistance, including reportedly 3000 food baskets to the newly liberated areas in Hays. It also contains a video of the Governor of Hudaydah thanking the National Resistance for the food baskets.)

4. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that neither the salaries paid to Tareq Saleh's fighters, nor the financial incentives that he distributes, came from the Government.<sup>43</sup> According to some fighters, their salaries or incentive payments are made by the UAE, through Tareq Saleh, mostly in Saudi Riyals.<sup>44</sup> The UAE stated that it provides "a substantial amount of financial support through the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen to the Government of Yemen to pay the salaries of West Coast forces."<sup>45</sup> The Government of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been requested to confirm the UAE's statement; the Panel has not yet received a response.

5. In 2021, the relationship between the Government of Yemen and Tareq Saleh remained complex, but cordial.<sup>46</sup> The Government cannot maintain the new frontlines with the Houthis in the Hudaydah Governorate and in West Ta'izz without the WCJF. At the same time, it cannot provide salaries or other support to maintain the loyalty of those forces to the Government. According to some, the establishment of the Political Bureau by Tareq Saleh is part of a plan to further consolidate his political position in the West Coast and in Yemen (see paragraph 7).<sup>47</sup> Indeed, since its establishment, Saleh has engaged in high-level meetings with foreign interlocutors, articulating his vision for Yemen.

6. The establishment of the PBNR and Tareq Saleh's engagement with the international community has created significant unease and tensions, especially amongst some communities

<sup>43</sup> Multiple sources from the Government of Yemen.

<sup>44</sup> Discussions in April, June, August and September 2021 with the Giant Brigades, leaders from Tihama, and Government of Yemen security and military forces. Some of these individuals were receiving incentives that they said came from the UAE. The STC negotiating team in Riyadh informed the Panel that while they were being supported by the Coalition, Tareq Saleh was supported bilaterally by the UAE.

<sup>45</sup> Communication to the Panel in November 2021.

<sup>46</sup> The Panel requested the Government of Yemen to provide a clarification on the nature of its current relationship with Tareq Saleh, the Panel is awaiting a response.

<sup>47</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen officials, Tihama community leaders, and some leaders in the Tihama National Council.

in Tihama.<sup>48</sup> They have expressed concerns that Tareq Saleh, an outsider to, and a guest of, the Tihama region is positioning himself as the *de facto* ruler of the region. Barely two weeks after the formation of the PBNR, there were clashes reported between the National Resistance forces and some local communities, with three reported deaths.<sup>49</sup> The withdrawal in November 2021, have further escalated tensions between Saleh and some Tihama political leaders (paragraph 29 of the main report and appendix 3).

7. The establishment of the PBNR has also created some tensions within the General People's Congress (GPC) because Saleh's primary support base comes from the GPC. This move has further weakened the already fragmented GPC. For example, representatives of the Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi 005)-led GPC faction informed the Panel that it did not support the formation of the Political Bureau, even if they continue to work together on some matters with Saleh.<sup>50</sup> While Saleh states publicly that the PBNR is not an alternative for the GPC, and that the PBNR represents the Joint Forces on the West Coast, it is likely that his ambitions are not limited to the West Coast.

<sup>51</sup> Saleh's PBNR representatives indicated to the Panel that the Political Bureau's ambitions and reach were national, and not merely regional.<sup>52</sup>

## II. Developments relating to the Giant Brigades

8. The Giant Brigades have acted as a "neutral force" in maintaining peace between different anti-Houthi forces. Within the Giants, there are units that are aligned with the Government of Yemen, while some others are more aligned with the United Arab Emirates. The Giants have successfully maintained a ceasefire in Abyan, following clashes between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen (see S/2021/79, paragraph 40).<sup>53</sup> In the June 2021 negotiations around the Riyadh Agreement, the possibility of deploying units of the Giants Brigade as a neutral force to protect the Yemeni Prime Minister and other Government officials in Aden was discussed.<sup>54</sup>

9. The Giants Brigade, in a communication with the Panel, informed that its present leader, Abu Zara al Mahrami, was appointed by President Hadi.<sup>55</sup> Around June 2020, al Mahrami returned to Aden from the UAE and then travelled onwards to the West Coast. He was reappointed as the commander of the different Giant brigades, as well as some Tihama brigades.<sup>56</sup> In 2021, there have been frictions and clashes between some components of the Giant Brigade. For example, tensions arose when Al Mahrami ordered to change the leaders of

<sup>48</sup> Discussions with representatives of the Tihama community including civil society, the Tihama National Council and the Tihama resistance forces.

<sup>49</sup> These clashes reportedly began after Tareq Saleh forces forcefully entered the house of a local prominent General People's Congress (GPC) leader in Mukha Zaid al Kharj. Tareq Saleh forces justified this to the Panel as a security operation. Others say the clashes was linked to the PBNR's formation.

<sup>50</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the GPC, June 2021.

<sup>51</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021. In an interview Saleh said, "The GPC is the umbrella that we are all under, but unfortunately, it was fragmented between those inside Yemen and those outside. This major political party was not given the opportunity to play its role in the Yemeni political arena, whether in foreign representation or internally. Inside Yemen, it is under pressure by the Houthis and the GPC in Sana'a has become very marginalized in its political role. Outside of the country, it is divided into a number of different factions. We hope the GPC can play a very important role. We're obviously never going to be an alternative to the GPC and the role it has played. But the political office of the National Resistance represents the Joint Forces here on the West Coast, and it also represents the political arm of all of these forces here in the Yemeni political arena."

See, <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>52</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021.

<sup>53</sup> The Panel understands that a unit under the leadership of the Giants, is in Abyan, maintaining a buffer zone and facilitating movement and communication between the two forces belonging to the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council. Discussions with individuals from the Giant Brigades, the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Protection Brigade, based in Abyan, and the Coalition. According to the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Brigade, the unit is under Hamdi Shukri.

<sup>54</sup> Panel discussions with both STC and Government negotiating teams.

<sup>55</sup> December 2021.

<sup>56</sup> This includes the 1st Tihama and the 1st Zaraniq brigade. Zaraniq is a tribe in Tihama.

the 1st and 11th Tihama Brigades and the 3rd Giants Brigade. (see also appendix 3). In two cases, there were affiliations between these units and the Government of Yemen. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade was also the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade under the Government of Yemen. In May 2021, the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade Commander was also named as the Commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> Presidential Brigade.<sup>57</sup> Subsequently, he was ordered by Al Mahrami to step down and was replaced by another senior commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.<sup>58</sup> In the case of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, it saw two leadership changes<sup>59</sup> and clashes in 2021 when Al Mahrami attempted to change, the second leader, Abu Ayesha, and replace him with a third individual, who was not a member of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade.<sup>60</sup> The Giants Brigade in its communication with the Panel in December 2021, justified the changes of Abu Ayesha because of, amongst others, his links to Islah party. The Panel received allegations against all the leaders mentioned in this paragraph relating to financial mismanagement of military resources.

### III. Developments relating to Tihama Fighters

10. In late 2020, all armed groups on the West Coast were reorganized under the dual leadership of Tareq Saleh of the National Resistance<sup>61</sup> and Abu Zara Al Mahrami of the Giant Brigades.<sup>62</sup> Some Tihama leaders viewed this as an attempt by the UAE and Tareq Saleh to reduce the Tihama influence on the West Coast, for example, by dividing their military forces under the command of two leaders who are not originally from the Tihama and preventing them, the Tihama people, from making autonomous military decisions (see also paragraphs 50 – 52 and annex 5 of S/2021/79). In discussions with the Panel, Tihama military and political leaders complained of persistent marginalization by different Yemeni leaders and the Government of Yemen, and lack of basic services for the local population. Both the Tihama and WCJF representatives acknowledged that because most of the Tihama fighters were only receiving their salaries through the Giants Brigade and National Resistance leaderships, they are compelled to fight with WCJF to ensure their and their families' survival.

11. The Tihama political leadership appeared to be divided; sometimes the Panel received conflicting political messages from them. The leadership includes those within the Tihama National Council, the Tihami Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, and Tihama leaders who are also members of the GPC. Some informed the Panel that if the 'occupation' of their lands continued by Tareq Saleh, they would have no choice but to use force to assert autonomy like the STC. Other Tihami leaders, some of whom were loyal to Saleh, expressed the need for a peaceful political solution based on equitable access to the resources on the West Coast. The Peaceful Tihama Movement, a political wing in the West Coast, and the Tihama Resistance, condemned the withdrawals of the WCJF in November 2021, particularly in view of the subsequent atrocities committed by the Houthis over the Tihama population (appendix 3).

<sup>57</sup> The appointment letter is with the Panel. Source: Government of Yemen.

<sup>58</sup> In discussions with the Panel, it was mentioned that the Giant Force leadership only removed him from his position as the Commander of the Tihama, but that his appointment by President Hadi remains unchanged.

<sup>59</sup> The first change was of Abdul Rahman al Lahji. The Giant Brigade informed the Panel in a communication in December 2021 that he was also appointed as the leader of the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade by the Government. The second leader was Abu Ayesha.

<sup>60</sup> According to information received by the Panel from the 3rd Giants Brigade and other sources, Abu Zara al Mahrami, sought to replace the Brigade leadership with a Yemeni individual who had returned from fighting in Libya.

<sup>61</sup> For example, the 4<sup>th</sup> Tihama Brigade joined Tareq Saleh in 2020 due to largely non-payment of salaries by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>62</sup> As opposed to 2019 when different force commanders were on an equal footing. See <https://www.ereemnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139> where a spokesperson for the West Coast said "this council includes members of all joint forces and has no president, deputy, secretary and the like, all under the leadership and supervision of the Arab alliance, and the council includes a selection of forces participating in the west coast front" and see appendix 4.

#### IV. UAE and the Coalition's role in the West Coast

10. The current role of the UAE on the West Coast remains opaque. The UAE has acknowledged to provides support to the WCJF and to the West Coast on humanitarian and development matters (figure 5.2 and 5.3).<sup>63</sup> However, the UAE has not been clear on the nature of its current military support to the WCJF; in July 2021, the UAE denied that it had provided any military support to Tareq Saleh or his forces. In October 2021, in contrast, the UAE stated that it had provided such support in 2019<sup>64</sup> In July 2021, the UAE stated that it had no troops permanently present on the West Coast.<sup>65</sup> According to sources on the ground, the UAE continues to have some presence on the West Coast,<sup>66</sup> even if it is not at the same scale before mid-2019. The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE does not exercise any direct or indirect authority over the leaders or their security and military operations” in the WCJF, and that “Tareq Saleh and Abu Zara (al Mahrami) are part of the joint forces, whose tasks include confronting the Houthis and managing operations in the west coast. The Coalition’s joint command deals with any problems they face”.<sup>67</sup> The Panel notes that in an interview with Saleh, he said that “the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance.” (appendix 4).<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup> UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has provided a substantial amount of humanitarian support to the West Coast prior to June 2019 (building schools, hospitals, reconstruction, including of Mocha port); and it continues to provide support to maintain the infrastructure that it has rehabilitated.” UAE communication to the Panel, November 2021.

<sup>64</sup> The UAE in its communication with the Panel in November 2021, informed the Panel that prior to 2019 “(t)he UAE as a part of the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen worked with these forces (West Coast armed groups and STC) to ensure that they are trained and equipped as a part of the capacity building measures that was undertaken by the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen. The UAE’s support was in the interest of ensuring that these forces were able to prevent and respond to Houthi and AQAP security threats, including after the departure of the UAE. This support was given with knowledge of the Government of Yemen.” The Panel received videos showing military vehicles coming into the Mocha port; the National Resistance in August 2021 stated that they arrived prior to the UAE’s redeployment around mid-2019, as the UAE wanted to provide new military equipment and vehicles to the armed groups in the West Coast prior to their movement.

<sup>65</sup> Discussions between the Panel and the UAE, July 2021.

<sup>66</sup> Individuals from the armed groups on the West Coast.

<sup>67</sup> Communication from the UAE, October 2021.

<sup>68</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>. The extracts are as follows:

*Saleh: Even before the withdrawal of the Emirati forces, they formed the Joint Command and a joint operations room between the National Resistance and the Giants Brigades... So the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance. Decisions are made all through consensus and consultations, through meetings between the leadership and representatives of all these parties.”*

*“Sana’a Center: ...What is the current state of your relationship with the UAE?*

*Saleh: It is a partnership. We and the UAE have put in place principles for this coalition, for this alliance, this is our cause and our interest. The UAE are part of this coalition and we need support to fight against the Houthis. We welcome their support on the condition that we are partners to liberate Yemen and to restore the state. These are our main objectives, to restore the state and ensure the return of state institutions and the legitimate government. This is the agreement that we had for our partnership with the UAE and they have adhered to this. There are no other interests or agendas outside of the liberation of Yemen from the coup,”*

Figure 5.2

**UAE support to the West Coast (Tweet from spokesperson of the National resistance)**

Source: <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1464884661226770435> (right). (Spokesperson of the National Resistance tweet on of the arrival of eighty thousand doses of COVID-19 vaccines provided by the UAE to the joint forces and civilians in the districts of the West Coast) and <https://2dec.net/news47970.html> (left) on the “west coast department of the national resistance medical forces” launching the first phase of the vaccination campaign for citizens and military personnel.

Figure 5.3

**UAE support to the West Coast (tweet from Tareq Saleh)**

Source: <https://twitter.com/tarikyemen/status/1466290740401741826>. (reportedly a completed apartment construction project in Mukha by the UAE to commemorate Ali Abdullah Saleh YEi.003)<sup>69</sup>

11. The Panel finds that, within the Coalition, the UAE continues to retain significant influence over the West Coast forces. In at least two documented incidents, the UAE has, according to individuals present at the meetings, been involved in trying to contain tensions and infighting amongst WCJF and between WCJF and Tai'zz military.<sup>70</sup> The Tihama leaders allege that the UAE, as well as Tareq Saleh, was instrumental in the reorganization of the West Coast armed groups in late 2020, that resulted in all Tihama forces falling under the dual leadership of Abu Zara al Mahrami and Tareq Saleh (appendices 3 and 4).

<sup>69</sup> Confirmed by a representative of the National Resistance.

<sup>70</sup> The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has good relations with the above-mentioned parties, but its influence on those parties is limited and focused on advancing the peace process. In light of its relationships, the UAE is working on reducing any armed escalations resulting from conflicting opinions, since the escalation took place before the Riyadh Agreement, in order to advance the peace process.”

12. For most part of 2021, the KSA appeared to keep its focus on Ma'rib, while the Government continued to allow the UAE, through the Coalition's Joint Forces Command established by the Coalition, to take the lead on the West Coast.<sup>71</sup> In November 2021, the Coalition clarified its own role in the withdrawals in Hudaydah and stated that "The joint forces in the West Coast carried out the redeployment and the reposition of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition" (appendix 1). It is the first time, that the Panel is aware of, that the Coalition acknowledged its role in a significant military operation in Yemen, without the prior knowledge of the Government.<sup>72</sup> The WCJF in its statement did not refer to the role of the Coalition (appendix 2), however, its representatives bilaterally acknowledged the leadership of the Coalition in this operation, to the exclusion of the Government.

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<sup>71</sup> Representatives of the Government informed the Panel that the UAE continues to have control or influence over the West Coast forces, even after their redeployment in mid-2019.

<sup>72</sup> The Panel has provided Saudi Arabia an opportunity to clarify if it informed the Government in advance of this movement, a response is pending.

## Appendix 1 Media article on the statement by the Coalition Spokesperson on the redeployments of Coalition forces and withdrawals of the WCJF

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Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen: Repositioning and Redeployment of the Joint Forces in the West Coast Is a Military Decision Taken by The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be Aligned with its Military Strategy in Yemen

Monday 1443/4/10 - 2021/11/15

Riyadh, Nov. 15, 2021, SPA -- Official Spokesperson of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen Brigadier General Turki Al-Malki issued the following statement:

"The redeployment and repositioning of Coalition military forces and Yemeni government forces in the area of operations falls under military strategies carried out by the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be aligned with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast carried out the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition. The repositioning and redeployment operation was carried out with discipline and flexibility as planned, which falls in line with future plans of the Coalition forces.

We commend the discipline of all Coalition Countries' military forces, as well as the Yemeni National Army and the Joint Forces in the West Coast during their military redeployment and repositioning operation.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast has achieved numerous victories, which culminated in the (Stockholm) Agreement following the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia's intransigence towards sitting at the negotiating table. Following almost (3) years of holding defensive positions, and the disruption of the implementation of the (Stockholm) Agreement by the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia, whose violations have exceeded (30,000) breaches of the Agreement's provisions, the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition deemed it important that these forces be redeployed and repositioned in order to become more effective and operationally flexible to contribute in the national battle of the Yemeni Army in a manner that guarantees its maneuverability and security in the area of operations; in a time where the Houthi militia still controls the three main ports on the Red Sea (Hodeida Port, Saleef Port and Ras Isa Port), and their disruption of the United Nations' supervision for the implementation of the Agreement.

We conclude by calling on the UN and UNMHA to play its part in implementing the (Stockholm) Agreement, as well as the international community to pressure the terrorist Houthi militia into full commitment and implementation of the Agreement's provisions."

--SPA

20:30 LOCAL TIME 17:30 GMT

0032

www.spa.gov.sa/2304419

Source: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

# Appendix 2 Media Report on the statement by the WCJF





الرئيسية الأخبار - التقارير - المقالات - انتهاكات المليشيات - المساعدات الإنسانية - مكتبة الفيديو - العمالققة في الإعلام - من نحن - اتصل بنا

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الأشهر

الأخيرة

**هدسة القوات المشتركة تنزع عشرات الغارات الناجمة زرعها مليشيات الحوثي تحت الحصار في حبس**

4 ديسمبر 2021

**إصابة مسجونين اثنين بسيلابا خفيفة أطلقتها مليشيات الحوثي على منزلها شرق حبس**

4 ديسمبر 2021

**الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تظهر الحفول الزراعية شمال حبس من الأتغام الحوية**

3 ديسمبر 2021

**القوات المشتركة تقدم في منطقة الدين جنوب غرب الجرحي وتسيطر على مواقع المليشيات**

7 ديسمبر 2021

**الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تفكك عشرات الأتغام الحوية زرعها المليشيات في المزارع بمدينة حبس**

10 ديسمبر 2021



# الرئيسية / الأخبار / بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

## بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

المركز الإعلامي لألوية العمالققة

12 نوفمبر 2021



تتابع القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي تطورات الأحداث المتتالية عقب تنفيذها قرار إخلاء المناطق المحكومة باتفاق (السويد)، لكون تلك المناطق محكومة باتفاق دولي يفيها مناطق منزوعة السلاح وأمنة للمدنيين الذين وقع اتفاق (السويد) بحجة حمايتهم ونعيمهم.

وبإذنا، فإننا في القوات المشتركة، نؤكّد وثيقة راسخة وقوية بالمر - إن شاء الله - أن فرار إعادة الانتشار جزء من المعركة الوطنية التي بدأناها وبذلنا فيها الغالي والتفيس لمواجهة المخاطر التي تهدد أمن الوطن والمواطن اليمني حيوياً، وأمن القومي العربي عموماً.

وإن قيادة القوات المشتركة، تؤكّد أنها اتخذت هذا القرار في ضوء خطة إعادة الانتشار المحددة في اتفاق (ستوكهولم) الذي تتسمك الحكومة الشرعية بتفهمه بالرغم من انتهاكات مليشيات الحوثي الاتفاق من اليوم التالي لتوقيعه، وما زالت المليشيات مستمرة في نسف الاتفاق حتى اليوم.

ولم تحط القوات المشتركة اليوم بالأضرار لتحرير مدينة الحديدة، وجرماتها من تحقيق هدف استراتيجي لليمن وأمن القومي العربي، كان من شأنه أن يسرع من إنهاء الطليشيات الحوثية، وإننا نرى واجبنا الديني والوطني يدفعنا للدفاع عن جهات ذات أهمية أخرى قد يستغلها العدو عند عدم وجود دفاعات كافية، وعدم وجود اتفاق دولي يردع الحوثي عن تقدمه، كما حصل مع فونانبا في (الحديدة).

وأنها قررت ذلك في سياق متابعتها للتطورات التي تشهدها جهات البلاد كلها، التي تفرض على كل حُرّ قادر أن يقدم الدعم والعمق بالوسائل المختلفة لجهات الدفاع عن اليمن واليمنيين في مواجهة أدوات (إيران) التي تعيثُ خراباً في (البيضاء والذوق)، وإسقاط ثلاث مديريات من محافظة شبوة وغيرها. تم الوصول إلى مشارف مدينة (مارب).

لقد رأت القوات المشتركة خطراً بفاتها محاصرة في مناس دفعات منع عليها الحرب، بقرار دولي، فيما الجهات المختلفة تتطلب دعماً بكلّ الأشكال؛ ومنها فتح جهات أخرى توقف الحوثيين عند حدّهم، ونؤكّد للمواطن اليمني والعربي، الذي يعيش معنا معاركنا القومية، أن اليمنيين لن يحدروا جهداً في إعادة ترتيب صفوفهم ومعاركهم للقتال (صفاً واحداً كاليمنيين المرموسين) في كلّ جهة والجاه.

وعليه، فقد بدأت تنفيذ خطتنا التي تحدد خطواتها دفاعية، تؤكّد معركة الساحل وبنيها (تهامة) على أهمية الاستعداد لأي تطورات قد تطرأ في جهات القتال ضد الحوثي.

ومن المؤسف له، أن هذه الخطة قوبلت بتضليل إعلامي، يستهدف ضرب الثقة الصلبة لمتنسي القوات المشتركة في إطار الاستهداف المعلن الذي تعرّض له فونانبا؛ بالطريقة والأدوات نفسها التي استخدمت في إضعاف دور الشرعية وفاعليتها في المعركة الوطنية.

إن أبطال القوات المشتركة في الوحدات والتنشيطات العسكرية جميعها ملتزمون بمعركتهم في كلّ شبر في مواجهة الأتغام الحوية، وستحذل جهاتنا صلبة تدق مليشيات إيران الهزائم المذلة.

وإننا ندعو الجميع إلى استشعار الواجب، ورش الصفوف، وتصدح النبات، والتزام الأهداف حتى يقضي الله أمرًا كان مفعولاً، وإن نعر الله لنصر.

Source: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/2-الساحل-في-المشتركة-القوات-الصادر-بيان-صادر>



**Unofficial translation (confirmed as accurate by a representative of the WCJF):**

The Joint Forces at the West Coast are monitoring the developments of the successive events following their implementation of the decision to evacuate the areas governed (according to Stockholm agreement). The reason is that those areas are governed by an international agreement that keeps them demilitarized and safe for civilians under the pretext of their protection and security.

To begin with, we, in the joint forces, affirm with firm and strong confidence in victory - God willing - that the redeployment decision is part of the national battle that we have begun and made priceless and precious efforts to address the threats targeting the security of our homeland and the Yemeni citizen in particular, and Arab national security in general.

The Joint Forces command confirms that it made this decision in the light of the redeployment plan outlined in the Stockholm agreement, which the Government is keen to implement, despite violations committed by Houthi militias from the next day after the agreement was signed, as Houthi militias continue to violate that agreement till this day.

The Joint Forces did not give the green light to liberate Hudaydah city, and by doing so a strategic goal for Yemen and Arab national security was deprived from being achieved. If Hudaydah city is liberated, the end of Houthi militias would have been accelerated.

We see it as our religious and patriotic duty that motivates us to defend other fronts of other importance, which the enemy may exploit when there are insufficient defenses as well as when there is an absence of an international agreement efficiently deterring the Houthi militias from their progress like what happened with our forces in (Hudaydah).

The Joint Forces decided that decision in the context of following the recent events and developments at the fronts of the whole country. Those developments of events impose on every free person - to his ability - to provide support and aid by various means to the fronts of defense of Yemen and Yemenis in the face of the tools/hands of (Iran); which is wreaking havoc in (Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf), and which brought down three districts from and through Shabwa governorate, reaching the outskirts of (Ma'rib) city.

The Joint Forces had noted the mistake of remaining besieged in defensive barricades and being prohibited by an international decision from fighting, while the various fronts require support in all forms; an example of such support is to open other fronts that would stop the Houthi militias, and by that assure to the Yemeni and Arab citizens; who are living with us our national battles, that the Yemenis will spare no effort in rearranging their rows and their battles to fight (as one row like a solid structure); In every front and direction.

Accordingly, The Joint Forces has begun implementing its plan, which defines defensive lines, secures the battle of the coast and keeps (Tihama) ready for any developments of events that may occur at the fronts of fighting against the Houthis.

Unfortunately, this plan was met with media misinformation and was misleading; that aims to target and strike the solid confidence of The Joint Forces' members as usual; In the same way and tools that were used to weaken the role and effectiveness of the legitimate government in the national battle.

The heroes of The Joint Forces in all military units and formations are committed to their battle in every inch in the face of the Houthi tumor. Our fronts will remain solid, subjecting Iran's militias to humiliating defeats. We call on everyone to feel the duty, rearrange the rows, charge their well, and adhere to aimed goals until God decide on the matter and God's victory is nearby.

## Appendix 3 Statement of Tihama

<p>بتاريخ: ٩ / ٤ / ١٤٤٣ هـ الموافق: ١٤ / ١١ / ٢٠٢١ م</p>	<p>بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم</p> 	<p>إقليم تهامة الحراك التهامي السلمي المقاومة التهامية</p>
<p>بيان الحراك التهامي السلمي والمقاومة التهامية رقم ( ٤ ) لسنة ٢٠٢١ م</p> <p>بشأن انسحاب القوات المشتركة من طرف واحد في مناطق سيطرتها على الساحل التهامي:</p> <p>لقد فوجئ الحراك التهامي والمقاومة التهامية في يوم الخميس الموافق ١١ نوفمبر ٢٠٢١ م بإنسحاب مفاجئ للقوات المشتركة من مناطق سيطرتهم في كل من مديرية الحوك ومديرية الحالي ومديرية الدريهمي ومديرية التحينا والخط الساحلي بما يعادل ٩٠ كيلو متراً بدعوى تنفيذ اتفاق استوكهولم من طرف واحد؛ لتتقدم مليشيا الحوثي العنصرية الإرهابية لمحاولة السيطرة على مناطق الانسحاب.</p> <p>ورغم أن أبناء تهامة لم يكونوا طرفاً في اتفاق استوكهولم؛ إلا أن تنفيذ الاتفاق تحت أي دعوى كان يقتضي أن يكون الانسحاب من الطرفين في مناطق محددة، بما في ذلك إخلاء المليشيا الحوثية لموانئ الحديد والصليف ورأس عيسى.</p> <p>ومهما كانت الدواعي السياسية أو العسكرية لهذا الانسحاب؛ إلا أن عدم وضع اعتبارات لنتائجه على الحالة الإنسانية لأبناء تهامة في المناطق التي أخلت منها القوات وأعدت مليشيا الحوثي اجتياحها؛ مؤشر انتكاسة ترافقت مع ذعر الأهالي من عودة الاجتياح الحوثي وملاحقاته وتصفياته والفوضى التي رافقت النزوح الجماعي مما يفترض أنها مناطق محررة وأمنة من بطش المليشيات.</p> <p>إننا في الحراك والمقاومة التهامية ندين ما حدث من انسحاب؛ أيًا كانت دواعيه وضروراته؛ نتيجة عدم أخذه لتداعياته الإنسانية في تهامة بعين الاعتبار؛ ونظراً لكون الميزرات والدوافع السياسية والعسكرية لهذا الانسحاب غامضة وغير مبررة؛ تطالب التحالف العربي باتخاذ موقف حازم تجاه ما حدث؛ وفتح تحقيق فيما جرى ويجري لأبناء تهامة؛ وإعادة تصويب الوضع بما يضمن إعادة السيطرة على المناطق التي تم الانسحاب منها وتطمين أبناء تهامة أن سلامتهم وسلامة أراضيهم مصانة وكرامتهم محفوظة.</p> <p>كما نحمل المجتمع الدولي في مقدمتهم الأمم المتحدة ومبعوثها الأممي كل المسؤولية الإنسانية عن التداعيات الإنسانية الكارثية التي حصلت وتحصل نتيجة غض النظر عن هذا الانتهاك الأرعن لجماعة الحوثي الإرهابية ومن يقف وراءها ونحملهم المسؤولية الكاملة تجاه الأهالي والمواطنين النازحين من أبناء تهامة والقيام بواجبهم في ضمان فتح كل الممرات الإنسانية لأهلنا في الداخل؛ وضمان وقف الانتهاكات الحوثية بحقهم والجرائم الانتقامية؛ بما في ذلك أي محاولات قسرية لعسكرتهم وعسكرة الحياة المدنية ووضع حد لجرائم الاتجار بالبشر.</p> <p>لا يخفى على كل متابع ما تعرض له أبناء هذا المنطقة الجغرافية الهامة في جغرافية اليمن والإقليم من محاولات إستبعادهم وتهميشهم من صنع القرار حتى بعد كل التصحيحات التي قدموها في سبيل منحهم حقهم في الشراكة العادلة في أرضهم، حيث تتابعت مسلسلات التآمر عليهم كمكون وطني أصيل ابتداء من تفتيت وتشطيت قوات تهامية نوعية</p>		



Source: Confidential, Tihama political leadership

**Unofficial translation of the Statement of Tihama**

**In The Name of Allah the Merciful**

**Tahamah Region**

**Date: 9 / 4 / 1443**

**H**

**Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak**

**Corresponding to 14 /**

**11 / 2021 A**

**Tahami Resistance**

**The Statement of Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak and Tahami Resistance No. (4) of the Year 2021**

In regard to the unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at the Tihami coast:

Tihami Movement/Hirak and Tihami Resistance were surprised on the Thursday of 11<sup>th</sup> of November 2021 by the sudden unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at Al-Hawk district, Al-Hali district, Al-duraihemi district, Al-Tuhaita district and the costal line, and that was from about 90 kilometres under the pretext of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, for the racist terrorist Houthi militia to advance to try to control the withdrawal areas.

The sons of Tihama were not a party in the Stockholm Agreement; However, the implementation of the agreement required that the withdrawal should be by both parties in limited areas, this included the Houthi militia's evacuation of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa.

Whatever the political or military reasons for this withdrawal, the failure to consider its consequences on the humanitarian situation of the people of Tihama in the areas from which the forces were evacuated and the Houthi militia re-invaded; is considered to be a setback, resulting in the people's fear of the return of the Houthi invasion and its pursuits and assassinations, and the chaos that accompanied the mass displacement from what are supposed to be liberated and safe areas from the violence of the militias.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance condemn the withdrawal that took place; whatever its reasons and necessities, because it did not take the Tihama's humanitarian repercussions into consideration. Given that the justifications and political and military motives for this withdrawal are vague and unjustified, we demand the Arab coalition to take a firm stand towards what happened and to open an investigation on what happened and is happening to the sons of Tihama, changing the situation to ensure the restoration of control over the areas from which the withdrawal occurred and to reassure the people of Tihama of their safety and that the integrity of their lands are protected and their dignity is preserved.

We also hold the international community, led by the United Nations and its UN envoy, responsible for the catastrophic humanitarian repercussions that have occurred and are occurring as a result of turning a blind eye to this reckless violation of the terrorist Houthi group and those behind it.

We hold them fully responsible towards the families and displaced citizens of Tihama and call them to carry out their duty to ensure the opening of all humanitarian safe passages for our people inside; as well as the responsibility of ensuring the cessation of Houthi violations against them (Tihama people) and the (cessation of) Houthi retaliatory crimes. This includes any coercive attempts to militarize them (Tihama people) and militarization of civilian life, as well as putting an end to human trafficking crimes.

It is no secret to the followers of the event; the attempts to exclude and marginalize the people of this important geographical area of Yemen and the region from decision-making, even after all the sacrifices they made in order to obtain their right to a just partnership in their land, the series of plots against them as an authentic national element continued, starting with the fragmentation and dispersal of the Tihama forces such as the (Tihama) Elite, the Third Brigade and the Eleventh Brigade, targeting the leadership of the Tihama Resistance First Brigade, and targeting the rest of the brigades, which were and are considered qualitative additions to Tihama and Yemen in general.

And now, after all the conspiracies to break up this Tihami force that is most eager to liberate its Yemeni land in the Tihami coast, we see those who fail them again, believing that they (Tihama people) will face their fate and that they are in a state of weakness.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance demand the legitimate government to announce the fall of the Stockholm Agreement as a result of the Houthi practices (Houthi advances) that accompanied the unjustified unilateral withdrawal; Issue a clear political position that considers the Stockholm Agreement as if it were nothing after this major setback, which prompted the Houthi militia to persist in recklessness. We also call on all the sons of Tihama and their free brothers from across Yemen to stand firm and line up, and we say to them: You are the ones who have resisted and liberated these areas, and you can recover them and defeat the Houthi terrorist militia. We also tell them rejoice, then rejoice, then rejoice, for aid and support will come to you very soon; Strengthen your vows, unite your words, unify your opinions, be on the heart of one man, leave differences aside, and make your goal the liberation of Tihama; So, persevere and be patient, and victory is your ally, by the will of God.

And just as victory swept you in the past, it will ally you recently and forever, because you are defending the right and defending your land, your religion and your faith, and on your hands, the myth of these militias has been broken and will end forever.

There is no place for traitorous climbers in the land of proud Tihama  
Mercy and forgiveness to the martyrs and a speedy recovery to the wounded.  
Long live proud Tihama freely.  
Issued by the Peaceful Tihami movement/Hirak  
On 11/14/2021AD

## Appendix 4 West Coast Joint Operations Room Command in 2019

**Table 9.1:**

Leaders of the Joint forces of the West Coast (established in June 2019 and information as of December 2019). Note: In 2021, the Panel understands that all of these brigades or leaders came under the National Resistance or the Giant Brigade.

Rank	Name	Forces	Comments
Major General	Haytham Qasm Taher	20 <sup>th</sup> Brigade	Former Minister of Defense (1990–1994).
Brigadier General	Ali Salem Al-Hassani	Amalika Forces	General Supervisor of the Amalika Forces.
Brigadier General	Ra'ed al Habhy	Amalika Forces	Commander, 1 <sup>st</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Hamdy Shukry	Amalika Forces	Commander, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Abdallahman al Lahjy	Amalika Forces	Commander of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Brigade. From Lahj.
Brigadier General	Tareq Saleh	Guards of the Republic/National Resistance	Commander of the Guards of the Republic.
Brigadier General	Ahmed al Kawkabany	Tihama Forces	Commander of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.
Brigadier General	Sadq Duwid	Guards of the Republic/National Resistance	Spokesperson for the Guards of the Republic
Brigadier General	Suleyman Mansour al Zaranwqy	Tihama Forces	Commander, Zaraniq Brigades
Brigadier General	Ali al Kuniny	Amalika Forces	Commander, 7 <sup>th</sup> Brigade
Brigadier General	Bassam al Mehdar	3 <sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade	Commander, Facilities/Logistics Brigade.

*Source:* Various sources in 2019

## Annex 6 STC statements on military and security appointments

Figure 6.1  
Appointment of three leaders of the Security Belt Forces

13-02-58 2021-12-11 من نحن

بحث بحث

المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي  
SOUTHERN TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
الموقف الرسمي

الرئيسية | اخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | أخبار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعازي | English

الرئيسية / اخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

## اخبار المجلس

### الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

الجمعة 25 يونيو 2021 الساعة 09:00 مساءً



الأكثر قراءة



الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزي بوفاه العميد حيدرة لهطل

فيديو



كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام للأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجنائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"

أصدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس فاسم الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، القرار رقم 14\* لعام 21، بمشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية. وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (1): تعيين العميد / محسن عبدالله الوالي، قائداً لقوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (2): تعيين العميد / مختار علي مثنى النوبي، نائباً لقائد قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (3): تعيين العميد / عبيد مثنى فاسم لعزم، ركن عمليات قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (4): تقوم قوات الحزام الأمني بالمهام الأمنية والشرطية وتعمل ضمن قوام وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (5): ينظم عمل قوات الحزام الأمني وفق نظم وقوانين وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (6): يعمل بعدد القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين.

+ 23

WhatsApp Telegram Email Twitter Facebook

Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408487032297504774?s=08>.

## **Translation provided by the STC**

President Al-Zubaidi issues decision appointing leadership for Security Belt Forces and to work within Ministry of Interior

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 14 of 2021 regarding the appointment of a leadership for the Security Belt Forces and their work within the Ministry of Interior.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah Al-Wali as Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Mukhtar Ali Muthanna Al-Nubi as Deputy Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Obaid Muthanna Qassem La'ram – Operations Staff officer of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (4): The Security Belt Forces to carry out security and police tasks and work within the framework of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (5): The work of the Security Belt Forces is regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (6): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.



Figure 6.2

## Appointment of three leaders of the Support and Attribution Forces

13-16-57 2021-12-11 من نحن

بحث بحث

المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي  
SOUTHERN TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
المؤتمر الرسمي

الرئيسية | اخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | أخبار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعار | English

الرئيسية / اخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة ألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية

## اخبار المجلس

### الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية

الجمعة ٢٥ يونيو ٢٠٢١ الساعة ٩:٠٠ مساءً



الأكثر قراءة

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزى بوفاته العميد حيدرة لهطل

فيديو

صدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس فاسم الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، القرار رقم ٣٣ لعام ٢٠٢١، تم بشأن تعيين قيادة ألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية، وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (١): تعيين اللواء / صالح أحمد محمد السيد، قائداً ألوية الإسناد والدعم

ماد (٢): تعيين العميد / علي ناصر متني المعكر، أركان حرب ألوية الإسناد والدعم

ماد (٣): تعيين العميد / عبدالسلام زين علي اليحياي، ركن عمليات ألوية الإسناد والدعم

ماد (٤): يتم نقل مقر القيادة وألوية الإسناد والدعم إلى خارج محافظة عدن ويتم ضمها ضمن ألوية البرية للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية.

ماد (٥): تخضع ألوية الإسناد والدعم لقيادة القوات البرية التي تخضع لوزارة الدفاع.

ماد (٦): ينظم عمل وعهام ألوية الإسناد والدعم وفق نظم وشوائب وزارة الدفاع

ماد (٧): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين

كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام للأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجبائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"

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Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408485644603695109?s=08> .

### **Translation provided by the STC**

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 13 for the year 2021, regarding the appointment of a command for the Backup and Support brigades and their inclusion within the southern ground forces.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Major General Saleh Ahmed Mohammad Al-Sayed as commander of the the Backup and Support brigades.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Ali Nasser Muthanna Al-Muaker – War Staff Officer for Support Brigades.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Abdul Salam Zain Ali Al-Bayhani - Operations Staff Officer of the Support Brigades.

Article (4): The headquarters and brigades of Backup and Support shall be transferred outside Aden governorate and shall be included within the land brigades of the Southern Armed Forces.

Article (5): Backup and Support brigades are subject to the command of the land forces, which are subject to the Ministry of Defense.

Article (6): The work and tasks of the Backup and Support brigades shall be regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Defense.

Article (7): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Note: The STC informed the Panel in December 2021 that there are no more military forces in Aden, and that they “fulfilled the Riyadh Agreement in this aspect from one side.” These military forces left to different fronts immediately after the issuance of the decree. The Government of Yemen denies that any movement of these forces outside of Aden.

## **Annex 7 Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020**

1. The Panel investigated the attack at Aden International Airport, which took place at approximately 1325 hours on 30 December 2020 shortly after a plane carrying the Ministers of the newly formed ‘unity’ government had arrived from Riyadh. The attack claimed the lives of 20 civilians, including Deputy Minister Yasmin al-Awadhi of the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Over 100 people were hospitalized as a result of injuries sustained during the incident. The Panel investigated whether the attack constituted a threat to peace and security in Yemen, as well as a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

2. Following an invitation by the Government of Yemen, the Panel visited Aden from 3 to 6 February 2021, where it had access to the impact locations at Aden International Airport as well as to the debris of the missiles used in the attack. The Panel also held meetings with representatives of the Government of Yemen and the National Commission for Inquiry, which were both conducting their own investigations into the incident. In Aden, the Panel interviewed victims and witnesses of the airport attack. It has also conducted remote interviews with a number of other individuals, including people who claim to have witnessed the launch of two missiles at the time of the attack from Tai’zz Airport. The Panel has also communicated on the attack with Houthis, journalists, independent analysts as well as international and local organisations.

3. The Panel had access to information provided by several Member States regarding the attack, including high-resolution satellite imagery of Tai’zz Airport from 30 December 2020. The Panel has requested permission to reproduce the imagery for this report, but so far the Member State which provided the imagery has not granted the Panel permission to do so.

### **I. Description of the incident**

4. On 30 December 2020, a Yemen Airways (Yemenia) Airbus A320-200 operating as flight IY535 left King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh at 1010 hours, carrying Yemeni Prime Minister Maen Abdulmalik Saeed, members of his cabinet, other officials, as well as the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen. The new ‘unity’ cabinet had been sworn in just four days earlier after long negotiations between the Hadi government and representatives of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The cabinet’s return to Aden was seen as a crucial step in the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement. The arrival of the plane was awaited by a crowd of people, who had gained access to the airport’s apron. It was also broadcast live on Yemeni television (see figure 7.1 below). Despite the high-profile nature of the event, security around the airport on 30 December 2020 seems to have been relatively light, even though the Government has informed the Panel that it had received some intelligence information in the early morning hours of 30 December about a possible attack.

Figure 7.1  
**The scene at Aden airport immediately before the attack**



**Source:** <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344431245481160704>

5. The Panel was informed that the plane arrived at Aden International Airport at approximately 1317 hours, about 90 minutes later than originally expected. Just minutes before its arrival, the airport authorities decided to change the incoming airliner's parking position from line 1 (the closest position to the terminal) to line 2, which is approximately 50 metres further away from the terminal. It is also clear from the presence of a red carpet visible in some of the video footage that the plane was originally supposed to park closer to the terminal.<sup>73</sup> According to airport officials interviewed by the Panel, the decision to change the parking position was taken to increase the distance between the waiting crowds and the plane. Following the plane's arrival, there was an additional delay as Major-General Shallal Ali Shaya, former Director-General of Security in Aden, disembarked first to greet his supporters on the apron. Only after Shallal Ali Shaya had boarded a vehicle to leave the airport, the rest of the passengers, including the members of the cabinet, began to leave the plane.

6. According to the time stamp on the closed-circuit television (CCTV) tapes of the airport, the first explosion occurred at 13:24:35 hours, when the VIP lounge in the terminal building was hit by a missile (see figure 7.2), which penetrated the concrete wall and caused a crater with a diameter of approximately two meters. Based on the damage to the terminal wall (see figure 7.3), the Panel assesses that the first missile was launched from a northerly direction. According to witnesses interviewed by the Panel, the Government had been planning to hold a press conference at this location after the arrival of the Prime Minister and the other cabinet members from Riyadh. It is likely that only the delay described in the previous paragraph prevented members of the Government from being harmed by this missile, which instead killed and injured a number of passengers, all civilians, waiting in the departure hall for the departure of Yemen Airways flight no. IY612 to Cairo.

<sup>73</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2c0WXcyvTQ0>.

Figure 7.2  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the first missile  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:24:35



30-12-2020 Wed 13:24:35



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.3

Damage to the outer wall of the terminal building, showing the angle of impact



*Source:* Panel

7. The second explosion occurred seconds later at 13:25:09 local time (based on the time stamp of the airport's CCTV footage), when a missile hit the airport apron (see figure 7.4), causing a crater with a diameter of approximately 75 centimetres with a depth of about 32 centimetres. The orientation of the crater shows that this missile impacted from approximately  $315^\circ$  from the North, i.e. from a north-westerly direction (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1). Given the dimensions of the crater, which are significantly smaller than in the case of the other two missiles, it is possible that the second missile carried a smaller quantity of explosives. Nevertheless, the missile impacted directly on lane 1 (see figure 7.5), where the Yemenia Airbus was supposed to park after its arrival from Riyadh. Had the plane's landing position not been changed at the last moment, it seems very likely that the plane would have suffered a direct hit, causing even greater loss of life and destruction.

Figure 7.4  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the second missile on the apron



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.5  
Impact point of the second missile on the runway



*Source:* Panel

8. At 13:25:33 local time, a third missile hit at a low earth wall close to the terminal building, approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile. The impact created a crater with a diameter of approximately 3 metres and a depth of 1.3 metres. Unfortunately, at the time of the Panel's visit to Aden International Airport, about four weeks after the attack, the crater had already partially been re-filled with earth, which made precise measurements impossible. However, the orientation of the crater, as well as the imagery from the CCTV cameras clearly shows that this missile came from a northerly direction.



Figure 7.6  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the third missile on the low earth wall  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:25:33



30-12-2020 Wed 13:25:33



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.7  
**Impact point of the third missile on the low earth wall**



*Source:* Panel

9. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel reported shots being fired. Gunfire can also be heard on some of the videos taken by journalists during the incident. Despite speculation that there was a simultaneous ground attack, the Panel has been informed by the authorities that those shots were fired by members of the Yemeni and Saudi security forces in the confusion following the explosions. With regard to the human toll of the attack, the Panel has received information from three different sources – the Government of Yemen, National Commission of Inquiry and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Aden – stating that a total of 20 people,<sup>74</sup> including three staff members of the ICRC perished as a result of the attack,<sup>75</sup> and that between 104 and 114 people were injured.<sup>76</sup> The difference in figures is due to the fact that the Government only listed people who were hospitalized, while OHCHR also included those injured but not hospitalized as a result of the attack. Among the injured were four children, nine women, ten journalists and 12 members of the military.<sup>77</sup>

10. The Panel has noted media reports that about four hours after the attack the Maasheeq palace, which is the seat of the government in Aden, was attacked by “an explosive-laden drone”, which was allegedly intercepted.<sup>78</sup> The Panel requested more information about this incident, and stands ready to conduct an inspection of the debris of the uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).

<sup>74</sup> This number includes three people who died from their injuries in hospital.

<sup>75</sup> <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-2-icrc-staff-members-killed-1-unaccounted-after-airport-blast>.

<sup>76</sup> The list with the names of the casualties received by the Panel from the Government of Yemen is reproduced in annex 4.

<sup>77</sup> According to information provided by OHCHR this number includes five foreign soldiers.

<sup>78</sup> <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2020/12/30/Yemeni-military-intercepts-explosive-laden-drone-near-Aden-s-presidential-palace>.

11. Immediately after the attack, the Government of Yemen attributed responsibility to the Houthis.<sup>79</sup> The Panel has taken note of statements by senior Houthi officials, including by the deputy foreign minister Hussein al-Ezzi<sup>80</sup> as well as by the ministry of human rights in Sana'a, who condemned the attack and stated that "the Saudi aggression coalition planned and directly supported terrorist groups to target Aden airport and civilians".<sup>81</sup> The Panel has not been able to find any evidence supporting the claim against Saudi Arabia. The Panel also notes that Abdulwahab al-Mahbashi, a member of the political office of the Houthis, when asked about the Aden airport attack, neither denied nor confirmed Houthi involvement in the incident, but rather stated in general that the Houthis have a right of self-defense.<sup>82</sup> In line with its methodology, the Panel has written to the leadership of the Houthi movement with detailed questions regarding the attack; a response is still pending.

## II. Possible launch sites of the attack on the Airport

12. The Panel is investigating different locations from which the missiles could have been launched on 30 December 2020. It has interviewed a number of witnesses, who claimed to have observed the launches, and has analyzed images and videos posted on social media in the aftermath of the attack. It has also reviewed satellite images obtained from different sources, including confidential images provided by a Member State. The Panel has also obtained the angle and direction of the impact craters and has cross-referenced this information with the CCTV footage, both of which imply that the missiles were launched from a northerly (in the case of the first and third missile) and a north-westerly (in the case of the second missile) direction. This suggests different launch sites.

13. Shortly after the attack, a number of videos were posted on social media which appear to show the launch of two solid-propellant<sup>83</sup> missiles in the vicinity of Tai'zz Airport. The four geo-located four videos (figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, using the angles and shadows of the sun, that they were taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>84</sup> The Panel also had access to a confidential, high-resolution satellite image provided by a Member State, which was taken on 30 December 2020 over Tai'zz Airport (13°41'08.88'' N, 044°08'21.12'' E). The satellite image appears to show two Transport-Erector-Launchers (TELs) positioned at a distance of several hundred metres apart towards the West of the airport's main runway. The TELs were oriented South-East, in the direction of Aden. According to the same Member State, the TELs were no longer visible on 31 December 2020. The Panel has requested a copy of the satellite image; a response is pending. The Panel has attempted to obtain high-resolution satellite images from other providers showing the same location at the same time but without success.

<sup>79</sup> [https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436](https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436).

<sup>80</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16883/Deputy-Minister-of-Foreign-Condemns-Targeting-Civilians-in-Aden-Airport>.

<sup>81</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16918/Ministry-of-Human-Rights-Saudi-Aggression-Coalition-Plans%2C-Directly-Supported-Terrorist-to-Target-Aden-Airport%2C%A0>.

<sup>82</sup> [https://twitter.com/South24\\_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20](https://twitter.com/South24_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20).

<sup>83</sup> The smoke trails of the two missiles in the videos show a distinctive white smoke, which is characteristic of so-called "composite solid-propellant", a combination of Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), ammonium perchlorate, aluminum particles and other additives.

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>. Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

Figure 7.8

Footage from different social media sources (“Video #2”, left) showing two missiles launched from Tai’zz Airport on 30 December 2020



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224> (left), Government of Yemen (right)

Figure 7.9

**Approximate locations of the two TELs at Tai'zz Airport on 30 December 2020 based on confidential information provided by a Member State**



*Source:* Panel

14. It appears clear from the videos posted on social media on 30 December 2020 that one of the missiles launched from Tai'zz Airport malfunctioned and crashed shortly after take-off. A number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel stated that it crashed near the Al-Hashdi soap factory in the Al-Jund valley south of the airport. The distance from Tai'zz Airport to Aden Airport is approximately 135 kilometers, which would imply the use of a short-range ballistic missile system. Images posted on social media, which were allegedly taken at the location shortly after the launch, are showing the remnants of the guidance and control section of a missile with control-surfaces which are characteristic for a guided weapon (see figure 7.10). The witnesses also stated that the area was cordoned off by Houthi fighters immediately after the crash and that local citizens were forced to delete any images taken on their

phones. Yemeni media also mentioned a number of arrests made by the Houthi forces of local people, who had taken videos and images of the launch.<sup>85</sup>

Figure 7.10

Images posted on social media showing the remnants of a guided missile, which allegedly crashed near the Al-Hashdi factory on 30 December 2020



Source: [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248).

15. In addition to the videos and images posted from Tai'zz, a number of videos were also posted on social media by users in Dhamar City on 30 December 2020, which appear to show the launch of two additional missiles. Three videos, which were geo-located (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, with slightly lower confidence than in the case of Tai'zz, that these were also taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>86</sup> The launch most likely occurred from a military police training center in the Al-Qarn area (14°30'41.4'' N, 044°25'00.84'' E) in the south of Dhamar City.<sup>87</sup> The Panel has been informed that the Government is in touch with a number of witnesses from Dhamar City, who have confirmed the launches. Unlike in

<sup>85</sup> <https://newsbeezer.com/egypteng/after-divulging-evidence-of-his-involvement-in-the-attack-on-aden-airport-al-houthi-launched-an-arrest-campaign/>.

<sup>86</sup> Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

<sup>87</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>.

the case of Tai'zz, the Panel has not been able to interview those witnesses. The Panel has tried to obtain satellite images of the likely launch location from a number of providers, but it seems that no high-resolution imagery was taken on 30 December 2020. The Panel notes that the distance from the police training center in Dhamar City to Aden airport is approximately 200 kilometres.

Figure 7.11

**Footage from social media (“Video 6”) allegedly showing the launch of two missiles from the police training center in Dhamar City**




**Source:** <https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345/>

### III. Analysis of the weapon system used in the attack

16. The Panel inspected the debris of the three missiles that were used in the attack on Aden airport. It is not clear who had access to the debris or whether pieces are missing, as it seems that entry to the airport was not tightly controlled in the immediate aftermath of the attack. It is also not clear which pieces belong to which of the three missiles as most of the debris was not labelled or packed in a way that would allow for clear attribution. The Panel is aware that pieces of debris are held by both the Government and by the National Commission of Inquiry.

17. The Panel has analyzed the CCTV footage from Aden airport, which for all the explosions clearly shows a missile-shaped form immediately before impact. Comparing the size of the shape with other objects in the frame whose size is known allows for a rough estimate of the missile's length, which is assessed to be between five and 5.5 meters (see figure 7.12 below). In addition, the impact angle points towards a ballistic missile, while the high degree of precision visible in some of the impacts (see for example figure 7.5 above) leads to the conclusion that guided missiles (as opposed to a less precise weapon, such as a rocket or a mortar grenade) were used in the attack. The available evidence points strongly towards the use of solid fuel, short-distance, surface-to-surface, ballistic missiles.

Figure 7.12  
**Calculation of the size of the missile based on the CCTV footage**



**Source:** Government of Yemen

18. The Houthi forces have been using short-range ballistic weapons for several years, both within Yemen and against border towns such as Jizan or Najran in Saudi Arabia. The most common weapon system in this category is the Badr-1, which the Houthis unveiled for the first time in February 2017 and which the Panel has documented several times since mid-2018. In its basic version, the Badr-1 is a solid-fuel, unguided, artillery rocket with a diameter of 300 millimetres, which is commonly launched from one of the twin launch containers mounted on a 6x6 TEL. The Panel believes that the Badr-1 artillery rocket is manufactured locally in Yemen without the need to source components from abroad. On 28 October 2018, the Houthis unveiled a guided version, dubbed the Badr-1P and stated a range of 150 kilometers and an accuracy of three meters, which unlike the basic version, appears to be launched from a rail. The Badr-1P features distinctive control-surface (pivoting fins) mounted in the front of the missile, immediately behind its warhead, and seems to have a length of approximately six meters. While it is possible that the Badr-1P is also domestically manufactured, it is very likely that at least some components of the weapon (such as the servo actuators and the guidance unit) are imported into Yemen.

Figure 7.13  
**Images showing the Badr-1P missile in the Houthi-affiliated media**



**Source:** Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 October 2018



19. The Panel has analyzed the debris of the three missiles collected at Aden airport by both the Government and the National Commission for Inquiry. It also had access to the pieces of debris that were sent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel notes that the debris has characteristics which are consistent with the debris of a solid-fuel missile with a diameter of approximately 300 millimetres<sup>88</sup> (see figure 7.14). The Panel also notes that the three missiles carried fragmentation warheads, featuring small metal cubes (see figure 7.15), a type of fragmentation which the Panel has previously observed as part of missiles and UAVs used by the Houthi forces.<sup>89</sup> The Panel has not seen any remnants of the guidance and control sections, which would allow for a better identification of the missile, and the only identifiable marking documented on the debris (“18F4”, see figure 7.16 below) has not been observed by the Panel previously. Appendix 2 contains additional images of the debris inspected by the Panel in Aden.

Figure 7.14

**Debris from the missiles used in the attack on Aden airport**



**Source:** Panel

<sup>88</sup> Precise measurements were impossible as the debris was severely bent out of shape as a result of the impact.

<sup>89</sup> See paragraph 7 in annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report ([S/2020/326](#)).

Figure 7.15  
Metal cubes which were part of the fragmentation warhead of the missile



*Source:* Panel


Figure 7.16  
Markings (“18F4”) documented on the debris of one of the missiles



*Source:* Government of Yemen

20. The Panel notes that the debris inspected in Aden has similar characteristics to debris which the Panel inspected in October 2020 during a visit to Ma'rib, in particular with regard to the diameter (approximately 300 millimeters) of the missile and the small metal cubes, which form part of the fragmentation warhead (see figure 7.17 below). The Government of Yemen commissioned a comparative laboratory analysis of the debris from Aden and Ma'rib, which concluded that the metallurgical content is very similar (see appendix 3). While this is far from conclusive, it does strengthen the probability that the missiles used in Aden and in Ma'rib were of the same type.

Figure 7.16  
Missile debris from Ma'rib inspected by the Panel in October 2020



Source: Panel

21. The Panel concluded with regard to the weapons used in the Ma'rib attacks, which are consistently referred to as “ballistic missiles” by both the Houthi forces and the Government of Yemen, that the debris was likely from an unguided artillery rocket (see page 8, [S/2021/79](#)). This assessment was based on (a) the relatively short distance between the frontlines and the impact points, (b) the absence of any debris from the guidance and control sections and (c) the comparatively low precision of the targeting. In contrast, the attacks in Aden were clearly conducted using a short-range guided ballistic missile. It is possible that the weapon system used in Ma'rib was the basic version of the Badr-1, while the weapon system in Aden was a guided version of the Badr-1 missile family. However, the Panel notes that the images of the guidance and control section of the missile which allegedly crashed south of Tai'zz Airport (see figure 17.10 above), do not correspond to the images of the Badr-1P, which were shown in the Houthi-affiliated media (see figure 7.13 above), in particular with regard to the size and form of the control surfaces.<sup>90</sup> While the distance between the airports of Tai'zz and Aden of approximately 135 kilometers would be within the range of 150 kilometers claimed by the Houthi-affiliated media for the Badr-1P, this is not the case for the distance of circa 200 kilometres between Dhamar City and Aden. It is therefore possible that, either (a) the missiles launched from Tai'zz and Dhamar were of different types, or (b) that the range of the Badr-1P missile has been extended, for example through the reduction of the payload (i.e. the amount of explosives carried). The inspection of the debris recovered from the airport in Aden does not give any indication that the type of missiles was different, while the diameter and the fragmentation warhead, as well as the laboratory analysis of the metal strongly points towards an extended-range version of the Badr-1 missile family.<sup>91</sup>

#### IV. Analysis of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations

22. Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. Military personnel, including members of the Coalition also use the facility. However, according to information received by the Panel from multiple sources, at the time of the attack no military operations were being carried out from the airport, nor were there any military aircraft at the locations where the three missiles impacted. As discussed above, the missile attack was targeting high-ranking members of the Government of Yemen upon their return

<sup>90</sup> The weapon systems shown on display in the Houthi-affiliated media are likely mock-ups, plus the design of locally assembled weapons are often “tweaked” to enhance performance, so this is far from conclusive. The Panel has never been able to inspect a complete Badr-1P missile.

<sup>91</sup> In addition to the basic Badr-1 rocket and the Badr-1P guided missile, the Houthi-affiliated media also in April 2019 displayed an “air burst” version called the Badr-1F with a claimed range of 160 kilometers. However, this missile appears to have a significantly greater diameter than the other member of the family.

from Riyadh. Government officials, including cabinet members, are civilians under IHL.<sup>92</sup> Although military personnel were present at the airport at the time of the incident, this was also the case for large numbers of civilians, including passengers waiting for their departure, airport personnel and journalists. This is also reflected in the number of casualties – no member of the military was among the 20 people killed in the attack and only 12 members of the military were among the more than 100 people who were hospitalized as a result of injuries. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the missiles carried fragmentation warheads containing small metal cubes, which are intended to cause more injuries.

23. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians.<sup>93</sup> Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. At the time of the attack, it was not, by purpose or use, making an effective contribution to military action and its partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, did not offer a definite military advantage. Therefore, it was not considered as a military objective at the time of the attack.<sup>94</sup> In addition, there was a large number of civilians present, including senior officials of the Government of Yemen, who were clearly targeted as discussed in previous sections. Based on the information and evidence received, the Panel therefore concludes that the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians<sup>95</sup> was not respected by the attackers, nor were the principles of proportionality or of precautions.<sup>96</sup>

## V. Conclusion

24. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the plane carrying senior government officials, including the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, was the target of the attack on 30 December 2020 and that this attack was carried out in violation of the applicable norms of IHL.<sup>97</sup> The Panel finds that the attack was carried out using a solid-fuel, guided, short-range ballistic missile with a fragmentation warhead, most probably an enhanced-range version of the Badr-1 family, which has been in frequent use by the Houthi forces against both targets in Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel has not yet seen any evidence suggesting that other conflict parties in Yemen have used guided missiles of this kind. While the Panel continues to investigate, the Panel concludes with very high confidence that at least two missiles were launched from Tai'zz Airport towards Aden on 30 December 2020, and that it is likely that two additional missiles were launched from the police training center in Dhamar City. The Panel has been able to confirm that both locations were under the control of the Houthi forces at the time of the launches

<sup>92</sup> The Minister of Defence, who has military status, was not present at the airport.

<sup>93</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>94</sup> See CIHL rule 8.

<sup>95</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

<sup>96</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>97</sup> As per its methodology the Panel stands ready to revise its findings if contrary evidence is made available to the Panel.

## Appendix 1 Maps

This annex contains a number of maps, which were prepared by UNITAR and UNOSAT on behalf of OHCHR and the National Commission for Inquiry, and they are reproduced here with their permission. The Panel has verified the impact locations and the approximate angle of the incoming missiles during a visit to Aden Airport in February 2021. The geo-locations of the social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar City are based on open-source information.

Figure 7.17

### List of geo-locations of social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar

Video #1	13°41'19.6080" N 044°09'40.68" E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847</a>
Video #2	13°39'14.1480" N 044°08'12.5520" E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224</a>
Video #3	Confidential	<a href="https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20">https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20</a>
Video #4	Main road outside of Tai'zz airport	<a href="https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20">https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20</a>
Video #5	14°32'17.1060" N 044°25'52.212" E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345">https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345</a>
Video #6	14°30'51.7932" N 044°24'33.3144" E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/">https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/</a>
Video #7	No precise coordinates	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873">https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873</a>
Video #8	14°31'46.2" N 044°24'09.4680" E	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0</a>

**Source:** <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>

Figure 7.18  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the first missile



Figure 7.19  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the second missile



104/301 Figure 7.20  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the third missile





Figure 7.21  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the direction of the incoming second missile



Figure 7.22  
Possible launch locations of the missiles on 30 December 2020



Source: UNITAR/UNOSAT

**Appendix 2 Additional images of the missile debris inspected by the Panel in Aden**

Figure 7.23  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.24  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.25  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.26  
**Screws from the missile**



Figure 7.27  
**Remnants of solid fuel**



*Source:* Panel

**Appendix 3 Results of the metallurgical analysis undertaken on behalf of the National Commission of Inquiry comparing two pieces of missile debris from Aden and Ma'rib**

وزارة الشؤون الخارجية  
 المؤسسة العامة للشؤون  
 مطبعة الجمهورية - صنعاء  
 التاريخ: 2022/01/25

الأخ / رئيس اللجنة الوطنية لتحقيق في ادعاءات انتهاكات حقوق الانسان (عن) المحترم  
 تحية طيبة ، وبعد  
 الموضوع / التقرير الفني حول مطابقة شظايا الصواريخ التي استهدفت مطار عدن الدولي

في البدء نود بكم تعيننا المتفصرة ، ونتمنى لكم التوفيق والسداد في مهام صلكم الاستاتي والتبيل لتحقيق في انتهاكات حقوق الانسان ، وبالإشارة الى الموضوع اعلاه ، نطعنم باننا قمنا باجراء الفحص المعنى الغير التالي للشظايا المستلمة للصواريخ التين تم اطلاقهما على كل من محافظة مارب و مطار عدن المعنى الدولي في العاصمة المؤقتة عدن بتاريخ 2020/12/30 ، وقد تمت الفحوصات التالية :-

- فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر :  
 تبين من خلال تحليل الانسعه الطيفيه لتعديد العناصر المكونه لمعدن شظايا الصاروخين بانهما متطابقيه في التحليل الكمي والنوعي .
- فحص صلادة معدن الشظايا :-  
 تم التكد من ان صلادة معدن الشظايا المشتركة لكلا الصاروخين في نطاق متقارب السطحية (3 + 15 ) لقيم صلادة المعدن بكمروج مقياس الصلاده برينيل (HB).

نتائج الفحوصات :

رقم عالم	التفاصيل / البيان	صاروخ محافظة مارب	صاروخ مطار عدن الدولي	ملاحظات					
1	قطعة الشظية الاولى	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر							
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr				
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %				
		الصلادة (HB)							
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)						
		132	103	134	122	141	119	114	125
2	قطعة الشظية الثانية	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر							
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr				
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %				
		الصلادة (HB)							
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)						
		206	190	174	190	169	156	200	175

من خلال نتائج الفحوصات التي تمت ، تؤكد لنا تطابق نوعية الصاروخين ومصدرهما

انتهى

2022/01/25

Source: Government of Yemen

**Unofficial translation from Arabic**

**Ministry of Electricity and Energy  
General Electricity Corporation  
Haswah Thermal Power Station (Aden)**

**Date:** 25 January 2021

**To:** Chair of the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Human Rights Violations (Aden)

**Subject:** Technical report on uniformity of fragments from the missiles that struck Aden International Airport Sir,

We send you our sincere greetings and wish you success as you carry out your humanitarian and noble work of investigating human rights violations. With regard to the above-mentioned subject, we should like to inform you that we have conducted non-destructive metallurgical testing of the fragments that we received from the missiles that were fired on 30 December 2020 at Ma'rib Governorate and Aden International Airport in the interim capital of Aden. The following tests were carried out:

**Tomographical analysis of the elements**

Using tomographical analysis, it was determined that the metallic composition of the two missile shards is quantitatively and qualitatively identical.

**Hardness of the metal comprising the shards**

It was determined that the hardness of the metal fragments from both rockets is within the allowable range (-3, +15) on the Brinell hardness scale (HB).

**Test results**

<i>Information/data</i>	<i>Missile fired at Ma'rib Governorate</i>				<i>Missile fired at Aden International Airport</i>				<i>Remarks</i>		
	<i>Tomographical analysis of the elements</i>										
<b>First shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	125	114	119	141	122	134	103	132			
<b>Second shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	175	200	156	169	190	174	190	206			

Based on the test results, we confirm that the missiles are of the same type and origin.

(Signed)  
Metallurgical Engineer

## Appendix 4 List of the casualties of the attack on 30 December 2020

Figure 7.27

### List of the people killed during the attack



### كشف بشهداء الاستهداف الصاروخي لمطار عدن الدولي بتاريخ ٢٠٢٠/١٢/٣٠م

الجهة التابع لها	المنصب	الاسم الكامل	م
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب مدير الامن السياسي عدن	عقيد / محفوظ محمد محفوظ	١
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط الامن السياسي عدن	محمد عبد الوالي صالح	٢
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب رئيس نوبة الامن السياسي مطار عدن	عقيد / يحيى مثنى قائد النهي	٣
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط امن سياسي	مساعد / محمد علي قاسم	٤
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس قسم الأجانب جوازات عدن	رائد/عدنان علي فضل موانس	٥
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس نوبة جوازات مطار عدن	رائد/علي احمد هادي	٦
امن عدن	مسئول عمليات قوات الطوارئ امن عدن	عقيد/عبد القوي محمد قاسم لخجر	٧
امن عدن	قائد الكتيبة الاولى طواري امن عدن	نقيب/صابر فضل الياضي	٨
امن عدن	احد افراد قوة الطواري	جندي/محمد عبد الرب احمد القاضي	٩
إدارة الإطفاء مطار عدن	سائق عربّة إطفاء - مطار عدن	سمير عباس حاصل	١٠
إدارة التسهيلات مطار عدن	ضابط تسهيلات - مطار عدن	ذويزن حيدر خضر احمد	١١
شركة النفط عدن	مدير إدارة تموين الطائرات	مهندس/بدر سعيد علي	١٢
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	احمد اقبال وزير	١٣
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	حميد شوعي القديمي	١٤
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( رواندي الجنسية )	سعيد كيرا لجتا	١٥
وزارة الأشغال	وكيل وزارة الأشغال لقطاع الإسكان	ياسمين محمد العواضي	١٦
قناة بلقيس	مراسل قناة بلقيس الضائحية	اديب محمد سنان الجناني	١٧

المرجع

● إدارة امن مطار عدن

Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.28

## List of the people who were hospitalized for injuries sustained during the attack

التاريخ: / ٢٠٢١ م  
الموافق: .....  
الرقم: .....  
المرفقات: .....



الجمهورية اليمنية  
وزارة الداخلية  
مكتب الوزير

## كشف تفصيلي عن الجرحى بسبب انفجارات مطار عدن الدولي

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التليفون
1	ابراهيم عبدالله قاسم	جريح	اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
2	ابويكر عبدالله عبيد	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
3	ابويكر عبدالله محمد	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		مرقد		
4	احمد علي احمد همدان	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
5	احمد علي فضل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
6	احمد محمد ثابت معوضة	نزيف حاد وجروح متهتكه في البطن والركبة اليمنى والكتف	البريهي	مدير عام بوزارة الشباب والرياضه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٤	
7	احمد مهدي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
8	ادم محمد محسن ناجي	نزيف حاد وشظايا في القدم الايمن	البريهي	الامانه العامه لمجلس الانتقالي النابذة الاعلامية	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٧	
9	اشرف عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفه (مسؤول مكتب الرياضة)	غادر المستشفى		
10	الخضر ناصر لصور	جريح	مستوصف السلام	رئيس الجامعه	غادر المستشفى		
11	الهام علي محمد ( طفلة )	شظايا بالرقيه	الالمانى	مواطنه	مرقد		
12	امجد عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفه (مسؤول مكتب الرياضة)	غادر المستشفى		
13	امين عبدربه حسين	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
14	ام ن عبدربه مصور	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	الامن السياسي	غادر المستشفى		
15	انتصار الزبيدي	جريح	مستوصف بايل		مرقد		
16	اياد سيف مصلىح	جرح في الظهر	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
17	ايمن محمد مساعد الامير	جروح متهتكه في الوجه والمرفق والراس	البريهي	مدير مكتب وكيل وزارة الداخلية	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ٢١٠	
18	بدر صالح الصلاحي	جريح	مستوصف بايل				
19	حسن محمد سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
20	حسين سالم محمد حفيظ	جريح	الامن السياسي	جيده			
21	حسن ن صالح عمر	جروح متهتكه في عظام الفخذ الايمن مع اصابة في الصنب	البريهي	الخدمات الطبيه العسكريه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
22	حيدر علي سعيد لهطل	نزيف حاد في البطن	البريهي	مسؤول الامن القومي	مرقد	جناح خاص ٢١١	
23	خالد احمد علي ناجي الرياشي	جريح	مستوصف بايل	مكافحة الارهاب	مرقد	حرجه	
24	خالد صالح محمد العطاس	شظايا متفرقة	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
25	خالد عبده سلام	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
26	خالد عمر عبدالله الرحم	شظايا في الراس	مستشفى خليج عدن	عقيد/مدير التموين لوزارة الداخلية	مرقد		
27	خالد محسن حسين الدوعاني	اجراءات طوارئ			غادر المستشفى		
28	خليل سعيد عوض بامطرف	شظايا	الوالي	الامن السياسي	مرقد		



م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التليفون
29	رعد مثنى قاسم	شظية بالكنتف الأيسر	البريهي	الأول مشاه كتبية الحماية بساق المحافظ	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٧	
30	روان بسمام	نزف مهيلي (حامل)	الصادقة		مرقد		
31	ريما علي سعيد الدويحي	عده جروح وقطوع في الوجه واصابه في احدى العينين	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد/عنايه	قسم العناية	
32	زكريا عبدالله صالح	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		رفود		
33	زكريا محمد صالح عمر	جروح متهتكه بالرأس (تم اجراء له عملية)	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٦	
34	زكريا باعبيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
35	سامي عمر سالم باوزير	شظايا بالرجل اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
36	سحر شوكت	اصابه	مستوصف بابل		غادر المستشفى		
37	سعيد مثنى الشعبي	اصابه في البطن	مستوصف الشفاء	اعلامي	مرقد		
38	سليمان ناصر الزامكي	شظية باليد والرأس	صابر	لائد الموات الخاصة	غادر المستشفى		
39	سميه الحاصل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
40	سيف سالم قاسم ثابت	اجراءات طوارئ	الامن السياسي		جيده		
41	شوقي شرجيبي	اجراءات طوارئ	الوالي	وكيل وزارة الصحة	غادر المستشفى		
42	صابر عبدالرب	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
43	صادق احمد علي الرتيبي	كسور مفتته عظام القدم الايمن	البريهي	اعلامي	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٢	
44	صالح ناصر عطف الحكمي	جروح متهتكه مع شظية في الفخذ الا سر	البريهي	نائب مدير الجوازات	غادر المستشفى		
45	صالح حمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	الالاماني	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
46	صالح محمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
47	صالح ميل ناجي	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
48	صرواح محمد العفيفي	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
49	صلاح احمد الكثيري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	صحفي	غادر المستشفى		
50	صلاح احمد صالح سريبي	كسور مفتته في عظام الساق الايسر مع جروح متهتكه في عظام الساق الايمن	البريهي	لائد كتبية الحماية (الواء الاول مشاه لتقاني)	مرقد	قسم انعاش جراحي	
51	صلاح قاسم محمد عثمان	في العمود واليد	مستوصف الشفاء	الامن السياسي	مرقد	جيده	
52	عبدالحكيم خالد علي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
53	عبدالرحمن علي عبدالله	شظايا بالوجه وكسر بالرجل اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
54	عبدالرزاق يحيى قاسم	جريح	مستوصف بابل		غادر المستشفى		
55	عبدالرشيد صالح علي الشعبي	اجراءات طوارئ	الالاماني	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
56	عبدالله سالم عبدالله سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
57	عبدالله عدنان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
58	عبدالله محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
59	عبدالله محمد عبدالله مساعد	كسر بالعمد اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
60	عبدالله ناصر عبدالقادر	شظية بالوجه	صابر	القوات الخاصه	مرقد		
61	عبدالملك عدنان محسن الصبلي	شظايا متفرقه بالمفصل	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
62	عبدالوهاب احمد محمد شران	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		مرقد		
63	عدنان احمد حسين موانس	حروقي بالجسم وشظايا	الجمهورية لمس الحروقي	قاطب ف مصلحة الهجرة والجوازات	مرقد		
64	عدنان علي فضل الصنغاني	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
65	علي احمد خيران	اجراءات طوارئ	الامن السياسي		جيده		
66	علي حمود الهدياتي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
67	علي سالم منثي	رضوض متعدده بالراس والاطراف	البريهي	ضابط في الامن (وزارة الداخليه)	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
68	علي سعيد علي سالم	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى	غادر المستشفى		
69	علي عبيدات	جريح	الوالي	غادر المستشفى			
70	علياء فؤاد	جريح	مستوصف باهل	غادر المستشفى			
71	عمار شجاع الدين	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود	غادر المستشفى			
72	عمر باربيش	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
73	عمر مبارك عمر باحميش	شظايا متفرقه	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
74	فنتحي يحيى الاحمدى	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	مستشار وزارة السياحه	غادر المستشفى		
75	فضل عل عل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود	غادر المستشفى			
76	فهم عل صالح	جريح	مستشفى البريهي	مرقد			
77	فهم ناصر عل حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	غادر المستشفى			
78	لايد ه ثم الحدي	طوارئ	النميب	مد ر برنامج الاعلام	غادر المستشفى		
79	لطف ف صل عبدالله الحامد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
80	لم بن وسام هشام	شظايا	النميب	طفله عمرها ٩ شهور	مرقد		
81	ماجد احمد ماهر ظاهر	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
82	ماجد حسن عبده شمسان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
83	ماهر محمد علي	شظايا بالكنتف والفخذ الامين	البريهي	لوة طوارئ امن عدن	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
84	محسن محمد عبدالله عبدالمتاع	نزيف في الدماغ وكسور في عظام الجمجمه وعظام الوجه	البريهي	مرقد/عنايه	قسم الامتاش الجرحي		
85	محفوظ حسن شغل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
86	محفوظ محمد محفوظ راجح	حروق في الجسم مع كسور مفتحة في عظام الساق الايسر	البريهي	نائب مدير الامن السياسي	مرقد/عنايه	قسم الامتاش الباطني	
87	محمد الجديري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
88	محمد حسين مبارك حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
89	محمد عبدالقوي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
90	محمد عبدالولي صالح مقبل	حروق بالجسم	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد/بليغه		
91	محمد علي الجنيدى	جريح	مستشفى خليج عدن	سكرتير محافظ	غادر المستشفى		
92	محمد علي غوان	اصابه بالساق اليسرى /طوارئ فمط	صابر	القوات الخاصه	غادر المستشفى		
93	محمد علي مارش	شظايا في الرجل	البريهي	القوات الخاصه	مرقد		
94	محمد علي محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود	اعلامي	غادر المستشفى		
95	محمد مساعده قاسم الامير	شظيه كبيرة في الفخذ الايسر مع فقدان مادي لعضلات الفخذ (اجراء عمليه استخراج الشظيه)	البريهي	وكيل وزارة الداخليه لخدمات الشرطة	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
96	محمد مصطفى محمد مكر	اصابه في اليد	مستوصف الشفاء	مرقد			
97	محمد موسى محمد عمر	اجراءات طوارئ	صابر	غادر المستشفى			
98	محمود صالح طالب	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
99	محمود صالح	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه	رقد			
100	مفيد حسن البحري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
101	منار سعيد عبدالله	جروح متتكمه في العرق الايسر والجبهه وكسر في عظام الاتف	البريهي	امن خفر السواحل	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٤	
102	مهدي محمد ناصر حنتوش	جريح	صابر	عميد في الجيش			
103	ناصر احمد مبارك	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود	رقد			
104	ناصر الشريف	شظايا	خليج عدن	نائب وزير النقل	غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
105	ناصر ثابت محمد قحطان	جريح	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
106	نبيل سكرة	اصابه في الكنتف		عميد	مرقد		
107	نقيب مفيد يحيى البهري	شظايا بالراس	الالمانى	عنايه/مدير سجن المنصورة	مرقد	قسم العنايه	
108	هاني ناصر احمد حيدرة النمي	شظايا	الوالي	الامن السياسي	رقد		
109	وسيم قحطان	جريح	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
110	وضاح عبدالله باديب	شظايا بسيطه	البريهي	غادر المستشفى			
111	وعد بدر معاوين	جريح	مستشفى المصافي	ابن الامين العام للمجلس المحلى البريهي	مرقد		
112	ياسين محمد عبدالباقي	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
113	يحيى عمر عبدالقوي الحمادي	جريح	الالمانى	عسكري الحزام الامني	مرقد		
114	يحيى عمر محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			

المرجع  
مكتب وكيل محافظة عدن لشئون الشهداء والجرحى

Source: Government of Yemen

## Annex 8 Mukha Port Attack, 11 September 2021

### I. Introduction

1. The Panel is investigating the attack at Mukha Port in Al Mukha, Ta'izz Governorate, which began at approximately 0945 hours and lasted until 11.15 hours on 11 September 2021, shortly after a representative of a Government of Yemen committee arrived at the port for meetings. The attack, during which two missiles and six UAVs were deployed, resulted in one injury to a port worker. There was damage to an office container used as conference room, to a warehouse and to the base of a control tower. At the time of the attack, the port was reportedly being converted for civilian use after years of exclusive military occupation.<sup>98</sup> The committee was meant to oversee this development, which would be an important milestone in normalising relationships between the WCJF and the Government, as well as in opening an additional port for civilian imports on the West Coast. Therefore, the Panel initiated investigations into this attack as a threat to peace, security, or stability of Yemen and a potential violation of international humanitarian law.

### II. Methodology

2. The Panel received information, including images, videos, and other documentary evidence from the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance. The Panel conducted interviews with representatives of the port authority, National Resistance, the visiting committee, Government of Yemen, local authorities, and other witnesses. The Panel has given the Houthis the opportunity to comment on the Panel's findings regarding the incident, a response is pending.<sup>99</sup> The Panel has not had an opportunity to inspect the debris directly of the weapons systems used in the attack but has requested to do so during a future visit to the West Coast.

### III. Description of the incident

3. On 11 September 2021, the committee was scheduled to attend several meetings at the Mukha Port.<sup>100</sup> In August 2021, the Panel was informed that the conversion of Mukha Port to civilian use had begun with the establishment of a customs post<sup>101</sup> and the appointment of a civilian port management team.<sup>102</sup> According to port officials, at least two civilian vessels had already docked at the port.<sup>103</sup> The committee, appointed by the Yemeni Minister of Transport (figure 8.1), was planning to conduct a general visit of the port to assess the repairs.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, this visit was viewed by all stakeholders as an important step towards future civilian oversight.

<sup>98</sup> According to the port authorities, the port had been under military occupation since at least 2017.

<sup>99</sup> Letter dated 13 December 2021.

<sup>100</sup> This meeting was, initially, scheduled for 7/8 September 2021, but was postponed to 11 September 2021, according to a port official.

<sup>101</sup> Source: Customs official. The document of the decision is with the Panel. The aim of this post was to allow the Government of Yemen to collect the revenue. According to a custom official, this revenue will be deposited with the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden after the establishment of the port. In a discussion with the Panel in May 2021, one of the concerns expressed by an official of the Government of Yemen was that the Mukha port was under the control of the National Resistance, and that the Government was unable to collect the revenue.

<sup>102</sup> Sources: Ministry of Transport official, National Resistance Forces, and port official.

<sup>103</sup> The Panel is unable to independently verify. On 30 July 2021, the port was opened to receive commercial ships, according to this official.

<sup>104</sup> The National Resistance Forces and the Government of Yemen.

Figure 8.1  
Appointment of the Committee that visited the Mukha Port on 11 September 2021



Source: Confidential


4. The Panel was informed that on 11 September 2021, at approximately 0930 hours, five senior officials of the committee arrived at the port.<sup>105</sup> Their first meeting commenced at approximately 0930 hours in the office of the General Manager (map 8.1).<sup>106</sup> There were at least 13 persons in this meeting room.<sup>107</sup> The representatives of the committee and some port officials were still at this meeting when the first missile hit near the office container used as a conference room in a different part of the port at 0945 hours, and therefore, were unharmed. The second missile hit a warehouse one minute later.

<sup>105</sup> According to the National Resistance, these individuals were the Deputy Under Secretary for Port Affairs, Ministry of Transport; the Director of Marine Environmental Protection, Maritime Affairs Authority; the Project Manager, Gulf of Aden Ports Corporation; the Director, Department of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Transport; The Director of Information of the Ministry of Transport and his team and Port of Al Mukha’ officials.

<sup>106</sup> Two individuals present at the meeting.

<sup>107</sup> Information from the port officials and visiting delegation. The Panel was informed by a port official that the Head of Port Security was at the meeting, and that the Head of the Coast Guards of Mukha, who was supposed to attend the meeting, did not attend.

Map 8.1



**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.

4. Had the meeting been in the conference room, which was attacked, as is considered the norm for a high-profile visit,<sup>108</sup> there would have been casualties (see figure 8.2). The Government of Yemen and the National Resistance in their identical letters to the Panel stated that “(t)he committee was scheduled to hold a meeting in the port’s conference room, which was struck by one of the ballistic missiles. However, none of the Committee members were injured because the committee was late in starting its visit.”<sup>109</sup> This Information was disputed by two individuals who participated in the meeting and stated that the conference room was not meant to be the venue, but as the committee was planning to visit the whole port, they could still have been harmed by the attack.

5. The attack lasted for approximately 90 minutes, with two missiles and three UAVs impacting on different targets and an additional three UAVs being shot down (see table 8.1 and map 8.2). The duration and scope of the attack indicates that the perpetrators also intended to damage the port facilities (see table 8.2). The incident resulted in an injury to a port worker from shrapnel.

<sup>108</sup> The Panel met both political and military leaders in the conference room in late August 2021.

<sup>109</sup> Letter from National Resistance dated 09 October 2021 and letter from the Government of Yemen dated 28 October 2021. Both letters had similar content and wording.

Table 8.1  
**Details of the attack on 11 September 2021**

<i>Target</i>	<i>Type of projectile</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Coordinates of targeted location</i>		<i>Description of the location</i>
Target 1	Missile	09.45	43° 13' 58.116"	13° 18' 33.8472"	Near a conference room.
Target 2	Missile	09.46	43° 14' 16.368"	13° 18' 34.1496"	A warehouse used by the West Coast Humanitarian Unit. <sup>110</sup>
Target 3	UAV	10.30	43° 13' 53.904"	13° 18' 36.936"	Base of the port control tower, which was approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile.
Target 4	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 18.492"	13° 18' 39.2112"	Exploded near an earth wall separating two maintenance yards.
Target 5	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 0.276"	13° 18' 20.3256"	Exploded next to an earth wall.
Target 6	UAV	11.03	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 7	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 8	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.

**Sources:** Panel, based on information provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

Map 8.2

**Locations of the five impact points**



<sup>110</sup> This is a unit that is affiliated with the National Resistance that carries out relief and humanitarian work on the West Coast.

*Source:* Panel, based on coordinates provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

1. The first missile hit near a conference room and completely destroyed it (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 8.2

**Damage to the area (Target #1)**



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.3

**Damage to the conference room**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 8.4

**Images of the missile (Target #1)**



**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

1. According to the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance, at 0946 hours, the second missile struck a hangar that was being used as a warehouse by the “West Coast Humanitarian Unit”. They informed the Panel that images taken by the surveillance camera demonstrated that the angle of descent was from the East.



Figure 8.5  
Damage to the hangar used as a warehouse (Target #2)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.6

Image of the second missile prior to impact (Target #2)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

8. The National Resistance stated that the following humanitarian items were destroyed in the second missile attack (see table 8.2).

Table 8.2

**Items destroyed by the second missile**

	<i>Category</i>	<i>Number</i>
1	Food basket	2,142 baskets
2	Shelter tents	920
3	Tarpaulins	1,800
4	Oxygen cylinders	70
5	First-aid kits	43
6	Children's clothing	437
7	Hunting equipment	100
8	Canvas roll	100

**Source:** National Resistance

9. An UAV impacted at the base of the port control tower. According to information received by the Panel, port workers reported that at least two of the UAVs approached at a low altitude from an easterly direction.

Figure 8.6

**Impact point of the UAV (Target #3)**

**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.7  
Impact point of another UAV and damage caused (Target #4)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.8  
Impact point of the third UAV (Target #5)



**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

9. According to information received by the Panel, the following damage to the port occurred (see table X.3).

Table 8.3  
**Damage arising from the attacks**

	Category	Damage
1	Buildings	4 buildings (19 rooms)
2	Offices	14
3	Warehouses	1
4	Control tower	1
5	Vehicles	23
6	Port protection boats	2
7	Miscellaneous furniture	
8	Electrical equipment and tools	
9	Water tanks	
10	Other damage	

**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

#### IV. Advance Warning

10. There were no advance warnings that the port would be a target. There were no reported sightings of surveillance UAVs on the day of the attack,<sup>111</sup> although surveillance UAVs were observed over the port about three days prior to the attack.<sup>112</sup> The Ta'izz Military Axis informed the Panel that they warned

<sup>111</sup> Panel interviews with two witnesses.

<sup>112</sup> The Panel was informed that these drones are still being observed over Al Mukha port as of November 2021.

the relevant authorities of preparations for a large-scale Houthi attack a few days before 11 September 2021 (see paragraph 11).<sup>113</sup>


#### IV. Attribution of responsibility

11. The National Resistance informed the Panel that, “the ballistic missiles and drones that the Houthi militias used to attack the port of Mukha were launched from areas controlled by those militias in Ta‘izziyah District, Ta‘izz Governorate.”<sup>114</sup> The Ta‘izz Military Axis informed the Panel that, on 5 September 2021, they provided information to their hierarchy of a possible large-scale attack by the Houthis, as there was information indicating that the Houthis were transporting missiles from Ta‘izz airport to the Al Hawban area.

12. The Houthis have not, to the knowledge of the Panel, claimed responsibility for the attacks on Mukha Port, although both the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance have attributed the attack to the Houthis.<sup>115</sup>

Map 8.3

#### Launch directions of the missiles



**Source:** Panel, Google Earth, based on information provided by Ta‘izz Military Axis

13. The Panel has obtained low-quality images of the debris of the UAVs reportedly used in the attack (see figure 8. 8). The images show engine parts as well as a piece of fuselage, apparently made from fiberglass. The debris shown in these images is consistent with components of UAVs manufactured and used by the Houthis. The National Resistance stated that, in their assessment, the UAVs used were SAMAD-3 models, however, the Panel is unable to independently verify this based on the limited

<sup>113</sup> The Panel was provided evidence to support these statements.

<sup>114</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

<sup>115</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

information available at this stage. The Panel has not received any other information regarding the type of missile used in the attacks.

Figure 8.9:

**Debris of the missiles/drones**



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

## VI. Analysis of IHL violations

13. Measures had been taken in 2021 to convert Mukha Port back into a civilian port. At the time of the attack, the conversion had not yet been completed and military personnel remained at the facility. The attack took place when a high-level committee visited the port. The visit was originally supposed to take place on 7 or 8 September and had been postponed to 09.30 am on 11 September 2021.<sup>116</sup>

14. The Panel finds it likely that the missile and UAV attack targeted the members of the committee and senior port officials, which would be a violation of IHL.<sup>117</sup> The visiting members of the committee and the port officials are civilians under IHL. Military personnel were likely present at the port at the time of the incident. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must always distinguish between

<sup>116</sup> Source: Port authority official.

<sup>117</sup> See article 13 (1) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions which prohibits direct targeting of civilians.

combatants and civilians.<sup>118</sup> If the target had been military forces present in the port, the attack could have been carried out at another time.

15. Under IHL, Mukha Port, at the time of the attack, was likely a dual-use object. This does not affect the question whether the committee was the intended target of the attack or not. Therefore, it is unlikely that the perpetrators respected the principles of distinction or proportionality and precautions.<sup>119</sup>

## VII. Conclusions

16. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the visiting committee was the likely target of the attack. Additionally, the Panel finds that another objective of the attack could have been to hamper the civilian conversion of the port. Like in the case of the Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020 (see annex 7), which targeted the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, it is possible that the perpetrators intended to disrupt initiatives aimed at normalizing the situation on the ground. The Panel also notes that on 10 November 2021, three missiles were launched towards two small military camps in Mukha,<sup>120</sup> which coincided with the first visit of the new Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen to the city.<sup>121</sup> This attack, which unlike the one on Mukha Port was claimed by the Houthis, might have been an attempt to disrupt his visit. The Panel is not aware of evidence suggesting any other party to the conflict in Yemen, other than the Houthis, has used UAVs of the kind used in the Mukha port attack.

<sup>118</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>119</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>120</sup> The name of the Giants camp that was hit was reportedly **معسكر صويح** and the National Resistance's camp was an administrative base camp. Two missiles impacted inside the camps, and one impacted outside, according to sources on the West Coast. <https://www.2dec.net/news47328.html>. The Panel cannot independently verify the number of missiles used. See below footnote.

<sup>121</sup> Information provided by the Ta'izz Military Axis to the Panel confirms that these missiles were launched possibly from Houthi controlled areas in Ta'izz. The Houthis stated that on that day "two ballistic missiles (that they launched) struck an enemy training camp in the west of Taiz province". See [en.yppagency.net/243466/](https://en.yppagency.net/243466/).

## Annex 9 Impact of Houthi activities on former female detainees

1. The Panel continues to monitor the activities of different armed groups that impact adversely on women, children, and minorities in a manner that threatens the peace, security, and stability of Yemen. The Panel in 2021 documented the targeting of present and former female detainees, politically active women as well as female professionals opposing the Houthis. According to the women interviewed, the Houthis, through their actions, have created an environment that undermines women's capacity to effectively participate in community and leadership activities. This annex is based on interviews with 14 former detainees and their families.<sup>127</sup>

### I. Continued repression of former female detainees

2. Former female detainees and/or their families informed the Panel that they continue to suffer marginalization by their communities and political leaders after their release. For most women, their detention severely affected their ability to continue their work in political or community-based activities. It also impacted their family life and the education of their children. In addition to those interviewed in 2019 and 2020, in 2021, the Panel interviewed former female detainees who had been raped during their imprisonment; the family of a woman who had become paralyzed during her incarceration and was unable to speak after close to a year of enforced disappearance; women who had been tortured and/or mutilated in detention; and women who had been subjected to enforced disappearance.<sup>123</sup>

3. Former detainees are particularly vulnerable in Sana'a and in other Houthi-controlled areas. According to former female detainees interviewed by the Panel, they are called "prison graduates" by the population and are often excluded from community activities because of the stigma associated with prostitution and sexual violence. Two former detainees informed the Panel that they witnessed another female detainee being killed by her relatives on the day of her release at the prison gate. The witnesses presumed this was because the detainee had brought shame to her family through her incarceration. The Panel also received information that the family of a well-known female detainee is facing daily insults, while being stigmatized because of her ongoing detention.

4. There are no effective measures in place to protect or support women fleeing Houthi-controlled areas over prolonged periods of time, despite the provisions of resolution 2467 (2019).<sup>124</sup> As a result, some of the women who have been interviewed by the Panel since 2019 had to return to their homes in Houthi-controlled areas. The Panel has not been able to re-establish communication with them since their return due to significant safety concerns. Women interviewed by the Panel continue to show signs of trauma because of their ordeals while incarcerated. Some women, who are now living outside of Houthi-controlled areas, have no means to cover their daily expenses and their children's education has stopped. The Panel was informed that some would like to bring their perpetrators to justice, but that no financial or legal means are available.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>122</sup> This included nine former female detainees and/or their families whose cases were not previously reported by the Panel, as well as five more former female detainees whose cases were reported in [S/2020/326](#) and [S/2021/79](#).

<sup>123</sup> Most women suffered multiple forms of violence.

<sup>124</sup> Paragraph 16 (a) and (d) of resolution 2467 (2019) asks "to ensure that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict in the respective countries receive the care required by their specific needs and without any discrimination" The resolution further encourages Member States and other actors to give due consideration to the establishment of a survivors' fund and to support civil society organizations working on this issue. See also paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 of resolution [2467\(2019\)](#).



5. Women were also separated from their husbands and/or families for reasons related to detention. One woman informed the Panel that her family sold most of their belongings to bribe Houthi officials for her release. When she left the prison, the family refused to communicate with her because Houthi officials had informed them that she engaged in prostitution, a claim she denies.<sup>126</sup> In another case, the family decided that the woman would leave her home in a Houthi-controlled area for her safety, while her husband continued his work inside the Houthi-controlled area.<sup>127</sup> Women who have been separated from their families continue to be at high risk for continued sexual violence and further traumatization (see paragraph 6). One woman, who left Houthi-controlled areas for Government-controlled areas after her ordeal, stated that the military in Government-controlled areas kept harassing her because she had arrived from Sana'a.

6. The Panel has received information that compromising videos and images of female detainees were taken by the Houthis. The women were threatened with the release of these videos and images. This potentially exposes former detainees to further violence and trauma. Three women stated how the Houthis made sexually compromising videos of them; and/or forced them to confess on video to sleeping with identified military commanders belonging to anti-Houthi forces. In another incident, the Houthis submitted similar coerced and sexually compromising videos as evidence against the detainee before the prosecution.<sup>128</sup> The Panel was also informed of an identified prison director who downloaded unveiled photos of female detainees from their phones, while he was interrogating them, and threatened to release them unless the detainees complied with his orders.

7. Many of the women interviewed by the Panel since 2019 were active members of the General People's Congress (GPC). It is unclear if these female detainees were included in the Government's list of detainees for prisoner exchanges. The Panel was also informed of threats against former detainees in a third country and was told of physical harm done to another former detainee,<sup>129</sup> likely committed by Houthi supporters present in that country.<sup>130</sup> Even amongst survivors, there are fears that some former detainees may be working for the Houthis as informers.

## **II. Outcome of the designation of Sultan Zabin (YEi.006) and update on sexual violence in Houthi-controlled detention centers**

8. On 25 February 2021, through the adoption of resolution 2251 (2021), the Security Council designated Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin (YEi.006), including for instigating a policy of violence and sexual abuse against politically active women. On 26 February 2021, Zabin denounced his designation

<sup>125</sup> These women could identify their perpetrators either by their names or as belonging to the Houthi apparatus.

<sup>126</sup> The woman was arrested, and presumably also detained, in Sana'a.

<sup>127</sup> Three women informed the Panel that their immediate relatives were victims of "road-accidents" and they suspect the Houthis caused the accidents to instill fear in the former detainees. The Panel was unable to verify independently the causes of the deaths. The ones who died were a sister and an adult female child of two women, and one case of paralysis of a minor child because of such "road-accidents".

<sup>128</sup> The detainee tried to have access to these after her release and was denied.

<sup>129</sup> The Panel stands ready to share this information orally with the members of the Security Council but will not provide such information in the report to protect the women and to ensure that host countries continue to accept these women.

<sup>130</sup> The Panel cannot independently verify this information as it did not meet the victim. This information was provided by two former detainees who knew the victim personally.

stating that it was the result of lobbying by “organized crime and terrorist organizations”.<sup>131</sup> He continued as the director of the criminal investigation division in Sana’a until his alleged death on 5 April 2021.<sup>132</sup> Houthi officials continued to publicly deny his involvement in the sexual violence of women and held an elaborate funeral for Zabin. However, several sources stated that the Panel’s report (S/2020/326), resulted in tribal pressure on the Houthis to release some women.

Figure 9.1  
Extract of Facebook post by Sultan Zabin (26 February 2021)

المعيد سلطان زابن  
26 February at 07:41 · 🌐

إن المواقف القوية والواضحة من الإرهاب والتصدية له ومعارضة الجريمة المنظمة وجرائم غسل الأموال ستظل هي المحور الرئيسي لعملنا وإن ثلثنا أية شوشرة إعلامية أو نبيلة من سيل الاتهامات الباطلة.. إن هذا الخط والتوجه في محاربة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب لن نعيد عنه ، لأننا نشعر أننا نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والدستوري والوطني والإنساني.. إسمارنا هنا على العمل الأممي الجاد والمسؤول هذا الأمر عصب وحقيقة داعمي الإرهاب والقوضي الأمنية المنمعة، كما أزعج كثيرا أجهزة المخابرات الدولية التي تعتبر بمحصبا النماء الواسع لأعمال الإرهابية والجريمة المنظمة وتجارة المخدرات، مما دفعهم إلى تحريك خلاياهم والبريبيهم المتطلعة في المنظمات الدولية لكيل التهم الباطلة ولدي علق الحقيقة وتصديق التصنيفات المتسرعة. نحن نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والوطني والإنساني ولا نعطى أي اهتمام للإثارة الإعلامية الرخيصة ولا نهتم بما تروججه أبقاق القوضي الذين يتحركون بالريموت كتنترول من مطابخ منظمي الجرائم المنظمة وداعمي الإرهاب.. ورحم الله امرأاً أعرف قدر نفسه..

Strong and clear attitudes towards and countering terrorism, combating organized crime and money laundering crimes will remain the central focus of our work, and no media buzz or nightingale will distract us from the flow of false accusations.  
This line and direction in the fight against organized crime and terrorism will not be deviated, because we feel that we are doing our legitimate, constitutional, national and humanitarian duty.  
Our insistence on serious and responsible security work has aroused the anger and guardianship of terrorism supporters and the devastating security chaos, and it has also greatly disturbed the international intelligence agencies, some of which consider the broad cover of terrorism, organized crime and drug trade, leading them to activate his cells M and their lobbies lobbies in international organizations for false accusations and loy neck the truth and marketing Rankings in a rush...  
We are doing our legitimate, national and humanitarian duty and we are not paying any attention to the cheap media hype and we do not care about what the chaos horns who are moving with the remont control of the kitchens of organized crime organizers and terrorists supporters are promoting.

And God bless a woman who knew her worth..  
🌟 Rate this translation

👍👎👏👍👎 216

37 comments 15 shares

Source: <https://m.facebook.com/sultan.zabinye/>.

9. After the designation of Zabin, the Panel documented other cases involving repeated rape and sexual violence in Houthi-controlled territory. Unlike in previous years, when women were raped to “purify” them, or as a punishment, or to coerce confessions (annex 5, S/2020/326), in 2021, the Panel documented a case where a female detainee was forced to have sexual intercourse with multiple men at secret detention centres because she was told that she was “being prepared for her future role as a sex worker” for important clients. According to the Houthis, her job was to obtain information from them. Additionally, the Panel also received further information that for at least one detainee, working as a prostitute to gather information for the Houthis was made a condition for their release.<sup>133</sup>

10. The Panel is investigating the involvement of an identified female in the trafficking of vulnerable women as sex workers after their release from Houthi prisons. Women whose families refuse to accept them after their detention are particularly vulnerable to such abuse. The female security wing of the Houthis (Zainabiyath) continues to repress and control women in prisons, professional workspaces, and in public places. In 2021, the Panel documented four more cases of sexual violence where the female security wing was directly involved in arrests, detention and/or violence, including in one case, where they tortured a woman. This new information complements the violations documented previously by the Panel in S/2020/326. The Panel is unaware of any measures taken by the Houthis to prevent sexual and other forms of violence against women in detention.

<sup>131</sup> See [https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m\\_ent\\_stream\\_source=timeline&anchor\\_composer=false](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m_ent_stream_source=timeline&anchor_composer=false).

<sup>132</sup> <http://www.ypageency.net/354210>. On 5 April 2021, the ministry of interior announced Sultan Zabin’s death from a terminal illness. The Panel continues to investigate if Zabin has indeed died, and the circumstances of his death as new information has emerged that merits consideration. The Panel will further investigate.

<sup>133</sup> In 2019, the Panel documented a similar case where a woman was released, according to her, because she accepted to prostitute herself to help Houthis get information from their enemies or to compromise their enemies. She informed the Panel that she was prepared to say anything to stop the regular rape and sexual violence she had to endure in secret detention centers.

11. According to information received and media reports Brigadier Ahsan Al-Hijazi is likely the successor of Sultan Zabin as the director of the criminal investigation division.<sup>134</sup> The Panel is unaware of any information, at this stage, that links him as a successor to Zabin in the above-mentioned policy.

12. In 2019, the Panel reported that Abdul Hakim al-Khaiwani, former deputy minister of interior, publicly stressed the strong relationship between the ministry of the interior, the prosecution and legal authorities in carrying out arrests and detentions in respect of countering “prostitution” networks (paragraph 22, [S/2020/326](#)). In 2021, a victim informed the Panel that al-Khaiwani was involved in her torture while in detention. Al-Khaiwani currently serves as the director of security and intelligence bureau of the Houthis.

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<sup>134</sup> [www.yagency.net/373403](http://www.yagency.net/373403). <http://althawrah.ye/archives/703942>.  
<https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3145632.htm>.

## Annex 10 Houthi cultural courses and summer camps as a threat to peace and security in Yemen

### I. Overview

1. The Panel finds that the conflict in Yemen continues, partly, because of the Houthis' ability to continue the recruitment of new fighters, despite heavy casualties on the battlefronts (see annex 4). Their ability to exercise political and security control over their territories and populations, in violation of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), relies to a significant extent on their ability to monitor and suppress dissent (see annex 9). The Panel is therefore investigating the impact of summer camps as well as religious and cultural courses in perpetuating the conflict and in radicalizing civilians, including children.

2. During the reporting period, these camps and courses were used to: (a) solidify Abdulmalik al Houthi's (YEi.004) authority and to consolidate his group's control over civilians;<sup>135</sup> (b) limit individual freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion;<sup>136</sup> (c) recruit fighters, including children;<sup>137</sup> (d) promote violence, hatred<sup>138</sup> and radicalization;<sup>139</sup> and (e) obtain popular support for the continuation of the conflict.<sup>140</sup> The Panel is also investigating incidents of reprisals against civilians who refused to participate in these courses (paragraphs 23 to 25),<sup>141</sup> including through the denial of humanitarian assistance (paragraph 20 and 21).<sup>142</sup>

<sup>135</sup> The Panel considers attempts by Houthi authorities to solidify their control over Houthi-controlled areas to be a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), including paragraphs 1 (b) and (d).

<sup>136</sup> This would include those situations where individuals are forced to attend these religious courses or chant slogans when those conflict with their belief systems. This includes freedoms relating to political expression and religion. See Articles 10, 18 (1), (2) and (4) and 19 (1), (2) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which entered into force for Yemen on 9 May 1984. No derogations have been made by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>137</sup> This would include situations where those courses operate to directly or indirectly recruit adults and children for conflict-related activities. In respect to recruitment of adults by the Houthis, the Panel finds it likely that these activities constitute a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015), as the nature of the conflict is such that the recruited Houthis are primarily fighting the Government of Yemen; and therefore, the act of recruitment is primarily aimed at undermining the Government's control over its territory. The recruitment of children under the age of 18 years by armed groups is prohibited under international law and anyone engaging in recruitment also falls within the designation criteria under paragraph 6 of resolution [2511\(2020\)](#). See article 4 (1) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, article 4 (3) (c) APII, CIHL rules 137 and 137.

<sup>138</sup> This would include situations where adults and children are forced to chant slogans that promote violence against nationalities or religious minorities and where textbooks for these courses, and lectures, demonize groups based on nationality, race or religion. Hate speech is defined by the Panel according to the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (2019) "any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factor." See [www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action\\_plan\\_on\\_hate\\_speech\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf). See also Article 20 (1) on the ban on war propaganda and 20 (2) of the ICCPR that prohibits "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence". See also General Comment 17 of the ICCPR Committee, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 11, Article 20 (Nineteenth session, 1983), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, [U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 \(1994\)](#).

<sup>139</sup> This would include those situations where individuals condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further the ideological or political goals espoused in these lectures. The Panel notes that there is no universally accepted definition for radicalization. The notion of 'radicalization' is generally used to convey the idea of "a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. This may include, but is not defined by, the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals." See A/HRC/33/29, para. 19.

<sup>140</sup> The Panel finds that these activities constitute threats to the peace, security and stability of Yemen and fall under paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), while also violating paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015).

<sup>141</sup> See paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#).

<sup>142</sup> See paragraph 19 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#).

3. It should be noted that religious and cultural courses organized by the Houthis have been a part of Yemeni society since at least the 1990s. Some of these courses, which aimed to provide religious education to children during their vacations, were called summer schools, summer centres or summer camps (summer camps). The Panel does not claim that every religious or cultural course in Yemen, including those in Houthi-controlled areas, falls within the Panel's mandate.<sup>143</sup> This investigation is limited to those camps and courses which fall under the criteria set out in the previous paragraph. The Panel also notes that the content and format of these courses vary between governorates, target groups, the local organizers, and other factors. Therefore, this annex is not meant to provide a generic description of all courses and summer camps held in Houthi-controlled areas. A detailed presentation of the Houthi perspective on these courses was shown in an al Masira documentary.<sup>144</sup>

4. During the reporting period, the Panel conducted bilateral in-person or remote interviews with thirty medical professionals, including those that rehabilitate former child combatants, teachers, participants in the courses, civil society activists, and former detainees who had been forced to undergo various religious and cultural courses, sometimes, as a condition of release.<sup>145</sup> This annex also contains outcome of information gathered on cases relating to 16 children.<sup>146</sup>

5. The Panel also received over 15 investigative and other reports on these cultural and religious courses. The Government of Yemen provided a list of locations where children have been receiving military training.<sup>147</sup> In this report, the Panel only reflects information that it was able to verify independently through testimonies and documentary evidence. Where sources have consented, the Panel has deposited these reports with the Secretariat for viewing by Member States.

## II. Types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”

6. The Panel investigates the role of “summer camps” for children and religious and cultural training courses for adults and children (hereinafter “cultural courses”) to radicalize participants and to recruit new fighters. The Panel's investigations demonstrate that there are several types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”; and, for ease of reference, the Panel classifies them as follows:<sup>148</sup>

<sup>143</sup> For example, the Panel was informed during its West Coast visit that Tareq Saleh forces were hosting summer schools.

<sup>144</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88>.

<sup>145</sup> This annex only contains information obtained from those who had either participated in or refused to participate in these courses or those who had first-hand information on the courses. Information provided by the Government of Yemen and civil society activists, who themselves had no experience with these courses, was considered as background information, and where consent was provided, the investigative reports of others are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>146</sup> This included four in-person interviews with children and their families; and four remote interviews with families of children. The Panel chose not to remotely interview children; but relied on their families' testimonies. In one case, for example, there were reports of sexual violence committed against the child by a military trainer. The Panel, as a policy, avoids the remote interviewing of children who have been subjected to sexual violence due to the potential harm such an interview could have on the child. During in-person interviews, the Panel ensures that a caregiver is in the room and that it obtained the informed consent of both the caregiver and the child. The Panel also includes in this report testimonies of a further five children and their families gathered on behalf of the Panel; and further three interviews with families of children gathered by a Yemeni organization, where full testimonies were provided to the Panel, with identification information of the children, were provided to the Panel.

<sup>147</sup> Most of these locations are schools. The Panel also notes open-source information on the closure of schools to enable such to be converted into summer camps. Some documents are referred to in this report; and others, where consent was given to share the documents, are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>148</sup> This is not an official classification; but a classification of the Panel for ease of understanding the concept of these courses and summer camps.

- a. Duration and format of the courses: half-day-courses; short courses from a few days to a few weeks; residential versus day courses; the Panel is also aware of open-ended courses.<sup>149</sup>
- b. Contents of the courses: some combine basic military training with “religious” or “cultural” lessons, others focus exclusively on the latter.<sup>150</sup> The Panel notes that some purely military training courses are also called “summer camps”.
- c. Target groups of the courses: children, university students, professionals, the general population, as well as specific courses for detainees. For adults, the Panel was not informed of the use of military training in “cultural courses”<sup>151</sup>

7. The summer camps and cultural courses are systematically organized and reach large parts of the population. In August 2019, the Houthi-affiliated media stated that there were 3,500 “summer camps” that trained 284,000 students. The cultural courses and summer camps are often implemented at the local level; for example, the supervisors<sup>152</sup> in a hospital or school may host these courses for their staff or students. Supervisors at the local level appear to take responsibility for the courses organized for the general population in Houthi-controlled areas.<sup>153</sup>

### III. Summer Camps and Cultural Courses for Children

#### A. The use of summer camps and cultural courses to recruit children as fighters or for supervisory functions

8. The Panel is investigating the cases of four children, aged between 7 and 14 years, who have received military training in summer camps or have been taken to military camps under the pretext of attending cultural courses.<sup>154</sup> In paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#), the Panel also reported on a 13-year-old child who was lured by the Houthis to a military training camp. They had told him he was going to participate in a three-day educational camp. He was kept for three months and received training on how to use small arms. He was sent to the front after the completion of the course (see annex 33 of [S/2020/326](#) for details).

<sup>149</sup> Those children interviewed by the Panel stayed from 3 – 9 months in these camps. Based on their testimonies, some children stay for longer until they are ready to be taken to the battlefield. For adults, the longest period that the Panel was informed of, was a week, except for the courses for detainees which lasted months. It should also be noted that for adults, the Panel has not documented cultural or religious courses that also provided military training. The Panel was however informed of possible “cultural” lectures in adult military camps, to radicalize fighters, so that their loyalty could be secured even in the most dangerous frontlines.

<sup>150</sup> The Panel was also informed of two types of camps: those that are open to all students, and they are taught “cultural” content, where some children are chosen from those and are provided opportunities for leadership and for acting as potential recruiters of adults in their families and other children. Then there were other camps that are for the selected few that are trained to go into battle.

<sup>151</sup> One reason for this maybe the lack of stigma and the lack of social resistance to adults joining in the fighting, as opposed to children, where the parents may object. For example, taking children from their homes in the pretext of participating in summer camps have occurred in four documented cases. The Panel also documented such a case in 2019, see paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#).

<sup>152</sup> In Houthi-controlled territories, alongside “formal state authorities” there are individuals who are appointed by the Houthi leadership to oversee or supervise the functions of those authorities or institutions. These individuals have significant powers, and they act by and on behalf of the Houthi leadership to implement central decisions at the local level. The highest-level supervisor at a governorate-level is the governorate supervisor, who would supervise the governor, and all activities in that governorate through a network of supervisors.

<sup>153</sup> Based on Panel discussions with participants of courses, their families and civil society activists researching the issue.

<sup>154</sup> Discussions with children and relatives.

<sup>155</sup> Discussions with Yemeni children in 2021, in the Gulf region.

9. In the cases of the four children above, the two younger children were taught how to clean weapons and trained on how to evade “rockets” in what was supposed to be a “summer camp”.<sup>155</sup> One child displayed to the Panel healing scars around his elbow, which he said occurred because of crawling on the ground as a part of his training. A 14-year-old child was directly taken to a military camp, where he was taught to dig tunnels and plant mines, together with other children.<sup>156</sup>

10. The Panel was informed that the recruitment of children is facilitated by cultural lessons given in public camps. For example, the Panel interviewed the parents of a 14-year-old child, who was taken to a Houthi military camp. In this case, the Panel was informed that the child refused to return to the family, which attributes this to the lessons in school which “brainwashed” the child by teaching him that God would want him to follow the Houthis instructions, over those of his parents (see also paragraphs 8, 9 and 18 for cases of nine other children who were taken from cultural courses to military trainings).

11. The Panel was also informed children who possess leadership qualities are selected to deliver ideological speeches, recruit fighters from among their peers, and/or to take over leadership roles in the Houthi movement. For example, a relative informed the Panel of a child, who, after taking lessons, condemned his parents as “non-believers” and became a local supervisor.<sup>157</sup> Testimonies of children and families who received military training through summer camps are also available in the public domain.<sup>158</sup>

## B. Hate speech in summer camps

12. In the “summer camps”, alongside religious lessons, the children were taught patriotic songs glorifying Houthi leaders, and received lectures in which, amongst others, they were told that they were fighting to liberate Palestine.<sup>159</sup>

13. The children and parents interviewed by the Panel stated that violence against Americans and Jews was encouraged. Children were expected to regularly shout the Houthi slogan “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.” (figure 10.1). The Panel has seen images of these slogans in mosques, schools, distributed as stickers to children, and attached to missiles (annex 11).

<sup>156</sup> The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Tareq Saleh forces informed the Panel that they continue to capture children from the battlefield who were recruited to lay mines on respectively, the Saudi-Yemeni borders and the battle frontlines. In 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided the Panel access to some of these children. A human rights activist from al Hudaydah reported multiple cases of injuries to children from the explosion of mines, which the children themselves were attempting to lay. The Panel has not been independently able to verify the causes for these injuries.

<sup>157</sup> The Panel spoke to a relative. The panel was unable to verify the information independently as the child and parents were in Houthi-controlled areas, which the Panel did not have access to.

<sup>158</sup> See “Scout activities... a new way for Houthis to recruit Yemeni youth” at <https://alkhaleejonline.net/سياسة/الأنشطة-الكشفية-طريقة/> and “Compulsory sectarian lesson what is the truth about al- houthi collecting the children of summer centers to al saleh mosque?” At <https://alasinahonline.com/sanaa/12890#.YZC-007MLIU>, <https://hunaalbayda.com/post/2261/> - معسكرات-تدريبية-لا- /مراكز-صيفية-الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لأجيال-اليمن See also [https://samrl.org/pdf/4554\\_5851609623282320014.pdf](https://samrl.org/pdf/4554_5851609623282320014.pdf), February 2021, <https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338>, <https://www.dw.com/ar/مستقبل-اليمن-لحاضر-وتفخيخ-لحاضر-ومستقبل-اليمن> - 58120089.

<sup>159</sup> Information from in-person interviews with Yemeni children, in the Gulf region, 2021.

Figure 10.1  
Children shouting slogans at a summer camp in 2019



Source: al Masira<sup>160</sup>

14. The Panel has had access to images from textbooks used in the summer camps. The Panel notes that the texts call for Jihad against both Israel, the United States of America and their supporters, and calls it a duty to stop the United States of America from executing its “evil plans” (figure 1).

Figure 10.2  
Study material used in summer camps



Source: Confidential (left),<sup>161</sup> Al Masirah (right)<sup>162</sup>

15. The Panel received documents on changes made to school curricula as well as to the textbooks used in “summer camps”. These changes are said to distort history in favour of the Houthi leadership’s right to govern in Yemen and to distort historical Islamic accounts with the aim to promote fighting

<sup>160</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.

<sup>161</sup> This text stated: “By Jihad; the believer beats their enemies, which are America and Israel, and all those that support them, and these countries have to be free from these countries, so the truth will shine. So, let’s do the Jihad for the sake of God. America is the major enemy for Muslims wherever they are. America is trying to fight Islam and control the world because the Jews are controlling them... America is the source of evil in the world, she has killed millions of Muslims. She has captured the Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq...and now wants to capture Yemen and they want to kill the Yemeni people with their planes, rockets, and missiles... it is our duty to do Jihad and not allow America to execute her plans. We cannot let them capture our country. America is a major devil.”

<sup>162</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.







"Allah . . . look at all those sea creatures, killed en masse . . ."

"Allah! It's the Occupier's crime, mass killing to build military bases . . ."

Jihad, having climbed to dry land: "Thieves, murderers and criminals! Why all this hatred? Friends, have you seen the crimes of the Emirati occupation against our precious islands?!"

"It's all been documented. We must expose their lies and their crimes for the whole world to see!"

[Emirati ship:] "I'd also like some flat land to build a military base. Don't worry, you pretty and rare trees, we're going to take good care of you . . ."

[Yemeni child, left:] "This is the enemy which murders children and women!"

Source: [https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen\\_2015-19.pdf](https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen_2015-19.pdf), p. 29-31 (translated by impact-se).

**A. Use of schools and mosques to recruit children and incite hatred**

17. The Panel notes the use of presumably safe spaces to recruit children as fighters and to spread hatred.<sup>169</sup> In Bayhan, Shabwah, barely a week after the Houthis took control,<sup>170</sup> there were reports of Houthi religious leaders coming from Ibb, Saada and other areas. Photographs show these imams distributing stickers with the Houthi slogan to children. The Panel also notes videos allegedly showing children from a school in Bayhan shouting the Houthi slogan.<sup>171</sup> The Shabwani educational authorities informed the Panel that they took immediate steps, on 29 September 2021, to close all schools in the Al Ain, Bayhan and Usaylan areas to prevent the children from becoming radicalized (see Figure 10.2). The schools reportedly re-opened after the educational authorities obtained a guarantee from the Houthis that they would not interfere with the education of the children (see annex 11).

<sup>169</sup> The Panel in this context means spaces that provide children with protected environments in which they participate in organized activities to play, socialize, learn, and express themselves. See <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/2923.pdf> for a definition of a child-friendly safe space.

<sup>170</sup> According to local sources, Houthis took control of Bayhan around 22 September 2021.

<sup>171</sup> Authenticity of video confirmed by two local sources.

Figure 10.4

**Document issued by educational authorities closing schools, citing “ideological and security” concerns for the children, 29 September 2021**



*Source:* Confidential

18. The Panel also documented the use of the al Saleh Mosque in Sana’a for a summer camp, where children as young as seven years were provided with basic military training (see figure 10.4 and annex 11). The Panel was informed that participants of this camp included homeless children who had come to the mosque seeking shelter.<sup>172</sup> The Panel also notes that summer camps, like mosques, are meant to be safe spaces where children can engage in religious activities consistent with their belief systems.<sup>173</sup> Yet in five cases that it documented, children were taken from cultural courses held in schools to military training, and in another five cases, parents were informed that the children were in cultural courses when they were in fact in military training.

<sup>172</sup> This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

<sup>173</sup> See for example [https://samrl.org/pdf/4554\\_5851609623282320014.pdf](https://samrl.org/pdf/4554_5851609623282320014.pdf) on the recruitment of children.

Figure 10.5  
**Sana'a-based prime minister inspects a summer school held in al Saleh Mosque, June 2021**



Source: [www.ypagency.net/367625](http://www.ypagency.net/367625)

#### **D. Physical harm and sexual violence against children at camps**

19. The Panel received information on sexual violence committed by an instructor against a child who underwent military training.<sup>174</sup> The child's phone was taken away from him, and the parents were told that the child was taken to a cultural course. Therefore, it took some time before the parents could find the child, and for the child to communicate to the parent what had happened to him. Children who are separated from their parents for prolonged periods of time, and whose means of communication were removed, have a higher likelihood of have been exposed to violence, as they become particularly vulnerable once they are separated from their parents. The Panel also finds that sexual violence is likely underreported in Yemen due to the social stigma associated with the crime. The Panel continues to investigate. In another case, some children who tried to escape from their "summer camp" were reportedly caught and beaten up.<sup>175</sup>

#### **E. Denial of humanitarian assistance**

20. The Panel has received information from multiple sources on nine cases in which Houthi supervisors have threatened families that they would be denied humanitarian assistance, if their children would not participate in summer camps or military courses.<sup>176</sup> These incidents occurred between 2018

<sup>174</sup> The Panel will refrain from providing further information to protect the identity of the child but stands ready to provide the Security Council verbally with further information on the circumstances of the violence.

<sup>175</sup> This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

<sup>176</sup> In five cases, where the Panel has not had access the families because of safety concerns for the families, it spoke to the researchers that documented these cases, who collected further information from the families on behalf of the Panel. The Panel has the names of the beneficiaries, the names of Houthi individuals who denied assistance, the dates of incidents and locations. The Panel stands ready to provide further situational information, without disclosing any identifiable information, as appropriate.

– 2020. According to a Yemeni non-governmental organization, in two cases, families were in fact deprived of humanitarian assistance. In another case documented by this organization, the Houthi supervisor offered a 15-year-old child to be registered to receive humanitarian aid in exchange for joining the Houthis on the frontlines. The child accepted and enrolled in a cultural and military training course for two months, after which he went to fight for the Houthis. He died in battle. Additionally, the Panel received information that a teacher was denied access to humanitarian assistance from a non-governmental organization because he refused to teach the “Houthi curriculum” in his class, and to send his children to fight. The teacher had previously been receiving this assistance for 5 years. The Panel interviewed another teacher in 2019, who stated that food baskets given by organizations were only distributed to teachers following the Houthi ideology. The Panel also received information on two children being sent cultural courses for 6 months, in exchange for humanitarian assistance provided by the local supervisor. After the children returned from the cultural course, assistance was only resumed after the parent agreed to send the children to military training. The assistance was provided by the supervisor directly to the families, allegedly these were UN assistance. In another case involving multiple children, the supervisor promised that the children will be acting as his security detail, and they would only attend cultural courses in a school in Sana’a.<sup>177</sup> The children were taken with the promise that the family would receive humanitarian assistance from the supervisor.<sup>178</sup> Three months later, the children were taken for military training.<sup>179</sup> When the parents asked the supervisor to return the children, the latter stated that he would continue to provide assistance, as well as the salaries to the parents. The supervisor informed the parents that one child was killed in the battle in Ma’rib. The parents, after their children returned or was killed in battle, approached the supervisor for continued humanitarian assistance, at which point he informed them that the priority for assistance would be for those families whose members are fighting. Some of the aid given by the supervisor had the UN logo.<sup>180</sup> In all of these cases, the cultural courses or summer camps were held in schools and it is from these schools that the children were then taken to the military fronts.

21. The Panel was informed that humanitarian assistance is denied through the removal of families’ names from the list of beneficiaries.<sup>181</sup> Local supervisors appear to have control over these lists.<sup>182</sup> The Panel has received information that at least two families took this threat seriously enough for them to send their children to the frontlines.<sup>183</sup> The Panel finds that local Houthi supervisors are exploiting the prevailing poverty to recruit children as fighters.<sup>184</sup> The Panel notes that in a 2021 study done by a local

<sup>177</sup> These were daily classes and the children would return home every day from the „summer camp“.

<sup>178</sup> The family received several packages of assistance directly from those affiliated with the supervisor.

<sup>179</sup> The children were gradually taken. Initially they would return home every day, but then they would return after a week, and then after 2 weeks until finally they were enrolled in a residential military training.

<sup>180</sup> The UN informed the Panel that such a practice of providing humanitarian assistance in exchange for fighting was unlikely as the UN would be informed if their food was diverted in this manner. The researchers informed the Panel that it was more unlikely that the families living under the control of the supervisor, would inform the UN, that their local supervisor was diverting food from the UN.

<sup>181</sup> The Panel notes open-source reporting on this issue: “... interviews for this paper, two families said the local Houthi supervisor forced them to send their children to the battlefields in exchange for humanitarian aid and a small salary. The salaries their children receive and the humanitarian aid they get, although very limited, is the main source of income they have.” See [www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions](http://www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions). See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> “Houthis take advantage of “citizens” need for aid to recruit them to fight”. See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children’s refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”(unofficial translation).

<sup>182</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>183</sup> Confidential source who interviewed the families.

<sup>184</sup> See study done by a local organization on the reasons for children to drop-out of school. According to them 4.7% of those interviewed dropped out because they were recruited by a party to a conflict but 48.3% dropped out for economic reasons. <https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/War-Of-Ignorance-1.pdf>.

Yemeni organization over 57% of children across Yemen who dropped out of school stated that they would re-join when their economic situation improved.<sup>185</sup> For children and families who are poor, humanitarian assistance given by organizations is vital to their economic survival. Thus, the Panel finds that the ability to access humanitarian assistance is a powerful incentive for parents and children to join fighting. The Panel continues to investigate.

#### IV. Cultural trainings targeting the general population

22. The Panel finds that the cultural courses provided in Houthi-controlled areas have also been perpetuating the conflict. They enable the Houthis to counter localized resistance to recruitment, to control popular dissent, and to maintain support for the Houthi leadership and its ideology. In some cases, individuals were forced to attend the courses as a demonstration of their loyalty to the Houthis cause.<sup>186</sup>

23. For example, one woman stated that she took multiple courses, even though they were contrary to her religious beliefs. She feared reprisals from the Houthis if she refused to participate.<sup>187</sup> In the cases investigated by the Panel, Houthi-appointed supervisors or managers in schools and hospitals monitor the participation of the employees in these activities. There are reports that non-participation has resulted in job losses.<sup>188</sup> In prisons, some men and women are provided ideological courses as a condition of release (see annex 9 and paragraph 26 below).

24. The Panel documented the arrest and detention of, and sexual violence committed against two women who had refused to participate in the cultural courses. One refused to participate because the course materials were contrary to her political beliefs, and the other because she saw these courses as promoting hatred. Both women did not want to shout the Houthi slogan. One of these women, while being sexually abused, was told that what was being taught in the courses was the “real Islam”. It was made clear to her that the violence used against her was because of her refusal to participate in the courses.<sup>189</sup> This woman believed that she was targeted because she was well-respected within her community, and because the Houthis wanted her to use her influence to recruit new fighters.<sup>190</sup>

25. The Panel was informed that medical professionals who attend these courses were expected to encourage patients to send their male relatives to fight in the conflict. Several individuals informed the Panel that they suspect that some of their co-workers may have become informers for the Houthis after they had taken a cultural course.

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> The panel also notes that in some cases individuals are free to choose whether to participate or not. Interviews conducted with individuals in Houthi-controlled areas, 2021.

<sup>187</sup> Interview in \Yemen, 2021.

<sup>188</sup> Confidential sources in some schools and hospitals, as well as civil society activists.

<sup>189</sup> <sup>1</sup> In-person interview with the Panel in 2021.

<sup>190</sup> Interview, 2021.

## A. Cultural trainings targeting vulnerable populations

### i. Targeting detainees

26. The Panel finds that cultural courses are also being used in a systematic manner in secret detention centres. These “rehabilitation” courses impose the Houthi vision of Islam, incite hatred against various groups, and disseminate lectures from the Houthi leadership. The Panel was informed of some organized courses using videos and different lecturers. One male detainee informed the Panel that the attendance of a six-month religious course, teaching Islam from the beginning, was a condition for his release. He, therefore, accepted to participate in the training and was indeed released after completion.<sup>191</sup> A female detainee said she begged to join the courses because she hoped that it would facilitate her release.<sup>192</sup> Another detainee said he was forced to take the courses and to shout the slogan despite him not being a Muslim. This individual also said he did so to demonstrate his loyalty in order to be released.<sup>193</sup>

### ii. Targeting children of female detainees

26. The Panel received information on four children between seven and 15-years old, who were forcibly taken away by the Houthis from their caretakers, after their mothers were detained. In two cases, their relatives were informed that the children were taken to a cultural course until their mothers are released. In fact, they were taken to a summer camp and provided with basic military training.<sup>194</sup> In the case of a third child, he was reportedly taken from a female detainee. She was subsequently informed by the Houthis, while still in detention, that the child had died on the Ma’rib front.<sup>195</sup> The Panel notes a report in 2021 of another child dying under similar circumstances.<sup>196</sup>

27. In another case, a mother informed the Panel that her interrogators told her that if she did not cooperate with them, her eight-year-old son would be taken by the Houthis to fight.<sup>197</sup> In view of the circumstances of the five children referenced here, the Panel has initiated investigations to establish whether the Houthis have a policy targeting the children of female detainees for military recruitment.

### iii. Targeting ethnic minorities

28. The Panel received information from Ta’izz and elsewhere on the possible targeting of children from ethnic minority groups for recruitment in summer camps, which it is in the process of verifying.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>191</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>193</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>194</sup> The Panel conducted in-person interviews with the children and a caregiver.

<sup>195</sup> The mother refused to be interviewed by the Panel as she was in Sana’a.

<sup>196</sup> See <https://gulfstateanalytics.com/houthi-crimes-against-women/>. It states “Then Doaa, arrested along her one-year-old daughter, spent two years in jail. Her husband obtained a divorce in her absence. Doaa says her older son was recruited by Houthis and deployed to the front lines where he died. She was not informed until her released”

<sup>197</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>198</sup> Information from the Ta’izz military axis and civil society. The Panel received also information on specific supervisors involved in organizing these courses. For open-source reporting on minority children see <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children's refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”

## V. Responsibility of Member States and international organizations

29. The Panel notes that some Member States and international organizations, including United Nations entities, have provided support to the ministry of education in Sana'a. The Panel finds that these entities are likely aware of the use of Houthi slogans in schools and in textbooks used in summer camps, which incite hatred against various groups and entice students to join the Houthi military.<sup>199</sup> Organizations supporting schools in Houthi-controlled areas have a responsibility to ensure that schools are safe spaces. Children should be able to study without being forced to shout political slogans or being asked to contribute to hate speech against various groups and nationalities or without being at risk of being recruited into the Houthi military. At minimum, those supporting the ministry of education should engage in a dialogue with the Minister or relevant authorities on the allegations above, as well as allegations concerning changes into school curriculum, and underscore that changes to curriculum and conduct in school should be in line with Yemen's international human rights obligations. It should also enhance existing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds and material provided to support the education of children are not diverted or misused to promote Houthi ideology, Houthi cause, or the conflict.

## VI. Individuals responsible for these policies

30. The top Houthi leadership is responsible for the use of some summer camps for ideological training, and, in some cases, basic military training.<sup>200</sup> The leadership is also responsible for organizing cultural courses, and any curriculum changes in schools that may entice children to fight. High numbers of children are recruited and killed in fighting, a fact which is also acknowledged in official Houthi media (figure 10.5).<sup>201</sup> In his annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General noted that the Houthis had recruited 134 boys and 29 girls in 2020 ([S/2021/437](#)). In the same report, the continuing rise in the number of grave violations, including the recruitment of children, particularly by the Houthis, and persistent high numbers of children killed and maimed, and increase in denials of humanitarian access were highlighted.<sup>202</sup>

<sup>199</sup> For publicly available information on summer camps see "With the aim of transferring them to the fronts...the Houthis sort students in their summer centers" at <https://www.alyqyn.com/print~33181>; "summer camps..."fuel" for Houthi battles in Yemen" at <https://al-ain.com/article/children-camps-summer-houthis-yemen>, "Houthis chart a path of no return for Yemen's generations" at <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/08/05/الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لأجيال-اليمن>

<sup>200</sup> See for example the participation of top leaders at the graduation ceremony of the al Saleh mosque (annex 11).

<sup>201</sup> The Panel has received over a hundred of extracts of similar photos of child martyrs, with their ages, but it cannot independently verify if all are children.

<sup>202</sup> See [S/2021/437](#) and <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/where-we-work/yemen/>.



Figure 10.6  
**Images of a child “martyr” in the Houthi media<sup>203</sup>**



**Source:** Government of Yemen

31. The Panel is not aware of any measures taken by the Sana’a-based minister of education, Yahyah Bader al Din al Houthi, to stop children being recruited, or to investigate allegations on schools and summer camps being used for child recruitment. The Panel also finds that the Sana’a-based minister of defense, major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi,<sup>204</sup> has not taken any effective measures to prevent the recruitment of children into the Houthi military. The Panel notes that Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) has stated that he fully supports the summer camps and will continue to fund them.<sup>76</sup> The Panel has initiated investigations into the roles of Abdullah Al-Razhi, director-general of educational coordination and summer activities at the ministry of youth and sport; and Muhammad Hussein Majd Al-Din Al-Muaydi, minister of youth and sports, in sustaining this policy.<sup>205</sup>

Figure 10.7  
**Yahayah Badreddin al Houthi**



**Source:** Al Masirah

<sup>203</sup> According to Government of Yemen, this 13-year-old child was killed in January 2020. Source: Government of Yemen. The Panel has received similar images and videos of children allegedly killed on the battlefield from multiple sources.

<sup>204</sup> وزير الدفاع اللواء محمد ناصر العاطفي

<sup>205</sup> [althawahrah.ye/archives/677254](http://althawahrah.ye/archives/677254). In Arabic, the name of the minister of youth and sports is وزير الشباب والرياضة محمد حسين مجد الدين المؤيدي

Figure 10.8

major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (second from right)



Source: [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/)

Figure 10.9

Guests at a graduation ceremony for summer camp in al Saleh mosque



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> (in the lower image, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, prime minister, Mohammed Ali al Houthi and Taha Al Mutawkkel, minister of health, are shown to attend a graduation ceremony at al Saleh Mosque)

32. Regarding the cultural courses, it is likely that the governorate-level supervisors exercise oversight while local supervisors implement the policy that had been formulated at the central level. The Panel continues to receive information that the ultimate control over the local supervisors lies with Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) and Mohammed Ali al Houthi.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>206</sup> Confidential sources in Yemen, including in Houthi-controlled areas.

**Annex 11      The use of Al Saleh Mosque as a summer school and for military purposes**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 12 Attack on Jeddah port on 14 December 2020

1. In the early morning hours of 14 December 2020, the port of Jeddah was attacked by at least three water-borne improvised explosives (WBIED) causing significant damage to two vessels, a merchant tanker and a Saudi warship, as well as to the port infrastructure. In June 2021, the Panel visited the sites of the attacks and interviewed representatives of the Royal Saudi Navy and Saudi Aramco, which operates parts of the port, and which had chartered the merchant tanker. The Panel has also been in contact with the operator of the tanker involved in the incident.

Figure 12.1

**Satellite images showing approximate impact locations of the WBIEDs**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

2. The first and the second WBIED employed targeted King Faisal Naval Base, a facility which hosts the Headquarters of the Western Fleet of the Royal Saudi Navy, and functions as the home port for its vessels. At 0007 hours, the first WBIED hit the Western end of Pier #8 located towards the Southern end of the base. The subsequent explosion caused significant damage to the concrete structure. The damage, as well as some of the repair work, was still visible when the Panel visited the impact location in June 2021. At 0015 hours, a second WBIED impacted the hull of the BORAIDA (902) on the starboard side. The vessel, a naval replenishment tanker based at Jeddah, was moored at that time to the North of Pier #8. The Panel has requested more information (including detailed images) on the damage caused to the warship from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a response to which is pending at the time of

writing. However, during the Panel's visit to the naval base, the repairs to the vessel's hulls were visible and an image obtained from other sources (see below) clearly shows damage above the waterline shortly after the attack.

Figure 12.2

**The BORAIDA shortly after the attack at King Faisal Naval Base**



**Source:** Confidential

3. At 0044 hours, the third WBIED impacted the port side of the hull of the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker BW RHINE (IMO: 9341940), which was moored at Main Berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal, a facility several kilometres away from King Faisal Naval Base in a North-Western direction. The vessel was operating a scheduled charter on behalf of Saudi Aramco and was offloading refined petroleum products. According to Saudi Aramco, at the time of the attack, the tanker had already been in port for about 20 hours and about 20 percent of the cargo was still onboard the vessel. The impact and subsequent explosion penetrated the hull of the ship at two locations at the waterline. The holes measured approximately 30 centimetres x 30 centimetres. The impact also caused a fire with flames reported to be 20 meters high which burned for about one hour. While the crew of the BW RHINE reported to the shipping line that they had heard two explosions from the direction of King Faisal Naval Base as well as subsequent gun fire, which caused the master to stop the offloading of the cargo, they did not receive a warning that an attack on Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal was imminent.

Figure 12.3

**Damage to the hull of the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

4. No injuries were reported from the attacks on either the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal nor the ones on the King Faisal Naval Base and while the damage to the vessels and the piers required extensive repairs, the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal was able to resume operations shortly after the attack. However, as noted in annex 16, the supply of petroleum products to the Western region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends heavily on Saudi Aramco's terminal and storage infrastructure in Jeddah. If the attack had done more damage to the tanker or the terminal infrastructure, the repercussions on the economy and civilian infrastructures for this part of the Kingdom would have been significant. In addition, a successful attack on a fully loaded oil tanker could have resulted in an oil spill, which would have serious environmental and economic repercussions for communities which depend on the Red Sea for their livelihoods, as well as a potentially negative impact on global trade and commerce.

Figure 12.4

**Recovery of the debris of the WBIED which hit the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

5. During its visit, the Panel was able to inspect the debris of the three WBIEDs which were used in the attacks on 14 December 2020. The Panel notes that the design of the boats is different from previous models deployed by the Houthi forces in the Red Sea.<sup>207</sup> Measuring between 6 and 8 meters from bow to stern and powered by two, 75-horsepower Yamaha outboard engines, these WBIEDs are basically skiffs converted for autonomous military deployment. Regrettably, the Panel has not been able to inspect the guidance and control systems of the WBIEDs, but it will likely, in the Panel's assessment, as in the case of previous generations, rely on pre-set GPS coordinates to guide it to its target. The Panel has also not been able to inspect any remnants of the warheads used in the WBIEDs, but images of debris recovered from the inside of the BW RHINE, as well as the "significant internal blast damage" reported by the crew, could imply that they were carrying a shaped charge similar to the ones used in some Houthi UAVs (see annex 15 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2020/326](#)) as well as in the WBIED attack on the Saudi-flagged merchant tanker ARSAN (IMO: 9421415) in the Southern Red Sea on 24 July 2018 (see annex 15 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2019/83](#)).

<sup>207</sup> The Houthis have previously used converted ten-meter patrol boats manufactured by the UAE (2017), as well as the smaller, 5.8 metre long, purpose-build 'Blowfish' model (since 2018), which is powered only by a single outboard engine. The design used in the attack on Jeddah port is more similar to the converted skiffs used in the attack on the Saudi-flagged tanker GLADIOLUS (IMO: 9169548) in the Gulf of Aden on 3 March 2020 (see paragraph 63 and annex 22 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2021/79](#)).

Figure 12.5

**Metal debris recovered from inside the BW RHINE, likely part of the shaped charge**



*Source:* Confidential

6. If the attack was conducted in the context of the conflict in Yemen, IHL would apply.<sup>208</sup> In this case, the attack against the King Faisal Naval Base would be permitted under IHL as this military base is a military objective by its nature.<sup>209</sup> However, the attack against the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker in the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal, a civilian tanker, is contrary to the IHL principle of distinction.<sup>210</sup> The Panel estimates that the targeting accuracy of the WBIEDs used in this attack is fairly high, with a margin of error of less than five metres. In addition, the distance between Main Berth #1, where the BW RHINE was moored, and King Faisal Naval Base is approximately 2,000 meters. It is therefore likely that the civilian tanker was the intended objective of the attack, in violation of international humanitarian law.

<sup>208</sup> For instance, if Houthi forces were responsible, the attack would be part of the conflict between the Houthis and the KSA. However, if the attack was conducted by another group, such as a terrorist group, with no link with the conflict in Yemen, IHL would not be applicable. In this case, the Panel concluded that the attack was conducted with near certainty by the Houthis, and therefore is linked with the conflict.

<sup>209</sup> CIHL rule 8.

<sup>210</sup> CIHL rule 1.



### Annex 13 Attack on Yanbu port on 27 April 2021

At 0615 hours on 27 April 2021, a patrol vessel of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia identified a target approaching the port of Yanbu, on the west coast of Saudi Arabia, from the open sea at a distance of six nautical miles (approximately 11 kilometres) and heading towards the Saudi Aramco refinery at high speed (more than 30 knots, approximately 55 kilometres/hour). The patrol vessel intercepted the target, which turned out to be a water borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) and disabled it at 0630 hours, approximately two nautical miles (3.7 kilometres) away from the refinery. At 0815 hours, the disabled craft had been moved by the waves to a location close to the Yanbu desalination plant where it was destroyed by another military patrol. The Panel has interviewed the crew of a merchant tanker, the *TORM HERMIA* (IMO: 9797993), which was moored at berth 71 of Yanbu port, and which had first reported the incident. Three crew members said that they observed the incident stating that the explosion took place at 08.05 hours approximately 1.4 nautical miles (2.6 kilometres) away from the tanker to the South-East between buoy 6R and 3R (see figure 13.3). The Panel has learned that following the incident, the Saudi military conducted a survey of the area and discovered the wreckage of a second WBIED in the Shu'ban al-Sab'ah area, approximately 30 nautical miles (55 kilometres) South of Yanbu port.

Figure 13.1

#### WBIED approaching Yanbu port as observed by the Saudi patrol vessel




**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 13.2  
Destruction of the WBIED by the Saudi military



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia


Figure 13.3  
ECDIS screenshot from the TORM HERMIA showing the approximate location of the explosion



Source: Confidential

Figure 13.4

Map showing the locations of the intercept and destruction of the first WBIED, as well as the location where the wreck of the second WBIED was found



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

## Annex 14 Attack on Jizan port on 30 July 2021

At 1712 hours on 30 July 2021, the crew of the Bahamas-flagged crude oil tanker ALBERTA (IMO: 9486922) noticed a UAV approaching at high speed from the starboard side. The vessel was moored at berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal, loading crude oil. The UAV exploded over the vessel's bow in the vicinity of the forecastle at an unknown height in a matter consistent with a loitering munition. The ALBERTA only sustained minor damage, including several holes in the floor of the main deck, possibly as a result of fragmentation,<sup>211</sup> as well as damage to a hydraulic line and a mooring winch. Neither a fire nor injuries among the crew members were reported. The crew was able to document a number of pieces of debris on the deck of the ALBERTA, which were later collected by the Saudi military. While the Panel has not been able to inspect the debris, the images show clearly that the weapon system used was a UAV, most likely a medium-range, QASEF-type, which has been documented multiple times by the Panel in cross-border attacks by the Houthis on locations in the South of Saudi Arabia. Whereas the explosives carried by those UAVs likely would be unable to seriously damage the vessel itself, it can cost the lives of crew members as evidenced by the attack on the MERCER STREET a day earlier (see annex 15). The distance from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen to the Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal is approximately 80 kilometres, which put the port within reach of medium-range UAVs.

Figure 14.1

### Possible fragmentation damage on the main deck of the ALBERTA



*Source:* Confidential

<sup>211</sup> Houthi UAVs often carry fragmentation warheads, which explode into a mass of small, fast-moving metal fragments ("fragmentation") that are lethal against individuals.

Figure 14.2

**Possible fragmentation damage in the roof of the main cavity**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.3

**Debris of the wing of the UAV made from fiberglass**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.4  
**Debris of the engine of the UAV**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.5  
**Small parts, possibly pieces of fragmentation from the UAV**



*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 15 Attack on MERCER STREET on 29 July 2021


1. The oil products tanker MERCER STREET (IMO: 9539585) was attacked three times over the span of several hours on 29 July 2021<sup>212</sup>, while steaming empty in international waters in the Gulf of Oman *en route* from Tanzania to the United Arab Emirates. The first attack occurred at 1045 hours when the crew reported that a UAV had missed the vessel, crashing approximately one nautical mile off the aft starboard. The bridge watch heard a loud buzzing noise followed by an explosion in the ocean, causing the water to erupt 15-20 metres in the air and black smoke rising at the point of impact. The second attack happened approximately 45 minutes later, at about 1130 hours. The bridge watch again reported a buzzing noise and stated that the UAV approached from the aft port quarter of the ship at an altitude of 20-25 metres. Prior to reaching the MERCER STREET, the UAV suddenly pitched nose up before rotating back down and proceeded in a 170 degrees downward descent towards the ship. According to the crew, the UAV was “light desert green” in colour. The second UAV narrowly missed the MERCER STREET and crashed into the ocean about one metre off the stern. The crew observed black smoke from an explosion on impact and recovered some pieces of UAV debris from the deck of the MERCER STREET. Following the second attack, the ship increased its speed from 11 knots (20 kilometres per hour) to 16 knots (30 kilometres per hour) but maintained its course.

2. The third attack happened at 2030 hours and this time the UAV hit the MERCER STREET’s aft superstructure from above, impacting the pilot’s cabin located on the aft bridge deck. The impact killed the ship’s master, a Romanian citizen, as well as a British security officer, making this the first fatal attack on a commercial vessel in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula in many years. The attack also destroyed the vessel’s communication equipment and created a breach in the roof of the pilot’s cabin. It also damaged the bridge deck, as well as the C and B decks. In the aftermath of the attack, the crew mustered inside the citadel and informed the company, which in turn alerted the U.S. Navy. U.S. forces were then dispatched to assist the vessel, to conduct a preliminary survey of the damage, and to accompany the MERCER STREET to a safe harbour.

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<sup>212</sup> Some reports state that the attacks took place on 29 and other that it occurred on 30 July 2021, the reason for that apparent discrepancy is that international naval forces are using Zulu time, the military version of coordinated universal time (UTC). In this report the Panel is using local, i.e., Gulf Standard Time, which is UTC+4.

Figure 15.1  
Aerial view of the aft castle showing the location of the impact



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.2  
Impact location of the UAV on the aft superstructure



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>



Figure 15.3

**Internal view of the impact location from the Pilot's cabin**



*Source:*

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.4

**Damage to exterior bulkhead below the impact point**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 15.5  
**Vertical stabilizer of the UAV**



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.6  
**Debris of a servo actuator from the UAV**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 15.7

**Fiberglass debris from the UAV recovered from the bridge wing**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 15.8

**Sketch by a crew member of the UAV used in the second attack**




*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 16 Attack on the Saudi Aramco Bulk Plant in Jeddah North

17. At 0342 hours in the early morning of 23 November 2020, the Saudi Aramco petroleum products distribution facility in Jeddah North was attacked by a cruise missile, which hit the top of storage tank #103 coming from a South-Westerly direction. One of 13 similar structures at the site used to store petroleum products such as diesel oil, gasoline and jet fuel. The tank has a capacity of 500,000 barrels and was filled with diesel at the time of the attack. The attack caused an explosion and a subsequent fire in the attack, the burn marks of which were still clearly visibly during the Panel’s visit to the facility in June 2021 and it took the company’s response team and the fire brigade about 40 minutes to extinguish the fire. Subsequent investigations showed that the impact of the missile had created a hole of 3.93 meters x 2.56 meters in the external roof of the storage tank and had completely destroyed the floating internal roof, a six-millimeter-thick structure made of carbon steel on top of the product. Company representatives interviewed by the Panel confirmed that there had been no advance warning of an attack.

**Figure 16.1**

Satellite Images showing the approximate impact point of the missile




**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

18. Shortly after the attack, a spokesman for the Houthi forces, brigadier general Yahya Sarie, announced in the Houthi-affiliated media that “the Yemeni missile forces targeted an Aramco

distribution station in Jeddah with a winged missile, Quds 2, which is announced for the first time”<sup>213</sup>. On the same day, in a letter to the President of the Security Council ([S/2020/1135](#)), the Permanent Representative of KSA also attributed responsibility for the “terrorist attack” on the bulk plant to the Houthi militia. The Panel also notes that the modus operandi of the attack, despite more limited in scale, is broadly like the previous attacks on the oil infrastructure in KSA, including the high-profile attack on 14 September 2019 on the Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays ([S/2020/326](#)).

**Figure 16.2**

Damage to the external roof of storage tank #103



**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

19. While operations at the Bulk Plant resumed within hours of the attack, storage tank #103 was out of service for about four months for repairs, which according to the company cost it approximately USD 1.5 million. Even though there were 15 employees of Saudi Aramco at the site when the attack happened, no injuries occurred. However, had the missile hit another storage tank containing a more flammable fuel than diesel oil (such as kerosene), it is possible that the tank’s firefighting system would not have been able to contain the blaze and that other tanks in the facility would have also been affected. The Panel believes that the missile system used by the Houthis in this attack (see paragraph 5 below) is sufficiently precise that storage tank #103 was deliberately targeted, but it not clear whether the attackers were aware what kind of fuel was stored there at the time of the attack.

20. According to information received by the Panel during its visit to the facility, the North Jeddah Bulk Plant has a total storage capacity of 5.2 billion barrels and plays a critical role in distributing up to 120,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per day to customers in the Jeddah, Mecca and al-Baha regions, which accounts for 25 to 30 percent of the Kingdom’s supplies. In addition to more than 1,000 petrol stations, the facility also supplies public utilities such as the King Abdulaziz International

<sup>213</sup> <http://en.ypagey.net/198784/>.

Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the vital Saline Water Conversion Corporation, which is responsible for the provision of most potable water in the Jeddah region. While the facility also supplies the Saudi military with petroleum products, it is mostly supplying civilian customers. If the plant had been out of service of a significant period, the impact on the Kingdom's economy as well as on the welfare of the residents of the Western region would likely have been significant.

**Figure 16.3**

Debris of the cruise missile used in the attack



**Source:** Panel

21. The Panel has been able to inspect the debris of the missile used in the attack and was informed that some parts were found inside of storage tank #103 during the repair works. The debris is consistent with the land attack cruise missile, which has been previously documented by the Panel as having been used in several attacks on targets in KSA in 2019 (annex 16 of [S/2020/326](#)) and whose parts were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden in November 2019 (paragraph 79 and annex 19 of [S/2021/79](#)). The damage to storage tank #103 of is also consistent with a missile of this type. The distance between the facility and Houthi-controlled territory is about 700 kilometres, which would put it close to maximum range estimated by the Panel for this weapon system. Whereas the Houthi forces have claimed that the missile used in the attack was a “Quds-2” cruise missile, during its inspection the Panel has not been able to identify significant design differences to the “Quds-1” model which was used in 2019. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of some of the commercial components used in the manufacturing of the missile (annex 23) to establish whether the missile was manufactured in Yemen, as claimed by the Houthis, or supplied by an external party.

22. The Aramco Bulk Plant can be considered as a dual-use object under IHL as it provides supplies both to the Saudi military and civilians. However, according to information received by the Panel, most petroleum products distributed by the facility are for civilian use. For instance, the Panel was informed by a company representative that approximately one percent of the aviation fuel distributed by the Bulk Plant are supplied to the Royal Saudi Air Force in Jeddah. As for other petroleum products distributed to the military, the Panel was unable to obtain specific data. Storage tank #103, which was the specific objective of the attack (see paragraph 3 above) was not

providing an effective contribution to the Kingdom's military action in Yemen and the Panel fails to see how its destruction offered the Houthis forces a definite military advantage. Therefore, the Panel considers that the tank was, at the time of the attack, a civilian object<sup>214</sup>. In addition, the Panel notes the importance of the Aramco Bulk Plant facility in providing supplies to critical civilian infrastructures such as the King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the Saline Water Conversion Corporation. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected in this attack.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> See CIHL rules 8 and 9.

<sup>215</sup> See CIHL rule 1.

## Annex 17      Attacks on Abha International Airport

1. Abha International Airport (IATA: AHB) is a civilian airport in the ‘Asir Province in the South of KSA, approximately 95 kilometers from the Yemeni border. This proximity to Houthi-controlled areas is also one of the reasons why the airport has been attacked more often than any other civilian facility in the KSA, even though the airports in Jizan and Najran<sup>216</sup> have also been attacked multiple times. In June 2021, the Panel visited Abha International Airport, as well as the nearby town of Khamish Mushait, which hosts an important Royal Saudi Air Force Base and met with airport staff and military officials to discuss the threats to civilian aviation. The Panel was also able to view CCTV footage of some of the attacks. In 2019, prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Abha International Airport handled 4.5 million passengers, making it the fifth largest airport in the Kingdom in terms of passenger numbers<sup>217</sup>. According to airport staff interviewed by the Panel, the airport is the main hub for the Southwestern region, offering a mix of domestic and international flights. Due to its colder climate, Abha is also an important destination for domestic tourism, in particular during the summer months and during Ramadan.

### Figure 17.1

Attacks on Abha International Airport as of 31 August 2021

<i>Date</i>	<i>Type of Attack</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
11 April 2018	UAV	6 injured
26 May 2018	UAV	2 injured
17 July 2018	UAV	None
6 September 2018	UAV	None
12 June 2019	Cruise Missile	26 injured
14 June 2019	UAV	None
23 June 2019	UAV	20 injured, 2 deaths
2 July 2019	UAV	10 injured
29 July 2019	UAV	5 injured
8 August 2019	UAV	None
28 August 2019	Cruise Missile	None
30 August 2019	UAV	None
10 September 2020	UAV	None
10 February 2021	UAV	None
16 February 2021	UAV	None
10 May 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	8 injured
<b>Total</b>		<b>77 injured, 2 deaths</b>

*Source:* Confidential

2. The Panel received information showing that there were 18 successful attacks on the airport between the start of the aerial attacks in 2018 and 31 August 2021, causing a total of 77 injuries and 2 deaths. The airport authorities told the Panel that until 31 June 2021 (the day of the Panel’s visit), the airport received a total of 491 threats, which are defined as warnings from the Saudi military

<sup>216</sup> According to the airport authorities in Abha, Najran Domestic Airport (IATA: EAM), which in 2014 handled 600,000 passengers, was closed completely between May 2015 and May 2019 as a result of the threats from Houthi-controlled Yemen.

<sup>217</sup> <https://gaca.gov.sa/web/en-gb/news/15/03/2019-aa>.



about incoming UAVs and missiles. They also noted that all warnings trigger an interruption of airport operations and an evacuation of passengers and staff from the apron into the terminal building.<sup>218</sup> According to the management of the AHB, not all successful attacks are preceded by a warning<sup>219</sup> and even when warnings are received, this is typically just a few minutes before the impact. This clearly shows that the Houthi forces have become more adept at evading detection by the Saudi air defenses, when using UAVs and cruise missiles. The late notice is also likely due to the close proximity of Abha to Yemen and the mountainous terrain, both of which limit the opportunities to detect and intercept an aerial threat. The following paragraphs describe some of the more “successful” attacks in greater detail.

**Figure 17.2**

Satellite image showing the approximate impact locations of the attacks discussed below



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

3. While the majority of attacks on the airport have been conducted with short-range Qasef-type UAVs which do not carry enough explosives to penetrate the concrete roof of the terminal building, it also experienced two cruise missile attacks in 2019. The attack on 12 June 2019 took place at 0225

<sup>218</sup> Airport staff informed the Panel that prior to June 2019 passengers were evacuated from the apron and the terminal to the landside areas of the facility as those were considered to be safe from attacks. Following the attack on the outdoor McDonalds restaurant located on the landside, which claimed the lives of two civilians and injured 21 others (see paragraph 4), the airport changed its security protocol and now evacuates into the terminal building, which provides some protection against UAV attacks.

<sup>219</sup> Out of the 16 successful attacks, prior warning was only received in ten cases.

hours in the morning when a Quds-1 land attack cruise missile penetrated the roof of the baggage hall in the arrival terminal. The subsequent explosion, which was captured by CCTV cameras, injured 26 passengers and airport staff. This was the first documented case of a Quds-1 cruise missile ever being deployed by the Houthi forces. The airport authorities informed the Panel that they received no prior warning from the Saudi military about the incoming missile. The second cruise missile attack took place on 28 August 2019, but no significant damage was reported. The Panel has inspected the debris of both cruise missiles in 2019 (see annex 16 of [S/2020/326](#)), as well as parts of a missile of the same type, which were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden (see paragraph 79 and annex 19 of [S/2021/79](#)).

### Figure 17.3

CCTV footage showing the moments immediately before and after the missile attack on 12 June 2019



**Source:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjsuhpROPyg>

4. The most lethal attack on Abha International Airport took place at 2120 hours on 23 June 2019 when a UAV exploded on the landside of the terminal building, immediately killing one civilian, who was at that time eating at an outdoor table of the McDonalds restaurant, and injuring 22 other people, one of whom died later from his injuries. Houthi UAVs (as well as some missiles) often carry a fragmentation warhead, i.e. small fragmentation, typically metal cubes, are scattered over a wide area following the detonation of the explosive filler. The UAVs are programmed to fly to pre-set GPS coordinates and then explode in mid-air, typically at a height of some 20 metres, or more rarely impact directly in a building or other structure, exploding on contact. This type of weapons with large blast effect and multiple fragmentations used in an area where there are civilians does not allow for discrimination between civilians and fighters. Contrary to IHL prescription, it also does not minimize damages to civilians and civilian objects.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>220</sup> CIHL rules 1 and 15.

**Figure 17.4**

Damage from fragmentation from a UAV attack visible on the apron of the airport



**Source:** Panel

5. At 1242 hours in the afternoon on 10 February 2021 Abha International Airport was attacked by a Qasef-type UAV, which hit a parked Airbus A320-214 with the registration code HZ-FAB operated by FLYADEAL (IATA: F3), a Jeddah-based low-cost airline. The explosion penetrated the fuselage of the aircraft on the left side and triggered a fire, which was put out by the airport fire brigade. In this specific case, the airport authorities received a warning from the Saudi military about 20 minutes before the attack which allowed them to complete the deplaning of the 119 passengers from the plane and to evacuate them to the terminal building. Even though the plane only suffered limited damage, it was out of service for four months. As far as the Panel is aware, this is the first incident in which a civilian aircraft in KSA was damaged by a Houthi UAV attack. The Panel has been informed by the airport authorities that the warhead of the UAV in this case did not contain fragmentation, which could imply that in this case the plane rather than the passengers was targeted. Under IHL, only military objectives can be the object of attack. According to information received by the Panel, the plane was not used by military and there was no military personnel or civilians having lost their protection under IHL on board or near the airplane. The Panel therefore concludes that the airplane was a civilian object protected under IHL against direct attacks and that the passengers and people nearby the airplane were also protected under IHL.<sup>221</sup>

<sup>221</sup> See CIHL rules 1, 5-8.

**Figure 17.5**

Still from video footage showing the damage to the fuselage



**Source:** <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/plane-catches-fire-after-houthi-attack-abha-airport-saudi-tv>.

4. In addition to the human casualties, there has been significant economic damage, both directly in terms of necessary repairs and protective measures such as the construction of a blast barrier between the apron and the terminal building, as well as indirect costs due to higher insurance premiums, reduced slots at the airport and a stop to night-time operations. Airport management estimates that the losses from the attacks amount to Saudi Riyal 40 million (approximately USD 10.65 million). Unlike in the case of attacks on other targets, the Houthi forces have repeatedly claimed responsibility for the strikes on Abha International Airport, stating that the facility is used for military operations by the Coalition<sup>222</sup>. During the meeting with the Panel, the airport management categorically denied that the facility was used for military operations. While the Panel is unable to independently verify this claim, it notes that the Saudi Air Force regularly operates from King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, about 13 kilometres East of Abha International Airport.

5. Abha International Airport is a civilian airport and is used by civilians. The Panel found that the attacks mentioned above were conducted in contravention to the principle of distinction.<sup>223</sup> In the case where the airport would be used for military operations by the Coalition, only attack against military objects or equipment and military personnel would be permitted by IHL. In addition, because the airport is used by civilians any attack should be conducted with constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects and all feasible precautions should be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>222</sup> With reference to the attack on 10 February 2021, the spokesman of the Houthi forces Yahya Sarie was quoted as saying: “The UAV air force targeted the airfield of warplanes at Abha International Airport – which is used for military purposes to target Yemeni people – with four drones”, see <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-houthis-saudi-arabia-abha-airport-attack>.

<sup>223</sup> CIHL rule 1.

<sup>224</sup> CIHL rule 15.

## Annex 18: New Houthi weapons displayed to the media

Figure 18.1  
SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (side view)<sup>225</sup>



Figure 18.2  
SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (top view)



<sup>225</sup> There are some indications that the UAV shown in the exhibition is a mockup, which is not airworthy.

Figure 18.3  
Unguided projectile carried by the SAMMAD-4 UAV



Figure 18.4  
RUJUM Hexcopter at the exhibition<sup>226</sup>



<sup>226</sup> Unlike the other new attack UAVs shown in the exhibition, the RUJUM was deployed in several attacks by the Houthis on different frontlines. At least two RUJUM hexcopters were shot down by GoY-affiliated forces, but despite several requests, so far, the Panel has been unable to inspect their debris, preventing further technical analysis.

Figure 18.5  
**KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (side view)**



Figure 18.6  
**KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (top view)**



Figure 18.7  
MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition (top view)



Figure 18.8  
Detail of the MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition



Source for figures 18.1 – 18.8: Almasirah.net



**Annex 19: Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 10 February 2021**

Figure 19.1

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.2

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.3  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.4  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.5  
**Type 56-1 assault rifles wrapped in plastic**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.6  
**Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm assault rifle and detail of the markings showing that the weapon was manufactured in 2017 by Factory 26 in China**



**7.62mm Type 56-1**  
**(Symbol) 17-CN 62068328**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.7  
**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.8  
**Detail of the marking on one of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, likely indicating that it was manufactured in China**



**(Triangle) CF / M80 / 401702**


*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.9  
AM-50 'Sayyad', 12.7x99mm calibre Anti-Material Rifle



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.10  
Details of markings on the Anti-Material Rifle



7A0347

2701264  
CAL12.7X99

264

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.11  
Ghadir-4 optical weapons scope



GH4-951036

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.12  
Components of 12,7x108mm calibre 'DSchK' heavy machine guns



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.13  
Marking on the receiver of one the heavy machine guns



**180058**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.14  
**Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1*<sup>227</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (front side)<sup>228</sup>**



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.15  
**Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1* found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (rear side)**




Source: Confidential

<sup>227</sup> The Panel notes that the description of the *Um-Almadain 1* does not match the images of the *Jelbut*-type dhow. Therefore, it is likely that this boat license is for another vessel.


<sup>228</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 19.16  
**Farsi-language warehouse receipt for ARIZONA brand cigarettes<sup>229</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.20  
**Mapping of coordinates allegedly retrieved from GPS devices onboard of the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

<sup>229</sup> The Panel inspected many similar receipts for cigarettes in Farsi, which were found on the dhow *Bahri-2*, seized with a cargo of weapons off the coast of Somalia on 24 June 2020. See figure 15.18 in annex 15, [S/2021/79](#).



Figure 19.21  
 Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (front side)<sup>230</sup>



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.22  
 Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

<sup>230</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

## Annex 20 Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 6 May 2021

Figure 20.1

**Shu'ai-type dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-2>

Figure 20.2

**Small arms and light weapons wrapped in green plastic onboard the dhow**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-3>

Figure 20.3  
ATGMs and wrapped SALW in the cargo hold of the dhow



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-4>

Figure 20.4  
Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm calibre assault rifle seized from the dhow



**Source:** Panel

Figure 20.5

**Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)**



**7.62mm Type 56-1  
(Symbol – Factory 26) 17-CN / 62130678**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.6

**M80, PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.7

Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured in China in 2017<sup>231</sup> at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)



(Symbol – Factory 26)  
M80 / 17-CN 02415

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.8

Type 85, 7.62x54mm calibre sniper rifle<sup>232</sup>




*Source:* Panel

<sup>231</sup> The Panel notes that the Chinese PKM-pattern machine guns, unlike the Type 56-1 assault rifles, showed significantly more wear and tear. It is possible that they were assembled using repurposed parts of older PKM-pattern machine guns. In 2020, the Panel noted that PKM-pattern machine guns seized by the Royal Saudi Navy from dhows sometimes combined parts with Cyrillic markings with parts bearing Chinese markings, which would support this theory.

<sup>232</sup> This is a Chinese copy of the Dragunov SVD-63 sniper rifle, which is manufactured in Russia. The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that this type of rifle has been seized in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 20.9

**Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)**



**(Symbol - Factory 26)  
7.62mm Type 85  
17-CN  
3309924**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.10

**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns manufactured in Bulgaria<sup>233</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>233</sup> The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that Bulgarian-manufactured weapons were seized from a dhow in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 20.11  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.12  
PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>234</sup>




*Source:* Panel

<sup>234</sup> These weapons appear to be copies of the Chinese, M80 version of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns. The Panel notes that, unlike the Bulgarian, Chinese and Russian PKM-pattern machine guns, these weapons do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production.

Figure 20.13

**Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun<sup>235</sup>**



**0409**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.14

**Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun**



**2500144**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>235</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking used on the machine guns has also been observed on the AM-50 'Sayyad' anti-material rifle (see figure 20.21). Dot Peen marking is not known to be used on Chinese or Russian manufactured weapons.



Figure 20.15  
Detail of stamp<sup>236</sup> on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.16  
Similar stamp documented on the rifle selector lever of Iranian G3A1 assault rifle



*Source:* <https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/smallarms.pdf>

<sup>236</sup> The Panel notes that not all the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, which the Panel assesses to be of Iranian-origin were bearing this stamp. The Panel believes that the machine guns were assembled using repurposed parts from older weapons, some of which had original government markings.

Figure 20.17  
**RPG-7 launchers, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>237</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.18  
**Detail of marking on RPG-7 launchers**



**0011803108**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>237</sup> The Panel notes that the RPG-7 launchers do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production. The Panel notes that all RPG-7 launchers inspected since 2019 have identical physical characteristics, including the green plastic heat shield, which is different from other versions of the RPG-7 launchers, as well as similar markings, highlighted in yellow (see figure 20.18).

Figure 20.19

AM-50 'Sayyad', 12.7x99mm calibre anti-material rifle, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>238</sup>



Source: Panel

Figure 20.20

AM-50 'Sayyad' anti-material rifle on display in Teheran in September 2013



photo - Foad Ashtari

Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/iranian-am50-and-russian-orsis-t-5000-rifles-in-iraq/>

<sup>238</sup> The Panel notes that the anti-material rifles seized from the dhow have no clear markings showing the country and year of production, however it also notes that all anti-material rifles inspected since 2018 have identical physical characteristics and markings. The AM- 50 'Sayyad' is an unlicensed copy of the HS.50 anti-material rifle manufactured in Austria. The main technical differences include a different grip and barrel design.

Figure 20.21  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle<sup>239</sup>



**1700399 / 580 / 26011580 / CAL12.7X99**

**Source:** Panel

Figure 20.22  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle



**6A1155**

**Source:** Panel

<sup>239</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking on the AM-50 'Sayyad' is similar to the marking on some of the PKM-pattern machine guns which were seized from the same dhow (see figure 20.13 and 20.14). The Panel has observed similar markings on other AM-50 'Sayyad' rifles inspected since 2018.

Figure 20.23

**Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope and its metal box, likely made in Iran**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.24

**Detail of marking on Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope**



**RG-004 A1  
1700560**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.25

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>-از-لشکر ۱۶-زرهی-قزوین-بازدید-فرمانده-نیروی-زمینی-ارتش-از-لشکر ۱۶-زرهی-قزوین (عکس) ۳

Figure 20.26

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>-از-لشکر ۱۶-زرهی-قزوین-بازدید-فرمانده-نیروی-زمینی-ارتش-از-لشکر ۱۶-زرهی-قزوین (عکس) ۷

Figure 20.27  
**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.28  
**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel


Figure 20.29  
Detail of markings indicating manufacture at the Tula Arms Plant in 1988



(Symbol – Tula Arms Plant) 88 / 985076

Source: Panel

Figure 20.30  
9M133 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia and transport container (in the background)



Source: Panel



Figure 20.31  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M113 / 07-85-536 / 2580 / 36-86-22

Source: Panel


Figure 20.32  
9M111M Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia



Source: Panel

Figure 20.33

**Detail of markings documented by the Panel**




**9M111M / 10-83-MK / 100486 / 42-85-53**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.34

**9M111-2 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.35

**Detail of markings documented by the Panel**



**9M111-2 / 03-79-MK / 47-80-53**


*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.36  
**POSP 12x50M Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus**



*Source:* Panel


Figure 20.37  
**Detail of serial number indicating manufacture in 2017**



**1701165**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.38  
Document found with the sights indicating that quality control took place in May 2017



Source: Panel

Figure 20.39  
POSP 8x42 Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus



Source: Panel

Figure 20.40  
Detail of serial number



596-1-1242

Source: Panel

Figure 20.41  
Yemeni Boat License for *Ramazu Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow<sup>240</sup> (front side)<sup>241</sup>



Source: Confidential

<sup>240</sup> The Panel notes that this appears to be the same license, which was previously documented on the smaller dhow seized on 10 February 2021 (see figure 19.21), raising the possibility that this is the same vessel. The Panel also notes that at least one dhow crew member was present on both occasions (see annex 21).

<sup>241</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 20.42


Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.43

Image from the Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device showing waypoint at Jask



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.44  
**Coordinates and dates reportedly retrieved from Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device**

GPS Device from 6 May 2021 Interdicted Flagless Dhow: Garmin echoMAP Plus 5AZ026107 Point Data



**Source:** Confidential

**Annex 21: Images and ID documents of the crew members of the dhows**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.



## Annex 22 Seizure of thermal weapon sights at the Shahn border crossing on 22 June 2021

1. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of seven RU90/120G thermal weapon sights, which were seized at 2000 hours on 22 June 2021 by Yemeni customs officers at the Shahn crossing on the border with Oman. The Panel has been informed that the sights were transported in the driver's cabin of a Mercedes truck with Omani license plates,<sup>242</sup> which was transporting tiles and ceramics from Oman to Yemen. The commercial truck driver, an individual holding a Pakistani passport,<sup>243</sup> told the customs officers that he received the package from a Yemeni individual called Ali in Mazyuna, a small settlement in Oman close to the border with Yemen, who asked him to deliver it to another Yemeni individual, who would be waiting for him on the Yemeni side of the border crossing. The driver claimed that he did not know what was inside the parcel and that he transported it as a favour, i.e., without receiving material compensation. The Panel understands that the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel disappeared when he saw that the package was impounded, and that the driver was released after questioning. The Panel has obtained the Omani mobile phone numbers of "Ali" and the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel on the Yemeni side and has contacted Oman requesting more information on the identity of the two individuals. A response is pending.

2. The Panel has obtained images as well as the serial numbers of the thermal weapon sights, which were seized at the border crossing. The Panel notes that the sights have technical characteristics consistent with thermal weapons sights manufactured by Rayan Roshd Afzar, a Chinese Iranian joint venture. Sights from this manufacturer have been seized from dhows in the Gulf of Oman and inspected by the Panel on multiple occasion (see paragraph 52 and annex 20, [S/2020/326](#), as well as paragraph 88 and annex 14, [S/2021/79](#)). Iran has informed the Panel that "the thermal weapon sights are NOT consistent with sights manufactured in Iran", however the Panel has noted information from publicly available sources (see figures 22.4 to 22.6 below), which seems to corroborate the Panel's analysis regarding their origin. The Panel continues to investigate.

Figure 22.1

### RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border



**Source:** Confidential

<sup>242</sup> The Panel has obtained the full details, i.e., license and engine serial number of the truck.

<sup>243</sup> The Panel has obtained the name and passport details of the driver.

Figure 22.2  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 22.3  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 22.4

## Rayan Roshd Afzar promotional leaflet



## رایان روشد افزار

### دوربین حرارتی

## RU90G / RU120G

WWW.MILITARY.IR

دوربین حرارتی مدل RU90G / RU120G  
 بمنظور مراقبت، شناسایی و هدف گیری  
 طراحی و ساخته شده است که قابل نصب  
 بروی انواع سلاح را دارا می باشد و در  
 شرایط مختلف محیطی (تاریکی مطلق  
 مه، دود، ابر) قابل استفاده است.

قابلیت ها:

- قابلیت نصب بروی انواع سلاح
- قابلیت استفاده بصورت دستی جهت دیده بانی
- قابلیت برنامه ریزی تا ۸ رتیکل هدف گیری
- بدنه مقاوم و آب بندی شده
- کاربری آسان

Source: [https://twitter.com/green\\_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4](https://twitter.com/green_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4)

Figure 22.4

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>

Figure 22.5

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>

**Annex 23 Chain of custody of the 30.600 G OEM pressure transmitter**

Figure 23.1  
House Air Waybill for the shipping of the transmitters from Germany to China in June 2020

NUE-14018567		NUE-14018567	
Shipper's Name and Address <b>BD Sensors GmbH BD-Sensors-Str. 1 95199 Thierstein Germany T: +499235982052 F: +499235981111</b>		Shipper's Account Number <b>Not Negotiable Air Waybill Issued by Streck Transportges. mbH Neuwieder Strasse 14 90411 Nuernberg</b>	
Shipper's Agent Name and Address <b>BD Sensors China Block B 2nd Floor, Building 10 No. 1188 Lianghang Rd. Pujiang Town 201112 Shanghai China T: 00862151600190803</b>		Consignee's Account Number <b>It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in agreement good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREOF BY THE SHIPPER, AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.</b>	
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City <b>Streck Transportges. mbH Neuwieder Strasse 14 90411 Nuernberg</b>		Accounting Information <b>MAWB: 999-76025784</b>	
Agent's IATA Code		Account No.	
Airport of Departure (Addr. of First Carrier) and Requested Routing <b>Nuernberg</b>		Reference Number <b>121420060024</b>	Optional Shipping Information <b>EXW THIERSTEIN</b>
To	By First Carrier	Routing and Destination	To
<b>PVG</b>	<b>CA</b>		<b>EUR</b>
Airport of Destination <b>Shanghai-Pu Dong</b>		Requested Flight/Date <b>CA1042/07</b>	Amount of Insurance <b>XXX</b>
Handling Information <b>NSC</b>		INSURANCE - If carrier offers insurance, and such insurance is requested in accordance with the conditions thereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked "Amount of Insurance".	
ECDs: 20DE871528552419E0, 20DE871528553293E1		Declared Value for Carriage	
20 Packages marked address and 7765		Declared Value for Customs <b>NCV</b>	
No. of Pieces RCP	Gross Weight	Rate Class	Chargeable Weight
20	540.0K	Q	540.0
Prepaid		Rate	Total
Weight Charge		Charge	As agreed
Collect		Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)	
Valuation Charge		transmitter not restricted 3/ 62x 32x 44 cm 1/ 42x 42x 42 cm 3/ 52x 42x 42 cm 1/ 48x 36x 36 cm 12/ 62x 42x 47 cm TTL VOL: 2.142 CBM 9026.20	
Tax		As agreed	
Total Other Charges Due Agent		Other Charges	
Total Other Charges Due Carrier		Shopper certifies that the particulars on the face hereof are correct and that insofar as any part of the consignment contains dangerous goods, such part is properly described by name and is in proper condition for carriage by air according to the applicable Dangerous Goods Regulations.	
Total Prepaid		Streck Transportges. mbH Julia Gabsteiger Signature of Shipper or its Agent	
Total Collect		Streck Transportges. mbH 2020-JUN-03 16:58 Nuernberg Executed on (date) at (place)	
Currency Conversion Rates		NUE AS CARRIER Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent	
For Carrier's Use only at Destination		Charges at Destination	
		Total Collected Charges	

NUE-14018567

Original 3 (for Shipper)

Figure 23.2

Excerpt from packing list showing that the transmitter was exported from Germany to BDS Sensors China in June 2020

Packing list				
BD Sensors GmbH BD-Sensors-Str. 1 95199 Thierstein		Shipping address 104437 BD SENSORS CHINA No.1188 Lianhang Rd., Pujiang town TJ-201112 SHANGHAI		
Total Number of Parcels: 20 Cartons				
Total weight:		539,950 KG		
Shipment Number/Date:		7765/02.06.2020		
Pack No.:		14 of 20 Cartons		
Gross weight:		17,400 KG (62.000 x 32.000 x 44.000 cm)		
Description Your order	Code Pos.	Sales order	Pos.	Quantity Prod. order
SPE800	26.600	G-4002-R-1-5-100-300-1-000		
BDS2005-043	20	21148843	20	2388881
Delivery/Item: 31143453/000110				10 PC
SN : ( 10845219 - 10845228 )				
OEM Pressure transmitter	30.600	G 30.600	G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000	
BDS2005-017	10	21148539	10	2387876
Delivery/Item: 31143453/000180				100 PC
SN : ( 10844242 - 10844441 )				

Figure 23.3

Bank information showing the transfer of funds from Oman to China for the purchase of the transmitters



## 对账单

借总笔数:0	借总金额:0.00
贷总笔数:1	贷总金额:13595.00
开始日期:20200601	结束日期:20200630
账号:上海, 121917329332501, 美元, 欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司	集团公司名称:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司
用户所属公司:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司	打印时间:2021/6/10 13:19
笔数:1	

交易类型	摘要	借	贷	余额	业务参考号	收/付方名称	收/付方账号	收付方开户行名	公司一卡通号
国外汇入 款项汇入中 心	汇入汇款流程 解付		13,595.00	13,595.00		INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE POBOX 1445 M USCAT MUSCAT		BANK NIZWA MUSC AT	

Figure 23.4  
Air Waybill for the export of the transmitters from BD Sensors China to Oman in July 2020

**178 PVG 20434781** Shipper's Name and Address: **BD SENSORS CHINA**  
 BLOCK B, 2ND FLOOR, BUILDING 10, NO. 1188, LIANFANG ROAD,  
 PUJIANG TOWN, MINHANG DISTRICT, SHANGHAI  
 TEL: 86-21-51800190  
 USCI: 91310000668840668Q

Shipper's Account Number: **INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY**  
 ELECTRONICS DEVICES AND ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY  
 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387 ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN  
 TEL: +96896674188  
 000047070

Not Validated by: **HYKC20070006**  
 Issued by: **SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO LTD**

Freight Prepaid: **FREIGHT PREPAID**

Agent: **W.M. QISHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

Flight Details: **PVG** (Origin) to **MUSCAT** (Destination)  
 Date: **2020-7-4**

Commodity: **MUSCAT** (HS Code: **8528.90.90**)  
 Description: **WORLDWIDE INFORMATION**

Weight: **45** kg  
 Volume: **0.15 CBM**

Incoterms: **AS ARRANGED**

Signature: **W.M. QISHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

Original 2 (FOR CONSIGNEE)

Figure 23.5

**Proof of delivery document showing that the transmitters were received in Muscat**



**PROOF OF DELIVERY** Date: 07.07.20

TO

Consignee: INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY LLC

Shipper: ED SENSORS CHINA

AOL: SHANGHAI

AOD: MUSCAT

AWB: HYKC20070006

ETA: 05.07.2020

Commodity: ED SENSORS

No of Pcs: 02

Gross Weight: 33 KGS

This is to confirm that we are received the cargo in good order

Date: *7-7-2020*

Name: *Muhammad Al-Muhammad*

Signature: 

Stamps: 





Figure 23.6  
 Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen<sup>244</sup> (first page)

Brand Name	Color	Ean	Model Number	Part Number	Size	Quantity
BD Sensors	Black	1101202176261	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	Stander	200

طلب أصناف

الجهورية اليمنية صنعاء شارع الخميني بيت بوس

<sup>244</sup> The Panel notes that the letterhead does not show any contact information, the Panel has so far been unable to find more information about this company.

Figure 23.7

**Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen (second page), stating that the transmitters are for use in a central air conditioning system**

**LIGHT ENERGY**  
Solar energy regulator & electrical technologies  
Equipment, fixtures & maintenance  
2020 /

**لايت إنرجي**  
منظومات الطاقة الشمسية و التقنيات الكهربائية  
تجهيزات وتركيبات و الصيانة

لايت إنرجي

تم تقديم الطلب على شراء صمام حساس ضغط او صمام منظم للضغط يعمل في أنظمة التبريد المركزيه و يقوم بعمل تنظيم الضغط لهذه المنظومة لتلافي حصول ضغط زائد و قتل و تعطل في نظام التبريد . وسوف يتم تركيب هذا الصمامات في منظومات التبريد هذه و تم ارفاق بعض المخططات من قبلنا نحن من اجل التوضيح أكثر لعمل هذا الحساس وانه يستخدم في نظام التبريد بأسم منظم ضغط.

**The refrigeration system**

**Retrofit Refrigerants**

Source: ChillerBox

Figure 23.8

Invoice from the importer in Oman for the company in Yemen<sup>245</sup>

**International Smart Digital Interface L.L.C**

Adress: 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387  
 City, Street : ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN  
 Phone: (968)95674188  
 Email: muaadh@internationaldigitalinterface.com  
 Website: internationaldigitalinterface.com

**INVOICE**

DATE 30/04/2020  
 PI # [01160]

**TO**

**Light Energy company**  
 solar energy regulator and electrical technologies  
 Equipment, fixtures and maintenance  
 contact Number: +967779326097

REQUISITIONER	SHIP VIA	F.O.B.	SHIPPING TERMS

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL
Pressure transmitter 30.600 G	30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000	200	120.00	24,000.00
				-

Comments or Special Instructions

SUBTOTAL	24,000.00
TAX	-
SHIPPING	-
OTHER	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 24,000.00</b>

If you have any questions about this Invoice, please contact above Details



<sup>245</sup> The Panel has been informed that the payment was made in cash in advance by a person, reportedly a Yemeni, claiming to act on behalf of the Yemeni company. The Panel has also tried to find out to whom the Yemeni mobile number on the invoice is registered, so far without success.

Figure 23.9

**Proof of delivery of the transmitters dated 8 July 2020 and signed by one Ziyad Muqbil Fari',<sup>246</sup> allegedly acting on behalf of a Yemeni company**




**Sources for figures 23.1 – 23.9: Confidential**

<sup>246</sup> The Panel was informed that the transmitters were picked up in Muscat. The Panel has contacted both Oman and Yemen regarding the identity of the person, who signed the receipt. Responses are pending.

**Annex 24 Chain of custody of the 3W-110i B2 engine**

Figure 24.1


**Diagram showing the chain of custody of the engine**



Source: Panel

Figure 24.2

**Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order**



Source: Confidential

Figure 24.3

**Unofficial translation of the screenshot in Figure 24.2**

Order number: 118674510762461297		Time of creation: 2018-01-25 00:09:31				
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany		¥14999.00	25	Access after-sales portal	Jermozi Contact me	Transaction successful Details
Colour: Silver	Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing					¥380975.00 (including shipping fee: ¥6000) View shipping Cell phone order

Figure 24.4  
Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order (continued)

**淘宝网** 宝贝 店铺  
输入您想要的宝贝

您的位置: [首页](#) [我的淘宝](#) [已卖出的宝贝](#)

1. 买家下单 2. 买家付款 3. 发货 4. 买家确认收货 5. 评价

当前订单状态: 交易成功

**淘宝提醒您**  
交易已成功, 如果买家提出售后要求, 请积极与买家协商, 做好售后服务。

**订单信息** 收货和物流信息

**买家信息**  
昵称: jermozi 真实姓名: A\*\*\*\*  
所在地区: 广东 广州 联系电话: 0\*\*\*\*  
邮件: h\*\*\*\* 发送站内信 支付宝: h\*\*\*\*

宝贝	宝贝属性	状态	单价(元)	数量	优惠	商品总价(元)	运费(元)
 代购德国进口航模飞机模型用发动机 3W-110 IB2 德国直邮正品	颜色分类: 银色 飞机种类: 固定翼	已确认收货	14999.00	25	-	374975.00	6000.00 ( 快递 )

实收款: **380975.00** 元

订单编号: 118674510762461297  
支付宝交易号: 2018012521001001800575095937  
成交时间: 2018-01-25 00:09:31  
付款时间: 2018-01-25 04:57:31  
确认时间: 2018-04-02 17:54:01

您的位置: [首页](#) [我的淘宝](#) [已卖出的宝贝](#)

1. 买家下单 2. 买家付款 3. 发货 4. 买家确认收货 5. 评价

当前订单状态: 交易成功

**淘宝提醒您**  
交易已成功, 如果买家提出售后要求, 请积极与买家协商, 做好售后服务。

**订单信息** 收货和物流信息

**物流信息**  
收货地址: 魏先生, 13699747779, 广东省 广州市 荔湾区 环市西路37号富力国际鞋业商贸中心1020房, 510145  
运送方式: 快递  
物流公司名称: EMS  
运单号: CI982007400DE

 我对购买流程有意见或建议, 跟淘宝说两句

阿里巴巴集团 | 阿里巴巴国际站 | 阿里巴巴中国站 | 全球速卖通 | 淘宝网 | 天猫 | 聚划算 | 一淘 | 阿里妈妈 | 阿里云计算 | 云OS | 万网 | 中国雅虎 | 支付宝  
关于淘宝 | 合作伙伴 | 营销中心 | 联系客服 | 开放平台 | 诚聘英才 | 联系我们 | 网站地图 | 法律声明 | © 2015 Taobao.com 版权所有



Source: Confidential

Figure 24.5

## Unofficial translation of the screenshot in figure 24.4

Taobao website							
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b> Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Buyer information</b>							
Nickname:	jermozil			Real names:	A***		
Location:	Guangzhou, Guangdong			Phone number:	0***		
Email:	h*** Send site message			Alipay:	h***		
<b>Product</b>	<b>Product attributes</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Unit price (CNY)</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Discount</b>	<b>Total price (CNY)</b>	<b>Shipping fee (CNY)</b>
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany	Colour: Silver Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing	Delivery confirmed	14999.00	25	-	374975.00	6000.00 (express delivery)
Payment received: CNY <b>380975.00</b>							
Order number:	118674510762461297						
Alipay transaction number:	2018012521001001800575095937						
Time of transaction:	2018-01-25 00:09:31						
Time of payment:	2018-01-25 04:57:31						
Time of confirmation:	2018-04-02 17:54:01						
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b> Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Shipping information</b>							
Recipient address:	Mr. Wei, 13699747779, Fuli International Shoe Trade Center, RM 1020, 37 Huanshi West Rd, Liwan District, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, 510145						
Shipping method:	Express delivery						
Name of shipper:	EMS						
Shipping number:	CI982007400DE						

Figure 24.6

**Packing list showing that the engine was transferred to Delro Modelltechnik**



Kunde / Customer: **753.1 Packliste / Packing list**  
**DELRO MODELLTECHNIK**

Datum /Date:06.03.18

AB-2018-3086

Karton Nr. / Box no.	Menge / Qty.	Einheit / Unit	Artikelnummer / Articlenumber:	Bezeichnung	Seriennummer / Serialnummer	Kartongröße / Box Size	Gewicht / Weight (Kg)	verpackt / packed
8	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822108K			
9	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822093K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822095K			
10	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822104K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822105K			
11	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822084K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822086K			
12	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822090K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822091K			
13	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822102K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822103K			
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						

Source: Confidential



Figure 24.7

**Invoice for the sale of the engines by Delro-Modelltechnik to TDQQ****Delro Modelltechnik**

Delro Modelltechnik - Herforder Str. 103 - 32584 Löhne

An  
Wu. TDQQ GMBH  
Feldbergstr. 7  
64293 Darmstadt  
DRechnungsnummer: 15245  
Kundennummer: 800191  
Rechnungsdatum: 15.02.2018

Seite: 1 von 1

**RECHNUNG**

Menge	Einheit	Bezeichnung	Einzelpreis	Rabatt	Gesamtpreis
25	Stück	Motor 3 W-110 iB2	1.205,37 €	7,5 %	27.874,18 €
1		Teil 1 Anzahlung am 31.01.18	-8.403,37 €		-8.403,37 €
1		Teil 2 Anzahlung am 025.02.18	-5.042,02 €		-5.042,02 €

Gesamt netto	14.428,79 €
USt. 19%	2.741,47 €
<b>Gesamtsumme</b>	<b>17.170,26 €</b>

Zahlbar sofort ohne Abzug.

Telefon: 05732/982053  
E-Mail: mail@delro.deBIC: GENODEM 1 HFV  
IBAN: DE10 4949 0070 0059 8081 02  
Kontoinhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
Bank: Volksbank Bad Oeynhausen  
Herford eG  
Bankleitzahl: 494 900 70  
Kontonummer: 59 808 102  
IBAN:  
BIC:Geschäftsführer: Detlef Rottmann  
Inhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
USt.-ID: DE 124 365 151  
Steuernummer: 31051130568**Source:** Confidential



## Annex 25 Corporate information on HSJ Electronic (HK) and Vista Automation & Communication

Figure 25.1  
Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited

存案 Filed



公司註冊處  
Companies Registry

周年申報表  
Annual Return

表格  
Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number  
1480116

**1 公司名稱 Company Name**

HSJ ELECTRONIC (HONG KONG) LIMITED  
華視界電子(香港)有限公司

**2 商業名稱(如有的話) Business Name (if any)**

**3 公司類別 Type of Company**

私人公司 Private company    
  公眾公司 Public company    
  擔保有限公司 Company limited by guarantee

**4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up**

14 / 07 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

(如屬私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。  
如屬公眾公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 6 個月屆滿之日。  
如屬擔保有限公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 9 個月屆滿之日。  
For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.  
For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.  
For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.)

**5 隨本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form**  
(私人公司無須填寫此項 A private company need not complete this section)

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

至  
To

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

**6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office**

ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE

45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH, TSIM SHA TSUI, KOWLOON

地區  
Region

Hong Kong

**本處專用 For Official Use**

Document Ref. No.:70001523798

Submission Date:15/07/2019

Resubmission Date:-

e

指明編號 1/2014 (2014年3月) Specification No. 1/2014 (March 2014) Page 1/7 頁

Figure 25.2

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格  
Form**NAR1**本申報表的結算日期  
Date to which this Return is Made Up

14 / 07 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項)

**Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)**

截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up

股份類別 Class of Shares

Ordinary

此類別股份的已發行總數 Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class

10,000

姓名/名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANGHONGFENG	廣東省深圳市龍崗區寶荷路 業德山谷花園1樓複式21C	10,000			

Figure 25.3

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	1480116
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	廣東省深圳市龍崗區		
	寶荷路振業樓山谷花園1棟複式21C		
	國家/地區 Country/Region	中國	
電郵地址 Email Address			
<b>身分證明 Identification</b>			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.4  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication



公司註冊處  
Companies Registry

周年申報表  
Annual Return

存案 Filed

表格  
Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number

2224659

1 公司名稱 Company Name

VISTA AUTOMATION & COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES LIMITED

2 商業名稱 (如有的話) Business Name (If any)

3 公司類別 Type of Company

私人公司 Private company     公眾公司 Public company     擔保有限公司 Company limited by guarantee

4 本申報表的結算日期

Date to which this Return is Made Up

15 / 04 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

(如屬私人公司，本申報表應列載至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。  
如屬公眾公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 6 個月期滿之日。  
如屬擔保有限公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 9 個月期滿之日。  
For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.  
For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.  
For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.)

5 隨本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期

Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form

(私人公司無須填報此項 A private company need not complete this section)

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY    至    日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY  
To

6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office

ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE,

45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH,

TSIM SHA TSUI, KLN

地區  
Region Hong Kong

本處專用 For Official Use

Document Ref. No.:70001449322

Submission Date:15/04/2019

Resubmission Date:-



Figure 25.5  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	2224659
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	FUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANGU GARDEN		
	BAOHE ROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN		
	GUANGDONG		
	國家/地區 Country/Region	China	
電郵地址 Email Address			
<b>身分證明 Identification</b>			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.6  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	<b>附表一 Schedule 1</b> (非上市公司適用 <b>FOR NON-LISTED COMPANY</b> ) 公司編號 <b>Company Number</b> 2224659			
本申報表的結算日期 <b>Date to which this Return is Made Up</b>		15 / 04 / 2019 日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY			
非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項) <b>Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)</b> 截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 <b>Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up</b>					
股份類別 <b>Class of Shares</b>	Ordinary				
此類別股份的已發行總數 <b>Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class</b>	10,000				
姓名 / 名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANGHONGPENG	PUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANGU GARDEN BAOHEROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN GUANGDONG	10,000			

Source for 25.1 – 25.6: Confidential



## Annex 26 Economic Issues

### I. Economic Issues that pose a potential threat to peace, security or stability

1. The Panel examined various issues concerning the economy of Yemen, which pose a threat to its peace, security, or stability. The deteriorating economic situation has resulted in frustration, deprivation, and resentment amongst the population, offering a fertile breeding ground for further conflict and social unrest. Some political groups have sought to take advantage of this situation. The STC's Economic Committee (EC) under Aidarous Al-Zubaidi held meetings with the Southern Money Exchange Association, without the participation of the or the Government of Yemen and discussed measures to alleviate the economic challenges arising from the volatile exchange rate situation.<sup>247</sup> Such actions by the STC over the banking and exchange companies are viewed by some as a challenge to the authority of the Central Bank of Yemen and the Government of Yemen, as part of a larger ongoing power struggle between the Government of Yemen and the STC.<sup>248</sup>

2. In the past few months, in order to ensure monetary and financial discipline and stability, the Central Bank of Yemen has issued a new regulation to improve the functioning of money exchange businesses, including measures such as stricter licensing conditions for new applicants and the introduction of e-auction systems. The Central Bank of Yemen has also taken some measures against certain exchange companies, suspending 80 exchange companies for legal violations and non-compliance with its instructions and shutting down 141 unlicensed companies.<sup>249</sup> In August 2021, the IMF made a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation for Yemen, worth USD 665 millions of reserves. This, according to the IMF is expected to improve Yemen's foreign exchange reserves by over 70 percent, and help address the crisis, especially food and medical needs of the population.<sup>250</sup>

### II. Depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER)

3. The rapid depreciation of the YER, which hit a historic low in early December, crossing the 1700 mark per USD, not only impacts economic stability, but poses a grave threat to peace in Yemen. The total external assets of Yemen, as a share of total assets, fell to 4.5 percent as of June 2021 from 5.3 percent in 2020 and 9.6 percent in 2019; the net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Yemen, as of June 2021, had further decreased by 13 percent, reaching a negative value of YER 958.3 billion.<sup>251</sup> This decline is attributed to the ongoing political instability which impacted the exports of oil, depriving Yemen of its primary source of foreign exchange. Secondly, in 2020, inward remittances by Yemeni diaspora declined by over 20 percent.<sup>252</sup> The exchange rate which was YER 591 per USD at the end of 2019 reached about YER 700 per USD at the end of 2020, and recently crossed the YER 1700 per USD, restricting Yemen's ability to finance imports of essential goods, thereby exerting severe strains on the purchasing power capacity of its already impoverished population. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, the cost of the national minimum food basket (MFB), which is indicative of the cost of living,

247 <https://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225>. During the Panel's meeting with the EC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC stated that these meetings were held to improve the situation.

248 During the meeting of the Panel with the EC of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that since the Government of Yemen and the Central Bank of Yemen did not do their job properly leading to the collapse of the YER and increase in the prices of basic commodities, they had to intervene.

249 Information provided by the Central Bank of Yemen.

250 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-get-655-mln-imf-reserves-new-sdr-allocation-2021-08-23/>.

251 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

252 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

reached 56,283 YER in June 2021, about 21 percent higher than the cost at the beginning of 2021.<sup>253</sup> In July 2021, the Government of Yemen, in order to earn additional Government revenue, doubled the exchange rate used for calculating Customs duties on non-essential goods imported through the ports under Government of Yemen control, from YER 250 per USD to YER 500 per USD.<sup>254</sup> Although this new rate is almost 29 percent of the prevailing market exchange rate of about YER 1700 per USD, this move by the Government of Yemen has increased the cost of imported goods. The Houthis criticised this decision and reacted by reducing the exchange rate for Customs purposes to YER 250 per USD for imports through the Hudaydah port, under their control.<sup>255</sup> As, currently, there are no imports of non-essential goods through ports under Houthi control, there will not be any real impact of this move by the Houthis and it appears to be part of the propaganda war.

### III. Fragmentation of the Banking and Financial System

4. A stable banking and financial sector is a critical prerequisite for ensuring larger economic stability. The present scenario does not offer promising signs for the future of Yemen's banking and financial sector, and thereby of its economic stability.

5. In the aftermath of the move of the Central Bank of Yemen's headquarters from Sana'a to Aden in September 2016, the bifurcation of the Central Bank of Yemen into two rival institutions was effectively formalised with the functioning of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden and the cby, Sana'a. This has led to a tussle between the two institutions for regulatory supremacy over the Yemeni banking sector. The escalation of conflict has led to the intensification of the economic crisis and further politicisation of the banking sector.

6. The areas under the control of the Houthis have a higher population; Sana'a is the major financial and trading hub of Yemen, and nearly all banks and exchange companies have their headquarters situated in Sana'a. In order to consolidate its own control and authority in this strategic region, the cby, Sana'a adopted measures aimed at undermining the authority of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. Chief among these have been the denial of vital information concerning the economy and banking sector of Yemen to Central Bank of Yemen, Aden,<sup>256</sup> and to ban currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden after 2017<sup>257</sup>. The Panel has been informed that the Houthi authorities have subjected those financial institutions not complying with such instructions to reprisals and punitive actions, including seizure of their assets and funds, imposition of fines, and detention of bank officials.

7. A central bank requires reports from commercial banks, and exchange companies that contain information on various aspects such as assets and liabilities, local and foreign currency holdings, foreign currency trades, internal and external financial transfers, import financing, and loans. These reports allow the central bank to monitor the banking sector with respect to their financial health, compliance with local laws and instructions, international regulations concerning anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing, and to frame and implement monetary, fiscal and economic policies as

253 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

254 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-government-doubles-customs-exchange-rate-boost-finances-2021-07-26/>.

255 <http://en.ypagency.net/231497/>.

256 Circular No. (4) of 2020, titled "Communication with the Enemy", addressed to all the exchange companies and institutions operating in the Republic of Yemen, was issued by the cby's Financial Information in Sana'a on 28 January 2020.

257 Circular issued by the ministry of finance in Sana'a on June 23, 2021 to all the finance affairs managers and the treasurers in charge of taxes/customs collection, and circular issued by the headquarters of cby - Sana'a on 27 June 2021.

well as banking and trade regulations. In January 2020, banks and exchange companies operating in Sana'a were instructed by the cby, Sana'a, not to provide any data to "any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries", and that the submission of any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and the violator will be held responsible (Figure 26.1 and Appendix 1).

8. In the absence of vital information regarding the operations of financial institutions in Houthi-controlled areas, functional capabilities of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden stand severely challenged. Objecting to this, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, responded by demanding reports and full access to information from commercial, Islamic, and microfinance banks and money exchange companies concerning all their activities and not merely activities confined to areas under the control of the central Government. Fines have been imposed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden on certain banks not complying with these stipulations.<sup>258</sup> Additionally, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden has also instructed the banks to shift their operational centres to Aden, failing which, they would be subjected to action, including suspension of their licences and informing other entities not to bank with them (Figure 26.2 and Appendix 2).<sup>259</sup>

<sup>258</sup> "In accordance with Commercial Bank Law No. 38 of 1998, YKB, IBY, and YBRD are liable to pay the daily fines (between 51,000-100,000 Yemeni rials) that CBY-Aden have been calculating since June 2020 for the banks' failure to provide monthly monetary data." - Yemen Economic Bulletin: Battle to Regulate Banks Threatens to Rupture the Financial Sector - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies  
<https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/12004>.

<sup>259</sup> <http://en.adenpress.news/news/33475>.

Figure 26.1

Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the banks for not sharing data with enemy

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE

البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Date: .....  
No.: .....  
القسم: ٩٩  
الرقم: ٢٢٠/٩٩  
التاريخ: ٢٠٢٠/٠١/٢٨  
الترقيات: .....

صنعا في 28|01|2020م

تعميم رقم (2) لسنة 2020م  
الى كافة البنوك العاملة في الجمهورية

المحترم  
الأخ / المدير العام / المدير الاقليمي  
بنك /  
تحية طيبة وبعد،،،

الموضوع/ التخابر مع العدو

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، وإلى توجيهات الاخ/ المحافظ عطفاً على اوامر من السلطات العليا، بمخاطبة البنوك والصرافين بعدم موافاة أي جهات غير قانونية مرتبطة بالمرتزقة بأي بيانات وأن تسليم أي بيانات لأي من تلك الجهات سيعتبر تخاير مع العدو وسيحمل كل من يخالف ذلك كامل المسؤولية. وعليه وجب مخاطبتكم بذلك.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا،  
رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
وليد محمد السادة

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Figure 26.2

## Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks

أصدر البنك المركزي اليمني اليوم، بيان هام موجه الى جميع البنوك التجارية والإسلامية العاملة في عموم الجمهورية، بشأن عدم التزام بعض البنوك بتقديم حساباتها الختامية والتي أصدر البنك المركزي بها مسبقاً مذكرات للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي انتهى موعدها اليوم.

وفي اجتماعه اليوم مع قيادات من قطاعي الرقابة على البنوك والعمليات الخارجية أكد نائب محافظ البنك المركزي شقيب الحبيشي حرص البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني بما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسؤوليته القانونية، فقد تضمن بيان البنك المركزي حزمة من الإجراءات لتصحيح بنية القطاع المصرفي، وأهمها تصنيف بعض البنوك غير المنضبطة قانوناً، كبنوك غير ملتزمة وتعميم أسماءها لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، الى جانب التوجيه الملزم بنقل مراكز عمليات البنوك التجارية والإسلامية الى عدن، حيث المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي اليمني، ولكي يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من كافة عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بالمتطلبات القانونية لها، وكذا التزامه بترحيل النقد الاجنبي للبنوك لتغذية حساباتها الخارجية، لمواجهة التزامات عملاءها المستوردين.

نص البيان:

حرصاً من البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني وبما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسؤوليته القانونية بموجب المادة (45) من قانون البنك المركزي اليمني رقم (14) لسنة 2000م والمواد (27)، (28)، (29)، (30)، (31) من قانون البنوك رقم (38) لسنة 1998م والتي أعطت البنك المركزي الحق في طلب أية بيانات أو معلومات من أي بنك يراها ضرورية عن موقفه المالي وعملياته المصرفية المختلفة بهدف فحصها ومراجعتها والتحقق من سلامة الوضع المالي للبنك وأنه يمارس أنشطته وفقاً للقوانين وتعليمات البنك المركزي بما فيها التعليمات الخاصة بإجراءات مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، كما ألزمت تلك المواد البنوك على تقديم البيانات المالية السنوية المدققة والمتطلبات الإضافية المرتبطة بها والتي يصادق عليها البنك المركزي.

وعطفاً على المذكرات الصادرة من البنك المركزي للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي تنتهي بتاريخ 6 يوليو 2021م، وبسبب عدم التزام بعض البنوك بالمتطلبات الواردة في تلك المذكرات.

وعليه فإن البنك المركزي يحمل البنوك غير الملتزمة المسؤولية الكاملة عن أية تبعات قد تترتب على ادراجها في القائمة الرسمية للبنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، والتي سيتم الإعلان عنها وإتاحتها لجميع الجهات المحلية والبنوك والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الخارجية والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى.

ويوجه البنك المركزي مشدداً، أن على كافة البنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها في بلادنا الإسراع بأن تكون مراكز إدارة عملياتها بعدن، حيث يتواجد المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي وبما يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من جميع عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر لمؤيداتها والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بكافة المتطلبات القانونية اللازمة لها.

كما يهيب البنك المركزي بكافة الشركات والمؤسسات التجارية المستوردة عدم تنفيذ أي عمليات مالية أو مصرفية ومنها فتح الاعتمادات والتحويلات مع البنوك التي سيتم ادراجها ضمن قائمة البنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، ولن يتحمل البنك المركزي المسؤولية عن أية أضرار ناتجة عن تنفيذ عمليات أو معاملات اذا أجريت عبر تلك البنوك.

كما يؤكد البنك المركزي بأنه سيتولى ترحيل مبالغ النقد الاجنبي الخاصة بالبنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها والملتزمة، لتغذية أرصدة حساباتها لدى البنوك في الخارج، بهدف تغطية اعتماداتها وتحويلاتها لاغراض مواجهة التزاماتها وتحديد عمليات الاستيراد.

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني

المركز الرئيسي - عدن

بتاريخ: 5 أغسطس 2021م

Source: <https://yemen-yba.com/10376> and <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>.

9. Caught between the conflicting directions from the cby, Sana'a and the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, banks and exchange companies currently struggle to operate and ensure legal compliance in a highly challenging and coercive regulatory environment. The Yemen Bank Association (YBA) and the Yemeni Exchangers Association (YEA) have unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a solution to the challenges faced by them in implementing the conflicting directions of the rival central banks. The YBA has also opposed the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden's direction requiring banks to shift their operational centres to Aden.<sup>260</sup> Challenges in implementation and the looming threat of punitive action has meant that the banking community currently faces tremendous stress.

#### IV. Currency War

10. In order to finance fiscal deficits, the Central Bank of Yemen has adopted the controversial tool of 'monetary emissions',<sup>261</sup> wherein new currency is printed and circulated into the economy. Apart from being inflationary, this has created new economic challenges. There is now a currency war by proxy between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis through their respective central banks. Although the armed conflict began in 2014, the two central banks emerged in 2016 and both areas continued to use the same currency notes up to 2019 until the cby, Sana'a, banned the new currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, for use in the areas under the control of the Houthis. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, "the January 2020 ban on newly printed banknotes in the region under Houthi control has limited the government's ability to pay salaries in this area and complicated monetary policy operations. This has increased the cost of financial transactions, reduced market transparency, and widened exchange rate gaps between Aden and Sana'a — to as much as 100 percent in some instances."<sup>262</sup>

11. The Panel has received information that the cby, Sana'a, issued a circular on 23 June 2021 banning the use of certain currency notes, printed in the year 2017 in the denomination of one thousand Yemeni rials in different series, issued by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden, in areas under Houthi control (Figure 26.3 and Appendix 3). Treating such currency as counterfeit notes, the cby, Sana'a prohibits the dealing, possession, or transfer of these notes within Houthi-controlled areas. Through another circular, issued on 27 June 2021, the cby, Sana'a, reiterated that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of such currency notes would entail prosecution on charges of harming the national economy (Figure 26.4 and Appendix 4).

<sup>260</sup> See the press release dated 12 August 2021 issued by the YBA, <https://yemen-yba.com/10376/>.

<sup>261</sup> Introducing cash to circulation in economy.

<sup>262</sup> CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

Figure 26.3

Circular dated 23 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a banning the use of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

الرقم: 380-110 - ورقه  
التاريخ: 13/ ذو القعدة/ 1442هـ  
الموافق: 2021/6/23م

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الجمهورية اليمنية  
وزارة المالية

الأخوة/ الوزراء، محافظي المحافظات، رؤساء مجالس الإدارات، المدراء  
المتقنين، رؤساء الهيئات في مختلف وحدات الخدمة العامة  
الأخوة/ مدراء الشؤون المالية  
الأخوة/ أمراء الصائغين، المكلفين بالتحويل  
أخوة طيبة وبعدها

**الموضوع/ تعميم بشأن منع تداول العملة المرورة**

إستناداً إلى الصلاحيات الممنوحة لوزارة المالية، وتطبيقاً للقرارات حكمة الإطّاد الوطني منع تداول  
أي عملة بقر حطر التعامل معها البنك المركزي -البنك المركزي - صنعاء  
وما كان ما أقدم عليه ما يسمى بنك عدن المدار من قبل العنوان بتروير طباعة فئة الألف ريال  
إصدار عام 2017م جريمة تضاد إلى سجل جرائم استهداف الاقتصاد الوطني وقسمة العملة الوطنية  
والناظر على التراكم القانونية ورأس المال الوطني، فإن التصدي لهذه الجرائم واجب وطني وأحلامي يجب  
أن نهض به كل المكونات وفي مقدمتها مؤسسات الدولة.  
وعليه، تؤكد وزارة المالية على الآتي:

1. مع حطر التعامل بالعملة (المرورة) والتي أكد عليها البنك المركزي في بيانه بتاريخ  
2021/6/22م (المرفق نسخة منه).
2. كل من استلم مبلغ أو فئة أو لست تزويجه لأي من هذه العملات المرورة سيتم مباشرة إحالته  
للسبابة وتطبيق قانون العقوبات النافذ بحقه بتهمة (الإضرار بالاقتصاد الوطني في المؤسسات  
وتداول عملات مرورة غير مصرح بها).
3. أهمية تفاعل كل كادر المؤسسات الحكومية في نوعية أبناء الشعب نحو مواجهة سياسات  
العنوان الاقتصادية.
4. على كل العاملين بالوظيفة المالية في مؤسسات الدولة التيقظ ومتابعة ما يصدر عن الجهة  
المختصة في إدارة السياسة النقدية (البنك المركزي - صنعاء) والعمل بموجبها.

تقب وزارة المالية بالشكر والجمع وإبلاغ عمليات وزارة المالية على الرقم الهاتفي (8005005) أو  
عمليات البنك المركزي (8006800) عن أي كيميات تجارية أو غيرها تتعامل مع مؤسساتكم  
تحوّل أو تزوّج هذه العملة المرورة.  
ونسأل الله أن يوفّقنا جميعاً لما فيه الحفاظ على الاقتصاد الوطني والحفاظ على قيمة عملته الوطنية  
والله الموفق

د. محمد بن عبد الله أبو حليم  
مدير الشؤون الاقتصادية  
وزير المالية

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Figure 26.4

Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution



**REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**  
**CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN**  
 Head Office Sana'a

**الجمهورية اليمنية**  
**البنك المركزي اليمني**  
 المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

---

**تعميم صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء**

إحاطاً بالبيان الصادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء - بتاريخ 2021/6/22م بشأن منع التعامل أو حيازة أو نقل العملة المزيفة فئة (1000) ريال التي يبدأ رقمها التسلسلي بغير حرف ( أ ) والمدون عليها عام 1438 هـ - 2017م، واستناداً إلى أحكام القوانين النافذة، ولما تقتضيه المصلحة الوطنية من منع تسرب العملة المزيفة، فإن البنك المركزي يهيب بجميع القادمين من المناطق المعتسة إلى مناطق حكومة الإقليم الوطني الالتزام بما يلي:

1. عدم نقل العملة المزيفة المشار إليها أعلاه.
2. أن الحد الأعلى المسموح بنقله من العملة البنيدية القانونية هو مبلغ (100.000) مائة ألف ريال فقط لكل شخص، ويسمح بنقل أي مبلغ من العملات الأجنبية.

وفي حالة المخالفة ستقوم الجهات المختصة بضبط المخالفين واتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بشأنهم وفق الحد الأقصى للعقوبات المقررة في قانون مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والقوانين الأخرى النافذة.

كما يهيب البنك بجميع المواطنين الاتصال على الرقم المجاني (8006800) أو رقم (01274327)، للإبلاغ عن أية مخالفة مما سبق.

علماً أن البنك سيقوم بصرف مكافأة بما يعادل نسبة (5%) من المبلغ المحسوط لمن قام بالإبلاغ عن المخالفة.

تأمل من الجميع الالتزام تحقياً للمصلحة العامة.

والله الموفق..

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني  
 المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
 2021/6/27م



تتوجه لكل من:  
 - رئيس مجلس الوزراء  
 - رئيس مجلس القضاء الأعلى  
 - وزير الداخلية  
 - رئيس جهاز الأمن والمخابرات  
 - وزير الصناعة والتجارة  
 - وزير الإدارة المحلية  
 - النائب العام  
 - الغرفة التجارية والصناعية  
 - جمعية البنوك اليمنية  
 - جمعية الصرافين اليمنيين

فاكس : 274360 تليفون التوجيه : 274310/18 ص ب 59 صنعاء - جمهورية اليمنية  
 Email : governor@centralbank.gov.ye Fax : 274360 Tel Operator : 274310 B.O.Box 59 Sana'a Y.R

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

12. A peculiar situation has arisen, as a result, wherein old notes printed prior to 2017 remain legal tender in both areas, and because of the ban imposed by the cby, Sana'a, the newer notes remain largely in circulation in areas under Government of Yemen control only. Due to this ban, areas under Houthi control face a major cash crunch, while the surplus currency notes in Government of Yemen areas has



led to inflation and the rapid depreciation of the YER rate. The market value of YERs varies between old and new notes and also between the two regions, with profiteers charging higher transfer costs between the two regions, as entities running businesses in Houthi-controlled areas are forced to purchase old banknotes at high premia from the black market. Since the experiment with the new notes backfired, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden reportedly printed and put billions of YERs in old banknotes into the market and withdrew the newly printed banknotes of YER 1,000 denomination, allowing the people to get old banknotes from local banks and exchange firms.<sup>263</sup> The cby, Sana'a, promptly banned these newly printed notes. While the exchange rate crossed YER 1700 per USD in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen, the rates in Houthi-controlled areas largely hover around the YER 600 per USD mark. This dismal ground situation has sharply fractured the economies of both parts of Yemen, adversely impacting domestic trade, and threatening economic stability in the country.

13. The international community should take note of the severity of this economic crisis and take concrete measures to prevent further divisions in Yemen which could lead to an irreversible fait accompli. In the absence of rapid improvements in the political and security situations, the future economic prospects appear to be gloomy.<sup>264</sup>

<sup>263</sup> <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1905641/business-economy>.

<sup>264</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021>.

**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the Banks for not sharing data with enemy**

Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office  
Sana'a

Financial Information Unit

Date : 28/01/2020

Circular No. (2) 2020  
To all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Regional Director

**Subject / Communication with the enemy**

Referring to the above subject, and to the governor's directives with the orders of the higher authorities to address the banks and money changers not to provide any data to any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries, and to submit any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and anyone who violates that will be held responsible.

Signed by:

Mr. Wadea Mohammed AL-Saddah,  
Head of Financial Information Collection Unit

## **Appendix 2 Unofficial Translation of Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks**

In the interest of the Central Bank for the sound performance of the Yemeni banking sector and the continuity of its activity in the service of the national economy in a manner that ensures the preservation of its reputation with international financial and banking institutions, and based on its legal responsibility under Article (45) of the Central Bank of Yemen Law No. (14) of 2000 AD and Articles (27), (28), (29), (30), (31) of the Banking Law No. (38) of 1998 AD, which gave the Central Bank the right to request any data or information from any bank it deems necessary about its financial position and its various banking operations with the aim of examining them and reviewing them and verifying the soundness of the bank's financial position and that it carries out its activities in accordance with the laws and instructions of the Central Bank, including the instructions for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing procedures.

In addition to the memoranda issued by the Central Bank to banks regarding the obligation to submit the financial statements within a period of (15) days, which ends on July 6, 2021 AD, and due to the failure of some banks to comply with the requirements contained in those memos. Accordingly, the Central Bank holds the non-compliant banks fully responsible for any consequences that may result from their inclusion in the official list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, which will be announced and made available to all local authorities, banks, external financial and banking institutions and other international organizations.

The Central Bank stresses that all commercial and Islamic banks licensed in our country should expedite the establishment of their operations management centres in Aden, where the headquarters of the Central Bank is located in a way that enables it to carry out verification procedures for all its operations and direct field inspection of its supporters and to ensure its commitment to fulfilling all necessary legal requirements she has. The Central Bank also calls upon all importing companies and commercial institutions not to carry out any financial or banking operations, including opening credits and transfers with banks that will be included in the list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, and the Central Bank will not be responsible for any damages resulting from the implementation of operations or transactions if conducted through those banks.

The Central Bank also confirms that it will carry out the transfer of foreign exchange amounts of licensed and committed commercial and Islamic banks, to feed their account balances with banks abroad, with the aim of covering their credits and transfers for the purposes of meeting their obligations, specifically import operations.

**Source:** <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>

**Appendix 3 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 23 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a banning the use of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden**

Republic of Yemen  
Ministry of Finance  
Number: 110-380

Date: 23/06/2021

Ministers, Governors of governorates, Heads of boards of directors  
Finance affairs managers  
Fund custodians having charge of collection

Subject: The prevention of Counterfeit Currency circulation

Based on the authority of the Ministry of Finance and in implementation of the decisions of the National Salvation Government to prevent the circulation of any business, the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen– Sana'a decides to ban dealing with it.

And since the so-called Bank of Aden, managed by the aggression, committed a forgery of printing, denomination of 1,000 rials, issued in 2017, a crime that is added to the record of crimes targeting the national economy and national labor values and affecting legal positions and national capital, then confronting these crimes is a patriotic duty. All components must be promoted, foremost among which are state institutions.

And the Ministry of Finance confirms the following:

1. Prohibition of dealing in (counterfeit) currency, which was confirmed by the Central Bank in its statement dated 06/22/2021 (Copy attached)
2. Whoever receives an amount or denomination promoting any of these counterfeit currencies will be directly referred to the representative and the penal code in force against him will be applied (damaging the national economy in institutions and unauthorized circulation of counterfeit currencies).
3. The importance of educating all government institutions' cadres towards confronting the economic policies of economic aggression.
4. All those working in the financial position in the institutions of the state must be vigilant and follow up on what is issued about managing monetary policy in the competent authority (the Central Bank – Sana'a) and directed to act accordingly.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (800500) or (8006800) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Signature

Mr. Rashid Abuud Abu Lahuum  
Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs

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**Appendix 4 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution**

**Republic of Yemen  
Central Bank of Yemen  
Head office Sanaa**

**Circular issued by the Headquarters of the Central Bank of Yemen - Sana'a**

An appendix to the statement issued by the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen - Sanaa - dated 22/06/2021 regarding prohibiting dealing, possession, or transfer of counterfeit currency in denominations of (1000) riyals, whose serial number is without the letter (A) and recorded in year 1438 - 2017 on it to the provisions of the laws in force, and what the national interest requires of preventing the leakage of false work.

The Central Bank of Yemen calling on all those coming from "the localized areas" (referring to the areas under the control of the legitimate government) to the areas of "the National Salvation Government" (referring to the areas under the control of Houthis) to abide by the following two things:

- 1) Not to transfer any counterfeit currency.
- 2) One hundred thousand (100,000) Yemeni Riyals is the maximum permissible limit for transferring the legal Yemeni currency for each person; however, transferring any amount of foreign currency is not prohibited.

And in the case of the violator the competent authorities will arrest the violators and take legal measures in their regard according to the maximum penalties stipulated in the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law and other applicable laws.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (8006800) or (01274327) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Note that the Central Bank in Sanaa will pay the person who reported the violation a reward equivalent to (5%).

Hope everyone is committed to achieve the public interest.

**Issued by the Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office - Sana'a  
27/06/2021**

Annex 27 Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021 issued by the president al-Amana specialised criminal prosecution court to the Tadhamon Bank

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
العدل أساس الحكم

النيابة العامة  
النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

الرقم: ٣٨٢١  
التاريخ: ٢٧/٠٦/٢٠٢١  
المرفقات:

الأخ / مدير بنك التضامن الاسلامي  
تحية طيبة وبعد:

المحترم  
بالإشارة الى الأحكام القضائية الصادرة من المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة ضد المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي في القضية رقم 102 لسنة 2019م ج ج والتي قضت بإدانته بتهمة المساس باستقلال الجمهورية اليمنية وإعانة العدو والتخابر مع العدوان والتخابر مع دولة الاحتلال اسرائيل ومعاقبته بالإعدام تعزيراً ومصادرة جميع أمواله الثابتة والمنقولة ، وبالإشارة الى مذكرة الأخ رئيس لجنة حصر واستلام ممتلكات الخونة رقم 269/14174 وتاريخ 23 / 6 / 2021م والمتضمنة ان اموال المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي النقدية المحجوز عليها لديكم هي الوضحة في الجدول التالي:

اسم العميل	المبلغ المحجوز	العملة	نوع الحساب	رقم الحساب
19100	31.289.623.900	ريال يمني	محفظة	001-886-271107-000
عبد ربه منصور هادي	636.221.984.25	ريال سعودي	جاري	112-682-211101-000
	907.722.643.44	ريال يمني	جاري	112-886-211101-000

وأنه قد تم فتح حساب لدى البنك المركزي خاص بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة.

ولذلك

يتم نقل تلك الاموال المحكوم بمصادرتها سائلة الذكر من لديكم الى البنك المركزي وايداعها في الحساب رقم (00/1215-10012) ريال يمني والحساب رقم (06/1215-10012) ريال سعودي الخاصين بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة واشعارنا بما يفيد ذلك في اسرع وقت ليتسنى لنا التصرف وفقاً للقانون.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا،

عبد الله محمد زهرة  
رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

صورة مع التحية لمعالي الاخ النائب العام

نجيب

Source: Confidential

**Appendix 1 Unofficial translation of Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021**

No. 3821

Dated : 27/6/2021

**Public Prosecution  
Specialized Criminal Prosecution**

**The Manager**

Tadhamon Bank

With reference to the judicial rulings issued by the Criminal Court of Al-Amana against the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, Case No. 102 of 2019 Case No. 407 of 2019 which sentenced him to conviction on charges of compromising the independence of the Republic of Yemen and advocate the enemy in communication with occupying country, Israel and death penalty punishment, condemnation and confiscation of all fixed and movable property, and with reference to the memorandum of Chairman of the Committee for the inventory and receipt of the properties of the traitors No. 14174/269 dated 23/6/2021 and included the money of the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi is seized with Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank that is shown in the following table:

Customer Name	Seized Amount	Currency	Account Type	Account Number
19100 Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi	31.289.623.900	Yemeni Rial	Saving	001-886-271107- 000
	636.221.984.25	Saudi Riyal	Current	112-682-211101- 000
	907.722.643.44	Yemeni Rial	Current	112-886-211101- 000

And that an account has been opened with you in the Central Bank for the management of the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution.

**Therefore**

Those funds, which were sentenced to confiscation above, shall be transferred from you to the Central Bank and deposited in account No. (00/1215-10012) Yemeni Rial and account No. (06/1215-10012) Saudi Riyals for managing the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution according to the law.

**Abdullah Mohammad Zahra****President- Al-Amana Specialized Criminal Prosecution**

Annex 28 Circular of 28 June 2021 issued by the central bank of yemen, Sana'a regarding freezing the funds of the Tadhamon Bank

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a



الجمهورية اليمنية  
البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
التاريخ: 2021/06/28  
الرقم:

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

عاجل

(تعميم الى جميع منشآت وشركات الصرافة العاملة في الجمهورية)

المهترم

الأخ / المدير العام

تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/ العجز على جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، والى مذكرة الأخ/ رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة القاضي/ عبدالله محمد زهرة رقم (3830) بتاريخ 2021/6/27م والمسلمة اليينا بتاريخ 2021/6/28م بخصوص العجز على جميع اموال بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة في جميع القطاعات المصرفية.

يتم حجز جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة لديكم في أي صورة كانت فوراً وموافاتنا بجميع الاموال والارصدة المحجوزة يومنا هذا.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير،،



فكس : 274113 تليفون 274093 ص . ب 393 صنعاء - الجمهورية اليمنية Sana'a Y.R P.O.Box:393 Tel : 274093 Fax 274113

Source: Confidential



**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular of 28 June 2021**

**REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

**CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a**

**Date: 28 June 2021**

**Financial Information Unit  
(Circular to all public money exchange institutions and companies in the Republic)**

**General Manager,**

**Subject : Seizure of all funds and balances of Al- Tadhamon Islamic Bank**

In reference to the above subject and to the memorandum of the Chief of the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of Al-Amana, Judge Abdullah Muhammad Zahra No. (3820) dated 27/6/2021 and handed over to us on 28/6/2021 regarding the seizure of all funds of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited in all banking sectors.

All funds and balances of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited with you, in any form, shall be seized immediately and we shall be provided with all the funds and balances seized today.

**Chief of Financial Information Unit  
Wadi Mohammad Al-Sada**

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**Fax: 274113 Lablon 274093M. Box 393 People - Republic of Yemen Fax 274113  
Tel: 274093 P.O.Box:3938, sana'a VR**

## Annex 29 Telecom Sector in Yemen

1. Despite the ongoing conflict, the telecommunications industry continues to witness significant growth and has been a major source of revenue for the Houthi authorities. According to the World Bank, prior to 2015, government revenue from the telecommunications industry was said to be second largest after hydrocarbons.<sup>265</sup> The number of mobile phone connections rose from 15.7 million in 2014 to 18.6 million by end-2019 and the number of internet users rose from 3.2 million in 2014 to 7.2 million by end-2019.<sup>266</sup>
2. A sector with a high revenue generating potential would naturally attract significant attention from the rival factions in the conflict. The majority of the telecom companies in Yemen are based in Sana'a, and a sizeable number of users reside in the Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthi authorities in Sana'a allegedly exercise control over these telecom companies and the sector, reportedly, has been a major source of revenue to the Houthis.<sup>267</sup> The Panel has received information that the Houthis, under the leadership of Abdullah Misfer Al-Shaer, have taken control of certain Sana'-based telecom companies.
3. The political, regulatory, and operational roles in the telecom sector in Yemen have not been segregated. The ministry of telecommunications and information technology responsible for the areas under the control of the Houthis is the overarching body that performs all types of roles concerning this sector: formulating bylaws, policies and plans; managing the spectrum for mobile broadband services; granting licenses; maintaining the national numbering plan; approving pricing policies for services; regulating all sub-sectors, namely landline and mobile telephony, internet services, and posts and also enforcing the laws, especially the licensing agreements between the Sana'-based ministry and the telecom service providers.
4. Companies operating in the areas under the control of the Houthis face policy uncertainties, levy of illegal fees and charges, extortion and confiscation of their assets. Licenses are deliberately issued for short durations to create operational uncertainties for companies.<sup>268</sup> The companies are forced to pay fees for a temporary extension of the operating licence on an annual basis, which provide a regular source of revenue to the authorities, both legal and illegal. The Panel received information that a total amount of about USD 22 million per annum, including an annual renewal fee of USD 13.2 million and the balance towards the frequency fees and the management fees, was collected by the de-facto authorities in Sana'a from some Sana'-based telecom companies.<sup>269</sup>

<sup>265</sup> <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/337651508409897554/Yemen-information-andcommunication-technology-ICT>.

<sup>266</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721> quoting from (i) for 2014 data, Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), "Statistical Year Book for 2016 – Chapter 13: Communications & Information Technology," and (ii) for 2019 data, MTIT (Sana'a), "Telecommunication and Information Technology Infrastructure Indicators 2019 [AR]."

<sup>267</sup> Panel received information from the GoY and other sources. "According to unofficial estimates, the Houthis annually receive about 80 billion riyals (equivalent to \$160 million) from the public and private telecommunications sector." see <https://alkhaleejonline.net/>.

<sup>268</sup> Panel received information from confidential sources that annual renewal fees of USD 13.2 million was collected by the ministry of telecom from the telecom companies; and taking into account the frequency fees and the management fees, the total revenue collected from MTN and Sabafon was about USD 22 million per annum.

<sup>269</sup> According to a report, published at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>, "In 2016, MTN Yemen paid \$36.4 million for a 29-month extension to their original 15-year license that was granted in July 2000, thereby extending their operating license to December 2017. .... MTN Yemen, which held a market share of 42.8% as of 2016 according to their estimates, presumably paid—according to the terms of their license agreement—what would have amounted to YER 1.7 billion annually for the duration of their 15-year license that became effective in July 2000.". The Panel has written to MTN for confirmation and their response is awaited.

5. The Houthis illegally collect fees under the pretext of regulating the telecommunications sector. The Sana'a-based companies continue to pay various fees such as license renewal fees, taxes, and zakat fees. The Panel has received information that some of the companies have also been subject to financial extortion by the Houthis who have also confiscated the funds and assets of private telecommunications companies in Yemen.<sup>270</sup> Further, according to a media report, Houthis allegedly took over Y mobile telecommunication company after arranging to declare it "bankrupt by a court under their control."<sup>271</sup> Y telecom, reportedly, "declared bankruptcy in March 2020 and left behind its physical assets such as real estate and its inventory of equipment in Sana'a, to restart its operations in Aden using 4G technology."<sup>272</sup> Y telecom has been requested by the Panel for a confirmation, their response is awaited.

6. The Government of Yemen has informed the Panel that USD 25 million of funds of MTN, Sana'a, located in the company's account maintained with the International Bank of Yemen, have allegedly been confiscated.<sup>273</sup> Finally, with effect from 17 November 2021, MTN Group, which held 82.8% of the shares in MTN Yemen, left Yemen by transferring its "majority shareholding in MTN Yemen to Emerald International Investment LCC. Emerald is a subsidiary of Zubair Investment Center LLC, an affiliate of Zubair Corporation LLC, which is the minority shareholder in MTN Yemen."<sup>274</sup> The Panel wrote to Sabafon in Aden, Sabafon in Sana'a, Y Telecom, YemenNet, MTN, TeleYemen in Aden and TeleYemen in Sana'a about this and for other information. While TeleYemen, Sana'a has replied to the Panel (see paragraph 84), responses from other companies are awaited.

7. The Panel was informed that Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer was appointed as managing director/chairman of Sabafon, Sana'a on 29 July 2019 and that he subsequently appointed the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Executive General Manager and the Financial Manager of Sabafon, Sana'a (Figure 29.1 and Appendix 1).

<sup>270</sup> As per the report of the Emirati al-Bayan newspaper, in 2018, the Ansarullah authorities confiscated YER 51 billion from Yemeni telecom operators distributed as follows: YER 27 billion from Sabafon, YER 17 billion from Y, YER 7 billion from MTN Yemen. See: <https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2019-10-08-1.3668294>.

<sup>271</sup> As per media report, quoting sources in the Sana'a-based ministry of communications and information technology, Sana'a, the Houthi leaders, namely Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, Abu Ali al-Hakem, and others were seeking to take over the mobile telecommunications company (Y) after declaring it bankrupt. "A commercial court subject to the control of the Houthi militias in Sanaa announced in an official announcement in Al-Thawra newspaper published on Wednesday March 11, 2020 the bankruptcy of 'Y' mobile company." See <https://www.newsyeemen.net/new/53464>. The Panel has written to Y Telecom for confirmation and their response is awaited.

<sup>272</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>.

<sup>273</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>274</sup> <https://www.mtn.com/mtn-group-progresses-with-the-simplification-of-its-portfolio-with-exit-from-yemen/>.

Figure 29.1

## Notification of changes in management of Sabafon



**Source:** Confidential

8. On 5 September 2019, Sabafon reportedly held an extraordinary general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company in Amman, Jordan, attended by the absolute majority of the company's shareholders, including a representative of the Government of Yemen. The shareholders condemned the action of the armed groups of the illegal authorities controlling the capital Sana'a, "breaking in and seizing the headquarters of Sabafon Company in Sana'a, controlling its departments, changing its guard, controlling its facilities, equipment and systems in Sana'a and imposing illegal managers on the company's departments in Sana'a".<sup>275</sup> The Assembly approved the transfer of the company's headquarters, administration and operations to the city of Aden; the move took place in September 2020 (Figure 29.2). Considering the significance of the internet for security and socio-economic purposes, and to avoid having to operate under Houthi control, the Government of Yemen informed the Panel that it decided to establish its own telecom infrastructure and set up in Aden through AdenNet<sup>276</sup> and TeleYemen, Aden.<sup>277</sup>

<sup>275</sup> <https://twitter.com/sabafonyemen/status/1178301571769217024>.

<sup>276</sup> Adennet started operational in end-July 2018.

<sup>277</sup> TeleYemen moved to Aden on 1 January 2019.

Figure 29.2

## Press release by Sabafon shareholders on the attack and shifting of Head Office to Aden

### Press release Issued by the Extraordinary Meeting of Sabafon Shareholders

(Sabafon shareholders unanimously annul the proceedings of the so-called judicial trustee)

Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony (Sabafon) held an extraordinary general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company in Amman, Jordan on Thursday, the fifth of September, 2019. It was attended by the absolute majority of the company's shareholders including Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco), Consolidated Contractors Company C.C.C, Hayel Saeed Anam Group, Al-Ahmar Group and a representative of the Yemeni Government. The Assembly reviewed the illegal actions that the company was exposed to recently by armed groups affiliated to the authorities of Sana'a and decided to continue the activity of the company and also approved the transfer of the company's headquarters, administration and operations to the city of Aden, the temporary capital of the Republic of Yemen in implementation of the invitation of the Government of Yemen. The assembly also made important decisions and statements regarding the future of the company's activities and operations.

1- Condemnation of armed groups of the illegal authorities controlling the capital Sana'a on Wednesday, 31-7-1919 AD, breaking in and seizing the headquarters of Sabafon Company in Sana'a, controlling its departments, changing its guard, controlling its facilities, equipment and systems in Sana'a and imposing illegal managers on the company's departments in Sana'a appointed by that armed group affiliated to the authorities in Sana'a, which is considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

2- The association refutes the allegations and fake news made by the intruders of the company belonging to the authorities of Sana'a. In this regard, the Assembly affirms that the general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company was not held during this year, except this extraordinary meeting held in Amman on 5-9-2019. The Assembly of company's shareholders has not taken any decisions to change the current board of directors' members, chairman or the managers of the company.

3 - The Assembly condemns the use of fraud and forgery as a cover for these blatant procedures based on that the intruders have held a fake meeting of the General Assembly of the company, while it is nothing more than a major lie that has nothing to do with the truth and a fabrication of papers and documents not issued by the authorities of the legal company. The reality of what happened to the company in Sana'a is the robbery by force and outside the framework of the law and the constitution of the rights of local and international shareholders who contributed and invested in the Republic of Yemen with good intention and credit according to the law and under the guarantees of the Constitution and the investment laws of the Republic of Yemen.

4- The Assembly condemns all illegal steps and actions taken by impersonators of managers in Sana'a who are appointed by the armed group and attempts to communicate illegally with local and international entities, including suppliers, distributors, banks and local and international service providers of the company. The Assembly calls on all local and international banks, distributors, suppliers and service providers of the company not to deal with any party or entity under any justification or reason, except by written instructions by the authorized signatories of the company duly, namely: current Chairman and CEO of the company and the financial manager that no decisions were taken by the general assembly of the company to change them.

5 - To report the invalidity, illegality and the lack of any documents of any kind or source provided by the illegal impersonated administration that controls the company's building and facilities in Sana'a under the protection of the armed group and the illegal Sana'a authorities as they are issued by illegal authorities located in the city of Sana'a, which is under the control and instructions of those authorities which control the capital Sana'a by armed force which are considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

6- The Assembly calls upon suppliers, entities, banks, distributors and others to emphasize the importance of implementing the Company's requests issued by its legal Department because of the importance of this matter and the critical current circumstances and the Company's and its shareholders' fears of the damages that may affect the Company as a result of dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a. In this regard, the assembly confirms the importance of protecting the banks accounts and funds, and the company's dealings with the entities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others of the tampering of the illegitimate authorities of Sana'a and those working with them in violation of the constitution, all laws and religious canons.

7- Holding the authorities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a full legal and criminal responsibility for all material and moral damages that affect the company and its various interests as a result of ignoring the company's requests, its legal management and its shareholders not to deal with the banks accounts, funds, transactions and interests of the company with any person or entity except through the official and legal administration of the company.

8- Announcing and reporting that the breaking in of the company by armed force and seizing the company by the armed group of the illegal authorities of Sana'a shall be considered as ignoring the Constitution, all laws in force, the state and its bodies and the judiciary. Stealing the funds and property owned by others and seize them by armed force, impersonating the shareholders, chairman and member of board of directors and the managers shall be considered criminal offenses and full-fledged crimes.

9- The Assembly decided to take all legal measures against those who committed these crimes or cooperate in achieving them against the company, its shareholders and employees, or impersonate the shareholders, members of the board of directors, its chairman, the CEO or any other administrative or legal status without any right and outside the law. The actors of the aforementioned crimes (persons and official and non-official entities), including the use of all rights and legal guarantees of the company and its shareholders to protect investments determined by laws, bilateral agreements and constitutional guarantees.



Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony - Sabafon  
Headquarters in the temporary capital of Aden  
Republic of Yemen

**Source:** <https://twitter.com/sabafonyemen/status/1178301571769217024>.


**9.** The Government of Yemen has informed the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (IANA) alleging that the office of TeleYemen in Sana'a is controlled by the Houthis and that TeleYemen, owned by the Government of Yemen has been relocated to Aden (Figure 29.4). The Panel wrote to TeleYemen, Sana'a about this, but the company denies any takeover by the Houthis and stated that its management was appointed prior to the current conflict and that this transfer to Aden was never officially communicated and, therefore, it does not recognize the transfer under company law. The Panel is investigating the extent of control exercised by the Houthis over some of the telecom companies.

**10.** Control over the telecom sector can provide a major strategic advantage to the Houthis. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis have gained effective control over the national Top Level Domain (TLD), '.ye'. Control over the TLD and illegal use of communication interception tools potentially would provide Houthis with the capacity to monitor and interdict traffic, censor content, carry out internet shutdowns, ban social media sites and personal messaging services, monitor private communications of opponents, and block domains in all parts of the country.

11. The Panel has received information that TeleYemen, has recently purchased a ‘bandwidth management system’ that uses deep packet inspection. Deep Packet Inspection can monitor all data, messages, text, voice, and video traffic over any packet in the bandwidth. TeleYemen, Sana’a has stated to the Panel that “the laws of Yemen require ISPs to filter certain content that goes against the law and Islamic doctrines and that they use it for the purpose of protecting children from any inappropriate content and there is no illegal usage”.<sup>278</sup>

Figure 29.4

### Letter from the Minister of Telecommunication and Information Technology, Government of Yemen to IANA



Source: Government of Yemen

<sup>278</sup> Letter from TeleYemen, Sana'a to the Panel dated 17 December 2021.

12. Considering the importance of the telecom sector for the economy and the general needs of the people of Yemen, this sector should be depoliticised, double taxation avoided, import policy reviewed to permit *bonafide* imports for use by the telecom companies across Yemen, and tariff rationalised. Access to telecommunication and internet is essential for the civilian population and any measures taken in respect to this sector should not result in any adverse consequences for the civilian population.

**Appendix 1 Unofficial translation: Notification of changes in management of Sabafon****Subject / Notification of changes in management in the company and the change of authorized signatories to the financial system with you**

Yemeni mobile phone company - Sabafon

Based on the company's general assembly meeting and its election of a new board of directors and a new chairman of the board, a new executive management has been appointed for the company, and we ask you to change all dealings with the company based on the new changes in its management through:

1. Radically cut off dealings with the previous administration
- 2 - Completely cancel the powers and signatures of the previous administration
- 3 - Approval of the powers and signatures of the authorized names by the new administration described below, on all checks and transfers from all company accounts on your part, in addition to all financial transactions.

Name	Designation
Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer	Chairman of the Board of Directors
Ahmed Ahmed Musaid	Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors
Abdul Khaliq Ali Ali al Gaili	Executive General Manager
Ali Ahmed Ahmed Jahiz	Financial Manager

Signature

Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer  
Chairman of the Board of Directors



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**Annex 30: Seizure of Telecom equipment by Yemeni Customs**

1. The Panel received allegations that Houthi authorities are illegally importing telecom equipment through land borders at Al Mahara, and that the Houthis have been setting up international calling facilities using satellite receivers, which are connected to SIM boxes that can attach about 100 SIM cards. Houthis also allegedly resort to illegal diversion of international calls and provide international call services to the users at rates less than the official rates. The revenue collected through these illegal call facilities is allegedly used by the Houthis for their activities that threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen.
2. The Government has informed the Panel that, “to strengthen their war-disciplined system, the militias are working on importing and smuggling precision equipments and communications equipment, whether traditional or those via satellite”.<sup>279</sup> The Government also informed that they have seized many consignments of telecom equipment, and “there are dozens of shipments that reach the Houthis through smuggling networks, and this poses a great danger to the security and stability of Yemen and Yemenis and contributes to prolonging the war.”<sup>280</sup> The Government has informed that they would share the details with the Panel.
3. The Panel is investigating a case in which a consignment of telecom equipment imported into Yemen in May 2021 through the Oman-Yemen land border was seized by the Yemeni Customs at Al-Mahara, as the said telecom equipment were brought into Yemen without obtaining permission or licence from the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of the Government of Yemen to import these items.
4. The Panel is investigating if the individuals or entities behind these illegal imports of telecom equipment have any links with or if they act on behalf of individuals designated under the 2140 sanctions regime or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and, if so, whether funds, financial assets or economic resources are being generated out of the use or sale of these equipment and/or whether these are used in violations of the sanctions regime for activities that threaten peace security and stability in Yemen. The Panel continues to investigate the allegations.

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<sup>279</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>280</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.


## Annex 31: Black-marketing and Illegal Fees on import of Fuel

1. According to various sources, the Houthis have created an artificial scarcity of fuel in areas under their control in order to force the traders to sell oil on the black-market operated by them and collect illegal fees from the sales. As per information made available by the Government of Yemen, the Houthis have collected official revenues on fuel imports in excess of YER 70 billion.<sup>281</sup>

2. Prior to June 2019, Hudaydah port was the major port of import of fuel into Yemen (48%), compared to Aden (33%), Mukalla (16%) and Nishtun (3%).<sup>282</sup> There has been a significant change in the pattern of fuel import into Yemen since then. In April-May 2021, the share of Hudaydah port had come down to 8 percent.<sup>283</sup> With the announcement by Saudi Arabia of a grant of USD 422 million worth of petroleum products to the Government of Yemen in March 2021,<sup>284</sup> for power stations and to support public services, as the country faced a fuel shortage, the volumes of imports through the southern ports started increasing in May–June 2021. Of the total quantities of fuel imported into the areas under the control of the Houthis, during April-May 2021, only eight percent (54,679 Metric Tonnes (MTs)) was imported through Hudaydah port and 92 percent (631,959 MTs) was transported by road after being imported through Aden, Mukalla and Nishtun ports under the control of the Government of Yemen.<sup>285</sup> The fuel supply to the Houthi-controlled areas by the land route, during April-May 2021, was about 10 thousand metric tonnes per day, which represented about 65 percent of the fuel imported into Yemen, in contrast to 6 thousand metric tonnes per day in January-March 2021,<sup>286</sup> evidencing an increase in supply through the land route.<sup>287</sup>

Figure 31.1

### Fuel Imports from January 2020 to July 2021 in MTs



#### Source:

[https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>281</sup> See the press release of the Government of Yemen available at <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>282</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>283</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>284</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-saudi-int-idUSKBN2BM36W>.

<sup>285</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>286</sup> <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>.

<sup>287</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

3. The Panel has received information that although the customs duties are collected at the first port of import in non-Houthi controlled areas, the Houthis, illegally collect additional fees and customs duties from the traders at their land customs stations.<sup>288</sup> The business of supplying fuel to Houthi-controlled areas has been found to be very lucrative for many, except of course the end-consumers: the Government of Yemen has increased its customs revenue from the imports; the STC also allegedly collect fees of about YER12 per litre of imported fuel from the importers;<sup>289</sup> and the importers/traders who seize this opportunity to get enriched. Unfortunately, the consumers on both sides have to suffer, the consumers in the Houthi-controlled areas pay more because of the land transportation cost, double taxation and the illegal practices being followed by the Houthis and the consumers in the Government of Yemen-controlled areas pay more mostly because of the depreciating YER, profits by the traders and other hidden supply chain and distribution costs. As per a report, “Fuel prices at Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) stations in DFA-controlled areas increased by 76% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 6,807 to YER 12,000 per 20 litres. --In IRG-controlled areas, prices rose by 108% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 5,372 to YER 11,175 per 20 litres.”<sup>290</sup> The Panel has been informed that the increase in fuel prices has negatively impacted the implementing partners of international humanitarian organizations.

<sup>288</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that the Houthis collect YER 37 per litre since February 2021.

<sup>289</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that earlier they were paying YER 7 per litre but since April 2021, it has been increased to YER 12 per litre and this amount is deposited in some designated account in an exchange company in Aden. During the meeting of the Panel with the Economic Committee (EC) of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that it represented local taxes.

<sup>290</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

**Annex 32: Saudi Deposit**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

### Annex 33 Investigation of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen

1. In this annex, the Panel presents case studies of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen investigated by the Panel since January 2021.
2. The deterioration of the security situation in Yemen affected the capacity of the Panel to have access to all information needed in respect to several investigations on airstrikes. The Panel itself and its sources were unable to undertake numerous travels, especially in areas near conflict zones. The fear of witnesses in Houthi-controlled areas to communicate with the Panel or to register the geolocation of incidents also affected the Panel's investigations.
3. The Panel received information, reports and/or pictures relating to six incidents that were allegedly attributable to the Coalition and was able to conclude investigations on two incidents (see appendix hereafter). The Panel sent a letter to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in respect to the six cases and is awaiting a reply.
4. For the four remaining cases described below, the Panel received insufficient evidence to conclude its investigation:
  - a) One incident occurred on 28 February 2021 at approximately 1230 hours, in which an explosive ordnance hit a house in al Hawk district, Al Hudaydah. It resulted in the death of five people, including one child, and the injury to a woman, and a child. The Panel received information that the incident could have been a UAV attack. The Panel has not received pictures of explosive ordnance debris and is unable to reach a conclusion in this respect. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>291</sup> the location of the incident was 14° 46' 28.2" N, 42° 57' 58.32" E.
  - b) One airstrike occurred on 7 March 2021 at approximately 1430 hours in which a civilian area in Al Amanat Al Asimah (Sana'a city) was hit. The incident resulted in the injury to a man and two children, as well as damage to shops and houses. According to information received by the Panel from two different sources, the location of the incident was in the vicinity of 15° 23' 28.68" N, 44° 11' 7.8" E.
  - c) Another airstrike occurred on 10 May 2021 at approximately 1600 hours in Rada'a district, Al Bayda, which targeted a car resulting in the death of one man and the injury of two women. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 22' 48"N, 44° 55' 15.6" E.
  - d) A fourth incident occurred on 18 September 2021, in which a car in Merkhaj al Ulya district, Shabwah, was hit, resulting in the death of five people including a child and a woman. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 26' 5.28" N, 45° 54' 50.76" E. On 22 September 2021, the spokesperson of the Coalition, Brigadier General Turki Al-Maliki said that: "the Coalition confirms that it has not received any information nor coordination from UN OCHA in Yemen regarding this allegation as per the coordination mechanism in such cases. No such information has been conveyed to the Coalition regarding the claimed airstrike. The Coalition considers these claims seriously, takes all necessary and required procedures to validate them, and announce the results of any investigations through proper referral to the Joint Incidents Assessment Team."<sup>292</sup>

<sup>291</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>292</sup> See online: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/2289036>.

5. In its report S/2019/83, annex 34, the Panel presented the results of its investigation in respect to a shelling incident that occurred on 2 August 2018 in the city of Hudaydah and which hit the al Thawra hospital and a market. The Panel concluded that both Houthi forces and the Coalition could have been responsible for the attack. On 29 September 2021, the JIAT released the result of some investigations, including this specific one, and concluded that the Coalition Surface Forces did not carry out any firing in Hudaydah city on that date.<sup>293</sup> The Panel has still not received any information from Houthi forces in connection to this attack.

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<sup>293</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2290995>

## Appendix 1 Airstrike against Al Raks village, Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib, 16 January 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 0830 hours on 16 January 2021, an explosive ordnance allegedly launched from an aircraft, hit a car in Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib. The incident resulted in the death of the driver who was, according to information received by the Panel, a merchant transporting food (see figure 33.1).
2. The Panel received different information regarding the specific location of the incident but was not able to verify it. According to a report received by the Panel, the incident occurred in Wadi Dhaza (وادي دحظة) on the road between the Al Amoud area and Al Raks village in the Al Mahliyah district. According to a local source, the incident occurred on the main road of Al Raks village, while the driver was going from one shop to another. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>294</sup> the incident occurred in Al Raks village at 14° 33' 37.08"N, 45° 17' 34.8"E.

### II. Legal analysis

3. According to information received by the Panel, the victim was not involved in hostilities and there were no military activities or fighting in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all times, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>295</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>296</sup>
5. Based on the information received by the Panel, it seems unlikely that the principle of distinction was respected.

Figure 33.1

#### Car after the incident



**Source:** Confidential

<sup>294</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>295</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>296</sup> CIHL rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

## Appendix 2: Al Salif Port, Al Hudaydah, 21 March 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 0230 hours on 21 March 2021, two explosive ordnances launched from an aircraft hit, approximately five minutes apart, a warehouse and a building owned by the Yemeni International Company for Food Production Ltd at Al Salif port (15° 18' 51.50"N, 42°40' 36.16"E) (see figures 33.2, 33.3 and 33.4). The incident resulted in the injury of six workers of the company.
2. The Panel received pictures of remnants of the explosive ordnances found in both buildings and they are consistent with guided bombs used by the Coalition (see figure 33.5).
3. The Panel sent a letter to the Coalition in respect to this incident and is awaiting a reply.

### II. Legal analysis

4. The Panel received information from several sources that the Houthis are using the port of Al Salif for military activities, among others for the manufacturing of sea mines. However, the Panel still lacks conclusive evidence.<sup>297</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the two buildings in the port of Al Salif referenced above were used for civilian purposes and not for military operations. They are located in a compound separated by a concrete wall in which several offices, accommodation, warehouses and grain silos are housed.
6. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all time, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>298</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.<sup>299</sup>
7. Based on the information received, the Panel concludes that it is unlikely that the principles of distinction and proportionality were respected, however, if additional information is provided, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

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
<sup>297</sup> The Panel welcomes any information and evidence in this respect.

<sup>298</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>299</sup> CIHL, rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).



Figure 33.2  
Location of the two buildings hit in Al Salif port




Source: Google Earth, Panel

Figure 33.3  
Damages to the accommodation buildings



Source: Confidential

Figure 33.4  
**Damages to the warehouse and impact crater**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 33.5  
**Pictures of debris found on the site after the incident**



**Source:** Confidential

**Annex 34    Violations in the context of detention**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 35 Use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated areas attributed to Houthi Forces

1. The Panel is investigating eight incidents of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by Houthi forces in Ma'rib and Ta'izz, which allegedly led to the deaths of 33 people, including eight children, and injuries to 51 others, including 11 children (see Table 34.1).

2. The Panel's investigations are based on interviews with victims and witnesses, reports, pictures and videos, as well as other information available in the public domain. The Panel sent a letter to the Houthi authorities in that respect and is awaiting a reply. If the Houthi political or military leadership can provide information and evidence regarding these attacks that may counter the Panel's preliminary findings, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

Table 35.1

### Cases of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by the Houthi forces between December 2020 and November 2021 investigated by the Panel

<i>Appendix</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Impact Point</i>	<i>Victims/Damage</i>
1	12 December 2020	13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E	Al Ahli Football club, Ta'izz	Two people killed, including one child, and two children injured.
2	8 January 2021	13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E	Near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar Ta'izz	One child killed, one woman and one child injured.
3	20 February 2021	13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E	Al Qahira, Ta'izz city	One child killed, four people injured, including three children.
4	5 March and 8 May 2021	13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E	Al Thawra hospital, Ta'izz	One person injured.
5	3 April 2021	tbc	Al Rawda, Ma'rib	One child killed, four children injured.
6	5 June 2021	15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E	Gas station, Ma'rib	Allegedly 14 killed, including one child, and 5 injured.
7	10 June 2021	15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E	Mosque, Ambulances, Ma'rib	Allegedly six killed and 32 injured.
8	30 October 2021	13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E	Al Camp Street, Ta'izz	Three children killed, one child injured.

*Source:* Panel

## Appendix 1 Al Ahli football club, Ta'izz city, 12 December 2020

### I. Background

1. On 12 December 2020, at approximately 0600 hours, an explosive ordnance hit the Al Ahli football club in Ta'izz city. The club is in the vicinity of the Al Shohada'a stadium (13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E) in a civilian area.
2. Eight civilians were present and the attack resulted in the death of one boy and one man, as well as injuries to three other boys.
3. The Al Ahli football club is located in the "Olympic field" in Ta'izz, which is an area hosting several sports clubs.
4. According to the information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance was launched from a mountainous area North of the impact point which is under Houthi control.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

5. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence at the Al Ahli football club or in its vicinity at the time of the attack.
6. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>300</sup>
7. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in the proximity of civilians and civilian objects, and especially in a densely populated area such as the city of Ta'izz.
8. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

Figure 35.1

#### Location of the impact



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>300</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.2  
**Damages to the Club**



*Source:* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab\\_channel=VICENews](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab_channel=VICENews)

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**Appendix 2      Area in the vicinity of the old airport in Al Mudhaffar, Ta'izz, 8 January 2021****I. Background**

1. On 8 January 2021, at approximately 1100 hours an explosive ordnance hit a residential area in Ta'izz city, near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar (13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E).
2. The incident resulted in the death of a 15-year-old boy, and injuries to a woman and a child.

**II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>301</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>301</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.3  
**Location of the impact**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel



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## Appendix 3 Al Qahira, Ta'izz city, 20 February 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 1700 hours on 20 February 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a civilian area in Al Qahira, Ta'izz (13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E). The attack resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four people: three children and one man.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

2. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.

3. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>302</sup>


4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.

5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>302</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.4  
**Location of the attack**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

## Appendix 4 Al Tharwa hospital, Ta'izz city, 5 March and 8 May 2021

### I. Background

1. On 5 March 2021, an explosive ordnance hit the operation theatre of the Al Tharwa hospital in Ta'izz (13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E). The incident resulted in injuries to one man. The operation theatre was hit again on 8 May 2021 at approximately 2330 hours and resulted in damage to the hospital.
2. This is not the first time the Panel has reported on this hospital being hit by explosive ordnances. See appendix 3, Annex 33 of [S/2021/79](#), table 9 and annex 51 of [S/2018/193](#), and paragraph 183 and annex 67 of [S/2018/594](#).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

3. Under IHL, hospitals and medical centers exclusively assigned for medical purposes must be respected and protected in all circumstances. Hospitals only lose their protection if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to commit acts harmful to the enemy. Furthermore, the protection of hospitals and medical units may cease only after a warning has been given and only after a reasonable time has elapsed after such a warning.<sup>303</sup>
4. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance came from the North of Tai'zz where the Houthis occupy a mountainous area.
5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction, and the rules affording protection to medical units were not respected.<sup>304</sup>

<sup>303</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Convention, art. 11 AP II and CIHL rule 28.

<sup>304</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

## Appendix 5 Al Rawdah, Ma'rib city, 3 April 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 1630 hours on 3 April 2021, an explosive ordnance hit Al Rawdah area, Ma'rib city (see figures 35.5 and 35.6). This resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four other children. According to testimonies and reports received by the Panel, the children were playing on the street when the explosive ordnance hit.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance originated from Sirwah district, parts of which are under the control of the Houthi forces.
3. The Panel was unable to identify the specific location of the impact point but received information that it is located approximately two kilometres South from the Sahn Al Jin military camp<sup>305</sup> and 1.5 kilometres North-West of a military base (see figure 35.7)

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

1. As mentioned above, the Panel notes two military locations at approximately two and 1.5 kilometres away from the location of the incident.
2. However, the Panel also notes that the explosive ordnance fell in a civilian area and that only civilian children were victims of the attack.
3. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>306</sup>
4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
5. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

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<sup>305</sup> 15°30'22.0"N, 45°19'36.0"E

<sup>306</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.5  
Damage resulting from the explosive ordnance



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.6  
**Debris of the explosive ordnance**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.7  
**Rawdah area (within the black line) and proximity of military facilities**



*Source:* Google Earth with Panel's annotation

## Appendix 6 Petrol station, Ma'rib city, 5 June 2021

### I. Background

1. Between 1700 and 1730 hours on 5 June 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a petrol station in Ma'rib city (15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E). According to reports, pictures, videos, and testimonies received by the Panel, the incident resulted in the deaths of between 14 and 21 civilians, including one child, and injuries to five people. Seven cars were also destroyed. The Panel only received conclusive evidence of the death of one child and one man.
2. According to information received by the Panel, several people, including some military personnel, were queuing at the petrol station to refuel at the time of the incident.
3. The Panel received information that there is a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen in the vicinity of the petrol station (see figure 35.9).
4. The Houthi forces acknowledged the attack and said that the target was the military camp nearby and Mohammed Ali Al Houthi called for an independent investigation (see figure 35.8).<sup>307</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the attack was launched from Sirwah district, located towards the West of Ma'rib city from areas under the control of Houthi forces at the time.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

6. The Panel notes the proximity of a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen to the petrol station and that, according to a declaration made on social media by Mohamed Ali Al Houthi, the military base was the intended objective of the attack.
7. However, the explosive ordnance hit a civilian target, a petrol station, and according to information received by the Panel, most of the victims were civilians, including children.
8. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>308</sup>
9. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
10. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

<sup>307</sup> [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090).

<sup>308</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.9

**Statement of Mohamed Ali Al Houthi on Twitter calling for an independent investigation<sup>309</sup>**

**Source:** [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090)

Figure 35.8

**Location of the impact and proximity of military objectives**

**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>308</sup> Non-official translation: “We asked the brothers in the Yemeni Ministry of Defense, and they said that they bombed only the camp in the picture below, and they have proof. We welcome and call for investigation by independent committees into the matter regarding what was said about Ma’rib today or what happened regarding the killing of the children of the Republic of Yemen and civilians in all governorates who were targeted by America and its coalition”.



Figure 35.10  
**Damage to the petrol station**



*Source:* Confidential

## Appendix 7 A Mosque, Ma'rib city, 10 June 2021

### I. Background

1. On 10 June 2021 at between 1800 and 1900 hours, two or three explosive devices and a UAV, hit a mosque (15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E) and its vicinity (see figure 35.11). Two civilian houses and a few ambulances were also affected. The incident resulted in the death of six people and the injuries to 32 additional people, including two or three members of the medical staff and one woman. The Panel received a list with the names of all victims.<sup>310</sup> The Panel has not been able to verify the identity of each victim, but the number received from different sources and reports are similar.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the area contains buildings belonging to the Police, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Planning and International Cooperation Office, as well as other governmental offices.
3. According to reports received by the Panel, three ambulances that responded to the incident were also damaged. Successive attacks at an interval of several minutes increase the risk of civilian casualties, in particular to medical personnel and first responders (see figure 35.12).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

4. The Panel notes that the area is located approximately two kilometres from the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 (see Appendix 6) and is in the vicinity of a military base.
5. However, the Panel notes that only civilian objects were hit: a mosque, ambulances, and civilian houses.
6. The Panel, therefore, concludes that it is likely that the principle of distinction was not respected, especially in respect to the UAV which has a high level of accuracy. If the military base was the intended objective, the Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected. Indeed IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>311</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.11  
**Location of attack**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

Figure 35.12  
**Distance between the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 and the mosque hit on 10 June 2021**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

**Figure 35.13**  
Damage to the Mosque



**Source:** Confidential

**Figure 35.14**  
Debris of the UAV



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 35.15  
**Damage to an ambulance**



**Source:** Confidential

## **Appendix 8 Near al Camp street, Ta'izz city, 30 October 2021**

### **I. Background**

1. On 30 October 2021, at approximately 1135 hours an explosive ordnance (see figure 35.16) hit a civilian area in the city of Ta'izz (13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E) near Al Khaeer mosque, killing three children and injuring a fourth (see figure 35.17). All children were from the same family. Two adults were also reportedly injured, but the Panel has not been able to verify this information.
2. According to information received by the Panel, this is a civilian area, and no military operations were going on in the area at the time of the attack.

### **II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>312</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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
<sup>312</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.16  
**Remnants found at the location of the incident**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.17  
Location of the attack



Source: Google map

Figure 35.18  
Impact point



Source: Confidential



## Annex 36 Indiscriminate use of landmines, IEDs and other explosive remnants by Houthi forces

### I. Background:

1. The indiscriminate use of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Houthis is endemic and systematic. Since 2016, the Panel has been documenting the impact of landmines and IEDs on civilians (see [S/2021/79](#), paras 140-142, [S/2020/326](#), paras 115-117 and [S/2018/193](#), annexes 43 and 44).

2. The indiscriminate use of landmines is prohibited by IHL.<sup>313</sup> When landmines are used, parties to the conflict must take particular care to minimize their indiscriminate effects. They also must record their placement to the extent possible. In addition, although not directly binding on non-state armed groups, Yemen is party to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (see section III on the use of anti-personnel mines by Houthis).

### II. West Coast:

3. During its visit to Aden, Al Khokha and Al Mukha and Al Khokha in August 2021, the Panel met with a wide range of stakeholders involved in monitoring and demining activities in Yemen, including Project Masam, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) and UNDP. The Panel was informed that there is no centralized database listing all clearance activities, incidents and emergency interventions undertaken by these different entities in Yemen. It is therefore difficult to have complete and exhaustive data.

4. The Panel was nevertheless able to gather significant information, as mentioned below:

- Between November 2020 and August 2021, the following explosive items were removed from the West Coast by the local demining teams (YEMAC, Project Masam and/or West Coast armed groups):

Table 36.1

#### Explosive items removed from the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021 by district and type of items

Districts:	Anti-Tank/Vehicle Mine	Anti-Personnel Mine	Sea mine	Explosive devices	Missiles	Shells (rockets)	Cluster munition	Pressure plates
Bab el Mandab	123	20		10	2	120		
Dhubab	148	26		16	1	124	1	
Mawza	135	31		24	5	132	3	6
Al Mukha	176	37	1	21	8	140	2	3
Khokha	184	26	1	25	5	138		8
Hays	321	41		31	9	155	4	10
Thuhayata	252	43	2	19	11	126	2	11
Durahimi	1,153	19	3	29	22	119	2	4

<sup>313</sup> See CIHL, rules 80, 81, 82, and 83.

Al Halia	730	52		116	33	130	10	22
Al Hawk	253	12	1	35	12	122	1	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,475</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>1,306</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>72</b>

*Source:* Local demining staff

- The Panel received information from the local authorities of Al Hudaydah and Al Khokha that, between January and June 2021, landmines and other explosive devices laid in those territories of the Al Hudaydah Governorate, which are under the control of the Government of Yemen, resulted in a high number of casualties. Most of them occurred in the district of Al Durahimi. In total, 17 children were killed and 15 were injured, nine women were killed and five injured, and 37 men were killed and 35 injured. The Panel also received information about several incidents affecting civilians between the months of July and October 2021. Two are detailed below.
- During a meeting in Al Mukha, the Panel was informed that according to the most recent survey, in 2021, 78 percent of the West Coast territory is confirmed to be a hazardous area, i.e. territory in which the presence of landmines, IEDs and/or unexploded ordnances (UXO) has been confirmed, and the other 22 percent is suspected to be a hazardous area. The Panel was informed that there are ten YEMAC teams on the West Coast: three in Al Mukha, one in Mawza, one in the South of Ta'izz, one in Jabal Habashi, two in Al Khokha, one in Mudhafar, one in Al Ma'afer and one in Durahimi. Each YEMAC team has the capacity of clearing areas of approximately 625m<sup>2</sup> per month.
- The Panel was also informed that demining teams in Yemen, including on the West Coast, proceed only for emergency demining, i.e., clearance of roads and passages to infrastructures and locations used by the civilians such as schools, hospitals, and water tanks. Therefore, no area can be considered as completely cleared and the risk of landmines is always there for the civilian population. In addition, the Panel was informed that in areas near active conflict zones, demined areas are constantly remined by the Houthis. The Panel received a list of 74 locations in Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Ma'rib and Shabwah where demining activities had been undertaken, which since have been retaken by Houthi forces.<sup>314</sup>
- The Panel received specific information on 62 cases in which demining teams were called for emergency interventions between September 2020 and August 2021 in ten districts across three Governorates, as mentioned below:
  - i) Ta'izz – Mawza: six incidents, including At Muoa`ad Bin Jabel School<sup>315</sup>, where three anti-tank mines, three artillery shells, ten fuses, and one IED were found on 12 December 2020.
  - ii) Ta'izz- Dhubab: seven incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the roads in or near villages, fishing areas and the Al Shaykh Saeid Port.
  - iii) Ta'izz-Al Mukha: four incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the village roads, farms and houses. One of these incidents resulted in the death of a civilian in Al Gadeed<sup>316</sup> in July 2021.
  - iv) Ta'izz- Al Wazi'iyah: five incidents, where explosive devices were found on the roads. In one of these incidents, cattle was killed<sup>317</sup> and in another one, five anti-tank mines, two IEDs, one

<sup>314</sup> Specific GPS coordinates on file with the Panel.

<sup>315</sup> N 43°38'06.11", E 13°22'34.54"

<sup>316</sup> N 43°21'53.10", E 13°06'20.80"

<sup>317</sup> N 43°40'20.50", E 13°17'24.50"

- artillery shell, and seven anti-personnel mines were found near roads and houses used by civilians.<sup>318</sup>
- v) Tai'zz-Dhubab: 15 incidents, where anti-tank mines were found on the roads used by the civilians, and inside farms. In Al Aradee Almandab, anti-personnel mines were also found at a fishing site.<sup>319</sup>
- vi) Ad Dali-Qa'atabah: ten incidents where anti-personnel mines were found in or near civilian houses and farms.
- vii) Al Hudaydah: 11 incidents, including one at a site in Al Tuhayata where 12 civilians were killed in November 2020.<sup>320</sup> In Al Khokha, landmines were found at the entrance of Al Fawz school in November 2020,<sup>321</sup> and others around a water well in December 2020,<sup>322</sup> in Al Hali, explosive devices were also found near a water pipe in August 2021,<sup>323</sup> and in Al Tuhayata, two 500-kilo bombs were found near a water pipe and cleared in January 2021(see figure 36.6).<sup>324</sup>
- viii) Lahij-Al Madaribah: four incidents, where anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were found on and near the roads used by the civilians, including on a road leading to a water well.<sup>325</sup>
- In addition, the Panel received information from Project MASAM that between November 2020, and the end of July 2021, they cleared 1,830 anti-personnel mines, 26,867 anti-vehicle mines, 315 IEDs and 40,141 UXO in Aden, Ad Dali, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Ma'rib, Shabwah and Ta'izz. Between July 2018 and November 2021, 4,168 anti-personnel mines, 95,525 anti-vehicle mines, 6,109 IEDs and 178,834 UXO were cleared by the group.

### III. Anti-personnel mines:

5. In 2021, the Panel continued to receive evidence of anti-vehicle mines modified by the Houthis for use as large anti-personnel landmines. The Panel was informed of two ways by which this is achieved: one is the use of pressure plates and the other is through the reduction of the headspace above the fuse within an improvised anti-tank device (see figure 36.1).

Figure 36.1:

#### Plastic cap used to reduce the headspace



**Source:** Project Masam

<sup>318</sup> N 43°50'28.70", E 13°09'29.70

<sup>319</sup> N 43°25'38.10", E 12°56'61.10"

<sup>320</sup> N 43°09'48.32", E 14°12'18.81"

<sup>321</sup> N 43°15'42.63", E 13°48'09.12"

<sup>322</sup> N 43°22'15.97", E 13°53'38.76"

<sup>323</sup> N 43°01'27.01", E 14°47'07.57"

<sup>324</sup> N 43°04'42.01", E 14°12'07.26"

<sup>325</sup> N 43°32'64.00", E 12°55'11.70"

#### IV. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

6. Houthi forces continued to manufacture a significant number of IEDs of different shapes and types, including IEDs concealed as rocks, palm tree trunks, as well as different booby traps. Those IEDs are activated through different means including pressure plates, crush wires, and passive infra-red sensors (see figures 36.2 to 36.5)

Figure 36.2:

##### **IEDs activation system: pressure plate**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.3:  
**IEDs activation system: crush wire**



**Source:** Panel

Figure 36.4:  
**IEDs activation system: passive infra-red sensor**



**Source:** Panel

Figure 36.5:  
**Booby trap**



*Source:* Panel

7. The Panel also received evidence that the Houthi forces use old aviation bombs as IEDs in the civilian areas, with significant risk for the civilian population. For instance, the Panel received evidence of two of these bombs being laid inside a water pipe in Al Thuhayata (43°04'42.01"N, 14°12'07.26"E) and cleared in January 2021 and that another nine were found at the entrance of a school in Medghal, Ma'rib and cleared in November 2018 (15°36'49.29"N, 44°53'2.65"E) (see figure 36.6).

Figure 36.6:  
**Aviation bombs found inside a water pipe and cleared between 5 and 7 January 2021**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 36.7:  
**Aviation bombs found at the entrance of a school and cleared on November 2018**



*Source:*

Project Masam

8. The Panel also received evidence of five anti-vehicle mines and 11 IEDs found in a school in al Khokha district, al Hudaydah and cleared on 25 November 2021 (13°52'07.88"N 43°25'32.87"E) (see figure 36.8).

Figure 36.8:  
**Anti-vehicle mines and IEDs found in a school in al Khokha**



*Source:* Project Masam

## V. Sea Mines

9. During its visit to the West Coast in August 2021, the Panel received documents, pictures, and other information about the use deployment of sea mines by the Houthis from different sources including people involved in demining and military sources. According to the information received, eight sea mines were found and removed from GoY-controlled areas of the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021. Most sea mines found on the West Coast are contact-type sea mines. Some magnetic sea mines have also been found in the past.

10. The Panel was informed during a meeting with the Yemen Coast Guard in August 2021 that during the period from mid-October to mid-April, due to bad weather conditions, there were fewer patrols on the West Coast and that the Houthis were using this opportunity to lay mines.

11. The Panel also received information that the Houthi forces possess the capacity to produce sea mines,<sup>326</sup> but has not been able to independently verify this.

## VI. Examples of landmine incidents affecting civilians

12. The Panel received information on several incidents of landmine explosions killing or injuring civilians in 2021. The Panel conducted broader investigations on two of them to illustrate the danger of unrecorded landmines in civilian areas.

13. On 29 July 2021, in Ad Durayhimi<sup>327</sup> district, Al Hudaydah Governorate, a car transporting 14 people ran over an explosive device hidden in the ground. Three people were killed, including two children and 11 were injured, including three children. Two of the injured people, one man and one child, died later from their wounds.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Information received from confidential source.

<sup>327</sup> Approximately at 14°36'38.49"N, 43°01'06.13"E

<sup>328</sup> The Panel communicated with three of the victims, received information, including pictures and list of victims from the authorities of Al Hudaydah Governorate, as well as from confidential sources.



Figure 36.9:  
Car after the explosion



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 36.10:  
Search for other landmines and/or IEDs around the incident location



*Source:* Confidential

14. On 13 September 2021, at approximately 1800 hours a lorry triggered an anti-vehicle landmine in Al Qataba area, Al Khokha district, Al Hudaydah (13°53'44.44"N, 43°15'18.36"E). The incident resulted in the injuries of 13 children and two women.<sup>329</sup> On 14 September 2021, a monitoring team

<sup>329</sup> Some media reported 17 victims, but the Panel was able to verify 15: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/09/13/شاهد-بالفيديو-17-جرحا-معظمهم-نساء-واطفال>. The Panel received information from two different sources as well as video and pictures of the victims at the hospital after the incident.

went to the area to search for and clear other explosive devices. They found a locally made anti-vehicle landmine believed to be similar to the one detonated by the lorry the day before.

Figure 36.11:

**Location of the incident**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 38.12:

**Anti-vehicle landmine found near the location of the incident on 14 September 2021**



**Source:** Confidential

15. The Panel also received evidence of an incident in Mayfa'a district, Shabwah, on 29 September 2021, which resulted in the death of one child and the injuries to three men. The incident was caused

by the explosion of IEDs left in a garbage dump near a mosque. When a fire started in the dump, civilians gathered to control it and were either killed or injured by the explosion.

## **VII. Risks associated with Demining**

16. The Panel received information from two different sources about incidents that occurred during demining operations in Yemen. One source informed the Panel that 29 workers had died during demining activities between 2018 and 2021. Another source informed the Panel that between 2015 and 2021, 45 workers had died during demining operations, and 37 were injured. According to sources involved in demining activities, these numbers are high compared to other areas of operation, and increased training and protective equipment should be provided to demining workers in Yemen. The Panel was also informed by different sources in Yemen that Houthis are constantly developing new technologies relating to landmines and IEDs, which makes the task of the demining teams more difficult and requires continuous training.

## **VI. Import of demining material**

17. The Panel received evidence that, in one case, requests for importing demining equipment, including protective material and detectors, took over a year and half before being approved by the Government of Yemen. Considering the needs and importance of this matter, the authorities in charge of approving importation of equipment related to mine clearance should take appropriate measures to reduce delays.

**Annex 37    Obstruction to humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

**List of acronyms**

ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
APII	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
AQAP	Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen in Aden
cby	Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIHL	Customary International Humanitarian Law
EC	Economic Committee of the STC
ECDIS	Electronic Chart Display and Information System
EUC	End-User Certificate
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading Facility
GoY	Government of Yemen
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Internet Protocol
ISP	Internet Service Providers
JIAT	Joint Incident Assessment Team
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
NM	Nautical Mile
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBNR	Political Bureau of the National Resistance
PN	Promissory Notes
RCC	Redeployment Coordination Committee
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
STC	Southern Transitional Council
TEL	Transport-Erector-Launchers
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNOSAT	United Nations Satellite Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WBIED	Water-borne Improvised Explosive Device
WCJF	West Coast Joint Forces
YCG	Yemeni Coast Guard
YEMAC	Yemen Executive Mine Action Center
YER	Yemeni rial