



## Consejo de Seguridad

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### Carta de fecha 25 de enero de 2022 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos sobre el Yemen

Los miembros del Grupo de Expertos sobre el Yemen tienen el honor de transmitir por la presente el informe final del Grupo, preparado de conformidad con el párrafo 10 de la resolución [2564 \(2021\)](#).

El informe se presentó al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [2140 \(2014\)](#) el 23 de diciembre de 2021, y el Comité lo examinó el 21 de enero de 2022.

Agradeceríamos que la presente carta y el informe se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se distribuyeran como documento del Consejo.

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## Informe final del Grupo de Expertos sobre el Yemen establecido en virtud de la resolución 2140 (2014) del Consejo de Seguridad

### *Resumen*

Durante el período que abarca el informe, las partes en el conflicto siguieron luchando por consolidar su control sobre los territorios y las poblaciones. En septiembre y octubre de 2021, en una rápida serie de acciones, las fuerzas huzíes tomaron varios distritos que rodeaban la ciudad de Marib, y en Al-Bayda y Shabwa. En noviembre, la retirada de las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental permitió que los huzíes tomaran el control de importantes zonas de la provincia de Al-Hudayda.

Se adoptaron medidas para socavar los Acuerdos de Estocolmo y de Riad durante el período sobre el que se informa. Ni la Coalición para Apoyar la Legitimidad en el Yemen ni las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental informaron al Comité de Coordinación del Redespiegue ni a la Misión de las Naciones Unidas en apoyo del Acuerdo sobre Al-Hudayda (UNMHA), establecida en virtud del Acuerdo de Estocolmo, de su intención de retirarse de las zonas de Al-Hudayda. Los huzíes también obstaculizaron el cumplimiento del mandato de la UNMHA. El Consejo de Transición del Sur realizó nombramientos unilaterales de personal militar y de seguridad, y el Gobierno del Yemen nombró a funcionarios públicos, socavando el Acuerdo de Riad. Se han hecho pocos avances en la aplicación de las disposiciones militares y políticas del Acuerdo de Riad.

El Gobierno del Yemen no proporcionó apoyo militar adecuado a los combatientes tribales en Marib, lo que dio lugar a que los huzíes tomaran el control de zonas estratégicas alrededor de la ciudad. Tanto el Consejo de Transición del Sur como el Gobierno del Yemen han tenido dificultades para conseguir los recursos necesarios para garantizar la prestación de servicios básicos, aliviar la actual crisis económica y pagar los sueldos ordinarios, lo que ha provocado manifestaciones públicas masivas en las zonas bajo su control. En el segundo semestre de 2021, las luchas militares internas entre las fuerzas afiliadas al Consejo de Transición del Sur y varios incidentes de seguridad graves pusieron en duda la capacidad del Consejo para mantener el orden en las zonas bajo su control.

En cambio, en las zonas controladas por los huzíes, la situación de la seguridad se mantuvo relativamente estable y no hubo ningún desafío importante a su autoridad política. Los huzíes continuaron su campaña sistemática para lograr que la población se adhiriera a su ideología y asegurar el apoyo popular a su causa y al conflicto; lo que incluía la organización de colonias de vacaciones y cursos culturales para adultos y niños. Continuó la política huzí de violencia sexual y represión contra las mujeres políticamente activas y las mujeres profesionales, incluso después de la designación por el Consejo de Seguridad de Sultan Saleh Aida Zabin (YEi.006) en febrero de 2021.

En el frente militar, los huzíes continuaron sus ataques aéreos y marítimos contra la Arabia Saudita. Los objetivos cercanos a la frontera siguieron siendo los expuestos a mayor riesgo y a menudo eran atacados por una combinación de aeronaves no tripuladas y cohetes de artillería de corto alcance. Los huzíes también siguieron lanzando ataques en el interior de la Arabia Saudita utilizando aeronaves no tripuladas de mayor alcance, así como misiles de crucero y balísticos. En el Mar Rojo, se emplearon artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes para lanzar ataques contra buques comerciales anclados en puertos de la Arabia Saudita, en algunos casos a más de 1.000 km de las costas del Yemen. La finalidad de esos ataques era principalmente política, es decir que los huzíes quieren presionar a Riad para que acepte un acuerdo político que sea beneficioso para ellos. Esto contrasta fuertemente con el uso de misiles y aeronaves no tripuladas dentro del Yemen, cuyo objetivo suele ser lograr la máxima letalidad.

La mayoría de los tipos de aeronaves no tripuladas, artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes y cohetes de corto alcance se ensamblan en las zonas controladas por los huzíes utilizando materiales disponibles a nivel local, así como componentes comerciales, como motores y artefactos electrónicos, que se obtienen del extranjero utilizando una compleja red de intermediarios en Europa, Oriente Medio y Asia.

En febrero y mayo de 2021, la Marina de los Estados Unidos de América incautó dos cargamentos de armas que se transportaban en dhows en el mar Árábigo. Estos incluían importantes cantidades de armas pequeñas y armas ligeras, misiles antitanque lanzados desde contenedores y dirigidos por cable, y equipos conexos, como miras ópticas. Una inspección de las armas incautadas realizada por el Grupo reveló que estas tenían marcas y características técnicas que coincidían con las armas documentadas por el Grupo en incautaciones anteriores, lo que indicaba un patrón común de suministros que incluía el empleo de dhows en el mar Árábigo.

El conflicto ha devastado la economía del Yemen. Debido a la gran dependencia del país de la importación de productos básicos y alimenticios, la rápida depreciación del valor del rial yemení, en las zonas que no están bajo el control de los huzíes, ha provocado fuertes presiones inflacionarias sobre los precios minoristas. Esto ha hecho que los alimentos sean cada vez más inaccesibles para gran parte de la población. Con sistemas de poder paralelos en el país, se ha producido una fragmentación sistemática del sistema económico y de las instituciones. Esto, a su vez, ha provocado un mayor deterioro de la economía y de las condiciones de vida de la población. Este estado de empobrecimiento ha creado una situación que es explotada por algunos para promover sus objetivos políticos, lo que en ocasiones ha desencadenado disturbios civiles en todo el país y ha supuesto una grave amenaza para la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad del país.

Los huzíes adoptan diversos métodos para enriquecerse y mantener sus actividades, especialmente mediante el uso o la amenaza del uso de la violencia y prácticas reguladoras coercitivas. Estas últimas incluyen la recaudación de tasas y gravámenes ilegales en sectores económicos de gran rentabilidad, como el petróleo y las telecomunicaciones, y la confiscación de activos y fondos de particulares y entidades. El impacto consiguiente de la fragmentación de las instituciones políticas, reguladoras y financieras ha creado un entorno coercitivo y difícil para la economía. Si no se aborda seriamente la situación macroeconómica, las soluciones políticas al conflicto no harán más que complicarse, lo que alejará aún más la visión de paz para la región.

La actual ofensiva de los huzíes contra Marib ha tenido consecuencias nefastas para la población civil, especialmente para los desplazados internos. Durante el período sobre el que se informa, se lanzaron varios ataques contra los campamentos de desplazados internos, que expusieron a una población ya vulnerable al miedo, a las lesiones y a la muerte, al tiempo que se provocaron nuevos desplazamientos. También se produjeron numerosos bombardeos sobre las ciudades de Marib y Taiz, que son zonas densamente pobladas, con consecuencias letales para los civiles.

El uso indiscriminado de minas terrestres por los huzíes, en particular en la costa occidental, plantea una amenaza constante para la población civil, que, de no abordarse, puede tener trágicas repercusiones en la vida, la seguridad y la salud, así como consecuencias a largo plazo.

La impunidad es más la norma que la excepción cuando se trata de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. Violaciones tales como las detenciones arbitrarias, las desapariciones forzadas, la tortura y los malos tratos, son endémicas y las cometen todas las partes. Los migrantes siguen siendo especialmente vulnerables a los abusos y a las violaciones

del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. En las zonas controladas por los huzíes, se están utilizando las detenciones y el sistema judicial para reprimir cualquier oposición o disidencia percibida, especialmente de periodistas, mujeres y minorías religiosas. En las zonas que no están controladas por los huzíes, el sistema judicial sigue siendo débil, disfuncional y las fuerzas de seguridad generalmente lo pasan por alto. Los ataques aéreos de la Coalición también siguen causando bajas civiles.

El apoyo a las víctimas de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y de los derechos humanos es casi inexistente. A menudo, las personas que han sido detenidas arbitrariamente durante años, luego de haber perdido sus casas y sus empleos, se quedan sin nada cuando son puestas en libertad. Este es el caso, en particular, de las mujeres que, además del trauma que sufren, tienen que enfrentarse al estigma social asociado a su detención. Además, tras años de detenciones y reclusiones arbitrarias y de desapariciones forzadas, un gran número de yemeníes han desaparecido. Sus familias quedan en el desamparo y reciben muy poco apoyo de las partes para averiguar el destino de sus familiares.

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\* Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial oficial.

## I. Introducción

1. Este informe, que se presenta al Consejo de Seguridad en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 10 de su resolución 2564 (2021), abarca el período comprendido entre el 6 de diciembre de 2020 y el 5 de diciembre de 2021 e incluye actualizaciones de las conclusiones de las investigaciones que figuran en el informe final del Grupo de 25 de enero de 2021 (S/2021/79).
2. El Grupo se ha atendido a lo dispuesto en el párrafo 14 de la resolución 2564 (2021), que se refiere a las mejores prácticas y los métodos recomendados por el Grupo de Trabajo Oficioso del Consejo de Seguridad sobre Cuestiones Generales relativas a las Sanciones (S/2006/997). El Grupo ha hecho hincapié en el cumplimiento de las normas relativas a la transparencia, la objetividad y las fuentes, las pruebas documentales, la corroboración obtenida de fuentes independientes verificables y el ofrecimiento de la posibilidad de responder<sup>1</sup>. De conformidad con el párrafo 11 de la resolución 2564 (2021), el Grupo siguió cooperando con el Equipo de Apoyo Analítico y Vigilancia de las Sanciones y con el Grupo de Expertos sobre Somalia.
3. En su anterior informe final, el Grupo informó sobre la aplicación del mecanismo del depósito saudí. En vista de la información adicional recibida por el Grupo desde la publicación de su informe anterior, el Grupo ha realizado un examen completo de la sección IX.B, anexo 28, y del texto conexo en el cuadro 1, y de la recomendación que figura en el párrafo 161 de dicho informe. Las conclusiones del presente informe actualizan y sustituyen las conclusiones de las partes mencionadas del informe anterior.
4. En el período que abarca el informe, el Grupo viajó a Egipto, Alemania, el Iraq, la Arabia Saudita y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, así como a Adén y a varios lugares en la costa occidental del Yemen<sup>2</sup>. El Grupo realizó inspecciones de las armas incautadas y de los restos de misiles, aeronaves no tripuladas y artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes en los países de la región.
5. La pandemia de enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19) siguió afectando a la capacidad del Grupo para viajar e investigar casos. El Grupo observa que algunas personas y entidades solo comparten información sensible en persona. Las restricciones relacionadas con la pandemia han obligado al Grupo a redactar a distancia, lo que ha tenido un efecto negativo en el proceso. El experto regional del Grupo dimitió el 31 de julio de 2021; en el momento de redactarse este informe, este puesto no se había cubierto.
6. El Grupo se reunió con altos miembros del Gobierno del Yemen, entre ellos el Vicepresidente y el Primer Ministro, así como con dirigentes del Consejo de Transición del Sur, incluido su Presidente. La visita a la costa occidental le brindó al Grupo la oportunidad de reunirse con autoridades locales, altos representantes de las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional, las Brigadas de Amaliqah y los dirigentes de Tihama. El Grupo también se reunió con altos funcionarios de la Arabia Saudita y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos.
7. El Grupo envió 147 cartas oficiales, 94 de las cuales estaban dirigidas a 21 Estados Miembros y 53 a 36 organizaciones, entidades y empresas. Al 17 de diciembre de 2021, todavía había 68 respuestas pendientes (véase el anexo 3).

<sup>1</sup> En el anexo 1 se presenta información adicional sobre la metodología del Grupo y la posibilidad de responder.

<sup>2</sup> Los principales topónimos del Yemen se reproducen en consonancia con los utilizados en el mapa del Sistema de Información Geográfica de las Naciones Unidas que figura en el anexo 2.

## II. Acontecimientos que afectan a la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad

8. El conflicto en el Yemen no puede entenderse sin un análisis del papel que desempeña dentro de la región, tanto en lo que respecta a las amenazas que suponen las acciones militares de las fuerzas huzíes para la seguridad de la Arabia Saudita y de la región en general, y los acontecimientos políticos regionales que afectan a la búsqueda de una solución pacífica.

9. Con una frontera larga y difícil de controlar, fuertes lazos sociales y económicos, y la importancia estratégica del Al-Bab-al-Mandab, para la Arabia Saudita, el conflicto en el Yemen tiene tanto que ver con la contención de una amenaza externa, como con el restablecimiento de la autoridad del Gobierno legítimo en interés de las relaciones bilaterales. El Gobierno de Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi requiere el continuo respaldo militar, financiero y político de Riad. Sin embargo, la Arabia Saudita busca cada vez más una salida de la guerra, entre otras cosas, porque la guerra es cara y no goza de popularidad entre el público nacional.

10. El papel que desempeñan los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en el Yemen, a diferencia de la Arabia Saudita, es más difícil de entender. Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos no comparten fronteras con el Yemen y existen menos lazos económicos y sociales entre los dos países. Después de haber dirigido las operaciones militares contra los huzíes en la costa occidental hasta la firma del Acuerdo de Estocolmo en 2018, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos retiraron oficialmente la mayor parte de sus fuerzas militares en 2019, aunque siguieron formando parte de la Coalición y también realizando operaciones de lucha contra el terrorismo. No obstante, siguen desempeñando un papel político destacado en el Yemen, sobre todo mediante el apoyo político, financiero y militar que prestan a las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental, así como mediante su apoyo político al Consejo de Transición del Sur.

11. La situación es menos clara en lo que respecta al apoyo externo a los huzíes. La República Islámica del Irán es un aliado político del movimiento por lo menos desde 2015 y mantiene un “embajador” en Saná. Es uno de los pocos Estados Miembros de las Naciones Unidas que reconoce a los huzíes como el Gobierno legítimo del Yemen.

12. El otro país de la región que mantiene canales de comunicación oficiales con los huzíes es Omán, que comparte frontera con el Yemen. Existen fuertes vínculos sociales y económicos entre ambas poblaciones. El Sultanato mantiene una posición neutral ante el conflicto y acoge a negociadores huzíes de alto nivel. El tráfico comercial terrestre sigue siendo animado. Aunque los pasos fronterizos están bajo el control del Gobierno del Yemen, existen pruebas de que personas y entidades basadas en Omán siguen suministrando por tierra a las fuerzas huzíes componentes para sus sistemas de armas (véanse los párrs. 69 y 70), así como otros equipos militares (véase el párr. 67).

13. En el Yemen, la situación política, de seguridad, militar, económica y humanitaria ha empeorado aún más durante el período que abarca el informe. El Gobierno de unidad, que incluye a representantes del Consejo de Transición del Sur y del Gobierno de Hadi, prestó juramento el 26 de diciembre de 2020. Este Gobierno, formado tras meses de negociaciones, fue el logro más importante del Acuerdo de Riad. Sin embargo, el Gobierno de unidad no ha podido cumplir todos sus objetivos, a saber, la retirada de Adén de las fuerzas militares afiliadas al Consejo de Transición del Sur, el enfrentamiento conjunto contra los huzíes, la estabilización de la moneda y el aumento de los ingresos del Gobierno<sup>3</sup>. Por ejemplo, el Gobierno del Yemen y el Consejo de Transición del Sur no están de acuerdo en que el Consejo haya retirado

<sup>3</sup> Véase [www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east](http://www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east).

todas las unidades militares de Adén (véase el anexo 6); los huzíes consiguieron importantes ventajas territoriales; y el tipo de cambio o del rial yemení frente al dólar de los Estados Unidos, que era de 720 en la fecha del anuncio, ha empeorado constantemente, superando los 1.700 a principios de diciembre de 2021.

14. Durante el período que se examina, ambos signatarios adoptaron medidas que socavaron el Acuerdo de Riad (véanse los párrs. 15 y 34)<sup>4</sup>. El Primer Ministro y algunos altos funcionarios del Gobierno se vieron obligados a abandonar Adén, apenas tres meses después de la formación del Gobierno de unidad, después de que manifestantes asaltaran el Palacio Masheeq, donde residía el Primer Ministro<sup>5</sup>. Tras ese incidente, a mediados de 2021, se formaron equipos de negociación del Gobierno del Yemen y del Consejo de Transición del Sur para intentar reactivar el Acuerdo de Riad y para que el Primer Ministro y su Gabinete pudieran regresar a Adén. En ausencia del Primer Ministro y tras el regreso a Adén del presidente del Consejo de Transición del Sur, Aidarous Zubaidi, en mayo de 2021<sup>6</sup>, el Consejo tomó medidas adicionales para establecer su control sobre diversas instituciones. En junio de 2021, el Consejo informó al Grupo de que había tomado el control de la isla de Mayyun/Perim con la ayuda de la Coalición<sup>7</sup>. Tras prolongadas negociaciones de la Arabia Saudita, el Primer Ministro regresó a Adén el 28 de septiembre de 2021.

15. La relación política entre el Consejo de Transición del Sur y el Gobierno sigue siendo tensa, y el Gobierno acusa al Consejo de aumentar las tensiones ya palpables con su retórica beligerante. El Consejo acusa al Gobierno de llevar a cabo una “guerra de servicios” al negar a la población bajo el control del Consejo el acceso a los servicios públicos<sup>8</sup>. En junio de 2021, la Arabia Saudita declaró que “la escalada política y mediática y las posteriores decisiones relativas a nombramientos políticos y militares del Consejo eran incompatibles con lo que se había acordado entre las dos partes”<sup>9</sup>. No es habitual que la Arabia Saudita señale públicamente a un partido específico para criticarlo.

16. El Grupo observa que tanto el Acuerdo de Estocolmo como el de Riad se negociaron con limitaciones de tiempo y durante situaciones de crisis, a saber, los avances de las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la ciudad de Al-Hudayda en 2018, y los enfrentamientos abiertos entre el Consejo de Transición del Sur y el Gobierno del Yemen en 2019. Ambos Acuerdos tienen una redacción amplia que deja lugar a importantes diferencias de interpretación por las partes en conflicto. Por ello, los Acuerdos en sí mismos no son más que puntos de partida para las negociaciones posteriores sobre su aplicación, que se ha estancado. Las retiradas de las Fuerzas Conjuntas en Al-Hudayda en noviembre de 2021 socavó el ya debilitado Acuerdo de Al-Hudayda. Aunque el Acuerdo de Riad tuvo un éxito parcial en el logro del alto el fuego a nivel local en Abyan en 2021, otros objetivos siguen sin alcanzarse en lo que respecta a su aplicación.

<sup>4</sup> Mesas redondas con los equipos de negociación del Consejo de Transición del Sur y del Gobierno del Yemen en Riad, junio y octubre de 2021.

<sup>5</sup> Aunque el Gobierno del Yemen acusó al Consejo de Transición del Sur de orquestar esas protestas, la implicación del Consejo de Transición del Sur fue menos visible que en agosto de 2019, cuando el vicepresidente del Consejo, Hani Ali Salem Binbrek, llamó públicamente a asaltar el palacio presidencial (véase S/2020/326, párr. 29).

<sup>6</sup> Véase <https://en.smanews.org/south-arabia/president-al-zubaidi-returns-to-aden-the-capital/>.

<sup>7</sup> Reunión con el equipo de negociación del Consejo en junio de 2021, en Riad. Mayyun, también conocida como Perim, es una isla muy pequeña en el estrecho de Bab-al-Mandab.

<sup>8</sup> Conversaciones con la delegación del Consejo en Riad, 2021.

<sup>9</sup> Véase <https://twitter.com/SPAreions/status/1410734209367363592?s=19>.




### III. Actividades de los grupos armados que amenazan la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad del Yemen

17. Durante todo el período que se examina, las fuerzas huzíes y del Gobierno del Yemen, respaldadas por la Coalición, siguieron luchando por tomar el control de la ciudad de Marib. En septiembre y octubre de 2021, en una rápida secuencia de acciones, los huzíes tomaron varios distritos en las provincias de Al-Bayda, Shabwa y Marib con el objetivo de rodear la ciudad (véase el mapa 1 y el anexo 4). A medida que la toma de la ciudad se convertía en una posibilidad real, las fuerzas contrarias a los huzíes comenzaron a reubicarse y a formar nuevas alianzas estratégicas (véase el párr. 31 y los anexos 4 y 5). En octubre y noviembre, se produjeron redistribuciones y retiradas sin precedentes tanto de la Coalición como de las Fuerzas Conjuntas (véanse los párrs. 18 a 20).

Mapa 1

#### Avances militares huzíes, septiembre y octubre de 2021



#### A. Retiradas de las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental de Al-Hudayda, noviembre de 2021

18. Alrededor del 10 y el 11 de noviembre de 2021, las brigadas de las Fuerzas Conjuntas comenzaron a retirarse de sus posiciones en la franja noroeste de la costa de Al-Hudayda. Según la Coalición y las Fuerzas Conjuntas, se trataba de una estrategia militar nacional planeada de antemano<sup>10</sup>, y destinada a reforzar los frentes de Shabwa y Marib<sup>11</sup>. Los días 12 y 13 de noviembre, las fuerzas huzíes tomaron el

<sup>10</sup> Para consultar las declaraciones, véase el anexo 5.

<sup>11</sup> Fuentes confidenciales.

control de las zonas desocupadas (véase el mapa 2)<sup>12</sup>. Alrededor del 14 de noviembre, la Coalición lanzó ataques aéreos para impedir nuevos avances de los huzíes, lo que, según se informa, fue su primera intervención en la zona desde la firma del Acuerdo de Estocolmo<sup>13</sup>.

19. Las retiradas tuvieron consecuencias adversas en la situación humanitaria de los civiles. Se informó a las autoridades civiles y militares de las retiradas 24 horas antes de que ocurrieran, lo que no les dio tiempo suficiente para evacuar a las personas vulnerables de las zonas<sup>14</sup>. El Gobierno del Yemen informó al Grupo de 54 presuntas violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario cometidas por las fuerzas huzíes, después de que éstas tomaran el control de las zonas desalojadas; la mayoría de las violaciones se produjeron el 12 de noviembre de 2021<sup>15</sup>. El 14 de noviembre, las Naciones Unidas informaron del desplazamiento de más de 800 familias debido a las retiradas<sup>16</sup>. El Movimiento Pacífico Tihama y la Resistencia Tihama condenaron las retiradas (véase el anexo 5). Por lo menos una brigada se negó a retirarse de su emplazamiento, hasta que las familias de sus miembros fueran evacuadas de forma segura. El Grupo considera que las Fuerzas Conjuntas y la Coalición deberían haber tomado medidas adecuadas para garantizar la seguridad de los civiles y de los combatientes heridos, especialmente velando por que los civiles en riesgo de sufrir represalias por parte de los huzíes fueran evacuados de manera oportuna.

20. Las Fuerzas Conjuntas indicaron que estas retiradas se habían efectuado de conformidad con el plan de redistribución del Acuerdo de Estocolmo (véase el anexo 5)<sup>17</sup>. Sin embargo, las retiradas no se coordinaron con el Gobierno del Yemen<sup>18</sup> ni con el Comité de Coordinación del Redespliegue que, según el Acuerdo, debe supervisar los redespliegues<sup>19</sup>. Tampoco se informó a la UNMHA, responsable de facilitar la aplicación del Acuerdo<sup>20</sup>, ni al Enviado Especial del Secretario General para el Yemen, que visitó Moca el 10 de noviembre.

21. El Acuerdo de Estocolmo, con la mediación del anterior Enviado Especial, goza de poca popularidad entre las Fuerzas Conjuntas: las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional, por ejemplo, consideran que el Acuerdo impidió su victoria en Al-Hudayda. Tanto ellos como la Resistencia de Tihama lamentan la firma del Acuerdo sin su

<sup>12</sup> Según se informa, los huzíes, al ser tomados por sorpresa, no tenían inicialmente suficientes contingentes para ocupar esas zonas.

<sup>13</sup> Véase [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift).

<sup>14</sup> Según se informa, fue difícil reagrupar las unidades afectadas. Algunos combatientes de las Fuerzas Conjuntas resultaron muertos.

<sup>15</sup> El Grupo también recibió información de múltiples fuentes, pero aún no ha podido investigar.

<sup>16</sup> Véase [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update\\_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast\\_20211114-final.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen%20Situation%20Update_Humanitarian%20Impact%20in%20Al%20Hodeidah%20and%20Red%20Sea%20Coast_20211114-final.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Un representante de las Fuerzas Conjuntas informó al Grupo de que los huzíes estaban planeando realizar operaciones militares contra Al-Faza en Al-Hudayda después de tomar la ciudad de Marib. La toma de esta estrecha franja de territorio controlada por las Fuerzas Conjuntas permitiría a los huzíes interrumpir efectivamente los suministros a 13 brigadas estacionadas al norte de Al-Faza.

<sup>18</sup> Un representante de las Fuerzas Conjuntas declaró que no se había informado a la UNMHA ni al Gobierno del Yemen por temor de que ambas entidades se vieran comprometidas, en otras palabras, no querían que los huzíes se enteraran de la retirada.

<sup>19</sup> Véase [www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837](http://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/yemeni-gov-t-denies-role-in-withdrawal-of-allied-forces-from-hudaydah/2419837). El Gobierno del Yemen confirmó la información. Los dirigentes de las Fuerzas Conjuntas son miembros de la delegación del Gobierno del Yemen ante el Comité de Coordinación del Redespliegue.

<sup>20</sup> Véase [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860](https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860).

participación<sup>21</sup>. Esta frustración se ha visto exacerbada por la incapacidad de las Naciones Unidas para alcanzar un acuerdo en Marib, que podría servir para detener los avances de los huzíes, de modo similar a como el Acuerdo de Estocolmo detuvo los nuevos avances de las Fuerzas Conjuntas en Al-Hudayda en 2018-2019<sup>22</sup>.

22. El Acuerdo de Al-Hudayda no ha logrado algunos objetivos importantes: se han producido múltiples violaciones del alto el fuego; se han impugnado las redistribuciones desde los puertos; y los huzíes han utilizado unilateralmente los ingresos del Banco Central del Yemen en Al-Hudayda, a pesar de los compromisos adquiridos<sup>23</sup>. Los huzíes también impidieron que la UNMHA cumpliera plenamente su mandato, incluida la supervisión de los desplazamientos de sus observadores. Además, los huzíes se valieron del Acuerdo para proteger objetivos militares de alto valor (véanse el párr. 49 y el anexo 36). La delegación del Gobierno del Yemen ante el Comité de Coordinación del Redespliegue interrumpió su participación en el mecanismo conjunto del Comité en marzo de 2020, después de que los huzíes presuntamente mataran a un oficial de enlace del Comité de Coordinación del Redespliegue afiliado al Gobierno del Yemen<sup>24</sup>.

23. Desde las retiradas en la costa occidental, las Fuerzas Conjuntas volvieron a tomar algunas zonas en las provincias de Al-Hudayda y Taiz Occidental que estaban bajo el control de los huzíes (véase el anexo 4). La Coalición también apoyó algunas de estas operaciones con ataques aéreos<sup>25</sup>.

24. También se produjeron desplazamientos de algunas Brigadas de Amaliqah hacia Adén y Abyan, al parecer con la intención de reforzar Shabwa (véanse los anexos 4 y 5). Las Fuerzas Conjuntas no se han desplegado en Marib<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Véase <https://2dec.net/news47583.html>, <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/-بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>.

<sup>22</sup> Mesas redondas con las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental, el Gobierno del Yemen y personas de Marib. Véase <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/-بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>.

<sup>23</sup> Conversaciones con el Gobierno del Yemen, las Fuerzas Conjuntas y los líderes de Tihama. Véase <https://republicanyemen.net/archives/27167>, <https://almahriah.net/video/6536>.

<sup>24</sup> El equipo del Comité de Coordinación del Redespliegue afiliado al Gobierno del Yemen solicitó a la UNMHA que se investigara el asesinato y le pidió que trasladara sus oficinas a una zona neutral porque se encontraban en una zona controlada por los huzíes. El Gobierno del Yemen informó al Grupo de que seguía reuniéndose con la UNMHA de forma unilateral; la reunión más reciente tuvo lugar el 7 de junio de 2021 (véase S/2021/79, párr. 12).

<sup>25</sup> Véase <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3305871/arab-coalition-says-supporting-yemeni-forces-west-coast-outside-areas-stockholm>.

<sup>26</sup> Representantes de las Fuerzas Conjuntas. Algunos miembros de la tercera Brigada de Amaliqah están combatiendo en Marib, pero lo están haciendo a título personal, según el Gobierno del Yemen (véase el párr. 38).

Mapa 2  
Cambios en las zonas de control al 1 de diciembre de 2021



*Fuente:* Gobierno del Yemen.

*Nota:* Las zonas en rojo intenso son las zonas que los huzíes habrían tomado tras los sucesos de noviembre de 2021.

25. El Gobierno del Yemen no parece tener una estrategia militar a nivel nacional para luchar contra los huzíes. La defensa de las líneas del frente en la costa occidental y el sur del Yemen contra los huzíes ha quedado en gran medida en manos de las Fuerzas Conjuntas y del Consejo de Transición del Sur. La Coalición, y no el Gobierno del Yemen, coordina las operaciones militares entre las diferentes facciones que luchan contra los huzíes. Por ejemplo, en 2021, tanto el Consejo como las Fuerzas Conjuntas informaron al Grupo de que eran los Emiratos Árabes Unidos o la Coalición que coordinaban las operaciones militares conjuntas con el Gobierno del Yemen (véase el anexo 5)<sup>27</sup> y de que no recibían instrucciones del Gobierno del Yemen ni del Ministerio de Defensa<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos declararon en octubre de 2021 que no tenían control operacional sobre los dirigentes del Consejo de Transición del Sur o de las Fuerzas Conjuntas y que las actividades de esas fuerzas estaban directamente vinculadas a sus dirigentes.

<sup>28</sup> Mesas redondas celebradas en Adén y sobre la costa occidental, en agosto de 2021, con jefes militares. Véase también una entrevista con el Director de la Oficina de la Presidencia en <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>.

26. No está claro hasta qué punto el Gobierno tiene autonomía respecto a la Coalición en la toma de decisiones militares. Entre los miembros de la Coalición también hay prioridades contrapuestas, lo que afecta claramente al panorama militar y político en el Yemen (véase S/2021/79, párr. 28). La Coalición, algunos funcionarios del Gobierno del Yemen y algunos jeques han expresado su preocupación por el hecho de que la corrupción en el Ministerio de Defensa, o la influencia del Partido Al-Islah sobre los militares y altos funcionarios, tenga repercusiones en el apoyo al Ejército Nacional y a las fuerzas tribales afiliadas, así como en su desempeño<sup>29</sup>.

## B. Grupos armados en la costa occidental

27. Desde 2019, las Fuerzas Conjuntas han mantenido en gran medida posiciones defensivas contra los huzíes. Durante el período que abarca el informe, se posicionaron como un agente importante más allá de la costa occidental, ofreciéndose para luchar en Marib y para enviar brigadas a Shabwa (véase el anexo 5). En noviembre de 2021, llevaron a cabo operaciones ofensivas en Al-Hudayda y Taiz Occidental<sup>30</sup>. Mientras que las fuerzas afiliadas al Consejo de Transición del Sur experimentaron cierto nivel de desintegración en el período que se examina (véase el párr. 35), los enfrentamientos en el seno de las Fuerzas Conjuntas fueron escasos y de menor duración, y tuvieron un impacto limitado en la población civil<sup>31</sup>. A medida que la frustración de la Coalición con el Gobierno del Yemen y el Consejo se hizo más evidente durante el período que abarca el informe, en particular debido a su incapacidad para aplicar el Acuerdo de Riad, las Fuerzas Conjuntas se perfilaron como un asociado más fiable de la Coalición, como demostró la retirada de las Fuerzas Conjuntas coordinada por la Coalición en noviembre de 2021<sup>32</sup>. El Gobierno del Yemen y las Fuerzas Conjuntas también mantienen una relación mutuamente beneficiosa, en la que las Fuerzas Conjuntas defienden la costa occidental contra los huzíes, y estas obtienen cierta legitimidad al estar alineadas con el Gobierno del Yemen.

28. A finales de 2020, todos los grupos armados de la costa occidental se reorganizaron bajo el doble liderazgo de Tareq Saleh, de las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional, y Abu Zara Al Mahrami, de las Brigadas de Amaliqah<sup>33</sup>. En marzo de 2021, Saleh creó el buró político de las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional (véase el anexo 5). La influencia de Saleh sobre las autoridades locales se hizo visible durante la visita del Grupo a Al-Jawja y Moca en agosto de 2021<sup>34</sup>. Saleh ofrece a las autoridades locales incentivos financieros, ayuda humanitaria y para el desarrollo, y garantías de su seguridad<sup>35</sup>. Esto es posible gracias al apoyo de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos a

<sup>29</sup> El Partido Al-Islah negó haber ejercido el control sobre el Gobierno y el ejército. Reuniones en Riad, octubre de 2021.

<sup>30</sup> Oficiales militares de Taiz y las Fuerzas Conjuntas. Véase <https://2dec.net/news47596.html> y <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>.

<sup>31</sup> Los enfrentamientos más notables fueron los que se produjeron entre la tercera Brigada de Amaliqah y Abu Zara Al-Mahrami por la decisión de este último de cambiar al jefe de la Brigada (véase el párr. 38).

<sup>32</sup> Las retiradas de noviembre de 2021 fueron los movimientos militares más importantes de los que la Coalición se responsabilizó, sin que se informara al Gobierno del Yemen. En lo que respecta al Consejo de Transición del Sur, véase el párr. 15.

<sup>33</sup> A diferencia de 2019, cuando los distintos mandos de las fuerzas estaban en igualdad de condiciones. Véase [www.aremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139](http://www.aremnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139) y el anexo 5, apéndice 4.

<sup>34</sup> La influencia no siempre se describía de forma favorable, por ejemplo, por quienes temían represalias si llevaban a cabo actividades que no eran aprobadas por Saleh.

<sup>35</sup> Reunión con las autoridades de Moca en la costa occidental. Véase también <https://2dec.net/news47897.html>.

Saleh<sup>36</sup>, que le permitió ocupar el lugar del Gobierno central ausente. Las actividades de Saleh en este sentido han erosionado aún más la autoridad del Gobierno del Yemen en la costa occidental.

29. Algunos líderes de Tihama consideran que las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional y las Brigadas de Amaliqah son extraños a su región<sup>37</sup>. Rechazan la incorporación de fuerzas armadas de Tihama en esas dos entidades, la que, según ellos, fue efectuada por Saleh y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos para debilitar el liderazgo militar de Tihama<sup>38</sup>. La retirada en noviembre de 2021 agravó aún más las tensiones ya que los huzíes se han hecho con el control de más territorio de Tihama y en el proceso han cometido atrocidades contra la población de Tihama (véase el anexo 5). Algunos dirigentes militares y políticos de Tihama, en reuniones con el Grupo celebradas a lo largo del período que se examina, declararon que no excluían el uso de la fuerza como opción si seguían siendo marginados de la adopción de decisiones políticas y militares a nivel local, y citaron el ejemplo del uso de la fuerza por el Consejo de Transición del Sur en Adén<sup>39</sup>.

30. Durante la visita del Grupo a la costa occidental en agosto de 2021, las autoridades locales declararon que los principales factores que socavaban su autoridad y les impedían emprender actividades de desarrollo eran la recaudación ilegal de ingresos por parte de las Fuerzas Conjuntas (véase la figura I) y la continua ocupación de edificios públicos por parte de las Brigadas de Amaliqah. En Moca, los ingresos recaudados por las Fuerzas Conjuntas no se depositaron en el Banco Central del Yemen<sup>40</sup>. Al-Mahrami, de las Brigadas de Amaliqah, y Ahmed Al-Kawkabani, antiguo Comandante de la primera Brigada de Tihama, informaron al Grupo de que estaban ocupando algunos edificios públicos para asegurarlos o para brindar bases provisionales a sus contingentes hasta que la Coalición les proporcionara lugares alternativos. Particulares de la costa occidental alegaron además que la incapacidad de las Fuerzas Conjuntas para frenar el contrabando de armas pequeñas, fertilizantes y combustible hacia las zonas controladas por los huzíes a través de la costa occidental había socavado aún más la autoridad de las instituciones locales, para frustración de la población local y de los combatientes.

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<sup>36</sup> Conversaciones confidenciales con las autoridades locales. Véase también <https://2dec.net/last47928.html>, y <https://2dec.net/last47939.html>, relativa a la entrega por los Emiratos Árabes Unidos de 80.000 dosis de vacunas contra la COVID-19 por intermedio de las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional. Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos informaron al Grupo de que prestaban ayuda humanitaria y para el desarrollo en la costa occidental.

<sup>37</sup> Reuniones con dirigentes militares y políticos de Egipto, la Arabia Saudita y el Yemen en 2021. Véase también [www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region](http://www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, véase también <https://almahriah.net/local/5952>.

<sup>39</sup> Reuniones celebradas antes de noviembre 2021.

<sup>40</sup> Fuentes confidenciales. Las Brigadas de Amaliqah informaron al Grupo de que la recaudación de ingresos se basaba en un acuerdo con las autoridades y que se utilizaba para fines de desarrollo.

Figura I  
**Recibos de “derechos de entrada” de combustible emitidos por las Fuerzas  
 Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental en el puesto de control de Al-Dubab**



Fuentes: Confidencial (redacciones del panel).

### C. Relación entre las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental y el Consejo de Transición del Sur

31. El Consejo de Transición del Sur y las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional informaron al Grupo en agosto de 2021 de que no mantenían una cooperación militar significativa<sup>41</sup>. Sin embargo, ante la posibilidad de que Marib cayera en manos de los huzíes, en octubre de 2021, las dos partes aludieron a su disposición a formar un frente unido contra los huzíes (véanse los anexos 1 y 5)<sup>42</sup>.

32. En cambio, algunas unidades de las Brigadas de Amaliqah lucharon junto al Consejo de Transición del Sur contra el Gobierno del Yemen en 2019<sup>43</sup>. En 2021, las Brigadas de Amaliqah utilizaron instalaciones controladas por el Consejo y mantuvieron un campamento militar en Adén (véase el párr. 38). Dentro de la Coalición, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos siguen manteniendo una influencia significativa sobre Saleh, Al-Mahrami y Zubaidi. Esta influencia ha evitado, hasta ahora, graves enfrentamientos entre las distintas fuerzas<sup>44</sup>.

### D. Grupos armados afiliados al Consejo de Transición del Sur

33. Durante la visita del Grupo en agosto de 2021, se hizo evidente que el Gobierno del Yemen no tenía una presencia militar o de seguridad efectiva en Adén. El Consejo de Transición del Sur y sus fuerzas afiliadas controlaban la provincia. En particular,

<sup>41</sup> Por ejemplo, en septiembre de 2021, el Grupo visitó un campamento para combatientes heridos de las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional en Adén, que dijeron sentirse inseguros entre miembros del Consejo, ya que la mayoría de los heridos eran del norte.

<sup>42</sup> Véase <https://2dec.net/news46965.html> y <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter>.

<sup>43</sup> En las conversaciones con el Grupo, Al-Mahrami afirmó que sus fuerzas tenían la intención de mantenerse neutrales y que no deseaban implicarse en los enfrentamientos entre el Gobierno del Yemen y el Consejo.

<sup>44</sup> Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos informaron al Grupo de Expertos de que “mantienen buenas relaciones con las partes mencionadas, pero que su influencia sobre ellas es limitada y se centra en el avance del proceso de paz” ... y de que “están trabajando para evitar que se produzca cualquier escalada armada como consecuencia de opiniones contrapuestas”.

las reuniones del Grupo con las autoridades locales se celebraron en presencia de oficiales del Consejo. El Consejo declaró que mantenía una provincia funcional, a pesar de la ausencia de altos funcionarios del Gobierno y del limitado apoyo financiero.

34. El Consejo afirmó que, en 2021, todas sus fuerzas militares y de seguridad se habían integrado en las fuerzas del Gobierno<sup>45</sup>; pero el Gobierno del Yemen lo niega<sup>46</sup>. Zubaidi confía en la continuidad de las fuerzas armadas del Consejo para hacer realidad su ambición política de crear un sur independiente<sup>47</sup>. Es probable que esto impida la integración completa de esas fuerzas, tal como se prevé en el Acuerdo de Riad. El Consejo declaró que el Gobierno del Yemen había violado el Acuerdo en 2021 mediante nombramientos unilaterales de funcionarios públicos<sup>48</sup>. El Gobierno del Yemen respondió que, de conformidad con el Acuerdo, el requisito de celebrar consultas con el Consejo se limitaba a los nombramientos de gobernadores y directores de seguridad de provincias específicas. Por ello, aunque el Acuerdo puede haber evitado escaladas militares entre el Gobierno del Yemen y el Consejo, no es una solución sostenible para la crisis política del sur<sup>49</sup>.

35. La autoridad del Consejo se ha deteriorado considerablemente desde que tomó el control de Adén en 2019. Las luchas internas entre militares y los graves incidentes de seguridad ocurridos en el período sobre el que se informa han puesto en duda la capacidad del Consejo para garantizar la seguridad en las zonas bajo su control. Por ejemplo, desde junio de 2021 se han producido tres explosiones importantes de artefactos explosivos improvisados, así como enfrentamientos entre combatientes del Consejo que causaron bajas civiles<sup>50</sup>. El Consejo siguió luchando por conseguir los recursos necesarios para garantizar la prestación de servicios básicos, paliar la crisis económica y asegurar el pago de sueldos ordinarios a sus combatientes. El apoyo de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos a las zonas controladas por el Consejo parece haber disminuido apreciablemente desde 2019, mientras que la Arabia Saudita sigue canalizando en gran medida su apoyo financiero a través del Gobierno del Yemen.

<sup>45</sup> Véase el anexo 6.

<sup>46</sup> Sin embargo, ambos reclaman el control sobre las Fuerzas de Élite Shabwaníes y Hadramíes. Conversaciones con el Gobierno del Yemen y el Consejo, celebradas en agosto y noviembre de 2021.

<sup>47</sup> Por ejemplo, en marzo de 2021 Zubaidi declaró que “la caída de Marib ... podría acelerar el proceso hacia unas conversaciones convocadas internacionalmente entre el Norte y el Sur. Podría llevar a una situación en la que el Consejo de Transición del Sur controlara en gran medida el sur y los huzíes controlasen la mayor parte del norte. En ese caso, tendría sentido que se celebraran conversaciones directas entre las partes que tienen el control”. Véase [www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists). También sigue abogando por un sur separado (véase <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58>).

<sup>48</sup> Véase <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2746991/yemen's-hadi-appoints-new-head-shura-council-attorney-general-cabinet-secretary>.

<sup>49</sup> Hasta ahora ha evitado grandes enfrentamientos en Abyan, Adén y Shabwa. Por ejemplo, se produjeron enfrentamientos localizados en Shabwa entre las Fuerzas de Élite Shabwaníes, afiliadas al Consejo de Transición del Sur, y el Gobierno del Yemen, después de que los Emiratos Árabes Unidos abandonaran el campamento de Alam en octubre de 2021.

<sup>50</sup> Los ataques con artefactos explosivos improvisados estuvieron dirigidos contra el Gobernador y dos periodistas, y un artefacto explosivo improvisado se colocó en el exterior del Aeropuerto Internacional de Adén. Algunos atribuyen estos incidentes a los huzíes. Véanse [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/10/yemen-aden-car-bomb-several-killed), [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car-bombing-in-aden](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/11/yemeni-journalist-and-child-killed-in-car-bombing-in-aden) y [www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport](http://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211030-at-least-12-killed-in-blast-near-yemen-s-aden-airport).



## E. Evolución de la situación en las zonas controladas por los huzíes

### 1. Acontecimientos militares


36. Durante el período que abarca el informe, los huzíes continuaron gobernando en sus territorios sin ninguna oposición política o militar significativa, al tiempo que conseguían importantes avances militares. Los huzíes tomaron el control total de Bayda y avanzaron hacia zonas de Al-Hudayda, Marib y Shabwa (véase el anexo 4). La situación de la seguridad en las zonas controladas por los huzíes se mantuvo estable en comparación con otras zonas del Yemen (véase el párr. 35). Los huzíes se beneficiaron de la inestabilidad en las zonas que no estaban bajo su control, y en ocasiones contribuyeron a ella (véanse los párrs. 37 a 40)<sup>51</sup>. Los huzíes continuaron socavando estratégicamente a sus oponentes.

37. Durante el período que se examina, el Grupo documentó cuatro incidentes de ataques con misiles y aeronaves no tripuladas en la costa occidental y en el sur, que estaban dirigidos contra importantes iniciativas políticas o que contribuían a sembrar el caos entre las fuerzas contrarias a los huzíes<sup>52</sup>. El 30 de diciembre de 2020, el aeropuerto internacional de Adén fue objeto de un ataque con misiles, justo en el momento en que aterrizaba el recién formado Gobierno de unidad (véase el anexo 7). La formación de este Gobierno era el logro más importante del Acuerdo de Riad y, si el avión no se hubiera retrasado, es probable que hubiera habido más bajas entre los representantes del Gobierno, lo que habría socavado meses de negociaciones. El momento del ataque también fue simbólico, ya que el regreso del Gobierno brindaba esperanzas al pueblo, después de dos años de enfrentamientos entre el Consejo de Transición del Sur y el Gobierno del Yemen. El 11 de septiembre de 2021, el puerto de Moca fue atacado con cinco aeronaves no tripuladas y dos misiles. En ese momento, un comité gubernamental estaba realizando una visita para supervisar la conversión del puerto para uso civil tras años de ocupación militar exclusiva. Esa conversión sería un hito importante en la normalización de las relaciones entre las Fuerzas Conjuntas y el Gobierno, al tiempo que se abría un nuevo puerto para importaciones civiles en la costa occidental (véase el anexo 8). El 10 de noviembre, unos misiles alcanzaron algunas bases militares en Moca, el día en que el Enviado Especial para el Yemen debía realizar su primera misión en la costa occidental (véanse el mapa 3 y el anexo 8).

<sup>51</sup> El Consejo de Transición del Sur declaró que cuando los huzíes llevaban a cabo ataques en “forma anónima”, ello permitía especular sobre quién podía ser el responsable y creaba más desconfianza entre las fuerzas contrarias a los huzíes.

<sup>52</sup> En los párrs. 114 a 117 y en el anexo 35, se documentan otros ataques de los huzíes que causaron bajas civiles en Taiz y Marib.

### Mapa 3 Ataque contra el puerto de Mocha



38. El 29 de agosto, el campamento de Anad en Lahij sufrió un ataque con misiles y una aeronave no tripulada<sup>53</sup>. Según se informa, esto provocó alrededor de 90 bajas en la tercera Brigada de Amaliqah<sup>54</sup>. La Brigada, que habitualmente está emplazada en la costa occidental, se encontraba en Anad para realizar una sesión de adiestramiento, tras desavenencias con Abu Zara Al-Mahrami, líder de las Brigadas de Amaliqah. Este ataque, que estaba dirigido contra la tercera Brigada, creó sospechas de colusión entre Al-Mahrami y los huzíes<sup>55</sup>, lo que niega Al-Mahrami<sup>56</sup>. Tras el ataque, algunos miembros de la tercera Brigada se dispersaron ya que, según dijeron, ya no confiaban en Al-Mahrami.

39. Salvo el ataque del 10 de noviembre, los ataques documentados en los párrafos 37 y 38 no han sido reivindicados por los huzíes (véanse los anexos 7 y 8)<sup>57</sup>. Es poco probable que otros grupos armados en el Yemen tengan la capacidad o la motivación para llevar a cabo estos ataques. Es significativo que en los cuatro ataques, los misiles, al parecer, fueron lanzados desde Taiz, que está controlada por los huzíes<sup>58</sup>. En al menos dos de los ataques, se informó al Grupo de que el eje militar de Taiz afiliado al Gobierno del Yemen, había emitido alertas tempranas a la Coalición. En el ataque del 29 de agosto, se avistaron drones de vigilancia sobre la zona antes del ataque, por lo que se esperaba un ataque<sup>59</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Para consultar las fuentes, véase el anexo 5.

<sup>54</sup> Véase [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/several-killed-in-houthi-attack-on-yemens-largest-base).

<sup>55</sup> Conversaciones del Grupo con miembros de la tercera Brigada en 2021.

<sup>56</sup> Comunicación con el Grupo, diciembre de 2021.

<sup>57</sup> En lo que respecta al ataque del 10 de noviembre, los huzíes declararon que habían lanzado misiles en esa dirección (véase el anexo 8). Los huzíes reivindicaron otro ataque en la base de Anad en 2019 (véase <https://apnews.com/article/yemen-ap-top-news-houthis-international-news-jamal-khashoggi-92f491d2794440afaf53967fceb0c1b9>).

<sup>58</sup> Véanse los anexos 7 y 8. Los dirigentes militares de Taiz proporcionaron información sobre los ataques perpetrados en agosto y noviembre de 2021.

<sup>59</sup> El Grupo entrevistó a combatientes que se encontraban en el campamento en el momento del incidente y que vieron las aeronaves no tripuladas. Dijeron que, a pesar de los repetidos llamamientos a la Coalición, no se tomó ninguna medida para evacuar a las fuerzas ni para interceptar las aeronaves no tripuladas. El comandante militar del Consejo de Transición del Sur, Abu Tahir, confirmó al Grupo que también se habían enviado alertas desde su lado, pero

40. También se informó al Grupo de que en el transcurso de 2021 se habían observado drones de vigilancia sobrevolando instituciones clave, como el Aeropuerto Internacional de Adén y el puerto de Moca. Las fuerzas contrarias a los huzíes en el Yemen no tienen medios para impedir que aeronaves no tripuladas o misiles entren en su espacio aéreo. El Consejo de Transición del Sur y las Fuerzas Conjuntas, que controlan los lugares donde se produjeron los cuatro ataques mencionados, señalaron que, después de que las fuerzas de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos abandonaran sus zonas, dejaron de contar con sistemas de defensa aérea eficaces, queja que el Grupo también había escuchado en Marib en octubre de 2020. Un miembro de la Coalición informó al Grupo de que no podía enviar sus sistemas de defensa aérea al Yemen, ya que ello supondría un incumplimiento de sus acuerdos de usuario final. De haberse contado con estos sistemas, probablemente se habría producido un menor número de bajas civiles y menos daños en las infraestructuras (véanse los párrs. 114 a 117).

## 2. Acontecimientos políticos y culturales

41. Los huzíes continuaron su campaña sistemática para lograr que la población se adhiriera a su ideología y asegurar el apoyo de la población local al conflicto. Al hacerlo, se dirigían específicamente a los grupos vulnerables. Por ejemplo, el Grupo ha documentado otros nueve casos en que los huzíes detuvieron, torturaron, mutilaron, violaron sexualmente o reprimieron a mujeres política o profesionalmente activas que se oponían a las opiniones de los huzíes. En estos y otros casos, los huzíes siguieron utilizando alegaciones de “prostitución” como pretexto para: a) reducir el apoyo de la comunidad a los antiguos detenidos y su aceptación, b) impedir que siguieran participando activamente en sus comunidades y c) asegurarse de que no amenazaran al régimen huzí (véase el anexo 9). Para ello, los huzíes hacen y guardan grabaciones de vídeo sexualmente comprometedoras, que siguen utilizando para ejercer presión contra cualquier oposición de estas mujeres. Estas medidas también tienen un efecto disuasorio en otras dirigentes mujeres. El aumento de la represión contra las mujeres que expresan sus opiniones políticas afecta a su capacidad para participar en los procesos de toma de decisiones relacionados con la solución del conflicto y, por tanto, constituye una amenaza para la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad en el Yemen (véanse S/2020/326, párr. 21 y anexo 5)<sup>60</sup>. Se disponía de pocas medidas para prestar apoyo psicosocial, económico o relacionado con la protección a las antiguas detenidas entrevistadas por el Grupo, lo que ha dado lugar a que algunas regresen con sus familias en las zonas controladas por los huzíes (véase el anexo 9)<sup>61</sup>.

42. Las colonias de vacaciones y los cursos culturales dirigidos a niños y adultos forman parte de la estrategia de los huzíes para conseguir apoyo para su ideología, animar a la gente a unirse a la lucha y motivar a los contingentes (véase el anexo 10). Mientras que algunos adultos participan en estos cursos culturales porque abrazan la ideología, otros participan para no perder las prestaciones laborales o la ayuda humanitaria o por miedo a sufrir represalias por no participar. Por ejemplo, dos mujeres que se negaron a participar en esos cursos fueron detenidas y violadas (véase el anexo 10).

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que no tenían medios para repeler los ataques. Los combatientes declararon que, a pesar de estar en peligro, se les había ordenado permanecer en el campamento. Los dirigentes de la Brigada de Amaliqah negaron tener conocimiento previo de las aeronaves no tripuladas o del comunicado militar de Taiz.

<sup>60</sup> Véase también la resolución 2467 (2019) del Consejo de Seguridad.

<sup>61</sup> En lo que respecta al apoyo a las víctimas de violencia de género, véase la resolución 2467 (2019), especialmente los párrs. 14, 16 a) y 16 d).

43. El Grupo investigó algunas colonias de vacaciones en escuelas y en una mezquita, utilizadas por los huzíes para difundir su ideología entre los niños, animarlos a luchar, proporcionarles instrucción militar básica o reclutarlos para combatir. En esas colonias de vacaciones se fomenta el discurso de odio y la violencia contra grupos específicos. Se instruye a los niños para que griten el lema de los huzíes, “Muerte a América, muerte a Israel, malditos los judíos, victoria al Islam”. En una colonia, se enseñó a niños de tan solo 7 años a limpiar armas y a evadir cohetes (véanse los anexos 10 y 11). El Grupo también documentó un caso en el que se cometió violencia sexual contra un niño que recibía instrucción militar. El Grupo recibió información sobre 10 casos en los que los niños fueron llevados a luchar con el pretexto de que participarían en cursos culturales o en los que fueron llevados de esos cursos al campo de batalla. También documentó nueve casos en los que la asistencia humanitaria a las familias se proporcionó, o se denegó, únicamente sobre la base de si sus hijos participaban en los combates o a profesores sobre la base de si enseñaban el programa de estudios huzí. En el anexo 10 figura información detallada sobre estas conclusiones.

**Figura II**  
**Material de estudio utilizado en las colonias de vacaciones (izquierda) y alumnos de una colonia de vacaciones utilizando esos libros (derecha)**



Fuente: Al-Masirah (izquierda) y confidencial (derecha) (véase [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)).

**Figura III**  
**Niños e invitados en la ceremonia de graduación de una escuela de verano, agosto de 2019**



Fuente: Al-Masirah (véase [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88)).

Nota: Entre los invitados se encontraban el Primer Ministro, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor; Mohammed Ali al Houthi; y el Ministro de Salud, Taha Mutawkkel.

44. El general de división Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (véase la figura V), en su calidad de Ministro de Defensa, tiene la responsabilidad de garantizar que no se reclute a niños en el ejército huzí. Yahyah Al Houthi (véase la figura IV), como Ministro de Educación, también tiene la responsabilidad de garantizar que las escuelas y las colonias de vacaciones no se utilicen para promover la violencia, el odio y la radicalización o para reclutar niños. En los anexos 10 y 11 se ofrece más información sobre estas personas.

Figura IV

**Yahyah al Houthi visitando una colonia de vacaciones**



Fuente: [www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88).

Figura V

**General de División Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (segundo de la derecha).**




Fuente: [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence).

## IV. Protección marítima

45. Desde diciembre de 2020, el Grupo ha documentado cinco ataques a buques comerciales, así como varios acercamientos sospechosos y un avistamiento de personas armadas a bordo de pequeñas embarcaciones en las aguas circundantes del Yemen<sup>62</sup> (véase el mapa 4). En comparación con el período del informe anterior, en el que tres buques comerciales fueron atacados en el Golfo de Adén, la atención pasó nuevamente al Mar Rojo, donde se produjeron cuatro ataques.

Mapa 4

### Incidentes de protección marítima ocurridos a partir de diciembre de 2020



46. La situación en el Mar Rojo se caracterizó por un aumento del número de ataques con artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes. Los ataques con artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes que se llevaron a cabo con éxito no estuvieron dirigidos contra buques en movimiento, sino contra barcos anclados en instalaciones petroleras marítimas en la Arabia Saudita, algunas de las cuales se encontraban a más de 1.000 km del Yemen. En algunos casos, se desplegó un nuevo tipo de artefacto explosivo improvisado flotante de mayor tamaño, que cuenta con dos motores fuera de borda y, por lo tanto, su consumo de combustible es considerablemente mayor que el de la generación anterior de artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes de tipo “blowfish”, que tienen un solo motor. Habida cuenta de la distancia mencionada anteriormente, al parecer, esos artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes fueron

<sup>62</sup> Por lo menos en dos casos, los acercamientos sospechosos comunicados resultaron ser interceptaciones de reconocimiento de la Guardia Costera Yemení que no se realizaron de acuerdo con los procedimientos internacionales.

lanzados desde una “nave nodriza” que habría remolcado dichos artefactos durante la mayor parte del viaje.

47. El primer ataque se produjo el 14 de diciembre de 2020, en el que se utilizaron tres artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes para lanzar un ataque contra el puerto de Yeda. Dos de los artefactos se dirigieron contra una base naval, dañando un buque de guerra saudí, mientras que otro alcanzó al buque cisterna de bandera singapurense BW Rhine (OMI: 9341940) en la terminal marítima de Saudi Aramco (véase la figura VI). El impacto y la posterior explosión penetraron el casco en la línea de flotación. También provocaron un incendio que ardió durante aproximadamente una hora. Aunque no se registraron heridos, se produjeron importantes daños materiales y consiguientes daños económicos (véase el anexo 12).

Figura V

#### **Incendio en el buque BW Rhine**



*Fuente:* Confidencial.

48. El 27 de abril de 2021, se produjo un ataque similar con dos artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes cerca del terminal Yasref en Yanbu, donde estaba anclado el buque petrolero de bandera singapurense Torm Hermia (OMI: 9797993) (véase la figura VII). La tripulación del buque confirmó que la Marina de la Arabia Saudita había interceptado un artefacto explosivo improvisado flotante a unas 1,4 millas náuticas del buque. La Arabia Saudita confirmó el ataque. Se detectó un segundo artefacto explosivo improvisado flotante, a unas 30 millas náuticas al sur del puerto de Yanbu (véase el anexo 13). El Grupo cree que la distancia entre la costa yemení y Yanbu es demasiado grande para que un artefacto explosivo improvisado flotante pueda operar de forma autónoma, por lo que es probable que haya estado implicada una “nave nodriza”.

Figura VII  
**Artefacto explosivo improvisado flotante utilizado en el ataque del 27 de abril de 2021**



*Fuente:* Confidencial.

49. La frecuencia de los artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes lanzados directamente desde las zonas controladas por los huzíes aumentó considerablemente durante el período que abarca el informe. Múltiples fuentes informaron al Grupo de que los artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes fueron ensamblados y lanzados desde los puertos de Al-Hudayda y Salif. La Coalición suele ser capaz de interceptar esos artefactos y tiende a responder con ataques aéreos contra los lugares de ensamblaje en las zonas controladas por los huzíes, lo que llevó a la UNMHA a hacer un llamamiento a la moderación a ambas partes en julio de 2021, ya que las “[amenazas a] las operaciones en puntos vitales de entrada de la ayuda” constituyen “una violación del Acuerdo de Al-Hudayda”<sup>63</sup>. El Grupo está investigando si las zonas abarcadas en el Acuerdo se utilizan para lanzar este tipo de artefactos y ha solicitado información adicional a la Coalición y a la UNMHA. Según la Coalición, al 31 de octubre de 2021, los huzíes habían lanzado 92 artefactos de este tipo desde el comienzo del conflicto.

50. El Grupo también documentó ataques con aeronaves no tripuladas contra buques comerciales. El 30 de julio de 2021, el petrolero Alberta (OMI: 9486922), con pabellón de las Bahamas, sufrió daños en el puerto de Yazan (véase el anexo 14). La aeronave no tripulada explotó sobre la proa del buque. Los trozos de fibra de vidrio recuperados de la cubierta muestran características técnicas que concuerdan con las aeronaves no tripuladas de media distancia del tipo Qasef, utilizadas frecuentemente por los huzíes para atacar objetivos en el sur de la Arabia Saudita. No hubo heridos y los daños fueron relativamente menores. Sin embargo, este incidente demuestra que los buques anclados siguen siendo vulnerables, especialmente en los puertos cercanos al Yemen.

51. Otro ataque con aeronaves no tripuladas en el Golfo de Omán estuvo dirigido contra el petrolero Mercer Street (OMI: 9539585), con pabellón de Liberia. El buque fue atacado por primera vez en la mañana del 29 de julio de 2021, cuando el capitán informó de dos “ataques con drones” con 30 minutos de diferencia, que no alcanzaron el buque. El buque sufrió otro ataque en la tarde del mismo día, cuando una tercera

<sup>63</sup> Véase [https://twitter.com/UN\\_Hudaydah/status/1412009048862568450](https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1412009048862568450).



aeronave no tripulada impactó sobre el puente, provocando importantes daños, así como dos bajas, incluida la del capitán del buque (véase el anexo 15).

52. Los primeros informes sugieren que el ataque podría haberse originado en el Yemen<sup>64</sup>. Por ello, el Grupo examinó la información disponible al público y recibió información confidencial de varios Estados Miembros sobre este incidente. Las aeronaves no tripuladas utilizadas parecen ser versiones avanzadas de la aeronave no tripulada de ala delta documentada anteriormente por el Grupo (véase S/2020/326, párr. 57 y anexo 15). Teniendo en cuenta la distancia de más de 1.700 km entre las zonas controladas por los huzíes y el lugar del ataque, para que un ataque contra un buque que se desplaza a velocidad de crucero tenga éxito, probablemente se requiera un sistema de relevos aéreos o marítimos. Esto hace que sea muy probable que otro actor haya sido el responsable del ataque, ya que el Grupo no tiene constancia de que los huzíes tengan acceso a esos sistemas. No obstante, el ataque muestra la rapidez con la que está evolucionando la tecnología de aeronaves no tripuladas, que parece estar también a disposición de los huzíes (véase el párr. 60), lo que plantea la posibilidad de que se produzcan ataques similares en las aguas que rodean al Yemen.

53. El segundo ataque en aguas internacionales próximas al Yemen afectó al buque de carga general de pabellón iraní Saviz (OMI: 9167253), que sufrió una explosión el 6 de abril de 2021 mientras se encontraba anclado en la región meridional del Mar Rojo, a unas 115 millas náuticas al noroeste de la costa yemení. Según la agencia de noticias Tasnim, de la República Islámica del Irán, el buque fue dañado por minas lapa, que habían sido adheridas al casco por buzos<sup>65</sup>. El Saviz había mantenido la misma posición desde al menos 2017, lo que dio lugar a las alegaciones de que la función del buque era apoyar las operaciones militares en la región<sup>66</sup>. La República Islámica del Irán informó al Grupo de que el buque había estado destinado a combatir la piratería marítima y de que el ataque no estaba relacionado con el conflicto del Yemen.

54. El Grupo sigue recibiendo informes sobre minas marinas colocadas en el sur del Mar Rojo por los huzíes, cerca de diferentes islas al este de los tres puertos bajo su control, y sobre minas marinas a la deriva cerca de la frontera con la Arabia Saudita. Según la Coalición, entre el inicio del conflicto y el 31 de octubre de 2021 se detectaron y destruyeron 205 minas marinas. El Grupo está investigando las alegaciones de que las minas se almacenan en lugares específicos de Al-Hudayda, Salif y Ras Isa y se despliegan desde ellos, lo que constituiría una violación del Acuerdo de Estocolmo.

## V. Armas y aplicación del embargo de armas selectivo

55. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en los párrafos 14 a 17 de la resolución 2216 (2015), el Grupo continúa centrándose en una serie de actividades de vigilancia e investigación para determinar si se han producido violaciones del embargo de armas selectivo para impedir que, de forma directa o indirecta, se suministraran, vendieran o transfirieran armas a las personas y entidades enumeradas en la lista por el Comité y el Consejo de Seguridad, o en su beneficio. En opinión del Grupo, todas las fuerzas militares y paramilitares leales a las autoridades con sede en Saná encuadran en esta definición.

<sup>64</sup> Véase <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/08/10/Senior-Pentagon-official-says-Iran-backed-Mercer-Street-attack-came-from-Yemen>.


<sup>65</sup> Véase [www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources](http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2021/04/07/2480410/iranian-ship-attacked-in-red-sea-sources).

<sup>66</sup> Véase <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/04/07/-Mother-ship-command-center-The-Iranian-ship-Saviz-attacked-in-Red-Sea>.

56. Durante el período que abarca el informe, los huzíes continuaron sus ataques aéreos contra la Arabia Saudita (véase el mapa 5). Los objetivos cercanos a la frontera entre la Arabia Saudita y el Yemen siguen siendo los de mayor riesgo y suelen ser atacados por una combinación de aeronaves no tripuladas de mediano alcance Qasef-2K y cohetes de artillería de tipo Badr. Los huzíes también siguieron lanzando ataques en el interior de la Arabia Saudita utilizando aeronaves no tripuladas de largo alcance tipo Samad, misiles de crucero tipo Quds y misiles balísticos Zulfiqar.

Mapa 5

**Ataques con misiles y aeronaves no tripuladas realizados desde 30 de diciembre de 2020**



57. Se efectuaron ataques en las zonas fronterizas varias veces por semana. Las operaciones de mayor alcance eran menos frecuentes y a menudo se producían en oleadas, es decir, las fuerzas huzíes lanzaban varias aeronaves no tripuladas y misiles contra múltiples objetivos como parte de la misma operación. En la mayoría de los ataques se utilizan aeronaves no tripuladas de fabricación local y cohetes Badr. La frecuencia de los ataques demuestra que los huzíes pueden obtener fácilmente componentes para estas armas en el extranjero.

58. El Grupo tiene conocimiento de un único ataque con un misil de crucero y de tres ataques confirmados con misiles balísticos de mayor alcance durante el período que se examina. Estas cifras concuerdan con las de años anteriores, que muestran que los huzíes siguen teniendo dificultades para abastecerse de sistemas de misiles sofisticados en el extranjero. Según la Coalición, entre el inicio del conflicto y el 31 de octubre de 2021, se lanzó un total de 781 aeronaves no tripuladas y 409 misiles balísticos contra objetivos en la Arabia Saudita.

59. Durante el período que se examina, los objetivos de los huzíes incluyeron infraestructuras civiles, como la planta de graneles de Saudi Aramco en Yeda (véase el anexo 16) y el Aeropuerto Internacional de Abha (véase el anexo 17). La finalidad de esos ataques es principalmente política; los huzíes quieren presionar a Riad para que acepte un acuerdo político que sea beneficioso para ellos. Esto contrasta fuertemente con el uso de misiles y aeronaves no tripuladas en el propio Yemen, donde el objetivo es lograr la máxima letalidad, como lo demuestra el ataque contra el aeropuerto de Adén del 30 de diciembre de 2020 (véase el anexo 7), al que contribuye la ausencia de unas defensas aéreas eficaces del Gobierno del Yemen.

## A. Nuevos sistemas de armas huzíes

60. El 11 de marzo de 2021, los huzíes presentaron a sus nuevos sistemas de armas (véase el anexo 18)<sup>67</sup>. La exposición incluía una nueva aeronave no tripulada denominada Samad-4, que lleva dos cohetes y, según se afirma, tiene un alcance de 2.000 km, así como un hexacóptero de corto alcance llamado Rujum. Este último parece ser un sistema chino YD6-1000S convertido para lanzar seis granadas de mortero pequeñas. Además, mostraron una aeronave no tripulada de ala delta llamada WAED, que, a parecer, es una versión avanzada del modelo documentado en 2019 (véase la figura VIII)<sup>68</sup>. Parece tener una mayor envergadura y probablemente tenga un mayor alcance. Visualmente, la forma de los estabilizadores verticales es la diferencia más evidente del diseño. En septiembre de 2020, se publicaron en los medios sociales imágenes de lo que parecía ser un WAED dañado en el frente de Alam, Marib<sup>69</sup>. El WAED parece ser capaz de llevar sistemas de sensores avanzados, que pueden ser controlados a una distancia de varios centenares de kilómetros con la ayuda de un sistema de retransmisión de datos, lo que aumenta considerablemente la amenaza para los objetivos móviles (véanse el párr. 52 y el anexo 15)<sup>70</sup>.

Figura VIII

**Aeronaves no tripuladas WAED en la exposición (izquierda) y posibles restos de WAED cerca de Marib (derecha)**



Fuentes: Almasirah.net (izquierda) y <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168> (derecha).

<sup>67</sup> [www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/12/21/2468309](http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/12/21/2468309) - از دستاوردهای جدید در - یمن - رونمایی - از - دستاوردهای جدید در - حوزہ دفاعی - از - پھیپادہای جدید - تا - موشک - های - سعیر - قاصم 2 - و - قدس 2 - فیلم

<sup>68</sup> Véase S/2020/326, párr. 57 y anexo 15.

<sup>69</sup> Véase <https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168>.

<sup>70</sup> Otros sistemas de aeronaves no tripuladas huzíes de mayor alcance utilizan coordenadas de un dispositivo de geolocalización (GPS) preestablecidas para encontrar sus objetivos, ya que el control por radio está limitado por la línea de visión. Esto significa que, una vez lanzados, el curso de esas aeronaves no se puede ajustar.

61. En el frente de batalla de Marib también se informó del primer despliegue de un misil superficie-aire “358”<sup>71</sup>, que, según se informa, se utilizó en julio de 2021 para interceptar un dron de vigilancia (véase la figura IX)<sup>72</sup>. Su velocidad comparativamente baja significa que no plantea una amenaza significativa para los aviones de guerra, pero puede ser eficaz contra aeronaves más lentas.

Figura IX

**Restos de un misil superficie-aire “358”, supuestamente recuperado cerca de Marib**



Fuente: <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>.

## B. Incautaciones

62. El 10 de febrero de 2021, a las 17.01 horas, el buque estadounidense Winston Churchill observó intentos de transbordo de carga entre dos dhows a unas 70 millas náuticas al este de la costa de Somalia (véanse la figura X y el mapa 6). El primer buque, un dhow Shu’ai, fue interceptado a las 11.05 horas del 11 de febrero de 2021, pero la bodega de carga estaba vacía y el dhow fue liberado cinco horas después. El segundo buque, un dhow más grande Jelbut, fue interceptado aproximadamente a las 14.00 horas. Llevaba a bordo 3.752 fusiles de asalto de tipo 56-1, 198 ametralladoras de uso múltiple de modelo PKM, componentes para 82 ametralladoras pesadas DShK, 50 fusiles antimaterial AM-50 “Sayyad” (junto con 50 miras telescópicas RG-004A1) y 90 lanzagranadas propulsadas por cohetes (RPG-7) (véase el anexo 19).

<sup>71</sup> Véase S/2021/79, párr. 81 y anexo 13.

<sup>72</sup> Véase <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284>.

Figura X  
Intento de transbordo de cargamento entre dos dhows el 10 de febrero de 2021



Fuente: Confidencial.

63. El Grupo ha obtenido pruebas de que los dhows estaban tripulados por nacionales yemeníes (véase el anexo 21). Según un Estado Miembro, la tripulación del dhow Jelbut declaró que se le había instruido para que navegara hasta el puerto de Yask, en la República Islámica del Irán, en enero de 2021, para recoger el cargamento, afirmación que parece estar respaldada por las coordenadas de un dispositivo de navegación recuperado a bordo<sup>73</sup> (véase el anexo 19, figura 19.20). Sin embargo, el Grupo no puede verificar de forma independiente esta información y no pudo inspeccionar el cargamento, ya que, según se informa, se había eliminado. Sobre la base de las imágenes disponibles, los fusiles de asalto y algunas de las ametralladoras de uso múltiple tienen características técnicas y marcas que coinciden con las de armas fabricadas en China, mientras que los fusiles antimaterial (y las miras asociadas) y los lanzacohetes portátiles son probablemente de origen iraní. La República del Irán ha informado al Grupo de que rechaza todo vínculo al dhow en cuestión y a las armas incautadas. El Grupo también observa que el envoltorio de plástico verde es semejante al utilizado en interceptaciones anteriores (véase la figura XI y el cuadro 1; S/2021/79, anexo 14, figura 14.6, y S/2019/83, anexo 16, párr. 7), lo que indica una fuente común.

<sup>73</sup> El Grupo solo recibió la información que aparece en el mapa en el anexo 19, figura 19.20; sin embargo, observa que se ofrece información más detallada sobre el trayecto del buque en un informe de Iniciativa Mundial contra la Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional, titulado “An Iranian fingerprint? Tracing type 56-1 assault rifles in Somalia”, que puede consultarse en <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/iran-firearms-somalia>.

Figura XI  
Fusiles de asalto tipo 56-1 envueltos en plástico




Fuente: Confidencial.

64. La segunda incautación de armas se produjo aproximadamente a las 1700 horas del 6 de mayo de 2021, cuando el buque estadounidense Monterrey interceptó un dhow Shu'ai en el mar Árabe, a unas 114 millas náuticas al sur de la costa del Pakistán (véase el mapa 6). El Grupo obtuvo pruebas de que el capitán de este dhow también estaba a bordo del dhow Shu'ai incautado el 11 de febrero de 2021 (véase el anexo 21). Algunas armas también estaban envueltas en plástico verde, lo que ya ha sido documentado por el Grupo en otras interceptaciones (véase el cuadro 1; S/2021/79, anexo 14, figura 14.6, y S/2019/83, anexo 16, párr. 7). El Grupo obtuvo coordenadas, a partir de un dispositivo de navegación presuntamente encontrado a bordo del dhow, que indicaban que el buque había estado en un lugar cercano al puerto de Yask el 4 de mayo de 2021 (véase el anexo 20, figura 20.44)<sup>74</sup>. El Grupo no puede verificar de forma independiente esta información y señala que las coordenadas de un dispositivo de geolocalización (GPS) no constituyen en sí una prueba concluyente de que el buque se encontraba en ese lugar.

<sup>74</sup> El Grupo observa que un dispositivo de navegación encontrado en el dhow *Bahri-2*, que fue incautado con un cargamento de armas el 24 de junio de 2020, también contenía las coordenadas del puerto de Yask (véase S/2021/79, anexo 15, figura 15.20).

Mapa 6  
**Incautaciones de armas pequeñas y armas ligeras, misiles dirigidos antitanque y miras, 2018 a 2021**



65. En agosto de 2021, el Grupo inspeccionó el cargamento, que incluía 2.556 fusiles de asalto tipo 56-1, 192 ametralladoras de uso múltiple de modelo PKM, 100 fusiles de francotirador tipo 85, 52 fusiles antimaterial AM-50 “Sayyad”, 35 fusiles de asalto AKS-74U y 194 lanzadores RPG-7 (véase el anexo 20). Los fusiles de asalto de tipo 56-1 y los fusiles de francotirador, así como 19 de las ametralladoras del modelo PKM, tienen características técnicas y marcas que coinciden con las fabricadas en China. La mayoría de las armas fueron fabricadas por Arsenal Jianshe (Fábrica Estatal 26) entre 2016 y 2017. De las restantes ametralladoras, 164 tienen características técnicas y marcas que coinciden con la fabricación en la República Islámica del Irán, mientras que seis fueron producidas en Bulgaria y en tres casos el origen no se ha aclarado. Los fusiles de asalto AKS-74U tienen características técnicas y marcas que coinciden con los fabricados en la fábrica de armas de Tula, en la actual Federación de Rusia, a finales del decenio de 1980. Los fusiles antimaterial AM-50 y los lanzadores RPG-7 tienen características técnicas y marcas que coinciden con los fabricados en la República Islámica del Irán. El Grupo también documentó varias miras de fusiles Ghadir, cuyas características coinciden con las fabricadas en la República Islámica del Irán, así como miras telescópicas POSP, fabricadas en Belarús. La República Islámica de Irán ha informado al Grupo de que las ametralladoras y los visores de fusil no son productos iraníes y, en su opinión, la “mera apariencia o la similitud de las marcas o características técnicas entre [esos] equipos y los productos de empresas iraníes no deberían llevar a conclusiones sobre su origen”. Además de las armas pequeñas y armas ligeras, el dhow también

transportaba 50 misiles antitanque dirigidos por cable y lanzados desde un contenedor, cuyas características técnicas coinciden con diferentes versiones de los misiles 9M111 y 9M113 fabricados entre 1978 y 1999 en la actual Federación de Rusia. Los misiles estaban empaquetados en tubos de plástico, como se observó en anteriores incautaciones marítimas realizadas por el Grupo (véanse la figura XII y el cuadro 1, así como [S/2020/326](#), anexo 20, figura 20.1), lo que indica un origen común.

Figura XII  
**Misiles dirigidos antitanque en su embalaje**



*Fuente:* Confidencial.

66. El Grupo no ha recibido respuestas sobre la cadena de custodia de las armas incautadas. La Federación de Rusia declaró que sus entidades militares no suministraban armas al Yemen, mientras que Bulgaria informó al Grupo de que no se disponía de registros sobre las ametralladoras y que estaba pendiente una respuesta de China<sup>75</sup>. La República Islámica del Irán declaró que las armas no habían sido vendidas, exportadas o transferidas al Yemen. En lo que respecta a las miras POSP, Belarús informó al Grupo de que habían sido exportadas a la República Islámica del Irán entre junio de 2016 y abril de 2018<sup>76</sup>, y de que ese país había proporcionado un certificado de usuario final en el que se declaraba que se utilizarían exclusivamente para las necesidades del Ministerio de Defensa y Logística de las Fuerzas Armadas.

<sup>75</sup> En años anteriores, China informó al Grupo de que los fusiles de asalto tipo 56-1 incautados “no se habían exportado al Yemen”. Sin embargo, esto no excluye la posibilidad de que las armas fueran exportadas a un tercer país.

<sup>76</sup> Esta es la quinta vez desde 2018 que se incautan miras telescópicas de Belarús exportadas a la República Islámica del Irán (véase el cuadro 1).



La República Islámica del Irán informó al Grupo de que las miras estaban siendo utilizadas por sus unidades militares y de que no se habían reexportado, transferido o vendido. Con algunas excepciones notables<sup>77</sup>, la combinación de armas indica un patrón común de suministro (véase el cuadro 1), probablemente procedente de las reservas del Gobierno, que incluye a dhows en el mar Arábigo, que transportan armas al Yemen y Somalia<sup>78</sup> (véase S/2021/79, párrs. 72 a 76). El Grupo sigue investigando, en cooperación con el Grupo de Expertos sobre Somalia.

67. El Grupo está investigando la cadena de custodia de siete miras de armas térmicas RU90/120G, que fueron incautadas el 22 de junio de 2021 en el paso fronterizo de Shahn, entre Omán y el Yemen (véanse la figura XIII y el anexo 22). Las miras son fabricadas por Rayan Roshd Afzar, una empresa conjunta chino-iraní<sup>79</sup>, y han aparecido anteriormente en incautaciones mezcladas con armas (véase S/2021/79, párr. 88 y anexo 14.). La República Islámica del Irán informó al Grupo de que las miras incautadas no habían sido fabricadas en ese país. Este incidente demuestra que también siguen entrando pequeñas cantidades de equipo militar al Yemen por tierra<sup>80</sup>.

Figura XIII

**Miras de armas térmicas RU90/120G incautadas en el paso fronterizo de Shahn**



Fuente: Confidencial.

<sup>77</sup> Estas excepciones incluyen fusiles de asalto AKS-74U y fusiles de francotirador Tipo 85.

<sup>78</sup> El papel de las redes delictivas en Somalia en esta red de suministro sigue siendo poco claro. Existen amplias pruebas de que el transbordo de armas tiene lugar frente a la costa de Somalia y de que algunas armas del cargamento terminan en el mercado negro somalí. Sin embargo, no está claro si las armas se envían inicialmente al Yemen y luego se trafican de nuevo al Cuerno de África, o si algunas de ellas se descargan directamente de los dhows a las costas somalíes.

<sup>79</sup> Véase [www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world](http://www.thedailybeast.com/the-chinese-company-selling-iranian-sniper-gear-around-the-world).

<sup>80</sup> La última incautación conocida de este tipo en el paso fronterizo de Shahn tuvo lugar el 20 de marzo de 2019 y consistía en municiones de armas pequeñas y armas ligeras y espoletas de granadas de mortero.

Cuadro 1  
**Armas pequeñas y armas ligeras, misiles dirigidos antitanque y miras incautados, documentados por el Grupo desde 2018**

	<i>Fusil de asalto de tipo 56-1</i>	<i>Lanza- cohetes portátil RPG-7</i>	<i>Fusil antimaterial AM-50</i>	<i>Ametralladoras PKM</i>	<i>Ametralladoras DshK</i>	<i>Miras ópticas de Belarús</i>	<i>Visores de fusil Ghadir</i>	<i>Miras Rayan Roshd Afzar</i>	<i>Misiles dirigidos antitanque (diferentes tipos)</i>
Golfo de Adén, 28 de junio de 2018	X <sup>a</sup>								
Adén, 10 de diciembre de 2018	X	X				X			
Golfo de Adén, 25 de noviembre de 2019									X <sup>a</sup>
Golfo de Adén, 9 de febrero de 2020						X		X	X <sup>a</sup>
Golfo de Adén, 17 de abril de 2020	X <sup>a</sup>		X	X		X	X	X	
Golfo de Adén, 24 de junio de 2020	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Golfo de Adén, 11 de febrero 2021	X <sup>ab</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>	X <sup>b</sup>		X <sup>b</sup>		
Golfo de Omán, 6 de mayo de 2021	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X		X	X		X <sup>a</sup>
Frontera de Shahn <sup>c</sup> , 22 de junio de 2021								X <sup>b</sup>	

Fuentes: Grupo y Estados Miembros.

<sup>a</sup> Los artículos tenían un embalaje similar.


<sup>b</sup> Los artículos no fueron inspeccionados por el Grupo.

<sup>c</sup> Shahn es un importante punto de paso fronterizo entre Omán y el Yemen (mapa 6).

### C. Investigaciones de la cadena de custodia

68. Los huzíes siguen obteniendo componentes críticos para sus sistemas de armas de empresas de Europa y Asia, utilizando una compleja red de intermediarios para ocultar la cadena de custodia (véase el mapa 7). Los cuatro casos que se describen a continuación ilustran esta pauta, de conformidad con las disposiciones del párrafo 8 de la resolución 2511 (2020). Los Estados Miembros han informado en repetidas ocasiones al Grupo de que esos componentes no son ni armas ni productos de doble uso con arreglo a la legislación nacional. Sin embargo, el Grupo considera que, dado que estos componentes tienen aplicaciones militares, las autoridades de control de exportaciones y de aduanas deben estar especialmente atentas para evitar las violaciones del embargo de armas selectivo.

Mapa 7  
Redes de suministro huzías



69. El Grupo investigó la cadena de custodia de un transmisor de presión OEM de 30.600G, fabricado por BD Sensors en Alemania, que formaba parte del misil de crucero tipo Quds utilizado en el ataque contra Yeda el 23 de noviembre de 2020 (véase el anexo 16). El Grupo documentó transmisores de presión similares como partes de misiles anteriores y los rastreó hasta la República Islámica del Irán y Turquía (véase S/2021/79, párrs. 79 y 80). Este transmisor fue adquirido por una empresa basada en Omán, que lo importó a través de China en julio de 2020, cuatro meses antes del ataque. La empresa omaní lo importó en nombre de un particular que decía representar a una empresa del Yemen (véase el anexo 23). Hasta ahora, el Grupo no ha podido establecer si los transmisores fueron efectivamente exportados de Omán al Yemen (lo que implicaría que el misil de crucero Quds fue fabricado por los huzies) o a otro país, tras lo cual terminaron en el Yemen. Es la segunda vez en los últimos años que se rastrean componentes para sistemas de armas huzías desde proveedores en China hasta empresas comerciales en Omán (véase S/2021/79, párr. 77)<sup>81</sup>.

70. El Grupo también investigó la cadena de custodia de seis motores fuera de borda E75BEHD fabricados por Yamaha en el Japón, que el Grupo documentó entre los restos de tres artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes utilizados en el ataque perpetrado el 14 de diciembre de 2020 contra el puerto de Yeda (véase el anexo 12). El Grupo pudo determinar que los motores fueron exportados a Dawood Trading, el distribuidor

<sup>81</sup> Sigue pendiente una respuesta de las autoridades omaníes sobre la cadena de custodia del cargamento de componentes de aeronaves no tripuladas tras su llegada a Salala el 2 de diciembre de 2018.

general de Yamaha en el Yemen, el 9 de marzo de 2020, a través de otra empresa comercial en Omán. El Grupo se puso en contacto con Dawood Trading para solicitar información sobre la cadena de custodia de los motores; la respuesta está pendiente.

71. El Grupo investigó la cadena de custodia de un motor rotativo de 2 cilindros 3W-110i B2 fabricado por 3W-Modellmotoren en Alemania, que inspeccionó en octubre de 2020 entre los restos de una aeronave no tripulada huzí en Marib (véase la figura XIV). El Grupo obtuvo pruebas (véase el anexo 24) que demostraban que el motor había sido pedido por un particular en China, a través de la plataforma de comercio electrónico Taobao.com, el 25 de enero de 2018. En respuesta a este pedido, una empresa en Alemania había encargado los motores al fabricante a través de otro intermediario, un minorista de aeromodelismo en Alemania y, según se informa, los exportó a China en marzo de 2018. El Grupo se ha puesto en contacto con China para solicitar información sobre la identidad del comprador y la cadena de custodia del motor; la respuesta está pendiente.

Figura XIV

**Motor 3W-110i B2 inspeccionado en Marib**



*Fuente:* Grupo.

72. El Grupo investigó además la cadena de custodia de los motores de turbina de gas Titán fabricados por AMT Netherlands, que documentó en 2020 como parte de los misiles superficie-aire “358” (véase [S/2021/79](#), párr. 81 y anexo 13). Se exportaron a Hong Kong (China) el 10 de marzo de 2017 y el 6 de junio de 2019. Según los certificados de usuario final obtenidos por el Grupo, los motores fueron adquiridos por una empresa de aeronaves que, según informó China, cesó sus actividades en 2014 y, por tanto, no podía haber importado los motores. El Grupo ha descubierto que los certificados de usuario final fueron presentados por una empresa basada en Hong Kong (China), HSJ Electronic (HK), que era el destinatario del motor con el número de serie #7023, mientras que los otros tres motores fueron entregados a otra empresa basada en Hong Kong (China), Vista Automation & Communication. Según los registros disponibles al público, tanto HSJ Electronic (HK) como Vista Automation & Communication eran propiedad de la misma persona (véase el anexo 25). Está pendiente la respuesta de China sobre la cadena de custodia de los motores.

## VI. Cuestiones financieras y económicas

### A. Cuestiones económicas

#### 1. Sinopsis

73. El Grupo examinó diversos problemas relativos a la economía del Yemen, que plantean una amenaza para la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad de ese país. Desde hace más de siete años, el Yemen está inmerso en un conflicto que ha devastado su economía. En las zonas que no están controladas por los huzíes, el rial yemení se ha venido depreciando rápidamente frente al dólar de los Estados Unidos, lo que ha aumentado los precios de los alimentos y ha llevado a más personas a la pobreza extrema<sup>82</sup>. Dado que cerca del 90 % de los productos básicos del Yemen son importados, las presiones inflacionarias, desencadenadas principalmente por el aumento de los precios de las importaciones, siguieron siendo fuertes. Según el Banco Central del Yemen, la inflación media de los precios de los alimentos superó el 30 % en 2020<sup>83</sup>. El producto interno bruto real se contrajo aproximadamente un 8,5 % en 2020 y el Banco Mundial preveía que la inflación general seguiría acelerándose rápidamente en 2021, hasta un estimado 45 %, frente a 35 % en 2020<sup>84</sup>.

#### 2. Problemas económicos que plantean una posible amenaza para la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad

74. El deterioro de la situación económica ha provocado frustración, privaciones y resentimiento entre la población de las zonas que no están controladas por los huzíes, lo que ofrece un caldo de cultivo fértil para nuevos disturbios y conflictos sociales. La paciencia de los ciudadanos de a pie se está agotando, como demuestran los casos cada vez más frecuentes de protestas, manifestaciones y disturbios públicos en esas zonas<sup>85</sup>, en que la gente toma las calles para protestar contra la volatilidad de los tipos de cambio, el aumento de los precios de los alimentos, la falta de pago de sueldos, la escasez de electricidad y la pobreza generalizada. Algunos grupos políticos han tratado de sacar provecho de esta situación.

75. El Comité de Asuntos Económicos del Consejo de Transición del Sur, bajo la dirección de Aidarous Zubaidi, celebró reuniones con la Southern Money Exchange Association, sin la participación del Banco Central del Yemen ni de otras entidades del Gobierno del Yemen, para examinar medidas destinadas a paliar los problemas económicos derivados de la volatilidad de los tipos de cambio<sup>86</sup>. Los críticos consideran que esas acciones del Consejo son un desafío a la autoridad del Banco Central y del Gobierno del Yemen sobre las empresas bancarias y cambiarias, como parte de una lucha de poder más amplia entre el Gobierno del Yemen y el Consejo<sup>87</sup>.

<sup>82</sup> Véase [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021).

<sup>83</sup> Boletín trimestral del Banco Central del Yemen, Evolución de la situación económica y monetaria, núm. 4 (septiembre de 2021). La tasa de inflación anual en 2020 se estimó en torno al 25 %, frente a una tasa media estimada del 10 % en 2019.

<sup>84</sup> Véase [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1).

<sup>85</sup> Según datos de Intelyse, al 27 de septiembre de 2021, se habían registrado 54 manifestaciones ocurridas ese mes en Adén, Shabwa, Abyan, Socotra, Lahjj y Hadramaut. Véase <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-key-message-update-protests-intensify-south-due-further-sharp-depreciation>.

<sup>86</sup> Véase [www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225](http://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225). Durante la reunión del Grupo con el Comité de Asuntos Económicos del Consejo de Transición del Sur, el Comité declaró que esas reuniones se habían celebrado para mejorar la situación.

<sup>87</sup> Durante la reunión del Grupo con el Comité de Asuntos Económicos, celebrada el 21 de agosto de 2021 en Adén, el Comité aclaró que, dado que el Gobierno del Yemen y el Banco Central del Yemen no habían hecho su trabajo debidamente, lo que había llevado a la caída del rial yemení

76. La fragilidad del sistema político y de la economía del Yemen sigue constituyendo una amenaza y poniendo en peligro la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad del país. La fragmentación consciente y sistemática del sistema económico y de las instituciones del Yemen por parte del Gobierno y de los huzíes ha dado lugar a la aparición de bancos centrales, autoridades aduaneras y fiscales, unidades de inteligencia financiera y autoridades de telecomunicaciones separados, así como a leyes y políticas económicas, comerciales, bancarias, arancelarias y fiscales separadas en las dos regiones (anexo 26).

77. La comunidad internacional debería tomar nota de la gravedad de esta crisis económica y adoptar medidas concretas para evitar que se produzcan más divisiones en el Yemen, que podrían conducir a un hecho consumado irreversible. A falta de una rápida mejora de la situación política y de seguridad, las perspectivas económicas parecen sombrías, lo que agrava la inestabilidad del país<sup>88</sup>.

## **B. Control de los recursos financieros por las entidades designadas y sus redes**

78. El Grupo investigó los fondos, otros activos financieros y recursos económicos que son propiedad o están bajo el control, directo o indirecto, de personas o entidades designadas de conformidad con el régimen de sanciones impuesto en virtud de la resolución 2140 (2014), o de personas o entidades que actúan en su nombre o siguiendo sus instrucciones, o de entidades que son propiedad o están bajo el control de esas personas o entidades, en contravención de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2140 (2014). Al parecer, están empleando los siguientes métodos para financiar sus actividades:

- a) Confiscación de activos y fondos de personas y entidades;
- b) Recepción de fondos de fuentes transfronterizas;
- c) Participación en el mercado negro e imposición de tasas ilegales a la importación de combustible y a otras actividades comerciales;
- d) Falsificación, contrabando y tráfico de estupefacientes, drogas y sustancias psicotrópicas, billetes, antigüedades y objetos antiguos;
- e) Recaudación de ingresos no tributarios y del azaque;
- f) Recaudación de derechos de aduana e impuestos.

79. A continuación se examinan detalladamente algunas de estas fuentes de financiación.

### **1. Confiscación de los fondos de Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi y de otras personas y entidades**

80. El 27 de junio de 2021, el presidente del tribunal penal especializado de Al-Amana, en Saná, emitió un memorando dirigido al Banco Tadhamon en el que le informaba de que los fondos congelados que se encontraban en tres cuentas bancarias específicas, mantenidas en dicho banco a nombre de Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, habían

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y a un aumento de los precios de los productos básicos, el Comité de Asuntos Económicos y el Consejo habían tenido que intervenir.

<sup>88</sup> Véase [www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021).

sido confiscados por el tribunal tras la condena de Hadi, entre otros cargos, por “comprometer la independencia de la República del Yemen”<sup>89</sup>.

81. Además, este tribunal ordenó al Banco Tadamon que transfiriera esos fondos a cuentas específicas del Banco Central del Yemen en Saná, gestionadas bajo la supervisión del fiscal. El Banco Tadamon informó al Grupo de que consideraba que esa transferencia vulneraba la resolución 2140 (2014). Por ello, había informado al gobernador del Banco Central del Yemen en Saná y al jefe de la fiscalía penal especializada que no estaría en condiciones de transferir los fondos. El Grupo recibió información de que, al 17 de noviembre de 2021, esos fondos no habían sido transferidos por el Banco Tadamon al Banco Central del Yemen en Saná. El Grupo considera que la congelación y confiscación de estas cuentas constituye una posible violación de los derechos humanos y del derecho internacional humanitario<sup>90</sup>.

82. Las investigaciones del Grupo han revelado además que los fondos y activos de ciertas entidades mantenidos en un banco también han sido ordenados por los tribunales para ser transferidos a las cuentas designadas del Banco Central del Yemen, Saná, pero el banco en cuestión no transfirió ninguna cantidad. El Grupo sigue investigando el asunto (anexo 27).

## 2. Confiscación de fondos del Banco Thadamon

83. El Banco Central del Yemen en Saná emitió una circular el 28 de junio de 2021, el mismo día en que el Banco Thadamon expresó al Banco Central que no podía transferir los fondos confiscados de Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, instruyendo a todos los establecimientos y empresas de cambio que operaban dentro de las zonas controladas por los huzíes que congelaran todos los fondos y saldos del Banco Thadamon depositados en ellos y que los transfirieran inmediatamente al Banco Central del Yemen (véase el anexo 28). El Banco Thadamon informó de que no mantenía ninguna cuenta en ninguna empresa o establecimiento de cambio. El Grupo considera que tales represalias del Banco Central del Yemen de Saná, al ordenar que se confiscaran los fondos y saldos de los bancos que operaban en las zonas bajo su control, repercutían negativamente en el buen funcionamiento del sector bancario y en la economía y la estabilidad del Yemen.

## 3. Ingresos del sector de telecomunicaciones

84. A pesar del conflicto en curso, el sector de las telecomunicaciones en el Yemen sigue experimentando un crecimiento significativo y ha sido una importante fuente de ingresos para las autoridades huzíes. Las empresas que operan en zonas bajo el control de los huzíes se enfrentan a la incertidumbre política, a la imposición de tasas y tarifas ilegales, a la extorsión y a la confiscación de sus activos. Las licencias se conceden deliberadamente por períodos cortos para crear incertidumbres operacionales para las empresas<sup>91</sup>. El Grupo está investigando el grado de control que

<sup>89</sup> El Grupo cree que, teniendo en cuenta la naturaleza política de este caso, el tribunal penal especializado de Al-Amana en Saná actuaba bajo el control o la dirección de Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004).

<sup>90</sup> Véase la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, art. 17; la Carta Árabe de Derechos Humanos de 2004, artículo 31 (véase <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/551368?ln=en>); Protocolo Adicional a los Convenios de Ginebra del 12 de agosto de 1949 relativo a la Protección de las Víctimas de los Conflictos Armados Sin Carácter Internacional (Protocolo II), art. 4 (2)(g); y Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja (CICR), base de datos sobre derecho internacional humanitario consuetudinario, normas 50 y 52.

<sup>91</sup> El Grupo recibió información de fuentes confidenciales, según la cual el Ministerio de Telecomunicaciones recaudaba anualmente 13,2 millones de dólares de las empresas de telecomunicaciones en Saná y que, teniendo en cuenta las tasas de frecuencia y las tasas de

ejercen los huzíes sobre las principales empresas de telecomunicaciones, a saber, MTN, Sabafon, TeleYemen e Y Telecom (véase el anexo 29). TeleYemen en Saná negó cualquier toma de control por parte de los huzíes y declaró que sus directores habían sido nombrados antes del actual conflicto. Sin embargo, el Gobierno del Yemen afirma que trasladó la oficina principal de TeleYemen a Adén y la mantuvo bajo su control. TeleYemen en Saná declaró que esa transferencia no había sido comunicada oficialmente y que, por lo tanto, no reconocía la transferencia en virtud del derecho de sociedades. El 80 % de los accionistas de Sabafon, decidieron trasladar la oficina principal de Sabafon a Adén en 2020. Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer, un colaborador cercano de Abdulmalik Al-Houthi (YEi.004), ha desempeñado un papel fundamental en la toma del control de la dirección de Sabafon<sup>92</sup>.

85. El Grupo está investigando si los huzíes han obtenido el control efectivo del dominio de nivel superior nacional “.ye”, y si están utilizando un “sistema de gestión del ancho de banda”, adquirido por TeleYemen en Saná. El control del dominio y el uso ilegal de las herramientas de telecomunicaciones podrían dar a los huzíes la capacidad de vigilar e interceptar el tráfico, censurar contenidos, llevar a cabo cierres de Internet, prohibir los sitios de redes sociales y los servicios de mensajería personal, vigilar las comunicaciones privadas de los opositores y bloquear dominios en todo el país. Se afirma que los huzíes utilizan estos equipos para vigilar el tráfico de datos y mensajes de texto, voz y vídeo en que participan sus opositores. TeleYemen en Saná ha aclarado al Grupo que “las leyes del Yemen exigen que los proveedores de servicios de Internet filtren ciertos contenidos que van en contra de la ley y de las doctrinas islámicas y que lo hacen con el fin de proteger a los niños de cualquier contenido inapropiado y que no hay ningún uso ilegal”<sup>93</sup>.

86. El Grupo está investigando un caso de incautación, por parte de las autoridades aduaneras yemeníes en Al Mahara, de equipos de telecomunicaciones importados por una empresa de telecomunicaciones con sede en Saná, sin obtener una licencia o la aprobación del Ministerio de Telecomunicaciones y Tecnología de la Información del Gobierno del Yemen.

87. El Gobierno del Yemen informó al Grupo de que había incautado muchas remesas de equipos de telecomunicaciones y de que había decenas de esas remesas que llegaban a manos de los huzíes a través de redes de contrabando. El Grupo sigue investigando. El acceso a las telecomunicaciones es esencial para la población civil y las medidas que se adopten en este sector no deben tener consecuencias negativas para la población civil (véase el anexo 29).

#### 4. Mercado negro y tasas ilegales impuestas a la importación de combustible

88. Antes de junio de 2020, el puerto de Al-Hudayda era el principal puerto de importación de combustible del Yemen (48 %); desde entonces, se ha producido un cambio significativo en el patrón de dicha importación. En abril y mayo de 2021, la parte de importaciones de combustible que llegaban al puerto de Al-Hudayda se redujo al 8 % (anexo 31)<sup>94</sup>. Según el Gobierno del Yemen<sup>95</sup>, el combustible suministrado a las zonas controladas por los huzíes por la ruta terrestre durante abril y mayo de 2021 fue de unas 10.000 toneladas por día, lo que representaba alrededor

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gestión, los ingresos totales recaudados por los huzíes de MTN y Sabafon ascendían a unos 22 millones de dólares por año.

<sup>92</sup> Carta dirigida al Grupo por el Gobierno del Yemen y fuentes confidenciales. El 29 de julio de 2019, Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer (hermano de Saleh Mesfer Saleh Al Shaer (YEi.007), fue nombrado director general de Sabafon en Saná (véase S/2020/326, anexo 26).

<sup>93</sup> Carta dirigida al Grupo por TeleYemen en Saná, de fecha 17 de diciembre de 2021.

<sup>94</sup> Véase el comunicado de prensa del Gobierno del Yemen en [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/).

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*



del 65 % del combustible importado al Yemen, frente al suministro de 6.000 toneladas durante enero y marzo de 2021<sup>96</sup>, lo que mostraba una tendencia al alza. Según varias fuentes, los huzíes crean una escasez artificial de combustible para obligar a los comerciantes a vender el combustible en el mercado negro que ellos manejan y para cobrar comisiones ilegales por las ventas. Según la información facilitada por el Gobierno del Yemen, los ingresos oficiales recaudados por los huzíes en concepto de importaciones de combustible (es decir, aduanas y otros impuestos a través del puerto de Al-Hudayda) superan los 70.000 millones de riales yemeníes<sup>97</sup>.

89. El Grupo recibió información de que, aunque los derechos de aduana se recaudan en el primer puerto de importación en las zonas no controladas por los huzíes, éstos cobran ilegalmente tasas y derechos de aduana adicionales a los comerciantes en los puestos aduaneros terrestres<sup>98</sup>. El negocio del suministro de combustible a las zonas controladas por los huzíes ha resultado ser muy lucrativo para muchos, y los consumidores finales pagan el precio: el Gobierno del Yemen ha aumentado sus ingresos aduaneros por las importaciones a través de los puertos bajo su control; según se informa, el Consejo de Transición del Sur también cobra tasas de aproximadamente 12 riales yemeníes por litro de combustible importado a los importadores a través del puerto de Adén<sup>99</sup>; y los importadores y comerciantes aprovechan esta oportunidad para enriquecerse (véase el anexo 31). Se informó al Grupo de que el aumento de los precios del combustible había estado afectando negativamente a los asociados en la ejecución de las organizaciones humanitarias internacionales.

## 5. Falsificación de billetes

90. En los párrafos 142 a 144 y en el anexo 53 de su informe de fecha 26 de enero de 2018 (S/2018/594) y en el párrafo 125 de su informe de fecha 25 de enero de 2019 (S/2019/83), el Grupo mencionó un caso relacionado con la confiscación de un camión que transportaba billetes de 5.000 riales yemeníes, por valor de 35.000 millones de riales (140 millones de dólares) impresos fuera del Yemen, en la zona de Yauf, controlada por el Gobierno, el 25 de mayo de 2017. Este caso fue citado por el Grupo para ilustrar cómo los huzíes habían tratado de resolver el problema de liquidez imprimiendo e introduciendo billetes en el Yemen para utilizarlos como moneda de curso legal.

91. En marzo de 2018, el Tribunal Regional de Fráncfort del Meno (Alemania) declaró culpable a Reza Heidari, ciudadano iraní residente en Alemania, y lo condenó a siete años de prisión. En 2021, el Grupo recibió más información y pruebas sobre este caso junto con una copia de la sentencia de apelación del 15 de mayo de 2020, que confirmaba la pena privativa de libertad de cinco años por su participación en el caso. El Grupo sigue investigando la cuestión.

<sup>96</sup> Véase <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>.

<sup>97</sup> Véase [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405).

<sup>98</sup> Por ejemplo, un importador declaró que los huzíes habían estado cobrando 37 riales yemeníes por litro desde febrero de 2021.

<sup>99</sup> Un importador informó al Grupo de que antes había pagado 7 riales por litro, según la demanda del Consejo de Transición del Sur, pero, desde abril de 2021, ese pago había aumentado a 12 riales por litro, que se depositaba en una cuenta designada en una empresa de cambio en Adén (por razones de seguridad, no se presentan los detalles en el presente informe). Sin embargo, durante la reunión del Grupo con la Comité de Asuntos Económicos del Consejo, celebrada el 21 de agosto de 2021 en Adén, el Comité aclaró que esa cantidad representaba los impuestos locales.

### C. Depósito saudí

92. En su anterior informe final, el Grupo informó sobre la aplicación del mecanismo de depósito saudí. La información recibida tras la publicación del informe arrojó nueva luz sobre los datos presentados en el mismo. Por tanto, el Grupo actualizó ese informe para que reflejara que la sección IX.B, el anexo 28 y el texto conexo que figura en el cuadro 1, y la recomendación que figura en el párrafo 161 de dicho informe no deberían tenerse en cuenta, a la espera de una evaluación definitiva. En consecuencia, el Grupo ha realizado un examen que se recoge íntegramente en el anexo 32.

93. Durante su examen, el Grupo interactuó con todas las partes interesadas pertinentes y examinó la información actualizada recibida de ellas, incluida la información sobre las transacciones realizadas después de la presentación del anterior informe final del Grupo. El examen realizado por el Grupo ha revelado que los importadores, que se acogieron a los beneficios del depósito saudí, han recibido importantes beneficios por un total de 370,27 millones de dólares por la diferencia entre las tasas de mercado y de cobertura de las cartas de crédito adoptadas por el Banco Central del Yemen en la aplicación del mecanismo del depósito saudí. El examen del Grupo demostró las deficiencias en la aplicación del mecanismo, que podrían haber permitido a los importadores retener los beneficios que se les habían adelantado sin trasladarlos a los consumidores.

94. Sobre la base de la información y las pruebas puestas a su disposición, que se detallan en el anexo 32, el examen final del Grupo no ha revelado pruebas irrefutables que corroboren las denuncias de corrupción, blanqueo de dinero o captura por las élites.

### D. Vigilancia de las medidas de prohibición de viajar y de congelación de activos

95. Sultan Saleh Aida Zabin (YEi.006), director de la división de investigación criminal en Saná, fue designado por el Consejo de Seguridad el 25 de febrero de 2021 mediante la aprobación de la resolución 2564 (2021). Según un informe de los medios de comunicación, el 5 de abril de 2021, el Ministerio del Interior anunció la muerte de Zabin a causa de una enfermedad terminal<sup>100</sup>. El Grupo aún no ha recibido ninguna prueba que confirme su muerte.

## VII. Actos que violan el derecho internacional humanitario y el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos

96. Las violaciones y los abusos del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos son cometidos de forma sistemática en el Yemen por todas las partes con una impunidad abrumadora. El sistema judicial es débil y en los pocos casos de detención y/o reclusión arbitraria en los que emite órdenes o decisiones, las autoridades y fuerzas de seguridad hacen caso omiso de ellas en gran medida<sup>101</sup>. Por lo tanto, el poder judicial no puede cumplir sus funciones de prevención y protección contra los abusos de los derechos humanos<sup>102</sup>.

<sup>100</sup> Véase [www.ypagency.net/354210](http://www.ypagency.net/354210).

<sup>101</sup> El Grupo documentó tres casos en que las autoridades habían hecho caso omiso de las órdenes de poner en libertad a un detenido. Sobre los ataques contra miembros del poder judicial, véase S/2021/79, párrs. 130 y 131. Durante el período que abarca el informe, el Grupo investigó otros tres casos.

<sup>102</sup> Véase la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, art. 8; y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, art. 2.

97. Las detenciones y reclusiones arbitrarias de periodistas y defensores de los derechos humanos, así como las amenazas contra ellos, siguieron siendo generalizados a lo largo del período que abarca el informe, lo que afectó a la capacidad de estos para documentar las violaciones e informar sobre ellas (véase el anexo 34)<sup>103</sup>.

98. No solo existen escasos recursos para las víctimas, sino que prácticamente no hay ayuda disponible; aquellos que han sido detenidos arbitrariamente y/o torturados y/o han visto sus bienes saqueados, a menudo se quedan sin nada. La mayoría no puede regresar a sus hogares debido a las constantes amenazas. Lo mismo ocurre con las familias cuyo principal sostén económico ha desaparecido o está detenido. En ambos casos, las mujeres son especialmente vulnerables (véase el párr. 41).

99. La continuación del conflicto está retrasando el establecimiento de mecanismos de justicia y reparación. Es fundamental garantizar la protección de quienes documentan las violaciones y preservar sus archivos.

## **A. Acciones e incidentes atribuidos a la Coalición**

### **1. Ataques aéreos de la Coalición**

100. El Grupo investigó seis ataques aéreos llevados a cabo por la Coalición en 2021: a) el 16 de enero en Maliya, Marib; b) el 28 de febrero en Hawak, Al-Hudayda; c) el 7 de marzo en Thawra, Saná; d) el 10 de mayo, en Rada, Al-Bayda; e) el 21 de marzo en Salif, Al-Hudayda; y f) el 18 de septiembre en Markha al-Ulya, Shabwa. Estos incidentes tuvieron como resultado la muerte de 12 civiles, entre ellos 2 niños y 1 mujer, y 13 heridos, entre ellos 3 niños y 3 mujeres. El Grupo concluyó sus investigaciones en los casos relacionados con los ataques aéreos del 16 de enero y el 28 de febrero (véase el anexo 33).

101. En 2020 y 2021, la Arabia Saudita proporcionó detalles al Grupo sobre el pago de indemnizaciones a las víctimas de 10 incidentes<sup>104</sup>, incluido el ataque contra el hospital de Hayya del 15 de agosto de 2016, que fue investigado por el Grupo<sup>105</sup>.

### **2. Detenciones por parte de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos**

102. El Grupo investigó casos de detención y reclusión arbitrarias, desaparición forzada y tortura por parte de efectivos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos en el Yemen. El Grupo recibió pruebas de tres personas detenidas en los siguientes lugares controlados por las fuerzas de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos entre 2018 y 2021: Balhaf, Shabwa; Aeropuerto de Rayyan, Al-Mukalla; puerto petrolero de Dubba y Al-Shihr, Hadramaut; y el puerto de Moca, Taiz (véase el anexo 34). En una carta dirigida al Grupo, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos negaron las denuncias de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos con la participación de sus nacionales en el contexto de la detención.

103. Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos informaron al Grupo de que se habían remitido denuncias de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos relacionadas con la detención al Equipo Conjunto de Investigación y Evaluación<sup>106</sup>. El Equipo confirmó que, si bien había

<sup>103</sup> Véase también [S/2021/79](#), sección XI.E.

<sup>104</sup> El Grupo aún no ha podido comprobar esta información.

<sup>105</sup> Véase [S/2018/193](#), anexo 49, apéndice C. Los otros incidentes se produjeron el 2 de mayo, el 2 y el 11 de julio, el 30 de agosto y el 9 de septiembre de 2015, el 10 de septiembre de 2016, el 19 de diciembre de 2017, el 21 de mayo de 2019 y el 6 de agosto de 2020.

<sup>106</sup> El Grupo investigó varios casos de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos por parte de oficiales de los Emiratos Árabes

investigado un caso relacionado con la detención de seis barcos de pesca y unos 90 pescadores en marzo de 2018, las actividades antiterroristas no formaban parte de su mandato.

104. Además, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos declararon que habían cooperado con el Director de Seguridad de Adén, General de División Shallal Ali Shaye, desde diciembre de 2015 hasta julio de 2020<sup>107</sup> en el contexto de las operaciones de lucha contra el terrorismo de la Coalición, sobre la base de una decisión del Gobierno del Yemen emitida a finales de 2015. Durante el período mencionado, el Grupo documentó varios casos de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos atribuidas a él o a sus fuerzas<sup>108</sup>.

## **B. Detenciones por parte del Gobierno del Yemen**

105. El Grupo investigó 18 casos de detenciones y reclusiones arbitrarias por parte de las fuerzas del Gobierno en Hadramaut, Marib, Shabwa y Taiz; un caso se refería a una mujer (véase el anexo 34). En Taiz, dos casos se referían a la 170ª Brigada, incluido un caso en el que un civil murió en detención, y otro que se refería a la 22ª Brigada “Mika”<sup>109</sup>. En Shabwa, la mayoría de las detenciones y reclusiones arbitrarias parecían tener una motivación política, ya que cinco de los siete casos documentados se referían a miembros o simpatizantes del Consejo de Transición del Sur, incluido un menor.

## **C. Detenciones en las zonas controladas por el Consejo de Transición del Sur**

106. Durante el período que se examina, el Grupo investigó 16 casos de detenciones y reclusiones arbitrarias por parte de grupos armados afiliados al Consejo de Transición del Sur en Adén, Lahij y Socotra, incluidos los de dos periodistas (véase el anexo 34).

107. Tres de los casos se refieren a denuncias de detención por parte de la unidad antiterrorista en una prisión no oficial dentro de un complejo del Consejo en Adén<sup>110</sup>.

108. Son especialmente preocupantes dos casos de personas muertas a tiros en puestos de control controlados por la novena Brigada, en la zona de Tur al-Baha, Lahij.

109. En Adén, 14 personas acusadas de participar en ataques contra mezquitas y clérigos están siendo procesadas. El Grupo recibió pruebas de que al menos 10 de

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Unidos en el Yemen en relación con la detención. Véanse [S/2021/79](#), párr. 127; [S/2020/326](#), párrs. 100 y 101; [S/2019/83](#), párr. 142; [S/2018/594](#), párrs. 166 a 172, y [S/2018/193](#), párrs. 132 a 134. En diciembre de 2018, en una carta dirigida al Grupo, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos negaron cualquier participación en dichas violaciones cometidas en el Yemen y afirmaron que no había instalaciones de detención ni detenidos en ninguno de los campamentos de sus fuerzas en el Yemen. También informaron al Grupo de que entonces todas las operaciones de detención y procedimientos subsiguientes estaban a cargo del Gobierno del Yemen. En julio de 2021, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos informaron al Grupo de que el contenido de esa carta seguía siendo pertinente.

<sup>107</sup> El General de División Shaye estuvo fuera de Adén de marzo a diciembre de 2020. Los Emiratos Árabes Unidos declararon que no habían tratado con él desde que dejó su cargo de Director de Seguridad de Adén.

<sup>108</sup> Véanse [S/2021/79](#), párr. 132 y anexo 32; [S/2020/326](#), párrs. 100 y 101 y 105 a 108 y anexo 28; [S/2019/83](#), párr. 158 y anexo 41, y [S/2018/594](#), párrs. 180 y 181 y anexo 65.

<sup>109</sup> El Grupo recibió pruebas de que le habían disparado y de que su cuerpo presentaba marcas de violencia.

<sup>110</sup> 12°46'32,1" N 44°59'18,9" E.

ellas habían sido torturadas durante su detención y forzadas a firmar confesiones; las pruebas a tal efecto fueron desestimadas por el presidente del tribunal.

110. El Grupo también recibió pruebas de que tres hombres desaparecidos en Adén desde 2016 estuvieron en un momento dado detenidos en la prisión de Mansoura, antes de ser entregados a las fuerzas antiterroristas por las autoridades penitenciarias<sup>111</sup>.

111. En febrero de 2021, miembros del poder judicial iniciaron una huelga en el sur del Yemen para protestar por las denuncias de corrupción en el consejo judicial. En agosto de 2021, se informó al Grupo de que varios detenidos no habían sido puestos en libertad a causa de la huelga y de que el poder judicial había aceptado reanudar su labor dos veces por semana. Sin embargo, esto no será suficiente para resolver los casos pendientes. En consecuencia, muchos detenidos continuarán sufriendo la prolongación de su detención o el retraso de sus juicios.

112. En Socotra, los tres casos documentados se referían a civiles que habían expresado opiniones críticas contra el Consejo de Transición del Sur. Fueron detenidos por períodos cortos y ninguno fue oficialmente acusado (véase el anexo 34).

## **D. Detenciones por parte de las Fuerzas Conjuntas en la Costa Occidental**

113. El Grupo investigó seis casos de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en Hays, Al-Jawja y Moca. Cuatro casos implicaban a las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional y dos casos implicaban a las Brigadas de Amaliqah primera y séptima (véase el anexo 34). Uno de los casos fue el de un menor que estuvo detenido durante casi dos años. En ninguno de estos casos, que implicaban detenciones de entre 4 y 23 meses, las víctimas fueron llevadas ante un órgano judicial u otro órgano imparcial. Las Fuerzas de Resistencia Nacional informaron al Grupo de que los tribunales en Hays no estaban funcionando debido a las hostilidades.

## **E. Incidentes atribuidos a los huzíes**

### **1. Uso de municiones explosivas contra civiles**

#### **a) Bombardeos**

114. El Grupo investigó ocho incidentes de uso indiscriminado de artefactos explosivos por los huzíes en zonas pobladas de Marib y Taiz, en los que presuntamente murieron 33 personas, entre ellas 8 niños, y otras 51 resultaron heridas, incluidos 11 niños (véase el anexo 36)<sup>112</sup>.

115. Desde comienzos de 2021, los intensos combates alrededor de Marib tuvieron graves consecuencias para la población civil. Varios ataques, en los que se utilizaron artefactos explosivos como proyectiles de artillería, alcanzaron los campamentos de desplazados internos, causando muertos y heridos entre la población civil, así como la destrucción de bienes de carácter civil. También provocaron el desplazamiento de numerosas personas que ya habían sido desplazadas varias veces, lo que aumentó sus necesidades y su vulnerabilidad. Entre el 8 y el 17 de febrero, el campamento de Zawr

<sup>111</sup> El Grupo accedió a la correspondencia entre el director de la prisión de Mansoura y el Director de Seguridad de Adén entre noviembre de 2020 y enero de 2021. No se especificaba la fecha de la transferencia.

<sup>112</sup> En algunos casos, el Grupo no pudo determinar el número exacto de víctimas a pesar de haber recibido información de múltiples fuentes.

fue objeto de por lo menos dos ataques, incluidas incursiones huzías en el campamento y la colocación de minas terrestres; Entre el 19 y el 21 de febrero, los campamentos de Sawabin y Haylan sufrieron al menos dos ataques; y entre el 16 de marzo y el 4 de abril, el campamento de Mil fue objeto de cinco ataques, el de Tawasul de dos ataques, el de Khair de dos ataques, el campamento de Dhat Al-Ra de uno y el de Suwayda también de uno<sup>113</sup>.

116. Estos casos demuestran un continuo desprecio por los principios de distinción y protección de los civiles por parte de las fuerzas huzías. El Grupo observa que al menos en un incidente en Marib, se utilizó una aeronave no tripulada (véase la figura XV). Según el análisis del Grupo, las aeronaves huzías son muy precisas.

117. Los ataques sistemáticos contra zonas pobladas en Taiz y Marib, a distancia de las líneas del frente activas, pueden considerarse actos destinados a sembrar el terror entre la población civil, lo que está prohibido por el derecho internacional humanitario (véase el anexo 36)<sup>114</sup>.

Figura XV

**Restos de la aeronave no tripulada utilizada en el ataque en Marib**



*Fuente:* Confidencial.

<sup>113</sup> El Grupo recibió informes de las autoridades de Marib y del Gobierno del Yemen, realizó entrevistas y recibió vídeos, imágenes e informes de fuentes locales con acceso directo a los campamentos. El Grupo tomó nota de la carta de fecha 26 de abril de 2021 dirigida al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente del Yemen ante las Naciones Unidas (S/2021/405).

<sup>114</sup> Véase el Protocolo II Adicional a los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949, art. 13 (2); y Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja (CICR), base de datos sobre derecho internacional humanitario consuetudinario, norma 2.

**b) Minas terrestres, artefactos explosivos improvisados y municiones sin detonar**

118. El uso indiscriminado de minas terrestres y artefactos explosivos improvisados por parte de los huzíes es endémico y sistemático. Desde 2016, el Grupo ha documentado su devastador impacto en la población civil (véase [S/2021/79](#), párrs. 140 a 142; [S/2020/326](#), párrs. 115 a 117, y [S/2018/193](#), anexos 43 y 44).

119. Durante el período que se examina, el Grupo reunió importantes pruebas sobre esta cuestión, especialmente durante la visita que realizó en agosto a la costa occidental, una de las regiones más afectadas. Las conclusiones del Grupo se reflejan en el anexo 35.

**2. Detención**

120. El Grupo investigó 17 casos relativos a 50 víctimas de violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario o del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en relación con la detención, incluidas la violencia sexual y la tortura por parte de las autoridades huzíes<sup>115</sup>. Entre las víctimas figuran 6 periodistas y 11 mujeres (véase el anexo 34)<sup>116</sup>.

121. Desde 2019, el Grupo ha investigado los casos de 10 personas<sup>117</sup>, entre ellas un menor, detenidos en relación con el asesinato de Saleh al Samad, presidente del Consejo Político Supremo de los huzíes, en abril de 2018. Estas personas fueron detenidas entre septiembre y octubre de 2018 y recluidas en un lugar secreto. Sus familias no recibieron noticias de su paradero hasta que aparecieron en televisión el 17 de abril de 2019, cuando comenzó su juicio, que fue presidido por el juez Amin Ali Ahmed Zabara<sup>118</sup>. El Grupo recibió pruebas de que habían sido torturadas y forzadas a firmar confesiones. Aunque esto se mencionó durante las audiencias judiciales, no se tomó ninguna medida al respecto. Uno de ellos murió en detención el 7 de agosto de 2019 presuntamente a causa de torturas. El Grupo también recibió pruebas de numerosas violaciones de las garantías procesales de los detenidos: sus confesiones no solo se obtuvieron bajo tortura y se utilizaron como pruebas en su contra, sino que el juicio comenzó sin que ellos tuvieran acceso a un abogado. Sus abogados tuvieron que hacer varias peticiones para acceder a las pruebas. En varias ocasiones, los acusados no pudieron reunirse con sus abogados antes de las sesiones judiciales. Se avisó a los abogados con muy poca antelación de las audiencias judiciales, lo que les dejó poco tiempo para prepararse. El 24 de agosto de 2020, todos los detenidos fueron condenados a muerte, lo que fue confirmado en apelación<sup>119</sup>. Los nueve fueron ejecutados públicamente. Sus familias fueron notificadas un día antes de la ejecución. Ya que muchos de los familiares de los condenados viven en Al-Hudayda, no pudieron viajar a tiempo a Saná.

122. El Grupo sigue investigando el caso de cuatro periodistas condenados a muerte que siguen detenidos en Saná<sup>120</sup>. Según la información recibida, durante el período que se examina, hubo conversaciones sobre su inclusión en un intercambio de prisioneros, pero estas no tuvieron resultado.

<sup>115</sup> Véanse, entre otros, Convenios de Ginebra, artículo 3, los artículos 4, 5 y 6 del Protocolo II Enmendado, y las normas 90, 93, 98, 100, 123 y 125 del derecho internacional humanitario consuetudinario.

<sup>116</sup> Véanse [S/2020/326](#), párrs. 22 y 118, y [S/2021/79](#), párr. 137.

<sup>117</sup> Las pruebas incluyen entrevistas, informes y documentos judiciales de por lo menos seis fuentes diferentes, incluidos los familiares de las víctimas.

<sup>118</sup> Véase [www.almanar.com.lb/5135682](http://www.almanar.com.lb/5135682).

<sup>119</sup> Según la información recibida por el Grupo, los jueces de apelación fueron Abdul Hafeez Abdul Razzaq Al Mahbashi, Hammoud Ahmed Al-Qulaisi y Muhammad Lotf Al-Zubayri.

<sup>120</sup> Véase [S/2021/79](#), párr. 147.

### 3. Reclutamiento de niños

123. El Grupo recibió una lista de 1.406 niños reclutados por los huzíes que habían muerto en el campo de batalla en 2020. El Grupo también recibió una lista de 562 niños reclutados por los huzíes, que murieron en el campo de batalla entre enero y mayo de 2021<sup>121</sup>. Tenían entre 10 y 17 años. Un gran número de ellos fueron asesinados en Amran, Dhammar, Hayya, Al-Hudayda, Ib, Sada y Saná (anexo 10).

### 4. Persecución y discriminación por motivos religiosos

124. El Grupo documentó la persecución sistemática de los judíos en las zonas controladas por los huzíes. La mayor parte de la población judía abandonó el Yemen tras varios años de persecución, que comenzó durante el Gobierno del expresidente Ali Abdullah Saleh, pero que se intensificó durante el régimen huzí. El Grupo tiene conocimiento de siete personas judías que permanecen en el Yemen, incluida una que sigue detenida a pesar de que en julio de 2019 se emitió una orden para su puesta en libertad. El Grupo también documentó dos casos de cristianos detenidos por los huzíes debido a su religión (véase el anexo 34).

125. Los procedimientos judiciales contra varios bahaís siguen activos a pesar de que muchos de ellos fueron expulsados del Yemen<sup>122</sup>; uno de los objetivos es completar la incautación de sus bienes y propiedades. En un discurso pronunciado en marzo de 2021, Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004), acusó a los “estadounidenses de tratar de establecer los movimientos Bahá’í y Ahmadiya y el ateísmo en el Yemen para socavar el Islam”<sup>123</sup>, mostrando su apoyo a esta política de persecución sistemática<sup>124</sup>.

### 5. Ataques contra la población civil

126. El Grupo investigó los ataques perpetrados por los huzíes contra la población civil en varias aldeas de la región de Hima, Taiz, en enero de 2021. Según la información, las denuncias y los testimonios recibidos<sup>125</sup>, en los ataques resultaron muertas 13 personas, incluido un niño, heridas 47 personas, entre ellas 7 niños y 7 mujeres, detenidas 257 personas, incluidos 14 niños, y desplazadas unas 150 familias. Al menos tres escuelas fueron allanadas por los huzíes y utilizadas para fines militares y de detención. La zona de Hima fue objeto de ataques anteriormente, en diciembre de 2017 y en abril de 2019.

127. Hacia finales de septiembre de 2021, los huzíes rodearon el distrito de Abdiya, Marib, y bloquearon el acceso por carretera. Durante varias semanas, la población civil sufrió escasez de alimentos y medicamentos<sup>126</sup>. El Grupo recibió información sobre 59 hombres detenidos por los huzíes durante este período, así como testimonios

<sup>121</sup> Estas listas fueron recopiladas por una fuente confidencial y por el Gobierno del Yemen, utilizando los anuncios públicos de los medios de comunicación huzíes. El Grupo también recibió un informe que contenía los nombres de 640 niños. El Grupo está dispuesto a compartir estas listas con el Comité.

<sup>122</sup> Véase S/2021/79, párr. 139.

<sup>123</sup> Véanse <https://web.archive.org/web/20210310212347> y [www.almasirah.net/post/181849](http://www.almasirah.net/post/181849).

<sup>124</sup> Véanse S/2021/79, párr. 139; S/2019/83, párr. 154, y S/2018/193, párr. 149.

<sup>125</sup> El Grupo recibió información de fuentes locales y de organizaciones no gubernamentales que incluía fotos, informes y vídeos.

<sup>126</sup> Esto se debió principalmente al bloqueo de los artículos comerciales. Según la información recibida por el Grupo, el Programa Mundial de Alimentos distribuyó alimentos a unas 15.000 personas a comienzos de septiembre y a finales de octubre, como estaba previsto inicialmente.



sobre la destrucción de una antena de comunicaciones, lo que hizo muy difícil obtener información sobre la situación<sup>127</sup>.

## F. Acciones atribuidas a Al-Qaida en la Península Arábiga

128. El 14 de junio de 2021, cinco investigadores del Gobierno del Yemen fueron secuestrados por Al-Qaida en la Península Arábiga en Kura, Shabwa, cerca de la frontera con Al-Bayda, una zona que se encuentra bajo el control de ese grupo. El grupo difundió un vídeo de los detenidos y pidió al Gobierno del Yemen que los intercambiara con miembros de Al-Qaida en la Península Arábiga. Los detenidos fueron puestos en libertad el 5 de julio de 2021.

## G. Controversias sobre tierras

129. Las controversias sobre tierras y bienes son un problema de larga data en el Yemen. Sin embargo, los años de conflicto han debilitado los sistemas de solución de conflictos, especialmente la administración de justicia y el aparato de seguridad, y han aumentado el poder de los grupos armados y las bandas implicadas en las controversias. El precio de las tierras también ha aumentado en los últimos años. Como consecuencia, la violencia por controversias sobre tierras ha aumentado y los civiles se han vuelto más vulnerables a la usurpación de sus tierras y viviendas por grupos armados.

130. El Grupo investigó un caso para ilustrar esta cuestión. El 10 de agosto de 2021, en Bir Basha, Taiz, se produjo una controversia por unas tierras pertenecientes a la familia Al-Harq y ocupadas por un grupo dirigido por Majid Al-Araj, afiliado a la 145ª Brigada del Gobierno del Yemen. A consecuencia de la controversia, resultaron muertos Majid Al-Araj, uno de sus hombres y cuatro hombres de la familia Al-Harq, y otra persona resultó herida. Posteriormente, un grupo afiliado a Al-Araj irrumpió en las viviendas de la familia Al-Harq, en presencia de mujeres y niños. Tres miembros de la familia Al-Harq fueron detenidos: dos menores y un joven, el último de los cuales murió en detención. Los militares de Taiz informaron al Grupo de que habían intervenido para asegurar la zona y que dos sospechosos que se resistían a ser detenidos habían resultado muertos y que se había detenido a otras nueve personas.

## H. Migrantes

131. El 7 de marzo de 2021 se produjo un incidente en el centro de detención de la Autoridad de Inmigración, Pasaportes y Naturalización en Saná, en el que resultaron muertos unos 45 migrantes y heridos otros 202<sup>128</sup>.

132. Según la información recibida, tras una discusión entre los guardias y los migrantes, que estaban en huelga de hambre en protesta por las condiciones de detención, las fuerzas de seguridad intervinieron y lanzaron municiones lacrimógenas en un hangar en el que los migrantes se habían encerrado. Como resultado, se inició

<sup>127</sup> Según los informes de prensa, el 4 de noviembre 52 personas fueron puestas en libertad. Véanse [www.saba.ye/ar/news3162733.htm](http://www.saba.ye/ar/news3162733.htm) y <https://twitter.com/abdulqadermortd/status/1456239360844632068>.

<sup>128</sup> El Grupo recibió información de múltiples fuentes de que unas 28 personas habían muerto a causa de sus heridas tras ser trasladadas a los hospitales. Según la Comisión Nacional para la Investigación de las Denuncias de Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos del Yemen, el número de víctimas era de 400 (véase [www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf](http://www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf)).

un incendio en la estructura abarrotada y mal ventilada, que tenía una sola puerta<sup>129</sup>. Según las autoridades huzíes, ese día había 862 migrantes en las instalaciones y 358 estaban en el hangar cuando se produjo el incidente<sup>130</sup>. Según la información recibida, las autoridades huzíes confiscaron los teléfonos móviles de las víctimas, incluso en los hospitales, en un intento de impedir la comunicación sobre el incidente.

133. Los huzíes culparon públicamente a la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones por el incidente, afirmando que la organización no había repatriado a los migrantes, lo que había dado lugar a las condiciones de hacinamiento<sup>131</sup>. Asimismo, según la información recibida, la declaración emitida tras el incidente por un grupo de migrantes, en la que se afirmaba que el incendio se debió a una pelea entre migrantes<sup>132</sup>, se hizo pública a raíz de la presión ejercida por las autoridades huzíes sobre los dirigentes de los migrantes.

134. Los medios de comunicación locales informaron de que las autoridades huzíes habían iniciado una investigación que resultó en la detención de 11 personas<sup>133</sup>. El Grupo recibió pruebas de que cuatro personas habían sido detenidas tras el incidente. Unos cuatro meses más tarde, fueron liberadas después de que las investigaciones concluyeran que el incendio había sido un accidente y que no habían cometido ningún delito<sup>134</sup>.

135. Entre julio y septiembre de 2021, los huzíes llevaron a cabo una “campana de seguridad” en Yawf y detuvieron a más de 700 migrantes, algunos de los cuales fueron expulsados por la fuerza de las zonas controladas por los huzíes, mientras que otros fueron detenidos.

## VIII. Obstrucción de la prestación y distribución de asistencia humanitaria

136. Desde finales de 2020, se ha informado de algunos avances en lo que respecta al acceso humanitario y a la posibilidad de que las organizaciones humanitarias llevaran a cabo evaluaciones de programas en las zonas controladas por los huzíes. Tras un largo período de bloqueo por parte de las autoridades basadas en Saná, la ejecución de un proyecto biométrico del Programa Mundial de Alimentos, destinado a garantizar la asistencia humanitaria ha seguido su curso. También se ha establecido un servicio aéreo humanitario regular a Marib<sup>135</sup>.

137. Sin embargo, siguen existiendo numerosos obstáculos para la prestación efectiva de la asistencia humanitaria en las zonas controladas por los huzíes, como demoras en la aprobación de los subacuerdos, solicitudes para obtener detalles de las listas de beneficiarios, presiones para influir en la selección de los asociados para la ejecución o en el diseño de los programas, restricciones al acceso y denegación de movimientos, incluida la imposición arbitraria de un “mahram”, o sea de un acompañante para el personal femenino<sup>136</sup>, y el acoso al personal humanitario. Las autoridades locales a menudo tratan de imponer sus propias exigencias bloqueando el

<sup>129</sup> El Grupo recibió información de organizaciones humanitarias internacionales, organizaciones no gubernamentales locales y particulares.

<sup>130</sup> Véase [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005).

<sup>131</sup> Véase [www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212](http://www.smc.gov.ye/archives/14212).

<sup>132</sup> El Grupo recibió una copia de la declaración.

<sup>133</sup> Véase [www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005](http://www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005).

<sup>134</sup> El Grupo dispone de copias de los documentos.

<sup>135</sup> Véase S/2021/79, sección III.

<sup>136</sup> Esta norma impide que las mujeres viajen sin estar acompañadas por un varón de su familia. Limita la posibilidad de que las empleadas de las organizaciones humanitarias cumplan sus funciones y, de no acatarse, las expone a ser arrestadas y detenidas.

paso de camiones en los puestos de control o amenazando a los agentes humanitarios. El Grupo también documentó casos en los que se amenazó a las familias con sacarlas de la lista de beneficiarios si se negaban a permitir que sus hijos se unieran a las fuerzas huzíes (véase el anexo 10).

138. El Grupo recibió pruebas de abusos, acoso y obstrucción continua por parte de los huzíes contra una organización humanitaria específica para obligar a esa organización a cambiar su política. Los abusos incluyeron violencia física, detenciones y encarcelamientos arbitrarios, denegación de visado o de entrada, expulsión del personal superior, restricción de la libertad de circulación de personal y suministros, e interferencias en las actividades y en la elección de los proveedores de servicios (véase el anexo 37).

139. Además de los dos empleados de las Naciones Unidas detenidos en noviembre de 2021<sup>137</sup>, el Grupo documentó la detención y reclusión de otros tres agentes humanitarios por las autoridades huzíes.

140. Continúa la campaña mediática contra las Naciones Unidas. Esto no solo va en detrimento de las actividades humanitarias, sino que también crea riesgos de seguridad adicionales (véase S/2021/79, párr. 48 y anexos 7 y 8).

141. En el sur del Yemen, la debilidad de las autoridades gubernamentales hace posible que los agentes locales impongan sus propias exigencias. Los riesgos de seguridad para las organizaciones humanitarias también están aumentando: el Grupo documentó cinco incidentes en los que el personal humanitario o la carga humanitaria fueron bloqueados en los puestos de control y tres incidentes en que vehículos de las organizaciones humanitarias fueron secuestrados por agentes desconocidos en Abyan y Taiz.

142. En abril de 2020, en el sur del Yemen, una organización humanitaria suspendió algunas de sus actividades durante varios meses debido a un desacuerdo sobre los incentivos para algunos funcionarios del Gobierno.

## IX. Recomendaciones

143. El Grupo recomienda que el Consejo de Seguridad, en su próxima resolución:

a) Exhorte al Consejo de Transición del Sur y al Gobierno del Yemen a que se abstengan de adoptar medidas que socaven el Acuerdo de Riad, y exprese su intención de imponer sanciones a quienes participen en esos actos;

b) Exhorte a los huzíes, al Gobierno del Yemen, a las Fuerzas Conjuntas y a la Coalición a que se abstengan de adoptar medidas que socaven el Acuerdo de Estocolmo, y exprese su intención de imponer sanciones a quienes participen en esos actos;

c) Exhorte a las partes en el conflicto a que se abstengan de utilizar las instituciones educativas, religiosas y públicas para incitar al odio o a la violencia contra cualquier grupo o nacionalidad, y exprese su intención de imponer sanciones a los responsables de esos actos;

d) Exhorte a las partes en el conflicto a que se abstengan de utilizar las escuelas, las colonias de vacaciones y las mezquitas para reclutar niños, y exprese su intención de imponer sanciones a los responsables de esos actos;

<sup>137</sup> Véase <https://apnews.com/article/science-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-nations-yemen-f138d377483ac1e1d106b131c9676286>.

e) Exhorte a los Estados Miembros a que redoblen sus esfuerzos para combatir el contrabando de armas y componentes a través de las rutas terrestres y marítimas, a fin de garantizar la aplicación del embargo de armas selectivo;

f) Exhorte a los Estados Miembros a que aumenten las medidas de diligencia debida respecto de la exportación de componentes disponibles en el mercado documentados por el Grupo que se encuentran en los sistemas de armas utilizados en beneficio de las personas incluidas en la Lista (S/2021/79, anexos 19 y 20), e informen al Comité al respecto;

g) Exhorte a las partes en el conflicto a que tomen medidas para evitar una mayor fragmentación de la economía del Yemen, en particular de las instituciones bancarias y financieras, y exprese su intención de imponer sanciones a los responsables de esos actos;

h) Exhorte a las partes en el conflicto a que garanticen la rendición de cuentas por las violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario y del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos cometidas por sus fuerzas y a que proporcionen reparación y apoyo inmediatos a las víctimas;

i) Exhorte a los Estados Miembros, a las partes en el conflicto y a otras partes interesadas a que consideren la posibilidad de establecer mecanismos de justicia transicional para el Yemen;

j) Recuerde la resolución 2474 (2019) y exhorte a las partes en el conflicto a que adopten todas las medidas apropiadas para buscar activamente a las personas dadas por desaparecidas, establezcan conductos adecuados para facilitar la comunicación con las familias de esas personas y consideren la posibilidad de crear mecanismos para prestar apoyo a esas familias;

k) Exhorte a las fuerzas huzíes a que tomen medidas para poner fin al uso indiscriminado de minas terrestres, registren su colocación y retiren las minas terrestres existentes de las zonas civiles bajo su control.

144. El Grupo recomienda que el Consejo de Seguridad incluya en el orden del día de la reunión mensual sobre el Yemen un debate centrado en:

a) Los problemas a que se enfrentan las mujeres detenidas en el Yemen, que se presentan en el anexo 9, incluya a estas mujeres en futuras iniciativas de justicia de transición, y considere la posibilidad de incluir en este debate al Gobierno del Yemen y a otras partes interesadas yemeníes pertinentes;

b) El uso de instituciones educativas, religiosas y públicas para difundir discursos de odio, fomentar la violencia y reclutar niños, y considere la posibilidad de incluir en este debate al Gobierno del Yemen y a otras partes interesadas yemeníes pertinentes.

145. El Grupo recomienda al Comité que considere la posibilidad de:

a) Examinar con los Estados Miembros la posibilidad de crear un fondo para las personas que han sobrevivido a la violencia sexual, que incluya a los supervivientes del Yemen, como se establece en el párrafo 17 de la resolución 2467 (2019);

b) Colaborar con el Arreglo de Wassenaar sobre el Control de las Exportaciones de Armas Convencionales y Bienes y Tecnologías de Doble Uso para incluir en su lista de bienes y tecnologías de doble uso las piezas comerciales utilizadas en los misiles, las aeronaves no tripuladas y los artefactos explosivos improvisados flotantes de los huzíes;

c) Alentar a las partes en el conflicto y a otras partes interesadas, incluidos los mediadores internacionales, a que incluyan en el proceso de paz medidas para evitar una mayor fragmentación de la economía del Yemen, incluidas las instituciones bancarias y financieras;

d) Alentar a los Estados Miembros a que presten apoyo a la Comisión Nacional Yemení para la Investigación de Presuntas Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos, especialmente en lo que respecta a la salvaguarda de sus archivos, incluida la creación de una copia de seguridad digital en el extranjero, e insta a las partes en el conflicto a que colaboren con la Comisión;

e) Colaborar con las partes en el conflicto y los mediadores internacionales a fin de incluir medidas de rendición de cuentas, justicia y reparación en el proceso de paz;

f) Alentar a los Estados Miembros a aumentar el apoyo a las actividades de desminado, incluso mediante sesiones de capacitación para el personal de desminado en el Yemen.

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## **Annex 1      Methodology**

1.      The Panel used satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also used commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
  
2.      The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
  
3.      The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
  
4.      The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
  
5.      The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.



## Appendix A      ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity<sup>1</sup> in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
  - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm.
  - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
    - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation.
    - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources.
    - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members.
    - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field.
    - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

## **Appendix B            Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses**

1.        The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, [S/2006/997](#), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#).

2.        The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

- (a)        All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
  
- (b)        In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
  - (i)        At least two eyewitnesses or victims.
  - (ii)        At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii)        If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavor to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations.
  - (iv)        Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
    - a.        In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
    - b.        The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
  - (v)        The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident.
  - (vi)        Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and

- 
- international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
- (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced.
  - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area.
  - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody.
  - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates.
  - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities.
  - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.
  - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim.
  - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates.
  - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (xx) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
  - (xxi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from

detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture.

- (xxii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.
  
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
  - (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview.
  - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
  - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained.
  - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.
  - (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
  
- (e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:
  - (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.
  - (ii) Interviews with people and organization providing assistance to these children.
  - (i) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.
  
- (f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt".
  
- (f) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel's standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian

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home, or in violations associated with children.

- (g) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution [2564 \(2021\)](#) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.
3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.
  4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.



Map No. 3847 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS  
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

### Annex 3 Summary of Panel correspondence

**Table 3.1**

Correspondence with Member States

<i>Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December/Comments</i>
Belarus	2		
Bulgaria	1		
People's Republic of China	4	4	
Canada	1	1	
France	2	1	
Gabon	1		
Germany	1		
Greece	1		
India	1		
Islamic Republic of Iran	8		
Japan	1		
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	23	8	
Oman	7	5	
Russian Federation	2		
Somalia	1	1	
Sweden	1	1	
Syria	1		
Turkey	1	1	
United Arab Emirates	3	1	One was a partial response.
United Kingdom	1	1	Engagement ongoing in respect of response.
United States of America	8		
Yemen	23	15	One was a partial response.
<b>Total (21)</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>39</b>	

**Table 3.2**

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December</i>
Sana'a based ministry of foreign affairs	5	5	1
Sana'a based central bank of yemen	1	1	1
Southern Transitional Council	2	1	1
National Resistance Forces Guards of the Republic	5	2	1
Puntland	1	1	
<b>Total (5)</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	

**Table 3.3**

Correspondence with international and regional organizations

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>
World Food Programme	1	
United Nations High Commission for Refugees	1	
International Organization for Migration	1	
United Nations Children's Fund	1	
World Health Organization	1	1
UN Mission to Support the Hdaydah Agreement	1	
<b>Total (6)</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>

**Table 3.4**

Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities

<i>Commercial company</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters</i>
Aurum Ship Management FZC	1	1
Al Mantab Logistics Company (SFZ) LLC	1	
Al Talib Shipping Company LLC	1	1
BCD & ME GmbH	1	1
Dawood Group of Companies, Sana'a	1	1
Hayel Saeed Group	3	
Carl Walther GmbH	1	
Central Bank Yemen (Aden)	4	
International Smart Digital Interface Company LLC	2	
Lonca Paz. Mak. San. Tic. A.S.	1	1
MTN Group	1	1
OHI Marine LLC	1	
Sabafon, Aden	1	1
Sabafon, Sana'a	1	1
Stamos Steam Ship Co	1	
Swaid & Sons for Exchange Co	1	1
Tadhamon Bank	2	
Tele Yemen, Sana'a	2	
Tele Yemen, Aden	1	1
TORM A/S	1	
Walbro LLC	1	
Zodiac Maritime Ltd	1	
Al Yah Satellite Communications Company P.T.S.C (Yahsat)	1	
Y Telecom	1	1
Yemen Net	1	1
<b>Total (25)</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>12</b>




## Annex 4 Battle for Ma'rib and Shabwah in 2021

1. The hostilities which escalated in the first half of 2020 have continued throughout 2021.<sup>2</sup> The Houthis made significant territorial gains, including in areas in the Governorates of Al Baydah, Shabwah, Ma'rib, and Al Hudaydah. While the Government of Yemen, the Coalition air forces, and the West Coast Joint Forces (WCJF) have engaged in both offensive and defensive operations<sup>3</sup> (see map 4.1 and table 4.1), the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has mostly been defensive in its battles against the Houthis.

Map 4.1

### Houthi military gains in September-October 2021 around Ma'rib City



Source: Panel

2. Despite support from the Coalition and some local tribes, the Government of Yemen has not been able to maintain all its front lines against the Houthis (Table 4.1). Like in 2020, the Houthis largely focused on increasing hostilities on the Ma'rib frontlines, despite significant human casualties, in 2021. They have been conducting a war of attrition by continuously sending reinforcements to the multiple battle fronts; targeting civilian and military infrastructure with short-range missiles and UAVs; as well as targeting government-allied tribes, for example, in the encirclement in Al Abdiya.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In 2019, the Panel reported that the frontlines remained relatively stable (paragraph 11, S/2020/326).

<sup>3</sup> For example, this includes areas in Maqbanah, Hays and Al Ain and Hess Junction, Ta'izz. Information from military sources.

<sup>4</sup> The encirclement started around 23 September 2021, after the Houthis successfully cut the last supply line, when it took over Harib in Ma'rib. The encirclement lasted until approximately mid-October 2021 and had significant negative consequences for the civilians affected and for the overall conflict. Some individuals fighting in the Jebel Murad area stated that this had an impact also on the fighting in Jabal Murad, as the tribal fighters wanted to prevent a similar encirclement in their areas.

3. With the unexpected fall of Al Juba, bordering Ma'rib city, and Jebel Murad in late October 2021, there was some significant repositioning of the conflict parties. At the time of writing, Ma'rib city is one of the last strongholds of the Government after the STC took control of Aden in 2019.<sup>5</sup> In Al Hudaydah and in Ta'izz, the West Coast Forces and Government Forces are concerned that should Ma'rib fall, they would be the next target.<sup>6</sup> For the STC, if Shabwah falls, their potential source of financial revenue from petroleum resources and their ambitions of self-governance would be adversely affected. Additionally, the Houthis would have better access to Southern areas of Yemen through Shabwah. The Houthis would also be in a stronger negotiating position. Thus, for all members of the anti-Houthi forces, the possible fall of Ma'rib and Shabwah presents an existential threat.

4. Therefore, in response to this threat, the Coalition and the WCJF began significant political and military repositioning from September to November 2021, focusing primarily on curbing Houthi advances into their territories, as shown in Table 4.1 for Yemeni forces and Table 4.2 for Coalition forces. The Coalition confirmed that their movements were necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>7</sup> The Government informed the Panel that they were not given advanced notice of the movements of the WCJF.

Table 4.1

**Main areas of battles between the Government of Yemen, WCJF, and the Houthis**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Timing</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Al Bayda	23 September 2021	The Houthis announce that they took full control of Al Bayda. <sup>8</sup>	The Houthis justified the takeover as a move to combat AQAP. <sup>9</sup> The capture of Al Bayda enabled the Houthis to intensify its efforts on the Ma'rib frontlines.
Ma'rib	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	Houthis have reportedly taken control of eight of the 14 districts of Ma'rib Governorate, with four districts under their partial control. <sup>10</sup> Both sides are sending reinforcements for fighting around Jebel Al Balaq, which borders the heavily populated and government-controlled city of Ma'rib. The fall of areas in Harib, <sup>11</sup> Jebel Murad <sup>12</sup> and Al Juba <sup>13</sup> were significant defeats for the Government in this period.	The defeats in Ma'rib are attributed to tribal divisions within the Murad tribe, inadequate provision of weapons to tribal allies, and the need to avoid a catastrophic situation such as Al Abdiya. <sup>14</sup> Through the movements in Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz (see below), some anti-Houthi forces are attempting to consolidate their positions to reinforce and fight Houthis in Ma'rib and Shabwah. Tareq Saleh and the Government of Yemen on the one hand; and the STC and Tareq Saleh on the other hand, seem willing to temporarily set aside their differences, and to consolidate their efforts to fight the

<sup>5</sup> <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/dam-will-break-if-houthi-rebels-take-marib-yemeni-official>.

<sup>6</sup> Discussions with representatives of the WCJF and Ta'izz military forces.

<sup>7</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08); <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>8</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-الحوثيون-يعلنون-استكمال-سيطره-البيضاء](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-الحوثيون-يعلنون-استكمال-سيطره-البيضاء).

<sup>9</sup> [https://arabic.rt.com/middle\\_east/1276104-الحوثيون-يعلنون-استكمال-سيطره-البيضاء](https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1276104-الحوثيون-يعلنون-استكمال-سيطره-البيضاء).

<sup>10</sup> According to some sources, 8 of the 14 districts in Ma'rib are under Houthi control and 4 partially (Serwah, Madghel, Raghwan, and Al-Joubah). Marib city and Alwadi are under the control of the Government of Yemen and affiliated forces. Information updated as at 15 November 2021.

<sup>11</sup> Around 22 September 2021. The attack reportedly came from Shabwah's Al Ain district.

<sup>12</sup> Around 26 October 2021.

<sup>13</sup> Around 25 October 2021, the capital of the district fell to the Houthis, but as of 15 November 2021 the fighting is still ongoing.

<sup>14</sup> Discussions with Murad and other civilian, military and tribal figures in Ma'rib.

Shabwah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September, the Houthis took control of areas in Bayhan, Ain and Usaylan in Shabwah.	<p>Houthis.<sup>15</sup> However, the STC may be using the circumstances to push the Government for more political concessions.<sup>16</sup></p> <p>The battle for these areas in Shabwah was won by the Houthis, with minimal resistance from the Government of Yemen. This had led to the fear that should Houthis decide to advance to Shabwah's oil rich areas, they would be able to do so with relative ease. There were attempts by some units of the Giants brigades to reinforce Shabwah through Abyan.<sup>17</sup> A united front of anti-Houthi forces in Shabwah is adversely affected by: 1) The current political infighting in Shabwah;<sup>18</sup> 2) the unpopularity of the pro-Islah Governor with the STC, UAE, and consequently some West Coast armed groups,<sup>19</sup> and 3) the fact that for the STC, control of Shabwah remains an important element in the fulfilment of their aspirations.</p> <p>These movements appear to be linked to the military setbacks in Ma'rib.<sup>23</sup> WCJF and the Coalition came under criticism for the November 2021 withdrawal. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stated that</p>
Al Hudaydah	September 2021 – 15 November 2021	In September 2021, there was an exchange of control of territories between the Giants brigades and the National Resistance. Around	

<sup>15</sup> Statements made by the Political Bureau of the National Resistance (PBNR) on 28 October 2021 (see <https://2dec.net/news/46965.html>); and STC statement stating that they will fight alongside the National Resistance forces to fight the Houthis (see <https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter>). In the PBNR, which Saleh chaired, it was stated "the political bureau renewed its call for all political components and national forces to unite in the defense arenas of the republic, for the parties to open a new page in their relations with each other, and for all to direct their weapons and political and media discourse against houthi militias." The spokesperson of STC said "we welcome any efforts in the STC to unite to confront houthi militias along the frontlines in the south and Yemen, and we express our readiness to partner with the national resistance and support it... and keep its threat away from our country and the region, while affirming our commitment to our southern national objectives." PBNR informed the Panel that Saleh also offered to fight with GoY in Ma'rib, this was confirmed by GoY to the Panel. Additionally, see interview with Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185> and the Director of the Office of President Hadi confirming the offer made by Saleh at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136>.

<sup>16</sup> For example, STC's President has stated his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the Houthis should Ma'rib fall: In an interview published in March 2021, he stated that "The fall in Marib would have serious consequences, not just at humanitarian level but it might accelerate the process towards internationally convened talks between the North and the South. It could lead to a situation where the STC are largely in control of the South and the Houthis control most of the North. In that case, it would make sense to have direct talks between the parties that are in control." (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists>). On 9 November 2021, the STC also threatened withdrawal from the Riyadh Agreement, unless their demands were met from the Government side. <https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=2206>.

<sup>17</sup> Reportedly, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Brigades were deployed to Abyan. Confidential military sources and officials of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>18</sup> In November 2021, Sheikh Awad Mohammed bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki held meetings in Shabwah calling, amongst others, for the dismissal of the Governor Mohammed Saleh Bin Adio. The former, reportedly a well-respected GPC member, appears to be challenging the authority of the Governor, reportedly an Islah party member. He returned to Shabwah in November 2021, after reportedly living 6 years in the UAE (<https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15894#Shabwa>). His return comes in the backdrop of the escalating tensions between the Governor and GPC, Governor and the STC and some tribes, as well as the Governor and the UAE (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). The Governor in 2021, continued his calls on the UAE personnel to vacate Belhaf (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). In October 2021, after a discussion involving Saudi Arabia, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE left Ataq airport and Al Alam camp, but UAE personnel are reportedly still present in Belhaf (table 4.2). According to local sources, there were reported clashes in Al Alam after the departure of the Coalition forces, between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and the Government of Yemen forces affiliated to the Governor.

<sup>19</sup> Local confidential sources. See tweet from Governor at <https://twitter.com/Mbinadeow/status/1430157247439687694>, See also <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-war-uae-balhaf-seaport-clash-government> and <https://debriefer.net/en/news-26767.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Panel discussions with military sources.

		11 November 2021, <sup>20</sup> the WCJF reportedly moved 13 brigades <sup>21</sup> from 14 locations <sup>22</sup> along the coastal line. Around 12 November 2021, the Houthis occupied these areas and opened the Sana'a-Al Hudaydah road.	“the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces” is in line with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts. <sup>24</sup> Yet, the Yemeni Government stated that they did not have advance notice of this withdrawal. <sup>25</sup>
Ta'izz	September 2021 – 20 November 2021	On 19 November 2021, the WCJF confirmed having captured the Al Adin-Hess junction, which connects Ibb with the Al Hudaydah supply route for the Houthis, <sup>26</sup> as well as other locations in Western Ta'izz.	This was an important victory for the WCJF who had suffered significant reputational damage for the 11 November 2021 withdrawal. Unlike in Shawbah, in Ta'izz, the WCJF and the Ta'izz Military Axis, as well as the political leadership have at times set aside their differences to meet and discuss joint strategies <sup>27</sup> .

*Sources:* Panel based on various sources.<sup>28</sup>

4. The Coalition also undertook redeployments during this period at Table 4.2, which according to them were also necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.<sup>29</sup>

Table 4.2

**Significant Coalition movements in October and November 2021**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Comments</i>
9 November 2021	Al Bureika Base in Aden	Significant troop reductions reported. <sup>30</sup>
31 October 2021	Ataq Airport in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces reported. <sup>31</sup>
26 October 2021	Al Alam Camp in Shabwah	Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces. Clashes between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and pro-Government forces followed, which resulted in the latter taking control of the camp. <sup>32</sup>
October and November 2021	Several small military camps in Mahra	Redeployment and consolidation of Coalition forces at Al Ghaydah airport. <sup>33</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The Panel notes that different dates between 10 – 12 November are referred to as dates when the withdrawal began, by different interlocutors.

<sup>21</sup> Source: representatives of the WCJF.

<sup>22</sup> Source: representatives of the Government of Yemen.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

<sup>25</sup> See paragraph 20 of the main report.

<sup>26</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/241049>, <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314>. Confirmed by military sources.

<sup>27</sup> The last meeting was in October 2021, according to military sources.

<sup>28</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen and military sources, local authorities, and civil society from Al Baydah, Ma'rib, Shawbah, al Hudaydah, and Ta'izz.

<sup>29</sup> [https://twitter.com/EKH\\_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08](https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPBpc60A&s=08);

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/>.

<sup>30</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

<sup>31</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>32</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>33</sup> Government of Yemen sources.

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16 November 2021

Khalidiyah Camp in Hadramawt Complete withdrawal of  
Coalition forces reported.<sup>34</sup>

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**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/240827>.

<sup>35</sup> The Panel has requested KSA for more information on its withdrawals, a response is pending.

## Annex 5      Developments on the West Coast

### I.      Developments relating to Tareq Saleh<sup>36</sup>

1.      In 2021, Tareq Saleh was one of the most powerful Yemeni military leaders on the non-Houthi controlled West Coast, and his brother, Ammar Saleh, the most powerful security and intelligence figure in the same area.<sup>37</sup> On 25 March 2021, Tareq Saleh announced the establishment of a “Political Bureau of the National Resistance” (PBNR).<sup>38</sup> This is the political wing of the existing military entity under Saleh, which is also known as the Guards of the Republic. According to information received by the Panel from individuals close to Tareq Saleh, he resented the fact that he was effectively excluded from the negotiations leading up to the Stockholm Agreement. This situation may have been a contributing factor in the formation of the PBNR.<sup>39</sup>
2.      Tareq Saleh’s ascension into political and military power have been largely facilitated by:
  - a.      The lack of authority exercised by the central Government on the West Coast, which has failed to integrate all the various armed groups on the West Coast into the National Army, except for some Giant Brigades (paragraph 6).
  - b.      The inability of the Government of Yemen to provide adequate health care to the wounded fighters, or to pay regular salaries to local West Coast civil service, security, and military officials, letting them to seek this support elsewhere.
  - c.      Direct humanitarian and reconstruction support by the UAE that comes through the National Resistance for communities on the West Coast, rather than to the central Government, (paragraph 4 and 10).
  - d.      The reliance of local authorities and civilians on ‘humanitarian assistance’<sup>40</sup> provided by the National Resistance humanitarian unit, which further increases the dependence of local authorities on Tareq Saleh to provide for populations in their localities (figure 5.1).
  - e.      Access to wide-reaching intelligence networks of Ammar Saleh, which allows Tareq Saleh to counter security threats in the area. This has created a space in which it has become difficult for individuals to criticize Tareq Saleh or the National Resistance openly.<sup>41</sup>
3.      Tareq Saleh is also providing financial incentives to local authorities, as well as security support.<sup>42</sup> The Panel noted that the same Government leaders that spoke out against Tareq Saleh

<sup>36</sup> In this annex, in order to prevent reprisals against individuals, the Panel will not indicate the sources of information, where such may have a potentially negative impact on those sources. Sources for this section include members of the Government of Yemen and its armed and security forces, the Yemeni Coast Guard on the West Coast, Political Bureau of the National Resistance, Tihama Resistance, Tihama political leaders, Tihama Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, Tihama National Council, and other Tihama and West Coast human rights activists, National Resistance Forces, Giant Brigades, civil society, and local authorities in Ta’izz and Hudaydah Governorates.

<sup>37</sup> Ammar Saleh used to be the Deputy of the National Security Bureau under Ali Abdullah Saleh effectively from 2002 to 2012.

<sup>38</sup> <https://t.co/BK0o6B9Kij> / Twitter.

<sup>39</sup> Tareq Saleh was excluded from various peace initiatives, including the Stockholm Agreement and the Riyadh Agreement, and the formation of the Unity Government in December 2020. In an interview, Saleh said, “(t)he political office was created as a result of the ongoing political situation in Yemen and the developments that have occurred. We, on the West Coast, need a political entity that represents us in any upcoming negotiations, for it to be another voice that represents the Yemeni people outside of any religious political parties.” See <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>40</sup> The Panel cannot confirm if assistance provided by the National Resistance is intended or distributed in an impartial, indiscriminate, or neutral manner and without pre-conditions.

<sup>41</sup> Multiple confidential sources who received threats.

<sup>42</sup> As incentives, unlike salary payments, are not regular and depends on maintaining favor with the paying authority, some individuals informed the Panel that they could not act independently to carry out their functions, when these actions were inconsistent with what was required by the WCJF.

in 2019 and 2020, adopted a more submissive attitude in 2021, as they adjusted to the realities on the ground.

Figure 5.1

### National Resistance's humanitarian unit providing support on the West Coast



**Source:** <https://2dec.net/news47950.html> (right) (showing mobile clinics on the West Coast, note the ambulance has the name of the national resistance); <https://2dec.net/news47897.html> (left) (showing a convoy of humanitarian assistance, including reportedly 3000 food baskets to the newly liberated areas in Hays. It also contains a video of the Governor of Hudaydah thanking the National Resistance for the food baskets.)

4. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that neither the salaries paid to Tareq Saleh's fighters, nor the financial incentives that he distributes, came from the Government.<sup>43</sup> According to some fighters, their salaries or incentive payments are made by the UAE, through Tareq Saleh, mostly in Saudi Riyals.<sup>44</sup> The UAE stated that it provides "a substantial amount of financial support through the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen to the Government of Yemen to pay the salaries of West Coast forces."<sup>45</sup> The Government of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been requested to confirm the UAE's statement; the Panel has not yet received a response.

5. In 2021, the relationship between the Government of Yemen and Tareq Saleh remained complex, but cordial.<sup>46</sup> The Government cannot maintain the new frontlines with the Houthis in the Hudaydah Governorate and in West Ta'izz without the WCJF. At the same time, it cannot provide salaries or other support to maintain the loyalty of those forces to the Government. According to some, the establishment of the Political Bureau by Tareq Saleh is part of a plan to further consolidate his political position in the West Coast and in Yemen (see paragraph 7).<sup>47</sup> Indeed, since its establishment, Saleh has engaged in high-level meetings with foreign interlocutors, articulating his vision for Yemen.

6. The establishment of the PBNR and Tareq Saleh's engagement with the international community has created significant unease and tensions, especially amongst some communities

<sup>43</sup> Multiple sources from the Government of Yemen.

<sup>44</sup> Discussions in April, June, August and September 2021 with the Giant Brigades, leaders from Tihama, and Government of Yemen security and military forces. Some of these individuals were receiving incentives that they said came from the UAE. The STC negotiating team in Riyadh informed the Panel that while they were being supported by the Coalition, Tareq Saleh was supported bilaterally by the UAE.

<sup>45</sup> Communication to the Panel in November 2021.

<sup>46</sup> The Panel requested the Government of Yemen to provide a clarification on the nature of its current relationship with Tareq Saleh, the Panel is awaiting a response.

<sup>47</sup> Discussions with Government of Yemen officials, Tihama community leaders, and some leaders in the Tihama National Council.

in Tihama.<sup>48</sup> They have expressed concerns that Tareq Saleh, an outsider to, and a guest of, the Tihama region is positioning himself as the *de facto* ruler of the region. Barely two weeks after the formation of the PBNR, there were clashes reported between the National Resistance forces and some local communities, with three reported deaths.<sup>49</sup> The withdrawal in November 2021, have further escalated tensions between Saleh and some Tihama political leaders (paragraph 29 of the main report and appendix 3).

7. The establishment of the PBNR has also created some tensions within the General People's Congress (GPC) because Saleh's primary support base comes from the GPC. This move has further weakened the already fragmented GPC. For example, representatives of the Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi 005)-led GPC faction informed the Panel that it did not support the formation of the Political Bureau, even if they continue to work together on some matters with Saleh.<sup>50</sup> While Saleh states publicly that the PBNR is not an alternative for the GPC, and that the PBNR represents the Joint Forces on the West Coast, it is likely that his ambitions are not limited to the West Coast.<sup>51</sup> Saleh's PBNR representatives indicated to the Panel that the Political Bureau's ambitions and reach were national, and not merely regional.<sup>52</sup>

## II. Developments relating to the Giant Brigades

8. The Giant Brigades have acted as a "neutral force" in maintaining peace between different anti-Houthi forces. Within the Giants, there are units that are aligned with the Government of Yemen, while some others are more aligned with the United Arab Emirates. The Giants have successfully maintained a ceasefire in Abyan, following clashes between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen (see S/2021/79, paragraph 40).<sup>53</sup> In the June 2021 negotiations around the Riyadh Agreement, the possibility of deploying units of the Giants Brigade as a neutral force to protect the Yemeni Prime Minister and other Government officials in Aden was discussed.<sup>54</sup>

9. The Giants Brigade, in a communication with the Panel, informed that its present leader, Abu Zara al Mahrami, was appointed by President Hadi.<sup>55</sup> Around June 2020, al Mahrami returned to Aden from the UAE and then travelled onwards to the West Coast. He was reappointed as the commander of the different Giant brigades, as well as some Tihama brigades.<sup>56</sup> In 2021, there have been frictions and clashes between some components of the Giant Brigade. For example, tensions arose when Al Mahrami ordered to change the leaders of

<sup>48</sup> Discussions with representatives of the Tihama community including civil society, the Tihama National Council and the Tihama resistance forces.

<sup>49</sup> These clashes reportedly began after Tareq Saleh forces forcefully entered the house of a local prominent General People's Congress (GPC) leader in Mukha Zaid al Kharj. Tareq Saleh forces justified this to the Panel as a security operation. Others say the clashes was linked to the PBNR's formation.

<sup>50</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the GPC, June 2021.

<sup>51</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021. In an interview Saleh said, "The GPC is the umbrella that we are all under, but unfortunately, it was fragmented between those inside Yemen and those outside. This major political party was not given the opportunity to play its role in the Yemeni political arena, whether in foreign representation or internally. Inside Yemen, it is under pressure by the Houthis and the GPC in Sana'a has become very marginalized in its political role. Outside of the country, it is divided into a number of different factions. We hope the GPC can play a very important role. We're obviously never going to be an alternative to the GPC and the role it has played. But the political office of the National Resistance represents the Joint Forces here on the West Coast, and it also represents the political arm of all of these forces here in the Yemeni political arena."

See, <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>.

<sup>52</sup> Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021.

<sup>53</sup> The Panel understands that a unit under the leadership of the Giants, is in Abyan, maintaining a buffer zone and facilitating movement and communication between the two forces belonging to the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council. Discussions with individuals from the Giant Brigades, the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Protection Brigade, based in Abyan, and the Coalition. According to the 1<sup>st</sup> Presidential Brigade, the unit is under Hamdi Shukri.

<sup>54</sup> Panel discussions with both STC and Government negotiating teams.

<sup>55</sup> December 2021.

<sup>56</sup> This includes the 1st Tihama and the 1st Zaraniq brigade. Zaraniq is a tribe in Tihama.



the 1st and 11th Tihama Brigades and the 3rd Giants Brigade. (see also appendix 3). In two cases, there were affiliations between these units and the Government of Yemen. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade was also the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade under the Government of Yemen. In May 2021, the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade Commander was also named as the Commander of the 8<sup>th</sup> Presidential Brigade.<sup>57</sup> Subsequently, he was ordered by Al Mahrami to step down and was replaced by another senior commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.<sup>58</sup> In the case of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, it saw two leadership changes<sup>59</sup> and clashes in 2021 when Al Mahrami attempted to change, the second leader, Abu Ayesha, and replace him with a third individual, who was not a member of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Giants Brigade.<sup>60</sup> The Giants Brigade in its communication with the Panel in December 2021, justified the changes of Abu Ayesha because of, amongst others, his links to Islah party. The Panel received allegations against all the leaders mentioned in this paragraph relating to financial mismanagement of military resources.

### III. Developments relating to Tihama Fighters

10. In late 2020, all armed groups on the West Coast were reorganized under the dual leadership of Tareq Saleh of the National Resistance<sup>61</sup> and Abu Zara Al Mahrami of the Giant Brigades.<sup>62</sup> Some Tihama leaders viewed this as an attempt by the UAE and Tareq Saleh to reduce the Tihama influence on the West Coast, for example, by dividing their military forces under the command of two leaders who are not originally from the Tihama and preventing them, the Tihama people, from making autonomous military decisions (see also paragraphs 50 – 52 and annex 5 of S/2021/79). In discussions with the Panel, Tihama military and political leaders complained of persistent marginalization by different Yemeni leaders and the Government of Yemen, and lack of basic services for the local population. Both the Tihama and WCJF representatives acknowledged that because most of the Tihama fighters were only receiving their salaries through the Giants Brigade and National Resistance leaderships, they are compelled to fight with WCJF to ensure their and their families' survival.

11. The Tihama political leadership appeared to be divided; sometimes the Panel received conflicting political messages from them. The leadership includes those within the Tihama National Council, the Tihami Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, and Tihama leaders who are also members of the GPC. Some informed the Panel that if the 'occupation' of their lands continued by Tareq Saleh, they would have no choice but to use force to assert autonomy like the STC. Other Tihami leaders, some of whom were loyal to Saleh, expressed the need for a peaceful political solution based on equitable access to the resources on the West Coast. The Peaceful Tihama Movement, a political wing in the West Coast, and the Tihama Resistance, condemned the withdrawals of the WCJF in November 2021, particularly in view of the subsequent atrocities committed by the Houthis over the Tihama population (appendix 3).

<sup>57</sup> The appointment letter is with the Panel. Source: Government of Yemen.

<sup>58</sup> In discussions with the Panel, it was mentioned that the Giant Force leadership only removed him from his position as the Commander of the Tihama, but that his appointment by President Hadi remains unchanged.

<sup>59</sup> The first change was of Abdul Rahman al Lahji. The Giant Brigade informed the Panel in a communication in December 2021 that he was also appointed as the leader of the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade by the Government. The second leader was Abu Ayesha.

<sup>60</sup> According to information received by the Panel from the 3rd Giants Brigade and other sources, Abu Zara al Mahrami, sought to replace the Brigade leadership with a Yemeni individual who had returned from fighting in Libya.

<sup>61</sup> For example, the 4<sup>th</sup> Tihama Brigade joined Tareq Saleh in 2020 due to largely non-payment of salaries by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>62</sup> As opposed to 2019 when different force commanders were on an equal footing. See <https://www.erehnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139> where a spokesperson for the West Coast said "this council includes members of all joint forces and has no president, deputy, secretary and the like, all under the leadership and supervision of the Arab alliance, and the council includes a selection of forces participating in the west coast front" and see appendix 4.

#### IV. UAE and the Coalition's role in the West Coast

10. The current role of the UAE on the West Coast remains opaque. The UAE has acknowledged to provide support to the WCJF and to the West Coast on humanitarian and development matters (figure 5.2 and 5.3).<sup>63</sup> However, the UAE has not been clear on the nature of its current military support to the WCJF; in July 2021, the UAE denied that it had provided any military support to Tareq Saleh or his forces. In October 2021, in contrast, the UAE stated that it had provided such support in 2019.<sup>64</sup> In July 2021, the UAE stated that it had no troops permanently present on the West Coast.<sup>65</sup> According to sources on the ground, the UAE continues to have some presence on the West Coast,<sup>66</sup> even if it is not at the same scale before mid-2019. The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE does not exercise any direct or indirect authority over the leaders or their security and military operations” in the WCJF, and that “Tareq Saleh and Abu Zara (al Mahrami) are part of the joint forces, whose tasks include confronting the Houthis and managing operations in the west coast. The Coalition’s joint command deals with any problems they face”.<sup>67</sup> The Panel notes that in an interview with Saleh, he said that “the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance.” (appendix 4).<sup>68</sup>

<sup>63</sup> UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has provided a substantial amount of humanitarian support to the West Coast prior to June 2019 (building schools, hospitals, reconstruction, including of Mocha port); and it continues to provide support to maintain the infrastructure that it has rehabilitated.” UAE communication to the Panel, November 2021.

<sup>64</sup> The UAE in its communication with the Panel in November 2021, informed the Panel that prior to 2019 “(t)he UAE as a part of the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen worked with these forces (West Coast armed groups and STC) to ensure that they are trained and equipped as a part of the capacity building measures that was undertaken by the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen. The UAE’s support was in the interest of ensuring that these forces were able to prevent and respond to Houthi and AQAP security threats, including after the departure of the UAE. This support was given with knowledge of the Government of Yemen.” The Panel received videos showing military vehicles coming into the Mocha port; the National Resistance in August 2021 stated that they arrived prior to the UAE’s redeployment around mid-2019, as the UAE wanted to provide new military equipment and vehicles to the armed groups in the West Coast prior to their movement.

<sup>65</sup> Discussions between the Panel and the UAE, July 2021.

<sup>66</sup> Individuals from the armed groups on the West Coast.

<sup>67</sup> Communication from the UAE, October 2021.

<sup>68</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185>. The extracts are as follows:

*Saleh: Even before the withdrawal of the Emirati forces, they formed the Joint Command and a joint operations room between the National Resistance and the Giants Brigades... So the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance. Decisions are made all through consensus and consultations, through meetings between the leadership and representatives of all these parties.”*

*“Sana’a Center: ...What is the current state of your relationship with the UAE?”*

*Saleh: It is a partnership. We and the UAE have put in place principles for this coalition, for this alliance, this is our cause and our interest. The UAE are part of this coalition and we need support to fight against the Houthis. We welcome their support on the condition that we are partners to liberate Yemen and to restore the state. These are our main objectives, to restore the state and ensure the return of state institutions and the legitimate government. This is the agreement that we had for our partnership with the UAE and they have adhered to this. There are no other interests or agendas outside of the liberation of Yemen from the coup,”*

Figure 5.2

### UAE support to the West Coast (Tweet from spokesperson of the National resistance)



Source: <https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1464884661226770435> (right). (Spokesperson of the National Resistance tweet on of the arrival of eighty thousand doses of COVID-19 vaccines provided by the UAE to the joint forces and civilians in the districts of the West Coast) and <https://2dec.net/news47970.html> (left) on the “west coast department of the national resistance medical forces” launching the first phase of the vaccination campaign for citizens and military personnel.

Figure 5.3

### UAE support to the West Coast (tweet from Tareq Saleh)



Source: <https://twitter.com/tarikyemen/status/1466290740401741826>. (reportedly a completed apartment construction project in Mukha by the UAE to commemorate Ali Abdullah Saleh YEi.003)<sup>69</sup>

11. The Panel finds that, within the Coalition, the UAE continues to retain significant influence over the West Coast forces. In at least two documented incidents, the UAE has, according to individuals present at the meetings, been involved in trying to contain tensions and infighting amongst WCJF and between WCJF and Tai'zz military.<sup>70</sup> The Tihama leaders allege that the UAE, as well as Tareq Saleh, was instrumental in the reorganization of the West Coast armed groups in late 2020, that resulted in all Tihama forces falling under the dual leadership of Abu Zara al Mahrami and Tareq Saleh (appendices 3 and 4).

<sup>69</sup> Confirmed by a representative of the National Resistance.

<sup>70</sup> The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has good relations with the above-mentioned parties, but its influence on those parties is limited and focused on advancing the peace process. In light of its relationships, the UAE is working on reducing any armed escalations resulting from conflicting opinions, since the escalation took place before the Riyadh Agreement, in order to advance the peace process.”

12. For most part of 2021, the KSA appeared to keep its focus on Ma'rib, while the Government continued to allow the UAE, through the Coalition's Joint Forces Command established by the Coalition, to take the lead on the West Coast.<sup>71</sup> In November 2021, the Coalition clarified its own role in the withdrawals in Hudaydah and stated that "The joint forces in the West Coast carried out the redeployment and the reposition of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition" (appendix 1). It is the first time, that the Panel is aware of, that the Coalition acknowledged its role in a significant military operation in Yemen, without the prior knowledge of the Government.<sup>72</sup> The WCJF in its statement did not refer to the role of the Coalition (appendix 2), however, its representatives bilaterally acknowledged the leadership of the Coalition in this operation, to the exclusion of the Government.

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<sup>71</sup> Representatives of the Government informed the Panel that the UAE continues to have control or influence over the West Coast forces, even after their redeployment in mid-2019.

<sup>72</sup> The Panel has provided Saudi Arabia an opportunity to clarify if it informed the Government in advance of this movement, a response is pending.

## Appendix 1 Media article on the statement by the Coalition Spokesperson on the redeployments of Coalition forces and withdrawals of the WCJF

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Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen: Repositioning and Redeployment of the Joint Forces in the West Coast Is a Military Decision Taken by The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be Aligned with its Military Strategy in Yemen

Monday 1443/4/10 - 2021/11/15

Riyadh, Nov. 15, 2021, SPA -- Official Spokesperson of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen Brigadier General Turki Al-Malki issued the following statement:

"The redeployment and repositioning of Coalition military forces and Yemeni government forces in the area of operations falls under military strategies carried out by the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition to be aligned with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast carried out the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition. The repositioning and redeployment operation was carried out with discipline and flexibility as planned, which falls in line with future plans of the Coalition forces.

We commend the discipline of all Coalition Countries' military forces, as well as the Yemeni National Army and the Joint Forces in the West Coast during their military redeployment and repositioning operation.

The Joint Forces in the West Coast has achieved numerous victories, which culminated in the (Stockholm) Agreement following the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia's intransigence towards sitting at the negotiating table. Following almost (3) years of holding defensive positions, and the disruption of the implementation of the (Stockholm) Agreement by the terrorist, Iran-backed Houthi militia, whose violations have exceeded (30,000) breaches of the Agreement's provisions, the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition deemed it important that these forces be redeployed and repositioned in order to become more effective and operationally flexible to contribute in the national battle of the Yemeni Army in a manner that guarantees its maneuverability and security in the area of operations; in a time where the Houthi militia still controls the three main ports on the Red Sea (Hodeida Port, Saleef Port and Ras Isa Port), and their disruption of the United Nations' supervision for the implementation of the Agreement.

We conclude by calling on the UN and UNMHA to play its part in implementing the (Stockholm) Agreement, as well as the international community to pressure the terrorist Houthi militia into full commitment and implementation of the Agreement's provisions."

--SPA

20:30 LOCAL TIME 17:30 GMT

0032

www.spa.gov.sa/2304419

Source: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2304419#2304419>.

## Appendix 2 Media Report on the statement by the WCJF





الرئيسية الأخبار - التقارير - المقالات - انتهاكات المليشيات - المساعدات الإنسانية - مكتبة الفيديو - العمالقعة في الإعلام - من نحن - اتصل بنا

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الأشهر

الأخيرة

**هندسة القوات المشتركة تزرع عشرات العشرات التامة زرعها مليشيات الحوثي تحت الجسور في حبس**

4 يونيو 2021

**إصابة مسنن الذي يتطابق فدية أطلقها مليشيات الحوثي على منزلها شرق حبس**

4 يونيو 2021

**الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تظهر الحفول الزراعية شمال حبس من الأرقام الجنوبية**

3 يونيو 2021

**القوات المشتركة لتقدم في منطقة الدين جنوب غرب الجرحي وتسيطر على مواقع المليشيات**

2 يونيو 2021

**الفرق الهندسية للقوات المشتركة تفكك عشرات الأرقام الجنوبية زرعها المليشيات في المزارع بحديرية حبس**

1 يونيو 2021



# الرئيسية | الأخبار | بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

### بيان صادر عن القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي

المركز الإعلامي لألوية العمالقعة

12 يونيو 2021



تتابع القوات المشتركة في الساحل الغربي، تطورات الأحداث المتتالية عقب تنفيذها قرار إخلاء المناطق المحكومة باتفاق (السويد)، لكون تلك المناطق محكومة باتفاق دولي يفيها مناطق منزوعة السلاح وأمنة للدينين الذين وقع اتفاق (السويد) بحجة حمايتهم وتأمينهم.

وإذنا، فإننا في القوات المشتركة، بوّجذ وثيقة راسخة وقوية بالمر - إن شاء الله - أن قرار إعادة الانتشار جزء من المعركة الوطنية التي بدأناها وبداها فيها الفائي والتفيس لمواجهة المخاطر التي تهدد أمن الوطن والمواطن اليمني حيوياً، وأتامن القومي العربي عموماً.

وإن قيادة القوات المشتركة، بوّجذ أنها اتخذت هذا القرار في ضوء خطة إعادة الانتشار المحددة في اتفاق (ستوكهولم) الذي تتمسك الحكومة الشرعية بتنفيذه، بالرغم من انتهاكات مليشيات الحوثي للاتفاق من اليوم التالي لتوقيعه، وما زالت المليشيات مستمرة في نسف الاتفاق حتى اليوم.

ولم تحط القوات المشتركة الضوء الأضخم لتحرير مدينة الحديدة، وجرمانها من تحقيق هدف استراتيجي لليمن وأتامن القومي العربي، كان من شأنه أن يسرع من إنهاء المليشيات الدولية، وإننا نرى واجبنا الديني والوطني يدفعنا للدفاع عن جيهاض ذات أهمية أخرى قد يسقطها العدو عند عدم وجود دفاعات كافية، وعدم وجود اتفاق دولي يردع الحوثي عن تقدمه، كما حصل مع فوانينا في (الحديدة).

وأنها قررت ذلك في سياق متابعتها التطورات؛ التي تشهدها جيهاض البلاد كلها، التي تفرض على كل جرد قادر أن يقدم الدعم والوعون بالوسائل المختلفة لجيهاض الدعاغ عن اليمن واليمنيين في مواجهة أدوات (إيران) التي تعيث خراباً في (البيضاء والويف)، وإسقاط ثلاث مديريات من محافظة شبوة وغيرها، تم الوصول إلى مشارف مدينة (مارب).

لقد رأت القوات المشتركة خطأ بفانها محاصرة في مناس دفعات منعوع عليها الحرب، بقرار دولي، فيما الجيهاض المختلفة تتطلب دعماً بكل الأشكال؛ ومنها: فتح جيهاض أخرى توقف الحوثيين عند حددهم، وبوّجذ للمواطن اليمني والعربي؛ الذي يعيش معنا معاركنا القومية، أن اليمنيين لن يحدروا جهداً في إعادة ترتيب صومهم ومعاركهم للقتال (صفاً واحداً كاليمنيين المرصوصين)؛ في كل جيهاض والجاه.

وعليه، فقد بدأت تنفيذ خطتنا التي تحدد خطواتها دفاعية، بوّجذ معركة الساحل وبنهي (تهامة) على أهبة الاستعداد لأي تطورات قد تطرأ في جيهاض القتال ضد الحوثي.

ومن المؤسف له، أن هذه الخطوة فوئت بتعميل إعلامي؛ يستهدف ضرب الثقة الصلبة لمنتسبي القوات المشتركة في إطار الاستهداف المعلن الذي تعرّض له فوانينا؛ بالطريقة والأدوات نفسها التي استخدمت في إضعاف دور الشرعية وفاعليها في المعركة الوطنية.

إن أبطال القوات المشتركة في الوحدات والتنظيمات العسكرية جميعها ملتزمون بمعركتهم في كل شبر في مواجهة الأوتة الدولية، وسنحذل جيهاضنا صلبة تحيق مليشيات إيران الهزائم المدلة.

وإننا ندعوا الجميع إلى استعمار الواجبه، ورش الصفوف، وتصدح النبات، والتزام الأهداف، حتى يقضي الله أمرًا كان مفعولاً، وإن نعر الله لتعريب.

Source: <https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/2-الساحل-في-القوات-المشتركة-في-البيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-2>

**Unofficial translation (confirmed as accurate by a representative of the WCJF):**

The Joint Forces at the West Coast are monitoring the developments of the successive events following their implementation of the decision to evacuate the areas governed (according to Stockholm agreement). The reason is that those areas are governed by an international agreement that keeps them demilitarized and safe for civilians under the pretext of their protection and security.

To begin with, we, in the joint forces, affirm with firm and strong confidence in victory - God willing - that the redeployment decision is part of the national battle that we have begun and made priceless and precious efforts to address the threats targeting the security of our homeland and the Yemeni citizen in particular, and Arab national security in general.

The Joint Forces command confirms that it made this decision in the light of the redeployment plan outlined in the Stockholm agreement, which the Government is keen to implement, despite violations committed by Houthi militias from the next day after the agreement was signed, as Houthi militias continue to violate that agreement till this day.

The Joint Forces did not give the green light to liberate Hudaydah city, and by doing so a strategic goal for Yemen and Arab national security was deprived from being achieved. If Hudaydah city is liberated, the end of Houthi militias would have been accelerated.

We see it as our religious and patriotic duty that motivates us to defend other fronts of other importance, which the enemy may exploit when there are insufficient defenses as well as when there is an absence of an international agreement efficiently deterring the Houthi militias from their progress like what happened with our forces in (Hudaydah).

The Joint Forces decided that decision in the context of following the recent events and developments at the fronts of the whole country. Those developments of events impose on every free person - to his ability - to provide support and aid by various means to the fronts of defense of Yemen and Yemenis in the face of the tools/hands of (Iran); which is wreaking havoc in (Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf), and which brought down three districts from and through Shabwa governorate, reaching the outskirts of (Ma'rib) city.

The Joint Forces had noted the mistake of remaining besieged in defensive barricades and being prohibited by an international decision from fighting, while the various fronts require support in all forms; an example of such support is to open other fronts that would stop the Houthi militias, and by that assure to the Yemeni and Arab citizens; who are living with us our national battles, that the Yemenis will spare no effort in rearranging their rows and their battles to fight (as one row like a solid structure); In every front and direction.

Accordingly, The Joint Forces has begun implementing its plan, which defines defensive lines, secures the battle of the coast and keeps (Tihama) ready for any developments of events that may occur at the fronts of fighting against the Houthis.

Unfortunately, this plan was met with media misinformation and was misleading; that aims to target and strike the solid confidence of The Joint Forces' members as usual; In the same way and tools that were used to weaken the role and effectiveness of the legitimate government in the national battle.

The heroes of The Joint Forces in all military units and formations are committed to their battle in every inch in the face of the Houthi tumor. Our fronts will remain solid, subjecting Iran's militias to humiliating defeats. We call on everyone to feel the duty, rearrange the rows, charge their well, and adhere to aimed goals until God decide on the matter and God's victory is nearby.

<p>بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ</p> <p>بتاريخ: ٩ / ٤ / ١٤٤٣ هـ</p> <p>الموافق: ١٤ / ١١ / ٢٠٢١ م</p>		<p>إقليم تهامة</p> <p>الحراك التهامي السلمي</p> <p>المقاومة التهامية</p>
<p>بيان الحراك التهامي السلمي والمقاومة التهامية رقم ( ٤ ) لسنة ٢٠٢١ م</p> <p>بشأن انسحاب القوات المشتركة من طرف واحد في مناطق سيطرتها على الساحل التهامي :</p>		
<p>لقد فوجئ الحراك التهامي والمقاومة التهامية في يوم الخميس الموافق ١١ نوفمبر ٢٠٢١ م بإنسحاب مفاجئ للقوات المشتركة من مناطق سيطرتهم في كل من مديرية الحوك ومديرية الحالي ومديرية الدريهمي ومديرية التحيتا والخض الساحلي بما يعادل ٩٠ كيلو متراً بدعوى تنفيذ اتفاق استوكهولم من طرف واحد؛ لتتقدم مليشيا الحوثي العنصرية الإرهابية لمحاولة السيطرة على مناطق الانسحاب.</p>		
<p>ورغم أن أبناء تهامة لم يكونوا طرفاً في اتفاق استوكهولم؛ إلا أن تنفيذ الاتفاق تحت أي دعوى كان يقتضي أن يكون الانسحاب من الطرفين في مناطق محدودة، بما في ذلك إخلاء المليشيا الحوثية لموانئ الحديد والصلب ورأس عيسى.</p>		
<p>ومهما كانت الدواعي السياسية أو العسكرية لهذا الانسحاب؛ إلا أن عدم وضع اعتبارات لنتائج على الحالة الإنسانية لأبناء تهامة في المناطق التي أخليت منها القوات وأعدت مليشيا الحوثي اجتياحها؛ مؤشر انتكاسة ترافقت مع ذعر الأهالي من عودة الاجتياح الحوثي وملاحقته وتصفياته والفوضى التي رافقت النزوح الجماعي مما يفترض أنها مناطق محررة وأمنة من بطش المليشيات.</p>		
<p>إننا في الحراك والمقاومة التهامية ندين ما حدث من انسحاب؛ أيًا كانت دواعيه وضروراته؛ نتيجة عدم أخذه لتداعياته الإنسانية في تهامة بعين الاعتبار؛ ونظراً لكون الميزرات والدوافع السياسية والعسكرية لهذا الانسحاب غامضة وغير مبررة؛ تطالب التحالف العربي باتخاذ موقف حازم تجاه ما حدث؛ وفتح تحقيق فيما جرى ويجري لأبناء تهامة؛ وإعادة تصويب الوضع بما يضمن إعادة السيطرة على المناطق التي تم الانسحاب منها وتطمين أبناء تهامة أن سلامتهم وسلامة أراضيهم مصانة وكرامتهم محفوظة.</p>		
<p>كما نحمل المجتمع الدولي في مقدمتهم الأمم المتحدة ومبعوثها الأممي كل المسؤولية الإنسانية عن التداعيات الإنسانية الكارثية التي حصلت وتحصل نتيجة غض النظر عن هذا الانتهاك الأرعن لجماعة الحوثي الإرهابية ومن يقف ورائها وتحملهم المسؤولية الكاملة تجاه الأهالي والمواطنين النازحين من أبناء تهامة والقيام بواجبهم في ضمان فتح كل الممرات الإنسانية لأهلنا في الداخل؛ وضمان وقف الانتهاكات الحوثية بحقهم والجرائم الانتقامية؛ بما في ذلك أي محاولات قسرية لعسكرتهم وعسكرة الحياة المدنية ووضع حد لجرائم الاتجار بالبشر.</p>		
<p>لا يخفى على كل متابع متعرض له أبناء هذا المنطقة الجغرافية الهامة في جغرافية اليمن والإقليم من محاولات إستهزائهم وتهميشهم من صنع القرار حتى بعد كل التحذيرات التي قدموها في سبيل منحهم حقهم في المشاركة العادلة في أرضهم، حيث تتابعت مسلسلات التآمر عليهم كمكون وطني أصيل ابتداء من تفتيت وتشتيت قوات تهامة نوعية</p>		





Source: Confidential, Tihama political leadership

## **Unofficial translation of the Statement of Tihama**

**In The Name of Allah the Merciful  
Tahamah Region  
Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak  
2021 A  
Tahami Resistance**

**Date: 9 / 4 / 1443 H  
Corresponding to 14 / 11 /**

### **The Statement of Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak and Tahami Resistance No. (4) of the Year 2021**

In regard to the unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at the Tihami coast:

Tihami Movement/Hirak and Tihami Resistance were surprised on the Thursday of 11<sup>th</sup> of November 2021 by the sudden unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at Al-Hawk district, Al-Hali district, Al-duraihemi district, Al-Tuhaita district and the costal line, and that was from about 90 kilometres under the pretext of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, for the racist terrorist Houthi militia to advance to try to control the withdrawal areas.

The sons of Tihama were not a party in the Stockholm Agreement; However, the implementation of the agreement required that the withdrawal should be by both parties in limited areas, this included the Houthi militia's evacuation of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa.

Whatever the political or military reasons for this withdrawal, the failure to consider its consequences on the humanitarian situation of the people of Tihama in the areas from which the forces were evacuated and the Houthi militia re-invaded; is considered to be a setback, resulting in the people's fear of the return of the Houthi invasion and its pursuits and assassinations, and the chaos that accompanied the mass displacement from what are supposed to be liberated and safe areas from the violence of the militias.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance condemn the withdrawal that took place; whatever its reasons and necessities, because it did not take the Tihama's humanitarian repercussions into consideration. Given that the justifications and political and military motives for this withdrawal are vague and unjustified, we demand the Arab coalition to take a firm stand towards what happened and to open an investigation on what happened and is happening to the sons of Tihama, changing the situation to ensure the restoration of control over the areas from which the withdrawal occurred and to reassure the people of Tihama of their safety and that the integrity of their lands are protected and their dignity is preserved.

We also hold the international community, led by the United Nations and its UN envoy, responsible for the catastrophic humanitarian repercussions that have occurred and are occurring as a result of turning a blind eye to this reckless violation of the terrorist Houthi group and those behind it.

We hold them fully responsible towards the families and displaced citizens of Tihama and call them to carry out their duty to ensure the opening of all humanitarian safe passages for our people inside; as

well as the responsibility of ensuring the cessation of Houthi violations against them (Tihama people) and the (cessation of) Houthi retaliatory crimes. This includes any coercive attempts to militarize them (Tihama people) and militarization of civilian life, as well as putting an end to human trafficking crimes.

It is no secret to the followers of the event; the attempts to exclude and marginalize the people of this important geographical area of Yemen and the region from decision-making, even after all the sacrifices they made in order to obtain their right to a just partnership in their land, the series of plots against them as an authentic national element continued, starting with the fragmentation and dispersal of the Tihama forces such as the (Tihama) Elite, the Third Brigade and the Eleventh Brigade, targeting the leadership of the Tihama Resistance First Brigade, and targeting the rest of the brigades, which were and are considered qualitative additions to Tihama and Yemen in general.

And now, after all the conspiracies to break up this Tihami force that is most eager to liberate its Yemeni land in the Tihami coast, we see those who fail them again, believing that they (Tihama people) will face their fate and that they are in a state of weakness.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance demand the legitimate government to announce the fall of the Stockholm Agreement as a result of the Houthi practices (Houthi advances) that accompanied the unjustified unilateral withdrawal; Issue a clear political position that considers the Stockholm Agreement as if it were nothing after this major setback, which prompted the Houthi militia to persist in recklessness. We also call on all the sons of Tihama and their free brothers from across Yemen to stand firm and line up, and we say to them: You are the ones who have resisted and liberated these areas, and you can recover them and defeat the Houthi terrorist militia. We also tell them rejoice, then rejoice, then rejoice, for aid and support will come to you very soon; Strengthen your vows, unite your words, unify your opinions, be on the heart of one man, leave differences aside, and make your goal the liberation of Tihama; So, persevere and be patient, and victory is your ally, by the will of God.

And just as victory swept you in the past, it will ally you recently and forever, because you are defending the right and defending your land, your religion and your faith, and on your hands, the myth of these militias has been broken and will end forever.

There is no place for traitorous climbers in the land of proud Tihama  
Mercy and forgiveness to the martyrs and a speedy recovery to the wounded.  
Long live proud Tihama freely.  
Issued by the Peaceful Tihami movement/Hirak  
On 11/14/2021AD

## Appendix 4 West Coast Joint Operations Room Command in 2019

**Table 9.1:**

Leaders of the Joint forces of the West Coast (established in June 2019 and information as of December 2019). Note: In 2021, the Panel understands that all of these brigades or leaders came under the National Resistance or the Giant Brigade.

Rank	Name	Forces	Comments
Major General	Haytham Qasm Taher	20 <sup>th</sup> Brigade	Former Minister of Defense (1990–1994).
Brigadier General	Ali Salem Al- Hassani	Amalika Forces	General Supervisor of the Amalika Forces.
Brigadier General	Ra'ed al Habhy	Amalika Forces	Commander, 1 <sup>st</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Hamdy Shukry	Amaliaka Forces	Commander, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Brigade, Amalika Forces
Brigadier General	Abdalrahman al Lahjy	Amalika Forces	Commander of the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Brigade. From Lahj.
Brigadier General	Tareq Saleh	Guards of the Republic/National Resistance	Commander of the Guards of the Republic.
Brigadier General	Ahmed al Kawkabany	Tihama Forces	Commander of the 1 <sup>st</sup> Tihama Brigade.
Brigadier General	Sadq Duwid	Guards of the Republic/National Resistance	Spokesperson for the Guards of the Republic
Brigadier General	Suleyman Mansour al Zaranwqy	Tihama Forces	Commander, Zaraniq Briagdes
Brigadier General	Ali al Kuniny	Amalika Forces	Commander, 7 <sup>th</sup> Brigade
Brigadier General	Bassam al Mehdar	3 <sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade	Commander, Facilities/Logistics Brigade.

*Source:* Various sources in 2019

## Annex 6 STC statements on military and security appointments

Figure 6.1

## Appointment of three leaders of the Security Belt Forces

13:02:58 2021-12-11 من نحن

بحث بحث

المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي  
SOUTHERN TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
الموقع الرسمي

الرئيسية | اخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | اذخار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعاز | English

الرئيسية / اخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

اخبار المجلس

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية

الجمعة ٢٥ يونيو ٢٠٢١ الساعة ٩:٠٠ مساءً

الأكثر قراءة

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزي بوفاه العميد حيدرة لهطل

فيديو

كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام للأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجنائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"

أصدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس فاسم الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية القرار رقم ٦٤ لعام ٢٠٢١م بشأن تعيين قيادة لقوات الحزام الأمني وعملها ضمن وزارة الداخلية. وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (١): تعيين العميد / محسن عبدالله الوالي، قائداً لقوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (٢): تعيين العميد / مختار علي مثنى النوبي، نائباً لقائد قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (٣): تعيين العميد / عبيد مثنى فاسم لعزم، ركن عمليات قوات الحزام الأمني.

ماد (٤): تقوم قوات الحزام الأمني بالمهام الأمنية والشرطية وتعمل ضمن قوام وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (٥): ينظم عمل قوات الحزام الأمني وفق نظم وقوانين وزارة الداخلية.

ماد (٦): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين.

+ 23

Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408487032297504774?s=08>.

## **Translation provided by the STC**

President Al-Zubaidi issues decision appointing leadership for Security Belt Forces and to work within Ministry of Interior

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 14 of 2021 regarding the appointment of a leadership for the Security Belt Forces and their work within the Ministry of Interior.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Brigadier General Mohsen Abdullah Al-Wali as Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Mukhtar Ali Muthanna Al-Nubi as Deputy Commander of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Obaid Muthanna Qassem La'ram – Operations Staff officer of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (4): The Security Belt Forces to carry out security and police tasks and work within the framework of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (5): The work of the Security Belt Forces is regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (6): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Figure 6.2

## Appointment of three leaders of the Support and Attribution Forces

13-16-57 2021-12-11 من نحن

بحث بحث

المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي  
SOUTHERN TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL  
الموقف الرسمي

الرئيسية | أخبار المجلس | تقارير | حوارات | أخبار الجنوب | البيانات | تقارير حقوقية | تعازي | English

الرئيسية / أخبار المجلس / الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة ألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية

## أخبار المجلس

### الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يصدر قراراً بشأن تعيين قيادة لألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية

الجمعة ٢٥ يونيو ٢٠٢١ الساعة ٩:٠٠ مساءً



أصدر الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي رئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، القرار رقم ٣٣ لعام ٢٠٢١، بمشأن تعيين قيادة ألوية الإسناد والدعم وضما للقوات البرية الجنوبية.

وتضمن القرار المواد التالية:

ماد (١): تعيين اللواء / صالح أحمد محمد السيد، قائداً لألوية الإسناد والدعم.

ماد (٢): تعيين العميد / علي ناصر متني المعكر، أركان حرب ألوية الإسناد والدعم.

ماد (٣): تعيين العميد / عبدالسلام زين علي البيحاني، ركن عمليات ألوية الإسناد والدعم.

ماد (٤): يتم نقل مقر القيادة وألوية الإسناد والدعم إلى خارج محافظة عدن ويتم ضمها ضمن ألوية البرية للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية.

ماد (٥): تخضع ألوية الإسناد والدعم لقيادة القوات البرية التي تخضع لوزارة الدفاع.

ماد (٦): ينظم عمل ومهام ألوية الإسناد والدعم وفق نظم وقوانين وزارة الدفاع.

ماد (٧): يعمل بعدا القرار من تاريخ صدوره، ويبلغ المعنيين.

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الأكثر قراءة

الرئيس القائد عيدروس الزبيدي يعزي بوفاته العميد حيدرة لعطل

فيديو

كلمة الأستاذ فضل الجعدي نائب الأمين العام للأمانة العامة لهيئة رئاسة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في تدشين الورشة التدريبية الثانية لبناء قدرات منتسبي الحزام الأمني والبحث الجنائي في "حقوق الإنسان وحقوق المحتجزين"

Source: <https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/1408485644603695109?s=08> .

### **Translation provided by the STC**

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 13 for the year 2021, regarding the appointment of a command for the Backup and Support brigades and their inclusion within the southern ground forces.

The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Major General Saleh Ahmed Mohammad Al-Sayed as commander of the the Backup and Support brigades.

Article (2): Appointing Brigadier General Ali Nasser Muthanna Al-Muaker – War Staff Officer for Support Brigades.

Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Abdul Salam Zain Ali Al-Bayhani - Operations Staff Officer of the Support Brigades.

Article (4): The headquarters and brigades of Backup and Support shall be transferred outside Aden governorate and shall be included within the land brigades of the Southern Armed Forces.

Article (5): Backup and Support brigades are subject to the command of the land forces, which are subject to the Ministry of Defense.

Article (6): The work and tasks of the Backup and Support brigades shall be regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Defense.

Article (7): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Note: The STC informed the Panel in December 2021 that there are no more military forces in Aden, and that they “fulfilled the Riyadh Agreement in this aspect from one side.” These military forces left to different fronts immediately after the issuance of the decree. The Government of Yemen denies that any movement of these forces outside of Aden.



## **Annex 7 Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020**

1. The Panel investigated the attack at Aden International Airport, which took place at approximately 1325 hours on 30 December 2020 shortly after a plane carrying the Ministers of the newly formed ‘unity’ government had arrived from Riyadh. The attack claimed the lives of 20 civilians, including Deputy Minister Yasmin al-Awadhi of the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Over 100 people were hospitalized as a result of injuries sustained during the incident. The Panel investigated whether the attack constituted a threat to peace and security in Yemen, as well as a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

2. Following an invitation by the Government of Yemen, the Panel visited Aden from 3 to 6 February 2021, where it had access to the impact locations at Aden International Airport as well as to the debris of the missiles used in the attack. The Panel also held meetings with representatives of the Government of Yemen and the National Commission for Inquiry, which were both conducting their own investigations into the incident. In Aden, the Panel interviewed victims and witnesses of the airport attack. It has also conducted remote interviews with a number of other individuals, including people who claim to have witnessed the launch of two missiles at the time of the attack from Tai’zz Airport. The Panel has also communicated on the attack with Houthis, journalists, independent analysts as well as international and local organisations.

3. The Panel had access to information provided by several Member States regarding the attack, including high-resolution satellite imagery of Tai’zz Airport from 30 December 2020. The Panel has requested permission to reproduce the imagery for this report, but so far the Member State which provided the imagery has not granted the Panel permission to do so.

### **I. Description of the incident**

4. On 30 December 2020, a Yemen Airways (Yemenia) Airbus A320-200 operating as flight IY535 left King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh at 1010 hours, carrying Yemeni Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed, members of his cabinet, other officials, as well as the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen. The new ‘unity’ cabinet had been sworn in just four days earlier after long negotiations between the Hadi government and representatives of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The cabinet’s return to Aden was seen as a crucial step in the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement. The arrival of the plane was awaited by a crowd of people, who had gained access to the airport’s apron. It was also broadcast live on Yemeni television (see figure 7.1 below). Despite the high-profile nature of the event, security around the airport on 30 December 2020 seems to have been relatively light, even though the Government has informed the Panel that it had received some intelligence information in the early morning hours of 30 December about a possible attack.

Figure 7.1  
**The scene at Aden airport immediately before the attack**



**Source:** <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344431245481160704>

5. The Panel was informed that the plane arrived at Aden International Airport at approximately 1317 hours, about 90 minutes later than originally expected. Just minutes before its arrival, the airport authorities decided to change the incoming airliner's parking position from line 1 (the closest position to the terminal) to line 2, which is approximately 50 metres further away from the terminal. It is also clear from the presence of a red carpet visible in some of the video footage that the plane was originally supposed to park closer to the terminal.<sup>73</sup> According to airport officials interviewed by the Panel, the decision to change the parking position was taken to increase the distance between the waiting crowds and the plane. Following the plane's arrival, there was an additional delay as Major-General Shallal Ali Shaya, former Director-General of Security in Aden, disembarked first to greet his supporters on the apron. Only after Shallal Ali Shaya had boarded a vehicle to leave the airport, the rest of the passengers, including the members of the cabinet, began to leave the plane.

6. According to the time stamp on the closed-circuit television (CCTV) tapes of the airport, the first explosion occurred at 13:24:35 hours, when the VIP lounge in the terminal building was hit by a missile (see figure 7.2), which penetrated the concrete wall and caused a crater with a diameter of approximately two meters. Based on the damage to the terminal wall (see figure 7.3), the Panel assesses that the first missile was launched from a northerly direction. According to witnesses interviewed by the Panel, the Government had been planning to hold a press conference at this location after the arrival of the Prime Minister and the other cabinet members from Riyadh. It is likely that only the delay described in the previous paragraph prevented members of the Government from being harmed by this missile, which instead killed and injured a number of passengers, all civilians, waiting in the departure hall for the departure of Yemen Airways flight no. IY612 to Cairo.

<sup>73</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2c0WXcyvTQ0>.

Figure 7.2  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the first missile  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:24:35



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.3

Damage to the outer wall of the terminal building, showing the angle of impact



*Source:* Panel

7. The second explosion occurred seconds later at 13:25:09 local time (based on the time stamp of the airport's CCTV footage), when a missile hit the airport apron (see figure 7.4), causing a crater with a diameter of approximately 75 centimetres with a depth of about 32 centimetres. The orientation of the crater shows that this missile impacted from approximately  $315^\circ$  from the North, i.e. from a north-westerly direction (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1). Given the dimensions of the crater, which are significantly smaller than in the case of the other two missiles, it is possible that the second missile carried a smaller quantity of explosives. Nevertheless, the missile impacted directly on lane 1 (see figure 7.5), where the Yemenia Airbus was supposed to park after its arrival from Riyadh. Had the plane's landing position not been changed at the last moment, it seems very likely that the plane would have suffered a direct hit, causing even greater loss of life and destruction.

Figure 7.4  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the second missile on the apron



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.5  
Impact point of the second missile on the runway



*Source:* Panel

8. At 13:25:33 local time, a third missile hit at a low earth wall close to the terminal building, approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile. The impact created a crater with a diameter of approximately 3 metres and a depth of 1.3 metres. Unfortunately, at the time of the Panel's visit to Aden International Airport, about four weeks after the attack, the crater had already partially been re-filled with earth, which made precise measurements impossible. However, the orientation of the crater, as well as the imagery from the CCTV cameras clearly shows that this missile came from a northerly direction.

Figure 7.6  
CCTV footage showing the impact of the third missile on the low earth wall  
30-12-2020 Wed 13:25:33



Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.7  
**Impact point of the third missile on the low earth wall**



*Source:* Panel

9. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel reported shots being fired. Gunfire can also be heard on some of the videos taken by journalists during the incident. Despite speculation that there was a simultaneous ground attack, the Panel has been informed by the authorities that those shots were fired by members of the Yemeni and Saudi security forces in the confusion following the explosions. With regard to the human toll of the attack, the Panel has received information from three different sources – the Government of Yemen, National Commission of Inquiry and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Aden – stating that a total of 20 people,<sup>74</sup> including three staff members of the ICRC perished as a result of the attack,<sup>75</sup> and that between 104 and 114 people were injured.<sup>76</sup> The difference in figures is due to the fact that the Government only listed people who were hospitalized, while OHCHR also included those injured but not hospitalized as a result of the attack. Among the injured were four children, nine women, ten journalists and 12 members of the military.<sup>77</sup>

10. The Panel has noted media reports that about four hours after the attack the Maasheeq palace, which is the seat of the government in Aden, was attacked by “an explosive-laden drone”, which was allegedly intercepted.<sup>78</sup> The Panel requested more information about this incident, and stands ready to conduct an inspection of the debris of the uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).

<sup>74</sup> This number includes three people who died from their injuries in hospital.

<sup>75</sup> <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-2-icrc-staff-members-killed-1-unaccounted-after-airport-blast>.

<sup>76</sup> The list with the names of the casualties received by the Panel from the Government of Yemen is reproduced in annex 4.

<sup>77</sup> According to information provided by OHCHR this number includes five foreign soldiers.

<sup>78</sup> <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2020/12/30/Yemeni-military-intercepts-explosive-laden-drone-near-Aden-s-presidential-palace>.



11. Immediately after the attack, the Government of Yemen attributed responsibility to the Houthis.<sup>79</sup> The Panel has taken note of statements by senior Houthi officials, including by the deputy foreign minister Hussein al-Ezzi<sup>80</sup> as well as by the ministry of human rights in Sana'a, who condemned the attack and stated that "the Saudi aggression coalition planned and directly supported terrorist groups to target Aden airport and civilians".<sup>81</sup> The Panel has not been able to find any evidence supporting the claim against Saudi Arabia. The Panel also notes that Abdulwahab al-Mahbashi, a member of the political office of the Houthis, when asked about the Aden airport attack, neither denied nor confirmed Houthi involvement in the incident, but rather stated in general that the Houthis have a right of self-defense.<sup>82</sup> In line with its methodology, the Panel has written to the leadership of the Houthi movement with detailed questions regarding the attack; a response is still pending.

## II. Possible launch sites of the attack on the Airport

12. The Panel is investigating different locations from which the missiles could have been launched on 30 December 2020. It has interviewed a number of witnesses, who claimed to have observed the launches, and has analyzed images and videos posted on social media in the aftermath of the attack. It has also reviewed satellite images obtained from different sources, including confidential images provided by a Member State. The Panel has also obtained the angle and direction of the impact craters and has cross-referenced this information with the CCTV footage, both of which imply that the missiles were launched from a northerly (in the case of the first and third missile) and a north-westerly (in the case of the second missile) direction. This suggests different launch sites.

13. Shortly after the attack, a number of videos were posted on social media which appear to show the launch of two solid-propellant<sup>83</sup> missiles in the vicinity of Tai'zz Airport. The four geo-located four videos (figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, using the angles and shadows of the sun, that they were taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>84</sup> The Panel also had access to a confidential, high-resolution satellite image provided by a Member State, which was taken on 30 December 2020 over Tai'zz Airport (13°41'08.88'' N, 044°08'21.12'' E). The satellite image appears to show two Transport-Erector-Launchers (TELs) positioned at a distance of several hundred metres apart towards the West of the airport's main runway. The TELs were oriented South-East, in the direction of Aden. According to the same Member State, the TELs were no longer visible on 31 December 2020. The Panel has requested a copy of the satellite image; a response is pending. The Panel has attempted to obtain high-resolution satellite images from other providers showing the same location at the same time but without success.

<sup>79</sup> [https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436](https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436).

<sup>80</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16883/Deputy-Minister-of-Foreign-Condemns-Targeting-Civilians-in-Aden-Airport>.

<sup>81</sup> <https://english.almasirah.net/post/16918/Ministry-of-Human-Rights-Saudi-Aggression-Coalition-Plans%2C-Directly-Supported-Terrorist-to-Target-Aden-Airport%2%A0>.

<sup>82</sup> [https://twitter.com/South24\\_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20](https://twitter.com/South24_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20).

<sup>83</sup> The smoke trails of the two missiles in the videos show a distinctive white smoke, which is characteristic of so-called "composite solid-propellant", a combination of Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), ammonium perchlorate, aluminum particles and other additives.

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>. Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

Figure 7.8

Footage from different social media sources (“Video #2”, left) showing two missiles launched from Tai’zz Airport on 30 December 2020



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224> (left), Government of Yemen (right)

Figure 7.9

**Approximate locations of the two TELs at Tai'zz Airport on 30 December 2020 based on confidential information provided by a Member State**



**Source:** Panel

14. It appears clear from the videos posted on social media on 30 December 2020 that one of the missiles launched from Tai'zz Airport malfunctioned and crashed shortly after take-off. A number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel stated that it crashed near the Al-Hashdi soap factory in the Al-Jund valley south of the airport. The distance from Tai'zz Airport to Aden Airport is approximately 135 kilometers, which would imply the use of a short-range ballistic missile system. Images posted on social media, which were allegedly taken at the location shortly after the launch, are showing the remnants of the guidance and control section of a missile with control-surfaces which are characteristic for a guided weapon (see figure 7.10). The witnesses also stated that the area was cordoned off by Houthi fighters immediately after the crash and that local citizens were forced to delete any images taken on their

phones. Yemeni media also mentioned a number of arrests made by the Houthi forces of local people, who had taken videos and images of the launch.<sup>85</sup>

Figure 7.10

Images posted on social media showing the remnants of a guided missile, which allegedly crashed near the Al-Hashdi factory on 30 December 2020



**Source:** [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=445103409846459&id=100030404109248).

15. In addition to the videos and images posted from Tai'zz, a number of videos were also posted on social media by users in Dhamar City on 30 December 2020, which appear to show the launch of two additional missiles. Three videos, which were geo-located (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, with slightly lower confidence than in the case of Tai'zz, that these were also taken shortly after 1300 hours.<sup>86</sup> The launch most likely occurred from a military police training center in the Al-Qarn area (14°30'41.4" N, 044°25'00.84" E) in the south of Dhamar City.<sup>87</sup> The Panel has been informed that the Government is in touch with a number of witnesses from Dhamar City, who have confirmed the

<sup>85</sup> <https://newsbeezzer.com/egypteng/after-divulging-evidence-of-his-involvement-in-the-attack-on-aden-airport-al-houthi-launched-an-arrest-campaign/>.

<sup>86</sup> Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.

<sup>87</sup> <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>.

launches. Unlike in the case of Tai'zz, the Panel has not been able to interview those witnesses. The Panel has tried to obtain satellite images of the likely launch location from a number of providers, but it seems that no high-resolution imagery was taken on 30 December 2020. The Panel notes that the distance from the police training center in Dhamar City to Aden airport is approximately 200 kilometres.

Figure 7.11

**Footage from social media (“Video 6”) allegedly showing the launch of two missiles from the police training center in Dhamar City**




**Source:** <https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345/>

### III. Analysis of the weapon system used in the attack

16. The Panel inspected the debris of the three missiles that were used in the attack on Aden airport. It is not clear who had access to the debris or whether pieces are missing, as it seems that entry to the airport was not tightly controlled in the immediate aftermath of the attack. It is also not clear which pieces belong to which of the three missiles as most of the debris was not labelled or packed in a way that would allow for clear attribution. The Panel is aware that pieces of debris are held by both the Government and by the National Commission of Inquiry.

17. The Panel has analyzed the CCTV footage from Aden airport, which for all the explosions clearly shows a missile-shaped form immediately before impact. Comparing the size of the shape with other objects in the frame whose size is known allows for a rough estimate of the missile's length, which is assessed to be between five and 5.5 meters (see figure 7.12 below). In addition, the impact angle points towards a ballistic missile, while the high degree of precision visible in some of the impacts (see for example figure 7.5 above) leads to the conclusion that guided missiles (as opposed to a less precise weapon, such as a rocket or a mortar grenade) were used in the attack. The available evidence points strongly towards the use of solid fuel, short-distance, surface-to-surface, ballistic missiles.

Figure 7.12  
**Calculation of the size of the missile based on the CCTV footage**



**Source:** Government of Yemen

18. The Houthi forces have been using short-range ballistic weapons for several years, both within Yemen and against border towns such as Jizan or Najran in Saudi Arabia. The most common weapon system in this category is the Badr-1, which the Houthis unveiled for the first time in February 2017 and which the Panel has documented several times since mid-2018. In its basic version, the Badr-1 is a solid-fuel, unguided, artillery rocket with a diameter of 300 millimetres, which is commonly launched from one of the twin launch containers mounted on a 6x6 TEL. The Panel believes that the Badr-1 artillery rocket is manufactured locally in Yemen without the need to source components from abroad. On 28 October 2018, the Houthis unveiled a guided version, dubbed the Badr-1P and stated a range of 150 kilometers and an accuracy of three meters, which unlike the basic version, appears to be launched from a rail. The Badr-1P features distinctive control-surface (pivoting fins) mounted in the front of the missile, immediately behind its warhead, and seems to have a length of approximately six meters. While it is possible that the Badr-1P is also domestically manufactured, it is very likely that at least some components of the weapon (such as the servo actuators and the guidance unit) are imported into Yemen.

Figure 7.13  
**Images showing the Badr-1P missile in the Houthi-affiliated media**



**Source:** Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 October 2018

19. The Panel has analyzed the debris of the three missiles collected at Aden airport by both the Government and the National Commission for Inquiry. It also had access to the pieces of debris that were sent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel notes that the debris has characteristics which are consistent with the debris of a solid-fuel missile with a diameter of approximately 300 millimetres<sup>88</sup> (see figure 7.14). The Panel also notes that the three missiles carried fragmentation warheads, featuring small metal cubes (see figure 7.15), a type of fragmentation which the Panel has previously observed as part of missiles and UAVs used by the Houthi forces.<sup>89</sup> The Panel has not seen any remnants of the guidance and control sections, which would allow for a better identification of the missile, and the only identifiable marking documented on the debris (“18F4”, see figure 7.16 below) has not been observed by the Panel previously. Appendix 2 contains additional images of the debris inspected by the Panel in Aden.

Figure 7.14

**Debris from the missiles used in the attack on Aden airport**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>88</sup> Precise measurements were impossible as the debris was severely bent out of shape as a result of the impact.

<sup>89</sup> See paragraph 7 in annex 15 of the Panel's Final Report (S/2020/326).

Figure 7.15  
Metal cubes which were part of the fragmentation warhead of the missile



*Source:* Panel

Figure 7.16  
Markings (“18F4”) documented on the debris of one of the missiles




*Source:* Government of Yemen

20. The Panel notes that the debris inspected in Aden has similar characteristics to debris which the Panel inspected in October 2020 during a visit to Ma'rib, in particular with regard to the diameter (approximately 300 millimeters) of the missile and the small metal cubes, which form part of the fragmentation warhead (see figure 7.17 below). The Government of Yemen commissioned a comparative laboratory analysis of the debris from Aden and Ma'rib, which concluded that the metallurgical content is very similar (see appendix 3). While this is far from conclusive, it does strengthen the probability that the missiles used in Aden and in Ma'rib were of the same type.



Figure 7.16  
Missile debris from Ma'rib inspected by the Panel in October 2020



*Source:* Panel

21. The Panel concluded with regard to the weapons used in the Ma'rib attacks, which are consistently referred to as “ballistic missiles” by both the Houthi forces and the Government of Yemen, that the debris was likely from an unguided artillery rocket (see page 8, S/2021/79). This assessment was based on (a) the relatively short distance between the frontlines and the impact points, (b) the absence of any debris from the guidance and control sections and (c) the comparatively low precision of the targeting. In contrast, the attacks in Aden were clearly conducted using a short-range guided ballistic missile. It is possible that the weapon system used in Ma'rib was the basic version of the Badr-1, while the weapon system in Aden was a guided version of the Badr-1 missile family. However, the Panel notes that the images of the guidance and control section of the missile which allegedly crashed south of Tai'zz Airport (see figure 17.10 above), do not correspond to the images of the Badr-1P, which were shown in the Houthi-affiliated media (see figure 7.13 above), in particular with regard to the size and form of the control surfaces.<sup>90</sup> While the distance between the airports of Tai'zz and Aden of approximately 135 kilometers would be within the range of 150 kilometers claimed by the Houthi-affiliated media for the Badr-1P, this is not the case for the distance of circa 200 kilometres between Dhamar City and Aden. It is therefore possible that, either (a) the missiles launched from Tai'zz and Dhamar were of different types, or (b) that the range of the Badr-1P missile has been extended, for example through the reduction of the payload (i.e. the amount of explosives carried). The inspection of the debris recovered from the airport in Aden does not give any indication that the type of missiles was different, while the diameter and the fragmentation warhead, as well as the laboratory analysis of the metal strongly points towards an extended-range version of the Badr-1 missile family.<sup>91</sup>

#### IV. Analysis of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations

22. Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. Military personnel, including members of the Coalition also use the facility. However, according to information received by the Panel from multiple sources, at the time of the attack no military operations were being carried out from the airport, nor were there any military aircraft at the locations where the three missiles impacted. As discussed above, the missile attack was targeting high-ranking members of the Government of Yemen upon their return

<sup>90</sup> The weapon systems shown on display in the Houthi-affiliated media are likely mock-ups, plus the design of locally assembled weapons are often “tweaked” to enhance performance, so this is far from conclusive. The Panel has never been able to inspect a complete Badr-1P missile.

<sup>91</sup> In addition to the basic Badr-1 rocket and the Badr-1P guided missile, the Houthi-affiliated media also in April 2019 displayed an “air burst” version called the Badr-1F with a claimed range of 160 kilometers. However, this missile appears to have a significantly greater diameter than the other member of the family.

from Riyadh. Government officials, including cabinet members, are civilians under IHL.<sup>92</sup> Although military personnel were present at the airport at the time of the incident, this was also the case for large numbers of civilians, including passengers waiting for their departure, airport personnel and journalists. This is also reflected in the number of casualties – no member of the military was among the 20 people killed in the attack and only 12 members of the military were among the more than 100 people who were hospitalized as a result of injuries. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the missiles carried fragmentation warheads containing small metal cubes, which are intended to cause more injuries.

23. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians.<sup>93</sup> Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. At the time of the attack, it was not, by purpose or use, making an effective contribution to military action and its partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, did not offer a definite military advantage. Therefore, it was not considered as a military objective at the time of the attack.<sup>94</sup> In addition, there was a large number of civilians present, including senior officials of the Government of Yemen, who were clearly targeted as discussed in previous sections. Based on the information and evidence received, the Panel therefore concludes that the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians<sup>95</sup> was not respected by the attackers, nor were the principles of proportionality or of precautions.<sup>96</sup>

## V. Conclusion

24. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the plane carrying senior government officials, including the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, was the target of the attack on 30 December 2020 and that this attack was carried out in violation of the applicable norms of IHL.<sup>97</sup> The Panel finds that the attack was carried out using a solid-fuel, guided, short-range ballistic missile with a fragmentation warhead, most probably an enhanced-range version of the Badr-1 family, which has been in frequent use by the Houthi forces against both targets in Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel has not yet seen any evidence suggesting that other conflict parties in Yemen have used guided missiles of this kind. While the Panel continues to investigate, the Panel concludes with very high confidence that at least two missiles were launched from Tai'zz Airport towards Aden on 30 December 2020, and that it is likely that two additional missiles were launched from the police training center in Dhamar City. The Panel has been able to confirm that both locations were under the control of the Houthi forces at the time of the launches

<sup>92</sup> The Minister of Defence, who has military status, was not present at the airport.

<sup>93</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>94</sup> See CIHL rule 8.

<sup>95</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

<sup>96</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>97</sup> As per its methodology the Panel stands ready to revise its findings if contrary evidence is made available to the Panel.

## Appendix 1            Maps

This annex contains a number of maps, which were prepared by UNITAR and UNOSAT on behalf of OHCHR and the National Commission for Inquiry, and they are reproduced here with their permission. The Panel has verified the impact locations and the approximate angle of the incoming missiles during a visit to Aden Airport in February 2021. The geo-locations of the social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar City are based on open-source information.

Figure 7.17

### List of geo-locations of social media videos in Tai'zz and Dhamar

Video #1	13°41'19.6080'' N 044°09'40.68'' E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344368644072099847</a>
Video #2	13°39'14.1480'' N 044°08'12.5520'' E	<a href="https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224">https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224</a>
Video #3	Confidential	<a href="https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20">https://twitter.com/Mrwanqayd/status/1344311451893325831?s=20</a>
Video #4	Main road outside of Tai'zz airport	<a href="https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20">https://twitter.com/hde999/status/1344705146354360320?s=20</a>
Video #5	14°32'17.1060'' N 044°25'52.212'' E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345">https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345</a>
Video #6	14°30'51.7932'' N 044°24'33.3144'' E	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/">https://www.facebook.com/100000681457679/videos/3985229198176423/</a>
Video #7	No precise coordinates	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873">https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=734935790753873</a>
Video #8	14°31'46.2'' N 044°24'09.4680'' E	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL1o-r5fKh0</a>

**Source:** <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/>

Figure 7.18  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the first missile



21-19594 Figure 7.19  
**Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the second missile**




Figure 7.20  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the third missile



Figure 7.21  
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the direction of the incoming second missile



Figure 7.22  
Possible launch locations of the missiles on 30 December 2020



Source: UNITAR/UNOSAT



**Appendix 2 Additional images of the missile debris inspected by the Panel in Aden**

Figure 7.23  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.24  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.25  
**Missile debris**



Figure 7.26  
**Screws from the missile**



Figure 7.27  
**Remnants of solid fuel**



*Source:* Panel

### Appendix 3 Results of the metallurgical analysis undertaken on behalf of the National Commission of Inquiry comparing two pieces of missile debris from Aden and Ma'rib

وزارة الكهرباء والطاقة  
 المؤسسة العامة للكهرباء  
 محطة السعوية المركزية - عدن  
 التاريخ: 2022/01/25

الأخ / رئيس اللجنة الوطنية للتحقيق في ادعاءات انتهاكات حقوق الانسان (عدن) المحترم

تحية طيبة ، وبعد

الموضوع / التقرير الفني حول مطابقة شظايا الصواريخ التي استهدفت مطار عدن الدولي

في البدء نود بكم تعويضنا المعنوية ، ونتمنى لكم التوفيق والسداد في مهام عملكم الانساني والتبيل للتحقيق في انتهاكات حقوق الانسان ، وادانة الجريمة في الموضوع اعلاه . نضعكم باتنا فمنا باجراء الفحص المعنى الغير التلافي للشظايا المستلمة للصواريخ التي تم اطلاقها على كل من محافظة مارب و مطار عدن المعنى الدولي في العاصمة المؤقتة عدن بتاريخ 2020/12/30 ، وقد تمت الفحوصات التالية :-

- فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر :  
 تبين من خلال تحليل الاشعة الطيفية لتحديد العناصر المكونة لمعدن شظايا الصواريخ باتهما متطابقة في التحليل الكمي والنوعي .
- فحص صلابة معدن الشظايا :-  
 تم التأكد من ان صلابة معدن الشظايا المشتركة لكلا الصاروخين في نطاق متقارب المسماة (3 + 15 ) لقيم صلابة المعدن بـ كروج مقياس الصلابة برينول (HB).

نتائج الفحوصات :

رقم مزم	التفصيل / البيان	صاروخ محافظة مارب	صاروخ مطار عدن الدولي	ملاحظات					
1	قطعة الشظية الاولى	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر							
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr				
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %				
		الصلابة (HB)							
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)						
		132	103	134	122	141	119	114	125
2	قطعة الشظية الثانية	فحص التحليل الطيفي للعناصر							
		المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr	المنجنيز Mn	الكروم Cr				
		~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %	~ 0.7 - 0.9 %	~ 0.25 %				
		الصلابة (HB)							
	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)	(HB) <sub>1</sub> , (HB) <sub>2</sub> , (HB) <sub>3</sub> , Δ(HB)						
		206	190	174	190	169	156	200	175

من خلال نتائج الفحوصات التي تمت ، نؤكد لنا تطابق نوعية الصاروخين ومصدرهما

انتهى  
 2022/01/25

Source: Government of Yemen

**Unofficial translation from Arabic**

**Ministry of Electricity and Energy**  
**General Electricity Corporation**  
**Haswah Thermal Power Station (Aden)**

**Date:** 25 January 2021

**To:** Chair of the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Human Rights Violations (Aden)

**Subject:** Technical report on uniformity of fragments from the missiles that struck Aden International Airport Sir,

We send you our sincere greetings and wish you success as you carry out your humanitarian and noble work of investigating human rights violations. With regard to the above-mentioned subject, we should like to inform you that we have conducted non-destructive metallurgical testing of the fragments that we received from the missiles that were fired on 30 December 2020 at Ma'rib Governorate and Aden International Airport in the interim capital of Aden. The following tests were carried out:

**Tomographical analysis of the elements**

Using tomographical analysis, it was determined that the metallic composition of the two missile shards is quantitatively and qualitatively identical.

**Hardness of the metal comprising the shards**

It was determined that the hardness of the metal fragments from both rockets is within the allowable range (-3, +15) on the Brinell hardness scale (HB).

**Test results**

<i>Information/data</i>	<i>Missile fired at Ma'rib Governorate</i>				<i>Missile fired at Aden International Airport</i>				<i>Remarks</i>		
	<i>Tomographical analysis of the elements</i>										
<b>First shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	125	114	119	141	122	134	103	132			
<b>Second shard</b>	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)	Manganese (Mn)	Chromium (Cr)			
	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%	~ 0.7-0.9%	~ 0.25%			
	Hardness (HB)										
	$\Delta(\text{HB})$				$(\text{HB})_1(\text{HB})_2(\text{HB})_3$				$\Delta(\text{HB})$		
	175	200	156	169	190	174	190	206			

Based on the test results, we confirm that the missiles are of the same type and origin.

(Signed)  
Metallurgical Engineer

## Appendix 4 List of the casualties of the attack on 30 December 2020

Figure 7.27

## List of the people killed during the attack



## كشف بشهداء الاستهداف الصاروخي لمطار عدن الدولي بتاريخ ٢٠٢٠/١٢/٣٠ م

الجهة التابع لها	المنصب	الاسم الكامل	م
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب مدير الامن السياسي عدن	عقيد / محفوظ محمد محفوظ	١
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط الامن السياسي عدن	محمد عبد الولي صالح	٢
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	نائب رئيس نوبة الامن السياسي مطار عدن	عقيد / يحيى مثنى قائد النهي	٣
الامن السياسي مطار عدن	ضابط امن سياسي	مساعد / محمد علي قاسم	٤
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس قسم الأجانب جوازات عدن	رائد/عدنان علي فضل موانس	٥
جوازات مطار عدن	رئيس نوبة جوازات مطار عدن	رائد/علي احمد هادي	٦
امن عدن	مسئول عمليات قوات الطوارئ امن عدن	عقيد/عبد القوي محمد قاسم لخجر	٧
امن عدن	قائد الكتيبة الاولى طواري امن عدن	تقيب/صابر فضل الياضي	٨
امن عدن	احد افراد قوة الطواري	جندي/محمد عبد الرب احمد القاضي	٩
إدارة الإطفاء مطار عدن	سائق عربّة إطفاء - مطار عدن	سمير عباس حاصل	١٠
إدارة التسهيلات مطار عدن	ضابط تسهيلات - مطار عدن	ذويزن حيدر خضر احمد	١١
شركة النفط عدن	مدير إدارة تموين الطائرات	مهندس/بدر سعيد علي	١٢
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	احمد اقبال وزير	١٣
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر ( يمني )	حميد شوعي القدي	١٤
الصليب الأحمر	موظف الصليب الأحمر (رواندي الجنسية)	سعيد كيرا لجتا	١٥
وزارة الاشغال	وكيل وزارة الاشغال لقطاع الإسكان	ياسمين محمد العواضي	١٦
قناة بلقيس	مراسل قناة بلقيس الفضائية	اديب محمد سنان الجناني	١٧

المرجع

● إدارة امن مطار عدن

Source: Government of Yemen

Figure 7.28

## List of the people who were hospitalized for injuries sustained during the attack

التاريخ: / ٢٠٢١ م  
 الموافق: .....  
 الرقم: .....  
 المرفقات: .....



الجمهورية اليمنية  
 وزارة الداخلية  
 مكتب الوزير

## كشف تفصيلي عن الجرحى بسبب انفجارات مطار عدن الدولي

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التليفون
1	ابراهيم عبدالله قاسم	جريح	اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
2	ابوبكر عبدالله عبيد	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
3	ابوبكر عبدالله محمد	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		رقود		
4	احمد علي احمد همدان	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
5	احمد علي فضل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
6	احمد محمد ثابت معوضه	نزيف حاد وجروح متهتكه في البطن والركبة اليمنى والكف	البريهي	مدير عام بوزارة الشباب والرياضه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٤	
7	احمد مهدي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
8	ادم محمد محسن ناجي	نزيف حاد وشظايا في القدم الايمن	البريهي	الامانه العامه لمجلس الانتقالي النابغه الاعلامية	مرقد	غرفه عامه رقم ٧	
9	اشرف عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفه ( مسوون مكتب الرياضة)	غادر المستشفى		
10	الخضر ناصر لصور	جريح	مستوصف السلام	رئيس الجامعه	غادر المستشفى		
11	الهام علي محمد ( طفلة )	شظايا بالرقيه	الاماتى	مواطنه	رقود		
12	امجد عزام خليفه	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية	ابن عزام خليفه ( مسوون مكتب الرياضة)	غادر المستشفى		
13	امين عبدربه حسين	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
14	ام ن عبدربه مصور	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	الامن السياسي	غادر المستشفى		
15	انتصار الزبيدي	جريح	مستوصف بابل		مرقد		
16	ايداد سيف مصلح	جرح في الظهر	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
17	ايمن محمد مساعد الامير	جروح متهتكه في الوجه والمرفق والراس	البريهي	مدير مكتب وكيل وزارة الداخلية	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ٢٠	
18	بدر صالح الصلاحي	جريح	مستوصف بابل				
19	حسن محمد سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	الاماتى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
20	حسين سالم محمد حفيظ	جريح	الامن السياسي	جيده			
21	حسن ن صالح عمر	جروح متهتكه في عظام الفخذ الايمن مع اصابة في العصب	البريهي	الخدمات الطبيه العسكريه	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
22	حيدر ه علي سعيد لهطل	نزيف حاد في البطن	البريهي	مسوول الامن القومي	مرقد	جناح خاص ٢١١	
23	خالد احمد علي ناجي الرياشي	جريح	مستوصف بابل	مكافحه الارهاب	مرقد	حرجه	
24	خالد صالح محمد العطاس	شظايا متفرقة	الاماتى	عسكري	مرقد		
25	خالد عبده سلام	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
26	خالد عمر عبدالله الرحم	شظايا في الراس	مستشفى خليج عدن	عقيد/مدير التموين لوزارة الداخلية	مرقد		
27	خالد محسن حسين الدوعاني	اجراءات طوارئ			غادر المستشفى		
28	خليل سعيد عوض بامطرف	شظايا	الوالي	الامن السياسي	رقود		

م	اسم الجريح	الاصابه	المستشفى	الصفه	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلفون
29	رعد مثنى قاسم	شظية بالكتف الأيسر	البريهي	الأول مشاة كتيبة الحماية-سوق الحافظ	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٧	
30	روان بسام	نزف مهليل (حامل)	الصادقة		مرقد		
31	ريما علي سعيد الدويحي	عده جروح وقطوع في الوجه واصابه في احدى العينين	الإلماني	عسكري	مرقد/عنايه	قسم العناية	
32	زكريا عبدالله صالح	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		رقود		
33	زكريا محمد صالح عمر	جروح منتهكه بالرأس (تم اجراء له عملية)	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٦	
34	زكريا باعبيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
35	سامي عمر سالم باوزير	شظايا بالرأس اليمنى	الإلماني	عسكري	مرقد		
36	سحر شوكت	اصابه	مستوصف بابل		غادر المستشفى		
37	سعيد مثنى الشعبي	اصابه في البطن	مستوصف الشفاء	اعلامي	مرقد		
38	سليمان ناصر الزامكي	شظية باليد والرأس	صابر	لائد الموات الخاصة	غادر المستشفى		
39	سميه الحاصل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
40	سيف سالم قاسم ثابت	اجراءات طوارئ	الامن السياسي		جديه		
41	شوقي شرجبي	اجراءات طوارئ	الوالي	وكيل وزارة الصحة	غادر المستشفى		
42	صابر عبدالرب	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
43	صاقي احمد علي الربيعي	كسور مفتته بعظام القدم الايمن	البريهي	اعلامي	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٢	
44	صالح ناصر عاطف الحكمي	جروح منتهكه مع شظية في الفخذ الا سر	البريهي	نائب مدير الجوازات	غادر المستشفى		
45	صالح حمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	الإلماني	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
46	صالح محمود محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
47	صالح ميميل ناجي	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
48	صرواح محمد العتيقي	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		غادر المستشفى		
49	صلاح احمد الكثوري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	صحفي	غادر المستشفى		
50	صلاح احمد صالح سريب	كسور مفتته في عظام الساق الايسر مع جروح منتهكه في عظام الساق الايمن	البريهي	لائد كتيبة الحماية ( القوات الأولى مشاة التلقي)	مرقد	قسم العنايه جرحي	
51	صلاح قاسم محمد عثمان	في العمود واليد	مستوصف الشفاء	الامن السياسي	مرقد	جديه	
52	عبدالحكيم خالد علي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
53	عبدالرحمن علي عبدالله	شظايا بالوجه وكسر بالرأس اليمنى	الإلماني	عسكري	مرقد		
54	عبدالرزاق يحيى قاسم	جريح	مستوصف بابل				
55	عبدالرفيق صالح علي الشعبي	اجراءات طوارئ	الإلماني	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
56	عبدالله سالم عبدالله سعيد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
57	عبدالله عدنان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
58	عبدالله محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى خليج عدن	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
59	عبدالله محمد عبدالله مساعد	كسر بالمدم اليمنى	الإلماني	عسكري	مرقد		
60	عبدالله ناصر عبدالقادر	شظية بالوجه	صابر	القوات الخاصة	مرقد		
61	عبدالمك عدنان محسن الصيلي	شظايا متفرقة بالمفصل	الإلماني	عسكري	مرقد		
62	عبدالوهاب احمد محمد شران	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلاحدود		مرقد		
63	عدنان احمد حسين موانس	حروق بالجسم وشظايا	الجمهورية لسم الحروق	قائمت مصلحة الهجرة والجوازات	مرقد		
64	عدنان علي فضل الصنقاني	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
65	علي احمد خيران	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي	الامن السياسي	جديه		
66	علي حمود الهدياتي	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الإصابة	المستشفى	الصفة	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلغون
67	علي سالم مثنى	رضوض متعددة بالرأس والاطراف	البريهي	ضابط في الامن (وزارة الداخلية)	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٥	
68	علي سعيد علي سالم	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
69	علي عبيدات	جريح	الوالي		غادر المستشفى		
70	علياء فؤاد	جريح	مستوصف بابل				
71	عمار شجاع الدين	جريح	مستشفى اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
72	عمر ياربيش	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
73	عمر مبارك عمر باحميش	شظايا متفرقة	الاماتى	عسكري	مرقد		
74	فتحي يحيى الاحمدى	اجراءات طوارئ	الاماتى	مستشار وزارة السياحة	غادر المستشفى		
75	فضل عن علي	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
76	فهم علي صالح	جريح	مستشفى البريهي		مرقد		
77	فهم ناصر علي حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
78	لايد ه ثم الحدي	طوارئ	النميب	مدر برنامج الاغلام	غادر المستشفى		
79	لطف ف صل عبدالله الحامد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
80	لم سن وسام هشام	شظايا	النميب	طفله عمرها ٩ شهور	مرقد		
81	ماجد احمد ماهر طاهر	اجراءات طوارئ	الاماتى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
82	ماجد حسن عيده شمسان	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
83	ماهر محمد علي	شظايا بالكنتف والفخذ الايمن	البريهي	لوة طوارئ امن عدن	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١٠	
84	محسن محمد عبدالله عبدالمنعم	نزيف في الدماغ وكسور في عظام الجمجمة وعظام الوجه	البريهي	مرقد/عنايه	اسم الامتاش الجرحى		
85	محفوظ حسن شعل	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى البريهي	اجراءات طوارئ	غادر المستشفى		
86	محفوظ محمد محفوظ راجح	حروق في الجسم مع كسور مفتته في عظام الساق الايسر	البريهي	نائب مدير الامن السياسي	عنايه/مرقد	اسم الامتاش الجرحى	
87	محمد الجديري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
88	محمد حسين مبارك حيدر	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
89	محمد عبدالقوي صالح	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
90	محمد عبدالولي صالح مقبل	حروق بالجسم	البريهي	الامن السياسي	مرقد/يليه		
91	محمد علي الجندي	جريح	مستشفى خليج عدن	سكرتير محافظ	غادر المستشفى		
92	محمد علي عوان	اصابه بالساق اليسرى بطوارئ فقط	صابر	القوات الخاصه	غادر المستشفى		
93	محمد علي مارش	شظايا في الرجل	البريهي	اعلامي	مرقد		
94	محمد علي محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	اطباء بلا حدود		غادر المستشفى		
95	محمد مساعد قاسم الامير	شظية كبيرة في الفخذ الايسر مع فقدان مادي لعصا الفخذ (تم اجراء عملية استئراج الشظية)	البريهي	وكيل وزارة الداخلية لخدمات الشرطة	مرقد	غرفة خاصة رقم ١١٠	
96	محمد مصطفى محمد مكر	اصابه في اليد	مستوصف الشفاء		مرقد		
97	محمد موسى محمد عمر	اجراءات طوارئ	صابر		غادر المستشفى		
98	محمود صالح طاب	شظايا			غادر المستشفى		
99	محمود صالح	شظايا	مستشفى الجمهورية		رقد		
100	مفيد حسن البحري	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
101	منار سعيد عبدالله	جروح متهنكه في المرفق الايسر والجبهة وكسر في عظام الالف	البريهي	امن خفر السواحل	مرقد	غرفة عامه رقم ٤	
102	مهدي محمد ناصر حنتوش	جريح	صابر	عميد في الجيش			
103	ناصر احمد مبارك	شظايا	اطباء بلا حدود		رقد		
104	ناصر الشريف	شظايا	خليج عدن	نائب وزير النقل	غادر المستشفى		

م	اسم الجريح	الإصابة	المستشفى	الصفة	ملاحظات	القسم	رقم التلغون
105	ناصر ثابت محمد قحطان	جريح	الاماتى	عسكري	مرقد		
106	نبيل سكرة	اصابه في الكنتف		عميد	مرقد		
107	نقيب مفيد يحيى البهري	شظايا بالرأس	الاماتى	عنايه/مدير سجن المنصورة	مرقد	قسم العنايه	
108	هاني ناصر احمد حيدرة النمي	شظايا	الوالي	الامن السياسي	رقد		
109	وسيم قحطان	جريح	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		
110	وضاح عبدالله بادي	شظايا بسيطة	البريهي		غادر المستشفى		
111	وعد بدر معاون	جريح	مستشفى المصافي	ابن الامن العام للمجلس المحلي البريهي	مرقد		
112	ياسين محمد عبدالباقي	اجراءات طوارئ	الاماتى	عسكري	غادر المستشفى		
113	يحيى عمر عبدالقوي الحمادي	جريح	الاماتى	عسكري الحزام الامني	مرقد		
114	يحيى عمر محمد	اجراءات طوارئ	مستشفى الجمهورية		غادر المستشفى		

المرجع  
مكتب وكيل محافظة عدن لشئون الشهداء والجرحى

Source: Government of Yemen



## Annex 8

## Mukha Port Attack, 11 September 2021

**I. Introduction**

1. The Panel is investigating the attack at Mukha Port in Al Mukha, Ta'izz Governorate, which began at approximately 0945 hours and lasted until 11.15 hours on 11 September 2021, shortly after a representative of a Government of Yemen committee arrived at the port for meetings. The attack, during which two missiles and six UAVs were deployed, resulted in one injury to a port worker. There was damage to an office container used as conference room, to a warehouse and to the base of a control tower. At the time of the attack, the port was reportedly being converted for civilian use after years of exclusive military occupation.<sup>98</sup> The committee was meant to oversee this development, which would be an important milestone in normalising relationships between the WCJF and the Government, as well as in opening an additional port for civilian imports on the West Coast. Therefore, the Panel initiated investigations into this attack as a threat to peace, security, or stability of Yemen and a potential violation of international humanitarian law.

**II. Methodology**

2. The Panel received information, including images, videos, and other documentary evidence from the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance. The Panel conducted interviews with representatives of the port authority, National Resistance, the visiting committee, Government of Yemen, local authorities, and other witnesses. The Panel has given the Houthis the opportunity to comment on the Panel's findings regarding the incident, a response is pending.<sup>99</sup> The Panel has not had an opportunity to inspect the debris directly of the weapons systems used in the attack but has requested to do so during a future visit to the West Coast.

**III. Description of the incident**

3. On 11 September 2021, the committee was scheduled to attend several meetings at the Mukha Port.<sup>100</sup> In August 2021, the Panel was informed that the conversion of Mukha Port to civilian use had begun with the establishment of a customs post<sup>101</sup> and the appointment of a civilian port management team.<sup>102</sup> According to port officials, at least two civilian vessels had already docked at the port.<sup>103</sup> The committee, appointed by the Yemeni Minister of Transport (figure 8.1), was planning to conduct a general visit of the port to assess the repairs.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, this visit was viewed by all stakeholders as an important step towards future civilian oversight.

<sup>98</sup> According to the port authorities, the port had been under military occupation since at least 2017.

<sup>99</sup> Letter dated 13 December 2021.

<sup>100</sup> This meeting was, initially, scheduled for 7/8 September 2021, but was postponed to 11 September 2021, according to a port official.

<sup>101</sup> Source: Customs official. The document of the decision is with the Panel. The aim of this post was to allow the Government of Yemen to collect the revenue. According to a custom official, this revenue will be deposited with the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden after the establishment of the port. In a discussion with the Panel in May 2021, one of the concerns expressed by an official of the Government of Yemen was that the Mukha port was under the control of the National Resistance, and that the Government was unable to collect the revenue.

<sup>102</sup> Sources: Ministry of Transport official, National Resistance Forces, and port official.

<sup>103</sup> The Panel is unable to independently verify. On 30 July 2021, the port was opened to receive commercial ships, according to this official.

<sup>104</sup> The National Resistance Forces and the Government of Yemen.

Figure 8.1  
Appointment of the Committee that visited the Mukha Port on 11 September 2021



Source: Confidential


4. The Panel was informed that on 11 September 2021, at approximately 0930 hours, five senior officials of the committee arrived at the port.<sup>105</sup> Their first meeting commenced at approximately 0930 hours in the office of the General Manager (map 8.1).<sup>106</sup> There were at least 13 persons in this meeting room.<sup>107</sup> The representatives of the committee and some port officials were still at this meeting when the first missile hit near the office container used as a conference room in a different part of the port at 0945 hours, and therefore, were unharmed. The second missile hit a warehouse one minute later.

<sup>105</sup> According to the National Resistance, these individuals were the Deputy Under Secretary for Port Affairs, Ministry of Transport; the Director of Marine Environmental Protection, Maritime Affairs Authority; the Project Manager, Gulf of Aden Ports Corporation; the, Director, Department of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Transport; The Director of Information of the Ministry of Transport and his team and Port of Al Mukha’ officials.

<sup>106</sup> Two individuals present at the meeting.

<sup>107</sup> Information from the port officials and visiting delegation. The Panel was informed by a port official that the Head of Port Security was at the meeting, and that the Head of the Coast Guards of Mukha, who was supposed to attend the meeting, did not attend.

Map 8.1



**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.

4. Had the meeting been in the conference room, which was attacked, as is considered the norm for a high-profile visit,<sup>108</sup> there would have been casualties (see figure 8.2). The Government of Yemen and the National Resistance in their identical letters to the Panel stated that “(t)he committee was scheduled to hold a meeting in the port’s conference room, which was struck by one of the ballistic missiles. However, none of the Committee members were injured because the committee was late in starting its visit.”<sup>109</sup> This information was disputed by two individuals who participated in the meeting and stated that the conference room was not meant to be the venue, but as the committee was planning to visit the whole port, they could still have been harmed by the attack.

5. The attack lasted for approximately 90 minutes, with two missiles and three UAVs impacting on different targets and an additional three UAVs being shot down (see table 8.1 and map 8.2). The duration and scope of the attack indicates that the perpetrators also intended to damage the port facilities (see table 8.2). The incident resulted in an injury to a port worker from shrapnel.

<sup>108</sup> The Panel met both political and military leaders in the conference room in late August 2021.

<sup>109</sup> Letter from National Resistance dated 09 October 2021 and letter from the Government of Yemen dated 28 October 2021. Both letters had similar content and wording.

Table 8.1  
**Details of the attack on 11 September 2021**

<i>Target</i>	<i>Type of projectile</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Coordinates of targeted location</i>		<i>Description of the location</i>
Target 1	Missile	09.45	43° 13' 58.116"	13° 18' 33.8472"	Near a conference room.
Target 2	Missile	09.46	43° 14' 16.368"	13° 18' 34.1496"	A warehouse used by the West Coast Humanitarian Unit. <sup>110</sup>
Target 3	UAV	10.30	43° 13' 53.904"	13° 18' 36.936"	Base of the port control tower, which was approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile.
Target 4	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 18.492"	13° 18' 39.2112"	Exploded near an earth wall separating two maintenance yards.
Target 5	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 0.276"	13° 18' 20.3256"	Exploded next to an earth wall.
Target 6	UAV	11.03	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 7	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 8	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air		Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.

**Sources:** Panel, based on information provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

Map 8.2

**Locations of the five impact points**



<sup>110</sup> This is a unit that is affiliated with the National Resistance that carries out relief and humanitarian work on the West Coast.

*Source:* Panel, based on coordinates provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

1. The first missile hit near a conference room and completely destroyed it (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 8.2

**Damage to the area (Target #1)**



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.3

**Damage to the conference room**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 8.4  
Images of the missile (Target #1)



**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

1. According to the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance, at 0946 hours, the second missile struck a hangar that was being used as a warehouse by the “West Coast Humanitarian Unit”. They informed the Panel that images taken by the surveillance camera demonstrated that the angle of descent was from the East.

Figure 8.5  
Damage to the hangar used as a warehouse (Target #2)



Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.6  
Image of the second missile prior to impact (Target #2)



Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

8. The National Resistance stated that the following humanitarian items were destroyed in the second missile attack (see table 8.2).

Table 8.2

**Items destroyed by the second missile**

	<i>Category</i>	<i>Number</i>
1	Food basket	2,142 baskets
2	Shelter tents	920
3	Tarpaulins	1,800
4	Oxygen cylinders	70
5	First-aid kits	43
6	Children's clothing	437
7	Hunting equipment	100
8	Canvas roll	100

**Source:** National Resistance

9. An UAV impacted at the base of the port control tower. According to information received by the Panel, port workers reported that at least two of the UAVs approached at a low altitude from an easterly direction.

Figure 8.6

**Impact point of the UAV (Target #3)**

**Sources:** Government of Yemen and the National Resistance



Figure 8.7  
Impact point of another UAV and damage caused (Target #4)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.8  
Impact point of the third UAV (Target #5)



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

9. According to information received by the Panel, the following damage to the port occurred (see table X.3).

Table 8.3

**Damage arising from the attacks**

	Category	Damage
1	Buildings	4 buildings (19 rooms)
2	Offices	14
3	Warehouses	1
4	Control tower	1
5	Vehicles	23
6	Port protection boats	2
7	Miscellaneous furniture	
8	Electrical equipment and tools	
9	Water tanks	
10	Other damage	

*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

#### IV. Advance Warning

10. There were no advance warnings that the port would be a target. There were no reported sightings of surveillance UAVs on the day of the attack,<sup>111</sup> although surveillance UAVs were observed

<sup>111</sup> Panel interviews with two witnesses.

<sup>112</sup> The Panel was informed that these drones are still being observed over Al Mukha port as of November 2021.

over the port about three days prior to the attack.<sup>112</sup> The Ta'izz Military Axis informed the Panel that they warned the relevant authorities of preparations for a large-scale Houthi attack a few days before 11 September 2021 (see paragraph 11).<sup>113</sup>


#### IV. Attribution of responsibility

11. The National Resistance informed the Panel that, “the ballistic missiles and drones that the Houthi militias used to attack the port of Mukha were launched from areas controlled by those militias in Ta‘izziyah District, Ta‘izz Governorate.”<sup>114</sup> The Ta'izz Military Axis informed the Panel that, on 5 September 2021, they provided information to their hierarchy of a possible large-scale attack by the Houthis, as there was information indicating that the Houthis were transporting missiles from Ta'izz airport to the Al Hawban area.

12. The Houthis have not, to the knowledge of the Panel, claimed responsibility for the attacks on Mukha Port, although both the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance have attributed the attack to the Houthis.<sup>115</sup>

Map 8.3

#### Launch directions of the missiles



**Source:** Panel, Google Earth, based on information provided by Ta'izz Military Axis

13. The Panel has obtained low-quality images of the debris of the UAVs reportedly used in the attack (see figure 8. 8). The images show engine parts as well as a piece of fuselage, apparently made from fiberglass. The debris shown in these images is consistent with components of UAVs manufactured and used by the Houthis. The National Resistance stated that, in their assessment, the

<sup>113</sup> The Panel was provided evidence to support these statements.

<sup>114</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

<sup>115</sup> Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively..

UAVs used were SAMAD-3 models, however, the Panel is unable to independently verify this based on the limited information available at this stage. The Panel has not received any other information regarding the type of missile used in the attacks.

Figure 8.9:

**Debris of the missiles/drones**



*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

## VI. Analysis of IHL violations

13. Measures had been taken in 2021 to convert Mukha Port back into a civilian port. At the time of the attack, the conversion had not yet been completed and military personnel remained at the facility. The attack took place when a high-level committee visited the port. The visit was originally supposed to take place on 7 or 8 September and had been postponed to 09.30 am on 11 September 2021.<sup>116</sup>

14. The Panel finds it likely that the missile and UAV attack targeted the members of the committee and senior port officials, which would be a violation of IHL.<sup>117</sup> The visiting members of the committee and the port officials are civilians under IHL. Military personnel were likely present at

<sup>116</sup> Source: Port authority official.

<sup>117</sup> See article 13 (1) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions which prohibits direct targeting of civilians.

the port at the time of the incident. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must always distinguish between combatants and civilians.<sup>118</sup> If the target had been military forces present in the port, the attack could have been carried out at another time.

15. Under IHL, Mukha Port, at the time of the attack, was likely a dual-use object. This does not affect the question whether the committee was the intended target of the attack or not. Therefore, it is unlikely that the perpetrators respected the principles of distinction or proportionality and precautions.<sup>119</sup>

## VII. Conclusions

16. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the visiting committee was the likely target of the attack. Additionally, the Panel finds that another objective of the attack could have been to hamper the civilian conversion of the port. Like in the case of the Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020 (see annex 7), which targeted the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, it is possible that the perpetrators intended to disrupt initiatives aimed at normalizing the situation on the ground. The Panel also notes that on 10 November 2021, three missiles were launched towards two small military camps in Mukha,<sup>120</sup> which coincided with the first visit of the new Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen to the city.<sup>121</sup> This attack, which unlike the one on Mukha Port was claimed by the Houthis, might have been an attempt to disrupt his visit. The Panel is not aware of evidence suggesting any other party to the conflict in Yemen, other than the Houthis, has used UAVs of the kind used in the Mukha port attack.

<sup>118</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL). The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>119</sup> See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

<sup>120</sup> The name of the Giants camp that was hit was reportedly *معسكر صويح* and the National Resistance's camp was an administrative base camp. Two missiles impacted inside the camps, and one impacted outside, according to sources on the West Coast. <https://www.2dec.net/news47328.html>. The Panel cannot independently verify the number of missiles used. See below footnote.

<sup>121</sup> Information provided by the Ta'izz Military Axis to the Panel confirms that these missiles were launched possibly from Houthi controlled areas in Ta'izz. The Houthis stated that on that day "two ballistic missiles (that they launched) struck an enemy training camp in the west of Taiz province". See [en.yppagency.net/243466/](https://en.yppagency.net/243466/).

## Annex 9 Impact of Houthi activities on former female detainees

1. The Panel continues to monitor the activities of different armed groups that impact adversely on women, children, and minorities in a manner that threatens the peace, security, and stability of Yemen. The Panel in 2021 documented the targeting of present and former female detainees, politically active women as well as female professionals opposing the Houthis. According to the women interviewed, the Houthis, through their actions, have created an environment that undermines women's capacity to effectively participate in community and leadership activities. This annex is based on interviews with 14 former detainees and their families.<sup>127</sup>

### I. Continued repression of former female detainees

2. Former female detainees and/or their families informed the Panel that they continue to suffer marginalization by their communities and political leaders after their release. For most women, their detention severely affected their ability to continue their work in political or community-based activities. It also impacted their family life and the education of their children. In addition to those interviewed in 2019 and 2020, in 2021, the Panel interviewed former female detainees who had been raped during their imprisonment; the family of a woman who had become paralyzed during her incarceration and was unable to speak after close to a year of enforced disappearance; women who had been tortured and/or mutilated in detention; and women who had been subjected to enforced disappearance.<sup>123</sup>

3. Former detainees are particularly vulnerable in Sana'a and in other Houthi-controlled areas. According to former female detainees interviewed by the Panel, they are called "prison graduates" by the population and are often excluded from community activities because of the stigma associated with prostitution and sexual violence. Two former detainees informed the Panel that they witnessed another female detainee being killed by her relatives on the day of her release at the prison gate. The witnesses presumed this was because the detainee had brought shame to her family through her incarceration. The Panel also received information that the family of a well-known female detainee is facing daily insults, while being stigmatized because of her ongoing detention.

4. There are no effective measures in place to protect or support women fleeing Houthi-controlled areas over prolonged periods of time, despite the provisions of resolution 2467 (2019).<sup>124</sup> As a result, some of the women who have been interviewed by the Panel since 2019 had to return to their homes in Houthi-controlled areas. The Panel has not been able to re-establish communication with them since their return due to significant safety concerns. Women interviewed by the Panel continue to show signs of trauma because of their ordeals while incarcerated. Some women, who are now living outside of Houthi-controlled areas, have no means to cover their daily expenses and their children's education has stopped. The Panel was informed that some would like to bring their perpetrators to justice, but that no financial or legal means are available.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>122</sup> This included nine former female detainees and/or their families whose cases were not previously reported by the Panel, as well as five more former female detainees whose cases were reported in [S/2020/326](#) and [S/2021/79](#).

<sup>123</sup> Most women suffered multiple forms of violence.

<sup>124</sup> Paragraph 16 (a) and (d) of resolution 2467 (2019) asks "to ensure that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict in the respective countries receive the care required by their specific needs and without any discrimination" The resolution further encourages Member States and other actors to give due consideration to the establishment of a survivors' fund and to support civil society organizations working on this issue. See also paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 of resolution [2467\(2019\)](#).

5. Women were also separated from their husbands and/or families for reasons related to detention. One woman informed the Panel that her family sold most of their belongings to bribe Houthi officials for her release. When she left the prison, the family refused to communicate with her because Houthi officials had informed them that she engaged in prostitution, a claim she denies.<sup>126</sup> In another case, the family decided that the woman would leave her home in a Houthi-controlled area for her safety, while her husband continued his work inside the Houthi-controlled area.<sup>127</sup> Women who have been separated from their families continue to be at high risk for continued sexual violence and further traumatization (see paragraph 6). One woman, who left Houthi-controlled areas for Government-controlled areas after her ordeal, stated that the military in Government-controlled areas kept harassing her because she had arrived from Sana'a.

6. The Panel has received information that compromising videos and images of female detainees were taken by the Houthis. The women were threatened with the release of these videos and images. This potentially exposes former detainees to further violence and trauma. Three women stated how the Houthis made sexually compromising videos of them; and/or forced them to confess on video to sleeping with identified military commanders belonging to anti-Houthi forces. In another incident, the Houthis submitted similar coerced and sexually compromising videos as evidence against the detainee before the prosecution.<sup>128</sup> The Panel was also informed of an identified prison director who downloaded unveiled photos of female detainees from their phones, while he was interrogating them, and threatened to release them unless the detainees complied with his orders.

7. Many of the women interviewed by the Panel since 2019 were active members of the General People's Congress (GPC). It is unclear if these female detainees were included in the Government's list of detainees for prisoner exchanges. The Panel was also informed of threats against former detainees in a third country and was told of physical harm done to another former detainee,<sup>129</sup> likely committed by Houthi supporters present in that country.<sup>130</sup> Even amongst survivors, there are fears that some former detainees may be working for the Houthis as informers.

## **II. Outcome of the designation of Sultan Zabin (YEi.006) and update on sexual violence in Houthi-controlled detention centers**

8. On 25 February 2021, through the adoption of resolution 2251 (2021), the Security Council designated Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin (YEi.006), including for instigating a policy of violence and sexual abuse against politically active women. On 26 February 2021, Zabin denounced his designation

<sup>125</sup> These women could identify their perpetrators either by their names or as belonging to the Houthi apparatus.

<sup>126</sup> The woman was arrested, and presumably also detained, in Sana'a.

<sup>127</sup> Three women informed the Panel that their immediate relatives were victims of "road-accidents" and they suspect the Houthis caused the accidents to install fear in the former detainees. The Panel was unable to verify independently the causes of the deaths. The ones who died were a sister and an adult female child of two women, and one case of paralysis of a minor child because of such "road-accidents".

<sup>128</sup> The detainee tried to have access to these after her release and was denied.

<sup>129</sup> The Panel stands ready to share this information orally with the members of the Security Council but will not provide such information in the report to protect the women and to ensure that host countries continue to accept these women.

<sup>130</sup> The Panel cannot independently verify this information as it did not meet the victim. This information was provided by two former detainees who knew the victim personally.

stating that it was the result of lobbying by “organized crime and terrorist organizations”.<sup>131</sup> He continued as the director of the criminal investigation division in Sana’a until his alleged death on 5 April 2021.<sup>132</sup> Houthi officials continued to publicly deny his involvement in the sexual violence of women and held an elaborate funeral for Zabin. However, several sources stated that the Panel’s report (S/2020/326), resulted in tribal pressure on the Houthis to release some women.

Figure 9.1  
Extract of Facebook post by Sultan Zabin (26 February 2021)

المعيد سلطان زابن  
26 February at 07:41 · 🌐

إن المواقف القوية والواضحة من الإرهاب والتصدى له ومعارضة الجريمة المنظمة وجرائم غسل الأموال ستظل هي المحور الرئيسي لعملائنا وإن تلبينا أية توشرة إعلامية أو بلبلة من سيل الاتهامات الباطلة. إن هذا الخط والتوجه في محاربة الجريمة المنظمة والإرهاب لن نغيره أبداً لأننا نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والانساني والوطني. كما انزعج كثير من أجهزة المخابرات الدولية التي تعتبر بعضها المعطاء الواسع للأعمال الإرهابية والجريمة المنظمة وتجارة المخدرات، مما دفعهم إلى تحريك خلاياهم وتربيتهم المتطلعة في المنظمات الدولية لكيال التهم الباطلة ولري عن الحقيقة وتصديق التصديقات المشرعة. نحن نقوم بواجبنا الشرعي والوطني والانساني ولا نعطى أي اهتمام للإثارة الإعلامية الرخيصة ولا نهم بما تروجوه أبقاق القومى الذين يتحركون بالريموت كتنترول من مطابخ منظمى الجرائم المنظمة وداعى الإرهاب. ورحم الله امرأاً عرف قدر نفسه.

Strong and clear attitudes towards and countering terrorism, combating organized crime and money laundering crimes will remain the central focus of our work, and no media buzz or nightingale will distract us from the flow of false accusations.  
This line and direction in the fight against organized crime and terrorism will not be deviated, because we feel that we are doing our legitimate, constitutional, national and humanitarian duty. Our insistence on serious and responsible security work has aroused the anger and guardianship of terrorism supporters and the devastating security chaos, and it has also greatly disturbed the international intelligence agencies, some of which consider the broad cover of terrorism, organized crime and drug trade, leading them to activate his cells M and their lobbies lobbies in international organizations for false accusations and loy neck the truth and marketing Rankings in a rush...  
We are doing our legitimate, national and humanitarian duty and we are not paying any attention to the cheap media hype and we do not care about what the chaos horns who are moving with the remont control of the kitchens of organized crime organizers and terrorists supporters are promoting.

And God bless a woman who knew her worth.  
🌐 Rate this translation

👍👎👏 216

37 comments 15 shares

Source: <https://m.facebook.com/sultan.zabinye/>.

9. After the designation of Zabin, the Panel documented other cases involving repeated rape and sexual violence in Houthi-controlled territory. Unlike in previous years, when women were raped to “purify” them, or as a punishment, or to coerce confessions (annex 5, S/2020/326), in 2021, the Panel documented a case where a female detainee was forced to have sexual intercourse with multiple men at secret detention centres because she was told that she was “being prepared for her future role as a sex worker” for important clients. According to the Houthis, her job was to obtain information from them. Additionally, the Panel also received further information that for at least one detainee, working as a prostitute to gather information for the Houthis was made a condition for their release.<sup>133</sup>

10. The Panel is investigating the involvement of an identified female in the trafficking of vulnerable women as sex workers after their release from Houthi prisons. Women whose families refuse to accept them after their detention are particularly vulnerable to such abuse. The female security wing of the Houthis (Zainabiyath) continues to repress and control women in prisons, professional workspaces, and in public places. In 2021, the Panel documented four more cases of sexual violence where the female security wing was directly involved in arrests, detention and/or violence, including in one case, where they tortured a woman. This new information complements the violations documented previously by the Panel in S/2020/326. The Panel is unaware of any measures taken by the Houthis to prevent sexual and other forms of violence against women in detention.

<sup>131</sup> See [https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story\\_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m\\_ent\\_stream\\_source=timeline&anchor\\_composer=false](https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m_ent_stream_source=timeline&anchor_composer=false).

<sup>132</sup> <http://www.yagency.net/354210>. On 5 April 2021, the ministry of interior announced Sultan Zabin’s death from a terminal illness. The Panel continues to investigate if Zabin has indeed died, and the circumstances of his death as new information has emerged that merits consideration. The Panel will further investigate.

<sup>133</sup> In 2019, the Panel documented a similar case where a woman was released, according to her, because she accepted to prostitute herself to help Houthis get information from their enemies or to compromise their enemies. She informed the Panel that she was prepared to say anything to stop the regular rape and sexual violence she had to endure in secret detention centers.



11. According to information received and media reports Brigadier Ahsan Al-Hijazi is likely the successor of Sultan Zabin as the director of the criminal investigation division.<sup>134</sup> The Panel is unaware of any information, at this stage, that links him as a successor to Zabin in the above-mentioned policy.

12. In 2019, the Panel reported that Abdul Hakim al-Khaiwani, former deputy minister of interior, publicly stressed the strong relationship between the ministry of the interior, the prosecution and legal authorities in carrying out arrests and detentions in respect of countering “prostitution” networks (paragraph 22, S/2020/326). In 2021, a victim informed the Panel that al-Khaiwani was involved in her torture while in detention. Al-Khaiwani currently serves as the director of security and intelligence bureau of the Houthis.

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<sup>134</sup> [www.yagency.net/373403](http://www.yagency.net/373403). <http://althawrah.ye/archives/703942>.  
<https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3145632.htm>.

## Annex 10 Houthi cultural courses and summer camps as a threat to peace and security in Yemen

### I. Overview

1. The Panel finds that the conflict in Yemen continues, partly, because of the Houthis' ability to continue the recruitment of new fighters, despite heavy casualties on the battlefronts (see annex 4). Their ability to exercise political and security control over their territories and populations, in violation of resolution 2216 (2015), relies to a significant extent on their ability to monitor and suppress dissent (see annex 9). The Panel is therefore investigating the impact of summer camps as well as religious and cultural courses in perpetuating the conflict and in radicalizing civilians, including children.

2. During the reporting period, these camps and courses were used to: (a) solidify Abdulmalik al Houthi's (YEi.004) authority and to consolidate his group's control over civilians;<sup>135</sup> (b) limit individual freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion;<sup>136</sup> (c) recruit fighters, including children;<sup>137</sup> (d) promote violence, hatred<sup>138</sup> and radicalization;<sup>139</sup> and (e) obtain popular support for the continuation of the conflict.<sup>140</sup> The Panel is also investigating incidents of reprisals against civilians who refused to participate in these courses (paragraphs 23 to 25),<sup>141</sup> including through the denial of humanitarian assistance (paragraph 20 and 21).<sup>142</sup>

<sup>135</sup> The Panel considers attempts by Houthi authorities to solidify their control over Houthi-controlled areas to be a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015), including paragraphs 1 (b) and (d).

<sup>136</sup> This would include those situations where individuals are forced to attend these religious courses or chant slogans when those conflict with their belief systems. This includes freedoms relating to political expression and religion. See Articles 10, 18 (1), (2) and (4) and 19 (1), (2) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which entered into force for Yemen on 9 May 1984. No derogations have been made by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>137</sup> This would include situations where those courses operate to directly or indirectly recruit adults and children for conflict-related activities. In respect to recruitment of adults by the Houthis, the Panel finds it likely that these activities constitute a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015), as the nature of the conflict is such that the recruited Houthis are primarily fighting the Government of Yemen; and therefore, the act of recruitment is primarily aimed at undermining the Government's control over its territory. The recruitment of children under the age of 18 years by armed groups is prohibited under international law and anyone engaging in recruitment also falls within the designation criteria under paragraph 6 of resolution 2511(2020). See article 4 (1) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, article 4 (3) (c) APII, CIHL rules 137 and 137.

<sup>138</sup> This would include situations where adults and children are forced to chant slogans that promote violence against nationalities or religious minorities and where textbooks for these courses, and lectures, demonize groups based on nationality, race or religion. Hate speech is defined by the Panel according to the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (2019) "any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factor." See [www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action\\_plan\\_on\\_hate\\_speech\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf). See also Article 20 (1) on the ban on war propaganda and 20 (2) of the ICCPR that prohibits "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence". See also General Comment 17 of the ICCPR Committee, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 11, Article 20 (Nineteenth session, 1983), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994).

<sup>139</sup> This would include those situations where individuals condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further the ideological or political goals espoused in these lectures. The Panel notes that there is no universally accepted definition for radicalization. The notion of 'radicalization' is generally used to convey the idea of "a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. This may include, but is not defined by, the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals." See A/HRC/33/29, para. 19.

<sup>140</sup> The Panel finds that these activities constitute threats to the peace, security and stability of Yemen and fall under paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), while also violating paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015).

<sup>141</sup> See paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution 2140 (2014).

<sup>142</sup> See paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015).

3. It should be noted that religious and cultural courses organized by the Houthis have been a part of Yemeni society since at least the 1990s. Some of these courses, which aimed to provide religious education to children during their vacations, were called summer schools, summer centres or summer camps (summer camps). The Panel does not claim that every religious or cultural course in Yemen, including those in Houthi-controlled areas, falls within the Panel's mandate.<sup>143</sup> This investigation is limited to those camps and courses which fall under the criteria set out in the previous paragraph. The Panel also notes that the content and format of these courses vary between governorates, target groups, the local organizers, and other factors. Therefore, this annex is not meant to provide a generic description of all courses and summer camps held in Houthi-controlled areas. A detailed presentation of the Houthi perspective on these courses was shown in an al Masira documentary.<sup>144</sup>

4. During the reporting period, the Panel conducted bilateral in-person or remote interviews with thirty medical professionals, including those that rehabilitate former child combatants, teachers, participants in the courses, civil society activists, and former detainees who had been forced to undergo various religious and cultural courses, sometimes, as a condition of release.<sup>145</sup> This annex also contains outcome of information gathered on cases relating to 16 children.<sup>146</sup>

5. The Panel also received over 15 investigative and other reports on these cultural and religious courses. The Government of Yemen provided a list of locations where children have been receiving military training.<sup>147</sup> In this report, the Panel only reflects information that it was able to verify independently through testimonies and documentary evidence. Where sources have consented, the Panel has deposited these reports with the Secretariat for viewing by Member States.

## II. Types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”

6. The Panel investigates the role of “summer camps” for children and religious and cultural training courses for adults and children (hereinafter “cultural courses”) to radicalize participants and to recruit new fighters. The Panel's investigations demonstrate that there are several types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”; and, for ease of reference, the Panel classifies them as follows:<sup>148</sup>

<sup>143</sup> For example, the Panel was informed during its West Coast visit that Tareq Saleh forces were hosting summer schools.

<sup>144</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88>.

<sup>145</sup> This annex only contains information obtained from those who had either participated in or refused to participate in these courses or those who had first-hand information on the courses. Information provided by the Government of Yemen and civil society activists, who themselves had no experience with these courses, was considered as background information, and where consent was provided, the investigative reports of others are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>146</sup> This included four in-person interviews with children and their families; and four remote interviews with families of children. The Panel chose not to remotely interview children; but relied on their families' testimonies. In one case, for example, there were reports of sexual violence committed against the child by a military trainer. The Panel, as a policy, avoids the remote interviewing of children who have been subjected to sexual violence due to the potential harm such an interview could have on the child. During in-person interviews, the Panel ensures that a caregiver is in the room and that it obtained the informed consent of both the caregiver and the child. The Panel also includes in this report testimonies of a further five children and their families gathered on behalf of the Panel; and further three interviews with families of children gathered by a Yemeni organization, where full testimonies were provided to the Panel, with identification information of the children, were provided to the Panel.

<sup>147</sup> Most of these locations are schools. The Panel also notes open-source information on the closure of schools to enable such to be converted into summer camps. Some documents are referred to in this report; and others, where consent was given to share the documents, are deposited with the Secretariat.

<sup>148</sup> This is not an official classification; but a classification of the Panel for ease of understanding the concept of these courses and summer camps.

- a. Duration and format of the courses: half-day-courses; short courses from a few days to a few weeks; residential versus day courses; the Panel is also aware of open-ended courses.<sup>149</sup>
- b. Contents of the courses: some combine basic military training with “religious” or “cultural” lessons, others focus exclusively on the latter.<sup>150</sup> The Panel notes that some purely military training courses are also called “summer camps”.
- c. Target groups of the courses: children, university students, professionals, the general population, as well as specific courses for detainees. For adults, the Panel was not informed of the use of military training in “cultural courses”<sup>151</sup>

7. The summer camps and cultural courses are systematically organized and reach large parts of the population. In August 2019, the Houthi-affiliated media stated that there were 3,500 “summer camps” that trained 284,000 students. The cultural courses and summer camps are often implemented at the local level; for example, the supervisors<sup>152</sup> in a hospital or school may host these courses for their staff or students. Supervisors at the local level appear to take responsibility for the courses organized for the general population in Houthi-controlled areas.<sup>153</sup>

### III. Summer Camps and Cultural Courses for Children

#### A. The use of summer camps and cultural courses to recruit children as fighters or for supervisory functions

8. The Panel is investigating the cases of four children, aged between 7 and 14 years, who have received military training in summer camps or have been taken to military camps under the pretext of attending cultural courses.<sup>154</sup> In paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#), the Panel also reported on a 13-year-old child who was lured by the Houthis to a military training camp. They had told him he was going to participate in a three-day educational camp. He was kept for three months and received training on how to use small arms. He was sent to the front after the completion of the course (see annex 33 of [S/2020/326](#) for details).

9. In the cases of the four children above, the two younger children were taught how to clean weapons and trained on how to evade “rockets” in what was supposed to be a “summer camp”.<sup>155</sup> One

<sup>149</sup> Those children interviewed by the Panel stayed from 3 – 9 months in these camps. Based on their testimonies, some children stay for longer until they are ready to be taken to the battlefield. For adults, the longest period that the Panel was informed of, was a week, except for the courses for detainees which lasted months. It should also be noted that for adults, the Panel has not documented cultural or religious courses that also provided military training. The Panel was however informed of possible “cultural” lectures in adult military camps, to radicalize fighters, so that their loyalty could be secured even in the most dangerous frontlines.

<sup>150</sup> The Panel was also informed of two types of camps: those that are open to all students, and they are taught “cultural” content, where some children are chosen from those and are provided opportunities for leadership and for acting as potential recruiters of adults in their families and other children. Then there were other camps that are for the selected few that are trained to go into battle.

<sup>151</sup> One reason for this maybe the lack of stigma and the lack of social resistance to adults joining in the fighting, as opposed to children, where the parents may object. For example, taking children from their homes in the pretext of participating in summer camps have occurred in four documented cases. The Panel also documented such a case in 2019, see paragraph 120 of [S/2020/326](#).

<sup>152</sup> In Houthi-controlled territories, alongside “formal state authorities” there are individuals who are appointed by the Houthi leadership to oversee or supervise the functions of those authorities or institutions. These individuals have significant powers, and they act by and on behalf of the Houthi leadership to implement central decisions at the local level. The highest-level supervisor at a governorate-level is the governorate supervisor, who would supervise the governor, and all activities in that governorate through a network of supervisors.

<sup>153</sup> Based on Panel discussions with participants of courses, their families and civil society activists researching the issue.

<sup>154</sup> Discussions with children and relatives.

<sup>155</sup> Discussions with Yemeni children in 2021, in the Gulf region.

child displayed to the Panel healing scars around his elbow, which he said occurred because of crawling on the ground as a part of his training. A 14-year-old child was directly taken to a military camp, where he was taught to dig tunnels and plant mines, together with other children.<sup>156</sup>

10. The Panel was informed that the recruitment of children is facilitated by cultural lessons given in public camps. For example, the Panel interviewed the parents of a 14-year-old child, who was taken to a Houthi military camp. In this case, the Panel was informed that the child refused to return to the family, which attributes this to the lessons in school which “brainwashed” the child by teaching him that God would want him to follow the Houthis instructions, over those of his parents (see also paragraphs 8, 9 and 18 for cases of nine other children who were taken from cultural courses to military trainings).

11. The Panel was also informed children who possess leadership qualities are selected to deliver ideological speeches, recruit fighters from among their peers, and/or to take over leadership roles in the Houthi movement. For example, a relative informed the Panel of a child, who, after taking lessons, condemned his parents as “non-believers” and became a local supervisor.<sup>157</sup> Testimonies of children and families who received military training through summer camps are also available in the public domain.<sup>158</sup>

## B. Hate speech in summer camps

12. In the “summer camps”, alongside religious lessons, the children were taught patriotic songs glorifying Houthi leaders, and received lectures in which, amongst others, they were told that they were fighting to liberate Palestine.<sup>159</sup>

13. The children and parents interviewed by the Panel stated that violence against Americans and Jews was encouraged. Children were expected to regularly shout the Houthi slogan “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.” (figure 10.1). The Panel has seen images of these slogans in mosques, schools, distributed as stickers to children, and attached to missiles (annex 11).

<sup>156</sup> The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Tareq Saleh forces informed the Panel that they continue to capture children from the battlefield who were recruited to lay mines on respectively, the Saudi-Yemeni borders and the battle frontlines. In 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided the Panel access to some of these children. A human rights activist from al Hudaydah reported multiple cases of injuries to children from the explosion of mines, which the children themselves were attempting to lay. The Panel has not been independently able to verify the causes for these injuries.

<sup>157</sup> The Panel spoke to a relative. The panel was unable to verify the information independently as the child and parents were in Houthi-controlled areas, which the Panel did not have access to.

<sup>158</sup> See “Scout activities... a new way for Houthis to recruit Yemeni youth” at <https://alkhaleejonline.net/سياسة/الأنشطة-الكشفية-طريقة/> and “Compulsory sectarian lesson what is the truth about al- houthi collecting the children of summer centers to al saleh mosque?” At <https://alasinahonline.com/sanaa/12890#.YZC-007MLIU>, <https://hunaalbayda.com/post/2261/> - معسكرات-تدريبية-لا- مراكز-صيفية-الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لأجيال-اليمن. See also [https://samrl.org/pdf/4554\\_5851609623282320014.pdf](https://samrl.org/pdf/4554_5851609623282320014.pdf), February 2021, <https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338>, <https://www.dw.com/ar/مستقبل-اليمن> -q-تجنيد-الأطفال-انتهاك-للطفولة-وتفخيخ-لحاضر-ومستقبل-اليمن-58120089.

<sup>159</sup> Information from in-person interviews with Yemeni children, in the Gulf region, 2021.

Figure 10.1  
Children shouting slogans at a summer camp in 2019



Source: al Masira<sup>160</sup>

14. The Panel has had access to images from textbooks used in the summer camps. The Panel notes that the texts call for Jihad against both Israel, the United States of America and their supporters, and calls it a duty to stop the United States of America from executing its “evil plans” (figure 1).

Figure 10.2  
Study material used in summer camps



Source: Confidential (left),<sup>161</sup> Al Masirah (right)<sup>162</sup>

15. The Panel received documents on changes made to school curricula as well as to the textbooks used in “summer camps”. These changes are said to distort history in favour of the Houthi leadership’s right to govern in Yemen and to distort historical Islamic accounts with the aim to promote fighting

<sup>160</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.

<sup>161</sup> This text stated: “By Jihad; the believer beats their enemies, which are America and Israel, and all those that support them, and these countries have to be free from these countries, so the truth will shine. So, let’s do the Jihad for the sake of God. America is the major enemy for Muslims wherever they are. America is trying to fight Islam and control the world because the Jews are controlling them... America is the source of evil in the world, she has killed millions of Muslims. She has captured the Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq...and now wants to capture Yemen and they want to kill the Yemeni people with their planes, rockets, and missiles... it is our duty to do Jihad and not allow America to execute her plans. We cannot let them capture our country. America is a major devil.”

<sup>162</sup> See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> dated 4 August 2019.





"Allah . . . look at all those sea creatures, killed en masse . . ."

"Allah! It's the Occupier's crime, mass killing to build military bases . . ."

Jihad, having climbed to dry land: "Thieves, murderers and criminals! Why all this hatred?"

Friends, have you seen the crimes of the Emirati occupation against our precious islands?!"

"It's all been documented. We must expose their lies and their crimes for the whole world to see!"

[Emirati ship:] "I'd also like some flat land to build a military base. Don't worry, you pretty and rare trees, we're going to take good care of you . . ."

[Yemeni child, left:] "This is the enemy which murders children and women!"

29

**Source:** [https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen\\_2015-19.pdf](https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/Review-of-Houthi-Educational-Materials-in-Yemen_2015-19.pdf), p. 29-31 (translated by impact-se).

### A. Use of schools and mosques to recruit children and incite hatred

17. The Panel notes the use of presumably safe spaces to recruit children as fighters and to spread hatred.<sup>169</sup> In Bayhan, Shabwah, barely a week after the Houthis took control,<sup>170</sup> there were reports of Houthi religious leaders coming from Ibb, Saada and other areas. Photographs show these imams distributing stickers with the Houthi slogan to children. The Panel also notes videos allegedly showing children from a school in Bayhan shouting the Houthi slogan.<sup>171</sup> The Shabwani educational authorities informed the Panel that they took immediate steps, on 29 September 2021, to close all schools in the Al Ain, Bayhan and Usaylan areas to prevent the children from becoming radicalized (see Figure 10.2). The schools reportedly re-opened after the educational authorities obtained a guarantee from the Houthis that they would not interfere with the education of the children (see annex 11).

<sup>169</sup> The Panel in this context means spaces that provide children with protected environments in which they participate in organized activities to play, socialize, learn, and express themselves. See <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/2923.pdf> for a definition of a child-friendly safe space.

<sup>170</sup> According to local sources, Houthis took control of Bayhan around 22 September 2021.

<sup>171</sup> Authenticity of video confirmed by two local sources.



Figure 10.4

Document issued by educational authorities closing schools, citing “ideological and security” concerns for the children, 29 September 2021



*Source:* Confidential

18. The Panel also documented the use of the al Saleh Mosque in Sana’a for a summer camp, where children as young as seven years were provided with basic military training (see figure 10.4 and annex 11). The Panel was informed that participants of this camp included homeless children who had come to the mosque seeking shelter.<sup>172</sup> The Panel also notes that summer camps, like mosques, are meant to be safe spaces where children can engage in religious activities consistent with their belief systems.<sup>173</sup> Yet in five cases that it documented, children were taken from cultural courses held in schools to military training, and in another five cases, parents were informed that the children were in cultural courses when they were in fact in military training.

<sup>172</sup> This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

<sup>173</sup> See for example [https://samrl.org/pdf/4554\\_5851609623282320014.pdf](https://samrl.org/pdf/4554_5851609623282320014.pdf) on the recruitment of children.

Figure 10.5

**Sana'a-based prime minister inspects a summer school held in al Saleh Mosque, June 2021**



Source: [www.ypagency.net/367625](http://www.ypagency.net/367625)

#### **D. Physical harm and sexual violence against children at camps**

19. The Panel received information on sexual violence committed by an instructor against a child who underwent military training.<sup>174</sup> The child's phone was taken away from him, and the parents were told that the child was taken to a cultural course. Therefore, it took some time before the parents could find the child, and for the child to communicate to the parent what had happened to him. Children who are separated from their parents for prolonged periods of time, and whose means of communication were removed, have a higher likelihood of have been exposed to violence, as they become particularly vulnerable once they are separated from their parents. The Panel also finds that sexual violence is likely underreported in Yemen due to the social stigma associated with the crime. The Panel continues to investigate. In another case, some children who tried to escape from their "summer camp" were reportedly caught and beaten up.<sup>175</sup>

#### **E. Denial of humanitarian assistance**

20. The Panel has received information from multiple sources on nine cases in which Houthi supervisors have threatened families that they would be denied humanitarian assistance, if their children would not participate in summer camps or military courses.<sup>176</sup> These incidents occurred between 2018

<sup>174</sup> The Panel will refrain from providing further information to protect the identity of the child but stands ready to provide the Security Council verbally with further information on the circumstances of the violence.

<sup>175</sup> This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

<sup>176</sup> In five cases, where the Panel has not had access the families because of safety concerns for the families, it spoke to the researchers that documented these cases, who collected further information from the families on behalf of the Panel. The Panel has the names of the beneficiaries, the names of Houthi individuals who denied assistance, the dates of incidents and locations. The Panel stands ready to provide further situational information, without disclosing any identifiable information, as appropriate.

– 2020. According to a Yemeni non-governmental organization, in two cases, families were in fact deprived of humanitarian assistance. In another case documented by this organization, the Houthi supervisor offered a 15-year-old child to be registered to receive humanitarian aid in exchange for joining the Houthis on the frontlines. The child accepted and enrolled in a cultural and military training course for two months, after which he went to fight for the Houthis. He died in battle. Additionally, the Panel received information that a teacher was denied access to humanitarian assistance from a non-governmental organization because he refused to teach the “Houthi curriculum” in his class, and to send his children to fight. The teacher had previously been receiving this assistance for 5 years. The Panel interviewed another teacher in 2019, who stated that food baskets given by organizations were only distributed to teachers following the Houthi ideology. The Panel also received information on two children being sent cultural courses for 6 months, in exchange for humanitarian assistance provided by the local supervisor. After the children returned from the cultural course, assistance was only resumed after the parent agreed to send the children to military training. The assistance was provided by the supervisor directly to the families, allegedly these were UN assistance. In another case involving multiple children, the supervisor promised that the children will be acting as his security detail, and they would only attend cultural courses in a school in Sana’a.<sup>177</sup> The children were taken with the promise that the family would receive humanitarian assistance from the supervisor.<sup>178</sup> Three months later, the children were taken for military training.<sup>179</sup> When the parents asked the supervisor to return the children, the latter stated that he would continue to provide assistance, as well as the salaries to the parents. The supervisor informed the parents that one child was killed in the battle in Ma’rib. The parents, after their children returned or was killed in battle, approached the supervisor for continued humanitarian assistance, at which point he informed them that the priority for assistance would be for those families whose members are fighting. Some of the aid given by the supervisor had the UN logo.<sup>180</sup> In all of these cases, the cultural courses or summer camps were held in schools and it is from these schools that the children were then taken to the military fronts.

21. The Panel was informed that humanitarian assistance is denied through the removal of families’ names from the list of beneficiaries.<sup>181</sup> Local supervisors appear to have control over these lists.<sup>182</sup> The Panel has received information that at least two families took this threat seriously enough for them to send their children to the frontlines.<sup>183</sup> The Panel finds that local Houthi supervisors are exploiting the prevailing poverty to recruit children as fighters.<sup>184</sup> The Panel notes that in a 2021 study done by a local

<sup>177</sup> These were daily classes and the children would return home every day from the „summer camp“.

<sup>178</sup> The family received several packages of assistance directly from those affiliated with the supervisor.

<sup>179</sup> The children were gradually taken. Initially they would return home every day, but then they would return after a week, and then after 2 weeks until finally they were enrolled in a residential military training.

<sup>180</sup> The UN informed the Panel that such a practice of providing humanitarian assistance in exchange for fighting was unlikely as the UN would be informed if their food was diverted in this manner. The researchers informed the Panel that it was more unlikely that the families living under the control of the supervisor, would inform the UN, that their local supervisor was diverting food from the UN.

<sup>181</sup> The Panel notes open-source reporting on this issue: “... interviews for this paper, two families said the local Houthi supervisor forced them to send their children to the battlefields in exchange for humanitarian aid and a small salary. The salaries their children receive and the humanitarian aid they get, although very limited, is the main source of income they have.” See [www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions](http://www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions). See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> “Houthis take advantage of “citizens” need for aid to recruit them to fight”. See also <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children’s refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”(unofficial translation).

<sup>182</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>183</sup> Confidential source who interviewed the families.

<sup>184</sup> See study done by a local organization on the reasons for children to drop-out of school. According to them 4.7% of those interviewed dropped out because they were recruited by a party to a conflict but 48.3% dropped out for economic reasons. <https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/War-Of-Ignorance-1.pdf>.

Yemeni organization over 57% of children across Yemen who dropped out of school stated that they would re-join when their economic situation improved.<sup>185</sup> For children and families who are poor, humanitarian assistance given by organizations is vital to their economic survival. Thus, the Panel finds that the ability to access humanitarian assistance is a powerful incentive for parents and children to join fighting. The Panel continues to investigate.

#### IV. Cultural trainings targeting the general population

22. The Panel finds that the cultural courses provided in Houthi-controlled areas have also been perpetuating the conflict. They enable the Houthis to counter localized resistance to recruitment, to control popular dissent, and to maintain support for the Houthi leadership and its ideology. In some cases, individuals were forced to attend the courses as a demonstration of their loyalty to the Houthis cause.<sup>186</sup>

23. For example, one woman stated that she took multiple courses, even though they were contrary to her religious beliefs. She feared reprisals from the Houthis if she refused to participate.<sup>187</sup> In the cases investigated by the Panel, Houthi-appointed supervisors or managers in schools and hospitals monitor the participation of the employees in these activities. There are reports that non-participation has resulted in job losses.<sup>188</sup> In prisons, some men and women are provided ideological courses as a condition of release (see annex 9 and paragraph 26 below).

24. The Panel documented the arrest and detention of, and sexual violence committed against two women who had refused to participate in the cultural courses. One refused to participate because the course materials were contrary to her political beliefs, and the other because she saw these courses as promoting hatred. Both women did not want to shout the Houthi slogan. One of these women, while being sexually abused, was told that what was being taught in the courses was the “real Islam”. It was made clear to her that the violence used against her was because of her refusal to participate in the courses.<sup>189</sup> This woman believed that she was targeted because she was well-respected within her community, and because the Houthis wanted her to use her influence to recruit new fighters.<sup>190</sup>

25. The Panel was informed that medical professionals who attend these courses were expected to encourage patients to send their male relatives to fight in the conflict. Several individuals informed the Panel that they suspect that some of their co-workers may have become informers for the Houthis after they had taken a cultural course.

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> The panel also notes that in some cases individuals are free to choose whether to participate or not. Interviews conducted with individuals in Houthi-controlled areas, 2021.

<sup>187</sup> Interview in \Yemen, 2021.

<sup>188</sup> Confidential sources in some schools and hospitals, as well as civil society activists.

<sup>189</sup> <sup>1</sup> In-person interview with the Panel in 2021.

<sup>190</sup> Interview, 2021.

## A. Cultural trainings targeting vulnerable populations

### i. Targeting detainees

26. The Panel finds that cultural courses are also being used in a systematic manner in secret detention centres. These “rehabilitation” courses impose the Houthi vision of Islam, incite hatred against various groups, and disseminate lectures from the Houthi leadership. The Panel was informed of some organized courses using videos and different lecturers. One male detainee informed the Panel that the attendance of a six-month religious course, teaching Islam from the beginning, was a condition for his release. He, therefore, accepted to participate in the training and was indeed released after completion.<sup>191</sup> A female detainee said she begged to join the courses because she hoped that it would facilitate her release.<sup>192</sup> Another detainee said he was forced to take the courses and to shout the slogan despite him not being a Muslim. This individual also said he did so to demonstrate his loyalty in order to be released.<sup>193</sup>

### ii. Targeting children of female detainees

26. The Panel received information on four children between seven and 15-years old, who were forcibly taken away by the Houthis from their caretakers, after their mothers were detained. In two cases, their relatives were informed that the children were taken to a cultural course until their mothers are released. In fact, they were taken to a summer camp and provided with basic military training.<sup>194</sup> In the case of a third child, he was reportedly taken from a female detainee. She was subsequently informed by the Houthis, while still in detention, that the child had died on the Ma’rib front.<sup>195</sup> The Panel notes a report in 2021 of another child dying under similar circumstances.<sup>196</sup>

27. In another case, a mother informed the Panel that her interrogators told her that if she did not cooperate with them, her eight-year-old son would be taken by the Houthis to fight.<sup>197</sup> In view of the circumstances of the five children referenced here, the Panel has initiated investigations to establish whether the Houthis have a policy targeting the children of female detainees for military recruitment.

### iii. Targeting ethnic minorities

28. The Panel received information from Ta’izz and elsewhere on the possible targeting of children from ethnic minority groups for recruitment in summer camps, which it is in the process of verifying.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>191</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.

<sup>193</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>194</sup> The Panel conducted in-person interviews with the children and a caregiver.

<sup>195</sup> The mother refused to be interviewed by the Panel as she was in Sana’a.

<sup>196</sup> See <https://gulfstateanalytics.com/houthi-crimes-against-women/>. It states “Then Doaa, arrested along her one-year-old daughter, spent two years in jail. Her husband obtained a divorce in her absence. Doaa says her older son was recruited by Houthis and deployed to the front lines where he died. She was not informed until her released”

<sup>197</sup> In-person interview with Panel in 2021.

<sup>198</sup> Information from the Ta’izz military axis and civil society. The Panel received also information on specific supervisors involved in organizing these courses. For open-source reporting on minority children see <https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739> which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children's refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”

## V. Responsibility of Member States and international organizations

29. The Panel notes that some Member States and international organizations, including United Nations entities, have provided support to the ministry of education in Sana'a. The Panel finds that these entities are likely aware of the use of Houthi slogans in schools and in textbooks used in summer camps, which incite hatred against various groups and entice students to join the Houthi military.<sup>199</sup> Organizations supporting schools in Houthi-controlled areas have a responsibility to ensure that schools are safe spaces. Children should be able to study without being forced to shout political slogans or being asked to contribute to hate speech against various groups and nationalities or without being at risk of being recruited into the Houthi military. At minimum, those supporting the ministry of education should engage in a dialogue with the Minister or relevant authorities on the allegations above, as well as allegations concerning changes into school curriculum, and underscore that changes to curriculum and conduct in school should be in line with Yemen's international human rights obligations. It should also enhance existing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds and material provided to support the education of children are not diverted or misused to promote Houthi ideology, Houthi cause, or the conflict.

## VI. Individuals responsible for these policies

30. The top Houthi leadership is responsible for the use of some summer camps for ideological training, and, in some cases, basic military training.<sup>200</sup> The leadership is also responsible for organizing cultural courses, and any curriculum changes in schools that may entice children to fight. High numbers of children are recruited and killed in fighting, a fact which is also acknowledged in official Houthi media (figure 10.5).<sup>201</sup> In his annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General noted that the Houthis had recruited 134 boys and 29 girls in 2020 (S/2021/437). In the same report, the continuing rise in the number of grave violations, including the recruitment of children, particularly by the Houthis, and persistent high numbers of children killed and maimed, and increase in denials of humanitarian access were highlighted.<sup>202</sup>

<sup>199</sup> For publicly available information on summer camps see "With the aim of transferring them to the fronts...the Houthis sort students in their summer centers" at <https://www.alyqyn.com/print~33181>; "summer camps..."fuel" for Houthi battles in Yemen" at <https://al-ain.com/article/children-camps-summer-houthis-yemen>, "Houthis chart a path of no return for Yemen's generations" at <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/08/05/الحوثيون-يرسمون-طريق-اللاعودة-لاجيال-اليمن>

<sup>200</sup> See for example the participation of top leaders at the graduation ceremony of the al Saleh mosque (annex 11).

<sup>201</sup> The Panel has received over a hundred of extracts of similar photos of child martyrs, with their ages, but it cannot independently verify if all are children.

<sup>202</sup> See S/2021/437 and <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/where-we-work/yemen/>.

Figure 10.6  
**Images of a child “martyr” in the Houthi media**<sup>203</sup>



**Source:** Government of Yemen

31. The Panel is not aware of any measures taken by the Sana’a-based minister of education, Yahyah Bader al Din al Houthi, to stop children being recruited, or to investigate allegations on schools and summer camps being used for child recruitment. The Panel also finds that the Sana’a-based minister of defense, major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi,<sup>204</sup> has not taken any effective measures to prevent the recruitment of children into the Houthi military. The Panel notes that Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) has stated that he fully supports the summer camps and will continue to fund them.<sup>76</sup> The Panel has initiated investigations into the roles of Abdullah Al-Razhi, director-general of educational coordination and summer activities at the ministry of youth and sport; and Muhammad Hussein Majd Al-Din Al-Muaydi, minister of youth and sports, in sustaining this policy.<sup>205</sup>

Figure 10.7  
**Yahayah Badreddin al Houthi**



**Source:** Al Masirah

<sup>203</sup> According to Government of Yemen, this 13-year-old child was killed in January 2020. Source: Government of Yemen. The Panel has received similar images and videos of children allegedly killed on the battlefield from multiple sources.

<sup>204</sup> وزير الدفاع اللواء محمد ناصر العاطفي

<sup>205</sup> althawrah.ye/archives/677254. In Arabic, the name of the minister of youth and sports is وزير الشباب والرياضة محمد حسين مجد الدين المؤيدي

Figure 10.8

major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (second from right)



Source: [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence/)

Figure 10.9

Guests at a graduation ceremony for summer camp in al Saleh mosque



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opF11zkY88> (in the lower image, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, prime minister, Mohammed Ali al Houthi and Taha Al Mutawkkel, minister of health, are shown to attend a graduation ceremony at al Saleh Mosque)

32. Regarding the cultural courses, it is likely that the governorate-level supervisors exercise oversight while local supervisors implement the policy that had been formulated at the central level. The Panel continues to receive information that the ultimate control over the local supervisors lies with Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) and Mohammed Ali al Houthi.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>206</sup> Confidential sources in Yemen, including in Houthi-controlled areas.



**Annex 11**

**The use of Al Saleh Mosque as a summer school and for military purposes**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 12 Attack on Jeddah port on 14 December 2020

1. In the early morning hours of 14 December 2020, the port of Jeddah was attacked by at least three water-borne improvised explosives (WBIED) causing significant damage to two vessels, a merchant tanker and a Saudi warship, as well as to the port infrastructure. In June 2021, the Panel visited the sites of the attacks and interviewed representatives of the Royal Saudi Navy and Saudi Aramco, which operates parts of the port, and which had chartered the merchant tanker. The Panel has also been in contact with the operator of the tanker involved in the incident.

Figure 12.1

**Satellite images showing approximate impact locations of the WBIEDs**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

2. The first and the second WBIED employed targeted King Faisal Naval Base, a facility which hosts the Headquarters of the Western Fleet of the Royal Saudi Navy, and functions as the home port for its vessels. At 0007 hours, the first WBIED hit the Western end of Pier #8 located towards the Southern end of the base. The subsequent explosion caused significant damage to the concrete structure. The damage, as well as some of the repair work, was still visible when the Panel visited the impact location in June 2021. At 0015 hours, a second WBIED impacted the hull of the BORAIDA (902) on the starboard side. The vessel, a naval replenishment tanker based at Jeddah, was moored at that time to the North of Pier #8. The Panel has requested more information (including detailed images) on the damage caused to the warship from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a response to which is pending at

the time of writing. However, during the Panel's visit to the naval base, the repairs to the vessel's hulls were visible and an image obtained from other sources (see below) clearly shows damage above the waterline shortly after the attack.

Figure 12.2

**The BORAIDA shortly after the attack at King Faisal Naval Base**



*Source:* Confidential

3. At 0044 hours, the third WBIED impacted the port side of the hull of the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker BW RHINE (IMO: 9341940), which was moored at Main Berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal, a facility several kilometres away from King Faisal Naval Base in a North-Western direction. The vessel was operating a scheduled charter on behalf of Saudi Aramco and was offloading refined petroleum products. According to Saudi Aramco, at the time of the attack, the tanker had already been in port for about 20 hours and about 20 percent of the cargo was still onboard the vessel. The impact and subsequent explosion penetrated the hull of the ship at two locations at the waterline. The holes measured approximately 30 centimetres x 30 centimetres. The impact also caused a fire with flames reported to be 20 meters high which burned for about one hour. While the crew of the BW RHINE reported to the shipping line that they had heard two explosions from the direction of King Faisal Naval Base as well as subsequent gun fire, which caused the master to stop the offloading of the cargo, they did not receive a warning that an attack on Saudi Aramco's Marine Terminal was imminent.


Figure 12.3

**Damage to the hull of the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

4. No injuries were reported from the attacks on either the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal nor the ones on the King Faisal Naval Base and while the damage to the vessels and the piers required extensive repairs, the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal was able to resume operations shortly after the attack. However, as noted in annex 16, the supply of petroleum products to the Western region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends heavily on Saudi Aramco's terminal and storage infrastructure in Jeddah. If the attack had done more damage to the tanker or the terminal infrastructure, the repercussions on the economy and civilian infrastructures for this part of the Kingdom would have been significant. In addition, a successful attack on a fully loaded oil tanker could have resulted in an oil spill, which would have serious environmental and economic repercussions for communities which depend on the Red Sea for their livelihoods, as well as a potentially negative impact on global trade and commerce.

Figure 12.4

**Recovery of the debris of the WBIED which hit the BW RHINE**

**Source:** Confidential

5. During its visit, the Panel was able to inspect the debris of the three WBIEDs which were used in the attacks on 14 December 2020. The Panel notes that the design of the boats is different from previous models deployed by the Houthi forces in the Red Sea.<sup>207</sup> Measuring between 6 and 8 meters from bow to stern and powered by two, 75-horsepower Yamaha outboard engines, these WBIEDs are basically skiffs converted for autonomous military deployment. Regrettably, the Panel has not been able to inspect the guidance and control systems of the WBIEDs, but it will likely, in the Panel's assessment, as in the case of previous generations, rely on pre-set GPS coordinates to guide it to its target. The Panel has also not been able to inspect any remnants of the warheads used in the WBIEDs, but images of debris recovered from the inside of the BW RHINE, as well as the "significant internal blast damage" reported by the crew, could imply that they were carrying a shaped charge similar to the ones used in some Houthi UAVs (see annex 15 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2020/326](#)) as well as in the WBIED attack on the Saudi-flagged merchant tanker ARSAN (IMO: 9421415) in the Southern Red Sea on 24 July 2018 (see annex 15 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2019/83](#)).

<sup>207</sup> The Houthis have previously used converted ten-meter patrol boats manufactured by the UAE (2017), as well as the smaller, 5.8 metre long, purpose-build 'Blowfish' model (since 2018), which is powered only by a single outboard engine. The design used in the attack on Jeddah port is more similar to the converted skiffs used in the attack on the Saudi-flagged tanker GLADIOLUS (IMO: 9169548) in the Gulf of Aden on 3 March 2020 (see paragraph 63 and annex 22 of the Panel's Final Report, [S/2021/79](#)).

Figure 12.5

**Metal debris recovered from inside the BW RHINE, likely part of the shaped charge**



*Source:* Confidential

6. If the attack was conducted in the context of the conflict in Yemen, IHL would apply.<sup>208</sup> In this case, the attack against the King Faisal Naval Base would be permitted under IHL as this military base is a military objective by its nature.<sup>209</sup> However, the attack against the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker in the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal, a civilian tanker, is contrary to the IHL principle of distinction.<sup>210</sup> The Panel estimates that the targeting accuracy of the WBIEDs used in this attack is fairly high, with a margin of error of less than five metres. In addition, the distance between Main Berth #1, where the BW RHINE was moored, and King Faisal Naval Base is approximately 2,000 meters. It is therefore likely that the civilian tanker was the intended objective of the attack, in violation of international humanitarian law.

<sup>208</sup> For instance, if Houthi forces were responsible, the attack would be part of the conflict between the Houthis and the KSA. However, if the attack was conducted by another group, such as a terrorist group, with no link with the conflict in Yemen, IHL would not be applicable. In this case, the Panel concluded that the attack was conducted with near certainty by the Houthis, and therefore is linked with the conflict.

<sup>209</sup> CIHL rule 8.

<sup>210</sup> CIHL rule 1.

### Annex 13      Attack on Yanbu port on 27 April 2021

At 0615 hours on 27 April 2021, a patrol vessel of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia identified a target approaching the port of Yanbu, on the west coast of Saudi Arabia, from the open sea at a distance of six nautical miles (approximately 11 kilometres) and heading towards the Saudi Aramco refinery at high speed (more than 30 knots, approximately 55 kilometres/hour). The patrol vessel intercepted the target, which turned out to be a water borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) and disabled it at 0630 hours, approximately two nautical miles (3.7 kilometres) away from the refinery. At 0815 hours, the disabled craft had been moved by the waves to a location close to the Yanbu desalination plant where it was destroyed by another military patrol. The Panel has interviewed the crew of a merchant tanker, the *TORM HERMIA* (IMO: 9797993), which was moored at berth 71 of Yanbu port, and which had first reported the incident. Three crew members said that they observed the incident stating that the explosion took place at 08.05 hours approximately 1.4 nautical miles (2.6 kilometres) away from the tanker to the South-East between buoy 6R and 3R (see figure 13.3). The Panel has learned that following the incident, the Saudi military conducted a survey of the area and discovered the wreckage of a second WBIED in the Shu'ban al-Sab'ah area, approximately 30 nautical miles (55 kilometres) South of Yanbu port.

Figure 13.1

#### **WBIED approaching Yanbu port as observed by the Saudi patrol vessel**




**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 13.2  
**Destruction of the WBIED by the Saudi military**



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 13.3  
**ECDIS screenshot from the TORM HERMIA showing the approximate location of the explosion**




Source: Confidential



Figure 13.4

Map showing the locations of the intercept and destruction of the first WBIED, as well as the location where the wreck of the second WBIED was found



Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

## Annex 14 Attack on Jizan port on 30 July 2021

At 1712 hours on 30 July 2021, the crew of the Bahamas-flagged crude oil tanker ALBERTA (IMO: 9486922) noticed a UAV approaching at high speed from the starboard side. The vessel was moored at berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal, loading crude oil. The UAV exploded over the vessel's bow in the vicinity of the forecastle at an unknown height in a matter consistent with a loitering munition. The ALBERTA only sustained minor damage, including several holes in the floor of the main deck, possibly as a result of fragmentation,<sup>211</sup> as well as damage to a hydraulic line and a mooring winch. Neither a fire nor injuries among the crew members were reported. The crew was able to document a number of pieces of debris on the deck of the ALBERTA, which were later collected by the Saudi military. While the Panel has not been able to inspect the debris, the images show clearly that the weapon system used was a UAV, most likely a medium-range, QASEF-type, which has been documented multiple times by the Panel in cross-border attacks by the Houthis on locations in the South of Saudi Arabia. Whereas the explosives carried by those UAVs likely would be unable to seriously damage the vessel itself, it can cost the lives of crew members as evidenced by the attack on the MERCER STREET a day earlier (see annex 15). The distance from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen to the Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal is approximately 80 kilometres, which put the port within reach of medium-range UAVs.

Figure 14.1

### Possible fragmentation damage on the main deck of the ALBERTA



*Source:* Confidential

<sup>211</sup> Houthi UAVs often carry fragmentation warheads, which explode into a mass of small, fast-moving metal fragments ("fragmentation") that are lethal against individuals.

Figure 14.2

**Possible fragmentation damage in the roof of the main cavity**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.3

**Debris of the wing of the UAV made from fiberglass**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.4  
**Debris of the engine of the UAV**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 14.5  
**Small parts, possibly pieces of fragmentation from the UAV**



**Source:** Confidential

## Annex 15      Attack on MERCER STREET on 29 July 2021

1.      The oil products tanker MERCER STREET (IMO: 9539585) was attacked three times over the span of several hours on 29 July 2021<sup>212</sup>, while steaming empty in international waters in the Gulf of Oman *en route* from Tanzania to the United Arab Emirates. The first attack occurred at 1045 hours when the crew reported that a UAV had missed the vessel, crashing approximately one nautical mile off the aft starboard. The bridge watch heard a loud buzzing noise followed by an explosion in the ocean, causing the water to erupt 15-20 metres in the air and black smoke rising at the point of impact. The second attack happened approximately 45 minutes later, at about 1130 hours. The bridge watch again reported a buzzing noise and stated that the UAV approached from the aft port quarter of the ship at an altitude of 20-25 metres. Prior to reaching the MERCER STREET, the UAV suddenly pitched nose up before rotating back down and proceeded in a 170 degrees downward descent towards the ship. According to the crew, the UAV was “light desert green” in colour. The second UAV narrowly missed the MERCER STREET and crashed into the ocean about one metre off the stern. The crew observed black smoke from an explosion on impact and recovered some pieces of UAV debris from the deck of the MERCER STREET. Following the second attack, the ship increased its speed from 11 knots (20 kilometres per hour) to 16 knots (30 kilometres per hour) but maintained its course.

2.      The third attack happened at 2030 hours and this time the UAV hit the MERCER STREET’s aft superstructure from above, impacting the pilot’s cabin located on the aft bridge deck. The impact killed the ship’s master, a Romanian citizen, as well as a British security officer, making this the first fatal attack on a commercial vessel in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula in many years. The attack also destroyed the vessel’s communication equipment and created a breach in the roof of the pilot’s cabin. It also damaged the bridge deck, as well as the C and B decks. In the aftermath of the attack, the crew mustered inside the citadel and informed the company, which in turn alerted the U.S. Navy. U.S. forces were then dispatched to assist the vessel, to conduct a preliminary survey of the damage, and to accompany the MERCER STREET to a safe harbour.

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<sup>212</sup> Some reports state that the attacks took place on 29 and other that it occurred on 30 July 2021, the reason for that apparent discrepancy is that international naval forces are using Zulu time, the military version of coordinated universal time (UTC). In this report the Panel is using local, i.e., Gulf Standard Time, which is UTC+4.

Figure 15.1  
**Aerial view of the aft castle showing the location of the impact**



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.2  
**Impact location of the UAV on the aft superstructure**



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.3  
**Internal view of the impact location from the Pilot's cabin**



*Source:*  
<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.4  
**Damage to exterior bulkhead below the impact point**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 15.5  
**Vertical stabilizer of the UAV**



**Source:**

<https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/PressReleases/MERCERSTREETATTACK06AUG2%20final.pdf>

Figure 15.6  
**Debris of a servo actuator from the UAV**



**Source:** Confidential



Figure 15.7  
**Fiberglass debris from the UAV recovered from the bridge wing**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 15.8  
**Sketch by a crew member of the UAV used in the second attack**




*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 16 Attack on the Saudi Aramco Bulk Plant in Jeddah North

17. At 0342 hours in the early morning of 23 November 2020, the Saudi Aramco petroleum products distribution facility in Jeddah North was attacked by a cruise missile, which hit the top of storage tank #103 coming from a South-Westerly direction. One of 13 similar structures at the site used to store petroleum products such as diesel oil, gasoline and jet fuel. The tank has a capacity of 500,000 barrels and was filled with diesel at the time of the attack. The attack caused an explosion and a subsequent fire in the attack, the burn marks of which were still clearly visibly during the Panel's visit to the facility in June 2021 and it took the company's response team and the fire brigade about 40 minutes to extinguish the fire. Subsequent investigations showed that the impact of the missile had created a hole of 3.93 meters x 2.56 meters in the external roof of the storage tank and had completely destroyed the floating internal roof, a six-millimeter-thick structure made of carbon steel on top of the product. Company representatives interviewed by the Panel confirmed that there had been no advance warning of an attack.

**Figure 16.1**

Satellite Images showing the approximate impact point of the missile




*Source:* Google Earth, Panel

18. Shortly after the attack, a spokesman for the Houthi forces, brigadier general Yahya Sarie, announced in the Houthi-affiliated media that “the Yemeni missile forces targeted an Aramco

distribution station in Jeddah with a winged missile, Quds 2, which is announced for the first time<sup>213</sup>. On the same day, in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/1135), the Permanent Representative of KSA also attributed responsibility for the “terrorist attack” on the bulk plant to the Houthi militia. The Panel also notes that the modus operandi of the attack, despite more limited in scale, is broadly like the previous attacks on the oil infrastructure in KSA, including the high-profile attack on 14 September 2019 on the Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays (S/2020/326).

**Figure 16.2**

Damage to the external roof of storage tank #103



**Source:** Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

19. While operations at the Bulk Plant resumed within hours of the attack, storage tank #103 was out of service for about four months for repairs, which according to the company cost it approximately USD 1.5 million. Even though there were 15 employees of Saudi Aramco at the site when the attack happened, no injuries occurred. However, had the missile hit another storage tank containing a more flammable fuel than diesel oil (such as kerosene), it is possible that the tank’s firefighting system would not have been able to contain the blaze and that other tanks in the facility would have also been affected. The Panel believes that the missile system used by the Houthis in this attack (see paragraph 5 below) is sufficiently precise that storage tank #103 was deliberately targeted, but it not clear whether the attackers were aware what kind of fuel was stored there at the time of the attack.

20. According to information received by the Panel during its visit to the facility, the North Jeddah Bulk Plant has a total storage capacity of 5.2 billion barrels and plays a critical role in distributing up to 120,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per day to customers in the Jeddah, Mecca and al-Baha regions, which accounts for 25 to 30 percent of the Kingdom’s supplies. In addition to more than 1,000 petrol stations, the facility also supplies public utilities such as the King Abdulaziz International

<sup>213</sup> <http://en.ypagecy.net/198784/>.

Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the vital Saline Water Conversion Corporation, which is responsible for the provision of most potable water in the Jeddah region. While the facility also supplies the Saudi military with petroleum products, it is mostly supplying civilian customers. If the plant had been out of service of a significant period, the impact on the Kingdom's economy as well as on the welfare of the residents of the Western region would likely have been significant.

**Figure 16.3**

Debris of the cruise missile used in the attack



**Source:** Panel

21. The Panel has been able to inspect the debris of the missile used in the attack and was informed that some parts were found inside of storage tank #103 during the repair works. The debris is consistent with the land attack cruise missile, which has been previously documented by the Panel as having been used in several attacks on targets in KSA in 2019 (annex 16 of [S/2020/326](#)) and whose parts were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden in November 2019 (paragraph 79 and annex 19 of [S/2021/79](#)). The damage to storage tank #103 of is also consistent with a missile of this type. The distance between the facility and Houthi-controlled territory is about 700 kilometres, which would put it close to maximum range estimated by the Panel for this weapon system. Whereas the Houthi forces have claimed that the missile used in the attack was a “Quds-2” cruise missile, during its inspection the Panel has not been able to identify significant design differences to the “Quds-1” model which was used in 2019. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of some of the commercial components used in the manufacturing of the missile (annex 23) to establish whether the missile was manufactured in Yemen, as claimed by the Houthis, or supplied by an external party.

22. The Aramco Bulk Plant can be considered as a dual-use object under IHL as it provides supplies both to the Saudi military and civilians. However, according to information received by the Panel, most petroleum products distributed by the facility are for civilian use. For instance, the Panel was informed by a company representative that approximately one percent of the aviation fuel distributed by the Bulk Plant are supplied to the Royal Saudi Air Force in Jeddah. As for other petroleum products distributed to the military, the Panel was unable to obtain specific data. Storage tank #103, which was the specific objective of the attack (see paragraph 3 above) was not providing an effective contribution to the Kingdom's military action in Yemen and the Panel fails to see how its

destruction offered the Houthis forces a definite military advantage. Therefore, the Panel considers that the tank was, at the time of the attack, a civilian object<sup>214</sup>. In addition, the Panel notes the importance of the Aramco Bulk Plant facility in providing supplies to critical civilian infrastructures such as the King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the Saline Water Conversion Corporation. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected in this attack.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> See CIHL rules 8 and 9.

<sup>215</sup> See CIHL rule 1.

## Annex 17                      Attacks on Abha International Airport

1. Abha International Airport (IATA: AHB) is a civilian airport in the ‘Asir Province in the South of KSA, approximately 95 kilometers from the Yemeni border. This proximity to Houthi-controlled areas is also one of the reasons why the airport has been attacked more often than any other civilian facility in the KSA, even though the airports in Jizan and Najran<sup>216</sup> have also been attacked multiple times. In June 2021, the Panel visited Abha International Airport, as well as the nearby town of Khamish Mushait, which hosts an important Royal Saudi Air Force Base and met with airport staff and military officials to discuss the threats to civilian aviation. The Panel was also able to view CCTV footage of some of the attacks. In 2019, prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Abha International Airport handled 4.5 million passengers, making it the fifth largest airport in the Kingdom in terms of passenger numbers<sup>217</sup>. According to airport staff interviewed by the Panel, the airport is the main hub for the Southwestern region, offering a mix of domestic and international flights. Due to its colder climate, Abha is also an important destination for domestic tourism, in particular during the summer months and during Ramadan.

### Figure 17.1

Attacks on Abha International Airport as of 31 August 2021

<i>Date</i>	<i>Type of Attack</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
11 April 2018	UAV	6 injured
26 May 2018	UAV	2 injured
17 July 2018	UAV	None
6 September 2018	UAV	None
12 June 2019	Cruise Missile	26 injured
14 June 2019	UAV	None
23 June 2019	UAV	20 injured, 2 deaths
2 July 2019	UAV	10 injured
29 July 2019	UAV	5 injured
8 August 2019	UAV	None
28 August 2019	Cruise Missile	None
30 August 2019	UAV	None
10 September 2020	UAV	None
10 February 2021	UAV	None
16 February 2021	UAV	None
10 May 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	None
31 August 2021	UAV	8 injured
<b>Total</b>		<b>77 injured, 2 deaths</b>

**Source:** Confidential

2. The Panel received information showing that there were 18 successful attacks on the airport between the start of the aerial attacks in 2018 and 31 August 2021, causing a total of 77 injuries and 2 deaths. The airport authorities told the Panel that until 31 June 2021 (the day of the Panel’s visit), the airport received a total of 491 threats, which are defined as warnings from the Saudi military about incoming UAVs and missiles. They also noted that all warnings trigger an interruption of airport

<sup>216</sup> According to the airport authorities in Abha, Najran Domestic Airport (IATA: EAM), which in 2014 handled 600,000 passengers, was closed completely between May 2015 and May 2019 as a result of the threats from Houthi-controlled Yemen.

<sup>217</sup> <https://gaca.gov.sa/web/en-gb/news/15/03/2019-aa>.

operations and an evacuation of passengers and staff from the apron into the terminal building.<sup>218</sup> According to the management of the AHB, not all successful attacks are preceded by a warning<sup>219</sup> and even when warnings are received, this is typically just a few minutes before the impact. This clearly shows that the Houthi forces have become more adept at evading detection by the Saudi air defenses, when using UAVs and cruise missiles. The late notice is also likely due to the close proximity of Abha to Yemen and the mountainous terrain, both of which limit the opportunities to detect and intercept an aerial threat. The following paragraphs describe some of the more “successful” attacks in greater detail.

**Figure 17.2**

Satellite image showing the approximate impact locations of the attacks discussed below



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

3. While the majority of attacks on the airport have been conducted with short-range Qasf-type UAVs which do not carry enough explosives to penetrate the concrete roof of the terminal building, it also experienced two cruise missile attacks in 2019. The attack on 12 June 2019 took place at 0225 hours in the morning when a Quds-1 land attack cruise missile penetrated the roof of the baggage hall

<sup>218</sup> Airport staff informed the Panel that prior to June 2019 passengers were evacuated from the apron and the terminal to the landside areas of the facility as those were considered to be safe from attacks. Following the attack on the outdoor McDonalds restaurant located on the landside, which claimed the lives of two civilians and injured 21 others (see paragraph 4), the airport changed its security protocol and now evacuates into the terminal building, which provides some protection against UAV attacks.

<sup>219</sup> Out of the 16 successful attacks, prior warning was only received in ten cases.

in the arrival terminal. The subsequent explosion, which was captured by CCTV cameras, injured 26 passengers and airport staff. This was the first documented case of a Quds-1 cruise missile ever being deployed by the Houthi forces. The airport authorities informed the Panel that they received no prior warning from the Saudi military about the incoming missile. The second cruise missile attack took place on 28 August 2019, but no significant damage was reported. The Panel has inspected the debris of both cruise missiles in 2019 (see annex 16 of S/2020/326), as well as parts of a missile of the same type, which were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden (see paragraph 79 and annex 19 of S/2021/79).

### Figure 17.3

CCTV footage showing the moments immediately before and after the missile attack on 12 June 2019



**Source:** <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjsuhPROPyg>

4. The most lethal attack on Abha International Airport took place at 2120 hours on 23 June 2019 when a UAV exploded on the landside of the terminal building, immediately killing one civilian, who was at that time eating at an outdoor table of the McDonalds restaurant, and injuring 22 other people, one of whom died later from his injuries. Houthi UAVs (as well as some missiles) often carry a fragmentation warhead, i.e. small fragmentation, typically metal cubes, are scattered over a wide area following the detonation of the explosive filler. The UAVs are programmed to fly to pre-set GPS coordinates and then explode in mid-air, typically at a height of some 20 metres, or more rarely impact directly in a building or other structure, exploding on contact. This type of weapons with large blast effect and multiple fragmentations used in an area where there are civilians does not allow for discrimination between civilians and fighters. Contrary to IHL prescription, it also does not minimize damages to civilians and civilian objects.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>220</sup> CIHL rules 1 and 15.



**Figure 17.4**

Damage from fragmentation from a UAV attack visible on the apron of the airport



**Source:** Panel

5. At 1242 hours in the afternoon on 10 February 2021 Abha International Airport was attacked by a Qasaf-type UAV, which hit a parked Airbus A320-214 with the registration code HZ-FAB operated by FLYADEAL (IATA: F3), a Jeddah-based low-cost airline. The explosion penetrated the fuselage of the aircraft on the left side and triggered a fire, which was put out by the airport fire brigade. In this specific case, the airport authorities received a warning from the Saudi military about 20 minutes before the attack which allowed them to complete the deplaning of the 119 passengers from the plane and to evacuate them to the terminal building. Even though the plane only suffered limited damage, it was out of service for four months. As far as the Panel is aware, this is the first incident in which a civilian aircraft in KSA was damaged by a Houthi UAV attack. The Panel has been informed by the airport authorities that the warhead of the UAV in this case did not contain fragmentation, which could imply that in this case the plane rather than the passengers was targeted. Under IHL, only military objectives can be the object of attack. According to information received by the Panel, the plane was not used by military and there was no military personnel or civilians having lost their protection under IHL on board or near the airplane. The Panel therefore concludes that the airplane was a civilian object protected under IHL against direct attacks and that the passengers and people nearby the airplane were also protected under IHL.<sup>221</sup>

<sup>221</sup> See CIHL rules 1, 5-8.

**Figure 17.5**

Still from video footage showing the damage to the fuselage



**Source:** <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/plane-catches-fire-after-houthi-attack-abha-airport-saudi-tv>.

4. In addition to the human casualties, there has been significant economic damage, both directly in terms of necessary repairs and protective measures such as the construction of a blast barrier between the apron and the terminal building, as well as indirect costs due to higher insurance premiums, reduced slots at the airport and a stop to night-time operations. Airport management estimates that the losses from the attacks amount to Saudi Riyal 40 million (approximately USD 10.65 million). Unlike in the case of attacks on other targets, the Houthi forces have repeatedly claimed responsibility for the strikes on Abha International Airport, stating that the facility is used for military operations by the Coalition<sup>222</sup>. During the meeting with the Panel, the airport management categorically denied that the facility was used for military operations. While the Panel is unable to independently verify this claim, it notes that the Saudi Air Force regularly operates from King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, about 13 kilometres East of Abha International Airport.

5. Abha International Airport is a civilian airport and is used by civilians. The Panel found that the attacks mentioned above were conducted in contravention to the principle of distinction.<sup>223</sup> In the case where the airport would be used for military operations by the Coalition, only attack against military objects or equipment and military personnel would be permitted by IHL. In addition, because the airport is used by civilians any attack should be conducted with constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects and all feasible precautions should be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>222</sup> With reference to the attack on 10 February 2021, the spokesman of the Houthi forces Yahya Sarie was quoted as saying: “The UAV air force targeted the airfield of warplanes at Abha International Airport – which is used for military purposes to target Yemeni people – with four drones”, see <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-houthis-saudi-arabia-abha-airport-attack>.

<sup>223</sup> CIHL rule 1.

<sup>224</sup> CIHL rule 15.

**Annex 18: New Houthi weapons displayed to the media**

Figure 18.1  
**SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (side view)**<sup>225</sup>



Figure 18.2  
**SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (top view)**



<sup>225</sup> There are some indications that the UAV shown in the exhibition is a mockup, which is not airworthy.

Figure 18.3  
Unguided projectile carried by the SAMMAD-4 UAV



Figure 18.4  
RUJUM Hexcopter at the exhibition<sup>226</sup>



<sup>226</sup> Unlike the other new attack UAVs shown in the exhibition, the RUJUM was deployed in several attacks by the Houthis on different frontlines. At least two RUJUM hexcopters were shot down by GoY-affiliated forces, but despite several requests, so far, the Panel has been unable to inspect their debris, preventing further technical analysis.

Figure 18.5  
**KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (side view)**



Figure 18.6  
**KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (top view)**



Figure 18.7  
MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition (top view)



Figure 18.8  
Detail of the MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition



Source for figures 18.1 – 18.8: Almasirah.net

**Annex 19: Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 10 February 2021**

Figure 19.1

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**

**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.2

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**

**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.3  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>

Figure 19.4  
**Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2503935/winston-s-churchill-seizes-illicit-weapons-from-two-dhows-off-somalia/>



Figure 19.5  
**Type 56-1 assault rifles wrapped in plastic**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.6  
**Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm assault rifle and detail of the markings showing that the weapon was manufactured in 2017 by Factory 26 in China**



**7.62mm Type 56-1**  
**(Symbol) 17-CN      62068328**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.7  
**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.8  
**Detail of the marking on one of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, likely indicating that it was manufactured in China**



**(Triangle) CF / M80 / 401702**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.9  
AM-50 'Sayyad', 12.7x99mm calibre Anti-Material Rifle



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.10  
Details of markings on the Anti-Material Rifle



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.11  
Ghadir-4 optical weapons scope



GH4-951036

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.12  
Components of 12,7x108mm calibre 'DSchK' heavy machine guns



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.13  
Marking on the receiver of one the heavy machine guns



**180058**

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 19.14

Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1*<sup>227</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (front side)<sup>228</sup>



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.15

Yemeni Boat License for the *Um-Almadain 1* found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow (rear side)




Source: Confidential

<sup>227</sup> The Panel notes that the description of the *Um-Almadain 1* does not match the images of the *Jelbut*-type dhow. Therefore, it is likely that this boat license is for another vessel.

<sup>228</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 19.16


**Farsi-language warehouse receipt for ARIZONA brand cigarettes<sup>229</sup> found on the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.20

**Mapping of coordinates allegedly retrieved from GPS devices onboard of the *Jelbut*-type dhow**



Source: Confidential

<sup>229</sup> The Panel inspected many similar receipts for cigarettes in Farsi, which were found on the dhow *Bahri-2*, seized with a cargo of weapons off the coast of Somalia on 24 June 2020. See figure 15.18 in annex 15, [S/2021/79](#).

Figure 19.21

Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (front side)<sup>230</sup>



Source: Confidential

Figure 19.22

Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the *Shu'ai*-type dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

<sup>230</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

**Annex 20     Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 6 May 2021**

Figure 20.1

***Shu'ai*-type dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-2>

Figure 20.2

**Small arms and light weapons wrapped in green plastic onboard the dhow**



**Source:** <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-3>



Figure 20.3  
ATGMs and wrapped SALW in the cargo hold of the dhow



*Source:* <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2600834/uss-monterey-seizes-illicit-weapons-in-the-north-arabian-sea/#images-4>

Figure 20.4  
Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm calibre assault rifle seized from the dhow



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.5

**Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)**



**7.62mm Type 56-1  
(Symbol – Factory 26) 17-CN / 62130678**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.6

**M80, PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.7

Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured in China in 2017<sup>231</sup> at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)



(Symbol – Factory 26)  
M80 / 17-CN 02415

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.8

Type 85, 7.62x54mm calibre sniper rifle<sup>232</sup>




*Source:* Panel

<sup>231</sup> The Panel notes that the Chinese PKM-pattern machine guns, unlike the Type 56-1 assault rifles, showed significantly more wear and tear. It is possible that they were assembled using repurposed parts of older PKM-pattern machine guns. In 2020, the Panel noted that PKM-pattern machine guns seized by the Royal Saudi Navy from dhows sometimes combined parts with Cyrillic markings with parts bearing Chinese markings, which would support this theory.

<sup>232</sup> This is a Chinese copy of the Dragunov SVD-63 sniper rifle, which is manufactured in Russia. The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that this type of rifle has been seized in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 20.9

**Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)**



**(Symbol - Factory 26)  
7.62mm Type 85  
17-CN  
3309924**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.10

**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns manufactured in Bulgaria<sup>233</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>233</sup> The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that Bulgarian-manufactured weapons were seized from a dhow in the Arabian Sea.

Figure 20.11  
**Detail of markings documented by the Panel**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.12  
**PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>234</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

<sup>234</sup> These weapons appear to be copies of the Chinese, M80 version of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns. The Panel notes that, unlike the Bulgarian, Chinese and Russian PKM-pattern machine guns, these weapons do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production.

Figure 20.13  
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun<sup>235</sup>



0409

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.14  
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun



2500144

*Source:* Panel

<sup>235</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking used on the machine guns has also been observed on the AM-50 'Sayyad' anti-material rifle (see figure 20.21). Dot Peen marking is not known to be used on Chinese or Russian manufactured weapons.

Figure 20.15  
Detail of stamp<sup>236</sup> on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.16  
Similar stamp documented on the rifle selector lever of Iranian G3A1 assault rifle



*Source:* <https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/smallarms.pdf>

<sup>236</sup> The Panel notes that not all the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, which the Panel assesses to be of Iranian-origin were bearing this stamp. The Panel believes that the machine guns were assembled using repurposed parts from older weapons, some of which had original government markings.

Figure 20.17  
**RPG-7 launchers, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>237</sup>**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.18  
**Detail of marking on RPG-7 launchers**



**0011803108**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>237</sup> The Panel notes that the RPG-7 launchers do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production. The Panel notes that all RPG-7 launchers inspected since 2019 have identical physical characteristics, including the green plastic heat shield, which is different from other versions of the RPG-7 launchers, as well as similar markings, highlighted in yellow (see figure 20.18).



Figure 20.19

AM-50 'Sayyad', 12.7x99mm calibre anti-material rifle, likely manufactured in Iran<sup>238</sup>



Source: Panel

Figure 20.20

AM-50 'Sayyad' anti-material rifle on display in Teheran in September 2013



photo - Foad Ashtari

Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/iranian-am50-and-russian-orsis-t-5000-rifles-in-iraq/>

<sup>238</sup> The Panel notes that the anti-material rifles seized from the dhow have no clear markings showing the country and year of production, however it also notes that all anti-material rifles inspected since 2018 have identical physical characteristics and markings. The AM- 50 'Sayyad' is an unlicensed copy of the HS.50 anti-material rifle manufactured in Austria. The main technical differences include a different grip and barrel design.

Figure 20.21  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle<sup>239</sup>



**1700399 / 580 / 26011580 / CAL12.7X99**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.22  
Detail of marking on AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifle



**6A1155**

*Source:* Panel

<sup>239</sup> The Panel notes that the dot peen marking on the AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ is similar to the marking on some of the PKM-pattern machine guns which were seized from the same dhow (see figure 20.13 and 20.14). The Panel has observed similar markings on other AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ rifles inspected since 2018.

Figure 20.23

**Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope and its metal box, likely made in Iran**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.24

**Detail of marking on Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope**



**RG-004 A1  
1700560**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.25

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>-زر هی-قزوین- باز دید-فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش-از-لشگر ۱۶-زر هی-قزوین-  
(عکس))

Figure 20.26

Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media



Source: <https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/>-زر هی-قزوین- باز دید-فرمانده نیروی زمینی ارتش-از-لشگر ۱۶-زر هی-قزوین-  
(عکس))

Figure 20.27

**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.28

**5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.29

**Detail of markings indicating manufacture at the Tula Arms Plant in 1988**




**(Symbol – Tula Arms Plant) 88 / 985076**

*Source:* Panel


Figure 20.30

**9M133 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia and transport container (in the background)**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.31  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M113 / 07-85-536 / 2580 / 36-86-22


Source: Panel

Figure 20.32  
9M111M Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia



Source: Panel

Figure 20.33  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M111M / 10-83-MK / 100486 / 42-85-53


Source: Panel

Figure 20.34  
9M111-2 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia



Source: Panel

Figure 20.35  
Detail of markings documented by the Panel



9M111-2 / 03-79-MK / 47-80-53

Source: Panel




Figure 20.36  
**POSP 12x50M Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.37  
**Detail of serial number indicating manufacture in 2017**




**1701165**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.38

**Document found with the sights indicating that quality control took place in May 2017**



Source: Panel

Figure 20.39

**POSP 8x42 Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus**



Source: Panel

Figure 20.40  
Detail of serial number



596-1-1242

Source: Panel

Figure 20.41  
Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow<sup>240</sup> (front side)<sup>241</sup>




Source: Confidential

<sup>240</sup> The Panel notes that this appears to be the same license, which was previously documented on the smaller dhow seized on 10 February 2021 (see figure 19.21), raising the possibility that this is the same vessel. The Panel also notes that at least one dhow crew member was present on both occasions (see annex 21).


<sup>241</sup> The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.

Figure 20.42  
Yemeni Boat License for *Ramaz Al-Karama 1* found on the dhow (rear side)



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.43  
Image from the Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device showing waypoint at Jask



Source: Confidential

Figure 20.44  
**Coordinates and dates reportedly retrieved from Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device**

GPS Device from 6 May 2021 Interdicted Flagless Dhow: Garmin echoMAP Plus 5AZ026107 Point Data



Source: Confidential

**Annex 21: Images and ID documents of the crew members of the dhows**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 22 Seizure of thermal weapon sights at the Shahn border crossing on 22 June 2021

1. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of seven RU90/120G thermal weapon sights, which were seized at 2000 hours on 22 June 2021 by Yemeni customs officers at the Shahn crossing on the border with Oman. The Panel has been informed that the sights were transported in the driver's cabin of a Mercedes truck with Omani license plates,<sup>242</sup> which was transporting tiles and ceramics from Oman to Yemen. The commercial truck driver, an individual holding a Pakistani passport,<sup>243</sup> told the customs officers that he received the package from a Yemeni individual called Ali in Mazyuna, a small settlement in Oman close to the border with Yemen, who asked him to deliver it to another Yemeni individual, who would be waiting for him on the Yemeni side of the border crossing. The driver claimed that he did not know what was inside the parcel and that he transported it as a favour, i.e., without receiving material compensation. The Panel understands that the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel disappeared when he saw that the package was impounded, and that the driver was released after questioning. The Panel has obtained the Omani mobile phone numbers of "Ali" and the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel on the Yemeni side and has contacted Oman requesting more information on the identity of the two individuals. A response is pending.

2. The Panel has obtained images as well as the serial numbers of the thermal weapon sights, which were seized at the border crossing. The Panel notes that the sights have technical characteristics consistent with thermal weapons sights manufactured by Rayan Roshd Afzar, a Chinese Iranian joint venture. Sights from this manufacturer have been seized from dhows in the Gulf of Oman and inspected by the Panel on multiple occasion (see paragraph 52 and annex 20, S/2020/326, as well as paragraph 88 and annex 14, S/2021/79). Iran has informed the Panel that "the thermal weapon sights are NOT consistent with sights manufactured in Iran", however the Panel has noted information from publicly available sources (see figures 22.4 to 22.6 below), which seems to corroborate the Panel's analysis regarding their origin. The Panel continues to investigate.

Figure 22.1

### RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border



**Source:** Confidential

<sup>242</sup> The Panel has obtained the full details, i.e., license and engine serial number of the truck.

<sup>243</sup> The Panel has obtained the name and passport details of the driver.

Figure 22.2  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 22.3  
**RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border**



*Source:* Confidential



Figure 22.4  
Rayan Roshd Afzar promotional leaflet

رایان رشد افزار  
دوربین حرارتی  
RU90G / RU120G

WWW.MILITARY.IR

دوربین حرارتی مدل RU90G / RU120G  
بمنظور مراقبت، شناسایی و هدف گیری  
طراحی و ساخته شده است که قابل نصب  
بر روی انواع سلاح را دارا می باشد و در  
شرایط مختلف محیطی (تاریکی مطلق  
مه، دود، ابر) قابل استفاده است.

قابلیت ها:

- قابلیت نصب بر روی انواع سلاح
- قابلیت استفاده بصورت دستی جهت دیده بانی
- قابلیت برنامه ریزی تا ۸ رتیکل هدف گیری
- بدنه مقاوم و آب بندی شده
- کاربری آسان

Source: [https://twitter.com/green\\_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4](https://twitter.com/green_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4)

Figure 22.4

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>

Figure 22.5

Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk>

Annex 23 Chain of custody of the 30.600 G OEM pressure transmitter

Figure 23.1 House Air Waybill for the shipping of the transmitters from Germany to China in June 2020

NUE-14018567 Shipper's Name and Address BD Sensors GmbH BD-Sensors-Str. 1 95199 Thierstein Germany T: +499235982052 F: +499235981111		Shipper's Account Number		NUE-14018567 Not Negotiable Air Waybill Issued by Streck Transportges. mbH Neuwieder Strasse 14 90411 Nuernberg			
BD Sensors China Block B 2nd Floor, Building 10 No. 1188 Lianghang Rd. Pujiang Town 201112 Shanghai China T: 00862151600190803		Consignee's Account Number		Copies 1, 2 and 3 of this Air Waybill are originals and have the same validity. It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in apparent good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREOF BY THE SHIPPER, AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.			
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City Streck Transportges. mbH Neuwieder Strasse 14 90411 Nuernberg		Accounting Information		MAWB: 999-76025784			
Agent's IATA Code		Account No.		Reference Number			
Airport of Departure (Addr. of First Carrier) and Requested Routing Nuernberg		Optional Shipping Information		121420060024 EXW THIERSTEIN			
To By First Carrier Routing and Destination to by to by		Currency		Declared Value for Carriage			
PVG CA		EUR		NVD NCV			
Airport of Destination Shanghai-Pu Dong CA1042/07		Requested Flight/Date XXX		Declared Value for Customs			
Handling Information NSC		Amount of Insurance		Insurance - If carrier offers insurance, and such insurance is requested in accordance with the conditions thereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked "Amount of Insurance".			
ECDs: 20DE871528552419E0, 20DE871528553293E1 20 Packages marked address and 7765		SC1		X			
No. of Pieces RCP	Gross Weight	Rate Class	Chargeable Weight	Rate	Total	Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume)	
20	540.0K	Q	540.0		As agreed	transmitter not restricted 3/ 62x 32x 44 cm 1/ 42x 42x 42 cm 3/ 52x 42x 42 cm 1/ 48x 36x 36 cm 12/ 62x 42x 47 cm TTL VOL: 2.142 CBM 9026.20	
20	540.0K				As agreed		
Prepaid		Weight Charge		Collect		Other Charges	
Valuation Charge		Tax		Total Other Charges Due Agent		Shopper certifies that the particulars on the face hereof are correct and that insofar as any part of the consignment contains dangerous goods, such part is properly described by name and is in proper condition for carriage by air according to the applicable Dangerous Goods Regulations.	
Total Other Charges Due Carrier		Total Prepaid		Total Collect		Streck Transportges. mbH Julia Gabsteiger Signature of Shipper or Its Agent	
Currency Conversion Rates		CC Charges in Decl. Currency		As agreed		Streck Transportges. mbH NUE AS CARRIER 2020-JUN-03 16:58 Nuernberg Executed on (date) at (place) Signature of Issuing Carrier or Its Agent	
For Carrier's Use only at Destination		Charges at Destination		Total Collect Charges		NUE-14018567	

Original 3 (for Shipper)

Figure 23.2

Excerpt from packing list showing that the transmitter was exported from Germany to BDS Sensors China in June 2020

Packing list				
BD Sensors GmbH BD-Sensors-Str. 1 95199 Thierstein		Shipping address 104437 BD SENSORS CHINA No.1188 Lianhang Rd., Pujiang town TJ-201112 SHANGHAI		
Total Number of Parcels:20 Cartons				
Total weight: 539,950 KG				
Shipment Number/Date: 7765/02.06.2020				
Pack No.: 14 of 20 Cartons				
Gross weight: 17,400 KG (62.000 x 32.000 x 44.000 cm)				
Description Your order	Code Pos.	Sales order	Pos.	Quantity Prod. order
SPE800 BDS2005-043 Delivery/Item: 31143453/000110 SN : ( 10845219 - 10845228 )	26.600 20	G-4002-R-1-5-100-300-1-000 21148843	10 20	2388881 10 PC
OEM Pressure transmitter BDS2005-017 Delivery/Item: 31143453/000180 SN : ( 10844242 - 10844441 )	30.600 10	G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000 21148539	10 10	2387876 100 PC

Figure 23.3

Bank information showing the transfer of funds from Oman to China for the purchase of the transmitters



## 对账单

借总笔数:0	借总金额:0.00
贷总笔数:1	贷总金额:13595.00
开始日期:20200601	结束日期:20200630
账号:上海, 121917329332501, 美元, 欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司	集团公司名称:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司
用户所属公司:欧智博德仪器仪表(上海)有限公司	打印时间:2021/6/10 13:19
笔数:1	

交易类型	摘要	借	贷	余额	业务参考号	收/付方名称	收/付方账号	收付方开户行名	公司一卡通号
国外特汇入 款项汇入中 心	汇入汇款流程 解付		13,595.00	13,595.00		INTERNATIONA L SMART DIGIT AL INTERFACE POBOX 1445 M USCAT MUSCAT		BANK NIZWA MUSC AT	

Figure 23.4 Air Waybill for the export of the transmitters from BD Sensors China to Oman in July 2020

**178 PVG 20434791** Shipper's Name and Address: **BD SENSORS CHINA**, BLOCK B, 2ND FLOOR, BUILDING 10, NO. 1188, LIANFANG ROAD, PUJIANG TOWN, MINHANG DISTRICT, SHANGHAI. TEL: 86-21-51800190. USCI: 9131000668840688Q.

Shipper's Account Number: **INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY LIMITED**, ELECTRONICS DEVICES AND ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY, 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387 ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN. TEL: +96896674188. C00047070.

Not Negotiable **Air Waybill** issued by **SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO LTD**. HYKC20070006.

Freight Prepaid. Description of Goods: **BD SENSORS**. Net Weight: **45**. Total: **AS ARRANGED**. Net, in Spec. Quantity of Cases: **BD SENSORS 58\*42\*30\*2**. VOL: 0.15 CBM.

TO: **MUAADH AHMED DIRECTOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY LLC ELECTRONICS DEVICES AND ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY ADD: 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387 ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN**

FROM: **BD SENSORS CHINA**


Signature of Shipper: **W.M. QI SHANGHAI SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.** Date: **2020-7-4**

Signature of Consignee: **SHANGHAI WEIMING CARGO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD.**

ORIGINAL 2 (FOR CONSIGNEE) HYKC20070006

Figure 23.5

Proof of delivery document showing that the transmitters were received in Muscat



**PROOF OF DELIVERY** Date: 07.07.20

TO

Consignee: INTERNATIONAL SMART DIGITAL INTERFACE COMPANY LLC

Shipper: ED SENSORS CHINA

AOL: SHANGHAI

AOD: MUSCAT

AWB: HYKC20070006

ETA: 05.07.2020

Commodity: ED SENSORS


No of Pcs: 02

Gross Weight: 33 KGS

This is to confirm that we are received the cargo in good order

Date: *7-7-2020*

Name: *Muhammad Almuhammad Almuhammad*

Signature: 


Stamps: 



Figure 23.6  
Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen<sup>244</sup> (first page)

Brand Name	Color	Ean	Model Number	Part Number	Size	Quantity
BD Sensors	Black	1101202176261	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	Stander	200

طلب أصناف

الجمهورية اليمنية صنعاء شارع الخميني بيت روس

<sup>244</sup> The Panel notes that the letterhead does not show any contact information, the Panel has so far been unable to find more information about this company.

Figure 23.7

**Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen (second page), stating that the transmitters are for use in a central air conditioning system**

**LIGHT ENERGY**  
Solar energy regulator & electrical technologies  
Equipment, fixtures & maintenance  
2020 /

**لايت إنرجي**  
منظومات الطاقة الشمسية و التقنيات الكهربائية  
تجهيزات وتركيبات و الصيانة

تم تقديم الطلب على شراء صمام حساس ضغط او صمام منظم للضغط يعمل في أنظمة التبريد المركزيه و يقوم بعمل تادعيم الضغط لهذه المنظومه لتتلقى حصول ضغط زائد و قتل و عمل في نظام التبريد . وسوف يتم تركيب هذا الصمامات في منظومات التبريد هذه وتم ارفاق بعض المخططات من قبلنا نحن  
من اجل التوضيح اكثر لعمل هذا الحساس وانه يستخدم في نظام التبريد بأسم منظم ضغط.

**The refrigeration system**

**Retrofit Refrigerants**

The diagram illustrates a refrigeration cycle with the following components: Solenoid Valve, Expansion Valve, Evaporator, Pressure Regulator (circled in yellow), Compressor, Condenser, Receiver, Oil Separator, and Pressure Control. The cycle is labeled 'Retrofit Refrigerants' and 'N R 1 V'. A 'Filter Drier' is located at the bottom of the system. A 'Sight Glass' and 'Ball Valve' are also shown at the bottom left. The source is cited as 'Source: Clivintex'.

**لايت إنرجي**  
منظومات الطاقة الشمسية و التقنيات الكهربائية  
تجهيزات وتركيبات و الصيانة



Figure 23.8

Invoice from the importer in Oman for the company in Yemen<sup>245</sup>**International Smart Digital Interface L.L.C**

Adress: 8730 WAY BLOCK NO 387  
 City, Street : ALMAABILAH SOUTH MUSCAT OMAN  
 Phone: (968)95674188  
 Email: muaadh@internationaldigitalinterface.com  
 Website: internationaldigitalinterface.com

**INVOICE**

DATE 30/04/2020  
 PI # [01160]

TO

**Light Energy company**

solar energy regulator and electrical technologies  
 Equipment, fixtures and maintenance  
 contact Number: +967779326097

REQUISITIONER	SHIP VIA	F.O.B.	SHIPPING TERMS

ITEM	DESCRIPTION	QTY	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL
Pressure transmitter 30.600 G	30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-300-2-1-000	200	120.00	24,000.00
				-

## Comments or Special Instructions

SUBTOTAL 24,000.00  
 TAX -  
 SHIPPING -  
 OTHER -  
**TOTAL \$ 24,000.00**

If you have any questions about this invoice, please contact above Details



<sup>245</sup> The Panel has been informed that the payment was made in cash in advance by a person, reportedly a Yemeni, claiming to act on behalf of the Yemeni company. The Panel has also tried to find out to whom the Yemeni mobile number on the invoice is registered, so far without success.

Figure 23.9

**Proof of delivery of the transmitters dated 8 July 2020 and signed by one Ziyad Muqbil Fari',<sup>246</sup> allegedly acting on behalf of a Yemeni company**

**LIGHT ENERGY**  
Solar energy regulator & electrical technologies  
Equipment, fixtures & maintenance  
2020 ✓/✓

**لايت إنرجي**  
منظومات الطاقة الشمسية و التقنيات الكهربائية  
تجهيزات وتركيبات و الصيانة

**لايت إنرجي**

**اشعار أستلام BD Sensors**  
الاخوه شركة / الواجهة الرقمية الذكية الدولية. نحيط بكم علما " بأن البضاعة  
الموضح في الجدول المشتراء من قبل شركتنا قد تم استلامها  
الاخ/ زياد مقبل فارح بمدينة مسقط.  
ولكم الشكر والتقدير

Brand Name	Color	Ean	Model Number	Part Number	Size	Quantity
BD Sensors	Black	1101202176261	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	BD30.600 G-4001-R-1-8-100-3	Stander	200

الجمهورية اليمنية صنعاء شارع الخميس بيت بوس


**Sources for figures 23.1 – 23.9: Confidential**

<sup>246</sup> The Panel was informed that the transmitters were picked up in Muscat. The Panel has contacted both Oman and Yemen regarding the identity of the person, who signed the receipt. Responses are pending.

## Annex 24 Chain of custody of the 3W-110i B2 engine

Figure 24.1

### Diagram showing the chain of custody of the engine



Source: Panel

Figure 24.2

### Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order



Source: Confidential

Figure 24.3

### Unofficial translation of the screenshot in Figure 24.2

Order number: 118674510762461297		Time of creation: 2018-01-25 00:09:31					
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany		¥14999.00	25	Access after-sales portal	Jermozi Contact me	Transaction successful Details	¥380975.00 (including shipping fee: ¥6000) View shipping Cell phone order
Colour: Silver	Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing						

Figure 24.4  
Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order (continued)



宝贝
店铺

您的位置: [首页](#) [我的淘宝](#) [已卖出的宝贝](#)

1. 买家下单
2. 买家付款
3. 发货
4. 买家确认收货
5. 评价

当前订单状态: 交易成功

**淘宝提醒您**  
交易已成功, 如果买家提出售后要求, 请积极与买家协商, 做好售后服务。

订单信息
收货和物流信息

**买家信息**

昵称: jermozi	真实姓名: A****
所在地区: 广东 广州	联系电话: 0****
邮件: h**** 发送站内信	支付宝: h****

宝贝	宝贝属性	状态	单价(元)	数量	优惠	商品总价(元)	运费(元)
 代购德国进口航模飞机模型用发动机 3W-110 iB2 德国直邮正品	颜色分类: 银色 飞机种类: 固定翼	已确认收货	14999.00	25	-	374975.00	6000.00 ( 快递 )

实收款: **380975.00** 元

---

订单编号: 118674510762461297

支付宝交易号: 2018012521001001800575095937

成交时间: 2018-01-25 00:09:31

付款时间: 2018-01-25 04:57:31

确认时间: 2018-04-02 17:54:01

您的位置: [首页](#) [我的淘宝](#) [已卖出的宝贝](#)

1. 买家下单
2. 买家付款
3. 发货
4. 买家确认收货
5. 评价

当前订单状态: 交易成功

**淘宝提醒您**  
交易已成功, 如果买家提出售后要求, 请积极与买家协商, 做好售后服务。

订单信息
收货和物流信息

**物流信息**

收货地址: 魏先生, 13699747779, , 广东省 广州市 荔湾区 环市西路37号富力国际鞋业商贸中心1020房, 510145

运送方式: 快递

物流公司名称: EMS

运单号: CI982007400DE

 我对购买流程有意见或建议, 跟淘宝说两句

阿里巴巴集团 | 阿里巴巴国际站 | 阿里巴巴中国站 | 全球速卖通 | 淘宝网 | 天猫 | 聚划算 | 一淘 | 阿里妈妈 | 阿里云计算 | 云OS | 万网 | 中国雅虎 | 支付宝
关于淘宝 | 合作伙伴 | 营销中心 | 联系客服 | 开放平台 | 诚聘英才 | 联系我们 | 网站地图 | 法律声明
© 2015 Taobao.com 版权所有

Source: Confidential

Figure 24.5

## Unofficial translation of the screenshot in figure 24.4

Taobao website							
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b>							
Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Buyer information</b>							
Nickname:	jermozij	Real names:	A***				
Location:	Guangzhou, Guangdong	Phone number:	0***				
Email:	h*** Send site message	Alipay:	h***				
Product	Product attributes	Status	Unit price (CNY)	Quantity	Discount	Total price (CNY)	Shipping fee (CNY)
Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany	Colour: Silver Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing	Delivery confirmed	14999.00	25	-	374975.00	6000.00 (express delivery)
Payment received: CNY <b>380975.00</b>							
Order number:	118674510762461297						
Alipay transaction number:	2018012521001001800575095937						
Time of transaction:	2018-01-25 00:09:31						
Time of payment:	2018-01-25 04:57:31						
Time of confirmation:	2018-04-02 17:54:01						
Current order status: Transaction successful							
<b>Taobao reminder</b>							
Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.							
<b>Order details</b>		<b>Shipping and delivery</b>					
<b>Shipping information</b>							
Recipient address:	Mr. Wei, 13699747779, Fuli International Shoe Trade Center, RM 1020, 37 Huanshi West Rd, Liwan District, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, 510145						
Shipping method:	Express delivery						
Name of shipper:	EMS						
Shipping number:	CI982007400DE						

Figure 24.6

**Packing list showing that the engine was transferred to Delro Modelltechnik**



**753.1 Packliste / Packing list**  
 Kunde / Customer: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK

Datum /Date: 06.03.18

AB-2018-3086

Karton Nr. / Box no.	Menge / Qty.	Einheit / Unit	Artikelnummer / Articlenumber:	Artikelbeschreibung	Seriennummer / Serialnummer	Kartongröße / Box Size	Gewicht / Weight (Kg)	verpackt / packed
8	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822108K			
9	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822093K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822095K			
10	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822104K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822105K			
11	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822084K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822086K			
12	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822090K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822091K			
13	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822102K	H124	9,20	IL
	1	Stück / pcs. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>	10.001.420	3W-110iB2 + Boxerzündung 35cm	1822103K			
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						
		Stück / pcs. <input type="checkbox"/> Paar / pair <input type="checkbox"/>						

Source: Confidential

Figure 24.7

**Invoice for the sale of the engines by Delro-Modelltechnik to TDQQ****Delro Modelltechnik**

Delro Modelltechnik - Herforder Str. 103 - 32584 Löhne

An  
Wu. TDQQ GMBH  
Feldbergstr. 7  
64293 Darmstadt  
DRechnungsnummer: 15245  
Kundennummer: 800191  
Rechnungsdatum: 15.02.2018

Seite: 1 von 1

**RECHNUNG**

Menge	Einheit	Bezeichnung	Einzelpreis	Rabatt	Gesamtpreis
25	Stück	Motor 3 W-110 iB2	1.205,37 €	7,5 %	27.874,18 €
1		Teil 1 Anzahlung am 31.01.18	-8.403,37 €		-8.403,37 €
1		Teil 2 Anzahlung am 025.02.18	-5.042,02 €		-5.042,02 €

Gesamt netto	14.428,79 €
USt. 19%	2.741,47 €
<b>Gesamtsumme</b>	<b>17.170,26 €</b>

Zahlbar sofort ohne Abzug.

Telefon: 05732/982053  
E-Mail: mail@delro.deBIC: GENODEM 1 HFV  
IBAN: DE10 4949 0070 0059 8081 02  
Kontoinhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
Bank: Volksbank Bad Oeynhausen  
Herford eG  
Bankleitzahl: 494 900 70  
Kontonummer: 59 808 102  
IBAN:  
BIC:Geschäftsführer: Detlef Rottmann  
Inhaber: Detlef Rottmann  
USt.-ID: DE 124 365 151  
Steuernummer: 31051130568**Source:** Confidential

Figure 24.8  
Shipping documents for the delivery of the engines to TDQQ

Kühne + Nagel ( AG & Co. ) KG  
Zweigniederlassung Bielefeld  
Ludwig-Erhard-Allee 40  
DE-33719 Bielefeld

**KÜHNE+NAGEL**

**\*\* RECHNUNG \*\***

BITTE BEI ZAHLUNG ANGEBEN

KD-KTO.	3987125	DATUM	13.03.18
BELEG-NR.	80002593	KD-NR.	35100871

---

00105

DELRO MODELLTECHNIK  
DETLEF ROTTMANN  
HERFORDER STR. 103  
DE 32584 LÖHNE

Ihre USt-ID: DE124365151

Our invoices must be paid immediately.  
Please use only the bank account mentioned in the footer.

Unsere Rechnungen sind sofort zu begleichen.  
Bitte verwenden Sie ausschließlich die im Fuß aufgeführte  
Bankverbindung.  
Bei Scheckzahlungen bitte nur Orderschecks verwenden.

---

Datum	Dispo	Rel. Sendungs-Nr.	Km	Betrag
Tar.	TO FRSA	tats. frpf. Zone	Fr Sperrigk. Frankatur	

---

Pos-Nr. von: 01-35-8563-803-052-11  
Com-Ref.: 035L06389078 Akz-Kd.:  
1.03. A6301 A630 330/000/6072432 404  
5277 26,0 166,5 09 C 1,110 DAP-FREI HAUS (UNVER  
WW: 3.000,00  
ABS: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK DE 32584 LÖHNE  
EMP: FRANK WEISS DE 63897 MILTENBERG  
1-CT MODELLFLUGZEUG

B2C-ZUSCHLAG	EUR	3,00
KN-TARIF DEUTSCHLAND ZONE 05	EUR	88,08
DIESELFLOATER	EUR	1,32
COMPLIANCE(ATS)-GEBÜHR	EUR	1,90
KN-PRIVAT	EUR	4,90
HAFTUNGSRISIKOPAUSCHALE	EUR	1,60
TRANSPORT-RISIKO-SCHUTZ	EUR	2,75
MAUT DEUTSCHLAND	EUR	2,27
		<b>Sendungssumme EUR</b>
		<b>105,82</b>

Rechtsform: Kommanditgesellschaft, Bremen HRA 21928, Ust-ID-Nr: DE 812723878, Geschäftsleitung Kühne + Nagel (AG & Co.) KG, Yngve Ruud (Vers.), Martin Birkenmann, Matthias Heimbach, Jan-Hendrik Köselingarten, Nicolas Vilgis, Jörn Bauer, Daniel Nagel, Lars Weidert, Personalchef national, Kühne + Nagel (AG & Co.) KG, Yngve Ruud (Vers.), Yngve Ruud (Vers.), Dieterick de Vries, Dominic Edmunds, Thierry Heff, Uwe Höt, Richard Hübn, Björn Johansson, Holger Kätz, Jan Kurze.

---

Pos-Nr. von: 01-35-8563-803-066-10  
Com-Ref.: 035L06415255 Akz-Kd.:  
9.03. A6301 A630 330/000/6073181 369  
KDE5 60,0 201,0 09 C 1,340 DAP-FREI HAUS (UNVER  
WW: 30.000,00  
ABS: DELRO MODELLTECHNIK DE 32584 LÖHNE  
EMP: XIANGYI WU, TDQQ GMB DE 64293 DARMSTADT  
1-EP MODELLMOTOREN

KN-TARIF DEUTSCHLAND ZONE 05	EUR	93,63
DIESELFLOATER	EUR	1,40
COMPLIANCE(ATS)-GEBÜHR	EUR	1,90
KN-PRIVAT	EUR	1,60
HAFTUNGSRISIKOPAUSCHALE	EUR	26,78
TRANSPORT-RISIKO-SCHUTZ	EUR	2,32
MAUT DEUTSCHLAND	EUR	2,32

Rechtsform: Kommanditgesellschaft, Bremen HRA 21928, Ust-ID-Nr: DE 812723878, Geschäftsleitung Kühne + Nagel (AG & Co.) KG, Yngve Ruud (Vers.), Martin Birkenmann, Matthias Heimbach, Jan-Hendrik Köselingarten, Nicolas Vilgis, Jörn Bauer, Daniel Nagel, Lars Weidert, Personalchef national, Kühne + Nagel (AG & Co.) KG, Yngve Ruud (Vers.), Yngve Ruud (Vers.), Dieterick de Vries, Dominic Edmunds, Thierry Heff, Uwe Höt, Richard Hübn, Björn Johansson, Holger Kätz, Jan Kurze.

Seite 1 von 2

Wir arbeiten ausschließlich auf Grundlage der Allgemeinen Deutschen Spediteurbedingungen 2017 (ADSp 2017). Hinweis: Die ADSp 2017 weichen in Ziffer 23 hinsichtlich des Haftungshöchstbetrages für Güterschäden (§ 431 HGB) vom Gesetz ab, indem sie die Haftung bei multimodalen Transporten unter Einschluss einer Seebeförderung und bei unbekanntem Schadenort auf 2 SZR/kg und im Übrigen die Regelhaltung von 8,33 SZR/kg zusätzlich auf 1,25 Millionen Euro je Schadenfall sowie 2,5 Millionen Euro je Schadenereignis, mindestens aber 2 SZR/kg, beschränken. Die ADSp sind auf unserer Webseite als Download erhältlich. Auf Anfrage senden wir Ihnen diese auch gerne zu.

Kühne + Nagel ( AG & Co. ) KG Zweigniederlassung Bielefeld Ludwig-Erhard-Allee 40 DE-33719 Bielefeld	Tel: +49 521 9203-0 Fax: +49 521 9203-1000 www.kuehne-nagel.com Steuernummer: 27/575/00054	Bank Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt/M. BLZ: 500 700 10 Konto-Nr. 31 31 331 IBAN: DE03 5007 0010 0313 1331 00 BIC: DEUTDE33XXX
---	---	---

**Kühne + Nagel ( AG & Co. ) KG**

ABLAGEN 00329686052018-03-13-14 00 45 682997LWST300W BFECDOOF FE252RGP 184811581

Source: Confidential



## Annex 25 Corporate information on HSJ Electronic (HK) and Vista Automation & Communication

Figure 25.1  
Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited

存案 Filed



公司註冊處  
Companies Registry

周年申報表  
Annual Return

表格  
Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number  
1480116

**1 公司名稱 Company Name**

HSJ ELECTRONIC (HONG KONG) LIMITED  
華視界電子(香港)有限公司

**2 商業名稱(如有的話) Business Name (if any)**

**3 公司類別 Type of Company**

私人公司       公眾公司       擔保有限公司  
 Private company      Public company      Company limited by guarantee

**4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up**

14 / 07 / 2019  
日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

(如屬私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。  
如屬公眾公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 6 個月屆滿之日。  
如屬擔保有限公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 9 個月屆滿之日。  
For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.  
For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.  
For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.)

**5 隨本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form**

(私人公司無須填報此項 A private company need not complete this section)

至

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY
日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

**6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office**

ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE

45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH, TSIM SHA TSUI, KOWLOON

地區 Region Hong Kong

**本處專用 For Official Use**

Document Ref. No.:70001523798  
Submission Date:15/07/2019  
Resubmission Date:-

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指明編號 1/2014 (2014年3月) Specification No. 1/2014 (March 2014) Page 1/7 頁

Figure 25.2

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格  
Form**NAR1**本申報表的結算日期  
Date to which this Return is Made Up

14 / 07 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項)

**Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)**

截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up

股份類別 Class of Shares

Ordinary

此類別股份的已發行總數 Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class

10,000

姓名/名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANGHONGFENG	廣東省深圳市龍崗區寶荷路 東戀山谷花園1樓複式21C	10,000			

Figure 25.3

## Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	1480116
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	廣東省深圳市龍崗區		
	寶荷路振業樓山谷花園1棟複式21C		
	國家/地區 Country/Region	中國	
電郵地址 Email Address			
身分證明 Identification			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.4  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication

存案 Filed



公司註冊處  
Companies Registry

周年申報表  
Annual Return

表格  
Form **NAR1**

公司編號 Company Number  
2224659

**1 公司名稱 Company Name**

VISTA AUTOMATION & COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES LIMITED

**2 商業名稱 (如有的話) Business Name (If any)**

**3 公司類別 Type of Company**

私人公司 Private company    
  公眾公司 Public company    
  擔保有限公司 Company limited by guarantee

**4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up**

15 / 04 / 2019

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

(如屬私人公司，本申報表應列載截至公司成立為法團的周年日期的資料。  
 如屬公眾公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 6 個月屆滿之日。  
 如屬擔保有限公司，申報表的結算日期應為該公司的會計參照期結束後的 9 個月屆滿之日。  
 For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.  
 For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.  
 For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.)

**5 隨本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form**  
 (私人公司無須填報此項 A private company need not complete this section)

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

至  
To

日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY

**6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office**

ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE,

45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH,

TSIM SHA TSUI, KLN

地區  
Region

Hong Kong

**本處專用 For Official Use**

Document Ref. No.:70001449322

Submission Date:15/04/2019

Resubmission Date:-

e

Figure 25.5  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	公司編號 Company Number	2224659
<b>12 董事 Directors</b>			
<b>A. 董事(自然人) Director (Natural Person)</b>			
<b>1 身分 Capacity</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 董事 Director	<input type="checkbox"/> 候補董事 Alternate Director	代替 Alternate to
中文姓名 Name in Chinese	張紅峰		
英文姓名 Name in English	姓氏 Surname	ZHANG	
	名字 Other Names	HONGFENG	
前用姓名 Previous Names	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
別名 Alias	中文 Chinese		
	英文 English		
住址 Residential Address	FUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANGU GARDEN		
	BAOHE ROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN		
	GUANGDONG		
國家/地區 Country/Region	China		
電郵地址 Email Address			
<b>身分證明 Identification</b>			
(a) 香港身分證號碼 Hong Kong Identity Card Number			( - )
(b) 護照 Passport	簽發國家 Issuing Country	China	
	號碼 Number	CHINAID14262219810326291X	

Figure 25.6  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

表格 Form	<b>NAR1</b>	附表一 Schedule 1 (非上市公司適用) <b>FOR NON-LISTED COMPANY</b> 公司編號 Company Number			
本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up		2224659			
15 / 04 / 2019 日 DD / 月 MM / 年 YYYY					
非上市公司的成員詳情(第 13 項) <b>Particulars of Member(s) of a Non-listed Company (Section 13)</b> 截至本申報表的結算日期的成員詳情 Particulars of Member(s) as at the Date to which this Return is Made Up					
股份類別 Class of Shares	Ordinary				
此類別股份的已發行總數 Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class	10,000				
姓名/名稱 Name	地址 Address	股份 Shares			備註 Remarks
		現時持有量 Current Holding	轉讓 Transferred		
			數目 Number	日期 Date	
張紅峰 ZHANGHONGFENG	PUSHI 21C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LIJANGU GARDEN BAOHEROAD LONGGANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN GUANGDONG	10,000			

Source for 25.1 – 25.6: Confidential

## Annex 26 Economic Issues

### I. Economic Issues that pose a potential threat to peace, security or stability

1. The Panel examined various issues concerning the economy of Yemen, which pose a threat to its peace, security, or stability. The deteriorating economic situation has resulted in frustration, deprivation, and resentment amongst the population, offering a fertile breeding ground for further conflict and social unrest. Some political groups have sought to take advantage of this situation. The STC's Economic Committee (EC) under Aidarous Al-Zubaidi held meetings with the Southern Money Exchange Association, without the participation of the or the Government of Yemen and discussed measures to alleviate the economic challenges arising from the volatile exchange rate situation.<sup>247</sup> Such actions by the STC over the banking and exchange companies are viewed by some as a challenge to the authority of the Central Bank of Yemen and the Government of Yemen, as part of a larger ongoing power struggle between the Government of Yemen and the STC.<sup>248</sup>

2. In the past few months, in order to ensure monetary and financial discipline and stability, the Central Bank of Yemen has issued a new regulation to improve the functioning of money exchange businesses, including measures such as stricter licensing conditions for new applicants and the introduction of e-auction systems. The Central Bank of Yemen has also taken some measures against certain exchange companies, suspending 80 exchange companies for legal violations and non-compliance with its instructions and shutting down 141 unlicensed companies.<sup>249</sup> In August 2021, the IMF made a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation for Yemen, worth USD 665 millions of reserves. This, according to the IMF is expected to improve Yemen's foreign exchange reserves by over 70 percent, and help address the crisis, especially food and medical needs of the population.<sup>250</sup>

### II. Depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER)

3. The rapid depreciation of the YER, which hit a historic low in early December, crossing the 1700 mark per USD, not only impacts economic stability, but poses a grave threat to peace in Yemen. The total external assets of Yemen, as a share of total assets, fell to 4.5 percent as of June 2021 from 5.3 percent in 2020 and 9.6 percent in 2019; the net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Yemen, as of June 2021, had further decreased by 13 percent, reaching a negative value of YER 958.3 billion.<sup>251</sup> This decline is attributed to the ongoing political instability which impacted the exports of oil, depriving Yemen of its primary source of foreign exchange. Secondly, in 2020, inward remittances by Yemeni diaspora declined by over 20 percent.<sup>252</sup> The exchange rate which was YER 591 per USD at the end of 2019 reached about YER 700 per USD at the end of 2020, and recently crossed the YER 1700 per USD, restricting Yemen's ability to finance imports of essential goods, thereby exerting severe strains on the purchasing power capacity of its already impoverished population. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, the cost of the national minimum food basket (MFB), which is indicative of the cost of living,

247 <https://www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225>. During the Panel's meeting with the EC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC stated that these meetings were held to improve the situation.

248 During the meeting of the Panel with the EC of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that since the Government of Yemen and the Central Bank of Yemen did not do their job properly leading to the collapse of the YER and increase in the prices of basic commodities, they had to intervene.

249 Information provided by the Central Bank of Yemen.

250 <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-get-655-mln-imf-reserves-new-sdr-allocation-2021-08-23/>.

251 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

252 CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

reached 56,283 YER in June 2021, about 21 percent higher than the cost at the beginning of 2021.<sup>253</sup> In July 2021, the Government of Yemen, in order to earn additional Government revenue, doubled the exchange rate used for calculating Customs duties on non-essential goods imported through the ports under Government of Yemen control, from YER 250 per USD to YER 500 per USD.<sup>254</sup> Although this new rate is almost 29 percent of the prevailing market exchange rate of about YER 1700 per USD, this move by the Government of Yemen has increased the cost of imported goods. The Houthis criticised this decision and reacted by reducing the exchange rate for Customs purposes to YER 250 per USD for imports through the Hudaydah port, under their control.<sup>255</sup> As, currently, there are no imports of non-essential goods through ports under Houthi control, there will not be any real impact of this move by the Houthis and it appears to be part of the propaganda war.

### III. Fragmentation of the Banking and Financial System

4. A stable banking and financial sector is a critical prerequisite for ensuring larger economic stability. The present scenario does not offer promising signs for the future of Yemen's banking and financial sector, and thereby of its economic stability.

5. In the aftermath of the move of the Central Bank of Yemen's headquarters from Sana'a to Aden in September 2016, the bifurcation of the Central Bank of Yemen into two rival institutions was effectively formalised with the functioning of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden and the cby, Sana'a. This has led to a tussle between the two institutions for regulatory supremacy over the Yemeni banking sector. The escalation of conflict has led to the intensification of the economic crisis and further politicisation of the banking sector.

6. The areas under the control of the Houthis have a higher population; Sana'a is the major financial and trading hub of Yemen, and nearly all banks and exchange companies have their headquarters situated in Sana'a. In order to consolidate its own control and authority in this strategic region, the cby, Sana'a adopted measures aimed at undermining the authority of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. Chief among these have been the denial of vital information concerning the economy and banking sector of Yemen to Central Bank of Yemen, Aden,<sup>256</sup> and to ban currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden after 2017<sup>257</sup>. The Panel has been informed that the Houthi authorities have subjected those financial institutions not complying with such instructions to reprisals and punitive actions, including seizure of their assets and funds, imposition of fines, and detention of bank officials.

7. A central bank requires reports from commercial banks, and exchange companies that contain information on various aspects such as assets and liabilities, local and foreign currency holdings, foreign currency trades, internal and external financial transfers, import financing, and loans. These reports allow the central bank to monitor the banking sector with respect to their financial health, compliance with local laws and instructions, international regulations concerning anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing, and to frame and implement monetary, fiscal and economic policies as

<sup>253</sup> CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).

<sup>254</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-government-doubles-customs-exchange-rate-boost-finances-2021-07-26/>.

<sup>255</sup> <http://en.yagency.net/231497/>.

<sup>256</sup> Circular No. (4) of 2020, titled "Communication with the Enemy", addressed to all the exchange companies and institutions operating in the Republic of Yemen, was issued by the cby's Financial Information in Sana'a on 28 January 2020.

<sup>257</sup> Circular issued by the ministry of finance in Sana'a on June 23, 2021 to all the finance affairs managers and the treasurers in charge of taxes/customs collection, and circular issued by the headquarters of cby - Sana'a on 27 June 2021.



well as banking and trade regulations. In January 2020, banks and exchange companies operating in Sana'a were instructed by the cby, Sana'a, not to provide any data to "any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries", and that the submission of any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and the violator will be held responsible (Figure 26.1 and Appendix 1).

8. In the absence of vital information regarding the operations of financial institutions in Houthi-controlled areas, functional capabilities of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden stand severely challenged. Objecting to this, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, responded by demanding reports and full access to information from commercial, Islamic, and microfinance banks and money exchange companies concerning all their activities and not merely activities confined to areas under the control of the central Government. Fines have been imposed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden on certain banks not complying with these stipulations.<sup>258</sup> Additionally, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden has also instructed the banks to shift their operational centres to Aden, failing which, they would be subjected to action, including suspension of their licences and informing other entities not to bank with them (Figure 26.2 and Appendix 2).<sup>259</sup>

<sup>258</sup> "In accordance with Commercial Bank Law No. 38 of 1998, YKB, IBY, and YBRD are liable to pay the daily fines (between 51,000-100,000 Yemeni rials) that CBY-Aden have been calculating since June 2020 for the banks' failure to provide monthly monetary data." - Yemen Economic Bulletin: Battle to Regulate Banks Threatens to Rupture the Financial Sector - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies  
<https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/12004>.

<sup>259</sup> <http://en.adenpress.news/news/33475>.

Figure 26.1

Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the banks for not sharing data with enemy

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE

البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

Date: .....  
No.: 09/14:20/99  
التاريخ: 28/01/2020  
الرقم: 99  
الفرق: 09/14:20/99  
الترقيات: .....

صنعا في 28|01|2020م

تعميم رقم (2) لسنة 2020م  
الى كافة البنوك العاملة في الجمهورية

المحترم  
الأخ / المدير العام / المدير الاقليمي  
بنك /  
تحية طيبة وبعد،،،

الموضوع / التخابر مع العدو

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، وإلى توجيهات الاخ/ المحافظ عطفاً على اوامر من السلطات العليا، بمخاطبة البنوك والصرافين بعدم موافاة أي جهات غير قانونية مرتبطة بالمرتزقة بأي بيانات وأن تسليم أي بيانات لأي من تلك الجهات سيعتبر تخابراً مع العدو وسيحمل كل من يخالف ذلك كامل المسؤولية. وعليه وجب مخاطبتكم بذلك.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا،

رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
وليد محمد السادة

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Figure 26.2

## Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks

أصدر البنك المركزي اليمني اليوم، بيان هام موجه الى جميع البنوك التجارية والإسلامية العاملة في عموم الجمهورية، بشأن عدم التزام بعض البنوك بتقديم حساباتها الختامية والتي أصدر البنك المركزي بها مسبقاً مذكرات للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي انتهى موعدها اليوم.

وفي اجتماعه اليوم مع قيادات من قطاعي الرقابة على البنوك والعمليات الخارجية أكد نائب محافظ البنك المركزي شكيب الحبيشي حرص البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني بما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسؤوليته القانونية، فقد تضمن بيان البنك المركزي حزمة من الإجراءات لتصحيح بنية القطاع المصرفي، وأهمها تصنيف بعض البنوك غير المنضبطة قانوناً، كبنوك غير ملتزمة وتعميم أسماءها لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، الى جانب التوجيه الملزم بنقل مراكز عمليات البنوك التجارية والإسلامية الى عدن، حيث المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي اليمني، ولكي يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من كافة عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بالمتطلبات القانونية لها، وكذا التزامه بترحيل النقد الاجنبي للبنوك لتغذية حساباتها الخارجية، لمواجهة التزامات عملاءها المستوردين.

نص البيان:

حرصاً من البنك المركزي على سلامة أداء القطاع المصرفي اليمني واستمرارية نشاطه في خدمة الاقتصاد الوطني وبما يكفل الحفاظ على سمعته لدى المؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الدولية، وانطلاقاً من مسؤوليته القانونية بموجب المادة (45) من قانون البنك المركزي اليمني رقم (14) لسنة 2000م والمواد (27)، (28)، (29)، (30)، (31) من قانون البنوك رقم (38) لسنة 1998م والتي أعطت البنك المركزي الحق في طلب أية بيانات أو معلومات من أي بنك يراها ضرورة عن موقفه المالي وعملياته المصرفية المختلفة بهدف فحصها ومراجعتها والتحقق من سلامة الوضع المالي للبنك وأنه يمارس أنشطته وفقاً للقوانين وتعليمات البنك المركزي بما فيها التعليمات الخاصة بإجراءات مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، كما ألزمت تلك المواد البنوك على تقديم البيانات المالية السنوية المدققة والمتطلبات الإضافية المرتبطة بها والتي يصادق عليها البنك المركزي.

وعطفاً على المذكرات الصادرة من البنك المركزي للبنوك بشأن الالتزام بتسليم البيانات المالية خلال مدة (15) يوم، والتي تنتهي بتاريخ 6 يوليو 2021م، وبسبب عدم التزام بعض البنوك بالمتطلبات الواردة في تلك المذكرات.

وعليه فإن البنك المركزي يحمل البنوك غير الملتزمة المسؤولية الكاملة عن أية تبعات قد تترتب على ادراجها في القائمة الرسمية للبنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، والتي سيتم الإعلان عنها وإتاحتها لجميع الجهات المحلية والبنوك والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية الخارجية والمنظمات الدولية الأخرى.

ويوجه البنك المركزي مشدداً، أن على كافة البنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها في بلادنا الإسراع بأن تكون مراكز إدارة عملياتها بعدن، حيث يتواجد المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي وبما يمكنه من القيام بإجراءات التحقق من جميع عملياتها والتفتيش الميداني المباشر لمؤيداتها والتأكد من التزامها بالوفاء بكافة المتطلبات القانونية اللازمة لها.

كما يهيب البنك المركزي بكافة الشركات والمؤسسات التجارية المستوردة عدم تنفيذ أي عمليات مالية أو مصرفية ومنها فتح الاعتمادات والتحويلات مع البنوك التي سيتم ادراجها ضمن قائمة البنوك المصنفة كبنوك غير ملتزمة، ولن يتحمل البنك المركزي المسؤولية عن أية أضرار ناتجة عن تنفيذ عمليات أو معاملات اذا أجريت عبر تلك البنوك.

كما يؤكد البنك المركزي بأنه سيتولى ترحيل مبالغ النقد الاجنبي الخاصة بالبنوك التجارية والإسلامية المرخص لها والملتزمة، لتغذية أرصدة حساباتها لدى البنوك في الخارج، بهدف تغطية اعتماداتها وتحويلاتها ليعراض مواجهة التزاماتها وتحديداً عمليات الاستيراد.

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني

المركز الرئيسي - عدن

بتاريخ: 5 أغسطس 2021م

Source: <https://yemen-yba.com/10376> and <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>.

9. Caught between the conflicting directions from the cby, Sana'a and the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, banks and exchange companies currently struggle to operate and ensure legal compliance in a highly challenging and coercive regulatory environment. The Yemen Bank Association (YBA) and the Yemeni Exchangers Association (YEA) have unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a solution to the challenges faced by them in implementing the conflicting directions of the rival central banks. The YBA has also opposed the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden's direction requiring banks to shift their operational centres to Aden.<sup>260</sup> Challenges in implementation and the looming threat of punitive action has meant that the banking community currently faces tremendous stress.

#### IV. Currency War

10. In order to finance fiscal deficits, the Central Bank of Yemen has adopted the controversial tool of 'monetary emissions',<sup>261</sup> wherein new currency is printed and circulated into the economy. Apart from being inflationary, this has created new economic challenges. There is now a currency war by proxy between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis through their respective central banks. Although the armed conflict began in 2014, the two central banks emerged in 2016 and both areas continued to use the same currency notes up to 2019 until the cby, Sana'a, banned the new currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, for use in the areas under the control of the Houthis. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, "the January 2020 ban on newly printed banknotes in the region under Houthi control has limited the government's ability to pay salaries in this area and complicated monetary policy operations. This has increased the cost of financial transactions, reduced market transparency, and widened exchange rate gaps between Aden and Sana'a — to as much as 100 percent in some instances."<sup>262</sup>

11. The Panel has received information that the cby, Sana'a, issued a circular on 23 June 2021 banning the use of certain currency notes, printed in the year 2017 in the denomination of one thousand Yemeni rials in different series, issued by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden, in areas under Houthi control (Figure 26.3 and Appendix 3). Treating such currency as counterfeit notes, the cby, Sana'a prohibits the dealing, possession, or transfer of these notes within Houthi-controlled areas. Through another circular, issued on 27 June 2021, the cby, Sana'a, reiterated that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of such currency notes would entail prosecution on charges of harming the national economy (Figure 26.4 and Appendix 4).

<sup>260</sup> See the press release dated 12 August 2021 issued by the YBA, <https://yemen-yba.com/10376/>.

<sup>261</sup> Introducing cash to circulation in economy.

<sup>262</sup> CBY's Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).



Figure 26.4

Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
Head Office Sana'a

البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

الجمهورية اليمنية  
البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

**تعميم صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء**

إدخاً بالبيان الصادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني - المركز الرئيسي صنعاء - بتاريخ 2021/6/22م بشأن منع التعامل أو حيازة أو نقل العملة المزيفة فئة (1000) ريال التي يبدأ رقمها التسلطي بخبر حرف ( أ ) والمدون عليها عام 1438هـ - 2017م، واستناداً إلى أحكام القوانين النافذة، ولما تقتضيه المصلحة الوطنية من منع تسرب العملة المزيفة، فإن البنك المركزي يهيب بجميع القاعدين من المناطق المعتمدة إلى مناطق حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني الالتزام بما يلي:

1. عدم نقل العملة المزيفة المشار إليها أعلاه.
2. أن الحد الأعلى المسموح بنقله من العملة اليمنية القانونية هو مبلغ (100.000) مائة ألف ريال فقط لكل شخص، ويسمح بنقل أي مبلغ من العملات الأجنبية.

وفي حالة المخالفة ستقوم الجهات المختصة بضبط المخالفين واتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بشأنهم وفق الحد الأقصى للعقوبات المقررة في قانون مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والقوانين الأخرى النافذة.

كما يهيب البنك بجميع المواطنين الاتصال على الرقم المجاني (8006800) أو رقم (01274327)، للإبلاغ عن أية مخالفة مما سبق.

علماً أن البنك سيقوم بصرف مكافأة بما يعادل نسبة (5%) من المبلغ المضبوط لمن قام بالإبلاغ عن المخالفة.

تأمل من الجميع الالتزام تحقياً للمصلحة العامة.

والله الموفق..

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
2021/6/27م

صورة لتقررين:

- رئيس مجلس الوزراء
- رئيس مجلس القضاء الأعلى
- وزير الداخلية
- رئيس جهاز الأمن والمخابرات
- وزير الصناعة والتجارة
- وزير الإدارة المحلية
- النائب العام
- الفرقة التجارية والصناعية
- جمعية البنوك اليمنية
- جمعية الصرافين اليمنيين

فكس : 274360 تليفون التعميم : 274310 18 : من ص.ب. 59 صنعاء - الجمهورية اليمنية  
Email : governor@centralbank.gov.ye Fax : 274360 Tel Operator : 274310 B.O.Box 59 Sana'a Y.R

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

12. A peculiar situation has arisen, as a result, wherein old notes printed prior to 2017 remain legal tender in both areas, and because of the ban imposed by the cby, Sana'a, the newer notes remain largely in circulation in areas under Government of Yemen control only. Due to this ban, areas under Houthi control face a major cash crunch, while the surplus currency notes in Government of Yemen areas has

led to inflation and the rapid depreciation of the YER rate. The market value of YERs varies between old and new notes and also between the two regions, with profiteers charging higher transfer costs between the two regions, as entities running businesses in Houthi-controlled areas are forced to purchase old banknotes at high premia from the black market. Since the experiment with the new notes backfired, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden reportedly printed and put billions of YERs in old banknotes into the market and withdrew the newly printed banknotes of YER 1,000 denomination, allowing the people to get old banknotes from local banks and exchange firms.<sup>263</sup> The cby, Sana'a, promptly banned these newly printed notes. While the exchange rate crossed YER 1700 per USD in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen, the rates in Houthi-controlled areas largely hover around the YER 600 per USD mark. This dismal ground situation has sharply fractured the economies of both parts of Yemen, adversely impacting domestic trade, and threatening economic stability in the country.

13. The international community should take note of the severity of this economic crisis and take concrete measures to prevent further divisions in Yemen which could lead to an irreversible fait accompli. In the absence of rapid improvements in the political and security situations, the future economic prospects appear to be gloomy.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1905641/business-economy>.

<sup>264</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/economic-update-october-2021>.

**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana'a to the Banks for not sharing data with enemy**

Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office  
Sana'a

Financial Information Unit

Date : 28/01/2020

Circular No. (2) 2020  
To all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Regional Director

**Subject / Communication with the enemy**

Referring to the above subject, and to the governor's directives with the orders of the higher authorities to address the banks and money changers not to provide any data to any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries, and to submit any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and anyone who violates that will be held responsible.

Signed by:

Mr. Wadea Mohammed AL-Saddah,  
Head of Financial Information Collection Unit



## **Appendix 2 Unofficial Translation of Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks**

In the interest of the Central Bank for the sound performance of the Yemeni banking sector and the continuity of its activity in the service of the national economy in a manner that ensures the preservation of its reputation with international financial and banking institutions, and based on its legal responsibility under Article (45) of the Central Bank of Yemen Law No. (14) of 2000 AD and Articles (27), (28), (29), (30), (31) of the Banking Law No. (38) of 1998 AD, which gave the Central Bank the right to request any data or information from any bank it deems necessary about its financial position and its various banking operations with the aim of examining them and reviewing them and verifying the soundness of the bank's financial position and that it carries out its activities in accordance with the laws and instructions of the Central Bank, including the instructions for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing procedures.

In addition to the memoranda issued by the Central Bank to banks regarding the obligation to submit the financial statements within a period of (15) days, which ends on July 6, 2021 AD, and due to the failure of some banks to comply with the requirements contained in those memos. Accordingly, the Central Bank holds the non-compliant banks fully responsible for any consequences that may result from their inclusion in the official list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, which will be announced and made available to all local authorities, banks, external financial and banking institutions and other international organizations.

The Central Bank stresses that all commercial and Islamic banks licensed in our country should expedite the establishment of their operations management centres in Aden, where the headquarters of the Central Bank is located in a way that enables it to carry out verification procedures for all its operations and direct field inspection of its supporters and to ensure its commitment to fulfilling all necessary legal requirements she has. The Central Bank also calls upon all importing companies and commercial institutions not to carry out any financial or banking operations, including opening credits and transfers with banks that will be included in the list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, and the Central Bank will not be responsible for any damages resulting from the implementation of operations or transactions if conducted through those banks.

The Central Bank also confirms that it will carry out the transfer of foreign exchange amounts of licensed and committed commercial and Islamic banks, to feed their account balances with banks abroad, with the aim of covering their credits and transfers for the purposes of meeting their obligations, specifically import operations.

**Source:** <https://cby-ye.com/news/131>

**Appendix 3 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 23 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a banning the use of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden**

Republic of Yemen  
Ministry of Finance  
Number: 110-380

Date: 23/06/2021

Ministers, Governors of governorates, Heads of boards of directors  
Finance affairs managers  
Fund custodians having charge of collection

Subject: The prevention of Counterfeit Currency circulation

Based on the authority of the Ministry of Finance and in implementation of the decisions of the National Salvation Government to prevent the circulation of any business, the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen– Sana'a decides to ban dealing with it.

And since the so-called Bank of Aden, managed by the aggression, committed a forgery of printing, denomination of 1,000 rials, issued in 2017, a crime that is added to the record of crimes targeting the national economy and national labor values and affecting legal positions and national capital, then confronting these crimes is a patriotic duty. All components must be promoted, foremost among which are state institutions.

And the Ministry of Finance confirms the following:

1. Prohibition of dealing in (counterfeit) currency, which was confirmed by the Central Bank in its statement dated 06/22/2021 (Copy attached)
2. Whoever receives an amount or denomination promoting any of these counterfeit currencies will be directly referred to the representative and the penal code in force against him will be applied (damaging the national economy in institutions and unauthorized circulation of counterfeit currencies).
3. The importance of educating all government institutions' cadres towards confronting the economic policies of economic aggression.
4. All those working in the financial position in the institutions of the state must be vigilant and follow up on what is issued about managing monetary policy in the competent authority (the Central Bank – Sana'a) and directed to act accordingly.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (800500) or (8006800) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Signature

Mr. Rashid Abuud Abu Lahuum  
Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs

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**Appendix 4 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana'a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution**

**Republic of Yemen  
Central Bank of Yemen  
Head office Sanaa**

**Circular issued by the Headquarters of the Central Bank of Yemen - Sana'a**

An appendix to the statement issued by the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen - Sanaa - dated 22/06/2021 regarding prohibiting dealing, possession, or transfer of counterfeit currency in denominations of (1000) riyals, whose serial number is without the letter (A) and recorded in year 1438 - 2017 on it to the provisions of the laws in force, and what the national interest requires of preventing the leakage of false work.

The Central Bank of Yemen calling on all those coming from "the localized areas" (referring to the areas under the control of the legitimate government) to the areas of "the National Salvation Government" (referring to the areas under the control of Houthis) to abide by the following two things:

- 1) Not to transfer any counterfeit currency.
- 2) One hundred thousand (100,000) Yemeni Riyals is the maximum permissible limit for transferring the legal Yemeni currency for each person; however, transferring any amount of foreign currency is not prohibited.

And in the case of the violator the competent authorities will arrest the violators and take legal measures in their regard according to the maximum penalties stipulated in the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law and other applicable laws.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (8006800) or (01274327) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Note that the Central Bank in Sanaa will pay the person who reported the violation a reward equivalent to (5%).

Hope everyone is committed to achieve the public interest.

**Issued by the Central Bank of Yemen  
Head Office - Sana'a  
27/06/2021**

Annex 27 Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021 issued by the president al-Amana specialised criminal prosecution court to the Tadhamon Bank

الرقم: ٣٨٢١	 <p>العدل أساس الحكم</p>	النيابة العامة
التاريخ: ٢٠٢١/٠٦/٢٧		النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة
المرفقات:		

الأخ / مدير بنك التضامن الاسلامي  
تحية طيبة وبعد:

المحترم  
بالإشارة الى الأحكام القضائية الصادرة من المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة ضد المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي في القضية رقم 102 لسنة 2019م ج ج والتي قضت بإدانتته بتهمة المساس باستقلال الجمهورية اليمنية وإعانة العدو والتخابر مع العدوان والتخابر مع دولة الاحتلال اسرائيل ومعاقبته بالإعدام تعزيراً ومصادرة جميع أمواله الثابتة والمنقولة ، وبالإشارة الى مذكرة الأخ رئيس لجنة حصر واستلام ممتلكات الخونة رقم 269/14174 وتاريخ 23 / 6 / 2021م والمتضمنة ان اموال المحكوم عليه عبد ربه منصور هادي النقدية المحجوز عليها لديكم هي الوضحة في الجدول التالي:

اسم العميل	المبلغ المحجوز	العملة	نوع الحساب	رقم الحساب
عبد ربه منصور هادي	31.289.623.900	ريال يمني	محفظة	001-886-271107-000
	636.221.984.25	ريال سعودي	جاري	112-682-211101-000
	907.722.643.44	ريال يمني	جاري	112-886-211101-000

وأنه قد تم فتح حساب لدى البنك المركزي خاص بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة.

ولذلك

يتم نقل تلك الاموال المحكوم بمصادرتها سائلة الذكر من لديكم الى البنك المركزي وايداعها في الحساب رقم (00/1215-10012) ريال يمني والحساب رقم (06/1215-10012) ريال سعودي الخاصين بإدارة الاموال المستردة والمصادرة تحت اشراف النيابة العامة واشعارنا بما يفيد ذلك في اسرع وقت ليتسنى لنا التصرف وفقاً للقانون.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا،

عبد الله محمد زهرة  
رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

صورة مع التحية لمعالي الاخ النائب العام

نجيب

Source: Confidential

**Appendix 1 Unofficial translation of Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021**

No. 3821

Dated : 27/6/2021

**Public Prosecution  
Specialized Criminal Prosecution**

**The Manager**

Tadhamon Bank

With reference to the judicial rulings issued by the Criminal Court of Al-Amana against the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, Case No. 102 of 2019 Case No. 407 of 2019 which sentenced him to conviction on charges of compromising the independence of the Republic of Yemen and advocate the enemy in communication with occupying country, Israel and death penalty punishment, condemnation and confiscation of all fixed and movable property, and with reference to the memorandum of Chairman of the Committee for the inventory and receipt of the properties of the traitors No. 14174/269 dated 23/6/2021 and included the money of the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi is seized with Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank that is shown in the following table:

Customer Name	Seized Amount	Currency	Account Type	Account Number
19100	31.289.623.900	Yemeni Rial	Saving	001-886-271107-000
Abdrabuh Mansour	636.221.984.25	Saudi Riyal	Current	112-682-211101-000
Hadi	907.722.643.44	Yemeni Rial	Current	112-886-211101-000

And that an account has been opened with you in the Central Bank for the management of the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution.

**Therefore**

Those funds, which were sentenced to confiscation above, shall be transferred from you to the Central Bank and deposited in account No. (00/1215-10012) Yemeni Rial and account No. (06/1215-10012) Saudi Riyals for managing the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution according to the law.

**Abdullah Mohammad Zahra****President- Al-Amana Specialized Criminal Prosecution**

Annex 28 Circular of 28 June 2021 issued by the central bank of yemen, Sana'a regarding freezing the funds of the Tadhamon Bank

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a



الجمهورية اليمنية  
البنك المركزي اليمني  
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء  
التاريخ: 2021/06/28  
الرقم:

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية  
Financial Information Unit

عاجل

(تعميم الى جميع منشآت وشركات الصرافة العاملة في الجمهورية)

المهترم

الأخ / المدير العام

تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/ الحجز على جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، والى مذكرة الأخ/ رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة القاضي/ عبدالله محمد زهرة رقم (3830) بتاريخ 2021/6/27م والمسلمة الينا بتاريخ 2021/6/28م بخصوص الحجز على جميع اموال بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة في جميع القطاعات المصرفية.

يتم حجز جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة لديكم في أي صورة كانت فوراً وموافاتنا بجميع الاموال والارصدة المحجوزة يومنا هذا.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير،،



فكس : 274113 تليفون 274093 ص . ب 393 صنعاء - الجمهورية اليمنية Sana'a Y.R P.O.Box:393 Tel : 274093 Fax 274113

Source: Confidential

**Appendix 1 Unofficial Translation of Circular of 28 June 2021**

**REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

**CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN  
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a**

**Date: 28 June 2021**

**Financial Information Unit  
(Circular to all public money exchange institutions and companies in the Republic)**

**General Manager,**

**Subject: Seizure of all funds and balances of Al- Tadhamon Islamic Bank**

In reference to the above subject and to the memorandum of the Chief of the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of Al-Amana, Judge Abdullah Muhammad Zahra No. (3820) dated 27/6/2021 and handed over to us on 28/6/2021 regarding the seizure of all funds of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited in all banking sectors.

All funds and balances of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited with you, in any form, shall be seized immediately and we shall be provided with all the funds and balances seized today.

**Chief of Financial Information Unit  
Wadi Mohammad Al-Sada**

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**Fax: 274113 Lablon 274093M. Box 393 People - Republic of Yemen Fax 274113  
Tel: 274093 P.O.Box:3938, sana'a VR**

## Annex 29 Telecom Sector in Yemen

1. Despite the ongoing conflict, the telecommunications industry continues to witness significant growth and has been a major source of revenue for the Houthi authorities. According to the World Bank, prior to 2015, government revenue from the telecommunications industry was said to be second largest after hydrocarbons.<sup>265</sup> The number of mobile phone connections rose from 15.7 million in 2014 to 18.6 million by end-2019 and the number of internet users rose from 3.2 million in 2014 to 7.2 million by end-2019.<sup>266</sup>

2. A sector with a high revenue generating potential would naturally attract significant attention from the rival factions in the conflict. The majority of the telecom companies in Yemen are based in Sana'a, and a sizeable number of users reside in the Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthi authorities in Sana'a allegedly exercise control over these telecom companies and the sector, reportedly, has been a major source of revenue to the Houthis.<sup>267</sup> The Panel has received information that the Houthis, under the leadership of Abdullah Misfer Al-Shaer, have taken control of certain Sana'-based telecom companies.

3. The political, regulatory, and operational roles in the telecom sector in Yemen have not been segregated. The ministry of telecommunications and information technology responsible for the areas under the control of the Houthis is the overarching body that performs all types of roles concerning this sector: formulating bylaws, policies and plans; managing the spectrum for mobile broadband services; granting licenses; maintaining the national numbering plan; approving pricing policies for services; regulating all sub-sectors, namely landline and mobile telephony, internet services, and posts and also enforcing the laws, especially the licensing agreements between the Sana'-based ministry and the telecom service providers.

4. Companies operating in the areas under the control of the Houthis face policy uncertainties, levy of illegal fees and charges, extortion and confiscation of their assets. Licenses are deliberately issued for short durations to create operational uncertainties for companies.<sup>268</sup> The companies are forced to pay fees for a temporary extension of the operating licence on an annual basis, which provide a regular source of revenue to the authorities, both legal and illegal. The Panel received information that a total amount of about USD 22 million per annum, including an annual renewal fee of USD 13.2 million and the balance towards the frequency fees and the management fees, was collected by the de-facto authorities in Sana'a from some Sana'-based telecom companies.<sup>269</sup>

<sup>265</sup> <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/337651508409897554/Yemen-information-andcommunication-technology-ICT>.

<sup>266</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721> quoting from (i) for 2014 data, Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), "Statistical Year Book for 2016 – Chapter 13: Communications & Information Technology," and (ii) for 2019 data, MTIT (Sana'a), "Telecommunication and Information Technology Infrastructure Indicators 2019 [AR]."

<sup>267</sup> Panel received information from the GoY and other sources. "According to unofficial estimates, the Houthis annually receive about 80 billion riyals (equivalent to \$160 million) from the public and private telecommunications sector." see <https://alkhaleejonline.net/>.

<sup>268</sup> Panel received information from confidential sources that annual renewal fees of USD 13.2 million was collected by the ministry of telecom from the telecom companies; and taking into account the frequency fees and the management fees, the total revenue collected from MTN and Sabafon was about USD 22 million per annum.

<sup>269</sup> According to a report, published at <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>, "In 2016, MTN Yemen paid \$36.4 million for a 29-month extension to their original 15-year license that was granted in July 2000, thereby extending their operating license to December 2017. .... MTN Yemen, which held a market share of 42.8% as of 2016 according to their estimates, presumably paid—according to the terms of their license agreement—what would have amounted to YER 1.7 billion annually for the duration of their 15-year license that became effective in July 2000.". The Panel has written to MTN for confirmation and their response is awaited.



5. The Houthis illegally collect fees under the pretext of regulating the telecommunications sector. The Sana'a-based companies continue to pay various fees such as license renewal fees, taxes, and zakat fees. The Panel has received information that some of the companies have also been subject to financial extortion by the Houthis who have also confiscated the funds and assets of private telecommunications companies in Yemen.<sup>270</sup> Further, according to a media report, Houthis allegedly took over Y mobile telecommunication company after arranging to declare it "bankrupt by a court under their control."<sup>271</sup> Y telecom, reportedly, "declared bankruptcy in March 2020 and left behind its physical assets such as real estate and its inventory of equipment in Sana'a, to restart its operations in Aden using 4G technology."<sup>272</sup> Y telecom has been requested by the Panel for a confirmation, their response is awaited.

6. The Government of Yemen has informed the Panel that USD 25 million of funds of MTN, Sana'a, located in the company's account maintained with the International Bank of Yemen, have allegedly been confiscated.<sup>273</sup> Finally, with effect from 17 November 2021, MTN Group, which held 82.8% of the shares in MTN Yemen, left Yemen by transferring its "majority shareholding in MTN Yemen to Emerald International Investment LCC. Emerald is a subsidiary of Zubair Investment Center LLC, an affiliate of Zubair Corporation LLC, which is the minority shareholder in MTN Yemen."<sup>274</sup> The Panel wrote to Sabafon in Aden, Sabafon in Sana'a, Y Telecom, YemenNet, MTN, TeleYemen in Aden and TeleYemen in Sana'a about this and for other information. While TeleYemen, Sana'a has replied to the Panel (see paragraph 84), responses from other companies are awaited.

7. The Panel was informed that Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer was appointed as managing director/chairman of Sabafon, Sana'a on 29 July 2019 and that he subsequently appointed the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Executive General Manager and the Financial Manager of Sabafon, Sana'a (Figure 29.1 and Appendix 1).

<sup>270</sup> As per the report of the Emirati al-Bayan newspaper, in 2018, the Ansarullah authorities confiscated YER 51 billion from Yemeni telecom operators distributed as follows: YER 27 billion from Sabafon, YER 17 billion from Y, YER 7 billion from MTN Yemen. See: <https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2019-10-08-1.3668294>.

<sup>271</sup> As per media report, quoting sources in the Sana'a-based ministry of communications and information technology, Sana'a, the Houthi leaders, namely Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, Abu Ali al-Hakem, and others were seeking to take over the mobile telecommunications company (Y) after declaring it bankrupt. "A commercial court subject to the control of the Houthi militias in Sanaa announced in an official announcement in Al-Thawra newspaper published on Wednesday March 11, 2020 the bankruptcy of 'Y' mobile company." See <https://www.newsyeemen.net/new/53464>. The Panel has written to Y Telecom for confirmation and their response is awaited.

<sup>272</sup> <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721>.

<sup>273</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>274</sup> <https://www.mtn.com/mtn-group-progresses-with-the-simplification-of-its-portfolio-with-exit-from-yemen/>.

Figure 29.1

**Notification of changes in management of Sabafon**

**Source:** Confidential

8. On 5 September 2019, Sabafon reportedly held an extraordinary general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company in Amman, Jordan, attended by the absolute majority of the company's shareholders, including a representative of the Government of Yemen. The shareholders condemned the action of the armed groups of the illegal authorities controlling the capital Sana'a, "breaking in and seizing the headquarters of Sabafon Company in Sana'a, controlling its departments, changing its guard, controlling its facilities, equipment and systems in Sana'a and imposing illegal managers on the company's departments in Sana'a".<sup>275</sup> The Assembly approved the transfer of the company's headquarters, administration and operations to the city of Aden; the move took place in September 2020 (Figure 29.2). Considering the significance of the internet for security and socio-economic purposes, and to avoid having to operate under Houthi control, the Government of Yemen informed the Panel that it decided to establish its own telecom infrastructure and set up in Aden through AdenNet<sup>276</sup> and TeleYemen, Aden.<sup>277</sup>

<sup>275</sup> <https://twitter.com/sabafonyemen/status/1178301571769217024>.

<sup>276</sup> Adennet started operational in end-July 2018.

<sup>277</sup> TeleYemen moved to Aden on 1 January 2019.

Figure 29.2

## Press release by Sabafon shareholders on the attack and shifting of Head Office to Aden

### Press release Issued by the Extraordinary Meeting of Sabafon Shareholders

(Sabafon shareholders unanimously annul the proceedings of the so-called judicial trustee)

Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony (Sabafon) held an extraordinary general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company in Amman, Jordan on Thursday, the fifth of September, 2019. It was attended by the absolute majority of the company's shareholders including Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco), Consolidated Contractors Company C.C.C, Hayel Saeed Anam Group, Al-Ahmar Group and a representative of the Yemeni Government.

The Assembly reviewed the illegal actions that the company was exposed to recently by armed groups affiliated to the authorities of Sana'a and decided to continue the activity of the company and also approved the transfer of the company's headquarters, administration and operations to the city of Aden, the temporary capital of the Republic of Yemen in implementation of the invitation of the Government of Yemen. The assembly also made important decisions and statements regarding the future of the company's activities and operations.

1- Condemnation of armed groups of the illegal authorities controlling the capital Sana'a on Wednesday, 31-7-1919 AD, breaking in and seizing the headquarters of Sabafon Company in Sana'a, controlling its departments, changing its guard, controlling its facilities, equipment and systems in Sana'a and imposing illegal managers on the company's departments in Sana'a appointed by that armed group affiliated to the authorities in Sana'a, which is considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

2- The association refutes the allegations and fake news made by the intruders of the company belonging to the authorities of Sana'a. In this regard, the Assembly affirms that the general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company was not held during this year, except this extraordinary meeting held in Amman on 5-9-2019. The Assembly of company's shareholders has not taken any decisions to change the current board of directors' members, chairman or the managers of the company.

3 - The Assembly condemns the use of fraud and forgery as a cover for these blatant procedures based on that the intruders have held a fake meeting of the General Assembly of the company, while it is nothing more than a major lie that has nothing to do with the truth and a fabrication of papers and documents not issued by the authorities of the legal company. The reality of what happened to the company in Sana'a is the robbery by force and outside the framework of the law and the constitution of the rights of local and international shareholders who contributed and invested in the Republic of Yemen with good intention and credit according to the law and under the guarantees of the Constitution and the investment laws of the Republic of Yemen.

4- The Assembly condemns all illegal steps and actions taken by impersonators of managers in Sana'a who are appointed by the armed group and attempts to communicate illegally with local and international entities, including suppliers, distributors, banks and local and international service providers of the company. The Assembly calls on all local and international banks, distributors, suppliers and service providers of the company not to deal with any party or entity under any justification or reason, except by written instructions by the authorized signatories of the company duly, namely: current Chairman and CEO of the company and the financial manager that no decisions were taken by the general assembly of the company to change them.

5 - To report the invalidity, illegality and the lack of any documents of any kind or source provided by the illegal impersonated administration that controls the company's building and facilities in Sana'a under the protection of the armed group and the illegal Sana'a authorities as they are issued by illegal authorities located in the city of Sana'a, which is under the control and instructions of those authorities which control the capital Sana'a by armed force which are considered illegal by the United Nations and the international community.

6- The Assembly calls upon suppliers, entities, banks, distributors and others to emphasize the importance of implementing the Company's requests issued by its legal Department because of the importance of this matter and the critical current circumstances and the Company's and its shareholders' fears of the damages that may affect the Company as a result of dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a. In this regard, the assembly confirms the importance of protecting the banks accounts and funds, and the company's dealings with the entities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others of the tampering of the illegitimate authorities of Sana'a and those working with them in violation of the constitution, all laws and religious canons.

7- Holding the authorities, suppliers, banks, distributors and others dealing with the illegal administration in Sana'a full legal and criminal responsibility for all material and moral damages that affect the company and its various interests as a result of ignoring the company's requests, its legal management and its shareholders not to deal with the banks accounts, funds, transactions and interests of the company with any person or entity except through the official and legal administration of the company.

8- Announcing and reporting that the breaking in of the company by armed force and seizing the company by the armed group of the illegal authorities of Sana'a shall be considered as ignoring the Constitution, all laws in force, the state and its bodies and the judiciary. Stealing the funds and property owned by others and seize them by armed force, impersonating the shareholders, chairman and member of board of directors and the managers shall be considered criminal offenses and full-fledged crimes.

9- The Assembly decided to take all legal measures against those who committed these crimes or cooperate in achieving them against the company, its shareholders and employees, or impersonate the shareholders, members of the board of directors, its chairman, the CEO or any other administrative or legal status without any right and outside the law. The actors of the aforementioned crimes (persons and official and non-official entities), including the use of all rights and legal guarantees of the company and its shareholders to protect investments determined by laws, bilateral agreements and constitutional guarantees.



Yemen Company for Mobile Telephony - Sabafon  
Headquarters in the temporary capital of Aden  
Republic of Yemen

**Source:** <https://twitter.com/sabafonyemen/status/1178301571769217024>.


9. The Government of Yemen has informed the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (IANA) alleging that the office of TeleYemen in Sana'a is controlled by the Houthis and that TeleYemen, owned by the Government of Yemen has been relocated to Aden (Figure 29.4). The Panel wrote to TeleYemen, Sana'a about this, but the company denies any takeover by the Houthis and stated that its management was appointed prior to the current conflict and that this transfer to Aden was never officially communicated and, therefore, it does not recognize the transfer under company law. The Panel is investigating the extent of control exercised by the Houthis over some of the telecom companies.

10. Control over the telecom sector can provide a major strategic advantage to the Houthis. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis have gained effective control over the national Top Level Domain (TLD), '.ye'. Control over the TLD and illegal use of communication interception tools potentially would provide Houthis with the capacity to monitor and interdict traffic, censor content, carry out internet shutdowns, ban social media sites and personal messaging services, monitor private communications of opponents, and block domains in all parts of the country.

11. The Panel has received information that TeleYemen, has recently purchased a ‘bandwidth management system’ that uses deep packet inspection. Deep Packet Inspection can monitor all data, messages, text, voice, and video traffic over any packet in the bandwidth. TeleYemen, Sana’a has stated to the Panel that “the laws of Yemen require ISPs to filter certain content that goes against the law and Islamic doctrines and that they use it for the purpose of protecting children from any inappropriate content and there is no illegal usage”.<sup>278</sup>

Figure 29.4

### Letter from the Minister of Telecommunication and Information Technology, Government of Yemen to IANA



Source: Government of Yemen

<sup>278</sup> Letter from TeleYemen, Sana'a to the Panel dated 17 December 2021.

12. Considering the importance of the telecom sector for the economy and the general needs of the people of Yemen, this sector should be depoliticised, double taxation avoided, import policy reviewed to permit *bonafide* imports for use by the telecom companies across Yemen, and tariff rationalised. Access to telecommunication and internet is essential for the civilian population and any measures taken in respect to this sector should not result in any adverse consequences for the civilian population.

**Appendix 1 Unofficial translation: Notification of changes in management of Sabafon****Subject / Notification of changes in management in the company and the change of authorized signatories to the financial system with you**

Yemeni mobile phone company - Sabafon

Based on the company's general assembly meeting and its election of a new board of directors and a new chairman of the board, a new executive management has been appointed for the company, and we ask you to change all dealings with the company based on the new changes in its management through:

1. Radically cut off dealings with the previous administration
- 2 - Completely cancel the powers and signatures of the previous administration
- 3 - Approval of the powers and signatures of the authorized names by the new administration described below, on all checks and transfers from all company accounts on your part, in addition to all financial transactions.

Name	Designation
Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer	Chairman of the Board of Directors
Ahmed Ahmed Musaid	Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors
Abdul Khaliq Ali Ali al Gaili	Executive General Manager
Ali Ahmed Ahmed Jahiz	Financial Manager

Signature

Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer  
Chairman of the Board of Directors

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**Annex 30: Seizure of Telecom equipment by Yemeni Customs**

1. The Panel received allegations that Houthi authorities are illegally importing telecom equipment through land borders at Al Mahara, and that the Houthis have been setting up international calling facilities using satellite receivers, which are connected to SIM boxes that can attach about 100 SIM cards. Houthis also allegedly resort to illegal diversion of international calls and provide international call services to the users at rates less than the official rates. The revenue collected through these illegal call facilities is allegedly used by the Houthis for their activities that threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen.
2. The Government has informed the Panel that, “to strengthen their war-disciplined system, the militias are working on importing and smuggling precision equipments and communications equipment, whether traditional or those via satellite”.<sup>279</sup> The Government also informed that they have seized many consignments of telecom equipment, and “there are dozens of shipments that reach the Houthis through smuggling networks, and this poses a great danger to the security and stability of Yemen and Yemenis and contributes to prolonging the war.”<sup>280</sup> The Government has informed that they would share the details with the Panel.
3. The Panel is investigating a case in which a consignment of telecom equipment imported into Yemen in May 2021 through the Oman-Yemen land border was seized by the Yemeni Customs at Al-Mahara, as the said telecom equipment were brought into Yemen without obtaining permission or licence from the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of the Government of Yemen to import these items.
4. The Panel is investigating if the individuals or entities behind these illegal imports of telecom equipment have any links with or if they act on behalf of individuals designated under the 2140 sanctions regime or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and, if so, whether funds, financial assets or economic resources are being generated out of the use or sale of these equipment and/or whether these are used in violations of the sanctions regime for activities that threaten peace security and stability in Yemen. The Panel continues to investigate the allegations.

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<sup>279</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

<sup>280</sup> Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.


## Annex 31: Black-marketing and Illegal Fees on import of Fuel

1. According to various sources, the Houthis have created an artificial scarcity of fuel in areas under their control in order to force the traders to sell oil on the black-market operated by them and collect illegal fees from the sales. As per information made available by the Government of Yemen, the Houthis have collected official revenues on fuel imports in excess of YER 70 billion.<sup>281</sup>

2. Prior to June 2019, Hudaydah port was the major port of import of fuel into Yemen (48%), compared to Aden (33%), Mukalla (16%) and Nishtun (3%).<sup>282</sup> There has been a significant change in the pattern of fuel import into Yemen since then. In April-May 2021, the share of Hudaydah port had come down to 8 percent.<sup>283</sup> With the announcement by Saudi Arabia of a grant of USD 422 million worth of petroleum products to the Government of Yemen in March 2021,<sup>284</sup> for power stations and to support public services, as the country faced a fuel shortage, the volumes of imports through the southern ports started increasing in May–June 2021. Of the total quantities of fuel imported into the areas under the control of the Houthis, during April-May 2021, only eight percent (54,679 Metric Tonnes (MTs)) was imported through Hudaydah port and 92 percent (631,959 MTs) was transported by road after being imported through Aden, Mukalla and Nishtun ports under the control of the Government of Yemen.<sup>285</sup> The fuel supply to the Houthi-controlled areas by the land route, during April-May 2021, was about 10 thousand metric tonnes per day, which represented about 65 percent of the fuel imported into Yemen, in contrast to 6 thousand metric tonnes per day in January-March 2021,<sup>286</sup> evidencing an increase in supply through the land route.<sup>287</sup>

Figure 31.1

### Fuel Imports from January 2020 to July 2021 in MTs



#### Source:

[https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>281</sup> See the press release of the Government of Yemen available at <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>282</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

<sup>283</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>284</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-saudi-int-idUSKBN2BM36W>.

<sup>285</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.

<sup>286</sup> <https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875>.

<sup>287</sup> <https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/>.



3. The Panel has received information that although the customs duties are collected at the first port of import in non-Houthi controlled areas, the Houthis, illegally collect additional fees and customs duties from the traders at their land customs stations.<sup>288</sup> The business of supplying fuel to Houthi-controlled areas has been found to be very lucrative for many, except of course the end-consumers: the Government of Yemen has increased its customs revenue from the imports; the STC also allegedly collect fees of about YER12 per litre of imported fuel from the importers;<sup>289</sup> and the importers/traders who seize this opportunity to get enriched. Unfortunately, the consumers on both sides have to suffer, the consumers in the Houthi-controlled areas pay more because of the land transportation cost, double taxation and the illegal practices being followed by the Houthis and the consumers in the Government of Yemen-controlled areas pay more mostly because of the depreciating YER, profits by the traders and other hidden supply chain and distribution costs. As per a report, “Fuel prices at Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) stations in DFA-controlled areas increased by 76% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 6,807 to YER 12,000 per 20 litres. --In IRG-controlled areas, prices rose by 108% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 5,372 to YER 11,175 per 20 litres.”<sup>290</sup> The Panel has been informed that the increase in fuel prices has negatively impacted the implementing partners of international humanitarian organizations.

<sup>288</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that the Houthis collect YER 37 per litre since February 2021.

<sup>289</sup> The Panel was informed by an importer that earlier they were paying YER 7 per litre but since April 2021, it has been increased to YER 12 per litre and this amount is deposited in some designated account in an exchange company in Aden. During the meeting of the Panel with the Economic Committee (EC) of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that it represented local taxes.

<sup>290</sup> [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817\\_acaps\\_yemen\\_analysis\\_hub\\_fuel\\_prices\\_0.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210817_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_fuel_prices_0.pdf).

**Annex 32: Saudi Deposit**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

### Annex 33 Investigation of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen

1. In this annex, the Panel presents case studies of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen investigated by the Panel since January 2021.
2. The deterioration of the security situation in Yemen affected the capacity of the Panel to have access to all information needed in respect to several investigations on airstrikes. The Panel itself and its sources were unable to undertake numerous travels, especially in areas near conflict zones. The fear of witnesses in Houthi-controlled areas to communicate with the Panel or to register the geolocation of incidents also affected the Panel's investigations.
3. The Panel received information, reports and/or pictures relating to six incidents that were allegedly attributable to the Coalition and was able to conclude investigations on two incidents (see appendix hereafter). The Panel sent a letter to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in respect to the six cases and is awaiting a reply.
4. For the four remaining cases described below, the Panel received insufficient evidence to conclude its investigation:
  - a) One incident occurred on 28 February 2021 at approximately 1230 hours, in which an explosive ordnance hit a house in al Hawk district, Al Hudaydah. It resulted in the death of five people, including one child, and the injury to a woman, and a child. The Panel received information that the incident could have been a UAV attack. The Panel has not received pictures of explosive ordnance debris and is unable to reach a conclusion in this respect. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>291</sup> the location of the incident was 14° 46' 28.2" N, 42° 57' 58.32" E.
  - b) One airstrike occurred on 7 March 2021 at approximately 1430 hours in which a civilian area in Al Amanat Al Asimah (Sana'a city) was hit. The incident resulted in the injury to a man and two children, as well as damage to shops and houses. According to information received by the Panel from two different sources, the location of the incident was in the vicinity of 15° 23' 28.68" N, 44° 11' 7.8" E.
  - c) Another airstrike occurred on 10 May 2021 at approximately 1600 hours in Rada'a district, Al Bayda, which targeted a car resulting in the death of one man and the injury of two women. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 22' 48"N, 44° 55' 15.6" E.
  - d) A fourth incident occurred on 18 September 2021, in which a car in Merkhaj al Ulya district, Shabwah, was hit, resulting in the death of five people including a child and a woman. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 26' 5.28" N, 45° 54' 50.76" E. On 22 September 2021, the spokesperson of the Coalition, Brigadier General Turki Al-Maliki said that: "the Coalition confirms that it has not received any information nor coordination from UN OCHA in Yemen regarding this allegation as per the coordination mechanism in such cases. No such information has been conveyed to the Coalition regarding the claimed airstrike. The Coalition considers these claims seriously, takes all necessary and required procedures to validate them, and announce the results of any investigations through proper referral to the Joint Incidents Assessment Team."<sup>292</sup>

<sup>291</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>292</sup> See online: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/2289036>.

5. In its report S/2019/83, annex 34, the Panel presented the results of its investigation in respect to a shelling incident that occurred on 2 August 2018 in the city of Hudaydah and which hit the al Thawra hospital and a market. The Panel concluded that both Houthi forces and the Coalition could have been responsible for the attack. On 29 September 2021, the JIAT released the result of some investigations, including this specific one, and concluded that the Coalition Surface Forces did not carry out any firing in Hudaydah city on that date.<sup>293</sup> The Panel has still not received any information from Houthi forces in connection to this attack.

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<sup>293</sup> <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=2290995>

## Appendix 1 Airstrike against Al Raks village, Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib, 16 January 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 0830 hours on 16 January 2021, an explosive ordnance allegedly launched from an aircraft, hit a car in Al Mahliyah district, Ma'rib. The incident resulted in the death of the driver who was, according to information received by the Panel, a merchant transporting food (see figure 33.1).

2. The Panel received different information regarding the specific location of the incident but was not able to verify it. According to a report received by the Panel, the incident occurred in Wadi Dhaza (وادي دحظة) on the road between the Al Amoud area and Al Raks village in the Al Mahliyah district. According to a local source, the incident occurred on the main road of Al Raks village, while the driver was going from one shop to another. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project,<sup>294</sup> the incident occurred in Al Raks village at 14° 33' 37.08"N, 45° 17' 34.8"E.

### II. Legal analysis

3. According to information received by the Panel, the victim was not involved in hostilities and there were no military activities or fighting in the area at the time of the attack.

4. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all times, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>295</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>296</sup>

5. Based on the information received by the Panel, it seems unlikely that the principle of distinction was respected.

Figure 33.1

#### Car after the incident



*Source:* Confidential

<sup>294</sup> <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>

<sup>295</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul\\_](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_).

<sup>296</sup> CIHL rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul\\_](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_).

## Appendix 2: Al Salif Port, Al Hudaydah, 21 March 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 0230 hours on 21 March 2021, two explosive ordnances launched from an aircraft hit, approximately five minutes apart, a warehouse and a building owned by the Yemeni International Company for Food Production Ltd at Al Salif port (15° 18' 51.50"N, 42°40' 36.16"E) (see figures 33.2, 33.3 and 33.4). The incident resulted in the injury of six workers of the company.
2. The Panel received pictures of remnants of the explosive ordnances found in both buildings and they are consistent with guided bombs used by the Coalition (see figure 33.5).
3. The Panel sent a letter to the Coalition in respect to this incident and is awaiting a reply.

### II. Legal analysis

4. The Panel received information from several sources that the Houthis are using the port of Al Salif for military activities, among others for the manufacturing of sea mines. However, the Panel still lacks conclusive evidence.<sup>297</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the two buildings in the port of Al Salif referenced above were used for civilian purposes and not for military operations. They are located in a compound separated by a concrete wall in which several offices, accommodation, warehouses and grain silos are housed.
6. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all time, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.<sup>298</sup> They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.<sup>299</sup>
7. Based on the information received, the Panel concludes that it is unlikely that the principles of distinction and proportionality were respected, however, if additional information is provided, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.


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<sup>297</sup> The Panel welcomes any information and evidence in this respect.

<sup>298</sup> See CIHL, rule 1 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

<sup>299</sup> CIHL, rule 16 at [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_rul](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

Figure 33.2  
Location of the two buildings hit in Al Salif port




Source: Google Earth, Panel

Figure 33.3  
Damages to the accommodation buildings



Source: Confidential

Figure 33.4  
**Damages to the warehouse and impact crater**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 33.5  
**Pictures of debris found on the site after the incident**



**Source:** Confidential



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**Annex 34      Violations in the context of detention**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

## Annex 35 Use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated areas attributed to Houthi Forces

1. The Panel is investigating eight incidents of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by Houthi forces in Ma'rib and Ta'izz, which allegedly led to the deaths of 33 people, including eight children, and injuries to 51 others, including 11 children (see Table 34.1).

2. The Panel's investigations are based on interviews with victims and witnesses, reports, pictures and videos, as well as other information available in the public domain. The Panel sent a letter to the Houthi authorities in that respect and is awaiting a reply. If the Houthi political or military leadership can provide information and evidence regarding these attacks that may counter the Panel's preliminary findings, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

Table 35.1

### Cases of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by the Houthi forces between December 2020 and November 2021 investigated by the Panel

<i>Appendix</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Impact Point</i>	<i>Victims/Damage</i>
1	12 December 2020	13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E	Al Ahli Football club, Ta'izz	Two people killed, including one child, and two children injured.
2	8 January 2021	13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E	Near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar Ta'izz	One child killed, one woman and one child injured.
3	20 February 2021	13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E	Al Qahira, Ta'izz city	One child killed, four people injured, including three children.
4	5 March and 8 May 2021	13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E	Al Thawra hospital, Ta'izz	One person injured.
5	3 April 2021	tbc	Al Rawda, Ma'rib	One child killed, four children injured.
6	5 June 2021	15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E	Gas station, Ma'rib	Allegedly 14 killed, including one child, and 5 injured.
7	10 June 2021	15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E	Mosque, Ambulances, Ma'rib	Allegedly six killed and 32 injured.
8	30 October 2021	13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E	Al Camp Street, Ta'izz	Three children killed, one child injured.

**Source:** Panel

## Appendix 1 Al Ahli football club, Ta'izz city, 12 December 2020

### I. Background

1. On 12 December 2020, at approximately 0600 hours, an explosive ordnance hit the Al Ahli football club in Ta'izz city. The club is in the vicinity of the Al Shohada'a stadium (13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E) in a civilian area.
2. Eight civilians were present and the attack resulted in the death of one boy and one man, as well as injuries to three other boys.
3. The Al Ahli football club is located in the "Olympic field" in Ta'izz, which is an area hosting several sports clubs.
4. According to the information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance was launched from a mountainous area North of the impact point which is under Houthi control.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

5. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence at the Al Ahli football club or in its vicinity at the time of the attack.
6. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>300</sup>
7. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in the proximity of civilians and civilian objects, and especially in a densely populated area such as the city of Ta'izz.
8. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

Figure 35.1

#### Location of the impact



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>300</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.2  
**Damages to the Club**



*Source:* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab\\_channel=VICENews](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab_channel=VICENews)

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**Appendix 2 Area in the vicinity of the old airport in Al Mudhaffar, Ta'izz, 8 January 2021****I. Background**

1. On 8 January 2021, at approximately 1100 hours an explosive ordnance hit a residential area in Ta'izz city, near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar (13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E).
2. The incident resulted in the death of a 15-year-old boy, and injuries to a woman and a child.

**II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>301</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>301</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.3  
**Location of the impact**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

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## Appendix 3 Al Qahira, Ta'izz city, 20 February 2021

### I. Background

1. At approximately 1700 hours on 20 February 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a civilian area in Al Qahira, Ta'izz (13°35'51.7"N, 44°00'58.1"E). The attack resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four people: three children and one man.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

2. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.

3. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>302</sup>


4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.

5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>302</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.4  
**Location of the attack**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel



## Appendix 4 Al Tharwa hospital, Ta'izz city, 5 March and 8 May 2021

### I. Background

1. On 5 March 2021, an explosive ordnance hit the operation theatre of the Al Tharwa hospital in Ta'izz (13°35'12.16"N, 44° 1'25.01"E). The incident resulted in injuries to one man. The operation theatre was hit again on 8 May 2021 at approximately 2330 hours and resulted in damage to the hospital.

2. This is not the first time the Panel has reported on this hospital being hit by explosive ordnances. See appendix 3, Annex 33 of [S/2021/79](#), table 9 and annex 51 of [S/2018/193](#), and paragraph 183 and annex 67 of [S/2018/594](#).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

3. Under IHL, hospitals and medical centers exclusively assigned for medical purposes must be respected and protected in all circumstances. Hospitals only lose their protection if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to commit acts harmful to the enemy. Furthermore, the protection of hospitals and medical units may cease only after a warning has been given and only after a reasonable time has elapsed after such a warning.<sup>303</sup>

4. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance came from the North of Tai'zz where the Houthis occupy a mountainous area.

5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction, and the rules affording protection to medical units were not respected.<sup>304</sup>

<sup>303</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Convention, art. 11 AP II and CIHL rule 28.

<sup>304</sup> See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.

**Appendix 5 Al Rawdah, Ma'rib city, 3 April 2021****I. Background**

1. At approximately 1630 hours on 3 April 2021, an explosive ordnance hit Al Rawdah area, Ma'rib city (see figures 35.5 and 35.6). This resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four other children. According to testimonies and reports received by the Panel, the children were playing on the street when the explosive ordnance hit.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance originated from Sirwah district, parts of which are under the control of the Houthi forces.
3. The Panel was unable to identify the specific location of the impact point but received information that it is located approximately two kilometres South from the Sahn Al Jin military camp<sup>305</sup> and 1.5 kilometres North-West of a military base (see figure 35.7)

**II. Analysis of IHL violations**

1. As mentioned above, the Panel notes two military locations at approximately two and 1.5 kilometres away from the location of the incident.
2. However, the Panel also notes that the explosive ordnance fell in a civilian area and that only civilian children were victims of the attack.
3. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>306</sup>
4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
5. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

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<sup>305</sup> 15°30'22.0"N, 45°19'36.0"E

<sup>306</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.5  
**Damage resulting from the explosive ordnance**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.6  
**Debris of the explosive ordnance**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.7  
**Rawdah area (within the black line) and proximity of military facilities**



*Source:* Google Earth with Panel's annotation

## Appendix 6 Petrol station, Ma'rib city, 5 June 2021

### I. Background

1. Between 1700 and 1730 hours on 5 June 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a petrol station in Ma'rib city (15°28'50.3"N, 45°18'47.4"E). According to reports, pictures, videos, and testimonies received by the Panel, the incident resulted in the deaths of between 14 and 21 civilians, including one child, and injuries to five people. Seven cars were also destroyed. The Panel only received conclusive evidence of the death of one child and one man.
2. According to information received by the Panel, several people, including some military personnel, were queuing at the petrol station to refuel at the time of the incident.
3. The Panel received information that there is a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen in the vicinity of the petrol station (see figure 35.9).
4. The Houthi forces acknowledged the attack and said that the target was the military camp nearby and Mohammed Ali Al Houthi called for an independent investigation (see figure 35.8).<sup>307</sup>
5. According to information received by the Panel, the attack was launched from Sirwah district, located towards the West of Ma'rib city from areas under the control of Houthi forces at the time.

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

6. The Panel notes the proximity of a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen to the petrol station and that, according to a declaration made on social media by Mohamed Ali Al Houthi, the military base was the intended objective of the attack.
7. However, the explosive ordnance hit a civilian target, a petrol station, and according to information received by the Panel, most of the victims were civilians, including children.
8. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>308</sup>
9. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.
10. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.

<sup>307</sup> [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090).


<sup>308</sup> CIHL, rule 15.

Figure 35.9

**Statement of Mohamed Ali Al Houthi on Twitter calling for an independent investigation<sup>309</sup>**

**Source:** [https://twitter.com/Moh\\_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090](https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090)

Figure 35.8

**Location of the impact and proximity of military objectives**

**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

<sup>308</sup> Non-official translation: “We asked the brothers in the Yemeni Ministry of Defense, and they said that they bombed only the camp in the picture below, and they have proof. We welcome and call for investigation by independent committees into the matter regarding what was said about Ma’rib today or what happened regarding the killing of the children of the Republic of Yemen and civilians in all governorates who were targeted by America and its coalition”.

Figure 35.10  
**Damage to the petrol station**



*Source:* Confidential

## Appendix 7 A Mosque, Ma'rib city, 10 June 2021

### I. Background

1. On 10 June 2021 at between 1800 and 1900 hours, two or three explosive devices and a UAV, hit a mosque (15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E) and its vicinity (see figure 35.11). Two civilian houses and a few ambulances were also affected. The incident resulted in the death of six people and the injuries to 32 additional people, including two or three members of the medical staff and one woman. The Panel received a list with the names of all victims.<sup>310</sup> The Panel has not been able to verify the identity of each victim, but the number received from different sources and reports are similar.
2. According to information received by the Panel, the area contains buildings belonging to the Police, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Planning and International Cooperation Office, as well as other governmental offices.
3. According to reports received by the Panel, three ambulances that responded to the incident were also damaged. Successive attacks at an interval of several minutes increase the risk of civilian casualties, in particular to medical personnel and first responders (see figure 35.12).

### II. Analysis of IHL violations

4. The Panel notes that the area is located approximately two kilometres from the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 (see Appendix 6) and is in the vicinity of a military base.
5. However, the Panel notes that only civilian objects were hit: a mosque, ambulances, and civilian houses.
6. The Panel, therefore, concludes that it is likely that the principle of distinction was not respected, especially in respect to the UAV which has a high level of accuracy. If the military base was the intended objective, the Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected. Indeed IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Confidential source.

<sup>311</sup> CIHL, rule 15.



Figure 35.11  
**Location of attack**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

Figure 35.12  
**Distance between the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 and the mosque hit on 10 June 2021**



**Source:** Google Earth, Panel

Figure 35.13  
Damage to the Mosque



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 35.14  
Debris of the UAV



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 35.15  
**Damage to an ambulance**



**Source:** Confidential

## **Appendix 8 Near al Camp street, Ta'zz city, 30 October 2021**

### **I. Background**

1. On 30 October 2021, at approximately 1135 hours an explosive ordnance (see figure 35.16) hit a civilian area in the city of Ta'izz (13°34'30.7"N, 44°01'46.2"E) near Al Khaeer mosque, killing three children and injuring a fourth (see figure 35.17). All children were from the same family. Two adults were also reportedly injured, but the Panel has not been able to verify this information.
2. According to information received by the Panel, this is a civilian area, and no military operations were going on in the area at the time of the attack.

### **II. Analysis of IHL violations**

3. According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.
4. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.<sup>312</sup>
5. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta'izz.
6. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

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<sup>312</sup> See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.

Figure 35.16  
**Remnants found at the location of the incident**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.17  
**Location of the attack**



*Source:* Google map

Figure 35.18  
**Impact point**



*Source:* Confidential

## Annex 36 Indiscriminate use of landmines, IEDs and other explosive remnants by Houthi forces

### I. Background:

1. The indiscriminate use of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Houthis is endemic and systematic. Since 2016, the Panel has been documenting the impact of landmines and IEDs on civilians (see [S/2021/79](#), paras 140-142, [S/2020/326](#), paras 115-117 and [S/2018/193](#), annexes 43 and 44).

2. The indiscriminate use of landmines is prohibited by IHL.<sup>313</sup> When landmines are used, parties to the conflict must take particular care to minimize their indiscriminate effects. They also must record their placement to the extent possible. In addition, although not directly binding on non-state armed groups, Yemen is party to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (see section III on the use of anti-personnel mines by Houthis).

### II. West Coast:

3. During its visit to Aden, Al Khokha and Al Mukha and Al Khokha in August 2021, the Panel met with a wide range of stakeholders involved in monitoring and demining activities in Yemen, including Project Masam, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) and UNDP. The Panel was informed that there is no centralized database listing all clearance activities, incidents and emergency interventions undertaken by these different entities in Yemen. It is therefore difficult to have complete and exhaustive data.

4. The Panel was nevertheless able to gather significant information, as mentioned below:

- Between November 2020 and August 2021, the following explosive items were removed from the West Coast by the local demining teams (YEMAC, Project Masam and/or West Coast armed groups):

Table 36.1

#### Explosive items removed from the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021 by district and type of items

Districts:	Anti-Tank/Vehicle Mine	Anti-Personnel Mine	Sea mine	Explosive devices	Missiles	Shells (rockets)	Cluster munition	Pressure plates
Bab el Mandab	123	20		10	2	120		
Dhubab	148	26		16	1	124	1	
Mawza	135	31		24	5	132	3	6
Al Mukha	176	37	1	21	8	140	2	3
Khokha	184	26	1	25	5	138		8
Hays	321	41		31	9	155	4	10
Thuhayata	252	43	2	19	11	126	2	11
Durahimi	1,153	19	3	29	22	119	2	4

<sup>313</sup> See CIHL, rules 80, 81, 82, and 83.

Al Halia	730	52		116	33	130	10	22
Al Hawk	253	12	1	35	12	122	1	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,475</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>1,306</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>72</b>

**Source:** Local demining staff

- The Panel received information from the local authorities of Al Hudaydah and Al Khokha that, between January and June 2021, landmines and other explosive devices laid in those territories of the Al Hudaydah Governorate, which are under the control of the Government of Yemen, resulted in a high number of casualties. Most of them occurred in the district of Al Durahimi. In total, 17 children were killed and 15 were injured, nine women were killed and five injured, and 37 men were killed and 35 injured. The Panel also received information about several incidents affecting civilians between the months of July and October 2021. Two are detailed below.
- During a meeting in Al Mukha, the Panel was informed that according to the most recent survey, in 2021, 78 percent of the West Coast territory is confirmed to be a hazardous area, i.e. territory in which the presence of landmines, IEDs and/or unexploded ordnances (UXO) has been confirmed, and the other 22 percent is suspected to be a hazardous area. The Panel was informed that there are ten YEMAC teams on the West Coast: three in Al Mukha, one in Mawza, one in the South of Ta'izz, one in Jabal Habashi, two in Al Khokha, one in Mudhafar, one in Al Ma'ifer and one in Durahimi. Each YEMAC team has the capacity of clearing areas of approximately 625m<sup>2</sup> per month.
- The Panel was also informed that demining teams in Yemen, including on the West Coast, proceed only for emergency demining, i.e., clearance of roads and passages to infrastructures and locations used by the civilians such as schools, hospitals, and water tanks. Therefore, no area can be considered as completely cleared and the risk of landmines is always there for the civilian population. In addition, the Panel was informed that in areas near active conflict zones, demined areas are constantly remined by the Houthis. The Panel received a list of 74 locations in Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Ma'rib and Shabwah where demining activities had been undertaken, which since have been retaken by Houthi forces.<sup>314</sup>
- The Panel received specific information on 62 cases in which demining teams were called for emergency interventions between September 2020 and August 2021 in ten districts across three Governorates, as mentioned below:
  - i) Ta'izz – Mawza: six incidents, including At Muoa`ad Bin Jabel School<sup>315</sup>, where three anti-tank mines, three artillery shells, ten fuses, and one IED were found on 12 December 2020.
  - ii) Ta'izz- Dhubab: seven incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the roads in or near villages, fishing areas and the Al Shaykh Saeid Port.
  - iii) Ta'izz-Al Mukha: four incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the village roads, farms and houses. One of these incidents resulted in the death of a civilian in Al Gadeed<sup>316</sup> in July 2021.
  - iv) Ta'izz- Al Wazi'iyah: five incidents, where explosive devices were found on the roads. In one of these incidents, cattle was killed<sup>317</sup> and in another one, five anti-tank mines, two IEDs, one

<sup>314</sup> Specific GPS coordinates on file with the Panel.

<sup>315</sup> N 43°38'06.11", E 13°22'34.54"

<sup>316</sup> N 43°21'53.10", E 13°06'20.80"

<sup>317</sup> N 43°40'20.50", E 13°17'24.50"



- artillery shell, and seven anti-personnel mines were found near roads and houses used by civilians.<sup>318</sup>
- v) Tai'zz-Dhubab: 15 incidents, where anti-tank mines were found on the roads used by the civilians, and inside farms. In Al Aradee Almandab, anti-personnel mines were also found at a fishing site.<sup>319</sup>
  - vi) Ad Dali-Qa'atabah: ten incidents where anti-personnel mines were found in or near civilian houses and farms.
  - vii) Al Hudaydah: 11 incidents, including one at a site in Al Tuhayata where 12 civilians were killed in November 2020.<sup>320</sup> In Al Khokha, landmines were found at the entrance of Al Fawz school in November 2020,<sup>321</sup> and others around a water well in December 2020,<sup>322</sup> in Al Hali, explosive devices were also found near a water pipe in August 2021,<sup>323</sup> and in Al Tuhayata, two 500-kilo bombs were found near a water pipe and cleared in January 2021(see figure 36.6).<sup>324</sup>
  - viii) Lahij-Al Madaribah: four incidents, where anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were found on and near the roads used by the civilians, including on a road leading to a water well.<sup>325</sup>
- In addition, the Panel received information from Project MASAM that between November 2020, and the end of July 2021, they cleared 1,830 anti-personnel mines, 26,867 anti-vehicle mines, 315 IEDs and 40,141 UXO in Aden, Ad Dali, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Ma'rib, Shabwah and Ta'izz. Between July 2018 and November 2021, 4,168 anti-personnel mines, 95,525 anti-vehicle mines, 6,109 IEDs and 178,834 UXO were cleared by the group.

### III. Anti-personnel mines:

5. In 2021, the Panel continued to receive evidence of anti-vehicle mines modified by the Houthis for use as large anti-personnel landmines. The Panel was informed of two ways by which this is achieved: one is the use of pressure plates and the other is through the reduction of the headspace above the fuse within an improvised anti-tank device (see figure 36.1).

Figure 36.1:

#### Plastic cap used to reduce the headspace



**Source:** Project Masam

<sup>318</sup> N 43°50'28.70", E 13°09'29.70

<sup>319</sup> N 43°25'38.10", E 12°56'61.10"

<sup>320</sup> N 43°09'48.32", E 14°12'18.81"

<sup>321</sup> N 43°15'42.63", E 13°48'09.12"

<sup>322</sup> N 43°22'15.97", E 13°53'38.76"

<sup>323</sup> N 43°01'27.01", E 14°47'07.57"

<sup>324</sup> N 43°04'42.01", E 14°12'07.26"

<sup>325</sup> N 43°32'64.00", E 12°55'11.70"

#### IV. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

6. Houthi forces continued to manufacture a significant number of IEDs of different shapes and types, including IEDs concealed as rocks, palm tree trunks, as well as different booby traps. Those IEDs are activated through different means including pressure plates, crush wires, and passive infra-red sensors (see figures 36.2 to 36.5)

Figure 36.2:

##### **IEDs activation system: pressure plate**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.3:  
**IEDs activation system: crush wire**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.4:  
**IEDs activation system: passive infra-red sensor**



*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.5:  
**Booby trap**



*Source:* Panel

7. The Panel also received evidence that the Houthi forces use old aviation bombs as IEDs in the civilian areas, with significant risk for the civilian population. For instance, the Panel received evidence of two of these bombs being laid inside a water pipe in Al Thuhayata (43°04'42.01"N, 14°12'07.26"E) and cleared in January 2021 and that another nine were found at the entrance of a school in Medghal, Ma'rib and cleared in November 2018 (15°36'49.29"N, 44°53'2.65"E) (see figure 36.6).

Figure 36.6:  
**Aviation bombs found inside a water pipe and cleared between 5 and 7 January 2021**



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 36.7:  
**Aviation bombs found at the entrance of a school and cleared on November 2018**



*Source:*

Project Masam

8. The Panel also received evidence of five anti-vehicle mines and 11 IEDs found in a school in al Khokha district, al Hudaydah and cleared on 25 November 2021 (13°52'07.88"N 43°25'32.87"E) (see figure 36.8).

Figure 36.8:  
**Anti-vehicle mines and IEDs found in a school in al Khokha**



*Source:* Project Masam

## V. Sea Mines

9. During its visit to the West Coast in August 2021, the Panel received documents, pictures, and other information about the use deployment of sea mines by the Houthis from different sources including people involved in demining and military sources. According to the information received, eight sea mines were found and removed from GoY-controlled areas of the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021. Most sea mines found on the West Coast are contact-type sea mines. Some magnetic sea mines have also been found in the past.

10. The Panel was informed during a meeting with the Yemen Coast Guard in August 2021 that during the period from mid-October to mid-April, due to bad weather conditions, there were fewer patrols on the West Coast and that the Houthis were using this opportunity to lay mines.

11. The Panel also received information that the Houthi forces possess the capacity to produce sea mines,<sup>326</sup> but has not been able to independently verify this.

## VI. Examples of landmine incidents affecting civilians

12. The Panel received information on several incidents of landmine explosions killing or injuring civilians in 2021. The Panel conducted broader investigations on two of them to illustrate the danger of unrecorded landmines in civilian areas.

13. On 29 July 2021, in Ad Durayhimi<sup>327</sup> district, Al Hudaydah Governorate, a car transporting 14 people ran over an explosive device hidden in the ground. Three people were killed, including two children and 11 were injured, including three children. Two of the injured people, one man and one child, died later from their wounds.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Information received from confidential source.

<sup>327</sup> Approximately at 14°36'38.49"N, 43°01'06.13"E

<sup>328</sup> The Panel communicated with three of the victims, received information, including pictures and list of victims from the authorities of Al Hudaydah Governorate, as well as from confidential sources.

Figure 36.9:  
Car after the explosion



*Source:* Confidential

Figure 36.10:  
Search for other landmines and/or IEDs around the incident location



*Source:* Confidential

14. On 13 September 2021, at approximately 1800 hours a lorry triggered an anti-vehicle landmine in Al Qataba area, Al Khokha district, Al Hudaydah (13°53'44.44"N, 43°15'18.36"E). The incident resulted in the injuries of 13 children and two women.<sup>329</sup> On 14 September 2021, a monitoring team

<sup>329</sup> Some media reported 17 victims, but the Panel was able to verify 15: [شاهد- https://alamalika.net/site/2021/09/13/](https://alamalika.net/site/2021/09/13/) [بـالفيديو- 17-جريحاً-معظمهم-نساء-وأط](#). The Panel received information from two different sources as well as video and pictures of the victims at the hospital after the incident.

went to the area to search for and clear other explosive devices. They found a locally made anti-vehicle landmine believed to be similar to the one detonated by the lorry the day before.

Figure 36.11:  
**Location of the incident**



**Source:** Confidential

Figure 38.12:  
**Anti-vehicle landmine found near the location of the incident on 14 September 2021**



**Source:** Confidential

15. The Panel also received evidence of an incident in Mayfa'a district, Shabwah, on 29 September 2021, which resulted in the death of one child and the injuries to three men. The incident was caused



by the explosion of IEDs left in a garbage dump near a mosque. When a fire started in the dump, civilians gathered to control it and were either killed or injured by the explosion.

## **VII. Risks associated with Demining**

16. The Panel received information from two different sources about incidents that occurred during demining operations in Yemen. One source informed the Panel that 29 workers had died during demining activities between 2018 and 2021. Another source informed the Panel that between 2015 and 2021, 45 workers had died during demining operations, and 37 were injured. According to sources involved in demining activities, these numbers are high compared to other areas of operation, and increased training and protective equipment should be provided to demining workers in Yemen. The Panel was also informed by different sources in Yemen that Houthis are constantly developing new technologies relating to landmines and IEDs, which makes the task of the demining teams more difficult and requires continuous training.

## **VI. Import of demining material**

17. The Panel received evidence that, in one case, requests for importing demining equipment, including protective material and detectors, took over a year and half before being approved by the Government of Yemen. Considering the needs and importance of this matter, the authorities in charge of approving importation of equipment related to mine clearance should take appropriate measures to reduce delays.

## **Annex 37 Obstruction to humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas**

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.

**List of acronyms**

ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
APII	Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
AQAP	Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen in Aden
cby	Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a
CCTV	Closed-circuit Television
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIHL	Customary International Humanitarian Law
EC	Economic Committee of the STC
ECDIS	Electronic Chart Display and Information System
EUC	End-User Certificate
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading Facility
GoY	Government of Yemen
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Internet Protocol
ISP	Internet Service Providers
JIAT	Joint Incident Assessment Team
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
NM	Nautical Mile
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBNR	Political Bureau of the National Resistance
PN	Promissory Notes
RCC	Redeployment Coordination Committee
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
STC	Southern Transitional Council
TEL	Transport-Erector-Launchers
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNOSAT	United Nations Satellite Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WBIED	Water-borne Improvised Explosive Device
WCJF	West Coast Joint Forces
YCG	Yemeni Coast Guard
YEMAC	Yemen Executive Mine Action Center
YER	Yemeni rial