



## Conseil de sécurité

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### Lettre datée du 25 janvier 2022, adressée à la Présidente du Conseil de sécurité par Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen

Les membres du Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen ont l'honneur de vous faire tenir ci-joint le rapport final qu'ils ont établi en application du paragraphe 10 de la résolution [2564 \(2021\)](#).

Le rapport a été soumis le 23 décembre 2021 au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), qui l'a examiné le 21 janvier 2022.

Nous vous serions reconnaissants de bien vouloir porter le texte de la présente lettre et du rapport à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité et de le faire distribuer comme document du Conseil de sécurité.

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## Rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur le Yémen créé en application de la résolution 2140 (2014) du Conseil de sécurité

### Résumé

Durant la période considérée, les parties au conflit ont poursuivi le combat pour consolider leur mainmise sur les territoires et les populations. En septembre et en octobre 2021, en succession rapide, les forces houthistes ont capturé plusieurs districts autour de la ville de Mareb, ainsi qu'à Beïda et Chaboua. En novembre 2021, le retrait des Forces conjointes sur la côte ouest leur a permis d'acquérir le contrôle d'importants secteurs de la province de Hodeïda.

Certaines mesures prises ont porté atteinte à l'Accord de Stockholm et à l'Accord de Riyad durant la période considérée. Ni la Coalition en appui à la légitimité au Yémen ni les Forces conjointes n'ont informé le Comité de coordination du redéploiement ou la Mission des Nations Unies en appui à l'accord sur Hodeïda (MINUAAH), créée par l'Accord de Stockholm, de leur intention de se retirer de certains secteurs de Hodeïda. Les houthistes ont aussi empêché la MINUAAH de s'acquitter de son mandat. Le Conseil de transition du Sud a entrepris de désigner unilatéralement des soldats et des agents de sécurité, et le Gouvernement yéménite des fonctionnaires publics, ce qui a compromis l'Accord de Riyad. Des progrès limités ont été accomplis sur le plan de l'exécution des dispositions militaires et politiques de l'Accord de Riyad.

L'insuffisance de l'appui militaire accordé par le Gouvernement yéménite aux combattants tribaux à Mareb a entraîné la prise de contrôle, par les houthistes, de zones stratégiques entourant la ville. Tant le Conseil de transition du Sud que le Gouvernement yéménite ont eu du mal à obtenir les ressources nécessaires pour garantir la prestation de services de base, l'atténuation de la crise économique et le versement régulier des salaires, ce qui a entraîné des manifestations publiques massives dans les zones qu'ils contrôlaient. Les luttes militaires intestines survenues au second semestre de 2021 au sein des forces affiliées au Conseil et plusieurs graves atteintes à la sécurité ont suscité des interrogations sur la capacité du Conseil de faire respecter l'ordre dans les secteurs qu'il contrôle.

En revanche, dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes, l'état de la sécurité est demeuré relativement stable sans que l'autorité politique dont ils bénéficiaient ait été gravement contestée. Ils ont poursuivi leur campagne systématique visant à amener la population à adhérer à leur idéologie et à rallier un vaste soutien à leur cause et au conflit par l'organisation notamment de camps d'été et de cours culturels destinés tant aux adultes qu'aux enfants. La politique houthiste de violence sexuelle et de répression contre les femmes actives sur les plans politique ou professionnel s'est poursuivie, notamment après l'inscription sur la Liste par le Conseil de sécurité de Sultan Saleh Aida Zabin (YEi.006) en février 2021.

Sur le front militaire, les houthistes ont poursuivi leurs attaques par voie aérienne et maritime contre l'Arabie saoudite. Les cibles proches de la frontière sont demeurées très exposées et ont été visées le plus souvent au moyen de drones aériens et de roquettes d'artillerie à courte portée. Les houthistes ont également continué de frapper au cœur de l'Arabie saoudite à l'aide de drones aériens à plus longue portée, ainsi que de missiles de croisière et de missiles balistiques. En mer Rouge, des engins explosifs improvisés flottants ont servi à attaquer des navires civils qui mouillaient dans des ports en Arabie saoudite, parfois à plus de 1 000 kilomètres des côtes yéménites. Les houthistes ont commis ces attaques à des fins principalement

politiciennes, cherchant à pousser Riyad à accepter un règlement politique qui leur soit favorable, contrairement à l'emploi de missiles et de drones aériens au Yémen-même, qui visait manifestement à faire le plus grand nombre de victimes possible.

La plupart des types de drones aériens, d'engins explosifs improvisés flottants et de roquettes à courte portée ont été assemblés dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes, à l'aide de matériaux disponibles sur place, tout comme les composants commerciaux tels que les moteurs et l'électronique, qui ont été acquis à l'étranger à l'aide d'un réseau complexe d'intermédiaires en Europe, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie.

En février et en mai 2021, la marine des États-Unis d'Amérique a saisi deux cargaisons d'armes à bord de boutres en mer d'Arabie. Elles comprenaient d'importantes quantités d'armes légères et de petit calibre, des missiles antichar filoguidés, largables à partir d'un conteneur, et du matériel associé comme des lunettes de visée. Une inspection des armes saisies par le Groupe d'experts a révélé qu'elles avaient des marquages et caractéristiques techniques conformes aux armes signalées par le Groupe d'experts au cours de saisies antérieures, révélant un mode commun d'approvisionnement à l'aide de boutres en mer d'Arabie.

Le conflit a dévasté l'économie du Yémen. Le pays étant fortement tributaire de l'importation de produits de première nécessité et de denrées alimentaires, la dépréciation rapide de la valeur du rial yéménite dans des secteurs n'étant pas sous le contrôle des houthistes a entraîné de graves pressions inflationnistes sur les prix de détail, rendant les denrées alimentaires de moins en moins accessibles pour une grande partie de la population. Dans un contexte de systèmes de pouvoir parallèles, une fragmentation systématique du système économique et des institutions s'est produite, ce qui a entraîné à son tour une nouvelle dégradation de l'économie et des conditions d'existence de la population. Cet état d'appauvrissement a créé une situation qui a été exploitée par certains pour faire avancer leurs objectifs politiques, entraînant parfois des troubles civils dans tout le Yémen et menaçant ainsi gravement la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité du pays.

Les houthistes ont adopté diverses méthodes pour s'enrichir et pérenniser leurs activités, notamment par l'emploi ou la menace de la violence et de pratiques réglementaires coercitives. Ils ont notamment perçu des redevances et des taxes illégaux dans des secteurs économiques à forte rentabilité, tels que le pétrole et les télécommunications, et confisqué les avoirs et les fonds d'individus et d'entités. L'effet en aval de la fragmentation des institutions politiques et financières et des organes de réglementation a créé un climat coercitif défavorable sur le plan de l'économie. Si l'on ne remédie pas sérieusement à la situation macroéconomique, les solutions politiques au conflit gagneront en complexité, éloignant encore plus la vision d'une paix pour la région.

L'offensive houthiste contre Mareb a eu des conséquences désastreuses pour la population civile, notamment les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur propre pays. Durant la période considérée, plusieurs attaques ont été commises contre des camps de personnes déplacées sur le plan intérieur, ce qui a exposé une population déjà très éprouvée à la peur, aux atteintes à l'intégrité physique et à la mort, tout en les contraignant à se déplacer de nouveau. De nombreux pilonnages ont également visé les villes de Mareb et de Taëz qui sont des zones densément peuplées, faisant bon nombre de morts parmi les civils.

L'emploi indiscriminé de mines terrestres par les houthistes, en particulier sur la côte ouest, constitue une menace constante contre la population civile et a des effets tragiques sur les vies, la sécurité et la santé, ainsi que des conséquences à long terme, si rien n'est fait pour y remédier.

L'impunité est la norme plutôt que l'exception dans le domaine des violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme. Les violations telles que les arrestations et les détentions arbitraires, les disparitions forcées, les actes de torture et les mauvais traitements sont généralisés et commis par toutes les parties. Les migrants continuent d'être particulièrement exposés aux violations du droit international des droits de l'homme et aux atteintes à ces droits. Dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes, le système pénitentiaire et judiciaire est instrumentalisé pour étouffer toute opposition et toute velléité de dissentiment éventuelle, notamment de la part des journalistes, des femmes et des minorités religieuses. Dans les secteurs qui ne sont pas contrôlés par les houthistes, le système judiciaire demeure anémié et dysfonctionnel et les forces de sécurité sont presque inexistantes. Les frappes aériennes de la Coalition continuent également de faire des victimes parmi les civils.

Il n'existe pratiquement aucune aide pour les victimes de violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme. Souvent, les personnes qui ont été détenues arbitrairement des années durant se retrouvent sans rien, une fois libérées, ayant perdu leur logement et leur emploi. C'est notamment le cas des femmes qui, en plus du traumatisme, se heurtent à l'opprobre social associé à la détention. En outre, après des années d'arrestations et de détentions arbitraires et de disparitions forcées, un grand nombre de Yéménites sont portés disparus. Leurs familles sont laissées dans l'incertitude et ne reçoivent aucune aide des parties pour connaître le sort de leurs proches.

## Table des matières

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction . . . . .	6
II. Faits nouveaux ayant entravé la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité . . . . .	7
III. Activités de groupes armés qui menacent la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité du Yémen . . . . .	9
A. Retrait des Forces conjointes sur la côte ouest de Hodeïda en novembre 2021 . . . . .	9
B. Groupes armés sur la côte ouest. . . . .	13
C. Liens entre les Forces conjointes et le Conseil de transition du Sud . . . . .	15
D. Groupes armés affiliés au Conseil de transition du Sud. . . . .	15
E. Faits nouveaux dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes . . . . .	17
IV. Sécurité maritime . . . . .	21
V. Armes et application de l’embargo sur les armes . . . . .	25
A. Nouveaux systèmes d’armes des houthistes . . . . .	27
B. Saisies . . . . .	28
C. Enquêtes sur la chaîne de possession . . . . .	34
VI. Questions économiques et financières. . . . .	37
A. Questions économiques . . . . .	37
B. Contrôle des ressources financières par des personnes désignées et leurs réseaux . . . . .	38
C. Dépôt saoudien . . . . .	42
D. Surveillance des mesures d’interdiction de voyager et de gel des avoirs . . . . .	42
VII. Actes commis en violation du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l’homme . . . . .	42
A. Actes et attaques attribués à la Coalition . . . . .	43
B. Détention par le Gouvernement yéménite. . . . .	44
C. Détentions dans les zones contrôlées par le Conseil de transition du Sud . . . . .	44
D. Détention par les Forces conjointes sur la côte ouest. . . . .	45
E. Attaques attribuées aux houthistes. . . . .	45
F. Actes attribués à Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique . . . . .	49
G. Différends fonciers . . . . .	49
H. Migrants. . . . .	49
VIII. Entrave à l’acheminement et à la distribution de l’aide humanitaire . . . . .	50
IX. Recommandations . . . . .	51
Annexes* . . . . .	54

\* Les annexes sont distribuées uniquement dans la langue de l’original et n’ont pas été revues par les services d’édition.

## I. Introduction

1. Le présent rapport, soumis au Conseil de sécurité en application du paragraphe 10 de la résolution [2564 \(2021\)](#), couvre la période du 6 décembre 2020 au 5 décembre 2021 et comprend des conclusions actualisées à partir des enquêtes qui avaient été citées dans le rapport final du Groupe d'experts du 25 janvier 2021 (voir [S/2021/79](#)).
2. Le Groupe d'experts s'est conformé au paragraphe 14 de la résolution [2564 \(2021\)](#) concernant les meilleures pratiques et méthodes recommandées par le Groupe de travail informel du Conseil de sécurité sur les questions générales relatives aux sanctions (voir [S/2006/997](#)). Il a mis l'accent en particulier sur le respect des normes relatives à la transparence, à l'objectivité et aux sources, preuves documentaires et allégations corroborées par des sources indépendantes et vérifiables, et le fait de donner un droit de réponse aux interlocuteurs<sup>1</sup>. Conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 11 de la résolution [2564 \(2021\)](#), le Groupe d'experts a maintenu une coopération avec l'Équipe d'appui analytique et de surveillance des sanctions et le Groupe d'experts sur la Somalie.
3. Dans son précédent rapport final, le Groupe d'experts avait rendu compte de la mise en place du mécanisme lié au dépôt saoudien. Au vu des informations complémentaires qu'il a reçues depuis la publication de son précédent rapport, il a entrepris un examen complet de la section IX.B à l'annexe 28 et les textes s'y rapportant dans le tableau 1, et de la recommandation figurant au paragraphe 161 dudit rapport. Les constatations du présent rapport actualisent et remplacent celles énoncées dans les parties susmentionnées du précédent rapport.
4. Durant la période considérée, le Groupe d'experts s'est rendu en Allemagne, en Arabie saoudite, en Égypte, aux Émirats arabes unis et en Iraq, ainsi qu'à Aden et dans des localités de la côte ouest du Yémen<sup>2</sup>. Il a mené des inspections des armes saisies, des débris de missiles, des drones aériens et des engins explosifs improvisés flottants dans les pays de la région.
5. La pandémie de maladie à coronavirus (COVID-19) a continué d'influencer la capacité du Groupe d'experts de voyager et d'enquêter. Ce dernier a constaté que bon nombre d'individus et d'entités ne communiquaient d'informations sensibles qu'en personne. Les restrictions liées à la pandémie l'ont contraint à établir son rapport à distance, ce qui a influencé négativement le processus. Son expert des questions régionales a démissionné le 31 juillet 2021 ; le poste n'avait pas encore été pourvu au moment de l'établissement du présent rapport.
6. Le Groupe d'experts s'est entretenu avec de hauts responsables du Gouvernement yéménite, notamment le Vice-Président et le Premier Ministre, ainsi qu'avec des dirigeants du Conseil de transition du Sud, dont le Président. La visite qu'il a effectuée sur la côte ouest lui a donné l'occasion de s'entretenir avec les autorités locales, et de hauts représentants des Forces de la Résistance nationale, des Brigades des Amaliqa et de la direction de Tihama. Il a également rencontré de hauts responsables de l'Arabie saoudite et des Émirats arabes unis.
7. Le Groupe d'experts a adressé 147 lettres officielles, dont 94 à 21 États Membres et 53 à 36 organisations, entités et sociétés ; il attendait encore 68 réponses au 17 décembre 2021 (voir annexe 3).

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<sup>1</sup> On trouvera des informations supplémentaires sur la méthode du Groupe d'experts et le droit de réponse à l'annexe 1.

<sup>2</sup> Les principaux lieux au Yémen sont épelés selon les transcriptions utilisées sur la carte du Système d'information géographique des Nations Unies dans l'annexe 2.

## II. Faits nouveaux ayant entravé la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité

8. L'on ne saurait comprendre le conflit au Yémen sans analyser son rôle dans la région, sur le plan des menaces que fait peser l'action militaire des forces houthistes sur la sécurité de l'Arabie saoudite et des pays voisins et de l'évolution de la situation politique régionale qui entrave la recherche d'une solution pacifique.

9. Pour l'Arabie saoudite, du fait de la difficulté de contrôler la longue frontière la séparant du Yémen, de la solidité des liens économiques et sociaux unissant ces deux pays et de l'importance stratégique du détroit de Bab el-Mandab, le conflit au Yémen concerne tant le fait d'enrayer une menace extérieure que de rétablir l'autorité du Gouvernement légitime, dans l'intérêt des relations bilatérales. Le Gouvernement d'Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi a besoin de l'appui constant de Riyad sur les plans militaire, financier et politique. L'Arabie saoudite cherche néanmoins de plus en plus à s'extirper d'une guerre qui lui coûte notamment cher et est impopulaire sur le front intérieur.

10. Contrairement au rôle joué par l'Arabie saoudite au Yémen, celui des Émirats arabes unis est plus difficile à cerner. Le pays n'a pas de frontière commune avec le Yémen et entretient avec lui des liens économiques et sociaux moins structurés. Ayant mené des opérations militaires contre les houthistes sur la côte ouest jusqu'à la signature de l'Accord de Stockholm en 2018, Abou Dhabi a retiré officiellement le gros de ses forces militaires en 2019, tout en continuant de faire partie de la Coalition et de conduire des opérations de lutte contre le terrorisme. Les Émirats arabes unis conservent toutefois un rôle politique démesuré au Yémen, notamment par la voie de la fourniture d'un appui politique, financier et militaire aux Forces conjointes sur la côte ouest et d'un appui politique au Conseil de transition du Sud.

11. La situation est plus opaque concernant l'appui extérieur apporté aux houthistes. La République islamique d'Iran est un allié politique du mouvement depuis au moins 2015 et dispose d'un « ambassadeur » à Sanaa. Elle fait partie des rares États Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à avoir reconnu les houthistes comme le gouvernement légitime du Yémen.

12. L'autre pays de la région à maintenir des voies de communication officielles avec les houthistes est Oman, qui partage une frontière avec le Yémen. Les populations des deux pays sont unies par de solides liens économiques et sociaux. Le sultanat a une position de neutralité à l'égard du conflit et héberge des négociateurs houthistes de haut rang. Les échanges commerciaux par voie terrestre sont dynamiques. Si les passages à travers la frontière sont sous le contrôle du Gouvernement yéménite, d'après certaines indications, des composants de systèmes d'armes (voir par. 69 et 70) et d'autre matériel militaire (voir par. 67) continuent d'être fournis par voie terrestre aux forces houthistes par des individus et des entités basés à Oman.

13. Au Yémen, la situation sur les plans politique, militaire, économique, humanitaire et de la sécurité a continué de se dégrader durant la période considérée. Le Gouvernement d'unité, qui comprend des représentants du Conseil de transition du Sud et du Gouvernement de Hadi, a prêté serment le 26 décembre 2020. Formé après des mois de négociations, il a été le résultat le plus important de l'Accord de Riyad. Il n'a cependant pas réussi à accomplir tous ses objectifs, à savoir le retrait d'Aden des forces militaires affiliées au Conseil de transition du Sud, conjugué à la lutte contre les houthistes, à la stabilisation de la monnaie et à l'augmentation des

recettes publiques<sup>3</sup>. Le Gouvernement yéménite et le Conseil sont par exemple en désaccord sur le fait de savoir si le Conseil a retiré toutes ses unités militaires d'Aden (voir annexe 6) ; les houthistes ont enregistré des gains territoriaux considérables ; et le taux de change du rial yéménite, qui était de 720 rials contre 1 dollar des États-Unis, à la date de l'annonce, s'est progressivement dégradé, pour franchir la barre des 1 700 au début du mois de décembre 2021.

14. Durant la période considérée, les deux signataires ont pris des mesures qui ont porté atteinte à l'Accord de Riyad (voir par. 15 et 34)<sup>4</sup>. Le Premier Ministre et quelques hauts fonctionnaires de haut rang du Gouvernement ont été contraints de quitter Aden, trois mois à peine après la formation du Gouvernement d'unité, à l'issue de la prise, par des manifestants, du palais de Maachiq où résidait le Premier Ministre<sup>5</sup>. Après cette attaque, à la mi-2021, des équipes de négociation du Gouvernement yéménite et du Conseil de transition du Sud ont été constituées dans une tentative de revitaliser l'Accord de Riyad et de permettre au Premier Ministre et à son cabinet de retourner à Aden. En l'absence du Premier Ministre et après le retour à Aden du Président du Conseil de transition du Sud, Aidarous Zubaidi, en mai 2021<sup>6</sup>, le Conseil a pris des mesures supplémentaires pour établir son contrôle sur diverses institutions. En juin 2021, il a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'il avait pris le contrôle de l'île de Mayoun/Périm, avec l'aide de la Coalition<sup>7</sup>. À la suite de négociations prolongées entreprises par l'Arabie saoudite, le Premier Ministre est retourné à Aden le 28 septembre 2021.

15. Les rapports politiques entre le Conseil de transition du Sud et le Gouvernement sont demeurés tendus, le Gouvernement accusant le Conseil d'avoir accentué les tensions, qui étaient déjà palpables, par la tenue de propos belliqueux. Le Conseil, lui, a accusé les autorités de mener une « guerre de services » en privant d'accès aux services publics les populations se trouvant sous son contrôle<sup>8</sup>. En juin 2021, l'Arabie saoudite a déclaré que « l'escalade sur les plans politique et médiatique et les décisions ultérieures prises par le Conseil, en matière de désignations politiques et militaires, n'étaient pas conformes à ce qui avait été convenu par les deux parties »<sup>9</sup>. Il est inhabituel que l'Arabie saoudite critique publiquement une partie en particulier.

16. Le Groupe d'experts note que l'Accord de Stockholm et l'Accord de Riyad ont été négociés dans des délais serrés en situation de crise, à savoir durant les avancées des Forces conjointes sur la ville de Hodeïda en 2018 et les combats actifs entre le Conseil de transition du Sud et le Gouvernement yéménite en 2019. Les deux Accords comportent des formulations vagues, qui laissent une marge d'interprétation importante par les parties au conflit. Les Accords en soi sont simplement un point de départ pour des négociations futures en matière d'application, qui en est au point mort. Les retraits à Hodeïda par les Forces conjointes en novembre 2021 ont porté atteinte à l'Accord de Hodeïda qui avait déjà été bien affaibli. Bien que l'Accord de Riyad ait partiellement abouti à des cessez-le-feu locaux à Abiyan in 2021, d'autres objectifs n'ont toujours pas été atteints, sur le plan de l'application.

<sup>3</sup> Voir [www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east](http://www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east).

<sup>4</sup> Entretiens du Groupe d'experts avec les équipes de négociation du Conseil de transition du Sud et du Gouvernement yéménite à Riyad en juin et octobre 2021.

<sup>5</sup> Bien que le Gouvernement yéménite ait accusé le Conseil de transition du Sud d'avoir orchestré ces manifestations, la participation de ce dernier a été moins visible qu'en août 2019, lorsque son vice-président, Hani Ali Salem Binbrek, avait réclamé publiquement la prise du palais présidentiel (voir S/2020/326, par. 29).

<sup>6</sup> Voir <https://en.smanews.org/south-arabia/president-al-zubaidi-returns-to-aden-the-capital/>.

<sup>7</sup> Entretien avec l'équipe de négociation du Conseil à Riyad en juin 2021. Mayoun, également appelée Périm, est un îlot situé dans le détroit de Bab el-Mandab.

<sup>8</sup> Entretiens avec la délégation du Conseil à Riyad en 2021.

<sup>9</sup> Voir <https://twitter.com/SPAregions/status/1410734209367363592?s=19>.




### III. Activités de groupes armés qui menacent la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité du Yémen

17. Tout au long de la période considérée, les houthistes et les forces du Gouvernement yéménite appuyées par la Coalition ont continué de se disputer le contrôle de la ville de Mareb. En septembre et en octobre 2021, en succession rapide, les houthistes ont capturé plusieurs districts des provinces de Beïda, de Chaboua et de Mareb, cherchant à encercler la ville (voir carte 1 et annexe 4). Lorsque la chute de Mareb est devenue imminente, les forces anti-houthistes ont commencé à se repositionner et à former de nouvelles alliances stratégiques (voir par. 31 et annexes 4 et 5). En octobre et en novembre 2021, tant la Coalition que les Forces conjointes avaient opéré des redéploiements et des retraits sans précédent (voir par. 18 à 20).

Carte 1

#### Gains militaires des houthistes en septembre-octobre 2021



#### A. Retrait des Forces conjointes sur la côte ouest de Hodeïda en novembre 2021

18. Vers le 10 ou le 11 novembre 2021, les brigades des Forces conjointes ont amorcé leur retrait des positions se trouvant sur la bande nord-ouest du littoral de Hodeïda. Selon la Coalition et les Forces conjointes, il s'agissait d'une stratégie militaire nationale planifiée<sup>10</sup>, visant à renforcer les fronts de Chaboua et de Mareb<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> Voir les déclarations à l'annexe 5.

<sup>11</sup> Sources confidentielles.

Les 12 et 13 novembre, les forces houthistes ont pris le contrôle des zones évacuées (voir carte 2)<sup>12</sup>. Autour du 14 novembre, la Coalition a lancé des frappes aériennes pour empêcher les houthistes de continuer d'avancer, lors de son premier engagement signalé dans le secteur, depuis la signature de l'Accord de Stockholm<sup>13</sup>.

19. Les retraits ont eu des conséquences préjudiciables sur la situation humanitaire de la population. Les civils et les autorités militaires en ont été informés 24 heures à l'avance, ce qui ne leur a pas donné suffisamment de temps pour évacuer les personnes vulnérables des secteurs concernés<sup>14</sup>. Le Gouvernement yéménite a informé le Groupe d'experts de 54 atteintes au droit international humanitaire commises par les forces houthistes, après la prise de contrôle des zones évacuées, dont la plupart se sont produites le 12 novembre 2021<sup>15</sup>. Au 14 novembre, l'Organisation des Nations Unies avait signalé le déplacement de plus de 800 familles, occasionné par les retraits<sup>16</sup>. Le Mouvement pacifique de Tihama et la Résistance de Tihama ont condamné les retraits (voir annexe 5). Au moins une brigade a refusé de quitter les lieux, tant que les familles de ses membres n'avaient pas été évacuées en toute sécurité. Le Groupe d'experts a estimé que les Forces conjointes et la Coalition auraient dû prendre des mesures adéquates pour garantir la sécurité des civils et des combattants blessés, notamment en veillant à ce que les civils exposés à des représailles de la part des houthistes soient évacués en temps voulu.

20. Les Forces conjointes ont indiqué que les retraits avaient été opérés conformément au plan de redéploiement de l'Accord de Stockholm (voir annexe 5)<sup>17</sup>. Ils n'avaient cependant pas été coordonnés avec le Gouvernement yéménite<sup>18</sup> ou le Comité de coordination du redéploiement qui, selon l'Accord, est tenu de superviser les redéploiements<sup>19</sup>. La MINUAAH, chargée de faciliter l'application de l'Accord, n'avait pas été informée<sup>20</sup>, tout comme l'Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général pour le Yémen, qui s'était rendu à Mokha le 10 novembre 2021.

21. L'Accord de Stockholm, négocié par l'ancien Envoyé spécial, est impopulaire parmi les Forces conjointes. Les Forces de la Résistance nationale estiment par exemple qu'il a entravé leur victoire à Hodeïda. Elles s'offusquent, tout comme la

<sup>12</sup> Pris de court, les houthistes n'auraient pas disposé de soldats en nombres suffisants pour occuper ces secteurs.

<sup>13</sup> Voir [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift).

<sup>14</sup> Il a été difficile, selon certaines informations, de regrouper les unités concernées. Des combattants des Forces conjointes ont été tués.

<sup>15</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a également reçu des informations de sources multiples mais n'a pas encore été en mesure d'enquêter.

<sup>16</sup> Voir [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update\\_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast\\_20211114-final.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast_20211114-final.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Un représentant des Forces conjointes a informé le Groupe d'experts que les houthistes prévoient de lancer des opérations militaires contre Faza à Hodeïda après avoir capturé la ville de Mareb. La prise de cette étroite bande de terre contrôlée par les Forces conjointes aurait permis aux houthistes de priver effectivement de ravitaillement 13 brigades stationnées au nord de Faza.

<sup>18</sup> Un représentant des Forces conjointes a déclaré que ni la Mission des Nations Unies en appui à l'Accord sur Hodeïda (MINUAAH) ni le Gouvernement yéménite n'avaient été informés, de crainte que les deux entités soient compromises, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ne voulaient pas que les houthistes aient vent du retrait.

<sup>19</sup> Voir [www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837](http://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837). Le Gouvernement yéménite a confirmé l'information. Les chefs des Forces conjointes sont membres de la délégation du Gouvernement yéménite au Comité de coordination du redéploiement.

<sup>20</sup> Voir [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860](https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860).

Résistance de Tihama, de ce qu'il ait été signé sans leur participation<sup>21</sup>. Cette irritation est accentuée par l'incapacité de l'ONU de parvenir à un accord à Mareb, qui aurait été à même d'arrêter les avancées des houthistes, à l'instar de l'Accord de Stockholm qui avait freiné toute nouvelle progression des Forces conjointes vers Hodeïda en 2018-2019<sup>22</sup>.

22. L'Accord de Hodeïda n'a pas abouti à l'accomplissement d'importants objectifs : de multiples violations du cessez-le-feu ont été commises, les redéploiements à partir des ports ont été contestés et les houthistes ont puisé unilatéralement dans les recettes de la Banque centrale du Yémen à Hodeïda, malgré les engagements mis en place<sup>23</sup>. Les houthistes ont également empêché la MINUAAH de s'acquitter pleinement de son mandat et ont notamment contrôlé les mouvements de ses observateurs. Ils ont en outre instrumentalisé l'Accord pour protéger des cibles militaires de grande importance (voir par. 49 et annexe 36). La délégation du Gouvernement yéménite au Comité de coordination du redéploiement a suspendu sa participation au mécanisme conjoint du Comité en mars 2020, après l'assassinat, attribué aux houthistes, d'un officier de liaison du Gouvernement yéménite au Comité<sup>24</sup>.

23. À la suite des retraits sur la côte ouest, les Forces conjointes ont repris aux houthistes certains secteurs de la province de Hodeïda et de la partie ouest de la province de Taëz (voir annexe 4). La Coalition a également appuyé quelques-unes de ces opérations au moyen de frappes aériennes<sup>25</sup>.

24. Quelques-unes des Brigades des Amaliqa se sont également déplacées d'Aden à Abiyān, cherchant, semble-t-il, à renforcer Chaboua (voir annexes 4 et 5). Les Forces conjointes ne se sont pas déployées à Mareb<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Voir <https://2dec.net/news47583.html> et <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/-بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>.

<sup>22</sup> Entretiens du Groupe d'experts avec les Forces conjointes, le Gouvernement yéménite et des habitants de Mareb. Voir <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/-بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>.

<sup>23</sup> Entretiens avec le Gouvernement yéménite, les Forces conjointes et les chefs de Tihama. Voir <https://republicanyemen.net/archives/27167>, <https://almahriah.net/video/6536>.

<sup>24</sup> L'équipe du Gouvernement yéménite au Comité de coordination du redéploiement a demandé à la MINUAAH l'ouverture d'une enquête sur l'assassinat et elle lui a demandé de transférer ses locaux dans une zone neutre, car elle se trouvait actuellement dans un secteur contrôlé par les houthistes. Le Gouvernement yéménite a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'il continuait de s'entretenir unilatéralement avec la MINUAAH; la réunion la plus récente s'est tenue le 7 juin 2021 (voir S/2021/79, par. 12).

<sup>25</sup> Voir <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3305871/arab-coalition-says-supporting-yemeni-forces-west-coast-outside-areas-stockholm>.

<sup>26</sup> Des représentants des Forces conjointes. Les membres de la Troisième Brigade des Amaliqa combattent à Mareb, mais le font à titre individuel, selon le Gouvernement yéménite (voir par. 38).

Carte 2  
 Changements dans les zones de contrôle au 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 2021



Source : le Gouvernement yéménite.

Note : les secteurs en rouge foncé auraient été capturés par les houthistes à la suite des événements de novembre 2021).

25. Le Gouvernement yéménite ne semble pas disposer au niveau national de stratégie militaire pour combattre les houthistes. Il laisse les Forces conjointes et le Conseil de transition du Sud se servir des lignes de front sur la côte ouest et dans le sud du Yémen pour se défendre contre les houthistes. C'est la Coalition et non lui qui coordonne les opérations militaires entre les diverses factions anti-houthistes. Par exemple, en 2021, tant le Conseil que les Forces conjointes ont indiqué au Groupe d'experts que c'étaient les Émirats arabes unis ou la Coalition qui coordonnaient les opérations militaires conjointes avec le Gouvernement yéménite (voir annexe 5)<sup>27</sup> et qu'ils ne recevaient pas d'instructions du Gouvernement yéménite ou du Ministère de la défense<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> Les Émirats arabes unis ont déclaré en octobre 2021 ne pas avoir de contrôle opérationnel sur les chefs du Conseil de transition du Sud ou des Forces conjointes et que les activités de ces forces étaient directement liées à leurs chefs.

<sup>28</sup> Entretiens du Groupe d'experts à Aden et sur la côte ouest avec des dirigeants militaires en août 2021. Voir également l'entretien avec le Directeur du Cabinet du Président à l'adresse suivante : <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>.

26. On ignore dans quelle mesure le Gouvernement dispose d'une autonomie par rapport à la Coalition sur le plan de la prise de décisions militaires. Parmi les membres de la Coalition, il existe des priorités concurrentes, qui influencent clairement le paysage militaire et politique du Yémen (voir S/2021/79, par. 28). La Coalition et quelques-uns des responsables du Gouvernement yéménite et des chefs tribaux craignent que la corruption au Ministère yéménite de la défense ou l'influence du Parti yéménite Islah sur les militaires et les responsables de haut rang n'entravent l'appui à l'armée nationale et aux forces tribales qui lui sont affiliées<sup>29</sup> et la prestation de celles-ci.

## B. Groupes armés sur la côte ouest

27. Depuis 2019, les Forces conjointes ont tenu des positions largement défensives contre les houthistes. Durant la période considérée, elles se sont positionnées comme un acteur de poids au-delà de la côte ouest, proposant de se battre à Mareb et de dépêcher des brigades à Chaboua (voir annexe 5). En novembre 2021, elles ont conduit des opérations offensives à Hodeïda et dans l'ouest de Taëz<sup>30</sup>. Si les forces affiliées au Conseil de transition du Sud ont connu un degré de désintégration durant la période considérée (voir par. 35), les affrontements au sein des Forces conjointes ont été rares et de courte durée et ont eu un effet restreint sur les civils<sup>31</sup>. Tandis que l'exaspération de la Coalition à l'égard du Gouvernement yéménite et du Conseil devenait plus manifeste, durant la période considérée, en particulier du fait que l'un ou l'autre ne parvenait pas à faire appliquer l'Accord de Riyad, les Forces conjointes se sont avérées un partenaire plus fiable de la Coalition, comme l'a démontré leur retrait, qui a été coordonné par cette dernière en novembre 2021<sup>32</sup>. Le Gouvernement yéménite et les Forces conjointes ont également des liens mutuellement avantageux : ces dernières ont défendu la côte ouest contre les houthistes et tiré une certaine légitimité de leur alignement sur le Gouvernement yéménite.

28. À la fin de 2020, tous les groupes armés sur la côte ouest s'étaient réorganisés sous la double bannière de Tareq Saleh des Forces de la Résistance nationale et d'Abou Zara al-Mahrami des Brigades des Amaliqa<sup>33</sup>. En mars 2021, Tareq Saleh a créé le bureau politique des Forces de la Résistance nationale (voir annexe 5). Le Groupe d'experts qui s'est rendu à Khokha et à Mokha en août 2021<sup>34</sup> a clairement constaté l'influence dont disposait Saleh sur les autorités locales : il leur fournissait des incitations financières, une aide sur les plans humanitaire et du développement et des garanties de sécurité<sup>35</sup>, au moyen du soutien que lui avaient accordé les Émirats

<sup>29</sup> Entretien à Riyad en octobre 2021. Le Parti yéménite Islah a nié exercer un contrôle, quel qu'il soit, sur le Gouvernement yéménite et l'armée.

<sup>30</sup> Les responsables militaires de Taëz et les Forces conjointes. Voir <https://2dec.net/news47596.html> et <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>.

<sup>31</sup> Les affrontements les plus notables ont opposé la Troisième Brigade des Amaliqa à Abou Zara Al-Mahrami en raison de la décision de ce dernier de remplacer le chef de la Troisième Brigade (voir par. 38).

<sup>32</sup> Les retraits de novembre 2021 ont été les mouvements militaires les plus importants dont la Coalition a pris la responsabilité, sans en informer le Gouvernement yéménite. Concernant le Conseil de transition du Sud, voir par. 15.

<sup>33</sup> Par opposition à 2019 lorsque les divers commandants des forces étaient sur un pied d'égalité. Voir [www.iremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139](http://www.iremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139) et annexe 5, appendice 4.

<sup>34</sup> L'influence n'a pas toujours été décrite de façon positive, par exemple par ceux qui craignaient des représailles, s'ils menaient des activités qui n'étaient pas approuvées par Saleh.

<sup>35</sup> Entretien avec les autorités de Mokha sur la côte ouest. Voir également <https://2dec.net/news47897.html>.

arabes unis<sup>36</sup>, le Gouvernement central se démarquant par son absence. Les activités de Saleh sur ce plan ont entamé davantage l'autorité du Gouvernement yéménite sur la côte ouest.

29. Certains chefs de la Tihama considèrent les Forces de la Résistance nationale et les Brigades des Amaliqa comme étrangères à leur région<sup>37</sup>. Ils sont réfractaires à l'incorporation des forces armées de Tihama dans ces deux entités qui, selon eux, a été amorcée par Saleh et les Émirats arabes unis pour affaiblir la direction militaire de Tihama<sup>38</sup>. Le retrait opéré en novembre 2021 a encore accentué les tensions (voir S/2021/79, par. 50), les houthistes ayant pris le contrôle de nouveaux territoires à Tihama et commis, ce faisant, des atrocités contre sa population (voir annexe 5). Quelques-uns des chefs politiques et militaires de Tihama, au cours d'entretiens avec le Groupe d'experts tout au long de la période considérée, ont déclaré qu'ils n'excluaient pas l'option du recours à la force s'ils continuaient d'être marginalisés par rapport aux prises de décisions politiques et militaires, citant l'exemple du recours à la force par le Conseil de transition du Sud à Aden<sup>39</sup>.

30. Durant la visite du Groupe d'experts sur la côte ouest en août 2021, les dirigeants locaux ont déclaré que les principaux facteurs qui compromettaient leur autorité et les empêchaient d'entreprendre des activités de développement étaient la collecte illégale de recettes fiscales par les Forces conjointes (voir fig. 1) et la poursuite de l'occupation des bâtiments publics par les Brigades des Amaliqa. À Mokha, les recettes perçues par les Forces conjointes n'ont pas été déposées à la Banque centrale du Yémen<sup>40</sup>. Mahrami, des Brigades des Amaliqa, et Ahmed Al-Kawkabani, ancien commandant de la première Brigade de Tihama, ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'ils occupaient quelques bâtiments publics afin d'en assurer la sécurité ou de s'en servir comme base temporaire pour leurs soldats, en attendant que la Coalition leur attribue d'autres locaux. Des habitants de la côte ouest ont également indiqué que l'incapacité des Forces conjointes de juguler la contrebande d'armes de petit calibre, d'engrais et de carburant à destination des zones contrôlées par les houthistes à travers la côte ouest compromettait davantage l'autorité des institutions locales, ce qui exaspérait les populations locales et les combattants.

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<sup>36</sup> Entretiens confidentiels avec les autorités locales. Voir également <https://2dec.net/last47928.html> et <https://2dec.net/last47939.html> au sujet de l'acheminement par les Émirats arabes unis de 80 000 doses de vaccin contre la COVID-19 par l'intermédiaire des Forces de la Résistance nationale. Les Émirats arabes unis ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'ils avaient fourni une aide sur les plans humanitaire et du développement sur la côte ouest.

<sup>37</sup> Entretiens avec des dirigeants militaires et politiques égyptiens, saoudiens et yéménites en 2021. Voir également [www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region](http://www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. Voir également <https://almahriah.net/local/5952>.

<sup>39</sup> Entretiens menés avant novembre 2021.

<sup>40</sup> Sources confidentielles. Les Brigades des Amaliqa ont informé le Groupe d'experts que la collecte de recettes fiscales était régie par un accord conclu avec les autorités et était consacrée au développement.

Figure I

**Reçus attestant la perception de carburant, émis par les Forces conjointes sur la côte ouest au point de passage de Doubab**



Sources : confidentielles (documents expurgés par le Groupe d'experts).

### C. Liens entre les Forces conjointes et le Conseil de transition du Sud

31. Le Conseil de transition du Sud et les Forces de la Résistance nationale ont informé le Groupe d'experts en août 2021 qu'ils n'avaient établi entre eux aucune coopération militaire poussée<sup>41</sup>. La perspective de voir Mareb tomber aux mains des houthistes en octobre 2021 les a néanmoins incités tous les deux à envisager de former un front uni contre les houthistes (voir annexes 1 et 5)<sup>42</sup>.

32. Certaines unités des Brigades des Amaliqa, en revanche, avaient lutté aux côtés du Conseil de transition du Sud contre le Gouvernement yéménite en 2019<sup>43</sup>. En 2021, les Brigades des Amaliqa ont utilisé les installations contrôlées par le Conseil et conservé un camp militaire à Aden (voir par. 38). Au sein de la Coalition, les Émirats arabes unis ont continué de conserver une influence considérable sur Saleh, Mahrami et Zubaidi, ce qui a empêché, à ce jour, des affrontements graves entre les différentes forces<sup>44</sup>.

### D. Groupes armés affiliés au Conseil de transition du Sud

33. Le Groupe d'experts a constaté durant sa visite en août 2021 que le Gouvernement yéménite n'avait manifestement pas de présence militaire ou de sécurité effective à Aden et que le Conseil de transition du Sud et les forces qui lui étaient affiliées contrôlaient la province. Des responsables du Conseil étaient présents

<sup>41</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a par exemple visité à Aden en septembre 2021 un camp destiné aux combattants blessés des Forces de la Résistance nationale, qui ont déclaré qu'ils ne se sentaient pas en sécurité parmi les membres du Conseil, la plupart des blessés étant originaires du nord.

<sup>42</sup> Voir <https://2dec.net/news46965.html> et <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0> .twitter.

<sup>43</sup> Lors d'entretiens avec le Groupe d'experts, Mahrami a déclaré que ses forces tenaient à rester neutres et ne voulaient pas être entraînées dans des accrochages entre le Gouvernement yéménite et le Conseil.

<sup>44</sup> Les Émirats arabes unis ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'ils avaient « de bons rapports avec les parties susmentionnées mais ne disposaient que d'une influence limitée sur elles, cherchant avant tout à faire avancer le processus de paix » et qu'ils « s'employaient à désamorcer toute escalade armée résultant de divergences d'opinions ».

aux réunions du Groupe d'experts avec des représentants des autorités locales. Le Conseil a déclaré qu'il veillait à ce que la province continue d'opérer, malgré l'absence d'agents de haut rang de l'État et la limitation de l'aide financière.

34. Le Conseil a déclaré qu'en 2021, toutes ses forces militaires et de sécurité avaient été intégrées aux forces gouvernementales<sup>45</sup>, ce que le Gouvernement yéménite a nié<sup>46</sup>. Zubaidi s'est fié à la présence constante des forces armées du Conseil pour satisfaire son ambition politique de créer un sud indépendant<sup>47</sup>, ce qui aurait été de nature à empêcher l'intégration totale de ces forces, comme l'envisageaient les dispositions de l'Accord de Riyad. Le Conseil a déclaré que le Gouvernement yéménite avait violé l'Accord en 2021 en procédant unilatéralement à la désignation de fonctionnaires<sup>48</sup>. Le Gouvernement yéménite a répondu que l'exigence de consultation avec le Conseil, selon les dispositions de l'Accord, se limitait à la désignation de gouverneurs et de directeurs de la sécurité dans certaines provinces précises. Bien que l'Accord en soi ait pu empêcher des escalades militaires entre le Gouvernement yéménite et le Conseil<sup>49</sup>, il ne constitue pas une solution durable à la crise politique dans le sud.

35. L'autorité du Conseil s'est considérablement affaiblie depuis qu'il a pris le contrôle d'Aden en 2019. Les luttes militaires intestines et les graves atteintes à la sécurité commises durant la période considérée ont suscité des interrogations quant à sa capacité de garantir la sécurité dans les secteurs qu'il contrôle. Par exemple, depuis juin 2021, trois importantes explosions aux engins explosifs improvisés se sont produites, ainsi que des accrochages entre ses combattants, qui ont fait des victimes parmi les civils<sup>50</sup>. Le Conseil a continué de s'efforcer d'obtenir les ressources nécessaires pour garantir la prestation des services de base, atténuer la crise économique et veiller au versement régulier des soldes à ses combattants. L'appui apporté par les Émirats arabes unis aux secteurs contrôlés par le Conseil semble avoir manifestement diminué depuis 2019, alors que l'Arabie saoudite a continué largement d'acheminer son aide financière par l'entremise du Gouvernement yéménite.

<sup>45</sup> Voir annexe 6.

<sup>46</sup> Tous deux affirment cependant contrôler les forces d'élite de Chaboua et du Hadramout. Entretiens avec le Gouvernement yéménite et le Conseil en août et novembre 2021.

<sup>47</sup> Par exemple, en mars 2021, Zubaidi a déclaré que « la chute de Mareb [...] pourrait accélérer le processus en vue de la tenue de pourparlers internationaux entre le nord et le sud et déboucher sur une situation où le Conseil de transition du Sud contrôlerait largement le sud et les houthistes la majeure partie du nord. En ce sens, il serait logique d'avoir des pourparlers directs entre des parties étant en contrôle ». Voir [www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists). Il a également continué de préconiser un Sud séparé (voir [www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58)).

<sup>48</sup> Voir <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2746991/yemen-s-hadi-appoints-new-head-shura-council-attorney-general-cabinet-secretary>.

<sup>49</sup> Il a, à ce jour, empêché des affrontements majeurs à Abiyan, Aden et Chaboua. Des affrontements localisés se sont produits par exemple à Chaboua entre les forces d'élite de Chaboua affiliées au Conseil de transition du Sud et le Gouvernement yéménite, après le retrait des Émirats arabes unis du camp d'Alam en octobre 2021.

<sup>50</sup> Les engins explosifs improvisés ont visé le Gouverneur et deux journalistes et un engin explosif improvisé a été posé à l'extérieur de l'Aéroport international d'Aden. Certains attribuent ces attaques aux houthistes. Voir [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed), [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car-bombing-in-aden](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car-bombing-in-aden) et [www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport](https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport).



## **E. Faits nouveaux dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes**

### **1. Faits nouveaux sur le plan militaire**

36. Durant la période considérée, les houthistes ont continué d'administrer leurs territoires sans rencontrer d'opposition politique ou militaire notable, tout en enregistrant d'importants gains militaires. Ils ont pris pleinement contrôle de Beïda et ont avancé dans des secteurs de Hodeïda, de Mareb et de Chaboua (voir annexe 4). L'état de la sécurité dans les zones qu'ils contrôlaient était stable, comparé à d'autres régions du Yémen (voir par. 35). Ils ont mis à profit l'instabilité qui régnait dans les zones n'étant pas sous leur contrôle, voire y ont contribué (voir par. 37 à 40)<sup>51</sup>. Ils ont continué d'affaiblir stratégiquement leurs opposants.


37. Durant la période considérée, le Groupe d'experts a consigné quatre attaques aux missiles et aux drones aériens sur la côte ouest et dans le sud, qui ont visé d'importantes initiatives politiques ou contribué à l'anarchie entre des forces anti-houthistes<sup>52</sup>. Le 30 décembre 2020, l'aéroport international d'Aden a été attaqué au moyen de missiles, juste au moment de l'atterrissage de l'avion transportant les membres du Gouvernement d'unité nouvellement constitué (voir annexe 7). La formation de ce nouveau Gouvernement avait été le résultat le plus important de l'Accord de Riyad et si l'avion n'avait pas eu du retard, les victimes auraient probablement été beaucoup plus nombreuses parmi les représentants du Gouvernement, ce qui aurait compromis des mois de négociations. Le moment choisi pour l'attaque était également symbolique, le retour du Gouvernement étant synonyme d'espoir pour le peuple, qui avait été témoin de deux années de combats entre le Conseil de transition du Sud et le Gouvernement yéménite. Le 11 septembre 2021, le port de Mokha a été attaqué à l'aide de cinq drones aériens et de deux missiles. À l'époque, un comité gouvernemental visitait le port pour superviser sa reconversion à des fins civiles, après des années d'occupation militaire exclusive. Cette conversion aurait constitué une importante étape pour ce qui était de normaliser les rapports entre les Forces conjointes et le Gouvernement, tout en ouvrant un port civil supplémentaire sur la côte ouest, en vue de l'importation d'articles civils (voir annexe 8). Le 10 novembre 2021, des missiles ont touché des bases militaires à Mokha, le jour où l'Envoyé spécial pour le Yémen devait entreprendre sa première mission sur la côte ouest (voir carte 3 et annexe 8).

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<sup>51</sup> Le Conseil de transition du Sud a déclaré que lorsque les houthistes menaient des attaques de façon « anonyme », cela donnait lieu à toutes sortes d'hypothèses sur la responsabilité de ces actes, accentuant la méfiance parmi les forces anti-houthistes.

<sup>52</sup> D'autres attaques des houthistes qui avaient fait des victimes parmi les civils à Taëz et à Mareb sont citées aux par. 114 à 117 et à l'annexe 35.

### Carte 3 Attaque contre le port de Mokha



38. Le 29 août 2021, le camp d'Anad à Lahj a fait l'objet d'attaques de missiles et d'un drone aérien<sup>53</sup>, qui ont occasionné quelque 90 blessés parmi la Troisième Brigade des Amaliqa<sup>54</sup>. Cette brigade, normalement positionnée sur la côte ouest, se trouvait à Anad pour une formation, à la suite de désaccords avec Abou Zara al-Mahrami, chef des Brigades des Amaliqa. L'attaque, qui visait la Troisième Brigade, a fait naître des soupçons de collusion entre Mahrami et les houthistes<sup>55</sup>, ce que Mahrami a réfuté<sup>56</sup>. À la suite de l'attaque, quelques-uns des membres de la Troisième Brigade se sont dispersés, disant que Mahrami ne leur inspirait plus confiance.

39. Hormis l'attaque du 10 novembre 2021, la responsabilité des attaques signalées aux paragraphes 37 et 38 n'a pas été revendiquée par les houthistes (voir annexes 7 et 8)<sup>57</sup>. Il est improbable que d'autres groupes armés au Yémen aient eu les capacités ou la motivation nécessaires pour les mener. Il convient de noter que lors des quatre attaques, il a été signalé que les missiles avaient été tirés depuis Taëz, qui est contrôlé par les houthistes<sup>58</sup>. Au cours de deux attaques au moins, le Groupe d'experts a été informé que des alertes rapides avaient été transmises à la Coalition par l'axe militaire de Taëz affilié au Gouvernement yéménite. Lors de l'attaque du 29 août 2021, des drones aériens de surveillance avaient été aperçus au préalable, ce qui laissait présager une attaque<sup>59</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Voir annexe 5 pour les sources.

<sup>54</sup> Voir [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base).

<sup>55</sup> Entretiens du Groupe d'experts avec des membres de la Troisième Brigade en 2021.

<sup>56</sup> Communication avec le Groupe d'experts, décembre 2021.

<sup>57</sup> Durant l'attaque du 10 novembre 2021, les houthistes ont déclaré avoir lancé des missiles dans cette direction (voir annexe 8). Ils avaient revendiqué la responsabilité d'une autre attaque contre la base d'Anad en 2019 (voir <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-ap-top-news-houthis-international-news-jamal-khashoggi-92f491d2794440afaf53967fceb0c1b9>).

<sup>58</sup> Voir annexes 7 et 8. Les informations ont été fournies par la direction militaire de Taëz sur les attaques qui se sont produites en août et en novembre 2021.

<sup>59</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a interrogé des combattants qui se trouvaient dans le camp au moment de l'attaque et avaient vu les drones aériens. Ils ont déclaré que, malgré les appels répétés lancés à la Coalition, aucune mesure n'avait été prise pour évacuer les forces ou intercepter les drones. Le commandant militaire du Conseil de transition du Sud, Abou Taher, a confirmé au Groupe d'experts que le Conseil avait lancé des avertissements mais n'avait aucun moyen de contrer les drones. Les combattants ont déclaré qu'ils se savaient en danger mais avaient été enjointés de rester

40. Le Groupe d'experts a également été informé que durant l'année 2021, des drones aériens de surveillance avaient été observés en train de survoler des institutions clefs telles que l'Aéroport international d'Aden et le port de Mokha. Les forces anti-houthistes au Yémen n'ont pas de moyen d'empêcher des drones aériens ou des missiles de pénétrer leur espace aérien. Le Conseil de transition du Sud et les Forces conjointes, qui contrôlent les sites des quatre attaques susmentionnées, ont déclaré qu'après le retrait des forces émiriennes de leurs secteurs, ils ne disposaient plus de systèmes de défense antiaérienne efficaces, plaignant que le Groupe d'experts avait également entendues à Mareb en octobre 2020. Un membre de la Coalition l'a informé que les membres ne pouvaient pas acheminer de systèmes de défense antiaérienne au Yémen, du fait que cela aurait constitué une violation des accords d'utilisateur final. La mise en place de tels systèmes aurait permis de réduire le nombre de victimes civiles et les dégâts aux infrastructures (voir par. 114 à 117).

## 2. Faits nouveaux sur les plans politique et culturel

41. Les houthistes poursuivent leur campagne systématique visant à amener la population à adhérer à leur idéologie et à rallier un appui local au conflit. Ce faisant, ils s'en prennent particulièrement aux groupes vulnérables. Le Groupe d'experts a confirmé par exemple neuf cas de torture, de mutilation et de violence sexuelle ou de répression politique contre des femmes actives sur le plan professionnel, qui s'opposaient aux vues des houthistes. Dans ces cas et dans d'autres, ils ont continué d'invoquer la « prostitution » pour : a) amener la communauté à s'abstenir d'aider ou d'accepter les anciennes détenues ; b) empêcher ces dernières de continuer d'avoir une participation active au sein de leur communauté ; c) veiller à ce qu'elles ne menacent pas le régime houthiste (voir annexe 9). À cette fin, ils ont enregistré et conservé des vidéos compromettantes sur le plan sexuel, dont ils ont continué de se servir comme moyen de pression pour museler toute opposition de la part de ces femmes. Ces mesures ont également eu un effet dissuasif sur d'autres dirigeantes. La répression accrue subie par des femmes exprimant des opinions politiques a entravé leur capacité de participer aux prises de décision liées au règlement du conflit, ce qui a menacé par conséquent la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité du Yémen (voir S/2020/326, par. 21 et annexe 5)<sup>60</sup>. Rares ont été les mesures qui ont été mises en place pour apporter un appui psychosocial ou économique ou une protection aux anciennes détenues interrogées par le Groupe d'experts, ce qui a poussé certaines d'entre elles à retourner dans leur famille dans des zones contrôlées par les houthistes (voir annexe 9)<sup>61</sup>.

42. Les camps d'été et les cours culturels organisés à l'intention des enfants et des adultes faisaient partie de la stratégie des houthistes visant à rallier un soutien à leur idéologie, à encourager les individus à se joindre à leur combat et à motiver les troupes (voir annexe 10). Si certains adultes se sont joints à ces cours culturels du fait qu'ils adhéraient à cette idéologie, d'autres l'ont fait pour éviter de perdre des avantages liés à l'emploi ou par crainte des représailles s'ils ne s'exécutaient pas. Par exemple, deux femmes qui avaient refusé de suivre ces cours ont été arrêtées et violées (voir annexe 10).

43. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur des camps d'été organisés dans des écoles et une mosquée par les houthistes pour propager leur idéologie parmi les enfants, les encourager à se battre, leur donner un entraînement militaire de base ou les recruter

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sur place. Les chefs des Brigades des Amaliqa ont nié avoir eu préalablement connaissance des drones ou du communiqué militaire de Taëz.

<sup>60</sup> Voir également la résolution 2467 (2019) du Conseil de sécurité.

<sup>61</sup> Au sujet de l'appui aux victimes des violences fondées sur le genre, voir la résolution 2467 (2019), notamment les paragraphes 14 et 16 a) et 16 d).

au combat (voir fig. II et III). Dans ces camps d'été, les discours de haine et la violence contre des groupes particuliers sont encouragés. Les enfants doivent scander le slogan houthiste, « Mort à l'Amérique, mort à Israël, que la malédiction s'abatte sur les Juifs, l'Islam vaincra ». Dans un camp, des enfants dont certains n'avaient que 7 ans, apprenaient à nettoyer des armes et à esquiver les roquettes (voir annexes 10 et 11). Le Groupe d'experts a consigné un cas de violence sexuelle contre un enfant qui suivait un entraînement militaire. Il a obtenu des informations sur 10 cas d'enfants emmenés se battre sous prétexte de suivre des cours culturels ou à l'issue de tels cours. Il a également étayé neuf cas d'octroi ou de refus d'octroi d'aide humanitaire aux familles, selon que les enfants participaient ou pas aux combats ou que les adultes concouraient ou non à l'enseignement du programme houthiste. Pour plus de détails sur ces constatations, se reporter à l'annexe 10.

Figure II  
**Matériel scolaire utilisé dans les camps d'été (à gauche) et élèves dans un camp d'été lisant le manuel (à droite)**



Source : Al-Masirah (à gauche) et confidentielle (à droite) (voir [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)).

Figure III  
**Enfants et invités à une cérémonie de fin d'études dans un camp d'été, août 2019**



Source : Al-Masirah (voir [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)).

Note : parmi les invités se trouvaient le premier ministre, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi et le ministre de la santé, Taha Moutaouakkel).

44. Le général de division, Mohammad Nasser al-Atifi (voir fig. IV), en sa qualité de ministre de la défense, a la responsabilité d'empêcher le recrutement d'enfants dans les rangs des forces houthistes. Yahyah al-Houthi (voir fig. IV), en sa qualité de ministre de l'éducation, doit également veiller à ce que les écoles et les camps d'été ne soient pas exploités à des fins de promotion de la violence, de la haine et de la

radicalisation ou du recrutement d'enfants. Pour plus d'information sur ces personnes, se reporter aux annexes 10 et 11.

Figure IV  
Yahyah al-Houthi visitant un camp d'été



Source : ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)).

Figure V  
Général de division Mohamed Nasser el-Atifi (deuxième à partir de la droite)




Source : [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence).

## IV. Sécurité maritime

45. Depuis décembre 2020, le Groupe d'experts a recensé cinq attaques contre des navires civils, plusieurs approches suspectes<sup>62</sup> et un signalement de personnes armées à bord de petits bateaux dans les eaux entourant le Yémen (voir carte 4). Par rapport à la précédente période considérée, durant laquelle trois navires civils avaient été attaqués dans le golfe d'Aden, l'attention s'est portée à nouveau sur la mer Rouge, où quatre attaques se sont produites.

<sup>62</sup> Dans deux cas au moins, l'approche suspecte signalée s'est révélée être la garde côtière yéménite qui hélait un navire, action qui n'a pas été menée conformément aux procédures internationales.

Carte 4  
Atteintes à la sécurité maritime depuis décembre 2020



46. La situation en mer Rouge s'est démarquée par une augmentation du nombre d'attaques au moyen d'engins explosifs improvisés flottants. Les attaques réussies, au moyen de tels engins, n'étaient pas dirigées contre des navires faisant route mais ceux à quai dans des installations pétrolières maritimes en Arabie saoudite, dont certains à plus de 1 000 kilomètres du Yémen. Parfois, un type nouveau d'engin explosif improvisé flottant plus grand a été déployé, alimenté par deux moteurs hors-bord, avec un taux de consommation de carburant beaucoup plus important que la génération précédente d'engins explosifs improvisés de type « poisson-globe » à moteur unique. Compte tenu de la distance citée précédemment, il est presque certain que ces engins explosifs improvisés flottants aient été lancés à partir d'un « navire-mère », qui les aurait remorqués pendant la majeure partie du trajet.

47. La première attaque s'est produite le 14 décembre 2020, lorsque trois engins explosifs improvisés flottants ont servi à attaquer le port de Djedda. Deux d'entre eux ont visé une base navale, endommageant un navire de guerre saoudien, tandis qu'un autre a touché le pétrolier *BW Rhine* (numéro OMI d'identification du navire 9341940) battant pavillon singapourien, au terminal portuaire de la compagnie Saudi Aramco (voir fig. VI). L'impact et l'explosion qui ont suivi ont percé la coque au niveau de la flottaison. Ils ont également provoqué un incendie qui a fait rage pendant une heure environ. Aucun blessé n'a été signalé mais les dégâts économiques et matériels sont considérables (voir annexe 12).

Figure VI  
**Incendie à bord du *BW Rhine***



Source : confidentielle.

48. Une attaque semblable, menée à l'aide de deux engins explosifs improvisés flottants, s'est produite le 27 avril 2021 près du terminal Yasref de Yanbo où stationnait le pétrolier *Torm Hermia* (numéro OMI : 9797993) battant pavillon singapourien (voir fig. VII). L'équipage du navire a confirmé que la marine saoudienne avait intercepté un engin explosif improvisé flottant à quelque 1,4 mille marin du navire. L'Arabie saoudite a confirmé l'attaque. Un second engin a été décelé à une trentaine de milles marins au sud du port de Yanbo (voir annexe 13). Le Groupe d'experts a estimé que la distance entre les côtes yéménites et Yanbo était trop grande, pour que des engins explosifs improvisés flottants puissent opérer en toute autonomie, et qu'un « navire-mère » était probablement intervenu.

Figure VII  
**Engin explosif improvisé flottant utilisé au cours de l'attaque du 27 avril 2021**



Source : confidentielle.

49. La fréquence du largage de tels engins explosifs improvisés flottants directement depuis des zones contrôlées par les houthistes a augmenté considérablement au cours de la période considérée. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé par des sources multiples que les engins explosifs improvisés flottants avaient été assemblés et largués depuis les ports de Hodeïda et de Salif. La Coalition parvient le plus souvent à intercepter de tels engins et tend à riposter au moyen d'attaques aériennes sur les lieux d'assemblage dans les secteurs contrôlés par les houthistes, ce qui a poussé la MINUAAH en juillet 2021 à appeler les deux parties à la retenue, les menaces contre « les opérations aux points vitaux d'entrée de l'aide » constituant « une violation de l'Accord de Hodeïda »<sup>63</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté pour établir si les zones visées par l'Accord servaient au largage d'engins explosifs improvisés flottants et a demandé un complément d'information à la Coalition et à la MINUAAH. Au 31 octobre 2021, 92 engins de ce type avaient été largués par les houthistes depuis le début du conflit, d'après la Coalition.

50. Le Groupe d'experts a également consigné des attaques de drones aériens qui avaient été commises contre des navires marchands. Le 30 juillet 2021, le pétrolier *Alberta* (numéro OMI : 9486922) battant pavillon panaméen a subi des dégâts au port de Jazan (voir annexe 14). Un drone aérien a explosé au-dessus de l'étrave du navire. Des éclats de fibres de verre récupérés sur le pont ont révélé des caractéristiques techniques conformes aux drones aériens à portée moyenne de type Qasef, employés fréquemment par les houthistes pour viser des cibles dans le sud de l'Arabie saoudite. Le drone n'a fait aucune victime et les dégâts étaient relativement mineurs. L'attaque indique néanmoins que les navires stationnés demeurent exposés, notamment dans les ports jouxtant le Yémen.

51. Une autre attaque de drone aérien s'est produite dans le golfe d'Oman, visant le pétrolier *Mercer Street* (numéro d'OMI : 9539585) battant pavillon libérien. Il a d'abord été attaqué le 29 juillet 2021 au matin, le capitaine ayant signalé « deux attaques de drones », à 30 minutes d'intervalle, qui ont manqué leur cible. Il a ensuite été attaqué dans la soirée, lorsqu'un troisième drone aérien a heurté la cabine du pont arrière, faisant deux victimes, dont le capitaine du navire, et d'importants dégâts matériels (voir annexe 15).

52. D'après les rapports préliminaires, l'attaque aurait été menée à partir du Yémen<sup>64</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a donc examiné les informations disponibles publiquement et obtenu des informations confidentielles de plusieurs États Membres sur cette attaque. Les drones aériens semblaient être des versions améliorées du drone aérien à aile delta, que le Groupe d'experts avait déjà répertorié (voir S/2020/326, par. 57 et annexe 15). Compte tenu de la distance de plus de 1 700 kilomètres qui séparait les zones contrôlées par les houthistes du lieu de l'attaque, il aurait fallu, pour viser avec succès un navire se déplaçant à une vitesse de croisière, recourir à un système de relais aériens ou maritimes. Or, les houthistes ne disposant pas d'accès à de tels systèmes, autant que le sache le Groupe d'experts, il est fort probable qu'un autre acteur porte la responsabilité de cette attaque. Celle-ci illustre néanmoins la rapidité de l'évolution de la technologie des drones aériens, dont les houthistes semblent disposer (voir par. 60), ce qui fait craindre des frappes semblables dans les eaux entourant le Yémen.

53. La seconde attaque qui s'est produite dans les eaux internationales au large du Yémen a visé le cargo classique *Saviz* (numéro d'OMI : 9167253) battant pavillon iranien, qui a connu une explosion le 6 avril 2021, alors qu'il était ancré dans la partie méridionale de la mer Rouge, à quelque 115 milles marins au nord-ouest des côtes

<sup>63</sup> Voir [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hodeïda/status/1412009048862568450](https://twitter.com/UN_Hodeïda/status/1412009048862568450).

<sup>64</sup> Voir <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/08/10/Senior-Pentagon-official-says-Iran-backed-Mercer-Street-attack-came-from-Yemen>.



yéménites. Selon l'agence de presse iranienne Tasnim, le navire a été endommagé par des mines ventouses, qui avaient été attachées à la coque par des plongeurs<sup>65</sup>. Le *Saviz* conservait cette même position depuis au moins 2017, ce qui porterait à croire que son rôle était d'appuyer les opérations militaires dans la région<sup>66</sup>. La République islamique d'Iran a informé le Groupe d'experts que le navire était chargé de lutter contre la piraterie en mer et que l'attaque n'était pas liée au conflit au Yémen.

54. Le Groupe d'experts a continué d'obtenir des informations sur des mines marines posées dans la partie méridionale de la mer Rouge par les houthistes, près d'îles situées à l'est des trois ports qu'ils contrôlent, ainsi que sur des mines marines dérivantes près de la frontière avec l'Arabie saoudite. Selon la Coalition, entre 2014, le début du conflit, et le 31 octobre 2021, 205 mines marines ont été détectées et détruites (voir annexe 35). Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur des allégations selon lesquelles les mines étaient stockées dans des lieux précis à Hodeïda, Salif et Ras Issa, à partir desquels elles étaient déployées, ce qui constituerait une violation de l'Accord de Stockholm.

## V. Armes et application de l'embargo sur les armes

55. Conformément aux paragraphes 14 à 17 de la résolution 2216 (2015), le Groupe d'experts a continué de porter son attention sur une série d'activités de surveillance et d'enquête afin d'établir si des violations de l'embargo ciblé sur les armes s'étaient produites, comprenant la fourniture, la vente ou le transfert directs ou indirects à des personnes et entités ou au profit de ces personnes et entités, inscrites sur la Liste du Comité et du Conseil de sécurité. Le Groupe d'experts estime que toutes les forces militaires et paramilitaires fidèles aux autorités basées à Sanaa tombent sous le coup de cette définition.


56. Au cours de la période considérée, les houthistes ont poursuivi leurs attaques aériennes contre l'Arabie saoudite (voir carte 5). Des cibles proches de la frontière entre le Yémen et l'Arabie saoudite étaient les plus exposées et ont été attaquées le plus souvent à l'aide de drones aériens à moyenne portée de type Qasaf-2K, conjuguées à des roquettes d'artillerie de type Badr. Les houthistes ont également continué de frapper au cœur de l'Arabie saoudite, utilisant des drones aériens à longue portée de type Samad, des missiles de croisière de type Quds et des missiles balistiques Zulfiqar.

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<sup>65</sup> Voir [www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources](http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources).

<sup>66</sup> Voir <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/04/07/-Mother-ship-command-center-The-Iranian-ship-Saviz-attacked-in-Red-Sea>.

Carte 5  
Frappes de missiles et de drones depuis le 30 décembre 2020



57. Des attaques dans les zones frontalières se sont produites plusieurs fois par semaine. Des opérations de plus longue portée ont été effectuées avec moins de fréquence et souvent par vagues, c'est-à-dire que les forces houthistes ont lancé plusieurs drones aériens et missiles sur des cibles multiples, dans le cadre d'une même opération. Des drones aériens de fabrication locale et des roquettes Badr ont été employés dans la majeure partie des attaques. La fréquence des attaques a montré que les houthistes pouvaient facilement se procurer les composants de ces armes à l'étranger.

58. Le Groupe d'experts a été informé d'une seule attaque menée à l'aide d'un missile de croisière et de trois autres attaques confirmées, perpétrées durant la période considérée à l'aide de missiles balistiques à plus longue portée. Ces chiffres cadrent avec ceux des années précédentes, montrant que les houthistes ont continué d'avoir du mal se procurer à l'étranger des systèmes de missiles perfectionnés. Selon la Coalition, depuis le début du conflit jusqu'au 31 octobre 2021, un total de 781 drones aériens et de 409 missiles balistiques ont été tirés sur des objectifs en Arabie saoudite.

59. Les cibles visées par les houthistes durant la période considérée comprenaient des infrastructures civiles telles que le dépôt de stockage de la Saudi Aramco à Djedda (voir annexe 16) et l'Aéroport international d'Abha (voir annexe 17). Ces attaques ont été principalement menées à des fins politiques, c'est-à-dire que les houthistes voulaient inciter Riyad à accepter un règlement politique qui leur soit bénéfique, contrairement à l'emploi de missiles et de drones aériens au Yémen même, où l'objectif était de faire le plus grand nombre de victimes, comme en a témoigné l'attaque contre l'Aéroport international d'Aden le 30 décembre 2020 (voir annexe 7), qui a été favorisée par l'absence de défense antiaérienne efficace du Gouvernement yéménite.

## A. Nouveaux systèmes d'armes des houthistes

60. Le 11 mars 2021, les houthistes ont, à l'occasion d'une exposition, présenté aux médias de nouveaux systèmes d'armes (voir annexe 18)<sup>67</sup>, notamment un nouveau drone aérien appelé Samad-4, qui porte deux roquettes et aurait une portée de 2 000 kilomètres, ainsi qu'un hexacoptère à courte portée, appelé Rujum. Ce dernier paraît être un hexacoptère YD6-1000S de fabrication chinoise, qui a été modifié de façon à larguer six petites grenades de mortier. Les houthistes ont également exhibé un drone aérien à aile delta appelé Waed, qui serait une version perfectionnée du modèle signalé en 2019 (voir fig. VII)<sup>68</sup>. Il semble avoir une envergure alaire plus large et probablement une portée plus longue. Visuellement, la forme des stabilisateurs verticaux est la différence de conception la plus évidente. En septembre 2020, des images de ce qui semblait être un drone Waed endommagé sur le front d'Alam (Mareb) ont été postées dans les médias sociaux<sup>69</sup>. Le drone Waed paraît capable de porter des groupes-capteurs perfectionnés, permettant un contrôle téléguidé sur des distances de plusieurs centaines de kilomètres à l'aide d'un système de retransmission des données, ce qui accentuerait considérablement la menace contre des cibles mobiles (voir par. 52 et annexe 15)<sup>70</sup>.

Figure VIII

**Drone aérien Waed exhibé (à gauche) et débris possibles d'un drone Waed près de Mareb (à droite)**



Sources : Almasirah.net (à gauche) et <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168> (à droite).

61. Sur le front de bataille de Mareb a été déployé le premier missile sol-air « 358 »<sup>71</sup> attesté, qui aurait servi en juillet 2021 à intercepter un drone aérien de surveillance (voir fig. IX)<sup>72</sup>. Sa vitesse relativement lente réduit la menace qu'il constitue pour les avions de combat ; il est néanmoins efficace contre des aéronefs plus lents.

<sup>67</sup> Voir [www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/12/21/2468309/](http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/12/21/2468309/) -در- دستاوردهای-جدید-در- یمن-رونمایی-از-دستاورد های-جدید-در- حوزه-دفاعی-از-پهپادهای-جدید-تا-موشک-های-سعیر-قاصم-2-و-قدس-2-فیلم

<sup>68</sup> Voir S/2020/326, par. 57 et annexe 15.

<sup>69</sup> Voir <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168>.

<sup>70</sup> D'autres systèmes de drones aériens à longue portée des houthistes se servent de coordonnées préétablies du système mondial de localisation (GPS) pour localiser leurs cibles, la radiocommande étant limitée par la ligne de mire. Cela signifie qu'à l'issue du tir, la trajectoire d'un tel drone ne peut plus être modifiée.

<sup>71</sup> Voir S/2021/79, par. 81 et annexe 13.

<sup>72</sup> Voir <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>.

Figure IX  
Débris d'un missile sol-air « 358 », qui auraient été retrouvés près de Mareb



Source : <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>.

## B. Saisies

62. Le 10 février 2021 à 17 h 1, le navire américain *Winston Churchill* a observé des tentatives de transbordement de cargaison entre deux boutres qui se trouvaient à quelque 70 milles marins à l'est des côtes somaliennes (voir fig. X et carte 6). Le premier navire, un boutre dit *Chouaai*, a été intercepté à 11 h 5 le 11 février 2021, mais sa cargaison s'est révélée être vide et la mainlevée de la saisie du boutre a été obtenue cinq heures plus tard. Le second navire, un boutre plus large dit *Jelbout* a été intercepté vers 14 heures. Il transportait 3 752 fusils d'assaut de type 56-1, 198 mitrailleuses polyvalentes PK, des composants pour 82 mitrailleuses lourdes DShK, 50 fusils antimatériel AM-50 Sayyad (ainsi que 50 viseurs optiques RG-004A1) et 90 lance-roquettes (RPG-7) (voir annexe 19).

Figure X  
Tentatives de transbordement de cargaison entre deux boutres le 10 février 2021



Source : confidentielle.

63. Selon les preuves obtenues par le Groupe d'experts, l'équipage des boutres était yéménite (voir annexe 21). D'après un État Membre, l'équipage du boutre dit *Jelbout* a déclaré avoir reçu pour ordre de se rendre au port de Jask (République islamique d'Iran) en janvier 2021 afin de récupérer la cargaison, une affirmation qui semble étayée par les coordonnées du dispositif de navigation récupéré à bord<sup>73</sup> (voir annexe 19, fig. 19.20). Le Groupe d'experts ne peut néanmoins pas confirmer cette information de manière indépendante et n'a pas pu inspecter la cargaison, qui aurait déjà été détruite. D'après les images disponibles, on constate que les fusils d'assaut et quelques-unes des mitrailleuses polyvalentes ont des caractéristiques techniques et des marquages conformes à des armes fabriquées en Chine, tandis que les fusils antimatériel (et viseurs associés) et les lance-roquettes sont probablement d'origine iranienne. La République islamique d'Iran a indiqué au Groupe d'experts qu'elle rejetait tout lien avec le boutre en question et les armes saisies. Ce dernier note également que l'emballage plastique vert est comparable à celui utilisé au cours d'interdictions antérieures (voir fig. XI et tableau 1 ; S/2021/79, annexe 14, fig. 14.6 ; et S/2019/83, annexe 16, par. 17), ce qui indique une source commune.

<sup>73</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu uniquement les renseignements figurant sur la carte à l'annexe 19, figure 19.20. Il note cependant que des informations plus détaillées sur la trajectoire du navire sont fournies dans un rapport de Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime intitulé « An Iranian fingerprint? Tracing type 56-1 assault rifles in Somalia » (Une empreinte digitale iranienne ? Retracer les fusils de type 56-1 en Somalie), consultable à l'adresse suivante : <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/iran-firearms-somalia/>).

Figure XI  
Fusils d'assaut de type 56-1 enveloppés de plastique




Source : confidentielle.

64. La deuxième saisie d'armes s'est produite vers 17 heures le 6 mai 2021 lorsque le navire américain *Monterrey* a intercepté un boutre dit *Chouaaï* en mer d'Arabie, à quelque 114 milles marins au sud de la côte pakistanaise (voir carte 6). Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu la preuve que le capitaine du boutre cité était également à bord du boutre de type *Chouaaï* saisi le 11 février 2021 (voir annexe 21). Certaines armes étaient de nouveau enveloppées de plastique vert, ce que le Groupe d'experts avait déjà signalé au cours d'autres interdictions (voir [tableau 1](#) ; [S/2021/79](#), annexe 14, figure 14.6 ; et [S/2019/83](#), annexe 16, par. 7). Il a obtenu des coordonnées, à partir d'un dispositif de navigation qui aurait été trouvé à bord, selon lesquelles le boutre s'était trouvé à proximité du port de Jask le 4 mai 2021 (voir annexe 20, figure 20.44)<sup>74</sup>. Il n'est pas en mesure de vérifier cette information de manière indépendante et note que des coordonnées affichées sur un dispositif de système mondial de localisation (GPS) ne prouvent pas en soi, de manière concluante, que le navire se trouvait en ces lieux.

<sup>74</sup> Le Groupe d'experts note qu'un dispositif de navigation trouvé sur le boutre *Bahri-2*, qui avait été saisi dans le cadre d'une cargaison d'armes le 24 juin 2020, comportait également les coordonnées du port de Jask (voir [S/2021/79](#), annexe 15, figure 15.20).

Carte 6  
Saisies d'armes légères et de petit calibre, missiles antichar guidés et viseurs, 2018-2021



65. En août 2021, le Groupe d'experts a inspecté la cargaison qui comprenait 2 556 fusils d'assaut de type 56-1, 192 armes automatiques polyvalentes PKM, 100 fusils de tireur d'élite de type 85, 52 fusils antimatériel AM-50 Sayyad, 35 fusils d'assaut AKS-74U et 194 lance-roquettes RPG-7 (voir annexe 20). Les fusils d'assaut de type 56-1, les fusils de tireur d'élite et 19 des mitrailleuses polyvalentes PKM ont des caractéristiques techniques et des marquages qui sont conformes à ceux de fabrication chinoise. La plupart ont été produits par Jianshe Arsenal (usine d'État 26) entre 2016 et 2017. Parmi les mitrailleuses restantes, 164 ont des caractéristiques techniques et des marquages conformes à ceux de fabrication iranienne, 6 ont été produits en Bulgarie et 3 sont d'origine indéterminée. Les fusils d'assaut AKS-74U ont des caractéristiques techniques et des marquages conformes à ceux fabriqués à la fin des années 1980 à l'usine d'armement de Toula dans l'actuelle Fédération de Russie. Les fusils antimatériel AM-50 et les lance-roquettes RPG-7 ont des caractéristiques techniques et des marquages conformes à ceux produits en République islamique d'Iran. Le Groupe d'experts a également signalé plusieurs lunettes de visée pour arme d'épaule Ghadir, qui ont des caractéristiques conformes à celles fabriquées en République islamique d'Iran, ainsi que des lunettes de tir fabriquées au Bélarus. La République islamique d'Iran a informé le Groupe d'experts que les mitrailleuses et les lunettes de visée n'étaient pas des produits iraniens et que, selon elle, la « simple apparence ou similitude dans les marquages ou caractéristiques techniques entre ce matériel et des produits d'entreprises iraniennes ne devraient pas mener à des conclusions concernant leur origine ». Outre les armes légères et de petit calibre, le bote transportait également 50 missiles antichar filoguidés, largables à partir de

conteneurs, qui ont des caractéristiques techniques conformes à des versions des missiles 9M111 et 9M113 fabriqués entre 1978 et 1999 dans l'actuelle Fédération de Russie. Les missiles étaient emballés dans des tubes en plastique, comme cela avait été observé par le Groupe d'experts lors de saisies maritimes antérieures (voir fig. XII et tableau 1, ainsi que [S/2020/326](#), [annexe 20](#), fig. 20.1), indiquant une source commune.

Figure XII  
Missiles antichar guidés dans leur emballage



Source : confidentielle.

66. Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas reçu de réponse concernant la chaîne de possession des armes saisies. La Fédération de Russie a déclaré que ses entités militaires ne fournissaient pas d'armes au Yémen, la Bulgarie a indiqué ne disposer d'aucun dossier relatif à des mitrailleuses et la Chine n'a pas encore répondu<sup>75</sup>. La République islamique d'Iran a déclaré que les armes n'avaient pas été vendues, exportées ou transférées au Yémen. Pour ce qui est des viseurs optiques POSP, le Bélarus a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'ils avaient été exportés en République islamique d'Iran entre juin 2016 et avril 2018<sup>76</sup> et que cette dernière avait fourni un certificat d'utilisateur final, disant qu'ils seraient exclusivement utilisés pour les besoins du Ministère de la défense et de la logistique des forces armées. La

<sup>75</sup> Les années précédentes, la Chine avait informé le Groupe d'experts que les fusils d'assaut de type 56-1 qui avaient été saisis « n'avaient pas été exportés au Yémen ». Cela n'exclut cependant pas la possibilité que les armes aient été exportées à un pays tiers.

<sup>76</sup> C'est la cinquième saisie depuis 2018 de viseurs optiques du Bélarus exportés en République islamique d'Iran (voir tableau 1).



République islamique d'Iran a informé le Groupe d'experts que les viseurs étaient utilisés par ses unités militaires et n'avaient pas été réexportés, transférés ou vendus. À quelques exceptions près<sup>77</sup>, l'assortiment d'armes indique un mode d'approvisionnement commun (voir tableau 1), probablement des stocks de l'État acheminés au moyen de boutres en mer d'Arabie transportant des armes au Yémen et en Somalie<sup>78</sup> (voir S/2021/79, par. 72 à 76). Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter, en coopération avec le Groupe d'experts sur la Somalie.

67. Le Groupe d'experts enquête sur la chaîne de possession de sept viseurs d'armes thermiques RU90/120G, saisis le 22 juin 2021 au point de passage de Chahn entre Oman et le Yémen (voir fig. XIII et annexe 22). Ils sont fabriqués par Rayan Roshd Afzar, une coentreprise sino-iranienne<sup>79</sup> et avaient fait leur apparition lors de saisies antérieures aux côtés d'armes (voir S/2021/79, par. 88 et annexe 14). La République islamique d'Iran a informé le Groupe d'experts que les viseurs saisis n'avaient pas été fabriqués sur son sol. Ces faits indiquent que du matériel militaire en petites quantités continue également d'entrer au Yémen par voie terrestre<sup>80</sup>.

Figure XIII

**Viseur d'armes thermique RU90/120G saisi au point de passage de Chahn**



Source : confidentielle.

<sup>77</sup> Il s'agit notamment des fusils d'assaut AKS-74U et des fusils de tireur d'élite de type 85.

<sup>78</sup> Le rôle des réseaux criminels en Somalie dans cette filière d'approvisionnement demeure opaque. Les preuves abondent au sujet de transbordements d'armes au large des côtes somaliennes, lesquelles échouent parfois sur le marché noir somalien. On ignore cependant si elles sont d'abord transportées au Yémen et se retrouvent dans la Corne de l'Afrique à l'issue d'un trafic, ou si certaines sont déchargées directement des boutres vers les côtes somaliennes.

<sup>79</sup> Voir [www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world](http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world).

<sup>80</sup> La dernière saisie connue de cette nature au point de passage de Chahn a été effectuée le 20 mars 2019 et comprenait des munitions pour armes légères et de petit calibre et des fusées de projectile de mortier.

Tableau 1  
Armes légères et de petit calibre, missiles antichar guidés et viseurs saisis, consignés par le Groupe d'experts depuis 2018

	<i>Fusils d'assaut de type 56-1</i>	<i>Lance-roquettes RPG-7</i>	<i>Fusils antimatériel AM-50</i>	<i>Mitrailleuses PKM</i>	<i>Mitrailleuses DshK</i>	<i>Viseurs optiques du Bélarus</i>	<i>Lunettes de visée pour arme d'épaule Ghadir</i>	<i>Viseurs Rayan Roshd Afzar</i>	<i>Missiles antichar guidés (de types divers)</i>
Golfe d'Aden 28 juin 2018	X <sup>a</sup>								
Aden, 10 décembre 2018	X	X				X			
Golfe d'Aden, 25 novembre 2019									X <sup>a</sup>
Golfe d'Aden, 9 février 2020						X		X	X <sup>a</sup>
Golfe d'Aden, 17 avril 2020	X <sup>a</sup>		X	X		X	X	X	
Golfe d'Aden, 24 juin 2020	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Golfe d'Aden, 11 février 2021	X <sup>a, b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>		X <sup>b</sup>		
Golfe d'Oman, 6 mai 2021	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X		X	X		X <sup>a</sup>
Frontière de Chahn <sup>c</sup> , 22 juin 2021								X <sup>b</sup>	

Sources : le Groupe d'experts et des États Membres.

<sup>a</sup> Articles enveloppés dans des emballages analogues.


<sup>b</sup> Articles non inspectés par le Groupe d'experts.

<sup>c</sup> Chahn est un des principaux points de passage entre Oman et le Yémen (voir carte 6).

### C. Enquêtes sur la chaîne de possession

68. Les houthistes ont continué d'acquérir des composants essentiels pour leurs systèmes d'armes auprès de sociétés établies en Europe et en Asie, se servant d'un réseau complexe d'intermédiaires afin de brouiller la chaîne de possession (voir carte 7). Les quatre cas décrits ci-après illustrent ce schéma, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 8 de la résolution 2511(2020). Les États Membres ont maintes fois indiqué au Groupe d'experts que ces composants n'étaient, au regard des lois nationales, ni des armes ni des articles à double usage. Ce dernier constate néanmoins que ces composants ont des applications militaires. Les autorités de contrôle des exportations et des douanes doivent donc redoubler de vigilance pour empêcher les violations de l'embargo sur les armes ciblées.

## Carte 7 Réseaux d'approvisionnement des houthistes



69. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur la chaîne de possession d'un transmetteur de pression de série 30.600G OEM produit par BD Sensors en Allemagne, faisant partie du missile de croisière de type Quds qui avait été utilisé dans l'attaque sur Djedda le 23 novembre 2020 (voir annexe 16). Il avait consigné des transmetteurs de pression comparables dans le cadre de missiles antérieurs, dont il avait remonté la trace jusqu'à la République islamique d'Iran et la Turquie (voir S/2021/79, par. 79 et 80). Ce transmetteur a été acheté par une société établie à Oman, qui l'a importé par l'intermédiaire de la Chine en juillet 2020, quatre mois avant l'attaque. La société omanaise a agi pour le compte d'un individu qui a affirmé représenter une société au Yémen (voir annexe 23). Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas pu établir à ce jour si les transmetteurs avaient réellement été exportés d'Oman vers le Yémen (ce qui laisserait entendre que les houthistes fabriquent des missiles de croisière Quds) ou vers un autre pays, après quoi ils ont échoué au Yémen. C'est la deuxième fois, ces dernières années que la trace de composants destinés à des systèmes d'armes des houthistes remonte depuis des fournisseurs en Chine jusqu'à des entreprises commerciales à Oman (voir S/2021/79, par. 77)<sup>81</sup>.

70. Le Groupe d'experts a également enquêté sur la chaîne de possession de six moteurs hors-bord E75BEHD fabriqués par Yamaha au Japon, qu'il a attestés parmi les débris de trois engins explosifs improvisés flottants utilisés lors de l'attaque du

<sup>81</sup> Le Groupe d'experts est toujours en attente d'une réponse des autorités omanaises au sujet de la chaîne de possession de la cargaison de composants de drones aériens, après leur arrivée à Salala le 2 décembre 2018.

14 décembre 2020 contre le port de Djedda (voir annexe 12). Il est parvenu à établir que les moteurs avaient été exportés à Dawood Trading, concessionnaire général de Yamaha au Yémen, le 9 mars 2020, par l'entremise d'une autre entreprise commerciale à Oman. Le Groupe d'experts a contacté Dawood Trading, pour demander des informations au sujet de la chaîne de possession des moteurs, et attend une réponse.

71. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur la chaîne de possession d'un moteur rotatif 3W-110i B2 à deux cylindres fabriqué par 3W-Modellmotoren en Allemagne, qu'il a inspecté en octobre 2020 parmi les débris d'un drone aérien des houthistes à Mareb. Il a obtenu des preuves (voir annexe 24) indiquant que le moteur avait été commandé le 25 janvier 2018 par un individu en Chine sur la plateforme de commerce électronique Taobao.com. Une société allemande s'était donc occupée de la demande et avait commandé les moteurs au fabricant par un autre intermédiaire, un détaillant de modèles réduits, et les aurait exportés en Chine en mars 2018. Le Groupe d'experts a contacté la Chine, demandant des informations sur l'identité de l'acheteur et la chaîne de possession du moteur, et attend toujours une réponse.

Figure XIV

**Inspection d'un moteur 3W-110i B2 à Mareb**



Source : Groupe d'experts.

72. Le Groupe d'experts a également enquêté sur la chaîne de possession de turbines à gaz Titan fabriquées par AMT Pays-Bas, qu'il avait signalées en 2020 dans le cadre des missiles sol-air « 358 » (voir [S/2021/79](#), par. 81 et annexe 13). Elles ont été exportées à Hong Kong (Chine) le 10 mars 2017 et le 6 juin 2019. D'après les certificats d'utilisateur final obtenu par le Groupe d'experts, les moteurs avaient été achetés par une compagnie aérienne qui, d'après la Chine, avait cessé ses activités en 2014 et n'avait donc pas pu importer les moteurs. Le Groupe d'experts a découvert que les certificats d'utilisateur final avaient été soumis par une entreprise basée à Hong Kong (Chine), HSJ Electronic (HK), qui était le destinataire du moteur portant le numéro de série #7023, tandis que les trois autres avaient été livrés à une autre société basée à Hong Kong (Chine), Vista Automation & Communication. Selon des

archives en accès public, HSJ Electronic (HK) et Vista Automation & Communication appartenaient au même individu (voir annexe 25). Le Groupe d'experts attend toujours une réponse de la Chine au sujet de la chaîne de possession des moteurs.

## VI. Questions économiques et financières

### A. Questions économiques

#### 1. Vue d'ensemble

73. Le Groupe d'experts a examiné diverses questions concernant l'économie au Yémen, qui font peser une menace sur la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité. Depuis sept ans, le pays est imbriqué dans un conflit qui a ravagé son économie. Dans les zones non contrôlées par les houthistes, le rial yéménite s'est rapidement déprécié par rapport au dollar des États-Unis, ce qui a poussé les prix des denrées alimentaires à la hausse et fait basculer de plus en plus de personnes dans l'extrême pauvreté<sup>82</sup>. Le pays a importé quelque 90 % des produits de première nécessité et les pressions inflationnistes, déclenchées principalement par l'augmentation des prix à l'importation, sont demeurées fortes. D'après la Banque centrale du Yémen, l'inflation moyenne des prix des denrées alimentaires a dépassé 30 % en 2020<sup>83</sup>. Le produit intérieur brut réel s'est contracté de quelque 8,5 % en 2020 et la Banque mondiale prévoit une accélération rapide de l'inflation générale en 2021, qui pourrait atteindre 45 %, contre 35 % en 2020<sup>84</sup>.

#### 2. Questions économiques pouvant menacer la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité

74. La dégradation de la situation économique a entraîné des privations et suscité l'exaspération et le ressentiment de la population dans les zones non contrôlées par les houthistes et constitué un terreau fertile pour de nouveaux troubles sociaux et conflits. Les gens ordinaires perdent patience, comme en témoignent l'agitation, les manifestations et les troubles de plus en plus fréquents, dans ces zones<sup>85</sup> : ils descendent dans la rue pour dénoncer l'envolée des taux de change, l'augmentation des prix des denrées alimentaires, le non-versement des salaires, les pénuries d'électricité et la pauvreté généralisée. Certains groupes politiques ont cherché à mettre cette situation à profit.

75. Le Comité économique du Conseil de transition du Sud, sous la direction d'Aidarous Zubaidi, a tenu des réunions avec l'Association des changeurs du Sud, sans la participation de la Banque centrale du Yémen ou d'autres entités du Gouvernement yéménite, pour s'entretenir de mesures visant à atténuer les problèmes économiques engendrés par l'instabilité du taux de change<sup>86</sup>. Ces agissements de la part du Conseil sont perçus par les critiques comme une remise en cause de l'autorité de la Banque centrale et du Gouvernement yéménite au sujet des entreprises bancaires

<sup>82</sup> Voir [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021).

<sup>83</sup> Banque centrale du Yémen, *Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments*, n° 4 (septembre 2021). Le taux annuel d'inflation en 2020 était estimé à quelque 25 %, soit une hausse par rapport à un taux moyen estimé à 10 % en 2019.

<sup>84</sup> Voir [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1).

<sup>85</sup> Selon les données d'Intelyse, au 27 septembre 2021, 54 manifestations avaient été enregistrées pendant ce mois à Aden, Chaboua, Abiyan, Socotra, Lahj et dans le Hadramout. Voir <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-key-message-update-protests-intensify-south-due-further-sharp-depreciation>.

<sup>86</sup> Voir [www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225](http://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225). Durant la réunion du Groupe d'experts avec le Comité économique du Conseil de transition du Sud, le Comité a déclaré que la tenue de ces réunions visait à améliorer la situation.

et des sociétés de change, dans le cadre de la lutte de pouvoir entre le Gouvernement yéménite et le Conseil<sup>87</sup>.

76. La nature fragile du système politique et l'économie du Yémen continue d'être menacée, ce qui met en péril la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité du pays. La fragmentation consciente et systématique du système économique et des institutions du Yémen tant par le Gouvernement yéménite que par les houthistes a entraîné un dédoublement des banques centrales, des autorités douanières et fiscales, des économies, des services de renseignements financiers et des autorités des télécommunications et suscité des lois et des politiques économiques, commerciales, bancaires, tarifaires et fiscales distinctes, dans les deux régions (voir annexe 26).

77. La communauté internationale doit prendre acte de la gravité de la crise économique et adopter des mesures concrètes pour empêcher de nouvelles divisions au Yémen, ce qui pourrait entraîner un fait accompli irréversible. En l'absence d'améliorations rapides de la situation politique et de l'état de la sécurité, les futures perspectives économiques semblent lugubres, ce qui concourt à l'instabilité du pays<sup>88</sup>.

## **B. Contrôle des ressources financières par des personnes désignées et leurs réseaux**

78. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur les fonds, autres avoirs financiers et ressources économiques qui sont en la possession ou sous le contrôle direct ou indirect des personnes désignées, au titre du régime des sanctions imposé par la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) du Conseil de sécurité ou de toute personne ou entité agissant pour le compte ou sur les ordres de celles-ci, ou de toute entité en leur possession ou sous leur contrôle, en violation des dispositions de la résolution [2140 \(2014\)](#). Elles utiliseraient les méthodes suivantes pour financer leurs activités :

- a) Confiscation d'avoirs et de fonds de personnes et d'entités ;
- b) Perception de fonds par des sources se trouvant au-delà des frontières ;
- c) Participation à des échanges sur le marché noir et imposition de redevances illégales sur l'importation de carburant et d'autres activités commerciales ;
- d) Contrefaçon, contrebande et trafic de stupéfiants, de drogues et de substances psychotropes, de billets de banque, d'antiquités et d'autres objets d'art ;
- e) Collecte de recettes non fiscales et de la zakat ;
- f) Collecte de taxes et de droits de douane.

79. On trouvera ci-après des détails sur quelques-unes de ces sources de financement.

### **1. Confiscation des fonds d'Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi et d'autres**

80. Le président du tribunal pénal spécialisé de Sanaa a adressé une note le 27 juin 2021 à la banque Tadhamon pour l'aviser que les fonds gelés se trouvant dans les trois comptes bancaires spécifiés conservés à la banque au nom d'Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi avaient été confisqués par le tribunal, qui avait reconnu ce dernier coupable des

<sup>87</sup> Durant la réunion du Groupe d'experts avec le Comité économique qui s'est tenue à Aden le 21 août 2021, ce dernier a déclaré qu'il avait dû intervenir, le Gouvernement yéménite et la Banque centrale du Yémen ne s'étant pas accompli dûment de leurs tâches, ce qui avait entraîné l'effondrement du rial yéménite et une augmentation des prix des produits de première nécessité.

<sup>88</sup> Voir [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021).

accusations retenues contre lui et notamment d'avoir « compromis l'indépendance de la République du Yémen »<sup>89</sup>.

81. La banque Tadhamon a été enjointe par le tribunal de transférer ces fonds à des comptes précis à la banque centrale du Yémen à Sanaa, gérés sous la supervision du procureur public. La banque a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'elle considérait ce transfert comme une violation des dispositions de la résolution 2140 (2014). Elle a donc informé le gouverneur de la banque centrale à Sanaa et le procureur du tribunal pénal spécialisé qu'elle ne serait pas en position de transférer ces fonds. Le Groupe d'experts a appris que les fonds n'avaient pas été transférés par la banque Tadhamon à la banque centrale à Sanaa au 17 novembre 2021. Il estime que le gel et la confiscation de ces comptes pourraient constituer une violation des droits humains et du droit international humanitaire<sup>90</sup>.

82. Le Groupe d'experts a appris, à l'issue des enquêtes menées, que les tribunaux avaient ordonné le transfert des fonds et des avoirs de certaines entités conservés dans une banque vers des comptes spécifiés à la banque centrale du Yémen à Sanaa, mais que la banque concernée n'avait pas procédé à ces transferts. Il continue d'enquêter sur l'affaire (voir annexe 27).

## 2. Confiscation des fonds de la banque Tadhamon

83. La banque centrale du Yémen à Sanaa a émis une circulaire le 28 juin 2021, le jour où la banque Tadhamon lui avait fait part de son incapacité de transférer les fonds confisqués à Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, et elle a donné pour instruction à l'ensemble des établissements et sociétés de change opérant dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes de geler tous les fonds et soldes de la banque Tadhamon déposés chez eux et de les transférer immédiatement à la banque centrale du Yémen à Sanaa (voir annexe 28). La banque Tadhamon a indiqué n'avoir aucun compte avec un établissement ou une société de change. Le Groupe d'experts a estimé que les représailles de la banque centrale du Yémen à Sanaa, à savoir le fait d'ordonner la confiscation de fonds et de soldes de banques opérant dans les zones se trouvant sous son contrôle, avaient un effet néfaste sur le bon fonctionnement du secteur bancaire et de l'économie, ainsi que de la stabilité du Yémen.

## 3. Recettes du secteur des télécommunications

84. Malgré le conflit en cours, le secteur des télécommunications au Yémen a continué de connaître une croissance importante et a été une source principale de revenus pour les autorités houthistes. Les sociétés opérant dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes ont connu des incertitudes sur le plan politique, se sont vues imposer des redevances et des charges illégales et ont été assujetties à de l'extorsion et à la confiscation de leurs biens. Elles se sont vues délibérément attribuer des licences de courte durée, l'objectif étant de susciter un flottement sur le plan des opérations<sup>91</sup>. Le

<sup>89</sup> Le Groupe d'experts estime qu'au vu de la nature politique de cette affaire, le tribunal pénal spécialisé Amana à Sanaa agissait sous le contrôle ou sur instruction d'Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004).

<sup>90</sup> Voir Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme (1948), art. 17 ; Charte arabe des droits de l'homme de 2004, art. 31 (consultable à l'adresse suivante : <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/551368?ln=en>) ; Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 et relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (Protocole II), art. 4 2) g) ; et Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR), base de données sur le droit international humanitaire coutumier, règles 50 et 52.

<sup>91</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations de sources confidentielles selon lesquelles des frais de renouvellement annuel se chiffrent à 13,2 millions de dollars avaient été perçus par le ministère des télécommunications auprès de sociétés de télécommunications à Sanaa et, compte tenu des

Groupe d'experts a enquêté pour établir l'étendue du contrôle exercé par les houthistes sur les principales sociétés de télécommunications, à savoir MTN, Sabafon, TeleYemen et Y Telecom (voir annexe 29). TeleYemen à Sanaa a nié toute mainmise de la part des houthistes et déclaré que sa direction avait été nommée avant le conflit en cours. Le Gouvernement yéménite a affirmé cependant avoir transféré le siège principal de TeleYemen à Aden et l'avoir gardée sous son contrôle. TeleYemen à Sanaa a déclaré que ce transfert ne lui avait jamais été officiellement communiqué et qu'elle ne le reconnaissait donc pas au regard des statuts de la compagnie : 80 % des actionnaires de Sabafon avaient décidé de transférer le siège central de Sabafon à Aden en 2020. Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer, proche associé d'Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004), a participé à la prise de contrôle de la gestion de Sabafon<sup>92</sup>.

85. Le Groupe d'experts enquête pour savoir si les houthistes ont obtenu effectivement le contrôle du domaine de premier niveau «.ye » et s'ils utilisent un « système de gestion de la bande passante » acquis par TeleYemen à Sanaa. Le contrôle du domaine de premier niveau et l'utilisation illégale d'instruments de télécommunications pourraient donner aux houthistes la capacité de surveiller et d'intercepter le trafic, de censurer du contenu, de procéder à des coupures d'Internet, d'interdire des sites de médias sociaux et des services de messagerie personnelle, de surveiller les communications privées d'opposants et de bloquer des domaines, dans toutes les régions du pays. Certains affirment que les houthistes se servent de ce matériel pour surveiller le trafic de données, de messages écrits ou vocaux et de vidéos contre leurs opposants. TeleYemen à Sanaa a précisé au Groupe d'experts que « les lois du Yémen exigeaient » des fournisseurs d'accès à Internet qu'ils « filtrent un certain contenu qui contrevenait à la loi et à la doctrine islamique et qu'ils s'en servent pour protéger les enfants contre tout contenu inapproprié, cet usage n'étant pas illégal »<sup>93</sup>.

86. Le Groupe d'experts enquête sur un cas de saisie par les autorités douanières yéménites à Mahara de matériel de télécommunications importé par une société sise à Sanaa, qui n'avait pas obtenu une licence ou l'aval du Ministère des télécommunications et des technologies de l'information du Gouvernement yéménite.

87. Le Gouvernement yéménite a informé le Groupe d'experts qu'il avait saisi de nombreuses cargaisons de matériel de télécommunication, dont des dizaines parvenaient aux houthistes par le truchement des réseaux de contrebande. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter. La population civile doit fondamentalement avoir accès aux services de télécommunications et ne devrait pas subir les conséquences néfastes de toute mesure prise concernant ce secteur (voir annexe 29).

#### 4. Marché noir et redevances illégales sur l'importation de carburant

88. Avant le mois de juin 2020, c'est principalement par le port d'Hodeïda qu'était importé le carburant au Yémen (48 %) ; depuis, un changement considérable a été opéré dans cette méthode d'importation. En avril et en mai 2021, la part d'importations de carburant arrivant au port de Hodeïda a baissé à 8 %<sup>94</sup> (voir annexe 31). Selon le Gouvernement yéménite<sup>95</sup>, le volume de carburant acheminé par

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redevances d'utilisation des fréquences et des frais de gestion, le revenu total perçu auprès de MTN et Sabafon par les houthistes était de quelque 22 millions de dollars par an.

<sup>92</sup> Lettre adressée au Groupe d'experts par le Gouvernement yéménite et sources confidentielles. Le 29 juillet 2019, Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer [frère de Saleh Mesfer Saleh Al-Shaer (YEi.007)], a été désigné directeur général de Sabafon à Sanaa (voir S/2020/326, annexe 26).

<sup>93</sup> Lettre datée du 17 décembre 2021, adressée au Groupe d'experts par TeleYemen à Sanaa.

<sup>94</sup> Voir le communiqué de presse du Gouvernement yéménite, consultable à l'adresse suivante : [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405).

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.



voie terrestre dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes en avril et en mai 2021 était de 10 000 tonnes par jour, soit quelque 65 % du carburant importé au Yémen, contre 6 000 tonnes de janvier à mars 2021<sup>96</sup>, dénotant une tendance à la hausse. Selon diverses sources, les houthistes ont créé des pénuries artificielles pour contraindre les négociants à vendre le carburant sur le marché noir qu'ils contrôlaient, percevant ainsi des redevances illégales sur les ventes. D'après les informations communiquées par le Gouvernement yéménite, les houthistes ont touché des recettes officielles sur les importations de carburant (taxes douanières et autres, par le port de Hodeïda) d'un montant supérieur à 70 milliards de rials yéménites<sup>97</sup>.

89. Le Groupe d'experts a appris que les négociants devaient non seulement s'acquitter des droits de douane au premier port d'importation dans les zones non contrôlées par les houthistes, mais verser aussi des redevances et des droits supplémentaires imposés illégalement par les houthistes à leurs postes de douane<sup>98</sup>. Le commerce de carburant dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes s'est avéré très lucratif pour bon nombre d'entités, tandis que les consommateurs finaux en faisaient les frais : le Gouvernement yéménite a vu ses recettes douanières augmenter au moyen des importations transitant par les ports qu'il contrôlait ; le Conseil de transition du Sud a touché également par la voie des importateurs des droits se chiffrant à quelque 12 rials yéménites par litre de carburant importé par le port d'Aden<sup>99</sup>. De leur côté, les importateurs et les commerçants ont saisi cette occasion pour s'enrichir (voir annexe 31). Le Groupe d'experts a été informé que l'augmentation du prix du carburant avait eu des retombées négatives sur les partenaires de réalisation des organisations humanitaires internationales.

## 5. Contrefaçon de billets de banque

90. Aux paragraphes 142 à 144 et à l'annexe 53 de son rapport daté du 26 janvier 2018 (S/2018/594) et au paragraphe 125 de son rapport daté du 25 janvier 2019 (S/2019/83), le Groupe d'experts a évoqué une affaire relative à la saisie le 25 mai 2017 dans le secteur de Jaouf, contrôlé par le Gouvernement, d'un camion transportant des billets à ordre, en coupures de 5 000 rials yéménites, d'une valeur totale de 35 milliards de rials yéménites (soit 140 millions de dollars) imprimés hors du Yémen. Il a cité cette affaire afin d'illustrer comment les houthistes cherchaient à régler les déficits de trésorerie au moyen de l'impression et de l'introduction des billets à ordre au Yémen, pour servir de monnaie légale.

91. La Haute Cour régionale de Francfort-sur-le-Main (Allemagne), en mars 2018, a condamné Reza Heidari, un Iranien résidant en Allemagne, à une peine de sept années de prison. En 2021, le Groupe d'experts a obtenu de nouveaux renseignements et éléments de preuve sur cette affaire, ainsi que le texte de l'arrêt au fond daté du 15 mai 2020, confirmant la peine privative de liberté de cinq ans au vu de l'implication de Heidari dans cette affaire. Le Groupe d'experts poursuit son enquête.

<sup>96</sup> Voir <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>.

<sup>97</sup> Voir [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405).

<sup>98</sup> Un importateur a déclaré par exemple que les houthistes percevaient 37 rials yéménites par litre depuis février 2021.

<sup>99</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a été informé par un importateur qui versait précédemment 7 rials yéménites par litre, à la demande du Conseil de transition du Sud, que ce montant était passé, depuis avril 2021, à 12 rials yéménites par litre, montant déposé dans un compte spécifié auprès d'une société de change à Aden (par souci de sécurité, les détails ne sont pas communiqués dans le présent rapport). Durant l'entretien du Groupe d'experts avec le Comité économique du Conseil de transition du Sud à Aden le 21 août 2021, le Comité a précisé que ce montant représentait les taxes locales.

### C. Dépôt saoudien

92. Dans son précédent rapport final, le Groupe d'experts avait signalé la mise en place d'un mécanisme concernant le dépôt saoudien (voir [S/2021/79](#)). Les renseignements reçus après la publication du rapport ont apporté un éclairage nouveau sur les données présentées dans le rapport. Le Groupe d'experts a donc actualisé ledit rapport pour indiquer qu'il ne fallait pas tenir compte de la section IX.B de l'annexe 28 et du texte s'y rapportant au tableau 1 et de la recommandation figurant au paragraphe 161, en attendant une évaluation finale. Il a donc procédé à un examen, qui est décrit intégralement à l'annexe 32.

93. Durant son examen, le Groupe d'experts a contacté toutes les parties concernées et passé en revue les renseignements actualisés communiqués, notamment sur les opérations menées après la présentation du précédent rapport final du Groupe d'experts. L'examen a révélé que les importateurs, qui avaient tiré profit du dépôt saoudien, avaient touché d'importants bénéfices d'un montant total de 370,27 millions de dollars, en raison de l'écart entre les taux du marché et les taux de couverture de la lettre de crédit adoptés par la Banque centrale du Yémen dans la mise en place du mécanisme lié au dépôt saoudien. L'examen du Groupe d'experts a mis en évidence les lacunes dans la mise en place dudit mécanisme, qui aurait pu permettre aux importateurs de conserver les bénéfices obtenus, sans en faire répercuter le coût sur le consommateur.

94. Sur la base des informations et des éléments recueillis, comme détaillé à l'annexe 32, l'examen final du Groupe d'experts n'a pas révélé de preuves irréfutables permettant de corroborer les allégations de corruption, de blanchiment d'argent ou d'accaparement de ressources par les élites.

### D. Surveillance des mesures d'interdiction de voyager et de gel des avoirs

95. Sultan Saleh Aida Zabin (YEi.006), directeur du département des enquêtes criminelles à Sanaa, a été désigné par le Conseil de sécurité le 25 février 2021 par l'adoption de la résolution [2564 \(2021\)](#). D'après un article de presse, le 5 avril 2021, le ministère de l'intérieur a annoncé le décès de Zabin à la suite d'une maladie en phase terminale<sup>100</sup>. Le Groupe d'expert n'a pas encore obtenu de preuves confirmant le décès de Zabin.

## VII. Actes commis en violation du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme

96. Les violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme et les atteintes à ces droits sont systématiques au Yémen et commis par toutes les parties qui bénéficient d'une impunité généralisée. Le système judiciaire est défaillant et les autorités et les forces de sécurité tiennent rarement compte des quelques cas d'arrestation ou de détention arbitraires à l'issue desquels des ordonnances ou des décisions ont été rendues<sup>101</sup>. Le pouvoir judiciaire n'est donc pas

<sup>100</sup> Voir [www.yagency.net/354210](http://www.yagency.net/354210).

<sup>101</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a consigné trois cas d'ordonnance de libération d'un détenu dont les autorités n'avaient pas tenu compte (pour ce qui est des attaques commises contre des membres de l'appareil judiciaire, voir [S/2021/79](#), par. 130 et 131). Durant la présente période considérée, le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur trois cas supplémentaires.

en mesure de s'acquitter de ses fonctions préventives ou protectives contre les atteintes aux droits humains<sup>102</sup>.

97. Les arrestations et détentions arbitraires de journalistes et de défenseurs des droits humains et les menaces dont ils font l'objet ont continué d'être généralisées tout au long de la période considérée, ce qui a entravé la capacité de ces personnes de consigner les violations et d'en rendre compte (voir annexe 34)<sup>103</sup>.

98. Non seulement les personnes rescapées ne disposent pas de recours, elles n'ont virtuellement aucune aide disponible ; celles qui ont été arbitrairement détenues, torturées ou dépouillées de leurs biens n'ont souvent plus rien. La majeure partie d'entre elles ne peuvent pas réintégrer leur foyer, étant soumises à des menaces constantes, tout comme les ménages dont le principal soutien de famille est porté disparu ou est détenu. Dans les deux cas, les femmes sont particulièrement exposées (voir par. 41).

99. La prolongation du conflit retarde l'établissement des mécanismes de justice et de recours. Il est fondamental de garantir la protection des personnes qui consignent ces violations et de préserver leurs archives.

## A. Actes et attaques attribués à la Coalition

### 1. Frappes aériennes de la Coalition

100. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur six raids aériens menés par la Coalition en 2021 : a) le 16 janvier à Mahliya (Mareb) ; b) le 28 février à Haouak (Hodeïda) ; c) le 7 mars à Tahoura (Sanaa) ; d) le 10 mai à Radaa (Beïda) ; e) le 21 mars in Salif (Hodeïda) ; et f) le 18 septembre à Markha el-Ouliya (Chaboua). Ils ont fait 12 morts parmi les civils, dont 2 enfants et 1 femme, et 13 blessés, dont 3 enfants et 3 femmes. Le Groupe d'experts a achevé ses enquêtes concernant les raids aériens du 16 janvier et du 28 février (voir annexe 33).

101. En 2020 et en 2021, l'Arabie saoudite a communiqué des détails au Groupe d'experts au sujet du versement de dédommagements aux victimes de 10 attaques<sup>104</sup>, dont une contre l'hôpital de Hajja le 15 août 2016, qui fait l'objet d'une enquête par le Groupe d'experts<sup>105</sup>.

### 2. Détentions par les Émirats arabes unis

102. Le Groupe d'experts enquête sur des cas d'arrestation et de détention arbitraires, de disparitions forcées et de torture impliquant des membres du personnel des Émirats arabes unis au Yémen. D'après les preuves obtenues, trois personnes ont été détenues de 2018 à 2021 dans les sites suivants, contrôlés par les forces émiriennes : Balhaf (Chaboua) ; l'aéroport de Rayyan (Moukalla) ; le port pétrolier de Doubba et de Chehr (Hadramout) ; et le port de Mokha (Taëz) (voir annexe 34). Dans une lettre adressée au Groupe d'experts, les Émirats arabes unis ont nié les allégations de violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme commises par leurs ressortissants dans le cadre de la détention.

<sup>102</sup> Voir Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, art. 8, et Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, art. 2.

<sup>103</sup> Voir également S/2021/79, Section XI. E.

<sup>104</sup> Le Groupe d'experts n'a pas encore été en mesure de confirmer.

<sup>105</sup> Voir S/2018/193, appendice C, annexe 49. Les autres attaques se sont produites le 2 mai, 2 et 11 juillet 2015, 30 août et 9 septembre 2015, le 10 septembre 2016, le 19 décembre 2017, le 21 mai 2019 et le 6 août 2020.

103. Les Émirats arabes unis ont informé le Groupe d'experts que les allégations de violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme ayant trait à la détention avaient été transmises à l'équipe conjointe chargée des évaluations relatives aux faits<sup>106</sup>, laquelle a confirmé que si elle avait enquêté sur une affaire ayant trait à une détention concernant six navires de pêche et quelque 90 pêcheurs, qui remontait à mars 2018, les activités de lutte contre le terrorisme n'étaient pas de son ressort.

104. Les Émirats arabes unis ont ajouté qu'ils avaient coopéré avec le Directeur de la sécurité à Aden, le général de division Shallal Ali Shaye, de décembre 2015 à juillet 2020<sup>107</sup> dans le cadre des opérations de lutte contre le terrorisme, menées par la Coalition, à la suite d'une décision du Gouvernement yéménite promulguée à la fin de 2015. Durant la période susmentionnée, le Groupe d'experts a étayé plusieurs cas de violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme attribuées à Shaye ou à ses forces<sup>108</sup>.

## B. Détention par le Gouvernement yéménite

105. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur 18 cas d'arrestation et de détention arbitraires par les forces gouvernementales dans le Hadramout, à Mareb, à Chaboua et à Taëz dont un cas concernant une femme (voir annexe 34). À Taëz, deux cas avaient trait à la 170<sup>e</sup> Brigade, dont un cas de civil mort en détention<sup>109</sup> et un troisième à la 22<sup>e</sup> Brigade dite « Mika ». À Chaboua, la plupart des arrestations et détentions arbitraires semblaient être à motivation politique, cinq des sept cas confirmés concernant des membres ou des partisans du Conseil de transition du Sud, dont un mineur.

## C. Détentions dans les zones contrôlées par le Conseil de transition du Sud

106. Durant la période considérée, le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur 16 cas d'arrestation et de détention arbitraires par des groupes armés affiliés au Conseil de transition du Sud à Aden, Lahj et Socotra, dont ceux de deux journalistes (voir annexe 34).

107. Trois des cas ont trait à des allégations de détention par le bureau de lutte contre le terrorisme dans une prison non officielle, dans un complexe du Conseil à Aden<sup>110</sup>.

<sup>106</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur plusieurs cas de violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme par des responsables émiriens au Yémen, dans le cadre de la détention. Voir S/2021/79, par. 127, S/2020/326, par. 100 et 101, S/2019/83 par. 142, S/2018/594, par. 166 à 172 et S/2018/193, par. 132 à 134. En décembre 2018, dans une lettre adressée au Groupe d'experts, les Émirats arabes unis ont nié toute implication dans ces violations au Yémen et déclaré qu'il n'existait pas de centres de détention ou de détenus dans les camps de leurs forces présentes au Yémen. Ils ont également informé le Groupe d'experts que toutes les opérations d'arrestation et les procédures ultérieures étaient à l'époque menées par le Gouvernement yéménite. En juillet 2021, ils ont confirmé au Groupe d'experts la teneur de ladite lettre.

<sup>107</sup> Le général de division Shaye était absent d'Aden de mars à décembre 2020. Les Émirats arabes unis ont déclaré qu'ils n'avaient pas traité avec lui depuis qu'il avait quitté son poste de Directeur de la sécurité à Aden.

<sup>108</sup> Voir S/2021/79, par. 132 et annexe 32 ; S/2020/326, par. 100 et 101 et 105 à 108 et annexe 28 ; S/2019/83, par. 58 et annexe 41 ; et S/2018/594, par. 180 et 181 et annexe 65.

<sup>109</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des preuves selon lesquelles il avait été tué par balle et que son corps portait des marques de violence.

<sup>110</sup> 12°46'32.1" N, 44°59'18.9" E.

108. Deux cas de personnes tuées par balle à des points de passage contrôlés par la 9<sup>e</sup> Brigade dans le secteur de Tour el-Baha (Lahj) sont particulièrement préoccupants.

109. À Aden, 14 personnes accusées d'avoir participé à des attaques contre des mosquées et des membres du clergé font actuellement l'objet de poursuites. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des preuves selon lesquelles au moins 10 d'entre elles avaient été torturées en détention et contraintes de signer des aveux, dont le président du tribunal n'a pas tenu compte.

110. Le Groupe d'experts a également obtenu des preuves selon lesquelles trois hommes portés disparus à Aden depuis 2016 avaient été détenus durant un moment à la prison de Mansoura, avant d'être remis aux forces antiterroristes par les autorités pénitentiaires<sup>111</sup>.

111. En février 2021, des membres du pouvoir judiciaire ont entamé une grève dans le sud du Yémen pour dénoncer des allégations de corruption au conseil judiciaire. En août 2021, le Groupe d'experts a appris que plusieurs détenus n'avaient pas été libérés en raison de la grève et que les autorités judiciaires avaient accepté de reprendre leurs travaux deux fois par semaine. Cela ne suffira cependant pas à rattraper l'arriéré d'affaires. Par conséquent, plusieurs détenus continueront de voir leur détention prolongée ou leur procès reporté.

112. À Socotra, les trois cas consignés concernaient des civils qui avaient critiqué le Conseil de transition du Sud. Ils ont été arrêtés pendant de courtes durées et aucun d'entre eux n'a été officiellement inculpé (voir annexe 34).

## **D. Détention par les Forces conjointes sur la côte ouest**

113. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur six cas de violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme à Heïs, Khokha et Mokha. Quatre cas concernaient les Forces de la Résistance nationale et les autres les première et septième Brigades des Amaliqa (voir annexe 34). Un cas avait trait à un mineur qui était détenu depuis près de deux ans. Dans aucun des cas relatifs à des détentions dont la durée allait de 4 à 23 mois, les victimes n'ont été présentées devant un organe judiciaire ou un autre organe impartial. Les Forces de la Résistance nationale ont informé le Groupe d'experts que les tribunaux à Heïs n'étaient pas opérationnels, du fait des hostilités.

## **E. Attaques attribuées aux houthistes**

### **1. Emploi d'engins explosifs contre des civils**

#### **a) Pilonnages**

114. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur huit faits d'emploi indiscriminé d'engins explosifs par les houthistes dans des zones peuplées de Mareb et de Taëz, qui auraient fait 33 morts, dont 8 enfants, et 51 blessés, dont 11 enfants (voir annexe 36)<sup>112</sup>.

115. Depuis le début de 2021, d'intenses combats autour de Mareb ont eu de graves répercussions sur les civils. Plusieurs attaques à l'aide d'engins explosifs tels que des obus d'artillerie ont touché des camps de déplacés, faisant des morts et des blessés

<sup>111</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a eu accès à la correspondance qui s'est déroulée de novembre 2020 à janvier 2021 entre le directeur de la prison de Mansoura et le Directeur des services de sécurité à Aden. La date du transfert n'avait pas été précisée.

<sup>112</sup> Dans certains cas, le Groupe d'experts n'a pas réussi à vérifier le nombre exact de victimes, tout en ayant obtenu des informations de sources multiples.

parmi les civils et détruisant des biens de caractère civil. Elles ont également entraîné le déplacement de bon nombre de personnes qui avaient déjà été déplacées à plusieurs reprises, ce qui a augmenté leurs besoins et leur vulnérabilité. Du 8 au 17 février, le camp de Zour a été attaqué au moins deux fois, notamment par les houthistes qui l'ont investi et y ont posé des mines terrestres ; du 19 au 21 février, les camps de Saouabin et de Hayalan ont été attaqués au moins deux fois ; du 16 mars au 4 avril, le camp de Milh a été attaqué cinq fois, celui de Taouassoul deux fois, celui de Kheïr deux fois, celui de Dhat el-Raa une fois et celui de Soueïda une fois<sup>113</sup>.

116. Ces faits démontrent un mépris constant de la part des houthistes à l'égard des principes de distinction et de protection des civils. Le Groupe d'experts a noté l'emploi d'un drone aérien au cours d'une attaque au moins à Mareb (voir fig. XV). Selon l'analyse du Groupe d'experts, les drones aériens des houthistes sont d'une grande précision.

117. Les attaques systématiques contre des zones peuplées de Taëz et de Mareb, à une certaine distance de lignes frontalières actives, peuvent être considérées comme des actes visant à propager la terreur contre la population civile, ce qui est proscrit au regard du droit international humanitaire (voir annexe 36)<sup>114</sup>.

Figure XV

**Débris d'un drone aérien utilisé dans l'attaque de Mareb**



Source : confidentielle.

<sup>113</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des rapports des autorités de Mareb et du Gouvernement yéménite, procédé à des entretiens et obtenu des vidéos, des images et des rapports de sources locales ayant un accès direct aux camps. Il a pris note de la lettre datée du 26 avril 2021, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le Représentant permanent du Yémen auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (voir [S/2021/405](#)).

<sup>114</sup> Voir Protocole additionnel II aux Conventions de Genève de 1949, art. 13 (2) ; et CICR, base de données sur le droit international humanitaire coutumier, règle 2.

## b) Mines terrestres, engins explosifs improvisés et engins non explosés

118. L'emploi indiscriminé de mines terrestres et d'engins explosifs improvisés par les houthistes est généralisé et systématique. Le Groupe d'experts a attesté depuis 2016 l'effet dévastateur qu'il avait sur les civils (voir [S/2021/79](#), par. 140 à 142, [S/2020/326](#), par. 115 à 117 et [S/2018/193](#), annexes 43 et 44).

119. Durant la période considérée, le Groupe d'experts a réuni des preuves considérables sur la question, en particulier durant sa visite en août sur la côte ouest, une des régions les plus touchées. On trouvera ses constatations à l'annexe 35.

## 2. Détention

120. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur 17 cas concernant 50 victimes de violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme, dans le cadre de la détention, notamment des violences sexuelles et des actes de torture par les autorités houthistes<sup>115</sup>. Six journalistes et 11 femmes figurent parmi les victimes (voir annexe 34)<sup>116</sup>.

121. Depuis 2019, le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur les cas de 10 individus<sup>117</sup>, dont un mineur arrêté dans le cadre de l'assassinat, en avril 2018, du président du conseil politique suprême des houthistes, Saleh al-Samad. Les individus ont été arrêtés entre septembre et octobre 2018 et détenus dans un lieu secret. Leurs familles étaient sans nouvelles sur le sort qui leur avait été réservé, jusqu'au moment de l'ouverture de leur procès, le 17 avril 2019, présidé par le juge Amin Ali Ahmed Zabara, qui a été retransmis à la télévision<sup>118</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des preuves selon lesquelles ils avaient été torturés et contraints de signer des aveux. Cela a été mentionné durant les audiences au tribunal, mais aucune mesure n'a été prise. L'un d'entre eux est mort en détention le 7 août 2019, supposément à la suite d'actes de torture. Le Groupe d'experts a également obtenu des preuves de nombreuses violations du droit des détenus à une procédure régulière : non seulement leurs aveux ont été obtenus sous la torture et utilisés comme preuves à charge, mais le procès a débuté sans qu'ils aient accès à un conseil. Leurs avocats ont dû demander maintes fois l'accès aux éléments de preuve. À plusieurs occasions, les accusés n'ont pas pu rencontrer leurs avocats avant les audiences. Les avocats ont été avisés en dernière minute de la tenue des audiences, ce qui leur a laissé très peu de temps pour se préparer. Le 24 août 2020, les neuf accusés ont tous été condamnés à mort, ce qui a été confirmé en appel<sup>119</sup>, et soumis à des exécutions publiques. Leurs familles ont été notifiées la veille de l'exécution. Comme beaucoup d'entre elles vivaient à Hodeïda, elles n'ont pas pu se rendre à temps à Sanaa.

122. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur le cas de quatre journalistes condamnés à mort, qui sont toujours détenus à Sanaa<sup>120</sup>. D'après les informations obtenues, des entretiens s'étaient déroulés durant la période considérée pour obtenir qu'ils fassent partie d'un échange de prisonniers, mais ils n'ont pas produit de résultats.

<sup>115</sup> Voir notamment les Conventions de Genève, article 3 commun ; Protocole II additionnel aux Conventions de Genève de 1949, art. 4 à 6 ; et CICR, base de données sur le droit international humanitaire coutumier, règles 90, 93, 98, 100, 123 et 125.

<sup>116</sup> Voir [S/2020/326](#), par. 22 et 118 ; et [S/2021/79](#), par 137.

<sup>117</sup> Les preuves consistaient en entretiens, rapports et pièces judiciaires provenant d'au moins six sources différentes, dont des proches des victimes.

<sup>118</sup> Voir [www.almanar.com.lb/5135682](http://www.almanar.com.lb/5135682).

<sup>119</sup> Selon des informations obtenues par le Groupe d'experts, les juges d'appel étaient Abdel Hafiz Abdel Razzaq al-Mahbachi, Hammoud Ahmed al-Qouleissi et Mohamed Lotf el-Zoubeïri.

<sup>120</sup> Voir [S/2021/79](#), par. 147.

### 3. Recrutement d'enfants

123. Le Groupe d'experts a reçu une liste de 1 406 enfants recrutés par les houthistes, qui sont décédés sur le champ de bataille en 2020. Il a également obtenu une liste de 562 enfants recrutés par les houthistes, qui sont décédés sur le champ de bataille entre janvier et mai 2021<sup>121</sup>. Ils avaient de 10 à 17 ans, et bon nombre d'entre eux ont été tués à Amran, Dhamar, Hajja, Hodeïda, Ebb, Saada et Sanaa (voir annexe 10).

### 4. Persécution et discrimination au motif de la religion

124. Le Groupe d'experts a confirmé la persécution systématique des juifs dans les zones contrôlées par les houthistes. La majeure partie de la population juive avait quitté le Yémen après plusieurs années de persécution, qui avait commencé durant le mandat de l'ancien Président Ali Abdullah Saleh, et s'est intensifiée lors de la prise du pouvoir par les houthistes. Le Groupe d'experts sait que sept juifs se trouvent encore au Yémen, dont l'un est toujours en détention, malgré une ordonnance de libération émise en juillet 2019. Il a également confirmé deux cas de chrétiens détenus par les houthistes au motif de la religion (voir annexe 34).

125. Les procédures judiciaires contre plusieurs bahaïs se sont poursuivies, malgré l'expulsion de plusieurs d'entre eux du Yémen<sup>122</sup>, l'objectif étant entre autres de parachever la saisie de leurs biens et de leurs propriétés. Dans un discours prononcé en mars 2021, Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) a accusé des « Américains d'avoir cherché à implanter le bahaïsme, l'ahmadisme et l'athéisme au Yémen afin de porter atteinte à l'islam »<sup>123</sup>, démontrant un appui à cette politique de persécution systématique<sup>124</sup>.

### 5. Attaques contre les civils

126. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur des attaques menées en janvier 2021 par les houthistes contre des civils dans plusieurs villages de la région de Hima (Taëz). Selon les informations, les rapports et les témoignages obtenus<sup>125</sup>, l'attaque a fait 13 morts, dont 1 enfant, et 47 blessés, dont 7 enfants et 7 femmes ; 257 personnes ont été arrêtées, dont 14 enfants, et quelque 150 familles ont été déplacées. Au moins trois écoles ont été capturées et utilisées par les houthistes à des fins militaires et de détention. Le secteur de Hima avait été attaqué dans le passé en décembre 2017 et en avril 2019.

127. Vers la fin de septembre 2021, les houthistes ont encerclé le district d'Abdiya (Mareb) et en ont bloqué l'accès par la route. Pendant quelques semaines, les civils ont subi des pénuries alimentaires et de médicaments<sup>126</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des informations sur 59 hommes arrêtés par les houthistes durant cette période<sup>127</sup>,

<sup>121</sup> Ces listes ont été établies par une source confidentielle et le Gouvernement yéménite, à l'aide d'annonces faites par les houthistes dans les médias. Le Groupe d'experts a également obtenu un rapport comportant les noms de 640 enfants. Il est disposé à communiquer ces listes au Comité.

<sup>122</sup> Voir S/2021/79, par. 139.

<sup>123</sup> Voir <https://web.archive.org/web/20210310212347/> et [www.almasirah.net/post/181849/](http://www.almasirah.net/post/181849/).

<sup>124</sup> Voir S/2021/79, par. 139 ; S/2019/83, par. 154 ; et S/2018/193, par. 149.

<sup>125</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations de sources locales et d'organisations non gouvernementales, à savoir des photographies, des rapports et des vidéos.

<sup>126</sup> Cela est dû principalement à l'obstruction du passage des articles commerciaux. Selon les informations reçues par le Groupe d'experts, la distribution de denrées alimentaires par le Programme alimentaire mondial à quelque 15 000 personnes s'est déroulée au début de septembre et à la fin d'octobre, comme prévu au départ.

<sup>127</sup> Selon des informations de presse, 52 personnes ont été libérées le 4 novembre : voir [www.saba.ye/ar/news3162733.htm](http://www.saba.ye/ar/news3162733.htm) et <https://twitter.com/abdulqadernortd/status/1456239360844632068>.



ainsi que des témoignages sur la destruction d'une antenne de communication qui a grandement entravé l'obtention d'information sur la situation.

## F. Actes attribués à Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique

128. Le 14 juin 2021, cinq enquêteurs du Gouvernement yéménite ont été enlevés par Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique à Koura (Chaboua) près de la frontière avec Beïda, un secteur qui est sous le contrôle du groupe. Ce dernier a diffusé une vidéo des détenus et demandé au Gouvernement yéménite de les échanger contre des membres d'Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique. Ils ont été relâchés le 5 juillet 2021.

## G. Différends fonciers

129. Les différends portant sur la terre et la propriété sont un problème de longue date au Yémen. Des années de conflit ont néanmoins affaibli les systèmes de règlement des conflits, notamment les appareils judiciaire et de sécurité, et accru le pouvoir des groupes et bandes armés qui sont mêlés aux litiges. Les terrains et l'immobilier ont également renchéri ces dernières années. Par conséquent, les violences relatives aux différends fonciers ont augmenté, les civils devenant plus fragilisés au fur et à mesure que leurs terres et leurs habitations sont saisies par des groupes armés.

130. Le Groupe d'experts a enquêté sur un cas illustrant cette question. Le 10 août 2021, à Bir Bacha (Taëz), un différend a éclaté au sujet d'une terre appartenant à la famille Harq et occupée par un groupe dirigé par Majid Al-Araj, affilié à la 145<sup>e</sup> Brigade du Gouvernement yéménite. La dispute a fait six morts dont Majid Al-Araj, un de ses hommes et quatre hommes de la famille Harq, et un blessé. Par la suite, un groupe affilié à Araj a fait irruption au domicile familial des Harq, en présence des femmes et des enfants. Trois membres de la famille Harq ont été arrêtés : deux mineurs et un jeune homme, lequel est décédé en détention. Les militaires de Taëz ont informé le Groupe d'experts qu'ils étaient intervenus pour sécuriser le secteur et que deux suspects qui avaient résisté aux arrestations avaient été tués et neuf autres placés en détention.

## H. Migrants

131. Le 7 mars 2021, une attaque s'est produite au centre de détention de l'Autorité de l'immigration, des passeports et de la naturalisation à Sanaa, à l'issue de laquelle quelque 45 migrants ont été tués et 202 autres blessés<sup>128</sup>.

132. Selon les informations obtenues, à la suite d'une dispute entre des gardiens et des migrants, qui étaient en grève de la faim du fait des conditions de détention, les forces de sécurité sont intervenues et ont lancé des gaz lacrymogènes contre un hangar où s'étaient barricadés les migrants. Un sinistre s'est déclaré dans la structure bondée et mal ventilée, qui n'était accessible que par une seule porte<sup>129</sup>. Selon les autorités houthistes, 862 migrants se trouvaient dans le centre ce jour-là et 358 dans le hangar

<sup>128</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a reçu des informations de sources multiples selon lesquelles quelque 28 personnes avaient succombé à leurs blessures après avoir été évacuées à l'hôpital. Selon la Commission nationale chargée d'enquêter sur les atteintes aux droits humains au Yémen, les victimes étaient au nombre de 400 (voir : [www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf](http://www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf)).

<sup>129</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des informations d'organisations humanitaires internationales, d'organisations non gouvernementales locales et de personnes.

où les faits se sont produits<sup>130</sup>. Selon les informations obtenues, les autorités houthistes ont confisqué les téléphones portables des victimes, notamment dans les hôpitaux, afin d'empêcher toute communication sur les faits.

133. Les houthistes ont imputé publiquement la responsabilité des faits à l'Organisation internationale pour les migrations, disant qu'elle n'avait pas rapatrié les migrants, ce qui avait entraîné une surpopulation<sup>131</sup>. Par ailleurs, selon les informations obtenues, la déclaration publiée à la suite des faits par un groupe de migrants, disant que l'incendie était dû à une altercation entre migrants<sup>132</sup> a été faite à l'issue de la pression exercée par les autorités houthistes sur les chefs des migrants.

134. Les médias locaux ont rapporté que les autorités houthistes avaient ouvert une enquête, qui avait entraîné l'arrestation de 11 personnes<sup>133</sup>. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des preuves selon lesquelles quatre personnes avaient été placées en détention, à la suite des faits. Elles ont été libérées environ quatre mois plus tard, les enquêtes ayant conclu que l'incendie était accidentel et qu'aucun crime n'avait été commis<sup>134</sup>.

135. De juillet à septembre 2021, les houthistes ont mené une « campagne de sécurité » à Jaouf, arrêtant plus de 700 migrants, en expulsant certains de force des zones qu'ils contrôlaient et en détendant d'autres.

## VIII. Entrave à l'acheminement et à la distribution de l'aide humanitaire

136. Depuis la fin de 2020, des progrès ont été signalés concernant l'accès humanitaire des organisations humanitaires et la possibilité pour elles d'évaluer les programmes dans les secteurs contrôlés par les houthistes. Après une longue période d'obstruction par les autorités basées à Sanaa, la mise en place d'un projet biométrique par le Programme alimentaire mondial visant à obtenir une assistance humanitaire est toujours en cours. Un service d'aide humanitaire par voie aérienne vers Mareb a également été établi<sup>135</sup>.

137. De nombreux obstacles subsistent cependant à l'acheminement efficace de l'aide humanitaire à travers les zones contrôlées par les houthistes, tels que les délais dans l'approbation des accords complémentaires, les demandes de communication des détails des listes de bénéficiaires, la pression visant à influencer le choix des partenaires de réalisation ou la conception des programmes, les restrictions d'accès et le refus de circulation, notamment l'imposition arbitraire d'un chaperon dit *mahram* concernant le personnel féminin<sup>136</sup> et le harcèlement du personnel humanitaire. Les autorités locales cherchent souvent à imposer leurs propres exigences en bloquant les camions aux points de passage ou en menaçant les acteurs humanitaires. Le Groupe d'experts a également consigné des cas où les familles étaient menacées d'être radiées de la liste des bénéficiaires si elles refusaient de permettre à leurs enfants de rejoindre les forces houthistes (voir annexe 10).

<sup>130</sup> Voir [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005).

<sup>131</sup> Voir [www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212](http://www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212).

<sup>132</sup> Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu le texte de la déclaration.

<sup>133</sup> Voir [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005).

<sup>134</sup> Le Groupe d'experts dispose d'exemplaires de ces documents.

<sup>135</sup> Voir S/2021/79, Section III.

<sup>136</sup> Cette règle empêche les femmes de voyager si elles ne sont pas accompagnées par un membre masculin de leur famille. Elle restreint la possibilité pour les employées d'organisations humanitaires de s'acquitter de leurs devoirs et les expose à des arrestations et à des détentions, si elles ne s'exécutent pas.

138. Le Groupe d'experts a obtenu des preuves de maltraitance, de harcèlement et d'entrave constante menés par les houthistes contre une certaine organisation humanitaire pour la contraindre à modifier sa politique. Les maltraitances comprenaient des violences physiques, des arrestations et détentions arbitraires, des refus de visa ou d'entrée, l'expulsion d'administrateurs de haut rang, des restrictions à la circulation du personnel et des fournitures et des ingérences dans les activités et le choix des prestataires de services (voir annexe 37).

139. Outre les deux fonctionnaires des Nations Unies arrêtés en novembre 2021<sup>137</sup>, le Groupe d'experts a confirmé l'arrestation et la détention de trois autres acteurs humanitaires par les autorités houthistes.

140. La campagne médiatique contre l'ONU se poursuit. Cela nuit aux activités humanitaires et créé également des risques de sécurité supplémentaires (voir S/2021/79, par. 48 et annexes 7 et 8).

141. Dans le sud du Yémen, la faiblesse des autorités gouvernementales a permis aux acteurs locaux d'imposer leurs propres exigences. Les risques de sécurité pour les organisations humanitaires augmentent également : le Groupe d'experts a confirmé cinq cas d'immobilisation de membres du personnel ou d'une cargaison humanitaires à des postes de contrôle et trois cas de détournement de véhicules d'organisations humanitaires par des intervenants indéterminés à Abiyan et Taëz.

142. En avril 2020, dans le sud du Yémen, quelques-unes des activités d'une organisation humanitaire ont été suspendues pendant plusieurs mois en raison d'un désaccord sur les incitations concernant des membres du personnel gouvernemental.

## IX. Recommandations

143. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Conseil de sécurité, dans sa prochaine résolution :

- a) demande au Conseil de transition du Sud et au Gouvernement yéménite de s'abstenir de prendre des mesures qui portent atteinte à l'Accord de Riyad et exprime son intention d'imposer des sanctions aux personnes participant à ces actes ;
- b) demande aux houthistes, au Gouvernement yéménite, aux Forces conjointes et à la Coalition de s'abstenir de prendre des mesures qui portent atteinte à l'Accord de Stockholm et exprime son intention d'imposer des sanctions aux personnes participant à ces actes ;
- c) demande aux parties au conflit de s'abstenir de se servir des établissements d'enseignement et des institutions religieuses et publiques pour inciter à la haine ou à la violence contre tout groupe ou nationalité et exprime son intention d'imposer des sanctions aux personnes participant à ces actes ;
- d) demande aux parties au conflit de s'abstenir d'utiliser les écoles, les camps d'été et les mosquées pour recruter des enfants et exprime son intention d'imposer des sanctions aux personnes participant à ces actes ;
- e) demande aux États Membres de redoubler d'efforts pour lutter contre la contrebande des armes et des composants par voie terrestre et maritime et de veiller à faire appliquer l'embargo sur les armes ciblé ;
- f) demande aux États Membres de renforcer les mesures de diligence raisonnable concernant l'exportation de composants disponibles dans le commerce,

<sup>137</sup> Voir <https://apnews.com/article/science-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-nations-yemen-fl38d377483ac1e1d106b131c9676286>.

qui ont été signalés par le Groupe d'experts dans les systèmes d'armes utilisées au profit de personnes visées par les sanctions (voir [S/2021/79](#), annexes 19 et 20) et d'en rendre compte au Comité ;

g) demande aux parties au conflit de prendre des mesures pour empêcher toute nouvelle fragmentation de l'économie du Yémen, notamment les institutions bancaires et financières, et exprime son intention d'imposer des sanctions aux personnes participant à ces actes ;

h) demande aux parties au conflit de veiller à ce que leurs forces qui ont commis des violations du droit international humanitaire et du droit international des droits de l'homme aient à en répondre et de fournir des réparations et une assistance immédiates aux victimes ;

i) demande aux États Membres, aux parties au conflit et aux autres parties prenantes concernées d'envisager d'établir un mécanisme de justice transitionnelle pour le Yémen ;

j) rappelle les dispositions de la résolution [2474 \(2019\)](#) et demande aux parties au conflit de prendre toutes les mesures voulues pour rechercher activement les personnes portées disparues, de mettre en place des moyens d'action appropriés permettant de communiquer avec leurs proches et d'envisager de mettre en place des mécanismes pour apporter un soutien à ces derniers ;

k) demande aux forces houthistes de prendre des mesures pour mettre un terme à l'emploi indiscriminé de mines terrestres, consigner leur emplacement et éliminer les mines terrestres existantes des secteurs civils qui sont sous leur contrôle.

144. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Conseil de sécurité intègre à l'ordre du jour de la réunion mensuelle sur le Yémen un débat ciblé sur :

a) les problèmes auxquels se heurtent les détenues au Yémen, comme indiqué à l'annexe 9, et intègre ces femmes aux futures initiatives de justice transitionnelle et envisage d'associer à ce débat des représentants du Gouvernement yéménite et d'autres parties prenantes yéménites ;

b) l'emploi des établissements d'enseignement et des institutions religieuses et publiques visant à diffuser les discours de haine, à encourager la violence et à recruter des enfants, et envisage d'associer à ce débat des représentants du Gouvernement yéménite et d'autres parties prenantes yéménites concernées.

145. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité envisage :

a) de s'entretenir avec les États Membres de la possibilité d'établir un fonds destiné aux personnes rescapées de la violence sexuelle, notamment du Yémen, comme énoncé au paragraphe 17 de la résolution [2467 \(2019\)](#) ;

b) de se mobiliser auprès de l'Arrangement de Wassenaar sur le contrôle des exportations d'armes classiques et de biens et technologies à double usage, pour intégrer les pièces détachées commerciales utilisées par les houthistes dans les missiles, les drones aériens et les engins explosifs improvisés flottants, dans sa liste des biens et technologies à double usage ;

c) d'encourager les parties au conflit et les autres parties prenantes concernées, notamment les médiateurs internationaux, à inclure dans le processus de paix des mesures visant à prévenir toute nouvelle fragmentation de l'économie du Yémen, notamment de ses institutions bancaires et financières ;

d) d'encourager les États Membres à appuyer la Commission nationale chargée d'enquêter sur les atteintes aux droits humains au Yémen, en particulier pour ce qui est de préserver ses archives, notamment par la voie de la mise en place d'une

sauvegarde numérique en mer, et de demander aux parties au conflit de collaborer avec la Commission ;

e) de contacter les parties au conflit et les médiateurs internationaux en vue d'intégrer des mesures de responsabilité, de justice et de réparation dans le processus de paix ;

f) d'engager les États Membres à accroître l'appui aux activités de déminage, notamment au moyen de formations à l'intention du personnel de déminage au Yémen.

## Table of Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Annex 1	Methodology . . . . . 56
Annex 2	UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map . . . . . 62
Annex 3	Summary of Panel correspondence . . . . . 63
Annex 4	Battle for Ma'rib and Shabwah in 2021 . . . . . 65
Annex 5	Developments on the West Coast . . . . . 70
Annex 6	STC statements on military and security appointments . . . . . 85
Annex 7	Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020 . . . . . 89
Annex 8	Mukha Port Attack, 11 September 2021 . . . . . 121
Annex 9	Impact of Houthi activities on former female detainees . . . . . 134
Annex 10	Houthi cultural courses and summer camps as a threat to peace and security in Yemen . . . . . 138
Annex 11	The use of Al Saleh Mosque as a summer school and for military purposes . . . . . 153
Annex 12	Attack on Jeddah port on 14 December 2020 . . . . . 154
Annex 13	Attack on Yanbu port on 27 April 2021 . . . . . 159
Annex 14	Attack on Jizan port on 30 July 2021 . . . . . 162
Annex 15	Attack on MERCER STREET on 29 July 2021 . . . . . 165
Annex 16	Attack on the Saudi Aramco Bulk Plant in Jeddah North . . . . . 170
Annex 17	Attacks on Abha International Airport . . . . . 174
Annex 18	New Houthi weapons displayed to the media . . . . . 179
Annex 19	Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 10 February 2021 . . . . . 183
Annex 20	Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 6 May 2021 . . . . . 192
Annex 21	Images and ID documents of the crew members of the dhows . . . . . 214
Annex 22	Seizure of thermal weapon sights at the Shahn border crossing on 22 June 2021 . . . . . 215
Annex 23	Chain of custody of the 30.600 G OEM pressure transmitter . . . . . 219
Annex 24	Chain of custody of the 3W-110i B2 engine . . . . . 227
Annex 25	Corporate information on HSJ Electronic (HK) and Vista Automation & Communication . . . . . 233
Annex 26	Economic Issues . . . . . 239
Annex 27	Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021 issued by the president al-Amana specialised criminal prosecution court to the Tadhamon Bank . . . . . 252
Annex 28	Circular of 28 June 2021 issued by the central bank of yemen, Sana'a regarding freezing the funds of the Tadhamon Bank . . . . . 254
Annex 29	Telecom Sector in Yemen . . . . . 256
Annex 30	Seizure of Telecom equipment by Yemeni Customs . . . . . 263
Annex 31	Black-marketing and Illegal Fees on import of Fuel . . . . . 264
Annex 32	Saudi Deposit . . . . . 266
Annex 33	Investigation of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen . . . . . 267

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Annex 34	Violations in the context of detention . . . . .	273
Annex 35	Use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated areas attributed to Houthi Forces . . . . .	274
Annex 36	Indiscriminate use of landmines, IEDs and other explosive remnants by Houthi forces . . . . .	295
Annex 37	Obstruction to humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas . . . . .	306
List of acronyms . . . . .		307

## **Annex 1 Methodology**

1. The Panel used satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also used commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.



## Appendix A 'The opportunity to reply' methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity<sup>1</sup> in a Panel's public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the 'opportunity to reply'.
2. The Panel's methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
  - (a) Providing an individual with an 'opportunity to reply' should be the norm.
  - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
    - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation.
    - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources.
    - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members.
    - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field.
    - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

## **Appendix B      Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses**

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, [S/2006/997](#), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

- (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
- (b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
  - (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims.
  - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavor to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations.
  - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
    - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
    - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
  - (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident.
  - (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and

- international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
- (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced.
  - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area.
  - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody.
  - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates.
  - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities.
  - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.
  - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim.
  - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates.
  - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (xx) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
  - (xxi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from


- detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture.
- (xxii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained.
  - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:
- (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
  - (ii) Interviews with people and organization providing assistance to these children.
  - (i) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.
- (f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt".
- (f) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel's standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian

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home, or in violations associated with children.

- (g) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.
3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.
4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.

# Annex 2 UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map



Map No. 3847 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS  
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

### Annex 3 Summary of Panel correspondence

**Table 3.1**

Correspondence with Member States

<i>Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December/Comments</i>
Belarus	2		
Bulgaria	1		
People's Republic of China	4	4	
Canada	1	1	
France	2	1	
Gabon	1		
Germany	1		
Greece	1		
India	1		
Islamic Republic of Iran	8		
Japan	1		
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	23	8	
Oman	7	5	
Russian Federation	2		
Somalia	1	1	
Sweden	1	1	
Syria	1		
Turkey	1	1	
United Arab Emirates	3	1	One was a partial response.
United Kingdom	1	1	Engagement ongoing in respect of response.
United States of America	8		
Yemen	23	15	One was a partial response.
<b>Total (21)</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>39</b>	

**Table 3.2**

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December</i>
Sana'a based ministry of foreign affairs	5	5	1
Sana'a based central bank of yemen	1	1	1
Southern Transitional Council	2	1	1
National Resistance Forces Guards of the Republic	5	2	1
Puntland	1	1	
<b>Total (5)</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	

**Table 3.3**

Correspondence with international and regional organizations

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>
World Food Programme	1	
United Nations High Commission for Refugees	1	
International Organization for Migration	1	
United Nations Children's Fund	1	
World Health Organization	1	1
UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	1	
<b>Total (6)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>

**Table 3.4**

Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities

<i>Commercial company</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters</i>
Aurum Ship Management FZC	1	1
Al Mantab Logistics Company (SFZ) LLC	1	
Al Talib Shipping Company LLC	1	1
BCD & ME GmbH	1	1
Dawood Group of Companies, Sana'a	1	1
Hayel Saeed Group	3	
Carl Walther GmbH	1	
Central Bank Yemen (Aden)	4	
International Smart Digital Interface Company LLC	2	
Lonca Paz. Mak. San. Tic. A.S.	1	1
MTN Group	1	1
OHI Marine LLC	1	
Sabafon, Aden	1	1
Sabafon, Sana'a	1	1
Stamos Steam Ship Co	1	
Swaid & Sons for Exchange Co	1	1
Tadhamon Bank	2	
Tele Yemen, Sana'a	2	
Tele Yemen, Aden	1	1
TORM A/S	1	
Walbro LLC	1	
Zodiac Maritime Ltd	1	
Al Yah Satellite Communications Company P.T.S.C (Yahsat)	1	
Y Telecom	1	1
Yemen Net	1	1
<b>Total (25)</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>12</b>




## Annex 4 Battle for Ma'rib and Shabwah in 2021

1. The hostilities which escalated in the first half of 2020 have continued throughout 2021.<sup>2</sup> The Houthis made significant territorial gains, including in areas in the Governorates of Al Baydah, Shabwah, Ma'rib, and Al Hudaydah. While the Government of Yemen, the Coalition air forces, and the West Coast Joint Forces (WCJF) have engaged in both offensive and defensive operations<sup>3</sup> (see map 4.1 and table 4.1), the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has mostly been defensive in its battles against the Houthis.

Map 4.1

### Houthi military gains in September-October 2021 around Ma'rib City



*Source:* Panel

2. Despite support from the Coalition and some local tribes, the Government of Yemen has not been able to maintain all its front lines against the Houthis (Table 4.1). Like in 2020, the Houthis largely focused on increasing hostilities on the Ma'rib frontlines, despite significant human casualties, in 2021. They have been conducting a war of attrition by continuously sending reinforcements to the multiple battle fronts; targeting civilian and military infrastructure with short-range missiles and UAVs; as well as targeting government-allied tribes, for example, in the encirclement in Al Abdiya.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In 2019, the Panel reported that the frontlines remained relatively stable (paragraph 11, S/2020/326).

<sup>3</sup> For example, this includes areas in Maqbanah, Hays and Al Ain and Hess Junction, Ta'izz. Information from military sources.

<sup>4</sup> The encirclement started around 23 September 2021, after the Houthis successfully cut the last supply line, when it took over Harib in Ma'rib. The encirclement lasted until approximately mid-October 2021 and had significant negative consequences for the civilians affected and for the overall conflict. Some individuals fighting in the Jebel Murad area stated that this had an impact also on the fighting in Jabal Murad, as the tribal fighters wanted to prevent a similar encirclement in their areas.

3. With the unexpected fall of Al Juba, bordering Ma'rib city, and Jebel Murad in late October 2021, there was some significant repositioning of the conflict parties. At the time of writing, Ma'rib city is one of the last strongholds of the Government after the STC took control of Aden in 2019.<sup>5</sup> In Al Hudaydah and in Ta'izz, the West Coast Forces and Government Forces are concerned that should Ma'rib fall, they would be the next target.<sup>6</sup> For the STC, if Shabwah falls, their potential source of financial revenue from petroleum resources and their ambitions of self-governance would be adversely affected. Additionally, the Houthis would have better access to Southern areas of Yemen through Shabwah. The Houthis would also be in a stronger negotiating position. Thus, for all members of the anti-Houthi forces, the possible fall of Ma'rib and Shabwah presents an existential threat.

4. Therefore, in response to this threat, the Coalition and the WCJF began significant political and military repositioning from September to November 2021, focusing primarily on curbing Houthi advances into their territories, as shown in Table 4.1 for Yemeni forces and Table 4.2 for Coalition forces. The Coalition confirmed that their movements were necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>7</sup> The Government informed the Panel that they were not given advanced notice of the movements of the WCJF.

Table 4.1

**Main areas of battles between the Government of Yemen, WCJF, and the Houthis**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Timing</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Al Bayda	23 September 2021	The Houthis announce that they took full control of Al Bayda. <sup>8</sup>	The Houthis justified the takeover as a move to combat AQAP. <sup>9</sup> The capture of Al Bayda enabled the Houthis to intensify its efforts on the Ma'rib frontlines.
Ma'rib	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	Houthis have reportedly taken control of eight of the 14 districts of Ma'rib Governorate, with four districts under their partial control. <sup>10</sup> Both sides are sending reinforcements for fighting around Jebel Al Balaq, which borders the heavily populated and government-controlled city of Ma'rib. The fall of areas in Harib, <sup>11</sup> Jebel Murad <sup>12</sup> and Al Juba <sup>13</sup> were significant defeats for the Government in this period.	The defeats in Ma'rib are attributed to tribal divisions within the Murad tribe, inadequate provision of weapons to tribal allies, and the need to avoid a catastrophic situation such as Al Abdiya. <sup>14</sup> Through the movements in Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz (see below), some anti-Houthi forces are attempting to consolidate their positions to reinforce and fight Houthis in Ma'rib and Shabwah. Tareq Saleh and the Government of Yemen on the one hand; and the STC and Tareq Saleh on the other hand, seem willing to temporarily set aside their differences, and to consolidate their efforts to fight the

<sup>5</sup> <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/dam-will-break-if-houthi-rebels-take-marib-yemeni-official>.

<sup>6</sup> Discussions with representatives of the WCJF and Ta'izz military forces.

<sup>7</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08); <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>8</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون).

<sup>9</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-سيطره-البيضاء-استكمال-يعلنون-الحوثيون).

<sup>10</sup> According to some sources, 8 of the 14 districts in Ma'rib are under Houthi control and 4 partially (Serwah, Madghel, Raghwan, and Al-Jubah). Marib city and Alwadi are under the control of the Government of Yemen and affiliated forces. Information updated as at 15 November 2021.

<sup>11</sup> Around 22 September 2021. The attack reportedly came from Shabwah's Al Ain district.

<sup>12</sup> Around 26 October 2021.

<sup>13</sup> Around 25 October 2021, the capital of the district fell to the Houthis, but as of 15 November 2021 the fighting is still ongoing.

<sup>14</sup> Discussions with Murad and other civilian, military and tribal figures in Ma'rib.

			Houthis. <sup>15</sup> However, the STC may be using the circumstances to push the Government for more political concessions. <sup>16</sup>
Shabwah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September, the Houthis took control of areas in Bayhan, Ain and Usaylan in Shabwah.	The battle for these areas in Shabwah was won by the Houthis, with minimal resistance from the Government of Yemen. This had led to the fear that should Houthis decide to advance to Shabwah's oil rich areas, they would be able to do so with relative ease. There were attempts by some units of the Giants brigades to reinforce Shabwah through Abyan. <sup>17</sup> A united front of anti-Houthi forces in Shabwah is adversely affected by: 1) The current political infighting in Shabwah; <sup>18</sup> 2) the unpopularity of the pro-Islah Governor with the STC, UAE, and consequently some West Coast armed groups, <sup>19</sup> and 3) the fact that for the STC, control of Shabwah remains an important element in the fulfilment of their aspirations.
Al Hudaydah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September 2021, there was an exchange of control of territories between the Giants brigades and the National Resistance. Around	These movements appear to be linked to the military setbacks in Ma'rib. <sup>23</sup> WCJF and the Coalition came under criticism for the November 2021 withdrawal. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stated that

<sup>15</sup> Statements made by the Political Bureau of the National Resistance (PBNR) on 28 October 2021 (see <https://2dec.net/news46965.html>); and STC statement stating that they will fight alongside the National Resistance forces to fight the Houthis (see <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter>). In the PBNR, which Saleh chaired, it was stated "the political bureau renewed its call for all political components and national forces to unite in the defense arenas of the republic, for the parties to open a new page in their relations with each other, and for all to direct their weapons and political and media discourse against houthi militias." The spokesperson of STC said "we welcome any efforts in the STC to unite to confront houthi militias along the frontlines in the south and Yemen, and we express our readiness to partner with the national resistance and support it... and keep its threat away from our country and the region, while affirming our commitment to our southern national objectives." PBNR informed the Panel that Saleh also offered to fight with GoY in Ma'rib, this was confirmed by GoY to the Panel. Additionally, see interview with Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185> and the Director of the Office of President Hadi confirming the offer made by Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>.

<sup>16</sup> For example, STC's President has stated his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the Houthis should Ma'rib fall: In an interview published in March 2021, he stated that "The fall in Marib would have serious consequences, not just at humanitarian level but it might accelerate the process towards internationally convened talks between the North and the South. It could lead to a situation where the STC are largely in control of the South and the Houthis control most of the North. In that case, it would make sense to have direct talks between the parties that are in control." (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists>). On 9 November 2021, the STC also threatened withdrawal from the Riyadh Agreement, unless their demands were met from the Government side. <https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=2206>.

<sup>17</sup> Reportedly, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Brigades were deployed to Abyan. Confidential military sources and officials of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>18</sup> In November 2021, Sheikh Awad Mohammed bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki held meetings in Shabwah calling, amongst others, for the dismissal of the Governor Mohammed Saleh Bin Adio. The former, reportedly a well-respected GPC member, appears to be challenging the authority of the Governor, reportedly an Islah party member. He returned to Shabwah in November 2021, after reportedly living 6 years in the UAE (<https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15894#Shabwa>). His return comes in the backdrop of the escalating tensions between the Governor and GPC, Governor and the STC and some tribes, as well as the Governor and the UAE (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). The Governor in 2021, continued his calls on the UAE personnel to vacate Belhaf (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). In October 2021, after a discussion involving Saudi Arabia, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE left Ataq airport and Al Alam camp, but UAE personnel are reportedly still present in Belhaf (table 4.2). According to local sources, there were reported clashes in Al Alam after the departure of the Coalition forces, between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and the Government of Yemen forces affiliated to the Governor.

<sup>19</sup> Local confidential sources. See tweet from Governor at <https://twitter.com/Mbinadeow/status/1430157247439687694>, See also <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-war-uae-balhaf-seaport-clash-government> and <https://debriefer.net/en/news-26767.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Panel discussions with military sources.

		11 November 2021, <sup>20</sup> the WCIJ reportedly moved 13 brigades <sup>21</sup> from 14 locations <sup>22</sup> along the coastal line. Around 12 November 2021, the Houthis occupied these areas and opened the Sana'a-Al Hudaydah road.	“the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces” is in line with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts. <sup>24</sup> Yet, the Yemeni Government stated that they did not have advance notice of this withdrawal. <sup>25</sup>
Ta'izz	September 2021 – 20 November 2021	On 19 November 2021, the WCJF confirmed having captured the Al Adin-Hess junction, which connects Ibb with the Al Hudaydah supply route for the Houthis, <sup>26</sup> as well as other locations in Western Ta'izz.	This was an important victory for the WCJF who had suffered significant reputational damage for the 11 November 2021 withdrawal. Unlike in Shawbah, in Ta'izz, the WCJF and the Ta'izz Military Axis, as well as the political leadership have at times set aside their differences to meet and discuss joint strategies <sup>27</sup> .

*Sources:* Panel based on various sources.<sup>28</sup>

4. The Coalition also undertook redeployments during this period at Table 4.2, which according to them were also necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>29</sup>

Table 4.2

**Significant Coalition movements in October and November 2021**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Comments</i>
9 November 2021	Al Bureika Base in Aden	Significant troop reductions reported. <sup>30</sup>
31 October 2021	Ataq Airport in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces reported. <sup>31</sup>
26 October 2021	Al Alam Camp in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces. Clashes between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and pro-Government forces followed, which resulted in the latter taking control of the camp. <sup>32</sup>
October and November 2021	Several small military camps in Mahra	Redeployment and consolidation of Coalition forces at Al Ghaydah airport. <sup>33</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The Panel notes that different dates between 10 – 12 November are referred to as dates when the withdrawal began, by different interlocutors.

<sup>21</sup> Source: representatives of the WCJF.

<sup>22</sup> Source: representatives of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

<sup>25</sup> See paragraph 20 of the main report.

<sup>26</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/241049>, <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>. Confirmed by military sources.

<sup>27</sup> The last meeting was in October 2021, according to military sources.

<sup>28</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen and military sources, local authorities, and civil society from Al Baydah, Ma'rib, Shawbah, al Hudaydah, and Ta'izz.

<sup>29</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08); <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>30</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

<sup>31</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>32</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>33</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

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16 November 2021

Khalidiyah Camp in Hadramawt

Complete withdrawal of  
Coalition forces reported.<sup>34</sup>

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**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/240827>.

<sup>35</sup> The Panel has requested KSA for more information on its withdrawals, a response is pending.

## Annex 5 Developments on the West Coast

### I. Developments relating to Tareq Saleh<sup>36</sup>

1. In 2021, Tareq Saleh was one of the most powerful Yemeni military leaders on the non-Houthi controlled West Coast, and his brother, Ammar Saleh, the most powerful security and intelligence figure in the same area.<sup>37</sup> On 25 March 2021, Tareq Saleh announced the establishment of a “Political Bureau of the National Resistance” (PBNR).<sup>38</sup> This is the political wing of the existing military entity under Saleh, which is also known as the Guards of the Republic. According to information received by the Panel from individuals close to Tareq Saleh, he resented the fact that he was effectively excluded from the negotiations leading up to the Stockholm Agreement. This situation may have been a contributing factor in the formation of the PBNR.<sup>39</sup>
2. Tareq Saleh’s ascension into political and military power have been largely facilitated by:
  - a. The lack of authority exercised by the central Government on the West Coast, which has failed to integrate all the various armed groups on the West Coast into the National Army, except for some Giant Brigades (paragraph 6).
  - b. The inability of the Government of Yemen to provide adequate health care to the wounded fighters, or to pay regular salaries to local West Coast civil service, security, and military officials, letting them to seek this support elsewhere.
  - c. Direct humanitarian and reconstruction support by the UAE that comes through the National Resistance for communities on the West Coast, rather than to the central Government, (paragraph 4 and 10).
  - d. The reliance of local authorities and civilians on ‘humanitarian assistance’<sup>40</sup> provided by the National Resistance humanitarian unit, which further increases the dependence of local authorities on Tareq Saleh to provide for populations in their localities (figure 5.1).
  - e. Access to wide-reaching intelligence networks of Ammar Saleh, which allows Tareq Saleh to counter security threats in the area. This has created a space in which it has become difficult for individuals to criticize Tareq Saleh or the National Resistance openly.<sup>41</sup>
3. Tareq Saleh is also providing financial incentives to local authorities, as well as security support.<sup>42</sup> The Panel noted that the same Government leaders that spoke out against Tareq Saleh

<sup>36</sup> In this annex, in order to prevent reprisals against individuals, the Panel will not indicate the sources of information, where such may have a potentially negative impact on those sources. Sources for this section include members of the Government of Yemen and its armed and security forces, the Yemeni Coast Guard on the West Coast, Political Bureau of the National Resistance, Tihama Resistance, Tihama political leaders, Tihama Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, Tihama National Council, and other Tihama and West Coast human rights activists, National Resistance Forces, Giant Brigades, civil society, and local authorities in Ta’izz and Hudaydah Governorates.

<sup>37</sup> Ammar Saleh used to be the Deputy of the National Security Bureau under Ali Abdullah Saleh effectively from 2002 to 2012.

<sup>38</sup> <https://t.co/BK0o6B9Kij> / Twitter.

<sup>39</sup> Tareq Saleh was excluded from various peace initiatives, including the Stockholm Agreement and the Riyadh Agreement, and the formation of the Unity Government in December 2020. In an interview, Saleh said, “(t)he political office was created as a result of the ongoing political situation in Yemen and the developments that have occurred. We, on the West Coast, need a political entity that represents us in any upcoming negotiations, for it to be another voice that represents the Yemeni people outside of any religious political parties.” See <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>40</sup> The Panel cannot confirm if assistance provided by the National Resistance is intended or distributed in an impartial, indiscriminate, or neutral manner and without pre-conditions.

<sup>41</sup> Multiple confidential sources who received threats.

<sup>42</sup> As incentives, unlike salary payments, are not regular and depends on maintaining favor with the paying authority, some individuals informed the Panel that they could not act independently to carry out their functions, when these actions were inconsistent with what was required by the WCJF.

in 2019 and 2020, adopted a more submissive attitude in 2021, as they adjusted to the realities on the ground.

Figure 5.1

### National Resistance's humanitarian unit providing support on the West Coast



**Source:** <https://2dec.net/news47950.html> (right) (showing mobile clinics on the West Coast, note the ambulance has the name of the national resistance); <https://2dec.net/news47897.html> (left) (showing a convoy of humanitarian assistance, including reportedly 3000 food baskets to the newly liberated areas in Hays. It also contains a video of the Governor of Hudaydah thanking the National Resistance for the food baskets.)

4. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that neither the salaries paid to Tareq Saleh's fighters, nor the financial incentives that he distributes, came from the Government.<sup>43</sup> According to some fighters, their salaries or incentive payments are made by the UAE, through Tareq Saleh, mostly in Saudi Riyals.<sup>44</sup> The UAE stated that it provides "a substantial amount of financial support through the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen to the Government of Yemen to pay the salaries of West Coast forces."<sup>45</sup> The Government of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been requested to confirm the UAE's statement; the Panel has not yet received a response.

5. In 2021, the relationship between the Government of Yemen and Tareq Saleh remained complex, but cordial.<sup>46</sup> The Government cannot maintain the new frontlines with the Houthis in the Hudaydah Governorate and in West Ta'izz without the WCJF. At the same time, it cannot provide salaries or other support to maintain the loyalty of those forces to the Government. According to some, the establishment of the Political Bureau by Tareq Saleh is part of a plan to further consolidate his political position in the West Coast and in Yemen (see paragraph 7).<sup>47</sup> Indeed, since its establishment, Saleh has engaged in high-level meetings with foreign interlocutors, articulating his vision for Yemen.

6. The establishment of the PBNR and Tareq Saleh's engagement with the international community has created significant unease and tensions, especially amongst some communities

<sup>43</sup> Multiple sources from the Government of Yemen.

<sup>44</sup> Discussions in April, June, August and September 2021 with the Giant Brigades, leaders from Tihama, and Government of Yemen security and military forces. Some of these individuals were receiving incentives that they said came from the UAE. The STC negotiating team in Riyadh informed the Panel that while they were being supported by the Coalition, Tareq Saleh was supported bilaterally by the UAE.

<sup>45</sup> Communication to the Panel in November 2021.

<sup>46</sup> The Panel requested the Government of Yemen to provide a clarification on the nature of its current relationship with Tareq Saleh, the Panel is awaiting a response.

<sup>47</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen officials, Tihama community leaders, and some leaders in the Tihama National Council.

in Tihama.<sup>48</sup> They have expressed concerns that Tareq Saleh, an outsider to, and a guest of, the Tihama region is positioning himself as the *de facto* ruler of the region. Barely two weeks after the formation of the PBNR, there were clashes reported between the National Resistance forces and some local communities, with three reported deaths.<sup>49</sup> The withdrawal in November 2021, have further escalated tensions between Saleh and some Tihama political leaders (paragraph 29 of the main report and appendix 3).

7. The establishment of the PBNR has also created some tensions within the General People's Congress (GPC) because Saleh's primary support base comes from the GPC. This move has further weakened the already fragmented GPC. For example, representatives of the Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi 005)-led GPC faction informed the Panel that it did not support the formation of the Political Bureau, even if they continue to work together on some matters with Saleh.<sup>50</sup> While Saleh states publicly that the PBNR is not an alternative for the GPC, and that the PBNR represents the Joint Forces on the West Coast, it is likely that his ambitions are not limited to the West Coast.<sup>51</sup> Saleh's PBNR representatives indicated to the Panel that the Political Bureau's ambitions and reach were national, and not merely regional.<sup>52</sup>

## II. Developments relating to the Giant Brigades

8. The Giant Brigades have acted as a "neutral force" in maintaining peace between different anti-Houthi forces. Within the Giants, there are units that are aligned with the Government of Yemen, while some others are more aligned with the United Arab Emirates. The Giants have successfully maintained a ceasefire in Abyan, following clashes between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen (see S/2021/79, paragraph 40).<sup>53</sup> In the June 2021 negotiations around the Riyadh Agreement, the possibility of deploying units of the Giants Brigade as a neutral force to protect the Yemeni Prime Minister and other Government officials in Aden was discussed.<sup>54</sup>

9. The Giants Brigade, in a communication with the Panel, informed that its present leader, Abu Zara al Mahrami, was appointed by President Hadi.<sup>55</sup> Around June 2020, al Mahrami returned to Aden from the UAE and then travelled onwards to the West Coast. He was reappointed as the commander of the different Giant brigades, as well as some Tihama brigades.<sup>56</sup> In 2021, there have been frictions and clashes between some components of the Giant Brigade. For example, tensions

<sup>48</sup> Discussions with representatives of the Tihama community including civil society, the Tihama National Council and the Tihama resistance forces.

<sup>49</sup> These clashes reportedly began after Tareq Saleh forces forcefully entered the house of a local prominent General People's Congress (GPC) leader in Mukha Zaid al Kharj. Tareq Saleh forces justified this to the Panel as a security operation. Others say the clashes was linked to the PBNR's formation.

<sup>50</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the GPC, June 2021.

<sup>51</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021. In an interview Saleh said, "The GPC is the umbrella that we are all under, but unfortunately, it was fragmented between those inside Yemen and those outside. This major political party was not given the opportunity to play its role in the Yemeni political arena, whether in foreign representation or internally. Inside Yemen, it is under pressure by the Houthis and the GPC in Sana'a has become very marginalized in its political role. Outside of the country, it is divided into a number of different factions. We hope the GPC can play a very important role. We're obviously never going to be an alternative to the GPC and the role it has played. But the political office of the National Resistance represents the Joint Forces here on the West Coast, and it also represents the political arm of all of these forces here in the Yemeni political arena."

See, <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>52</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021.

<sup>53</sup> The Panel understands that a unit under the leadership of the Giants, is in Abyan, maintaining a buffer zone and facilitating movement and communication between the two forces belonging to the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council. Discussions with individuals from the Giant Brigades, the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Protection Brigade, based in Abyan, and the Coalition. According to the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Brigade, the unit is under Hamdi Shukri.

<sup>54</sup> Panel discussions with both STC and Government negotiating teams.

<sup>55</sup> December 2021.

<sup>56</sup> This includes the 1st Tihama and the 1st Zaraniq brigade. Zaraniq is a tribe in Tihama.



arose when Al Mahrami ordered to change the leaders of

the 1st and 11th Tihama Brigades and the 3rd Giants Brigade. (see also appendix 3). In two cases, there were affiliations between these units and the Government of Yemen. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade was also the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade under the Government of Yemen. In May 2021, the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade Commander was also named as the Commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> Presidential Brigade.<sup>57</sup> Subsequently, he was ordered by Al Mahrami to step down and was replaced by another senior commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.<sup>58</sup> In the case of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, it saw two leadership changes<sup>59</sup> and clashes in 2021 when Al Mahrami attempted to change, the second leader, Abu Ayesha, and replace him with a third individual, who was not a member of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade.<sup>60</sup> The Giants Brigade in its communication with the Panel in December 2021, justified the changes of Abu Ayesha because of, amongst others, his links to Islah party. The Panel received allegations against all the leaders mentioned in this paragraph relating to financial mismanagement of military resources.

### III. Developments relating to Tihama Fighters

10. In late 2020, all armed groups on the West Coast were reorganized under the dual leadership of Tareq Saleh of the National Resistance<sup>61</sup> and Abu Zara Al Mahrami of the Giant Brigades.<sup>62</sup> Some Tihama leaders viewed this as an attempt by the UAE and Tareq Saleh to reduce the Tihama influence on the West Coast, for example, by dividing their military forces under the command of two leaders who are not originally from the Tihama and preventing them, the Tihama people, from making autonomous military decisions (see also paragraphs 50 – 52 and annex 5 of S/2021/79). In discussions with the Panel, Tihama military and political leaders complained of persistent marginalization by different Yemeni leaders and the Government of Yemen, and lack of basic services for the local population. Both the Tihama and WCJF representatives acknowledged that because most of the Tihama fighters were only receiving their salaries through the Giants Brigade and National Resistance leaderships, they are compelled to fight with WCJF to ensure their and their families' survival.

11. The Tihama political leadership appeared to be divided; sometimes the Panel received conflicting political messages from them. The leadership includes those within the Tihama National Council, the Tihami Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, and Tihama leaders who are also members of the GPC. Some informed the Panel that if the 'occupation' of their lands continued by Tareq Saleh, they would have no choice but to use force to assert autonomy like the STC. Other Tihami leaders, some of whom were loyal to Saleh, expressed the need for a peaceful political solution based on equitable access to the resources on the West Coast. The Peaceful Tihama Movement, a political wing in the West Coast, and the Tihama Resistance, condemned the withdrawals of the WCJF in November 2021, particularly in view of the subsequent atrocities committed by the Houthis over the Tihama population (appendix 3).

<sup>57</sup> The appointment letter is with the Panel. Source: Government of Yemen.

<sup>58</sup> In discussions with the Panel, it was mentioned that the Giant Force leadership only removed him from his position as the Commander of the Tihama, but that his appointment by President Hadi remains unchanged.

<sup>59</sup> The first change was of Abdul Rahman al Lahji. The Giant Brigade informed the Panel in a communication in December 2021 that he was also appointed as the leader of the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade by the Government. The second leader was Abu Ayesha.

<sup>60</sup> According to information received by the Panel from the 3rd Giants Brigade and other sources, Abu Zara al Mahrami, sought to replace the Brigade leadership with a Yemeni individual who had returned from fighting in Libya.

<sup>61</sup> For example, the 4<sup>th</sup> Tihama Brigade joined Tareq Saleh in 2020 due to largely non-payment of salaries by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>62</sup> As opposed to 2019 when different force commanders were on an equal footing. See <https://www.ereemnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139> where a spokesperson for the West Coast said "this council includes members of all joint forces and has no president, deputy, secretary and the like, all under the leadership and supervision of the Arab alliance, and the council includes a selection of forces participating in the west coast front" and see appendix 4.

#### IV. UAE and the Coalition's role in the West Coast

10. The current role of the UAE on the West Coast remains opaque. The UAE has acknowledged to provides support to the WCJF and to the West Coast on humanitarian and development matters (figure 5.2 and 5.3).<sup>63</sup> However, the UAE has not been clear on the nature of its current military support to the WCJF; in July 2021, the UAE denied that it had provided any military support to Tareq Saleh or his forces. In October 2021, in contrast, the UAE stated that it had provided such support in 2019<sup>64</sup> In July 2021, the UAE stated that it had no troops permanently present on the West Coast.<sup>65</sup> According to sources on the ground, the UAE continues to have some presence on the West Coast,<sup>66</sup> even if it is not at the same scale before mid-2019. The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE does not exercise any direct or indirect authority over the leaders or their security and military operations” in the WCJF, and that “Tareq Saleh and Abu Zara (al Mahrami) are part of the joint forces, whose tasks include confronting the Houthis and managing operations in the west coast. The Coalition’s joint command deals with any problems they face”.<sup>67</sup> The Panel notes that in an interview with Saleh, he said that “the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance.” (appendix 4).<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup> UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has provided a substantial amount of humanitarian support to the West Coast prior to June 2019 (building schools, hospitals, reconstruction, including of Mocha port); and it continues to provide support to maintain the infrastructure that it has rehabilitated.” UAE communication to the Panel, November 2021.

<sup>64</sup> The UAE in its communication with the Panel in November 2021, informed the Panel that prior to 2019 “(t)he UAE as a part of the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen worked with these forces (West Coast armed groups and STC) to ensure that they are trained and equipped as a part of the capacity building measures that was undertaken by the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen. The UAE’s support was in the interest of ensuring that these forces were able to prevent and respond to Houthi and AQAP security threats, including after the departure of the UAE. This support was given with knowledge of the Government of Yemen.” The Panel received videos showing military vehicles coming into the Mocha port; the National Resistance in August 2021 stated that they arrived prior to the UAE’s redeployment around mid-2019, as the UAE wanted to provide new military equipment and vehicles to the armed groups in the West Coast prior to their movement.

<sup>65</sup> Discussions between the Panel and the UAE, July 2021.

<sup>66</sup> Individuals from the armed groups on the West Coast.

<sup>67</sup> Communication from the UAE, October 2021.

<sup>68</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>. The extracts are as follows:

*Saleh: Even before the withdrawal of the Emirati forces, they formed the Joint Command and a joint operations room between the National Resistance and the Giants Brigades ... So the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance. Decisions are made all through consensus and consultations, through meetings between the leadership and representatives of all these parties.”*

*“Sana’a Center: ...What is the current state of your relationship with the UAE?*

*Saleh: It is a partnership. We and the UAE have put in place principles for this coalition, for this alliance, this is our cause and our interest. The UAE are part of this coalition and we need support to fight against the Houthis. We welcome their support on the condition that we are partners to liberate Yemen and to restore the state. These are our main objectives, to restore the state and ensure the return of state institutions and the legitimate government. This is the agreement that we had for our partnership with the UAE and they have adhered to this. There are no other interests or agendas outside of the liberation of Yemen from the coup,”*

Figure 5.2

**UAE support to the West Coast (Tweet from spokesperson of the National resistance)**

Source: <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1464884661226770435> (right). (Spokesperson of the National Resistance tweet on of the arrival of eighty thousand doses of COVID-19 vaccines provided by the UAE to the joint forces and civilians in the districts of the West Coast) and <https://2dec.net/news47970.html> (left) on the “west coast department of the national resistance medical forces” launching the first phase of the vaccination campaign for citizens and military personnel.

Figure 5.3

**UAE support to the West Coast (tweet from Tareq Saleh)**

Source: <https://twitter.com/tarikyemen/status/1466290740401741826>. (reportedly a completed apartment construction project in Mukha by the UAE to commemorate Ali Abdullah Saleh YEi.003)<sup>69</sup>

11. The Panel finds that, within the Coalition, the UAE continues to retain significant influence over the West Coast forces. In at least two documented incidents, the UAE has, according to individuals present at the meetings, been involved in trying to contain tensions and infighting amongst WCJF and between WCJF and Tai'zz military.<sup>70</sup> The Tihama leaders allege that the UAE, as well as Tareq Saleh, was instrumental in the reorganization of the West Coast armed groups in late 2020, that resulted in all Tihama forces falling under the dual leadership of Abu Zara al Mahrami and Tareq Saleh (appendices 3 and 4).

<sup>69</sup> Confirmed by a representative of the National Resistance.

<sup>70</sup> The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has good relations with the above-mentioned parties, but its influence on those parties is limited and focused on advancing the peace process. In light of its relationships, the UAE is working on reducing any armed escalations resulting from conflicting opinions, since the escalation took place before the Riyadh Agreement, in order to advance the peace process.”

12. For most part of 2021, the KSA appeared to keep its focus on Ma'rib, while the Government continued to allow the UAE, through the Coalition's Joint Forces Command established by the Coalition, to take the lead on the West Coast.<sup>71</sup> In November 2021, the Coalition clarified its own role in the withdrawals in Hudaydah and stated that "The joint forces in the West Coast carried out the redeployment and the reposition of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition" (appendix 1). It is the first time, that the Panel is aware of, that the Coalition acknowledged its role in a significant military operation in Yemen, without the prior knowledge of the Government.<sup>72</sup> The WCJF in its statement did not refer to the role of the Coalition (appendix 2), however, its representatives bilaterally acknowledged the leadership of the Coalition in this operation, to the exclusion of the Government.

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<sup>71</sup> Representatives of the Government informed the Panel that the UAE continues to have control or influence over the West Coast forces, even after their redeployment in mid-2019.

<sup>72</sup> The Panel has provided Saudi Arabia an opportunity to clarify if it informed the Government in advance of this movement, a response is pending.

## Appendix 1 Media article on the statement by the Coalition Spokesperson on the redeployments of Coalition forces and withdrawals of the WCJF

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Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen: Repositioning and Redeployment of the Joint Forces in the West Coast Is a Military Decision Taken by The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be Aligned with its Military Strategy in Yemen

Monday 1443/4/10 - 2021/11/15

Riyadh, Nov. 15, 2021, SPA -- Official Spokesperson of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen Brigadier General Turki Al-Malki issued the following statement:

"The redeployment and repositioning of Coalition military forces and Yemeni government forces in the area of operations falls under military strategies carried out by the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be aligned with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast carried out the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition. The repositioning and redeployment operation was carried out with discipline and flexibility as planned, which falls in line with future plans of the Coalition forces.

We commend the discipline of all Coalition Countries' military forces, as well as the Yemeni National Army and the Joint Forces in the West Coast during their military redeployment and repositioning operation.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast has achieved numerous victories, which culminated in the (Stockholm) Agreement following the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia's intransigence towards sitting at the negotiating table. Following almost (3) years of holding defensive positions, and the disruption of the implementation of the (Stockholm) Agreement by the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia, whose violations have exceeded (30,000) breaches of the Agreement's provisions, the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition deemed it important that these forces be redeployed and repositioned in order to become more effective and operationally flexible to contribute in the national battle of the Yemeni Army in a manner that guarantees its maneuverability and security in the area of operations; in a time where the Houthi militia still controls the three main ports on the Red Sea (Hodeida Port, Saleef Port and Ras Isa Port), and their disruption of the United Nations' supervision for the implementation of the Agreement.

We conclude by calling on the UN and UNMHA to play its part in implementing the (Stockholm) Agreement, as well as the international community to pressure the terrorist Houthi militia into full commitment and implementation of the Agreement's provisions."

--SPA

20:30 LOCAL TIME 17:30 GMT

0032

www.spa.gov.sa/2304419

Source: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

# Appendix 2 Media Report on the statement by the WCJF



- الأخيرة**
- الأشهر**
- هندسة القوات المشتركة تنزع عشرات الغارات الناجمة زرعها مليشيات الحوثي تحت الجسور في حبس 4 ديسمبر 2021
- إعادة مسنين الذين ينطابها خادمة أطلقها مليشيات الحوثي على منزلها شرق حبس 4 ديسمبر 2021
- الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تظهر الحفول الزراعية شمال حبس من الأرقام الحوثية 3 ديسمبر 2021
- القوات المشتركة لتقدم في منطقة الدين جنوب غرب الجرادح وتسيطر على مواقع المليشيات 2 ديسمبر 2021
- الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تهكك عشرات الأرقام الحوثية زرعها المليشيات في المزارع بحديرية حبس 1 ديسمبر 2021



الرئيسية / الأخبار / بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

## بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

المركز الإعلامي لألوية العمالقعة

12 نوفمبر 2021

تتابع القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي، تطورات الأحداث المتتالية عقب تنفيذها قرار إخلاء المناطق المحكومة باتفاق (السويد)، لكون تلك المناطق محكومة باتفاق دولي يفيها مناطق منزوعة السلاح وأمنة للمدنيين الذين وقع اتفاق (السويد) بحجة حمايتهم وتأمينهم.

وإذنا، فإننا في القوات المشتركة، نؤجّد وثيقة راسخة وقوية بالتمر - إن شاء الله - أن قرار إعادة الانتشار جزء من المعركة الوطنية التي بدأناها وبذلنا فيها العالي والتفيس لمواجهة المخاطر التي تهدد أمن الوطن والمواطن اليمني حوصلاً، وأثمن الثمن القومي العربي عموماً.

وإن قيادة القوات المشتركة، تؤجّد أنها اتخذت هذا القرار في ضوء خطة إعادة الانتشار المحددة في اتفاق (ستوكهولم)؛ الذي تتمسك الحكومة الشرعية بتنفيذه، بالرغم من انتهاكات مليشيات الحوثي الانتهاك من اليوم التالي لتوقيعه، وما زالت المليشيات مستمرة في نسف الاتفاق حتى اليوم.

ولم تعط القوات المشتركة الضوء الأخضر لتحرير مدينة الحديدة، وجرمانها من تحقيق هدف استراتيجي لليمن وأثمن القومي العربي، كان من شأنه أن يسرع من إنهاء المليشيات الحوثية، وإننا نرى واجبنا الديني والوطني دفعنا للدفاع عن جهات ذات أهمية أخرى قد يستغلها العدو عند عدم وجود دفاعات كافية، وعدم وجود قوات دولي يردع الحوثي عن تقدمه، كما فعل مع فونانا في (الحديدة).

وأما فرت ذلك في سياق متابعها التطورات؛ التي تشهدها جهات البلاد كلها، التي يفرض على كل جرد فادر أن يقدم الدعم والوعون بالوسائل المختلفة لجهات الدفاع عن اليمن واليمنيين في مواجهة أدوات (إيران)؛ التي تعيد خرائطها في (اليمناء والووف)، وإسقاط ثلاث مديريات من محافظة شبوة وغيرها، ثم الوصول إلى مشارف مدينة (مارب).

لقد رأت القوات المشتركة خطراً يهددها محاصرة في مناس دفعات ممنوع عليها الحرب، بقرار دولي، فيما الجهات المختلفة تتطلب دعماً بكل الأشكال؛ ومنها فتح جهات أخرى توقف الحوثيين عند حددهم، ونؤجّد للمواطن اليمني والعربي؛ الذي يعيش معنا معاركنا القومية، أن اليمنيين لن يخذروا جهداً في إعادة ترتيب صومهم ومعاركهم للقتال (صفاً واحداً كاليمنيين المرصوصين)؛ في كل جهة والجاه.

وعليه، فقد بدأت تنفيذ خطتنا التي نحدد خطواتها دفاعية، نؤجّد معركة الساحل وبنينا (تهامة) على أهبة الاستعداد لأي تطورات قد تطرأ في جهات القتال ضد الحوثي.

ومن المؤسف له، أن هذه الخطة فونبت بتضليل إعلامي؛ يستهدف ضرب الثقة الصلبة لمنتسبي القوات المشتركة في إطار الاستهداف المعتاد الذي تتعرض له فونانا؛ بالطريقة والأدوات نفسها التي استخدمت في إضعاف دور الشرعية وإغلبها في المعركة الوطنية.

إن أبطال القوات المشتركة في الوحدات والتنشيطات العسكرية جميعها ملتزمون بمعركتهم في كل شبر في مواجهة الأتوة الحوثية، وستظل جهاتنا صلبة تدق مليشيات إيران الهزائم المذلة.

وإننا ندعو الجميع إلى استئثار الواجب، ورش الصفوف، وتصحيح النيات، والتزام الأهداف؛ حتى يقضي الله أمراً كان مفعولاً، وإن نعر الله للقرين.

Source: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/2-الساحل-في-القوات-المشتركة-في-البيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-الغربي>

**Unofficial translation (confirmed as accurate by a representative of the WCJF):**

The Joint Forces at the West Coast are monitoring the developments of the successive events following their implementation of the decision to evacuate the areas governed (according to Stockholm agreement). The reason is that those areas are governed by an international agreement that keeps them demilitarized and safe for civilians under the pretext of their protection and security.

To begin with, we, in the joint forces, affirm with firm and strong confidence in victory - God willing - that the redeployment decision is part of the national battle that we have begun and made priceless and precious efforts to address the threats targeting the security of our homeland and the Yemeni citizen in particular, and Arab national security in general.

The Joint Forces command confirms that it made this decision in the light of the redeployment plan outlined in the Stockholm agreement, which the Government is keen to implement, despite violations committed by Houthi militias from the next day after the agreement was signed, as Houthi militias continue to violate that agreement till this day.

The Joint Forces did not give the green light to liberate Hudaydah city, and by doing so a strategic goal for Yemen and Arab national security was deprived from being achieved. If Hudaydah city is liberated, the end of Houthi militias would have been accelerated.

We see it as our religious and patriotic duty that motivates us to defend other fronts of other importance, which the enemy may exploit when there are insufficient defenses as well as when there is an absence of an international agreement efficiently deterring the Houthi militias from their progress like what happened with our forces in (Hudaydah).

The Joint Forces decided that decision in the context of following the recent events and developments at the fronts of the whole country. Those developments of events impose on every free person - to his ability - to provide support and aid by various means to the fronts of defense of Yemen and Yemenis in the face of the tools/hands of (Iran); which is wreaking havoc in (Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf), and which brought down three districts from and through Shabwa governorate, reaching the outskirts of (Ma'rib) city.

The Joint Forces had noted the mistake of remaining besieged in defensive barricades and being prohibited by an international decision from fighting, while the various fronts require support in all forms; an example of such support is to open other fronts that would stop the Houthi militias, and by that assure to the Yemeni and Arab citizens; who are living with us our national battles, that the Yemenis will spare no effort in rearranging their rows and their battles to fight (as one row like a solid structure); In every front and direction.

Accordingly, The Joint Forces has begun implementing its plan, which defines defensive lines, secures the battle of the coast and keeps (Tihama) ready for any developments of events that may occur at the fronts of fighting against the Houthis.

Unfortunately, this plan was met with media misinformation and was misleading; that aims to target and strike the solid confidence of The Joint Forces' members as usual; In the same way and tools that were used to weaken the role and effectiveness of the legitimate government in the national battle.

The heroes of The Joint Forces in all military units and formations are committed to their battle in every inch in the face of the Houthi tumor. Our fronts will remain solid, subjecting Iran's militias to humiliating defeats. We call on everyone to feel the duty, rearrange the rows, charge their well, and adhere to aimed goals until God decide on the matter and God's victory is nearby.

## Appendix 3 Statement of Tihama

<p>بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ</p> <p>بتاريخ: ٩ / ٤ / ١٤٤٣ هـ</p> <p>الموافق: ١٤ / ١١ / ٢٠٢١ م</p>		<p>إقليم تهامة</p> <p>الحراك التهامي السلمي</p> <p>المقاومة التهامية</p>
<p>بيان الحراك التهامي السلمي والمقاومة التهامية رقم ( ٤ ) لسنة ٢٠٢١ م</p> <p>بشأن انسحاب القوات المشتركة من طرف واحد في مناطق سيطرتها على الساحل التهامي:</p>		
<p>لقد فوجئ الحراك التهامي والمقاومة التهامية في يوم الخميس الموافق ١١ نوفمبر ٢٠٢١ م بانسحاب مفاجئ للقوات المشتركة من مناطق سيطرتهم في كل من مديرية الحوك ومديرية الحالي ومديرية الدريهمي ومديرية التحيتا والخط الساحلي بما يعادل ٩٠ كيلو متراً بدعوى تنفيذ اتفاق استوكهولم من طرف واحد؛ لتتقدم مليشيا الحوثي العنصرية الإرهابية لمحاولة السيطرة على مناطق الانسحاب.</p>		
<p>ورغم أن أبناء تهامة لم يكونوا طرفاً في اتفاق استوكهولم؛ إلا أن تنفيذ الاتفاق تحت أي دعوى كان يقتضي أن يكون الانسحاب من الطرفين في مناطق محددة، بما في ذلك إخلاء المليشيا الحوثية لموانئ الحديد والصلب ورأس عيسى.</p>		
<p>ومهما كانت الدواعي السياسية أو العسكرية لهذا الانسحاب؛ إلا أن عدم وضع اعتبارات لتناجحه على الحالة الإنسانية لأبناء تهامة في المناطق التي أخليت منها القوات وأعدت مليشيا الحوثي اجتياحها؛ مؤشر انتكاسة ترافقت مع ذعر الأهالي من عودة الاجتياح الحوثي وملاحقته وتصفياته والوفوضى التي رافقت النزوح الجماعي مما يفترض أنها مناطق محررة وأمنة من بطش المليشيات.</p>		
<p>إننا في الحراك والمقاومة التهامية ندين ما حدث من انسحاب؛ أيًا كانت دواعيه وضروراته؛ نتيجة عدم أخذه لتداعياته الإنسانية في تهامة بعين الاعتبار؛ ونظراً لكون الميزرات والدوافع السياسية والعسكرية لهذا الانسحاب غامضة وغير مبررة؛ تطالب التحالف العربي باتخاذ موقف حازم تجاه ما حدث؛ وفتح تحقيق فيما جرى ويجري لأبناء تهامة؛ وإعادة تصويب الوضع بما يضمن إعادة السيطرة على المناطق التي تم الانسحاب منها وتطمين أبناء تهامة أن سلامتهم وسلامة أراضيهم مصانة وكرامتهم محفوظة.</p>		
<p>كما نحمل المجتمع الدولي في مقدمتهم الأمم المتحدة ومبعوثها الأممي كل المسؤولية الإنسانية عن التداعيات الإنسانية الكارثية التي حصلت وتحصل نتيجة غض النظر عن هذا الانتهاك الأرعن لجماعة الحوثي الإرهابية ومن يقف وراءها ونحملهم المسؤولية الكاملة تجاه الأهالي والمواطنين النازحين من أبناء تهامة والقيام بواجبهم في ضمان فتح كل المعابر الإنسانية لأهلنا في الداخل؛ وضمان وقف الانتهاكات الحوثية بحقهم والجرائم الانتقامية؛ بما في ذلك أي محاولات قسرية لعسكرتهم وعسكرة الحياة المدنية ووضع حد لجرائم الاتجار بالبشر.</p>		
<p>لا يخفى على كل متابع ماتعرض له أبناء هذا المنطقة الجغرافية الهامة في جغرافية اليمن والإقليم من محاولات استبعادهم وتهميشهم من صنع القرار حتى بعد كل التضحيات التي قدموها في سبيل منحهم حقهم في الشراكة العادلة في أرضهم، حيث تتابع مسلمات التأمير عليهم كمكون وطني أصيل ابتداء من تفتيت وتشتيت قوات تهامية نوعية</p>		





Source: Confidential, Tihama political leadership

## **Unofficial translation of the Statement of Tihama**

**In The Name of Allah the Merciful  
Tahamah Region  
Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak  
2021 A  
Tahami Resistance**

**Date: 9 / 4 / 1443 H  
Corresponding to 14 / 11 /**

### **The Statement of Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak and Tahami Resistance No. (4) of the Year 2021**

In regard to the unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at the Tihami coast:

Tihami Movement/Hirak and Tihami Resistance were surprised on the Thursday of 11<sup>th</sup> of November 2021 by the sudden unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at Al-Hawk district, Al-Hali district, Al-duraihemi district, Al-Tuhaita district and the costal line, and that was from about 90 kilometres under the pretext of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, for the racist terrorist Houthi militia to advance to try to control the withdrawal areas.

The sons of Tihama were not a party in the Stockholm Agreement; However, the implementation of the agreement required that the withdrawal should be by both parties in limited areas, this included the Houthi militia's evacuation of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa.

Whatever the political or military reasons for this withdrawal, the failure to consider its consequences on the humanitarian situation of the people of Tihama in the areas from which the forces were evacuated and the Houthi militia re-invaded; is considered to be a setback, resulting in the people's fear of the return of the Houthi invasion and its pursuits and assassinations, and the chaos that accompanied the mass displacement from what are supposed to be liberated and safe areas from the violence of the militias.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance condemn the withdrawal that took place; whatever its reasons and necessities, because it did not take the Tihama's humanitarian repercussions into consideration. Given that the justifications and political and military motives for this withdrawal are vague and unjustified, we demand the Arab coalition to take a firm stand towards what happened and to open an investigation on what happened and is happening to the sons of Tihama, changing the situation to ensure the restoration of control over the areas from which the withdrawal occurred and to reassure the people of Tihama of their safety and that the integrity of their lands are protected and their dignity is preserved.

We also hold the international community, led by the United Nations and its UN envoy, responsible for the catastrophic humanitarian repercussions that have occurred and are occurring as a result of turning a blind eye to this reckless violation of the terrorist Houthi group and those behind it.

We hold them fully responsible towards the families and displaced citizens of Tihama and call them to carry out their duty to ensure the opening of all humanitarian safe passages for our people inside; as

well as the responsibility of ensuring the cessation of Houthi violations against them (Tihama people) and the (cessation of) Houthi retaliatory crimes. This includes any coercive attempts to militarize them (Tihama people) and militarization of civilian life, as well as putting an end to human trafficking crimes.

It is no secret to the followers of the event; the attempts to exclude and marginalize the people of this important geographical area of Yemen and the region from decision-making, even after all the sacrifices they made in order to obtain their right to a just partnership in their land, the series of plots against them as an authentic national element continued, starting with the fragmentation and dispersal of the Tihama forces such as the (Tihama) Elite, the Third Brigade and the Eleventh Brigade, targeting the leadership of the Tihama Resistance First Brigade, and targeting the rest of the brigades, which were and are considered qualitative additions to Tihama and Yemen in general.

And now, after all the conspiracies to break up this Tihami force that is most eager to liberate its Yemeni land in the Tihami coast, we see those who fail them again, believing that they (Tihama people) will face their fate and that they are in a state of weakness.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance demand the legitimate government to announce the fall of the Stockholm Agreement as a result of the Houthi practices (Houthi advances) that accompanied the unjustified unilateral withdrawal; Issue a clear political position that considers the Stockholm Agreement as if it were nothing after this major setback, which prompted the Houthi militia to persist in recklessness. We also call on all the sons of Tihama and their free brothers from across Yemen to stand firm and line up, and we say to them: You are the ones who have resisted and liberated these areas, and you can recover them and defeat the Houthi terrorist militia. We also tell them rejoice, then rejoice, then rejoice, for aid and support will come to you very soon; Strengthen your vows, unite your words, unify your opinions, be on the heart of one man, leave differences aside, and make your goal the liberation of Tihama; So, persevere and be patient, and victory is your ally, by the will of God.

And just as victory swept you in the past, it will ally you recently and forever, because you are defending the right and defending your land, your religion and your faith, and on your hands, the myth of these militias has been broken and will end forever.

There is no place for traitorous climbers in the land of proud Tihama  
Mercy and forgiveness to the martyrs and a speedy recovery to the wounded.  
Long live proud Tihama freely.  
Issued by the Peaceful Tihami movement/Hirak  
On 11/14/2021AD

## Appendix 4 West Coast Joint Operations Room Command in 2019

**Table 9.1:**

Leaders of the Joint forces of the West Coast (established in June 2019 and information as of December 2019). Note: In 2021, the Panel understands that all of these brigades or leaders came under the National Resistance or the Giant Brigade.

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Forces</b>	<b>Comments</b>
Major General	Haytham Qasm Taheer	20 <sup>th</sup> Brigade	Former Minister of Defense (1990–1994).
Brigadier General	Ali Salem Al- Hassani	Amalika Forces	General Supervisor of the Amalika Forces.
Brigadier General	Ra'ed al Habhy	Amalika Forces	Commander, 1 <sup>st</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Hamdy Shukry	Amalika Forces	Commander, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Abdallahman al Lahjy	Amalika Forces	Commander of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Brigade. From Lahj.
Brigadier General	Tareq Saleh	Guards of the Republic/National Resistance	Commander of the Guards of the Republic.
Brigadier General	Ahmed al Kawkabany	Tihama Forces	Commander of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.
Brigadier General	Sadq Duwid	Guards of the Republic/National Resistance	Spokesperson for the Guards of the Republic
Brigadier General	Suleyman Mansour al Zaranwqy	Tihama Forces	Commander, Zaraniq Brigades
Brigadier General	Ali al Kuniny	Amalika Forces	Commander, 7 <sup>th</sup> Brigade
Brigadier General	Bassam al Mehdar	3 <sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade	Commander, Facilities/Logistics Brigade.

*Source:* Various sources in 2019

## Annex 6 STC statements on military and security appointments

Figure 6.1

## Appointment of three leaders of the Security Belt Forces

13:02:58 2021-12-11 من نحن

بحث بحث

المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي  
SOUTHERN TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
الموقع الرسمي

الرئيسية | اخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | أخبار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعار | English

الرئيسية / اخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

اخبار المجلس

الأكثر قراءة

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزي بوفاته العميد حيدرة لهطل

فيديو

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

الجمعة 25 يونيو 2021 الساعة 9:00 مساءً

أصدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس فاسم الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، القرار رقم 74 لعام 21، تم بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية. وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (1): تعيين العميد / محسن عبدالله الوالي، قائداً لقوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (2): تعيين العميد / مختار علي مثنى النوبي، نائباً لقائد قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (3): تعيين العميد / عبيد مثنى فاسم لعزم، ركن عمليات قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (4): تقوم قوات الحزام الأمني بالمهام الأمنية والشرطية وتعمل ضمن قوام وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (5): ينظم عمل قوات الحزام الأمني وفق نظم وفوائين وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (6): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين.

رقم 74 لعام 21، تم بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية.

وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (1): تعيين العميد / محسن عبدالله الوالي، قائداً لقوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (2): تعيين العميد / مختار علي مثنى النوبي، نائباً لقائد قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (3): تعيين العميد / عبيد مثنى فاسم لعزم، ركن عمليات قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (4): تقوم قوات الحزام الأمني بالمهام الأمنية والشرطية وتعمل ضمن قوام وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (5): ينظم عمل قوات الحزام الأمني وفق نظم وفوائين وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (6): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين.

كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام للأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجنائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"

23

Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408487032297504774?s=08>.

## **Translation provided by the STC**

President Al-Zubaidi issues decision appointing leadership for Security Belt Forces and to work within Ministry of Interior

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 14 of 2021 regarding the appointment of a leadership for the Security Belt Forces and their work within the Ministry of Interior.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah Al-Wali as Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Mukhtar Ali Muthanna Al-Nubi as Deputy Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Obaid Muthanna Qassem La'ram – Operations Staff officer of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (4): The Security Belt Forces to carry out security and police tasks and work within the framework of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (5): The work of the Security Belt Forces is regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (6): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Figure 6.2

## Appointment of three leaders of the Support and Attribution Forces

13:16:57 2021-12-11 من نحن

بحث بحث

المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي  
SOUTHERN TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
الديمقراطي

الرئيسية | اخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | أخبار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعازي | English

الرئيسية / اخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة ألوية الإسناد والدعم وضمها للقوات البرية الجنوبية

## اخبار المجلس

### الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لألوية الإسناد والدعم وضمها للقوات البرية الجنوبية

الجمعة 25 يونيو 2021 الساعة 9:00 مساءً



الأكثر قراءة

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزى بوفاته العميد حيدرة لهطل



فيديو



كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام للأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجنائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"



صدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، القرار رقم 33 لعام 41، تم بشأن تعيين قيادة ألوية الإسناد والدعم وضمها للقوات البرية الجنوبية. وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (1): تعيين اللواء / صالح أحمد محمد السيد، قائداً لألوية الإسناد والدعم

ماد (2): تعيين العميد / علي ناصر متني المعكر، أركان حرب ألوية الإسناد والدعم

ماد (3): تعيين العميد / عبدالسلام زين علي البيحاني، ركن عمليات ألوية الإسناد والدعم

ماد (4): يتم نقل مقر القيادة وألوية الإسناد والدعم إلى خارج محافظة عدن ويتم ضمها ضمن ألوية البرية للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية.

ماد (5): تخضع ألوية الإسناد والدعم لقيادة القوات البرية التي تخضع لوزارة الدفاع.

ماد (6): ينظم عمل ومهام ألوية الإسناد والدعم وفق نظم وشوآئين وزارة الدفاع

ماد (7): يعمل بحدا الفرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين

37

WhatsApp Telegram Twitter Facebook

Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408485644603695109?s=08> .

### **Translation provided by the STC**

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 13 for the year 2021, regarding the appointment of a command for the Backup and Support brigades and their inclusion within the southern ground forces.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Major General Saleh Ahmed Mohammad Al-Sayed as commander of the the Backup and Support brigades.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Ali Nasser Muthanna Al-Muaker – War Staff Officer for Support Brigades.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Abdul Salam Zain Ali Al-Bayhani - Operations Staff Officer of the Support Brigades.

Article (4): The headquarters and brigades of Backup and Support shall be transferred outside Aden governorate and shall be included within the land brigades of the Southern Armed Forces.

Article (5): Backup and Support brigades are subject to the command of the land forces, which are subject to the Ministry of Defense.

Article (6): The work and tasks of the Backup and Support brigades shall be regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Defense.

Article (7): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Note: The STC informed the Panel in December 2021 that there are no more military forces in Aden, and that they “fulfilled the Riyadh Agreement in this aspect from one side.” These military forces left to different fronts immediately after the issuance of the decree. The Government of Yemen denies that any movement of these forces outside of Aden.



## **Annex 7 Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020**

1. The Panel investigated the attack at Aden International Airport, which took place at approximately 1325 hours on 30 December 2020 shortly after a plane carrying the Ministers of the newly formed ‘unity’ government had arrived from Riyadh. The attack claimed the lives of 20 civilians, including Deputy Minister Yasmin al-Awadhi of the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Over 100 people were hospitalized as a result of injuries sustained during the incident. The Panel investigated whether the attack constituted a threat to peace and security in Yemen, as well as a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

2. Following an invitation by the Government of Yemen, the Panel visited Aden from 3 to 6 February 2021, where it had access to the impact locations at Aden International Airport as well as to the debris of the missiles used in the attack. The Panel also held meetings with representatives of the Government of Yemen and the National Commission for Inquiry, which were both conducting their own investigations into the incident. In Aden, the Panel interviewed victims and witnesses of the airport attack. It has also conducted remote interviews with a number of other individuals, including people who claim to have witnessed the launch of two missiles at the time of the attack from Tai’zz Airport. The Panel has also communicated on the attack with Houthis, journalists, independent analysts as well as international and local organisations.

3. The Panel had access to information provided by several Member States regarding the attack, including high-resolution satellite imagery of Tai’zz Airport from 30 December 2020. The Panel has requested permission to reproduce the imagery for this report, but so far the Member State which provided the imagery has not granted the Panel permission to do so.

### **I. Description of the incident**

4. On 30 December 2020, a Yemen Airways (Yemenia) Airbus A320-200 operating as flight IY535 left King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh at 1010 hours, carrying Yemeni Prime Minister Maen Abdulmalik Saeed, members of his cabinet, other officials, as well as the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen. The new ‘unity’ cabinet had been sworn in just four days earlier after long negotiations between the Hadi government and representatives of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The cabinet’s return to Aden was seen as a crucial step in the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement. The arrival of the plane was awaited by a crowd of people, who had gained access to the airport’s apron. It was also broadcast live on Yemeni television (see figure 7.1 below). Despite the high-profile nature of the event, security around the airport on 30 December 2020 seems to have been relatively light, even though the Government has informed the Panel that it had received some intelligence information in the early morning hours of 30 December about a possible attack.

Figure 7.1  
The scene at Aden airport immediately before the attack



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344431245481160704>

5. The Panel was informed that the plane arrived at Aden International Airport at approximately 1317 hours, about 90 minutes later than originally expected. Just minutes before its arrival, the airport authorities decided to change the incoming airliner's parking position from line 1 (the closest position to the terminal) to line 2, which is approximately 50 metres further away from the terminal. It is also clear from the presence of a red carpet visible in some of the video footage that the plane was originally supposed to park closer to the terminal.<sup>73</sup> According to airport officials interviewed by the Panel, the decision to change the parking position was taken to increase the distance between the waiting crowds and the plane. Following the plane's arrival, there was an additional delay as Major-General Shallal Ali Shaya, former Director-General of Security in Aden, disembarked first to greet his supporters on the apron. Only after Shallal Ali Shaya had boarded a vehicle to leave the airport, the rest of the passengers, including the members of the cabinet, began to leave the plane.

6. According to the time stamp on the closed-circuit television (CCTV) tapes of the airport, the first explosion occurred at 13:24:35 hours, when the VIP lounge in the terminal building was hit by a missile (see figure 7.2), which penetrated the concrete wall and caused a crater with a diameter of approximately two meters. Based on the damage to the terminal wall (see figure 7.3), the Panel assesses that the first missile was launched from a northerly direction. According to witnesses interviewed by the Panel, the Government had been planning to hold a press conference at this location after the arrival of the Prime Minister and the other cabinet members from Riyadh. It is likely that only the delay described in the previous paragraph prevented members of the Government from being harmed by this missile, which instead killed and injured a number of passengers, all civilians, waiting in the departure hall for the departure of Yemen Airways flight no. IY612 to Cairo.

<sup>73</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2c0WXcyvTQ0>.

Figure 7.2  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the first missile  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:24:35



30-12-2020 Wed 13:24:35



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.3

Damage to the outer wall of the terminal building, showing the angle of impact



*Source:* Panel

7. The second explosion occurred seconds later at 13:25:09 local time (based on the time stamp of the airport's CCTV footage), when a missile hit the airport apron (see figure 7.4), causing a crater with a diameter of approximately 75 centimetres with a depth of about 32 centimetres. The orientation of the crater shows that this missile impacted from approximately  $315^\circ$  from the North, i.e. from a north-westerly direction (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1). Given the dimensions of the crater, which are significantly smaller than in the case of the other two missiles, it is possible that the second missile carried a smaller quantity of explosives. Nevertheless, the missile impacted directly on lane 1 (see figure 7.5), where the Yemenia Airbus was supposed to park after its arrival from Riyadh. Had the plane's landing position not been changed at the last moment, it seems very likely that the plane would have suffered a direct hit, causing even greater loss of life and destruction.

Figure 7.4  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the second missile on the apron



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.5  
Impact point of the second missile on the runway



*Source:* Panel

8. At 13:25:33 local time, a third missile hit at a low earth wall close to the terminal building, approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile. The impact created a crater with a diameter of approximately 3 metres and a depth of 1.3 metres. Unfortunately, at the time of the Panel's visit to Aden International Airport, about four weeks after the attack, the crater had already partially been re-filled with earth, which made precise measurements impossible. However, the orientation of the crater, as well as the imagery from the CCTV cameras clearly shows that this missile came from a northerly direction.

Figure 7.6  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the third missile on the low earth wall  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:25:33



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.7  
**Impact point of the third missile on the low earth wall**



*Source:* Panel

9. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel reported shots being fired. Gunfire can also be heard on some of the videos taken by journalists during the incident. Despite speculation that there was a simultaneous ground attack, the Panel has been informed by the authorities that those shots were fired by members of the Yemeni and Saudi security forces in the confusion following the explosions. With regard to the human toll of the attack, the Panel has received information from three different sources – the Government of Yemen, National Commission of Inquiry and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Aden – stating that a total of 20 people,<sup>74</sup> including three staff members of the ICRC perished as a result of the attack,<sup>75</sup> and that between 104 and 114 people were injured.<sup>76</sup> The difference in figures is due to the fact that the Government only listed people who were hospitalized, while OHCHR also included those injured but not hospitalized as a result of the attack. Among the injured were four children, nine women, ten journalists and 12 members of the military.<sup>77</sup>

10. The Panel has noted media reports that about four hours after the attack the Maasheeq palace, which is the seat of the government in Aden, was attacked by “an explosive-laden drone”, which was allegedly intercepted.<sup>78</sup> The Panel requested more information about this incident, and stands ready to conduct an inspection of the debris of the uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).

<sup>74</sup> This number includes three people who died from their injuries in hospital.

<sup>75</sup> <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-2-icrc-staff-members-killed-1-unaccounted-after-airport-blast>.

<sup>76</sup> The list with the names of the casualties received by the Panel from the Government of Yemen is reproduced in annex 4.

<sup>77</sup> According to information provided by OHCHR this number includes five foreign soldiers.

<sup>78</sup> <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2020/12/30/Yemeni-military-intercepts-explosive-laden-drone-near-Aden-s-presidential-palace>.



11. Immediately after the attack, the Government of Yemen attributed responsibility to the Houthis.<sup>79</sup> The Panel has taken note of statements by senior Houthi officials, including by the deputy foreign minister Hussein al-Ezzi<sup>80</sup> as well as by the ministry of human rights in Sana'a, who condemned the attack and stated that "the Saudi aggression coalition planned and directly supported terrorist groups to target Aden airport and civilians".<sup>81</sup> The Panel has not been able to find any evidence supporting the claim against Saudi Arabia. The Panel also notes that Abdulwahab al-Mahbashi, a member of the political office of the Houthis, when asked about the Aden airport attack, neither denied nor confirmed Houthi involvement in the incident, but rather stated in general that the Houthis have a right of self-defense.<sup>82</sup> In line with its methodology, the Panel has written to the leadership of the Houthi movement with detailed questions regarding the attack; a response is still pending.

## II. Possible launch sites of the attack on the Airport

12. The Panel is investigating different locations from which the missiles could have been launched on 30 December 2020. It has interviewed a number of witnesses, who claimed to have observed the launches, and has analyzed images and videos posted on social media in the aftermath of the attack. It has also reviewed satellite images obtained from different sources, including confidential images provided by a Member State. The Panel has also obtained the angle and direction of the impact craters and has cross-referenced this information with the CCTV footage, both of which imply that the missiles were launched from a northerly (in the case of the first and third missile) and a north-westerly (in the case of the second missile) direction. This suggests different launch sites.

13. Shortly after the attack, a number of videos were posted on social media which appear to show the launch of two solid-propellant<sup>83</sup> missiles in the vicinity of Tai'zz Airport. The four geo-located four videos (figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, using the angles and shadows of the sun, that they were taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>84</sup> The Panel also had access to a confidential, high-resolution satellite image provided by a Member State, which was taken on 30 December 2020 over Tai'zz Airport (13°41'08.88'' N, 044°08'21.12'' E). The satellite image appears to show two Transport-Erector-Launchers (TELs) positioned at a distance of several hundred metres apart towards the West of the airport's main runway. The TELs were oriented South-East, in the direction of Aden. According to the same Member State, the TELs were no longer visible on 31 December 2020. The Panel has requested a copy of the satellite image; a response is pending. The Panel has attempted to obtain high-resolution satellite images from other providers showing the same location at the same time but without success.

<sup>79</sup> [https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436](https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436).

<sup>80</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16883/Deputy-Minister-of-Foreign-Condemns-Targeting-Civilians-in-Aden-Airport>.

<sup>81</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16918/Ministry-of-Human-Rights-Saudi-Aggression-Coalition-Plans%2C-Directly-Supported-Terrorist-to-Target-Aden-Airport%2%A0>.

<sup>82</sup> [https://twitter.com/South24\\_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20](https://twitter.com/South24_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20).

<sup>83</sup> The smoke trails of the two missiles in the videos show a distinctive white smoke, which is characteristic of so-called "composite solid-propellant", a combination of Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), ammonium perchlorate, aluminum particles and other additives.

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>. Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

Figure 7.8

Footage from different social media sources (“Video #2”, left) showing two missiles launched from Tai’zz Airport on 30 December 2020



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224> (left), Government of Yemen (right)

Figure 7.9

**Approximate locations of the two TELs at Tai'zz Airport on 30 December 2020 based on confidential information provided by a Member State**



*Source:* Panel

14. It appears clear from the videos posted on social media on 30 December 2020 that one of the missiles launched from Tai'zz Airport malfunctioned and crashed shortly after take-off. A number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel stated that it crashed near the Al-Hashdi soap factory in the Al-Jund valley south of the airport. The distance from Tai'zz Airport to Aden Airport is approximately 135 kilometers, which would imply the use of a short-range ballistic missile system. Images posted on social media, which were allegedly taken at the location shortly after the launch, are showing the remnants of the guidance and control section of a missile with control-surfaces which are characteristic for a guided weapon (see figure 7.10). The witnesses also stated that the area was cordoned off by Houthi fighters immediately after the crash and that local citizens were forced to delete any images taken on their

phones. Yemeni media also mentioned a number of arrests made by the Houthi forces of local people, who had taken videos and images of the launch.<sup>85</sup>

Figure 7.10

Images posted on social media showing the remnants of a guided missile, which allegedly crashed near the Al-Hashdi factory on 30 December 2020



Source: [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248).

15. In addition to the videos and images posted from Tai'zz, a number of videos were also posted on social media by users in Dhamar City on 30 December 2020, which appear to show the launch of two additional missiles. Three videos, which were geo-located (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, with slightly lower confidence than in the case of Tai'zz, that these were also taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>86</sup> The launch most likely occurred from a military police training center in the Al-Qarn area (14°30'41.4'' N, 044°25'00.84'' E) in the south of Dhamar City.<sup>87</sup> The Panel has been informed that the Government is in touch with a number of witnesses from Dhamar City, who have confirmed the launches. Unlike in

<sup>85</sup> <https://newsbeezer.com/egypteng/after-divulging-evidence-of-his-involvement-in-the-attack-on-aden-airport-al-houthi-launched-an-arrest-campaign/>.

<sup>86</sup> Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

<sup>87</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>.

the case of Tai'zz, the Panel has not been able to interview those witnesses. The Panel has tried to obtain satellite images of the likely launch location from a number of providers, but it seems that no high-resolution imagery was taken on 30 December 2020. The Panel notes that the distance from the police training center in Dhamar City to Aden airport is approximately 200 kilometres.

Figure 7.11

Footage from social media ("Video 6") allegedly showing the launch of two missiles from the police training center in Dhamar City




Source: <https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345/>

### III. Analysis of the weapon system used in the attack

16. The Panel inspected the debris of the three missiles that were used in the attack on Aden airport. It is not clear who had access to the debris or whether pieces are missing, as it seems that entry to the airport was not tightly controlled in the immediate aftermath of the attack. It is also not clear which pieces belong to which of the three missiles as most of the debris was not labelled or packed in a way that would allow for clear attribution. The Panel is aware that pieces of debris are held by both the Government and by the National Commission of Inquiry.

17. The Panel has analyzed the CCTV footage from Aden airport, which for all the explosions clearly shows a missile-shaped form immediately before impact. Comparing the size of the shape with other objects in the frame whose size is known allows for a rough estimate of the missile's length, which is assessed to be between five and 5.5 meters (see figure 7.12 below). In addition, the impact angle points towards a ballistic missile, while the high degree of precision visible in some of the impacts (see for example figure 7.5 above) leads to the conclusion that guided missiles (as opposed to a less precise weapon, such as a rocket or a mortar grenade) were used in the attack. The available evidence points strongly towards the use of solid fuel, short-distance, surface-to-surface, ballistic missiles.

Figure 7.12  
**Calculation of the size of the missile based on the CCTV footage**



**Source:** Government of Yemen

18. The Houthi forces have been using short-range ballistic weapons for several years, both within Yemen and against border towns such as Jizan or Najran in Saudi Arabia. The most common weapon system in this category is the Badr-1, which the Houthis unveiled for the first time in February 2017 and which the Panel has documented several times since mid-2018. In its basic version, the Badr-1 is a solid-fuel, unguided, artillery rocket with a diameter of 300 millimetres, which is commonly launched from one of the twin launch containers mounted on a 6x6 TEL. The Panel believes that the Badr-1 artillery rocket is manufactured locally in Yemen without the need to source components from abroad. On 28 October 2018, the Houthis unveiled a guided version, dubbed the Badr-1P and stated a range of 150 kilometers and an accuracy of three meters, which unlike the basic version, appears to be launched from a rail. The Badr-1P features distinctive control-surface (pivoting fins) mounted in the front of the missile, immediately behind its warhead, and seems to have a length of approximately six meters. While it is possible that the Badr-1P is also domestically manufactured, it is very likely that at least some components of the weapon (such as the servo actuators and the guidance unit) are imported into Yemen.

Figure 7.13  
**Images showing the Badr-1P missile in the Houthi-affiliated media**



**Source:** Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 October 2018

19. The Panel has analyzed the debris of the three missiles collected at Aden airport by both the Government and the National Commission for Inquiry. It also had access to the pieces of debris that were sent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel notes that the debris has characteristics which are consistent with the debris of a solid-fuel missile with a diameter of approximately 300 millimetres<sup>88</sup> (see figure 7.14). The Panel also notes that the three missiles carried fragmentation warheads, featuring small metal cubes (see figure 7.15), a type of fragmentation which the Panel has previously observed as part of missiles and UAVs used by the Houthi forces.<sup>89</sup> The Panel has not seen any remnants of the guidance and control sections, which would allow for a better identification of the missile, and the only identifiable marking documented on the debris (“18F4”, see figure 7.16 below) has not been observed by the Panel previously. Appendix 2 contains additional images of the debris inspected by the Panel in Aden.

Figure 7.14

**Debris from the missiles used in the attack on Aden airport**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>88</sup> Precise measurements were impossible as the debris was severely bent out of shape as a result of the impact.

<sup>89</sup> See paragraph 7 in annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report ([S/2020/326](#)).

Figure 7.15  
**Metal cubes which were part of the fragmentation warhead of the missile**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 7.16  
**Markings (“18F4”) documented on the debris of one of the missiles**




*Source:* Government of Yemen

20. The Panel notes that the debris inspected in Aden has similar characteristics to debris which the Panel inspected in October 2020 during a visit to Ma'rib, in particular with regard to the diameter (approximately 300 millimeters) of the missile and the small metal cubes, which form part of the fragmentation warhead (see figure 7.17 below). The Government of Yemen commissioned a comparative laboratory analysis of the debris from Aden and Ma'rib, which concluded that the metallurgical content is very similar (see appendix 3). While this is far from conclusive, it does strengthen the probability that the missiles used in Aden and in Ma'rib were of the same type.



Figure 7.16  
Missile debris from Ma'rib inspected by the Panel in October 2020



*Source:* Panel

21. The Panel concluded with regard to the weapons used in the Ma'rib attacks, which are consistently referred to as “ballistic missiles” by both the Houthi forces and the Government of Yemen, that the debris was likely from an unguided artillery rocket (see page 8, [S/2021/79](#)). This assessment was based on (a) the relatively short distance between the frontlines and the impact points, (b) the absence of any debris from the guidance and control sections and (c) the comparatively low precision of the targeting. In contrast, the attacks in Aden were clearly conducted using a short-range guided ballistic missile. It is possible that the weapon system used in Ma'rib was the basic version of the Badr-1, while the weapon system in Aden was a guided version of the Badr-1 missile family. However, the Panel notes that the images of the guidance and control section of the missile which allegedly crashed south of Tai'zz Airport (see figure 17.10 above), do not correspond to the images of the Badr-1P, which were shown in the Houthi-affiliated media (see figure 7.13 above), in particular with regard to the size and form of the control surfaces.<sup>90</sup> While the distance between the airports of Tai'zz and Aden of approximately 135 kilometers would be within the range of 150 kilometers claimed by the Houthi-affiliated media for the Badr-1P, this is not the case for the distance of circa 200 kilometres between Dhamar City and Aden. It is therefore possible that, either (a) the missiles launched from Tai'zz and Dhamar were of different types, or (b) that the range of the Badr-1P missile has been extended, for example through the reduction of the payload (i.e. the amount of explosives carried). The inspection of the debris recovered from the airport in Aden does not give any indication that the type of missiles was different, while the diameter and the fragmentation warhead, as well as the laboratory analysis of the metal strongly points towards an extended-range version of the Badr-1 missile family.<sup>91</sup>

#### IV. Analysis of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations

22. Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. Military personnel, including members of the Coalition also use the facility. However, according to information received by the Panel from multiple sources, at the time of the attack no military operations were being carried out from the airport, nor were there any military aircraft at the locations where the three missiles impacted. As discussed above, the missile attack was targeting high-ranking members of the Government of Yemen upon their return

<sup>90</sup> The weapon systems shown on display in the Houthi-affiliated media are likely mock-ups, plus the design of locally assembled weapons are often “tweaked” to enhance performance, so this is far from conclusive. The Panel has never been able to inspect a complete Badr-1P missile.

<sup>91</sup> In addition to the basic Badr-1 rocket and the Badr-1P guided missile, the Houthi-affiliated media also in April 2019 displayed an “air burst” version called the Badr-1F with a claimed range of 160 kilometers. However, this missile appears to have a significantly greater diameter than the other member of the family.

from Riyadh. Government officials, including cabinet members, are civilians under IHL.<sup>92</sup> Although military personnel were present at the airport at the time of the incident, this was also the case for large numbers of civilians, including passengers waiting for their departure, airport personnel and journalists. This is also reflected in the number of casualties – no member of the military was among the 20 people killed in the attack and only 12 members of the military were among the more than 100 people who were hospitalized as a result of injuries. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the missiles carried fragmentation warheads containing small metal cubes, which are intended to cause more injuries.

23. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians.<sup>93</sup> Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. At the time of the attack, it was not, by purpose or use, making an effective contribution to military action and its partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, did not offer a definite military advantage. Therefore, it was not considered as a military objective at the time of the attack.<sup>94</sup> In addition, there was a large number of civilians present, including senior officials of the Government of Yemen, who were clearly targeted as discussed in previous sections. Based on the information and evidence received, the Panel therefore concludes that the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians<sup>95</sup> was not respected by the attackers, nor were the principles of proportionality or of precautions.<sup>96</sup>

## V. Conclusion

24. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the plane carrying senior government officials, including the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, was the target of the attack on 30 December 2020 and that this attack was carried out in violation of the applicable norms of IHL.<sup>97</sup> The Panel finds that the attack was carried out using a solid-fuel, guided, short-range ballistic missile with a fragmentation warhead, most probably an enhanced-range version of the Badr-1 family, which has been in frequent use by the Houthi forces against both targets in Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel has not yet seen any evidence suggesting that other conflict parties in Yemen have used guided missiles of this kind. While the Panel continues to investigate, the Panel concludes with very high confidence that at least two missiles were launched from Tai'zz Airport towards Aden on 30 December 2020, and that it is likely that two additional missiles were launched from the police training center in Dhamar City. The Panel has been able to confirm that both locations were under the control of the Houthi forces at the time of the launches

<sup>92</sup> The Minister of Defence, who has military status, was not present at the airport.

<sup>93</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>94</sup> See CIHL rule 8.

<sup>95</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

<sup>96</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>97</sup> As per its methodology the Panel stands ready to revise its findings if contrary evidence is made available to the Panel.

## Appendix 1      Maps

This annex contains a number of maps, which were prepared by UNITAR and UNOSAT on behalf of OHCHR and the National Commission for Inquiry, and they are reproduced here with their permission. The Panel has verified the impact locations and the approximate angle of the incoming missiles during a visit to Aden Airport in February 2021. The geo-locations of the social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar City are based on open-source information.

Figure 7.17

### List of geo-locations of social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar

Video #1	13°41'19.6080'' N 044°09'40.68'' E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847</a>
Video #2	13°39'14.1480'' N 044°08'12.5520'' E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224</a>
Video #3	Confidential	<a href="https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20">https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20</a>
Video #4	Main road outside of Tai'zz airport	<a href="https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20">https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20</a>
Video #5	14°32'17.1060'' N 044°25'52.212'' E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345">https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345</a>
Video #6	14°30'51.7932'' N 044°24'33.3144'' E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/">https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/</a>
Video #7	No precise coordinates	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873">https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873</a>
Video #8	14°31'46.2'' N 044°24'09.4680'' E	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0</a>

**Source:** <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>

Figure 7.18  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the first missile



21-19594  
Figure 7.19  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the second missile



110/307 Figure 7.20  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the third missile



Figure 7.21  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the direction of the incoming second missile



Figure 7.22  
Possible launch locations of the missiles on 30 December 2020



Source: UNITAR/UNOSAT



**Appendix 2 Additional images of the missile debris inspected by the Panel in Aden**

Figure 7.23  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.24  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.25  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.26  
**Screws from the missile**



Figure 7.27  
**Remnants of solid fuel**



*Source:* Panel

### Appendix 3 Results of the metallurgical analysis undertaken on behalf of the National Commission of Inquiry comparing two pieces of missile debris from Aden and Ma'rib

وزارة الشؤون الخارجية  
 المؤسسة العامة للشؤون  
 محطة السوء الخارجية - عدن  
 التاريخ: 2022/01/25

الأخ / رئيس اللجنة الوطنية للتحقيق في ادعاءات انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان (عدن) المحترم

تحية طيبة ، وبعد

**الموضوع / التقرير الفني حول مطابقة شظايا الصواريخ التي استهدفت مطار عدن الدولي**

في البدء نود بكم تعيننا المتقدمة ، ونتمنى لكم التوفيق والسداد في مهام عملكم الإنساني والتبيل للتحقيق في انتهاكات حقوق الإنسان ، وإيثاراً في الموضوع أعلاه ، نضعكم باتناً فمناً بإجراء الفحص المعنى الغير التلبي للشظايا المستلمة للصواريخ التي تم إطلاقها على كل من محافظة مأرب و مطار عدن المعنى الدولي في العاصمة المؤقتة عدن بتاريخ 2020/12/30 ، وقد تمت الفحوصات التالية :-

- فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر :  
 كين من خلال تعاقب الأشعة الطيفية لتعديد العناصر المكونة لمعدن شظايا الصواريخ ، بالتحديد مطابقتها في التحليل الكمي والنوعي .
- فحص صلابة معدن الشظايا :-  
 تم التأكد من أن صلابة معدن الشظايا المشتركة لكلا الصواريخ في نطاق متقارب السطحية ( -3 + 15 )  
 لقيم صلابة المعدن بـ كروج مقياس الصلابة برينيل (HB) .

**نتائج الفحوصات :**

رقم عالم	التفاصيل / البيان	صواريخ محافظة مأرب	صواريخ مطار عدن الدولي	ملاحظات	
1	قطعة الشظية الأولى	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر			
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %
		الصلابة (HB)			
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> (HB) <sub>2</sub> (HB) <sub>3</sub> Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> (HB) <sub>2</sub> (HB) <sub>3</sub> Δ(HB)			
		132 103 134 122	141 119 114 125		
2	قطعة الشظية الثانية	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر			
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %
		الصلابة (HB)			
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> (HB) <sub>2</sub> (HB) <sub>3</sub> Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> (HB) <sub>2</sub> (HB) <sub>3</sub> Δ(HB)			
		206 190 174 190	169 156 200 175		

من خلال نتائج الفحوصات التي تمت ، نؤكد لنا تطابق نوعية الصواريخ وخبر ومصدرهما

انتهى  
 26 10 21

Source: Government of Yemen

Unofficial translation from Arabic

**Ministry of Electricity and Energy  
General Electricity Corporation  
Haswah Thermal Power Station (Aden)**

**Date:** 25 January 2021

**To:** Chair of the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Human Rights Violations (Aden)

**Subject:** Technical report on uniformity of fragments from the missiles that struck Aden International Airport Sir,

We send you our sincere greetings and wish you success as you carry out your humanitarian and noble work of investigating human rights violations. With regard to the above-mentioned subject, we should like to inform you that we have conducted non-destructive metallurgical testing of the fragments that we received from the missiles that were fired on 30 December 2020 at Ma'rib Governorate and Aden International Airport in the interim capital of Aden. The following tests were carried out:

**Tomographical analysis of the elements**

Using tomographical analysis, it was determined that the metallic composition of the two missile shards is quantitatively and qualitatively identical.

**Hardness of the metal comprising the shards**

It was determined that the hardness of the metal fragments from both rockets is within the allowable range (-3, +15) on the Brinell hardness scale (HB).

**Test results**

<i>Information/data</i>	<i>Missile fired at Ma'rib Governorate</i>				<i>Missile fired at Aden International Airport</i>				<i>Remarks</i>		
	<i>Tomographical analysis of the elements</i>										
<b>First shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	125	114	119	141	122	134	103	132			
<b>Second shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	175	200	156	169	190	174	190	206			

Based on the test results, we confirm that the missiles are of the same type and origin.

(Signed)  
Metallurgical Engineer

## Appendix 4 List of the casualties of the attack on 30 December 2020

Figure 7.27

### List of the people killed during the attack



### كشف بشهداء الاستهداف الصاروخي لطار عدن الدولي بتاريخ ٢٠٢٠/١٢/٣٠م

الجهة التابع لها	المنصب	الاسم الكامل	م
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب مدير الامن السياسي عدن	عقيد / محفوظ محمد محفوظ	١
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط الامن السياسي عدن	محمد عبد الولي صالح	٢
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب رئيس نوبة الامن السياسي مطار عدن	عقيد / يحيى مثنى قائد النهي	٣
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط امن سياسي	مساعد / محمد علي قاسم	٤
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس قسم الأجانب جوازات عدن	رائد/عدنان علي فضل موانس	٥
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس نوبة جوازات مطار عدن	رائد/علي احمد هادي	٦
امن عدن	مسئول عمليات قوات الطوارئ امن عدن	عقيد/عبد القوي محمد قاسم لخجر	٧
امن عدن	قائد الكتيبة الاولى طواري امن عدن	نقيب/صابر فضل الياضي	٨
امن عدن	احد افراد قوة الطواري	جندي/محمد عبد الرب احمد القاضي	٩
إدارة الإطفاء مطار عدن	سائق عربّة إطفاء - مطار عدن	سمير عباس حاصل	١٠
إدارة التسهيلات مطار عدن	ضابط تسهيلات - مطار عدن	ذويزن حيدر حضر احمد	١١
شركة النفط عدن	مدير إدارة تموين الطائرات	مهندس/بدر سعيد علي	١٢
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	احمد اقبال وزير	١٣
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	حميد شوعي القديمي	١٤
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر (رواندي الجنسية)	سعيد كيرا لچنا	١٥
وزارة الأشغال	وكيل وزارة الأشغال لقطاع الإسكان	ياسمين محمد العواضي	١٦
قناة بلقيس	مراسل قناة بلقيس الفضائية	اديب محمد سنان الجناني	١٧

المرجع

● إدارة امن مطار عدن

Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.28

## List of the people who were hospitalized for injuries sustained during the attack

التاريخ: / ٢٠٢١ م  
الموافق: .....  
الرقم: .....  
المرفقات: .....



الجمهورية اليمنية  
وزارة الداخلية  
مكتب الوزير

## كشف تفصيلي عن الجرحى بسبب انفجارات مطار عدن الدولي

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
1	ابراهيم عبدالله قاسم	جريح	اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
2	ابوبكر عبدالله عبيد	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
3	ابوبكر عبدالله محمد	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		رقد		
4	احمد علي احمد همدان	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
5	احمد علي فضل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
6	احمد محمد ثابت معوضه	نزيف حاد وجروح متهتكه في البطن والركبة اليمنى والكتف	البريهي	مدير عام بوزارة الشباب والرياضه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٤	
7	احمد مهدي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى بلانود		غادر المستشفى		
8	ادم محمد محسن ناجي	نزيف حاد وشظايا في القدم الايمن	البريهي	الامانه العامه لمتحى الانتفاشى النابره الاعلاميه	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٧	
9	اشرف عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفه ( مسؤل مكتب الرياضه	غادر المستشفى		
10	الخضر ناصر لصور	جريح	مستوصف السلام	رئيس الجامعه	غادر المستشفى		
11	الهام علي محمد ( طفلة )	شظايا بالرقيه	الالمانى	مواطنه	رقد		
12	امجد عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفه ( مسؤل مكتب الرياضه	غادر المستشفى		
13	امين عديريه حسين	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
14	ام ن عديريه مصور	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	الامن السياسى	غادر المستشفى		
15	انتصار الزبيدي	جريح	مستوصف بايل		مرقد		
16	ايد سيف مصلى	جرح في الظهر	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
17	ايمين محمد مساعد الامير	جروح متهتكه في الوجه والمرفق والراس	البريهي	مدير مكتب وكيل وزارة الداخلية	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
18	بدر صالح الصلاحي	جريح	مستوصف بايل				
19	حسن محمد سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
20	حسين سالم محمد حفيظ	جريح	الامن السياسى	جيده			
21	حسن ن صالح عمر	جروح متهتكه في عظام الفخذ الايمن مع اصابة في النصب	البريهي	الخدمات الطبيه العسكريه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
22	حيدر ه علي سعيد لهطل	نزيف حاد في البطن	البريهي	مسؤل الامن القومى	مرقد	جناح خاص ٢١١	
23	خالد احمد علي ناجي الرياشى	جريح	مستوصف بايل	مكافحة الازهاب	مرقد	حرجه	
24	خالد صالح محمد العطاس	شظايا متفرقة	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
25	خالد عبده سلام	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
26	خالد عمر عبدالله الرحم	شظايا في الراس	مستشفى خليج عدن	عقيد/مدير التموين لوزارة الداخلية	مرقد		
27	خالد محسن حسين الدوعانى	اجراءات طوارئ			غادر المستشفى		
28	خليل سعيد عوض بامطرف	شظايا	الوالى	الامن السياسى	رقد		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التليفون
29	رعد مثنى قاسم	شظية بالكنتف الایسر	البريهي	الأول مشاه كتيبة الحماية بساق المحافظ	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٧	
30	روان بسلام	نزف مهيلي (حامل)	الصادقة		مرقد		
31	ريما علي سعيد الدويحي	عده جروح وقطوع في الوجه واصابه في احدى العينين	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد/عنايه	قسم العناية	
32	زكريا عبدالله صالح	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		رقود		
33	زكريا محمد صالح عمر	جروح متهتكه بالرأس (تم اجراء له عملية)	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٦	
34	زكريا باعبيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
35	سامي عمر سالم باوزير	شظايا بالرجل اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
36	سحر شوكت	اصابه	مستوصف بابل		غادر المستشفى		
37	سعيد مثنى الشعبي	اصابه في البطن	مستوصف الشفاء	اعلامي	مرقد		
38	سليمان ناصر الزامكي	شظية باليد والرأس	صابر	لائد الموات الخاصة	غادر المستشفى		
39	سميه الحاصل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
40	سيف سالم قاسم ثابت	اجراءات طوارئ	الامن السياسي		جيده		
41	شوقي شرجيبي	اجراءات طوارئ	الوالي	وكيل وزارة الصحة	غادر المستشفى		
42	صابر عبدالرب	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
43	صادق احمد علي الرتيبي	كسور مفتته بعظام القدم الايمن	البريهي	اعلامي	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٢	
44	صالح ناصر عاطف الحكمي	جروح متهتكه مع شظية في الفخذ الايسر	البريهي	نائب مدير الجوازات	غادر المستشفى		
45	صالح حمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	الالاماني	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
46	صالح محمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
47	صالح ميميل ناجي	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
48	صرواح محمد العفيفي	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
49	صلاح احمد الكثيري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	صحفي	غادر المستشفى		
50	صلاح احمد صالح سريبي	كسور مفتته في عظام الساق الايسر مع جروح متهتكه في عظام الساق الايمن	البريهي	تدقيقه الصحافي (الواء الاول مشاه المتقاضي)	مرقد	قسم انعاش جراحي	
51	صلاح قاسم محمد عثمان	في العمود واليد	مستوصف الشفاء	الامن السياسي	مرقد	جيده	
52	عبدالحكيم خالد علي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
53	عبدالرحمن علي عبدالله	شظايا بالوجه وكسر بالرجل اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
54	عبدالرزاق يحيى قاسم	جريح	مستوصف بابل		غادر المستشفى		
55	عبدالرشيد صالح علي الشعبي	اجراءات طوارئ	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
56	عبدالله سالم عبدالله سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
57	عبدالله عدنان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
58	عبدالله محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
59	عبدالله محمد عبدالله مساعد	كسر بالعمد اليمنى	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
60	عبدالله ناصر عبدالقادر	شظية بالوجه	صابر	القوات الخاصه	مرقد		
61	عبدالملك عدنان محسن الصبيلى	شظايا متفرقه بالمفصل	الالاماني	عسكري	مرقد		
62	عبدالوهاب احمد محمد شران	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		مرقد		
63	عدنان احمد حسين موانس	حروق بالجسم وشظايا	الجمهوريه لسم الحروق	ظابط ف مصنعه الهجرة والجوازات	مرقد		
64	عدنان علي فضل الصنغاني	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
65	علي احمد خيران	اجراءات طوارئ	الامن السياسي		جيده		
66	علي حمود الهدياتي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
67	علي سالم منتي	رضوض متعدده بالراس والاطراف	البريهي	ضابط في الامن (وزارة الداخليه)	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٥	
68	علي سعيد علي سالم	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى	غادر المستشفى		
69	علي عبيدات	جريح	الوالي	غادر المستشفى			
70	علاء فؤاد	جريح	مستوصف بابل	غادر المستشفى			
71	عمار شجاع الدين	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
72	عمر باريش	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
73	عمر مبارك عمر باحميش	شظايا متفرقه	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
74	فنتحي يحيى الاحمدى	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	مستشار وزارة السياحه	غادر المستشفى		
75	فضل علّ علّ	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
76	فهمّ علّ صالح	جريح	مستشفى البريهي	مرقد			
77	فهمّ ناصر علّ حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	غادر المستشفى			
78	لايد ه ثم الحدي	طوارئ	النميب	مد ر برنامج الالغام	غادر المستشفى		
79	لطف ف صل عبدالله الحامد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
80	لم بس وسام هشام	شظايا	النميب	طفله عمرها ٩ شهور	مرقد		
81	ماجد احمد ماهر طاهر	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
82	ماجد حسن عبده شمسان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
83	ماهر محمد علي	شظايا بالكنتف والغخذ الامين	البريهي	لوة طوارئ امن عدن	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
84	محسن محمد عبدالله عبدالمانع	نزيف في الدماغ وكسور في عظام الجمجمه وعظام الوجه	البريهي	مرقد/عنايه	غادر المستشفى	قسم الاعمال الجراحي	
85	محفوظ حسن شغل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
86	محفوظ محمد محفوظ راجح	حروق في الجسم مع كسور مفتته في عظام الساق الایسر	البريهي	نائب مدير الامن السياسي	مرقد/عنايه	قسم الاعمال الباطني	
87	محمد الجديري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
88	محمد حسين مبارك حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
89	محمد عبدالقوي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
90	محمد عبدالولي صالح مقبل	حروق بالجسم	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد/قليغه		
91	محمد علي الجندي	جريح	مستشفى خليج عدن	سكرتير محافظ	غادر المستشفى		
92	محمد علي عون	اصابه بالساق اليسرى /طوارئ فمط	صابر	القوات الخاصه	غادر المستشفى		
93	محمد علي مارش	شظايا في الرجل	البريهي	القوات الخاصه اعلامي	مرقد		
94	محمد علي محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
95	محمد مساعد قاسم الامير	شظيه كبيرة في الفخذ الا سمر مع فقدان مادي لعضلات الفخذ(تم اجراء عملية استخراج الشظيه)	البريهي	وكيل وزارة الداخليه لخدمات الشرطة	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ٢١٠	
96	محمد مصطفى محمد مكر	اصابه في اليد	مستوصف الشفاء	مرقد			
97	محمد موسى محمد عمر	اجراءات طوارئ	صابر	غادر المستشفى			
98	محمود صالح طالب	شظايا	غادر المستشفى				
99	محمود صالح	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهوريه	رقد			
100	مفيد حسن البحري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
101	منار سعيد عبدالله	جروح متهتكه في العرق الایسر والجبه وكسر في عظام الاتف	البريهي	امن خفر السواحل	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٤	
102	مهدي محمد ناصر حنتوش	جريح	صابر	عميد في الجيش	رقد		
103	ناصر احمد مبارك	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود	غادر المستشفى			
104	ناصر الشريف	شظايا	خليج عدن	نائب وزير النقل	غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
105	ناصر ثابت محمد قحطان	جريح	الالمانى	عسكري	مرقد		
106	نبيل سكرة	اصابه في الكنتف		عميد	مرقد		
107	نقيب مفيد يحيى البهري	شظايا بالراس	الالمانى	عنايه/مدير سجن المنصوره	مرقد	قسم العنايه	
108	هاني ناصر احمد حيدرة النمي	شظايا	الوالي	الامن السياسي	رقد		
109	وسيم قحطان	جريح	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			
110	وضاح عبدالله باديب	شظايا بسيطه	البريهي	غادر المستشفى			
111	وعد بدر معاون	جريح	مستشفى المصافي	ابن الامين العام للمجلس المحي البريقه	مرقد		
112	ياسين محمد عبدالباقي	اجراءات طوارئ	الالمانى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
113	يحيى عمر عبدالقوي الحمادي	جريح	الالمانى	عسكري الحزام الامني	مرقد		
114	يحيى عمر محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهوريه	غادر المستشفى			

المرجع  
مكتب وكيل محافظة عدن لشئون الشهداء والجرحى

Source: Government of Yemen



## Annex 8 Mukha Port Attack, 11 September 2021

### I. Introduction

1. The Panel is investigating the attack at Mukha Port in Al Mukha, Ta'izz Governorate, which began at approximately 0945 hours and lasted until 11.15 hours on 11 September 2021, shortly after a representative of a Government of Yemen committee arrived at the port for meetings. The attack, during which two missiles and six UAVs were deployed, resulted in one injury to a port worker. There was damage to an office container used as conference room, to a warehouse and to the base of a control tower. At the time of the attack, the port was reportedly being converted for civilian use after years of exclusive military occupation.<sup>98</sup> The committee was meant to oversee this development, which would be an important milestone in normalising relationships between the WCJF and the Government, as well as in opening an additional port for civilian imports on the West Coast. Therefore, the Panel initiated investigations into this attack as a threat to peace, security, or stability of Yemen and a potential violation of international humanitarian law.

### II. Methodology

2. The Panel received information, including images, videos, and other documentary evidence from the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance. The Panel conducted interviews with representatives of the port authority, National Resistance, the visiting committee, Government of Yemen, local authorities, and other witnesses. The Panel has given the Houthis the opportunity to comment on the Panel's findings regarding the incident, a response is pending.<sup>99</sup> The Panel has not had an opportunity to inspect the debris directly of the weapons systems used in the attack but has requested to do so during a future visit to the West Coast.

### III. Description of the incident

3. On 11 September 2021, the committee was scheduled to attend several meetings at the Mukha Port.<sup>100</sup> In August 2021, the Panel was informed that the conversion of Mukha Port to civilian use had begun with the establishment of a customs post<sup>101</sup> and the appointment of a civilian port management team.<sup>102</sup> According to port officials, at least two civilian vessels had already docked at the port.<sup>103</sup> The committee, appointed by the Yemeni Minister of Transport (figure 8.1), was planning to conduct a general visit of the port to assess the repairs.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, this visit was viewed by all stakeholders as an important step towards future civilian oversight.

<sup>98</sup> According to the port authorities, the port had been under military occupation since at least 2017.

<sup>99</sup> Letter dated 13 December 2021.

<sup>100</sup> This meeting was, initially, scheduled for 7/8 September 2021, but was postponed to 11 September 2021, according to a port official.

<sup>101</sup> Source: Customs official. The document of the decision is with the Panel. The aim of this post was to allow the Government of Yemen to collect the revenue. According to a custom official, this revenue will be deposited with the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden after the establishment of the port. In a discussion with the Panel in May 2021, one of the concerns expressed by an official of the Government of Yemen was that the Mukha port was under the control of the National Resistance, and that the Government was unable to collect the revenue.

<sup>102</sup> Sources: Ministry of Transport official, National Resistance Forces, and port official.

<sup>103</sup> The Panel is unable to independently verify. On 30 July 2021, the port was opened to receive commercial ships, according to this official.

<sup>104</sup> The National Resistance Forces and the Government of Yemen.

Figure 8.1  
**Appointment of the Committee that visited the Mukha Port on 11 September 2021**



Source: Confidential


4. The Panel was informed that on 11 September 2021, at approximately 0930 hours, five senior officials of the committee arrived at the port.<sup>105</sup> Their first meeting commenced at approximately 0930 hours in the office of the General Manager (map 8.1).<sup>106</sup> There were at least 13 persons in this meeting room.<sup>107</sup> The representatives of the committee and some port officials were still at this meeting when the first missile hit near the office container used as a conference room in a different part of the port at 0945 hours, and therefore, were unharmed. The second missile hit a warehouse one minute later.

<sup>105</sup> According to the National Resistance, these individuals were the Deputy Under Secretary for Port Affairs, Ministry of Transport; the Director of Marine Environmental Protection, Maritime Affairs Authority; the Project Manager, Gulf of Aden Ports Corporation; the Director, Department of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Transport; The Director of Information of the Ministry of Transport and his team and Port of Al Mukha’ officials.

<sup>106</sup> Two individuals present at the meeting.

<sup>107</sup> Information from the port officials and visiting delegation. The Panel was informed by a port official that the Head of Port Security was at the meeting, and that the Head of the Coast Guards of Mukha, who was supposed to attend the meeting, did not attend.

Map 8.1



**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.

4. Had the meeting been in the conference room, which was attacked, as is considered the norm for a high-profile visit,<sup>108</sup> there would have been casualties (see figure 8.2). The Government of Yemen and the National Resistance in their identical letters to the Panel stated that “(t)he committee was scheduled to hold a meeting in the port’s conference room, which was struck by one of the ballistic missiles. However, none of the Committee members were injured because the committee was late in starting its visit.”<sup>109</sup> This Information was disputed by two individuals who participated in the meeting and stated that the conference room was not meant to be the venue, but as the committee was planning to visit the whole port, they could still have been harmed by the attack.

5. The attack lasted for approximately 90 minutes, with two missiles and three UAVs impacting on different targets and an additional three UAVs being shot down (see table 8.1 and map 8.2). The duration and scope of the attack indicates that the perpetrators also intended to damage the port facilities (see table 8.2). The incident resulted in an injury to a port worker from shrapnel.

<sup>108</sup> The Panel met both political and military leaders in the conference room in late August 2021.

<sup>109</sup> Letter from National Resistance dated 09 October 2021 and letter from the Government of Yemen dated 28 October 2021. Both letters had similar content and wording.

Table 8.1  
**Details of the attack on 11 September 2021**

<i>Target</i>	<i>Type of projectile</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Coordinates of targeted location</i>		<i>Description of the location</i>
Target 1	Missile	09.45	43° 13' 58.116"	13° 18' 33.8472"	Near a conference room.
Target 2	Missile	09.46	43° 14' 16.368"	13° 18' 34.1496"	A warehouse used by the West Coast Humanitarian Unit. <sup>110</sup>
Target 3	UAV	10.30	43° 13' 53.904"	13° 18' 36.936"	Base of the port control tower, which was approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile.
Target 4	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 18.492"	13° 18' 39.2112"	Exploded near an earth wall separating two maintenance yards.
Target 5	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 0.276"	13° 18' 20.3256"	Exploded next to an earth wall.
Target 6	UAV	11.03	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 7	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 8	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.

**Sources:** Panel, based on information provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

Map 8.2  
**Locations of the five impact points**



<sup>110</sup> This is a unit that is affiliated with the National Resistance that carries out relief and humanitarian work on the West Coast.

*Source:* Panel, based on coordinates provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

1. The first missile hit near a conference room and completely destroyed it (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 8.2

**Damage to the area (Target #1)**



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.3

**Damage to the conference room**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 8.4

**Images of the missile (Target #1)**



**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

1. According to the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance, at 0946 hours, the second missile struck a hangar that was being used as a warehouse by the “West Coast Humanitarian Unit”. They informed the Panel that images taken by the surveillance camera demonstrated that the angle of descent was from the East.

Figure 8.5  
Damage to the hangar used as a warehouse (Target #2)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.6  
Image of the second missile prior to impact (Target #2)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

8. The National Resistance stated that the following humanitarian items were destroyed in the second missile attack (see table 8.2).

Table 8.2

**Items destroyed by the second missile**

	<i>Category</i>	<i>Number</i>
1	Food basket	2,142 baskets
2	Shelter tents	920
3	Tarpaulins	1,800
4	Oxygen cylinders	70
5	First-aid kits	43
6	Children's clothing	437
7	Hunting equipment	100
8	Canvas roll	100

**Source:** National Resistance

9. An UAV impacted at the base of the port control tower. According to information received by the Panel, port workers reported that at least two of the UAVs approached at a low altitude from an easterly direction.

Figure 8.6

**Impact point of the UAV (Target #3)**

**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance



Figure 8.7  
Impact point of another UAV and damage caused (Target #4)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.8  
Impact point of the third UAV (Target #5)



**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

9. According to information received by the Panel, the following damage to the port occurred (see table X.3).

Table 8.3  
**Damage arising from the attacks**

	Category	Damage
1	Buildings	4 buildings (19 rooms)
2	Offices	14
3	Warehouses	1
4	Control tower	1
5	Vehicles	23
6	Port protection boats	2
7	Miscellaneous furniture	
8	Electrical equipment and tools	
9	Water tanks	
10	Other damage	

**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

#### IV. Advance Warning

10. There were no advance warnings that the port would be a target. There were no reported sightings of surveillance UAVs on the day of the attack,<sup>111</sup> although surveillance UAVs were observed over the port about three days prior to the attack.<sup>112</sup> The Ta'izz Military Axis informed the Panel that they warned

<sup>111</sup> Panel interviews with two witnesses.

<sup>112</sup> The Panel was informed that these drones are still being observed over Al Mukha port as of November 2021.

the relevant authorities of preparations for a large-scale Houthi attack a few days before 11 September 2021 (see paragraph 11).<sup>113</sup>


#### IV. Attribution of responsibility

11. The National Resistance informed the Panel that, “the ballistic missiles and drones that the Houthi militias used to attack the port of Mukha were launched from areas controlled by those militias in Ta‘izziyah District, Ta‘izz Governorate.”<sup>114</sup> The Ta‘izz Military Axis informed the Panel that, on 5 September 2021, they provided information to their hierarchy of a possible large-scale attack by the Houthis, as there was information indicating that the Houthis were transporting missiles from Ta‘izz airport to the Al Hawban area.

12. The Houthis have not, to the knowledge of the Panel, claimed responsibility for the attacks on Mukha Port, although both the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance have attributed the attack to the Houthis.<sup>115</sup>

Map 8.3

#### Launch directions of the missiles



**Source:** Panel, Google Earth, based on information provided by Ta‘izz Military Axis

13. The Panel has obtained low-quality images of the debris of the UAVs reportedly used in the attack (see figure 8. 8). The images show engine parts as well as a piece of fuselage, apparently made from fiberglass. The debris shown in these images is consistent with components of UAVs manufactured and used by the Houthis. The National Resistance stated that, in their assessment, the UAVs used were SAMAD-3 models, however, the Panel is unable to independently verify this based on the limited

<sup>113</sup> The Panel was provided evidence to support these statements.

<sup>114</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

<sup>115</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

information available at this stage. The Panel has not received any other information regarding the type of missile used in the attacks.

Figure 8.9:  
Debris of the missiles/drones



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

## VI. Analysis of IHL violations

13. Measures had been taken in 2021 to convert Mukha Port back into a civilian port. At the time of the attack, the conversion had not yet been completed and military personnel remained at the facility. The attack took place when a high-level committee visited the port. The visit was originally supposed to take place on 7 or 8 September and had been postponed to 09.30 am on 11 September 2021.<sup>116</sup>

14. The Panel finds it likely that the missile and UAV attack targeted the members of the committee and senior port officials, which would be a violation of IHL.<sup>117</sup> The visiting members of the committee and the port officials are civilians under IHL. Military personnel were likely present at the port at the time of the incident. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must always distinguish between

<sup>116</sup> Source: Port authority official.

<sup>117</sup> See article 13 (1) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions which prohibits direct targeting of civilians.

combatants and civilians.<sup>118</sup> If the target had been military forces present in the port, the attack could have been carried out at another time.

15. Under IHL, Mukha Port, at the time of the attack, was likely a dual-use object. This does not affect the question whether the committee was the intended target of the attack or not. Therefore, it is unlikely that the perpetrators respected the principles of distinction or proportionality and precautions.<sup>119</sup>

## VII. Conclusions

16. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the visiting committee was the likely target of the attack. Additionally, the Panel finds that another objective of the attack could have been to hamper the civilian conversion of the port. Like in the case of the Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020 (see annex 7), which targeted the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, it is possible that the perpetrators intended to disrupt initiatives aimed at normalizing the situation on the ground. The Panel also notes that on 10 November 2021, three missiles were launched towards two small military camps in Mukha,<sup>120</sup> which coincided with the first visit of the new Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen to the city.<sup>121</sup> This attack, which unlike the one on Mukha Port was claimed by the Houthis, might have been an attempt to disrupt his visit. The Panel is not aware of evidence suggesting any other party to the conflict in Yemen, other than the Houthis, has used UAVs of the kind used in the Mukha port attack.

<sup>118</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>119</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>120</sup> The name of the Giants camp that was hit was reportedly **معسكر صويح** and the National Resistance's camp was an administrative base camp. Two missiles impacted inside the camps, and one impacted outside, according to sources on the West Coast. <https://www.2dec.net/news47328.html>. The Panel cannot independently verify the number of missiles used. See below footnote.

<sup>121</sup> Information provided by the Ta'izz Military Axis to the Panel confirms that these missiles were launched possibly from Houthi controlled areas in Ta'izz. The Houthis stated that on that day "two ballistic missiles (that they launched) struck an enemy training camp in the west of Taiz province". See [en.yppagency.net/243466/](https://en.yppagency.net/243466/).

## Annex 9 Impact of Houthi activities on former female detainees

1. The Panel continues to monitor the activities of different armed groups that impact adversely on women, children, and minorities in a manner that threatens the peace, security, and stability of Yemen. The Panel in 2021 documented the targeting of present and former female detainees, politically active women as well as female professionals opposing the Houthis. According to the women interviewed, the Houthis, through their actions, have created an environment that undermines women's capacity to effectively participate in community and leadership activities. This annex is based on interviews with 14 former detainees and their families.<sup>127</sup>

### I. Continued repression of former female detainees

2. Former female detainees and/or their families informed the Panel that they continue to suffer marginalization by their communities and political leaders after their release. For most women, their detention severely affected their ability to continue their work in political or community-based activities. It also impacted their family life and the education of their children. In addition to those interviewed in 2019 and 2020, in 2021, the Panel interviewed former female detainees who had been raped during their imprisonment; the family of a woman who had become paralyzed during her incarceration and was unable to speak after close to a year of enforced disappearance; women who had been tortured and/or mutilated in detention; and women who had been subjected to enforced disappearance.<sup>123</sup>

3. Former detainees are particularly vulnerable in Sana'a and in other Houthi-controlled areas. According to former female detainees interviewed by the Panel, they are called "prison graduates" by the population and are often excluded from community activities because of the stigma associated with prostitution and sexual violence. Two former detainees informed the Panel that they witnessed another female detainee being killed by her relatives on the day of her release at the prison gate. The witnesses presumed this was because the detainee had brought shame to her family through her incarceration. The Panel also received information that the family of a well-known female detainee is facing daily insults, while being stigmatized because of her ongoing detention.

4. There are no effective measures in place to protect or support women fleeing Houthi-controlled areas over prolonged periods of time, despite the provisions of resolution 2467 (2019).<sup>124</sup> As a result, some of the women who have been interviewed by the Panel since 2019 had to return to their homes in Houthi-controlled areas. The Panel has not been able to re-establish communication with them since their return due to significant safety concerns. Women interviewed by the Panel continue to show signs of trauma because of their ordeals while incarcerated. Some women, who are now living outside of Houthi-controlled areas, have no means to cover their daily expenses and their children's education has stopped. The Panel was informed that some would like to bring their perpetrators to justice, but that no financial or legal means are available.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>122</sup> This included nine former female detainees and/or their families whose cases were not previously reported by the Panel, as well as five more former female detainees whose cases were reported in [S/2020/326](#) and [S/2021/79](#).

<sup>123</sup> Most women suffered multiple forms of violence.

<sup>124</sup> Paragraph 16 (a) and (d) of resolution 2467 (2019) asks "to ensure that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict in the respective countries receive the care required by their specific needs and without any discrimination" The resolution further encourages Member States and other actors to give due consideration to the establishment of a survivors' fund and to support civil society organizations working on this issue. See also paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 of resolution [2467\(2019\)](#).

5. Women were also separated from their husbands and/or families for reasons related to detention. One woman informed the Panel that her family sold most of their belongings to bribe Houthi officials for her release. When she left the prison, the family refused to communicate with her because Houthi officials had informed them that she engaged in prostitution, a claim she denies.<sup>126</sup> In another case, the family decided that the woman would leave her home in a Houthi-controlled area for her safety, while her husband continued his work inside the Houthi-controlled area.<sup>127</sup> Women who have been separated from their families continue to be at high risk for continued sexual violence and further traumatization (see paragraph 6). One woman, who left Houthi-controlled areas for Government-controlled areas after her ordeal, stated that the military in Government-controlled areas kept harassing her because she had arrived from Sana'a.

6. The Panel has received information that compromising videos and images of female detainees were taken by the Houthis. The women were threatened with the release of these videos and images. This potentially exposes former detainees to further violence and trauma. Three women stated how the Houthis made sexually compromising videos of them; and/or forced them to confess on video to sleeping with identified military commanders belonging to anti-Houthi forces. In another incident, the Houthis submitted similar coerced and sexually compromising videos as evidence against the detainee before the prosecution.<sup>128</sup> The Panel was also informed of an identified prison director who downloaded unveiled photos of female detainees from their phones, while he was interrogating them, and threatened to release them unless the detainees complied with his orders.

7. Many of the women interviewed by the Panel since 2019 were active members of the General People's Congress (GPC). It is unclear if these female detainees were included in the Government's list of detainees for prisoner exchanges. The Panel was also informed of threats against former detainees in a third country and was told of physical harm done to another former detainee,<sup>129</sup> likely committed by Houthi supporters present in that country.<sup>130</sup> Even amongst survivors, there are fears that some former detainees may be working for the Houthis as informers.

## **II. Outcome of the designation of Sultan Zabin (YEi.006) and update on sexual violence in Houthi-controlled detention centers**

8. On 25 February 2021, through the adoption of resolution 2251 (2021), the Security Council designated Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin (YEi.006), including for instigating a policy of violence and sexual abuse against politically active women. On 26 February 2021, Zabin denounced his designation

<sup>125</sup> These women could identify their perpetrators either by their names or as belonging to the Houthi apparatus.

<sup>126</sup> The woman was arrested, and presumably also detained, in Sana'a.

<sup>127</sup> Three women informed the Panel that their immediate relatives were victims of "road-accidents" and they suspect the Houthis caused the accidents to install fear in the former detainees. The Panel was unable to verify independently the causes of the deaths. The ones who died were a sister and an adult female child of two women, and one case of paralysis of a minor child because of such "road-accidents".

<sup>128</sup> The detainee tried to have access to these after her release and was denied.

<sup>129</sup> The Panel stands ready to share this information orally with the members of the Security Council but will not provide such information in the report to protect the women and to ensure that host countries continue to accept these women.

<sup>130</sup> The Panel cannot independently verify this information as it did not meet the victim. This information was provided by two former detainees who knew the victim personally.

stating that it was the result of lobbying by “organized crime and terrorist organizations”.<sup>131</sup> He continued as the director of the criminal investigation division in Sana’a until his alleged death on 5 April 2021.<sup>132</sup> Houthi officials continued to publicly deny his involvement in the sexual violence of women and held an elaborate funeral for Zabin. However, several sources stated that the Panel’s report (S/2020/326), resulted in tribal pressure on the Houthis to release some women.

Figure 9.1  
Extract of Facebook post by Sultan Zabin (26 February 2021)

العبيد سلطان زابن  
26 February at 07:41 · 🌐

إن المواقف القوية والواضحة من الإرهاب والتسديد له ومقاومة الجريمة المنظمة وجرائم غسل الأموال ستظل هي المحور الرئيسي لعملائنا وإن تفتتت أية شوشرة إعلامية أو بلبلة من سبيل الاتهامات الباطلة..  
إن هذا الخط والتوجه في محاربة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب لن نغيره عنه ؛ لأننا نشعر أننا نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والسياسي والوطني والإنساني..  
إصرارنا هنا على العمل الأمسي الجاد والمسؤول هو الأثر عصب وحظيفة داعمي الإرهاب والقوضي الأمنية المستمر، كما أزعج كثير الأجهزة المعايرات الدولية التي تعتبر بعضها النطاء الواسع للأعمال الإرهابية والجريمة المنظمة وتجارة المخدرات، مما دفعهم إلى تحريك خلائهم ولوبيهم المتطلعة في المنظمات الدولية لكيال التهم الباطلة ولقي عنق الحقيقة وتصديق التصديقات المتسرعة.  
نحن نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والوطني والإنساني ولا نعلم أي اهتمام للإثارة الإعلامية الرخيصة ولا نهم بما تروجه أبقاق القوضي الذين يتحركون بالريموت كتنترول من مطابع منظمي الجرائم المنظمة وداعمي الإرهاب..  
ورحم الله امرأة عرف قدر نفسه..

Strong and clear attitudes towards and countering terrorism, combating organized crime and money laundering crimes will remain the central focus of our work, and no media buzz or nightingale will distract us from the flow of false accusations.  
This line and direction in the fight against organized crime and terrorism will not be deviated, because we feel that we are doing our legitimate, constitutional, national and humanitarian duty.  
Our insistence on serious and responsible security work has aroused the anger and guardianship of terrorism supporters and the devastating security chaos, and it has also greatly disturbed the international intelligence agencies, some of which consider the broad cover of terrorism, organized crime and drug trade, leading them to activate his cells M and their lobbies lobbies in international organizations for false accusations and loy neck the truth and marketing Rankings in a rush...  
We are doing our legitimate, national and humanitarian duty and we are not paying any attention to the cheap media hype and we do not care about what the chaos horns who are moving with the remont control of the kitchens of organized crime organizers and terrorists supporters are promoting.

And God bless a woman who knew her worth..  
🌐 Rate this translation

👍👎👏 216

37 comments 15 shares

Source: <https://m.facebook.com/sultan.zabinye/>.

9. After the designation of Zabin, the Panel documented other cases involving repeated rape and sexual violence in Houthi-controlled territory. Unlike in previous years, when women were raped to “purify” them, or as a punishment, or to coerce confessions (annex 5, S/2020/326), in 2021, the Panel documented a case where a female detainee was forced to have sexual intercourse with multiple men at secret detention centres because she was told that she was “being prepared for her future role as a sex worker” for important clients. According to the Houthis, her job was to obtain information from them. Additionally, the Panel also received further information that for at least one detainee, working as a prostitute to gather information for the Houthis was made a condition for their release.<sup>133</sup>

10. The Panel is investigating the involvement of an identified female in the trafficking of vulnerable women as sex workers after their release from Houthi prisons. Women whose families refuse to accept them after their detention are particularly vulnerable to such abuse. The female security wing of the Houthis (Zainabiyath) continues to repress and control women in prisons, professional workspaces, and in public places. In 2021, the Panel documented four more cases of sexual violence where the female security wing was directly involved in arrests, detention and/or violence, including in one case, where they tortured a woman. This new information complements the violations documented previously by the Panel in S/2020/326. The Panel is unaware of any measures taken by the Houthis to prevent sexual and other forms of violence against women in detention.

<sup>131</sup> See [https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m\\_ent\\_stream\\_source=timeline&anchor\\_composer=false](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m_ent_stream_source=timeline&anchor_composer=false).

<sup>132</sup> <http://www.ypageency.net/354210>. On 5 April 2021, the ministry of interior announced Sultan Zabin’s death from a terminal illness. The Panel continues to investigate if Zabin has indeed died, and the circumstances of his death as new information has emerged that merits consideration. The Panel will further investigate.

<sup>133</sup> In 2019, the Panel documented a similar case where a woman was released, according to her, because she accepted to prostitute herself to help Houthis get information from their enemies or to compromise their enemies. She informed the Panel that she was prepared to say anything to stop the regular rape and sexual violence she had to endure in secret detention centers.



11. According to information received and media reports Brigadier Ahsan Al-Hijazi is likely the successor of Sultan Zabin as the director of the criminal investigation division.<sup>134</sup> The Panel is unaware of any information, at this stage, that links him as a successor to Zabin in the above-mentioned policy.

12. In 2019, the Panel reported that Abdul Hakim al-Khaiwani, former deputy minister of interior, publicly stressed the strong relationship between the ministry of the interior, the prosecution and legal authorities in carrying out arrests and detentions in respect of countering “prostitution” networks (paragraph 22, [S/2020/326](#)). In 2021, a victim informed the Panel that al-Khaiwani was involved in her torture while in detention. Al-Khaiwani currently serves as the director of security and intelligence bureau of the Houthis.

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<sup>134</sup> [www.yagency.net/373403](http://www.yagency.net/373403). <http://althawrah.ye/archives/703942>.  
<https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3145632.htm>.

## Annex 10 Houthi cultural courses and summer camps as a threat to peace and security in Yemen

### I. Overview

1. The Panel finds that the conflict in Yemen continues, partly, because of the Houthis' ability to continue the recruitment of new fighters, despite heavy casualties on the battlefronts (see annex 4). Their ability to exercise political and security control over their territories and populations, in violation of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), relies to a significant extent on their ability to monitor and suppress dissent (see annex 9). The Panel is therefore investigating the impact of summer camps as well as religious and cultural courses in perpetuating the conflict and in radicalizing civilians, including children.

2. During the reporting period, these camps and courses were used to: (a) solidify Abdulmalik al Houthi's (YEi.004) authority and to consolidate his group's control over civilians;<sup>135</sup> (b) limit individual freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion;<sup>136</sup> (c) recruit fighters, including children;<sup>137</sup> (d) promote violence, hatred<sup>138</sup> and radicalization;<sup>139</sup> and (e) obtain popular support for the continuation of the conflict.<sup>140</sup> The Panel is also investigating incidents of reprisals against civilians who refused to participate in these courses (paragraphs 23 to 25),<sup>141</sup> including through the denial of humanitarian assistance (paragraph 20 and 21).<sup>142</sup>

<sup>135</sup> The Panel considers attempts by Houthi authorities to solidify their control over Houthi-controlled areas to be a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), including paragraphs 1 (b) and (d).

<sup>136</sup> This would include those situations where individuals are forced to attend these religious courses or chant slogans when those conflict with their belief systems. This includes freedoms relating to political expression and religion. See Articles 10, 18 (1), (2) and (4) and 19 (1), (2) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which entered into force for Yemen on 9 May 1984. No derogations have been made by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>137</sup> This would include situations where those courses operate to directly or indirectly recruit adults and children for conflict-related activities. In respect to recruitment of adults by the Houthis, the Panel finds it likely that these activities constitute a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015), as the nature of the conflict is such that the recruited Houthis are primarily fighting the Government of Yemen; and therefore, the act of recruitment is primarily aimed at undermining the Government's control over its territory. The recruitment of children under the age of 18 years by armed groups is prohibited under international law and anyone engaging in recruitment also falls within the designation criteria under paragraph 6 of resolution [2511\(2020\)](#). See article 4 (1) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, article 4 (3) (c) APII, CIHL rules 137 and 137.

<sup>138</sup> This would include situations where adults and children are forced to chant slogans that promote violence against nationalities or religious minorities and where textbooks for these courses, and lectures, demonize groups based on nationality, race or religion. Hate speech is defined by the Panel according to the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (2019) "any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factor." See [www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action\\_plan\\_on\\_hate\\_speech\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf). See also Article 20 (1) on the ban on war propaganda and 20 (2) of the ICCPR that prohibits "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence". See also General Comment 17 of the ICCPR Committee, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 11, Article 20 (Nineteenth session, 1983), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, [U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 \(1994\)](#).

<sup>139</sup> This would include those situations where individuals condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further the ideological or political goals espoused in these lectures. The Panel notes that there is no universally accepted definition for radicalization. The notion of 'radicalization' is generally used to convey the idea of "a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. This may include, but is not defined by, the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals." See A/HRC/33/29, para. 19.

<sup>140</sup> The Panel finds that these activities constitute threats to the peace, security and stability of Yemen and fall under paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), while also violating paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015).

<sup>141</sup> See paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#).

<sup>142</sup> See paragraph 19 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#).

3. It should be noted that religious and cultural courses organized by the Houthis have been a part of Yemeni society since at least the 1990s. Some of these courses, which aimed to provide religious education to children during their vacations, were called summer schools, summer centres or summer camps (summer camps). The Panel does not claim that every religious or cultural course in Yemen, including those in Houthi-controlled areas, falls within the Panel's mandate.<sup>143</sup> This investigation is limited to those camps and courses which fall under the criteria set out in the previous paragraph. The Panel also notes that the content and format of these courses vary between governorates, target groups, the local organizers, and other factors. Therefore, this annex is not meant to provide a generic description of all courses and summer camps held in Houthi-controlled areas. A detailed presentation of the Houthi perspective on these courses was shown in an al Masira documentary.<sup>144</sup>

4. During the reporting period, the Panel conducted bilateral in-person or remote interviews with thirty medical professionals, including those that rehabilitate former child combatants, teachers, participants in the courses, civil society activists, and former detainees who had been forced to undergo various religious and cultural courses, sometimes, as a condition of release.<sup>145</sup> This annex also contains outcome of information gathered on cases relating to 16 children.<sup>146</sup>

5. The Panel also received over 15 investigative and other reports on these cultural and religious courses. The Government of Yemen provided a list of locations where children have been receiving military training.<sup>147</sup> In this report, the Panel only reflects information that it was able to verify independently through testimonies and documentary evidence. Where sources have consented, the Panel has deposited these reports with the Secretariat for viewing by Member States.

## II. Types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”

6. The Panel investigates the role of “summer camps” for children and religious and cultural training courses for adults and children (hereinafter “cultural courses”) to radicalize participants and to recruit new fighters. The Panel's investigations demonstrate that there are several types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”; and, for ease of reference, the Panel classifies them as follows:<sup>148</sup>

<sup>143</sup> For example, the Panel was informed during its West Coast visit that Tareq Saleh forces were hosting summer schools.

<sup>144</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88>.

<sup>145</sup> This annex only contains information obtained from those who had either participated in or refused to participate in these courses or those who had first-hand information on the courses. Information provided by the Government of Yemen and civil society activists, who themselves had no experience with these courses, was considered as background information, and where consent was provided, the investigative reports of others are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>146</sup> This included four in-person interviews with children and their families; and four remote interviews with families of children. The Panel chose not to remotely interview children; but relied on their families' testimonies. In one case, for example, there were reports of sexual violence committed against the child by a military trainer. The Panel, as a policy, avoids the remote interviewing of children who have been subjected to sexual violence due to the potential harm such an interview could have on the child. During in-person interviews, the Panel ensures that a caregiver is in the room and that it obtained the informed consent of both the caregiver and the child. The Panel also includes in this report testimonies of a further five children and their families gathered on behalf of the Panel; and further three interviews with families of children gathered by a Yemeni organization, where full testimonies were provided to the Panel, with identification information of the children, were provided to the Panel.

<sup>147</sup> Most of these locations are schools. The Panel also notes open-source information on the closure of schools to enable such to be converted into summer camps. Some documents are referred to in this report; and others, where consent was given to share the documents, are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>148</sup> This is not an official classification; but a classification of the Panel for ease of understanding the concept of these courses and summer camps.

- a. Duration and format of the courses: half-day-courses; short courses from a few days to a few weeks; residential versus day courses; the Panel is also aware of open-ended courses.<sup>149</sup>
- b. Contents of the courses: some combine basic military training with “religious” or “cultural” lessons, others focus exclusively on the latter.<sup>150</sup> The Panel notes that some purely military training courses are also called “summer camps”.
- c. Target groups of the courses: children, university students, professionals, the general population, as well as specific courses for detainees. For adults, the Panel was not informed of the use of military training in “cultural courses”<sup>151</sup>

7. The summer camps and cultural courses are systematically organized and reach large parts of the population. In August 2019, the Houthi-affiliated media stated that there were 3,500 “summer camps” that trained 284,000 students. The cultural courses and summer camps are often implemented at the local level; for example, the supervisors<sup>152</sup> in a hospital or school may host these courses for their staff or students. Supervisors at the local level appear to take responsibility for the courses organized for the general population in Houthi-controlled areas.<sup>153</sup>

### III. Summer Camps and Cultural Courses for Children

#### A. The use of summer camps and cultural courses to recruit children as fighters or for supervisory functions

8. The Panel is investigating the cases of four children, aged between 7 and 14 years, who have received military training in summer camps or have been taken to military camps under the pretext of attending cultural courses.<sup>154</sup> In paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#), the Panel also reported on a 13-year-old child who was lured by the Houthis to a military training camp. They had told him he was going to participate in a three-day educational camp. He was kept for three months and received training on how to use small arms. He was sent to the front after the completion of the course (see annex 33 of [S/2020/326](#) for details).

9. In the cases of the four children above, the two younger children were taught how to clean weapons and trained on how to evade “rockets” in what was supposed to be a “summer camp”.<sup>155</sup> One child

<sup>149</sup> Those children interviewed by the Panel stayed from 3 – 9 months in these camps. Based on their testimonies, some children stay for longer until they are ready to be taken to the battlefield. For adults, the longest period that the Panel was informed of, was a week, except for the courses for detainees which lasted months. It should also be noted that for adults, the Panel has not documented cultural or religious courses that also provided military training. The Panel was however informed of possible “cultural” lectures in adult military camps, to radicalize fighters, so that their loyalty could be secured even in the most dangerous frontlines.

<sup>150</sup> The Panel was also informed of two types of camps: those that are open to all students, and they are taught “cultural” content, where some children are chosen from those and are provided opportunities for leadership and for acting as potential recruiters of adults in their families and other children. Then there were other camps that are for the selected few that are trained to go into battle.

<sup>151</sup> One reason for this maybe the lack of stigma and the lack of social resistance to adults joining in the fighting, as opposed to children, where the parents may object. For example, taking children from their homes in the pretext of participating in summer camps have occurred in four documented cases. The Panel also documented such a case in 2019, see paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#).

<sup>152</sup> In Houthi-controlled territories, alongside “formal state authorities” there are individuals who are appointed by the Houthi leadership to oversee or supervise the functions of those authorities or institutions. These individuals have significant powers, and they act by and on behalf of the Houthi leadership to implement central decisions at the local level. The highest-level supervisor at a governorate-level is the governorate supervisor, who would supervise the governor, and all activities in that governorate through a network of supervisors.

<sup>153</sup> Based on Panel discussions with participants of courses, their families and civil society activists researching the issue.

<sup>154</sup> Discussions with children and relatives.

<sup>155</sup> Discussions with Yemeni children in 2021, in the Gulf region.

displayed to the Panel healing scars around his elbow, which he said occurred because of crawling on the ground as a part of his training. A 14-year-old child was directly taken to a military camp, where he was taught to dig tunnels and plant mines, together with other children.<sup>156</sup>

10. The Panel was informed that the recruitment of children is facilitated by cultural lessons given in public camps. For example, the Panel interviewed the parents of a 14-year-old child, who was taken to a Houthi military camp. In this case, the Panel was informed that the child refused to return to the family, which attributes this to the lessons in school which “brainwashed” the child by teaching him that God would want him to follow the Houthis instructions, over those of his parents (see also paragraphs 8, 9 and 18 for cases of nine other children who were taken from cultural courses to military trainings).

11. The Panel was also informed children who possess leadership qualities are selected to deliver ideological speeches, recruit fighters from among their peers, and/or to take over leadership roles in the Houthi movement. For example, a relative informed the Panel of a child, who, after taking lessons, condemned his parents as “non-believers” and became a local supervisor.<sup>157</sup> Testimonies of children and families who received military training through summer camps are also available in the public domain.<sup>158</sup>

## B. Hate speech in summer camps

12. In the “summer camps”, alongside religious lessons, the children were taught patriotic songs glorifying Houthi leaders, and received lectures in which, amongst others, they were told that they were fighting to liberate Palestine.<sup>159</sup>

13. The children and parents interviewed by the Panel stated that violence against Americans and Jews was encouraged. Children were expected to regularly shout the Houthi slogan “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.” (figure 10.1). The Panel has seen images of these slogans in mosques, schools, distributed as stickers to children, and attached to missiles (annex 11).

<sup>156</sup> The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Tareq Saleh forces informed the Panel that they continue to capture children from the battlefield who were recruited to lay mines on respectively, the Saudi-Yemeni borders and the battle frontlines. In 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided the Panel access to some of these children. A human rights activist from al Hudaydah reported multiple cases of injuries to children from the explosion of mines, which the children themselves were attempting to lay. The Panel has not been independently able to verify the causes for these injuries.

<sup>157</sup> The Panel spoke to a relative. The panel was unable to verify the information independently as the child and parents were in Houthi-controlled areas, which the Panel did not have access to.

<sup>158</sup> See “Scout activities... a new way for Houthis to recruit Yemeni youth” at <https://alkhaleejonline.net/سياسة/الأنشطة-الكشفية-طريقة/> and “Compulsory sectarian lesson what is the truth about al- houthi collecting the children of summer centers to al saleh mosque?” At <https://alasinahonline.com/sanaa/12890#.YZC-007MLIU>, <https://hunaalbayda.com/post/2261/-/مسكرات-تدريبية-لا-> [مراكز-صيفية-الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لأجيال-اليمن](https://www.dawia.org/مراكز-صيفية-الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لأجيال-اليمن). See also [https://samrl.org/pdf/4554\\_5851609623282320014.pdf](https://samrl.org/pdf/4554_5851609623282320014.pdf), February 2021, <https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338>, <https://www.dw.com/ar/منتقل-اليمن-وحاضر-وتفخيخ-لحاضر-ومستقبل-اليمن> [تجنيد-الأطفال-انتهاك-للطفولة-وتفخيخ-لحاضر-ومستقبل-اليمن](https://www.dawia.org/تجنيد-الأطفال-انتهاك-للطفولة-وتفخيخ-لحاضر-ومستقبل-اليمن) [58120089](https://www.dawia.org/تجنيد-الأطفال-انتهاك-للطفولة-وتفخيخ-لحاضر-ومستقبل-اليمن).

<sup>159</sup> Information from in-person interviews with Yemeni children, in the Gulf region, 2021.

Figure 10.1  
Children shouting slogans at a summer camp in 2019



Source: al Masira<sup>160</sup>

14. The Panel has had access to images from textbooks used in the summer camps. The Panel notes that the texts call for Jihad against both Israel, the United States of America and their supporters, and calls it a duty to stop the United States of America from executing its “evil plans” (figure 1).

Figure 10.2  
Study material used in summer camps



Source: Confidential (left),<sup>161</sup> Al Masirah (right)<sup>162</sup>

15. The Panel received documents on changes made to school curricula as well as to the textbooks used in “summer camps”. These changes are said to distort history in favour of the Houthi leadership’s right to govern in Yemen and to distort historical Islamic accounts with the aim to promote fighting

<sup>160</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.

<sup>161</sup> This text stated: “By Jihad; the believer beats their enemies, which are America and Israel, and all those that support them, and these countries have to be free from these countries, so the truth will shine. So, let’s do the Jihad for the sake of God. America is the major enemy for Muslims wherever they are. America is trying to fight Islam and control the world because the Jews are controlling them... America is the source of evil in the world, she has killed millions of Muslims. She has captured the Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq...and now wants to capture Yemen and they want to kill the Yemeni people with their planes, rockets, and missiles... it is our duty to do Jihad and not allow America to execute her plans. We cannot let them capture our country. America is a major devil.”

<sup>162</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.





"Allah . . . look at all those sea creatures, killed en masse . . ."

"Allah! It's the Occupier's crime, mass killing to build military bases . . ."

Jihad, having climbed to dry land: "Thieves, murderers and criminals! Why all this hatred?

Friends, have you seen the crimes of the Emirati occupation against our precious islands?!"

"It's all been documented. We must expose their lies and their crimes for the whole world to see!"

[Emirati ship:] "I'd also like some flat land to build a military base. Don't worry, you pretty and rare trees, we're going to take good care of you . . ."

[Yemeni child, left:] "This is the enemy which murders children and women!"

29

**Source:** [https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen\\_2015-19.pdf](https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen_2015-19.pdf), p. 29-31 (translated by impact-se).

### A. Use of schools and mosques to recruit children and incite hatred

17. The Panel notes the use of presumably safe spaces to recruit children as fighters and to spread hatred.<sup>169</sup> In Bayhan, Shabwah, barely a week after the Houthis took control,<sup>170</sup> there were reports of Houthi religious leaders coming from Ibb, Saada and other areas. Photographs show these imams distributing stickers with the Houthi slogan to children. The Panel also notes videos allegedly showing children from a school in Bayhan shouting the Houthi slogan.<sup>171</sup> The Shabwani educational authorities informed the Panel that they took immediate steps, on 29 September 2021, to close all schools in the Al Ain, Bayhan and Usaylan areas to prevent the children from becoming radicalized (see Figure 10.2). The schools reportedly re-opened after the educational authorities obtained a guarantee from the Houthis that they would not interfere with the education of the children (see annex 11).

<sup>169</sup> The Panel in this context means spaces that provide children with protected environments in which they participate in organized activities to play, socialize, learn, and express themselves. See <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/2923.pdf> for a definition of a child-friendly safe space.

<sup>170</sup> According to local sources, Houthis took control of Bayhan around 22 September 2021.

<sup>171</sup> Authenticity of video confirmed by two local sources.





Figure 10.5  
**Sana'a-based prime minister inspects a summer school held in al Saleh Mosque, June 2021**



Source: [www.ypagency.net/367625](http://www.ypagency.net/367625)

#### **D. Physical harm and sexual violence against children at camps**

19. The Panel received information on sexual violence committed by an instructor against a child who underwent military training.<sup>174</sup> The child's phone was taken away from him, and the parents were told that the child was taken to a cultural course. Therefore, it took some time before the parents could find the child, and for the child to communicate to the parent what had happened to him. Children who are separated from their parents for prolonged periods of time, and whose means of communication were removed, have a higher likelihood of have been exposed to violence, as they become particularly vulnerable once they are separated from their parents. The Panel also finds that sexual violence is likely underreported in Yemen due to the social stigma associated with the crime. The Panel continues to investigate. In another case, some children who tried to escape from their "summer camp" were reportedly caught and beaten up.<sup>175</sup>

#### **E. Denial of humanitarian assistance**

20. The Panel has received information from multiple sources on nine cases in which Houthi supervisors have threatened families that they would be denied humanitarian assistance, if their children would not participate in summer camps or military courses.<sup>176</sup> These incidents occurred between 2018

<sup>174</sup> The Panel will refrain from providing further information to protect the identity of the child but stands ready to provide the Security Council verbally with further information on the circumstances of the violence.

<sup>175</sup> This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

<sup>176</sup> In five cases, where the Panel has not had access the families because of safety concerns for the families, it spoke to the researchers that documented these cases, who collected further information from the families on behalf of the Panel. The Panel has the names of the beneficiaries, the names of Houthi individuals who denied assistance, the dates of incidents and locations. The Panel stands ready to provide further situational information, without disclosing any identifiable information, as appropriate.

– 2020. According to a Yemeni non-governmental organization, in two cases, families were in fact deprived of humanitarian assistance. In another case documented by this organization, the Houthi supervisor offered a 15-year-old child to be registered to receive humanitarian aid in exchange for joining the Houthis on the frontlines. The child accepted and enrolled in a cultural and military training course for two months, after which he went to fight for the Houthis. He died in battle. Additionally, the Panel received information that a teacher was denied access to humanitarian assistance from a non-governmental organization because he refused to teach the “Houthi curriculum” in his class, and to send his children to fight. The teacher had previously been receiving this assistance for 5 years. The Panel interviewed another teacher in 2019, who stated that food baskets given by organizations were only distributed to teachers following the Houthi ideology. The Panel also received information on two children being sent cultural courses for 6 months, in exchange for humanitarian assistance provided by the local supervisor. After the children returned from the cultural course, assistance was only resumed after the parent agreed to send the children to military training. The assistance was provided by the supervisor directly to the families, allegedly these were UN assistance. In another case involving multiple children, the supervisor promised that the children will be acting as his security detail, and they would only attend cultural courses in a school in Sana’a.<sup>177</sup> The children were taken with the promise that the family would receive humanitarian assistance from the supervisor.<sup>178</sup> Three months later, the children were taken for military training.<sup>179</sup> When the parents asked the supervisor to return the children, the latter stated that he would continue to provide assistance, as well as the salaries to the parents. The supervisor informed the parents that one child was killed in the battle in Ma’rib. The parents, after their children returned or was killed in battle, approached the supervisor for continued humanitarian assistance, at which point he informed them that the priority for assistance would be for those families whose members are fighting. Some of the aid given by the supervisor had the UN logo.<sup>180</sup> In all of these cases, the cultural courses or summer camps were held in schools and it is from these schools that the children were then taken to the military fronts.

21. The Panel was informed that humanitarian assistance is denied through the removal of families’ names from the list of beneficiaries.<sup>181</sup> Local supervisors appear to have control over these lists.<sup>182</sup> The Panel has received information that at least two families took this threat seriously enough for them to send their children to the frontlines.<sup>183</sup> The Panel finds that local Houthi supervisors are exploiting the prevailing poverty to recruit children as fighters.<sup>184</sup> The Panel notes that in a 2021 study done by a local

<sup>177</sup> These were daily classes and the children would return home every day from the „summer camp“.

<sup>178</sup> The family received several packages of assistance directly from those affiliated with the supervisor.

<sup>179</sup> The children were gradually taken. Initially they would return home every day, but then they would return after a week, and then after 2 weeks until finally they were enrolled in a residential military training.

<sup>180</sup> The UN informed the Panel that such a practice of providing humanitarian assistance in exchange for fighting was unlikely as the UN would be informed if their food was diverted in this manner. The researchers informed the Panel that it was more unlikely that the families living under the control of the supervisor, would inform the UN, that their local supervisor was diverting food from the UN.

<sup>181</sup> The Panel notes open-source reporting on this issue: “... interviews for this paper, two families said the local Houthi supervisor forced them to send their children to the battlefields in exchange for humanitarian aid and a small salary. The salaries their children receive and the humanitarian aid they get, although very limited, is the main source of income they have.” See [www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions](http://www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions). See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> “Houthis take advantage of “citizens” need for aid to recruit them to fight”. See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children’s refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”(unofficial translation).

<sup>182</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>183</sup> Confidential source who interviewed the families.

<sup>184</sup> See study done by a local organization on the reasons for children to drop-out of school. According to them 4.7% of those interviewed dropped out because they were recruited by a party to a conflict but 48.3% dropped out for economic reasons. <https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/War-Of-Ignorance-1.pdf>.

Yemeni organization over 57% of children across Yemen who dropped out of school stated that they would re-join when their economic situation improved.<sup>185</sup> For children and families who are poor, humanitarian assistance given by organizations is vital to their economic survival. Thus, the Panel finds that the ability to access humanitarian assistance is a powerful incentive for parents and children to join fighting. The Panel continues to investigate.

#### IV. Cultural trainings targeting the general population

22. The Panel finds that the cultural courses provided in Houthi-controlled areas have also been perpetuating the conflict. They enable the Houthis to counter localized resistance to recruitment, to control popular dissent, and to maintain support for the Houthi leadership and its ideology. In some cases, individuals were forced to attend the courses as a demonstration of their loyalty to the Houthis cause.<sup>186</sup>

23. For example, one woman stated that she took multiple courses, even though they were contrary to her religious beliefs. She feared reprisals from the Houthis if she refused to participate.<sup>187</sup> In the cases investigated by the Panel, Houthi-appointed supervisors or managers in schools and hospitals monitor the participation of the employees in these activities. There are reports that non-participation has resulted in job losses.<sup>188</sup> In prisons, some men and women are provided ideological courses as a condition of release (see annex 9 and paragraph 26 below).

24. The Panel documented the arrest and detention of, and sexual violence committed against two women who had refused to participate in the cultural courses. One refused to participate because the course materials were contrary to her political beliefs, and the other because she saw these courses as promoting hatred. Both women did not want to shout the Houthi slogan. One of these women, while being sexually abused, was told that what was being taught in the courses was the “real Islam”. It was made clear to her that the violence used against her was because of her refusal to participate in the courses.<sup>189</sup> This woman believed that she was targeted because she was well-respected within her community, and because the Houthis wanted her to use her influence to recruit new fighters.<sup>190</sup>

25. The Panel was informed that medical professionals who attend these courses were expected to encourage patients to send their male relatives to fight in the conflict. Several individuals informed the Panel that they suspect that some of their co-workers may have become informers for the Houthis after they had taken a cultural course.

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> The panel also notes that in some cases individuals are free to choose whether to participate or not. Interviews conducted with individuals in Houthi-controlled areas, 2021.

<sup>187</sup> Interview in \Yemen, 2021.

<sup>188</sup> Confidential sources in some schools and hospitals, as well as civil society activists.

<sup>189</sup> <sup>1</sup> In-person interview with the Panel in 2021.

<sup>190</sup> Interview, 2021.

## A. Cultural trainings targeting vulnerable populations

### i. Targeting detainees

26. The Panel finds that cultural courses are also being used in a systematic manner in secret detention centres. These “rehabilitation” courses impose the Houthi vision of Islam, incite hatred against various groups, and disseminate lectures from the Houthi leadership. The Panel was informed of some organized courses using videos and different lecturers. One male detainee informed the Panel that the attendance of a six-month religious course, teaching Islam from the beginning, was a condition for his release. He, therefore, accepted to participate in the training and was indeed released after completion.<sup>191</sup> A female detainee said she begged to join the courses because she hoped that it would facilitate her release.<sup>192</sup> Another detainee said he was forced to take the courses and to shout the slogan despite him not being a Muslim. This individual also said he did so to demonstrate his loyalty in order to be released.<sup>193</sup>

### ii. Targeting children of female detainees

26. The Panel received information on four children between seven and 15-years old, who were forcibly taken away by the Houthis from their caretakers, after their mothers were detained. In two cases, their relatives were informed that the children were taken to a cultural course until their mothers are released. In fact, they were taken to a summer camp and provided with basic military training.<sup>194</sup> In the case of a third child, he was reportedly taken from a female detainee. She was subsequently informed by the Houthis, while still in detention, that the child had died on the Ma’rib front.<sup>195</sup> The Panel notes a report in 2021 of another child dying under similar circumstances.<sup>196</sup>

27. In another case, a mother informed the Panel that her interrogators told her that if she did not cooperate with them, her eight-year-old son would be taken by the Houthis to fight.<sup>197</sup> In view of the circumstances of the five children referenced here, the Panel has initiated investigations to establish whether the Houthis have a policy targeting the children of female detainees for military recruitment.

### iii. Targeting ethnic minorities

28. The Panel received information from Ta’izz and elsewhere on the possible targeting of children from ethnic minority groups for recruitment in summer camps, which it is in the process of verifying.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>191</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>193</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>194</sup> The Panel conducted in-person interviews with the children and a caregiver.

<sup>195</sup> The mother refused to be interviewed by the Panel as she was in Sana’a.

<sup>196</sup> See <https://gulfstateanalytics.com/houthi-crimes-against-women/>. It states “Then Doaa, arrested along her one-year-old daughter, spent two years in jail. Her husband obtained a divorce in her absence. Doaa says her older son was recruited by Houthis and deployed to the front lines where he died. She was not informed until her released”

<sup>197</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>198</sup> Information from the Ta’izz military axis and civil society. The Panel received also information on specific supervisors involved in organizing these courses. For open-source reporting on minority children see <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children's refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”

## V. Responsibility of Member States and international organizations

29. The Panel notes that some Member States and international organizations, including United Nations entities, have provided support to the ministry of education in Sana'a. The Panel finds that these entities are likely aware of the use of Houthi slogans in schools and in textbooks used in summer camps, which incite hatred against various groups and entice students to join the Houthi military.<sup>199</sup> Organizations supporting schools in Houthi-controlled areas have a responsibility to ensure that schools are safe spaces. Children should be able to study without being forced to shout political slogans or being asked to contribute to hate speech against various groups and nationalities or without being at risk of being recruited into the Houthi military. At minimum, those supporting the ministry of education should engage in a dialogue with the Minister or relevant authorities on the allegations above, as well as allegations concerning changes into school curriculum, and underscore that changes to curriculum and conduct in school should be in line with Yemen's international human rights obligations. It should also enhance existing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds and material provided to support the education of children are not diverted or misused to promote Houthi ideology, Houthi cause, or the conflict.

## VI. Individuals responsible for these policies

30. The top Houthi leadership is responsible for the use of some summer camps for ideological training, and, in some cases, basic military training.<sup>200</sup> The leadership is also responsible for organizing cultural courses, and any curriculum changes in schools that may entice children to fight. High numbers of children are recruited and killed in fighting, a fact which is also acknowledged in official Houthi media (figure 10.5).<sup>201</sup> In his annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General noted that the Houthis had recruited 134 boys and 29 girls in 2020 (S/2021/437). In the same report, the continuing rise in the number of grave violations, including the recruitment of children, particularly by the Houthis, and persistent high numbers of children killed and maimed, and increase in denials of humanitarian access were highlighted.<sup>202</sup>

<sup>199</sup> For publicly available information on summer camps see "With the aim of transferring them to the fronts...the Houthis sort students in their summer centers" at <https://www.alyqyn.com/print~33181>; "summer camps..."fuel" for Houthi battles in Yemen" at <https://al-ain.com/article/children-camps-summer-houthis-yemen>, "Houthis chart a path of no return for Yemen's generations" at <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/08/05/الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لأجيال-اليمن>

<sup>200</sup> See for example the participation of top leaders at the graduation ceremony of the al Saleh mosque (annex 11).

<sup>201</sup> The Panel has received over a hundred of extracts of similar photos of child martyrs, with their ages, but it cannot independently verify if all are children.

<sup>202</sup> See S/2021/437 and <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/where-we-work/yemen/>.

Figure 10.6  
**Images of a child “martyr” in the Houthi media<sup>203</sup>**



**Source:** Government of Yemen

31. The Panel is not aware of any measures taken by the Sana’a-based minister of education, Yahyah Bader al Din al Houthi, to stop children being recruited, or to investigate allegations on schools and summer camps being used for child recruitment. The Panel also finds that the Sana’a-based minister of defense, major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi,<sup>204</sup> has not taken any effective measures to prevent the recruitment of children into the Houthi military. The Panel notes that Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) has stated that he fully supports the summer camps and will continue to fund them.<sup>76</sup> The Panel has initiated investigations into the roles of Abdullah Al-Razhi, director-general of educational coordination and summer activities at the ministry of youth and sport; and Muhammad Hussein Majd Al-Din Al-Muaydi, minister of youth and sports, in sustaining this policy.<sup>205</sup>

Figure 10.7  
**Yahayah Badreddin al Houthi**



**Source:** Al Masirah

<sup>203</sup> According to Government of Yemen, this 13-year-old child was killed in January 2020. Source: Government of Yemen. The Panel has received similar images and videos of children allegedly killed on the battlefield from multiple sources.

<sup>204</sup> وزير الدفاع اللواء محمد ناصر العاطفي

<sup>205</sup> althawrah.ye/archives/677254. In Arabic, the name of the minister of youth and sports is وزير الشباب والرياضة محمد حسين مجد الدين المؤيدي

Figure 10.8  
**major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (second from right)**



**Source:** [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/)

Figure 10.9  
**Guests at a graduation ceremony for summer camp in al Saleh mosque**



**Source:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> (in the lower image, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, prime minister, Mohammed Ali al Houthi and Taha Al Mutawkkel, minister of health, are shown to attend a graduation ceremony at al Saleh Mosque)

32. Regarding the cultural courses, it is likely that the governorate-level supervisors exercise oversight while local supervisors implement the policy that had been formulated at the central level. The Panel continues to receive information that the ultimate control over the local supervisors lies with Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) and Mohammed Ali al Houthi.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>206</sup> Confidential sources in Yemen, including in Houthi-controlled areas.



**Annex 11            The use of Al Saleh Mosque as a summer school and for military purposes**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 12 Attack on Jeddah port on 14 December 2020

1. In the early morning hours of 14 December 2020, the port of Jeddah was attacked by at least three water-borne improvised explosives (WBIED) causing significant damage to two vessels, a merchant tanker and a Saudi warship, as well as to the port infrastructure. In June 2021, the Panel visited the sites of the attacks and interviewed representatives of the Royal Saudi Navy and Saudi Aramco, which operates parts of the port, and which had chartered the merchant tanker. The Panel has also been in contact with the operator of the tanker involved in the incident.

Figure 12.1

**Satellite images showing approximate impact locations of the WBIEDs**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

2. The first and the second WBIED employed targeted King Faisal Naval Base, a facility which hosts the Headquarters of the Western Fleet of the Royal Saudi Navy, and functions as the home port for its vessels. At 0007 hours, the first WBIED hit the Western end of Pier #8 located towards the Southern end of the base. The subsequent explosion caused significant damage to the concrete structure. The damage, as well as some of the repair work, was still visible when the Panel visited the impact location in June 2021. At 0015 hours, a second WBIED impacted the hull of the BORAIDA (902) on the starboard side. The vessel, a naval replenishment tanker based at Jeddah, was moored at that time to the North of Pier #8. The Panel has requested more information (including detailed images) on the damage caused to the warship from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a response to which is pending at the time of

writing. However, during the Panel's visit to the naval base, the repairs to the vessel's hulls were visible and an image obtained from other sources (see below) clearly shows damage above the waterline shortly after the attack.

Figure 12.2

**The BORAIDA shortly after the attack at King Faisal Naval Base**



*Source:* Confidential

3. At 0044 hours, the third WBIED impacted the port side of the hull of the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker BW RHINE (IMO: 9341940), which was moored at Main Berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal, a facility several kilometres away from King Faisal Naval Base in a North-Western direction. The vessel was operating a scheduled charter on behalf of Saudi Aramco and was offloading refined petroleum products. According to Saudi Aramco, at the time of the attack, the tanker had already been in port for about 20 hours and about 20 percent of the cargo was still onboard the vessel. The impact and subsequent explosion penetrated the hull of the ship at two locations at the waterline. The holes measured approximately 30 centimetres x 30 centimetres. The impact also caused a fire with flames reported to be 20 meters high which burned for about one hour. While the crew of the BW RHINE reported to the shipping line that they had heard two explosions from the direction of King Faisal Naval Base as well as subsequent gun fire, which caused the master to stop the offloading of the cargo, they did not receive a warning that an attack on Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal was imminent.

Figure 12.3

**Damage to the hull of the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

4. No injuries were reported from the attacks on either the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal nor the ones on the King Faisal Naval Base and while the damage to the vessels and the piers required extensive repairs, the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal was able to resume operations shortly after the attack. However, as noted in annex 16, the supply of petroleum products to the Western region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends heavily on Saudi Aramco's terminal and storage infrastructure in Jeddah. If the attack had done more damage to the tanker or the terminal infrastructure, the repercussions on the economy and civilian infrastructures for this part of the Kingdom would have been significant. In addition, a successful attack on a fully loaded oil tanker could have resulted in an oil spill, which would have serious environmental and economic repercussions for communities which depend on the Red Sea for their livelihoods, as well as a potentially negative impact on global trade and commerce.

Figure 12.4

**Recovery of the debris of the WBIED which hit the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

5. During its visit, the Panel was able to inspect the debris of the three WBIEDs which were used in the attacks on 14 December 2020. The Panel notes that the design of the boats is different from previous models deployed by the Houthi forces in the Red Sea.<sup>207</sup> Measuring between 6 and 8 meters from bow to stern and powered by two, 75-horsepower Yamaha outboard engines, these WBIEDs are basically skiffs converted for autonomous military deployment. Regrettably, the Panel has not been able to inspect the guidance and control systems of the WBIEDs, but it will likely, in the Panel's assessment, as in the case of previous generations, rely on pre-set GPS coordinates to guide it to its target. The Panel has also not been able to inspect any remnants of the warheads used in the WBIEDs, but images of debris recovered from the inside of the BW RHINE, as well as the "significant internal blast damage" reported by the crew, could imply that they were carrying a shaped charge similar to the ones used in some Houthi UAVs (see annex 15 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2020/326](#)) as well as in the WBIED attack on the Saudi-flagged merchant tanker ARSAN (IMO: 9421415) in the Southern Red Sea on 24 July 2018 (see annex 15 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2019/83](#)).

<sup>207</sup> The Houthis have previously used converted ten-meter patrol boats manufactured by the UAE (2017), as well as the smaller, 5.8 metre long, purpose-build 'Blowfish' model (since 2018), which is powered only by a single outboard engine. The design used in the attack on Jeddah port is more similar to the converted skiffs used in the attack on the Saudi-flagged tanker GLADIOLUS (IMO: 9169548) in the Gulf of Aden on 3 March 2020 (see paragraph 63 and annex 22 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2021/79](#)).

Figure 12.5

**Metal debris recovered from inside the BW RHINE, likely part of the shaped charge**



*Source:* Confidential

6. If the attack was conducted in the context of the conflict in Yemen, IHL would apply.<sup>208</sup> In this case, the attack against the King Faisal Naval Base would be permitted under IHL as this military base is a military objective by its nature.<sup>209</sup> However, the attack against the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker in the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal, a civilian tanker, is contrary to the IHL principle of distinction.<sup>210</sup> The Panel estimates that the targeting accuracy of the WBIEDs used in this attack is fairly high, with a margin of error of less than five metres. In addition, the distance between Main Berth #1, where the BW RHINE was moored, and King Faisal Naval Base is approximately 2,000 meters. It is therefore likely that the civilian tanker was the intended objective of the attack, in violation of international humanitarian law.

<sup>208</sup> For instance, if Houthi forces were responsible, the attack would be part of the conflict between the Houthis and the KSA. However, if the attack was conducted by another group, such as a terrorist group, with no link with the conflict in Yemen, IHL would not be applicable. In this case, the Panel concluded that the attack was conducted with near certainty by the Houthis, and therefore is linked with the conflict.

<sup>209</sup> CIHL rule 8.

<sup>210</sup> CIHL rule 1.

### **Annex 13     Attack on Yanbu port on 27 April 2021**

At 0615 hours on 27 April 2021, a patrol vessel of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia identified a target approaching the port of Yanbu, on the west coast of Saudi Arabia, from the open sea at a distance of six nautical miles (approximately 11 kilometres) and heading towards the Saudi Aramco refinery at high speed (more than 30 knots, approximately 55 kilometres/hour). The patrol vessel intercepted the target, which turned out to be a water borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) and disabled it at 0630 hours, approximately two nautical miles (3.7 kilometres) away from the refinery. At 0815 hours, the disabled craft had been moved by the waves to a location close to the Yanbu desalination plant where it was destroyed by another military patrol. The Panel has interviewed the crew of a merchant tanker, the *TORM HERMIA* (IMO: 9797993), which was moored at berth 71 of Yanbu port, and which had first reported the incident. Three crew members said that they observed the incident stating that the explosion took place at 08.05 hours approximately 1.4 nautical miles (2.6 kilometres) away from the tanker to the South-East between buoy 6R and 3R (see figure 13.3). The Panel has learned that following the incident, the Saudi military conducted a survey of the area and discovered the wreckage of a second WBIED in the Shu'ban al-Sab'ah area, approximately 30 nautical miles (55 kilometres) South of Yanbu port.

Figure 13.1

#### **WBIED approaching Yanbu port as observed by the Saudi patrol vessel**




**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 13.2  
Destruction of the WBIED by the Saudi military



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 13.3  
ECDIS screenshot from the TORM HERMIA showing the approximate location of the explosion




Source: Confidential



Figure 13.4

Map showing the locations of the intercept and destruction of the first WBIED, as well as the location where the wreck of the second WBIED was found



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

## Annex 14 Attack on Jizan port on 30 July 2021

At 1712 hours on 30 July 2021, the crew of the Bahamas-flagged crude oil tanker ALBERTA (IMO: 9486922) noticed a UAV approaching at high speed from the starboard side. The vessel was moored at berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal, loading crude oil. The UAV exploded over the vessel's bow in the vicinity of the forecandle at an unknown height in a matter consistent with a loitering munition. The ALBERTA only sustained minor damage, including several holes in the floor of the main deck, possibly as a result of fragmentation,<sup>211</sup> as well as damage to a hydraulic line and a mooring winch. Neither a fire nor injuries among the crew members were reported. The crew was able to document a number of pieces of debris on the deck of the ALBERTA, which were later collected by the Saudi military. While the Panel has not been able to inspect the debris, the images show clearly that the weapon system used was a UAV, most likely a medium-range, QASEF-type, which has been documented multiple times by the Panel in cross-border attacks by the Houthis on locations in the South of Saudi Arabia. Whereas the explosives carried by those UAVs likely would be unable to seriously damage the vessel itself, it can cost the lives of crew members as evidenced by the attack on the MERCER STREET a day earlier (see annex 15). The distance from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen to the Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal is approximately 80 kilometres, which put the port within reach of medium-range UAVs.

Figure 14.1

### Possible fragmentation damage on the main deck of the ALBERTA



*Source:* Confidential

<sup>211</sup> Houthi UAVs often carry fragmentation warheads, which explode into a mass of small, fast-moving metal fragments ("fragmentation") that are lethal against individuals.

Figure 14.2

**Possible fragmentation damage in the roof of the main cavity**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.3

**Debris of the wing of the UAV made from fiberglass**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.4  
**Debris of the engine of the UAV**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.5  
**Small parts, possibly pieces of fragmentation from the UAV**



*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 15     Attack on MERCER STREET on 29 July 2021

1. The oil products tanker MERCER STREET (IMO: 9539585) was attacked three times over the span of several hours on 29 July 2021<sup>212</sup>, while steaming empty in international waters in the Gulf of Oman *en route* from Tanzania to the United Arab Emirates. The first attack occurred at 1045 hours when the crew reported that a UAV had missed the vessel, crashing approximately one nautical mile off the aft starboard. The bridge watch heard a loud buzzing noise followed by an explosion in the ocean, causing the water to erupt 15-20 metres in the air and black smoke rising at the point of impact. The second attack happened approximately 45 minutes later, at about 1130 hours. The bridge watch again reported a buzzing noise and stated that the UAV approached from the aft port quarter of the ship at an altitude of 20-25 metres. Prior to reaching the MERCER STREET, the UAV suddenly pitched nose up before rotating back down and proceeded in a 170 degrees downward descent towards the ship. According to the crew, the UAV was “light desert green” in colour. The second UAV narrowly missed the MERCER STREET and crashed into the ocean about one metre off the stern. The crew observed black smoke from an explosion on impact and recovered some pieces of UAV debris from the deck of the MERCER STREET. Following the second attack, the ship increased its speed from 11 knots (20 kilometres per hour) to 16 knots (30 kilometres per hour) but maintained its course.

2. The third attack happened at 2030 hours and this time the UAV hit the MERCER STREET’s aft superstructure from above, impacting the pilot’s cabin located on the aft bridge deck. The impact killed the ship’s master, a Romanian citizen, as well as a British security officer, making this the first fatal attack on a commercial vessel in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula in many years. The attack also destroyed the vessel’s communication equipment and created a breach in the roof of the pilot’s cabin. It also damaged the bridge deck, as well as the C and B decks. In the aftermath of the attack, the crew mustered inside the citadel and informed the company, which in turn alerted the U.S. Navy. U.S. forces were then dispatched to assist the vessel, to conduct a preliminary survey of the damage, and to accompany the MERCER STREET to a safe harbour.

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<sup>212</sup> Some reports state that the attacks took place on 29 and other that it occurred on 30 July 2021, the reason for that apparent discrepancy is that international naval forces are using Zulu time, the military version of coordinated universal time (UTC). In this report the Panel is using local, i.e., Gulf Standard Time, which is UTC+4.

Figure 15.1  
Aerial view of the aft castle showing the location of the impact



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.2  
Impact location of the UAV on the aft superstructure



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.3  
**Internal view of the impact location from the Pilot's cabin**



**Source:**  
<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.4  
**Damage to exterior bulkhead below the impact point**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 15.5  
**Vertical stabilizer of the UAV**



*Source:*

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.6  
**Debris of a servo actuator from the UAV**



*Source:* Confidential



Figure 15.7  
**Fiberglass debris from the UAV recovered from the bridge wing**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 15.8  
**Sketch by a crew member of the UAV used in the second attack**




*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 16 Attack on the Saudi Aramco Bulk Plant in Jeddah North

17. At 0342 hours in the early morning of 23 November 2020, the Saudi Aramco petroleum products distribution facility in Jeddah North was attacked by a cruise missile, which hit the top of storage tank #103 coming from a South-Westerly direction. One of 13 similar structures at the site used to store petroleum products such as diesel oil, gasoline and jet fuel. The tank has a capacity of 500,000 barrels and was filled with diesel at the time of the attack. The attack caused an explosion and a subsequent fire in the attack, the burn marks of which were still clearly visibly during the Panel’s visit to the facility in June 2021 and it took the company’s response team and the fire brigade about 40 minutes to extinguish the fire. Subsequent investigations showed that the impact of the missile had created a hole of 3.93 meters x 2.56 meters in the external roof of the storage tank and had completely destroyed the floating internal roof, a six-millimeter-thick structure made of carbon steel on top of the product. Company representatives interviewed by the Panel confirmed that there had been no advance warning of an attack.

**Figure 16.1**

Satellite Images showing the approximate impact point of the missile




**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

18. Shortly after the attack, a spokesman for the Houthi forces, brigadier general Yahya Sarie, announced in the Houthi-affiliated media that “the Yemeni missile forces targeted an Aramco distribution station in Jeddah with a winged missile, Quds 2, which is announced for the first time”<sup>213</sup>.

On the same day, in a letter to the President of the Security Council ([S/2020/1135](#)), the Permanent Representative of KSA also attributed responsibility for the “terrorist attack” on the bulk plant to the Houthi militia. The Panel also notes that the modus operandi of the attack, despite more limited in scale, is broadly like the previous attacks on the oil infrastructure in KSA, including the high-profile attack on 14 September 2019 on the Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays ([S/2020/326](#)).

**Figure 16.2**

Damage to the external roof of storage tank #103



**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

19. While operations at the Bulk Plant resumed within hours of the attack, storage tank #103 was out of service for about four months for repairs, which according to the company cost it approximately USD 1.5 million. Even though there were 15 employees of Saudi Aramco at the site when the attack happened, no injuries occurred. However, had the missile hit another storage tank containing a more flammable fuel than diesel oil (such as kerosene), it is possible that the tank’s firefighting system would not have been able to contain the blaze and that other tanks in the facility would have also been affected. The Panel believes that the missile system used by the Houthis in this attack (see paragraph 5 below) is sufficiently precise that storage tank #103 was deliberately targeted, but it not clear whether the attackers were aware what kind of fuel was stored there at the time of the attack.

20. According to information received by the Panel during its visit to the facility, the North Jeddah Bulk Plant has a total storage capacity of 5.2 billion barrels and plays a critical role in distributing up to 120,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per day to customers in the Jeddah, Mecca and al-Baha regions, which accounts for 25 to 30 percent of the Kingdom’s supplies. In addition to more than 1,000 petrol stations, the facility also supplies public utilities such as the King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the vital Saline Water Conversion Corporation,

<sup>213</sup> <http://en.yagency.net/198784/>.

which is responsible for the provision of most potable water in the Jeddah region. While the facility also supplies the Saudi military with petroleum products, it is mostly supplying civilian customers. If the plant had been out of service of a significant period, the impact on the Kingdom's economy as well as on the welfare of the residents of the Western region would likely have been significant.

**Figure 16.3**

Debris of the cruise missile used in the attack



*Source:* Panel

21. The Panel has been able to inspect the debris of the missile used in the attack and was informed that some parts were found inside of storage tank #103 during the repair works. The debris is consistent with the land attack cruise missile, which has been previously documented by the Panel as having been used in several attacks on targets in KSA in 2019 (annex 16 of [S/2020/326](#)) and whose parts were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden in November 2019 (paragraph 79 and annex 19 of [S/2021/79](#)). The damage to storage tank #103 of is also consistent with a missile of this type. The distance between the facility and Houthi-controlled territory is about 700 kilometres, which would put it close to maximum range estimated by the Panel for this weapon system. Whereas the Houthi forces have claimed that the missile used in the attack was a “Quds-2” cruise missile, during its inspection the Panel has not been able to identify significant design differences to the “Quds-1” model which was used in 2019. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of some of the commercial components used in the manufacturing of the missile (annex 23) to establish whether the missile was manufactured in Yemen, as claimed by the Houthis, or supplied by an external party.

22. The Aramco Bulk Plant can be considered as a dual-use object under IHL as it provides supplies both to the Saudi military and civilians. However, according to information received by the Panel, most petroleum products distributed by the facility are for civilian use. For instance, the Panel was informed by a company representative that approximately one percent of the aviation fuel distributed by the Bulk Plant are supplied to the Royal Saudi Air Force in Jeddah. As for other petroleum products distributed to the military, the Panel was unable to obtain specific data. Storage tank #103, which was the specific objective of the attack (see paragraph 3 above) was not providing an effective contribution to the Kingdom's military action in Yemen and the Panel fails to see how its destruction offered the Houthis forces a definite military advantage. Therefore, the Panel considers that the tank

was, at the time of the attack, a civilian object<sup>214</sup>. In addition, the Panel notes the importance of the Aramco Bulk Plant facility in providing supplies to critical civilian infrastructures such as the King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the Saline Water Conversion Corporation. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected in this attack.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> See CIHL rules 8 and 9.

<sup>215</sup> See CIHL rule 1.

## Annex 17      Attacks on Abha International Airport

1. Abha International Airport (IATA: AHB) is a civilian airport in the ‘Asir Province in the South of KSA, approximately 95 kilometers from the Yemeni border. This proximity to Houthi-controlled areas is also one of the reasons why the airport has been attacked more often than any other civilian facility in the KSA, even though the airports in Jizan and Najran<sup>216</sup> have also been attacked multiple times. In June 2021, the Panel visited Abha International Airport, as well as the nearby town of Khamish Mushait, which hosts an important Royal Saudi Air Force Base and met with airport staff and military officials to discuss the threats to civilian aviation. The Panel was also able to view CCTV footage of some of the attacks. In 2019, prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Abha International Airport handled 4.5 million passengers, making it the fifth largest airport in the Kingdom in terms of passenger numbers<sup>217</sup>. According to airport staff interviewed by the Panel, the airport is the main hub for the Southwestern region, offering a mix of domestic and international flights. Due to its colder climate, Abha is also an important destination for domestic tourism, in particular during the summer months and during Ramadan.

### Figure 17.1

Attacks on Abha International Airport as of 31 August 2021

<i>Date</i>	<i>Type of Attack</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
11 April 2018	UAV	6 injured
26 May 2018	UAV	2 injured
17 July 2018	UAV	None
6 September 2018	UAV	None
12 June 2019	Cruise Missile	26 injured
14 June 2019	UAV	None
23 June 2019	UAV	20 injured, 2 deaths
2 July 2019	UAV	10 injured
29 July 2019	UAV	5 injured
8 August 2019	UAV	None
28 August 2019	Cruise Missile	None
30 August 2019	UAV	None
10 September 2020	UAV	None
10 February 2021	UAV	None
16 February 2021	UAV	None
10 May 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	8 injured
<b>Total</b>		<b>77 injured, 2 deaths</b>

*Source:* Confidential

2. The Panel received information showing that there were 18 successful attacks on the airport between the start of the aerial attacks in 2018 and 31 August 2021, causing a total of 77 injuries and 2 deaths. The airport authorities told the Panel that until 31 June 2021 (the day of the Panel’s visit), the airport received a total of 491 threats, which are defined as warnings from the Saudi military about incoming UAVs and missiles. They also noted that all warnings trigger an interruption of airport

<sup>216</sup> According to the airport authorities in Abha, Najran Domestic Airport (IATA: EAM), which in 2014 handled 600,000 passengers, was closed completely between May 2015 and May 2019 as a result of the threats from Houthi-controlled Yemen.

<sup>217</sup> <https://gaca.gov.sa/web/en-gb/news/15/03/2019-aa>.

operations and an evacuation of passengers and staff from the apron into the terminal building.<sup>218</sup> According to the management of the AHB, not all successful attacks are preceded by a warning<sup>219</sup> and even when warnings are received, this is typically just a few minutes before the impact. This clearly shows that the Houthi forces have become more adept at evading detection by the Saudi air defenses, when using UAVs and cruise missiles. The late notice is also likely due to the close proximity of Abha to Yemen and the mountainous terrain, both of which limit the opportunities to detect and intercept an aerial threat. The following paragraphs describe some of the more “successful” attacks in greater detail.

**Figure 17.2**

Satellite image showing the approximate impact locations of the attacks discussed below



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

3. While the majority of attacks on the airport have been conducted with short-range Qasf-type UAVs which do not carry enough explosives to penetrate the concrete roof of the terminal building, it also experienced two cruise missile attacks in 2019. The attack on 12 June 2019 took place at 0225 hours in the morning when a Quds-1 land attack cruise missile penetrated the roof of the baggage hall

<sup>218</sup> Airport staff informed the Panel that prior to June 2019 passengers were evacuated from the apron and the terminal to the landside areas of the facility as those were considered to be safe from attacks. Following the attack on the outdoor McDonalds restaurant located on the landside, which claimed the lives of two civilians and injured 21 others (see paragraph 4), the airport changed its security protocol and now evacuates into the terminal building, which provides some protection against UAV attacks.

<sup>219</sup> Out of the 16 successful attacks, prior warning was only received in ten cases.

in the arrival terminal. The subsequent explosion, which was captured by CCTV cameras, injured 26 passengers and airport staff. This was the first documented case of a Quds-1 cruise missile ever being deployed by the Houthi forces. The airport authorities informed the Panel that they received no prior warning from the Saudi military about the incoming missile. The second cruise missile attack took place on 28 August 2019, but no significant damage was reported. The Panel has inspected the debris of both cruise missiles in 2019 (see annex 16 of [S/2020/326](#)), as well as parts of a missile of the same type, which were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden (see paragraph 79 and annex 19 of [S/2021/79](#)).

### Figure 17.3

CCTV footage showing the moments immediately before and after the missile attack on 12 June 2019



**Source:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjsuhPROPyg>

4. The most lethal attack on Abha International Airport took place at 2120 hours on 23 June 2019 when a UAV exploded on the landside of the terminal building, immediately killing one civilian, who was at that time eating at an outdoor table of the McDonalds restaurant, and injuring 22 other people, one of whom died later from his injuries. Houthi UAVs (as well as some missiles) often carry a fragmentation warhead, i.e. small fragmentation, typically metal cubes, are scattered over a wide area following the detonation of the explosive filler. The UAVs are programmed to fly to pre-set GPS coordinates and then explode in mid-air, typically at a height of some 20 metres, or more rarely impact directly in a building or other structure, exploding on contact. This type of weapons with large blast effect and multiple fragmentations used in an area where there are civilians does not allow for discrimination between civilians and fighters. Contrary to IHL prescription, it also does not minimize damages to civilians and civilian objects.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>220</sup> CIHL rules 1 and 15.



**Figure 17.4**

Damage from fragmentation from a UAV attack visible on the apron of the airport



**Source:** Panel

5. At 1242 hours in the afternoon on 10 February 2021 Abha International Airport was attacked by a Qasef-type UAV, which hit a parked Airbus A320-214 with the registration code HZ-FAB operated by FLYADEAL (IATA: F3), a Jeddah-based low-cost airline. The explosion penetrated the fuselage of the aircraft on the left side and triggered a fire, which was put out by the airport fire brigade. In this specific case, the airport authorities received a warning from the Saudi military about 20 minutes before the attack which allowed them to complete the deplaning of the 119 passengers from the plane and to evacuate them to the terminal building. Even though the plane only suffered limited damage, it was out of service for four months. As far as the Panel is aware, this is the first incident in which a civilian aircraft in KSA was damaged by a Houthi UAV attack. The Panel has been informed by the airport authorities that the warhead of the UAV in this case did not contain fragmentation, which could imply that in this case the plane rather than the passengers was targeted. Under IHL, only military objectives can be the object of attack. According to information received by the Panel, the plane was not used by military and there was no military personnel or civilians having lost their protection under IHL on board or near the airplane. The Panel therefore concludes that the airplane was a civilian object protected under IHL against direct attacks and that the passengers and people nearby the airplane were also protected under IHL.<sup>221</sup>

<sup>221</sup> See CIHL rules 1, 5-8.

**Figure 17.5**

Still from video footage showing the damage to the fuselage



**Source:** <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/plane-catches-fire-after-houthi-attack-abha-airport-saudi-tv>.

4. In addition to the human casualties, there has been significant economic damage, both directly in terms of necessary repairs and protective measures such as the construction of a blast barrier between the apron and the terminal building, as well as indirect costs due to higher insurance premiums, reduced slots at the airport and a stop to night-time operations. Airport management estimates that the losses from the attacks amount to Saudi Riyal 40 million (approximately USD 10.65 million). Unlike in the case of attacks on other targets, the Houthi forces have repeatedly claimed responsibility for the strikes on Abha International Airport, stating that the facility is used for military operations by the Coalition<sup>222</sup>. During the meeting with the Panel, the airport management categorically denied that the facility was used for military operations. While the Panel is unable to independently verify this claim, it notes that the Saudi Air Force regularly operates from King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, about 13 kilometres East of Abha International Airport.

5. Abha International Airport is a civilian airport and is used by civilians. The Panel found that the attacks mentioned above were conducted in contravention to the principle of distinction.<sup>223</sup> In the case where the airport would be used for military operations by the Coalition, only attack against military objects or equipment and military personnel would be permitted by IHL. In addition, because the airport is used by civilians any attack should be conducted with constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects and all feasible precautions should be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>222</sup> With reference to the attack on 10 February 2021, the spokesman of the Houthi forces Yahya Sarie was quoted as saying: “The UAV air force targeted the airfield of warplanes at Abha International Airport – which is used for military purposes to target Yemeni people – with four drones”, see <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-houthis-saudi-arabia-abha-airport-attack>.

<sup>223</sup> CIHL rule 1.

<sup>224</sup> CIHL rule 15.

**Annex 18: New Houthi weapons displayed to the media**

Figure 18.1  
**SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (side view)**<sup>225</sup>



Figure 18.2  
**SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (top view)**



<sup>225</sup> There are some indications that the UAV shown in the exhibition is a mockup, which is not airworthy.

Figure 18.3  
Unguided projectile carried by the SAMMAD-4 UAV



Figure 18.4  
RUJUM Hexcopter at the exhibition<sup>226</sup>



<sup>226</sup> Unlike the other new attack UAVs shown in the exhibition, the RUJUM was deployed in several attacks by the Houthis on different frontlines. At least two RUJUM hexcopters were shot down by GoY-affiliated forces, but despite several requests, so far, the Panel has been unable to inspect their debris, preventing further technical analysis.

Figure 18.5  
**KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (side view)**



Figure 18.6  
**KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (top view)**



Figure 18.7  
MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition (top view)



Figure 18.8  
Detail of the MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition



Source for figures 18.1 – 18.8: Almasirah.net

**Annex 19: Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 10 February 2021**

Figure 19.1

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.2

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.3  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.4  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>



Figure 19.5  
**Type 56-1 assault rifles wrapped in plastic**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.6  
**Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm assault rifle and detail of the markings showing that the weapon was manufactured in 2017 by Factory 26 in China**



**7.62mm Type 56-1**  
**(Symbol) 17-CN 62068328**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.7  
**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.8  
**Detail of the marking on one of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, likely indicating that it was manufactured in China**



**(Triangle) CF / M80 / 401702**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.9  
AM-50 'Sayyad', 12.7x99mm calibre Anti-Material Rifle



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.10  
Details of markings on the Anti-Material Rifle



7A0347

2701264  
CAL12.7X99

264

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.11  
Ghadir-4 optical weapons scope



GH4-951036

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.12  
Components of 12,7x108mm calibre 'DSchK' heavy machine guns



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.13  
Marking on the receiver of one the heavy machine guns



**180058**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.14

Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1*<sup>227</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (front side)<sup>228</sup>



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.15

Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1* found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (rear side)




Source: Confidential

<sup>227</sup> The Panel notes that the description of the *Um-Almadain 1* does not match the images of the *Jelbut*-type dhow. Therefore, it is likely that this boat license is for another vessel.


<sup>228</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 19.16  
**Farsi-language warehouse receipt for ARIZONA brand cigarettes<sup>229</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.20  
**Mapping of coordinates allegedly retrieved from GPS devices onboard of the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

<sup>229</sup> The Panel inspected many similar receipts for cigarettes in Farsi, which were found on the dhow *Bahri-2*, seized with a cargo of weapons off the coast of Somalia on 24 June 2020. See figure 15.18 in annex 15, [S/2021/79](#).

Figure 19.21

Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (front side)<sup>230</sup>



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.22

Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

<sup>230</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

**Annex 20    Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 6 May 2021**

Figure 20.1

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-2>

Figure 20.2

**Small arms and light weapons wrapped in green plastic onboard the dhow**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-3>



Figure 20.3

**ATGMs and wrapped SALW in the cargo hold of the dhow**



*Source:* <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-4>

Figure 20.4

**Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm calibre assault rifle seized from the dhow**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.5

**Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)**



**7.62mm Type 56-1  
(Symbol – Factory 26) 17-CN / 62130678**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.6

**M80, PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.7

Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured in China in 2017<sup>231</sup> at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)



(Symbol – Factory 26)  
M80 / 17-CN 02415

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.8

Type 85, 7.62x54mm calibre sniper rifle<sup>232</sup>




*Source:* Panel

<sup>231</sup> The Panel notes that the Chinese PKM-pattern machine guns, unlike the Type 56-1 assault rifles, showed significantly more wear and tear. It is possible that they were assembled using repurposed parts of older PKM-pattern machine guns. In 2020, the Panel noted that PKM-pattern machine guns seized by the Royal Saudi Navy from dhows sometimes combined parts with Cyrillic markings with parts bearing Chinese markings, which would support this theory.

<sup>232</sup> This is a Chinese copy of the Dragunov SVD-63 sniper rifle, which is manufactured in Russia. The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that this type of rifle has been seized in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 20.9

**Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)**



**(Symbol - Factory 26)  
7.62mm Type 85  
17-CN  
3309924**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.10

**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns manufactured in Bulgaria<sup>233</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>233</sup> The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that Bulgarian-manufactured weapons were seized from a dhow in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 20.11  
**Detail of markings documented by the Panel**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.12  
**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>234</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>234</sup> These weapons appear to be copies of the Chinese, M80 version of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns. The Panel notes that, unlike the Bulgarian, Chinese and Russian PKM-pattern machine guns, these weapons do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production.

Figure 20.13  
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun<sup>235</sup>



0409

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.14  
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun



2500144

*Source:* Panel

<sup>235</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking used on the machine guns has also been observed on the AM-50 'Sayyad' anti-material rifle (see figure 20.21). Dot Peen marking is not known to be used on Chinese or Russian manufactured weapons.

Figure 20.15  
Detail of stamp<sup>236</sup> on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.16  
Similar stamp documented on the rifle selector lever of Iranian G3A1 assault rifle



*Source:* <https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/smallarms.pdf>

<sup>236</sup> The Panel notes that not all the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, which the Panel assesses to be of Iranian-origin were bearing this stamp. The Panel believes that the machine guns were assembled using repurposed parts from older weapons, some of which had original government markings.

Figure 20.17  
**RPG-7 launchers, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>237</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.18  
**Detail of marking on RPG-7 launchers**



**0011803108**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>237</sup> The Panel notes that the RPG-7 launchers do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production. The Panel notes that all RPG-7 launchers inspected since 2019 have identical physical characteristics, including the green plastic heat shield, which is different from other versions of the RPG-7 launchers, as well as similar markings, highlighted in yellow (see figure 20.18).



Figure 20.19  
**AM-50 ‘Sayyad’, 12.7x99mm calibre anti-material rifle, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>238</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.20  
**AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ anti-material rifle on display in Teheran in September 2013**



photo : Foad Ashtari

*Source:* <https://armamentresearch.com/iranian-am50-and-russian-orsis-t-5000-rifles-in-iraq/>

<sup>238</sup> The Panel notes that the anti-material rifles seized from the dhow have no clear markings showing the country and year of production, however it also notes that all anti-material rifles inspected since 2018 have identical physical characteristics and markings. The AM- 50 ‘Sayyad’ is an unlicensed copy of the HS.50 anti-material rifle manufactured in Austria. The main technical differences include a different grip and barrel design.

Figure 20.21  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle<sup>239</sup>



**1700399 / 580 / 26011580 / CAL12.7X99**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.22  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle



**6A1155**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>239</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking on the AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ is similar to the marking on some of the PKM-pattern machine guns which were seized from the same dhow (see figure 20.13 and 20.14). The Panel has observed similar markings on other AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ rifles inspected since 2018.

Figure 20.23

**Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope and its metal box, likely made in Iran**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.24

**Detail of marking on Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope**



**RG-004 A1  
1700560**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.25

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>- باز دید- فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش از لشکر ۱۶ زرهی- قزوین- (عکس))

Figure 20.26

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>- باز دید- فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش از لشکر ۱۶ زرهی- قزوین- (عکس))

Figure 20.27

**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.28

**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel


Figure 20.29  
Detail of markings indicating manufacture at the Tula Arms Plant in 1988



(Symbol – Tula Arms Plant) 88 / 985076


*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.30  
9M133 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia and transport container (in the background)



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.31  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M113 / 07-85-536 / 2580 / 36-86-22

Source: Panel


Figure 20.32  
9M111M Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia



Source: Panel

Figure 20.33

Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M111M / 10-83-MK / 100486 / 42-85-53

Source: Panel

Figure 20.34

9M111-2 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia



Source: Panel

Figure 20.35

Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M111-2 / 03-79-MK / 47-80-53

Source: Panel



Figure 20.36  
**POSP 12x50M Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus**



*Source:* Panel


Figure 20.37  
**Detail of serial number indicating manufacture in 2017**



**1701165**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.38  
Document found with the sights indicating that quality control took place in May 2017



Source: Panel

Figure 20.39  
POSP 8x42 Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus



Source: Panel

Figure 20.40  
Detail of serial number



596-1-1242

Source: Panel

Figure 20.41  
Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow<sup>240</sup> (front side)<sup>241</sup>




Source: Confidential

<sup>240</sup> The Panel notes that this appears to be the same license, which was previously documented on the smaller dhow seized on 10 February 2021 (see figure 19.21), raising the possibility that this is the same vessel. The Panel also notes that at least one dhow crew member was present on both occasions (see annex 21).

<sup>241</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 20.42


Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.43

Image from the Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device showing waypoint at Jask



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.44

**Coordinates and dates reportedly retrieved from Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device**

GPS Device from 6 May 2021 Interdicted Flagless Dhow: Garmin echoMAP Plus 5AZ026107 Point Data



**Source:** Confidential

**Annex 21: Images and ID documents of the crew members of the dhows**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 22 Seizure of thermal weapon sights at the Shahn border crossing on 22 June 2021

1. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of seven RU90/120G thermal weapon sights, which were seized at 2000 hours on 22 June 2021 by Yemeni customs officers at the Shahn crossing on the border with Oman. The Panel has been informed that the sights were transported in the driver's cabin of a Mercedes truck with Omani license plates,<sup>242</sup> which was transporting tiles and ceramics from Oman to Yemen. The commercial truck driver, an individual holding a Pakistani passport,<sup>243</sup> told the customs officers that he received the package from a Yemeni individual called Ali in Mazyuna, a small settlement in Oman close to the border with Yemen, who asked him to deliver it to another Yemeni individual, who would be waiting for him on the Yemeni side of the border crossing. The driver claimed that he did not know what was inside the parcel and that he transported it as a favour, i.e., without receiving material compensation. The Panel understands that the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel disappeared when he saw that the package was impounded, and that the driver was released after questioning. The Panel has obtained the Omani mobile phone numbers of "Ali" and the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel on the Yemeni side and has contacted Oman requesting more information on the identity of the two individuals. A response is pending.

2. The Panel has obtained images as well as the serial numbers of the thermal weapon sights, which were seized at the border crossing. The Panel notes that the sights have technical characteristics consistent with thermal weapons sights manufactured by Rayan Roshd Afzar, a Chinese Iranian joint venture. Sights from this manufacturer have been seized from dhows in the Gulf of Oman and inspected by the Panel on multiple occasion (see paragraph 52 and annex 20, [S/2020/326](#), as well as paragraph 88 and annex 14, [S/2021/79](#)). Iran has informed the Panel that "the thermal weapon sights are NOT consistent with sights manufactured in Iran", however the Panel has noted information from publicly available sources (see figures 22.4 to 22.6 below), which seems to corroborate the Panel's analysis regarding their origin. The Panel continues to investigate.

Figure 22.1

### RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border



**Source:** Confidential

<sup>242</sup> The Panel has obtained the full details, i.e., license and engine serial number of the truck.

<sup>243</sup> The Panel has obtained the name and passport details of the driver.

Figure 22.2  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 22.3  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential



Figure 22.4  
Rayan Roshd Afzar promotional leaflet



## رایان رشدا افزار

### دوربین حرارتی

## RU90G / RU120G

WWW.MILITARY.IR

دوربین حرارتی مدل RU90G / RU120G  
 بمنظور مراقبت، شناسایی و هدف گیری  
 طراحی و ساخته شده است که قابل نصب  
 بروی انواع سلاح را دارا می باشد و در  
 شرایط مختلف محیطی (تاریکی مطلق  
 مه، دود، ابر) قابل استفاده است.

قابلیت ها:

- قابلیت نصب بروی انواع سلاح
- قابلیت استفاده بصورت دستی جهت دیده بانی
- قابلیت برنامه ریزی تا ۸ رتیکل هدف گیری
- بدنه مقاوم و آب بندی شده
- کاربری آسان

Source: [https://twitter.com/green\\_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4](https://twitter.com/green_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4)

Figure 22.4

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>

Figure 22.5

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>



Figure 23.2

**Excerpt from packing list showing that the transmitter was exported from Germany to BDS Sensors China in June 2020**

Packing list				
BD Sensors GmbH BD-Sensors-Str. 1 95199 Thierstein		Shipping address 104437 BD SENSORS CHINA No.1188 Lianhang Rd., Pujiang town TJ-201112 SHANGHAI		
Total Number of Parcels: 20 Cartons				
Total weight: 539,950 KG				
Shipment Number/Date: 7765/02.06.2020				
Pack No.: 14 of 20 Cartons				
Gross weight: 17,400 KG (62.000 x 32.000 x 44.000 cm)				
Description Your order	Code Pos.	Sales order	Pos.	Quantity Prod. order
SPE800	26.600	G-4002-R-1-5-100-300-1-000		
BDS2005-043	20	21148843	20	2388881
Delivery/Item: 31143453/000110				10 PC
SN : ( 10845219 - 10845228 )				
OEM Pressure transmitter	30.600	G 30.600	G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000	
BDS2005-017	10	21148539	10	2387876
Delivery/Item: 31143453/000180				100 PC
SN : ( 10844242 - 10844441 )				

Figure 23.3

**Bank information showing the transfer of funds from Oman to China for the purchase of the transmitters**



## 对账单

借总笔数:0	借总金额:0.00
贷总笔数:1	贷总金额:13595.00
开始日期:20200601	结束日期:20200630
账号:上海, 121917329332501, 美元, 欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司	集团公司名称:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司
用户所属公司:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司	打印时间:2021/6/10 13:19
笔数:1	

交易类型	摘要	借	贷	余额	业务参考号	收/付方名称	收/付方账号	收付方开户行名	公司一卡通号
国外将汇入款项汇入中心	汇入汇款流程解付		13,595.00	13,595.00		INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE POBOX 1445 M USCAT MUSCAT		BANK NIZWA MUSC AT	

Figure 23.4

Air Waybill for the export of the transmitters from BD Sensors China to Oman in July 2020

**178 PVG 20434781** Shipper's Name and Address: **BD SENSORS CHINA**  
 BLOCK B, 2ND FLOOR, BUILDING 10, NO. 1188, LIANFANG ROAD,  
 PUJIANG TOWN, MINHANG DISTRICT, SHANGHAI  
 TEL: 86-21-51800190  
 USCI: 913100008684065820

Shipper's Account Number: **INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY L.L.C**  
 ELECTRONICS DEVICES AND ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY  
 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387 ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN  
 TEL: +96896674188  
 00047070

Shipper's Account Number: **W.M.C SHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

Freight Prepaid

Agent: **W.M.C SHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

Forwarding Agent: **W.M.C SHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

Flight: **PVG** to **MUSCAT** by **DKB EK** on **2020-7-4**

Weight: **45** kg

Volume: **0.15** CBM

Commodity: **BD SENSORS**

Dimensions: **56\*42\*30** cm

Insurance: **NIL**

Signature of Shipper: **W.M.C SHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

Signature of Agent: **W.M.C SHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

Original 2 (FOR CONSIGNEE)

HYKC20070005

Figure 23.5

**Proof of delivery document showing that the transmitters were received in Muscat**



The document is a 'PROOF OF DELIVERY' form from Royal Logistics. At the top center is the Royal Logistics logo, which consists of a stylized 'R' with a crown on top and a blue truck icon to its right. To the right of the logo is the company name in Arabic 'المملكة اللوجستية' and in English 'ROYAL LOGISTICS'. Below the logo and name is a horizontal line. Underneath the line, the words 'PROOF OF DELIVERY' are printed in bold, underlined capital letters. To the right of this, the date 'Date: 07.07.20' is printed. Below the title, the word 'TO' is printed. The main body of the document contains the following information: 'Consignee: INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY LLC', 'Shipper: ED SENSORS CHINA', 'AOL: SHANGHAI', 'AOD: MUSCAT', 'AWB: HYKC20070006', 'ETA: 05.07.2020', 'Commodity: ED SENSORS', 'No of Pcs: 02', and 'Gross Weight: 33 KGS'. Below this information, a statement reads 'This is to confirm that we are received the cargo in good order'. The 'Date:' field is filled with the handwritten date '7-7-2020'. The 'Name:' field is filled with the handwritten name 'Musaab Al-Musaab Al-Musaab'. The 'Signat:' field is followed by a large, empty rectangular box. The 'Stamps:' field is followed by a circular official stamp. The stamp contains the following text: 'INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY LLC', 'P.O. Box: 208 | RC1812', 'Sultanate of Oman', and 'ROYAL LOGISTICS'. The stamp also features a central emblem with Arabic calligraphy.

Figure 23.6  
Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen<sup>244</sup> (first page)



<p><b>LIGHT ENERGY</b> Solar energy regulator &amp; electrical technologies Equipment, fixtures &amp; maintenance 2020/٤١٢٠</p>	<p><b>لايت إنرجي</b> منظومات الطاقة الشمسية والتقنيات الكهربائية تجهيزات وتركيبات والصيانة لايت إنرجي</p>	
---	---	--

طلب أصناف

Brand Name	Color	Ean	Model Number	Part Number	Size	Quantity
BD Sensors	Black	1101202176261	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	Stander	200



الجمهورية اليمنية صنعاء شارع الخمسين بيت بوس

<sup>244</sup> The Panel notes that the letterhead does not show any contact information, the Panel has so far been unable to find more information about this company.

Figure 23.7

Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen (second page), stating that the transmitters are for use in a central air conditioning system

**LIGHT ENERGY**  
Solar energy regulator & electrical technologies  
Equipment, fixtures & maintenance  
2020/ /

**لايت إنرجي**  
منظومات الطاقة الشمسية و التقنيات الكهربائية  
تجهيزات وتركيبات و الصيانة

لايت إنرجي

تم تقديم الطلب على شراء صمام حساس ضغط او صمام منظم للضغط يعمل في أنظمة التبريد المركزيه و يقوم بعمل تنظيم الضغط لهذه المنظومة لتتلقى حصول ضغط زائد و قتل و عزل في نظام التبريد . وسوف يتم تركيب هذا الصمامات في منظومات التبريد هذه وتم ارفاق بعض المخططات من قبلنا نحن من اجل التوضيح أكثر لعمل هذا الحساس وانه يستخدم في نظام التبريد بأسم منظم ضغط.

### The refrigeration system

#### Retrofit Refrigerants

The diagram illustrates a refrigeration cycle with the following components: Solenoid Valve, Expansion Valve, Evaporator, Pressure Regulator (circled in yellow), Compressor, Condenser, Receiver, Oil Separator, and Pressure Control. The cycle is connected to a network of pipes with various valves (Ball Valve, Sight Glass, Filter Drier) and a thermostat. The text above the diagram explains that the order is for a pressure-sensitive valve or pressure regulator for use in a central air conditioning system, and that the diagram is provided for clarification of the valve's function in such a system.

Source: ChillerBox



Figure 23.8

Invoice from the importer in Oman for the company in Yemen<sup>245</sup>

**International Smart Digital Interface L.L.C**

Adress: 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387  
 City, Street : ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN  
 Phone: (968)95674188  
 Email: muaadh@internationaldigitalinterface.com  
 Website: internationaldigitalinterface.com

**INVOICE**

DATE 30/04/2020  
 PI # [01160]

**TO**

**Light Energy company**  
 solar energy regulator and electrical technologies  
 Equipment, fixtures and maintenance  
 contact Number: +967779326097

REQUISITIONER	SHIP VIA	F.O.B.	SHIPPING TERMS

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL
Pressure transmitter 30.600 G	30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000	200	120.00	24,000.00
				-

Comments or Special Instructions

SUBTOTAL	24,000.00
TAX	-
SHIPPING	-
OTHER	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 24,000.00</b>

If you have any questions about this Invoice, please contact above Details



<sup>245</sup> The Panel has been informed that the payment was made in cash in advance by a person, reportedly a Yemeni, claiming to act on behalf of the Yemeni company. The Panel has also tried to find out to whom the Yemeni mobile number on the invoice is registered, so far without success.

Figure 23.9

**Proof of delivery of the transmitters dated 8 July 2020 and signed by one Ziyad Muqbil Fari',<sup>246</sup> allegedly acting on behalf of a Yemeni company**




**Sources for figures 23.1 – 23.9:** Confidential

<sup>246</sup> The Panel was informed that the transmitters were picked up in Muscat. The Panel has contacted both Oman and Yemen regarding the identity of the person, who signed the receipt. Responses are pending.

**Annex 24 Chain of custody of the 3W-110i B2 engine**

Figure 24.1


**Diagram showing the chain of custody of the engine**



Source: Panel

Figure 24.2

**Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order**



Source: Confidential

Figure 24.3

**Unofficial translation of the screenshot in Figure 24.2**

Order number: 118674510762461297		Time of creation: 2018-01-25 00:09:31					
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany		¥14999.00	25	Access after-sales portal	Jermozi Contact me	Transaction successful Details	¥380975.00 (including shipping fee: ¥6000.00) View shipping Cell phone order
Colour: Silver	Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing						

Figure 24.4

## Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order (continued)

**淘宝网** 宝贝 店铺

您的位置: [首页](#) [我的淘宝](#) [已卖出的宝贝](#)

**1. 买家下单**    **2. 买家付款**    **3. 发货**    **4. 买家确认收货**    **5. 评价**

当前订单状态: 交易成功

**淘宝提醒您**  
交易已成功, 如果买家提出售后要求, 请积极与买家协商, 做好售后服务。

**订单信息**    收货和物流信息

**买家信息**  
 昵称: jermozi    真实姓名: A\*\*\*  
 所在地区: 广东 广州    联系电话: 0\*\*\*  
 邮件: h\*\*\* 发送站内信    支付宝: h\*\*\*

宝贝	宝贝属性	状态	单价(元)	数量	优惠	商品总价(元)	运费(元)
 代购德国进口航模飞机模型用发动机 3W-110 IB2 德国直邮正品	颜色分类: 银色 飞机种类: 固定翼	已确认收货	14999.00	25	-	374975.00	6000.00 ( 快递 )

**实收款: 380975.00 元**

订单编号: 118674510762461297  
 支付宝交易号: 2018012521001001800575095937  
 成交时间: 2018-01-25 00:09:31  
 付款时间: 2018-01-25 04:57:31  
 确认时间: 2018-04-02 17:54:01

您的位置: [首页](#) [我的淘宝](#) [已卖出的宝贝](#)

**1. 买家下单**    **2. 买家付款**    **3. 发货**    **4. 买家确认收货**    **5. 评价**

当前订单状态: 交易成功

**淘宝提醒您**  
交易已成功, 如果买家提出售后要求, 请积极与买家协商, 做好售后服务。

**订单信息**    收货和物流信息

**物流信息**  
 收货地址: 魏先生, 13699747779, , 广东省 广州市 荔湾区 环市西路37号富力国际鞋业商贸中心1020房, 510145  
 运送方式: 快递  
 物流公司名称: EMS  
 运单号: CI982007400DE

 我对购买流程有意见或建议, 跟淘宝说两句

阿里巴巴集团 | 阿里巴巴国际站 | 阿里巴巴中国站 | 全球速卖通 | 淘宝网 | 天猫 | 聚划算 | 一淘 | 阿里妈妈 | 阿里云计算 | 云OS | 万网 | 中国雅虎 | 支付宝

关于淘宝 | 合作伙伴 | 营销中心 | 联系客服 | 开放平台 | 诚聘英才 | 联系我们 | 网站地图 | 法律声明    © 2015 Taobao.com 版权所有



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 24.5

**Unofficial translation of the screenshot in figure 24.4**

<b>Taobao website</b>							
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b> Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Buyer information</b>							
Nickname:	jermozil	Real names:	A***				
Location:	Guangzhou, Guangdong	Phone number:	0***				
Email:	h*** Send site message	Alipay:	h***				
<b>Product</b>	<b>Product attributes</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Unit price (CNY)</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Discount</b>	<b>Total price (CNY)</b>	<b>Shipping fee (CNY)</b>
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany	Colour: Silver Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing	Delivery confirmed	14999.00	25	-	374975.00	6000.00 (express delivery)
Payment received: CNY <b>380975.00</b>							
Order number:	118674510762461297						
Alipay transaction number:	2018012521001001800575095937						
Time of transaction:	2018-01-25 00:09:31						
Time of payment:	2018-01-25 04:57:31						
Time of confirmation:	2018-04-02 17:54:01						
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b> Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Shipping information</b>							
Recipient address:	Mr. Wei, 13699747779, Fuli International Shoe Trade Center, RM 1020, 37 Huanshi West Rd, Liwan District, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, 510145						
Shipping method:	Express delivery						
Name of shipper:	EMS						
Shipping number:	C1982007400DE						

Figure 24.6

**Packing list showing that the engine was transferred to Delro Modelltechnik**



**753.1 Packliste / Packing list**

Kunde / Customer: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK

Datum / Date: 06.03.18

AB-2018-3086

Karton Nr. / Box no.	Menge / Qty.	Einheit / Unit	Artikelnummer / Article number:	Artikelnummer / Article number:	Seriennummer / Serial number	Kartongröße / Box Size	Gewicht / Weight (Kg)	verpackt / packed
8	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822108K			
9	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822093K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822095K			
10	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822104K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822105K			
11	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822084K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822086K			
12	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822090K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822091K			
13	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822102K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822103K			
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						

Source: Confidential

Figure 24.7

**Invoice for the sale of the engines by Delro-Modelltechnik to TDQQ****Delro Modelltechnik**

Delro Modelltechnik - Herforder Str. 103 - 32584 Löhne

An  
Wu. TDQQ GMBH  
Feldbergstr. 7  
64293 Darmstadt  
DRechnungsnummer: 15245  
Kundennummer: 800191  
Rechnungsdatum: 15.02.2018

Seite: 1 von 1

**RECHNUNG**


Menge	Einheit	Bezeichnung	Einzelpreis	Rabatt	Gesamtpreis
25	Stück	Motor 3 W-110 iB2	1.205,37 €	7,5 %	27.874,18 €
1		Teil 1 Anzahlung am 31.01.18	-8.403,37 €		-8.403,37 €
1		Teil 2 Anzahlung am 025.02.18	-5.042,02 €		-5.042,02 €

Gesamt netto	14.428,79 €
USt. 19%	2.741,47 €
<b>Gesamtsumme</b>	<b>17.170,26 €</b>

Zahlbar sofort ohne Abzug.

Telefon: 05732/982053  
E-Mail: mail@delro.deBIC: GENODEM 1 HFV  
IBAN: DE10 4949 0070 0059 8081 02  
Kontoinhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
Bank: Volksbank Bad Oeynhausen  
Herford eG  
Bankleitzahl: 494 900 70  
Kontonummer: 59 808 102  
IBAN:  
BIC:Geschäftsführer: Detlef Rottmann  
Inhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
USt.-ID: DE 124 365 151  
Steuernummer: 31051130568**Source:** Confidential

Figure 24.8  
Shipping documents for the delivery of the engines to TDQQ

Kühne + Nagel ( AG & Co. ) KG Zweigniederlassung Bielefeld Ludwig-Erhard-Allee 40 DE-33719 Bielefeld		<b>KÜHNE+NAGEL</b> 																																																																																																
		<b>** RECHNUNG **</b>																																																																																																
		BITTE BEI ZAHLUNG ANGEBEN KD-KTO. 3987125 DATUM 13.03.18 BELEG-NR. 80002593 KD-NR. 35100871																																																																																																
00105 DELRO MODELLTECHNIK DETLEF ROTTMANN HERFORDER STR. 103 DE 32584 LÖHNE		Ihre USt-ID: DE124365151 Our invoices must be paid immediately. Please use only the bank account mentioned in the footer. Unsere Rechnungen sind sofort zu begleichen. Bitte verwenden Sie ausschließlich die im Fuß aufgeführte Bankverbindung. Bei Scheckzahlungen bitte nur Orderschecks verwenden.																																																																																																
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Datum</th> <th>Dispo</th> <th>Rel. Sendungs-Nr.</th> <th>Km</th> <th>Betrag</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Tar. TO</th> <th>FRSA</th> <th>tats. frpf. Zone</th> <th>Fr Sperrigk. Frankatur</th> <th></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="5">                             Pos-Nr. von: 01-35-8563-803-052-11                              Com-Ref.: 035L06389078 Akz-Kd.:                              1.03. A6301 A630 330/000/6072432 404                              5277 26,0 166,5 09 C 1,110 DAP-FREI HAUS (UNVER                              WW: 3.000,00                              ABS: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK DE 32584 LÖHNE                              EMP: FRANK WEISS DE 63897 MILTENBERG                              1-CT MODELLFLUGZEUG                         </td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 3,00</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 88,08</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 1,32</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 1,90</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 4,90</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 1,60</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 2,75</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 2,27</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>Sendungssumme</td> <td>EUR 105,82</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="5">                             -----                              Pos-Nr. von: 01-35-8563-803-066-10                              Com-Ref.: 035L06415255 Akz-Kd.:                              9.03. A6301 A630 330/000/6073181 369                              KDE5 60,0 201,0 09 C 1,340 DAP-FREI HAUS (UNVER                              WW: 30.000,00                              ABS: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK DE 32584 LÖHNE                              EMP: XIANGYI WU, TDQQ GMB DE 64293 DARMSTADT                              1-EP MODELLMOTOREN                         </td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 93,63</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 1,40</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 1,90</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 1,60</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 26,78</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>EUR 2,32</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Datum	Dispo	Rel. Sendungs-Nr.	Km	Betrag	Tar. TO	FRSA	tats. frpf. Zone	Fr Sperrigk. Frankatur		Pos-Nr. von: 01-35-8563-803-052-11 Com-Ref.: 035L06389078 Akz-Kd.: 1.03. A6301 A630 330/000/6072432 404 5277 26,0 166,5 09 C 1,110 DAP-FREI HAUS (UNVER WW: 3.000,00 ABS: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK DE 32584 LÖHNE EMP: FRANK WEISS DE 63897 MILTENBERG 1-CT MODELLFLUGZEUG									EUR 3,00					EUR 88,08					EUR 1,32					EUR 1,90					EUR 4,90					EUR 1,60					EUR 2,75					EUR 2,27				Sendungssumme	EUR 105,82	----- Pos-Nr. von: 01-35-8563-803-066-10 Com-Ref.: 035L06415255 Akz-Kd.: 9.03. A6301 A630 330/000/6073181 369 KDE5 60,0 201,0 09 C 1,340 DAP-FREI HAUS (UNVER WW: 30.000,00 ABS: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK DE 32584 LÖHNE EMP: XIANGYI WU, TDQQ GMB DE 64293 DARMSTADT 1-EP MODELLMOTOREN									EUR 93,63					EUR 1,40					EUR 1,90					EUR 1,60					EUR 26,78					EUR 2,32
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Kühne + Nagel ( AG & Co. ) KG Zweigniederlassung Bielefeld Ludwig-Erhard-Allee 40 DE-33719 Bielefeld		Tel: +49 521 9203-0 Fax: +49 521 9203-1000 www.kuehne-nagel.com Steuernummer: 27/575/00054																																																																																																
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Rechtsform: Kommanditgesellschaft, Bremen HRA 21928, Ust-IdNr.: DE 81272878, Geschäftsleitung Kühne + Nagel (AG & Co.) KG, Yngve Ruud (Vors.), Martin Brinkmann, Akhil Das (Beirat), Henning Krogger (Beirat), Jörn Krogger (Beirat), Jörn Krogger (Beirat), Jörn Krogger (Beirat), Jörn Krogger (Beirat), Jörn Krogger (Beirat), Yngve Ruud (Vors.), Diederick de Vries, Dominic Edmunds, Thierry Heff, Uwe Hoff, Richard Hahn, Björn Johansson, Holger Ketz, Jan Kunze

Source: Confidential



## Annex 25 Corporate information on HSJ Electronic (HK) and Vista Automation & Communication

Figure 25.1  
Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited

存案 Filed



公司註冊處  
Companies Registry

周年申報表  
Annual Return

表格  
Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number  
1480116

**1 公司名稱 Company Name**

HSJ ELECTRONIC (HONG KONG) LIMITED  
華視界電子(香港)有限公司

**2 商業名稱(如有的話) Business Name (if any)**

**3 公司類別 Type of Company**

私人公司 Private company    
  公眾公司 Public company    
  擔保有限公司 Company limited by guarantee

**4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up**

14 / 07 / 2019  
日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

(如屬私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。  
如屬公眾公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 6 個月屆滿之日。  
如屬擔保有限公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 9 個月屆滿之日。  
For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.  
For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.  
For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.)

**5 隨本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form**  
(私人公司無需填報此項 A private company need not complete this section)

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

至  
To

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

**6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office**

ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE

45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH, TSIM SHA TSUI, KOWLOON

地區  
Region

Hong Kong

**本處專用 For Official Use**

Document Ref. No.: 70001523798  
Submission Date: 15/07/2019  
Resubmission Date: -



Figure 25.2

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格  
Form**NAR1**本申報表的結算日期  
Date to which this Return is Made Up

14 / 07 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項)

**Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)**

截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up

股份類別 Class of Shares

Ordinary

此類別股份的已發行總數 Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class

10,000

姓名 / 名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANG HONG FENG	廣東省深圳市龍崗區寶荷路匯業樓山谷花園1樓複式21C	10,000			

Figure 25.3

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	1480116
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	廣東省深圳市龍崗區		
	寶荷路振業樓山谷花園1棟複式21C		
	國家/地區 Country/Region	中國	
電郵地址 Email Address			
身分證明 Identification			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.4  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication

存案 Filed



公司註冊處  
Companies Registry

周年申報表  
Annual Return

表格  
Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number  
2224659

**1 公司名稱 Company Name**

VISTA AUTOMATION & COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES LIMITED

**2 商業名稱 (如有的話) Business Name (if any)**

**3 公司類別 Type of Company**

私人公司 Private company    
  公眾公司 Public company    
  擔保有限公司 Company limited by guarantee

**4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up**

15 / 04 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

(如屬私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。  
 如屬公眾公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 6 個月期滿之日。  
 如屬擔保有限公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 9 個月期滿之日。  
 For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.  
 For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.  
 For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.)

**5 隨本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form**  
 (私人公司無須填報此項 A private company need not complete this section)

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

至  
To

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

**6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office**

ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE,

45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH,

TSIM SHA TSUI, KLN

地區  
Region

Hong Kong

**本處專用 For Official Use**

Document Ref. No.:70001449322

Submission Date:15/04/2019

Resubmission Date:-

e

Figure 25.5  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	2224659
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	FUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANGU GARDEN		
	BAOHE ROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN		
	GUANGDONG		
	國家/地區 Country/Region	China	
電郵地址 Email Address			
<b>身分證明 Identification</b>			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.6  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	<b>附表一 Schedule 1</b> (非上市公司適用 <b>FOR NON-LISTED COMPANY</b> ) 公司編號 Company Number			
本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up		2224659			
15 / 04 / 2019 日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY					
非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項) <b>Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)</b> 截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up					
股份類別 Class of Shares	Ordinary				
此類別股份的已發行總數 Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class	10,000				
姓名/名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANG HONGPENG	PUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANGU GARDEN BAOHEROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN GUANGDONG	10,000			

Source for 25.1 – 25.6: Confidential

## Annex 26 Economic Issues

### I. Economic Issues that pose a potential threat to peace, security or stability

1. The Panel examined various issues concerning the economy of Yemen, which pose a threat to its peace, security, or stability. The deteriorating economic situation has resulted in frustration, deprivation, and resentment amongst the population, offering a fertile breeding ground for further conflict and social unrest. Some political groups have sought to take advantage of this situation. The STC's Economic Committee (EC) under Aidarous Al-Zubaidi held meetings with the Southern Money Exchange Association, without the participation of the or the Government of Yemen and discussed measures to alleviate the economic challenges arising from the volatile exchange rate situation.<sup>247</sup> Such actions by the STC over the banking and exchange companies are viewed by some as a challenge to the authority of the Central Bank of Yemen and the Government of Yemen, as part of a larger ongoing power struggle between the Government of Yemen and the STC.<sup>248</sup>

2. In the past few months, in order to ensure monetary and financial discipline and stability, the Central Bank of Yemen has issued a new regulation to improve the functioning of money exchange businesses, including measures such as stricter licensing conditions for new applicants and the introduction of e-auction systems. The Central Bank of Yemen has also taken some measures against certain exchange companies, suspending 80 exchange companies for legal violations and non-compliance with its instructions and shutting down 141 unlicensed companies.<sup>249</sup> In August 2021, the IMF made a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation for Yemen, worth USD 665 millions of reserves. This, according to the IMF is expected to improve Yemen's foreign exchange reserves by over 70 percent, and help address the crisis, especially food and medical needs of the population.<sup>250</sup>

### II. Depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER)

3. The rapid depreciation of the YER, which hit a historic low in early December, crossing the 1700 mark per USD, not only impacts economic stability, but poses a grave threat to peace in Yemen. The total external assets of Yemen, as a share of total assets, fell to 4.5 percent as of June 2021 from 5.3 percent in 2020 and 9.6 percent in 2019; the net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Yemen, as of June 2021, had further decreased by 13 percent, reaching a negative value of YER 958.3 billion.<sup>251</sup> This decline is attributed to the ongoing political instability which impacted the exports of oil, depriving Yemen of its primary source of foreign exchange. Secondly, in 2020, inward remittances by Yemeni diaspora declined by over 20 percent.<sup>252</sup> The exchange rate which was YER 591 per USD at the end of 2019 reached about YER 700 per USD at the end of 2020, and recently crossed the YER 1700 per USD, restricting Yemen's ability to finance imports of essential goods, thereby exerting severe strains on the purchasing power capacity of its already impoverished population. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, the cost of the national minimum food basket (MFB), which is indicative of the cost of living,

247 <https://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225>. During the Panel's meeting with the EC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC stated that these meetings were held to improve the situation.

248 During the meeting of the Panel with the EC of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that since the Government of Yemen and the Central Bank of Yemen did not do their job properly leading to the collapse of the YER and increase in the prices of basic commodities, they had to intervene.

249 Information provided by the Central Bank of Yemen.

250 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-get-655-mln-imf-reserves-new-sdr-allocation-2021-08-23/>.

251 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

252 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

reached 56,283 YER in June 2021, about 21 percent higher than the cost at the beginning of 2021.<sup>253</sup> In July 2021, the Government of Yemen, in order to earn additional Government revenue, doubled the exchange rate used for calculating Customs duties on non-essential goods imported through the ports under Government of Yemen control, from YER 250 per USD to YER 500 per USD.<sup>254</sup> Although this new rate is almost 29 percent of the prevailing market exchange rate of about YER 1700 per USD, this move by the Government of Yemen has increased the cost of imported goods. The Houthis criticised this decision and reacted by reducing the exchange rate for Customs purposes to YER 250 per USD for imports through the Hudaydah port, under their control.<sup>255</sup> As, currently, there are no imports of non-essential goods through ports under Houthi control, there will not be any real impact of this move by the Houthis and it appears to be part of the propaganda war.

### III. Fragmentation of the Banking and Financial System

4. A stable banking and financial sector is a critical prerequisite for ensuring larger economic stability. The present scenario does not offer promising signs for the future of Yemen's banking and financial sector, and thereby of its economic stability.

5. In the aftermath of the move of the Central Bank of Yemen's headquarters from Sana'a to Aden in September 2016, the bifurcation of the Central Bank of Yemen into two rival institutions was effectively formalised with the functioning of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden and the cby, Sana'a. This has led to a tussle between the two institutions for regulatory supremacy over the Yemeni banking sector. The escalation of conflict has led to the intensification of the economic crisis and further politicisation of the banking sector.

6. The areas under the control of the Houthis have a higher population; Sana'a is the major financial and trading hub of Yemen, and nearly all banks and exchange companies have their headquarters situated in Sana'a. In order to consolidate its own control and authority in this strategic region, the cby, Sana'a adopted measures aimed at undermining the authority of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. Chief among these have been the denial of vital information concerning the economy and banking sector of Yemen to Central Bank of Yemen, Aden,<sup>256</sup> and to ban currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden after 2017<sup>257</sup>. The Panel has been informed that the Houthi authorities have subjected those financial institutions not complying with such instructions to reprisals and punitive actions, including seizure of their assets and funds, imposition of fines, and detention of bank officials.

7. A central bank requires reports from commercial banks, and exchange companies that contain information on various aspects such as assets and liabilities, local and foreign currency holdings, foreign currency trades, internal and external financial transfers, import financing, and loans. These reports allow the central bank to monitor the banking sector with respect to their financial health, compliance with local laws and instructions, international regulations concerning anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing, and to frame and implement monetary, fiscal and economic policies as

253 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

254 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-government-doubles-customs-exchange-rate-boost-finances-2021-07-26/>.

255 <http://en.ypagency.net/231497/>.

256 Circular No. (4) of 2020, titled "Communication with the Enemy", addressed to all the exchange companies and institutions operating in the Republic of Yemen, was issued by the cby's Financial Information in Sana'a on 28 January 2020.

257 Circular issued by the ministry of finance in Sana'a on June 23, 2021 to all the finance affairs managers and the treasurers in charge of taxes/customs collection, and circular issued by the headquarters of cby - Sana'a on 27 June 2021.



well as banking and trade regulations. In January 2020, banks and exchange companies operating in Sana'a were instructed by the cby, Sana'a, not to provide any data to "any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries", and that the submission of any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and the violator will be held responsible (Figure 26.1 and Appendix 1).

8. In the absence of vital information regarding the operations of financial institutions in Houthi-controlled areas, functional capabilities of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden stand severely challenged. Objecting to this, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, responded by demanding reports and full access to information from commercial, Islamic, and microfinance banks and money exchange companies concerning all their activities and not merely activities confined to areas under the control of the central Government. Fines have been imposed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden on certain banks not complying with these stipulations.<sup>258</sup> Additionally, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden has also instructed the banks to shift their operational centres to Aden, failing which, they would be subjected to action, including suspension of their licences and informing other entities not to bank with them (Figure 26.2 and Appendix 2).<sup>259</sup>

<sup>258</sup> "In accordance with Commercial Bank Law No. 38 of 1998, YKB, IBY, and YBRD are liable to pay the daily fines (between 51,000-100,000 Yemeni rials) that CBY-Aden have been calculating since June 2020 for the banks' failure to provide monthly monetary data." - Yemen Economic Bulletin: Battle to Regulate Banks Threatens to Rupture the Financial Sector - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies  
<https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/12004>.

<sup>259</sup> <http://en.adenpress.news/news/33475>.

Figure 26.1

Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the banks for not sharing data with enemy

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE

البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Date: .....  
No.: .....  
الرقم: ٩٩  
التاريخ: ٢٨/٠١/٢٠٢٠  
الترقيمات: .....

صنعا في 28|01|2020م

تعميم رقم (2) لسنة 2020م  
الى كافة البنوك العاملة في الجمهورية

المحترم  
الأخ / المدير العام / المدير الاقليمي  
بنك /  
تمة طيبة ورس،،

الموضوع/ التخابير مع العدو

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، وإلى توجيهات الاخ/ المحافظ عطفاً على اوامر من السلطات العليا، بمخاطبة البنوك والصرافين بعدم موافاة أي جهات غير قانونية مرتبطة بالمرتزقة بأي بيانات وأن تسليم أي بيانات لأي من تلك الجهات سيعتبر تخاير مع العدو وسيحمل كل من يخالف ذلك كامل المسؤولية. وعليه وجب مخاطبتكم بذلك.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا،  
رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
وتوقيع السيد

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Figure 26.2

## Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks

أصدر البنك المركزي اليمني اليوم، بيان هام موجه الى جميع البنوك التجارية والإسلامية العاملة في عموم الجمهورية، بشأن عدم التزام بعض البنوك بتقديم حساباتها الختامية والتي أصدر البنك المركزي بها مسبقاً مذكرات للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي انتهى موعدها اليوم.

وفي اجتماعه اليوم مع قيادات من قطاعي الرقابة على البنوك والعمليات الخارجية أكد نائب محافظ البنك المركزي شكيب الحبشي حرص البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني بما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسؤوليته القانونية، فقد تضمن بيان البنك المركزي حزمة من الإجراءات لتصحيح بنية القطاع المصرفي، وأهمها تصنيف بعض البنوك غير المنضبطة قانوناً، كبنوك غير ملتزمة وتعميم أسماءها لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، الى جانب التوجيه الملزم بنقل مراكز عمليات البنوك التجارية والإسلامية الى عدن، حيث المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي اليمني، ولكي يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من كافة عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بالمتطلبات القانونية لها، وكذا التزامه بترحيل النقد الاجنبي للبنوك لتغذية حساباتها الخارجية، لمواجهة التزامات عملاءها المستوردين.

نص البيان:

حرصاً من البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني وبما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسؤوليته القانونية بموجب المادة (45) من قانون البنك المركزي اليمني رقم (14) لسنة 2000م والمواد (27)، (28)، (29)، (30)، (31) من قانون البنوك رقم (38) لسنة 1998م والتي أعطت البنك المركزي الحق في طلب أية بيانات أو معلومات من أي بنك يراها ضرورية عن موقفه المالي وعملياته المصرفية المختلفة بهدف فحصها ومراجعتها والتحقق من سلامة الوضع المالي للبنك وأنه يمارس أنشطته وفقاً للقوانين وتعليمات البنك المركزي بما فيها التعليمات الخاصة بإجراءات مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، كما ألزمت تلك المواد البنوك على تقديم البيانات المالية السنوية المدققة والمتطلبات الإضافية المرتبطة بها والتي يصادق عليها البنك المركزي.

وعطفاً على المذكرات الصادرة من البنك المركزي للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي تنتهي بتاريخ 6 يوليو 2021م، وبسبب عدم التزام بعض البنوك بالمتطلبات الواردة في تلك المذكرات.

وعليه فإن البنك المركزي يحمل البنوك غير الملتزمة المسؤولية الكاملة عن أية تبعات قد تترتب على ادراجها في القائمة الرسمية للبنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، والتي سيتم الإعلان عنها وإتاحتها لجميع الجهات المحلية والبنوك والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الخارجية والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى.

ويوجه البنك المركزي مشدداً، أن على كافة البنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها في بلادنا الإسراع بأن تكون مراكز إدارة عملياتها بعدن، حيث يتواجد المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي وبما يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من جميع عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر لمؤيداتها والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بكافة المتطلبات القانونية اللازمة لها.

كما يهيب البنك المركزي بكافة الشركات والمؤسسات التجارية المستوردة عدم تنفيذ أي عمليات مالية أو مصرفية ومنها فتح الاعتمادات والتحويلات مع البنوك التي سيتم ادراجها ضمن قائمة البنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، ولن يتحمل البنك المركزي المسؤولية عن أية أضرار ناتجة عن تنفيذ عمليات أو معاملات اذا أجريت عبر تلك البنوك.

كما يؤكد البنك المركزي بأنه سيتولى ترحيل مبالغ النقد الاجنبي الخاصة بالبنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها والملتزمة، لتغذية أرصدة حساباتها لدى البنوك في الخارج، بهدف تغطية اعتماداتها وتحويلاتنا لأغراض مواجهة التزاماتها وتحديد عمليات الاستيراد.

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني

المركز الرئيسي - عدن

بتاريخ: 5 أغسطس 2021م

Source: <https://yemen-yba.com/10376> and <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>.

9. Caught between the conflicting directions from the cby, Sana'a and the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, banks and exchange companies currently struggle to operate and ensure legal compliance in a highly challenging and coercive regulatory environment. The Yemen Bank Association (YBA) and the Yemeni Exchangers Association (YEA) have unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a solution to the challenges faced by them in implementing the conflicting directions of the rival central banks. The YBA has also opposed the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden's direction requiring banks to shift their operational centres to Aden.<sup>260</sup> Challenges in implementation and the looming threat of punitive action has meant that the banking community currently faces tremendous stress.

#### IV. Currency War

10. In order to finance fiscal deficits, the Central Bank of Yemen has adopted the controversial tool of 'monetary emissions',<sup>261</sup> wherein new currency is printed and circulated into the economy. Apart from being inflationary, this has created new economic challenges. There is now a currency war by proxy between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis through their respective central banks. Although the armed conflict began in 2014, the two central banks emerged in 2016 and both areas continued to use the same currency notes up to 2019 until the cby, Sana'a, banned the new currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, for use in the areas under the control of the Houthis. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, "the January 2020 ban on newly printed banknotes in the region under Houthi control has limited the government's ability to pay salaries in this area and complicated monetary policy operations. This has increased the cost of financial transactions, reduced market transparency, and widened exchange rate gaps between Aden and Sana'a — to as much as 100 percent in some instances."<sup>262</sup>

11. The Panel has received information that the cby, Sana'a, issued a circular on 23 June 2021 banning the use of certain currency notes, printed in the year 2017 in the denomination of one thousand Yemeni rials in different series, issued by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden, in areas under Houthi control (Figure 26.3 and Appendix 3). Treating such currency as counterfeit notes, the cby, Sana'a prohibits the dealing, possession, or transfer of these notes within Houthi-controlled areas. Through another circular, issued on 27 June 2021, the cby, Sana'a, reiterated that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of such currency notes would entail prosecution on charges of harming the national economy (Figure 26.4 and Appendix 4).

<sup>260</sup> See the press release dated 12 August 2021 issued by the YBA, <https://yemen-yba.com/10376/>.

<sup>261</sup> Introducing cash to circulation in economy.

<sup>262</sup> CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).



Figure 26.4

**Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution**

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
Head Office Sana'a

البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

الجمهورية اليمنية  
البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

**تعميم صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء**

إحاطاً بالبيان الصادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء - بتاريخ 2021/6/22م بشأن منع التعامل أو حيازة أو نقل العملة المزيفة فئة (1000) ريال التي يبدأ رقمها التسلسلي بغير حرف ( أ ) والمدون عليها عام 1438هـ - 2017م، واستناداً إلى أحكام القوانين النافذة، ولما تقتضيه المصلحة الوطنية من منع تسرب العملة المزيفة، فإن البنك المركزي يهيب بجميع القاطنين من المناطق المعتمدة إلى مناطق حكومة الإقليم الوطني الالتزام بما يلي:

1. عدم نقل العملة المزيفة المشار إليها أعلاه.
2. أن الحد الأعلى المسموح بنقله من العملة اليمنية القانونية هو مبلغ (100.000) مائة ألف ريال فقط لكل شخص، ويسمح بنقل أي مبلغ من العملات الأجنبية.

وفي حالة المخالفة ستقوم الجهات المختصة بضبط المخالفين واتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بشأنهم وفق الحد الأقصى للعقوبات المقررة في قانون مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والقوانين الأخرى النافذة.

كما يهيب البنك بجميع المواطنين الاتصال على الرقم المجاني (8006800) أو رقم (01274327)، للإبلاغ عن أية مخالفة مما سبق.

علماً أن البنك سيقوم بصرف مكافأة بما يعادل نسبة (5%) من المبلغ المضبوط لمن قدم بالإبلاغ عن المخالفة.

تأمل من الجميع الالتزام تحقياً للمصلحة العامة.

والله الموفق..

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
2021/6/27م

تسليمه لكل من:

- رئيس مجلس الوزراء
- رئيس مجلس القضاء الأعلى
- وزير الداخلية
- رئيس جهاز الأمن والمخابرات
- وزير الصناعة والتجارة
- وزير الإدارة المحلية
- النائب العام
- الغرفة التجارية والصناعية
- جمعية البنوك اليمنية
- جمعية الصرافين اليمنيين

فكس : 274360 تليفون التوجيه : 274310/18 : ص.ب. 59 صنعاء - جمهورية اليمنية  
Email : governor@centralbank.gov.ye Fax : 274360 Tel Operator : 274310 B.O.Box 59 Sana'a Y.R

**Source:** Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

12. A peculiar situation has arisen, as a result, wherein old notes printed prior to 2017 remain legal tender in both areas, and because of the ban imposed by the cby, Sana'a, the newer notes remain largely in circulation in areas under Government of Yemen control only. Due to this ban, areas under Houthi control face a major cash crunch, while the surplus currency notes in Government of Yemen areas has

led to inflation and the rapid depreciation of the YER rate. The market value of YERs varies between old and new notes and also between the two regions, with profiteers charging higher transfer costs between the two regions, as entities running businesses in Houthi-controlled areas are forced to purchase old banknotes at high premia from the black market. Since the experiment with the new notes backfired, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden reportedly printed and put billions of YERs in old banknotes into the market and withdrew the newly printed banknotes of YER 1,000 denomination, allowing the people to get old banknotes from local banks and exchange firms.<sup>263</sup> The cby, Sana'a, promptly banned these newly printed notes. While the exchange rate crossed YER 1700 per USD in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen, the rates in Houthi-controlled areas largely hover around the YER 600 per USD mark. This dismal ground situation has sharply fractured the economies of both parts of Yemen, adversely impacting domestic trade, and threatening economic stability in the country.

13. The international community should take note of the severity of this economic crisis and take concrete measures to prevent further divisions in Yemen which could lead to an irreversible fait accompli. In the absence of rapid improvements in the political and security situations, the future economic prospects appear to be gloomy.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1905641/business-economy>.

<sup>264</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021>.

**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the Banks for not sharing data with enemy**

Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office  
Sana'a

Financial Information Unit

Date : 28/01/2020

Circular No. (2) 2020  
To all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Regional Director

**Subject / Communication with the enemy**

Referring to the above subject, and to the governor's directives with the orders of the higher authorities to address the banks and money changers not to provide any data to any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries, and to submit any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and anyone who violates that will be held responsible.

Signed by:

Mr. Wadea Mohammed AL-Saddah,  
Head of Financial Information Collection Unit



## **Appendix 2 Unofficial Translation of Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks**

In the interest of the Central Bank for the sound performance of the Yemeni banking sector and the continuity of its activity in the service of the national economy in a manner that ensures the preservation of its reputation with international financial and banking institutions, and based on its legal responsibility under Article (45) of the Central Bank of Yemen Law No. (14) of 2000 AD and Articles (27), (28), (29), (30), (31) of the Banking Law No. (38) of 1998 AD, which gave the Central Bank the right to request any data or information from any bank it deems necessary about its financial position and its various banking operations with the aim of examining them and reviewing them and verifying the soundness of the bank's financial position and that it carries out its activities in accordance with the laws and instructions of the Central Bank, including the instructions for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing procedures.

In addition to the memoranda issued by the Central Bank to banks regarding the obligation to submit the financial statements within a period of (15) days, which ends on July 6, 2021 AD, and due to the failure of some banks to comply with the requirements contained in those memos. Accordingly, the Central Bank holds the non-compliant banks fully responsible for any consequences that may result from their inclusion in the official list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, which will be announced and made available to all local authorities, banks, external financial and banking institutions and other international organizations.

The Central Bank stresses that all commercial and Islamic banks licensed in our country should expedite the establishment of their operations management centres in Aden, where the headquarters of the Central Bank is located in a way that enables it to carry out verification procedures for all its operations and direct field inspection of its supporters and to ensure its commitment to fulfilling all necessary legal requirements she has. The Central Bank also calls upon all importing companies and commercial institutions not to carry out any financial or banking operations, including opening credits and transfers with banks that will be included in the list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, and the Central Bank will not be responsible for any damages resulting from the implementation of operations or transactions if conducted through those banks.

The Central Bank also confirms that it will carry out the transfer of foreign exchange amounts of licensed and committed commercial and Islamic banks, to feed their account balances with banks abroad, with the aim of covering their credits and transfers for the purposes of meeting their obligations, specifically import operations.

**Source:** <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>

**Appendix 3 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 23 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a banning the use of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden**

Republic of Yemen  
Ministry of Finance  
Number: 110-380

Date: 23/06/2021

Ministers, Governors of governorates, Heads of boards of directors  
Finance affairs managers  
Fund custodians having charge of collection

Subject: The prevention of Counterfeit Currency circulation

Based on the authority of the Ministry of Finance and in implementation of the decisions of the National Salvation Government to prevent the circulation of any business, the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen– Sana'a decides to ban dealing with it.

And since the so-called Bank of Aden, managed by the aggression, committed a forgery of printing, denomination of 1,000 rials, issued in 2017, a crime that is added to the record of crimes targeting the national economy and national labor values and affecting legal positions and national capital, then confronting these crimes is a patriotic duty. All components must be promoted, foremost among which are state institutions.

And the Ministry of Finance confirms the following:

1. Prohibition of dealing in (counterfeit) currency, which was confirmed by the Central Bank in its statement dated 06/22/2021 (Copy attached)
2. Whoever receives an amount or denomination promoting any of these counterfeit currencies will be directly referred to the representative and the penal code in force against him will be applied (damaging the national economy in institutions and unauthorized circulation of counterfeit currencies).
3. The importance of educating all government institutions' cadres towards confronting the economic policies of economic aggression.
4. All those working in the financial position in the institutions of the state must be vigilant and follow up on what is issued about managing monetary policy in the competent authority (the Central Bank – Sana'a) and directed to act accordingly.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (800500) or (8006800) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Signature

Mr. Rashid Abuud Abu Lahuum  
Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs

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**Appendix 4 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution**

**Republic of Yemen  
Central Bank of Yemen  
Head office Sanaa**

**Circular issued by the Headquarters of the Central Bank of Yemen - Sana'a**

An appendix to the statement issued by the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen - Sanaa - dated 22/06/2021 regarding prohibiting dealing, possession, or transfer of counterfeit currency in denominations of (1000) riyals, whose serial number is without the letter (A) and recorded in year 1438 - 2017 on it to the provisions of the laws in force, and what the national interest requires of preventing the leakage of false work.

The Central Bank of Yemen calling on all those coming from "the localized areas" (referring to the areas under the control of the legitimate government) to the areas of "the National Salvation Government" (referring to the areas under the control of Houthis) to abide by the following two things:

- 1) Not to transfer any counterfeit currency.
- 2) One hundred thousand (100,000) Yemeni Riyals is the maximum permissible limit for transferring the legal Yemeni currency for each person; however, transferring any amount of foreign currency is not prohibited.

And in the case of the violator the competent authorities will arrest the violators and take legal measures in their regard according to the maximum penalties stipulated in the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law and other applicable laws.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (8006800) or (01274327) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Note that the Central Bank in Sanaa will pay the person who reported the violation a reward equivalent to (5%).

Hope everyone is committed to achieve the public interest.

**Issued by the Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office - Sana'a  
27/06/2021**

Annex 27 Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021 issued by the president al-Amana specialised criminal prosecution court to the Tadhamon Bank

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
العدل أساس الحكم



النيابة العامة  
النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

الرقم: ٣٨٢١  
التاريخ: ٢٧/٠٦/٢٠٢١  
المرفقات:

الأخ / مدير بنك التضامن الاسلامي  
تحية طيبة وبعد،  
المحترم

بالإشارة الى الأحكام القضائية الصادرة من المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة ضد المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي في القضية رقم 102 لسنة 2019م ج ج والتي قضت بإدائته بتهمة المساس باستقلال الجمهورية اليمنية وإعانة العدو والتخابر مع العدوان والتخابر مع دولة الاحتلال اسرائيل ومعاقبته بالإعدام تعزيراً ومصادرة جميع أمواله الثابتة والمنقولة ، وبالإشارة الى مذكرة الأخ رئيس لجنة حصر واستلام ممتلكات الخونة رقم 269/14174 وتاريخ 2021 / 6 / 23م والمتضمنة ان اموال المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي النقدية المحجوز عليها لديكم هي الوضحة في الجدول التالي:

اسم العميل	المبلغ المحجوز	العملة	نوع الحساب	رقم الحساب
19100	31.289.623.900	ريال يمني	محفظة	001-886-271107-000
عبد ربه منصور هادي	636.221.984.25	ريال سعودي	جاري	112-682-211101-000
	907.722.643.44	ريال يمني	جاري	112-886-211101-000

وأنه قد تم فتح حساب لدى البنك المركزي خاص بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة.

ولذلك

يتم نقل تلك الاموال المحكوم بمصادرتها سائلة الذكر من لديكم الى البنك المركزي وايداعها في الحساب رقم (00/1215-10012) ريال يمني والحساب رقم (06/1215-10012) ريال سعودي الخاصين بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة واشعارنا بما يفيد ذلك في اسرع وقت ليتسنى لنا التصرف وفقاً للقانون.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا،

عبد الله محمد زهرة  
رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

صورة مع التحية لعمالي الاخ النائب العام

نجيب

Source: Confidential

## Appendix 1 Unofficial translation of Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021

No. 3821

Dated : 27/6/2021

**Public Prosecution  
Specialized Criminal Prosecution**

### The Manager

Tadhamon Bank

With reference to the judicial rulings issued by the Criminal Court of Al-Amana against the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, Case No. 102 of 2019 Case No. 407 of 2019 which sentenced him to conviction on charges of compromising the independence of the Republic of Yemen and advocate the enemy in communication with occupying country, Israel and death penalty punishment, condemnation and confiscation of all fixed and movable property, and with reference to the memorandum of Chairman of the Committee for the inventory and receipt of the properties of the traitors No. 14174/269 dated 23/6/2021 and included the money of the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi is seized with Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank that is shown in the following table:

Customer Name	Seized Amount	Currency	Account Type	Account Number
19100 Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi	31.289.623.900	Yemeni Rial	Saving	001-886-271107-000
	636.221.984.25	Saudi Riyal	Current	112-682-211101-000
	907.722.643.44	Yemeni Rial	Current	112-886-211101-000

And that an account has been opened with you in the Central Bank for the management of the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution.

### Therefore

Those funds, which were sentenced to confiscation above, shall be transferred from you to the Central Bank and deposited in account No. (00/1215-10012) Yemeni Rial and account No. (06/1215-10012) Saudi Riyals for managing the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution according to the law.

**Abdullah Mohammad Zahra**

**President- Al-Amana Specialized Criminal Prosecution**

Annex 28 Circular of 28 June 2021 issued by the central bank of yemen, Sana'a regarding freezing the funds of the Tadhamon Bank

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a



الجمهورية اليمنية  
البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
التاريخ: 2021/06/28  
الرقم:

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

عاجل

(تعميم الى جميع منشآت وشركات الصرافة العاملة في الجمهورية)

المهترم

الأخ / المدير العام

تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/ العجز على جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، والى مذكرة الأخ/ رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة القاضي/ عبدالله محمد زهرة رقم (3830) بتاريخ 2021/6/27م والمسلمة الينا بتاريخ 2021/6/28م بخصوص العجز على جميع اموال بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة في جميع القطاعات المصرفية.

يتم حجز جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة لديكم في أي صورة كانت فوراً وموافاتنا بجميع الاموال والارصدة المحجوزة يومنا هذا.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير،،



فكس : 274113 تليفون 274093 ص . ب 393 صنعاء - الجمهورية اليمنية Sana'a Y.R P.O.Box:393 Tel : 274093 Fax 274113

Source: Confidential

**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular of 28 June 2021**

**REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

**CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a**

**Date: 28 June 2021**

**Financial Information Unit  
(Circular to all public money exchange institutions and companies in the Republic)**

**General Manager,**

**Subject : Seizure of all funds and balances of Al- Tadhamon Islamic Bank**

In reference to the above subject and to the memorandum of the Chief of the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of Al-Amana, Judge Abdullah Muhammad Zahra No. (3820) dated 27/6/2021 and handed over to us on 28/6/2021 regarding the seizure of all funds of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited in all banking sectors.

All funds and balances of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited with you, in any form, shall be seized immediately and we shall be provided with all the funds and balances seized today.

**Chief of Financial Information Unit  
Wadi Mohammad Al-Sada**

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**Fax: 274113 Lablon 274093M. Box 393 People - Republic of Yemen Fax 274113  
Tel: 274093 P.O.Box:3938, sana'a VR**

## Annex 29 Telecom Sector in Yemen

1. Despite the ongoing conflict, the telecommunications industry continues to witness significant growth and has been a major source of revenue for the Houthi authorities. According to the World Bank, prior to 2015, government revenue from the telecommunications industry was said to be second largest after hydrocarbons.<sup>265</sup> The number of mobile phone connections rose from 15.7 million in 2014 to 18.6 million by end-2019 and the number of internet users rose from 3.2 million in 2014 to 7.2 million by end-2019.<sup>266</sup>

2. A sector with a high revenue generating potential would naturally attract significant attention from the rival factions in the conflict. The majority of the telecom companies in Yemen are based in Sana'a, and a sizeable number of users reside in the Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthi authorities in Sana'a allegedly exercise control over these telecom companies and the sector, reportedly, has been a major source of revenue to the Houthis.<sup>267</sup> The Panel has received information that the Houthis, under the leadership of Abdullah Misfer Al-Shaer, have taken control of certain Sana'-based telecom companies.

3. The political, regulatory, and operational roles in the telecom sector in Yemen have not been segregated. The ministry of telecommunications and information technology responsible for the areas under the control of the Houthis is the overarching body that performs all types of roles concerning this sector: formulating bylaws, policies and plans; managing the spectrum for mobile broadband services; granting licenses; maintaining the national numbering plan; approving pricing policies for services; regulating all sub-sectors, namely landline and mobile telephony, internet services, and posts and also enforcing the laws, especially the licensing agreements between the Sana'-based ministry and the telecom service providers.

4. Companies operating in the areas under the control of the Houthis face policy uncertainties, levy of illegal fees and charges, extortion and confiscation of their assets. Licenses are deliberately issued for short durations to create operational uncertainties for companies.<sup>268</sup> The companies are forced to pay fees for a temporary extension of the operating licence on an annual basis, which provide a regular source of revenue to the authorities, both legal and illegal. The Panel received information that a total amount of about USD 22 million per annum, including an annual renewal fee of USD 13.2 million and the balance towards the frequency fees and the management fees, was collected by the de-facto authorities in Sana'a from some Sana'-based telecom companies.<sup>269</sup>

<sup>265</sup> <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/337651508409897554/Yemen-information-andcommunication-technology-ICT>.

<sup>266</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721> quoting from (i) for 2014 data, Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), "Statistical Year Book for 2016 – Chapter 13: Communications & Information Technology," and (ii) for 2019 data, MTIT (Sana'a), "Telecommunication and Information Technology Infrastructure Indicators 2019 [AR]."

<sup>267</sup> Panel received information from the GoY and other sources. "According to unofficial estimates, the Houthis annually receive about 80 billion riyals (equivalent to \$160 million) from the public and private telecommunications sector." see <https://alkhaleejonline.net/>.

<sup>268</sup> Panel received information from confidential sources that annual renewal fees of USD 13.2 million was collected by the ministry of telecom from the telecom companies; and taking into account the frequency fees and the management fees, the total revenue collected from MTN and Sabafon was about USD 22 million per annum.

<sup>269</sup> According to a report, published at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>, "In 2016, MTN Yemen paid \$36.4 million for a 29-month extension to their original 15-year license that was granted in July 2000, thereby extending their operating license to December 2017. .... MTN Yemen, which held a market share of 42.8% as of 2016 according to their estimates, presumably paid—according to the terms of their license agreement—what would have amounted to YER 1.7 billion annually for the duration of their 15-year license that became effective in July 2000.". The Panel has written to MTN for confirmation and their response is awaited.



5. The Houthis illegally collect fees under the pretext of regulating the telecommunications sector. The Sana'a-based companies continue to pay various fees such as license renewal fees, taxes, and zakat fees. The Panel has received information that some of the companies have also been subject to financial extortion by the Houthis who have also confiscated the funds and assets of private telecommunications companies in Yemen.<sup>270</sup> Further, according to a media report, Houthis allegedly took over Y mobile telecommunication company after arranging to declare it "bankrupt by a court under their control."<sup>271</sup> Y telecom, reportedly, "declared bankruptcy in March 2020 and left behind its physical assets such as real estate and its inventory of equipment in Sana'a, to restart its operations in Aden using 4G technology."<sup>272</sup> Y telecom has been requested by the Panel for a confirmation, their response is awaited.

6. The Government of Yemen has informed the Panel that USD 25 million of funds of MTN, Sana'a, located in the company's account maintained with the International Bank of Yemen, have allegedly been confiscated.<sup>273</sup> Finally, with effect from 17 November 2021, MTN Group, which held 82.8% of the shares in MTN Yemen, left Yemen by transferring its "majority shareholding in MTN Yemen to Emerald International Investment LCC. Emerald is a subsidiary of Zubair Investment Center LLC, an affiliate of Zubair Corporation LLC, which is the minority shareholder in MTN Yemen."<sup>274</sup> The Panel wrote to Sabafon in Aden, Sabafon in Sana'a, Y Telecom, YemenNet, MTN, TeleYemen in Aden and TeleYemen in Sana'a about this and for other information. While TeleYemen, Sana'a has replied to the Panel (see paragraph 84), responses from other companies are awaited.

7. The Panel was informed that Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer was appointed as managing director/chairman of Sabafon, Sana'a on 29 July 2019 and that he subsequently appointed the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Executive General Manager and the Financial Manager of Sabafon, Sana'a (Figure 29.1 and Appendix 1).

<sup>270</sup> As per the report of the Emirati al-Bayan newspaper, in 2018, the Ansarullah authorities confiscated YER 51 billion from Yemeni telecom operators distributed as follows: YER 27 billion from Sabafon, YER 17 billion from Y, YER 7 billion from MTN Yemen. See: <https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2019-10-08-1.3668294>.

<sup>271</sup> As per media report, quoting sources in the Sana'a-based ministry of communications and information technology, Sana'a, the Houthi leaders, namely Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, Abu Ali al-Hakem, and others were seeking to take over the mobile telecommunications company (Y) after declaring it bankrupt. "A commercial court subject to the control of the Houthi militias in Sana'a announced in an official announcement in Al-Thawra newspaper published on Wednesday March 11, 2020 the bankruptcy of 'Y' mobile company." See <https://www.newsyemen.net/new/53464>. The Panel has written to Y Telecom for confirmation and their response is awaited.

<sup>272</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>.

<sup>273</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>274</sup> <https://www.mtn.com/mtn-group-progresses-with-the-simplification-of-its-portfolio-with-exit-from-yemen/>.



Figure 29.2

## Press release by Sabafon shareholders on the attack and shifting of Head Office to Aden

### Press release Issued by the Extraordinary Meeting of Sabafon Shareholders

(Sabafon shareholders unanimously annul the proceedings of the so-called judicial trustee)

Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony (Sabafon) held an extraordinary general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company in Amman, Jordan on Thursday, the fifth of September, 2019. It was attended by the absolute majority of the company's shareholders including Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco), Consolidated Contractors Company C.C.C, Hayel Saeed Anam Group, Al-Ahmar Group and a representative of the Yemeni Government.

The Assembly reviewed the illegal actions that the company was exposed to recently by armed groups affiliated to the authorities of Sana'a and decided to continue the activity of the company and also approved the transfer of the company's headquarters, administration and operations to the city of Aden, the temporary capital of the Republic of Yemen in implementation of the invitation of the Government of Yemen. The assembly also made important decisions and statements regarding the future of the company's activities and operations.

1- Condemnation of armed groups of the illegal authorities controlling the capital Sana'a on Wednesday, 31-7-1919 AD, breaking in and seizing the headquarters of Sabafon Company in Sana'a, controlling its departments, changing its guard, controlling its facilities, equipment and systems in Sana'a and imposing illegal managers on the company's departments in Sana'a appointed by that armed group affiliated to the authorities in Sana'a, which is considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

2- The association refutes the allegations and fake news made by the intruders of the company belonging to the authorities of Sana'a. In this regard, the Assembly affirms that the general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company was not held during this year, except this extraordinary meeting held in Amman on 5-9-2019. The Assembly of company's shareholders has not taken any decisions to change the current board of directors' members, chairman or the managers of the company.

3 - The Assembly condemns the use of fraud and forgery as a cover for these blatant procedures based on that the intruders have held a fake meeting of the General Assembly of the company, while it is nothing more than a major lie that has nothing to do with the truth and a fabrication of papers and documents not issued by the authorities of the legal company. The reality of what happened to the company in Sana'a is the robbery by force and outside the framework of the law and the constitution of the rights of local and international shareholders who contributed and invested in the Republic of Yemen with good intention and credit according to the law and under the guarantees of the Constitution and the investment laws of the Republic of Yemen.

4- The Assembly condemns all illegal steps and actions taken by impersonators of managers in Sana'a who are appointed by the armed group and attempts to communicate illegally with local and international entities, including suppliers, distributors, banks and local and international service providers of the company. The Assembly calls on all local and international banks, distributors, suppliers and service providers of the company not to deal with any party or entity under any justification or reason, except by written instructions by the authorized signatories of the company duty, namely: current Chairman and CEO of the company and the financial manager that no decisions were taken by the general assembly of the company to change them.

5 – To report the invalidity, illegality and the lack of any documents of any kind or source provided by the illegal impersonated administration that controls the company's building and facilities in Sana'a under the protection of the armed group and the illegal Sana'a authorities as they are issued by illegal authorities located in the city of Sana'a, which is under the control and instructions of those authorities which control the capital Sana'a by armed force which are considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

6- The Assembly calls upon suppliers, entities, banks, distributors and others to emphasize the importance of implementing the Company's requests issued by its legal Department because of the importance of this matter and the critical current circumstances and the Company's and its shareholders' fears of the damages that may affect the Company as a result of dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a. In this regard, the assembly confirms the importance of protecting the banks accounts and funds, and the company's dealings with the entities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others of the tampering of the illegitimate authorities of Sana'a and those working with them in violation of the constitution, all laws and religious canons.

7- Holding the authorities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a full legal and criminal responsibility for all material and moral damages that affect the company and its various interests as a result of ignoring the company's requests, its legal management and its shareholders not to deal with the banks accounts, funds, transactions and interests of the company with any person or entity except through the official and legal administration of the company.

8- Announcing and reporting that the breaking in of the company by armed force and seizing the company by the armed group of the illegal authorities of Sana'a shall be considered as ignoring the Constitution, all laws in force, the state and its bodies and the judiciary. Stealing the funds and property owned by others and seize them by armed force, impersonating the shareholders, chairman and member of board of directors and the managers shall be considered criminal offenses and full-fledged crimes.

9- The Assembly decided to take all legal measures against those who committed these crimes or cooperate in achieving them against the company, its shareholders and employees, or impersonate the shareholders, members of the board of directors, its chairman, the CEO or any other administrative or legal status without any right and outside the law. The actors of the aforementioned crimes (persons and official and non-official entities), including the use of all rights and legal guarantees of the company and its shareholders to protect investments determined by laws, bilateral agreements and constitutional guarantees.



Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony - Sabafon  
Headquarters in the temporary capital of Aden  
Republic of Yemen

**Source:** <https://twitter.com/sabafonyemen/status/1178301571769217024>.


9. The Government of Yemen has informed the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (IANA) alleging that the office of TeleYemen in Sana'a is controlled by the Houthis and that TeleYemen, owned by the Government of Yemen has been relocated to Aden (Figure 29.4). The Panel wrote to TeleYemen, Sana'a about this, but the company denies any takeover by the Houthis and stated that its management was appointed prior to the current conflict and that this transfer to Aden was never officially communicated and, therefore, it does not recognize the transfer under company law. The Panel is investigating the extent of control exercised by the Houthis over some of the telecom companies.

10. Control over the telecom sector can provide a major strategic advantage to the Houthis. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis have gained effective control over the national Top Level Domain (TLD), '.ye'. Control over the TLD and illegal use of communication interception tools potentially would provide Houthis with the capacity to monitor and interdict traffic, censor content, carry out internet shutdowns, ban social media sites and personal messaging services, monitor private communications of opponents, and block domains in all parts of the country.

11. The Panel has received information that TeleYemen, has recently purchased a ‘bandwidth management system’ that uses deep packet inspection. Deep Packet Inspection can monitor all data, messages, text, voice, and video traffic over any packet in the bandwidth. TeleYemen, Sana’a has stated to the Panel that “the laws of Yemen require ISPs to filter certain content that goes against the law and Islamic doctrines and that they use it for the purpose of protecting children from any inappropriate content and there is no illegal usage”.<sup>278</sup>

Figure 29.4

### Letter from the Minister of Telecommunication and Information Technology, Government of Yemen to IANA



**Source:** Government of Yemen

<sup>278</sup> Letter from TeleYemen, Sana'a to the Panel dated 17 December 2021.

12. Considering the importance of the telecom sector for the economy and the general needs of the people of Yemen, this sector should be depoliticised, double taxation avoided, import policy reviewed to permit *bonafide* imports for use by the telecom companies across Yemen, and tariff rationalised. Access to telecommunication and internet is essential for the civilian population and any measures taken in respect to this sector should not result in any adverse consequences for the civilian population.

**Appendix 1 Unofficial translation: Notification of changes in management of Sabafon****Subject / Notification of changes in management in the company and the change of authorized signatories to the financial system with you**

Yemeni mobile phone company - Sabafon

Based on the company's general assembly meeting and its election of a new board of directors and a new chairman of the board, a new executive management has been appointed for the company, and we ask you to change all dealings with the company based on the new changes in its management through:

1. Radically cut off dealings with the previous administration
- 2 - Completely cancel the powers and signatures of the previous administration
- 3 - Approval of the powers and signatures of the authorized names by the new administration described below, on all checks and transfers from all company accounts on your part, in addition to all financial transactions.

Name	Designation
Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer	Chairman of the Board of Directors
Ahmed Ahmed Musaid	Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors
Abdul Khaliq Ali Ali al Gaili	Executive General Manager
Ali Ahmed Ahmed Jahiz	Financial Manager

Signature

Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer  
Chairman of the Board of Directors

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**Annex 30: Seizure of Telecom equipment by Yemeni Customs**

1. The Panel received allegations that Houthi authorities are illegally importing telecom equipment through land borders at Al Mahara, and that the Houthis have been setting up international calling facilities using satellite receivers, which are connected to SIM boxes that can attach about 100 SIM cards. Houthis also allegedly resort to illegal diversion of international calls and provide international call services to the users at rates less than the official rates. The revenue collected through these illegal call facilities is allegedly used by the Houthis for their activities that threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen.
2. The Government has informed the Panel that, “to strengthen their war-disciplined system, the militias are working on importing and smuggling precision equipments and communications equipment, whether traditional or those via satellite”.<sup>279</sup> The Government also informed that they have seized many consignments of telecom equipment, and “there are dozens of shipments that reach the Houthis through smuggling networks, and this poses a great danger to the security and stability of Yemen and Yemenis and contributes to prolonging the war.”<sup>280</sup> The Government has informed that they would share the details with the Panel.
3. The Panel is investigating a case in which a consignment of telecom equipment imported into Yemen in May 2021 through the Oman-Yemen land border was seized by the Yemeni Customs at Al-Mahara, as the said telecom equipment were brought into Yemen without obtaining permission or licence from the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of the Government of Yemen to import these items.
4. The Panel is investigating if the individuals or entities behind these illegal imports of telecom equipment have any links with or if they act on behalf of individuals designated under the 2140 sanctions regime or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and, if so, whether funds, financial assets or economic resources are being generated out of the use or sale of these equipment and/or whether these are used in violations of the sanctions regime for activities that threaten peace security and stability in Yemen. The Panel continues to investigate the allegations.

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<sup>279</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>280</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.


## Annex 31: Black-marketing and Illegal Fees on import of Fuel

1. According to various sources, the Houthis have created an artificial scarcity of fuel in areas under their control in order to force the traders to sell oil on the black-market operated by them and collect illegal fees from the sales. As per information made available by the Government of Yemen, the Houthis have collected official revenues on fuel imports in excess of YER 70 billion.<sup>281</sup>

2. Prior to June 2019, Hudaydah port was the major port of import of fuel into Yemen (48%), compared to Aden (33%), Mukalla (16%) and Nishtun (3%).<sup>282</sup> There has been a significant change in the pattern of fuel import into Yemen since then. In April-May 2021, the share of Hudaydah port had come down to 8 percent.<sup>283</sup> With the announcement by Saudi Arabia of a grant of USD 422 million worth of petroleum products to the Government of Yemen in March 2021,<sup>284</sup> for power stations and to support public services, as the country faced a fuel shortage, the volumes of imports through the southern ports started increasing in May–June 2021. Of the total quantities of fuel imported into the areas under the control of the Houthis, during April-May 2021, only eight percent (54,679 Metric Tonnes (MTs)) was imported through Hudaydah port and 92 percent (631,959 MTs) was transported by road after being imported through Aden, Mukalla and Nishtun ports under the control of the Government of Yemen.<sup>285</sup> The fuel supply to the Houthi-controlled areas by the land route, during April-May 2021, was about 10 thousand metric tonnes per day, which represented about 65 percent of the fuel imported into Yemen, in contrast to 6 thousand metric tonnes per day in January-March 2021,<sup>286</sup> evidencing an increase in supply through the land route.<sup>287</sup>

Figure 31.1

### Fuel Imports from January 2020 to July 2021 in MTs



#### Source:

[https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>281</sup> See the press release of the Government of Yemen available at <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>282</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>283</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>284</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-saudi-int-idUSKBN2BM36W>.

<sup>285</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>286</sup> <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>.

<sup>287</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.



3. The Panel has received information that although the customs duties are collected at the first port of import in non-Houthi controlled areas, the Houthis, illegally collect additional fees and customs duties from the traders at their land customs stations.<sup>288</sup> The business of supplying fuel to Houthi-controlled areas has been found to be very lucrative for many, except of course the end-consumers: the Government of Yemen has increased its customs revenue from the imports; the STC also allegedly collect fees of about YER12 per litre of imported fuel from the importers;<sup>289</sup> and the importers/traders who seize this opportunity to get enriched. Unfortunately, the consumers on both sides have to suffer, the consumers in the Houthi-controlled areas pay more because of the land transportation cost, double taxation and the illegal practices being followed by the Houthis and the consumers in the Government of Yemen-controlled areas pay more mostly because of the depreciating YER, profits by the traders and other hidden supply chain and distribution costs. As per a report, “Fuel prices at Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) stations in DFA-controlled areas increased by 76% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 6,807 to YER 12,000 per 20 litres. --In IRG-controlled areas, prices rose by 108% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 5,372 to YER 11,175 per 20 litres.”<sup>290</sup> The Panel has been informed that the increase in fuel prices has negatively impacted the implementing partners of international humanitarian organizations.

<sup>288</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that the Houthis collect YER 37 per litre since February 2021.

<sup>289</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that earlier they were paying YER 7 per litre but since April 2021, it has been increased to YER 12 per litre and this amount is deposited in some designated account in an exchange company in Aden. During the meeting of the Panel with the Economic Committee (EC) of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that it represented local taxes.

<sup>290</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

**Annex 32: Saudi Deposit**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

### Annex 33 Investigation of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen

1. In this annex, the Panel presents case studies of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen investigated by the Panel since January 2021.

2. The deterioration of the security situation in Yemen affected the capacity of the Panel to have access to all information needed in respect to several investigations on airstrikes. The Panel itself and its sources were unable to undertake numerous travels, especially in areas near conflict zones. The fear of witnesses in Houthi-controlled areas to communicate with the Panel or to register the geolocation of incidents also affected the Panel's investigations.

3. The Panel received information, reports and/or pictures relating to six incidents that were allegedly attributable to the Coalition and was able to conclude investigations on two incidents (see appendix hereafter). The Panel sent a letter to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in respect to the six cases and is awaiting a reply.

4. For the four remaining cases described below, the Panel received insufficient evidence to conclude its investigation:

a) One incident occurred on 28 February 2021 at approximately 1230 hours, in which an explosive ordnance hit a house in al Hawk district, Al Hudaydah. It resulted in the death of five people, including one child, and the injury to a woman, and a child. The Panel received information that the incident could have been a UAV attack. The Panel has not received pictures of explosive ordnance debris and is unable to reach a conclusion in this respect. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>291</sup> the location of the incident was 14° 46' 28.2" N, 42° 57' 58.32" E.

b) One airstrike occurred on 7 March 2021 at approximately 1430 hours in which a civilian area in Al Amanat Al Asimah (Sana'a city) was hit. The incident resulted in the injury to a man and two children, as well as damage to shops and houses. According to information received by the Panel from two different sources, the location of the incident was in the vicinity of 15° 23' 28.68" N, 44° 11' 7.8" E.

c) Another airstrike occurred on 10 May 2021 at approximately 1600 hours in Rada'a district, Al Bayda, which targeted a car resulting in the death of one man and the injury of two women. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 22' 48"N, 44° 55' 15.6" E.

d) A fourth incident occurred on 18 September 2021, in which a car in Merkhaj al Ulya district, Shabwah, was hit, resulting in the death of five people including a child and a woman. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 26' 5.28" N, 45° 54' 50.76" E. On 22 September 2021, the spokesperson of the Coalition, Brigadier General Turki Al-Maliki said that: "the Coalition confirms that it has not received any information nor coordination from UN OCHA in Yemen regarding this allegation as per the coordination mechanism in such cases. No such information has been conveyed to the Coalition regarding the claimed airstrike. The Coalition considers these claims seriously, takes all necessary and required procedures to validate them, and announce the results of any investigations through proper referral to the Joint Incidents Assessment Team."<sup>292</sup>

<sup>291</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>292</sup> See online: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/2289036>.

5. In its report S/2019/83, annex 34, the Panel presented the results of its investigation in respect to a shelling incident that occurred on 2 August 2018 in the city of Hudaydah and which hit the al Thawra hospital and a market. The Panel concluded that both Houthi forces and the Coalition could have been responsible for the attack. On 29 September 2021, the JIAT released the result of some investigations, including this specific one, and concluded that the Coalition Surface Forces did not carry out any firing in Hudaydah city on that date.<sup>293</sup> The Panel has still not received any information from Houthi forces in connection to this attack.

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<sup>293</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2290995>

## Appendix 1 Airstrike against Al Raks village, Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib, 16 January 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 0830 hours on 16 January 2021, an explosive ordnance allegedly launched from an aircraft, hit a car in Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib. The incident resulted in the death of the driver who was, according to information received by the Panel, a merchant transporting food (see figure 33.1).
2. The Panel received different information regarding the specific location of the incident but was not able to verify it. According to a report received by the Panel, the incident occurred in Wadi Dhaza ( وادي دحظة ) on the road between the Al Amoud area and Al Raks village in the Al Mahliyah district. According to a local source, the incident occurred on the main road of Al Raks village, while the driver was going from one shop to another. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>294</sup> the incident occurred in Al Raks village at 14° 33' 37.08"N, 45° 17' 34.8"E.

### II. Legal analysis

3. According to information received by the Panel, the victim was not involved in hostilities and there were no military activities or fighting in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all times, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>295</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>296</sup>
5. Based on the information received by the Panel, it seems unlikely that the principle of distinction was respected.

Figure 33.1

#### Car after the incident



*Source:* Confidential

## Appendix 2: Al Salif Port, Al Hudaydah, 21 March 2021

<sup>294</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>295</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>296</sup> CIHL rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

## I. Background

1. At approximately 0230 hours on 21 March 2021, two explosive ordnances launched from an aircraft hit, approximately five minutes apart, a warehouse and a building owned by the Yemeni International Company for Food Production Ltd at Al Salif port (15° 18' 51.50"N, 42°40' 36.16"E) (see figures 33.2, 33.3 and 33.4). The incident resulted in the injury of six workers of the company.
2. The Panel received pictures of remnants of the explosive ordnances found in both buildings and they are consistent with guided bombs used by the Coalition (see figure 33.5).
3. The Panel sent a letter to the Coalition in respect to this incident and is awaiting a reply.

## II. Legal analysis

4. The Panel received information from several sources that the Houthis are using the port of Al Salif for military activities, among others for the manufacturing of sea mines. However, the Panel still lacks conclusive evidence.<sup>297</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the two buildings in the port of Al Salif referenced above were used for civilian purposes and not for military operations. They are located in a compound separated by a concrete wall in which several offices, accommodation, warehouses and grain silos are housed.
6. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all time, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>298</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.<sup>299</sup>
7. Based on the information received, the Panel concludes that it is unlikely that the principles of distinction and proportionality were respected, however, if additional information is provided, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

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<sup>297</sup> The Panel welcomes any information and evidence in this respect.

<sup>298</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).


<sup>299</sup> CIHL, rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

Figure 33.2  
Location of the two buildings hit in Al Salif port




Source: Google Earth, Panel

Figure 33.3  
Damages to the accommodation buildings



Source: Confidential

Figure 33.4  
**Damages to the warehouse and impact crater**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 33.5  
**Pictures of debris found on the site after the incident**



**Source:** Confidential



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**Annex 34      Violations in the context of detention**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 35 Use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated areas attributed to Houthi Forces

1. The Panel is investigating eight incidents of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by Houthi forces in Ma'rib and Ta'izz, which allegedly led to the deaths of 33 people, including eight children, and injuries to 51 others, including 11 children (see Table 34.1).

2. The Panel's investigations are based on interviews with victims and witnesses, reports, pictures and videos, as well as other information available in the public domain. The Panel sent a letter to the Houthi authorities in that respect and is awaiting a reply. If the Houthi political or military leadership can provide information and evidence regarding these attacks that may counter the Panel's preliminary findings, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

Table 35.1

### Cases of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by the Houthi forces between December 2020 and November 2021 investigated by the Panel

<i>Appendix</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Impact Point</i>	<i>Victims/Damage</i>
1	12 December 2020	13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E	Al Ahli Football club, Ta'izz	Two people killed, including one child, and two children injured.
2	8 January 2021	13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E	Near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar Ta'izz	One child killed, one woman and one child injured.
3	20 February 2021	13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E	Al Qahira, Ta'izz city	One child killed, four people injured, including three children.
4	5 March and 8 May 2021	13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E	Al Thawra hospital, Ta'izz	One person injured.
5	3 April 2021	tbc	Al Rawda, Ma'rib	One child killed, four children injured.
6	5 June 2021	15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E	Gas station, Ma'rib	Allegedly 14 killed, including one child, and 5 injured.
7	10 June 2021	15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E	Mosque, Ambulances, Ma'rib	Allegedly six killed and 32 injured.
8	30 October 2021	13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E	Al Camp Street, Ta'izz	Three children killed, one child injured.

*Source:* Panel

## Appendix 1 Al Ahli football club, Ta'izz city, 12 December 2020

### I. Background

1. On 12 December 2020, at approximately 0600 hours, an explosive ordnance hit the Al Ahli football club in Ta'izz city. The club is in the vicinity of the Al Shohada'a stadium (13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E) in a civilian area.
2. Eight civilians were present and the attack resulted in the death of one boy and one man, as well as injuries to three other boys.
3. The Al Ahli football club is located in the "Olympic field" in Ta'izz, which is an area hosting several sports clubs.
4. According to the information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance was launched from a mountainous area North of the impact point which is under Houthi control.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

5. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence at the Al Ahli football club or in its vicinity at the time of the attack.
6. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>300</sup>
7. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in the proximity of civilians and civilian objects, and especially in a densely populated area such as the city of Ta'izz.
8. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

Figure 35.1


#### Location of the impact



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>300</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.2  
**Damages to the Club**



*Source:* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab\\_channel=VICENews](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab_channel=VICENews)

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**Appendix 2 Area in the vicinity of the old airport in Al Mudhaffar, Ta'izz, 8 January 2021****I. Background**

1. On 8 January 2021, at approximately 1100 hours an explosive ordnance hit a residential area in Ta'izz city, near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar (13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E).
2. The incident resulted in the death of a 15-year-old boy, and injuries to a woman and a child.

**II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>301</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>301</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.3  
**Location of the impact**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

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## Appendix 3 Al Qahira, Ta'izz city, 20 February 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 1700 hours on 20 February 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a civilian area in Al Qahira, Ta'izz (13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E). The attack resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four people: three children and one man.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

2. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.

3. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>302</sup>


4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.

5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>302</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.4  
**Location of the attack**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel



## Appendix 4 Al Tharwa hospital, Ta'izz city, 5 March and 8 May 2021

### I. Background

1. On 5 March 2021, an explosive ordnance hit the operation theatre of the Al Tharwa hospital in Ta'izz (13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E). The incident resulted in injuries to one man. The operation theatre was hit again on 8 May 2021 at approximately 2330 hours and resulted in damage to the hospital.
2. This is not the first time the Panel has reported on this hospital being hit by explosive ordnances. See appendix 3, Annex 33 of [S/2021/79](#), table 9 and annex 51 of [S/2018/193](#), and paragraph 183 and annex 67 of [S/2018/594](#).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

3. Under IHL, hospitals and medical centers exclusively assigned for medical purposes must be respected and protected in all circumstances. Hospitals only lose their protection if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to commit acts harmful to the enemy. Furthermore, the protection of hospitals and medical units may cease only after a warning has been given and only after a reasonable time has elapsed after such a warning.<sup>303</sup>
4. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance came from the North of Tai'zz where the Houthis occupy a mountainous area.
5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction, and the rules affording protection to medical units were not respected.<sup>304</sup>

<sup>303</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Convention, art. 11 AP II and CIHL rule 28.

<sup>304</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

## Appendix 5 Al Rawdah, Ma'rib city, 3 April 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 1630 hours on 3 April 2021, an explosive ordnance hit Al Rawdah area, Ma'rib city (see figures 35.5 and 35.6). This resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four other children. According to testimonies and reports received by the Panel, the children were playing on the street when the explosive ordnance hit.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance originated from Sirwah district, parts of which are under the control of the Houthi forces.
3. The Panel was unable to identify the specific location of the impact point but received information that it is located approximately two kilometres South from the Sahn Al Jin military camp<sup>305</sup> and 1.5 kilometres North-West of a military base (see figure 35.7)

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

1. As mentioned above, the Panel notes two military locations at approximately two and 1.5 kilometres away from the location of the incident.
2. However, the Panel also notes that the explosive ordnance fell in a civilian area and that only civilian children were victims of the attack.
3. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>306</sup>
4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
5. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

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<sup>305</sup> 15°30'22.0"N, 45°19'36.0"E

<sup>306</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.5  
Damage resulting from the explosive ordnance



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.6  
**Debris of the explosive ordnance**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.7  
**Rawdah area (within the black line) and proximity of military facilities**



*Source:* Google Earth with Panel's annotation

## Appendix 6 Petrol station, Ma'rib city, 5 June 2021

### I. Background

1. Between 1700 and 1730 hours on 5 June 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a petrol station in Ma'rib city (15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E). According to reports, pictures, videos, and testimonies received by the Panel, the incident resulted in the deaths of between 14 and 21 civilians, including one child, and injuries to five people. Seven cars were also destroyed. The Panel only received conclusive evidence of the death of one child and one man.
2. According to information received by the Panel, several people, including some military personnel, were queuing at the petrol station to refuel at the time of the incident.
3. The Panel received information that there is a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen in the vicinity of the petrol station (see figure 35.9).
4. The Houthi forces acknowledged the attack and said that the target was the military camp nearby and Mohammed Ali Al Houthi called for an independent investigation (see figure 35.8).<sup>307</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the attack was launched from Sirwah district, located towards the West of Ma'rib city from areas under the control of Houthi forces at the time.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

6. The Panel notes the proximity of a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen to the petrol station and that, according to a declaration made on social media by Mohamed Ali Al Houthi, the military base was the intended objective of the attack.
7. However, the explosive ordnance hit a civilian target, a petrol station, and according to information received by the Panel, most of the victims were civilians, including children.
8. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>308</sup>
9. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
10. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

<sup>307</sup> [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090).

<sup>308</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.9

**Statement of Mohamed Ali Al Houthi on Twitter calling for an independent investigation<sup>309</sup>**

**Source:** [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090)

Figure 35.8

**Location of the impact and proximity of military objectives**

**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>308</sup> Non-official translation: “We asked the brothers in the Yemeni Ministry of Defense, and they said that they bombed only the camp in the picture below, and they have proof. We welcome and call for investigation by independent committees into the matter regarding what was said about Ma’rib today or what happened regarding the killing of the children of the Republic of Yemen and civilians in all governorates who were targeted by America and its coalition”.

Figure 35.10  
Damage to the petrol station



*Source:* Confidential

## Appendix 7 A Mosque, Ma'rib city, 10 June 2021

### I. Background

1. On 10 June 2021 at between 1800 and 1900 hours, two or three explosive devices and a UAV, hit a mosque (15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E) and its vicinity (see figure 35.11). Two civilian houses and a few ambulances were also affected. The incident resulted in the death of six people and the injuries to 32 additional people, including two or three members of the medical staff and one woman. The Panel received a list with the names of all victims.<sup>310</sup> The Panel has not been able to verify the identity of each victim, but the number received from different sources and reports are similar.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the area contains buildings belonging to the Police, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Planning and International Cooperation Office, as well as other governmental offices.
3. According to reports received by the Panel, three ambulances that responded to the incident were also damaged. Successive attacks at an interval of several minutes increase the risk of civilian casualties, in particular to medical personnel and first responders (see figure 35.12).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

4. The Panel notes that the area is located approximately two kilometres from the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 (see Appendix 6) and is in the vicinity of a military base.
5. However, the Panel notes that only civilian objects were hit: a mosque, ambulances, and civilian houses.
6. The Panel, therefore, concludes that it is likely that the principle of distinction was not respected, especially in respect to the UAV which has a high level of accuracy. If the military base was the intended objective, the Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected. Indeed IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>311</sup> CIHL, rule 15.



Figure 35.11  
**Location of attack**



*Source:* Google Earth, Panel

Figure 35.12  
**Distance between the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 and the mosque hit on 10 June 2021**



*Source:* Google Earth, Panel

**Figure 35.13**  
Damage to the Mosque



**Source:** Confidential

**Figure 35.14**  
Debris of the UAV



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 35.15  
**Damage to an ambulance**



**Source:** Confidential

## **Appendix 8 Near al Camp street, Ta'izz city, 30 October 2021**

### **I. Background**

1. On 30 October 2021, at approximately 1135 hours an explosive ordnance (see figure 35.16) hit a civilian area in the city of Ta'izz (13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E) near Al Khaeer mosque, killing three children and injuring a fourth (see figure 35.17). All children were from the same family. Two adults were also reportedly injured, but the Panel has not been able to verify this information.
2. According to information received by the Panel, this is a civilian area, and no military operations were going on in the area at the time of the attack.

### **II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>312</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>312</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.16  
**Remnants found at the location of the incident**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.17  
**Location of the attack**



*Source:* Google map

Figure 35.18  
**Impact point**



*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 36 Indiscriminate use of landmines, IEDs and other explosive remnants by Houthi forces

### I. Background:

1. The indiscriminate use of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Houthis is endemic and systematic. Since 2016, the Panel has been documenting the impact of landmines and IEDs on civilians (see [S/2021/79](#), paras 140-142, [S/2020/326](#), paras 115-117 and [S/2018/193](#), annexes 43 and 44).

2. The indiscriminate use of landmines is prohibited by IHL.<sup>313</sup> When landmines are used, parties to the conflict must take particular care to minimize their indiscriminate effects. They also must record their placement to the extent possible. In addition, although not directly binding on non-state armed groups, Yemen is party to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (see section III on the use of anti-personnel mines by Houthis).

### II. West Coast:

3. During its visit to Aden, Al Khokha and Al Mukha and Al Khokha in August 2021, the Panel met with a wide range of stakeholders involved in monitoring and demining activities in Yemen, including Project Masam, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) and UNDP. The Panel was informed that there is no centralized database listing all clearance activities, incidents and emergency interventions undertaken by these different entities in Yemen. It is therefore difficult to have complete and exhaustive data.

4. The Panel was nevertheless able to gather significant information, as mentioned below:

- Between November 2020 and August 2021, the following explosive items were removed from the West Coast by the local demining teams (YEMAC, Project Masam and/or West Coast armed groups):

Table 36.1

#### Explosive items removed from the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021 by district and type of items

Districts:	Anti-Tank/Vehicle Mine	Anti-Personnel Mine	Sea mine	Explosive devices	Missiles	Shells (rockets)	Cluster munition	Pressure plates
Bab el Mandab	123	20		10	2	120		
Dhubab	148	26		16	1	124	1	
Mawza	135	31		24	5	132	3	6
Al Mukha	176	37	1	21	8	140	2	3
Khokha	184	26	1	25	5	138		8
Hays	321	41		31	9	155	4	10
Thuhayata	252	43	2	19	11	126	2	11
Durahimi	1,153	19	3	29	22	119	2	4

<sup>313</sup> See CIHL, rules 80, 81, 82, and 83.

Al Halia	730	52		116	33	130	10	22
Al Hawk	253	12	1	35	12	122	1	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,475</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>1,306</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>72</b>

*Source:* Local demining staff

- The Panel received information from the local authorities of Al Hudaydah and Al Khokha that, between January and June 2021, landmines and other explosive devices laid in those territories of the Al Hudaydah Governorate, which are under the control of the Government of Yemen, resulted in a high number of casualties. Most of them occurred in the district of Al Durahimi. In total, 17 children were killed and 15 were injured, nine women were killed and five injured, and 37 men were killed and 35 injured. The Panel also received information about several incidents affecting civilians between the months of July and October 2021. Two are detailed below.
- During a meeting in Al Mukha, the Panel was informed that according to the most recent survey, in 2021, 78 percent of the West Coast territory is confirmed to be a hazardous area, i.e. territory in which the presence of landmines, IEDs and/or unexploded ordnances (UXO) has been confirmed, and the other 22 percent is suspected to be a hazardous area. The Panel was informed that there are ten YEMAC teams on the West Coast: three in Al Mukha, one in Mawza, one in the South of Ta'izz, one in Jabal Habashi, two in Al Khokha, one in Mudhafar, one in Al Ma'afer and one in Durahimi. Each YEMAC team has the capacity of clearing areas of approximately 625m<sup>2</sup> per month.
- The Panel was also informed that demining teams in Yemen, including on the West Coast, proceed only for emergency demining, i.e., clearance of roads and passages to infrastructures and locations used by the civilians such as schools, hospitals, and water tanks. Therefore, no area can be considered as completely cleared and the risk of landmines is always there for the civilian population. In addition, the Panel was informed that in areas near active conflict zones, demined areas are constantly remined by the Houthis. The Panel received a list of 74 locations in Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Ma'rib and Shabwah where demining activities had been undertaken, which since have been retaken by Houthi forces.<sup>314</sup>
- The Panel received specific information on 62 cases in which demining teams were called for emergency interventions between September 2020 and August 2021 in ten districts across three Governorates, as mentioned below:
  - i) Ta'izz – Mawza: six incidents, including At Muoa`ad Bin Jabel School<sup>315</sup>, where three anti-tank mines, three artillery shells, ten fuses, and one IED were found on 12 December 2020.
  - ii) Ta'izz- Dhubab: seven incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the roads in or near villages, fishing areas and the Al Shaykh Saeid Port.
  - iii) Ta'izz-Al Mukha: four incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the village roads, farms and houses. One of these incidents resulted in the death of a civilian in Al Gadeed<sup>316</sup> in July 2021.
  - iv) Ta'izz- Al Wazi'iyah: five incidents, where explosive devices were found on the roads. In one of these incidents, cattle was killed<sup>317</sup> and in another one, five anti-tank mines, two IEDs, one

<sup>314</sup> Specific GPS coordinates on file with the Panel.

<sup>315</sup> N 43°38'06.11", E 13°22'34.54"

<sup>316</sup> N 43°21'53.10", E 13°06'20.80"

<sup>317</sup> N 43°40'20.50", E 13°17'24.50"



- artillery shell, and seven anti-personnel mines were found near roads and houses used by civilians.<sup>318</sup>
- v) Tai'zz-Dhubab: 15 incidents, where anti-tank mines were found on the roads used by the civilians, and inside farms. In Al Aradee Almandab, anti-personnel mines were also found at a fishing site.<sup>319</sup>
  - vi) Ad Dali-Qa'atabah: ten incidents where anti-personnel mines were found in or near civilian houses and farms.
  - vii) Al Hudaydah: 11 incidents, including one at a site in Al Tuhayata where 12 civilians were killed in November 2020.<sup>320</sup> In Al Khokha, landmines were found at the entrance of Al Fawz school in November 2020,<sup>321</sup> and others around a water well in December 2020,<sup>322</sup> in Al Hali, explosive devices were also found near a water pipe in August 2021,<sup>323</sup> and in Al Tuhayata, two 500-kilo bombs were found near a water pipe and cleared in January 2021(see figure 36.6).<sup>324</sup>
  - viii) Lahij-Al Madaribah: four incidents, where anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were found on and near the roads used by the civilians, including on a road leading to a water well.<sup>325</sup>
- In addition, the Panel received information from Project MASAM that between November 2020, and the end of July 2021, they cleared 1,830 anti-personnel mines, 26,867 anti-vehicle mines, 315 IEDs and 40,141 UXO in Aden, Ad Dali, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Ma'rib, Shabwah and Ta'izz. Between July 2018 and November 2021, 4,168 anti-personnel mines, 95,525 anti-vehicle mines, 6,109 IEDs and 178,834 UXO were cleared by the group.

### III. Anti-personnel mines:

5. In 2021, the Panel continued to receive evidence of anti-vehicle mines modified by the Houthis for use as large anti-personnel landmines. The Panel was informed of two ways by which this is achieved: one is the use of pressure plates and the other is through the reduction of the headspace above the fuse within an improvised anti-tank device (see figure 36.1).

Figure 36.1:

#### Plastic cap used to reduce the headspace



**Source:** Project Masam

<sup>318</sup> N 43°50'28.70", E 13°09'29.70

<sup>319</sup> N 43°25'38.10", E 12°56'61.10"

<sup>320</sup> N 43°09'48.32", E 14°12'18.81"

<sup>321</sup> N 43°15'42.63", E 13°48'09.12"

<sup>322</sup> N 43°22'15.97", E 13°53'38.76"

<sup>323</sup> N 43°01'27.01", E 14°47'07.57"

<sup>324</sup> N 43°04'42.01", E 14°12'07.26"

<sup>325</sup> N 43°32'64.00", E 12°55'11.70"

#### IV. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

6. Houthi forces continued to manufacture a significant number of IEDs of different shapes and types, including IEDs concealed as rocks, palm tree trunks, as well as different booby traps. Those IEDs are activated through different means including pressure plates, crush wires, and passive infra-red sensors (see figures 36.2 to 36.5)

Figure 36.2:

##### **IEDs activation system: pressure plate**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.3:  
**IEDs activation system: crush wire**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.4:  
**IEDs activation system: passive infra-red sensor**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.5:  
**Booby trap**



*Source:* Panel

7. The Panel also received evidence that the Houthi forces use old aviation bombs as IEDs in the civilian areas, with significant risk for the civilian population. For instance, the Panel received evidence of two of these bombs being laid inside a water pipe in Al Thuhayata (43°04'42.01"N, 14°12'07.26"E) and cleared in January 2021 and that another nine were found at the entrance of a school in Medghal, Ma'rib and cleared in November 2018 (15°36'49.29"N, 44°53'2.65"E) (see figure 36.6).

Figure 36.6:  
**Aviation bombs found inside a water pipe and cleared between 5 and 7 January 2021**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 36.7:

**Aviation bombs found at the entrance of a school and cleared on November 2018**



*Source:*

Project Masam

8. The Panel also received evidence of five anti-vehicle mines and 11 IEDs found in a school in al Khokha district, al Hudaydah and cleared on 25 November 2021 (13°52'07.88"N 43°25'32.87"E) (see figure 36.8).

Figure 36.8:

**Anti-vehicle mines and IEDs found in a school in al Khokha**



*Source:* Project Masam

## V. Sea Mines

9. During its visit to the West Coast in August 2021, the Panel received documents, pictures, and other information about the use deployment of sea mines by the Houthis from different sources including people involved in demining and military sources. According to the information received, eight sea mines were found and removed from GoY-controlled areas of the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021. Most sea mines found on the West Coast are contact-type sea mines. Some magnetic sea mines have also been found in the past.

10. The Panel was informed during a meeting with the Yemen Coast Guard in August 2021 that during the period from mid-October to mid-April, due to bad weather conditions, there were fewer patrols on the West Coast and that the Houthis were using this opportunity to lay mines.

11. The Panel also received information that the Houthi forces possess the capacity to produce sea mines,<sup>326</sup> but has not been able to independently verify this.

## VI. Examples of landmine incidents affecting civilians

12. The Panel received information on several incidents of landmine explosions killing or injuring civilians in 2021. The Panel conducted broader investigations on two of them to illustrate the danger of unrecorded landmines in civilian areas.

13. On 29 July 2021, in Ad Durayhimi<sup>327</sup> district, Al Hudaydah Governorate, a car transporting 14 people ran over an explosive device hidden in the ground. Three people were killed, including two children and 11 were injured, including three children. Two of the injured people, one man and one child, died later from their wounds.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Information received from confidential source.

<sup>327</sup> Approximately at 14°36'38.49"N, 43°01'06.13"E

<sup>328</sup> The Panel communicated with three of the victims, received information, including pictures and list of victims from the authorities of Al Hudaydah Governorate, as well as from confidential sources.

Figure 36.9:  
Car after the explosion



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 36.10:  
Search for other landmines and/or IEDs around the incident location



**Source:** Confidential

14. On 13 September 2021, at approximately 1800 hours a lorry triggered an anti-vehicle landmine in Al Qataba area, Al Khokha district, Al Hudaydah (13°53'44.44"N, 43°15'18.36"E). The incident resulted in the injuries of 13 children and two women.<sup>329</sup> On 14 September 2021, a monitoring team

<sup>329</sup> Some media reported 17 victims, but the Panel was able to verify 15: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/09/13/-شاهد-بالفيديو-17-جرحا-معظمهم-نساء-واط>. The Panel received information from two different sources as well as video and pictures of the victims at the hospital after the incident.

went to the area to search for and clear other explosive devices. They found a locally made anti-vehicle landmine believed to be similar to the one detonated by the lorry the day before.

Figure 36.11:  
**Location of the incident**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 38.12:  
**Anti-vehicle landmine found near the location of the incident on 14 September 2021**



**Source:** Confidential

15. The Panel also received evidence of an incident in Mayfa'a district, Shabwah, on 29 September 2021, which resulted in the death of one child and the injuries to three men. The incident was caused



by the explosion of IEDs left in a garbage dump near a mosque. When a fire started in the dump, civilians gathered to control it and were either killed or injured by the explosion.

## **VII. Risks associated with Demining**

16. The Panel received information from two different sources about incidents that occurred during demining operations in Yemen. One source informed the Panel that 29 workers had died during demining activities between 2018 and 2021. Another source informed the Panel that between 2015 and 2021, 45 workers had died during demining operations, and 37 were injured. According to sources involved in demining activities, these numbers are high compared to other areas of operation, and increased training and protective equipment should be provided to demining workers in Yemen. The Panel was also informed by different sources in Yemen that Houthis are constantly developing new technologies relating to landmines and IEDs, which makes the task of the demining teams more difficult and requires continuous training.

## **VI. Import of demining material**

17. The Panel received evidence that, in one case, requests for importing demining equipment, including protective material and detectors, took over a year and half before being approved by the Government of Yemen. Considering the needs and importance of this matter, the authorities in charge of approving importation of equipment related to mine clearance should take appropriate measures to reduce delays.

## **Annex 37 Obstruction to humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

**List of acronyms**

ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
APII	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
AQAP	Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen in Aden
cby	Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIHL	Customary International Humanitarian Law
EC	Economic Committee of the STC
ECDIS	Electronic Chart Display and Information System
EUC	End-User Certificate
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading Facility
GoY	Government of Yemen
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Internet Protocol
ISP	Internet Service Providers
JIAT	Joint Incident Assessment Team
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
NM	Nautical Mile
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBNR	Political Bureau of the National Resistance
PN	Promissory Notes
RCC	Redeployment Coordination Committee
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
STC	Southern Transitional Council
TEL	Transport-Erector-Launchers
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNOSAT	United Nations Satellite Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WBIED	Water-borne Improvised Explosive Device
WCJF	West Coast Joint Forces
YCG	Yemeni Coast Guard
YEMAC	Yemen Executive Mine Action Center
YER	Yemeni rial