



General Assembly

Distr.: General
6 December 2021
English
Original: Arabic/Chinese/English/
French/Russian

Seventy-sixth session First Committee

Compendium of submissions

Note by the Chair

1. The Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) held its meetings during the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly against the background of the continuing health crisis that made it necessary to take important measures in order to safeguard the health and safety of delegates and the staff of the Secretariat, while fulfilling the responsibilities attributed to the Committee.
2. The physical distance guidelines and constraints related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic had an impact on the logistical resources available for the work of the Committee, with a decrease in the number of meetings and thus the shortening of its programme of work.
3. As a result of these circumstances, and in order to make it possible for all delegations to express their views on all items on the agenda, the Committee decided that statements on the thematic clusters could be presented in-person, written form or as pre-recorded statements. While in-person statements would be included in the verbatim records and longer versions of those statements posted to the eStatements portal, written submissions* for the thematic discussions and in exercise of the right of reply would be included in a compendium, to be issued as an official document of the Committee, in the language of submission.
4. The Committee adopted this decision regarding the modalities of work for its seventy-sixth session at its plenary meeting of 30 September 2021.
5. It is my hope that the present compendium will be a valuable instrument for all delegations that have taken part in the deliberations of the seventy-sixth session of the First Committee, and might also serve as a tool for future occasions when circumstances might make such an approach useful.

Omar **Hilale** (Morocco)

* The statements contained in the present compendium are circulated in the languages of submission only and without formal editing and are reproduced as shared by the concerned delegation.



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Written submissions for the thematic discussions

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بيان المجموعة العربية
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي الأول حول الأسلحة النووية
اللجنة الأولى: الدورة ٧٦ للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

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السيد الرئيس،

- 1- أود بدايةً أن أعرب عن تضامن المجموعة العربية مع البيان الذي ألقاه وفد إندونيسيا بالنيابة عن حركة عدم الانحياز.

السيد الرئيس،

- 2- ترحب المجموعة العربية بدخول معاهدة حظر الأسلحة النووية حيز النفاذ والذي يمثل - إلى جانب الالتزام القانوني المترتب على أطرافه - مصدراً عرفياً جديداً للقانون الدولي المنظم لمجال نزع السلاح ويضع الأسلحة النووية في مكانها المنطقية كأسلحة تتعارض حيازتها واستخدامها أو حتى التهديد باستخدامها مع أبسط قواعد القانون الدولي الإنساني إلى جانب ما تمثله من تهديد مباشر للسلم والأمن الدوليين.
- 3- وتؤكد المجموعة العربية أن دخول معاهدة حظر الأسلحة النووية حيز النفاذ يرسى قاعدة دولية بحظر الأسلحة النووية، وهو أمر من شأنه سد ثغرة رئيسية تتعلق بمساواة الأسلحة النووية وأسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى التي تم التوصل لاتفاقيات ملزمة تحظرها بما يتسق مع أبسط قواعد القانون الإنساني الدولي. وتؤكد المجموعة العربية أن معاهدة حظر الأسلحة النووية لا تتعارض مع معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية وإنما تكملها وتدفع في اتجاه استكمال تحقيق أهدافها.
- 4- وتدعو المجموعة العربية جميع الدول النووية للتصديق على معاهدة الحظر الشامل للتجارب النووية على وجه السرعة، مؤكدة على أن القرارات الإيجابية التي تتخذها الدول النووية سيكون لها تأثير مفيد على صعيد التصديق على تلك المعاهدة، وأن الدول النووية تقع على عاتقها مسؤولية خاصة تتمثل في تشجيع بلدان الملحق ٢ على التوقيع والتصديق، ولا سيما تلك البلدان أو الأطراف التي لم تنضم بعد إلى معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية ولا تزال تشغل منشآت نووية غير خاضعة لنظام الضمانات الشاملة

أو البلدان التي لديها برامج وأنشطة نووية غير معلنة أو التي تدور عليها تساؤلات حول طبيعتها السلمية في هذا الصدد.

5- كما تعرب المجموعة عن القلق نتيجة استمرار الاخفاق في تحقيق تقدم ملموس على صعيد نزع السلاح النووي، والفشل المتكرر في الالتزامات ذات الصلة الصادرة عن مؤتمر مراجعة معاهدة عدم الانتشار النووي لأعوام ١٩٩٥ و ٢٠٠٠ و ٢٠١٠، حيث تتنصل الدول النووية من وضع أي أطر زمنية محددة لتنفيذ تلك الالتزامات الدولية من أجل التخلص التام من الأسلحة النووية.

6- كما تعرب المجموعة عن رفضها استمرار الدول النووية في تبني عقائد عسكرية تجيز استخدام السلاح النووي وتسمح باستخدامه ضد دول غير نووية، بجانب سعي بعض الدول لتطوير وزيادة أسلحتها النووية في ظل ما يشهده العالم من توتر حالياً. وفي هذا الإطار، تؤكد المجموعة على أن التخلص الكامل والنهائي من الأسلحة النووية، بموجب المادة السادسة من معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية، وبشكل خاضع للتحقق الدولي، هو الضمان الوحيد لعدم استخدام تلك الأسلحة المخالفة للقانون الدولي الإنساني.

7- كما تعرب المجموعة العربية عن رفضها لاستمرار الدول النووية في تبني عقائد عسكرية تستند على مبدأ الردع النووي الذي ينطوي على إجازة استخدام السلاح النووي أو التهديد باستخدامه. وتؤكد المجموعة أن التخلص الكامل والنهائي من الأسلحة النووية، بموجب المادة السادسة من معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية هو الضمان الوحيد لعدم انتشار تلك الأسلحة وعدم استخدامها أو التهديد باستخدامها سواء من جانب الدول أم الفاعلين من غير الدول.

السيد الرئيس،

8- إن فشل مؤتمر مراجعة معاهدة عدم الانتشار النووي الأخير عام ٢٠١٥ يضعنا أمام مسؤولية مضاعفة لمسارعة الخطى نحو الحفاظ على مصداقية واستمرارية المنظومة التي ترسيها المعاهدة والعمل على إنجاح مؤتمر المراجعة العاشر من خلال التوصل لنتائج واضحة حول تنفيذ كافة الالتزامات السابقة وتعزيز فاعلية المعاهدة.

9- ونود أن نؤكد أن مسؤولية إخلاء الشرق الأوسط من الأسلحة النووية مسؤولية دولية جماعية، التزمت المجموعة العربية بنصيبها فيها، ويتبقى التزام الأطراف الأخرى بذلك، وإلا ستكون مصداقية معاهدة عدم الانتشار النووي على المحك بما يهدد استقرار منظومة منع الانتشار عموماً.

السيد الرئيس،

- 10- تشدد المجموعة العربية على ضرورة اتخاذ خطوات عملية وتدابير فورية، وهو ما يدعو إليه مشروع القرار العربي السنوي المعنون "مخاطر الانتشار النووي في الشرق الأوسط"
- 11- وتعرّب المجموعة عن قلقها ازاء الخطر الأمني المستمر جراء مواصلة اسرائيل رفض الانضمام لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية، باعتبارها الوحيدة في الشرق الأوسط التي لم تنضم للمعاهدة وترفض اخضاع كافة منشأتها النووية لنظام الضمانات الشاملة للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية.
- 12- ونعيد تأكيد أن الاستمرار في تأخير تنفيذ الالتزام الدولي الخاص بقرار ١٩٩٥ بشأن الشرق الأوسط، يمثل انتكاسة خطيرة ويعرقل التقدم ليس فقط في مجال منع الانتشار النووي وإنما أيضاً في مسار تحقيق السلام والأمن المستدامين في المنطقة والعالم، وكذلك الفشل المتكرر في تنفيذ الالتزامات ذات الصلة عن مؤتمر مراجعة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية لعامي ٢٠١٠ و٢٠١٥.
- 13- وفي هذا السياق، ترحب المجموعة العربية بانعقاد الدورة الأولى لمؤتمر إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية وكافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في الشرق الأوسط الذي عقدته الأمم المتحدة في نوفمبر ٢٠١٩ برئاسة المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية بموجب مقرر الجمعية العامة رقم 73/546، وبإنجاح تلك الدورة في التوصل لنتائج إيجابية واعتماد عدد من القرارات الموضوعية والإجرائية الهامة على النحو الذي يعكسه تقرير السكرتير العام الوارد بالوثيقة A/75/63.
- 14- وتنتطلع المجموعة العربية لإنجاح الدورة الثانية للمؤتمر برئاسة دولة الكويت والمقرر عقدها خلال الفترة من ٢٩ نوفمبر إلى ٣ ديسمبر ٢٠٢١، وتحت المجموعة كافة الأطراف المدعوة لهذا المؤتمر على المشاركة فيه بحسن نية بهدف التفاوض على معاهدة ملزمة قانوناً في هذا الشأن بما يسهم في تعزيز السلم والأمن على المستويين الإقليمي والدولي.

السيد الرئيس،

- 15- ختاماً، تدعو المجموعة إلى تحقيق عالمية معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية، التي تعد الركيزة الأساسية للنظام الدولي المتعدد الأطراف لنزع السلاح وتحقيق الأمن الدولي، وتؤكد ضرورة مراعاة التوازن بين أركان معاهدة عدم الانتشار النووي الثلاث وإصلاح الخلل الناتج

عن تَعمد التَّركيز من جانب بعض الأطراف على عدم الانتشار على حساب نزع السلاح، فضلاً عن ضرورة تعزيز التعاون في الاستخدامات السلمية للطاقة الذرية لتمكين الدول الأطراف بالمعاهدة من توظيف حقها غير القابل للتصرف في كافة أوجه الاستخدامات السلمية للطاقة الذرية.

وشكراً.

بيان المجموعة العربية
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي الثاني حول أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى
اللجنة الأولى: الدورة ٧٦ للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

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السيد الرئيس،

- 1- تؤكد المجموعة العربية تضامنها مع البيان الذي ألقاه وفد إندونيسيا باسم حركة عدم الانحياز.
- 2- وتتمسك المجموعة العربية بموقفها المبدئي الثابت بشأن التوصل لعالم خال من أسلحة الدمار الشامل، سواء كانت نووية أو كيميائية أو بيولوجية، مع إيلاء الأولوية اللازمة لقضية إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية وكافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في الشرق الأوسط وفقاً للقرارات الدولية ذات الصلة.
- 3- ومن المهم أيضاً التذكير بأن أول دورة استثنائية للجمعية العامة مكرسة لموضوعات نزع السلاح SSOD-I، حددت بشكل واضح وبتوافق الآراء أولويات نزع السلاح، حيث أقرت منح الأولوية القصوى لنزع السلاح النووي، إلا أننا حتى الآن لا نرى تقدماً ملموساً بشأن نزع الأسلحة النووية وحظرها على النحو الذي تم تحقيقه بشأن الأسلحة الكيميائية والبيولوجية.
- 4- وقد قامت المجموعة العربية بدور فعال في الجهود المتعلقة بالتخلص من أسلحة الدمار الشامل، كما تستمر المجموعة العربية في دعم معاهدتي حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية والبيولوجية، والعمل على تحقيق أهدافهما، فضلاً عن إدانة أي استخدام لأسلحة الدمار الشامل من جانب أي طرف وتحت أي ظرف.
- 5- وتؤكد المجموعة أن انضمام إسرائيل لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية، كطرف غير نووي، سيسهم في تحقيق عالمية المعاهدة وبناء الثقة، إلى جانب تحقيق الأمن الإقليمي والدولي وتعزيز مصداقية النظام الدولي لنزع السلاح وعدم الانتشار، حيث أن إسرائيل هي الوحيدة في المنطقة التي لم تنضم لأي من المعاهدات الثلاث ذات الصلة بأسلحة الدمار الشامل.

السيد الرئيس،

- 6- إن فشل مؤتمر عام ٢٠١٥ لمراجعة معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية – رغم الجهود الحثيثة التي بذلتها المجموعة العربية وحركة عدم الانحياز – له آثار سلبية تتمثل في استمرار حالة الجمود الحالي لجهود إخلاء الشرق الأوسط من أسلحة الدمار الشامل، رغم أن

نتائج المؤتمرات السابقة لمراجعة معاهدة عدم الانتشار تضمنت تدابير عملية بشأن الركائز الثلاثة للمعاهدة وتربط هذه الركائز بتنفيذ قرار ١٩٩٥ بشأن الشرق الأوسط.

7- لقد وافقت الدول العربية، بقرار شجاع ينبع من حسن النوايا، على توسيع نطاق إجراءات ضبط التسلح في المنطقة ليشمل أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى إلى جانب الأسلحة النووية لدحض ذرائع التمسك بالأسلحة النووية من جانب طرف واحد بالمنطقة كوسيلة للردع، بحيث تكون منطقة الشرق الأوسط هي المنطقة الوحيدة التي يتم التوصل لمعاهدة لإخلائها ليس فقط من الأسلحة النووية كما هو الحال في المعاهدات الإقليمية القائمة في مناطق أخرى بل ومن كافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل.

8- وتدعو المجموعة العربية الى ضرورة تعزيز جهود المجتمع الدولي وبذل المزيد من الجهود نحو انشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية وأسلحة الدمار الشامل الاخرى في الشرق الأوسط.

9- وفي هذا السياق، ترحب المجموعة العربية بانعقاد الدورة الأولى لمؤتمر إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية وكافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في الشرق الأوسط الذي عقدته الأمم المتحدة في نوفمبر ٢٠١٩ برئاسة المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية بموجب مقرر الجمعية العامة رقم 73/546، وبإنجاح تلك الدورة في التوصل لنتائج إيجابية واعتماد عدد من القرارات الموضوعية والإجرائية الهامة على النحو الذي يعكسه تقرير السكرتير العام الوارد بالوثيقة A/75/63.

10- وتتطلع المجموعة العربية لنجاح الدورة الثانية للمؤتمر برئاسة دولة الكويت والمقرر عقدها خلال الفترة من ٢٩ نوفمبر إلى ٣ ديسمبر ٢٠٢١، وتحت المجموعة كافة الأطراف المدعوة لهذا المؤتمر على المشاركة فيه بحسن نية بهدف التفاوض على معاهدة ملزمة قانوناً في هذا الشأن بما يساهم في تعزيز السلم والأمن على المستويين الإقليمي والدولي.

وشكراً.

بيان المجموعة العربية
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي الثالث حول الفضاء الخارجي
اللجنة الأولى: الدورة ٧٦ للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

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السيد الرئيس،

- 1- أود بداية أن أعرب عن تأييد المجموعة العربية لما تضمنه البيان الذي ألقاه وفد إندونيسيا بالنيابة عن حركة عدم الانحياز.
- 2- تؤمن المجموعة العربية بأهمية أن يظل استخدام الفضاء الخارجي محصوراً بشكل رئيسي في الأغراض السلمية وحظر كافة أنواع التسلح أو النزاعات المسلحة في الفضاء الخارجي. وقد أدت الاتفاقيات الدولية القائمة دوراً إيجابياً من أجل تعزيز الاستخدام السلمي للفضاء الخارجي وتنظيم الأنشطة فيه، إلا أن هذه الاتفاقيات أصبحت تحتاج لتطوير ملموس لتتماشى مع التطورات الأخيرة وإعلان عدد من الدول عن تطوير قدرات إما لوضع أسلحة في الفضاء الخارجي أو لشن هجوم مسلح ضد الأقمار الصناعية والأصول في الفضاء الخارجي.
- 3- ونود أن نؤكد على أن الأولويات العربية في هذا الشأن تركز على المبادئ التالية:

أولاً: أن الفضاء الخارجي يعتبر ملكية مشتركة للإنسانية، ومن ثم فإن كافة الأنشطة في الفضاء الخارجي ينبغي تقنينها تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة من أجل ضمان مبادئ الشمولية والعالمية وإعمال قاعدة التوافق الدولي في هذا المجال الحيوي، وهو ما يتطلب صكاً دولياً ملزماً يحول دون انطلاق سباق تسلح في الفضاء الخارجي.

ثانياً: أن أي مسعى لتنظيم أنشطة الفضاء الخارجي يجب أن يهدف إلى الحفاظ على مصالح جميع الدول، وينبغي ألا يؤدي بأي شكل إلى إعاقة قيام الدول بتوظيف حقها الأصيل في استخدام الفضاء الخارجي في الأغراض السلمية المشروعة التي لا تتصل بالتسلح.

ثالثاً: تشدد المجموعة العربية على ضرورة إبقاء الفضاء الخارجي مجالاً سلمياً خالياً من النزاعات، وبالتالي فإن الصك الدولي الملزم المنشود لمنع سباق التسلح في الفضاء الخارجي ينبغي أن يشمل حظر وضع أسلحة - هجومية كانت أم دفاعية - في الفضاء، وحظر أي هجوم مسلح على الأجسام في الفضاء الخارجي أو الإضرار المتعمد بها، وحظر تطوير أو تجربة أية أسلحة أو تقنيات يكون غرضها الوحيد القيام بهجمات مسلحة ضد الأجسام في الفضاء الخارجي، مع وضع الآليات والإجراءات التي تسمح بالتحقق من تلك الالتزامات في إطار متعدد الأطراف.

رابعاً: نود التأكيد على أهمية تعزيز التعاون الدولي في مجال الاستخدامات السلمية للفضاء الخارجي، والعمل على إدماج الدول النامية ضمن منظومة الدول المستخدمة والمنفعة من الأنشطة والتطبيقات الفضائية.

4- ومن هذا المنطلق، ترحب المجموعة العربية بالتقدم الذي تم إحرازه في إطار المناقشات الموضوعية لفريقي الخبراء الحكوميين المعنيين بالتوصل لعناصر موضوعية لصك قانوني ملزم بشأن منع سباق التسلح في الفضاء الخارجي وفقاً لقرار الجمعية العامة رقم 72/250، والتي يمكن أن تمثل إسهاماً في أي مفاوضات مستقبلية في هذا الشأن. وتدعو الدول العربية لاستمرار العمل على إطلاق مفاوضات في إطار الأمم المتحدة حول هذا الصك القانوني متعدد الأطراف لسد الثغرات القائمة في المنظومة القانونية الدولية المنظمة لأنشطة الدول في الفضاء الخارجي، حيث تتزايد المخاطر في ضوء الاعتماد المطرد على تقنيات الفضاء الخارجي في عدد من المجالات الحيوية ذات الأهمية الاستراتيجية، بالتوازي مع تزايد مستويات التوتر والتنافس العسكري على المستوى الدولي.

وشكراً.

بيان المجموعة العربية
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي الرابع حول الأسلحة التقليدية
اللجنة الأولى: الدورة ٧٦ للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

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السيد الرئيس،

1- أود بداية أن أعرب عن تأييد المجموعة العربية لما تضمنه البيان الذي ألقاه وفد إندونيسيا باسم حركة عدم الانحياز.

السيد الرئيس،

2- تولي الدول الأعضاء بجامعة الدول العربية اهتماماً متزايداً بمكافحة الاتجار والإمداد غير المشروع بالأسلحة الصغيرة والخفيفة، خاصةً في ضوء الآثار الكارثية على المستويات الأمنية والإنسانية والاقتصادية لظاهرة التزايد غير المسبوق في الإمداد غير المشروع بالأسلحة الصغيرة والخفيفة في المنطقة العربية، وما يبدو من قيام بعض الحكومات باللجوء لإمداد الإرهابيين والجماعات المسلحة غير المشروعة بالأسلحة لإطالة أمد الصراعات المسلحة وتحقيق أهداف سياسية مغرضة بالمخالفة لأبسط قواعد القانون الدولي وميثاق الأمم المتحدة وعدد من قرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة وآخرها قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ٢٣٧٠ لعام ٢٠١٧.

3- وفي هذا السياق، تؤكد المجموعة العربية أهمية برنامج عمل الأمم المتحدة لمكافحة الاتجار غير المشروع في الأسلحة الصغيرة والخفيفة من كافة جوانبه، و تدعو للحفاظ على قيمة هذا البرنامج كأداة أممية توافقية تمثل الغرض الرئيسي منها في بناء الثقة وتعزيز التعاون بين دول العالم من أجل القضاء على الاتجار غير المشروع في الأسلحة الصغيرة والخفيفة، على ألا تتعارض أية إجراءات يتم اتخاذها في هذا الشأن مع الحق المشروع للدول في الدفاع عن النفس بموجب ميثاق الأمم المتحدة، وفي تصنيع واستيراد الأسلحة التقليدية لهذا الغرض.

4- وتؤكد المجموعة العربية ضرورة التمييز بين مكافحة الاتجار والإمداد غير المشروع بالأسلحة - والتي تعد الهدف الرئيسي لبرنامج العمل - وبين فرض قيود مسبقة أو تمييزية أو احتكارية على الاتجار المشروع في الأسلحة التقليدية فيما بين الحكومات وفقاً للتقدير السيادي لكل منها لطبيعة التهديدات الأمنية التي تواجهها. وتطالب المجموعة بضرورة الالتزام بحظر أي توريد للأسلحة لدولة ما دون ترخيص رسمي من السلطة المعنية بدولة الاستيراد.

- 5- وتؤكد المجموعة على الحق المشروع للدول في توفير احتياجاتها من الأسلحة التقليدية طبقاً للمادة ٥١ من ميثاق الأمم المتحدة بشأن حق الدفاع الشرعي عن النفس، كما تؤكد رفضها القاطع لفرض أية قيود على هذا الحق.
- 6- وتتمسك المجموعة العربية بأن برنامج العمل يعتبر إطاراً دولياً قائماً بذاته، وتؤكد ضرورة الحرص على عدم تداخل تنفيذ برنامج العمل مع أية آليات دولية أخرى، وتجنب الزج بموضوعات خلافية لا يشملها البرنامج.
- 7- وتؤكد المجموعة العربية مجدداً أهمية تعزيز التعاون الدولي والمساعدات الفنية لتنفيذ برنامج العمل وأداة التتبع الدولية بما في ذلك دعم قدرات الدول بالتقنيات الحديثة ذات الصلة وبناء القدرات، لاسيما في مجالات تأمين المخزون ومراقبة الحدود، دون تدخل في سيادة الدول أو فرض شروط تتعارض مع روح البرنامج وأهدافه.
- 8- كما ترى المجموعة العربية أهمية ألا يؤدي تقديم المساعدات لدولة ما لانتقاص من موارد المساعدات التنموية الرسمية ODA المخصصة لتلك الدولة، أو محاولة إيجاد روابط غير محددة بين تقديم تلك المساعدات المطلوبة في مجال مكافحة الاتجار والإمداد غير المشروع بالأسلحة التقليدية وبين تنفيذ أهداف التنمية المستدامة SDGs فيما يتجاوز الهدف الفرعي الرابع من الهدف السادس عشر الذي يتناول تحديداً موضوع مكافحة الاتجار غير المشروع في الأسلحة الصغيرة والخفيفة.
- 9- تؤكد المجموعة العربية أنه من الأولي أن يتم التركيز أولاً على سد الثغرات التي تحول دون تحقيق فاعلية الجهود الأممية ومتعددة الأطراف ذات الصلة بمكافحة الإمداد والاتجار غير المشروع في الأسلحة قبل النظر في التعامل مع الإشكاليات الخاصة بالذخائر، وأن هناك ضرورة لإجراء دراسة متأنية من جانب الخبراء الفنيين والقانونيين للتبعات الفنية والاقتصادية والأمنية والقانونية المترتبة على المقترحات الخاصة بتطبيق بعض الآليات والقواعد المطبقة على الأسلحة على الذخائر.
- 10- وترحب المجموعة باعتماد الوثيقة الختامية للاجتماع السابع لبرنامج عمل الأمم المتحدة للأسلحة الصغيرة والخفيفة، وتتطلع للبناء على التوصيات الواردة بها خلال الاجتماع الثامن لبرنامج العمل العام المقبل.
- 11- وختاماً، تأخذ المجموعة علماً مع التقدير بصدر الوثيقة الختامية لفريق الخبراء الحكوميين المعنى بدراسة المشكلات المترتبة على تراكم الفائض من مخزون الذخائر التقليدية، وما تضمنته من توصيات خاصة مقترح إنشاء مجموعة عمل مفتوحة العضوية تهدف إلى وضع إطار دولي شامل للتعامل مع الذخائر التقليدية على كافة المستويات الوطنية والإقليمية والدولية.

وشكراً.

بيان المجموعة العربية
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي الخامس: التدابير الأخرى لنزع السلاح
اللجنة الأولى: الدورة ٧٦ للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

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السيد الرئيس،

- 1- أود بداية أن أعرب عن تأييد المجموعة العربية لبيان حركة عدم الانحياز .
- 2- فيما يتعلق بالشق الخاص بتدابير نزع السلاح الأخرى، تؤكد المجموعة العربية أن الحلول المتفق عليها في الإطار متعدد الأطراف وفقاً لميثاق الأمم المتحدة توفر السبيل الوحيد المستدام لمعالجة قضايا نزع السلاح والأمن الدولي. وتدعو المجموعة العربية جميع الدول الأعضاء إلى تجديد وتنفيذ التزاماتها الفردية والجماعية في الإطار الدولي المتعدد الأطراف، وتؤكد إيمانها بدور الأمم المتحدة المحوري في مجال نزع السلاح وعدم الانتشار.
- 3- وتود المجموعة العربية أن تعبر عن قلقها إزاء زيادة التوتر والإنفاق العسكري العالمي، والذي يمكن إنفاق جزء كبير منه لتعزيز التنمية المستدامة والقضاء على الفقر حول العالم، لا سيما في البلدان النامية، ومنها الدول العربية. وتؤكد المجموعة مجدداً أهمية متابعة تنفيذ برنامج العمل المعتمد في المؤتمر الدولي المعني بالصلة بين نزع السلاح والتنمية والذي عقد عام ١٩٨٧، وكذلك متابعة تأثير زيادة النفقات العسكرية على معدل تنفيذ أهداف التنمية المستدامة في إطار أجندة ٢٠٣٠ للأمم المتحدة.

السيد الرئيس،

- 4- إن الاستمرار في امتلاك وتحديث الترسانات النووية يعدان من أشد الأخطار على السلم والأمن الدوليين وعلى التنمية المستدامة. ولذلك، تشدد المجموعة العربية على ضرورة أن تراعي المحافل الدولية لنزع السلاح المعايير البيئية ذات الصلة عند التفاوض على معاهدات واتفاقيات نزع السلاح والحد من التسلح، وعلى ضرورة أن تسهم جميع الدول في ضمان الامتثال للمعايير البيئية في تنفيذ تلك المعاهدات والاتفاقيات.
- 5- وتعتبر المجموعة العربية عن قلقها إزاء تزايد استخدام تكنولوجيا المعلومات الاتصالات في أنشطة تخريبية تخل بالسلم والأمن الدوليين، بما في ذلك أنشطة تقوم بها المنظمات الإرهابية والإجرامية، وتؤكد المجموعة العربية ضرورة استمرار الأمم المتحدة في العمل على تطوير قواعد ملزمة تنظم هذا السلوك المسئول للدول في هذا المجال الحيوي، والتطوير المستمر للضوابط الحاكمة لهذا المجال بما يواكب تطورات المتسارعة، وتؤكد المجموعة العربية على الحاجة إلى مواصلة التعاون الدولي والحفاظ على دور مركزي للأمم المتحدة في هذه الجهود.

6- وفي مجال الأمن السيبراني، تؤكد المجموعة على أهمية دعم التعاون الدولي لتعزيز أمن تقنيات الاتصالات والمعلومات، بما يحصن الدول ويعزز قدراتها ضد أية هجمات تخريبية، وهو ما أكدته تقارير عدة فرق متتابعة من الخبراء الحكوميين. وتحرص المجموعة على استمرار الدور المركزي للأمم المتحدة في تطوير منظومة المعايير الدولية لأمن المعلومات والاتصالات، واستمرار التعاون في إطار الأمم المتحدة في هذا المجال الذي بات يؤثر على جميع المرافق الحيوية لمختلف الدول ويشهد تزايداً لافتاً في توظيفه في أغراض تخريبية تخل بالأمن الدولي.

7- وترحب المجموعة في هذا السياق باعتماد الوثيقة الختامية بالتوافق لمجموعة العمل مفتوحة العضوية المنشأة بقرار الجمعية العامة رقم 73/27، وتتطلع لبدء اجتماعات مجموعة العمل مفتوحة العضوية الجديدة المنشأة بقرار الجمعية العامة رقم 75/240 خلال شهر ديسمبر المقبل.

وشكراً.

بيان المجموعة العربية
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي السادس: نزع السلاح والأمن الإقليمي
اللجنة الأولى: الدورة ٧٦ للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

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السيد الرئيس،

- 1- أود بدايةً أن أعرب عن تأييد المجموعة العربية لبيان حركة عدم الانحياز.
- 2- كما تود المجموعة العربية التذكير بما تضمنته عدد من قرارات الجمعية العامة ومخرجات دوراتها الخاصة المكرسة لنزع السلاح وتوصيات هيئة الأمم المتحدة لنزع السلاح الصادرة بتوافق الآراء من إشارات واضحة حول العلاقة بين نزع السلاح والحفاظ على السلم والأمن الدوليين، وبين نزع السلاح وتحقيق التنمية المستدامة، فضلاً عن تناول عدد من قرارات ووثائق الأمم المتحدة لمحورية جهود نزع السلاح وضبط التسلح على المستوى الإقليمي.
- 3- ولعل منطقة الشرق الأوسط من أكثر مناطق العالم احتياجاً لدفع جهود نزع السلاح وضبط التسلح بما يسهم في بناء الثقة وتحقيق السلم والأمن وإرساء دعائم مستقرة للتنمية المستدامة.
- 4- وتؤكد المجموعة العربية الأهمية المحورية لاتفاقيات إقامة مناطق خالية من الأسلحة النووية في كافة أنحاء العالم، بما في ذلك منطقة الشرق الأوسط، وفي هذا الشأن نشدد على ضرورة اتخاذ خطوات فعلية وتدابير فورية، وهو ما يدعو إليه القرار العربي الذي تتقدم به سنوياً المجموعة العربية والمعنون "مخاطر الانتشار النووي في الشرق الأوسط". ونتطلع إلى مواصلة المجتمع الدولي والدول الساعية للسلام والاستقرار دعم هذا القرار الهام أسوة بالأعوام السابقة.
- 5- وتدعو المجموعة العربية الدول الثلاث الراعية لقرار الشرق الأوسط الصادر عن مؤتمر المراجعة والتّمديد لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية لعام ١٩٩٥ والذي يمثل جزءاً لا يتجزأ من صفقة التّمديد اللانهائي للمعاهدة، إلى تحمل مسؤوليتها في تنفيذ قرار الشرق الأوسط لعام ١٩٩٥، كما تجدد تأكيدها وإصرارها على المضي قدماً في بذل كل ما بوسعها من أجل الوصول إلى منطقة شرق أوسط خالية من الأسلحة النووية وأسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى بما يدعم من فرص السلام والأمن والاستقرار في واحدة من أكثر مناطق العالم تعرضاً للنزاعات وعدم الاستقرار.
- 6- وفي هذا السياق، ترحب المجموعة العربية بانعقاد الدورة الأولى لمؤتمر إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية وكافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في الشرق الأوسط الذي عقدته الأمم المتحدة في نوفمبر ٢٠١٩ برئاسة المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية بموجب مقرر الجمعية

العامّة رقم 73/546، وبنجاح تلك الدّورة في التّوصل لنتائج إيجابيّة واعتماد عدد من القرارات الموضوعيّة والإجرائيّة الهامّة على النحو الذي يعكسه تقرير السّكرتير العامّ الوارد بالوثيقة A/75/63.

7- وتطلّع المجموعة العربيّة لنجاح الدّورة الثّانية للمؤتمر برئاسة دولة الكويت والمقرر عقدها خلال الفترة من ٢٩ نوفمبر إلى ٣ ديسمبر ٢٠٢١، وتحت المجموعة كافّة الأطراف المدعوة لهذا المؤتمر على المشاركة فيه بحسن نية بهدف التفاوض على معاهدة ملزمة قانوناً في هذا الشّأن بما يسهم في تعزيز السّلم والأمن على المستويين الإقليميّ والدوليّ.

السيد الرئيس،

8- لقد التزمت الدول العربيّة بنصيبها من تحمّل المسؤوليّة إزاء إحلال الأمن والاستقرار في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وإنشاء منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمار الشامل، ويبقى على الأطراف الأخرى تحمّل مسؤولياتها. وفي هذا الصدد، تعرب المجموعة العربيّة عن قلقها البالغ إزاء الخطر المستمرّ جراء استمرار إسرائيل في رفض الانضمام لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النوويّة، باعتبارها الوحيدة في الشرق الأوسط التي لم تنضم للمعاهدة وترفض إخضاع منشآتها النوويّة لنظام الضمانات الشاملة للوكالة الدوليّة للطاقة الذرية.

9- وتعيد المجموعة التأكيد على أن الاستمرار في تأخير تنفيذ الالتزام الدولي الخاص بقرار عام ١٩٩٥، الذي ينص على إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النوويّة وسائر أسلحة الدمار الشامل في الشرق الأوسط يمثل انتكاسة بالغة لجهود نزع السلاح النووي، ويعرقل التّقدم في جهود منع انتشار أسلحة الدمار الشامل على مستوى العالم وإحلال الأمن في المنطقة.

10- وتطلّع المجموعة العربيّة لأن تمثّل نتائج الدّورة الثّانية لمؤتمر إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النوويّة وكافّة أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في الشرق الأوسط دفعةً ملموسة للجهود الخاصّة بإطلاق مسار تفاوضي حول إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النوويّة وأسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في منطقة الشرق الأوسط بما يحقق مصالح وأمن الجميع دون تمييز بما يتسق مع مبادئ وأهداف الأمم المتّحدة والالتزامات المتفق عليها في هذا الشّأن.

وشكراً.

بيان المجموعة العربية
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي السابع: آليات نزع السلاح
اللجنة الأولى: الدورة ٧٦ للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة

—

السيد الرئيس،

1- أود بدايةً أن أعرب عن تضامن المجموعة العربية مع بيان حركة عدم الانحياز.

السيد الرئيس،

2- إن مساعي المجموعة العربية لتحقيق عالمية معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية هي جزء لا يتجزأ من التزامها المبدئي بنزع السلاح النووي وصولاً إلى عالم خالٍ من الأسلحة النووية باعتباره الأولوية القصوى لجهود نزع السلاح والأمن الدولي، وذلك على النحو الذي أقرته الدورة الاستثنائية الأولى للجمعية العامة المكرسة لنزع السلاح عام ١٩٧٨. وتعيد المجموعة العربية التذكير بأن مرجعية أنشطة وآليات نزع السلاح للأمم المتحدة تستند فقط إلى تلك الدورات الخاصة، ولا يمكن تعديلها إلا من خلال دورة استثنائية جديدة للجمعية العامة تخصص لهذا الغرض.

3- وترحب المجموعة بعقد دورة استثنائية رابعة للجمعية العامة مكرسة لنزع السلاح، وتتطلع إلى توصل هذه الدورة الاستثنائية لنتائج ملموسة تهدف إلى تدارك التطورات العديدة التي شهدتها الساحة الدولية على صعيد التهديدات المتزايدة للأمن الدولي، في وقت تشهد فيه المنظومة الدولية لنزع السلاح تطوراً هاماً وتاريخياً متمثلاً في دخول معاهدة حظر الأسلحة النووية حيز النفاذ والذي يمثل - إلى جانب الالتزام القانوني المترتب على أطرافه - مصدراً عريضاً جديداً للقانون الدولي المنظم لمجال نزع السلاح ويضع الأسلحة النووية في مكانتها المنطقية كأسلحة تتعارض حيازتها واستخدامها أو حتى التهديد باستخدامها مع أبسط قواعد القانون الدولي الإنساني إلى جانب ما تمثله من تهديد مباشر للأمن الدوليين.

السيد الرئيس،

4- تؤكد المجموعة العربية على أهمية تضافر الجهود الدولية لمعالجة الانتكاسة الخطيرة التي شهدتها منظومة معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية متمثلة في فشل مؤتمر مراجعة معاهدة

عدم الانتشار عام ٢٠١٥، والسعي لإنجاح مؤتمر المراجعة العاشر من خلال التوصل لوثيقة ختامية متوازنة وشاملة تتعامل بشكل واضح مع التحديات التي تواجه الركائز الثلاث للمعاهدة، وفي مقدمتها ركيزة نزع السلاح النووي، فضلاً عن إحراز تقدم ملموس إزاء قضية إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية وأسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في الشرق الأوسط والتي تمثل أحد الشروط الضرورية لنجاح المؤتمر في الوفاء بولايته.

5- كما تؤكد من جديد ضرورة تمكين مؤتمر نزع السلاح، باعتباره المحفل الوحيد المنشأ خصيصاً للتفاوض على معاهدات نزع السلاح من أداء دوره، وتؤكد كذلك أن الجمود الحالي في أعمال مؤتمر نزع السلاح لا يعود بالضرورة لقصور في آليات المؤتمر، وإنما يعود إلى غياب الإرادة السياسية لبعض الدول. وبالتالي تشدد المجموعة العربية على ضرورة الإسراع بتنفيذ دور مؤتمر نزع السلاح في تنفيذ ولايته التفاوضية، خاصة فيما يتعلق بنزع السلاح النووي.

6- وترى المجموعة العربية أن الموضوعات المطروحة على مشروع جدول أعمال مؤتمر نزع السلاح متسقة مع الأهداف والأولويات المتفق عليها دولياً في هذا المجال، ولا يجوز تقديم التعامل مع أحدها قبل الاتفاق على خطوات تنفيذية للتخلص من الأسلحة النووية، أو أن يتم التركيز على فرض التزامات جديدة في مجال منع الانتشار على حساب نزع السلاح النووي، بشكل يقود للمزيد من الاختلالات بين التزامات الدول النووية في مجال نزع السلاح النووي من جهة، والتزامات الدول غير النووية في مجال عدم الانتشار من جهة أخرى.

السيد الرئيس،

7- تؤكد المجموعة العربية على أهمية عقد اجتماعات هيئة نزع السلاح خلال العام المقبل، وتدعو المجموعة العربية كافة الأطراف المعنية لضرورة تجنب تكرار التطورات التي شهدتها هيئة نزع السلاح خلال عام ٢٠١٩، والتي أدت بكل أسف لعرقلة انعقاد الاجتماعات الرسمية للهيئة وعدم القدرة على اعتماد جدول الأعمال.

8- ولقد عبرت المجموعة العربية مراراً عن خيبة أملها لعدم تمكين هيئة نزع السلاح من التوصل إلى توافق بشأن أية توصيات منذ سنوات طويلة، فيما عدا التطور النسبي الذي شهدته الدورة الماضية، وهو أمر يرجع للمواقف غير البناءة لبعض الدول النووية التي تستمر في عرقلة التوصل إلى توافق بشأن إجراءات نزع السلاح النووي.

9- وقد بذلت المجموعة العربية جهوداً كبيرة من أجل التوصل إلى نتائج توافقية، وقامت بدور بناء، خاصة في إطار المساعي متعددة الأطراف لتحقيق هدف نزع السلاح النووي وعدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية. ومن هنا تؤكد المجموعة في هذا السياق على ضرورة أن تبدي الدول النووية الإرادة السياسية اللازمة والمرونة المطلوبة من أجل تمكين الهيئة من

التوصل لنتائج موضوعية بشأن نزع السلاح النووي، على أن يكون الحد الأدنى لهذه النتائج يتضمن تأكيداً للالتزامات الدولية القائمة في مجال نزع السلاح النووي وفقاً لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية وللالتزامات التي تضمنتها نتائج مؤتمرات مراجعة المعاهدة.

10- وختاماً، تود المجموعة العربية أن تسجل تقديرها للدور البحثي الهام الذي يضطلع به معهد الأمم المتحدة لدراسات نزع السلاح، وأن تشير إلى أهمية تناول دراسات المعهد بشكل متوازن للقضايا ذات الأولوية لجميع الدول الأعضاء وعدم ربط أولويات أبحاث المعهد بتفضيلات الدول المانحة وحدها.

وشكراً.

**WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)
THEMATIC DEBATE ON CLUSTER 6: REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY
THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

Mr. Chair,

1. I have the honour to submit this statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. ASEAN recognises the unprecedented challenges endured by our region and the world including by the COVID-19 pandemic that has impacted the well-being and prosperity of the people of ASEAN and the world.
3. In light of this, we underscore the importance of further strengthening ASEAN Centrality and unity in our engagement with ASEAN's external partners, including through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).
4. We reiterate our adherence to the fundamental principles and purposes enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in upholding a rules-based regional order anchored in international law. This includes collectively underscoring the importance of strengthening international and regional cooperation in nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, we will highlight three main items on regional disarmament that are of interest to ASEAN, as follows.
 - A. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
5. We reaffirm our strong support to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and urge all States Parties to renew their commitment to the full implementation of the NPT and look forward to the Review Conference next January 2022.
6. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force on 22 January 2021, provides that each State Party undertakes never under any circumstance to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The TPNW is a historic agreement which contributes towards global nuclear disarmament and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments.
7. In our region, we reiterate our commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty) and the ASEAN Charter.
8. Thus, we stress the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and reaffirm our commitment to continuously engage the Nuclear Weapon States and intensify efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty.
9. We recognise the importance of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones to the nuclear disarmament efforts and continue to support ongoing efforts towards the establishment of such zones, especially in the Middle East.
10. We also urge all concerned parties to resume peaceful dialogue and continue working towards the realisation of lasting peace and stability in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearised Korean Peninsula and reiterate our readiness to play a constructive role, including through utilising ASEAN-led platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum in promoting a conducive atmosphere to peaceful dialogue among the concerned parties.

B. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

11. In this endeavor, we advance our efforts among others through collaboration between ASEAN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) particularly after signing the Practical Arrangements (PA) on Cooperation in the Areas of Nuclear Science and Technology and Applications, Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards, in September 2019. We welcome its progress through the convening of relevant activities and initiatives, including through the implementation of Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution (NUTEC) project in South-East Asia Region to address global plastic pollution.

12. We underscore the importance of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) and welcomed the outcomes of the 7th and 8th Annual Meetings of the ASEANTOM in November 2020 and July 2021 respectively that discussed ways to enhance cooperation among the nuclear regulatory bodies and further strengthen nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in the region. In this regard, we welcome the finalisation of the ASEAN Protocol for Emergency Response Preparedness to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency by the ASEANTOM in July 2021. The Protocol, which was jointly developed by ASEANTOM and the IAEA, is aimed to strengthen the coordination of ASEAN Member States for preparing and responding to nuclear or radiological emergencies in ASEAN countries or elsewhere potentially having an impact on the region, in the areas of information sharing, assessment, support for decision making and public communications.

C. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

13. We note with satisfaction the progress of cooperation in the ARF and reiterate the importance of the ARF as a key platform for dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues of common interest and concern.

14. ASEAN welcomes the implementation of the ARF Hanoi Plan of Action II (2020-2025) and look forward to further discussions on developing a vision for the ARF after 2025. In this regard, we look forward to Cambodia's Chairmanship of the 29th ARF and ASEAN Regional Forum Security Policy Conference (ASPC) in 2022.

Mr. Chair,

15. In conclusion, we remain committed to the obligations under instruments on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that ASEAN Member States are signatories or Party to. ASEAN reaffirms its commitment to be future-ready for any security challenges and to enhance our cooperation with the international community to advance our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Thank you.

**WRITTEN STATEMENT
SUBMITTED BY THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)**

**FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE SEVENTY-SIXTH SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

CLUSTER STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

1. This written statement is submitted on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. During this uncertain Covid-19 pandemic, protracted conflicts and rising political tensions, ASEAN is gravely concerned with illicit proliferation of conventional weapons throughout the world, which contributes to violence and instability, perpetuates poverty, and undermines human welfare. The use of small arms in conflicts situations results in over 200,000 civilian deaths each year. It affects the livelihood and economy of the local people and creates tremendous pressure on the local government as well as the surrounding regions.
3. ASEAN believes that in order to maintain our peace, stability, and sustainable development, effective regulation and control of conventional weapons is necessary. ASEAN reiterates that the implementation of relevant international agreements on conventional weapons should be in conformity with fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, with States bearing the primary role. At the same time, ASEAN also acknowledges that States have its sovereign rights to acquire and manage their conventional inventory for self-defense as well as safeguarding national security.
4. ASEAN strongly believes that consistent international action is one of the key steps towards disarmament. ASEAN remains interested in the continued developments of various frameworks and international legally binding instruments, including the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. We also look forward to the convening of the Nineteen Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention to be held in the Hague, next month.
5. ASEAN welcomes the outcome document of the July 2021 Seventh Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and Its International Tracing Instrument. ASEAN trusts that this outcome would guide us in enhancing global efforts in regulating the flow of such weapons and combating the illicit trade of types of weapons at the national, regional, and international levels.
6. To this end, ASEAN has been diligently working to reinforce the disarmament machinery in the region and beyond. We continue to address arms smuggling through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Moreover, the annual meetings of ASEAN Police Chiefs enable stronger regional cooperation in transnational crime investigations. At the same time, the ASEAN Forensic Science Institute helps promote the exchange of information on forensic investigations related to illicit arms. Through these mechanisms, ASEAN has been able to work effectively to combat the smuggling of small arms and light weapons as well as other related-transnational crimes in the region.
7. We look forward to the 1st Senior Officials' Meeting of the Central Authorities on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (SOM-MLAT) to be convened by Brunei Darussalam in the last quarter of 2021 to discuss various issues in ensuring the effective implementation of the MLAT and strengthening the AMS capacity to combat transnational crimes.
8. There is a need to address the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly by non-state actors. ASEAN notes the outcomes of the Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties of the Second Amended Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and that the CCW is tackling potential threats arising from lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), including possible acquisition by armed non-state actors. To counter these threats, a robust and future-proof legally-binding instrument is needed.

9. The ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre, located in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, was established as a Regional Centre of excellence to address the humanitarian aspects of unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war. The Centre provides medical and rehabilitation assistance to victims and conducts research and community awareness about the danger and incidents posed by landmines. The Centre continues to work closely with the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining towards achieving our common objective, of saving lives. ASEAN welcomed the convening of ARMAC's hybrid workshop on "Achieving Sustainable and Inclusive Development in Landmine/ERW Affected Countries" in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in July 2021.
 10. To rescue our people, particularly women and children from the devastating effects of land mines, it is important that demining projects should be developed with a holistic approach to include victim-support and strong community development focus. ASEAN calls upon all States Parties, particularly developed countries, and the international community to provide necessary financial, technical, and humanitarian assistance for the reintegration and rehabilitation of the victims.
 11. In conclusion, ASEAN reaffirms its strong commitment to combating the illicit trade of conventional weapons and calls upon all states to join hands to stop their illegal trading activities to ensure that we all are safe, and our developmental efforts will continue without disruption.
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中国代表团在第76届联大一委

关于核裁军问题的专题发言

(2021年10月22日,纽约)

主席先生:

当前全球战略安全形势严峻复杂,国际核裁军体系面临空前挑战。美国渲染大国竞争,强化军事同盟体系,斥巨资升级三位一体核武库,发展并部署低当量核武器,寻求在远离本土的亚太和欧洲部署陆基中导,还不断发展和部署全球反导系统,计划在外空部署导弹拦截器,谋求攻防兼备的绝对军事优势。这些消极动向严重威胁地区安全,损害全球战略平衡与稳定,严重阻碍国际核裁军进程。

在当前形势下,国际社会应共同推动国际核裁军进程,维护全球战略稳定,共同构建普遍安全的人类命运共同体。

第一,要坚持核裁军国际共识。核裁军应遵循“维护全球战略稳定”和“各国安全不受减损”等基本原则,采取公正合理、逐步削减、向下平衡的核裁军步骤。美、俄作为拥有最大核武库的国家,应该按照国际共识,切实履行核裁军特殊、优先责任,继续以可核查、不可逆和有法律约束力的方式,进一步大幅、实质削减核武器,为最终实现全面彻底核裁军创造条件。美国应以负责任的态度进行核态势审议,停止制造大国对立和对抗,纠正谋求压倒性军事优势的错误做法,放弃发展或部署全球导弹防御系统,不寻求在亚太及欧洲部署中导,为防止核军备竞赛、维护战略稳定做出应有的贡献。

第二,要维护国际核裁军与核不扩散体系。国际社会应以《不扩散核武器条约》第十次审议大会为契机,平衡推进核裁军、防扩散与和平利用核能三大支柱,恪守往届审议大会达成的核裁军共识,推进地区核热点问题的政治外交解决,促进和平利用核能国际合作。支持《全面禁止核试验条约》核查机制建设,推动条约早日生效,并在条约生效前恪守暂停试承诺。推动裁谈会在达成全面平衡工作计划基础上,按照“香农报告”所载授权谈判一项“禁产条约”。维护联大一委、裁谈会等多边军控机制权威性和有效性,抵制可能损害其权威的“小集团”“小圈子”。

第三,要降低核武器在国家安全政策中的作用。核武器国家应重申“核战争打不赢也打不得”理念,放弃以首先使用核武器为基础的核威慑政策,缔结“互不首先使用核武器”的多边条约。无条件向所有无核武器国家提供消极和积极安全保证,并就此谈判缔结国际法律文书。同时,重申不将核武器瞄准任何国家,增进战略互信。有关核武器国家应废除核保护伞及核共享的政策和做法,将部署在国外的核武器全部撤回本国。

第四,要协调应对影响战略稳定的新因素。随着外空、网络、人工智能等新科技军事化运用日益发展,国际社会要深入研究其对全球战略稳定带来的复杂影响,推动加强规则制定,同时也要避免对和平利用及国际合作造成不必要的妨碍,保障广大发展中国家合理合法享有科技发展红利。

主席先生,

核裁军与核不扩散相辅相成。美国、英国、澳大利亚三国决定开展核潜艇合作,公然违反《不扩散核武器条约》精神。三国合作直接涉及向澳这一无核武器国家转让武器级高浓铀,国际原子能机构现行保障监督体系无法有效核查澳是否将高浓铀转用于核武器,三国此举造成直接核扩散风险。美英此举也再次暴露其在核出口问题上一贯奉行的“双重标准”,将刺激其他国家效仿,给地区核热点问题的政治外交解决带来新的复杂因素,对国际核不扩散体系造成持久伤害。国际社会应敦促三国改弦更张,停止这一不负责任的行为。

美国核潜艇10月初在南海海域发生碰撞事故,中方对此次事件表示严重关切。美方时隔5天才发表一份语焉不详的简短声明,声明没有讲清此次事故是否发生核泄漏,是否造成核安全问题。这种做法缺乏透明度,极易引发误解误判,中国及南海周边国家不得不质疑事件真相和美方意图。美方应认真对待各方关切,采取负责任态度,尽快对此次事故作出详尽说明。

主席先生,

中国坚持走和平发展道路,奉行自卫防御的核战略。中国积极倡导全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器,明确承诺在任何时候和任何情况下都不首先使用核武器、无条件不对无核武器国家和无核武器地区使用或威胁使用核武器。中国是核武器国家中唯一作出并始终恪守上述承诺的国家。中国从未在国外部署核武器,也从不参加任何形式的核军备竞赛,始终将核力量维持在国家安全需要的最低水平。上述举措本身就是对国际和平与安全的重要贡献。

中国积极推动五核国合作进程。中国积极推动五核国发表防止核战争的联合声明,重申“核战争打不赢也打不得”理念。中国牵头完成制订新版五核国核术语表,协调五核国与东盟就《东南亚无核武器区条约》议定书签署问题重启对话。中方正与其他四核国积极对话,推动核政策与核战略、减少战略风险、“禁产条约”、和平利用核能等议题的讨论,争取向《不扩散核武器条约》十审会提交可视成果。随着国际安全形势更加复杂,中方主张五核国就事关战略稳定的所有重大问题持续开展对话合作。

中国始终以实际行动支持国际核裁军进程。中国积极参与《不扩散核武器条约》审议进程,将向十审会提交更新版的国家履约报告。中国支持《全面禁止核试验条约》的宗旨和目标,恪守“暂停试”承诺,致力于推动条约早日生效。中国作为条约第二大会费国,积极支持国际监测系统建设,境内已建成10个台站和1个核素实验室,5座台站通过核证验收并启动实时数据传输,为履约筹备做出积极贡献。中国认为充分有效的核裁军核查措施是最终全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器的重要技术保障,将继续积极参与联合国核裁军核查专家组工作。

最后我愿重申,中国愿同国际社会一道,为实现全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器的崇高目标作出不懈努力。

谢谢主席先生。

(Translation)

**Written Statement by the Chinese Delegation
at the Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons
at the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UNGA
(New York, 22 October 2021)**

Mr. Chairman,

The global strategic security situation is undergoing profound and complex adjustment, and the international nuclear disarmament regime is facing unprecedented challenges. The US has been constantly hyping up major-power competition, strengthening military alliances, making significant investment in upgrading its nuclear triad, and developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons. It also seeks to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Asia-Pacific and Europe, develops and deploys global missile defense system, and plans to deploy anti-missile interceptors in outer space, in the pursuit of absolute advantages in both offensive and defensive military capabilities. All these negative moves have posed severe threats to regional security, undermined global strategic balance and stability, and seriously hindered global nuclear disarmament process.

Under the current circumstances, the international community should jointly promote the international nuclear disarmament process, maintain global strategic stability, and foster a community of universal security with a shared future for humankind.

First, we should continue to uphold the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament should be a fair and reasonable process of gradual and balanced reduction on the basis of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. The US and Russia, as the two largest nuclear-weapon states, should further substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally-binding manner in line with consensus reached by the international community, with the view to creating the conditions for realizing complete and thorough nuclear disarmament. The US should conduct the nuclear posture review in a responsible manner, stop provoking major-power confrontation, redress its wrong moves to seek overwhelming military advantages, abandon development or deployment of the global missile defense system, and refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific and Europe, so as to contribute its share to preventing nuclear arms races and maintaining strategic stability.

Second, we should uphold the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The international community should take the 10th Review Conference of the NPT as an opportunity to promote nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy as the three pillars of the NPT, honor the commitments and consensus of previous review conferences, facilitate political and diplomatic settlement of regional nuclear hot-spot issues, and promote international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We should support the development of the CTBT verification system, promote the entry into force of the Treaty as early as possible, and honor the moratorium on nuclear tests before the Treaty's entry into force. We should support the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon Report (CD/1299), on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced Program of Work. We should firmly uphold the authority and effectiveness of the CD, the First Committee of the UNGA and other multilateral arms control mechanisms, and refrain from resorting to any exclusive cliques that may undermine their authority.

Third, we should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines. Nuclear-weapon states should reaffirm that "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", abandon nuclear deterrence policies based on the first-use of nuclear weapons, conclude a multilateral treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons, provide unconditional negative and positive security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states, and negotiate an international legally-binding instrument in this regard. In addition, nuclear-weapon states should

reaffirm that they will not target nuclear weapons at any State, in order to enhance strategic mutual trust. Relevant nuclear-weapon states should put an end to the policies and practices of nuclear umbrella and nuclear sharing, and withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed in other countries.

Fourth, we should take a holistic approach to address new factors affecting strategic stability. The military applications of emerging technologies related to outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence and other areas have brought increasing implications on strategic stability. The international community should carry out in-depth studies on such implications and formulate relevant international rules. At the same time, unnecessary obstacles to peaceful uses and international cooperation should be avoided to ensure that developing countries have legitimate access to the dividends of technological development.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are interconnected. China wishes to remind all parties that the decision of the US, the UK and Australia to develop cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines flagrantly violates the spirit of NPT. It directly involves the transfer of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Australia, a non-nuclear-weapon State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under its current safeguards system, is unable to effectively verify whether Australia will divert HEU to the production of nuclear weapons. The act of the three countries have posed direct risks of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, what the US and the UK have done once again reveals their “double standards” approach all along on nuclear export, and will stimulate others to follow suit. It will complicate the political and diplomatic settlement of regional nuclear hot-spot issues by bringing in new factors, and inflict persistent damages on the international non-proliferation regime. The international community should urge the three countries to change course and put an end to such an irresponsible behavior.

China is seriously concerned about the collision incident of a US nuclear submarine taking place in early October in the South China Sea. It took the US side five days to come up with a vague statement, which made no reference to whether the accident has caused nuclear leakage or nuclear safety concern. Such lack of transparency on the US side could lead to misunderstanding and miscalculation. China and other countries surrounding the South China Sea cannot help but ask what truly happened and question the US intention. The US side should take concerns of all parties in a serious manner, adopt a responsible attitude, and give a detailed account of what happened as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman,

China is committed to the path of peaceful development and the nuclear strategy of self-defense. China has all along advocated complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and made a clear commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China is the only nuclear-weapon state that has made and honored such commitments. China has never deployed nuclear weapons abroad, never participated in any form of nuclear arms race, and has always kept its nuclear force at the minimum level required for national security. These measures per se are important contributions to global peace and security.

China has taken an active part in the P5 cooperation. China is actively promoting the P5 to issue a joint statement on the prevention of nuclear war, in which the formula that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” will be reaffirmed. The second phase of the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms led by China has yielded substantive results. China has actively coordinated the restart of dialogues between P5 and ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. China is also engaged in discussions with the other P4 on nuclear policies and doctrines, reduction of strategic risks, FMCT, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, etc. with the aim of submitting tangible results to the tenth NPT review

conference. As the international security situation is getting more and more complex, China holds the view that the P5 should continue dialogue and cooperation on all major issues concerning strategic stability.

China supports international nuclear disarmament with concrete actions. China takes an active part in the NPT review process and will submit an updated version of its national report. China supports the purposes and objectives of the CTBT, honors its commitment to the moratorium on nuclear tests, and is committed to promoting the early entry into force of the Treaty. As the second largest contributor to the CTBT Prepcom, China supports the development of the International Monitoring System, and has built ten CTBT monitoring stations and one radionuclide lab, among which five certified stations have started real-time data transmission, thus making a positive contribution to the preparation of treaty compliance. China believes full and effective verification measures are important technical guarantee for achieving the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and will continue to take an active part in the work of the new UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

In conclusion, I wish to stress once again that China is committed to working hand in hand with the rest of the international community to make unremitting efforts towards achieving the lofty goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

中国代表团在第76届联大一委

关于生化武器问题的专题发言

(2021年10月22日, 纽约)

主席先生:

当前形势下, 加强《禁止生物武器公约》和《禁止化学武器公约》对维护国际和平与安全、促进经济和社会发展的重要性更加突出。我们应践行真正的多边主义, 积极开展对话与合作, 共同捍卫两个公约的宗旨和目标, 维护其权威性和有效性。

主席先生,

生物安全没有国界, 人类命运紧密相连。我们呼吁国际社会加强团结合作, 共同推动明年召开的《禁止生物武器公约》第九次审议大会取得实质成果。结合去年以来形势发展和不久前举行的公约系列专题会议, 中方有几点主张:

一是重启核查议定书谈判。建立《公约》核查机制是确保遵约、建立互信的最有效手段。各方对此既有明确的政治共识, 也有坚实的谈判基础。我们呼吁各方就重启核查议定书谈判涉及的技术问题开展先期讨

论，主张审议大会就此作出决定。我们再次敦促美方认真考虑国际社会的立场和关切，改变独家反对的立场。

二是解决履约关切。美国是世界上生物军事化活动最多的国家，同时也是唯一反对核查的国家，这使我们不得不怀疑美方履约的诚意。我们再次呼吁美方对其生物军事化活动，包括境内的生物军事基地、境外的大量实验室作出澄清，并接受国际核查，以建立国际社会对美方履约的信心。在建立核查机制之前，应通过公约建立信任措施机制，宣布境外生物军事化活动的情况，以缓解国际社会的疑虑。

三是加强科技发展审议。倡导负责任的生物科研，对于降低生物安全风险、促进生物科学造福人类具有重要意义。我们呼吁所有利益攸关方自愿采纳《科学家生物安全行为准则天津指南》，并共同推动审议大会核可。在前不久举行的专题会议上，各方就《天津指南》展开热烈互动。我们对所以参与、支持相关多边进程的国家，以及为达成《天津指南》作出重要贡献的科学机构、专家学者表示赞赏。我们也支持各方继续开展讨论，以便审议大会就建立《禁止生物武器公约》科技审议机构作出决定。

四是促进国际合作。疫情背景下促进生物科技和平利用的重要性、紧迫性更加突出，发展中国家对于个别国家实施歧视性管制的关切也更加突出。中方始终和广大发展中国家站在一起。我们将提交“在国际安全领域促进和平利用国际合作”决议草案，推动平衡处理防扩散与和平利用的关系，保障发展中国家在生物等领域和平利用的权利，使《不扩散核武器条约》《禁止化学武器公约》《禁止生物武器公约》等国际条约得到更加全面、平衡的执行。希望各方积极支持。

此外，关于“使用生化武器事件联合国秘书长调查机制”，该机制的成立有独特历史背景，一些国家对机制的授权、启动门槛调查的客观性和公正性等一直存有关切。我们相信，联合国秘书长会秉持客观公正态度妥善处理相关问题，中方将继续支持并深入参与机制能力测试等活动。与此同时，我们也支持结合形势发展变化，对该机制的运作规则等开展进一步的研究和讨论。

主席先生，

日前中俄两国外长发表《关于加强〈禁止生物武器公约〉的联合声明》，该声明已作为联大文件散发。这是中俄首次就这一问题发表联合声明，表明了两国维护全球生物安全、捍卫多边主义的坚定决心和负责任态度。我们将继续与国际社会一道，致力于加强《禁止生物武器公约》机制。

主席先生，

销毁库存化武、遗弃化武是《禁止化学武器公约》的核心目标和宗旨。作为世界上唯一拥有库存化武的国家，美国应切实履行义务，尽快完成库存化武销毁。日本应切实承担化武遗弃国责任，加大投入稳步推进日遗化武销毁进程，中方愿就后续工作同日方以及禁化武组织保持沟通。

禁化武组织在推动实现“无化武世界”、促进化工领域国际合作方面发挥着不可或缺的重要作用。中方对禁化武组织的运作因政治对抗和分歧而受到影响表示关切。我们再次呼吁有关国家停止政治操弄，回归协商一致传统，共同改进禁化武组织工作氛围，维护禁化武公约的权威性和有效性。

中方一贯坚决反对任何国家、任何人在任何情况下使用化学武器，对指称使用化武事件，应严格按照《禁止化学武器公约》规定，秉持公正、客观、专业原则，通过对话与合作查明事件真相。

对话合作是解决叙利亚化武问题的唯一正确途径。今年4月第25次缔约国大会上，一些国家再次强推表决叙化武问题决定，通过的票数不足缔约国半数，说明一味施压难以获得支持，更无助于解决问题。我们希望禁化武组织技秘处按照公约授权，发挥积极作用。我们也鼓励叙政府同技秘处保持合作，推动有关未决事项取得积极进展。

中方希望“执行《禁止化学武器公约》”决议草案能够坚持平衡、全面原则，在广泛吸收各方意见基础上凝聚共识。希望中方的立场和关切在草案中得到妥善反映。

谢谢主席先生。

(Translation)

**Written Statement by the Chinese Delegation
at the Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
at the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UNGA
(New York, 22 October 2021)**

Mr. Chairman,

Under the current circumstances, strengthening Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention is becoming ever more important for maintaining international peace and security and promoting economic and social development. We should practice genuine multilateralism, actively engage in dialogue and cooperation and work together to safeguard the mandates and objectives of the two Conventions to enhance their authority and effectiveness.

Mr. Chairman,

Biosecurity knows no borders, and the future of mankind are closely linked. We call on the international community to enhance unity and cooperation, push together for substantive results in the upcoming BWC Ninth Review Conference next year. In light of recent developments and the Meetings of Experts of BWC held not long ago, China has the following propositions:

Firstly, resuming the negotiation of a verification protocol. Establishing a verification mechanism is the most effective approach to ensure compliance and build mutual trust. In this regard, states parties have had explicit political consensus and solid basis for negotiation. We call on all parties to carry out preliminary discussions on relevant technical issues and propose that the upcoming Ninth Review Conference should make decisions on the resumption of the negotiation of a verification protocol. We urge the United States to seriously consider the positions and concerns of the international community and abandon its entrenched position of being the sole country opposing the negotiation of a verification protocol.

Secondly, addressing compliance concerns. The United States conducts more bio-military activities than any other countries in the world and is the only one rejecting establishing a verification regime, which cause concerns regarding the US sincerity about compliance. We once again call on the US to clarify its bio-military activities, including its domestic biological military bases and overseas military bio-laboratories, and accept international verification to increase confidence in the compliance of the US. Before the establishment of a verification mechanism, the US should declare its overseas bio-military activities to the Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) under the BWC to allay the doubts of the international community.

Thirdly, strengthening bio-technology review. China always advocates responsible bio-scientific research to reduce biosecurity risks and make sure that bio-science benefit mankind. We call on all the stake-holders to adopt voluntarily the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists and push jointly the Ninth Review Conference to endorse the guidelines. At the Meeting of Experts of BWC held not long ago, states parties had intensive interactions over the guidelines. We express our appreciation to all countries that have participated in and supported this multilateral process, as well as the scientific institutions, experts and scholars that have made important contributions to the formulation of the guidelines. Meanwhile, we also support states parties to continuously conduct discussions so that the Review Conference can make decisions on the establishment of a scientific advisory body under BWC.

Fourthly, promoting international cooperation. Against the backdrop of COVID-19, the importance and urgency of promoting the peaceful use of bio-technology are more pronounced, so are the developing countries' concerns about discriminatory export controls imposed by a certain country. China always stands with the majority of developing countries and will submit to the 76th session of the UNGA First Committee a draft resolution entitled "Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security", to strike a balance between non-proliferation and peaceful uses and uphold the legitimate rights of developing countries to peaceful uses in biotechnology and in other fields, so as to ensure that relevant international treaties as NPT, CWC and BWC are implemented in a more comprehensive and balanced way. We hope that all parties will actively support this resolution.

In addition, regarding the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM), which was established with a unique historical background, some countries have expressed concerns over the objectivity and impartiality of the mandate and the threshold for initiating an investigation under the mechanism. We believe that the Secretary-General will properly address related issues in an objective and fair way and we will continuously support and deeply engage in exercises under the mechanism. Meanwhile, we also support further study and discussions on the guidelines of the mechanism in light of the changing situation.

Mr. Chairman,

Recently, Foreign Ministers of China and Russian Federation released a Joint Statement on Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and it has been distributed as a UNGA document. This is the first time China and Russian release a joint statement on BWC, demonstrating two countries' strong determination and responsible attitude on preserving global biosecurity and defending multilateralism. We will continue to work with the international community to strengthen the BWC.

Mr. Chairman,

The destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and the abandoned chemical weapons is the core objective and the mandate of the CWC. As the only country with stockpiles of chemical weapons, the United States should earnestly fulfill its obligations under the CWC and expedite the destruction of its stockpiles. Japan should take up its responsibility for its abandoned chemical weapons in China, invest more resources and steadily move forward

the destruction of ACWs in China. China is ready to maintain communication with Japan and the OPCW on the follow-up work.

The OPCW has played an indispensable role in realizing the goal of a world free of chemical weapons and promoting international cooperation on chemical industry. China has concerns over the negative influences on the operation of the OPCW due to political confrontation and political divergence within the organization. We reiterate our appeals to relevant countries to stop political manipulation and revert to the OPCW's tradition of decision-making by consensus, and to work together in improving the atmosphere of the OPCW and maintaining the authority and effectiveness of the CWC.

China has always firmly opposed the use of chemical weapons by any country or any individual under any circumstances. Cases of alleged use of chemical weapons should be investigated in an impartial, objective and professional manner, in strict accordance with CWC, and the conclusion should be made through dialogue and cooperation.

Dialogue and cooperation is the only viable way for resolving the Syrian chemical weapons issue. At the CWC Conference of State Parties last April, some countries have again forced a vote on the draft decision on the Syrian chemical weapons issue, and the approval votes account for less than half of the total numbers of the state parties. This shows that pressure can not win wide support and is not conducive to the solution of the problem. We hope that the Technical Secretariat (TS) of OPCW could play a positive role in accordance with its mandate under the CWC. We also encourage the Syrian government to cooperate with the TS and push for positive progress on resolving the pending issues.

China hopes that the draft resolution on "the implementation of the CWC" could be balanced and comprehensive, drawing consensus by absorbing the opinions of all parties. We hope that the position and concerns of Chinese side will be reflected in the draft resolution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

中国代表团在第76届联大一委

关于外空问题的专题发言

(2021年10月22日, 纽约)

主席先生:

当前外空安全形势日趋复杂严峻, 外空武器化和军备竞赛风险日益上升, 成为当前外空安全面临的最大和最根本威胁。特别是, 美国近年来大力推行"主导外空"战略, 公然将外空界定为新的"作战疆域", 成立外空军和外空司令部, 加速开展外空武器试验和军事演习, 不断推进外空武器化。受此影响, 英国、法国、德国等多个北约成员宣布成立外空军和外空司令部, 加快外空军事能力建设, 并深化外空军事合作。这些举动严重威胁外空安全, 并给全球战略稳定带来严重消极影响。在此背景下, "星球大战"日益成为现实, 防止外空军备竞赛刻不容缓。

主席先生，

和平利用外空、防止军备竞赛是国际社会普遍共识。40年来，联大每年以压倒性多数通过决议重申这一原则，并要求裁谈会就此谈判达成国际法律文书。在中国与俄罗斯共同推动下，联合国成立“防止外空军备竞赛”政府专家组，就相关国际法律文书要素开展了深入、实质性讨论。中、俄提出的“防止在外空放置武器、对外空物体使用或威胁使用武力条约”草案正在得到越来越多国家支持。令人遗憾的是，美国出于一己私利，不愿接受任何国际约束，长期消极抵制外空军控进程，导致国际社会谈判防止外空军备竞赛法律文书的努力停滞不前。

一些国家正在积极推动讨论制定“负责任外空行为准则”。中方认为，各国维护外空安全、和平利用外空的迫切需求与超级大国在谋求外空军事战略优势之间的矛盾，才是国际社会在外空领域所面临的最重要和最紧迫的问题。“准则”把外空安全与和平利用两个维度纠缠在一起，混淆了外空军备竞赛带来的安全风险以及在和平利用外空中可能产生的安保问题，试图通过宽泛、模糊且具有强烈主观色彩的方式规范外空行为，可能给个别国家“甩锅卸责”提供借口，导致外空领域多边军控的“失焦”。

主席先生，

联合国全体成员国有必要全面客观评估外空安全形势，切实重视防止外空武器化和军备竞赛问题，严防外空沦为新的战场。为此，中方愿提出以下建议：

一是拥有最强空间能力的国家，要真正负起特殊责任，摒弃在外空追求绝对优势、绝对自由、绝对安全的单边主义思维，纠正将个别国家或集团的安全凌驾于他国安全之上的不负责做法。

二是裁谈会应立即启动外空军控条约谈判，并加强与裁审会、联合国政府专家组、开放式工作组等机构的联系。中俄共同提出的外空军控条约草案（PPWT）为有关讨论提供了良好基础，欢迎各方提出建设性意见。在谈判启动之前，可考虑成立技术专家组，深入讨论未来外空军控法律文书定义、范围、核查等技术性问题，为下步启动谈判奠定基础。

三是各国应坚定支持联合国在外空国际治理中发挥主导作用，聚焦防止外空军备竞赛的主题，确保外空国际规则制定进程的广泛参与性、公正性和包容性。

四是各国应加强沟通对话，不断弥合分歧，扩大共识，寻求适当、可行的透明和建立信任措施，为谈判制定外空军控国际法律文书提供补充。

中方愿继续与各方共同努力，积极在外空领域践行构建人类命运共同体理念，为维护外空持久和平与共同安全做出贡献。

谢谢主席先生。

(Translation)
**Written Statement of the Chinese Delegation
at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space
at the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UNGA
(New York, 22 October 2021)**

Mr. Chairman,

The outer space security situation becomes increasingly complicated and severe. The risks of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space have become the greatest and most fundamental threat to outer space security. In particular, in recent years, the US pursues a space dominance strategy, publicly declares outer space as a new war-fighting domain, establishes an independent Space Force and Space Command, and carries outer space weapons tests and space military exercises, which accelerate the weaponization of outer space. Driven by these moves, other space-faring powers, including the UK, France, and Germany, have announced to establish their Space Forces and Space Commands, built up military capacities and deepened military cooperation in outer space. Such actions seriously threaten the security of outer space and have brought negative impact on global strategic stability. Against this backdrop, the Star War is becoming a reality, and it is of great urgency to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Mr. Chairman,

The peaceful use of outer space and prevention of an arm race in outer space are the consensus of the international community. In the past four decades, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions with an overwhelming majority every year which reiterated the above principles and requested the negotiation and conclusion of an international legally-binding instrument on PAROS at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). As proposed by China and Russia, the UN established the Group of Government Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space which conducted in-depth and substantive discussions on the elements of relevant international legally-binding instrument. The draft Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) proposed by China and Russia is gathering wide support from more and more countries. Unfortunately, the US, out of its selfish interests, is still rejecting any international constraint and standing in the way of the international arms control process on outer space, which leads to the stalemate of negotiating a legally-binding instrument on PAROS.

Some counties are actively promoting the concept of norms of responsible behaviors in outer space. China believes that the most important and prominent issue in outer space is the contradiction between the aspirations of all nations to ensure space security, the peaceful use of outer space and the hegemonic doctrine of one superpower to seek military and strategic advantage in outer space. The norms intertwine space security and peaceful use of outer space, mix up the security issues caused by the potential arms race in outer space and safety issues caused by the peaceful use of outer space, and try to regulate space behaviors in a general, ambiguous and subjective manner. These may be used as an excuse for certain country to shrink its own responsibility, blame others and divert the focus of the multilateral outer space arms control process.

Mr. Chairman,

All UN members shall take a comprehensive and objective overview on outer space security situation, attach high importance to preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and ensure that the outer space will never be a new battlefield. To this end, China would like to make the following proposals:

Firstly, those with the most advanced space capabilities should bear a special responsibility, abandon the mindset of unilateralism which includes pursuing absolute superiority, absolute freedom and unilateral security in outer

space, and correct the irresponsible approaches of placing the security of individual countries or groups over others.

Secondly, the CD should immediately start the formal negotiation, and synchronize with the UN Disarmament Commission, relevant UN Group of Government Experts and Open-Ended Working Group. The draft PPWT proposed by China and Russia provides a good basis for future instrument, and we welcome constructive views and suggestions from all parties. Prior to the start of formal negotiation, a technical expert group could be established to discuss technical issues such as definition, scope and verification, with a view to laying a good basis for formal negotiations.

Thirdly, all UN member states should support the UN in playing its leading role in outer space governance, focus on the topic of PAROS, and ensure extensive participation, fairness and inclusiveness in related international rule-making process.

Lastly, all UN member states should strengthen communication and dialogue, bridge differences, broaden common ground, and seek appropriate and feasible transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) which could serve as a useful complement to the negotiation of a legally-binding arms control instrument on outer space.

China stands ready to make joint efforts with other parties in outer space with a view to building a community with a shared future for humankind, and make contributions to the peace, security and sustainability of outer space.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

中国代表团在第76届联大一委

关于常规武器问题的专题发言

(2021年10月22日, 纽约)

主席先生:

当前, 常规武器非法转让和转用风险有增无减。特别是, 美国为了一己私利, 放宽本国武器贸易出口管制政策, 撤销签署《武器贸易条约》。同时, 持续通过向非国家行为体售武等手段, 露骨干涉别国内政, 严重冲击国际社会规范常规武器贸易的多边努力, 破坏国际和地区和平与稳定。

联合国秘书长古特雷斯在裁军议程中将常规武器军控谓之为“拯救生命的裁军”, 反映了在多边主义框架下进一步加强常规武器军控的重要意义, 也体现了国际社会对常规武器非法转让和滥用的反思和警惕。

主席先生,

中国一贯高度重视常规武器问题, 全面参与相关国际军控进程。作为一项重要具体行动, 中国于去年7月正式加入《武器贸易条约》并于日前正式提交了初始国家报告。这是中国积极参与全球武器贸易治理、维护国际和地区和平的重要举措, 进一步体现了中方支持多边主义、推动构建人类命运共同体的决心和诚意。

中国忠实履行联合国轻小武器《行动纲领》和《识别与追查国际文书》各项义务，支持面向发展中国家开展国际合作与援助。中国国家主席习近平2018年在中非合作论坛北京峰会上明确支持落实“消弭非洲枪声”倡议。为落实上述承诺，中方于2018年至2019年通过中国—联合国和平与发展基金提供了约140万美元。

作为《特定常规武器公约》及其五个附加议定书的完全成员国，中方一贯支持公约各项工作，建设性参与地雷、简易爆炸装置、战争遗留爆炸物及“致命性自主武器系统”的相关讨论，致力于国际人道主义扫雷援助与合作。迄今为止，中国政府已通过捐款、援助器材、举办培训项目、实地指导等方式，向40余国提供了总额超过1亿人民币的人道主义扫雷援助，培训1000余名专业扫雷技术人员。今年，中国向东盟区域扫雷行动中心捐赠了20万美元，用于合办相关地区会议。中国还将继续向柬埔寨和老挝提供一批人道主义物资，帮助东盟国家加强扫雷能力建设。

主席先生，

常规武器问题涉及面广，成因复杂，处理起来并非易事。为全面彻底解决有关问题引发的地区动荡和人道主义关切，中方主张：

一是坚持多边主义。大国应重信守诺，在武器出口上采取负责任的态度，停止干涉他国内政，停止武器贸易作为政治工具。各国应积极支持联合国在常规武器军控领域的主渠道作用，推动和鼓励更多国家参与常规军控进程，不断提升相关条约的普遍性和有效性。

二是坚持标本兼治。各国应通过政治、外交手段解决争端，建立信任并慎用武力，为根本解决常规武器问题创造条件。同时，应切实履行国际义务，不断加强能力建设和国际合作。

三是加强资源整合。应强化联合国框架内常规武器军控机制间的互动协同。加强《武器贸易条约》与联合国“常规武器登记册”、轻小武器《行动纲领》等机制交流，做到相互补充，相互促进，争取形成合力。

四是深化国际合作。各国应加强政策、执法等领域的信息交流和经验分享，构建全球、区域和次区域的协同机制。发达国家应根据发展中国家的现实困难和需要，在机制建设、资金捐助、技术转让、人员培训等领域加大援助力度。

主席先生，

解决常规武器引发的各方面问题绝非一日之功，需要国际社会合作应对。中方愿同各方保持交流合作，携手推动常规武器军控领域各项工作取得新进展，为解决常规武器滥用引发的人道主义问题、维护国际和地区的和平与稳定进一步做出积极贡献。

谢谢主席先生。

(Translation)
Written Statement of the Chinese Delegation
at the Thematic Discussion on Conventional Arms
at the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UNGA
(New York, 22 October 2021)

Mr. Chairman,

Nowadays the risks of illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms remain unabated. In particular, the U.S., out of its own interest, constantly ease its arms export control policy and even revoke its signature to the Arms Trade Treaty. Meanwhile, the U.S. flagrantly interferes in the internal affairs of other countries by providing arms to non-state actors, which undercut multilateral efforts in regulating conventional arms trade and undermines international and regional peace and stability.

As Secretary-General Mr. António Guterres stated in his Disarmament Agenda, conventional arms control is part of “disarmament that saves lives”. This is a reflection of the importance of further strengthening conventional arms control under the multilateral framework, as well as the international community’s introspection on and vigilance of the illicit trade and misuse of conventional arms.

Mr. Chairman,

China attaches great importance to the issue of conventional arms, and has actively participated in the process of relevant arms control process. As an important action, China acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) last July and submitted its initial report recently. This is a significant step taken by China in participating in the global governance on arms trade and safeguarding international and regional peace, which testifies to China’s determination and sincerity in upholding multilateralism and forging a community with a shared future for mankind.

China faithfully implements the obligations under the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), and supports international cooperation and assistance to developing countries. At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China’s support to the implementation of the initiative of “Silencing the Guns”. To fulfil this commitment, China has provided \$1.4 million through the China-United Nations Peace and Development Fund in 2018 and 2019.

As a High Contracting Party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its five protocols, China has consistently supported the work of the CCW, constructively participated in relevant discussions on Landmine, Improvised Explosive Device (IED), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), and has been committed to international humanitarian de-mining assistance and cooperation. So far, the Chinese Government has provided humanitarian assistance worth over 100 million RMB yuan to more than 40 countries through donation, equipment assistance, training programs and field instructions, and has trained over 1,000 professional de-mining staffs. In 2021, the Chinese Government donated \$200,000 to the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) for co-hosting related regional meetings. Besides, China will continue to provide de-mining equipment and humanitarian materials to Cambodia and the Laos, with a view to enhancing their de-mining capacity.

Mr. Chairman,

The problems caused by conventional weapons are wide-ranging, complex and thus difficult. In order to resolve the regional turbulence and humanitarian concerns caused by conventional weapons in a holistic manner, China would like to make the followings proposals:

Firstly, upholding multilateralism. Major States should honor their commitments, take a responsible attitude towards arms export, and refrain from interfering in other countries' internal affairs by using arms trade. We should actively support the UN's main channel in the field of conventional arms control, promote and encourage more countries to join in the process, so as to strengthen the universality and effectiveness of relevant treaties.

Secondly, addressing both symptoms and root causes. All countries should resolve disputes through political and diplomatic means, so as to create conditions to fundamentally address the problem of illicit trade of conventional arms. Meanwhile, we should earnestly fulfill our international obligations and continue strengthening capacity building and international cooperation.

Thirdly, strengthening coordination among different mechanisms. We should strengthen coordination, cooperation and information sharing among relevant UN mechanisms on conventional arms control including the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA) and the UN Programme of Action on Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), so as to forge a mutual complementary and reinforcing architecture.

Fourthly, deepening international cooperation. To build a coordinated global, regional and sub-regional mechanism, we need to improve information and experience sharing in the fields of policy making, law enforcement, etc. The developed countries should strengthen assistance on capacity building, financial donation, technology transfer and personnel training according to the realistic difficulties and upon the request from developing countries,

Mr. Chairman,

The various issues caused by conventional weapons can not be addressed overnight and the international community needs to tackle it in a collaborated manner. China stands ready to maintain exchange and cooperation with all countries to promote new progress in conventional arms control and further contribute to addressing humanitarian concerns caused by misuse of conventional weapons and safeguarding international and regional peace and stability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

中国代表团在第76届联大一委

关于信息安全问题的专题发言

(2021年10月22日, 纽约)

主席先生:

当前, 新冠疫情推升数字化、网络化发展大势, 数字经济已成各国复苏新引擎, 数据成为促进创新发展的新动力, 人类社会加速迈入数字文明新时代。与此同时, 网络安全风险挑战有增无减。网络攻击、网络犯罪和网络恐怖主义突出, 关键信息基础设施存在较大风险隐患。一些国家将网络空间作为新的战场, 推行威慑进攻理念, 将军事同盟引入网络空间, 危害国际和平与安全。个别国家以安全为借口打压他国领先企业, 大搞“集团政治”, 引入意识形态分歧, 制造分裂并人为割裂全球供应链, 严重干扰和阻碍全球数字合作与发展。

面对上述挑战，各国应增进互信，携手合作，共同推进网络空间全球治理和国际规则制定，维护网络空间的和平、安全与繁荣。

第一，要坚定维护和平。数字技术与现实世界深度融合，网络战打不赢也打不得。各方应切实遵守《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则，特别是主权平等、不干涉内政、不使用或威胁使用武力、和平解决争端等原则，始终维护网络空间和平属性，坚决反对网络空间军备竞赛，致力于通过对话与合作解决网络安全威胁。

第二，要坚守公平正义。各国无论国家大小、发展先后或持何政治立场，都应平等享有数字机遇。刻意搞双重标准，甚至不惜造谣抹黑，引入意识形态分歧，人为割裂全球产业链、供应链和价值链，不仅违背经济发展的客观规律，不符合全球化的时代潮流，最终也将阻碍自身发展。

第三，要平衡安全与发展。网络安全与经济发展互为基石、相互促进。要把握发展这把解决安全问题的总钥匙，致力于弥合数字鸿沟，切实解决发展不平衡问题。同时，各国应致力于为信息通信技术的应用营造公平、公正、非歧视的环境，防止泛化滥用安全问题，甚至以此为由遏制他国正当的经济和科技发展。

第四，要构建国际规则。制定各方普遍接受的网络空间国际规则，是维护网络空间长治久安的关键。联合国理应发挥主导作用。今年联合国信息安全开放式工作组和政府专家组成功达成报告，凸显国际社会对这一问题的共同期待。我们要携手推动新一届开放式工作组持续取得进展，打造符合大多数国家意愿和利益的数字治理新秩序。

主席先生，

中方积极倡导网络空间对话与合作。我们建设性参与联合国框架下网络安全进程，积极推动上海合作组织、金砖国家、东盟地区论坛网络安全合作，并与各国广泛开展网络事务对话交流。我们提出《全球数据安全倡议》并同东盟发表《中阿数据安全合作倡议》，为维护全球数据和供应链安全、推动数字发展与合作提出了建设性解决方案。中方愿与各方一道，共同探讨网络安全新威胁新挑战的应对之策，为维护全球网络空间的繁荣与稳定，构建网络空间命运共同体做出不懈努力。

谢谢主席先生。

(Translation)

**Written Statement by the Chinese Delegation
at the Thematic Discussion on Information Security
at the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UNGA
(New York, 22 October 2021)**

Mr. Chairman,

As the epidemic situation is driving the trend of digitalization and networking, digital economy becomes the new engine of economic recovery, and data serves as the new impetus for innovation and development, which has accelerated the arrival of a new era of digital civilization. At the same time, we are also faced with emerging risks and challenges, including the rampancy of cyber attacks, cyber crimes and cyber terrorism, the grave risks imposed upon critical information infrastructures. Some states attempt to turn the cyberspace into a new battlefield where they can pursue a strategy of deterrence by forging military alliance, which will jeopardize international peace and security. Certain State abuses national security concept to suppress foreign leading companies, pursues bloc politics and introduces ideological differences. Such moves will deliberately fragment global supply chain by creating divisions and undermine global development and cooperation.

To effectively address these challenges, all States should build up mutual trust, deepen cooperation, jointly advance global governance and international rules-making in cyberspace, thus building a peace, secure and prosperous cyberspace.

First, States should stay committed to maintaining peace. Digital technologies are deeply integrated into real life. Cyber war can not be won and must never be fought. All States should observe the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, particularly principles of sovereignty, non-interference of internal affairs, refraining from the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of international disputes. States should faithfully maintain the peaceful nature of cyberspace and strongly oppose arms race in cyberspace, and address threats through dialogues and cooperation.

Second, States should ensure fairness and justice. All states, in disregard of size, development level and political position, should equally enjoy digital opportunities. Double standards, slandering others, hyping up ideological differences, deliberately interrupting global industrial, supply and value chains run counter to the laws of economic development and the trend of globalization, and will eventually hamper their own development.

Third, States should balance security and development. ICTs security and economic development not only build upon, but also support each other. We should hold on to the master key of development in addressing security challenges, further our dedication to bridging digital gap, and take tangible moves to address disparate development. At the same time, we should create a fair, just and non-discriminatory environment for the development of ICTs, and prevent the generalization and abuse of “national security concerns” especially as a pretext to suppress other states’ rightful economic and technical development.

Fourth, State should develop international norms in cyberspace. Formulating universally accepted rules and norms are the key to maintaining peace and stability in cyberspace. The United Nations should play a leading role in this regard. The successful outcomes of both OEWG and UNGGE this year highlight the common aspirations of the international community to further discussion and build consensus on relevant issues. We will work together with all parties to deliver more outcomes from the 2021-2025 OEWG, and to forge new order of digital governance that reflects the will and the interests of most States.

Mr. Chairman,

China actively advocates dialogues and cooperation in cyberspace. China has always been playing a constructive role in multilateral process under the auspices of the UN, deepening cooperation on cyber security within the

framework of SCO, BRICS and ARF, and stepping up bilateral dialogues on cyber affairs. We proposed the Global Initiative on Data Security and released together with the League of Arab States the China-LAS Cooperation Initiative on Data Security, offering constructive solutions to maintaining global data and supply chain safety and stepping up digital development and cooperation. To build a community with a shared future in cyberspace, China is ready to make unremitting efforts with all parties to further explore ways to address new threats and challenges and maintain prosperity and stability in cyberspace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

中国代表团在第76届联大一委

关于裁军机制问题的专题发言

(2021年10月22日, 纽约)

主席先生:

自第一届裁军特别联大以来, 联大一委、裁谈会、裁审会等多边裁军机制在维护国际安全、推动军控与裁军进程方面, 发挥着不可替代的作用。当前, 国际安全形势发生复杂深刻变化, 新挑战、新问题不断涌现, 新冠病毒和“政治病毒”冲击多边裁军进程。个别国家极力谋求绝对安全优势和霸权地位, 对多边裁军机制采取实用主义态度。一些国家刻意绕开裁谈会等多边机制, 另起炉灶推动有关条约谈判。在此形势下, 传统多边裁军机制权威性面临严峻挑战, 有效性受到削弱。

中方认为, 以联合国为核心的这些多边裁军机制, 其议题虽不相同, 授权也有差别, 但都是联合国成员国坚持多边主义的体现, 是平等讨论国际安全问题、推动国际军控进程、开展全球安全治理的重要平台。在当前复杂的国际安全形势下, 这些机制的作用必须得到加强。中方主张:

首先, 应捍卫多边主义, 切实维护裁军机制的权威性。《禁止化学武器公约》《全面禁止核试验条约》等重要军控条约的达成, 充分证明多边裁军机制的有效性和可行性。当前, 一些机制工作陷入僵局, 其根本原因是各方围绕军控与裁军优先议题存在分歧, 不能归咎于机制本身及其议事规则。绕过联合国、通过排他性小集团推动有关进程更是不负责任的行为。各方应坚决摒弃利己主义、例外主义, 弘扬和践行真正的多边主义, 在平等、合作、共赢的基础上开展对话协商, 为多边裁军机制注入活力, 推动国际军控与裁军进程取得新进展。

第二, 应增进团结, 坚决反对多边裁军机制政治化。裁谈会等多边裁军机制是促进共同安全的平台, 不是政治对抗的场所。一段时间以来, 一些国家在裁军平台肆意散布“政治病毒”, 频频干涉他国内政、指责抹黑其他国家。这不仅严重干扰了机制本身的工作, 还严重恶化各国间互信与合作氛围, 造成机制成员间的分裂, 我们对此应予坚决反对。各方应进一步加强协调, 在相互尊重的基础上, 通过平等协商弥合分歧, 凝

聚共识，以合作谋和平、以合作促安全，打造风清气正的多边裁军环境，共同应对当前突出的风险与挑战。

第三，应开拓创新，推动多边裁军机制与时俱进。当前，传统与非传统安全问题相互交织，新兴科技及其军事应用深刻改变全球力量对比和战略稳定格局，新冠疫情凸显生物安全的重要性，军控的内涵与外延正不断拓展。在此形势下，多边裁军机制既要积极就传统议题开展工作，同时也要与时俱进，在充分讨论和协调基础上，积极就新安全议题开展工作，妥善应对各类新威胁、新挑战。

中方愿与各方一道，继续坚定致力于多边主义，积极支持并参与多边裁军机制工作，为维护多边裁军机制、不断推进国际军控和裁军进程而不懈努力。

谢谢主席先生。

(Translation)
**Written Statement of the Chinese Delegation
 at the Thematic Discussion on Disarmament Machinery
 at the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UNGA
 (New York, 22 October 2021)**

Mr. Chairman,

Since the SSOD-I, disarmament machinery including the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament, and the Disarmament Commission, have played an indispensable role in facilitating arms control and disarmament process and maintaining international security. At the moment, the international security landscape is undergoing complex and profound changes, new challenges and problems are emerging, and multilateral disarmament process is plagued by both corona virus and “political virus”. A certain country adopts an utilitarian attitude towards multilateral disarmament machinery, in order to serve its goal of gaining hegemony status and absolute security advantage. Some countries attempt to invent new venues for treaty negotiation, deliberately circumventing the Conference on Disarmament and other relevant multilateral mechanisms. Such trends are undermining the authority and effectiveness of traditional multilateral disarmament mechanisms.

China believes that these multilateral disarmament mechanisms under the UN framework, although having different agendas and mandates, are all embodiment of the UN Member States’ commitment to multilateralism. They are important platforms for discussing international security issues, promoting international arms control process, and safeguarding global security governance on an equal footing. In light of the complex international security landscape, it is imperative that we revitalize and strengthen these mechanisms. To this end, China would like to make the following proposals:

Firstly, we should firmly uphold multilateralism and the authority of disarmament machinery. The successful adoption of important arms control instruments, including the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, fully testifies to the effectiveness and viability of the multilateral disarmament mechanisms. The mechanisms per se and their rules of procedure should not be blamed for the current stalemate, which is caused by divergences over priorities of arms control and disarmament. It is irresponsible to sideline the UN and make rules through exclusive cliques. Instead, all parties should firmly abandon egoism and exceptionalism, uphold and practice true multilateralism, continue to commit themselves to bridging differences and building consensus through consultation on the basis of equality and mutual respect, thus injecting impetus into the multilateral disarmament mechanisms and achieve new progress in the meanwhile.

Secondly, we should earnestly promote solidarity and oppose politicization of disarmament machinery. The Conference on Disarmament and other relevant multilateral mechanisms serve to provide a venue for promoting common security for all, rather than a battlefield for political wrestling. For quite some time, certain countries have been recklessly spreading “political virus” in disarmament platforms by repeatedly interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and carrying out smear campaigns against other countries. Such practices have disrupted the normal operation of these mechanisms, intoxicated the environment for mutual trust and cooperation, and aggravated divisions among member states. We should guard against and resolutely oppose such acts. In order to create a conducive environment for multilateral disarmament and jointly address prominent risks and challenges, it is important that all parties respect and coordinate with each other, build consensus and bridge differences, and promote peace and security through cooperation.

Thirdly, we should make innovative efforts to keep disarmament machinery abreast of the times. As traditional and non-traditional security issues become ever more intertwined, the subject and scope of arms control and disarmament are also being expanded. In particular, the emerging technologies and their military applications are profoundly affecting the global military balance and strategic stability, while the Covid-19 pandemic is further underlining the importance of biological security. Multilateral disarmament mechanisms should adapt themselves to this new reality. In addition to working on traditional agenda items, we should also actively deal with new security issues on the basis of thorough discussion and coordination, so as to properly address new challenges and threats.

Mr. Chairman,

China remains committed to multilateralism. We stand ready to work with all parties to support and participate in the work of disarmament machinery, and make joint efforts in pushing forward international arms control and disarmament process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Statement by Mr. Kim In Chol
First Secretary
at the Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons of the First Committee
at the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Mr. Chairman,

A peaceful and safe world aspired by humankind is the denuclearized world that presupposes total elimination of nuclear weapons.

When the nuclear weapons were first used 76 years ago, the world clearly witnessed the catastrophic damage and still remembers it.

Preventing the recurrence of such nuclear calamity is the historical mission and duty our generation is entrusted with for the prosperity and happiness of the coming generations.

However, it is the today's reality that the threat of use of nuclear weapons is continued with nuclear arms race in full swing against the aspirations and efforts of humankind for building a world free from nuclear weapons.

With more than 700 billion US\$ for military expenditure every year, the United States is hell-bent on developing state-of-the-art hardware including hypersonic missiles, long-range precision guided weapons, new-generation ICBMs, nuclear strategic bombers and it is violating non-proliferation obligations by transferring nuclear technologies to its allies.

The recent U.S. decision to transfer the technology for building nuclear-powered submarine to Australia is an extremely dangerous act destroying strategic balance of the Asia-Pacific region and triggering arms race.

Following the announcement of the program for increasing the number of nuclear weapons early this year, the UK also conducted military actions without hesitation endangering the peace and stability of the region by dispatching a nuclear aircraft carrier to the Asia-Pacific Ocean far from its land in the second half of the year.

On the other hand, bilateral and multilateral disarmament treaties that helped to promote nuclear disarmament and confidence-building for several decades were abrogated or reduced to only names one after another in recent years, thus evoking great disappointment of the international community.

Although the New START, the only remaining treaty between Russia and the U.S., was extended with much difficulty early this year, the prospect of negotiation for adopting a new treaty remains pessimistic.

All these facts clearly prove who is the ringleader that impedes the nuclear disarmament and undermines the nuclear non-proliferation regime at present.

The U.S. with the largest nuclear arsenal in the world and as the only user of nukes, should take the lead in nuclear disarmament with practical steps for reduction of nuclear weapons with special responsibility for international peace and security.

Mr. Chairman,

No less number of countries believe that the U.S. has become hostile towards the DPRK because it possessed nuclear weapons. This is a misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, the U.S. has been antagonizing and threatening the DPRK with nuclear weapons for several decades, and it left us with no other option but to follow the arduous road to building up self-defensive deterrent.

The war deterrent in our stock is not for targeting a specific state or forces and pursuing any supremacy, but for defending ourselves on our own.

What we mean by the war deterrent is literally the deterrent for the righteous self-defense to prevent aggressive war and safeguard the sovereignty of our state.

We are further strengthening our war deterrent to deal with the ever deteriorating security environment of the Korean Peninsula on our own active initiative.

The DPRK's activities in exercise of its right to self-defense never pose any threat and its rightful buildup of national defense capability is not harmful to the security of the neighboring countries even in the least.

All measures taken by the DPRK to strengthen its national defense capability are the righteous activities aimed to actively control the security environment of the Korean Peninsula and the region and to safeguard the security of the state and people.

The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear-weapon state, will not misuse its nuclear weapons unless the aggressive hostile forces attempt to have recourse to their nuclear weapons against it, and sincerely abide by the duties of nuclear non-proliferation assumed before the international community.

The DPRK will, in the future, too, make an active contribution to the efforts of the international community to firmly defend the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and the rest of the world.

Thank you.

**Statement by the Arab Republic of Egypt
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1)
Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt aligns itself with the statements made by the Non-Aligned Movement, the African Group and the Arab Group, and wishes to make the following remarks:

Egypt reiterates its concern over the grave threat posed to humanity and international security by the continued possession of nuclear weapons by a few States, and reaffirms that the total, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their proliferation, use, or threat of use.

Arguments which set preconditions for, or artificial impediments to, the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations will only lead to the gradual demise of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The rising levels of tensions at the global level coupled with rapid technological developments make the risk of intentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons at one of its highest levels since the Cold War era.

The intensified competition among a number of States to develop, test, and deploy faster and more powerful delivery systems such as hypersonic missiles or nuclear-powered missiles, in combination with the rising levels of malicious uses of cyber and outer-space technologies, exponentially raises the risk of triggering a nuclear war either intentionally or by mistake.

The continued collapse and erosion of major bilateral treaties of nuclear disarmament and arms control makes any possible progress on implementing the agreed nuclear disarmament obligations extremely difficult to achieve in the foreseen future.

Immediate progress is necessary to restore trust and faith in the current regime. As a first step, the 10th NPT Review Conference has to reconfirm the validity of all previous commitments and reaffirm the commitment of all States Parties to implement them without any conditionality, and further build on them with practical timebound measures.

Egypt is of the view that the outcomes of the 10th NPT Review Conference should include a declaration by all nuclear-weapon States that “a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought”, combined with agreeing to timebound negotiations on the total, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. We hope that the extension of the New Start Treaty will be a step in the right direction.

Mr. Chairman,

The decades-long stalemate in the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, as well as countless similar resolutions, is eroding the credibility and sustainability of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and multilateral norms, as well as the rule of law at the international level.

This stalemate is one of the root causes of the instability and lack of security in a region that already suffers from chronic military conflicts and arms races, especially taking into consideration the unprecedented spread of armed conflicts and terrorism.

In this regard, we believe that the Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, which has successfully convened its First Session in November 2019 under the chairmanship of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and managed to reach a number of important and significant outcomes as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/75/63, represents an important opportunity for the United Nations to take meaningful practical steps in this direction

through an institutional inclusive and consensus-based process. We look forward to the Second Session of the conference in November 2021 under the chairmanship of the State of Kuwait.

We reiterate that this Conference aims at reaching arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region on the basis of consensus. It is a genuine attempt to achieve a longstanding agreed international commitment in a nondiscriminatory manner that does not aim at singling out any State in the region.

At the holistic level, this process could serve as a platform to address all regional disarmament, non-proliferation and strategic challenges. We sincerely hope that all invited States will participate in the following sessions of this Conference, which could lead to a major contribution to the strengthening of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and a breakthrough in addressing the deteriorating security conditions in the region, not to mention its possible positive impact on the forthcoming session of the NPT Review Conference which we all hope would succeed.

In the same vein, we also count on the continued support of all Member States to this initiative, as well as to the resolution that Egypt tables annually on “the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East” which used to be adopted by consensus until the year 2017, and the resolution that we table on behalf of the Arab Group entitled “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”. We consider the support by Member States to be a proof of their commitment to nuclear disarmament as well as to achieving collective security and sustainable peace in the Middle East and to achieving the agreed obligations in this regard.

Thank you.

**Statement by the Arab Republic of Egypt
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cluster 2)
Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt aligns itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group.

Mr. Chairman,

The First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament had confirmed the effect of disarmament on international peace and security. The adoption of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017 represents a historical step in terms of prohibiting nuclear weapons, as chemical and biological weapons are prohibited by their respective conventions. It also establishes a customary rule in international law with regard to prohibiting nuclear weapons.

In spite of the wars, tensions and instability that the Middle East witnessed over decades, Egypt has joined the NPT in a good faith and implemented all the commitments under the treaty. Egypt joined consensus on indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 Review Conference upon the understanding that the package includes the 1995 resolution on establishing the Middle East NWFZ, which was not implemented until now. Egypt also was the first country in the region to propose including other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East NWFZ.

Egypt calls for an immediate action to face the strategic imbalance in the Middle East due to persistence of one state to impede the efforts of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Such persistence impedes achieving security and stability in the region, which leads to more conflicts, arms race, instability, international intervention and lack of sustainable peace.

In this regard, we believe that the Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, which has successfully convened its First Session in November 2019 under the chairmanship of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and managed to reach a number of important and significant outcomes as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/75/63, represents an important opportunity for the United Nations to take meaningful practical steps in this direction through an institutional inclusive and consensus-based process. We look forward to the Second Session of the conference in November 2021 under the chairmanship of the State of Kuwait.

We reiterate that this Conference aims at reaching arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region on the basis of consensus. It is a genuine attempt to achieve a longstanding agreed international commitment in a nondiscriminatory manner that does not aim at singling out any State in the region. This process could serve as a platform to address all regional disarmament, non-proliferation and strategic challenges.

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt condemns any use of weapons of mass destruction by any side under any circumstances. In this regard, Egypt has always supported the implementation of international resolutions especially Security Council resolution no. 1540 to avoid the illegal diversion of weapons of mass destruction to sub-state actors and terrorist groups.

We highlight once more the double standards in the position expressed by some Member States, when they call on certain Member States by name to accede to the conventions on chemical and biological weapons, while not calling on Israel to accede to the NPT. They become hesitant when it comes to supporting the Conference on Establishment of the Middle East NWFZ using the pretext that the political and security circumstances in the region are not ready yet for such a step.

In fact, many Member States, which call for the universal adherence to the conventions on chemical and biological weapons, owns nuclear weapons or under what so called nuclear security umbrella. The same Member States claim that the circumstances are not ready yet for disarmament and refuse to deal on equal footing with nuclear weapons on the one hand and chemical and biological weapons on the other hand in terms of prohibiting their use and ownership, although nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons of mass destruction and are in conflict with the main principles of humanity and international humanitarian law.

Egypt reminds those Member States that the principles are indivisible, the security of some Member States are not more important than others, as all Member States are equal in terms of rights and sovereignty. We advise those Member States to reconsider their positions, which reflect a clear case of double standards.

Thank you.

**Statement of the Arab Republic of Egypt
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate - Cluster 3: Outer Space
Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt aligns itself with the statements of the Arab Group, the African Group, and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Mr. Chairman,

Outer-space is a shared heritage owned equally by all the peoples of the world, and a common asset for humanity. In today's world, almost all aspects of human activities on earth are either directly or indirectly dependent on outer space technologies.

Taking into consideration the extreme volatility of the outer space environment, it must not be allowed to turn into a scene for military conflicts that could have catastrophic implications.

Without prejudice to the possible value of TCBMs as interim measure in the short term, there is a clear need for a legally binding instrument that would complement the existing international legal framework by preventing an arms race in outer space and filling the existing legal gaps in this area, especially taking into consideration the alarming announcements by some States in relation to their plans of weaponizing outer space, in addition to the continued development of weapons designed to attack outer-space assets.

Such a legally binding instrument should have a comprehensive scope that primarily includes four prohibitions:

- 1) A prohibition on the placement of any weapons, defensive or offensive, in outer space,
- 2) A prohibition on any armed attacks against satellites or any outer- space assets,
- 3) A prohibition on any intentional harmful interference that interrupts the normal functioning of outer-space assets, and
- 4) A prohibition on the development, testing, and stockpiling of weapons that are specifically designed for the sole purpose of attacking outer space assets or being deployed or used as a weapon in outer space.

We believe that each of these prohibitions (contained in such a legally binding instrument) can be subject to specific verification measures, using a diversified set of tools that could be supplemented by transparency measures, as well as a mechanism for consultations and dispute-settlement.

We also believe that such an instrument can be designed to avoid any infringement on the full utilization of the peaceful uses of outer-space or dual-use technologies by all States for purposes other than weaponization. The required definitions can be easily determined in a manner that would avoid such infringement. The existing legal framework, especially the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 represents a good basis. Nevertheless, there is a clear need for serious efforts to reach new legally binding instruments that complement the existing legal framework, considering the relevant significant technological developments and the need for assurances that outer space would remain free of armed conflicts or arms races.

Progress can be achieved through a gradual approach, including through the development of binding rules of States behavior in outer-space.

In this context, Egypt once again recalls the substantive progress made during the discussions of the Governmental Group of Experts established pursuant to UNGA Resolution 72/250 which witnessed a remarkable level of depth in the discussions concerning all controversial legal and technical aspects. The un-bracketed text of the final report of that GGE is a remarkable effort that can and should represent the basis of future discussions in order not to start from scratch.

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt and Sri Lanka have once more tabled their joint annual resolution entitled “Prevention of an Arms Race in the Outer Space”. We count on the support of all Member States to this important resolution which attempts to bridge the gaps and create common grounds for further progress on PAROS.

Moreover, Egypt co-sponsored the two resolutions entitled “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” and “Further Practical Measure for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”.

Egypt reiterates its readiness to support any credible effort that complements the existing initiatives and aims at elaborating rules that would pave the way to conclude legally-binding instruments on PAROS including through prohibiting the weaponization of outer space and actions that may turn it into an arena for conflict.

Thank you.

**Statement of the Arab Republic of Egypt
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate – Cluster 4: Conventional Weapons
Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt aligns itself with the statements of the Arab Group, the African Group, and the Non-Aligned Movement, and wishes to make the following remarks:

Egypt remains fully committed to engaging in any balanced multilateral endeavor that aims to tackle the multiple challenges and threats arising from the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, provided that such an endeavor is consistent with the UN Charter and does not intend to negatively affect the rights of States to acquire their legitimate defense needs.

We continue to fully support the United Nations Program of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) as an essential multilateral instrument that contributes to the eradication of illicit trafficking in SALW. Egypt has submitted its national report on the implementation of the PoA for the year 2020. We also reiterate the importance of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) as a valuable tool in this regard.

We welcome the adoption of the outcome document of BMS7 and are looking forward to convening BMS8 in 2022 to elaborate more on issues related to diversion of small arms and light weapons to unauthorized recipients and implement the conclusions of BMS7 especially with regard to establishing the Fellowship program proposed by NAM to offer training to developing countries.

Mr. Chairman,

The Middle East and Africa face severe threats due to the increasing illicit flows and intentional transfers of SALW to terrorists and illegal armed groups. It is obvious that this unprecedented flow is conducted with the direct support of a few States that resort to arming terrorists as a tool of their foreign policies, in a clear violation of the UN Charter, international norms, and several UNSC resolutions, the latest being resolution 2370 which was adopted unanimously in August 2017.

Some argued that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was going to be the solution that would stop all illegal flows of conventional arms. In this regard, we reiterate that the ATT's various shortcomings, especially its lack of clear definitions and criteria, largely undermines its possible effectiveness, and makes it possible to abuse this treaty as a tool to manipulate and monopolize the legitimate trade in conventional weapons in a politicized manner, while ignoring the prevention of the intentional supply of weapons to unauthorized recipients such as terrorists and illegal armed groups.

We reiterate our call on the States parties to the ATT to ensure that its implementation is consistent with the UN Charter without any infringement on the rights of States to meet their national security and self-defense needs.

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt is one of the States that have suffered the most from the use of landmines, as 20% of the world's landmines were planted in Egyptian soil during WWII, and there is a continued need to intensify international cooperation to tackle this major problem. Fully aware of the relevant humanitarian considerations, Egypt imposed a moratorium since the 1980s on the production and export of antipersonnel landmines, long before the conclusion of the relevant conventions including the Ottawa Convention, which fell short of addressing many key elements associated with the threat of landmines.

Mr. Chairman,

It is important to highlight that most of the challenges that we face today with regards to the supply of conventional arms to terrorists and illegal armed groups are not mainly due to a lack of proper export controls or inadequate stockpiles security. They are primarily due to the fact that certain States continue to deliberately supply illicit weapons to terrorists and illegal armed groups and obstruct an international prohibition on the supply of weapons to unauthorized recipients, in contradiction with several principles enshrined in the Charter. This is a phenomenon that requires the immediate attention of and more tangible measures by the United Nations.

Thank you.

**Statement of the Arab Republic of Egypt
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate on Other Disarmament Measures and International Security (Cluster 5)
Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt aligns itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement, the African group, and the Arab Group and wishes to make the following remarks:

Egypt reiterates that nondiscriminatory multilateral legally-binding instruments are the most effective measures for achieving sustainable progress in the area of disarmament and international security.

We stress that the continued commitment by all States to previously agreed undertakings and to the rule of law at the international level, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, is a necessary condition for maintaining international peace and security and avoiding chaos.

Taking into consideration the rapid scientific and technological developments in several strategic fields, there are several domains which have a direct impact on international security that are left without any internationally agreed rules to prevent them from turning into scenes of arms races and armed conflicts, and to ensure the reliable continuation of the contribution of the relevant technologies to development and welfare. Cyberspace, outer space, and the weaponization applications of Artificial Intelligence including in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons are prominent examples.

The lack of progress in addressing the severe security threats that arise in such domains is clearly not due to the lack of technical expertise on the part of the international community, but is rather due to the continued misguided belief by some States that an absolute dominance in such domains can be maintained, and thereby resisting any effort towards the development of equitable rules-based international regimes prohibiting the malicious uses and weaponization of such technologies.

In a multipolar world where the relevant technologies are available and accessible to many State and non-State actors, this approach can only lead to an arms race that no one can win, while international security continues to severely deteriorate.

In the area of cyber-security and the possible malicious use of information and telecommunication technologies as a means of warfare, achieving meaningful progress towards establishing a reliable regime based on agreed rules has been stalled for more than a decade. Efforts towards the codification of recommendations or towards utilizing them as a basis for legally binding instruments continue to be strongly resisted at a time that the international security aspects of ICTs are becoming too important to be left without an international regime that regulates State behavior in this strategic domain.

We strongly welcome the conclusion of the OEWG established by Resolution 73/27 and adopting its outcome document by consensus and are looking forward to convening the first session of the new OEWG established according to resolution 75/240 next December to continue our constructive dialogue and elaborate rules and principles on States' use of ICTs, building on international law and the recommendations that have already been endorsed by the UN with a view to addressing the rising threats and the existing gaps.

The OEWG witnessed many creative ideas and constructive proposals, including on the future of regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the UN such as the possible establishment of a UN Programme of Action as a mechanism to follow-up the implementation of the agreed norms and examining the possible developments of further norms pending an agreement on launching negotiations on a legally-binding instrument.

This proposal of a possible UN Programme of Action on cybersecurity aims at establishing a more concerted global effort under an inclusive UN platform that is action-oriented and would be developed in a complementary and coordinated manner with other relevant UN processes. We are looking forward to further elaborating this proposal in an open and inclusive manner, primarily within the new OEWG with the participation of all stakeholders.

Thank you.

**Statement of the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate - Cluster 6: Regional Disarmament and Security
Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt aligns itself with the statements of the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to make the following remarks:

The Middle East remains one of the most volatile regions in the world. The situation continues to worsen with the unprecedented spread of conflicts, proxy wars, terrorism and sectarian violence.

Quoting from the Final Document of SSOD-I, which was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly in 1978, "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry ... nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through [...] the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces".

Today, in the year 2020, there's a need to recognize that peace and security cannot be achieved in the Middle East under deterrence and the accumulation of weaponry instead of engagement on the establishment of an equitable security architecture that achieves the collective and collaborative security of all the States and peoples of the region.

Serious steps towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the Middle East, could have saved the region and the world from devastating wars and horrors, as well as from the chronic country-specific proliferation concerns.

In this regard, we believe that the Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, which has successfully convened its First Session in November 2019 under the chairmanship of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and managed to reach a number of important and significant outcomes as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/75/63, represents an important opportunity for the United Nations to take meaningful practical steps in this direction through an institutional inclusive and consensus-based process. We look forward to the Second Session of the conference in November 2021 under the chairmanship of the State of Kuwait.

Mr. Chairman,

In addition to its commitment to achieving a lasting and just peace in the Middle East, Egypt has constructively engaged with all international efforts aiming at addressing the challenges related to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in the region.

Continuing to ignore the severity of the deteriorating security conditions in the region will only lead to further catastrophic consequences. The region is already witnessing a new chapter of a gravely alarming arms race, and we cannot continue to stand idly watching with our hands tied.

We urge all Member States to engage with the ongoing efforts and to honor the relevant previous agreements and undertakings. Missing another opportunity to engage in a constructive, inclusive, and consensus-based process will only mean a call for the continuation of violence and chaos.

Thank you.

**Statement of the Arab Republic of Egypt
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate – Cluster 7: Disarmament Machinery
Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt aligns itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group and wishes to make the following remarks:

Egypt assigns immense importance to the United Nations disarmament machinery and considers disarmament and arms control to be an essential pillar of the UN mandate in preserving international peace and security, which remains the *raison d'être* of the organization.

The stalemate in disarmament efforts is not necessarily the result of defects in the machinery itself as much as it is a reflection of the lack of political will by some States that seek to maintain absolute military dominance and believe in deterrence rather than collaborative and collective security.

Mr. Chairman,

The failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to adopt a balanced and comprehensive program of work for over 24 years requires immediate action to rectify this situation. We believe that this can only be achieved through launching negotiations on the verifiable and irreversible total elimination of nuclear weapons with specific benchmarks and timelines.

There is also a need for similar efforts to revitalize the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and to allow it to adopt recommendations on nuclear disarmament. Egypt also expresses its serious disappointment regarding the inability to convene the formal sessions of the UNDC in 2019 and 2020 and considers this to be another very alarming indication of how threatened the UN Disarmament Machinery is.

We look forward to a successful SSOD-IV as a landmark event that is urgently needed to address the alarming stalemate in disarmament and go back to the drawing board to revisit the current design of the machinery.

We continue to value the role of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. We reiterate our call for more financial independence for UNIDIR to continue to generate new ideas and to promote practical actions on disarmament.

Furthermore, seeking better synergies and coordination among the First Committee, the CD, the UNDC and UNIDIR may contribute to a more efficient and effective functioning of the machinery.

We once again commend the Secretary General's timely and valuable Disarmament Agenda. This initiative indicates a clear recognition of the need to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Machinery and to bring disarmament back to the forefront of the UN's focus.

We also encourage the active role and contributions of non-governmental organizations and the civil society in support of the UN's Disarmament Machinery.

Finally, the First Committee has a central role in bridging the gaps and creating momentum and guidance for the Disarmament Machinery. It is our hope that a constructive and consensual approach will be followed by all Member States in order to succeed in this task.

Thank you.

EU Statement on Nuclear Weapons
United Nations General Assembly First Committee
76th Session
New York, 11 October 2021

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, and Albania*, as well as the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this statement.

The current complex security environment, which is marked by increased tensions and continued proliferation crises, underscores the need to preserve and further advance general arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes. We welcome and encourage further initiatives and processes at international and regional levels to restore dialogue and trust and promote transparency and confidence-building measures. The EU also calls on all States concerned to do their utmost to prevent a new arms race, as it would risk further escalating tensions and undermine the significant reductions achieved after the end of the Cold War.

The upcoming Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides an opportunity for States Parties to strengthen implementation and honour its commitments.

The EU reaffirms its unequivocal support for the NPT as the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in facilitating cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The EU reaffirms the importance of its universalization. In this regard, we call on all States that have not yet done so to join this Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. The NPT is a historic success. It has an enduring value and its full implementation is needed now more than ever.

The EU strongly supports all three pillars of the NPT and will continue to promote comprehensive, balanced, and full implementation of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Its concrete, equally important and mutually reinforcing steps on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy remain valid. We recall that all States Parties have committed to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and its objectives of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. We remain resolved to seek a safer world for all in accordance with the goals of the Treaty in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. We call for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security.

The EU notes the severe consequences associated with nuclear weapons use and emphasises that all States share the responsibility to prevent such an occurrence from happening.

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

We welcome the engagement by EU Member States to mobilize political will, work to build consensus, and promote implementation of the goals of the NPT through various initiatives, such as the Stockholm Initiative established during the current review cycle. We welcome the current momentum on risk reduction, including strategic and nuclear risk reduction measures, which can contribute to alleviating tensions and building necessary trust and confidence to promote further progress in disarmament. We urge all States concerned to discuss, agree, and implement practical measures to that end. The EU will spare no effort in working towards a successful outcome at the Review Conference, and has made a number of concrete contributions, including its funding of a series of thematic and regional seminars.

Mr. Chair,

EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

In this regard, we welcome the extension of the New START Treaty for an additional five years. The reduction of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals under the New START Treaty, enhanced notably by its robust verification mechanism, contributes to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of deployed nuclear weapons. The EU strongly encourages further reductions to their arsenals including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons and to pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, risk reduction, verification activities, laying the ground for even more robust and ambitious future arms control agreements. We call on China to actively contribute to this process. We welcome the launch of the Strategic Dialogue at the summit between the Russian Federation and the United States in Geneva. Recalling the obligations for all States arising from Art. VI of the NPT, we underline that the two nuclear weapon States with the largest arsenals hold a special responsibility in the area of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The EU stresses the need to preserve and further advance arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation processes. In this regard, the EU acknowledges the efforts of France to demonstrate increased transparency on its doctrines and the nuclear weapons it possesses. The EU recalls Action 5 of the NPT 2010 Action Plan, which calls upon nuclear weapons states to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

We welcome the continuation of P5 dialogue, under the coordination of France, which can help to decrease tensions, increase collective security and should contribute to the NPT review process.

The EU acknowledges the importance of existing nuclear weapon free zones for peace and security. The EU recognises that treaty-based security assurances are available to nuclear weapon free zones and encourages nuclear weapon States to sign and ratify the relevant protocols of the Treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones drawn up following the requisite consultations. We also call on those States in existing nuclear weapon free zones that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the relevant nuclear weapon free zone Treaties.

The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We consider the 1995 Resolution valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East. The EU has continuously expressed its readiness to assist in the process and help produce a conducive atmosphere. Furthermore, the EU continues to provide substantive funding to the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East.

The EU takes note of the successful convening and outcome of the UN Conference in 2019 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The EU recalls that such zones can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between all States of the region concerned as set out in the 1999 Guidelines of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC).

The EU also recognises the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear weapon States as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. Negative security assurances can be an important confidence building measure which strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, contribute to nuclear disarmament and enhance regional and global security, in line with the goals and objectives of the NPT. We stress the importance of continued reaffirmation by nuclear weapon States of their existing security assurances, endorsed by relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

We recall that Russia has violated its commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on security assurances, in connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State.

Mr. Chair,

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the CTBT's opening for signature. Promoting universal adherence to and the entry into force of the CTBT is a top priority for the EU. The Treaty is a strong confidence and security building measure at international, regional and bilateral level, one of the key pillars of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture contributing to global peace and security. It is an effective instrument with a solid and effective verification mechanism. All EU Member States have ratified the CTBT and are abiding by its obligations. We urge all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay. We welcome the latest ratifications by Cuba and the Union of Comoros, increasing the number of ratifications to 170. Until the treaty is universalised, it is also crucial that all States fully observe the moratorium on nuclear test explosions and other nuclear explosions and refrain from any actions contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

The European Union welcomes the election of Dr. Robert Floyd as Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) on 20 May 2021. We count on his leadership to take further important steps towards the universalisation and the entry into force of the Treaty. The EU will continue to provide its full support to take this important work forward. We thank the outgoing Executive Secretary, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, for his leadership and tireless efforts in promoting the CTBT over the past eight years. The EU supports the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament Action 4: 'Bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force'.

Mr. Chair,

The JCPOA, a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture, endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council through its resolution 2231 (2015). It is the fruit of effective multilateralism and indicative of the important work done by members of the international community when working collectively. In this context, the European Union welcomes the declared intention of the United States to re-join the JCPOA.

The EU has repeatedly regretted Iran's violations of the JCPOA that started in July 2019 and continues to date. We remain deeply concerned about Iran's continued accumulation of low as well as highly enriched uranium, in violation of the JCPOA. Both are key steps in the development of a nuclear weapon and Iran has no credible civilian need for either measure. Iran's continued R&D with advanced centrifuges, as well as activities with uranium metal are of particular concern. These activities are in violation of the JCPOA. They also raise serious non-proliferation concerns, particularly following Iran's decision to suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol and JCPOA transparency provisions, which has substantially decreased IAEA access to key information about Iran's nuclear programme. We urge Iran to reverse these activities and return to full implementation of its

commitments without delay. In addition, we urge Iran to commit to scheduling a firm date for the seventh round of negotiations in Vienna.

It is crucial that Iran fully cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The necessary verification and monitoring activities including transparency measures foreseen under the JCPOA need to be restored. In addition, Iran must fully and promptly cooperate with the IAEA on the four outstanding safeguards-related issues and provide the necessary clarifications. The EU highly values the work and the professionalism of the IAEA. Its impartial and technical work is of utmost importance and is a cornerstone for the credibility of the JCPOA.

The DPRK's actions and stated intention to continue developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and earlier announcements that it no longer considers itself bound by its moratorium on nuclear testing is a matter of grave concern. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as its ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes in line with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. The EU calls on the DPRK to continue refraining from testing nuclear weapons and to implement a full moratorium on all types of ballistic missile launches. DPRK's recent missile and ballistic activities reflect the fact that the country continues to produce weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, which directly threaten regional and international peace and security. The DPRK must return to full compliance with its obligations under the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons State and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The EU urges the DPRK to bring into force an Additional Protocol to that Agreement and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without delay.

The EU calls on the DPRK to respond constructively to the readiness for dialogue expressed by the United States and the Republic of Korea. The EU stands ready to support new diplomatic processes aimed at pursuing sustainable peace and security and the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, the EU will continue to encourage the full implementation of all relevant UN sanctions while implementing its own autonomous sanctions regime on the DPRK and calls on all states to fully and effectively implement all DPRK-related sanctions.

Mr. Chair,

The EU and its Member States reiterate their longstanding support for an immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and we support starting such negotiations in accordance with the document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. To demonstrate our continued commitment, the EU has become a supporter of the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament Action 7: 'Conclude a Treaty Banning Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons'.

Starting such negotiations is not only an EU priority, but the overwhelming will of the international community, as manifested in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan and reiterated by UN General Assembly Resolution 73/65, which reaffirmed the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In the meantime, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons that have not yet done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on their production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We welcome the action by France, which has declared a moratorium and dismantled or converted such facilities, and call on others to follow suit.

We welcome the convening of the Group of Governmental experts (GGE) to consider the role of nuclear verification in advancing nuclear disarmament in 2021 and support further efforts in all relevant fora. In this regard, we welcome the contribution of practical cooperation such as the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and practical exercises, such as the Belgian exercise regarding the plutonium measurement methods, the Franco -

German Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NuDiVe) exercises as well as the research and demonstration of high explosive detection methods carried out by the Netherlands, within the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) format. While verification is not an end in itself, further development of the multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities would assist in the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

I thank you Mr. Chair,

**EU Statement on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
United Nations General Assembly First Committee
76th Session
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

In a world of geopolitical tensions and multifaceted threats to international and regional stability, the EU will enhance its efforts to promote peace and security and work together with other partners to uphold fundamental values and strengthen the capacity of the UN to fulfil its mandate in that regard.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery remains a grave threat to international peace and security. While the international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed down the spread of WMD and their delivery systems, a number of States have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons, and the risk that terrorists could access such weapons, material or means of delivery remains real.

Compliance with and enforcement of international obligations is a fundamental pillar of a global effort to uphold the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and to prevent an erosion of this landscape.

Mr. Chair,

The EU reiterates that the use of chemical weapons by anyone - be it a State or a non - State actor - anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances is a violation of international law and can amount to the most serious crimes of international concern - war crimes and crimes against humanity.

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Impunity for the use of chemical weapons must not and will not be tolerated. Ending impunity and ensuring accountability are crucial to preserve the integrity of the established norms and to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

We denounce the Syrian Arab Republic's continued violation of its obligations as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Air Force. We welcome the Decision adopted by the 25th Conference of States Parties to the CWC suspending the voting rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic due to its failure to comply with the Convention.

The EU continues to fully support the work of the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact Finding Mission (FFM) as well the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) in seeking to resolve the identified gaps and inconsistencies in the Syrian initial declaration, in investigating chemical weapons use in Syria as well as in identifying the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria.

The EU reiterates its full confidence in the professionalism, impartiality and independence of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and underlines the OPCW complementarity with the work of the United Nations. In this context, the EU appreciates the regular sharing of information of OPCW activities and investigations with the United Nations Secretary-General, the UN Security Council regarding the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) established in 2016.

The European Union condemns in the strongest possible terms the attempt to assassinate Alexei Navalny, through poisoning using a chemical nerve agent of the "Novichok" group in August 2020. The poisoning has been confirmed, without doubt, by specialised laboratories in Germany, France and Sweden, as well as by the OPCW.

More than one year on from the attack, the EU continues to call on the Russian Federation to investigate this assassination attempt without further delay, and to fully cooperate with the OPCW and facilitate a Technical Assistance Visit in order to ensure a fully transparent and impartial international investigation.

Those responsible for the assassination attempt on Mr. Navalny must be brought to justice. On 14 October 2020 under its Chemical Weapons Sanctions Regime, the European Union imposed restrictive measures against six Russian individuals and one entity responsible for inducing and providing support to the poisoning of Mr. Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent.

The EU also condemns the use of chemical agents in the murder of the DPRK citizen, Kim Jong Nam in 2017, and of the March 2018 chemical attack in Salisbury.

The European Union also continues to demonstrate its commitment to strengthen collective efforts to ensure accountability for perpetrators of chemical attacks through the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons (PAI).

Mr. Chair,

The EU continues to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) politically, diplomatically and financially to ensure the full and effective implementation of and universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We reiterate our call once again upon those States not yet party to the CWC - the DPRK, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan - to join the Convention without further delay.

The EU provides significant voluntary financial contributions in support of the OPCW core activities, such as international cooperation through the OPCW Africa Programme, and the establishment of the new Centre for Chemistry and Technology. In addition, the European Union has contributed €2.1M to the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity, in support of activities under the OPCW Cyber Security, Resilience and Information

Assurance Programme, to be carried out over the next two years. The voluntary funding supports investment in secure digital information and communication infrastructure.

Mr. Chair,

The EU and its Member States reaffirm our strong support for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the global norm against biological weapons and a fundamental pillar of the international community's efforts to prevent disease from ever being used as such a weapon. We fully engage in international efforts to improve bio-safety and bio-security around the globe. Today, as the COVID-19 pandemic is testing the resilience of our societies and the international community as a whole, we must strengthen the Convention and its implementation. This necessitates keeping pace with the rapid developments which are taking place in biological sciences and biotechnology, inter alia by establishing a science and technology review mechanism. The EU and its Member States are entirely committed to contributing to the success of the forthcoming Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC next year and continue to provide substantial support to the Convention, including significant financial contributions.

The EU also supports politically and financially the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM). As the only currently available independent international instrument for investigating the possible use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of international law as mandated in paragraph 4 of resolution 42/37C, the UNSGM is a key component of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

Mr. Chair,

The EU underlines the continued key importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and its follow-on Resolutions, which establish legally-binding obligations for all States to prevent and deter non-State actors from obtaining access to weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. The EU's capacity-building assistance in support of UNSCR 1540 has significantly helped States to fulfil their reporting obligations and facilitated cooperation between relevant stakeholders.

Furthermore, the EU and its Member States continue to support the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other WMD and their delivery systems in the Middle East. As stated in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, such zones can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between all States of the region concerned.

The EU urges Iran to refrain from any ballistic missile activities that are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The EU fully implements the resolution with respect to the export of missile-related items to and from Iran and calls upon Iran to fully respect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the transfer of missiles and relevant material and technology to state and non-state actors. We reiterate our long-standing serious concern about the regional military build-up.

Since December 2012, the Syrian regime has made a repeated use of ballistic missiles. This is alarming. The Syrian activities related to missile technology, along with strong indications of technical and financial support from third countries and the resulting proliferation of missile technology from the Syrian soil to non-state actors in the region, constitute a source of concern for the international community.

The EU is gravely concerned about the continued build-up of the DPRK's missile capabilities as demonstrated by its launch of ballistic missiles on 15 September and its announcement that it test fired cruise missiles on 11 and

12 September 2021. The repeated ballistic missile launches by the DPRK represent a serious threat to regional and international peace and security and violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. We call on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear and any other Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes as well as its delivery systems programme and existing nuclear programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and to fully comply with all its international obligations and commitments. The EU urges the DPRK to engage in dialogue and undertake constructive action towards this objective. Until this happens, the EU and its Member States will continue to strictly enforce existing sanctions and encourage and support all other States to do the same. The EU and its Member States recall that all UN Member States are obliged to implement the restrictions targeting the DPRK's illegal activities, as imposed by the UN Security Council, and should do their utmost to curb proliferation of goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile-related programmes, including the transfer of dual-use items and their financing.

Mr. Chair,

The EU has been a firm supporter of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) since its inception. The HCoC is the result of efforts by the international community to regulate the area of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. An integral part of the multilateral non-proliferation architecture, the HCoC is the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument relating to the spread of ballistic missiles.

All EU Member States have subscribed to the Code. We welcome the increase on the number of signatories, since the signing and entry into force in November 2002, from 93 to 143. The EU will continue in its diplomatic outreach to a number of non-subscribing States in support of the universalisation of the Code.

The EU recognises the crucial contribution of export control regimes towards ensuring a safer and more secure world. We also recognise the role of those regimes in underpinning key disarmament and non-proliferation instruments such as the NPT. The EU also recalls that the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) plays a crucial role in tackling the proliferation of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies and that all EU Member States should be allowed to participate in its work. The EU strongly supports the MTCR and other international export control regimes, such as the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

I thank you, Mr. Chair

**EU Statement
UN General Assembly 76th Session
First Committee
Thematic Discussion on Outer Space
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The EU and its Member States continue to strongly promote the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually-acceptable basis. In line with applicable international treaties, we recognise outer space as a global commons, to be used for the benefit of all. Many of the systems and services that are today essential for well-being as well as security depend directly or indirectly on space.

The EU and its MS continue to promote the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space as a key priority for us, and in our common interest for present and future generations. Thus, as firm believers in multilateralism with a strong United Nations at its core, we consider that this is best achieved through international cooperation.

The EU and its Member States underline that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and other applicable international law, as well as the guiding principles developed in the UN framework, constitute the cornerstone of the global governance of outer space. We note the applicability of international law, including the UN Charter, to outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding, as also reflected in Article 3 of the Outer Space Treaty. The EU and its Member States stress the importance of conducting space activities in accordance therewith.

The EU and its Member States remain strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is essential for strengthening international security and stability and for safeguarding the long-term use of the space environment for peaceful purposes.

The EU and its Member States actively contribute to and support the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and its Subcommittees and welcome the progress made on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.

The space environment is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive. Outer space is an area where we have seen a considerable amount of challenges to our common security in recent years and this merits our full attention, including at and beyond the present UNGA. The destruction of space objects or interruptions of their services pose an inherent risk to connected societies increasingly dependent on these services. Furthermore, the dual-use nature of many space objects and systems poses challenges when it comes to protecting space assets and identifying threats, distinguishing between innocuous behaviours and potentially threatening ones.

Mr. Chair,

The EU and its Member States remain convinced that transparency and confidence-building measures can make an important contribution to the security, safety and sustainability of activities in outer space. They highlight the importance of the mutually-reinforcing role of transparency and confidence-building measures, reducing the risks of misperception, miscalculation, and unintended conflict escalation, and the need to advocate for responsible behaviour in outer space. The EU and its Member States will continue to advocate for responsible behaviour in outer space, as well as a comprehensive approach in addressing challenges, risks and threats to the peaceful use of outer space, in compliance with international law, notably in the framework of the United Nations.

Without excluding the possibility of a legally binding instrument in the future, the EU and its Member States believe that voluntary measures constitute a pragmatic way forward at the moment, starting with norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, through an incremental and inclusive process. The EU and its Member States emphasise that any future legally binding framework in the scope of space security should be effective and verifiable and should cover all relevant threats, be they Earth-to-space, space-to-space, or space-to-Earth.

Mr. Chair,

The rapid growth of human activities in space, coupled with the increased diversity of space operators, makes it ever more necessary to develop new international norms, rules and standards, guidelines, best practices, measures to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and misperception, and other transparency and confidence-building measures within the UN framework to govern human activity in space, ensuring compliance with existing international law and transparency and confidence-building measures.

The EU and its Member States remain concerned about the continued development, testing and proliferation of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), both ground-based and co-orbital and underline the importance of addressing such dangerous and highly destabilising developments promptly and as part of international efforts to prevent threat to objects in outer space. There are particular risks associated with these weapons. Among the most visible threats are kinetic anti-satellite tests, be they ground-based or co-orbital, their effects are the destruction of the targeted satellite as well as the collateral generation of space debris, potentially long lived debris. The EU and its Member States urge all States to refrain from the destruction of space objects that generate space debris, especially multiple long-lived debris as it causes harm to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

In this context, the commitment to responsible behaviour is essential to avoid potentially harmful interference with the peaceful exploration and use of outer space and to facilitate equitable access to outer space for all.

It is therefore urgent and in the interest of all States to pragmatically and immediately improve space security. Given the dual-use nature of many space systems, the EU and its Member States believe that an approach based on behaviours, supported by relevant monitoring capabilities, is the most pragmatic way forward to improving space security today as it will help to reduce the risks of misunderstandings, misperceptions and miscalculation and it will therefore help decrease the risk of conflicts and escalation in outer space. This kind of approach may be more long-lasting as it would address the risk of the development of technologies overtaking any eventual agreements.

The EU and its Member States consider that the process launched with UNGA Resolution 75/36 on “Reducing space threats through responsible behaviours”, will further help create the momentum for more ambitious steps, which could include the possibility of a new legally binding instrument in the future. The EU and its Member States supported this initiative and contributed to the UNSG report with a joint reply. Efforts to pursue political commitments, through a comprehensive approach, dealing with all aspects of space activities, and as a complement to compliance with existing international law, remain relevant. The EU and its Member States believe that convening an open-ended working group in this regard is a promising, inclusive and pragmatic approach in the near term that could result in agreeing on a voluntary instrument to establish principles, standards, rules and norms of responsible behaviour across the full range of space activities and related challenges.

Mr. Chair,

Universally-shared, multilaterally agreed principles of responsible behaviour should increase international cooperation in space, commit to mutual non-interference in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, facilitate an equitable access to outer space and increase transparency in the conduct of space activities.

The EU and its Member States consider it important to jointly pursue and intensify efforts to address challenges in outer space, with the involvement of all UN Member States and therefore continue to be fully committed to engage constructively in discussions on the prevention of threats in outer space.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

**EU Statement
Thematic Discussion on Conventional Weapons
United Nations General Assembly First Committee
76th Session
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its Member States.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this statement.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only causes human casualties but also destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty. The EU considers that, in line with the 2030 Agenda (SDG Targets 16.1 and 16.4) a sustainable development cannot be realised without peace and security, and that peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development.

The EU recalls that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its constituent Protocols, is an important instrument of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and one of the major instruments for conventional disarmament. The EU reiterates the commitment of the European Union and its Member States to respect and comply fully with IHL, including through full implementation of the EU Guidelines on the promotion of compliance with IHL.

In view of the upcoming 6th Review Conference of the CCW, the EU supports efforts to universalise and strengthen the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and stresses the importance of compliance with all CCW provisions and annexed Protocols. We trust that appropriate time will be allocated to a structured debate on the most relevant issues, in particular the importance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, including Protocol III. We strongly support efforts to strengthen this important instrument of International Humanitarian Law in order to reduce the humanitarian harm and minimise the risks and effects in particular of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosive remnants of war. In this regard, we welcome an update of the Political Declaration on IEDs. We remain concerned at the humanitarian impact and the heavy consequences on social and economic development arising from the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) and believe that MOTAPM should remain on the CCW agenda.

The EU has most recently shown its support for the CCW in its Council Decision CSFP 2021/1694 in support of the universalisation, implementation and strengthening of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) of 21 September 2021. In this decision the EU has pledged over 1.6 million Euro to UNODA for the implementation of projects in support of the Convention.

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The EU welcomes the substantive contribution by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). We would like to see the remaining session of the GGE in 2021 focused on reaching consensus on recommendations in relation to the clarification, consideration, and development of aspects of the normative and operational framework on LAWS. We call upon all High Contracting Parties to engage constructively ahead of the CCW Review Conference in order to achieve substantive results. The CCW remains the relevant international forum in this regard, combining diplomatic, legal and military expertise.

Mr. Chair,

The Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention (APLC) is a transformative milestone for disarmament, and an example of what the EU stands for: a rules-based international order, rooted in respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. The European Union stands united in its support for the universal ban on anti-personnel mines. The Convention is a crucial international instrument providing a comprehensive response to end the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, including by prohibiting their use, stockpiling, production, trade and transfer and ensuring their destruction, as well as mine clearance and making provision for victim assistance. We are concerned by the potential humanitarian impact arising from the failure of Eritrea to comply with its Article 5 obligations, and call upon it to take the necessary steps to ensure full compliance with its obligations.

We appeal to all actors to refrain from the production, stockpiling, trade and transfer of anti-personnel mines and strongly condemn their use anywhere, anytime, and by any actor, whether States or non-State actors. We urge all States that have not yet done so to join the Convention without delay, and as an interim step, to comply with the norms of the Convention.

Implementing the Convention is fundamental for peace, stabilisation and economic recovery. We continue to honour our commitments with a view to achieving a world free of anti-personnel mines, as set out in the Oslo Action plan. The EU and its Member States have a long history of support, through their various instruments, to countries affected by mines in their efforts to clear mines and destroy stockpiles, to promote education on the risks of mines, and to provide assistance to victims, their families and communities. For example the recently adopted EU Council Decision 2021/257/CFSP provides 2.6 million EUR over a period of four years to the full implementation of the Oslo action plan and the universalisation of the Convention. In addition to this, the EU and its Member States have contributed more than 400 million EUR to mine action since 2019.

The EU welcomes the humanitarian achievements of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which has celebrated its 10th anniversary since its entry into force. We are deeply concerned by the unacceptable impact on civilian populations of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, including the extensive use of cluster munitions in Syria, as well as uses in Yemen, Libya and most recently in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We call upon all actors to refrain from such use and to fully observe the principles of International Humanitarian Law. The EU is grateful to Switzerland for successfully hosting the Second Review Conference of the CCM, where States Parties adopted by consensus the Lausanne Declaration and the Lausanne Action plan, which will serve as a key guide for States Parties in realising the objectives set out in the Convention over the next 5 years.

Mr. Chair,

The EU and its Member States reaffirm their strong support for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It is a key international instrument aimed at establishing the highest possible common international standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms and preventing and eradicating the illicit trade of conventional arms and preventing their diversion. Universalisation and the full implementation of the ATT ranks high among priorities of the EU. In this light, we call on all UN Member States, especially the major arms importers, exporters and transit States, to ratify or accede to the ATT without further delay.

Transparency is key to the proper implementation of the ATT. The EU calls on all States Parties to fulfil their treaty obligations regarding regular reporting and to make their reports publicly available, which would act as a further confidence building measure.

In line with the 2018 EU Strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, the EU has committed to prevent and curb the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition and to promote accountability and responsibility with regard to their legal trade. Furthermore, the EU has adopted a uniform approach to the export of SALW and their ammunition, while establishing a set of common features that end-user certificates will have to respect in order to diminish the risk of diversion to illicit or unintended users (Council Decision 2021/38/CFSP).

The EU strongly encourages the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN PoA). In this respect we welcomes the results of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States (BMS7) in July this year. The EU is a committed supporter of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), one of the most important achievements of the UN PoA and an essential tool in the fight against diversion, un-authorised re-export and the illicit trade in SALW. However, the ITI must adapt to technological developments to keep its relevance and full effectiveness.

The EU underscores the importance of a gender sensitive approach to SALW-control, highlights the differing impacts of armed violence on women, men, girls and boys, and promotes the role of women in the implementation of the UN PoA and gender mainstreaming in SALW control actions as a condition for their effectiveness.

Terrorist attacks all around the world, including on European soil, illustrate the link between organised crime and terrorism, notably in the trafficking of firearms. The EU recognizes the role of the UN PoA in the fight against terrorism, including in connection to Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) as these weapons pose a very specific risk when diverted into unauthorised hands. We also welcome the recognition of the successful model of regional and sub-regional roadmaps that the EU supports.

The EU continues to believe that the implementation of the UN PoA must be supported by synergies with other international and regional instruments focused on similar objectives such as the Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Firearms Protocol. In order to reinforce international cooperation and effective implementation of the UN PoA we need to build on the momentum generated by the successful outcome of the BMS7 and the Seventh Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty.

Mr. Chair,

We welcome the ongoing consultation process Protecting Civilians in Urban Warfare which Ireland has launched with the aim of contributing to the elaboration of a Political Declaration to address the humanitarian harm arising from the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of explosive weapons in populated areas

The EU also welcomes the agreement of a consensus report in September in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus with substantial recommendations as an important success for conventional arms control and look forward to the timely continuation of the process. The GGE report is rich in substance — from exploration of safety and security considerations, and existing gaps in through-life ammunition management to key overarching issues such as international cooperation and assistance and gender mainstreaming. This report also recommends to elaborate under the auspices of the General Assembly a new global framework which should address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance, without prejudice to national legal systems, regarding national ammunition ownership, possession and use, as a set of political commitments which will be part of a comprehensive framework to support safe, secure, and sustainable through-

life ammunition management at the national, sub-regional, regional and global levels, building upon and complementing existing frameworks.

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission
Octobre 2021**

Déclaration de la France

« DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE »

La 10ème conférence d'examen du Traité de non-prolifération, dont nous avons fêté l'an passé le 50ème anniversaire, sera un moment phare de l'année 2022. Il doit être l'occasion de réaffirmer le caractère central du TNP dans le régime de non-prolifération, et de reconnaître les bénéfices immenses qu'il a apportés à la sécurité internationale. Le TNP est l'un des traités les plus universels au monde. Il est le seul traité à permettre d'éviter la prolifération des armes nucléaires et de réduire toute possibilité de confrontation nucléaire, tout en apportant à chacun les bénéfices des usages pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire.

1) Le TNP aura également permis de considérablement limiter le nombre d'Etats qui ont acquis l'arme nucléaire. Toutefois, la prolifération nucléaire continue de poser une menace sérieuse à la paix et la stabilité régionale et internationale et doit ainsi rester notre priorité collective.

S'agissant de l'Iran, la France reste fermement engagée en faveur du JCPOA et de sa préservation. Notre objectif reste constant : l'Iran ne doit jamais se doter de l'arme nucléaire. En dépit de nos efforts pour préserver cet accord, l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) confirme que l'Iran poursuit depuis plusieurs mois des activités extrêmement préoccupantes en violation du JCPOA, y compris la production d'uranium enrichi à 20 et 60% et d'uranium métal, qui constituent des étapes clés dans la fabrication d'une arme et qui n'ont aucune explication civile crédible en Iran. L'Iran n'a aujourd'hui jamais été aussi près d'une capacité du seuil. C'est d'autant plus préoccupant qu'il a considérablement réduit sa coopération avec l'AIEA, s'est désengagé des arrangements de vérification et de suivi de l'Accord et a cessé l'application du Protocole additionnel, empêchant l'Agence de mettre pleinement en œuvre le mandat qui lui a été confié. Nous soutenons fermement les efforts du Directeur général de l'AIEA et de ses équipes pour préserver la continuité de la connaissance de l'Agence sur le programme iranien et pour obtenir des réponses à ses questions portant sur certaines activités et matières non-déclarées en Iran. Nous poursuivons nos efforts, en étroite coordination avec nos partenaires, pour que l'Iran mette un terme sans délai à toutes ses activités en violation du JCPOA et reprenne les négociations de Vienne, qu'il a lui-même suspendues il y a plus de trois mois, en vue de conclure rapidement un accord sur le retour des Etats-Unis et de l'Iran au respect de leurs engagements au titre du JCPOA. La pleine mise en œuvre de l'Accord sur le nucléaire iranien doit aller de pair avec le respect de la résolution 2231 alors que l'Iran poursuit le développement à un rythme soutenu de son programme balistique. Il s'agit d'une nécessité de non-prolifération et de sécurité, non seulement pour le Moyen-Orient mais également pour l'ensemble de la communauté internationale.

Moins d'un mois avant l'ouverture de cette Première commission dédiée au désarmement et à la sécurité internationale, la Corée du Nord a procédé à de nouveaux tirs de missiles qui nous rappellent, une fois de plus, sa détermination à poursuivre et diversifier ses programmes d'armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs au mépris des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et des conséquences néfastes de ces activités sur la paix et la sécurité régionale comme internationale. Seul pays à avoir procédé à des essais nucléaires au XXIème siècle, la Corée du Nord continue de donner la priorité au développement de ses arsenaux nucléaire, balistique et d'armes de destruction massives en toute illégalité, à se soustraire à ses engagements au titre du Traité sur la non-prolifération et à défier l'autorité du Conseil de sécurité. Le refus de la RPDC de s'engager de bonne foi dans un dialogue sérieux sur la dénucléarisation complète, vérifiable et irréversible et l'adaptation systématique de ses méthodes pour contourner les sanctions sont inacceptables. Nous devons poursuivre nos efforts pour assurer la mise en œuvre stricte, entière et universelle de ces sanctions pour que le régime nord-

coréen accepte enfin le dialogue et abandonne de manière complète, vérifiable et irréversible ses programmes proliférants.

2) Sur le désarmement, la France se conforme pleinement à ses engagements au titre de l'article VI du TNP. Elle le fait dans le cadre d'une approche progressive et pragmatique, la seule réaliste, de façon à promouvoir la stabilité régionale et internationale, sur la base d'une sécurité non diminuée pour tous.

Nous partageons l'objectif, à terme, de l'élimination totale des armes nucléaires, lorsque le contexte stratégique le permettra. Aujourd'hui la France maintient son arsenal à un niveau le plus bas compatible avec le contexte stratégique, conformément au principe de stricte suffisance.

Le bilan de la France en matière de désarmement nucléaire est exemplaire et sans égal parmi les Etats dotés : en attestent le démantèlement irréversible des installations de production de matières fissiles pour les armes nucléaires ; le démantèlement complet de la composante nucléaire sol-sol ; la réduction de moitié du nombre d'armes nucléaires et la réduction d'un tiers de la composante océanique et de la composante aéroportée ; le démantèlement irréversible du site d'essais dans le Pacifique, parmi d'autres mesures.

La France accorde une grande importance aux efforts de transparence. Elle a précisé la composition de son arsenal nucléaire, soit moins de 300 armes en tout, 4 sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins, trois lots de 16 missiles portés par sous-marins, et 54 missiles aéroportés.

Toutes ces décisions sont cohérentes avec notre refus de toute course aux armements et le maintien de notre dissuasion nucléaire à un niveau de stricte suffisance. La France ne conçoit la dissuasion nucléaire que comme strictement défensive, pour protéger ses intérêts vitaux dans des circonstances extrêmes de légitime défense, conformément à la Charte des Nations-Unies. Elle est pleinement consciente de ses responsabilités particulières, notamment au titre de son statut d'Etat doté au sens du TNP. Elle expose régulièrement et publiquement sa doctrine de dissuasion, dans un souci de transparence, comme en témoigne le discours du Président de la République en février 2020.

La France accorde par ailleurs des garanties négatives de sécurité à tous les Etats non dotés parties au TNP qui respectent leurs engagements de non-prolifération. Elle a soutenu, en prenant des engagements contraignants, la création de zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires en Amérique Latine et dans les Caraïbes, dans le Pacifique, en Afrique et en Asie centrale. Ces engagements ont été confirmés au plus haut niveau de l'Etat français. Nous souhaitons poursuivre le dialogue entre les pays de l'ASEAN et le P5 pour avancer vers la signature du protocole au Traité de Bangkok instituant une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires en Asie du Sud-Est. Les pays de l'ASEAN doivent également se saisir de la question.

La France a repris en septembre 2020 la présidence du processus P5, enceinte de dialogue réunissant les 5 Etats dotés de l'arme nucléaire. Consciente des responsabilités spéciales qui incombent aux Etats du P5, la France est convaincue de l'importance d'un dialogue continu dans ce format, en particulier sur les politiques et doctrines nucléaires et les enjeux stratégiques internationaux, pour maintenir la stabilité stratégique et réduire les risques d'escalade involontaire. La France coordonne les travaux visant à mettre en œuvre la feuille de route du P5, telle qu'agréée dès la conférence de Pékin et réaffirmée lors de la présidence britannique et à plusieurs reprises depuis lors, avec pour objectif de formaliser une contribution positive des Etats du P5 à la conférence d'examen du TNP par la concrétisation d'une série de livrables couvrant les 3 piliers du Traité. Nous vous renvoyons ici à la déclaration de la France en tant que présidente du P5, prononcée lors du discours général de cette première commission.

3) La prolongation pour 5 ans du traité New Start sur les arsenaux nucléaires stratégiques entre la Russie et les États-Unis (en février dernier), puis la reprise du dialogue stratégique américano-russe à la suite du sommet Biden-Poutine depuis juin dernier sont des signaux positifs. Toutefois, beaucoup d'efforts restent à faire en

matière de maîtrise des armements. En particulier, depuis la fin du traité FNI, la France appelle à la tenue de discussions visant à s'assurer que les intérêts de sécurité des Européens seront bien pris en compte dans une négociation sur un nouvel instrument à même d'assurer la stabilité stratégique sur le continent européen. L'érosion des instruments de maîtrise des armements est un sujet de préoccupation pour les Européens, qui doivent être parties prenantes de cette discussion, qui concerne leur sécurité.

4) Dans cet esprit, nous estimons dangereux de déconnecter les enjeux de désarmement nucléaire de la prise en compte du contexte de sécurité, caractérisé par des tensions globales et régionales croissantes, l'augmentation de certains arsenaux, et par la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs.

C'est la raison pour laquelle la France s'oppose au Traité d'interdiction des armes nucléaires (TIAN). Loin de renforcer l'architecture du désarmement et de la non-prolifération nucléaire, il fragilise au contraire gravement le régime de non-prolifération, en premier lieu le TNP, dont il ne reprend pas les plus hauts standards. En effet, le TIAN comporte des dispositions qui nient le caractère central du TNP : ainsi, il ne pose pas comme condition d'adhésion d'être partie au TNP et ne prévoit pas de régime de vérification. Il comporte en outre des dispositions bien moins protectrices que le TNP, par exemple sur le droit d'accès au nucléaire civil, qui n'est pas encadré dans le TIAN. Il n'est pas une réponse au risque de prolifération. Pour ces raisons, la France réitère qu'elle n'entend pas y adhérer.

5) La France poursuivra son action résolue et déterminée en faveur des prochaines étapes réalistes et graduelles du désarmement nucléaire, et nous appelons tous les Etats parties à nous rejoindre autour d'un agenda positif de désarmement nucléaire, tel qu'exposé par le Président de la République :

Comme nous l'avons évoqué, le premier objectif est la préservation de la primauté et de la centralité du TNP pour notre architecture de sécurité internationale.

L'entrée en vigueur du TICE est une autre priorité et nous appelons tous les Etats qui ne l'ont pas déjà fait à signer et ratifier le TICE. La France a été le premier Etat doté à signer et ratifier le TICE, il y a 25 ans, et continue de soutenir activement les travaux de l'OTICE, tant sur un plan scientifique et technique que financier. L'achèvement et l'entretien du système de surveillance international, installé à 92% et véritable clé de voûte du régime de vérification, demeurent une priorité. Avec la certification de la station IS25, à la Guadeloupe en 2021, la France remplit désormais tous ses engagements au titre du traité, et se singularise par cet effort.

La négociation, à la Conférence du désarmement, d'un Traité FMCT, sur la base du document CD/1299 et du mandat qu'il contient, constitue également une étape incontournable et irremplaçable vers un monde exempt d'armes nucléaires. Un FMCT empêchera le développement quantitatif des arsenaux nucléaires. Il n'y aura pas de monde exempt d'armes nucléaires sans FMCT. Nous appelons au lancement sans attendre des négociations sur un traité FMCT à la Conférence du désarmement.

Les échanges sur les enjeux techniques de la vérification du désarmement nucléaire entre Etats dotés et non dotés d'armes nucléaires sont également importants pour accroître la compréhension et renforcer la confiance entre les Etats parties au TNP. La France contribue résolument aux travaux du Partenariat international sur la vérification du désarmement nucléaire (IPNDV), a participé au groupe d'experts gouvernementaux (GGE) sur le rôle de la vérification en matière de désarmement nucléaire, et maintiendra le même niveau d'engagement au sein du nouveau GGE qui débutera ses travaux d'ici quelques semaines. L'exercice international de terrain organisé conjointement par l'Allemagne et la France NuDiVe mené en septembre 2019 était une réalisation inédite. Cette coopération franco-allemande sur les enjeux concrets de la vérification du désarmement nucléaire a vocation à se poursuivre, y compris d'ici quelques mois par un nouvel exercice de terrain simulant des procédures de vérification du démantèlement d'une tête nucléaire.

Enfin, les efforts dans le domaine de la réduction des risques stratégiques doivent se poursuivre. Ils reposent principalement sur la transparence des doctrines nucléaires, le dialogue entre responsables politiques et militaires des Etats dotés ou possesseurs, les instruments de communication de crise et les mesures de réassurance, de prévention et de gestion des crises.

Le P5 apportera sa contribution aux discussions en cours sur ce sujet, afin notamment d'ouvrir la voie vers l'identification de mesures de réduction des risques et le lancement d'un dialogue dans lequel les Etats non dotés ont également un rôle à jouer.

L'engagement constructif et de bonne foi de tous les Etats parties sera un élément déterminant pour la tenue prochaine de la 10ème Conférence d'examen du TNP et partant, pour la préservation et le renforcement de cet instrument crucial, pilier de l'architecture de désarmement et non-prolifération./.

Courtesy translation

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee
October 2021**

Statement by France

“NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT”

The 10th Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which we celebrated the 50th anniversary last year, will be a key moment in 2022. It should be an opportunity to reaffirm the centrality of the NPT to the non-proliferation regime, and to recognise the immense benefits it has brought to international security. The NPT is one of the most universal treaties in the world. It is the only treaty that prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduces the possibility of nuclear confrontation, while providing everyone with the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

1) The NPT has also significantly limited the number of States that have acquired nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, nuclear proliferation continues to pose a serious threat to regional and international peace and stability and must therefore remain our collective priority.

With regard to Iran, France remains firmly committed to the JCPoA and its preservation. More broadly, our objective remains constant: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons. Despite our efforts to preserve this agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran has been pursuing for several months activities of great concern in violation of the JCPoA, including the production of 20 and 60% enriched uranium and uranium metal, which are key steps in the manufacture of a weapon and which have no credible civilian explanation in Iran. Iran has never been so close to a threshold capability. This is all the more worrying given that Iran has significantly reduced its cooperation with the IAEA, disengaged from the verification and monitoring arrangements of the Agreement, and stopped implementing the Additional Protocol, preventing the Agency from fully implementing its mandate. We strongly support the efforts of the IAEA Director General and his staff to maintain the continuity of the Agency's knowledge of the Iranian programme and to obtain answers to its questions about certain undeclared activities and materials in Iran. We continue our efforts, in close coordination with our partners, to ensure that Iran immediately ceases all activities in violation of the JCPoA and resumes the Vienna negotiations, which it itself suspended more than three months ago, with a view to reaching an early agreement on the return of the United States and Iran to compliance with their commitments under the JCPoA. Full implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal must go hand in hand with compliance with Resolution

2231 as Iran continues to develop its ballistic programme at a steady pace. This is a non-proliferation and security necessity, not only for the Middle East but also for the entire international community.

Less than a month before the opening of this First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, North Korea carried out new missile launches that remind us, once again, of its determination to pursue and diversify its weapons of mass destruction programmes and their means of delivery in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions and of the harmful consequences of these activities on regional and international peace and security. As the only country to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century, DPRK continues to prioritise the development of its nuclear, ballistic and weapons of mass destruction arsenals illegally, evading its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and defying the authority of the Security Council. The DPRK's refusal to engage in good faith in a serious dialogue on complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation and its systematic adaptation of methods to circumvent sanctions are unacceptable. We must continue our efforts to ensure the strict, full and universal implementation of these sanctions so that the North Korean regime finally accepts dialogue and completely, verifiably and irreversibly abandons its proliferation programmes.

2) On disarmament, France fully complies with its commitments under Article VI of the NPT. It does so within the framework of a progressive and pragmatic approach, the only realistic one, so as to promote regional and international stability, on the basis of undiminished security for all.

We share the objective of the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons, when the strategic context allows for it. Today, France maintains its arsenal at the lowest level compatible with the strategic context, in accordance with the principle of strict sufficiency.

France's record on nuclear disarmament is exemplary and unparalleled among the nuclear-weapon States: the irreversible dismantling of fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons; the complete dismantling of the ground-to-ground nuclear component; the halving of the number of nuclear weapons and the reduction of the oceanic and airborne components by one third; the irreversible dismantling of the test site in the Pacific, amongst other measures.

France attaches great importance to transparency efforts. It has clarified the composition of its nuclear arsenal, with less than 300 weapons in all, 4 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, three batches of 16 submarine-launched missiles, and 54 airborne missiles.

All these decisions are consistent with our refusal to engage in any arms race and with the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent at a level of strict sufficiency. France sees nuclear deterrence as strictly defensive only, to protect its vital interests in extreme circumstances of self-defence, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. It is fully aware of its particular responsibilities, in particular by virtue of its status as an NPT nuclear-weapon state. It regularly and publicly sets out its doctrine of deterrence, with a view to transparency, as shown by the speech of the President of the Republic in February 2020.

France also provides negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States that comply with their non-proliferation commitments. It has supported, through binding commitments, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Pacific, Africa and Central Asia. These commitments have been confirmed at the highest level of the French state. We wish to continue the dialogue between ASEAN countries and the P5 to move towards the signature of the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. ASEAN countries should also take up this issue.

In September 2020, France took over the chairmanship of the P5 process, a forum for dialogue between the five nuclear-weapon States. Aware of the special responsibilities incumbent on the P5 States, France is convinced of the importance of a continuous dialogue in this format, in particular on nuclear policies and doctrines and international strategic issues, to maintain strategic stability and reduce the risks of unintentional escalation.

France is coordinating work to implement the P5 roadmap, as agreed at the Beijing conference and reaffirmed during the UK presidency and on several occasions since, with the aim of formalising a positive contribution by the P5 States to the NPT Review Conference through the delivery of a series of deliverables covering the 3 pillars of the Treaty. We refer you here to the statement of France as chair of the P5, delivered during the general address of this First Committee.

3) The extension for 5 years of the New Start Treaty on strategic nuclear arsenals between Russia and the United States (last February) and the resumption of the US-Russian strategic dialogue following the Biden-Putin summit last June are positive signals. However, much remains to be done in the field of arms control. In particular, since the demise of the INF Treaty, France has been calling for discussions to ensure that European security interests are taken into account in negotiations on a new instrument to ensure strategic stability on the European continent. The erosion of arms control instruments is a matter of concern for Europeans, who must be involved in this discussion which concerns their security.

4) In this spirit, we consider it dangerous to disconnect the challenges of nuclear disarmament from the security context, characterised by growing global and regional tensions, the increase of certain arsenals, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

This is why France is opposed to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Far from strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, it seriously undermines the non-proliferation regime, first and foremost the NPT, whose highest standards it does not meet. Indeed, the TPNW contains provisions that go against the centrality of the NPT: for example, it does not make being a party to the NPT a condition for accession and does not provide for a verification regime. It also contains provisions that are far less protective than the NPT, for example on the right of access to civilian nuclear power, which is not regulated in the TPNW. It is not a response to the risk of proliferation. For these reasons, France reiterates that it does not intend to join.

5) France will continue its resolute and determined action in favour of the next realistic and gradual steps towards nuclear disarmament, and we call on all States Parties to join us in a positive nuclear disarmament agenda, as set out by the President of the Republic:

As we have mentioned, the first objective is the preservation of the primacy and centrality of the NPT for our international security architecture.

The entry into force of the CTBT is another priority and we call on all States that have not already done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. France was the first Nuclear Weapon State to sign and ratify the CTBT 25 years ago and continues to scientifically, technically and financially support the work of the CTBTO. The completion and maintenance of the international monitoring system, which is 92% installed and is the cornerstone of the verification regime, remains a priority. With the certification of the IS25 station in Guadeloupe in 2021, France is now fulfilling all its commitments under the treaty, and stands out in this effort.

The negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate it contains, is also an essential and irreplaceable step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. An FMCT will prevent the quantitative development of nuclear arsenals. There will be no nuclear-weapon-free world without an FMCT. We call for the immediate start of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.

Exchanges on the technical issues of nuclear disarmament verification between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States are also important to increase understanding and build confidence among NPT States parties. France contributes to the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), participated in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the role of verification in nuclear disarmament, and

will maintain the same level of engagement in the new GGE which will start its work in the next few weeks. The joint German-French international field exercise NuDiVe in September 2019 was a first-time achievement. This Franco-German cooperation on the concrete challenges of nuclear disarmament verification is intended to continue, including in a few months' time through a new field exercise simulating nuclear warhead dismantlement verification procedures.

Finally, efforts in the area of strategic risk reduction must continue. These efforts are mainly based on the transparency of nuclear doctrines, dialogue between political and military leaders of the nuclear-weapon states, crisis communication tools and measures for reassurance, prevention and crisis management.

The P5 will contribute to the ongoing discussions on this subject, in particular to pave the way for the identification of risk reduction measures and the launching of a dialogue in which non-nuclear-weapon States also have a role to play.

The constructive and good faith engagement of all States Parties will be a key element for the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference and thus for the preservation and strengthening of this crucial instrument, a pillar of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture./.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission**

Déclaration de la France

« AUTRES ARMES DE DESTRUCTION MASSIVE »

L'appel au respect des normes de non prolifération des armes de destruction massives ne doit jamais être un vain mot car il en va de la préservation de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité internationales ; l'appel à tous les États à ce qu'ils respectent leurs obligations internationales n'est pas une option : c'est un impératif ferme et immédiat. Face à la menace que représente la prolifération nucléaire, balistique, chimique et biologique, nous devons nous montrer résolus. C'est notre responsabilité collective que de refuser la banalisation des crises de prolifération et l'impunité dont croient jouir certains États.

En quelques années seulement, que ce soit en Syrie, en Russie ou sur le territoire de la Malaisie et du Royaume-Uni, le tabou de l'emploi d'armes chimiques, que l'on pensait inviolable, a été levé et nous assistons à une réémergence de l'emploi de ces armes abjectes.

La question chimique syrienne est loin d'être résolue : la non-coopération du régime syrien avec l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC) est flagrante et les emplois répétés d'armes chimiques ont été confirmés par plusieurs mécanismes indépendants et par les équipes mêmes de l'OIAC. En dépit de l'adoption de la résolution 2118 au Conseil de sécurité en 2013 -résolution qui doit être pleinement mise en œuvre- le régime syrien continue de refuser de faire la lumière sur l'état de ses stocks d'armes chimiques. Nous avons démontré notre fermeté face aux mensonges répétés du régime syrien en adoptant en avril dernier lors de la 25ème Conférence des États parties à la Convention sur l'interdiction des armes chimiques (CIAC) une décision, portée par la France au nom de 46 délégations, suspendant certains droits et privilèges de la République arabe syrienne en raison de son non-respect de la Convention. Nous ne pouvions pas laisser un Etat-partie violer de manière flagrante et répétée ses engagements internationaux sans agir. Cette décision n'est pas irréversible et il revient désormais à la Syrie de se mettre en conformité avec ses obligations si elle souhaite rétablir ses droits et privilèges. Pour cela, nous le rappelons, il est impératif que la Syrie coopère résolument et de bonne foi, conformément à ses obligations internationales, avec l'OIAC, qui poursuit son travail en toute transparence et

avec un très grand professionnalisme. La Syrie s'enferme dans une impasse. L'OIAC et ses États parties lui ont tendu la main pour mettre fin à la guerre chimique qu'elle mène de manière illégale et choquante depuis maintenant dix ans contre sa propre population ; à elle désormais de saisir cette opportunité.

Comme l'a confirmée l'OIAC, la tentative d'assassinat contre Alexeï Navalny en août 2020 au moyen d'un agent neurotoxique appartenant à la famille des « Novitchok », est une autre détestable illustration du recours à une arme chimique par un État partie à la CIAC. Je tiens ici à rappeler ce qu'est le Novitchok : un agent neurotoxique développé par la Russie, utilisé par la Russie, employé sur le territoire de Russie. Il appartient donc à la Russie de faire toute la lumière sur les circonstances de ce crime et sur ceux qui l'ont perpétré. Cette affaire, tout comme celle de Salisbury, montre que la norme de non-prolifération chimique doit être rappelée avec fermeté pour ne pas laisser l'impunité s'installer.

La France soutient à cet égard le projet de résolution déposé par la Pologne qui souligne la pertinence du régime d'interdiction de l'emploi d'armes chimiques et la nécessité de rétablir des instruments de prévention d'emploi de ces armes.

Nous le rappelons avec force : l'emploi d'armes chimiques est inacceptable quel que soit le lieu, la période, l'auteur et quelles que soient les circonstances. Notre action ne doit connaître aucune exception ni en Syrie, ni ailleurs. La France est déterminée à œuvrer, en lien étroit avec ses partenaires, contre l'utilisation de ces armes et pour que les auteurs d'attaques chimiques soient traduits en justice et sanctionnés. C'est en particulier l'objectif du Partenariat international contre l'impunité d'utilisation d'armes chimiques (PICIA) lancé à Paris en 2018 et qui réunit désormais 40 États et l'Union européenne. Nous devons tout faire pour que la menace que fait peser la réémergence de l'emploi d'armes chimiques sur notre sécurité collective cesse et pour restaurer la crédibilité de la norme d'interdiction de ces armes.

Nous devons également poursuivre nos efforts en vue d'une coopération renforcée et opérationnelle dans le cadre de la Convention sur l'interdiction des armes biologiques et à toxines (CIABT) dont la neuvième Conférence d'examen se tiendra en août prochain. Cette Convention est l'unique norme internationale quasi universelle de lutte contre la prolifération biologique : c'est un pilier fondamental du régime de non-prolifération. Nous devons saisir l'échéance de la prochaine Conférence d'examen et les défis récents posés par la pandémie de Covid-19 pour intensifier nos efforts en vue de l'universalisation de cette Convention. Nous devons aussi chercher à renforcer la transparence et la confiance dans le cadre de la CIABT. A cet égard, la France poursuivra notamment ses efforts dans trois directions : en premier lieu, nous poursuivrons notre implication en vue d'opérationnaliser l'article X de la Convention au travers de notre initiative « SecBio », plateforme internationale en ligne visant à aider au développement dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la sûreté biologiques à destination des installations et des praticiens ; en second lieu, nous continuerons de promouvoir la mise en place d'une plateforme pour les exercices de transparence volontaire dont l'objectif est d'accroître la coopération et l'assistance par le partage croisé d'expériences ; enfin, nous espérons que la proposition franco-indienne d'élaboration d'une base de données visant à une meilleure compréhension par les États de la mise en œuvre de l'article VII retiendra l'attention de tous.

Convaincue que les violations directes et graves de la CIAC qui se sont multipliées depuis 2013 ne doivent pas rester impunies, la France s'est portée volontaire pour être « championne » de l'action de l'agenda du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies intitulée « rétablir le respect de la norme globale contre les armes chimiques ». Dans le même esprit, la France a décidé d'endosser le rôle de champion des actions 10 et 11 de l'agenda du SGNU, « se préparer à enquêter sur les allégations d'emploi d'armes biologiques » et « développer un cadre pour répondre à tout emploi d'armes biologiques ». Notre objectif est de garantir que les instruments permettant de faire toute la lumière sur une potentielle attaque chimique ou biologique demeurent indépendants et robustes. C'est pourquoi, nous devons en particulier préserver la nature et la portée du mécanisme d'enquête du Secrétaire général des Nations unies, instrument international indépendant permettant d'enquêter sur l'utilisation présumée d'armes chimiques et biologiques et qui vise à faire respecter les normes internationales en contribuant à dissuader les

États membres des Nations Unies, les individus ou les organisations d'utiliser de telles armes. Nous n'accepterons pas que l'indépendance, la flexibilité et l'efficacité du mécanisme du Secrétaire général soient remises en question.

Monsieur le Président,

Moins d'un mois avant l'ouverture de cette Première commission dédiée au désarmement et à la sécurité internationale, la Corée du Nord a procédé à de nouveaux tirs de missiles qui nous rappellent, une fois de plus, sa détermination à poursuivre et diversifier ses programmes d'armes de destruction massives et de leurs vecteurs au mépris des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et des conséquences néfastes de ces activités sur la paix et la sécurité régionale comme internationale. Seul pays à avoir procédé à des essais nucléaires au XXI^{ème} siècle, la Corée du Nord continue de donner la priorité au développement de ses arsenaux nucléaire, balistique et d'armes de destruction massives en toute illégalité, à se soustraire à ses engagements au titre du Traité sur la non-prolifération et à défier l'autorité du Conseil de sécurité. Le refus de la RPDC de s'engager de bonne foi dans un dialogue sérieux sur la dénucléarisation complète, vérifiable et irréversible et l'adaptation systématique de ses méthodes pour contourner les sanctions est inacceptable. Nous devons poursuivre nos efforts pour assurer la mise en œuvre stricte, entière et universelle de ces sanctions pour que le régime nord-coréen accepte enfin le dialogue et abandonne ses programmes proliférants.

Comme nous le savons, la Corée du Nord dispose également d'un programme d'armes chimiques et elle a très probablement fait usage d'un agent neurotoxique, le VX, à l'encontre de l'un de ses ressortissants en 2017 en Malaisie.

Le Plan d'Action Global Commun (JCPoA) constitue un élément clé de l'architecture de non-prolifération. L'objectif est clair : s'assurer que l'Iran ne puisse jamais acquérir l'arme nucléaire. En dépit de nos efforts pour préserver cet accord, l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) confirme que l'Iran poursuit depuis plusieurs mois des activités extrêmement préoccupantes en violation du JCPoA, y compris la production d'uranium enrichi à 20 et 60% et d'uranium métal, qui constituent des étapes clés dans la fabrication d'une arme et qui n'ont aucune explication civile crédible en Iran. L'Iran n'a aujourd'hui jamais été aussi près d'une capacité du seuil. C'est d'autant plus préoccupant qu'il a considérablement réduit sa coopération avec l'AIEA, s'est désengagé des arrangements de vérification et de suivi de l'Accord et a cessé l'application du Protocole additionnel, empêchant l'Agence de mettre pleinement en œuvre le mandat qui lui a été confié. Nous soutenons fermement les efforts du Directeur général de l'AIEA et de ses équipes pour préserver la continuité de la connaissance de l'Agence sur le programme iranien et pour obtenir des réponses à ses questions portant sur certaines activités et matières non-déclarées en Iran. Nous poursuivons nos efforts, en étroite coordination avec nos partenaires, pour que l'Iran mette un terme sans délai à toutes ses activités en violation du JCPoA et reprenne les négociations de Vienne, qu'il a lui-même suspendues il y a plus de trois mois, en vue de conclure rapidement un accord sur le retour des États-Unis et de l'Iran au respect de leurs engagements au titre du JCPoA. La pleine mise en œuvre de l'Accord sur le nucléaire iranien doit aller de pair avec le respect de la résolution 2231 alors que l'Iran poursuit le développement à un rythme soutenu de son programme balistique. Il s'agit d'une nécessité de non-prolifération et de sécurité, non seulement pour le Moyen-Orient mais également pour l'ensemble de la communauté internationale.

La problématique des vecteurs d'armes de destruction massive est d'importance majeure car le développement illégal de programmes balistiques par plusieurs pays alimente la dissémination de ces technologies. Nous constatons avec inquiétude une dangereuse accélération de la diffusion de technologies de missiles sophistiquées, y compris vers des acteurs non-étatiques, notamment depuis le territoire de Syrie. La RPDC continue d'aider des pays tiers à développer des technologies de missiles tandis que l'Iran a continué de transférer des vecteurs et technologies associées à des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques au Moyen-Orient, en violation de plusieurs résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité.

Dans ce contexte, il est urgent que nous intensifions nos efforts pour renforcer les arrangements multilatéraux. Nous invitons tous les États à rejoindre le Code de Conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques (HCoC) et à adhérer aux Directives du Régime de Contrôle de la Technologie des Missiles (MTCR). La France est également favorable à l'élargissement de la participation à l'Initiative de Sécurité contre la Prolifération (PSI) qui est une mise en œuvre concrète de la résolution 1540. Cette résolution et le comité qu'elle a créé, ont permis des progrès dans toutes les régions du monde, contre la prolifération des armes nucléaires, chimiques, biologiques et de leurs vecteurs. Mais la menace a évolué et de nouveaux défis sont apparus. Le rôle du Comité 1540 ainsi que ses capacités d'expertise doivent ainsi être renforcés. La menace de terrorisme nucléaire ou radiologique n'a pas disparu et il est essentiel de poursuivre la coopération internationale face à ce défi commun./.

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee**

Statement by France

“OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION”

Courtesy translation

The call for all States to respect their non-proliferation international obligations is not an option: it is a firm and immediate imperative, for the preservation of international peace, security and stability is at stake. In the face of the threat of nuclear, ballistic, chemical and biological proliferation, we must be firm. It is our collective responsibility to reject the trivialisation of proliferation crises and the impunity that some States believe they enjoy.

In just a few years, whether in Syria, Russia, Malaysia or the United Kingdom, the taboo on the use of chemical weapons, which was thought to be inviolable, has been lifted and we are witnessing a re-emergence of the use of these abject weapons.

The Syrian chemical issue is far from resolved: the Syrian regime's non-cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is blatant and the repeated use of chemical weapons has been confirmed by several independent mechanisms and by the OPCW's own staff. Despite the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2118 in 2013 - a resolution that must be fully implemented - the Syrian regime continues to refuse to shed light on the status of its chemical weapons stockpiles. We demonstrated our firmness in the face of the Syrian regime's repeated lies by adopting last April at the 25th Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a decision, carried by France on behalf of 46 delegations, suspending certain rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic due to its non-compliance with the Convention. We could not allow a State Party to blatantly and repeatedly violate its international commitments without taking action. This decision is not irreversible and it is now up to Syria to comply with its obligations if it wishes to restore its rights and privileges. To this end, we reiterate, it is imperative that Syria cooperates resolutely and in good faith, in accordance with its international obligations, with the OPCW, which is continuing its work in full transparency and with great professionalism. Syria is at an impasse. The OPCW and its States Parties have reached out to Syria to end the chemical warfare it has been conducting illegally and shockingly for ten years now against its own population; it must now seize this opportunity.

As confirmed by the OPCW, the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny in August 2020 using a nerve agent belonging to the “Novichok” family is another abhorrent example of the use of a chemical weapon by a State Party to the CWC. I would like to recall here what Novichok is: a nerve agent developed by Russia, used by Russia, and used on the Russian territory. It is therefore up to Russia to shed full light on the circumstances of this crime and on those who perpetrated it. This case, like that of Salisbury, shows that the norm of chemical non-proliferation must be firmly recalled in order not to allow impunity to take hold.

In this respect, France supports the draft resolution tabled by Poland, which stresses the relevance of the regime prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the need to re-establish instruments to prevent the use of these weapons.

We strongly reiterate that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed, and under whatever circumstances. There must be no exception to our action in Syria or elsewhere. France is determined to work, in close cooperation with its partners, against the use of these weapons and to ensure that the perpetrators of chemical attacks are brought to justice and punished. This is in particular the objective of the International Partnership against Impunity for Chemical Weapons Use (PICIAC) launched in Paris in 2018 and which now brings together 40 States and the European Union. We must do everything possible to end the threat to our collective security posed by the re-emergence of chemical weapons use and to restore the credibility of the norm prohibiting these weapons.

We must also continue our efforts towards enhanced and operational cooperation in the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which will hold its ninth Review Conference in August. The BTWC is the only near-universal international norm against biological proliferation and is a fundamental pillar of the non-proliferation regime. We must seize the opportunity of the upcoming Review Conference and the recent challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic to intensify our efforts to universalise the Convention. We must also seek to strengthen transparency and confidence in the BTWC. In this respect, France will continue its efforts in three directions: First, we will continue our involvement in operationalising Article X of the Convention through our “SecBio” initiative, an international online platform to assist development in the field of biosafety and biosecurity for facilities and practitioners; Secondly, we will continue to promote the establishment of a platform for voluntary transparency exercises aimed at increasing cooperation and assistance through the cross-sharing of experiences; finally, we hope that the Franco-Indian proposal for the development of a database aimed at a better understanding by States of the implementation of Article VII will receive the attention of all.

Convinced that the direct and serious violations of the CWC that have multiplied since 2013 must not go unpunished, France has volunteered to be a “champion” of the UN Secretary-General’s agenda action entitled “Restoring compliance with the global norm against chemical weapons”. In the same spirit, France has decided to take on the role of champion of actions 10 and 11 of the UNSG agenda, “prepare to investigate allegations of use of biological weapons” and “develop a framework to respond to any use of biological weapons”. Our goal is to ensure that the instruments for investigating a potential chemical or biological attack remain independent and robust. In particular, therefore, we must preserve the nature and scope of the UN Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, an independent international instrument for investigating the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, which aims to uphold international norms by helping to deter the use of such weapons by UN member states, individuals and organisations. We will not accept that the independence, flexibility and effectiveness of the Secretary-General’s mechanism be called into question.

Less than a month before the opening of this First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, North Korea has carried out new missile launches which remind us, once again, of its determination to pursue and diversify its programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the harmful consequences of these activities on regional and international peace and security. As the only country to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century, North Korea continues to prioritise the development of its nuclear, ballistic and weapons of mass destruction

arsenals illegally, evading its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and defying the authority of the Security Council. The DPRK's refusal to engage in good faith in a serious dialogue on complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation and its systematic adaptation of methods to circumvent sanctions is unacceptable. We must continue our efforts to ensure the strict, full and universal implementation of these sanctions so that the North Korean regime finally accepts dialogue and abandons its proliferation programmes.

North Korea also has a chemical weapons programme and most likely used a nerve agent, VX, against one of its nationals in 2017 in Malaysia.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a key element of the non-proliferation architecture. The objective is clear: to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon. Despite our efforts to preserve this agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran has been pursuing activities of grave concern in violation of the JCPOA for several months, including the production of 20 and 60% enriched uranium and uranium metal, which are key steps in the manufacture of a weapon and have no credible civilian explanation in Iran. Iran has never been so close to a threshold capability. This is all the more worrying given that it has significantly reduced its cooperation with the IAEA, disengaged from the verification and monitoring arrangements of the Agreement, and stopped implementing the Additional Protocol, preventing the Agency from fully implementing its mandate. We strongly support the efforts of the IAEA Director General and his staff to maintain the continuity of the Agency's knowledge of the Iranian programme and to obtain answers to its questions about certain undeclared activities and materials in Iran. We continue our efforts, in close coordination with our partners, to ensure that Iran immediately ceases all activities in violation of the JCPOA and resumes the Vienna negotiations, which it itself suspended more than three months ago, with a view to reaching an early agreement on the return of the United States and Iran to compliance with their commitments under the JCPOA. Full implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal must go hand in hand with compliance with Resolution 2231 as Iran continues to develop its ballistic programme at a steady pace. This is a non-proliferation and security necessity, not only for the Middle East but also for the entire international community.

The issue of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction is of major importance because the illegal development of ballistic programmes by several countries is fuelling the spread of these technologies. We note with concern a dangerous acceleration in the spread of sophisticated missile technologies, including to non-state actors, notably from the territory of Syria. The DPRK continues to assist third countries in the development of missile technologies, while Iran has continued to transfer delivery systems and related technologies to state and non-state actors in the Middle East, in violation of several Security Council resolutions.

In this context, it is urgent that we intensify our efforts to strengthen multilateral arrangements. We invite all states to join the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines. France is also in favour of broadening participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is a concrete implementation of Resolution 1540. This resolution and the committee it created have enabled progress in all regions of the world against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. But the threat has evolved and new challenges have emerged. The role of the 1540 Committee and its expertise must therefore be strengthened. The threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism has not disappeared and it is essential to pursue international cooperation in the face of this common challenge./.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission
Octobre 2021**

Déclaration de la France

« ESPACE EXTRA-ATMOSPHERIQUE »

L'espace est aujourd'hui indispensable, pour ses applications touchant à la vie quotidienne, et pour ses finalités tant civiles que militaires. Cette utilisation croissante de l'espace signifie que notre dépendance envers les moyens spatiaux ne peut que croître.

La France est attachée à la préservation de la paix et de la sûreté des activités spatiales, ainsi qu'au respect des principes clés qui régissent les activités spatiales, notamment ceux de la Charte des Nations Unies et du traité de l'Espace de 1967, telle que la liberté d'accès à l'espace et son utilisation pacifique.

La France est en outre attachée à assurer la sécurité et la viabilité à long terme des activités spatiales, afin de prévenir la dégradation des conditions d'exploitation de l'espace et de préserver l'accès des générations futures à l'espace.

Toutefois, les bénéfices que nous retirons des applications spatiales sont sérieusement menacés par la détérioration actuelle de l'environnement spatial, du fait des risques d'incidents, d'actes délibérés, voire à cause d'actes hostiles qui peuvent aggraver dans des proportions considérables la prolifération des débris spatiaux et menacer notre sûreté et la pérennité de l'utilisation de l'espace. Il est de notre intérêt commun de promouvoir un principe d'utilisation responsable de l'espace.

L'analyse renouvelée de l'environnement spatial, de ses menaces, et de ses risques ont conduit à une adaptation de notre stratégie spatiale nationale. La stratégie de défense spatiale publiée en juin 2019 vise à renforcer notre autonomie stratégique, en particulier en renforçant des capacités militaires actuelles de veille stratégique et d'appui aux opérations; en étendant des capacités de connaissance de la situation spatiale (SSA); enfin en développant d'une capacité défensive dans l'espace. Notre stratégie est strictement défensive et conforme au droit international et à la Charte des Nations Unies, qui s'applique dans son intégralité à l'espace extra-atmosphérique.

Le projet sino-russe de traité visant la prévention du déploiement en premier d'armes dans l'espace déposé à la Conférence du désarmement et les résolutions y afférentes présentées en Première Commission, comportent de nombreuses défaillances. Ils ne comprennent pas de définition de ce qu'est une arme dans l'espace. Or, la majorité des moyens spatiaux étant aujourd'hui duale, la distinction entre des capacités militaires ou civiles, offensives et défensives et, en définitive, le choix d'en interdire certaines plutôt que d'autres, est malaisée. Ainsi tout objet spatial peut être une arme par destination. Certaines capacités nécessaires au maintien d'un accès libre et viable à l'espace, comme les capacités de service en orbite et de retrait actif des débris par exemple, peuvent également être utilisées à des fins agressives.

En outre le PPWT et les initiatives y afférentes ne s'adressent qu'à un type exclusif de menaces, occultant les menaces provenant du sol vers l'espace, ou encore les menaces résultant de comportements hostiles ou agressifs. Nonobstant son opposition au projet de traité PPWT, la France a contribué activement aux travaux du GGE PAROS, qui a permis de démontrer les limites du PPWT et l'intérêt d'y préférer des mesures de transparence de confiance et de comportements responsables.

Sans s'opposer a priori à des approches de type juridique, pour peu qu'elles soient vérifiables, la France privilégie à ce stade des propositions immédiatement applicables compte tenu de la rapide détérioration de l'espace extra-atmosphérique et du caractère urgent de la réponse à y apporter.

A ce titre, la priorité doit être aujourd'hui de promouvoir des mesures de confiance et de transparence, ainsi que l'adoption de normes de comportement responsable des acteurs dans l'espace, notamment une norme d'interdiction de la production volontaire de débris multiples à longue durée de vie.

Une approche par les comportements apparaît aujourd'hui comme la plus adaptée afin d'améliorer de manière pragmatique et immédiate la sûreté spatiale, dans la mesure où elle permettra de réduire les risques d'incompréhensions et de malentendus dans l'espace. En encadrant la conduite de certaines activités afin d'éviter qu'elles puissent être perçues comme agressives, cette approche vise à réduire leur potentiel déstabilisateur et à diminuer les risques de conflits et d'escalade dans l'espace. Par ailleurs, l'approche basée sur les comportements, qui se concentre notamment sur les effets de ceux-ci sur les systèmes spatiaux, l'environnement ou les populations, apparaît davantage pérenne car elle ne pourra pas être dépassée par les développements technologiques futurs.

La France apporte ainsi tout notre soutien à la résolution portée par le Royaume-Uni pour la deuxième année consécutive, relative à la « réduction des menaces dans l'espace par l'adoption de normes, règles et principes de comportement responsable ». Cette initiative, présentée sous le point de l'ordre du jour consacré à prévention de la course aux armements dans l'espace, est bienvenue, car elle offre une voie de sortie au blocage qui a prévalu sur le terrain diplomatique relatif à l'espace ces dernières années.

La résolution a lancé un processus inclusif, graduel et ouvert de définition de normes de comportement responsables, dont l'élaboration du rapport du secrétaire général a constitué une première étape.

La contribution française au rapport du Secrétaire général porte notamment sur la caractérisation des actions responsables, irresponsables ou menaçantes au regard de leurs effets, ainsi que de leur impact sur la sûreté et sécurité internationale, et propose de se pencher en priorité sur des normes relatives à trois catégories de comportements : les comportements intentionnels susceptibles d'avoir un fort impact sur l'environnement spatial; les comportements présentant un risque accru de malentendus; et ceux pouvant avoir un impact sur la sécurité des personnes et des biens. La France a également évidemment participé à la rédaction de la contribution de l'UE, laquelle montre la très grande convergence de l'Union sur ce sujet.

Par ailleurs, en invitant les Etats à présenter leurs politiques spatiales, la résolution 75/36 vise à augmenter la transparence des activités spatiales, tout en réduisant les risques d'erreurs de jugement ou de calcul. Nous invitons tous les Etats à contribuer activement à ce processus, auquel la France a pris toute sa part en présentant sa stratégie de défense spatiale à la Conférence du désarmement./.

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee
October 2021**

Statement by France

“OUTER SPACE”

Courtesy translation

Outer space is indispensable today, for its everyday life applications, and for both its civilian and military purposes. This growing use of outer space means that our dependence on outer space assets can only increase.

France is committed to preserving the peace and security of outer space activities, as well as to respecting the key principles governing outer space activities, notably those of the United Nations Charter and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, such as freedom of access to outer space and its peaceful use.

France is also committed to ensuring the safety and long-term sustainability of outer space activities, in order to prevent the degradation of the conditions for the exploitation of outer space and to preserve the access of future generations to outer space.

However, the benefits we derive from space applications are seriously threatened by the current deterioration of the outer space environment, due to the risk of incidents, deliberate acts and even hostile acts that can significantly increase the proliferation of outer space debris and threaten our safety and the sustainability of the use of outer space. It is in our common interest to promote a principle of responsible use of outer space.

The renewed analysis of the outer space environment, its threats, and its risks have led to an adaptation of our national outer space strategy. The outer space defence strategy published in June 2019 aims at strengthening our strategic autonomy, in particular by reinforcing current military capabilities of strategic intelligence and support to operations; by extending space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities; and by developing a defensive capability in outer space. Our strategy is strictly defensive and in accordance with international law and the UN Charter, which applies in its entirety to outer space.

The Sino-Russian draft treaty on the prevention of the first placement of weapons in outer space tabled in the Conference on Disarmament and the related resolutions tabled in the First Committee have many flaws. They do not include a definition of a weapon in outer space. Since most outer space assets are now dual-use, the distinction between military and civilian, offensive and defensive capabilities and, ultimately, the choice to prohibit some rather than others, is not easy. For example, any space object can be a weapon by design. Some capabilities necessary to maintain free and viable access to outer space, such as in-orbit service and active debris removal capabilities, can also be used for aggressive purposes.

Furthermore, the PPWT and related initiatives address only one type of threat, ignoring threats from the ground into outer space, or threats resulting from hostile or aggressive behaviour. Notwithstanding its opposition to the draft PPWT, France has actively contributed to the work of the PAROS GGE, which has demonstrated the limits of the PPWT and the value of preferring transparency and confidence-building measures and responsible behaviour.

Without being opposed a priori to legal approaches, as long as they are verifiable, France favours at this stage proposals that are immediately applicable, given the rapid deterioration of outer space and the urgent nature of the response to be provided.

In this respect, the priority today must be to promote confidence-building and transparency measures, as well as the adoption of norms of responsible behaviour by actors in outer space, in particular a norm prohibiting the voluntary production of multiple long-lived debris.

A behavioural approach appears today to be the most appropriate way to improve outer space safety in a pragmatic and immediate way, insofar as it will reduce the risks of misunderstandings and misconceptions in outer space. By framing the conduct of certain activities so that they cannot be perceived as aggressive, this approach aims to reduce their destabilising potential and to reduce the risk of conflict and escalation in outer space. On the other hand, the behavioural approach, which focuses on the effects of behaviour on outer space systems, the environment or populations, appears to be more sustainable as it cannot be overtaken by future technological developments.

France therefore fully supports the resolution carried by the United Kingdom for the second consecutive year on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. This initiative, presented under the agenda item on PAROS, is welcome as it offers a way out of the stalemate that has prevailed in the diplomatic field on outer space in recent years.

The resolution launched an inclusive, gradual and open process of defining responsible norms of behaviour, of which the preparation of the Secretary-General’s report was a first step.

The French contribution to the Secretary-General’s report focuses in particular on the characterisation of responsible, irresponsible or threatening actions in terms of their effects, as well as their impact on international safety and security, and proposes to focus on norms relating to three categories of behaviour: intentional behaviour likely to have a strong impact on the outer space environment; behaviour presenting an increased risk of misunderstanding; and behaviour likely to have an impact on the safety of persons and property. France also participated in the drafting of the EU contribution, which shows the great convergence of the Union on this subject.

Furthermore, by inviting States to present their outer space policies, Resolution 75/36 aims to increase the transparency of outer space activities, while reducing the risks of errors of judgement or calculation. We invite all States to contribute actively to this process, in which France has played a full part by presenting its outer space defence strategy to the Conference on Disarmament.

76ème session de l’Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies Première Commission

Déclaration de la France

« ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES »

La dégradation du contexte de sécurité international se traduit par la persistance de conflits et de crises, l’aggravation de la menace terroriste, ou encore la multiplication et la diversification des trafics au-delà de toute frontière. Ces évolutions préoccupantes sont autant de raisons de renouveler notre engagement collectif à renforcer l’universalité, le respect et l’efficacité de nos instruments de désarmement et de maîtrise des armements conventionnels.

Les armes conventionnelles continuent de représenter un enjeu majeur de sécurité pour l’ensemble des régions du monde, qu’elles soient affectées par des conflits ou non. Les actions entreprises au niveau international sur les armes conventionnelles s’insèrent dans une approche globale du désarmement, de la non-prolifération et de la maîtrise des armements. Comme dans beaucoup d’autres domaines, il n’y a pas de réponse unique, mais une série

de mesures spécifiques, adaptées et concrètes dont l'objectif premier doit être de renforcer la sécurité internationale, en prenant en compte les préoccupations de sécurité de chacun et au profit de tous.

Le commerce illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre, les ALPC, continue d'alimenter les conflits et d'exacerber la violence armée, d'alimenter le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée. Il constitue une grave menace à la paix et à la sécurité internationales. Les ALPC sont aujourd'hui les armes qui font, de loin, le plus de victimes dans le monde. Elles constituent un frein au développement des Etats les plus fragiles. Le programme d'action des Nations Unies sur les armes légères et de petit calibre (PoA), ainsi que l'Instrument international de traçage (ITI), demeurent des instruments essentiels et doivent être la pierre angulaire de nos efforts pour prévenir, éliminer et combattre les trafics illicites d'ALPC.

Nous nous félicitons à cet égard des engagements pris par les Etats lors de la septième réunion biennale du Programme d'action des Nations unies sur les armes légères et de petit calibre, en particulier s'agissant de la prévention et de la lutte contre le détournement de ces armes au profit d'utilisateurs finaux non autorisés et des appels au renforcement de la coopération et de la coordination régionale et sous-régionale y compris via l'établissement de plans d'actions assortis de buts et objectifs visant à combattre de manière durable et coordonnée le commerce illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre. C'est l'objectif même de la feuille de route conjointement lancée par la France et l'Allemagne pour appuyer les efforts des pays des Balkans occidentaux pour le contrôle des armes à feu et la prévention de leur dissémination. Nous saluons également les efforts de la présidence en vue d'une meilleure prise en compte des questions de genre qui fut l'un des axes majeurs de la présidence française de la 3ème conférence du PoA. Enfin, nous pensons qu'il est indispensable que les Etats répondent aux défis posés par les développements technologiques en matière de conception et de fabrication des armes légères et de petit calibre tant en termes de marquage que de traçage de ces armes.

L'accumulation et la mauvaise gestion de stocks de munitions conventionnelles constituent également une problématique majeure, du fait des risques d'explosion ou de détournement de ces munitions vers les marchés illicites.

Nous saluons les travaux et recommandations du Groupe d'Experts Gouvernementaux désignés par le SGNU qui vient d'achever ses travaux. Dans le prolongement des recommandations du précédent GGE de 2008, ce groupe d'experts gouvernementaux a bien tiré les enseignements de l'expérience des Etats dans la mise en place des mesures nationales requises pour contrôler ces munitions pendant leur cycle de vie, et prévenir les risques à la fois de sûreté et de sécurité pour les populations. Ces dernières décennies depuis les années 80 ont vu 623 explosions accidentelles de stocks de munitions coûter la vie à 30 000 personnes dans 106 Etats. De plus, les munitions détournées au profit des groupes terroristes conduisent souvent aujourd'hui non seulement à leur usage direct mais aussi indirect par la fabrication d'engins explosifs improvisés très meurtriers.

Le Groupe d'experts gouvernementaux a fait des recommandations en vue de la préparation d'un Cadre global de coopération, qui rassemblerait des principes politiques communs, comme référence pour les Etats et renforcerait également la coopération et l'assistance internationale, en particulier au niveau régional ou sous-régional.

L'Allemagne et la France présentent à nouveau conjointement cette année la résolution biennale relative aux « problèmes liés à l'accumulation de stocks de munitions classiques en excès », traditionnellement adoptée sans vote. Elle propose d'assurer un suivi à l'AGNU aux travaux du Groupe d'experts gouvernementaux, tout en recueillant les vues de tous les Etats membres des Nations Unies sur la question. Nous invitons chaque délégation à soutenir son adoption.

Monsieur le Président,

Le Traité sur le commerce des armes repose sur deux grands piliers. Le premier est de renforcer la régulation du commerce légal des armes classiques, notamment en créant un partenariat de responsabilité entre exportateurs,

importateurs et pays de transit, dans toutes les régions du monde. La poursuite de l'universalisation du TCA est donc essentielle pour conforter son statut de norme internationale pour la régulation du commerce des armes, et concourir au renforcement de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. C'est d'ailleurs l'un des objectifs du programme européen d'appui au TCA (ATT-OP) auquel la France contribue activement. Le TCA a également pour objectif de contribuer à la prévention et à la lutte contre les trafics illicites d'armes classiques. La France s'est mobilisée en ce sens depuis plusieurs années.

La septième conférence des Etats parties au Traité sur le commerce des armes, sous la présidence du Sierra Leone, a permis notamment de souligner la nécessité de renforcer les efforts en vue d'éradiquer le commerce illicite des ALPC.

Monsieur le Président,

La conférence d'examen de la convention sur certaines armes classiques, la CCAC, se tiendra en décembre 2021 et j'aurai l'honneur de la présider. La France est très attachée à la CCAC et à ses cinq protocoles. Cette convention est unique dans le paysage multilatéral car elle permet de réunir des expertises complémentaires, qu'elles soient politiques, juridiques, militaires ou diplomatiques. Cette spécificité de la CCAC est un gage de la capacité de la Convention à se saisir d'enjeux actuels et d'enjeux prospectifs.

Les enjeux prospectifs : à l'image des travaux du GGE sur les technologies émergentes dans le domaine des systèmes d'armes létaux autonomes qui sont le parfait exemple du très grand intérêt de cette enceinte. La France y participe très activement et y a formulé des propositions de substance. La France salue le travail du président belge du GGE et espère que des avancées substantielles pourront être obtenues dans ce cadre.

Les enjeux actuels comme les engins explosifs improvisés (EEI) qui sont également traités au sein de la CCAC. Le danger représenté par ces armes acquises et utilisées par des groupes non-étatiques, est global. La mobilisation de la communauté internationale sur ce dossier est essentielle. La France salue l'initiative du président japonais du protocole amendé 2 pour mettre à jour la déclaration sur les EEI faite en 2016.

La France est pleinement engagée sur cette question depuis de nombreuses années, comme le montre son implication dans la résolution dédiée aux EEI en Première commission, des travaux de recherche qu'elle soutient sur ce sujet, ou encore de son rôle de coordination du groupe d'experts sur les EEI au sein de la CCAC.

La France est également attachée aux normes de droit international humanitaire, notamment le premier protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève. Afin de renforcer la protection des civils face aux conséquences d'un usage indiscriminé et disproportionné des armes, notre priorité doit être l'universalisation des instruments existants de droit international humanitaire et la mise en œuvre effective des principes qu'ils énoncent, en particulier ceux de distinction entre la population civile et les combattants, ainsi qu'entre les biens de caractère civil et les objectifs militaires, de précaution, de proportionnalité et d'interdiction des maux superflus et des souffrances inutiles. Nous devons également encourager le partage de bonnes pratiques entre les Etats et leurs forces armées.

En septembre, s'est tenue la neuvième Conférence d'Examen de la Convention sur les Armes à sous-munitions. Les succès de la Convention d'Oslo se confirment même si, en 2021, des allégations d'emplois d'armes à sous-munitions ont encore concerné des pays non-membres de la Convention. Au terme de la Conférence d'examen, le Rapport Final de la Convention a été adopté au consensus. Il a permis, à travers lui, l'adoption de plusieurs documents d'importance : le Plan d'action de Dubrovnik, le Plan d'action de Lausanne et la Déclaration de Lausanne.

Sur les conventions d'Ottawa et d'Oslo, la France s'apprête à s'investir encore un peu plus. Sur la Convention d'Oslo, elle a rejoint le Comité pour l'état général et le fonctionnement de la Convention. Sur la convention d'Ottawa, la France est désormais membre du Comité thématique en charge de l'Application de l'article 5.

Au-delà, il est de notre responsabilité collective de continuer à plaider pour un haut niveau d'ambition, en continuant à pousser pour l'universalisation de la Convention d'Oslo interdisant les armes à sous-munitions, ainsi que pour celle de la Convention d'Ottawa interdisant les mines antipersonnel.

Les difficultés financières qui grèvent les conventions du désarmement année après année doivent cesser. Les Etats doivent verser leurs contributions, et s'en acquitter en temps et en heure, afin de mettre un terme à la crise alarmante que connaissent les conventions du désarmement.

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee**

Statement by France

“CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS”

Courtesy translation

France fully associates itself with the statement made by the European Union and wishes to make the following additional remarks.

The international security context is deteriorating, as evidenced by the persistence of conflicts and crises, the worsening of the terrorist threat, and the multiplication and diversification of trafficking across all borders. These worrying developments are all reasons to renew our collective commitment to strengthening the universality, respect and effectiveness of our disarmament and conventional arms control instruments.

The crises of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must not make us forget that conventional weapons continue to represent a major security challenge for all regions of the world, whether affected by conflicts or not. International action on conventional weapons is part of a comprehensive approach to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. As in many other areas, there is no single answer, but a series of specific, tailored and practical measures whose primary objective must be to enhance international security, taking into account the security concerns of all and for the benefit of all.

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, SALW, continues to fuel conflicts and exacerbate armed violence, terrorism and organised crime. It poses a serious threat to international peace and security. Today, SALW are by far the most deadly weapons in the world. They hinder the development of the most fragile states. The UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), as well as the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), remain essential instruments and must be the cornerstone of our efforts to prevent, eradicate and combat the illicit trafficking of SALW.

In this regard, we welcome the commitments made by States at the Seventh Biennial Meeting of the UN PoA on SALW, in particular with regard to preventing and combating the diversion of these weapons to unauthorised end-users, and the calls for enhanced regional and sub-regional co-operation and co-ordination, including through the establishment of action plans with goals and objectives to combat the illicit trade in SALW in a sustainable and co-ordinated manner. This is the very objective of the roadmap jointly launched by France and Germany to support the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to control firearms and prevent their spread. We also welcome the Presidency's efforts to take better account of gender issues, which was one of the major axes of the French Presidency of the 3rd PoA conference. Finally, we believe that it is essential that States respond to the challenges posed by technological developments in the design and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, both in terms of marking and tracing these weapons.

The accumulation and mismanagement of stocks of conventional ammunition is also a major problem, due to the risks of explosion or diversion of such ammunition to illicit markets.

We welcome the work and recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) appointed by the UNSG, which has just completed its work. Building on the recommendations of the previous GGE in 2008, this group has learned well from the experience of States in putting in place the national measures required to control these munitions during their life cycle, and to prevent both safety and security risks to populations. In recent decades since the 1980s, 623 accidental stockpile explosions have claimed the lives of 30,000 people in 106 States. Moreover, munitions diverted to terrorist groups now often lead not only to their direct use but also indirectly to the manufacture of highly lethal improvised explosive devices.

The GGE made recommendations for the preparation of a Comprehensive Framework for Cooperation, which would bring together common political principles as a reference for States and would also strengthen international cooperation and assistance, in particular at the regional or sub-regional level.

Germany and France are again jointly introducing this year's biennial resolution on "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus", which is traditionally adopted without a vote. It proposes to follow up in the UNGA the work of the GGE, while gathering the views of all UN Member States on the issue. We invite each delegation to support its adoption.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has two main pillars. The first is to strengthen the regulation of the legal trade in conventional arms, including through the creation of a partnership of responsibility between exporters, importers and transit countries, in all regions of the world. The continued universalisation of the ATT is therefore essential to consolidate its status as an international standard for the regulation of the arms trade and to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. This is one of the objectives of the European ATT support programme (ATT-OP) to which France is actively contributing. The ATT also aims to contribute to preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional weapons. France has been working on this for several years.

The seventh conference of States Parties to the ATT, under the chairmanship of Sierra Leone, highlighted the need to strengthen efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW.

The review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW, will be held in December 2021 and I will have the honour to chair it. France is very committed to the CCW and its five protocols. This convention is unique in the multilateral landscape because it brings together complementary expertise, whether political, legal, military or diplomatic. This specificity of the CCW is a guarantee of the Convention's ability to deal with current and future issues.

Prospective issues: the work of the GGE on emerging technologies in the field of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) is a perfect example of the great interest of this forum. France is a very active participant and has made substantive proposals. France welcomes the work of the Belgian chairperson of the GGE and hopes that substantial progress can be made in this framework.

Current issues such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are also dealt with within the CCW. The danger posed by these weapons, acquired and used by non-state groups, is global. The mobilisation of the international community on this issue is essential. France welcomes the initiative of the Japanese President of the Amended Protocol 2 to update the declaration on IEDs made in 2016.

France has been fully committed to this issue for many years, as shown by its involvement in the resolution dedicated to IEDs in the First Committee, the research work it supports on this subject, and its role in coordinating the group of experts on IEDs within the CCW.

France is also committed to the norms of international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular the first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. In order to strengthen the protection of civilians from the consequences of indiscriminate and disproportionate use of weapons, our priority must be the universalisation of existing IHL instruments and the effective implementation of the principles they set out, in particular those of distinctions between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, precaution, proportionality and the prohibition of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. We must also encourage the sharing of best practice between states and their armed forces.

The Ninth Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was held in September. The successes of the Oslo Convention are being confirmed, even if, in 2021, allegations of cluster munitions use still concerned countries that are not members of the Convention. At the end of the Review Conference, the Convention's Final Report was adopted by consensus. Through it, several important documents were adopted: the Dubrovnik Action Plan, the Lausanne Action Plan and the Lausanne Declaration.

On the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions, France is preparing to become even more involved. On the Oslo Convention, it has joined the Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. With regard to the Ottawa Convention, France is now a member of the thematic committee in charge of the implementation of Article 5.

Beyond that, it is our collective responsibility to continue to advocate for a high level of ambition, by continuing to push for the universalization of the Oslo Convention banning cluster munitions, as well as the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines.

The financial difficulties that plague the disarmament conventions year after year must stop. States must pay their contributions, and pay them on time, in order to put an end to the alarming crisis facing the disarmament conventions.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission**

Déclaration de la France

« CYBER »

Dans un monde en évolution rapide, les usages civils et militaires du domaine cyber se multiplient, représentant d'importants vecteurs de développement mais posant aussi de nombreux défis pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. L'aggravation des menaces liées aux utilisations malveillantes des technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC), observée de longue date par la communauté internationale, se poursuit. La fréquence, la sévérité et la sophistication des cyberattaques, perpétrées par des acteurs étatiques comme non étatiques, continuent de s'accroître, et les conséquences de ces attaques peuvent être catastrophiques sur le plan économique, sécuritaire voire humanitaire, ainsi que l'illustre par exemple le fléau des rançongiciels qui peuvent toucher les citoyens, les entreprises comme des infrastructures critiques essentielles au fonctionnement de nos sociétés. En outre, le développement des capacités cyber offensives des Etats peut accroître les risques de tensions, voire d'escalade.

Dans ce contexte, la France s'est engagée en faveur du renforcement de la sécurité et de la stabilité du cyberspace. A titre national, elle a œuvré en faveur de la transparence en publiant en 2019 sa position quant à l'application du droit international aux opérations cyber. Elle a également lancé des initiatives, comme l'Appel de Paris pour la confiance et la sécurité dans le cyberspace, afin de promouvoir des principes pour régir le

cyberespace et de stimuler la coopération entre les diverses parties prenantes, Etats, collectivités, entreprises et organisations non gouvernementales. En outre, la France s'investit dans les travaux menés par les Nations unies pour répondre aux défis croissants posés par l'essor des TIC pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. Au cours des deux dernières années, elle a ainsi participé activement aussi bien aux travaux du groupe de travail à composition non limitée (OEWG) créé sur le fondement de la résolution 73/27 qu'à ceux du groupe d'experts gouvernementaux (GGE) créé sur le fondement de la résolution 73/266.

La France salue les résultats de l'OEWG et du GGE, qui sont tous deux parvenus cette année à s'accorder sur des rapports finaux consensuels. Ces rapports réaffirment notamment l'applicabilité du cadre normatif pour le comportement responsable des Etats, fondé sur le droit international existant, sur des normes de comportement responsable et sur des mesures de confiance. Ils apportent en outre des éclairages utiles pour la compréhension et la mise en œuvre de ce cadre.

La conclusion consensuelle de l'OEWG et du GGE crée une dynamique positive sur laquelle nous devons nous appuyer pour poursuivre des travaux constructifs, sur la base du consensus. Dans cet esprit, la France accueille favorablement la présentation par les Etats-Unis et la Russie d'une résolution conjointe sur les enjeux de sécurité liés aux TIC. La France apporte son soutien et son co-parrainage à cette résolution. Elle souhaite notamment que l'Assemblée générale puisse saluer, de façon consensuelle, les conclusions du dernier GGE, de même qu'elle reconnaît celle de l'OEWG.

La France est attachée à la poursuite d'un dialogue inclusif dans le cadre des Nations unies, et participera à ce titre au nouvel OEWG 2021-2025 qui a été mis en place par la résolution 75/240. Ma délégation souhaite que les travaux de ce groupe permettent notamment d'approfondir le dialogue sur le cadre normatif applicable dans le cyberespace, en se basant sur l'acquis consolidé par les processus précédents.

Si la poursuite d'un dialogue inclusif au sein des Nations unies est nécessaire et utile, il est également urgent d'entreprendre des actions concrètes pour répondre aux besoins les plus criants des Etats, soutenir la mise en œuvre des engagements existants et renforcer effectivement la sécurité et la stabilité du cyberespace. C'est pourquoi la France, avec 53 autres Etats, soutient la mise en place d'un Programme d'action (PoA), c'est-à-dire d'un outil inclusif, permanent au sein des Nations unies, dédié à la mise en œuvre des normes internationales agréées, à travers le renforcement des capacités des Etats, les échanges de bonnes pratiques, le dialogue avec l'ensemble des autres parties prenantes – secteur privé, chercheurs et organisations non gouvernementales. Il est à présent temps de travailler à une option de long terme, constructive, coordonnée et inclusive qui permettrait de compléter les travaux menés jusqu'à présent de développer les initiatives en matière de renforcement capacitaire. Le PoA pourrait bien sûr être mis en place de façon complémentaire avec les autres processus onusiens pertinents dans le domaine de la cybersécurité. Le PoA créerait le cadre d'un engagement politique fondé sur les normes et principes déjà agréés, tout en offrant la possibilité de les enrichir progressivement, si cela est nécessaire.

La France se réjouit que la proposition du PoA ait été citée dans les rapports adoptés par l'OEWG et le GGE cette année, et se tient prête, conformément aux recommandations de ces rapports, à préciser et développer cette proposition, en dialoguant avec l'ensemble des Etats, ainsi qu'avec les autres acteurs, y compris dans le nouvel OEWG.

Il est de notre responsabilité et dans notre intérêt de défendre les cadres d'action et les règles de droit édictés collectivement, en nous engageant pour le renforcement du rôle du système onusien dans cette régulation. Nous espérons donc que le plus grand nombre d'Etats possible pourra soutenir cette initiative afin d'envoyer un message résolu de la communauté internationale alors que les menaces cyber n'ont jamais été aussi fortes.

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee**

Statement by France

“CYBERSPACE”

Courtesy translation

In a rapidly changing world, civilian and military uses of the cyber domain are multiplying, representing important vectors of development but also posing numerous challenges to international peace and security. The threats posed by the malicious uses of information and communication technologies (ICTs), which the international community has long observed, continue to grow. The frequency, severity and sophistication of cyber-attacks, perpetrated by both State and non-State actors, continue to increase, and the consequences of these attacks can be catastrophic in economic, security and even humanitarian terms, as illustrated for example by the scourge of ransomwares, which can affect citizens, businesses and critical infrastructure essential to the functioning of our societies. Furthermore, the development of offensive cyber capabilities by States can increase the risk of tension, or even escalation.

In this context, France is committed to strengthening the security and stability of cyberspace. On a national level, it has worked to promote transparency by publishing its position on the application of international law to cyber operations in 2019. It has also launched initiatives, such as the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, to promote principles to govern cyberspace and to stimulate cooperation between the various stakeholders, States, communities, companies and non-governmental organisations. In addition, France is involved in the work of the United Nations to address the growing challenges posed by the rise of ICTs to international peace and security. Over the past two years, it has actively participated in the work of both the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) established on the basis of resolution 73/27 and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established on the basis of resolution 73/266.

France welcomes the results of the OEWG and the GGE, which both managed this year to agree on consensual final reports. In particular, these reports reaffirm the applicability of the normative framework for responsible State behaviour, based on existing international law, standards of responsible behaviour and confidence-building measures. They also provide useful insights into the understanding and implementation of this framework.

The consensual conclusion of the OEWG and the GGE creates a positive dynamic on which we must build to continue constructive work, based on consensus. In this spirit, France welcomes the presentation by the United States and Russia of a joint resolution on ICT security issues. France supports and co-sponsors this resolution. In particular, it hopes that the General Assembly will be able to welcome, by consensus, the conclusions of the last GGE, just as it recognises that of the OEWG.

France is committed to the continuation of an inclusive dialogue within the framework of the United Nations, and will therefore participate in the new OEWG 2021-2025 which was set up by resolution 75/240. It hopes that the work of this group will enable us to deepen the dialogue on the normative framework applicable in cyberspace, based on the experience consolidated by the previous processes.

Whilst the pursuit of an inclusive dialogue within the United Nations is necessary and useful, it is also urgent to undertake concrete actions to respond to the most pressing needs of States, to support the implementation of existing commitments and to effectively strengthen the security and stability of cyberspace. This is why France, along with 52 other States, supports the establishment of a Programme of Action (PoA), i.e. an inclusive, permanent tool within the United Nations, dedicated to the implementation of agreed international standards, through capacity building of States, exchanges of best practices, dialogue with all other stakeholders - private

sector, researchers and non-governmental organisations. It is now time to work on a long-term, constructive, coordinated and inclusive option that would complement the work done so far and develop capacity building initiatives. The PoA could of course be set up in a complementary way to other relevant UN processes in the field of cyber security. The PoA would create a framework for political commitment based on the standards and principles already agreed, whilst offering the possibility of gradually enriching them, if necessary.

France is pleased that the PoA proposal was mentioned in the reports adopted by the OEWG and the GGE this year, and is ready, in accordance with the recommendations of these reports, to specify and develop this proposal, in dialogue with all States, as well as with other stakeholders, including in the new OEWG.

It is our responsibility and our interest to defend the collectively agreed frameworks and rules of law, and to commit ourselves to strengthening the role of the UN system in this regulation. We therefore hope that as many States as possible will support this initiative in order to send a strong message from the international community at a time when cyber threats have never been so strong.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission**

Déclaration de la France

« DÉSARMEMENT RÉGIONAL »

La France s'associe pleinement au discours prononcé au nom de l'Union européenne.

La dimension régionale des travaux de la Première Commission revêt pour la France une grande importance. L'Union européenne a apporté la preuve de l'utilité d'une gouvernance régionale unique en son genre. Cette expérience de gouvernance régionale originale est par ailleurs mise au service d'Etats tiers au travers d'une coopération renforcée notamment dans le domaine du désarmement.

La France est fermement convaincue de l'importance centrale de la coopération et de l'assistance internationales. La France réitère son engagement notamment en faveur des efforts de coopération et d'assistance destinés en particulier à lutter contre le commerce illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre sous tous ses aspects, et auxquels elle participe à la fois au niveau national et dans le cadre de l'Union européenne :

La France participe notamment activement au programme d'assistance de l'UE destiné à favoriser l'entrée en vigueur, l'universalisation rapide et la mise en œuvre effective du Traité sur le commerce des armes. Dans le cadre de la deuxième phase de ce programme, l'agence française Expertise France a organisé cette année des ateliers, des visites d'étude et d'autres activités connexes au profit du Mexique, de Madagascar, du Mali, du Libéria, du Burkina Faso, de la Côte d'Ivoire et du Sénégal. Ces actions visent à appuyer les Etats non européens qui en font la demande à rendre leur système national de contrôle des transferts d'armements en conformité avec le TCA. Ce projet comporte également des actions visant à promouvoir, avec le soutien des pays partenaires et des organisations régionales pertinentes, l'universalisation du Traité auprès d'autres Etats.

La France contribue activement à des projets visant au renforcement des capacités en matière de contrôle des armes légères. Elle apporte ainsi son soutien au Centre de perfectionnement aux actions post-conflictuelles de déminage et de dépollution (CPADD) de Ouidah, au Bénin, qui offre des programmes de formation dans le domaine de gestion des stocks, qui permettent de lutter contre le détournement, ainsi que des programmes d'entraînement au traçage et au marquage des armes.

La France apporte également un appui aux efforts menés par plusieurs Etats en matière de lutte contre les trafics illicites via la fourniture d'équipements et de formations associées (en matière d'appui aux échanges de preuves balistiques et d'analyse des armes saisies) et d'une expertise technique.

Les initiatives de non-prolifération et de désarmement menées aux niveaux mondial, régional et sous-régional sont par nature complémentaires. La mobilisation de la communauté internationale contre la menace posée par le commerce illicite d'armes légères et de petit calibre en constitue là encore un bon exemple.

Au niveau régional, la coopération est essentielle compte tenu de la nature largement transfrontalière des trafics d'ALPC. La France encourage cette coopération régionale, comme en témoigne les actions qu'elle mène dans la zone-sahélo saharienne en matière de lutte contre les groupes armés terroristes. En lien avec l'Union européenne et dans le contexte de la CEDEAO, la France et l'Union européenne se retrouvent pour insuffler des coopérations régionales et des coordinations. En s'impliquant activement dans la montée en puissance de la force conjointe du G5 Sahel, la France a encouragé les Etats de cette région (Tchad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali et Mauritanie) à renforcer leur présence militaire dans les zones frontalières en améliorant leur coordination grâce à une chaîne de commandement unique. La France soutient également les efforts entrepris par l'Union Européenne et l'OSCE pour renforcer la prévention et la lutte contre les trafics illicites d'armes légères et de petit calibre, développer des bonnes pratiques en matière de régulation de ces armes et encourager l'assistance et la coopération dans ce domaine.

Au niveau sous régional, la France est à l'origine, avec l'Allemagne, d'une initiative -soutenue par l'Union européenne - visant à réduire les trafics d'armes à feu dans les Balkans occidentaux à l'horizon 2024. Elle se base sur des objectifs à la fois opérationnels et capacitaires et sur une large gamme d'activités. Celles-ci se concentrent autour de la sécurisation des stocks, de la collecte d'armes en circulation ou encore du démantèlement des réseaux de trafiquants. Un peu plus de trois ans après son lancement, nous pouvons reconnaître que cette coopération est déjà un succès. L'Union européenne a intégré la feuille route dans le nouveau Plan d'action 2020-2025 de lutte contre les trafics d'armes à feu, et nous constatons que cette initiative novatrice représente dans sa méthode un modèle intéressant pour d'autres régions.

La France souligne la nécessité d'adopter une approche de la coopération et de l'assistance qui soit fondée sur l'expression des besoins par les Etats ou les institutions destinataires. Elle accorde une grande importance à l'adéquation entre les besoins exprimés et l'assistance fournie, ainsi qu'au développement des capacités des destinataires. Il s'agit là de l'une des clefs du succès de l'assistance internationale. La France souhaite également réaffirmer la nécessité d'assurer la coordination des différentes initiatives d'assistance, afin d'éviter tout doublon et de garantir l'efficacité maximale de toutes les actions entreprises.

A l'échelle du continent européen, la France, comme les autres Etats membres de l'UE, apporte un fort soutien à la mise en œuvre de mesures de transparence et de confiance adaptées à la situation géostratégique de la région, et s'engage activement dans le dialogue visant à les renforcer, notamment au sein de l'OSCE.

Les trois grands instruments de maîtrise des armements conventionnels - le Traité sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe, le Document de Vienne et le traité Ciel ouvert - mis en place au cours des années 1990 afin de renforcer la transparence et la prévisibilité dans les activités militaires et d'établir un équilibre des forces présentes en Europe, sont aujourd'hui fortement fragilisés. Le Traité sur les forces conventionnelles en Europe aura permis la destruction de nombreux équipements ; mon pays ne se résout pas à le voir dépérir et appelle les parties à créer les conditions pour revenir à sa mise en œuvre pleine et entière.

Nous regrettons les retraits successifs du Traité Ciel Ouvert qui portent atteinte à l'un des piliers de l'architecture de maîtrise des armements conventionnels en Europe auquel la France est profondément attachée. La France appelle les Etats parties à parvenir à des solutions de compromis permettant d'assurer la continuité du fonctionnement institutionnel du Traité et d'envisager sereinement la poursuite des activités de survol.

Le Document de Vienne, pour sa part, constitue un instrument de confiance autant que de transparence et de réduction des risques : ma délégation souhaite poursuivre avec tous les pays concernés le renforcement et la modernisation de ce texte, pour l'adapter à l'évolution des doctrines et des équipements militaires./

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee**

Statement by France

“REGIONAL DISARMAMENT”

Courtesy translation

France fully associates itself with the speech made on behalf of the European Union.

The regional dimension of the work of the First Committee is of great importance to France. The European Union has demonstrated the usefulness of unique regional governance.

This experience of original regional governance is also put at the service of third countries through enhanced cooperation, particularly in the field of disarmament.

France is firmly convinced of the central importance of international cooperation and assistance. France reiterates its commitment to cooperation and assistance efforts aimed in particular at combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and in which it participates both at the national level and within the framework of the European Union:

France is actively participating in the EU's assistance programme to promote the entry into force, rapid universalisation and effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty. In the framework of the second phase of this programme, the French agency Expertise France has organised workshops, study visits and other related activities this year for Mexico, Madagascar, Mali, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. These actions aim to support non-European States, upon request, in bringing their national arms transfer control systems into compliance with the ATT. This project also includes actions aimed at promoting, with the support of partner countries and relevant regional organisations, the universalisation of the Treaty with other States

France actively contributes to projects aimed at capacity building in the field of small arms control. It supports the Center for Humanitarian Demining Training (CPADD) in Ouidah, Benin, which offers training programmes in stockpile management to combat diversion, as well as training programmes in tracing and marking weapons.

France also supports the efforts of several States in the fight against illicit trafficking through the provision of equipment and associated training (in support of ballistic evidence exchange and analysis of seized weapons) and technical expertise.

Non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives at the global, regional and sub-regional levels are complementary in nature. The mobilisation of the international community against the threat posed by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is another good example.

At regional level, cooperation is essential given the largely cross-border nature of SALW trafficking. France encourages this regional cooperation, as demonstrated by its actions in the Sahel-Saharan area in the fight against armed terrorist groups. In conjunction with the European Union and in the context of ECOWAS, France and the European Union are working together to promote regional cooperation and coordination. By being actively involved in the rise of the G5 Sahel joint force, France has encouraged the states of this region (Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mauritania) to strengthen their military presence in the border areas by improving their coordination through a single chain of command. France also supports the efforts undertaken by the European

Union and the OSCE to strengthen the prevention of and fight against illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, to develop best practices in the regulation of these weapons and to encourage assistance and cooperation in this field. At the sub-regional level, France, together with Germany, has launched an initiative - supported by the European Union - to reduce firearms trafficking in the Western Balkans by 2024. It is based on both operational and capability objectives and a wide range of activities. These activities focus on securing stocks, collecting weapons in circulation and dismantling trafficking networks. Just over three years after its launch, we can acknowledge that this cooperation is already a success. The European Union has integrated the roadmap into the new 2020-2025 Action Plan to combat firearms trafficking, and we note that this innovative initiative represents an interesting model for other regions in its method.

France stresses the need to adopt an approach to cooperation and assistance that is based on the expression of needs by recipient States or institutions. It attaches great importance to the match between the needs expressed and the assistance provided, as well as to the development of the recipients' capacities. This is one of the keys to the success of international assistance. France also wishes to reaffirm the need to ensure the coordination of the various assistance initiatives, in order to avoid any duplication and to guarantee the maximum effectiveness of all actions undertaken.

On the European continent, France, like the other EU Member States, strongly supports the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures adapted to the geostrategic situation in the region, and is actively involved in the dialogue aimed at strengthening them, particularly within the OSCE.

The three major conventional arms control instruments - the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty - established in the 1990s to enhance transparency and predictability in military activities and to establish a balance of forces in Europe, are now seriously undermined. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty has enabled the destruction of a great deal of equipment; my country cannot resign itself to it weakening and calls on the parties to create the conditions for a return to its full implementation.

We regret the successive withdrawals from the Open Skies Treaty, which undermine one of the pillars of Europe's conventional arms control architecture to which France is deeply attached. France calls on the States Parties to reach compromise solutions that will ensure the continuity of the institutional functioning of the Treaty and allow the continuation of overflight activities to be envisaged with serenity.

The Vienna Document, for its part, is an instrument of confidence as much as of transparency and risk reduction: my delegation wishes to continue to work with all the countries concerned to strengthen and modernise this text, in order to adapt it to the evolution of military doctrines and equipment.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission**

Déclaration de la France

« MACHINERIE DU DESARMEMENT »

La machinerie du désarmement et ses institutions telles qu'issues de la Session extraordinaire sur le désarmement (SSOD-I) de 1978 nous fournissent un cadre solide qui demeure indispensable à tout progrès sur la voie du désarmement, en œuvrant par étapes successives en faveur du désarmement général et complet.

La France est attachée à la Conférence du désarmement, seule instance multilatérale chargée de la négociation de traités de désarmement à vocation universelle. C'est d'ailleurs bien à la Conférence du Désarmement (CD), ou dans les organes qui l'ont précédée, qu'ont été négociés les grands traités de désarmement, notamment le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), la Convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines et sur leur destruction (CIABT), la Convention sur l'Interdiction des Armes Chimiques (CIAC), ainsi que le Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE), auxquels la France rappelle son attachement le plus fort.

La France ne peut que regretter le blocage de la CD depuis de longues années. La mise en place d'organes subsidiaires en 2018 avait permis des échanges très substantiels sur chacun des points à l'ordre du jour de l'agenda, notamment sur le traité d'interdiction de la production de matières fissiles pour les armes nucléaires (FMCT). Ce sujet, prioritaire pour mon pays, est également le plus mûr pour le lancement de négociations. La France soutiendrait une reconduction d'année en année des organes subsidiaires, dans une logique de continuité et d'approfondissement des échanges. Nous soutenons par ailleurs toute proposition permettant d'améliorer l'efficacité de la CD et d'y introduire plus de continuité. En ce sens, la France tient à saluer les efforts intenses entrepris par le P6 cette année et espère que ce mécanisme informel se poursuivra à l'avenir afin de garantir le suivi des travaux. En dépit de l'échec à adopter un programme de travail cette année encore, la France reste convaincue du rôle clé de la CD, qui demeure également une enceinte indispensable pour faire vivre le dialogue stratégique.

Cette année, sous présidence canadienne, la CD a débattu de l'opportunité d'actualiser son Règlement Intérieur. Il a été proposé que les titres et fonctions, qui aujourd'hui apparaissent au seul masculin, se voient adjoindre leurs équivalents féminins. La France regrette que la CD ne soit pas parvenue à un consensus sur un tel amendement de nature technique et important.

La France reste vivement préoccupée par les graves problèmes de financement que connaissent les enceintes de désarmement depuis des années. Nous déplorons le manque de liquidités dû aux mauvais payeurs et rappelons à ce titre que le paiement des contributions nationales est une obligation. Cette situation est particulièrement préoccupante car la viabilité financière des instruments de désarmement est indispensable pour garantir leur efficacité. Sans les fonds disponibles, les réunions ne peuvent parfois pas se tenir, ou bien se tiennent dans des conditions insatisfaisantes, ce qui affecte considérablement une mise en œuvre efficace des traités et des conventions.

Cette situation affecte parfois le multilinguisme. Nous rappelons que le multilinguisme n'est pas une option, mais bien le garant d'un multilatéralisme efficace en permettant à chaque Etat de faire participer des experts qui puissent s'exprimer dans la langue de leur choix. Ainsi, disposer en partie du multilinguisme comme d'une mesure d'économie au sein d'enceintes multilatérales n'est pas à la hauteur de nos engagements.

L'Institut des Nations Unies sur la recherche pour le désarmement, l'UNIDIR, est un acteur incontournable de la communauté du désarmement qui a su développer une expertise importante, y compris sur les sujets stratégiques émergents comme l'espace et le cyber, pour ne citer que ces sujets. Saluant les travaux de l'UNIDIR qui contribuent à notre réflexion collective sur les grands enjeux du désarmement aujourd'hui, nous continuerons d'accompagner l'Institut, qui a apporté les preuves de sa résilience. Nous soutenons une augmentation de la subvention onusienne du budget de l'UNIDIR afin d'apporter une plus grande stabilité financière à l'institut.

La France salue l'arrivée, à la tête de l'UNIDIR, de son nouveau directeur Robin Geiss. Elle lui adresse tout son soutien dans la poursuite des travaux menés par l'institut.

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee**

Statement by France

“THE DISARMAMENT MACHINERY”

Courtesy translation

The disarmament machinery and its institutions, which emerged from the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I), provide us with a solid framework which remains indispensable for any progress towards disarmament, working in successive stages towards general and complete disarmament.

France is attached to the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral forum for the negotiation of universal disarmament treaties. It was indeed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), or in its predecessor bodies, that the major disarmament treaties were negotiated, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to all of which France reiterates its strongest attachment.

France can only regret that the CD has been blocked for many years. The establishment of subsidiary bodies in 2018 had enabled very substantial exchanges on each of the items on the agenda, particularly on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). This subject, which is a priority for my country, is also the most ripe for the launch of negotiations. In the spirit of continuity and deepening of exchanges, France would support an annual reconfirmation of the subsidiary bodies. We also support any proposal to improve the effectiveness of the CD and to introduce more continuity. In this sense, France welcomes the intense efforts undertaken by the P6 this year and hopes that this informal mechanism will continue in the future to guarantee the follow-up of the work. Despite the failure to adopt a work programme again this year, France remains convinced of the key role of the CD, which also remains an indispensable forum for keeping the strategic dialogue alive.

This year, under the Canadian presidency, the CD discussed the opportunity to update its Rules of Procedure. It was proposed that titles and functions, which currently only appear in the masculine form, should be accompanied by their feminine equivalents. France regrets that the CD did not reach a consensus on such a technical yet important topic.

France remains deeply concerned about the serious funding problems that disarmament fora have been experiencing for years. In particular, we deplore the lack of liquidity due to bad payers and recall that the payment of national contributions is an obligation. This is of particular concern as the financial sustainability of disarmament instruments is essential to ensure their effectiveness. Without the available funds, meetings sometimes cannot be held, or are held in unsatisfactory conditions, which considerably affects the effective implementation of treaties and conventions.

This situation can also affect multilingualism. We recall that multilingualism is not an option, but a guarantee of effective multilateralism by allowing each State to involve experts who can express themselves in the language of their choice. Thus, disposing of multilingualism as a cost-saving measure within multilateral fora does not live up to our commitments.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR, is a key player in the disarmament community and has developed significant expertise, including on emerging strategic issues such as outer-space and cyber, to name but two. We welcome UNIDIR's work, which contributes to our collective thinking on the major issues of disarmament today, and we will continue to support the Institute, which has demonstrated its resilience. We support an increase in the UN subvention to UNIDIR's budget in order to bring greater financial stability to the Institute.

France welcomes the arrival at the head of UNIDIR of its new director Robin Geiss and offers him its full support in the pursuit of the work carried out by the Institute.

76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee

Chair's statement – UNGA First Committee 2021 France as coordinator of the P5

France has the honour to report to the Committee on the state of play in the P5 Process of dialogue between the five Nuclear Weapon States recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

50 years after the entry into force of the NPT, we reaffirm the P5's commitment to this landmark treaty. We remain committed under the NPT to the pursuit of good faith negotiations on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. By helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, the NPT has made a vital contribution to nuclear disarmament and to reduce the number of proliferating states. The Treaty continues to help create conditions that would be essential for further progress on nuclear disarmament.

In September 2020, France succeeded to the United Kingdom as coordinator of the P5. The P5 members have been pursuing the implementation of the joint roadmap approved in Beijing in January 2019, with the aim of contributing in a concrete and positive manner to the 10th Review Conference as well as to the next NPT review cycle.

A virtual meeting of the P5 « Principals » took place on 8 July to take stock of the work undergone. The Principals recognized that despite the impact of the health crisis, work has continued, with the P5's determination to register progress under the various workstreams of the P5 roadmap remaining intact.

1. We attach great importance to the dialogue on doctrines and nuclear policies as means of strengthening predictability, confidence and mutual understanding within the P5 and as a concrete risk reduction measure. The P5 members have reaffirmed their intention to organize a dedicated side event at the Review conference and their desire to pursue exchanges on doctrines.
2. We value the work currently underway on strategic risk reduction, a topic of high value for the NPT Review Conference, and reaffirm our readiness to work on this issue in the long-term.
3. Regarding the FMCT, our position remains to support the negotiation of a multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable non-discriminatory treaty, banning the production of fissile materials used to produce

nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices (FMCT), on a consensus basis and with the participation of all countries involved within the Conference on disarmament. P5 experts meetings have recently resumed on the FMCT, with a view to agreeing on a joint deliverable.

4. The second edition of the glossary of key nuclear terms is almost finalized. The P5 will highlight the benefits of the work undertaken on the glossary, which is an important transparency and confidence building measure that can help enhance mutual understanding on respective nuclear policies.

5. The P5 reaffirms its support to the objectives of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and its availability to deepen exchanges with ASEAN member-states pertaining to the Bangkok treaty.

6. Regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the P5 recalls the need to strengthen the IIIrd pillar of the NPT, and remains engaged to widen access to nuclear techniques and to support the role of nuclear energy in the energetic transition. Work is underway in Vienna to prepare joint P5 deliverables for the Review conference.

Mr President,

The P5 has a special responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. Given the tense international security context, the pursuit and strengthening of the dialogue amongst the members of the P5 and between NWS and NNWS is key to strategic stability. Against this background, France is honored to have been entrusted with the important responsibility of coordinating the P5 process and will do its utmost to sustain the P5 efforts towards a successful Review Conference and beyond. The next important milestone will be the Paris conference in December 2021, which France will host ahead of the NPT Review conference.

I thank you./.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission**

**Déclaration du Président - Première Commission de l'AGNU 2021
La France comme coordinatrice du P5**

La France a l'honneur de rendre compte à la Commission de l'état d'avancement du processus P5 de dialogue entre les cinq Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires reconnus par le Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire (TNP) - Chine, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Fédération de Russie, France et Royaume-Uni.

50 ans après l'entrée en vigueur du TNP, nous réaffirmons l'engagement du P5 envers ce traité historique. Nous restons attachés, en vertu du TNP, à la poursuite de négociations de bonne foi sur des mesures efficaces liées au désarmement nucléaire et sur un traité de désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international strict et efficace. Nous soutenons l'objectif ultime d'un monde sans armes nucléaires offrant une sécurité non diminuée pour tous. En aidant à atténuer les tensions internationales et à créer des conditions de stabilité, de sécurité et de confiance entre les nations, le TNP a apporté une contribution essentielle au désarmement nucléaire et à la réduction du nombre d'Etats proliférant. Le traité continue d'aider à créer les conditions qui seraient essentielles à de nouveaux progrès en matière de désarmement nucléaire.

La France a succédé au Royaume-Uni en tant que coordinatrice du P5 en septembre 2020. Les membres du P5 ont poursuivi la mise en œuvre de la feuille de route conjointe agréée à Pékin en janvier 2019, dans l'objectif de

contribuer de manière concrète et positive à la 10e conférence d'examen ainsi qu'au prochain cycle d'examen du TNP.

Une réunion virtuelle des « Principals » du P5 a eu lieu le 8 juillet pour faire le point sur le travail accompli. Les « Principals » ont constaté qu'en dépit de l'impact de la crise sanitaire, les travaux se sont poursuivis et que la détermination du P5 à enregistrer des progrès dans les différents chantiers de la feuille de route du P5 demeure intacte.

1. Nous attachons une grande importance au dialogue sur les doctrines et les politiques nucléaires comme moyen de renforcer la prévisibilité, la confiance et la compréhension mutuelle au sein du P5 et comme mesure concrète de réduction des risques. Les membres du P5 ont réaffirmé leur intention d'organiser un événement parallèle dédié lors de la conférence d'examen et leur volonté de poursuivre les échanges sur les doctrines.

2. Nous apprécions les travaux en cours sur la réduction des risques stratégiques, un sujet de grande importance pour la Conférence d'examen du TNP, et réaffirmons notre volonté de travailler sur cette question à long terme.

3. Sur le FMCT, notre position reste de soutenir la négociation d'un traité multilatéral, non discriminatoire, internationalement et effectivement vérifiable, interdisant la production de matières fissiles utilisées pour produire des armes nucléaires et d'autres dispositifs nucléaires explosifs (FMCT), sur la base d'un consensus et avec la participation de tous les pays impliqués dans la Conférence sur le désarmement. Les réunions d'experts du P5 ont récemment repris sur le FMCT, en vue de convenir d'un résultat commun.

4. La deuxième édition du glossaire des principaux termes nucléaires est presque finalisée. Le P5 soulignera les avantages du travail entrepris sur le glossaire, qui est une importante mesure de transparence et de confiance pouvant contribuer à améliorer la compréhension mutuelle des politiques nucléaires respectives.

5. Le P5 réaffirme son soutien aux objectifs de la zone exempte d'armes nucléaires en Asie du Sud-Est et sa volonté d'approfondir les échanges avec les États membres de l'ASEAN concernant le traité de Bangkok.

6. Sur les usages pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire, le P5 rappelle la nécessité de renforcer le troisième pilier du TNP, et reste engagé pour élargir l'accès aux techniques nucléaires et soutenir le rôle de l'énergie nucléaire dans la transition énergétique. Des travaux sont en cours à Vienne pour préparer les livrables communs du P5 pour la conférence d'examen.

M. le Président,

Le P5 a une responsabilité particulière dans le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. Dans un contexte international de sécurité tendue, la poursuite et le renforcement du dialogue entre les membres du P5 et entre les EDAN et les ENDAN sont essentiels à la stabilité stratégique. Dans ce contexte, la France est honorée de s'être vue confier l'importante responsabilité de coordonner le processus du P5 et fera tout son possible pour soutenir les efforts du P5 en vue de la réussite de la Conférence d'examen et au-delà. La prochaine étape importante sera la conférence de Paris en décembre 2021, que la France accueillera avant la conférence d'examen du TNP.

Je vous remercie./.

**76ème session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies
Première Commission
(New York, 5 octobre 2021)**

**Intervention de M. Yann HWANG
Ambassadeur, Représentant permanent de la France
auprès de la Conférence du Désarmement
Chef de la délégation française**

« DÉBAT GÉNÉRAL »

Monsieur le Président,

Ma délégation vous présente ses félicitations pour votre élection à la présidence de cette 1ère commission, et tous ses vœux de succès dans cette tâche importante.

La France s'associe à la déclaration de l'Union européenne, et souhaiterait présenter les remarques complémentaires suivantes à titre national.

Les évolutions du contexte géopolitique ont dessiné un monde dans lequel nous faisons face à un retour de la compétition stratégique, imprévisible et aux conflictualités croissantes. La France ne se résout pas à la dégradation de l'environnement de sécurité international. Nous sommes convaincus que le dialogue, la responsabilité et la détermination nous permettront de relever les défis auxquels nous faisons face. C'est dans cet esprit qu'il nous faut œuvrer au renforcement de la maîtrise des armements, l'une des clés de notre sécurité collective.

La menace que fait peser la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et leurs vecteurs reste vive. Les utilisations inacceptables d'armes chimiques en Syrie, en Malaisie, au Royaume-Uni et en Russie, en violation complète de la Convention sur l'interdiction des armes chimiques (CIAC), ont poussé la communauté internationale à réagir : Le « partenariat international contre l'impunité d'utilisation d'armes chimiques », impulsé par la France, rassemble aujourd'hui 40 États et l'Union européenne. Cette année a vu l'adoption au printemps lors de la 25e Conférence des États parties à la CIAC, à une très large majorité, de la décision « Contrer la détention et l'emploi d'armes chimiques par la République arabe syrienne », décision qui suspend certains droits et privilèges de la Syrie à l'OIAC, sur la base d'un texte présenté par la France au nom de 46 délégations. Nous le répétons avec force, les auteurs d'attaques chimiques doivent être sanctionnés. Il en va de notre sécurité collective.

Notre sécurité collective requiert également de continuer à lutter sans relâche contre la prolifération des armes nucléaires. Sur l'Iran, la France demeure pleinement engagée, avec ses partenaires du E3, à la préservation de l'accord de Vienne afin de réduire les risques de prolifération liés à l'Iran. Depuis deux ans, Téhéran s'est progressivement désengagé de cet accord et poursuit désormais depuis plusieurs mois des activités très préoccupantes qui constituent des étapes clés dans la fabrication d'une arme nucléaire. Le retour de l'Iran à la table des négociations, débutées en avril et suspendues à sa demande depuis désormais plus de trois mois, est urgent afin d'organiser le plus rapidement possible son retour au respect plein et entier des dispositions du Plan d'action global commun (JCPoA). C'est le sens de nos efforts, en lien avec l'ensemble des participants au JCPoA et les États-Unis.

Il est également indispensable que l'Iran reprenne la coopération pleine et entière avec l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, dont nous soutenons fermement le travail et qui doit pouvoir faire complet usage de son mandat en Iran. L'Iran doit mettre pleinement en œuvre les engagements qu'il a pris auprès de l'Agence en matière de vérification et fournir des explications complètes et techniquement crédibles aux questions que l'AIEA se pose en matière de garanties sur la présence de matières nucléaires non déclarées en Iran.

S'agissant de la Corée du Nord, nous constatons que son programme nucléaire reste opérationnel et que son programme balistique poursuit son développement, comme le démontrent les tirs de missiles encore observés ces dernières semaines. Nous poursuivrons nos efforts pour assurer la mise en œuvre stricte, entière et universelle des sanctions qui visent le régime nord-coréen en application des résolutions du CSNU pour que Pyongyang accepte enfin le dialogue et abandonne ses programmes proliférants.

Monsieur le Président,

Dans ce contexte tendu, les grandes échéances de cette fin d'année et de 2022 seront cruciales :

1- 2021 s'achèvera par la tenue de la conférence d'examen de la Convention sur certaines armes classiques (CCAC), particulièrement importante pour la France cette année alors qu'elle préside l'enceinte. Cette conférence doit être l'occasion de renforcer la CCAC et d'engranger des progrès sur la problématique des technologies émergentes dans le domaine des systèmes d'armes létales autonomes (SALA).

2- L'année 2022 devrait s'ouvrir sur un événement phare et attendu, la 10ème conférence d'examen du traité de non-prolifération nucléaire (TNP), dont nous espérons qu'elle pourra se tenir dans les meilleures conditions possibles. Pour la France, l'enjeu central sera simple : réaffirmer l'autorité et la primauté de ce traité au cœur de notre sécurité collective. Le TNP est le déterminant de notre stabilité stratégique depuis plus de 50 ans. Il est le seul traité permettant d'éviter la prolifération des armes nucléaires et de réduire la possibilité de confrontation nucléaire, sur la voie du désarmement général et complet, tout en apportant à chacun l'accès aux usages pacifiques de l'atome.

La France a présenté un agenda positif de désarmement nucléaire, dans le cadre d'une approche graduelle du désarmement nucléaire, la seule en mesure d'engranger des progrès tangibles vers la réalisation d'un monde sans armes nucléaires avec une sécurité non-diminuée pour tous. La France prend ses responsabilités et obligations en tant qu'Etat doté au titre du TNP très au sérieux. En tant que présidente du P5, elle aura à cœur d'œuvrer à une contribution positive et concrète du P5 à la conférence d'examen (Je vous renvoie à la déclaration de la France en tant que présidente du P5).

3- L'année 2022 se poursuivra avec un autre événement clé pour le calendrier du désarmement, la 9ème Conférence d'examen de la Convention sur l'interdiction des armes biologiques et à toxines (CIABT) prévue en août 2022. L'actuelle pandémie a montré le potentiel hautement perturbateur des agents biologiques pour nos sociétés humaines et nous oblige ainsi à œuvrer pour l'adoption de mécanismes multilatéraux permettant une coopération opérationnelle entre Etats parties à la Convention. La France porte, à cette fin, 3 propositions concrètes pour opérationnaliser chacun des piliers de la Convention : (i) la coopération internationale autour des usages pacifiques des agents biologiques ; (ii) la transparence dans la mise en œuvre nationale pour asseoir la confiance entre les Etats parties ; (iii) enfin, la clause de sécurité collective de la Convention.

Monsieur le Président, La France contribue activement à cette première commission :

- Avec l'Allemagne, nous portons la résolution sur les stocks de munitions en surplus, qui peuvent faire courir un risque de détournement vers des utilisateurs finaux non autorisés si ils ne sont pas convenablement entreposés ;
- La France porte également la résolution sur la lutte contre la menace que représentent les engins explosifs improvisés (EEI) qui ont fait plus de 60 000 tués ou blessés sur les 10 dernières années ;
- En matière de sécurité extra-atmosphérique, la France réaffirme son plein soutien à la résolution britannique visant à réduire les menaces dans l'espace par l'adoption de normes de comportements responsables. Nous y voyons une façon pragmatique et concrète de renforcer la sécurité spatiale face aux champs des menaces et risques grevant aujourd'hui l'utilisation pacifique de l'espace.

- En matière de cyber-sécurité, la France, conjointement avec une cinquantaine de partenaires, continue de soutenir l'établissement d'un programme d'action pour promouvoir des comportements responsables dans le cyberspace. Nous aurons l'occasion de le rappeler dans une déclaration conjointe des Etats parrains du PoA.

Cette 76ème session de la 1ère commission de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies s'ouvre une nouvelle fois dans un contexte difficile. Notre expérience a néanmoins montré que des efforts sérieux de négociation et de bonne foi permettent de progresser pour consolider les régimes de sécurité collective sur lesquels reposent la paix et la stabilité internationales.

Dans cette perspective, la France est résolue à être motrice d'un multilatéralisme efficace, alliant une solidarité forte entre Européens et un dialogue ouvert mais exigeant avec l'ensemble de nos interlocuteurs.

Je vous remercie./.

**76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee
(New York, 5 October 2021)**

**Statement by Mr Yann HWANG
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament
Head of the French delegation**

“GENERAL DEBATE”

Courtesy translation

Mr. President,

My delegation congratulates you upon your election as President of this First Committee and wishes you every success in this important task.

France associates itself with the declaration of the European Union and would like to make the following additional remarks in its national capacity.

We are facing a return to strategic competition, in a volatile and tense geopolitical context. France cannot accept the deterioration of the international security environment. We are convinced that dialogue, responsibility and determination will enable us to meet the challenges we face. It is in this spirit that we must work to strengthen arms control, one of the keys to our collective security.

The threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery remains acute. The unacceptable use of chemical weapons in Syria, Malaysia, the United Kingdom and Russia, in complete violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has prompted the international community to respond: The “International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons”, spearheaded by France, now brings together 40 States and the European Union. Spring of this year saw the adoption at the 25th Conference of States Parties to the CWC, by a very large majority, of the decision “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, a decision that suspends certain rights and privileges of Syria at the OPCW, on the basis of a text presented by France on behalf of 46 delegations. We repeat forcefully that the perpetrators of chemical attacks must be punished. Our collective security depends on it.

Our collective security also requires us to continue to fight relentlessly against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On Iran, France remains fully committed, with its E3 partners, to preserving the Vienna agreement in order to reduce the risks of proliferation linked to Iran. For the past two years, Tehran has gradually disengaged from this agreement and has now been pursuing for several months very worrying activities that constitute key steps in the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. Iran's return to the negotiations, which began in April and have been suspended at its request for over three months now, is urgent in order to organise Iran's return to full compliance with the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as soon as possible. This is the direction of our efforts, in conjunction with all the participants in the JCPOA and the United States.

It is also essential that Iran resumes full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which we strongly support and must be able to make full use of its mandate in Iran. Iran must fully implement its verification commitments to the Agency and provide full and technically credible explanations to the IAEA's safeguards questions about the presence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran.

With regard to North Korea, we note that its nuclear programme remains operational and that its ballistic programme continues to build up, as demonstrated by the missile launches seen again in recent weeks. We will continue our efforts to ensure the strict, full and universal implementation of sanctions against the North Korean regime in application of UNSC resolutions so that Pyongyang finally accepts dialogue and abandons its proliferation programmes.

Mr. President,

In this tense context, we have 3 crucial upcoming events:

1- 2021 will end with the holding of the Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which is particularly important for France as Chair. This conference should be an opportunity to strengthen the CCW and to make progress on the issue of emerging technologies in the field of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS).

2- The year 2022 should open with a key and eagerly awaited event, the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which we hope can be held under the best possible conditions. For France, the central issue will be simple: to reaffirm the authority and primacy of this treaty, which lies at the heart of our collective security. The NPT has been the determining factor of our strategic stability for over 50 years. It is the only treaty that makes it possible to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reduce the possibility of nuclear confrontation, on the path to general and complete disarmament, while providing everyone with access to the peaceful uses of the nuclear energy.

France has presented a positive nuclear disarmament agenda, as part of a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, contributing to tangible progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. France takes its responsibilities and obligations as NWS very seriously. As Chair of the P5, it is committed to working towards a positive and concrete contribution of the P5 to the Review Conference (I refer you to France's statement as Chair of the P5).

3- The year 2022 will bring along another key event in the disarmament calendar, the 9th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in August 2022. The current pandemic has shown the highly disruptive potential of biological agents for our human societies and thus obliges us to work for the adoption of multilateral mechanisms allowing operational cooperation between States Parties to the Convention. To this end, France is putting forward three concrete proposals to operationalise each of the pillars of the Convention: (i) international cooperation on the peaceful use of biological agents; (ii) transparency in national implementation to build confidence between States Parties; (iii) finally, the Convention's collective security clause.

Mr President, France is actively contributing to this first committee:

- Together with Germany, we are carrying the resolution on ammunition stockpiles in surplus, which can pose a risk of diversion to unauthorised end-users if they are not properly stored;
- France is also carrying the resolution on combating the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which have killed or injured more than 60,000 people over the past 10 years;
- In terms of outer space security, France reaffirms its full support for the UK resolution aimed at reducing threats in outer space through the adoption of rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour. We see this as a pragmatic and concrete way to strengthen security in outer space in the face of the range of threats and risks that currently affect the peaceful use of space.
- In the area of cyber security, France, together with some fifty partners, continues to support the establishment of a programme of action to promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace. We will have the opportunity to reiterate this in a joint declaration by the PoA's sponsor States.

This 76th session of the 1st Committee of the United Nations General Assembly is once again opening in a difficult context. However, our experience has shown that serious efforts at negotiation and good faith make it possible to make progress in consolidating the collective security regimes on which international peace and stability are based.

In this perspective, France is determined to be the driving force behind effective multilateralism, combining strong solidarity amongst Europeans and an open but demanding dialogue with all our interlocutors.

Thank you./.

Germany
Statement on Nuclear Weapons
UN General Assembly, 76th Session, First Committee

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Germany is fully aligned with the EU statement.

Excellencies, colleagues,

In challenging times we are heading towards the 10th Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and I should like to start by thanking Ambassador Zlauvinen for his outstanding stewardship to make this happen.

In the face of power shifts, growing tensions and arms race dynamics the NPT remains the bedrock for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This treaty is a success story of multilateralism and we should not shy away from honoring its tremendous achievements: in curbing proliferation risks; spreading the benefits of nuclear technology; and in bringing down nuclear arsenals from cold-war levels.

But the NPT is a living treaty and it must stand the test of time – over and over again. Proliferation challenges and disarmament commitments require us to remain fully engaged.

Regarding Iran, the full implementation of all provisions contained in UNSCR 2231 and both its annexes is essential. Germany remains committed to the revitalization and full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by all sides. We ask Iran to turn words into action and return to the negotiation table. Time is on no one's side. We remain deeply concerned by the overall trajectory of the Iranian nuclear program marked by systematic JCPOA violations, activities lacking plausible civilian justifications, reduced transparency and insufficient cooperation with the IAEA. We urge Iran to reverse course and to return to full compliance with its political commitments and legal obligations in the nuclear field.

Looking at North Korea, the development over the last years is sobering. The continuous development of its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles arsenal has become a major challenge to global non-proliferation efforts and it must be met with unity and resolve. We fully support the US and South Korean efforts to establish dialogue and negotiations with North Korea. We urge the DPRK to positively react to these initiatives. Only by embarking on a path towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization can North Korea regain the trust of the international community, expect sanctions relief and lay the ground for a sustainable peace in the region.

Mr Chair, the IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements along with the Additional Protocol constitute the current IAEA verification standard and we strongly support its universalisation. We must ensure that the safeguards system and our non-proliferation efforts at large live up to the proliferation challenges as they evolve.

Excellencies, colleagues,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. We know that limited progress on nuclear disarmament has burdened the NPT community since the adoption of the 2010 Action Plan.

Against this background, the extension of the New START Treaty for additional five years was an important step. The limits on the strategic arsenals of the two biggest nuclear powers and the transparency provided by the verification regime substantially contribute to global security. With their decision to extend New START the US and Russia renewed momentum for arms control and disarmament and inspired hope for more steps to come.

In that light, we welcome the two Presidents' joint reaffirmation from 16 June 2021 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and we welcome the Strategic Stability Dialogue now established, seeking to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures. Germany strongly supports US-Russian strategic talks leading to broader arms control arrangements, addressing all nuclear weapons and facilitating further reductions in the future.

We hope that the impetus provided by the US and Russia will have a spill-over on China, too, and will also stimulate tangible results within the P5 dialogue. There is a lot all Nuclear Weapon States can do together to meet their shared responsibility.

That is why the Stockholm Initiative, last year in Berlin, presented a road-map with more than 20 practical steps to further advance nuclear disarmament: Maximum transparency on arsenals; stronger negative security assurances; broader arms control negotiations are all Stepping Stones towards the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

We invite all NPT States to lend their support to these proposals and call on Nuclear-Weapons States to jointly take the steps necessary for their implementation.

Now is the time to reduce nuclear risks. The Stockholm Initiative has substantiated its views on how nuclear risk reduction can be operationalized as a matter of urgency. To facilitate nuclear disarmament – not to replace it.

Mr Chair,

25 years after the CTBT was opened for signature, the treaty has yet to enter into force. We renew our call on all states that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT – in particular those listed under Annex II – to show leadership and do so without delay. Ending nuclear testing is both a humanitarian imperative and a rational choice for international security.

On FMCT we have been biding time for far too long. It is high time to start negotiations. Differences on certain aspects must no longer serve as a pretext not to move forward. We welcome that the P5 have put FMCT on their agenda but what we need to see are courageous steps. That is why Germany is a main sponsor of the resolution calling on all states to actively contribute to facilitating negotiations now.

Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States can very effectively work together. Nuclear disarmament verification is a case in point. Developing robust and proliferation-proof verification procedures is a prerequisite for a nuclear-weapons free world. To that end, Germany and France are currently preparing another practical exercise following the successful NuDiVe exercise in 2019. We look forward to broad attendance and to complementing our practical engagement by more conceptual work in the GGE next year.

Excellencies, colleagues,

The NPT Review Conference is a chance to be seized. Together, we must be clear that the commitments we have made in the past are firm in all the three pillars. We need to see more progress in their implementation and renew the common vision of the NPT and its future.

All of this is possible.

Like the Stockholm Initiative the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative brings together perspectives from different regions and backgrounds. The NPDI has made recommendations to strengthen the NPDI in all its aspects.

In that spirit – by showing respect for different priorities on the basis of a shared and comprehensive understanding of the treaty – can we further advance the goals of the NPT.

Thank you.

**Statement on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
UN General Assembly, 76th Session, First Committee**

Mr Chairman,

Germany fully aligns itself with the statement by the European Union.

The BTWC remains a major pillar of the international WMD arms control and non-proliferation architecture. Germany welcomes the successful intersessional work carried out in the Meetings of Experts in August and September 2021.

The global pandemic of 2020 and 2021 has shown the biosecurity risks the international community faces and the need to work together in mitigating them. It has also shown that rapid developments in the field of biotechnology and the life sciences need to be carefully monitored in view of their dual use potential. Germany strongly upholds its proposal that a “Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum” be established under the auspices of the BTWC. We see this as a key deliverable for the forthcoming Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC next year.

Mr Chairman,

The Chemical Weapons Convention, banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and combining this with an effective verification regime, is the world’s most successful disarmament convention and, together with the OPCW, its implementing organisation, it is also key for the prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons.

But the global ban on the use of chemical weapons has been infringed upon repeatedly in recent years. The use of such weapons against civilian populations has been a particularly atrocious trait of the Syrian civil war. The reports presented by the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team are an important step in the fight against impunity.

Those reports and the outstanding questions regarding Syria’s declaration to the OPCW are matters of grave concern. It is high time that Syria respect its obligations under international law by providing immediate and unfettered access to the OPCW and resolving all pending issues with regard to its initial declaration. We welcome the decision adopted at the 25th Conference of State Parties to the CWC suspending the voting rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic until it fully complies with the CWC. Syria must not be allowed to dodge its international obligations.

We are equally concerned by the repeated use of particularly dangerous and internationally banned nerve agents in the cases of Mr Skripal and Mr Navalny. The use of such nerve agents has been confirmed by the OPCW as well as by independent national laboratories. The Russian Federation, on whose territory the attack on Mr Navalny took place more than one year ago, has not provided any explanations on the attack, nor have we learned of any internal investigation of that case. We continue to call on Russia to launch such an investigation, to answer all outstanding questions in full transparency and without further delay and to fully cooperate with the OPCW.

Mr. Chairman,

The OPCW, its Director-General and Technical Secretariat have proven their technical and professional expertise and their high degree of impartiality and independence. They deserve our full trust, confidence and support.

Therefore Germany has continued to support the OPCW both in the framework of its regular obligations as State Party to the CWC as well as through voluntary contributions.

Mr. Chairman,

There is no doubt: we need to uphold the Convention's integrity. The OPCW was given the instruments to do that. Let us join forces to keep it the world's most successful multilateral disarmament regime.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

**Statement on Conventional Weapons
UN General Assembly, 76th Session, First Committee**

Mr. Chair,

Germany aligns itself with the Statement of the European Union. I will make some additional remarks in a national capacity.

The widespread circulation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and their ammunition continues to fuel conflict and bloodshed. To save lives, we jointly need to step up our efforts to strengthen small arms control, during all stages of conflict, using all instruments at our disposal, at the international, regional, national and local level.

Germany is particularly concerned with the implementation gap between multilaterally agreed guidance and practices on the ground. One of our biggest concerns is to close this implementation gap. In 2020, Germany contributed with 19 Mio. EUR to strengthen small arms control around the world. Building on the momentum of the successful outcome of BMS7, we need to make sure that vital provisions as set out in the UN Programme of Action are finally put into practice.

We are convinced that one way to achieve this is via comprehensive and well-coordinated regional processes such as the "Western Balkans Roadmap for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons", the "Caribbean Firearms Roadmap" or the ECOWAS Regional Plan of Action. That is why we wholeheartedly supported their establishment and continue to support their comprehensive implementation. Germany also considers it essential that civil society, women and youth are included into these efforts.

Inextricably linked to the challenges presented by Small Arms and Light Weapons are the risks presented by the illicit circulation of conventional ammunition. On this topic, we would like to draw your attention to the successful conclusion of the UN GGE on conventional ammunition under German chairmanship. The group has issued very substantial consensus recommendations, in particular regarding steps to address the safety and security challenges arising from conventional ammunition in a comprehensive manner.

We think it is vital to follow-up on the Group's recommendations as well as to maintain the current momentum. Germany and France therefore propose to integrate a follow-up process to the GGE into this year's ammunition resolution in the 1st Committee. We suggest establishing an Open Ended Working Group in 2022 to elaborate a new global framework addressing existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance. This global framework should take the form of a set of political commitments. Together with actions at the national level, and voluntary arrangements at sub-regional and regional levels, this framework would become part of a comprehensive framework to support safe, secure, and sustainable through-life ammunition management. As with the consensus report of the GGE, we hope to find consensus support for this mandate and the resolution.

Germany furthermore welcomes the fact that despite Covid-19-restrictions the 7th Conference of States Parties [CSP7] to the Arms Trade Treaty [ATT] could successfully take place in a hybrid format from 30 August until 2 September in Geneva. We feel honoured to have been appointed as Chairs of CSP8. During the CSP8-cycle, the German Presidency will focus on “post-shipment controls” [PSCs] and “on-site verifications” respectively. Universalisation and stocktaking are additional priorities. Germany has introduced thorough post-shipment controls for certain numbers and categories of arms, especially for those that are easily divertible, such as small arms. We would be pleased to share our experience and encourage others to adopt this practice, which we regard as an effective measure to build confidence between exporting and importing states.

- With regard to emerging technologies and in particular lethal autonomous weapons, we welcome the intense discussions that have taken place in the CCW group of governmental experts since August. We commend the Belgian Chair for his continuous efforts to work towards consensus by building upon the eleven guiding principles endorsed by the Meeting of CCW High Contracting Parties in 2019. We look forward to the draft final report that the Chair plans to present before the next GGE meeting. We would welcome if the report could harness the two-tier approach introduced by France and Germany consisting of a clear commitment not to develop, produce, acquire, deploy or use fully autonomous lethal weapons systems operating completely outside a human chain of command and control on the one hand, and – on the other hand – the agreement on positive obligations, in particular that lethal weapons systems featuring autonomy must comply with a number of provisions such as
 - compliance with international law,
 - preservation of human responsibility and accountability at all times,
 - Retention of appropriate/sufficient human control during the whole life-cycle of the system considered,
 - and adoption and implementation of tailored risk mitigation measures and appropriate safeguards regarding safety and security.

We consider it indispensable that the group delivers a substantial outcome on this important issue to the CCW RevCon in December,

We continue to be staunch supporters of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention against Cluster Munitions. Last year, Germany provided almost 50 Mio. EUR for Mine Action and Victim Assistance, remaining one of the largest donors in this area. Since universalisation of both conventions has slowed down in recent years, we need to redouble efforts to bring additional states into the conventions. The country coalition concept, which brings together affected countries and donor countries as well as implementing agencies, can play a vital role in order to achieve the full implementation of both conventions as well as the accession of new States Parties.

The protection of civilians in armed conflict remains of key importance for Germany. We are dismayed by the devastating humanitarian impact on civilians that the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects has had in populated areas in conflicts like in Syria, Libya and Yemen. The provisions of IHL regarding the protection of civilians must be fully respected by all parties to an armed conflict. Germany therefore continues to support the process for a meaningful and inclusive political declaration, led by Ireland, in order to strengthen the compliance with IHL and protect civilians in armed conflict. Identifying and exchanging military good practices in IHL application can contribute to this decisively.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on Nuclear Weapons
at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, October 2021**

UN Member States embraced collectively in the final outcome document of the tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (SSOD-1), that the ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. After four decades, the international community is yet to effectively meet the historic challenge and shared objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, though some progress has been made. India believes that effective and reformed multilateralism with a strong and reliable UN at its core is capable of achieving solutions to problems of international peace and security.

2. India's voice and active role, for the past several decades, in the global efforts towards disarmament is well known. In 1954, India was the first country in the world to call for a ban on nuclear testing. In 1965, India's call for a non-discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as distinct from non-dissemination is yet another testimony to India's prescience.

3. India is unequivocal in its commitment to universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Fully cognizant that disarmament can be achieved through a steady, gradual and effective process, India's Working Paper submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2007, CD/1816 envisions a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework, based on the following elements:

- Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines;
- Measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental nuclear war, de-alerting of nuclear-weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on 'no-first-use' of nuclear-weapons;
- Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States;
- Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe.

4. In line with our vision, India has supported the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the CD. Furthermore, India's annual resolution, on a "Convention on the Prohibition of the use of Nuclear Weapons", tabled since 1982 in the UNGA requests the CD to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Our annual resolution on 'Reducing Nuclear Danger', tabled since 1988 in the UNGA, has drawn much-needed global attention to the hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons and calls for steps to reduce the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting of nuclear weapons. India presents the two aforementioned resolutions in this Cluster and seeks the continued kind support of all Member States for their adoption.

5. As a responsible nuclear weapons State, India has a policy of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence based on a No First Use posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. India is

prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements. Furthermore, India remains committed to maintaining a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Without prejudice to the priority that we attach to nuclear disarmament, we also support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the CD of a non-discriminatory, multilateral internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

6. India would like to reiterate that the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, negotiated outside the CD, does not create any obligations for India. India believes that this Treaty, in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law. However, India stands ready to work with all countries to achieve our shared goal of nuclear disarmament.

7. India strongly supports the upholding and strengthening of global non-proliferation objectives. The international community has a vital interest in preventing terrorists and non-state actors from gaining access to nuclear weapons, sensitive materials and technologies and in isolating States which harbor and provide support to terrorists based on their soil. The international community must take a firm and united stand against those who indulge in nuclear threats or benefit from clandestine proliferation linkages.

8. India believes that a climate of trust and confidence coupled with political will and intensified dialogue among States will help achieve consensus towards the shared objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. India stands ready to work with all Member States in achieving this noble goal.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, October 2021**

India is deeply concerned by the growing linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and is fully cognizant of the need to urgently address this grave threat to humanity through international cooperation and within the United Nations framework.

2. Having faced the menace of terrorism for many decades, India through its annual Resolution at the UNGA, titled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, has drawn the attention of the international community to the dangers of the proliferation of WMD and the potential for its exploitation by terrorists and non-state actors for hostile purposes. Tabled since 2002 and adopted by consensus, the resolution urges Member States to support international efforts as well as to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. India seeks the continued support of all Member States towards these important initiatives that are embodied in the resolution under the Other WMD Cluster and for its adoption by consensus.

3. On its part, India has an overarching and integrated legislation in the Indian domestic law, namely, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2005, that effectively translates at the operational level, India’s firm commitment to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. India has a robust and effective national export control system based on legislation, regulations and a control list of sensitive material, equipment and technologies consistent with the highest international standards. Furthermore, India contributes to the global non-proliferation efforts as a member of the export control regimes including the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group.

4. India attaches high importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is a unique, non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally verifiable disarmament instrument and serves as a model for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. India maintains that the use of chemical weapons, anywhere, by anybody and under any circumstances cannot be justified and the perpetrators

of such acts must be held accountable. Any use of chemical weapons is in complete disregard of humanity, is reprehensible and contrary to the provisions of the Convention, as well as accepted international legal norms.

5. India believes that the provisions of the Convention must be implemented in a manner that it does not hinder legitimate activities. With a burgeoning chemical industry and with the second largest number of declared chemical facilities to the OPCW, India ranks among the States Parties receiving the largest number of industry inspections from the OPCW and has an impeccable track record of verification inspections.

6. India shares the concerns related to the recent instances of the alleged use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world, including by non-state actors, especially terrorist groups and in this regard, underlines the need for the full and effective implementation of the Convention. India urges that the provisions and procedures laid down in the Convention be strictly adhered to by the OPCW and the Member States and that the concerns regarding alleged use be addressed on the basis of cooperation among all parties concerned. India calls on States Parties to the CWC to undertake appropriate measures to prevent use or threat of use of chemical weapons by non-state actors.

7. India accords high priority to the universalization and full and effective implementation of the BWC as well as further strengthening of the Convention through the negotiation of a comprehensive and legally binding protocol. The Meetings of Experts of the BWC held this year have been a fruitful exchange of in-depth views on a number of important issues and a

significant contribution towards strengthening the inter-sessional process under the Convention. India looks forward to constructive engagement at the Review Conference next year and a meaningful outcome to strengthen the Convention. India seeks the support of all Member States on its joint proposal with France for establishment of a database to strengthen assistance, response and preparedness under Article VII of the BWC.

8. We must make sure that the financial health of the Convention is on a sustainable footing by ensuring both stability and predictability of resources. We would urge all States Parties to ensure that their financial contributions are made in time which would help in addressing the severe challenges the Convention is currently faced with regard to its financial status.

9. India is ready to work with all Member States on these important issues with a view to preserving global peace and security.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on Conventional Weapons
of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, October 2021**

India is a party to all the five Protocols of the CCW and is committed to ensure the full implementation of its obligations under the Convention and the humanitarian principles that they exemplify. The CCW, being an important instrument of International Humanitarian law, while stipulating measures to mitigate humanitarian concerns arising from the use of specific weapons and weapon systems, also takes into account the military necessity of such weapons, thus striving to strike a balance between the two requirements. India supports efforts towards the universalization of this important Convention. India believes that it is important to maintain the financial sustainability of the Convention so as to ensure its full and effective implementation. India is concerned about the precarious financial situation of the CCW and calls upon all High Contracting parties to make their financial contributions to the Convention, in full and on time. India looks forward to productive outcomes at the Sixth Review Conference of the CCW later this year.

2. India attaches high priority to the full implementation of the Amended Protocol II of the Convention as well as its universalization. AP-II of the Convention strikes a fine balance between humanitarian concerns on landmines and legitimate defence requirements, particularly of States with long borders, such as India. India supports the goal of a world free of the threat of landmines. India observes a moratorium on the export and transfer of landmines. India has fulfilled all its obligations under the Amended Protocol II related, inter-alia, to the non-production of non-detectable mines as well as rendering all anti-personnel mines detectable. We have also been submitting our national annual reports in a timely manner.

3. India believes that AP-II serves as an appropriate mechanism for addressing the issue of IEDs under the CCW framework. Having faced the menace of the use of IEDs by non-state actors for the last three decades that have caused casualties of both our defence personnel and civilians, India is sensitive to the issue of IED threat mitigation and victim assistance. Our Centres of Excellence on Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) remain well-informed about the latest developments with respect to IED design, development, proliferation and the global threat mitigation effort to minimize the IED contaminated areas.

4. Protocol V, which was negotiated during the Presidency of India in 2002-03, holds a special significance for India. India is deeply aware of the grave humanitarian concerns arising from the explosive remnants of war and thus attaches importance to cooperation and providing assistance, to various countries, in the implementation of Protocol V. India is willing to share its best practices with other High Contracting Parties and the United Nations. India's ratification of the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities underscores the importance we attach to victim assistance. India supports efforts towards victim assistance and technical cooperation both under the UN mandate as well as on a bilateral basis.

5. Our "India for Humanity" initiative launched in 2018 coinciding with Mahatma Gandhi's 150th birth anniversary celebrations, has successfully conducted several artificial limb fitments camps in various countries with more than 6500 artificial limbs fitted across the world. The initiative has been extended till March 2023. India also extends assistance to international demining and rehabilitation efforts and has undertaken specialist training programmes on Counter IED, bomb disposal and demining with numerous partner countries. We stand ready to contribute towards capacity building, victim assistance and victim rehabilitation, upon request from friendly countries in future under the UN mandate.

6. India participates as an Observer in the meetings of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and looks forward to its participation in the 19th Meeting of States Parties this year.

7. India supports the continued deliberations on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) on the basis of an agreed mandate within the framework of the CCW. India also reaffirms its support to the eleven Guiding Principles adopted during the annual Meeting of High Contracting Parties in 2019. India has actively participated in the discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS held this year. While the deliberations in the GGE have been useful to understand commonalities, they have also equally demonstrated the need for further work on a number of aspects concerning LAWS. India, therefore, supports continuation of the mandate of the GGE on LAWS, beyond the Sixth Review Conference this year, with participation of all relevant stakeholders, with a view to taking forward the fruitful deliberations during the current review cycle.

8. India, without prejudice to a negotiated outcome to be reached by consensus by the GGE, is not in a position to support any stance which prejudices the outcome of the ongoing deliberations including in the form of a prohibition or moratorium on further development or use of LAWS. India stands ready to actively participate in the deliberations of the GGE and work with fellow High Contracting Parties to reach a common understanding based on consensus.

9. Weapons in the hands of terrorists are the most threatening form of illicit SALWs. Therefore, India values the full and effective implementation of the UN PoA as a means to combat terrorism and transnational crime. India

attaches great priority to the UN Programme of Action as an important multilateral instrument. The Biennial Meeting of States -7 held earlier this year successfully adopted an outcome document after substantive discussions on the important issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons. We look forward to further consolidating the progress made so far, at the BMS-8 next year.

10. India supports the UN Register on Conventional Arms and the UN Report on Military Expenditures and has submitted its national reports regularly. India is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement. India has enacted robust national export controls governing the transfer of conventional weapons in line with the international standards and remains committed to preventing illegal transfer of conventional weapons.

11. In line with the importance that India attaches to the CCW, our Annual Disarmament Fellowship programme for young foreign diplomats, includes modules on the CCW. We believe that awareness of the Convention and its principles and provisions would help in further strengthening and universalization of the Convention. India stands ready to work with all Member States in this important area of our work and with a view to promoting international peace and security.

**Statement by India during the thematic debate on
Other Disarmament Measures and International Security
at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, October 2021**

Science and Technology is the most important catalyst for economic and social development. Technology-based innovations have transformed our world and have impacted every aspect of human lives - be it food security, energy, education, communication, travel, health or medicine and contribute to the effective achievement of Sustainable Development Goals. At the same time, we have to be mindful that while emerging technologies offer tremendous benefits, they also pose potential challenges to international peace and security in view of the possibility of their malicious use, including by non-State actors and terrorists. Thus, it is all the more important that Member States keep abreast of the latest S&T developments which have a bearing on international peace and security and to address any potential risks.

2. India strongly believes that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of science and technology should be promoted through relevant means, including technology transfer, sharing of information and exchange of equipment and materials. At the same time, India is convinced that international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications be effectively regulated, keeping in mind legitimate defense requirements of all States and non-proliferation concerns.

3. India's annual resolution on the 'Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament', adopted by consensus, addresses the felt need of States for enhanced international cooperation in the peaceful uses of science and technology. Acknowledging the need to regulate the transfer of technologies for peaceful uses, in accordance with relevant international obligations, to address the risk of proliferation by States or non-State actors, the resolution inter-alia, highlights the importance for Member States to continue efforts to apply developments in science and technology for disarmament-related purposes as well as to engage with experts and relevant stakeholders from industry, academia and civil society to effectively address the challenges involved. India is grateful to the Secretary General for submitting the updated report A/76/182, as mandated by the 2020 resolution.

4. One of the important emerging areas in the field of Science and Technology relates to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). ICT can deliver enormous economic and social benefits for countries, but they can also have a negative impact on international peace and security, especially due to their susceptibility to harmful uses by both State and non-State actors. The race for cutting-edge technologies, research and

development can accentuate strategic competition and also widen the technology divide. This needs the attention of the international community.

5. States are leveraging the latest ICT technologies to augment contemporary forms of cross-border terrorism. The world is already witnessing the use of cyber tools to compromise State security through, inter alia, attacks on critical national infrastructure and disruption of social harmony through radicalisation. Democratic and open societies have been particularly vulnerable to such cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns. New and emerging technologies, for instance the use of machine learning and big data, have the potential to improve the lethality of such acts, posing a grave threat to international peace and security. The commercialization of these technologies, including in WMDs, necessitates addressing the risk of proliferation of such technologies by States and non-State actors.

6. We are also witnessing the sophisticated use of information and communications technologies by terrorists around the world to broaden their appeal, spread virulent propaganda, incite hatred and violence, recruit and raise funds. India would like to underscore the need for Member States to address the implications of exploitation of technological and digital innovation for terrorism.

7. India is committed to promoting an open, accessible, and secure ICT ecosystem, based on mutual trust, confidence and universal values. We reiterate that resilient, diverse, and secure technology supply chains are vital for maintaining a stable and secure ICT environment. We welcome the consensus adoption of the reports of the GGE and OEWG on ICT earlier this year, which has laid a strong foundation to the new OEWG. We hope that the new OEWG would carry forward the positive momentum and provide an inclusive platform to develop a common understanding on addressing the challenges in the realm of ICT security.

8. Given the relevance and importance of the cross-cutting nature of Science and Technology and its significance to Member States, India believes that this important topic should bring Member States together to collectively address its complex challenges. India seeks the continued support of all Member States towards the adoption of its resolution on the 'Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament' by consensus this year. We would also encourage Member States to co-sponsor this resolution and join us in this collective endeavour to make a meaningful contribution to global peace and security.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on Disarmament Machinery at the
First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, October 2021**

In an age of interdependence, a reformed, reliable, and effective United Nations is a sine qua non in pursuit of disarmament. The final outcome document of the Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-1), has observed that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. India is firmly committed to the ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and to multilateralism to achieve them. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his address at the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly has reminded that if the United Nations has to keep itself relevant, it has to improve its effectiveness and increase its reliability.

2. The framework for UN disarmament machinery laid out by the SSOD-1, consisting of the triad of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the First Committee and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), continue to be the ideal forums for making meaningful progress on matters of disarmament, international security, and non-proliferation.

3. India accords the highest priority to the CD as the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The CD's Agenda comprises the most critical issues related to international peace and security. The CD

brings together its Member States in sovereign equality and in full responsibility to negotiate legally-binding instruments on disarmament. The CD has the mandate as well as the membership to commence negotiations on the core items on its Agenda based on a comprehensive and balanced Programme of work. Despite several attempts over the years, the CD has regrettably not been able to adopt a Programme of Work.

4. India is committed to efforts aimed at the Conference to agree on a Programme of Work in fulfilment of its important mandate.

Instead of being sceptical on the relevance of the CD, what is really needed is a concrete demonstration of political will and to get down to negotiating legally binding instruments. It is equally important not to let the work of the CD be disrupted by some who wish to politicise the work of the CD and for Member States to instead, focus their valuable time and resources on its negotiating mandate. India has expressed its readiness and commitment to work with other Member States on all core items on the CD's Agenda, including a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

5. The UNDC is the universal forum that provides for in-depth consideration of important disarmament issues and for enhancing understanding and consensus. That the UNDC has lost three years of substantive work in 2019-21 is an opportunity lost for Member States to deliberate on issues of importance to international security and disarmament. India hopes that the UNDC, will be able to conduct its work next year and makes substantive recommendations on the issues on its agenda.

6. India looks forward to the convening of the SSOD-IV, which is long overdue and can be a useful opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the disarmament machinery and to look at ways to further revitalize it.

7. The First Committee, mandated by the SSOD-1 to deal with the questions related to international peace and security is an important platform that brings together all UN Member States to contribute their views. India is pleased that the First Committee has been able to carry on with its important work during the pandemic in exceptional circumstances. India hopes that exchanges in the First Committee would lead to further coalescing of views among Member States to finding collective solutions on matters related to disarmament and international security.

8. India also values the efforts of the UNIDIR which brings immense value to our work. India believes that the disarmament machinery should function as a composite whole, so that the progress made in one could contribute to and be leveraged by another.

9. India's annual Disarmament and International Security fellowship demonstrates the high priority we attach to promoting disarmament education. We look forward to further deepening our engagement through our Disarmament for Youth initiative.

10. India stands ready to work with all Member States in a spirit of cooperation and constructive engagement to revitalize the disarmament machinery to safeguard global peace and security.

**Statement by
the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
Thematic Debate: “Nuclear Weapons”
First Committee 76th Session United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am honored to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. NAM reiterates its concern at the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons as well as the lack of progress shown by Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in eliminating their nuclear weapons. NAM expresses concern at the sustained modernization of nuclear weapons, the continuous improvements in existing nuclear weapons, and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, including new delivery vehicles, as provided for in the military doctrines of some NWS, including the latest United States Nuclear Posture Review, that set out rationales for the use of such weapons against non-NWS.
3. NAM States Parties to the NPT expresses its deep concern about the declared review of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons policy, as contained in the “The Integrated Review 2021”, that includes increasing its stockpile ceiling of nuclear weapons by up to 44 percent, lowering the threshold for the possible use of such weapons, and reducing transparency about its nuclear weapons.
4. NAM is also concerned that the strategic dialogue between the NWS has remained limited. NAM takes note of the extension of the New START Treaty in 2021. NAM calls for the renewal of the commitments agreed within the framework of the Treaty. NAM also expresses its concern over the termination of the INF Treaty and its serious implications on international peace and security as well as efforts towards nuclear disarmament.
5. Reaffirming NAM principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains the agreed highest disarmament priority for the UN, NAM strongly calls upon the NWS to comply with their legal obligations and undertakings urgently, and eliminate their nuclear weapons totally, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner. All modernization or extension to their nuclear weapons related facilities should also cease immediately.
6. Pending the achievement of total elimination, a universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and legally binding instrument to effectively assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be concluded, as a high priority.
7. A UN High-level International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, as decided through the General Assembly resolutions, should be convened. Noting also the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021, NAM hopes that it would contribute to furthering the global objective of nuclear weapons' total elimination. NAM States Parties to the TPNW are fully committed to its implementation and look forward to engage constructively in the lead up to the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in March 2022 towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.
8. Non-proliferation derives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. Both are mutually reinforcing and essential. NAM emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements.

Mr. Chairman,

9. NAM States Parties to the NPT regret the failure of the 9th NPT Review Conference to reach consensus on a final outcome document despite efforts made by NAM delegations, and call upon NWS to demonstrate political will to enable the 10th Review Conference to have concrete recommendations towards achieving nuclear disarmament, the ultimate objective of the NPT.

10. NAM States Parties to the NPT call on all NWS to promptly implement their long overdue obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the commitments agreed by consensus at the NPT Review Conference without further delay. Furthermore, they also urge all NWS to refrain from any action that would run counter to the Treaty's objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons and the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The States Parties express concern that despite the commitment of the NWS and long-standing requests by NNWS to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved in this regard. It is a matter of more concern that NNWS implicitly or explicitly have been subject to nuclear threats by some nuclear weapon States contrary to their obligations under the UN Charter. They also call for the commencement of negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances in accordance with UNGA resolution A/RES/75/75.

11. NAM State Parties to the NPT reaffirms that the convening of the 10th NPT Review Conference is especially important given the crucial role of the NPT in international security. Thus, all efforts must be made to ensure the convening of the Conference in a manner that contributes to a successful outcome.

12. In this regard, NAM welcomes the Convening of the First Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons according to the General Assembly Decision 73/546, under the Presidency of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the adoption of a Political Declaration and its Final Report. In this regard, NAM looks forward to the Second Session of the Conference and continues to call upon all States of the region, without exception, to actively participate in this Conference and negotiate in good faith and bring to a conclusion a legally-binding Treaty on the establishment of the Zone. NAM States Parties to the NPT also stress that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, as well as other relevant decisions on the subject, adopted within the context of the Review Conferences, remain valid until the objective of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East is achieved and that the implementation of decision 73/546 is without prejudice to the validity of aforesaid resolution and decisions and shall not also be construed as their replacement.

13. NAM reiterated their full support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. As a priority step to this end, they reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of the Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions. They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone. Pending its establishment, they demanded on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without precondition and further delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards according to Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. They called for the earliest implementation of relevant IAEA resolutions on "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East". They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighboring and other States, and condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. In this context they also condemned the statement made by the then Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, related to the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. They urged the continued consideration of the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities in the context of the IAEA, including at the General Conference. They were of the view that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbors, and the region. They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, they expressed their serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to

the nuclear facilities of one NWS. This development will have potentially serious negative implications on security in the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Chairman,

14. NAM reiterates its firm belief that non-proliferation policies should not undermine the inalienable right of States to acquire, have access to, import or export nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

15. NAM reaffirms the inalienable right of each State to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy, including the sovereign right to develop full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes without discrimination. It is the sovereign right of each State to define its national energy policies. Any decisions on multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus.

16. NAM recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and nuclear security rests with individual states. Any multilateral norms, guidelines or rules in nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. NAM continues to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist; and emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

17. NAM also stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), especially by all NWS, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. NAM expresses concern at the decision of the US to not seek ratification of the CTBT, as announced in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, taking into account the special responsibility of NWS for the realization of entry into force of the CTBT.

Mr. Chairman,

18. NAM is tabling a draft resolution to update “Follow-up to the 2013 High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament.” NAM will appreciate support by all member states on it.

19. Finally, while noting the statements by NWS of their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, NAM reaffirms the need for their urgent concrete actions to achieve this goal in accordance with their nuclear disarmament legal obligations and commitments. NAM remains committed to cooperate for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Thank you.

**Statement by
the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
Thematic Debate: “Other Weapons of Mass Destruction”
First Committee 76th Session United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am honored to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

2. Non-fulfillment of the commitments and obligations assumed under the relevant international legally binding instruments especially on weapons of mass destruction continues to pose threats to global peace and security.

3. NAM States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC) note with satisfaction the effective operation of CWC, as the only comprehensive multilateral treaty banning an entire category of WMD, providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. They urge United States, as the only remaining State Party, to take every necessary measure to ensure its compliance with the “Detailed plan for the destruction of Chemical Weapons remaining after the final extended destruction deadline of 29 April 2012”, in the shortest time possible, in order to achieve the complete elimination of all categories of chemical weapons, which is one of the main pillars of the Convention and the fundamental and top priority of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and to uphold the credibility and integrity of the Convention. They express deep regret for non-adoption of the report of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to Review the Operation of the Convention owing to lack of consensus, despite broad consultations and best efforts, and politicization on some issues. They call for promotion of international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention without any discrimination and restriction.

4. NAM States Parties to the CWC invite all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible. The accession of the State of Palestine, as the 193rd State Party in 2018, is a significant step towards achieving Convention’s universality.

5. NAM States Parties to the CWC reaffirm the importance of international cooperation in the field of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under CWC. NAM States Parties to the CWC reiterates their call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation for the benefit of States Parties through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. NAM States Parties to the CWC recalls that the full, balanced, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention, in particular economic and technical development through international cooperation, is fundamental to the achievement of its object and purpose, and reaffirms the need to respect the principles included in the Convention, and called upon States parties to the CWC to avoid the polarization and politicization of the work of the Organization, while encouraging States Parties to continue working cooperatively in the interest of consensus.

6. The use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals, as weapons anywhere by anyone under any circumstances is reprehensible and completely contrary to international law, particularly the provisions of the Convention. Those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.

7. NAM reiterates its condemnation of Israeli military aggression against Gaza Strip in 2009 and July and August 2014 and the occupying power’s indiscriminate shelling and bombing of Palestinian civilian areas. Expressing grave concern over the reported use in civilian areas of harmful and potentially fatal incendiary weapons, such as white phosphorous, NAM reiterates its call for a thorough investigation of this serious matter by relevant bodies under the appropriate international conventions and agreements.

8. International support to provide special care and assistance to all victims suffering from exposure to chemical weapons is an urgent humanitarian need. The States Parties to the Convention as well as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should pay attention to meeting those needs.

9. NAM State Parties to the CWC attach high importance to OPCW and emphasize the importance of consensus in the decision-making process on matters of substance. OPCW should be strengthened to deal with ongoing and future challenges within the confines of the CWC, without distorting the OPCW’s mandate. to uphold the authority and credibility of the OPCW.

Mr. Chairman,

10. NAM States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) consider that the Convention represents an important component of the international legal architecture related to WMD. They recognize that the lack of a verification system continues to pose challenge to effectiveness of the Convention. They call for resumption of multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory legally binding Protocol, dealing with all Articles of the Convention, in a balanced and comprehensive manner to sustainably strengthen the Convention, including through verification measures. They urge the Party rejecting negotiations to reconsider its policy. They further emphasize the need for enhancing, without restrictions, international cooperation, assistance and exchanges in toxins, biological agents, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes without any discrimination, in conformity with the Convention.

11. NAM States Parties to the BWC express satisfaction on the increased number of parties to the Convention, and supports the participation of NAM States Parties to the BWC to the upcoming Meeting of States Parties.

12. They further emphasize the need for enhancing, without restrictions, international cooperation, assistance and exchanges in toxins, biological agents, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes without any discrimination, in conformity with the Convention.

13. In the context of UN Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and its subsequent resolutions, NAM underlines the need to ensure that any actions by the Security Council do not undermine the UN Charter, existing multilateral treaties on WMD, and international Organizations established in this regard, as well as the functions, power and role of the General Assembly. NAM cautions against the continuing practice of the Security Council to utilize its authority to define legislative requirements for Member States in implementing its decisions. In this regard, NAM stresses that the issue of acquisition of WMD by non-State actors should be addressed in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner by the GA, taking into account views of all Member States. NAM further stresses that the comprehensive review of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) prior to the expiry of the Committee's mandate in February 2022 should strictly abide by the UN Charter, as well as relevant international legally binding instruments and mandate of the aforementioned resolution, and be based on the main thrust to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by non-state actors. NAM also stress that efforts should be strived for the comprehensive review of the implementation of the Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to observe the principle of consensus and for it to be conducted through open, transparent and inclusive consultations with Member States.

14. NAM reaffirms the need to prevent emergence of new types of WMD, and therefore, supports the necessity of monitoring the situation and triggering international action as required. In this regard, NAM welcomes the adoption of GA Resolution 75/31 entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of WMD and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Thank you.

**Statement by
the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
Thematic Debate: “Outer space (disarmament aspects)”
First Committee 76th Session United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am pleased to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. NAM recognizes the common interest of all humankind and the inalienable, legitimate sovereign rights of all States in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. NAM reconfirms its stand to oppose and reject any acts denying or violating it and emphasizes that prevention of an arms race in outer space, including a ban to deploy or use weapons therein, would avert a grave danger for international peace and security.
3. NAM emphasizes the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. NAM also calls for the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
4. NAM rejects the declaration by the United States in 2018 that “Space is a warfighting domain” or “the next battle field” and accordingly reemphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), inter alia, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including through the establishment of an ad hoc committee under this agenda item as early as possible, taking note of a draft treaty on the “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT), presented jointly by Russia and China in the CD on 12 February 2008 and updated in 2014. Taking note of the substantive progress made through the discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established pursuant to GA resolution 72/250, as reflected in the draft final report of this GGE, and expressing strong disappointment that consensus on the draft final report of the GGE was blocked by its member from the US, NAM notes that it could have represented a good basis for further negotiations towards adopting an international legally-binding instrument.
5. NAM continues to be concerned over the negative implications of development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems and threat of weaponization of outer space that have, inter alia, contributed to further erosion of an international climate conducive to strengthening of international security. The abrogation of ABM Treaty brought new challenges to international peace and stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. NAM remains seriously concerned at the negative security consequences of deployment of strategic missile defense systems, which could trigger an arms race(s) and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.
6. NAM welcomed General Assembly resolutions 73/30 on “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” and 73/31 on “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”, both of which reaffirm the importance and urgency of the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space and the willingness of all States to contribute to reaching this common goal, as well as resolution 73/72 on “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities”, which reaffirms that “preventing an arms race in outer space is in the interest of maintaining international peace and security”.
7. NAM underscores that while voluntary TCBMs may partially contribute to reducing mistrust and enhancing the safety of outer space operations in the short-term, it cannot represent a substitute for the early conclusion of a legally-binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including the prohibition of the placement of any weapons in outer space, as well as the threat or use of force against outer space objects. NAM further urges all Member States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the

goal of preventing an arms race in outer space as an essential condition for the sustainability of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

8. NAM continues to reaffirm the need for a universal, comprehensive, and non-discriminatory multilateral approach toward the issue of missiles in all its aspects, negotiated multilaterally within the UN. Any initiatives on this subject should take into account security concerns of all states and their inherent right to peaceful uses of space technologies.

Thank you.

**Statement by
the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
Thematic Debate: "Conventional Weapons"
First Committee 76th Session United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am pleased to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

2. Non-fulfillment of the commitments and obligations assumed under the relevant international legally binding instruments especially on conventional weapons continues to pose threats to global peace and security.

3. NAM continues to affirm the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms and relevant parts, components, and ammunition for their self-defense and security needs.

NAM expresses its concern about unilateral coercive measures in this area, and emphasizes that no undue restriction should be placed on transfer of such arms.

4. NAM remains deeply concerned over a wide range of security, humanitarian and socio-economic consequences arising from the illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). NAM calls on all states, in particular major producing States, to ensure that supply of SALW is limited only to governments or to entities duly authorized by them. NAM also underlines the need for a balanced, full and effective implementation of the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument, and in this regard, stresses the urgent need to intensify efforts to promote international cooperation and assistance. NAM also calls on the UN, in its activities in support of the implementation of the PoA, to rely further on the expertise available in developing countries.

5. NAM notes the successful conclusion of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States Parties to the PoA, held in July 2021, and the adoption of its outcome document, including the expedient establishment of a dedicated fellowship training programme on small arms and light weapons particularly for developing countries.

6. Recognizing the adverse humanitarian impact caused by the use of cluster munitions, and expressing solidarity with the cluster munitions-affected countries, NAM calls for providing the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to unexploded cluster munitions clearance operations, the social and economic rehabilitation of victims as well as to ensure full access of affected countries to material, equipment, technology and financial resources for unexploded cluster munitions clearance.

7. NAM continues to deplore the use, in contravention of international humanitarian law, of anti-personnel mines in conflict situations aimed at maiming, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians. NAM calls upon all States in position to do so, to provide the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to landmine clearance operations, the social and economic rehabilitation of victims as well as to ensure full access of affected countries to material equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance.

8. NAM States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention) reiterate their commitment to full implementation of the Maputo Action Plan.

9. Noting the Arms Trade Treaty, NAM States Parties to the ATT call for balanced, transparent and objective implementation of the Treaty, in strict accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, and the inherent right of each State to security and to individual or collective self defense. NAM also underscores that its implementation should, in no way, affect the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms and their parts and components for their self-defense, security needs and the maintenance of territorial integrity of its member states.

10. NAM States Parties to the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), and its Protocols, encourage other States to become parties to the Convention and its Protocols.

11. NAM is of the view that Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) raise a number of ethical, legal, moral, technical, as well as international peace and security related questions, which should be thoroughly deliberated and examined in the context of conformity to international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In this regard, NAM States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) welcome the adoption by consensus of the 2018 Report of the GGE on LAWS and have agreed that there is an urgent need to pursue a legally-binding instrument on LAWS

12. NAM recognizes the significant imbalance in production, possession and trade in conventional weapons between the industrialized and the Non-Aligned Countries, and calls for a significant reduction in production, possession and trade of conventional weapons by the industrialized states with a view to enhancing international and regional peace and security.

13. Finally, NAM expresses concern at the increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs. NAM further stresses the importance of the reduction of military expenditures, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, and urges all States to devote resources made available from there to economic and social development, in particular in the fight against poverty.

Thank you.

**Statement by
the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
Thematic Debate: “Other Disarmament Measures and International Security”
First Committee 76th Session United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am pleased to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

2. While NAM notes the positive benefits of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their contribution to development, and encourages States to implement the norms, rules and principles for the responsible behavior of States, as this will contribute to increasing stability and security in cyberspace, NAM is concerned with the cases of illegal and malicious use of new ICTs to the detriment of Members States of the Movement and expresses strong condemnation and rejection to those violations. NAM further reiterates the need to prevent the cyberspace from becoming a theater of military operations.

3. NAM confirms the conclusions of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE), in its 2013 and 2015 reports, that international law, and in particular the UN Charter is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment. NAM reiterates the importance of ensuring that the use of such technologies is fully in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, international law and, especially, the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and adhering to the well-established principle of peaceful coexistence among States.

4. NAM notes the conclusion of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG), as the first inclusive mechanism established within the UN with the participation of all Member States, acting on the basis of consensus. NAM also welcomes the consensual adoption of its outcome document.

5. NAM stresses that the development of any international legal framework to address issues related to the use of ICTs with implications on international peace and security should take into account the concerns and interests of all States and be based on consensus and pursued within the UN with the active and equal participation of all States. NAM further underscores that such a legal framework, together with a multilateral inclusive institutional platform dedicated to international cooperation on safeguarding the peaceful uses of ICTs, will represent a major contribution towards increasing stability and security in cyberspace through prevention of conflicts, thereby promoting the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and the peaceful uses of ICTs.

6. At the same time, as a principled position, NAM stresses that nothing in that legal framework shall affect the inalienable rights of States in the development and use of ICTs for peaceful purposes, or restrict or deny, in any manner whatsoever, developing countries of the ICTs related science, know-how, technology and services in all its aspects for peaceful purpose. NAM rejects any unilateral measures not in accordance with the UN Charter and international law that impede the full achievement of economic and social development by the population of the affected countries and that hinder their well-being.

7. NAM condemns the misuse of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), including the internet and social media, to incite and commit acts of terrorism.

Mr. Chairman,

8. NAM also emphasizes the importance of observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements. Furthermore, NAM reaffirms that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation, and that all States, through their actions, should contribute fully to ensuring compliance with aforementioned norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions to which they are parties.

9. NAM welcomes the adoption without a vote of General Assembly Resolution 75/43 on the relationship between disarmament and development. NAM expresses concern at the increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs. NAM further stresses the importance of the reduction of military expenditures, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, and urges all States to devote resources made available from there to address the new challenges for the international community in the fields of development, poverty eradication and the elimination of the diseases that afflict humanity, including the COVID-19 pandemic. NAM firmly supports the unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures aimed at reducing military expenditures, thereby contributing to strengthening regional and international peace and security and recognized that confidence building measures assisted in this regard.

10. Under this cluster, NAM is presenting the following three draft resolutions and will welcome support from all Member States:

- 1) Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control.
- 2) Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.
- 3) Relationship between disarmament and development.

Thank you.

**Statement by
the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
Thematic Debate: “Regional disarmament and security”
First Committee 76th Session United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am honored to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

2. NAM reiterates its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and in this context, underlines that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the UN Charter, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. NAM also underscores its principled position concerning the non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of any State.

3. NAM reiterates its full support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. As a priority step to this end, NAM reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of the Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions. NAM calls upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone. Pending its establishment, NAM demands on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without precondition and further delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. 4. NAM State Parties to the NPT reiterate their profound disappointment that the 2010 action plan on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD has not been implemented. They strongly reject the alleged impediments for not implementing the 2010 Action plan on the Middle East and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. This runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution, which constitutes the original terms of reference of establishing this zone. It also violates the collective agreement reached at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

5. Recalling the opposition expressed by US, UK and Canada at the concluding session of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, NAM States Parties to the NPT express their disappointment that as the result of such opposition, consensus on new measures regarding the process to establish a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and all other WMD was not achieved. This could undermine efforts towards strengthening NPT regime as a whole. NAM reemphasizes the special responsibility of co-sponsor States of 1995 resolution on the Middle East in implementation of that resolution. NAM is concerned that the persistent lack of implementation of the 1995 Resolution, contrary to the decisions made at the relevant NPT Review Conferences, undermines the

effectiveness and credibility of the NPT and disrupts the delicate balance between its three pillars, taking into account that the indefinite extension of the Treaty agreed at the 1995 Review Conference is inextricably linked to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

6. In this regard, NAM welcomes the Convening of the First Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons according to the General Assembly Decision 73/546, under the Presidency of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the adoption of a Political Declaration and its Final Report. In this regard, NAM looks forward to the Second Session of the Conference and continues to call upon all States of the region, without exception, to actively participate in this Conference and negotiate in good faith and bring to a conclusion a legally-binding Treaty on the establishment of the Zone. NAM States Parties to the NPT also stress that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, as well as other relevant decisions on the subject, adopted within the context of the Review Conferences, remain valid until the objective of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East is achieved and that the implementation of decision 73/546 is without prejudice to the validity of aforesaid resolution and decisions and shall not also be construed as their replacement.

Mr. Chairman,

7. NAM recalls the successful conclusion of nuclear negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and E3/EU+3, resulting in the finalization of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015 adopted by Security Council resolution 2231. NAM calls for its full implementation by all its participants and underlines that this agreement shows once again that dialogue and diplomacy are the most appropriate means to resolve such issues, as NAM has always advocated.

8. NAM believes that Nuclear-Weapon-Free zones (NWFZs) established by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty as well as Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Status are positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. In the context of NWFZs, it is essential that NWS provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone under any circumstances. NAM calls upon all NWS to ratify related protocols to all treaties establishing NWFZs, withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations incompatible with their object and purpose, and respect the denuclearization status of these zones.

9. NAM urges States to conclude agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned with a view to establishing new NWFZs in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the Principles and Guidelines adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999.

10. In closing, NAM emphasizes the importance of UN activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centers for peace and disarmament. NAM is presenting following a draft resolution, under this cluster, for which it welcomes support from all delegations:

- Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Thank you.

**Statement by
the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement
Thematic Debate: “Disarmament Machinery”
First Committee 76th Session United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2021**

Mr. Chairman,

1. It is my honor to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. NAM is concerned at continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. NAM is determined to continue promoting multilateralism, as the core principle of negotiations in these areas and as the only sustainable approach to address these issues, in accordance with the UN Charter.
3. Enhancing the effectiveness of UN disarmament machinery is thus a shared objective. Based on its existing rules of procedure and methods of work, this machinery has produced landmark treaties and guidelines. NAM believes that the main difficulty lies in lack of political will by some states to achieve progress, particularly on nuclear disarmament.
4. NAM reaffirms the importance of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and reiterates its call on the CD to agree by consensus on a balanced and comprehensive program of work without any further delay, taking into account the security interests of all states. In this regard, NAM reaffirms the importance of the principle contained in the final document of the SSODI that “Adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage”. NAM strongly rejects any politicization of the work of the CD and calls upon all member states to fully respect its rules of procedures and agreed methods of work.
5. NAM also underlines the importance and relevance of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) with universal membership, as the sole specialized and deliberative body within the UN multilateral disarmament machinery, to consider various problems in the field of disarmament and submit concrete recommendations to the General Assembly. NAM further calls upon UN Member States to display necessary political will and flexibility, in order to enable the Commission to agree on “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”.
6. NAM expresses grave concern at the inability of the UNDC to convene its organizational and substantive sessions since 2019, in a formal setting, and expresses hope that, by addressing all underlying issues among concerned delegations, the UNDC will hold its substantive sessions as soon as possible, in a formal setting, so as to fulfill its mandate, by adopting agreed substantive recommendations.
7. For its part, NAM stands ready to engage constructively on advancement of issues on the UN disarmament agenda and the ways and means of strengthening the disarmament machinery. NAM underscores the importance of convening the Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-IV), as it would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with current international situation, the most critical aspects of disarmament process, and to mobilize international community and public opinion in favor of elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of control and reduction of conventional weapons. In this regard, NAM welcomes the GA endorsement of the report of the Open-Ended Working Group on SSOD-IV and the substantive recommendations contained therein, and stresses continuing of consultations on next steps for convening of SSOD-IV.
8. Expressing its deep concern on the continued lack of adequate representation from NAM countries in the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), NAM requests the Secretary-General and High Representative to undertake steps to ensure proper, balanced, and equitable representation in that office. NAM calls for

transparency and strict application on the principle of equitable geographical representation, including in particular in the composition of any Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established in the field of disarmament and international security. NAM also underlines the importance of transparency and openness of the work of such groups.

9. Under this cluster, NAM is presenting following two draft resolutions for which it will welcome support from everyone:

- United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament;
- Convening of the Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

10. Finally, NAM notes with concern the increasing trend towards tabling competing proposals addressing the same topics under the same agenda items, and wishes to underscore that this trend could undermine the credibility and consistency of the outcomes of the UN Disarmament Machinery as well as the functioning of this Machinery, in addition to sending confusing signals to the Member States, the Secretariat, and the international community in the course of implementing the relevant resolutions. NAM encourages all Member States to cooperate in a constructive manner to reach agreements on the relevant topics with a view to preserving the principles and objectives of multilateral diplomacy.

11. NAM urges all countries to work together cooperatively and demonstrate their political commitment concretely, including here in the First Committee, to ensure that the disarmament machinery can achieve its potential fully to bolster global peace and security.

Thank you

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 76 First Committee
Thematic Discussions: Nuclear Weapons**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Achieving global nuclear disarmament remains one of the most long-lasting goals of the United Nations. However, today, international security is under threat by the existence of almost 14,000 nuclear weapons with well-funded, long-term plans to not only modernize but also strengthen the arsenals of NWSs while ignoring the implications of their related policies, including the nuclear arms race.

Unfortunately, relying on nuclear deterrence persists as an element in the security policies of all NWSs, the latest as set out in the UK's integrated review 2021. And yet, no nuclear disarmament negotiations are underway in spite of the clear legal obligation for these states under Article VI of the NPT.

Furthermore, the United States' withdrawal from the INF in 2019 spelled an end to the commitment to eliminate an entire class of nuclear missiles. Similarly, its withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, as well as the unwillingness of the current US Administration to return to it, have caused immense damages to international efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

It should be noted with grave concern that the US Government is the main hindrance at the global level in moving towards nuclear disarmament.

We believe that the extension of the new START should be followed by the possessors of the two largest nuclear arsenals and other NWSs to agree on nuclear disarmament.

In the same vein, the clandestine nuclear weapons of the Israeli regime are the main obstacle to establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. We reiterate our call on the international community to compel Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, promptly accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon party without any preconditions and place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA's full-scope safeguards.

Iran is of the view that the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law and is a crime against humanity. We strongly support the NAM proposal to commence negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention on the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament. This is a legal, political and moral responsibility for the international community, in general, and the Nuclear Weapon States, in particular.

Taking note of the entry into force of the TPNW as a beginning, not an end, the Islamic Republic of Iran is urging the NWSs to accomplish their legal, political and ethical obligation to put an end to nuclear options and ensure nuclear disarmament.

Thank you!

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 76 First Committee
Thematic Discussions: Other WMDs**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

The Islamic Republic of Iran has the highest record in accession to the international legal instruments banning WMD, including BTWC, CWC, and other important documents. Iran's initiative for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East is, per se, a clear commitment to the disarmament and non-proliferation norm. This genuine approach has its roots in our Islamic belief to reject WMDs, in rational calculation of our national interest and the bitter experience of being attacked by Saddam of Iraq during the 1980s which resulted in nearly 100,000 victims - some of whom lost their lives immediately and some who still suffer decades later from those attacks. We condemn any use of chemical weapons, by anyone and under any circumstance, and we strongly support the full and effective implementation of the provisions of the CWC. We also support upholding the authority of the 1925 Geneva protocol as an important building block of the global ban of CWs.

It is unfortunate that 24 years after the entry force of the CWC, the use or threat to use of chemical weapons is still a matter of grave concern to international security. In addition, the destruction of chemical weapons, the main pillar of the Convention as well as its universality is yet to be realized. The United States as the only possessor of the chemical weapons stockpiles has not only failed to meet the final extended deadline of April 2012 for the destruction of chemical weapons but has also sought to postpone the fulfillment of its obligations until 2023. My delegation urges the sole possessor State Party to utilize its entire capacity to expedite the completion of the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles in the shortest amount of time prior to the scheduled timeline. Furthermore, it is unequivocally disturbing that the Israeli regime, a non-party with a WMD program in the Middle East, is generously rewarded by some of the member states.

Despite the utmost efforts by the international community to ensure that the OPCW remains a center to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention, the CWC, in general, and the OPCW, in particular, have faced many challenges in recent years that threatens their integrity and credibility. While the practice of decision-making through consensus helped to promote the cause of the CWC, it is a matter of extreme concern that a few States Parties have chosen a different path. This unconstructive approach towards questioning the practice of consensus as it becomes an uneven trend in the OPCW undoubtedly would further lead to the polarization of the organization, jeopardizing its credibility as well as the integrity of the PMO's decisions.

Iran strongly supports the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and calls for its balanced, full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation.

We firmly believe that the most effective approach to strengthening the Convention is through the resumption of the negotiations on a legally binding protocol for the Convention. As such, we call on the United States to withdraw its objection to the resumption of such negotiations.

The continued non-adherence of the Israeli regime to the BWC is a major obstacle to its universality while also endangering the security of the BWC States Parties in the Middle East.

Ridding the world of such dangerous weapons of mass destruction is a collective responsibility. In this regard, Iran will continue supporting all genuine international efforts to fulfill this responsibility.

Thank You!

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 76 First Committee
Thematic Discussions: Outer Space**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran reiterates its principled position that outer space and other celestial bodies are humanity's common heritage and must be used only for peaceful purposes as well as for the benefit of all countries, regardless of their economic or technological progress.

From our perspective, the prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a severe threat to international peace and security. Therefore, further measures, including a legally binding instrument with appropriate and effective verification provisions, shall be developed timely by the CD. Inaction is not and cannot be an option in this raveling situation.

Given the obvious realities, we are deeply concerned over the increasing threat of weaponizing outer space, including the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space which has, inter alia, contributed to the further weakening of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security.

As declared by US officials, the Space Force's budget of \$17.4 billion will have a more than 13% increase from FY 2021. This increase will aid in the modernization of the US Air Force and further development of its Space Force.

On the other side, contrary to the accepted principles governing Outer Space, the United States has imposed illegal sanctions against Iranian Space Agencies which are all civilian space entities in nature. This move by the U.S. is in clear contradiction with the principles of international space law, including the right of free access to outer space and international cooperation in space activities. In our view, despite all these attempts, the U.S. cannot and will not be able to dominate space.

On another note, over the last year we witnessed positions and movements that went beyond not only the bounds of the Conference on Disarmament but also out of the accepted interpretations of peaceful outer space basic principles. One of the ostensible examples is the so-called Reducing Space Threat through Responsible Behavior.

These ideas continue to mull while a long list of accepted principles by consensus remain on the waiting list for materialization. It seems that an apt holistic approach in articulating new rules, norms, and regulations is balancing between the needs and norms on one hand with limitations and on the ground realities on the other.

The Islamic Republic of Iran insists that measures, rules, and regulations which would hinder/limit access to space for nations with emerging space capabilities should be avoided. Also, States should refrain from developing an international legal framework with high thresholds and ambiguous concepts, such as “responsible behavior in space”, which would obstruct the developing countries’ peaceful space activities.

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 76 First Committee
Thematic Discussions: Conventional Weapons**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran reaffirms the sovereign and inherent right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms for their self-defense and security needs under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Any arrangement for the regulation of conventional armaments should be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. There are globally accepted processes in place, like the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and light Weapons in All its Aspects, the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and some others in which their effective and indiscriminate implantation as well as respect for their exact mandates will lead to alleviate a part of these concerns. My delegation has actively and constructively offered its contribution to the relevant meetings. However, it is regrettable that the final version of the outcome document of the BMS 7 contains provisions including the establishment of an open-ended expert group that is not consistent with the mandate of the BMS and is beyond its powers as envisaged in the PoA. In fact, according to the PoA it is only the review conference that has the power to take such a decision.

However, their overproduction, massive transfer and excessive accumulation in certain regions have caused actual concerns in terms of the regional and international security. The figures in each of these areas are worrying, and it is imperative to adopt an approach reducing global military expenditure, responsible production as well as transfer of conventional weapons.

A glance at the Middle East proves that the circumstances are exceedingly alarming in our region where the security situation is already complicated. Arms imports by states in the Middle East were 25 per cent higher in 2016-2020 when compared to the data from 2011-2015. The US is the biggest arms seller to the region.

In addition to its WMDs, a large arsenal of sophisticated offensive conventional weapons of the Israeli regime continues to threaten the peace and security of the region and beyond. This regime is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II.

Additionally, the manifold increases in the military budgets and arms imports in our region is another chronic concern.

Thank You.

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 76 First Committee
Thematic Discussions: Regional Security**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Security and stability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf sub-region are of the utmost importance for the region and beyond. Iran has steadily supported this public good and has offered a number of proposals to strengthen the security in the region. We stand by those initiatives which have evolved to respond to the exact security need of the region. Our first proposal in 1985 became the foundation of paragraphs 5 and 8 of Security Council Resolution 598, which read:

5. Calls upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict

8. Further requests the Secretary-General to examine in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other states of the region measures to enhance the security and stability of the region;

Regrettably—and despite our persistent follow-ups—those paragraphs remain unimplemented.

Our region has since witnessed the scene of several wars, massive foreign military buildups, the ensuing nightmare of extremism and terrorism, the dangerous accumulation of the most sophisticated weaponry as well as aggression and power projections by various actors.

It is noteworthy that three flawed prescriptions, namely, purchase of security from others, having security at the expense of the insecurity of other neighbors and establishing regional hegemony have all resulted in catastrophic consequences.

Unfortunately, a number of extra-regional actors have examined this situation as an opportunity to expand their military presence and sell more weapons.

The U.S. has deployed nearly 50,000 troops in the Persian Gulf region in 29 military installations with more than 300 combat aircrafts. The illegitimate U.S. presence—7,600 miles from its shores— culminated in the cowardly assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, Daesh's Enemy No.1, by President Trump.

In the region itself, the excessive military budgets and arms imports by certain States are alarming.

Unsurprisingly, the USA is the number one arms seller to some regional countries, including a country that is the largest buyer of that weaponry with military spending that amounted to an estimated \$78.4 billion in 2019. It was the third-largest military spender globally and by far the largest military spender in the Persian Gulf region.

Those are the same weapons that are abused for suppression and war crimes or transferred to terrorist groups.

In this context, we must not condone the fact that the Israeli regime relies on its military aid from the US as well as the aggressive military establishment it has created which is a chronic source of insecurity in the region and beyond.

Yet, the military build-ups and hundreds of billions of dollars of arms sales have enhanced neither the security of the external powers nor of the region.

We need collective efforts by regional countries to establish inclusive dialogue and security networking in this region. To realize a balanced, active and smart foreign policy, Iran pursues a courteous relationship with its neighbors.

Thank You!

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 76 First Committee
Thematic Discussions: Other Disarmament Measures and International Security**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran supports the ICTs as humanity's common heritage which must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and with ample consideration of the need to balance security and development. Irresponsible use of this technology by States or non-state actors, including terrorist groups, surely poses serious threats to the world's security and stability.

As the U.S. has not only started militarizing cyberspace, its military has also begun carrying out multiple cyberattacks. The U.S. is not alone in this regard; Israeli regime has also launched many cyber-attacks against Iran. Both should be held responsible and accountable as such brazen and irresponsible actions cannot be condoned.

Unfortunately, some other countries have also followed the path to weaponize cyberspace which can only exacerbate the already deteriorating state of international security. These attempts, even if not used in cyber operations, can initiate an arms race in cyberspace.

In this situation, the establishment of the OEWG on the security within and in the use of information and telecommunications technologies for the next five years, based on its founding resolution 75/240 with a clear mandate and working process, is a promising development. Under the UN auspices, it can hopefully deliver a truly inclusive, transparent and democratic process when compared to any other similar process. These attributes and advantages of the OEWG prove the best merit entailed within this process that can unify all the existing or prospective processes into one, i.e., the OEWG.

We sincerely hope that this process, along with the necessary political will of the entire membership, will lead to a successful conclusion leaving no one behind. This can only be accomplished by accommodating the views and concerns of all countries, not just a select set of countries.

Now, ahead of the first substantive session of the new OEWG, we think it is important to take all organizational decisions, including the establishment of the subgroups, as envisaged in the said resolution. We believe that an expanded bureau with the possibility of electing two co-chairs, one from developed and one from developing nations, for each subgroup would maximize proper representation in the OEWG stewardship.

We believe that the OEWG could contribute to international peace and security through the settlement of the unresolved issues from the previous OEWG. It should also prepare the requirements for developing further international legal norms and rules concerning the prevention of the use of ICT and cyberspace for malicious purposes. The end of such an endeavor should be to develop a legally binding instrument.

I thank You!

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 76 First Committee
Thematic Discussions: UN Disarmament Machinery**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran reaffirms the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Conference on Disarmament is the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body with the role and mandate of which should be strengthened, especially by the resumption of its substantive work.

Noting the entry into force of the TPNW while also emphasizing the vital importance and continued validity of the Final Document of the SSOD-I, we strongly support the early commencement of negotiations in the CD on the comprehensive nuclear weapons convention. From our perspective, the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the highest priority of the UN's disarmament machinery.

Regretfully, the current cycle of the UNDC has been subject to the politicized approach of the US by extending its bilateral agenda concerning specific countries to multilateral diplomacy. Additionally, the frequent and continuous negative vote of the US and Israel in the First Committee is not only damaging the valued practice of consensual decision making in this august body but also proves their maligned approach towards disarmament.

Furthermore, the US' arbitrary compliance reports on Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments are undermining the authority of relevant international instruments and organizations.

We reiterate our position that the major problem of the UN Disarmament Machinery, in particular the CD, is the "lack of genuine political will" on the part of certain Nuclear-Weapon-States and their advocates that are unwilling to agree on a balanced and comprehensive program of work to deal with all of the core issues on an equal footing.

Last but not least, the international community needs a strict application of the principle of equitable geographical distribution in the composition of the UNODA. We note with satisfaction a gradual shift in the inclination of the member states to establish OEWGs rather than GGEs in the field of disarmament and international security. Iran welcomes the establishment of a UN fellowship program on SALW, and we continue to support the UN fellowship program on disarmament. It should also be noted that overemphasizing some

marginal issues in disarmament and international security documents threatens to put the main thrust of those documents in jeopardy and, as such, this practice must stop.

I thank you!

**Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons and Space
(Clusters I and III)
Statement by Ireland**

Ireland aligns itself with the statements made by the European Union and by South Africa on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.

Chair,

Ireland is strongly committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as we have been since our first days at the UN.

We are just months away from the rescheduled Review Conference of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Treaty remains the cornerstone of the Disarmament and Non Proliferation regime.

Ireland expects tangible progress across all three pillars of the NPT, with a particular focus on the disarmament pillar, where progress has been unacceptably slow. Article VI of the NPT, as well as past consensus outcomes of previous review conferences, including the unequivocal undertaking of the Nuclear Weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals; the practical steps agreed in 2000; and the 2010 Action Plan provide a framework to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. These obligations and commitments must be honoured and must be implemented. Our increased understanding of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons also adds further urgency for progress on nuclear disarmament and should be recognised at the Review Conference. Over five decades after its entry into force, such slow progress in implementing the Treaty's nuclear disarmament obligations is untenable. The indefinite possession of nuclear weapons runs counter to the object and purpose of the NPT and threatens to erode its credibility and effectiveness.

Ireland is proud of its role in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Its entry into force in January this year is a landmark moment for nuclear disarmament. The Treaty is an effective legal measure contributing to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT and reflects the desire of the overwhelming majority in the General Assembly for urgent action. We look forward to the first Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in March 2022, where States Parties will set out concrete plans for the full implementation of the Treaty's humanitarian centred objectives. The Meeting of States Parties is open to all states to attend as observers.

Ireland reiterates the vital importance of nuclear weapon free zones for international and regional peace and security. We call on the Nuclear Weapon States to take all measures necessary to bring the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties into force and withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations. Ireland supports the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. This is integral to the package of measures that secured the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. We were encouraged by the adoption of a political declaration at the New York Conference November 2019 by participating States, which expressed their intent and commitment to pursue the establishment of the zone on the basis of consensus agreement of all States of the Region. We hope that further progress can be made at the second session of the conference later this year.

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is an integral part of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Ireland calls individually on each of the eight remaining Annex 2 States to join the CTBT without delay or condition. Ireland calls on all states to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty. Nonetheless, such measures do not have the same permanent and legally binding effect to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions, which can only be achieved with the entry into force of the Treaty.

Ireland welcomes the extension of the New START Treaty by the United States and Russia and the commencement of dialogue between these countries on Strategy Stability. We hope that these talks can lead Russia, the United States and other countries to agree on deeper reductions to their arsenals, leading to their total elimination. We also welcome the reiteration by the US and Russia that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and call on all nuclear weapon States to add their voice to this declaration.

Chair,

Ireland also recognises the contribution of export control regimes to non-proliferation, which play an important role in maintaining a safer and more secure world. Ireland attaches great importance to the export control regimes, such as the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as to The Hague Code of Conduct. These regimes contribute to the enhancement of international peace and stability by preventing the diversion of sensitive materials, technology and equipment to illegal end-users, and to the implementation of treaty obligations on non-proliferation. These export control regimes work continually to keep up with challenges posed by current, new and emerging technologies.

Ireland commends the unique and indispensable role of the IAEA across the areas of nuclear energy, safety and security, and in the implementation of the NPT. Ireland strongly supports the universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, and considers the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol constitute the current verification standard under the NPT. In this regard, Ireland calls on states developing their civilian nuclear programmes to amend or rescind their Small Quantities Protocol and sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as a matter of priority. The upcoming NPT Review Conference will provide a timely opportunity to reaffirm the importance of universal adherence to IAEA safeguards, and build momentum to make progress on this issue.

Chair,

Ireland strongly supports the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Ireland welcomes the six rounds of talks, which have taken place in Vienna over the past few months aimed at ensuring the return by the United States to the JCPOA, and the JCPOA's full and effective implementation by all sides. I urge all sides to return imminently to Vienna and to conclude these talks.

Ireland deeply regrets the accelerated steps away from compliance, which Iran has taken as reported by the IAEA. These steps include the continued enrichment of uranium, activities related to uranium metal, R&D activities and increased centrifuges. Ireland is gravely concerned by Iran's decision to suspend, as of 23 February 2021, the implementation of transparency measures as envisaged in the JCPOA. This is important not only to facilitate the full implementation of the JCPOA but is essential for the international community's confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In addition, Iran must provide full and timely access to the IAEA inspectors and extend full cooperation to the IAEA in clarifying any outstanding safeguards questions the Agency may have. I take this opportunity to thank IAEA Director General Grossi and his team for their extensive efforts in support of the JCPOA.

Ireland continues to be seriously concerned about the ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities of the DPRK, which represent a serious threat to international peace and security, in particular the missile launches in recent months. Ireland urges the DPRK to fully dismantle its nuclear programme in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and demonstrate good faith by immediately signing and ratifying the CTBT as well as returning to compliance with its obligations under the NPT and cooperating fully with the IAEA.

Chair,

Ireland is strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually

acceptable basis for all. Ireland stresses the importance of conducting space activities in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. Ireland contributed to the UNSG report on “Reducing space threats through responsible behaviours”. Without excluding the development of legally binding agreements, Ireland believes that voluntary measures constitute a pragmatic way forward at the moment, starting with norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, through an inclusive process.

Chair,

The pandemic has illustrated how interconnected our world is, and how risks can quickly become reality with devastating consequences. Ireland is wholeheartedly committed to multilateralism to solve these global challenges. With particular regard to nuclear weapons, we will continue our efforts to achieve their complete elimination, to ensure that the world will never have to endure their devastating humanitarian consequences again.

Thank you.

**Thematic Debate
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cluster II)
Statement by Ireland**

Chair,

Ireland aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and would like to add the following remarks in a national capacity.

Ireland remains staunchly resolute that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have no place in our world. The presence of these weapons compromises international peace and security and the risk that non-state actors may acquire WMD adds a further dangerous dimension.

We regard the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as key instruments in the international community’s efforts to achieve a world free of all WMD. We call on those remaining States who have not yet joined these instruments to accede to them without any further delay.

Chair,

The very essence of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a promise to consign chemical weapons to history. As we approach 25 years since its entry into force, Ireland, including as an elected member of the Security Council, will continue to do everything within our power to help deliver on that promise. We must all remain united and firm in upholding the international prohibition against chemical weapons, making it clear that the use of these weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time is abhorrent and unacceptable.

It is vital that individuals responsible for any use of chemical weapons are held accountable. The international community must redouble efforts to prevent impunity and Ireland underlines the critical role of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in this regard. Its diligence, professionalism and impartiality while addressing the use of chemical weapons offer a vital first step towards accountability and an end to impunity. Ireland calls on all States to uphold the integrity of the CWC and cooperate fully with the OPCW. Ireland is also a member of the International Partnership against the Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which is designed to supplement the international mechanisms to combat the proliferation of Chemical Weapons.

Despite the CWC’s numerous successes, there is little doubt that the global norm against chemical weapon use is being challenged. In particular, we remain deeply concerned by Syria’s lack of progress in addressing the serious and growing list of issues under its initial declaration. Its cooperation with the OPCW and its investigative missions remain sporadic and limited. Such persistent non-compliance with its obligations is unacceptable and

demanding an appropriate response. The decision adopted by the Twenty-Fifth Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, suspending certain rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic, was both proportionate and necessary. Regrettably, the pattern of visa delays and denials used to hold up the OPCW's work on the ground persists. Such obstruction is in stark contrast with the approach of the Technical Secretariat, who have actively sought to assist Syria, with flexibility and professionalism, to resolve outstanding issues. It is only through Syria's real and meaningful cooperation with the OPCW that we can resolve the outstanding issues, and gain assurances that, in line with its obligations under the CWC and Resolution 2118, its entire stocks of chemical weapons are declared and verifiably destroyed.

Chair,

Ireland would like to reiterate once more our deep concern in relation to the confirmed use of a Novichok nerve agent against the Russian citizen Mr Alexei Navalny. The confirmation by multiple independent laboratories that a nerve agent from the 'novichok' group was used to poison Mr Navalny is deeply worrying. The Russian Federation should respond to international calls to immediately investigate this matter in an open and transparent manner. To ensure that those responsible can be held to account, we strongly encourage reengagement with the OPCW to facilitate an OPCW Technical Assistance Visit. Ireland supports the European Union's restrictive measures against a number of Russian individuals for inducing and providing support in the poisoning of Mr Navalny, and other uses of chemical weapons.

Chair,

Ireland is a committed State Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) since it opened for signature in 1972. The BTWC was the first multilaterally negotiated Treaty to prohibit a full category of WMD and is a key element in the international community's efforts to address WMD proliferation. The pandemic's spread in early 2020 and the global shutdown which ensued have shown us in the starkest terms how quickly biosecurity and biosafety threats may emerge. The pandemic has confirmed the complex and interconnected nature of the issues we must be prepared to deal with in this area, and the importance and benefits of a multilateral and coordinated approach. Advances in biological sciences and biotechnology today are occurring at an accelerated pace. Many of these scientific advances bring added benefits to society and assist us in our achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. We need look no further than the development of Covid-19 vaccines, achieved in record time, in order to realise the speed of advancement. This same speed, however, could jeopardise effective regulation and policy oversight, and underscores the necessity of establishing a science and technology review mechanism within the Convention. The pace of scientific developments and in particular, the dual-use nature of biological agents and toxins, requires us to ensure that the associated are monitored and controlled carefully.

Ireland emphasises its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological or Toxin Weapons (UNSGM). The Mechanism is key component of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture – one which is based on the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the UN General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council. The Mechanism is effective, efficient, and has been proven to work with integrity, independence, and impartiality.

Chair,

Any threat or use of weapons of mass destruction is abhorrent and can never be tolerated. Ireland continues to fully support the comprehensive implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, including through our active engagement in the deliberation of the 1540 Committee as members of the UN Security Council. Resolution 1540 remains a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture, and a key tool in the fight against non-state actors seeking to acquire and use WMD. We encourage States to abide by their obligations and responsibilities under this Resolution. This year, much of our focus of the Committee's work is on the

Comprehensive Review of Resolution 1540, which provides an opportunity for the international community to reinforce its collective resolve to advance the objectives of the resolution. We strongly encourage all states to actively engage in the Comprehensive Review.

The Irish Defence Forces has a long-standing and successful partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in providing Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) training to its humanitarian staff. This training is designed to enable humanitarian personnel to continue to perform their humanitarian tasks in a contaminated environment, including areas contaminated by use of WMD. In doing so, Ireland is equipping these frontline workers with the practical skills they will need to continue delivering vital services in the most extreme situations. Although this training was interrupted in 2020 and 2021 due to the pandemic, planning has commenced to host the next course in June 2022.

Chair,

Effective export controls and multilateral cooperation are crucial to stopping the proliferation of technologies which can foster the development of WMDs and other devastating weapons. Ireland emphasises that the intention of Export Control regimes is not to impede either technological development or trade, but to limit the risk of these activities contributing to the proliferation of WMDs. Ireland strongly supports key export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. We recognise the contribution of these regimes towards ensuring a safer and more secure world.

It is further vital for non-proliferation discussions to take account of emerging developments and future technologies. We must ensure that our ability to regulate emerging developments is not outpaced by technology. Ireland is further concerned by the potentially destabilising effects of hypersonic missiles and believes that it is vital for non-proliferation discussions to take account of such developments.

Ireland is a longstanding subscribing state of the Hague Code of Conduct which has many complementarities with the MTCR. The HCoC has delivered concrete results as the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument in this arena. We welcome recent adherents to the Code and call on all non-subscribing states to adhere to it without further delay.

Chair,

Ireland remains committed to the important goal of achieving a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, based on arrangements freely arrived at by states of the region. We continue to call for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution and the agreement reached at the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Zone. Progress on this key issue can bring vital momentum to our broader disarmament work. We were encouraged by the adoption of a political declaration at the New York Conference in November of 2019 by participating States, which expressed their intent and commitment to pursue this issue. We are keen for work on this issue to continue, with the involvement of all stakeholders from the region.

Chair,

Ireland is seriously concerned about the acceleration of missile programmes in certain countries and the technological advances made by them. The development, tests or use of ballistic missiles is clearly a destabilising factor in various regions of the world. The cases of the DPRK and Iran are of particular concern.

The recent reported long-range cruise, ballistic missile and hypersonic missile tests conducted by DPRK, in violation of UN resolutions, are the latest in a series of destabilising activities undertaken by North Korea this year. We call on the DPRK to immediately end its destabilising actions, and to take concrete steps in dismantling its missile-, WMD- and nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Iran's continued development and testing of ballistic missiles, including activities aimed at increasing the range and precision of its missiles and increasing the number of tests and operational launches, are a matter of serious concern. These activities are an inherent risk to regional security. These activities are incompatible with UNSC Resolution 2231 which places clear restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile activities, including on activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons launches using such ballistic missile technology; and further calls on Iran not to transfer any missile or missile component or missile technology to non-States actors.

**Thematic Debate
Conventional Weapons (Cluster IV)
Statement by Ireland**

Ireland aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and would like to add the following remarks in a national capacity.

While we are slowly returning to in-person meetings, the world continues its fight against COVID-19. The pandemic has delayed or curtailed much of our work across a number of issues. However, we have also found innovative solutions to facilitate progress in some areas. In this context, Ireland thanks the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the secretariats and implementation support units of the conventional weapons treaties and conventions for continuing their dedication during this pandemic.

Chair,

The grim truth is that, while COVID has brought many aspects of our lives to a stop, conflicts around the world have persisted. Conventional weapons continue to be used daily in armed conflict and perpetuate violence across the world, causing deaths, injuries and significant socio-economic harm. As such, they require our constant attention, intense scrutiny, and regulation through comprehensive legal frameworks to ensure compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law.

Modern conflict is more urbanised than ever, and civilians continue to suffer its effects. This reality can have devastating implications for individuals and their communities in the short, medium and long term. The interrelationship between disarmament, peace, security and sustainable development is irrefutable, and Ireland continues to advocate for a holistic approach in our work in the Security Council. Ireland welcomes that this interrelationship forms a central theme in the U.N. Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament and we are proud to be championing three of its actions.

In line with the UNSG's agenda, Ireland is leading a diplomatic process to elaborate a political declaration to address the issue of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. Ireland shares the international community's concern at the impacts the use of explosive weapons in populated areas are causing to civilians during active hostilities.

Year after year, the UN Secretary General reports that over 90 per cent of those killed and injured by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas were civilians, including children.

It is well-documented that the manner in which explosive weapons are being used in populated areas is having devastating short and long-term effects. The widespread loss of life and the physical and psychological injuries inflicted on civilians are simply unacceptable.

The devastating impacts also extend to critical infrastructure, such as roads, hospitals and sanitation facilities. This infrastructure is vital to meet immediate humanitarian needs and for post-conflict development. This destruction often acts as a catalyst for the displacement of people within and across borders, putting displaced persons and refugees at greater risk of exploitation and abuse.

It is for these reasons that Ireland is leading consultations in Geneva on a Political Declaration to address the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. While face-to-face work on the declaration has been interrupted, good progress has been made and we are determined to finalise a Declaration that will result in positive and lasting behavioural change as soon as possible. We appreciate the sustained priority attached to this issue by the UN Secretary General and the President of the ICRC, and are encouraged by the level of cross-regional support shown throughout the consultations to date.

Chair,

The continued illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons is an issue of deep concern. These illicit flows of arms and ammunition are destabilising, heightening tensions, prolonging conflicts, fuelling organised crime, and facilitating human rights violations, including gender-based violence. The eradication of illicit flows of small arms and light weapons is a prerequisite of sustainable peace and conflict prevention, and an express target of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Ireland is a strong supporter of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument. We welcome the outcomes from this year's Biennial Meetings of States to the PoA. We urge states to support the establishment of a new Open Ended Working Group on new technologies and look forward to continuing our work on updating the Technical Annex.

The Arms Trade Treaty is the cornerstone of efforts to tackle illicit proliferation, providing states with the basis for an effective and responsible export control system. We welcome steps by the ATT and its working groups to improve reporting and aid transparency. We welcome the decision of the Sixth Conference of State Parties to undertaking mapping of synergies with complementary instruments so that we may better and more efficiently coordinate across related initiatives. We are pleased to note that there are now 110 State Parties to the ATT as we continue efforts towards its universalisation.

Chair,

The upcoming Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons presents High Contracting Parties and other stakeholders with a vital opportunity to examine the status and operation of the Convention and its Protocols. We have a collective duty to ensure that, as means and methods of warfare evolve, the CCW remains fit for purpose and capable of responding in an effective way. Universalisation of the Convention and its protocols must be a key focus at this Review Conference.

The issue of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) is one of humanitarian urgency. We remain concerned by the evidence of the humanitarian impact arising from the use of these weapons. While the use of MOTAPM is regulated by the customary rules of International Humanitarian Law, Amended Protocol II remains the only source of specific regulation on the use of MOTAPM. Ireland remains committed to an ambitious outcome on MOTAPM at the Review Conference.

In relation to the issue of IEDs within the framework of APII, I would like to thank Colombia and France for their work as coordinators, and Japan as President of the Annual Conference on APII. IEDs continue to cause devastating humanitarian harm. It is imperative that the CCW Review Conference recognize these impacts and reiterate the need for coordinated action to combat the threat they pose. We hope that the IED questionnaire and the updated IED political declaration will be adopted as concrete outcomes on this issue.

With regard to Protocol III, Ireland remains concerned at the reported use of incendiary weapons in armed conflict, in particular the reported use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against targets located within concentrations of civilians. We reiterate the need for all parties to conflict to strictly comply with Protocol III. The continued applicability and relevance of Protocol III is an issue which we feel should be considered in greater depth at this year's Review Conference with a view to reaching agreement to continue discussions on the Protocol's universalisation and implementation at the next Meeting of High Contracting Parties.

The CCW's Protocol V is also an invaluable instrument. Ireland believes that work on the implementation of the protocol must be intensified, particularly with regard to the recording of the use of explosive ordnance during active hostilities. Greater adherence to the protocol is particularly relevant today, when a large number of conflicts involve heavy and prolonged use of explosive ordnance in urban settings; putting civilians at significant risk both during and long after conflict.

Chair,

We are conscious of the potential risks posed by emerging weapon technologies, such as Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). For Ireland, autonomous weapons systems pose complex legal, military, technological and ethical challenges. We firmly believe that for such systems to comply with IHL, context-specific and value-based judgment by human beings is required, and so the retention of human control is critical. Systems that do not incorporate such human control must not be developed, deployed or used as they are incompatible with IHL. Furthermore, there can be no accountability gap in the design, development, deployment, and use of AWS. Ireland is closely engaged within the current Group of Governmental Experts on AWS and is committed to achieving an ambitious outcome. We wish to thank our Belgian colleagues for their efforts and assure them of our full co-operation as they finalise the GGE's recommendations on the clarification, consideration and development of the normative and operational framework on Autonomous Weapons.

Chair,

The cooperation and assistance programmes for humanitarian demining supported by Ireland are directly linked to our commitments under the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention (APLC), the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), as well as Protocol V of the CCW on Explosive Remnants of War. Ireland has a long history of supporting humanitarian mine action programmes, designed to clear contaminated land and to advance long-term economic development. We are currently in a three-year programme where we are committing €5.5 million annually to humanitarian de-mining. We look forward to the Meeting of States Parties of the APLC next month in The Hague and making further progress on the full implementation of the Oslo Action Plan.

Recent reports of the use of cluster munitions have underscored the devastating impacts of these weapons. Cluster Munitions are by design indiscriminate, and their use is unacceptable. We condemn all reported incidence of Cluster Munitions use and we call on all states to join the CCM as a matter of urgency.

To this end we welcome the adoption of the Lausanne Action Plan by the Second Review Conference of the CCM earlier this year. Its incorporation of gender and diversity mainstreaming, survivor engagement, and victim's assistance throughout is a testament to the success of the convention. The new plan is ambitious, sets clear goals and introduces new initiatives such as country coalitions, which will strengthen the work of the convention and the established norm against the use of cluster munitions.

To conclude, Ireland would also like to express our sincere thanks for the crucial role played by UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and by civil society particularly in this most challenging of years. They have contributed immensely to our progress on these old and new challenges in conventional arms, which continue to have the most direct and immediate impacts on people's lives.

**Thematic Debate
Other Disarmament Measures and International Security (Cluster V)
Statement by Ireland**

Ireland aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and would like to add the following remarks in a national capacity.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated our growing dependency on ICTs, and it has further highlighted the need to build cyber resilience. Ireland has strongly criticised the reprehensible cyber-attacks against medical and health care facilities and other critical infrastructure during the pandemic. In this regard, we note our own experience with the ransomware attack against the ICT systems of our health service in May which caused extensive disruption to the lives of our citizens during an already difficult time. These and other malicious cyber activities endanger lives, erode trust, destabilise societies, and can escalate the risk of conflict. This crisis has again highlighted the need for states to work together to make our shared cyberspace safer and more secure, and in our view, the UN is the preeminent forum to tackle this global challenge, which impacts on all pillars of its agenda.

At the UN, Ireland has contributed to the extensive discussions that have taken place at the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG), welcoming the consensus report adopted in April 2021. Ireland looks forward to the continued discussions on cyber at the OEWG and to further promoting international cooperation in the field of security and the use of ICTs, reiterating the importance and applicability of international law in maintaining peace and stability. Ireland will also continue to support efforts to promote the implementation of rules, norms and principles of responsible state behaviour, to build resilience, and to tackle the global digital divide, including through capacity-building and the sharing of best practices.

Ireland supports the further elaboration of a UN Programme of Action to establish a permanent, inclusive, action-oriented forum for discussions on cyber aimed at advancing cooperation against malicious uses of ICT in order to promote a global, open, free and secure Cyberspace, where human rights and fundamental freedoms apply.

Thank you.

**Thematic Debate
Disarmament Machinery (Cluster VII)
Written Statement by Ireland**

Ireland fully aligns with the statement made by the European Union and makes the following remarks in a national capacity.

Chair,

Ireland remains steadfastly committed to addressing the challenges posed by the current security environment. We reiterate the need for an effective UN disarmament machinery, which facilitates our ability to make progress on our shared objectives.

The links between disarmament, peace, and international security have been made many times throughout this Committee. We must recognise that the failure to implement existing disarmament commitments will lead to a further deterioration in the global security environment.

The First Committee is an important component of the disarmament machinery and helps to set the agenda for future progress on key issues. We welcome the improvements in the working methods of the Committee,

including the necessary adaptations to the constraints imposed by the pandemic, but remain concerned that the proceedings can often be marked by significant divergences and by procedural matters that can restrict the time available to address substantive issues.

Chair,

Ireland attaches great importance to the diversity of voices in disarmament fora. The full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and men across all parts of the disarmament machinery must become the norm. We know that a diversity of voices results in more efficient and effective policies. We are encouraged that a high proportion of UN disarmament appointments are held by women, and we welcome the UN Secretary General's commitment to gender parity at all levels of the organisation.

It has now been over 20 years since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325. It is time for a genuinely equal contribution, by women and men, to the goal of global peace and security. Disarmament has a key role to play with respect to the fulfilment of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda. Integrating disarmament considerations, particularly small arms and light weapons, into the WPS agenda must be a top priority, as should the integration of the WPS agenda into our initiatives and actions to combat diversion and weapons proliferation.

Ireland is among the most active champions of the WPS agenda and gender issues in disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. Ireland's Third National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 reflects this commitment and includes actions related to both conventional and weapons of mass destruction.

For Ireland, gender equality is a cross-cutting horizontal priority and we will continue to integrate gender perspectives and gender sensitive approaches across all spheres of our disarmament policies. As part of this approach, we believe in outreach and information sharing on Gender issues. We are pleased to have been able to speak on numerous panels examining gender and disarmament in areas including nuclear, SALW, cluster munitions, and biological weapons over the last years

This is also the first full NPT Review Cycle to integrate gender perspectives throughout, and Ireland will continue to champion the diversity of voices across all three pillars of the NPT. Ireland will likewise continue to highlight the disproportionate impact of ionising radiation on women and girls, as recognised in the TPNW.

We are proud to co-chair the International Gender Champions Disarmament Impact Group, or DIG, in Geneva. Through our work in the DIG, we have taken practical steps toward realising gender equality and the inclusion of gender perspectives in the disarmament machinery this year. In March of this year, the DIG published the revised edition of the Gender and Disarmament Resource Pack. Even more recently, in June, we were pleased to publish the most recent factsheet on gender equality in the biological weapons regime, which highlighted how underrepresentation in this area can reinforce existing biases and excludes the perspectives and knowledge of large segments of the population. As such, it is an issue that impacts us all, and we must work collectively to address the issue to ensure diverse participation and the full, meaningful, and equal participation of women and men. We thank the many Member States and other stakeholders who have contributed to the work of the Group to date and welcome all efforts to prioritise gender issues in disarmament.

Chair,

Through the negotiation of the CWC and the CTBT, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) demonstrated its ability to negotiate multilateral disarmament instruments. It must do so again. It is unacceptable that the CD has failed to make progress on any substantive work or even agree a programme of work for over twenty years. Such stagnation undermines the credibility of the body, and is not sustainable. It is incumbent on us to uphold and strengthen the international disarmament machinery in the interests of global peace and security, and the CD should be at the centre of this work.

Effective cooperation and engagement on disarmament issues is particularly important in an environment of tension and distrust: we cannot continue to neglect our collective responsibilities. While not perfect, multilateralism still offers the only real hope for cooperative, constructive engagement and for maintaining peace and security. We know that a focus only on narrow self-interest is not a sustainable approach: it takes courage and leadership to look beyond our national short-term interest, and this is what is required to reinvigorate the work and effectiveness of the CD.

The work of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) must also resume urgently. Ireland strongly supports the important role of the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body of the UN General Assembly on disarmament matters. We were deeply disappointed that the UNDC was again unable to hold formal substantive deliberations this year. We must redouble our efforts to ensure that it too is returns to its important work.

Chair,

Ireland fully supports UN Secretary General Guterres' Agenda for Disarmament, which aims to return multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation to its central role in building international peace and security, as well as situating disarmament in broader global discussions including sustainable development. The Agenda presents us with a unique opportunity to break the stalemate and to facilitate the achievement of the sustainable development goals. Ireland is committed to championing the actions therein, including action 1 on facilitating dialogue on nuclear disarmament, action 14 on explosive weapons in populated areas and action 21 on impact of arms on conflict management. We also welcome the Secretary General's focus on the risks of nuclear weapons, cyberwarfare and autonomous weapons in his recently-published 'Our Common Agenda', and on the peaceful, secure and sustainable use of outer space.

Ireland continues to highlight the importance of, and advocate for, broad engagement and participation of civil society across disarmament fora. We firmly believe that civil society groups are vital partners in the disarmament machinery. Their knowledge and expertise is essential in ensuring the disarmament machinery remains connected to emerging issues. We have seen the instrumental part that civil society campaigns have played in disarmament efforts in recent years, and Ireland believes that this participation should be further supported. Inclusiveness must be at the fore of our approach to the disarmament machinery. In those issues which are central to the First Committee's mandate, NGOs and civil society play an important role within the framework of Treaties and Conventions, tracking the implementation of State's disarmament commitments, and bringing pressure to bear on States through lobbying and the raising of public awareness. They also provide crucial services, from victim assistance to capacity building. We must ensure that, even in these challenging times as we continue to battle with the consequences of the pandemic, civil society engagement is prioritised and supported and that the disarmament machinery is sincerely inclusive.

In ensuring inclusiveness in the disarmament machinery, Ireland also strongly encourages a proactive approach to promote the participation of youth in these fora. Future generations will inherit the consequences of our action and our inaction on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues. Their voices must be heard. Youth movements can be engaged to provide views from affected communities and under-represented populations, and they can bring fresh and creative ideas to well-established institutions. At Ireland's recent Security Council Presidency event in September, which we held to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, we were pleased to invite a member of the CTBTO Youth to share her perspectives and ideas on how to engage and mentor youth. Inspirational young people in the field of disarmament, such as the CTBTO Youth Group, provide invaluable reminders to policy-makers and leaders of the responsibility we owe to this generation, and the next.

Chair,

It is a matter of course that sustainable funding is critical to a properly functioning disarmament machinery. We stress the need for all States to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. Ireland recognises the invaluable contribution of UNIDIR to our work, via its research on disarmament and international security over the past four decades. Ireland is pleased to support UNIDIR's important work through unearmarked core funding, and we reiterate the need to provide a more stable and sustainable financial basis for the organisation. It also has a vital technical competence and provided essential input to our work at the subsidiary bodies at the CD. The long-term financial sustainability of the institute is therefore in all our interests.

Chair,

In conclusion, we must remain cognisant and sincere in our conviction that disarmament is a key driver of peace and security around the world. We have a responsibility to our people, and to our planet, to make progress in this area. The disarmament machinery and its various instruments cannot function properly without UN Member States' willingness to compromise and engage constructively. A fully functioning disarmament machinery will bring us closer to achieving a peaceful and more secure future.

Thank you.

**Statement by JAPAN
At the First Committee of the 76th Session of the General Assembly
- Thematic Debate: Nuclear Weapons -**

It has already been 76 years since the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ever since that day, it has been Japan's mission to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

We still find ourselves struggling to achieve that goal today. We must make sure that the horrors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are never repeated. That can only be guaranteed by the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

With the NPT Review Conference less than 2 months away, it is imperative that the international community regains its momentum and determination for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It should refocus on upholding and strengthening the NPT as the cornerstone of such global efforts.

First and foremost, we cannot afford to repeat the experience of the last Review Conference in 2015 and we will make our utmost efforts to make sure this does not happen.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio, hailing from Hiroshima, Japan has reaffirmed its determination and will continue to make its utmost efforts to bridge differences among nations on how to advance nuclear disarmament, and pursue a common ground upon which all states can work together to achieve a meaningful outcome at the upcoming NPT Review Conference.

To this end, Japan has submitted the draft resolution entitled "Joint courses of action and future oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons" to this committee. I ask all Member States to lend their support to this draft resolution. Compared to last year, this year's draft resolution has been largely improved and should provide a sound common basis to work with at the upcoming Review Conference.

In particular, it recognizes the reaffirmation of the importance of implementing past commitments of the NPT Review Conferences, and support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

With regard to concrete measures, Japan encourages all states, especially nuclear armed states to implement the following six courses of action.

The first is transparency. Efforts to increase transparency and accountability, through the enhancement of the reporting mechanism, the submission of NPT national implementation reports and discussion of these reports, helps build confidence and trust, and establishes common ground that can facilitate nuclear disarmament. States parties, in particular, nuclear-weapon states, should provide frequent and detailed reporting on their disarmament efforts, and use all available opportunities to further explain and share information regarding topics covered in their respective reports.

In this connection, Japan welcomes the five-year extension by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of the New START Treaty. We do stress the importance of concrete actions for more transparency between and among nuclear-weapon States, and strongly hope that this progress will lead to the development of a broader framework of arms control, which involves other countries beyond the U.S. and Russia and covers a wider range of weapon systems.

Second is nuclear risk reduction. Concrete actions should be taken to reduce the risks of nuclear weapon use inter alia by miscalculation or by misunderstanding. Japan encourages all nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons to take actions to reduce the risks of nuclear weapon use and to make further efforts to this end including transparency and dialogue, hotlines, or information and data exchanges.

Third and fourth, we reaffirm the importance of all efforts towards FMCT negotiations, including substantive discussions at the CD, and the entry into force of the CTBT. Japan encourages all nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile materials for the use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices until an FMCT takes effect. Signing and ratifying the CTBT, continued support for the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO are also examples of actions that can be jointly undertaken by all Member States. Japan encourages all states to declare or maintain existing moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.

Fourth is nuclear disarmament verification. Japan underscores the indispensable role of effective and credible nuclear disarmament verification, and has made substantive contributions to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

Fifth is disarmament and non-proliferation education. Japan encourages all Member States to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, efforts with which future generations can actively engage, including through dialogue platforms, mentoring, internships, fellowships, scholarships, model events and youth group activities, as well as to raise awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons, including through, among others, visits by leaders, youth and others to and interactions with communities and people, including the hibakusha who pass on their experiences to the future generations.

In addition to these actions, Japan cannot but highlight its deep concern about North Korea's continued development of nuclear and missile capabilities, including developments highlighted by the IAEA Director General's Report in August and the recent missile launches. Japan reaffirms its strong commitment to the goal of achieving CVID of all of North Korea's nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles of all ranges as well as related programmes and facilities in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Japan calls on North Korea to take concrete steps. We also call on all Member States to fully implement relevant UNSCRs.

There are two final points that we would like to make. The first is that while tensions can flare, as we go into the NPT Review Conference, we need civility. We need to have civil discussions as we engage in negotiations. Then Foreign Minister Kishida established the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament in 2017 which released an outcome document, called Chair's Report in 2019, which pointed out the importance of restoring civility in discourse as one of the principles for positive engagement to bridge disarmament divide. We need this now and at the upcoming Review Conference more than ever. At the same time, we cannot but stress the importance of leaders and the youth visiting Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While our discourse should be civil, it should not solely be pragmatic or defending our entrenched national positions. Whatever positions we may take, we believe that our common goal of the total eliminations of nuclear weapons must be grounded in humanity and a conviction to do so, this is no better ensured than going to, seeing and feeling Ground Zero and learning the utter devastation cast upon the people and cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With the next NPT Review Conference just around the corner, I end my remarks by calling on all states to join forces in our endeavor by demonstrating both civility and also a humane conviction towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the upcoming discourse to enable all of us to bring about substantive advancement of nuclear disarmament.

**STATEMENT BY JAPAN
AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76th SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
- THEMATIC DEBATE: OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION -**

Japan remains fully committed to multilateral efforts related to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in order to achieve global and regional peace and stability. The use of such weapons must not be permitted under any circumstances and thus Japan reiterates the importance of reinforcing the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and other relevant regimes.

The international community has made significant progress in preventing the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, the repeated use of chemical weapons has become a serious and urgent issue in recent years. The international community must be united in condemning the use of these weapons and perpetrators should be identified and held accountable.

In this regard, Japan welcomes reports issued by the Fact Finding Mission (FFM) and the Identification and Investigation Team (IIT). Their investigative work is essential for establishing facts surrounding allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and identify the perpetrators. Japan commends their professional, impartial and independent work and continues to assist related activities of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW in the country. In addition, Japan welcomes the adoption of the decision related to the first report of the IIT during the 94th session of the Executive Council, and the decision during the 25th session of the Conference of State Parties, both of which require Syria to fulfil its responsibility. We will continue to collaborate with other States Parties to the CWC to deal with the use of chemical weapons and deter its further use.

The increased threat posed by non-State actors, including by terrorists, is of particular concern and we must prevent chemical weapons and toxic chemicals from falling into their hands. In order to address this challenge, we should work to strengthen the OPCW to maximize its efficiency and encourage the States Parties to implement their national measures. Japan commends ongoing efforts by the Technical Secretariat for this purpose, even during the Covid-19 pandemic, and will also provide assistance to countries in need and actively take part in discussions to promote the national implementation of the CWC.

Japan commits itself to the destruction of its abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) as an obligation under the CWC and has invested enormous financial resources, amounting to approximately 2.6 billion Euros to cover all the related costs associated with its national operation. Although the destruction project entails various challenges and uncertainties, Japan has been making consistent progress with successful destruction of approximately 59,000 ACW items out of the 90,000 recovered. Despite the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the project continued on a partial basis with the constructive bilateral cooperation and coordination with China.

It is imperative to recognize that the Covid-19 pandemic reiterates the relevance of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The pandemic demonstrates the potential of biological weapons to cause detrimental impact on a global scale, and hence may inspire interests in creating biological weapons. In order to reinforce the international prohibition against biological weapons, States Parties should cooperatively and constructively discuss the possible measures to strengthen the BWC towards the intersessional programme and work toward producing concrete outcomes at the 9th Review Conference next year. Japan contributes to strengthening the BWC, particularly the science and technology review process, the improvement of confidence building measures, the mechanism and procedures for providing support to states endangered by treaty violations and other incidents. To contribute to achieving such outcomes, Japan serves as chair one of the meetings to facilitate the convergence of views in the field of science and technology review process.

In order to demonstrate commitment to international cooperation and assistance and to reinforce the BWC regime, Japan has undertaken a number of initiatives in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU). In the past a few years, Japan organized capacity-building workshops, bringing together various Asian countries to enhance preparedness for and response to the use of biological weapons, as well as thematic seminars in Geneva to promote dialogue on this topic. Additionally, despite the ongoing global pandemic, an online training course to promote national implementation of the BWC was successfully held last year, inviting BWC national contact points across Asia. Japan will continue to organize more international cooperation projects of this kind and hopes that many States Parties to the BWC will participate in and take advantage of our initiatives.

The United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigating the alleged use of biological and chemical weapons (UNSGM) is also an important and independent pillar to verify and prevent their use and proliferation. It is also the only available tool to investigate in the case of biological attacks and thus Japan supports the concept of preserving and strengthening the UNSGM.

Japan also underlines the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which provides the international community with a basis for tackling the threat of WMD proliferation to non-State actors. Japan contributed approximately 1 million US dollars to the UNODA to promote its implementation, and part of the contribution was utilized for the translation of the Online Training Course on UNSCR 1540. Japan will continue to support the implementation of the Resolution, beyond the next comprehensive review to be adopted in 2022.

To conclude, Japan recognizes the importance of strengthening the relevant international treaties and regimes in order to realize our goal of a world free of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons. In this regard, we emphasize the need for effort and cooperation between stakeholders to strive towards a common understanding and take effective actions.

**STATEMENT BY JAPAN
AT THE MEETING OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE 76th SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
- THEMATIC DEBATE: OUTER SPACE -**

While our society is increasingly relying on space systems, the outer space environment has been changing rapidly with an influx of new actors and the diversification of activities. As a result, risks against sustainable and stable use of outer space are more serious today than ever before, as outer space is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive.

In this regard, Japan supports the idea of preventing an arms race in outer space as our unwavering basic position. We have participated in substantive discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as well as in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the United Nations.

The dual-use nature of space objects brings complexity to defining a weapon in outer space and makes it challenging to interpret and verify intentions behind certain outer space activities. In other words, it is difficult to distinguish civil activities and military activities, as well as acts committed out of benevolence or malice.

The international community is required to come up with ideas and approaches that enable us to overcome these challenges. Japan underscores the need to characterize responsible behavior, which would be a practical step to further develop and implement norms, rules and principles in outer space, and could prove relatively durable in the face of changing circumstances. Therefore, Japan supports the establishment of an open-ended working group

on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors and stands ready to make proactive contributions to the discussion to uphold space as safe, secure, stable and sustainable environment.

Japan also underlines the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) as pragmatic and near-term measures to increase trust and prevent misperception and miscalculations in space activities, which currently involve a wide range of actors and stakeholders. We believe that it is imperative to reaffirm the significance of TCBMs. The international community should reach a common understanding on ways to reduce threats to space systems in order to maintain outer space as a peaceful, safe, stable, and sustainable environment, free from an arms race. As a means to pave the way in this direction, Japan will promote the TCBMs contained in the recommendations of the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Report, which are effective in terms of the goal of PAROS. Japan also believes that the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) could contribute to this endeavor. Further discussions on TCBMs and on how we can reduce threats to space systems will help States deepen mutual understanding, and allow them to have a more profound understanding both on threats and risks to space activities and on what could be acceptable parameters for responsible space activities.

In conclusion, Japan would like to reiterate its strong commitment to ensuring the security, safety, stability and sustainability of outer space activities.

**STATEMENT OF JAPAN
AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE
OF THE 76th SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
- THEMATIC DEBATE: CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS –**

Mr. Chair,

A number of violent events that took place around the globe in the past year have reiterated the pressing importance of the control and disarmament of conventional weapons. The world has witnessed many lives deprived of, populations displaced, and families torn apart due to various types of tragedies caused by illicit arms, remaining mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and irresponsible transfers of weapons to unauthorized recipients. With the need for “Disarmament that Saves Lives” becoming more imminent than ever, Japan believes it imperative for all Member States to stand united to address the challenges we all face.

Japan recognizes the important role that the CCW plays to that end, and supports the ongoing discussions towards the Sixth Review Conference, scheduled to take place in December. In particular, Japan, as President-designate of the 23rd Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, wishes to highlight that APII continues to play its essential role in reducing human suffering and preventing civilian losses caused by landmines, booby traps, and other devices including IEDs. In this respect, Japan will take the lead to update the IEDs Declaration at APII, and looks forward to working towards the revision with other High Contracting Parties.

Another subject of significance within the CCW framework is the emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). While appreciating the progress made by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) so far, Japan believes it appropriate for the High Contracting Parties to extend the mandate of the Group and continue its discussions about LAWS, building on the past work and the outcomes of the Group, including the 11 Guiding Principles. We look forward to further advancement of international discourse and consolidation of potential solutions that uphold International Humanitarian Law and other relevant international instruments.

Japan will continue its active contribution to the exploration towards international rulemaking effort within the CCW framework.

The Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which had been postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic, was finally concluded in September this year. Japan welcomes the “Lausanne Declaration”, adopted at the Conference, and renews its commitments in order to realize “a world free of the casualties, suffering and socio-economic impacts caused by cluster munitions”.

Mines and other explosives continue to cause casualties around the world. Landmines threaten or deprive the lives, livelihoods and dignity of local populations and hinder the realization of human security. In 2020 alone, Japan provided assistance for projects in 21 countries and regions, amounting to approximately 39 million US dollars, in collaboration with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), other international organizations, and NGOs. Japan will continue to play an active role on mine action.

Mr. Chair,

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. While the PoA was indispensable to the progress made in the last two decades, the issues related to illicit transfer of SALW remain serious challenges that the international community must tackle urgently. In this regard, Japan welcomes the constructive discussions and successful outcomes of the Seventh Biennial Meeting (BMS7) of the PoA in July. To maintain and build on that momentum, Japan again joins Colombia and South Africa in proposing to this Committee the resolution on “The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.” We call on Members States to uphold the spirit of the PoA and support this important resolution.

It is indeed out of that sense of urgency that Japan supported the activities of Amnesty Month of the African Union’s Silencing the Guns Initiative, through capacity building and weapon collections in four countries in Africa. With the same aspiration, we also contributed 2 million US dollars to the Saving Lives Entity, or SALIENT, launched here in New York two years ago, to support fellow States in advancing their conventional arms control. Given the urgent nature of the SALW issue, we hope to see concrete activities and results of SALIENT on the ground as soon as possible.

The need for better SALW control was also highlighted at the Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7) of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), where measures to prevent diversion through better management of arms transfer were actively discussed. As the Vice-President of the Eighth Conference of States Parties (CSP8) and a long-time member of the Voluntary Trust Fund Selection Committee of the Treaty, Japan will surely continue to play an active role in promoting treaty implementation, universalization and transparency in arms trade.

Mr. Chair,

Ensuring human security and materializing a safer world require effective and constructive work across the international community in multiple areas and existing frameworks of conventional arms control and disarmament. Please be assured that Japan remains committed to continuing its contribution and stands ready to work with other Member States, international organizations and civil society to move things forward.

**STATEMENT BY JAPAN
AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76th SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
- THEMATIC DEBATE: OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY –**

Firstly, the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more severe, with more uncertainty facing the existing order than Japan has enjoyed up until now. Cyberspace has become a realm of competition that reflects geopolitical tensions, regardless of the situation. The state of cyberspace can no longer be simply distinguished between peacetime and wartime, as there are increasing numbers of alleged cases of cyberattacks by military

units with advanced cyber capabilities targeting the critical infrastructure of other countries. As greater segments of society become increasingly digitalized, cyberattacks pose a risk of rapidly developing into an increasingly grave situation. Influence operations carried out using cyberspace and cyberattacks, which are difficult to attribute and whose incurred damages are hard to assess, can, at times, be conducted in combination with military operations and used in an attempt to change the status quo without engaging in armed attacks. The nature of cyberspace is asymmetrical and there is an overwhelming advantage for the attackers. In order to ensure security in cyberspace, it is essential to strengthen our capabilities to deter and respond to cyberattacks seamlessly between peacetime and contingency situations.

In order to deter malicious cyber activities and protect people's safety and rights, Japan will continue to have close coordination with its ally and like-minded countries on a continuous basis, and will take resolute responses against cyber threats, including those possibly sponsored by states, utilizing political, economic, technological, legal, diplomatic, and all other viable and effective means and capabilities.

To ensure "a free, fair and secure cyberspace" on a global scale, Japan will promote its basic principles in the international arena. Japan will also continue to play an active role to advance the rule of law in cyberspace and establish international rules in line with Japan's basic principles and in collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries. In addition to employing capabilities to disrupt an opponent's use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, Japan will take due steps including the use of diplomatic means and criminal prosecution. As an example of diplomatic means, in July 2021, Japan issued a statement that firmly condemned cyberattacks conducted by a cyberattack group which the Chinese government is very likely behind, condemned cyberattacks involved a cyberattack group which the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was very likely behind, and indicated that Japan will take strict measures against these activities.

Japan welcomes the sixth GGE report and the OEWG report, both adopted by consensus.

The greatest value of the OEWG report was that it was adopted by consensus in a process where all UN Members participated fully. The UN Members affirmed the *acquis* directly, including that international law, particularly the UN Charter in its entirety, is applicable in cyberspace.

The GGE report has additional value. For each of the 11 norms included in the 2015 GGE report, the new report provides guidance and examples of implementation. Japan hopes that this content will further promote cooperation between States in advancing responsible State behaviour. In addition, it is clearer now that internationally wrongful acts attributable to a State entail State responsibility. The applicability of international humanitarian law is expressed in a clear manner. The Group noted again the inherent right of States to take measures recognized in the Charter.

Especially, for the stabilization of cyberspace, it is essential that international law and norms work together to prevent internationally wrongful acts using ICTs and to promote responsible State behavior in cyberspace.

Japan is committed to safeguarding a free, fair and secure cyberspace and will continue to actively contribute to discussions and efforts to promote rule of law in cyberspace, including at the United Nations.

Second, just as education always gives us power to take steps forward, disarmament and non-proliferation education plays a fundamental role in fostering understanding on nuclear weapons and their humanitarian consequences.

Even though we are currently facing the severe and unstable international security environment, the importance of raising awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons is not diminished. On the contrary, education has been assuming more importance under the current circumstances, with the divergence of views among states becoming even greater. In this context, Japan strongly believes in the power of education to break the current stalemate and help us move forward in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Against this backdrop, Japan has actively engaged in various efforts to pass on the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to future generations, putting particular importance on the engagement of younger generations. For instance, Japan has contributed to the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme since 1983, by inviting young diplomats to Japan and providing them with opportunities to gain insight into the realities of the consequences of atomic bombings. In addition, Japan supports civil society's efforts through designation of "Special Communicators" and "Youth Communicators for a World without Nuclear Weapons," which have facilitated civil society involvement in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with more than 750 designated delegates to date.

Furthermore, as Japan's draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the First Committee this year demonstrates, Japan encourages all States to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, and to raise awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, Japan welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Japan firmly believes in the power of disarmament and non-proliferation education and the potential for future generations to achieve our common goal, the realization of "a world without nuclear weapons." Japan has been and will continue to take the lead on this issue and encourages all Member States to join our efforts.

**STATEMENT BY JAPAN
AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76th SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
- THEMATIC DEBATE: DISARMAMENT MACHINERY -**

Japan strongly recognizes the important role of the UN disarmament machinery, namely, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), which were all established in 1978 by the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-1).

The CD is the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, which brings together key stakeholders, including all nuclear-weapon possessing countries. As members of such an essential body, it is our shared responsibility to achieve tangible results. However, the CD has been in a stalemate for more than two decades. The CD was not able to agree on a programme of work (POW) during this year's session.

The CD should be a venue where the Member States are willing to understand divergent views and to compromise while seeking a common ground. Building upon previous negotiations, we need to prioritize substantive discussions on agenda items according to their degree of maturity. From this perspective, Japan reiterates the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut- Off Treaty (FMCT).

Additionally, we consider that the following could be highlighted as the potential topics for further discussions: (1) Transparency, (2) Nuclear Risk Reduction, (3) CTBT, (4) Nuclear Disarmament Verification, and (5) Nuclear Disarmament and Non- Proliferation Education. Japan is convinced that advancing substantive discussions on these specific issues will help increase the positive momentum in the CD and is crucial for the adoption of a POW at next year's session.

In order to make substantive progress, robust cooperation and coordination among CD presidents is indispensable. We expect China, the first President of the CD in 2022, to take proactive, collective and concrete steps by holding informal consultations with all relevant stakeholders and further strengthening P6 coordination.

Japan is determined to promote and contribute to such endeavors so that the CD will be able to move forward to fulfill its own mandate.

Japan stands ready to cooperate with the UN and its Member States to make strides towards strengthening the work of the existing disarmament machinery. In this context, Japan hopes fruitful discussions will be made in the 2022 session of the UNDC.

Statement
Submitted by the Lao People's Democratic Republic
on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The Thematic Discussion on Cluster 2: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
of the First Committee during the 76th Session
of the United Nations General Assembly

1. This written statement is submitted on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. ASEAN reiterates its support to the UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament launched in 2018, specifically "ensuring respect for norms against chemical and biological weapons concerns the interests of all humanity". All weapons of mass destruction, if detonated intentionally or by accident, can result in severe casualty and cause massive loss of life, damage to property, significant harm to numerous species and biodiversity. ASEAN therefore, strongly condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of such weapons by any party under any circumstances in anywhere as this constitutes a serious violation of international law, and urges the international community to fully and effectively implement all treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction, as well as Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004).
3. As parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), all ASEAN Member States recognize that the BWC constitutes a critical component of the international legal framework related to WMD. Therefore, ASEAN continues to reiterate its calls for the resumption of multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory legally binding Protocol, dealing with all Articles of the Convention, in a balanced and comprehensive manner to sustainably strengthen the Convention, including through verification measures. In addition, ASEAN reaffirms its support to the efforts of the international community to prevent terrorists and other non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of distribution by enhancing dialogue and cooperation.
4. ASEAN recognizes that the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) remains one of the most successful instruments of disarmament that completely prohibits an entire category of WMD, providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the international law. All ASEAN Member States are also parties to CWC, and strictly abide by our international obligations under the convention. In this regard, ASEAN invites those States that have yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible.
5. We strongly believe that the international community should increase its efforts to strengthen international cooperation in order to eliminate chemical weapons and enhance international support to help all victims suffering from the chemical weapons. In this connection, ASEAN commends the OPCW for its unwavering efforts to support the implementation of the provisions of the CWC and welcomes the progress in eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles under the CWC.
6. Recognizing the threats and dangers of the existence and use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, ASEAN continues to call for universal adherence to applicable international legal instruments prohibiting these weapons.
7. On regional cooperation, ASEAN remains committed to improving regional capacity to address chemical, biological and radiological threats. The ASEAN chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) defense experts have continued to meet under the Network of ASEAN CBR Defense Experts since its established in 2018 to build network as well as sharing information and best practices through visits, workshops and virtual table-top exercise in order to strengthen regional preparedness and cooperation against chemical, biological and radiological threats.

8. Practical cooperation in the ASEAN defence sector continues to make good progress since its inception in 2006. This year, the ASEAN Defence Ministers adopted and signed the Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration in Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Towards A Future-Ready, Peaceful and Prosperous ASEAN, and reaffirmed the ADMM's commitment as the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN to continue to implement the ADMM Three-Year Work Programme 2020-2022 to outline the future direction of ASEAN defence cooperation and advance the cause of peace and stability in the region. In addition, the 15th ADMM approved the propose conduct of the Ad Hoc ADMM-Plus Conference on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Threats to develop a deeper understanding of the risk posed by CBR agents in terrorist acts in the region through the sharing of information and best practices, enhance cooperation and preparedness against CBR threats, and establish closer networks between regional and international CBR experts.

9. Furthermore, ASEAN defence sector has reaffirmed its commitment and contribution to ASEAN's collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic through the ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine (ACMM) and the Network of ASEAN CBR Defence Experts in the form of dialogue, sharing of best practices and lesson learned and exploring new forms of collaboration including cross-pillar and cross-sectoral cooperation.

10. In addition, the Regional Secretariat of the EU CBRN Center of Excellence in Southeast Asia has been working to enhance the capacity of the ASEAN Member States in mitigating CBRN-related risks by ensuring cooperation and coordination in South-East Asia and supporting efforts to identify CBRN risk mitigation needs, develop National CBRN Action Plans and formulate and implement regional project proposals. As part of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Workshop on Raising Awareness and Promoting Cooperation on CBRN Risk Mitigation was held in Manila in 2018 for policy professionals, practitioners, security forces, and health experts. Building upon this work, the 28th ARF has also agreed to carry out the ARF Table Top Exercise (TTX) on Response Capabilities to CBRN Incidents and Training on Developing Exercises to Counter CBRN Terrorism, which has been postponed this year due to the pandemic, in the inter-sessional 2021-2022.

11. ASEAN reaffirms its support for the work of the OPCW and the BWC's Implementation Support Unit and stress the importance of enhanced international support for States Parties in need of assistance to build national capacity for the implementation of treaties related to weapons of mass destruction in accordance with national and international law and the UN Charter.

**STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MALAYSIA
ON BEHALF OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)
THE THEMATIC DISCUSSION ON CLUSTER 3:
OUTER SPACE (DISARMAMENT ASPECTS)**

1. This written statement is submitted on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. ASEAN recognizes access to outer space as an inalienable right of all States. We believe that the exploration and use of outer space should exclusively be for peaceful purposes only, which are in the collective interest of humanity. All activities in outer space must be conducted in accordance with international law and the principle of non-appropriation of outer space.
3. The current global geopolitics and security environment require concerted efforts by all parties to maintain outer space as a domain of peace and security. Realizing the emerging threats to the rules-based international order, ASEAN reaffirms the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and its weaponization.
4. In this regard, we urge all Member States to respect and ensure the strict compliance with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space and the full implementation of the relevant UN General Assembly Resolutions, including Resolution 75/35.
5. ASEAN acknowledged the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 72/250, in which its membership comprised of an ASEAN Member State, Malaysia. While we note that substantive progress was made through the discussions in 2018 and 2019, ASEAN regrets that the GGE failed to agree on a consensus final report. ASEAN believes that the substantive discussions in the GGE could serve as a good basis for further negotiations towards adopting an international legally binding instrument on preventing of an arms race in outer space and on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.
6. ASEAN recognizes significant progress made by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses of outer space. In this regard, ASEAN remains committed to collaborating with Member States of the COPUOS. ASEAN welcomes the endorsement by COPUOS of the “Space2030” Agenda, a forward-looking and comprehensive document for reaffirming and strengthening the contribution of space activities and space tools to the achievement of sustainable development. ASEAN supports the adoption of the “Space2030” Agenda by the General Assembly and will work closely with other States in its implementation. ASEAN also calls for continued action in mitigating the effects of space debris through relevant multilateral fora.
7. As it is incumbent upon all States to ensure that the use and exploration of outer space are exclusively for peaceful purposes, the General Assembly must play a vital role in fostering continued dialogue on current issues and challenges in this field. In this regard, ASEAN emphasizes the urgent need for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to commence its substantive work including through the establishment of an ad hoc committee under the agenda item “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”. ASEAN stands ready to engage constructively in addressing the threats to and from space systems, towards ensuring peaceful uses of space.
8. ASEAN recognizes that the CD has the primary role in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, without further delay. We believe that the immediate commencement of such work by the CD will contribute to the sustaining of momentum that has been built on this issue thus far.

Mr. Chairman,

9. ASEAN underscores that space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite communications, earth observation system and satellite navigation technologies, provide indispensable tools for viable long-term solutions for sustainable development of all countries. This in turn will improve people's lives as well as contribute to the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

10. The international community has benefited immensely from enhancements in the telecommunications and financial sectors which have been made possible by space-based technology. Moving forward, activities in outer space should not remain the exclusive preserve of a small group of States. ASEAN encourages the strengthening of capacity-building programmes, with particular emphasis on developing countries, to ensure that outer space is, both in principle and in practice, a truly global commons which all States can avail themselves to.

11. Confidence-building measures play a critical role in preventing an arms race in outer space, and this is recognized by the international community through General Assembly Resolution 75/69. On this note, ASEAN will continue to support initiative of this nature, through appropriate platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Space Security Workshop. We look forward to future workshop that will provide opportunities to explore critical issues, including on space security threats and hazards, transparency and confidence-building measures and areas for international cooperation.

12. Undoubtedly, with increased access to outer space, comes greater responsibilities on the entire UN membership. ASEAN therefore calls on all UN Member States to refrain from actions that are contrary to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well as to the relevant existing treaties. ASEAN stands ready to contribute actively to the maintenance of international peace and security and promoting international cooperation.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the written statements submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and by Vietnam on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), respectively.
2. The existence of nuclear weapons today constitutes one of the greatest existential threats to humanity.
3. It is therefore imperative and has become more critical than ever, that we act on nuclear disarmament. The only and absolute guarantee against the existential threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons is their total elimination.
4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains until today the cornerstone of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Malaysia hopes that States Parties will reaffirm their obligations and past commitments towards the Treaty at the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference, and progress effectively towards their implementation.
5. Malaysia hails the entry into force of the TPNW as the much needed momentum in rejuvenating the process towards general and complete nuclear disarmament. The Treaty further strengthens the global norms that nuclear weapons are unacceptable given its catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences. Malaysia looks forward to continue its constructive engagement in the lead up to the First Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW in March 2022.
6. The expeditious entry into force of the CTBT is long overdue. In this regard, Malaysia urges the Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to allow for the Treaty's entry into force as soon as possible.
7. Malaysia firmly believes that nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) are essential in enhancing global and regional peace and security. These instruments strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote the necessary conditions for regional development and stability.
8. As a founding member of ASEAN and a State Party to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, Malaysia is committed to safeguarding Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. This objective is enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty).
9. Although the SEANWFZ Treaty has been in force for over two decades, its Protocol has yet to be signed by any of the Nuclear Weapon States. Malaysia underscores the urgent need to resolve outstanding matters pertaining to the signing and ratifying of the SEANWFZ Protocol at the earliest, in line with the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025.
10. To this end and as a way forward, ASEAN Member States should begin open and constructive dialogues with the Nuclear-Weapon-States to bridge their concerns and reservations, as annually agreed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.
11. Malaysia believes that the establishment of the Middle East Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) will enhance global and regional peace and strengthen WMD non-proliferation among all countries of the region.

12. On this note, Malaysia welcomes the convening of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in November 2019 and hopes for more progress to be made during the Second Session of the Conference.

13. Malaysia is pleased to present to the First Committee its traditional resolution entitled “Follow-Up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”.

14. With regard to the Korean Peninsula, Malaysia stresses on the importance of continued peaceful dialogue amongst all concerned parties in order to realise lasting peace and stability of a denuclearised Korean Peninsula.

15. On the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Malaysia hopes for the success of diplomacy resulting in a return of concerned parties to the agreement and its subsequent full implementation.

16. Malaysia recognizes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as the fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. Malaysia also believes that the role and contribution of the IAEA are equally important in facilitating the use of nuclear energy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner.

17. With the growing number of issues and complexities due to continued threats posed by nuclear weapons, it is critical that Member States exhaust all possible efforts to make the necessary progress to preserve the international peace and security, as the status quo is not an option

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON
OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statements submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and by the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), respectively.

2. Malaysia’s commitment to the global disarmament architecture and non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction is total and unwavering. Malaysia, therefore, reaffirms that mutually agreed international rules as well as complete and inclusive principles of disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction are essential to ensure peace, security, and sustainable development.

3. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the only comprehensive multilateral instrument banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. Malaysia is committed to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the CWC.

4. Malaysia appreciates the important role and continuous work of the OPCW to achieve the objectives and purposes of the CWC, particularly in ensuring full implementation of its provisions. To date, 98.8% of the world’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been verifiably destroyed. Malaysia will continue to work closely with the OPCW and other States Parties in ensuring the fulfilment of obligations under the CWC.

5. Despite this remarkable progress, Malaysia regrets the recent re-emergence of the use of chemical weapons which is abhorrent and a flagrant violation of international law, especially the CWC. Malaysia condemns in the strongest possible term the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. Those responsible for the deployment of such weapons must be identified and held accountable.

6. Malaysia fully supports and commends efforts by the international community to press for universal adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and promote its universalization, as well as the sustained determination of the international community in complying with provisions under the Convention. To this end, Malaysia believes that effective verification measures should be put in place to strengthen the BWC.

7. On that note, Malaysia is committed to its adherence and implementation of the obligations under the BWC. We stand ready to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, as stipulated under Article X of the Convention.

8. Realizing the grave consequences of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Malaysia calls for all Member States to adhere to the related multilateral instruments with a view to achieving effective progress towards the prohibition and elimination of all WMDs including chemical and biological weapons.

9. As a State Party to the SEANWFZ Treaty, Malaysia will make every effort to ensure that the Southeast Asian region remains a zone free of nuclear weapons and all of other WMDs. In this connection, Malaysia will continue to support efforts in promoting peace and stability in the region, in accordance with international law and principles of the UN Charter.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON OUTER SPACE
(DISARMAMENT ASPECTS)
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statements submitted on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

2. Malaysia recognizes access to outer space as an inalienable right of all States. We believe that the exploration and use of outer space should exclusively be for peaceful purposes only, which are in the collective interest of humanity. All activities in outer space must be conducted in accordance with international law and the principle of non-appropriation of outer space.

3. The current global geopolitics and security environment require concerted efforts by all parties to maintain outer space as a domain of peace and security. Realizing the emerging threats to the rules-based international order, Malaysia reaffirms the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and its weaponization.

4. Malaysia acknowledged the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which was established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 72/250, in which it served as one of the members. Malaysia believes that the substantive discussions in the GGE could serve as a good basis for further negotiations towards adopting an international legally binding instrument on preventing of an arms race in outer space and on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.

5. Malaysia recognizes significant progress made by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses of outer space.

6. Malaysia remains committed to ratifying and acceding to international treaties governing the use of outer space that uphold the legal principles adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 1963. In this regard, Malaysia adopted its National Space Policy 2030 in 2017 and launched the Malaysia Space Exploration 2030 Programme (Malaysia Space-X 2030). We look forward to cooperating and collaborating with the other Member States as we put our national outer space regulation framework in place.

7. As it is incumbent upon all States to ensure that the use and exploration of outer space are exclusively for peaceful purposes, the General Assembly must play a vital role in fostering continued dialogue on current issues and challenges in this field.

8. Malaysia emphasizes the urgent need for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to commence its substantive work including through the establishment of an ad hoc committee under the agenda item “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”. Malaysia stands ready to engage constructively in addressing the threats to and from space systems, towards ensuring peaceful uses of space.

9. Malaysia recognizes that the CD has the primary role in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, without further delay. We believe that the immediate commencement of such work by the CD will contribute to the sustaining of momentum that has been built on this issue thus far.

10. Malaysia underscores that space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite communications, earth observation system and satellite navigation technologies, provide indispensable tools for viable long-term solutions for sustainable development of all countries. This in turn will improve people’s lives as well as contribute to the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

11. The international community has benefited immensely from enhancements in the telecommunications and financial sectors which have been made possible by space-based technology. Moving forward, activities in outer space should not remain the exclusive preserve of a small group of States.

12. Confidence-building measures play a critical role in preventing an arms race in outer space, and this is recognized by the international community through General Assembly Resolution 75/69. On this note, Malaysia will continue to support initiative of this nature, through appropriate platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Space Security Workshop. We look forward to future workshop that will provide opportunities to explore critical issues, including on space security threats and hazards, transparency and confidence-building measures and areas for international cooperation.

13. Malaysia looks forward to working closely with all Member States in solidifying international solidarity to realise the potential of outer space to strengthen the international framework for science, technology and outer space activities. Malaysia remains committed to strengthening international cooperation on outer space for safeguarding the peaceful uses of space for future generations.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statements submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and by Cambodia on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), respectively.

2. Whilst maintaining our efforts to eradicate all weapons of mass destruction, we should not disregard the devastating consequences caused by conventional weapons. In this regard, Malaysia commends the UN Secretary-General for placing particular emphasis on this subject in his Agenda for Disarmament. Malaysia joins members of the international community in calling for further action to reduce the serious humanitarian impacts caused by conventional weapons, especially on the lives of civilians.

3. As a Signatory State of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Malaysia reiterates its commitment to international efforts at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade of conventional arms. Malaysia believes that the

ATT will help to strengthen existing national policies on conventional weapons, bearing in mind the legitimate right of States to self-defence. Malaysia is committed to working towards the process of ratifying the Treaty.

4. Malaysia has implemented domestic legal provisions, in particular the Strategic Trade Act (STA) 2010, Customs Act 1967, and Arms Act 1960, to govern the circulation of conventional weapons. Malaysia will continue to work with States Parties and international organisations to strengthen existing mechanisms as well as exploring other initiatives in fulfilling Malaysia's obligations under the Treaty.

5. The widespread misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has resulted in an extensive range of negative humanitarian and serious threats to international peace and security. In this regard, Malaysia supports the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) which aims to prevent the misuse and proliferation of small arms. Malaysia hopes that the PoA will be fully implemented by States since it serves as a roadmap for the international community to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms.

6. Malaysia believes that collective action must be taken through a holistic arms control and disarmament approach, post-conflict peacebuilding, conflict prevention and socio-economic development. As such, Malaysia will continue to enhance cooperation and to work closely with members of the international community towards a strong global solution in dealing with the illicit trade of arms.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statements submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and by Singapore on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), respectively.

2. In the current era of globalization, our economies and societies have become more dependent on information technology and computer network to conduct day-to-day businesses. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has amplified the importance of new technologies, as many aspects of our daily lives moved into virtual format.

3. Digital transformation presents tremendous benefits and opportunities for people everywhere. At the same time, this growing dependency on digital platforms has increased our exposure to cyber-attacks. The pervasive and constantly evolving nature of cyber threats requires coordinated expertise from multiple stakeholders across different domains and across borders, to effectively mitigate threats, build trust, share information, and realise the benefits of technology.

4. Malaysia recognises cybersecurity as one of its major national security challenges. The incorporation of cybersecurity as a central strategy into Malaysia's digital initiatives is vital to support its goal to become a truly digital nation through the delivery of state-of-the-art cybersecurity solutions.

5. With this in mind, we have launched the Cybersecurity Strategy (MCSS) that outlines five strategic pillars to be the guiding principles to enhance the national cyber security management from 2020 to 2024. The strategy covers a wide scope in cyberspace from governance and legislation to R&D, education, and global collaboration. It signifies our efforts in the realm of cyber security as one of the main priorities in our national security agenda.

6. Realising the risks and importance to protect the Critical National Information Infrastructure, Malaysia has formulated the National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) which comprises the network information systems of critical sectors of the country.

7. Malaysia also welcomes the initiatives by the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Disarmament on the issue of cyber security and supports the programmes underscored in improving the capacity building and knowledge sharing among the Member States to enhance cyber security capabilities and combat cyber-attacks.

8. Malaysia remains committed to working with other countries and all stakeholders towards a peaceful, secure, and resilient cyberspace that will serve as an enabler of economic progress, enhanced regional connectivity, and the betterment of living standards for all.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statements submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and by Brunei Darussalam on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), respectively.

2. Malaysia views the nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) established by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, Semipalatinsk and Mongolia's declaration as vital importance in enhancing global and regional peace. These instruments strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

3. As a founding member of ASEAN and a State Party to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, Malaysia is committed to safeguarding Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. This objective is enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty).

4. Malaysia underscores the importance of realizing the overarching objectives of the SEANWFZ Treaty and its Protocol, in accordance with the Kuala Lumpur Declaration 2015, "ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together", adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the 27th ASEAN Summit in 2015. The accession of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to the SEANWFZ Protocol remains imperative.

5. Although the SEANWFZ Treaty has been in force for over two decades, its Protocol has yet to be signed by any of the Nuclear Weapon States. Malaysia underscores the urgent need to resolve outstanding matters pertaining to the signing and ratifying of the SEANWFZ Protocol at the earliest, in line with the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025.

6. To this end and as a way forward, ASEAN Member States should begin open and constructive dialogues with the Nuclear-Weapon-States to bridge their concerns and reservations, as annually agreed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.

7. Malaysia believes that the establishment of the Middle East Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) will enhance global and regional peace and strengthen WMD non-proliferation among all countries of the region.

8. Malaysia welcomes the convening of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in November 2019 and hopes for more progress to be made in this regard.

9. Malaysia underscores that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones is an integral part of nuclear disarmament and the promotion of regional peace and stability. Malaysia is hopeful that the 4th Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia to be held in due course will contribute to further strengthening collaboration and coordination between the Zones.

10. Malaysia fully supports commitments of the Secretary-General in his Disarmament Agenda to increase efforts in facilitating dialogue between Member States in order to help Member States to return to a common vision and path of an enhanced regional and global peace.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statements submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and by the Philippines on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), respectively.

2. Malaysia remains an ardent proponent of multilateralism in the pursuit of general and complete disarmament. We believe in the need for reinvigorating the UN Disarmament Machinery including the UNGA First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC). These machineries would add further impetus to ongoing efforts pertaining to various disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

3. The UNGA First Committee is the realization of the international community's faith in multilateral approaches on disarmament and international security matters. It serves as a main platform in addressing challenges, bridging gaps, and building consensus. It is of utmost importance for all Member States to maintain constructive engagement to ensure the success of this Committee's deliberative process.

4. Malaysia reiterates that the CD needs to re-conquer its relevancy as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The stagnation of the disarmament process within the CD undermines the credibility of the Conference and building on the widespread public dismay towards disarmament. To realise this, Malaysia will continue to engage constructively in the CD while encouraging other Member States to exercise flexibility so as to revive the stalled multilateral negotiations

5. Malaysia remains supportive of establishing Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) in facilitating the formulation of substantive work for the CD. In this regard, Malaysia believes that non-CD members could also provide a significant contribution of work in taking forward this multilateral disarmament forum. Therefore, Malaysia calls for the membership of the CD to be opened to all UN Member States in promoting inclusivity and transparency of the CD.

6. Malaysia reaffirms the relevance and importance of the UNDC as the sole specialized and deliberative body within the multilateral disarmament machinery. Malaysia expresses regret at the inability of the UNDC to hold its substantive sessions for three consecutive years from 2019 to 2021. We hope that the UNDC will be able to commence its work next year and make substantive recommendations on its agenda.

7. Malaysia fully supports the work of the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament for its continued technical assistance to Member States towards the realization of measures of peace, arms regulation and disarmament in the Asia Pacific region. The Centres play an important role in disarmament by their effort in providing substantial support and promoting peace, security and stability at various levels. Malaysia looks forward to participating in programmes hosted by these centres in the future.

8. Malaysia welcomes the aspiration of the Secretary-General as set out in his Disarmament Agenda to build stronger partnerships and encourage cooperation to enhance strategic stability and preserving human civilization. We firmly support the existing disarmament machinery and committed to working with all Member States to strengthen the current framework of the machinery.

**Statement of the Netherlands
at the
Seventy-Sixth Session of the General Assembly
First Committee
on
Other Disarmament Measures and International Security
New York, 14 October 2021**

In light of the rapid developments in the technological field, the Netherlands wants to emphasize the importance of responsible use of new technologies. New technologies bring opportunities for our field of work, for example for verification of disarmament and arms control, or for transparency purposes. But new technologies also bring about more complexity and pose potential challenges for the implementation of broadly agreed upon norms and rules in armed conflict. Therefore, as an international community, we need to strengthen the international governance of emerging technologies. The Netherlands supports the development of coordinated diplomatic responses to address emerging security challenges posed by new technologies and thereby puts emphasis on safeguarding and strengthening of the existing international frameworks that are essential for international stability and peace. The application of and compliance with international (humanitarian) law should be the starting point. In addition, the Netherlands underlines the importance of the existing security frameworks for technology transfers for peaceful uses.

We continue to witness an increased reliance on information and communications technology, and the global COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this trend. When cyber operations are directed against critical parts of our infrastructure, governments or societies, the harmful effects will be felt immediately and widely, and they may pose a risk to international peace and security. States must therefore cooperate to protect the rules-based international order and promote an open, free, secure, stable, accessible and interoperable ICT environment for the benefit of the social and economic development of our global society.

In that regard, the Netherlands recalls that existing international law, including the UN Charter, is applicable to cyberspace and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and to promoting a free, open and secure cyberspace, as has been acknowledged by consensus by this General Assembly. Furthermore, human rights and fundamental freedoms apply online as they do offline.

The Netherlands welcomes the consensus reports of both the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). The two groups had the important task of furthering global understandings of State uses of ICTs in the context of international security. The respective consensus reports reaffirm the normative framework for responsible State behavior in cyberspace. Building on this framework, they succeeded in adding an additional layer of common understandings on threats, norms, rules and principles of responsible behavior of States, confidence building measures, capacity building, existing international law, and regular institutional dialogue. For example, both reports promote the protection of critical infrastructure against malicious use of ICTs, including healthcare infrastructure, political and electoral processes, public institutions, and the general availability or integrity of the internet. The Netherlands also attaches great value to the reference contained in the GGE report to international humanitarian law in the context of State uses of ICTs.

Following the successful conclusion of the OEWG and the GGE, we look positively at the developments regarding the joint resolution put forward by the United States and the Russian Federation, which welcomes the two reports and calls upon States to be guided by them in their use of ICTs. The Netherlands also welcomes the commencement of the new Open-ended Working Group and plans to participate actively in its discussions in the coming years. While States have a primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Netherlands is convinced that our discussions can benefit from exchanges with and insights from other relevant stakeholders, including civil society, academia and the private sector.

The new Open-ended Working Group established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 75/240 provides a platform to further develop common understandings on the normative framework for responsible State behavior in cyberspace. In complementarity to the new OEWG process, the Netherlands considers it urgent to advance the implementation of what has already been agreed. The Netherlands therefore supports, along with 53 other co-sponsors, the initiative to develop a Programme of Action. The PoA would provide an inclusive, transparent, regular and action-oriented framework to implement the outcomes of the OEWG and GGEs through international cooperation and capacity building. In the coming year, we will continue to consult and engage with all interested States, including through our discussions in the OEWG, on such a mechanism that will allow for concrete progress to achieve stability in cyberspace.

NORWAY

Chair,

The world cannot afford to relax its efforts in the fight against weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention has been violated repeatedly in the last few years. The pandemic highlights the importance of strong defences against biological threats.

As mentioned in the General debate, Norway is appalled by the recurrent use of chemical weapons. We condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons anywhere, under any circumstances. We continue to urge the Russian Federation to conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances surrounding the poisoning of Mr. Alexei Navalny in August last year, share the findings of the investigation with states parties to the CWC and bring those responsible to justice.

Norway remains steadfast in its support of the decision made at the resumed conference of the states parties to the CWC in April this year, suspending certain rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic. The OPCW and the UN have together attributed eight cases of use of chemical weapons to Syrian authorities and two cases to the so-called Islamic State. All of these cases occurred after Syria's accession to the CWC in 2013. Eight years after its accession, 20 cases from Syria's initial declaration still remain outstanding. This is not acceptable.

There exists no Western plot to undermine Russia's and Syria's sovereign interests. No illegitimate decisions have been made at the OPCW, and the OPCW has not been usurped. There exist documented violations of the chemical weapons convention and there exists a cross-regional group of countries willing to use the available instruments of the convention to address those violations. Norway belongs to this group.

Chair,

At the ninth review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, states parties should take bold action to strengthen the convention. Norway is pleased to note that there seems to be broad agreement on the need for a science and technology review mechanism. We look forward to further discussions about the exact form and function of such a mechanism.

The BWC has well-known institutional deficiencies. In the absence of a fully-fledged implementing organisation, we encourage states parties to use their financial contributions to the BWC to strengthen the implementation support unit whenever possible. Article X of the convention is essential to ensure that states parties enjoy the widest possible access to scientific and technical knowledge for peaceful purposes. Norway recently announced a contribution to the implementation support unit to strengthen the Article X cooperation over the next three years.

Chair,

The UN Secretary General's Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons was used satisfactorily in 2013. Norway is of the view that the independence of the mechanism must be preserved. The secretary-general has ample opportunity to update the guidelines for the mechanism, should he see the need. Norway therefore sees no need for member states to initiate such an update procedure.

Thank you.

STATEMENT
Prepared by
The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines
to the United Nations in New York
On behalf of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
For the Cluster 7 of the First Committee Statement
(Disarmament Machinery)

1. Given the persistent threats to international security, it remains necessary more than ever to preserve and strengthen the nature, role and purpose of the various fora under the UN disarmament machinery.¹
2. ASEAN is of the firm view that global disarmament and non-proliferation issues can be best addressed through multilateralism, and all countries committed to their obligations and our collective resolve towards a more peaceful world. Indeed, based on its existing rules of procedure and methods of work, the United Nations disarmament machinery has produced important treaties and guidelines, and has promoted confidence and trust amongst States.
3. ASEAN expresses its concern about new challenges on disarmament and strategic weapons control, as well as the current stalemate in major multilateral disarmament negotiations. ASEAN therefore welcomes further coordination and cooperation between the General Assembly and the Security Council on the non-proliferation and disarmament of WMDs, illicit proliferation of conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons.
4. ASEAN recognizes the First Committee as the most inclusive platform for comprehensive discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation. Dialogues in this Committee must strive to be constructive, relevant and in good faith. We call on Member States to exercise flexibility and compromise for the success of the Committee's deliberations. ASEAN recognizes the important role of the Conference on Disarmament and reiterates its call on the Conference to agree, by consensus, on a balanced and comprehensive program of work without further delay.
5. ASEAN continues to stress the importance of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as a multilateral negotiating body on disarmament-related treaties, and along with NAM, reiterates the call on the CD to agree by consensus on a balanced and comprehensive program of work without further delay, taking into account the security interest of all states. Agreed Ad Ref Draft UNGA76 NAM Statement on Disarmament Machinery.² We also continue to advocate for the CD to enlarge its membership and increase interactions with relevant stakeholders to bring fresh perspectives to the body. Furthermore, we also support NAM in strongly rejecting any politicization of the work of the CD and calls upon all member states to fully respect its rules of procedures and agreed methods of work.³

¹ UNGA74 ASEAN 1C Cluster 7 Statement

² Agreed Ad Ref Draft UNGA76 NAM Statement on Disarmament Machinery

³ Agreed Ad Ref Draft UNGA76 NAM Statement on Disarmament Machinery

6. ASEAN remains engaged with the UN Disarmament Commission (DC) and looks forward to its substantive session, which has been postponed in the past three (3) years. We encourage all Member States to work together constructively to resolve outstanding issues that hinder our collective efforts in this body. In the same spirit, we encourage all Member States to reflect on the outcome of the Open-ended Working Group on convening the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (4th SSOD) and to continue discussions on convening the 4th SSOD without delay. The 4th SSOD would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with current international situation, the most critical aspects of disarmament process, and to mobilize international community and public opinion in favor of elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of control and reduction of conventional weapons.⁴

7. ASEAN acknowledges the necessity of utilizing a multistakeholder approach in our work, as it has proven to be an important catalyst in moving forward important discussions and actions on disarmament. It is in this context, we welcome enhanced engagement with civil society, academia, women and youth.

8. ASEAN commends the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda, a milestone achievement that called on all Member States to demonstrate stronger political commitment to preserve multilateralism, the foundation upon which disarmament and non-proliferation rests. Efforts at conflict prevention should also fit into a comprehensive disarmament machinery.

9. ASEAN reiterates that Regional Centres for Disarmament are valuable contributors towards global disarmament. ASEAN therefore reaffirms its support for the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPPD) in promoting regional disarmament priorities, bridging needs and fostering cooperation in our region. We also encourage taking into account the analyses and recommendations of think-tanks and research institutions, such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), to enhance disarmament efforts at the local, regional, and global levels.

10. ASEAN emphasizes that we must ensure that the disarmament machinery will keep pace with the rapidly evolving security landscape and advancements in science and technology, including developments in cyber space.

11. ASEAN reaffirms its readiness to coordinate and cooperate with other Member States, regional and international organisations to promote international peace and security and search for solutions to regional and international issues, including those on non-proliferation, disarmament and weapons control, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

12. In closing, disarmament and non-proliferation issues must be seen not solely through political and security lens, but as a cross-cutting matter that involves such aspects as political-security, economic and socio-cultural. With this comprehensive outlook in mind, ASEAN stands ready to collaborate with all partners to enhance the effectiveness of the UN disarmament machinery⁵ and advance our common disarmament and non-proliferation vision within the larger objectives of the UN in achieving a peaceful and prosperous world.

⁴ Agreed Ad Ref Draft UNGA76 NAM Statement on Disarmament Machinery

⁵ UNGA74 ASEAN 1C Cluster 7 Statement

**ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ представителя Российской Федерации в Первом комитете 76-й сессии ГА ООН в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу «Ядерные вооружения»
(13 октября 2021 г.)**

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Вопросы ядерного разоружения занимают центральное место в международной повестке дня. Несмотря на явный прогресс по сокращению стратегических вооружений, от ядерных держав требуют более глубоких шагов по ликвидации ядерного оружия.

С пониманием относимся к взглядам тех, кто выступает за немедленный и безусловный отказ от ядерных вооружений. Разделяем благородную цель достижения безъядерного мира. Вместе с тем попытки навязать странам, обладающим ядерным оружием, полную и безоговорочную ликвидацию их арсеналов едва ли осуществимы в отрыве от существующих стратегических реалий и законных интересов в сфере безопасности. В этой связи считаем принятие Договора о запрещении ядерного оружия ошибочным и по сути контрпродуктивным. Оно лишь усугубляет ситуацию, провоцируя глубокие разногласия в международном сообществе и расшатывая основ ДНЯО.

Реальный прогресс в ядерном разоружении можно обеспечивать только на основе консенсуса, придерживаясь линии на выверенные поэтапные сокращения в контексте статьи VI ДНЯО и императивности поддержания стратегического баланса на основе принципа неделимой безопасности.

Российская Федерация, осознавая свою особую ответственность как ядерной державы и постоянного члена СБ ООН за выполнение обязательств по статье VI ДНЯО, неукоснительно выполняет действующие соглашения в данной сфере. Наши усилия по практическим сокращениям ядерных вооружений в рамках договорённостей с США хорошо известны. Продолжаем выполнять свои обязательства по Договору о СНВ 2010 года. К контрольной дате (5 февраля 2018 года) сократили наш арсенал ниже предельных уровней вооружений, установленных ДСНВ.

В позитиве отмечаем заключение Соглашения с США 26 января 2021 г. о продлении Договора до 5 февраля 2026 г., что обеспечивает должный уровень взаимной транспарентности в отношении подпадающих под его охват СНВ. Намерены использовать этот период для запуска переговоров с США о будущем контроле над ракетно-ядерными вооружениями с учётом всех факторов, влияющих на стратегическую стабильность, включая наступательные и оборонительные вооружения, как ядерные, так и неядерные, способные решать стратегические задачи.

По договорённости президентов России и США на саммите в Женеве 16 июня начат комплексный диалог по стратегической стабильности. Состоялись два раунда. Деловая атмосфера встреч даёт повод с осторожным оптимизмом ожидать, что у сторон получится творчески поработать над поиском точек соприкосновения в целях сближения позиций на основе учёта интересов друг друга.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Полностью отдаём себе отчёт в сложности и масштабности стоящих перед нами задач. Так, выход США из Договора о РСМД 2 августа 2019 г. обнулил международно-правовые запреты на развертывание в Европе ракетных вооружений средней и меньшей дальности наземного базирования. С целью предотвращения новой губительной гонки ракетно-ядерных вооружений Российская Федерация взяла на себя в одностороннем порядке инициативу не размещать первой подпадавшие под Договор системы, в тех регионах, где не будут развёртываться такие средства американского производства. Призываем США и их союзников принять аналогичные обязательства. Но воз и ныне там.

Более того, 26 октября 2020 г. в «Заявлении о дополнительных шагах по деэскалации обстановки в Европе в условиях прекращения действия ДРСМД» Президент Российской Федерации В.В.Путин в развитие инициативы о встречных мораториях предложил заинтересованным сторонам рассмотреть конкретные варианты взаимных верификационных мер для снятия имеющихся озабоченностей. Наши инициативы остаются в силе. Просим присмотреться к ним самым внимательным образом.

Ответственно заявляем, у России не было и нет РСМД наземного базирования. Утверждать обратное – значит создавать заведомо ложную картину и покрывать тех, кто несет ответственность за развал ДРСМД.

Другой пример. Российская Федерация четырехкратно сократила количество нестратегического ядерного оружия (НСЯО) от уровня, которым СССР располагал в 1991 году. Всё НСЯО переведено в категорию неразвёрнутого, находится исключительно на национальной территории и сосредоточено на централизованных базах хранения, где обеспечивается высочайший режим безопасности, дающий надёжную гарантию от случайного или несанкционированного применения. Контроль над российским НСЯО не передаётся другим государствам ни прямо, ни косвенно, не проводится отработка его применения в ходе мероприятий сил общего назначения.

На контрасте ядерное оружие США остаётся на территории неядерных государств Европы, в рамках НАТО отрабатывается его применение на европейском театре, причем с привлечением неядерных государств. Необходимо безотлагательно прекратить подобную, противоречащую ДНЯО практику, вернуть ядерное оружие на национальную территорию его обладателя, а инфраструктуру в Европе ликвидировать.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Российская Федерация последовательно выступает за переподтверждение всеми ядерными державами основополагающей формулы о том, что в ядерной войне не может быть победителей, и она никогда не должна быть развязана. Первые важные шаги уже сделаны. Этот постулат подтверждён в Совместном заявлении Президентов В.В.Путина и Дж.Байдена от 16 июня 2021 г. Россия и Китай включили его в Совместное заявление от 29 июня, приуроченное к двадцатилетию подписания Договора о добрососедстве, дружбе и сотрудничестве между нашими странами. Призываем остальные государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, последовать нашему примеру.

Главная задача – не допустить повторения трагедии 1945 г., когда ядерное оружие было использовано США против японских городов.

Открыты к любым конструктивным идеям о многосторонних переговорных форматах по вопросам предотвращения гонки вооружений, укрепления международной безопасности и стабильности, которые должны вестись на основе консенсуса с учётом законных интересов их участников. Попытки «принудить» кого-либо к участию в таких дискуссиях представляются контрпродуктивными.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Российская Федерация рассматривает ДНЯО как одну из основ современного миропорядка. Тот факт, что на Конференции 1995 г. по рассмотрению и продлению действия ДНЯО было решено бессрочно продлить Договор, свидетельствует о его эффективности. Придаём большое значение успешному функционированию всех трёх «столпов» ДНЯО: разоружения, нераспространения и мирного использования атомной энергии.

В последние годы режим ДНЯО подвергается серьёзным испытаниям. На фоне слома сложившейся системы соглашений в области контроля над вооружениями усиливаются разногласия между государствами-участниками по вопросам осуществления Договора. Надеемся, что на предстоящей 10-й Обзорной конференции совместными усилиями удастся разорвать «порочный круг» копившихся взаимных обвинений и противоречий и выйти на общеприемлемые решения, способствующие укреплению режима ДНЯО.

Будучи одним из инициаторов и депозитариев ДНЯО, напоминаем о необходимости выполнения решения Конференции 1995 г. о создании зоны, свободной от ядерного оружия и других видов ОМУ, и средств его доставки на Ближнем Востоке (ЗСОМУ). Особую ответственность за его имплементацию несут Россия, США и Великобритания как соавторы резолюции Конференции по данному вопросу.

Первая сессия Конференции по ЗСОМУ, прошедшая в ноябре 2019 г., показала готовность участников к поиску решений путем компромисса. В этой связи призываем США подключиться ко второй её сессии. Считаем важным участие в дискуссиях Израиля.

Поддерживаем деятельность МАГАТЭ в качестве проверочного механизма ДНЯО. Выступаем за универсализацию Доппротокола к Соглашению о гарантиях в качестве исключительно добровольной меры. При этом отмечаем, что система гарантий должна сохранять технически обоснованный, неполитизированный и непредвзятый характер.

Российская Федерация рассматривает ДВЗЯИ как важнейший документ в сфере ядерного нераспространения и неукоснительно соблюдает его положения. В этом году мы отмечаем 25-летие со дня открытия Договора для подписания. Однако ДВЗЯИ не вступил в силу из-за позиции восьми государств из Приложения 2, чья ратификация необходима для его превращения в действующий международно-правовой инструмент. Призываем упомянутые страны незамедлительно ратифицировать Договор.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Рассчитываем на конструктивный заинтересованный диалог по всему спектру вопросов ядерного разоружения, ориентированный на достижение взаимоприемлемых, основанных на балансе интересов результатов. Российская делегация к такой совместной работе готова.

Благодарю за внимание.

**ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 76-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Другие виды ОМУ» (13 октября 2021 г.)**

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Россия полностью поддерживает международный режим запрета химического, биологического и токсинного оружия, последовательно выступает за его универсализацию и укрепление.

Неукоснительно соблюдаем обязательства по Конвенции о запрещении биологического и токсинного оружия (КБТО), которая поставила вне закона целую категорию ОМУ. КБТО должна оставаться надёжным инструментом сокращения угрозы использования биологических агентов в качестве оружия и способствовать развитию международного сотрудничества в биологической сфере в мирных целях. Наивысшая эффективность Конвенции может быть достигнута только при выполнении всеми государствами-участниками её положений в полном объёме. Решению этой задачи способствовало бы принятие юридически обязывающего Протокола к Конвенции с надёжным механизмом проверки.

Призываем продуктивно использовать намеченное на ноябрь Совещание государств - участников КБТО для закрепления консенсуса в отношении конкретных предложений по улучшению осуществления Конвенции в целях их одобрения на Обзорной конференции КБТО в 2022 г. В этой связи представляются весьма полезными российские инициативы. Речь, в частности, идёт о создании в рамках КБТО мобильных медико-биологических отрядов для оказания помощи в случае применения биологического оружия, расследования такого применения и содействия в борьбе с инфекционными заболеваниями различного происхождения и подготовке кадров. Исходя из положительного опыта работы российских специалистов, концепция мобильных отрядов позволила бы обеспечить в комплексе реализацию целого ряда положений КБТО, включая, но не ограничиваясь, международным сотрудничеством по статье X.

Мы также предлагаем учредить в рамках Конвенции Научно-консультативный комитет, который будет осуществлять оценку достижений в сфере науки и технологий, имеющих отношение к Конвенции, и вырабатывать соответствующие рекомендации. Рассчитываем на формирование консенсуса среди государств-участников.

Отмечаем наращивание военно-биологической активности некоторых государств за пределами своих национальных границ, что несет вызовы для режима КБТО, поскольку такая деятельность никак не контролируется. С целью повышения транспарентности мы предложили усовершенствовать формат мер укрепления доверия путём включения в форму отчётности данных о военно-биологической активности за рубежом, чтобы способствовать уверенности в соблюдении КБТО. Призываем всех, кого это касается,

отказаться от милитаризации здравоохранения. Рассчитываем также на задействование предусмотренного КБТО консультационного механизма для урегулирования всех вопросов, которые имеются или могут возникнуть в связи с реализацией положений Конвенции.

Российская Федерация выступила с инициативой об учреждении группы правительственных экспертов с участием всех заинтересованных государств КБТО в целях разработки конкретного механизма реализации статьи VI Конвенции о проведении расследований возможных нарушений КБТО. Необходимость согласования конкретных процедур выполнения данного положения КБТО давно назрела.

Наше предложение никоим образом не ставит под сомнение независимый статус Механизма Генсекретаря ООН по расследованию случаев возможного применения химического и биологического оружия (МГС). Наоборот, эти международные инструменты могли бы взаимодополнять друг друга в контексте применения КБТО и Женевского протокола 1925 года о запрещении применения на войне удушливых, ядовитых или других подобных газов и бактериологических средств.

Россия подтверждает заинтересованность в укреплении экспертного и технического потенциала МГС и намерена продолжать вносить вклад в общие усилия мирового сообщества. В плане практического использования МГС важное значение придаём его принципам и процедурам, которые содержатся в приложении I документа ООН A/44/561. Однако данные принципы и процедуры, за исключением приложений, не обновлялись с момента их одобрения резолюцией ГА ООН 45/57С от 4 декабря 1990 г. В этой связи весьма велик риск того, что они устарели. В целях начала работы по обеспечению эффективного задействования МГС Российская Федерация внесла в Первый комитет проект соответствующей резолюции. Обращаемся с просьбой о его поддержке и соавторстве.

В условиях отсутствия ощутимого прогресса в деле укрепления КБТО продолжают выдвигаться идеи, нацеленные на формирование параллельных, не опирающихся на положения КБТО, форматов. К таковым относятся так называемые «добровольные оценочные посещения» (peer reviews) микробиологических объектов двойного назначения. Идеи весьма сомнительные в силу отсутствия объективных критериев оценки и подбора участников. С такими непонятными для практической реализации концепциями мы согласиться не сможем.

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Конвенция о запрещении химического оружия (КЗХО) является ключевым инструментом в сфере химического разоружения и нераспространения. Российская Федерация стояла у истоков создания КЗХО и последовательно выступает за её укрепление.

Добросовестно и в полном объеме выполняем свои обязательства по Конвенции. Наглядным примером служит то, что в 2017 году Россия досрочно уничтожила свой химарсенал, что подтверждено Техсекретариатом Организации по запрещению химического оружия (ОЗХО). Призываем США, последнюю в мире страну, обладающую заявленным химоружием, ликвидировать свои запасы в кратчайшие сроки. У американской стороны для этого имеются все финансовые и технологические возможности.

В самой ОЗХО сложилась весьма непростая ситуация. Эта некогда авторитетная международная структура, получившая в 2013 году Нобелевскую премию мира, где решения всегда принимались консенсусом, оказалась расколотой вследствие политизации, размывания мандата, отхода от положений КЗХО. Ряд государств фактически переформатировали ОЗХО в угоду своим узкокорыстным геополитическим установкам. Это не могло не сказаться на репутации ОЗХО и доверии к её экспертным возможностям.

В апреле с.г. несколько стран «продавили» в ОЗХО голосованием беспрецедентное для Организации решение о поражении Сирии в правах и привилегиях по КЗХО. В его основу легли ангажированные и бездоказательные выводы созданной в нарушение принципа консенсуса и Статьи XV Конвенции нелегитимной Группы по расследованию и идентификации (ГРИ).

Два отчета ГРИ – по случаям с предполагаемым применением химоружия в Аль-Латамне и Саракибе – предвзяты, фактологически недостоверны, технически безграмотны, методологически ничтожны. Судя по всему, цель работы Группы не в том, чтобы профессионально и объективно разобраться в произошедшем, а сфабриковать выводы так, дабы возложить вину исключительно на Дамаск. Тем самым, впервые в истории ОЗХО в нарушение норм КЗХО и принципа консенсуса была реализована задача по обвинению добросовестного участника Конвенции в невыполнении своих обязательств. Подобные подходы категорически неприемлемы.

В этом же ряду и идущий вразрез с положениями КЗХО и игнорирующий мнение многих государств-членов ОЗХО проект решения о запрете на аэрозольное применение в правоохранных целях химикатов, воздействующих на центральную нервную систему, который предлагается одобрить на 26-й сессии Конференции государств-участников КЗХО в ноябре текущего года. В соответствии с её Статьей XV поправки подобного рода могут быть внесены в КЗХО только на основе абсолютного консенсуса. Россия никоим образом себя с этим решением не ассоциирует. Призываем государства-участники КЗХО голосовать против неправомерного предложения, остановить дальнейшую политизацию деятельности ОЗХО и принять совместные меры по сохранению целостности Конвенции.

Сирийская Арабская Республика регулярно информирует СБ ООН и ОЗХО о подготовке боевиками химических атак и провокаций. Террористы обладают собственной технологической и производственной базой по синтезу боевых отравляющих веществ и имеют разветвлённые каналы поставок их прекурсоров. Существует риск рецидивов «химтерроризма» за пределами Сирии. Считаем, что к поступающей от сирийской стороны информации необходимо относиться со всей серьёзностью, чтобы скоординированными усилиями противодействовать реальной угрозе «химического» терроризма.

В этой связи Российская Федерация еще в 2016 году внесла на рассмотрение Конференции по разоружению в Женеве проект основных элементов по борьбе с актами хим- и биотерроризма. Наше предложение, пользующееся широкой поддержкой на Конференции, остается в силе.

Благодарю за внимание.

**ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ представителя Российской Федерации в Первом комитете 76-й сессии ГА ООН в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу «Космос (разоруженческие аспекты)»
(13 октября 2021 г.)**

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

В этом году весь мир отмечает знаменательную дату – 60-летие первого полёта человека в космос. 12 апреля 1961 года наш соотечественник Ю.А.Гагарин совершил полёт вокруг Земли на корабле «Восток», открыв эру пилотируемой космонавтики. Его подвиг положил начало использованию и исследованию космоса человеком.

Мирное освоение космоса служит эффективным средством для решения многих глобальных проблем, в том числе в плане социально-экономического развития. Речь, например, идёт об изучении и более широком использовании природных ресурсов Земли, борьбе со стихийными бедствиями, обеспечении населения продовольствием, улучшении транспорта и связи, создании перспективных материалов и технологий.

По мере освоения около земного пространства проявляются и новые вызовы, требующие совместных ответов мирового сообщества. Особого внимания членов ООН требует восприятие космоса рядом стран как арены для ведения боевых действий в связи с реализацией односторонних установок на размещение оружия в космосе, наращивание потенциала силового воздействия (как кинетического, так и некинетического) на космические объекты. Осуществляются масштабные программы по разработке систем вооружений для применения силы или угрозы силой в космосе, из космоса или в отношении космоса.

Ставка сделана на достижение собственного военного доминирования в ущерб интересам всех остальных действующих или потенциальных участников космической деятельности. В итоге нам грозят негативные

последствия, чреватые дестабилизацией обстановки и гонкой вооружений в космическом пространстве, что подрывало бы и перспективы режима ограничения вооружений в целом.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Российская Федерация предлагает, чтобы ГА ООН провозгласила в качестве исторической ответственности всех государств обеспечение того, чтобы освоение космического пространства осуществлялось исключительно в мирных целях, на благо человечества.

Гонка вооружений в космосе, если её не удастся своевременно предотвратить, поглотит огромные материальные ресурсы, создаст непреодолимые преграды для международного сотрудничества в мирном освоении космического пространства и для использования результатов научно-технического прогресса в этой области в мирных целях.

В этой связи сейчас как никогда важно, чтобы предотвращение гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве как необходимое условие для его сохранения для мирных целей на благо всего человечества стало нормой национальной политики государств-членов ООН, общепризнанным международным принципом. Нельзя допустить пересмотра решений Первой спецсессии ГА ООН по разоружению 1978 г., направленных на проведение исследований и использование космоса сугубо в мирных целях, предотвращение гонки вооружений в космосе (ПГВК) и запуск соответствующих переговоров в русле Договора о космосе (ДК) 1967 г. Данные цели подтверждаются в ежегодной египетско-ланкийской резолюции ГА ООН по ПГВК, которую российская делегация неизменно поддерживает и выступает соавтором.

От государств-членов ООН требуется подтвердить приверженность действующим международно-правовым нормам, регламентирующим деятельность в космосе. Помимо этого, следует также зафиксировать общее понимание, что в космосе (в т.ч. на орбите вокруг Земли и на небесных телах) не должно размещаться оружие любого вида. Востребован и запрет на применение или угрозу применения силы в отношении космических объектов, а также с их использованием. Предлагаем государствам - членам ООН взять на себя следующие обязательства в любой удобной для них форме:

- не задействовать космические объекты в качестве средства поражения любых целей на Земле, в воздушном и в космическом пространстве;
- не уничтожать, не повреждать, не нарушать нормального функционирования и не изменять траекторию полёта космических объектов других государств;
- не создавать, не испытывать и не развёртывать космическое оружие любых видов базирования для выполнения любых задач, в т.ч. для противоракетной обороны, в качестве противоспутниковых средств, для использования против целей на Земле или в воздухе, а также ликвидировать уже имеющиеся у государств такие системы;
- не испытывать и не использовать в военных, в том числе противоспутниковых, целях пилотируемые космические корабли;
- не оказывать содействие и не побуждать другие государства, группы государств, международные, межправительственные, а также любые неправительственные организации, включая неправительственные юридические лица, учреждённые, зарегистрированные или расположенные на территории, находящейся под их юрисдикцией и/или контролем, к участию в указанной выше деятельности.

Опираясь на решения Первой спецсессии ГА ООН по разоружению 1978 г. Российская Федерация предлагает договориться о принципиальном решении вопроса по предотвращению гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве и сохранении космоса для мирных целей – ввести полный и всеобъемлющий запрет на космические ударные вооружения, а также на любые средства наземного, воздушного или морского базирования, предназначенные для поражения объектов в космосе.

В этой связи последовательно проводим линию на запуск переговоров по разработке международного юридически обязывающего инструмента по предотвращению гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве и его сохранению для мирных целей, запрещающего размещение в космосе любых видов вооружений, а также применение силы или угрозы силой в космосе, из космоса или в отношении космоса.

Так, в 2008 г. Российская Федерация и КНР внесли для рассмотрения Конференцией по разоружению (КР) проект договора о предотвращении размещения оружия в космическом пространстве, применения силы или угрозы силой в отношении космических объектов, а в 2014 г. – его обновлённую версию, учитывающую высказанные рядом государств замечания и предложения. Документ по-прежнему находится на столе переговоров КР, имеет всеобъемлющий характер и является добротной основой для выработки соответствующего многостороннего инструмента. Нам хорошо известна критика ряда государств в отношении ДПРОК, однако альтернативных предложений в сфере ПГВК пока никто не представил. Подтверждаем готовность их рассмотреть.

Стабилизировать ситуацию на период, пока такой многосторонний инструмент будет вырабатываться, призвана выдвинутая Российской Федерацией и ставшая уже международной инициатива/политическое обязательство о неразмещении первыми оружия в космосе (НПОК). Её полноформатными участниками стали уже три десятка государств, и число сторонников продолжает расти.

Данная инициатива является единственной в плане предотвращения вепонизации космоса. Будучи одной из мер транспарентности и доверия в целях ПГВК, инициатива по НПОК за последние годы стала существенным политическим фактором, способствующим укреплению международного мира, обеспечению равной и неделимой безопасности для всех, а также повышению предсказуемости и устойчивости деятельности государств по исследованию и использованию космического пространства в мирных целях.

Только гарантированное предотвращение гонки вооружений в космосе и его сохранение для мирных целей обеспечит возможности для использования ближнего и дальнего безвоздушного пространства на благо человечества, его освоения в целях созидания.

Российская делегация вносит на рассмотрение Первого комитета проект резолюции ГА ООН «Неразмещение первыми оружия в космосе». Документ уже оформился на ооновской площадке в качестве традиционного, принимаемого ежегодно Генассамблеей с 2014 г. по инициативе трёх изначальных соавторов – Бразилии, КНР и России. Подготовлены к рассмотрению Первым комитетом проекты резолюций «Дальнейшие практические шаги по ПГВК» и «Меры по обеспечению транспарентности и укреплению доверия в космической деятельности (МТДК)». Напомним, что документ по МТДК с 2013 г. принимался консенсусом при соавторстве России, Китая и США. Сожалеем, что в 2018 г. США не просто отказались от соавторства, а без каких-либо на то причин проголосовали «против».

Рассчитываем, что российские проекты получают широкую поддержку и соавторство.

Спасибо за внимание.

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 76-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Обычные вооружения»
(13 октября 2021 г.)

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Россия является одним из наиболее активных участников Конвенции о «негуманном» оружии (КНО). Призываем к дальнейшему укреплению её режима путём универсализации Конвенции и Протоколов к ней, а также добросовестного выполнения их положений.

С удовлетворением отмечаем, что после продолжительной паузы в связи с пандемией коронавируса в этом году возобновилась полноценная работа в рамках КНО. В очном формате, за что мы последовательно выступали, состоялись сессии Группы правительственных экспертов государств-участников КНО по смертоносным автономным системам вооружений (ГПЭ по САС), Подготовительного комитета Шестой Обзорной конференции КНО, а также совещания экспертов по Дополненному протоколу II и Протоколу V.

Рассчитываем на успешную подготовку и проведение Шестой Обзорной конференции Конвенции. Настроены на взаимодействие со всеми государствами-участниками в целях принятия взаимоприемлемых решений.

Продолжаем придерживаться позиции, что к рассмотрению новых тем в рамках КНО следует подходить взвешенно – при сбалансированном учёте гуманитарных озабоченностей и законных оборонных интересов государств. Такой подход приобретает особую актуальность в свете активных попыток ряда стран и представителей гражданского общества апеллировать к гуманитарным озабоченностям в качестве абсолютного и единственно достаточного условия для введения ограничительно-запретительных режимов в отношении конкретных видов обычных вооружений.

Российская Федерация исходит из достаточности норм международного права, включая международное гуманитарное право, которые в полной мере применимы к новым технологиям в области САС и не нуждаются в модернизации или адаптации с учётом специфики данных систем вооружений. Упомянутые системы, их технические характеристики и особенности, происходящие из наличия автономности, а также их использование в ходе боевых операций должны соответствовать закреплённым (в частности, в преамбуле КНО) принципам защиты гражданского населения от военных действий, ненанесения чрезмерных повреждений (в т.ч. долговременного и серьёзного ущерба природной среде), а также непричинения излишних страданий. Кроме того, использование САС должно отвечать критериям соразмерности и пропорциональности.

В условиях, когда отсутствуют действующие образцы САС, остаются неопределёнными их базовые характеристики и понятийный аппарат, налицо значительный разброс в подходах участников обсуждений, поспешные шаги могут нанести ущерб научно-техническому прогрессу в сфере информационных технологий, искусственного интеллекта, мирной робототехники и т.п. На нынешнем этапе не видим необходимости в каком-либо юридически обязывающем инструменте по таким системам и введении запрета или моратория на их разработку, применение и технологии создания. Полагаем, что вместо этого профильная ГПЭ, которую рассматриваем как оптимальную площадку для обсуждения тематики САС, могла бы сосредоточиться на анализе действующих международно-правовых норм.

Ход дискуссии по проблематике применения в густонаселённых районах боеприпасов взрывного действия (БВД) находится в фокусе нашего внимания. Убеждены, что следует с осторожностью подходить к выработке неких «политических деклараций» о запрете данного вида вооружений, которые впоследствии могут быть использованы для дискредитации любых военных операций с применением БВД, а также их разделения на «допустимые» и «недопустимые».

Решение связанных с применением БВД проблем лежит в плоскости добросовестного выполнения уже существующих положений международно-правовых инструментов, прежде всего Дополнительного протокола I 1977 г. к Женевским конвенциям 1949 г., а также широкого задействования политико-дипломатических средств урегулирования вооружённых конфликтов. Считаем имеющееся правовое регулирование достаточным, в т.ч. для того, чтобы нивелировать гуманитарные риски в контексте использования такого вида вооружений. Решение связанных с применением БВД проблем лежит исключительно в плоскости добросовестного выполнения уже существующих норм МГП.

Отмечаем, что применение самодельных взрывных устройств (СВУ), представляющих одну из наиболее значимых гуманитарных угроз в современном мире, в последние годы, к сожалению, лишь возрастает. Это наглядно подтверждает статистика Инженерных войск России, полученная на территории Сирии, – треть всех обезвреженных нашими военными взрывных устройств составляли именно СВУ.

Основу для координации международных усилий по противодействию СВУ представляют «профильные» резолюции СБ и ГА ООН. В полной мере поддерживаем продолжение обсуждения тематики СВУ на площадке Дополненного протокола 2 КНО. Исходим из того, что данные усилия должны соответствовать предмету и целям Конвенции.

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Придавая большое значение проблематике незаконного оборота обычных вооружений, выступаем за более эффективную реализацию Программы действий ООН по предотвращению и искоренению незаконной торговли легким и стрелковым оружием, призванную купировать переток оружия в нелегальный оборот. Требуется скоординированные усилия всего мирового сообщества при сохранении центральной роли ООН.

Значительное внимание уделяем Регистру обычных вооружений ООН как одному из основных механизмов транспарентности и обеспечения международной безопасности посредством отслеживания и выявления дестабилизирующих накоплений оружия в тех или иных регионах мира. В то же время с настороженностью относимся к попыткам ряда стран расширить сферу охвата Регистра, принимая во внимание уже имевшие место прецеденты, когда этот механизм был использован в несвойственных его предназначению целях, в т.ч. при определении параметров оружейного эмбарго, вводимого по линии СБ ООН.

По-прежнему полагаем нецелесообразным присоединяться к Международному договору о торговле оружием в его нынешнем виде, а также участвовать в проводимых под его эгидой официальных мероприятиях даже в качестве наблюдателей. Исходим из того, что установленные Договором стандарты значительно ниже российских. Серьезные вопросы вызывает и применение Договора на практике. Недопустимо, когда его отдельные участники продолжают напрямую или опосредованно поставлять продукцию военного назначения в зоны вооруженных конфликтов.

Благодарю за внимание.

Unofficial translation

**STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on “Nuclear Weapons”
(13 October 2021)**

Mr. Chair,

The nuclear disarmament issues are in the centre of the international agenda. Despite the obvious progress in strategic arms reduction, there are claims that the nuclear powers should make more far-reaching steps in eliminating nuclear weapons.

We understand the views of those who advocate for an immediate and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons. We share the noble goal of achieving a nuclear-free world. At the same time, attempts to impose on the states that possess nuclear weapons a complete and unconditional elimination of their arsenals are hardly practicable without taking into account current strategic realities and legitimate security interests. For these reasons, we consider the adoption of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as misguided and counter-productive in its essence. It only aggravates the situation provoking deep divisions in the international community and undermining the foundations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Tangible progress in nuclear disarmament can only be achieved based on consensus, respecting the course towards calibrated and phased reductions in the context of Article VI of the NPT and taking into account the imperative of maintaining strategic balance on the basis of principle of indivisible security.

Conscious of its special responsibility as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council for the observance of obligations under Article VI of the NPT, the Russian Federation fully complies with the existing agreements in this area. Our efforts towards actual nuclear arms reductions in line with our arrangements with the United States are well known. We continue to meet our obligations under the 2010 New START Treaty. By the Treaty deadline (which is February 5, 2018) we reduced our arsenals below the limits set by New START.

We positively note the Agreement with the United States reached on January 26, 2021 to extend the New START until February 5, 2026. Thus we secured an adequate level of mutual transparency in relation to strategic offensive weapons covered by the Treaty. We intend to use this timeframe for talks with the United States on the future arms control taking into account all factors that impact strategic stability, including offensive and defensive arms, both nuclear and non-nuclear, capable of performing strategic tasks.

By agreement of the Presidents of Russia and the United States at the summit in Geneva on June 16, an integrated dialogue on strategic stability began. Two rounds took place so far. The business-like atmosphere of the meetings gives rise to cautious optimism that the Parties will be able to creatively work on finding common ground in order to bring their positions closer taking into account each other's interests.

Mr. Chair,

We are fully aware of the difficulty and scale of the challenges we face. Thus, the United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019 nullified international legal prohibitions on deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range land-based missiles. In order to prevent a new disastrous arms race in nuclear-missile area, the Russian Federation unilaterally took over the initiative of no first placement of systems previously prohibited by the INF Treaty in those regions where such American-made systems would not be deployed. We urge the United States and its allies to make similar commitments. But the cart is still upon the self-same spot.

What is more, on October 26, 2020, President Vladimir Putin in his Statement on additional steps to de-escalate the situation in Europe after the termination of the INF Treaty, building up on the initiative on mutual moratoria invited all the parties concerned to consider specific options of reciprocal verification measures to remove existing concerns. Our proposals remain in force. We call to look at them in the most attentive way.

With all responsibility we assure that Russia has never possessed intermediate- or shorter-range land-based missiles. To state the opposite is to paint a false picture and cover up for those who are responsible for the breakdown of the INF Treaty.

Let me give another example. The Russian Federation has four-fold reduced the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) from the numbers that the Soviet Union had in 1991. All NSNW have been transferred to the category of non-deployed, located within the national territory and concentrated in centralized storage facilities, where a maximum-level security is assured, preventing any accidental or unauthorized use of the nuclear weapons. Control over Russia's NSNW is not transferred to any other states either directly or indirectly, and its use is not being practiced during the activities of the general-purpose forces.

By contrast, US nuclear weapons, remain within the territories of non-nuclear European states. Their use is practiced by NATO at the European theatre with the involvement of non-nuclear states. It is imperative that such practice contrary to the NPT is stopped immediately. Nuclear weapons should be returned to the national territory of the owner state, and the infrastructure in Europe should be dismantled.

Mr. Chair,

The Russian Federation has consistently advocated the recommitment by all nuclear powers to the fundamental formula that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Important first steps have already been taken. The mentioned principle was confirmed in the Joint statement by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden of June 16, 2021. Russia and China included it in the Joint statement of June 29 on the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between our countries. We urge remaining nuclear-weapon States to follow suit. The main task is to prevent the tragedy of 1945, when the United States used nuclear weapons against Japanese cities, from happening again.

We are open to any constructive ideas regarding multilateral negotiating formats on prevention of an arms race and strengthening of international security and stability, which should be pursued based on consensus and with due regard to the legitimate interests of their participants. Attempts to "compel" anyone to participate in such discussions are counterproductive.

Mr. Chair,

The Russian Federation sees the NPT as one of the foundations of today's world order. The fact that the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed to indefinitely extend the Treaty proves its effectiveness. We attach great importance to the successful functioning of all three NPT pillars: non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In recent years, the NPT regime has been facing significant challenges. As the established system of arms control agreements has broken down, controversies between States Parties regarding the implementation of the Treaty have been growing. We hope that at the forthcoming 10th Review Conference as a result of joint efforts we will be able to break the "vicious circle" of accumulated mutual accusations and contradictions and reach generally acceptable solutions that will strengthen the NPT regime.

As one of the initiators and depositary states of the NPT, we reiterate the need to implement the 1995 Conference's decision to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (WMDFZ). Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, as co-sponsors of the Conference resolution on this issue, bear special responsibility for its implementation.

The first session of the WMDFZ Conference held in November 2019 had demonstrated the participants' willingness to seek solutions through compromise. In this regard, we call on the United States to join the second session. We consider Israel's participation in the discussions to be important.

We support the work of the IAEA as the verification mechanism for the NPT. We encourage the universalization of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement as an entirely voluntary measure. However, we note that the safeguards system should remain technically sound, non-politicized and unbiased.

The Russian Federation sees the CTBT as an essential instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and strictly abides by its provisions. This year marks the 25th anniversary of opening for signature of the Treaty. However, the CTBT has not entered into force due to the position of eight Annex 2 states whose ratification is necessary for it to become a valid international legal instrument. We urge all those countries to ratify the Treaty without further delay.

Mr. Chair,

We look forward to a constructive and engaging dialogue on the full range of nuclear disarmament issues, aimed at achieving mutually acceptable outcome that is based on a balance of interests. The Russian delegation stands ready for such cooperation.

Thank you.

Unofficial translation

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on "Other Weapons of Mass Destruction"
(13 October 2021)

Mr. Chair,

Russia fully supports the international regime of prohibition of chemical, biological and toxin weapons and consistently advocates its universalization and strengthening.

We strictly adhere to our obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which outlawed an entire category of WMD. The BWC should remain a reliable instrument for reducing the threat of the use of biological agents as weapons and promote international cooperation in the biological field for peaceful purposes. The highest effectiveness of the Convention can be achieved only through the full implementation of its provisions by all States Parties. The adoption of the legally binding Protocol to the Convention with a credible verification mechanism would help solve this problem.

We call for productive use of the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention scheduled for November 2021 to consolidate consensus regarding certain proposals to improve the implementation of the Convention for their approval at the BWC Review Conference in 2022. Russia's initiatives seem rather useful to that end. I mean, in particular, the establishing within the BWC of mobile biomedical units to render assistance in case of the use of biological weapons, investigate such use, and to help in coping with infectious diseases of various origin and train personnel. Given the positive experience of Russian specialists, the concept of mobile units would ensure integrated implementation of a whole range of BWC provisions, including, but not limited to, international cooperation under Article X.

We also propose to establish a scientific advisory committee under the Convention, which will assess scientific and technological achievements related to the Convention and provide relevant recommendations. We expect consensus among the States Parties.

We note the increased military-biological activity of certain States beyond their national borders, which challenges the BWC regime as such activity is not controlled. With a view to enhancing transparency, we proposed to improve the format of confidence building measures by including in the report form data on military-biological activity abroad to ensure assurance that the BWC is complied with. We call upon everyone concerned to refrain from the militarization of public healthcare. Also, we expect the engagement of the consultative procedures established by the BWTC to resolve all issues that exist or are likely to arise in relation to the implementation of the Convention provisions.

The Russian Federation presented an initiative on the establishment of a group of governmental experts with the participation of all interested BWC States with a view to developing a concrete mechanism of the implementation of Article VI of the Convention on investigation of alleged violations of the BWC. There is a long-overdue need for elaboration of certain procedures for the implementation of this BWC provision.

Our proposal does not in any way prejudice the independent status of the UN Secretary-General's mechanism for investigating alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. On the contrary, these international instruments could complement each other in the context of the implementation of the BWC and the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Russia reaffirms its interest in strengthening expert and technological potential of the UN Secretary-General's mechanism and intends to further contribute to common efforts of the world community. In terms of the practical use of the Mechanism, we attach importance to its principles and procedures contained in Annex I to UN document A/44/561. However, those principles and procedures, except for annexes, have not been updated since their approval by UN GA resolution 45/57C of 4 December 1990. In this regard, there is high risk that they are outdated. With a view to starting work to ensure the effective use of the Mechanism, the Russian Federation submitted a draft relevant resolution to the First Committee. We ask your support and co-sponsorship.

In the absence of any visible progress in strengthening the BWC, ideas still emerge aimed to build parallel formats, not based on the BWC provisions. They include so called "peer reviews" of dual-use microbiological facilities. The ideas are rather dubious as they lack impartial criteria for assessment and selection of participants. We cannot agree with such concepts that are unclear in terms of practical implementation.

Mr. Chair,

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a key instrument of chemical disarmament and non-proliferation. The Russian Federation stood at the origins of the CWC and has consistently supported its strengthening.

We scrupulously and fully comply with our obligations under the Convention. A vivid depiction of this is the early destruction by Russia in 2017 of its chemical weapons stockpile, which was confirmed by the Technical Secretariat of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We call on the United States, the last country in the world possessing the declared chemical weapons, to destroy its stockpiles promptly. The US side has all financial and technological resources to do it.

The OPCW is in a difficult situation. This once reputable international structure, which received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013, where all decisions were always taken by consensus, divided due to politicization, dilution of its mandate and derogation from the CWC provisions. A number of States have in fact reformatted the OPCW to serve their self-serving geopolitical agendas. This could not but affect the OPCW reputation and confidence in its expertise.

In April 2021, several countries forced through, via voting in the OPCW, an unprecedented for the Organization decision on the suppression of Syria's rights and privileges under the CWC. It was based on biased and unsubstantiated conclusions of the illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) created in violation of Article XV of the Convention.

Two reports of the IIT – on the chemical incidents in the towns of Al Lataminah and Saraqib – are partial, factually unreliable, technically ignorant and methodologically void. Obviously, the objective of the Team was not to sort out professionally and objectively what had happened but to forge conclusions so to lay the blame exclusively on Damascus. Thus, for the first time in the OPCW history and in violation of the CWC norms and the principle of consensus, the mission to accuse a diligent State Party to the Convention in non-compliance with its obligations was accomplished. Such an approach is completely unacceptable.

In the same vein is a draft decision on the Aerosolised Use of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes, which is contrary to the CWC provisions and ignores the opinion of many OPCW Member States and which is proposed to be approved at the 26th session of the Conference of the States Parties of the CWC in November 2021. In accordance with its Article XV, such amendments may be made to the CWC only by absolute consensus. Russia does not associate itself with this decision in any way. We call on the CWC States Parties to vote against this ineligible proposal, stop further politicization of the OPCW activity and take joint measures to preserve the integrity of the Convention.

The Syrian Arab Republic regularly provides the UNSC and the OPCW with information about the preparation by militants of chemical attacks and provocations. Terrorists possess their own technological and production capacities to synthesize chemical warfare agents and have extended channels for procuring their precursors. There is a risk of recurrence of chemical terrorism outside Syria. We believe the information provided by the Syrian side should be treated seriously in order to counter the real threat of chemical terrorism via coordinated efforts.

In this context, back in 2016 the Russian Federation submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva draft basic elements for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism. Our proposal, which enjoys wide support at the Conference, is still valid.

Thank you.

Unofficial translation

**Statement by the Representative of the Russian Federation in the First Committee of the 76th Session of
the UN General Assembly at
the Thematic Debate on “Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)”
(13 October 2021)**

Mr. Chair,

This year the whole world celebrates a landmark date – the 60th anniversary of the first manned space flight. On 12 April 1961, our compatriot Yuri Gagarin orbited the Earth on the Vostok spacecraft, ushering in the era of manned cosmonautics. His feat marked the beginning of human use and exploration of outer space.

The peaceful exploration of outer space serves as an effective means for solving many global challenges, including those related to social and economic development. This includes, for example, the study and wider use of the Earth's natural resources, natural disaster management, food security, improved transportation and communications, and the creation of advanced materials and technologies.

With the exploration of near-Earth space, new challenges emerge that require collaborative responses from the global community. Particular attention by the UN Member States should be paid to the perception of outer space by some countries as an arena for combat operations due to the implementation of unilateral policies for the placement of weapons in outer space, and for the build-up of capacities for the use of force (both kinetic and non-kinetic) against outer space objects. Extensive programs are underway to develop weapon systems designed for the threat or use of force in outer space, from outer space, and against outer space.

Their goal is to achieve military dominance to the detriment of all other acting or potential participants in space activities. As a result, we face negative consequences that could destabilize the situation and lead to an arms race in outer space, which would also undermine the prospects of the arms limitation regime as a whole.

Mr. Chair,

The Russian Federation proposes that the UN GA should proclaim the historic responsibility of all States to ensure that the exploration of outer space is carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of humankind.

An arms race in outer space, if not prevented in time, will consume enormous material resources and create insurmountable barriers to international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space and to the use of the results of scientific and technological progress in this field for peaceful purposes.

It is therefore more critical than ever that the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as an essential prerequisite for preserving it for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all humanity, becomes a norm for national policies of UN Member States, a generally recognized international principle. The decisions of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament of 1978, aimed at the exploration and use of space for exclusively peaceful purposes, the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the launch of the relevant negotiations in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty should not be allowed to be reconsidered. These goals are reaffirmed in the annual Egyptian-Sri Lankan UN GA resolution on PAROS, which the Russian delegation has consistently supported and co-sponsored.

The UN Member States are required to reaffirm their commitment to the existing international legal norms regulating outer space activities. Furthermore, a common understanding should also be formalized that no weapons of any kind should be placed in outer space (including in orbit around the Earth and on celestial bodies). A prohibition on the threat or use of force against or with outer space objects is also required.

We invite all UN Member States to make the following commitments in any convenient form for them:

- not to use space objects as a means to hit any targets on Earth, in the air, or in outer space;
- not to destroy, damage, disrupt functioning or alter the trajectory of space objects of other States;
- not to build, test or place space weapons of any type of basing for any purpose, including for ballistic missile defense, as counter-satellite systems, for use against targets on Earth or in the air, and to eliminate such systems that States already have;
- not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including countersatellite purposes;
- not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international, intergovernmental, or any non-governmental organizations, including non-governmental legal entities, established, registered or located in the territory under their jurisdiction and/or control, to engage in the above activities.

Building on the decisions of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978, the Russian Federation proposes to agree on a fundamental solution to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and preservation outer space for peaceful purposes, that is, to introduce a total and comprehensive ban of space strike weapons, as well as all land-, air- or sea-based systems designed to hit objects in outer space.

In this regard, we have consistently advocated the launching of negotiations to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space and to preserve it for peaceful purposes that would prohibit the placement of any type of weapon in outer space and the use or threat of force in, from or against outer space.

Thus, in 2008 the Russian Federation and the PRC submitted for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, and in 2014, its updated version taking into account the comments and suggestions made by a number of States. The document is still on the negotiating table of the CD, is comprehensive and provides a good basis for the elaboration of the relevant multilateral instrument. We are well aware of the criticism by several States in relation to the PPWT, but no alternative in the sphere of PAROS has been proposed yet. We reaffirm our willingness to consider them.

The Russian initiative/political commitment on no first placement of weapons in outer space (NFP), which has already become international, is intended to stabilize the situation while such a multilateral instrument is being elaborated. It already enjoys the full-fledged participation of thirty States, and the number of supporters continues to increase.

The initiative is a unique measure to prevent the weaponisation of space. As one of transparency and confidence-building measures for PAROS, the NFP initiative has become a significant political factor in recent years, contributing to international peace, ensuring equal and indivisible security for all, and increasing predictability and sustainability in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space by States.

Only the guaranteed prevention of an arms race in outer space and its preservation for peaceful purposes will ensure the use of near and deep outer space for the benefit of the mankind and its exploration for the purposes of creation.

The Russian delegation submits to the First Committee a UNGA draft resolution entitled “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”. The document has already become traditional within the United Nations adopted annually by the General Assembly since 2014 on the initiative of the three initial co-sponsors – Brazil, the PRC, and Russia. Draft resolutions “Further Practical Steps for PAROS” and “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (TCBMs)” have been prepared for consideration by the First Committee. We would like to remind you that the document on TCBMs co-sponsored by Russia, China, and the United States has been adopted by consensus since 2013. We regret that in 2018 the United States did not just refuse to co-sponsor it, but voted against it for no apparent reason.

We expect that Russian drafts will receive widespread support and co-sponsorship.

Thank you.

Unofficial translation

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Conventional Weapons»
(13 October 2021)

Mr. Chair,

Russia is one of the most active Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). We call for further strengthening of its regime, via universalization of the Convention and its Protocols as well as implementation in good faith of their provisions.

We note with satisfaction that after a long pause due to the coronavirus pandemic, a full-fledged work within the CCW has resumed this year. Sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE on LAWS), the Preparatory Committee for the Sixth Review Conference, as well as meetings of

experts under Amended Protocol II and Protocol V have been held in in-person format, which we have consistently advocated.

We hope for the successful preparation and holding of the Sixth CCW RevCon. We are set for interaction with all State Parties in order to make mutually acceptable decisions.

We continue to believe that consideration of new topics in the framework of the CCW should be approached in a sensible manner, taking into account the balance between humanitarian concerns and the legitimate defense interests of States. Such approach is particularly relevant against the background of active attempts of certain countries and civil society representatives to appeal to humanitarian aspects as the only absolutely sufficient condition for imposing restrictions and prohibitions on specific types of conventional weapons.

The Russian Federation assumes that norms of international law including international humanitarian law fully apply to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, and are sufficient. There is no need for their modernization or adaptation given the specifics of these weapon systems. The mentioned systems, their technical characteristics and features resulting from their autonomous capabilities as well as their use during combat operations must comply with the principles (enshrined, in particular, in the CCW Preamble) of the civilian protection against the effects of hostilities, superfluous injury (including long-term and severe damage to the natural environment) or unnecessary suffering. Moreover, the use of LAWS should meet the adequacy and proportionality criteria.

Since prototypes of such systems are non-existent and LAWS basic characteristics and conceptual frameworks remain uncertain and, moreover, there is a considerable divergence in positions among State Parties. Under these conditions any precipitate steps may only damage scientific and technological progress in areas related to information technology, artificial intelligence, peaceful robotics, etc. At this stage, we see no necessity for a legally binding instrument on such systems containing a ban or a moratorium on their development, use and related technologies. We believe that instead the dedicated GGE, which, in our opinion, is the best platform to discuss LAWS issues, could focus on analyzing existing international legal norms.

The discussion on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) is in the focus of our attention. We are convinced that one has to be cautious when it comes to elaboration of some «political declarations» on the prohibition of this type of weapons. Such weapons may be later used in order to discredit any military operation that employs explosive weapons as well as to pigeonhole those weapons into categories of «acceptable» and «unacceptable».

Any issues related to use of explosive weapons can be solved through implementation in good faith of already existing provision of international legal instruments, first of all, of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as the active engagement of political and diplomatic means of resolving armed conflicts. We consider the existing legal regulation sufficient, inter alia in order to neutralize humanitarian risks associated with the use of this type of weapons. The solution to the problems regarding use of explosive weapons lies exclusively in the implementation of the already existing norms of IHL in good faith.

We note that the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), posing the most significant humanitarian threat in the modern world, has, unfortunately, only increased over the recent years. The statistics of the Russian Engineering Troops obtained on the territory of Syria clearly confirms it: a third of all explosive devices neutralized by our military were precisely IEDs.

Relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions represent the basis for coordination of international efforts to counter IEDs. We fully support further discussion of the IEDs topic within the CCW Amended Protocol II. We proceed from the fact that these efforts should be consistent with the subject and purposes of the Convention.

Mr. Chair,

We attach great importance to the issue of illicit traffic of conventional weapons. We stand for a more efficient implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, which aims to reliably curb transfers into illicit trade. This work requires concerted efforts of the entire international community with the UN playing the central role.

We pay great attention to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as one of the key mechanisms for ensuring transparency and international security through tracking and detection of destabilizing stockpiles of arms in some regions of the world. At the same time, we are cautious about attempts of a number of States to expand the scope of the Register, taking into account the past precedents when this mechanism was used for non-prescribed purposes, such as by defining the parameters of the arms embargo imposed by the UN SC.

We still believe it is inadvisable to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty in its current form and participate, even as observers, in official events held under its auspices. We assume that the Treaty-established standards are way below the Russian ones. The Practical implementation of the Treaty raises serious questions. It is unacceptable when its individual State Parties continue supplying military products directly or indirectly to the zones of armed conflicts.

Thank you.

SINGAPORE

**STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) FOR THE 76TH
SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC
DEBATE ON CLUSTER FIVE:
OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

This statement is made on behalf of ASEAN.

2. The COVID-19 pandemic has amplified the importance of new technologies, as many aspects of our daily lives have moved online. Digital transformation presents tremendous benefits and opportunities for people everywhere. At the same time, this growing dependency on digital platforms has increased our exposure to cyber-attacks. The pervasive and constantly evolving nature of cyber threats requires coordinated expertise from multiple stakeholders across different domains and across borders, to effectively mitigate threats, build trust, share information, and realise the benefits of technology. No government can deal with the growing sophistication and transboundary nature of cyber threats alone. Regional collaboration is imperative. To this end, ASEAN has taken the following steps:

3. First, ASEAN established a Cybersecurity Coordinating Committee in 2020 to promote cross-sectoral and cross-pillar cooperation to strengthen cybersecurity in the region. The Coordinating Committee promotes policy coherence across different sectors, and enhance the alignment of regional cybersecurity policy, while taking into account national operational considerations of ASEAN Member States. During its inaugural meeting in November 2020, the Committee welcomed the proposal to develop a Regional Action Plan on the Implementation of the Norms of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace to facilitate ASEAN Member States prioritising the implementation of the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour in the use of Information and Communications Technologies.

4. Second, ASEAN recognises the importance of continuing dialogue and cooperation, especially during this pandemic. The 6th ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC) was held virtually in October 2021, on the side-lines of the Singapore International Cyber Week. ASEAN Member States also highlighted the importance of taking practical steps to enhance the cybersecurity of our region, and the urgent need to protect national and cross-border Critical Information Infrastructure, especially in light of cybersecurity threats posed by the current COVID-19 pandemic. The 15th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) also adopted the concept paper on ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence to promote cooperation on cybersecurity and information, and enhance cooperation against cyber attacks, disinformation and misinformation.

5. Third, ASEAN will continue coordinating cyber capacity-building programmes to equip ASEAN Member States with the policy, operational, and technical capacities to implement the 2015 GGE norms, and also to level up the region's cyber capacities as a whole. This common goal drives the work of the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence in Singapore and the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre in Thailand.

6. ASEAN reaffirms that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, underpins an open, secure, stable, accessible, interoperable, and peaceful Information and Communications Technology environment. In addition to implementing the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms, ASEAN recognises the need to further develop, on the basis of consensus, voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. In this regard, ASEAN reaffirms that the UN must continue to play a central role in discussions on cybersecurity, and that such discussions must remain open and inclusive, where the views of all States are taken into account. ASEAN welcomes the consensus reports of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Developments in the Field of Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security (OEWG) and the sixth

iteration of the UNGGE. ASEAN is pleased that Ambassador Burhan Gafoor of Singapore was elected Chair of the OEWG (2021-2025). We look forward to meaningful and positive outcomes that will strengthen international cooperation on this vital issue.

7. Finally, ASEAN remains committed to working with all stakeholders towards a peaceful, secure, and resilient cyberspace that will serve as an enabler of economic progress, enhanced regional connectivity, and the betterment of living standards for all.

76th SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA76)
FIRST COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 2021
STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Chairperson,

South Africa associates itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the African Group, the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition.

Chairperson,

This year we convene for the First Committee Session against the backdrop of the 25th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which establish a prohibition on all nuclear weapons tests. South Africa has always been a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We strongly associate ourselves with the CTBT's call for the cessation of all nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. This distinguishes the CTBT as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Sadly, the potential that the CTBT holds for the international community's aspirations to free the world from the ever present threat of nuclear war, will never be realised for as long as the CTBT fails to enter into force. Even more sadly, it would appear as though some States would not hesitate to delay the entry into force of the Treaty to serve particular and narrow interests, rather than to take the broader international community's interests and aspirations into account.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, demonstrated the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and reminded us that the United Nations was founded on the principle to save succeeding generations from suffering the scourge of war, representing a historic opportunity to reaffirm that nuclear weapons should never be used again and to advance nuclear disarmament

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), negotiated and adopted by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations entered into force on 22 January 2021. This is testimony of the concerns of the international community with regard to nuclear weapons. It finally bans the only category of weapon of mass destruction not yet to be subject to a global prohibition, following the example of the existing conventions proscribing biological and chemical weapons, and it does so with a pronounced humanitarian approach. We reiterate that the doors into this Treaty have always been open. We take this opportunity to encourage all States that have not done so, to ratify the TPNW and join the community of nations that are committed to a world free of nuclear weapons. They have a moral duty to join and we have a moral duty to bring them in.

Chairperson,

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone for non-proliferation and disarmament and complimented by other numerous international and regional instruments, such as the CTBT and the TPNW. We, therefore, attach great importance to the continued validity of the outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, as well as the extensive Action Plan aimed at accelerating the implementation of all Treaty provisions under the three Treaty pillars. However, urgent action is required to fully implement the commitments and undertakings entered into at these Review Conferences.

Article VI of the NPT is continually undermined by the weapon modernisation programmes, policy pronouncements on stockpile increases and a continued reliance on nuclear weapons in security doctrines. Thus, in this regard, more needs to be done particularly by nuclear weapon States in the area of nuclear disarmament. South Africa reiterates its belief that concrete progress on these solemn undertakings is essential to the success of the Tenth Review Conference. We reiterate that the goals of the NPT can never be achieved if it is seen only as a

means to protect the security concerns of a few countries at the expense of humanity at large. This merely encourages proliferation, contradicts nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, and ultimately undermines the Treaty.

We look forward to the convening of the Tenth NPT Review Conference next year and trust that it will yield all the desirable outcomes for the sake of humanity.

Chairperson,

It is equally important for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to remain a priority for the international community. Such a Treaty should serve both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives and would need to be both credible and feasible. A ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would reinforce the ideals enshrined in the NPT and complement the CTBT, as well as the TPNW.

Finally Chairperson, we once again stress that, nuclear weapons are inhumane weapons, and it is inconceivable that their use, under any circumstance, could ever be consistent with international law, particularly international humanitarian law. Nuclear disarmament is not only a legal obligation, but also a moral and ethical imperative. It is with this in mind that my delegation has the honour to again table for consideration a resolution entitled “Ethical Imperatives for a world without nuclear weapons” which we hope will again receive wide support.

I thank you

**76th SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA76)
FIRST COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 2021
STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON OTHER WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION**

Chairperson,

For my delegation, the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction remains one of South Africa’s key foreign policy priorities.

We remain fully committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to our obligations as a State Party. We call upon the States that are not yet part of the Convention to join as soon as possible, as we all have collective responsibility to ensure a safe world, free of chemical weapons and to uphold the international norm against chemical weapons established under the CWC.

South Africa supports the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the technically competent international authority in the field of chemical weapons. The CWC States Parties must have full confidence in its work, including that there should not be political interference. We remain concerned about the continued polarisation in the OPCW Policy Making Organs, leading to the frequent adoption of decisions through a vote rather than by consensus as it was the practice in the past. We therefore urge caution in preserving the integrity of the OPCW as an objective and impartial organisation.

We condemn the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. It is imperative that States are held accountable for any non-compliance with their CWC obligations.

South Africa also underlines the importance of capacity-building and international cooperation for the benefit of States Parties through the transfer of technology, knowledge, material, and equipment for peaceful purposes. We

note the progress achieved under the Fifth Phase of the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa and welcome the outcomes of the 19th Regional Meeting of National Authorities of African States Parties, as well as the 3rd Meeting of the Steering Committee. We reiterate the importance of fully funding future phases of this programme under the regular budget of the OPCW to ensure its sustainability.

South Africa remains resolved to have an OPCW Designated Laboratory that will be able to enhance international cooperation by performing off-site analysis of chemical samples collected by OPCW inspectors from chemical production facilities, storage depots and other installations, or from the site of an alleged use of chemical weapons.

Chairperson,

Greater gender and geographical balance in the workforce of the OPCW Technical Secretariat also remains a priority. South Africa values the improved gender representation in the organisation, in particular at the senior level, but also calls for intensified action in order to address the still outstanding geographical balance in the Organisation, in particular from African States.

Chairperson,

The COVID-19 pandemic has showed the world how vulnerable we all are to the devastating human and economic consequences of biological threats. The Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention forms an essential part of the multilateral system dealing with such threats.

South Africa welcomes the work already done in the build-up to the Ninth BTWC Review Conference which represents an important opportunity to strengthen Convention and its balanced implementation, and we will continue to work with other State Parties towards this outcome. We note the rich and constructive proposals to strengthen the Convention as most recently presented during the 2021 BTWC Meeting of Experts and encourage further consideration of these proposals ahead of the Meeting of State Parties and the upcoming Review Conference.

We support the NAM position that it is of great importance to strengthen the Convention through the resumption of the multilateral negotiations on a legally binding Protocol dealing with all Articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner, including through verification measures. The proposal for an Open-Ended Working Group to elaborate on consensus measures and proposals for a legally binding instrument, offers a good way forward on this long overdue issue.

In the interim, we believe that BTWC process would benefit from additional, more regular decision-making points which could inter alia be achieved by mandating the Meeting of State Parties with some decision-making powers, without prejudice to the central mandate and function of the Review Conferences. We welcome the proposal to mainstream a gender perspective in the implementation of the Convention, which would bring the BWTC on par with other UN bodies. South Africa also notes with appreciation the proposal to establish a new bio-safety agency, but we are of the firm view that the objectives and proposals of this proposal are best pursued in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention and driven by the Member States of the Convention.

As the primary objective of Article VII of the BTWC is to provide assistance to a State Party that has been exposed to danger as the result of a violation of the Convention, South Africa welcomes the discussions that have taken place in the BTWC on operationalizing this Article and will continue to work on its initiative for the development of voluntary guidelines that can assist State Parties when submitting a request for assistance. South Africa believes that the information provided in the request for assistance would play a crucial role in assisting the UNSC to come to a speedy decision. We further believe that the information provided in support of a request for assistance is voluntary and a prerogative of the requesting State Party. South Africa hopes that support can be given to this initiative ahead of the 9th BTWC Review Conference in 2022.

Chairperson,

South Africa also attaches great importance to the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism (UNSGM). With its unique but well-defined technical mandate to establish the facts regarding alleged chemical or biological weapon incidents and to report promptly the results of the investigations, the UNSGM exists in harmony with the chemical and biological weapon instruments and relevant multilateral institutions. We consider the legal situation of the Mechanism to be clear and unambiguous, and particularly value the fact that this UNGA-established mechanism is directly available to each Member States when it is needed. We note also that the founding UNGA resolution 32/37C mandates the Secretary-General "with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports". In doing so, the UNGA-endorsed technical guidelines and procedures document provides that the Secretary-General should undertake this task "bearing in mind modifications proposed by Member States". While our experts do not find the current technical guidelines and procedures to be wanting, we will not stand in the way of a process that would allow Member States to propose modifications, in a coordinated manner, for consideration by the Secretary-General.

Finally, my delegation would like to underscore that the universalisation of the BWC and the CWC is crucial for the effective eradication of all biological and chemical weapons. We call upon those countries not yet party to these Conventions to join without further delay.

I thank you.

**76th SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA76)
FIRST COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 2021
STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE
ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS**

Chairperson,

While the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic continues to have devastating and tragic effects around the globe, we have not been spared from the extraordinary challenges faced across the spectrum of our work in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

This includes the disruptive impacts in the area of conventional weapons. Despite these damaging effects, we have made a degree of progress at the international level through UN Conferences, sessions and other events, during which we were able to, albeit in virtual format for most of us, take stock of or review such developments.

The pandemic has also adversely affected regional conventional arms implementation initiatives in Africa, obliging us to shift much of our focus and energy from the peace and security agenda to that of combating the spread of COVID-19. One such a regional initiative is the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps for "Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020". In this regard, South Africa wishes to highlight the December 2020 Decision of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of the AU to extend the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap for a period of ten years, from 2021 to 2030, with periodic reviews every two years.

The African Union Master Roadmap identifies a number of obstacles such as the persistence of illicit transfers and illegal arms transactions as constituting serious threats to the African peace and security agenda. The AU's Roadmap sets out practical and implementable steps that will assist the AU in its pursuit of progress in the realisation of the ideal of a continent free of violent conflict.

South Africa remains steadfast in its resolve, together with our fellow African sisters and brothers, and with the support of the international community, to making concrete progress on the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap, within the context of the AU's Agenda 2063.

Chairperson,

South Africa joined others in participating in the recently held Seventh Conference of States Parties (CSP7) to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). One of the stated purposes of the ATT is to contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability. It is also worth noting that it is only through our full, active and collective implementation of the Treaty and support to its subsidiary bodies that we can achieve the objectives of the ATT. Those objectives remain that of setting the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms, as well as to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to preclude their diversion.

The Seventh Biennial Meeting of States (BMS7) to Consider the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA) can be deemed to have been a resounding success. South Africa is satisfied that the Outcome Document addresses both the consideration of the national, regional and global implementation of the UNPoA and certain specific issues that have been gaining momentum in recent years.

The first specific issue that my delegation wishes to mention is on recent developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology and design, while the second relates to the growing international calls for the equal, full and effective participation of women, including in leadership roles in all policy, planning and implementation processes, mechanisms and fora and at all levels.

Chairperson,

Last month saw the conclusion of the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), with the adoption of the Lausanne Declaration and the Lausanne Action Plan. It is South Africa's hope that the Action Plan, which is a political commitment, will lead to the achievement of concrete and sustainable progress towards the universalisation and implementation of the CCM for the period 2022 to 2026.

The forthcoming Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention will provide an opportunity for States Parties to renew their commitments under the Oslo Action Plan, adopted in Oslo at the Fourth Review Conference of States Parties in December 2019. It is South Africa's hope that these commitments can be satisfactorily implemented at the respective national levels.

The Sixth Review Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) will take place in December 2021. Given the challenges in having structured discussions during the past 18 months, negligible tangible progress has thus far been achieved. Given this situation, South Africa would support the extension of the existing mandate of the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Chairperson,

South Africa was a member of the recently concluded Group of Governmental Experts on Ammunition, which included a major substantive proposal to establish a comprehensive framework to support safe, secure and sustainable through-life management of ammunition. It is hoped that further work, to be conducted in the form of an Open-Ended Working Group, will make great strides in preventing both unforeseen explosions and combating the diversion of ammunition.

Chairperson,

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (UNPoA). South Africa is thus particularly honoured to introduce, along with our co-authors Colombia and Japan, the annual draft resolution entitled “The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”.

Following previous practice, the draft resolution builds on existing commitments and contains certain key recent developments and conference outcomes. As co-authors, we strive to restrict the text to those issues on which we believe there to be an emerging consensus or broad agreement. The co-authors regard this so-called omnibus resolution as the implementation roadmap for future substantive work in furthering the aims of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons and the International Tracing Instrument.

Since the co-authors customarily endeavour to obtain consensus on the resolution, we trust that all delegations will support the text in order to have it adopted without a vote.

In conclusion, Chairperson, we should continue to promote the implementation and universalisation goals of all the conventions and consensus political agreements on conventional weapons to which we are respectively committed as States. All of the instruments and their related action plans mentioned in this delegation’s statement contain commitments, some legally binding, relating to international cooperation and assistance.

However, without converting these commitments made on paper into the provision of concrete and sustained assistance to States that face many very real implementation challenges, especially developing countries, the full universalisation of these instruments will remain elusive.

I thank you.

76th SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA76)
FIRST COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 2021
STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ICT IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chairperson,

South Africa supported the different strands of work and rich consensus outcomes on ICT in the context of peace and security that has been achieved in the General Assembly. It is, however, important to now unite behind a single process and we look forward to the work of the second session of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG). This will serve as an all-inclusive, single-track for discussing how we can all address the emerging, complex and pervasive threats to international peace and security in cyberspace.

With the ICT field continually and rapidly evolving, it is unlikely that we will ever reach a point of having a complete, sustainable response to the opportunities and threats. In view of the significant work already done, implementation of what we have already agreed on should be an essential element. We therefore welcome efforts towards the elaboration of a Programme of Action as part of the work going forward. To govern the use of cyberspace and especially the threats posed to international peace and security, South Africa also supports the applicability of international law and specifically the United Nations Charter in its entirety.

Despite the real threats, the positive economic and social opportunities that can be derived from ICTs should not be overshadowed by the malicious use of these technologies. To achieve sustainable international responses and

harness these opportunities, it remains essential to bridge the digital and gender divides, which will be key to building resilience while at the same time fostering greater development.

South Africa remains concerned by the growing threat of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. While we believe we should confront these threats through greater cooperation and the development of best practice mechanisms, these efforts should support national priorities and efforts to identify and designate such infrastructure. States, especially developing countries, are all at varying positions of risk given the varying capacities of States to respond to the threats posed by malicious acts in cyberspace. Capacity building is critical in bringing States on par for the betterment of the security of global cyberspace, as this is truly a global challenge that requires global solutions.

We believe that the engagement of all relevant actors including civil society and the private sector to both understand the nature of these threats and to cooperate and adequately address, across all of society, the threats posed by both State and non-State actors, will enrich this Member State-driven process.

I thank you.

**76th SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA76)
FIRST COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 2021
STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON THE DISARMAMENT
MACHINERY**

Chairperson,

The disarmament machinery plays an essential part to achieve the world envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and in the current global environment. It is therefore essential for the disarmament machinery components to be able to fulfil their respective mandates. We remain concerned that neither the Conference on Disarmament nor the Disarmament Commission were able to engage in substantive work since our last session. At the same time, we note the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was negotiated and adopted by the General Assembly. We also note that the Open-Ended Working Group mechanism is increasingly being considered to take key issues forward and we support the fact that these are inclusive, transparent and consensus based. While we support the disarmament machinery, there is no gainsaying in recognizing that both these negotiating or deliberative avenues have created space to give effect to the aspirations of a majority of States long frustrated elsewhere in the procedurally and often politically deadlocked disarmament machinery. These observations lead my delegation to ask whether this is not a Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) moment, a time to holistically revisit and revitalise the disarmament machinery to meet the demands and opportunities of this millennium?

Chairperson,

We share the frustration and concerns of many Member States about the inaction in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 2021 which did not meet expectations for an end to the protracted impasse, notwithstanding the challenges posed by the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic. South Africa remains committed to a functioning Conference on Disarmament that is mandated to negotiate multilateral disarmament instruments and it is regrettable that in the 25 years that South Africa and 22 other countries were admitted as members of this body has not discharged its basic mandate with the exception being the negotiations on the CTBT.

The inability of the CD to deliver on its responsibility as the “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum” ranks high amongst the serious challenges facing international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts.

Chairperson,

We therefore urgently need to attend to the current state of the Conference on Disarmament. We can no longer engage in the repetitive past activities that have not brought the Conference closer to an agreement on a Programme of Work. This has distracted the CD from starting negotiations and in so doing, effectively turn the Conference into a deliberative body as opposed to a negotiating forum, while creating the illusion that substantive work is being done. We have said many times before that this continued impasse is not sustainable, it is also diminishing the credibility of the Conference and will increasingly affect the relevance and stature of the CD.

Chairperson,

South Africa regrets that the United Nations Disarmament Commission was again not able to conduct substantive work in 2021. As the deliberative body in the disarmament machinery, the UNDC is uniquely placed to find much needed common ground.

Chairperson,

Despite these challenges, my delegation is encouraged by the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and we would like to commend the institute for conducting high quality independent research and convening timely discussions on issues within the field of disarmament. The current geo-political environment requires such innovative perspectives and enhanced dialogues that can respond to our collective security concerns.

In this context, my delegation joins the call to ensure the equal engagement and meaningful participation of women across multiple disarmament fora. Prioritising a gender perspective into disarmament and international security discussions expands our knowledge and understanding of challenges, with a view to greater progress in disarmament.

I thank you, Chairperson.

**Written Statement
Submitted by Thailand
Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons
of the First Committee, Seventy-Sixth Session
of the United Nations General Assembly**

1. Thailand aligns itself with the statement submitted on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Thailand's long history of support for nuclear disarmament is based on our belief that nuclear weapons pose a fundamental danger to our collective security, and on the unacceptable humanitarian consequences that a nuclear war would cause, including the disproportionate impact on the health of women and girls and the environment.
3. Member States are sending a clear message that nuclear weapons represent an existential threat to humanity and the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to guarantee against their use and threat of use. This is well reflected by swift entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
5. As we plan for the First Meeting of States Parties, we would like to encourage all parties, States Parties and non-States Parties alike, to participate in the meeting, so that all sides can work together on this issue of particular importance. Thailand strongly believes that both the TPNW and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remain the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, share the common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We call on all States Parties to the NPT to renew their commitments towards the full implementation of the Treaty, in particular Article VI and urge all parties to work in good faith towards the success of the 10th NPT Review Conference.
6. Thailand also places utmost importance to the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In this regard, we join others in urging the Annex 2 States to join the Treaty so that the Treaty's entry into force may finally be realized. At the same time, Thailand places utmost importance to promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) important work.
7. As depositary of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty), Thailand reiterates our commitment to preserve Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Bangkok Treaty. We call on the Nuclear Weapon States to sign and ratify the Treaty's protocol at the earliest. We also continue to support to the ongoing efforts toward the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.
8. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and a denuclearized Korean Peninsula remains of crucial significance for the maintenance of peace not only for those regions but beyond. We call upon the involved parties to continue to cooperate in good faith.
9. Nuclear weapons are inhumane weapons and could never be justified under any circumstances. Not only is nuclear disarmament a legal obligation, it is also a moral and ethical imperative. On our part, Thailand will continue to play a constructive role and work closely with all parties towards the common goal of eliminating nuclear weapons once and for all.

**Written Statement
Submitted by Thailand
Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
of the First Committee, Seventy-Sixth Session
of the United Nations General Assembly**

1. Thailand aligns itself with the statements made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and by Lao PDR on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) are among the most serious threats in the history humankind, and their existence continues to jeopardize the maintenance of international peace and security. Thailand believes that global security can only be achieved through the elimination of all WMDs.
3. In recent years, the world has witnessed a number of incidents that point to the growing threat of biological and chemical weapons such as the confirmed use of chemical weapons in different parts of the world. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons requires determined efforts and commitment of the international community.
4. On biological weapons, the cooperation under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) framework remains a key element to address the weapons' proliferation. The current pandemic has demonstrated us how vital it is for international community to be collectively prepared and build up the capacity to respond to biological threats. In this regard, Thailand fully supports the strengthening of the BWC with a legally-binding verification protocol to the Treaty. Thailand believes that this is essential and timely for full and effective management of such harmful material.
5. As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Thailand opposes the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances. Thailand fully supports inspection and verification of any alleged use of chemical weapons, as they are an integral part of the effective and transparent implementation of the CWC. Thailand, therefore, commends the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for carrying out its work under the very difficult circumstances during the pandemic time.
6. Thailand would like to reiterate its continued commitment towards the obligations under the CWC. Our National Authority, the Department of Industrial Works, under the Ministry of Industry of Thailand, continues to exert utmost efforts in adopting necessary measures to implement our obligations, including by: strengthening the export control system; performing on-site inspections; submitting annual declarations; and revising the National Chemicals Inventory on a regular basis.
7. We welcome the progress on the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, especially the report by OPCW that currently more than 98.7% of world chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed. We call on all States Parties to continue to live up to their commitments, and intensify efforts in the destruction of remaining stockpiles.
8. Effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 is one of the tools to help us to prevent WMDs from falling into the wrong hands. Thailand urges Member States to pay particular attention to the control over dual-use items. On our part, the Thai authorities have been updating relevant legislation to effectively control dual-use items and the transfer of technology, while enhancing interactions with the private sector.
9. Lastly, Thailand wishes to reiterate its commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament of all WMDs, and urges all parties to cooperate and uphold their commitments in order to accomplish our collective goal of international peace and security, and the well-being for all.

**Written Statement
Submitted by Thailand
Thematic Discussion on Conventional Weapons
of the First Committee, Seventy-Sixth Session
of the United Nations General Assembly**

1. Thailand aligns itself with the statement submitted on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Thailand would like to reiterate its firm commitment to full and effective control of conventional weapons. The issue on conventional weapons control is multi-faceted, as they are explicitly linked with international peace and security, as well as sustainable development and humanitarian aspects. The destructiveness of the weapons lies not in their size, but in their widespread use and relatively easy access. Therefore, the control of such weapons have much greater positive impact on human lives and well-being than generally perceived.
3. On our part, Thailand wishes to share our perspective and update the Committee on our as follows:
4. Thailand continues to be affected by anti-personnel landmines, therefore, mine action is an urgent and important priority for us. As a State Party to the Mine Ban Convention, Thailand has put its utmost efforts to mine clearance operations in order to fulfill our commitments under the Convention, and in line with the Oslo Action Plan. To date, Thailand has cleared and released more than 95 percent of the mine contaminated area.
5. This year, Thailand is also honoured to be serving as the Chair of the Committee on Victim Assistance under the framework of the Convention. Thailand is of the view that victim assistance should be placed as one of the top priorities for States Parties, and that its work should be carried out in synergy with other frameworks, in order to ensure that such assistance is in line with the principles of inclusiveness and non-discrimination.
6. The illicit use and transfer of conventional weapons continue to pose serious threat not only to the international peace and security in the context of armed conflicts, but also by fuelling violence and conflict and potentially exacerbating human rights violations. The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the UN PoA), although not legally-binding, is a very essential multilateral framework that continues to strengthen States' efforts in combating illicit arms smuggling and arms proliferation. The UN PoA continues to guide Thailand in its national efforts in response to the illicit trade and diversion of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).
7. In this regard, Thailand welcomes the constructive outcome document of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States (BMS7) to consider the Implementation of the UN PoA, held in July this year. The outcome lays down practical steps for States in dealing with new challenges from SALWs, as the world is facing more sophisticated methods of arm smuggling, as well as new technologies, such as 3D printing.
8. Conventional weapons can pose a serious threat if they fall into wrong hands. Thailand continues to uphold the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), as a multilateral instrument to combat illegal arms trade and transfer. We are working towards Treaty's ratification, and while pursuing this goal, Thailand is taking all necessary measures to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit flow of arms. It is our shared responsibility to work together to strengthen its control regime and to ensure that the ATT lives up to its humanitarian mandate.
9. Addressing conventional weapons issues requires concerted efforts of all parties. One State alone cannot succeed in working towards the achievement of international peace and security. Thailand would like to reaffirm its unwavering commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation of conventional weapons. We stand ready to work closely, and build on the constructive partnerships, with all parties to address the challenges that are lying ahead in these areas.

**Written Statement
Submitted by Thailand
Thematic Discussion
on Other Disarmament Measures and International Security
of the First Committee, Seventy-Sixth Session
of the United Nations General Assembly**

1. Thailand associates itself with the statement submitted on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and ASEAN.

2. Thailand wishes to speak on a subject of great importance to us: the issue of security in the field of Information and Communications Technology (ICT). ICT is extrinsically linked to every aspect of our lives, while its impact on global affairs undoubtedly continues to grow. Cybersecurity threats are not just a danger to international peace and security – but also to humanity. As we have seen during the pandemic, it is important to protect our critical infrastructures (CI) and critical information infrastructures (CII), particularly healthcare facilities, against malicious cyber activities. Urgent attention and cooperation are thus required to ensure that everyone can safely and fairly enjoy the benefits of ICT.

3. The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) present essential arenas for Member States to engage on the issue of cybersecurity, which we should utilize to their fullest potential. Thailand is of view that the consultations under the GGE and the OEWG complement each other as they help strengthen cooperation among Member States and stakeholders.

4. In this light, Thailand welcomes the fruitful conclusion of the previous OEWG and the adoption, by consensus, of its report, which provides further elaboration on the voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour.

As divergence in views among Member States remains, it is best that we exert flexibilities with an aim to forge further mutual understanding and pave the way forward on this critical issue during the 2021 – 2025 term of the OEWG.

5. Thailand fully adheres to the voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour. To this end, we believe that assistance through capacity-building are necessary to enable Member States with different levels of capacity to effectively uphold these norms. Thailand therefore urges Member States in the position to do so to provide capacity-building programmes to those in need, in a transparent, holistic and multi-disciplinary manner, while taking into account specific needs and contexts.

6. Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) are a crucial tool for promoting trust and preventing conflicts in cyberspace. On our part, Thailand is working closely with other ASEAN Member States to establish CBMs at the regional level, and encouraging this practice at a global scale.

7. Thailand joins the global community in the efforts to address the threats emanating from the malicious use of ICT, which is likely to pose risks to international peace and security for years to come. We stand ready to cooperate in all relevant frameworks in order to attain constructive outcomes in the area of cybersecurity.

**Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Since the early 1990s, each U.S. administration has conducted a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to review U.S. nuclear weapons policies and posture. The Biden-Harris Administration is no different. The latest review began in July and is ongoing. While it is too early to share any conclusions, the direction provided by the President is clear:

- We will address the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons;
- We will head off costly arms races and re-establish U.S. credibility as a leader in arms control;
- We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, while ensuring the U.S. strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible;
- We will engage in meaningful dialogue with Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in pursuit of additional risk reduction and arms control measures; and
- We will work with our allies and partners to address the threats posed by Iran and the DPRK.

None of these should be a surprise as they reflect the general path the United States has taken for decades. The number of U.S. nuclear weapons has steadily, sometimes dramatically, decreased since a peak total in 1967.

In line with our obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we are committed to working in good faith towards progress on nuclear disarmament. To continue our leadership and commitment to confidence building in the NPT review process, the United States has released its aggregate numbers of active and inactive warheads in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile from 2018-2020. The historical release of our stockpile numbers demonstrates our commitment to transparency. These numbers demonstrate that we have reduced our nuclear weapons stockpile by approximately 88% from its maximum in 1967. The U.S. stockpile in 2020 totaled 3,750 warheads. In addition, approximately 2,000 warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. The United States is taking tangible steps to demonstrate our transparency and to bolster the global non-proliferation regime, and we call on Russia and the PRC to also commit to transparency and provide the same data on their stockpiles as we have released.

But creating a safer and more secure world is not solely about numbers. It is also about actions that reduce risk, lessen the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculations, and enhance stability. That is why in its first days, the Biden-Harris Administration worked with Russia to extend the New START Treaty for the maximum five years provided for in the treaty, ensuring its limits, transparency, and verification mechanisms provide predictability and a firm foundation while we seek additional arms control measures with Russia. To that end we have embarked on a Strategic Stability Dialogue with Russia to lay the groundwork for such measures.

The United States has made clear its concerns about Russia's nuclear future. Russia's arsenal—similar to that of the United States—is significantly smaller than it was in the days of the Cold War. But unlike the United States, Russia is adding to its arsenal novel nuclear-armed strategic weapons, including nuclear-powered systems, that are not subject to New START limits. In addition it has violated the INF Treaty to produce, test, and field a prohibited intermediate-range missile; and is projected to grow its arsenal of some 1,000 to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons—a category of weapons that the United States has reduced to a minimum.

The United States questions why Russia is doing these things. Particularly given that President Putin recently reaffirmed with President Biden in June the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The United States has made clear that even the use of a single nuclear weapon would change the nature of a conflict and risk further escalation.

At the same time, the PRC is building a larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal than the “minimum deterrent” it has touted for decades. This rapid build-up has become more difficult to hide and highlights how the PRC is deviating from decades of nuclear strategy based around minimum deterrence. These advances highlight why it is in everyone’s interest that nuclear powers talk to one another directly about reducing nuclear dangers and avoiding miscalculation. We encourage Beijing to engage with us on practical measures to reduce the risks of destabilizing arms races and conflict. The United States, the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation have pursued such measures for decades, because finding ways to prevent war is the responsible course. We believe the PRC should be doing the same.

In addition to constructing new ICBM fields, the PRC is pursuing novel nuclear-powered delivery systems. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also fielding a strategic bomber for its nascent nuclear triad, and developing an array of other nuclear strike capabilities, including low-yield weapons and hypersonic weapons. Since 2017, the PLA has also conducted exercises involving launch-on-warning, and now has deployed at least one satellite into orbit for this posture.

All of which indicate the PRC is steering in a direction toward greater instability and nuclear dangers. That is not a destination where the United States wants to end up. This is why it is in everyone’s interest that nuclear powers talk to one another directly about reducing nuclear dangers and avoiding miscalculation.

Actions, however, can say more than words at times. The United States has joined the other P5 states, with the exception of the PRC, in declaring and adhering to a moratorium on fissile material production. In addition, the United States continues to support the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) on the basis of consensus and with the participation of all key states. Ending the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons would constrain the future growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles and therefore is one of the essential steps toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Our commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remains steadfast. We support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and are committed to working to achieve its entry into force, recognizing the significant challenges that lie ahead in reaching this goal. In line with the goals of the CTBT, the United States continues to observe its zero-yield nuclear explosive testing moratorium and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain such a moratorium. Maintaining the international norm against nuclear explosive testing remains in the interest of all nations.

The United States has engaged in a number of initiatives designed to cooperatively improve the environment for addressing future nuclear disarmament. The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) brings together states with and without nuclear weapons under a cooperative framework to further understanding of the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament.

Another such effort, the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative, brings together a geographically and politically diverse group of states with and without nuclear weapons to facilitate further progress on nuclear disarmament by identifying ways to overcome aspects of the security environment that impede such progress. CEND continues to be a unique and valuable forum for states to develop practical recommendations designed to point the way to real and sustainable progress on disarmament. The United States recognizes that arms control itself can and should contribute to improving the security environment.

All of these measures are prime examples of U.S.-supported “effective measures” that help to create the environment for future nuclear disarmament and are an important demonstration of our commitment to such disarmament, built upon the solid foundation of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

We face a number of difficult challenges in key regions of the world. The United States remains prepared to engage in diplomacy with the DPRK toward our objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Our offer remains to meet without preconditions. Our policy calls for a calibrated, practical approach that is open to, and will explore diplomacy with the DPRK to make tangible progress that increases the security of the United States, our allies, and our deployed forces. The U.S. commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan remain ironclad.

Regarding Iran, we will continue our sincere efforts toward a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA commitments. The United States, our allies, and partners have been steadfast in pursuing a path of meaningful diplomacy with Iran, and we have made clear that if Iran commits to a mutual return to compliance, the United States is prepared to provide sanctions relief in accordance with the terms of the deal. However, we have also made clear that Iran’s continued nuclear escalations are unconstructive and inconsistent with its stated goal of returning to mutual compliance with the JCPOA and will not provide Iran any negotiating leverage. This only raises the importance of robust verification, which remains the foundation of any lasting deal, and the IAEA plays a central role in that. We are deeply troubled by Iran’s failure to live up to its Joint Statement commitments from Director General Grossi’s September trip to Tehran, and in particular its refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to reinstall monitoring equipment at Karaj. In addition, we continue to urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve outstanding safeguards questions about possible undeclared nuclear material and activities.

To address these challenges and respond to other nuclear proliferation challenges wherever they may arise, we must all support the IAEA’s critical role in applying safeguards to verify that states are not diverting nuclear material or pursuing clandestine nuclear programs. This builds confidence that makes possible the thriving international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. The IAEA Additional Protocol, combined with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, has become the de facto safeguards standard; we can all help make it the universal standard. And all states must be held to account if they violate their safeguards and other nonproliferation obligations.

Finally, Mr. Chairman,

This year marks the 21st anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which formalized the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in our international policy architecture. The United States is fully committed to advancing Women, Peace, and Security, emphasizing meaningful participation of women in governance and security processes, including those related to nonproliferation. This includes advocating with partner governments to allow women access to and influence over decision making, especially those within the security sector, and providing logistical and technical support to amplify the existing efforts of women leaders.

The United States institutionalized our WPS commitment through our Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, which made us the first country in the world with a comprehensive domestic law on this issue. In June, we released our first public report tracking progress made on the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and highlights government-wide accomplishments, identifies gaps in our efforts, and outlines opportunities to address those gaps and inform future WPS efforts.

One specific point to highlight from the report – our WPS efforts have catalyzed U.S. leadership in multilateral arms control, disarmament, and security diplomacy. Led by the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC), these efforts built a cadence of WPS leadership in the Conference on Disarmament, the

Forum for Security Cooperation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, and here, the UN First Committee. U.S. messaging on WPS more than doubled in speeches to these bodies, and we advocated for increased leadership of women in these organizations. We encourage our partners to continue to promote the WPS agenda.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Mr. Chairman, Colleagues,

As we approach the 25th anniversary of the entry-into-force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), it is regrettable that the threat and use of chemical weapons continues to be an issue of grave concern to the global community. Since 2013, there have been egregious violations of the CWC and malign behavior that simply are intolerable; yet we must remain resolute and united in our efforts to reverse this trend and reaffirm the world's commitment to end the use of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. Despite the few who continue to use these abhorrent weapons in contravention of international norms, it is the many who remain steadfast in defending and preserving the norm against the use of chemical weapons. It is the resolve of the many to see an end to the threat and use of chemical weapons and hold accountable the few seeking to normalize it.

Mr. Chairman,

Those of us defending and preserving the norm against the use of chemical weapons include the brave men and women of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW is a well-respected organization with a long history of impartiality, transparency, and professionalism that speaks for itself. There is no basis for deliberate attacks on the OPCW's Technical Secretariat; questioning its expertise and using false arguments to diminish the successful work it has achieved in the implementation of the CWC. We express our deepest appreciation to the Technical Secretariat and remain confident that it will continue to faithfully carry out the significant mandates we have entrusted to it, even in the midst of the ongoing pandemic.

The CWC and the OPCW remain under assault by those who continue to use chemical weapons and flout their international obligations, but we are soundly confident that a growing number of responsible nations are making clear that there will be consequences for using chemical weapons. Over the past decade, we have witnessed the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Malaysia, Iraq, the United Kingdom, and now in Russia with the poisoning of Mr. Alexei Navalny. The use of chemical weapons cannot go unchecked or treated with impunity. There must be consequences and accountability for those who blatantly disregard international norms and standards and the rule of law. While it may be uncomfortable for some to hear the truth, the facts are clear. The Assad regime has flouted its international obligations and disregarded the standards of basic humanity by repeatedly using chemical weapons against its own people. The OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) most recently concluded in separate reports released in April 2020 and earlier this year that the Syrian Arab Republic was responsible for chemical weapons attacks in March 2017 and in February 2018. In response, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision setting out clear measures for Syria to take, and it failed to fulfill any of these measures. To that end, we stand with the nearly ninety (90) countries that voted in favor of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) decision to suspend certain rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the CWC until it completes the measures requested by the Executive Council. Just to be clear, the adoption of the CSP decision represents a significant milestone, but it does not conclude the work to address Syria's possession and use of

chemical weapons. The OPCW continues to determine that the declaration submitted by the Assad regime eight years ago still cannot be considered accurate and complete.

Sadly, the Assad regime continues to deliberately delay and obstruct the work of the OPCW. Syria once again demonstrated its lack of candor when it recently reported the destruction of two containers that had previously been inspected by the Declaration Assessment Team and were relevant to OPCW investigations. Despite instructions to the regime not to open, move, or alter the containers and their contents in any way, without seeking prior written consent of the OPCW, the Assad regime reported these cylinders had been destroyed during an attack on June 8, 2021, at a different location. The regime did not notify the OPCW that the cylinders allegedly had been moved to a new location until it reported their destruction. The United States urges the Syrian Arab Republic, once again, to come into compliance with and meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Mr. Chairman, similarly, the Russian Government must comply with its obligations. Over a year ago, Russian security agents poisoned Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny with a Novichok nerve agent in Russia. The Russian government and its propaganda network continue to conduct an extensive disinformation campaign to cast doubt on and deflect blame for its role in the attack. In April of this year, 59 States Parties joined in the international call condemning the poisoning of Mr. Navalny with a chemical weapon, urging transparency from the Russian government, and reiterating that those responsible for chemical weapons use must be held to account. Nevertheless, Russia has failed to cooperate in any meaningful way with the OPCW and continues to refuse to be transparent about the incident.

We cannot allow impunity for the use of chemical weapons. Doing so will further embolden those who are prepared to continue to use them. All responsible nations should share an interest in deterring further chemical weapons use and restoring the global norm against such use. We must signal to state and non-state actors alike that the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated. That is why this year, the United States has imposed two rounds of sanctions and imposed other costs on Russia for its use of a chemical weapon against Mr. Navalny. The Russian Federation should explain the use of a chemical weapon against Mr. Navalny on its soil, declare its remaining chemical weapons program, and verifiably destroy any chemical weapons it continues to possess, including Novichok nerve agents. Consequently, and in an effort to further understand the facts surrounding the use of a Novichok on Russian territory, 45 concerned States Parties, to include the United States, sought clarification from the Russian Federation at the October meeting of the OPCW Executive Council, submitting questions under Article IX of the CWC.

Mr. Chairman, nearly every country in the world is party to the CWC, and the vast majority of these nations comply with their obligations. It is not politicization to state the facts and acknowledge there are consequences for using chemical weapons. It is not politicization to ensure that there is no impunity for those who violate their international obligations or are given a way of escaping accountability because it is politically uncomfortable.

The obligations of the Convention apply to all; we must faithfully seek compliance by all States Parties. If we fail to act, we risk continued use of chemical weapons with impunity. Such a degradation of the global norm against chemical weapons use strikes at the very heart of the CWC and undermines global objectives toward international security, arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, we also must address current and emerging CW threats such as the aerosolized use of central nervous system-acting chemicals, both by state and non-state actors. We welcome the OPCW Executive Council's adoption of the decision, "Understanding Regarding the Aerosolized Use of Central Nervous System-acting Chemicals (CNSAC) for Law Enforcement Purposes," at the Ninety-Sixth Session in March and thank the Council for recommending action by the CSP on this important matter. The United States, Australia, and Switzerland, along with the forty-two other co-sponsors, encourage all countries to support the adoption of the decision during the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference of the States Parties in November. Finally, we

further commend the commitments made by participating States of the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and invite others to join.

I would now like to turn to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and preparations for the Ninth Review Conference of the BWC next year. With the COVID-19 pandemic, we are all experiencing the tragic human loss and devastating economic consequences of a biological outbreak. It is obvious – now more than ever – that biological outbreaks know no borders and impact certain populations, such as vulnerable groups, women, and children, in different magnitudes. We must take them seriously and do so together – there is no time to waste. If there is any silver lining to the COVID-19 pandemic, it could be that the world emerges more able to prevent all biological threats – whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in origin. Let's not limit our focus on the immediate challenge of this pandemic but take meaningful action to shore up our shared vulnerability to the potentially catastrophic consequences of the full range of biological threats, including those posed by biological weapons. Let's rise to the occasion and convert the international attention to biological threats into concrete and long-lasting impact by taking visible and meaningful action at the 9th Review Conference for the BWC.

Mr. Chairman, the BWC embodies a crucial norm: that biological weapons are repulsive and unacceptable. Since the BWC entered into force in 1975, the nature of the threat from biological weapons has evolved and the world continues to face threats from both states and non-state actors willing to disregard this international norm. Efforts to take serious international action – even on areas with widespread support from BWC States Parties – are hampered by the legacy of the Protocol negotiations abandoned in 2001. A small number of States Parties consistently obstruct most substantive action, insisting that the only way forward is a return to negotiations on an all-encompassing, legally binding protocol to the Convention. While the BWC has made incremental progress over the past two decades, serving as a useful platform to exchange information and promote action at the national level, a handful of obstructionists prevent nearly all proposals for collective action in support of the BWC. In the wake of the worst pandemic in over a century, we hope that States Parties will break this impasse and make more effective use of the BWC as part of strengthening global health security writ large. In this regard, the forthcoming Review Conference is a unique opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, at the August 2022 Review Conference, we need to bring the BWC into the 21st century. In the past two decades, science and technology advanced while security concerns evolved, yet the BWC has done neither. Therefore, the United States will take action to break the two-decades-long deadlock over strengthening the BWC. We will propose that BWC States Parties adopt and promptly implement specific measures to strengthen the BWC that already have widespread support. These include but are not limited to measures to: assist states attacked with biological weapons; enhance international technical cooperation; keep up with advances in science and technology; and reform BWC decision-making. If the current pandemic has taught us anything, it is that we do not know how much time we have until the next such disease outbreak occurs; these proactive steps cannot wait.

At the same time, the United States recognizes that there are other, difficult issues that also need serious attention within the BWC. Therefore, an integral part of our proposed approach is creation of a temporary expert group to intensively explore longer-term, specific measures to strengthen implementation and promote compliance. We believe this two-part approach will enable progress in the short run, while creating a path that could allow BWC States Parties to develop, assess, and eventually negotiate approaches to the most challenging questions regarding verification and compliance. The United States will present further information on this proposed approach during the BWC meetings in November, and we seek States Parties' reactions and insights. Now is the time to strengthen this key bulwark against the full range of biological threats, and we hope States Parties will join us to bring the BWC into the 21st century.

Mr. Chairman, it is also important that we highlight the 21st anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which formalized the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in our international policy architecture. The United States institutionalized our WPS commitment through our Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017,

which made us the first country in the world with a comprehensive domestic law on this issue. In June, we released our first public report tracking progress made on the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security and highlights government-wide accomplishments, identifies gaps in our efforts, and outlines opportunities to address those gaps and inform future WPS efforts.

The United States is fully committed to advancing Women, Peace, and Security, emphasizing meaningful participation of women in governance and security processes, including those related to nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction. This includes advocating with partner governments to allow women access to and influence over decisions, especially those which we have discussed here today. We call on all State Parties to ensure that women have a seat at the table and can meaningfully participate in discussions and negotiations regarding the implementation of the various agreements and conventions discussed here today.

Thematic Debate Statement by the United States Cluster 3 on Outer Space

Mr. President,

Today, the world is increasingly reliant on space assets for prosperity and security that bring tremendous benefits to all nations. The United States believes that there is a common interest in maintaining peace and security in outer space for the benefit of all. The Administration's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance clearly states that we will explore and use outer space to the benefit of humanity, and ensure the safety, stability, and security of outer space activities. As such, we reaffirm the applicability of international law to space activities, including the Outer Space Treaty and the UN Charter, which continue to serve as an essential framework to help ensure that the exploration and use of outer space is for the benefit of all nations.

At the same time, we take note of the desire of all countries to maintain space as a peaceful and sustainable environment, while reducing threats to space systems and space operations, and preventing conflict from occurring in outer space. However, we recognize that space remains a domain of competition and we must take steps to reduce uncertainty and manage the risk that competition will lead to conflict. To effectively address these threats and risks, we need to move beyond a singular focus on failed efforts to establish legally binding arms control agreements focused solely on the prevention of an arms race in space, towards an expanded approach that takes into account additional potential threats to international peace and security, including from ground-based systems that are increasing the contested nature of the outer space environment. To that end, the Administration believes that we must promote shared norms on space. This is in our view consistent with SSOD-1 and the recognition that the current environment in outer space is much more complex than it was in 1978.

That complexity is demonstrated in the development of anti-satellite weapons by countries that seek to deny other countries the use of outer space with the main threat currently from ground-based systems. For example, in 2018, Russia announced the deployment of a ground-based laser weapon called the Peresvet, which the Russian Ministry of Defense has stated is designed to "fight satellites." In 2020, Russia tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile capable of destroying satellites in low-Earth orbit. Subsequently, the commander of Russia's aerospace forces, Col.-Gen. Sergei Surovikin, disclosed that Russia's S-500 air defense missile system would have the capability to "destroy low-orbit satellites." Here we have the main proponent of the No First Placement (NFP) resolution actively proclaiming that their country has the capability to attack satellites in orbit, with no explanation of how this system is consistent with its advocacy for space arms control.

Then there is China – a co-sponsor of the NFP resolution – which in 2007 launched a ground-based missile that intentionally destroyed a Chinese satellite, creating 3,000 pieces of trackable orbital debris and much more debris we cannot track. Despite the fact that this debris remains in orbit today and will remain for over 300 years, China

has moved forward with the deployment of this system capable of targeting on-orbit assets. China has also established a Strategic Support Force to centralize the People's Liberation Army's strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities in order to "achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force."

And the threats are not limited just to ground-based systems. Russia has also tested and deployed capabilities in outer space. In October 2017, the Russian Ministry of Defense conducted highly questionable space activities with COSMOS 2519 and 2521, which the United States described in 2018 at both the Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly. The on-orbit behavior by the Russian satellites COSMOS 2521, which launched a high-speed projectile, was inconsistent with any sort of device on-orbit except for an anti-satellite weapon. In 2020 Russia demonstrated potentially dangerous behavior with another similar set of satellites, COSMOS 2542 and COSMOS 2543, by maneuvering near a U.S. Government satellite during a period of time, then later moving away and firing a new object at high velocity in Low Earth Orbit. The firing action was inconsistent with COSMOS 2543's stated mission of inspection and also appeared to be an anti-satellite weapon. Although this test was non-destructive, the behavior was both potentially threatening and strikingly characteristic of a space-based counterspace system and nothing else. The activities of COSMOS 2543 in 2020 and COSMOS 2519 in 2017 are clear examples of Russia's hypocritical behavior when it comes to its advocacy for the No First Placement resolution and legally binding arms control in space.

So, the question for the international community continues to be, "What can we do to reduce these risks?" The United States believes we can reduce these risks by cooperating in the development of voluntary, non-legally binding norms of responsible behavior that strengthen the stability and security of the outer space environment.

That is why we seek to advance multilateral measures that are voluntary, pragmatic, and transparent, build confidence and are consistent with the criteria recommended by the 2013 "Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities."

Instead of focusing on ill-defined and unverifiable proposals, our approach is anchored by the proposition that we should examine and develop ideas around observable behaviors to maintain outer space as a safe, stable, secure, and sustainable environment. We should recognize that satellites, even if they don't have weapons on them, are going to start interacting more in space than ever before. Some interactions will be beneficial, while other interactions could be viewed as potentially threatening. The international community must work together to address these issues, rather than ignore them because they don't fit some States' definition of "preventing an arms race in outer space."

That is why the United States supports calls for a process to articulate threats to space systems, report on and further develop and implement responsible behaviors to manage perceived threats and risks to space systems, and infrastructure. We welcome the establishment of an inclusive, international process through the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee that can enhance the safety and security of outer space. That is why the United States is pleased to co-sponsor the United Kingdom's resolution on "Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behavior" and looks forward to future efforts based on its constructive approach. This does not mean that we should cease engaging on and discussing space security issues at the Conference on Disarmament. Instead, it is the view of the United States that we can proceed with both of these approaches in parallel.

Beyond this, we believe that such "norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors" generated in peacetime could form the foundation for habits of trust and co-operation between operators in the space environment and reduce the risk of operating in space or the risk of conflict extending into outer space. We look forward to working cooperatively to identify those behaviors and develop and implement those voluntary, pragmatic, and non-legally binding norms of responsible behavior over the coming years.

Finally, Mr. President, I would be remiss if I did not mention that this year marks the 21st anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which formalized the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in our international policy architecture. The United States institutionalized our WPS commitment through our Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, which made us the first country in the world with a comprehensive domestic law on this issue. In June, we released our first public report tracking progress made on the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and highlights government-wide accomplishments, identifies gaps in our efforts, and outlines opportunities to address those gaps and inform future WPS efforts.

The United States is fully committed to advancing Women, Peace, and Security, emphasizing meaningful participation of women in governance and security processes, including those we have discussed here today. We encourage all States to enable conditions for women to meaningfully participate in discussions regarding space and the appropriate use thereof.

**Statement by Ambassador Jeffrey Eberhardt,
Head of the Delegation of the United States of America to UN First Committee
Thematic Discussion on Conventional Weapons**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Responsible State use of conventional weapons contributes to global and regional security and stability. However, in the wrong hands, these tools of security are a source of global and regional destabilization. The international community must cooperate to reduce risks posed by illicitly traded small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), including Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), and related ammunition. We were honored to provide an expert to the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on problems arising from the accumulation of ammunition stockpiles in surplus, which concluded earlier this year and produced a balanced set of recommendations regarding steps states can take to reduce the safety and security risks associated with conventional ammunition stockpiles.

We welcomed the decision of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) High Contracting Parties to continue the GGE on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons through 2021. Despite the restrictions made necessary due to COVID-19, the GGE resumed in-person sessions in August 2021 and has held ten days of substantive discussions this year so far. As a community, we should work to understand better the potential risks and benefits that are presented by weapons with autonomous functions, including their potential to strengthen compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and mitigate harm to civilians. The U.S. military has robust programs and processes to implement IHL, and advanced technologies have been shown to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Being willing to invest in such capabilities along with the implementation of other good practices can improve protections for civilians. Our delegation looks forward to the GGE's final 5-day session scheduled for early December in order to continue our work towards a robust, substantive outcome for the GGE to recommend to the CCW's Sixth Review Conference later that month.

MANPADS remain a significant threat to civil and military aviation—the absence of recent incidents against civilian aircraft should not be viewed as a reason to lessen our efforts. The United States continues to undertake focused work with partners to deter illicit trafficking and use of MANPADS, including through training programs for aviation and border security professionals, destruction of excess State-held stocks through the U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) programs, and assisting with the mitigation of MANPADS threats in border locations and near critical civilian aviation sites.

States must act responsibly not only in their use of weapons, but also in their transfers of weapons. The UN Register of Conventional Arms is the cornerstone of international transparency and confidence-building efforts on conventional arms. In 2019, SA/LW were added to the UN Register's existing seven categories of heavy

weapons, ensuring that the UN Register provides transparency on the international transfer of the full spectrum of conventional weapons. We urge all States to report to the UN Register.

The United States is participating in the Irish-led effort to develop a political declaration that relates to the protection of civilians in urban warfare. We believe this effort could be an excellent opportunity for States to share good practices to mitigate harm to civilians in armed conflict and to strengthen compliance with IHL. However, in our view, an effort to ban or stigmatize the use of explosive weapons is impractical and counterproductive because it could hamper efforts to protect civilians from bad actors like ISIS, or encourage bad actors to use human shields and to hide in urban areas. Sharing and promoting good practices through non-political, military-to-military exchanges should be our common focus.

Clearing explosive hazards contributes to stability and protects civilians. The United States is the single largest financial contributor to CWD efforts. Since 1993, we have provided more than \$4 billion in assistance to more than 100 countries to reduce excess arms and ammunition from State stockpiles, to improve stockpile security, and to remediate explosive hazards. Even amidst the global pandemic, we continue to provide support, particularly as humanitarian mine action plays a vital role in our effort to deliver stabilization assistance in both post-conflict and conflict zones.

Lastly, this year marks the 21st anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which formalized the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in our international policy architecture. The United States is fully committed to advancing Women, Peace, and Security, emphasizing meaningful participation of women in governance and security processes, including those related to nonproliferation. This includes advocating with partner governments to allow women access to and influence over decisions, especially those within the security sector, and providing logistical and technical support to amplify the existing efforts of women leaders.

Statement by the United States Thematic Discussion on Regional Disarmament and Security

Mr. Chairman, we are entering a period of critical diplomacy that is focused on building a stable, enduring foundation for this Committee's disarmament, security, and nonproliferation objectives. The United States believes that regional approaches are a crucial part of this agenda. We remain strongly committed to the universal strength and longevity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In a demonstration of our commitment to NPT Article VI, the United States successfully worked with Russia to extend the New START Treaty for the maximum period possible. Our two countries have also begun a new Strategic Stability Dialogue to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures to increase strategic stability. The United States notes these positive developments are significant contributions toward meeting the NPT's disarmament objectives and complement our efforts on non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Such efforts are especially notable in the lead-up to the NPT Review Conference planned for early 2022. The United States encourages all NPT Parties to focus on their shared interests in the NPT and on finding common ground at the RevCon. All NPT Parties benefit from nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and all can contribute to each other. We are using the time remaining until the RevCon to listen to the top priorities and concerns of a wide range of NPT Parties, and we look forward to working together to achieve a positive outcome.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has committed to reinvigorate and modernize our partnerships around the world. We recognize that our vital national interests compel connections with allies and partners, especially fellow democracies.

We realize that much of the history of the 21st century will be written by free nations and free peoples in the Indo-Pacific, and it is critical for us to deepen our regional cooperation there on new and emerging areas of interest. This is why we jointly announced last month the creation of an enhanced trilateral security Partnership: AUKUS —Australia, UK, US. This partnership, which is focused on sustaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities. Historically, our three countries have consistently worked with regional partners to support a secure, stable, and peaceful Indo-Pacific, and to maintain the highest standards of nuclear nonproliferation, and we will continue to do so. AUKUS will be a continuation of these long-standing efforts. We are also all committed to ASEAN centrality and ASEAN led architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States remains focused on promoting a stable and prosperous Middle East. Cooperation with our allies and partners in ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS is critical to achieving this aim. We also look forward to building on the Abraham Accords with Israel and other regional states, which provide new avenues for positive cooperation in climate change, cyber security, and technology. As part of the Biden-Harris Administration's renewed multilateral engagement, the United States is working in tandem with allies and partners to advance UN peace processes in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The United States continues to support the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction. We are committed to working with all the regional states to advance this goal in an inclusive, consensus-based manner.

We will also continue our sincere efforts toward a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA commitments. The United States and our allies and partners have been steadfast in pursuing a path of meaningful diplomacy with Iran, and we have made clear that if Iran commits to a mutual return to compliance, the United States is prepared to provide sanctions relief in accordance with the terms of the deal. However, we have also made clear that Iran's continued nuclear escalations beyond JCPOA limits are unconstructive and inconsistent with its stated goal of returning to mutual compliance with the JCPOA and will not provide Iran any negotiating leverage. This only raises the importance of robust verification, which remains the foundation of any lasting deal and the IAEA plays a central role in that. We are deeply troubled by Iran's failure to live up to its September 12 IAEA-Iran Joint Statement commitments from Director General Grossi's September trip to Tehran, and in particular its refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to reinstall monitoring equipment at the centrifuge component manufacturing workshop at Karaj. In addition, we remain seriously concerned by Iran's failure to resolve the IAEA's serious, outstanding safeguards questions about possible undeclared nuclear material and activities. Iran's actions to deploy advanced centrifuges, enrich uranium to 60%, and produce uranium metal also are troubling steps in the wrong direction that move us away from mutual compliance, not toward it. We have made clear these steps will not provide Iran any negotiating leverage. Iran must provide the required cooperation with the IAEA without further delay, as called for by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2020. As we have said, robust verification remains the foundation of any lasting deal, and Iran should follow through on the Joint Statement and permit these important verification measures.

The United States has long supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in regions across the world as a way for states to improve regional security, reinforce the NPT and the global nonproliferation regime, and advance disarmament on a regional basis. The principles and guidelines on the establishment of NWFZs adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999 include the central principle that such zones be established on the basis of arrangements freely adopted by all states of the region concerned. The United States reaffirms its strong support for NWFZs that meet these criteria. The United States is also supporting a project implemented by the Organization of American States' Committee against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE) to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region's free trade zones. We are glad to partner with the OAS/CICTE on their efforts to promote a universal, genuine, and non-discriminatory disarmament and nonproliferation regime in the region.

Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, the rules-based international order is under assault from the destabilizing behavior of a handful of countries. The United States condemns Syrian and Russian use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons. To this end, during the 98th Session of the OPCW Executive Council the United States and 44 other countries submitted to Russia questions regarding the poisoning of Mr. Aleksey Navalny on Russian soil. The Kremlin cannot continue to obfuscate its role in using a Novichok chemical weapons against Mr. Navalny. We also remain firmly supportive of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties' decision to suspend some of Syria's rights and privileges, and we commend the OPCW teams who are investigating CW use in Syria. The United States also looks forward to the upcoming Conference of the States Parties that is poised to take action to address the aerosolized use of central nervous system-acting chemicals in law enforcement. Forty-four States Parties – representing all regional groups – are co-sponsoring a decision that will make clear States Parties' views on this application of the Convention and deter future interest in and use of such chemicals for offensive purposes. We call on all States Parties to support this decision.

The upcoming BWC Review Conference comes at a critical moment: we must seize this opportunity to bring the Biological Weapons Convention into the 21st century, as part of a broader effort to counter biological threats regardless of whether they are naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin.

There are still several challenges to the regional disarmament and security agenda. We have released new information on the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile to increase transparency and demonstrate our commitment to nuclear disarmament, but are disappointed to see a lack of similar transparency from Russia and China. China's efforts to rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal only lead to further instability and insecurity, and we hope that China will join us in taking steps to reduce nuclear risks and to advance our shared disarmament objectives under Article VI of the NPT.

We remain prepared to engage in diplomacy with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) toward our objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Our offer remains to meet without preconditions. Our policy calls for a calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with the DPRK to make tangible progress that increases the security of the United States, our allies, and our deployed forces. The U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remains ironclad.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is strongly committed to UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, which will also reinforce the disarmament agenda. It is our long-standing belief that women's safety and meaningful participation must be at the heart of our efforts to promote security, disarmament, and just and sustainable peace. To that end, the United States enacted the Women, Peace, and Security Act in 2017, the first comprehensive national law of its kind to promote the safety and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of conflict prevention, management, and resolution, which we implement through the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security. We have since released the Implementation Plans for the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security through our Department of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and USAID, as well as the first report tracking and measuring our Women, Peace, and Security progress this past June. In this regard, we regret the failure of the CD to take even a modest step of making its rules of procedure gender-neutral. This situation is another sad statement on the CD's ability to work effectively.

Still, the United States is glad to see good-faith cooperation on many other difficult regional security challenges. We have made considerable progress towards this Committee's objectives, but there is still work to be done. The United States is ironclad in our commitment to these disarmament and nonproliferation goals and remains hopeful that the First Committee will continue to fulfill its vital role in this work.

U.S. Statement: 2021 UNFC Thematic Debate on Cyber

Mr. Chairman, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) each concluded earlier this year with new substantive consensus reports, both of which enhance the consensus-based framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that has repeatedly been affirmed by the international community. To build on this progress, the United States and Russia developed a consolidated draft cyber resolution for consideration at this year's UNGA First Committee (UNFC). This is the first time since 2016 that the UNFC is considering a single cyber resolution.

The GGE and OEWG processes were successful because UN member states chose to set aside their disagreements and focus on areas of common ground. These two reports demonstrate the value of multilateralism and consensus-driven work. They are a success story for the UNFC.

The OEWG enabled participation by all UN member states and created a platform for non-governmental stakeholders to share their views on the framework. The GGE enabled in-depth expert negotiations on how to implement the framework. The United States joined consensus on the OEWG report because it reaffirmed and enhanced the framework the United States has supported for a decade. The United States joined consensus on the GGE report because it provides thoughtful and thorough guidance that will serve as an invaluable resource in assisting states to implement the framework. It also made important statements on international law issues that, coupled with the compendium of voluntary national contributions, help to advance our understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace.

This resolution's primary purpose is to highlight those efforts and reinforce the significance of their recommendations. The text affirms the OEWG and GGE reports and calls for states to be guided in their actions by those reports. It is only with such implementation that those reports can positively impact international cyber stability. The draft resolution also calls on member states to build on those reports in future processes, including the new OEWG.

This work is far from complete. UN member states must focus on ensuring that states with the desire to adhere to this framework and its recommendations have the capacity to do so. That must be a priority of our work going forward.

Finally, it is also important that we highlight the 21st anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which formalized the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in our international policy architecture. The United States institutionalized our WPS commitment through our Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, which made us the first country in the world with a comprehensive domestic law on this issue. In June, we released our first public report tracking progress made on the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security and highlights government-wide accomplishments, identifies gaps in our efforts, and outlines opportunities to address those gaps and inform future WPS efforts.

The United States is fully committed to advancing Women, Peace, and Security, emphasizing meaningful participation of women in governance and security processes, including those related to nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction. This includes advocating with partner governments to allow women access to and influence over decisions, especially those which we have discussed here today. We call on all State Parties to ensure that women have a seat at the table and can meaningfully participate in discussions and negotiations regarding the implementation of the various agreements and conventions discussed here today.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
UK STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Over the last 51 years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has extended the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provided a framework for significant levels of disarmament since the Cold War peak.

The UK remains strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, including Article VI, and to our collective long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

While significant progress has been made in reducing the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, we must acknowledge the growing challenges in the international security environment.

We all have a responsibility to uphold the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We must reinforce global non-proliferation efforts and strengthen the multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament.

The UK has a long track-record on nuclear disarmament. After the end of the Cold War, we dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons that we held, detargeted and dealerted our nuclear weapons, reduced our deterrent capability to a single delivery system – the only Nuclear Weapon State to do so – and reduced the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.

The UK played a central role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, was one of the first states to sign it in 1996, and completed ratification in 1998. We continue to campaign vocally for its entry into force, including by regularly lobbying those states in Annex 2 of the Treaty to sign and ratify. The UK is one of the largest financial contributors to the CTBT Organisation, providing £4.5 million annually as well as extensive technical and political support.

We will continue to play a leading role on practical work towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons. One major aspect of that is our work in developing nuclear disarmament verification measures, which will be an essential element in enabling a future nuclear weapon-free world. We invest significantly in our national research programme and international initiatives, including the Quad Partnership with the United States, Sweden and Norway and the International Partnership on Nuclear

Disarmament Verification. We look forward to participating actively in the next Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification established under resolution 74/50.

The UK also continues to press for the start and conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and is working actively with others, including the other Nuclear Weapon States, to explore ways of moving forward.

We remain committed to all nuclear weapon-free zones. We have signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaties establishing nuclear weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa, and Central Asia. We stand ready, with the other Nuclear Weapon States, to engage further with the ASEAN States on the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in South East Asia. We support the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free from nuclear weapons, all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in accordance with the Resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all the States of the region.

We must continue to work internationally to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and enhance mutual trust and security. That is why the UK established the P5 Process in 2009: to build trust and confidence among the Nuclear

Weapon States and to improve coordination and dialogue on nuclear issues, taking us further towards our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We have continued to pursue this goal, leading dialogue amongst the Nuclear Weapon States on nuclear policy and doctrines and on strategic risk reduction.

It is through such practical steps that the UK believes real progress can be made. The NPT is a fundamental pillar of international security, and provides the only credible route to nuclear disarmament. The UK will not sign or ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and does not accept any argument that this treaty contributes to the development of customary international law binding on the UK or on other non-parties.

The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains real. Iran has this year become the first non-nuclear weapons state to produce High Enriched Uranium, and has begun to produce uranium metal enriched to 20% which provides irreversible knowledge gain relevant to weaponisation. Iran's escalations are reducing the space for diplomacy and the counter-proliferation value of the JCPOA. We urge Iran to return to negotiations in Vienna and swiftly conclude a return to the deal. The UK is also concerned by the continued development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

The DPRK's most recent ballistic missile launches violate multiple resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and are a clear indication that sanctions targeting these prohibited programmes must remain in place and be strictly enforced by the international community. We call for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the DPRK.

As the 10th NPT Review Conference approaches, we will continue to work with partners across the international community and civil society to achieve a meaningful outcome that contributes to the preservation, universalisation, and full implementation of the NPT. We reaffirm our resolve to seek a safer world for all and to take further practical steps and effective measures to create the conditions for further nuclear disarmament negotiations.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
UK STATEMENT ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery remains a key objective for the promotion of international peace and security. This includes upholding the complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical and biological weapons. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are all essential pillars of the international rules-based system. The UK calls on all states to join and adhere to these treaties.

The UK also strongly supports the continued independence of the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigating alleged uses of chemical or biological weapons, which complements these treaties and is the sole international mechanism for investigating the alleged use of biological weapons. Since the entry into force of the CWC in 1997, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is responsible for investigating allegations of alleged use of chemical weapons for all states party to the CWC. For states that are not party to the CWC, the Verification Annex envisages close coordination between the OPCW's expert resources and the United Nations Secretary-General. The UK cannot support proposals that would undermine the Secretary-General's mandate or the independence of the mechanism.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the importance of a robust global biosecurity regime, of which the BTWC is an indispensable part. We urge States Parties to seize the opportunity presented by the forthcoming Ninth Review Conference to work together to strengthen the Convention's implementation. Assistance and cooperation, scientific and technological developments and institutional frameworks are all important areas to progress.

Chemical weapons remain a threat to international peace and security. We should all uphold the total ban on chemical weapons use. The use of chemical weapons in recent years in Russia, Syria, the UK, Malaysia and Iraq illustrate the continuing danger. We reiterate that any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances, is unacceptable.

The confirmed use of a Novichok nerve agent in August 2020 in Russia against Alexey Navalny is a grave concern. It follows another Novichok nerve agent being used in Salisbury in the UK in 2018. Russia should be transparent about what

happened in both incidents, and should account for the use of this chemical weapon, which was developed in the Soviet Union and Russia.

Since 2018, with UK backing, the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team has worked to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria. This team has published two reports, attributing responsibility to the Assad regime for four attacks, following the finding by the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism that the Assad regime was responsible for four other attacks and Daesh for two attacks. States Parties voted in April 2021 to suspend Syria's voting rights and privileges at the OPCW until it takes the necessary steps to comply with the Convention specified by the OPCW's Executive Council. We urge Syria to take these measures without delay.

The UK strongly supports the independent, impartial and expert work of the OPCW. The OPCW should be allowed to conduct its work free from disinformation or assaults on its integrity. We look forward to the opening of the Chemistry Technology Centre and welcome continued work on capacity-building among States Parties, with ongoing UK financial support.

The UK is chair of the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and material of mass destruction in 2021, as part of its Presidency of the G7. This group comprises over 30 countries and international organisations, and works to optimise international programmes that counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our work includes a focus on support for the OPCW, a biosecurity initiative for Africa, and encouraging states to focus on making safe existing stocks of highly enriched uranium. We will also take forward activities to build on the recent publication of the UK's national risk assessment on proliferation finance.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 plays a crucial role in preventing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, from falling into the hands of non-state actors, including terrorists; the Global Partnership also supports its implementation and the strengthening of capability in export controls. In 2021, the Security Council should reaffirm the principles of UNSCR 1540. We encourage States to use the Comprehensive Review to assess and to strengthen their own implementation of the measures set out in UNSCR 1540.

Iran continues to conduct a range of activities with ballistic missiles which are inconsistent with UNSCR 2231. These pose a sustained threat to global security as these missiles could serve as a potential delivery system for weapons of mass destruction. We remain concerned by Iran's development of advanced technologies of increasing complexity and capability, under the guise of Space Launch Vehicle research. These technologies have clear transferability to ballistic missiles. In February, Iran launched a Space Launch Vehicle carrying a satellite up to an altitude

of 500km. This was followed by an additional launch of the Qased Space Launch Vehicle in June. These launches will have enabled Iran to test technologies applicable to Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, which is inconsistent with restrictions under UNSCR 2231. With France and Germany, the UK submitted a letter to the UN Secretary General on 10 August setting out our detailed concerns.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
OUTER SPACE WRITTEN STATEMENT
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM**

The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space remains a key objective for the preservation of international peace and security. To achieve it, we need to consider not only the capabilities that could fuel an arms race, but also the behaviours, actions, activities and omissions that could lead to escalation and conflict.

This was recognised by the General Assembly last year, in adopting resolution 75/36 on ‘reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours’. The UK thanks the Secretary-General for his excellent report (A/76/77) pursuant to that resolution, and to those Member States, international organisations and civil society organisations that submitted their views.

In line with the report’s recommendation that “Member States study the ideas contained in the present report and decide on an inclusive process to take these issues forward at the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly”, the UK is pleased to introduce a resolution calling for an Open-Ended Working Group to build on the report and continue the work begun by last year’s resolution.

In the past year we have again seen weapons deployed to space and counterspace weapons used from Earth. Challenges to our ability to operate safely and securely in space continue to proliferate. Jamming of signals from satellites threatens navigation, operations and our ability to defend ourselves. Direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles are being tested with the intention to hit satellites.

As the report of the Secretary-General says, “outer space is increasingly devolving into an arena for strategic competition. Terrestrial geopolitical rivalries are being reproduced in Earth orbit and beyond. This increases the risk that armed conflict could one day be extended into or even be initiated in outer space. These trends are accompanied by the growing capacity of a number of States to attack space systems with a variety of means, both from space and from the Earth. When it comes to many such counterspace concepts, we still lack a common understanding of the impact and consequences of their use.”

We need to build trust in each other’s actions, define acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and establish norms around the use of on-earth technologies that can affect satellites. We believe this behaviours-based approach can prevent miscalculation and escalation from leading to conflict. This approach can involve a combination of legally binding obligations and political commitments, which can be pursued in a progressive, sustained and complementary manner.

The UK commends this draft resolution to the Committee, and looks forward to working with all Member States to develop this new approach, in the hope that it will contribute positively to preventing an arms race in outer space and delivering our shared goal of maintaining space as a peaceful, safe, stable, secure, and sustainable environment, for the benefit of all.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
UK STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM**

The UK is deeply committed to the humanitarian aims of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. We are proud to work with partners to support work to clear cluster bombs, mines and other explosive remnants of war across the globe, and to stem the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

This commitment is underscored by our assumption of the Presidency of the 10th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, in which capacity we have the honour to introduce the annual resolution on the implementation of the Convention. Building on the successful outcome of the 2nd Review Conference, we will pursue universalisation of the Convention, explore alternative financing options for the clearance of cluster munitions, and start work on delivering the Lausanne Action Plan.

As a long-standing supporter of both the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, we call on all states not yet party to accede to these important treaties without delay.

Last year marked the 40th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a central arms control instrument. The UK welcomes the progress made by the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and looks forward to further meetings this year. This progress demonstrates clearly that the CCW is where these discussions should remain. We believe that the eleven guiding principles, affirmed at the 2019 Meeting of High Contracting Parties, represent important areas of international consensus. The UK looks forward to furthering the group's discussions on this complex subject and to contributing to recommendations on aspects of the normative and operational

framework ahead of the CCW's 6th Review Conference in 2021. Central to these future discussions is the need to better understand the concept of human control and to achieve consensus around a set of positive obligations, to include technical, legal and military good practice to be applied throughout the lifecycle of a weapon.

The UK is strongly committed to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and its goal to create the highest common standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms and prevent their illicit trade and diversion. The universalisation and full implementation of the Treaty is extremely important, and we continue to encourage all states to prioritise ratification and accession. We welcome the thematic focus on small arms and light weapons at the recent ATT 7th Conference of States Parties.

We welcome The Gambia's announcement that they intend to accede to the Treaty shortly. The ATT grows stronger with each new State Party. But we must acknowledge that the Treaty cannot fully achieve its object and purpose as long as major exporters remain outside the discussion. Their accession will be fundamental to efforts to achieve the treaty's aims and objectives. As such, they must be the priority for future engagement. Industry, regional organisations, academia and civil society can bring unique perspectives in this context.

We also underscore the important role multilateral export control regimes play as part of international counter-proliferation efforts. These regimes set standards of best practice and promote robust but proportionate domestic controls on dual-use technology, maintaining provisions to ensure the transfer of technology destined for peaceful uses is facilitated.

Preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles remains an issue of utmost importance to the UK. Such proliferation, in tandem with the illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, poses a grave danger to regional and global peace and security.

The UK is an active member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which provides an international benchmark for export controls that can support efforts to design, improve, and implement national export controls. The MTCR does not disrupt legitimate trade, nor does it restrict access to equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Its focus is entirely on limiting the risk that trade, or technological developments, could contribute to the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering WMD.

The control of arms, including of small arms and light weapons, should be seen as an important part of our wider approach to conflict. The UK is therefore pleased to have supported UNIDIR in a project to integrate conventional arms control into conflict prevention work. This will increase understanding of the risks and impact of arms, and better appreciate how conventional arms control can contribute to UN conflict prevention, management and resolution.

We also place real importance on work to deal with stockpiles of ammunition, including through the recently concluded Group of Governmental Experts. We support states to better manage stockpiles, both bilaterally, and through work to make the existing International Ammunition Technical Guidelines more accessible and useable by a wide variety of states.

The rules based international system is crucial for tackling threats to life and security. It is in our collective interest that these instruments function. This is impossible without full funding, effective implementation, and involvement of all relevant stakeholders. We therefore call on all Participating States to pay their contributions; meet their obligations; and support active and meaningful participation of all relevant actors and stakeholders. In this way, we will build a safer world.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT STATEMENT
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Regional stability based upon a mutual understanding of neighbours' responsibilities towards each other is essential for global peace. The situation in several regions gives cause for concern.

The tension and instability in the Middle East continues to pose a threat to global peace and security. This is worsened by Iran's destabilising behaviour, including its development of ballistic missiles, its provision of military and financial support to a range of actors and its deeply concerning escalatory activity on its nuclear programme and its systematic non-compliance with its JCPoA commitments. Iran must reverse all measures inconsistent with the agreement and return to full compliance without delay. Iran actively proliferates its missile technology throughout the region, including to non-state actors, in violation of UNSC resolutions 2216, 1701 and 1546. We call on Iran to abide by the provisions of these resolutions and urge all states to remain vigilant with regard to the implementation of these resolutions.

Addressing the use of chemical weapons in Syria remains a serious and urgent concern. The OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism and the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team have attributed responsibility to the Assad regime for eight chemical weapons attacks. After the Assad regime failed to take the required action, States Parties voted in April 2021 to suspend Syria's voting rights and privileges at the OPCW until it takes the necessary steps, including resolving outstanding issues with its chemical weapons declaration. We call on Syria to take these steps without delay.

Against this backdrop, the UK continues to support a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. The UK attended the November 2019 Conference on the Middle East Weapons of

Mass Destruction Free Zone as an observer, and voiced our reservations about the credibility of a process that does not include all States of the region. We were pleased that the majority of participants were constructive. Our view remains that such a process can only succeed if based on consensus and on arrangements freely arrived at between all regional States.

In Asia, the UK is concerned by the continued development of the DPRK's illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These prohibited programs are a serious threat to global and regional security. We call for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the DPRK, and urge the DPRK to engage in dialogue with the United States. Until the DPRK does so, sanctions targeting the DPRK's illicit programmes must continue to be strictly enforced by the international community.

The UK also remains concerned about the potential for a nuclear crisis between India and Pakistan. We encourage both parties to engage in dialogue to reduce tensions and the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation, and are committed to working with them to understand and respond to safety and security threats to the region. We welcome both States reaffirming the 2003 ceasefire and urge them to refrain from actions that could jeopardise regional stability.

In our own region, Europe, the Russian Federation has undermined peace and security through its pattern of aggressive and destabilising behaviour against its neighbours. There have now been two confirmed uses of Novichok nerve agents, in Siberia and Salisbury. Russia must account for these uses of a chemical weapon, which was developed in the Soviet Union and Russia, fully declare any chemical weapons to the OPCW, and finally destroy them as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention

Russia's deployment of a missile system prohibited under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty caused the Treaty's demise and made Europe, and the world, a more dangerous place. In this context, progress on strategic stability has become even more essential. The UK welcomes the extension of New START, which must be the beginning, not an end, of a new era of arms control. The UK supports the ongoing Strategic Stability Dialogue between the US and Russia, to further that aim.

The UK, along with our allies, is committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We will therefore continue our efforts with all parties to construct confidence-building measures, universalise the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and reinforce the rules-based international system that underpins global security.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
DISARMAMENT MACHINERY STATEMENT
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM**

2021 has been yet another challenging year for the multilateral disarmament machinery. Ongoing restrictions due to the Covid-19 pandemic have disrupted the work of vital forums.

The UK takes this opportunity to place on record its deep thanks and appreciation for the work of all office-holders, secretariats, technicians, interpreters and others for their superb efforts to keep our work going to the extent possible in these extraordinary circumstances.

The failure to progress on our vital work within the Conference on Disarmament cannot however be blamed on the pandemic. Once again, despite the tireless work of the six Presidencies, who have sought to present creative proposals to move our work forward, a small number of States have again prevented the Conference from

adopting a Programme of Work. We also regret that the Conference was unable to agree to a simple linguistic change to its Rules of Procedure to render them gender neutral.

It was also deeply concerning that the applications of five UN Member States to participate in the work of the Conference as observers were blocked for bilateral political reasons unconnected with the work of the Conference. At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it was recognized that the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum should have a relatively small membership for the sake of convenience. The work of the Conference on Disarmament is, however, vital to the interests of all United Nations Member States

and all Member States should have the right to participate in it as observers. The legitimacy of the Conference rests on it being transparent to the rest of the UN membership, and we strongly urge the two States concerned to reconsider their position on this matter in the 2022 session.

As for the UN Disarmament Commission, the UK continues to support the efforts of Australia to get the Commission back to work. The work of the UNDC has been held up by an issue that has no relevance to its work for far too long.

We look forward to continued engagement with all delegations on vital disarmament and non-proliferation issues, across the UN disarmament machinery.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
OTHER DISARMAMENT – CYBER STATEMENT
FIRST COMMITTEE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM**

The United Kingdom is committed to a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, and to advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

Today almost everything has a digital dimension. The international community must grasp the tremendous opportunities that cyberspace offers, for learning, for business, for communication and for entertainment. But we must also treat the threats that go with that, with the seriousness they deserve.

In 2021, the UK was pleased to join consensus on the reports of both the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). These reports added valuable layers of additional understanding to the consensus framework for responsible state behaviour in the use of Information and Communication Technologies, demonstrating the value of regular institutional dialogue on this topic. We call on all Member States to support the adoption of the GGE report, as they did the OEWG report, to complete this valuable work.

The threats posed by malicious and dangerous activity in cyberspace are clearer than ever. We must continue our work to uphold the rule of law: embodying responsible state behaviour, incentivising compliance, deterring attacks and holding others to account for irresponsible state behaviour, attributing malicious cyber acts to States and continuing to counter those who conduct reckless cyber-attacks for their own malicious ends.

International law, an essential and binding element of the consensus framework, applies to state behaviour in cyberspace just as it applies to activities in any other domain. This was unanimously reaffirmed by the General Assembly earlier this year. The Human Rights Council and the General Assembly have also affirmed that human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the relevant international instruments, must be respected and upheld equally online and offline.

Implementation is key to the success of any framework. By putting into practice the voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour that we as an international community have agreed, we can reduce risks to international peace, security and stability. By undertaking confidence-building measures, such as sharing Points of Contact, holding dialogues or sharing national positions on the application of international law to state behaviour in cyberspace, we foster trust, cooperation, transparency and predictability.

And it is vital that we actively build cyber capacity for all. The UK was pleased to announce earlier this year that we will invest over \$30m to support cyber capacity-building in vulnerable countries - particularly in Africa and the Indo-Pacific. UK funding will help build national emergency response teams to protect countries against cyber threats.

Looking ahead to a new OEWG, we must give ourselves the best possible chance to make progress. Substantive dialogue ensures all views are heard and sets the ground for genuine progress. It should always be our first step. Bringing people together remains our goal. The UK is proud to have come together with international partners in good faith to build consensus on a framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. But consensus can be fragile and we must redouble our efforts to maintain progress.

The UK is committed to working with all countries, and with its many stakeholders, to ensure cyberspace is governed by rules and norms that enhance our collective security, promote democratic values, support global economic growth, and counter the spread of digital authoritarianism.

We must ensure human rights are protected online, as they are offline, and build a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, accessible to everyone. Working together, we can achieve this aim.

Statement by Mr. Anatolii Zlenko, Second Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN, at the UNGA First Committee Thematic Debate on Cluster V “Other Disarmament Measures”

Mr. Chair,

Rapid development of information and communication technologies progressively led to the “re-formatting” of internet space: nowadays it is no longer a comfortable platform for communication, but also real weapon, which becomes more and more dangerous in hands of hackers, criminals, some state actors and their proxies.

Unfortunately, despite existing legal norms and institutional mechanisms established to combat cybercrimes on national, regional and international levels, the advantages of modern digital world are too often been abused, with cyber-attacks on the rise, having become a new method of hybrid warfare.

Mr. Chair,

International policy is progressively becoming vulnerable to cyber threats. Over the last few years, a number of states in the world have become lucrative targets of cyber-attacks.

Ukraine is the state where cyber-attacks since 2014 became one of the major elements of the external attempt to undermine our sovereignty. In 2014-2021 Ukraine has faced an unprecedented number of cyber-operations against vital objects of our critical infrastructure. Most of those attacks were carried out by hacker groups being controlled from the Russian Federation.

Cyber-operations against major critical infrastructure facilities, energy, transport, oil and gas sectors are challenges and threats to international peace and security.

In times of COVID-19 pandemic, the devastating impact of malicious cyber operations is evident. Some state and non-state actors abuse the global crisis to launch cyber operations, including against the health sector, which is a matter of an urgent concern for the international community.

Yet not only critical infrastructure, but international politics are becoming progressively vulnerable to malicious use of ever more complex and sophisticated ICT capabilities that was confirmed by headline-making cases of interference into major election campaigns and candidate’s profiles committed by Kremlin’s hackers.

Mr. Chair,

Cyber stability has become a crucial component of ensuring wider peace and security that requires strict adherence to international law, the application of which in cyberspace has been recently reaffirmed in the OEWG and GGE reports, appropriate implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behavior, as well as strengthening international cooperation to preserve a free, open, stable and secure cyberspace.

We emphasize that a particular attention should be placed on elaboration of unified standards in combating cyber threats, sharing best practices, building mutual trust in the field of cybersecurity, preventing the use of cyberspace for political, terrorist and other malicious purposes, as well as providing financial and technical assistance to enhance national capacities to withstand cyber threats, mitigate the risks and strengthening resilience.

In this regard, Ukraine strongly supports the establishment UN Programme of action on the Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace as a permanent, inclusive and action-oriented instrument aimed at advancing concrete cooperation against the malicious use of ICTs.

Mr. Chair,

As of today, cyber-operations against critical infrastructure and governmental agencies, as well as disinformation campaigns, that may incite terrorism, is a widely used method of interference into internal affairs of sovereign states, including Ukraine.

No doubt, Russia uses high technologies to get its own political and geopolitical objectives, namely by supporting and exacerbating conflicts in neighboring states, conducting aggressive information wars.

We strongly encourage the international community to thoroughly consider the issue of accountability in cases of identification of a particular state or state actors behind preparation or exercising targeted malicious use of ICTs or dissemination of lies for hostile purposes.

After all, international efforts made in this domain are simply in vain if there are no reliable mechanisms to detect, punish and bring to justice individuals and relevant states, responsible for coordinating and financing illicit activities in the global cyberspace.

Thank you.

Statement by Mr. Anatolii Zlenko, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN, at the UNGA First Committee Thematic Debate on Cluster VI “Regional Disarmament and Security”

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine certainly recognizes the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security. This is why Ukraine remains a conscientious and active participating state of all conventional arms control regimes based primarily on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (thereafter CFE-Treaty), the Treaty on Open Skies (OST), the OSCE Vienna Document 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) (the Vienna Document) that underpinned European security architecture.

However, the current conventional arms control regime is eroding because OST, CFE-Treaty and Vienna document do not reflect current politico-military realities. Missed opportunities for modernization, accompanied by non-compliance, suspensions, and withdrawals have reduced their contribution to the common security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Ukraine and other European states now face an increasingly more difficult environment of the European security, accentuated by a loss of trust, a lack of transparency, and blatant acts of aggression and violations by Russia of international law, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of certain states within their internationally recognized borders, and a loss of collaborative spirit.

Mr. Chair,

In 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the key regime of the CFE-Treaty and in so doing set the conditions for the hidden “snap” aggression against Ukraine in 2014. During 2014-2020, Russia “de facto” removed from the zone of application of the CFE-Treaty, OST and CSBMs the parts of the temporary occupied territories of Ukraine and Georgia with a total area of over 57,500 square km. These temporary occupied territories of Ukraine and Georgia were transformed by Russia into nontransparent “grey zones” with large-scale concentration of Russia’s combat forces, weapons and equipment.

Russia’s withdrawal from the OST earlier this year was not unexpected for Ukraine and other European State parties to the Treaty. In that way, the Russian Federation’s course deliberately launched back in the mid-2000s

reached culmination. This course aims to dismantle all the regimes in Europe, which ensured the military restraint, limited the deployment of offensive weapons, and prevented sudden large-scale military activities in the Euro-Atlantic.

Additionally, the Russian Federation blocks the process of modernizing the existing CSBM toolbox and refuses to fulfill the provisions of the Chapter III (Risk reduction) of the Vienna Document. Rather than fulfill and improve the valid regional arms control and CSBMs regimes in good faith, Russia sequentially continues to terminate them.

Russian ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine, the large-scale concentration of Russian's troops and attack equipment near the Ukrainian state borders conducted by Russia during 2020-2021 in combining with Russia's intensive "snap" exercises on the temporary occupied territory of Ukraine's Crimea destabilize military-political situation in Europe and confirm the inadequacy of present CSBM-tools.

In March 2021 Ukraine was again under the threat of a new large-scale military attack by Russia due to the unusual military activity of the Russian Armed Forces and the concentration of approximately 110,000 troops near Ukraine's eastern borders and in the occupied Crimea. The large-scale military buildup gave rise to security concerns of Ukraine and many other participating States and necessitated the activation of the Chapter III of the Vienna Document 2011.

On April 7 2021, Ukraine activated the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. In accordance with procedures stipulated by the document, Ukraine sent an official request to the Russian side to provide an explanation of Russia's large-scale military build-up over the last days along the border with Ukraine and in the temporarily occupied territories.

Regretfully, the Russian side refused to provide substantial information upon the request, claiming that it is not conducting such activities. Further attempts of the Ukrainian side to engage Russia in consultations aimed at reducing tensions were disregarded by the Russian side.

Later on, thanks to the international pressure, the Russian Federation withdrew its troops, which were deployed near the Eastern border with Ukraine, but only partially.

To conclude, Mr. Chair, Ukraine, like all civilized states of the Euro-Atlantic community, is interested in restoring of military transparency and predictability, as well regional stability and mutual international confidence. For achieving these goals, Ukraine will support all efforts of the international community aimed at Russia's return to the international legal field and multilateral conventional arms control mechanisms existing within its framework, the recovery by the Russian Federation of its lost ability to comply with the international legal obligations, as well as Russia's abandonment of its course of spreading its military-political expansion and the destabilization of Europe.

Thank you.

Statement by Mr. Anatolii Zlenko, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Ukraine at the UN, at the UNGA First Committee Thematic Debate on Cluster VII "Disarmament machinery"

Mr. Chair,

Ukraine consistently supports a multilateral approach to the disarmament and international security agenda. While recognizing the difficulties in the implementation of existing international treaties and in bringing new ones into force, we reaffirm our commitment to maintaining and strengthening the current disarmament

machinery and international cooperation in order to reinforce existing international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is essential that both non-nuclear and nuclear weapon States are involved in this process.

We strongly support all three key multilateral bodies in the field of disarmament,

non-proliferation and international, namely the UN General Assembly First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission.

The First Committee remains a major forum to discuss various disarmament, non-proliferation and international security issues, as well as for adoption of decisions and resolution aimed at strengthening the existing global security architecture.

Ukraine believes that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is an important multilateral platform for arms control negotiations allowing to maintain dialogue on these crucial issues. International legal instruments discussed at this forum comprise an essential part of the modern global security architecture

Ukraine regret's the Conference's protracted stalemate and urges it to resume substantive work on the range of important agreements. This includes the Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) and a legally-binding instrument on security assurances.

While recognizing the important task of the Conference to negotiate new disarmament instruments, we believe that parallel to these important efforts, due attention of the CD must be paid to the issue of adherence to already existing treaties and arrangements. This includes the Memorandum on the Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1994 (Budapest Memorandum), the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as other crucial treaties and agreements within the field of its competence.

We regret of the actions of some delegations, in particular raising of visa issues at the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) for a few years in a row, which resulted in the failure of the UNDC to hold its substantive session.

Ukraine strongly believes that States with issues related to the issuance of visas should raise them within the mandated body, which is the Host Country Committee, but not the at the UN forums on disarmament, non-proliferation and international security.

To conclude, Mr. Chair, we express our hope that we will avoid destructive approaches that did not allow the UNDC to convene its substantive session in 2019-2021 and, therefore, this important disarmament forum will resume its duties next year.

Thank you.

**STATEMENT
ON BEHALF OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)
BY
H.E. AMBASSADOR DANG DINH QUY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS
AT THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 76TH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR
CLUSTER 1 (NULCEAR WEAPONS)**

Mr. Chairperson,

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN aligns itself with statement delivered by the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM).

We warmly congratulate you, Mr. Chairperson, and the members of the Bureau on your election. We are proud to have our fellow member, Malaysia represented in the Bureau. We believe that under your able leadership, the First Committee will produce a sound outcome. We assure you of our full support in this regard. We express our appreciation to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and her good office for their contributions to advancing the United Nations disarmament agenda.

Mr. Chairperson,

Humanity faces unprecedented threat and challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, socio-economic hardships, terrorism, etc. Let us not forget that nuclear weapons are among the biggest threats to the survival of humankind and the planet. Nuclear disarmament continues to require consistent efforts of the international community. It is more pertinent these days, given the emerging challenges caused by rivalry among major powers, modernization trend of nuclear arsenals and the non-proliferation issues in the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East.

ASEAN supports international efforts toward achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. ASEAN remains concerned about catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use or test of nuclear weapons and the risks posed by their continued existence. ASEAN continues to reiterate that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to guarantee against their use and threat of use.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. ASEAN continues to emphasise the importance of the balanced implementation of all three pillars of the NPT. ASEAN calls upon all States Parties to the NPT to renew their commitments towards the full and effective implementation of the NPT, including its Article VI toward general and complete nuclear disarmament. ASEAN urges all parties, particularly Nuclear Weapons States, to pursue dialogue and negotiation in good faith for the success of the upcoming 10th Review Conference of the NPT and further implementation of the NPT.

ASEAN reaffirms its collective position against nuclear tests and continues to stress the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). With all ASEAN Member States having ratified the CTBT, ASEAN continues to call upon the remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay for its early entry into force.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a historic achievement which contributes towards global nuclear disarmament and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. In addition to the NPT and the CTBT, the TPNW which entered into force on 22 January 2021 provides that each State Party undertakes never under any circumstance to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Mr. Chairperson,

ASEAN continues to emphasise the importance of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. ASEAN continues to uphold its commitment to preserve the Southeast Asia region as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty, Bangkok Treaty). ASEAN stresses the importance of the full and effective implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty, including through implementing the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty (2018 – 2022).

We reaffirm our commitment to continuously engage the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and intensify the ongoing efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objective and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty. At the same time, we continue to support the ongoing efforts toward the establishment of such zones globally, especially in the Middle East.

ASEAN reiterates that every State has the right to the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology, in particular for its economic and social development. ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) held its 7th and 8th Annual Meeting in November 2020 and July 2021 respectively. We will continue to strengthen its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

ASEAN stresses the importance of continued dialogue and negotiation amongst all concerned parties in order to realise lasting peace and stability in a denuclearised Korean Peninsula, including through the full and expeditious implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and agreements reached among concerned parties. ASEAN stands ready to play a constructive role, including through utilising ASEAN-led platforms such as the ARF, in promoting a conducive atmosphere to dialogue and negotiation amongst the concerned parties.

I thank you Mr. Chairperson.

Section II

Written submissions in exercise of the right of reply

1. Azerbaijan
2. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
3. Japan
4. Pakistan
5. United Kingdom

First statement in exercise of the Right of Reply by the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan
First Committee, 76th session of the UNGA
New York, 13 October 2021

Right of Reply

Mr. Chair,

Despite Azerbaijan's good faith efforts to advance the region to post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, we are compelled to refute the revanchist position of Armenia's delegation.

We have already outlined Armenia's non-compliance with regional arms control verification mechanisms and evidence of this non-compliance found in the occupied territories.

Particularly cynical are accusations that Azerbaijan I quote: "politicizes the landmine issue". The truth is many citizens of Azerbaijan are living under constant threat from landmines planted by Armenia. This threat can be easily removed, and we call on Armenia to do so instead of engaging in pointless debate over it.

Once again, we note that Armenia's representative directly contradicts the letter and spirit of the Trilateral Statement of 10 November 2020, and we call on the delegation of Armenia to finally abandon its destructive position.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Second statement in exercise of the Right of Reply by the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan
First Committee, 76th session of the UNGA
New York, 13 October 2021

Right of Reply

Mr. Chair,

Once again, I will be very brief.

It is regrettable that a year after the war, the level of hatred in Armenia's society towards Azerbaijan is at its highest yet and it is reflected in the statements of Armenia's delegation today.

It is disturbing to see that anyone who dares to speak about reconciliation or peaceful coexistence with Azerbaijan is labeled a "traitor" in Armenia.

My delegation will simply remind Armenia's representative that Armenia bears full responsibility for propagation and consequences of this hatemongering.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First Committee of the 76th United Nations General Assembly
Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The I. R. of Iran against Israeli Regime
12 October 2021

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chair,

I am compelled to take the floor to reject the allegations made by the Israeli representative against my country.

In fact, the dissemination of false and fabricated accusations against regional countries, particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran, has long been a standard practice of Israel, with the exclusive purpose of concealing its crimes and brutalities against innocent Palestinian people. Nevertheless, it is quite evident that no amount of disinformation and manufactured crises can cover up the criminal nature, as well as the expansionist and warmongering policies, that this regime has pursued over the past 70 years.

Israel, in flagrant violation of international law and in total disregard for all relevant United Nations resolutions, continues to violate the fundamental rights and dignity of the Palestinian people and other Arabs living under its occupation. As a result, Palestinians are deprived of their lands and properties, forcibly evicted while being subjected to violence, terror and intimidation. Meanwhile, any right of the Palestinians to self-determination has been negated under the title of “one Jewish State”.

Worse still, under the current challenging circumstances and as the international community focuses on mitigating the severe effects and consequences of COVID-19, the Israeli regime continues to exploit this period to accelerate its illegal settlement activities as well as annexation schemes in order to further entrench its military occupation. Simultaneously, the inhumane and suffocating blockade on the Gaza Strip continues to deepen the severity of the humanitarian crisis and inflict misery on the Palestinian civilian population there.

At the regional level, the continued occupation of territories of other countries and frequent encroachments against the countries of the region have seriously endangered peace and security in the region and beyond.

The Israeli regime’s entire history is full of aggression against its neighbors and other countries in the Middle East region. Given such a dark track record, the Israeli regime’s hysteric attempts in order to seek international sympathy and favor by claiming that it is under threat are nothing but manipulative attempts to spread propaganda.

Israel continues to defy all international regimes governing weapons of mass destruction by refusing to adhere to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Further, it continues to seriously hamper the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East proposed by Iran in 1974. Indeed, nuclear weapons in the hands of this regime pose the most serious threat to the security of all States in the Middle East and the non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, it attempts to portray Iran’s conventional weapon capabilities or its exclusively peaceful nuclear program, which is under the most robust verification of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as a challenge to regional stability. This is but a hypocritical move to distract attention away from the real danger posed to regional peace and security by Israel, particularly its nuclear-weapon arsenals as well as clandestine and un-safeguarded nuclear installations and activities.

First Committee of the 76th United Nations General Assembly
Right of Reply
Submitted by
The I. R. of Iran against Israeli Regime
12 October 2021

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chair

I am compelled to take the floor following the outrageous accusations that were directed against my Country by the representative of the Israeli regime. I will not delve deeply into these absurdities due to the fact that they do not warrant serious consideration. I simply want to remind all of the delegations in this room today that this regime has, once again, attempted to defend what cannot be defended, which is the violation of the core crimes rendered under international law, namely, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.

Using the tribune of international communities, Israel continues to spin a web of lies and deceive not only public opinions but also international communities with ridiculous displays to prevent criminal leaders of this regime from being tried in international courts.

These remarks are merely another aspect of a series of malign demonstrations which stem from its conspiratorial nature. Given its possession of hundreds of nuclear warheads, the Zionist regime is the greatest global threat to peace and security.

What we have said about the Israeli entity is based on international facts. Israel occupies Palestinian territory. For more than half a century, it has been killing Palestinians on a daily basis. It has committed acts of aggression 17 times against its neighbors and beyond. These are the facts. A total of 85 Security Council resolutions have been adopted against Israel, and Israel has rejected all of them. Israel does not comply with any of them. Therefore, nuclear weapons in the hands of such a regime pose the greatest threat to the peace and security of the region. That is what we have said time and again. I believe that those are the plain facts, and we believe that it is our duty to state those facts here in the First Committee.

First Committee of the 76th United Nations General Assembly
Right of Reply
Submitted by
The I. R. of Iran against Some European Countries and KSA

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chair,

I would like to take the floor to exercise my right of reply in response to the baseless allegations made by the representatives of some of the European countries and the KSA regarding my country and we reject them categorically.

On JCPOA, as we stated earlier, the uncontested reality is that so far, Iran has adhered to the JCPOA terms while US and E3 have failed to meet their JCPOA obligations. Iran is committed to the full implementation of JCPOA provided that the other participants live up fully to their commitments and lift all unjust sanctions in a speedy and verifiable manner. Iran's defensive missile capability is being pursued in line with our inherent rights and international commitments.

In addition to honoring their JCPOA commitments, the European countries need to put pressure on US to return to full implementation of JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).

It is a fact that during the negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Saudi Arabia, along with the Israeli regime, did their best to derail this process. Their position on the Plan is not surprising, and, following its conclusion and unanimous endorsement by the Security Council through Council resolution 2231 (2015), they have missed no opportunities, including through disseminating disinformation, to seriously undermine the full and effective implementation of the Plan as well as that resolution. They still pursue such policies and practices systematically and in gross violation of their explicit legal obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The representative of the KSA is raising questions about Iran's peaceful nuclear program while it is still implementing an old version of SQPs, thus preventing the IAEA from being able to fully monitor and verify the Saudi's nuclear activities.

On regional security, raising unfounded accusations against the defensive ballistic missile program of Iran is also an attempt to cover up the skyrocketing trend in the military expenditure of Saudi Arabia and its unquenchable appetite for importing deadly arms.

In fact, the real source of regional insecurity is the massive build-up of foreign forces and military installations, a large number of which are hosted by some regional countries, including Saudi Arabia. We hope that Saudi Arabia will heed Iran's calls to establish a dialogue within the region to address regional problems.

First Committee of the 76th United Nations General Assembly
Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The I. R. of Iran against the USA

18 Oct. 2021

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chair,

I would like to exercise my right of reply against the unacceptable statements made by some delegations including the representative of the United States against Iran.

The JCPOA has been a comprehensive plan of action carefully negotiated and concluded between Iran and E3/Eu+3 as a final solution for the artificial crisis created over Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The JCPOA's unanimous endorsement as an inseparable part of UNSC Resolution 2231 is a multi-party agreement based on reciprocity. Its scope, provisions, and timeframes are based on a delicate, negotiated and multilaterally accepted balance that cannot be altered, renegotiated or widened.

We are aware of the fact that the JCPOA is not, and was never intended to be, a catch-all agreement that resolves every issue of contention. By all accounts, the deal was working exactly as intended until Trump's withdrawal. Iran remained in full compliance with its commitments even a year following the US' exit. But in response to the reimposition of US sanctions, Iran had to take measures, time and again, consistent with the provisions of the JCPOA, including paragraphs 26 and 36 which allow Iran to do so.

It is regrettable that the officials of the current US Administration, while having criticized Trump for his maximal pressure, in practice, have continued to impose those sanctions and have shown no readiness to lift them while they insist that Iran should fulfill its commitments first.

The US Administration must realize that the gambit to use sanctions to leverage further Iranian concessions did not work under Trump and will not work under Biden so the best way is not to use sanctions as a leverage against Iran in the course of nuclear talks and rather they should be lifted all and immediately.

It is up to the JCPOA's other participants as well as the US to ensure that Iran effectively enjoys the benefits from its implementation and the deal is not collapsing with the US' unacceptable approach.

Despite all challenges, Iran has continued its constructive cooperation and technical engagement with the IAEA. Despite all allegations against Iran, we are fulfilling our Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA as the mere instrument that legally applies to Iran's nuclear program.

I thank you!

First Committee of the 76th United Nations General Assembly
Right of Reply submitted by Japan
October 22, 2021

Japan exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to the statement by the representative of China, with regard to the issue of the water stored in tanks at the TEPCO's (Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings') Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

On April 13, the Government of Japan announced "the basic policy on handling of the ALPS treated water at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station".

This policy states that the water to be discharged is processed by devices such as ALPS (Advanced Liquid Processing System), the Multi-nuclides Removal Equipment, to meet regulatory standards (hereinafter called "ALPS treated water"). Accordingly, the water to be discharged is NOT "contaminated water".

TEPCO is taking steps to discharge the ALPS treated water into the sea, subject to the approval by the independent Nuclear Regulation Authority, based on the basic policy.

The basic policy also states that for ensuring safety of public and surrounding environment, the ALPS treated water would be discharged into the sea only when TEPCO complies with the regulatory standards based on recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). Furthermore, considering relevant international law and international practice, measures will be taken, prior to the discharge, to assess the potential impact on the marine environment, and to ascertain the environmental situation through continuous monitoring after the discharge in close cooperation with international organizations such as the IAEA.

The IAEA acknowledges the discharge of the ALPS treated water into the sea as technically feasible and in line with international practice. In addition, the IAEA will conduct reviews on the handling of the ALPS treated water from an independent perspective. In this regard, Japan and the IAEA signed the Terms of Reference (TOR) on their cooperation in July, 2021. In September, IAEA officials visited Japan to discuss ongoing and further cooperation. Japan will continue to cooperate with the IAEA for the safety and regulatory reviews as well as Marine Monitoring.

The Government of Japan has been providing the international community with relevant information regarding the handling of the ALPS treated water. Such efforts include information sharing at various international conferences hosted by the IAEA and other organizations. The Government of Japan will continue to explain its efforts to the international community in a transparent manner. In addition, the Government of Japan will continue cooperating with the IAEA towards the implementation of the reviews, including safety aspect, by the agency. Japan is willing to discuss the details based on scientific evidence at appropriate fora with relevant expertise on the issue.

Right of Reply in response to the delegation of India
By First Secretary
Mr. Gul Qaiser Sarwani
During the General Debate of First Committee
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
New York, 4 October 2021

Mr. Chairman,

I have requested the floor to respond to the comments made by the delegation of India. The observations made by my delegation might be uncomfortable for India, but they remain irrefutable facts.

The extremist ideology pervasive in India today, along with its offensive doctrines and hegemonic pretensions; its quest for conventional and strategic military dominance; a history of aggression against its neighbours; and the refusal to engage in a dialogue or mediation on dispute resolution, confidence building or risk reduction, present a clear danger. Not just to Pakistan, but to regional and international peace and security.

India's illegal actions in Occupied Jammu & Kashmir, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, coupled with its belligerent rhetoric, have compounded the regional security situation.

Contrary to the assertion made, these issues are completely relevant to this Committee's work, as they carry grave implications for regional and international peace and security.

Pakistan has been and will continue to highlight India's "State terrorism" against the people of Indian Illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

Make no mistake, Indian state terrorism in IIOJ&K will not be able to dampen the indomitable spirit of those seeking their inalienable right to self-determination.

Nor will India's attempt to divert attention from its sponsorship of terrorism ever succeed.

Moreover, the Indian delegation's statement did not address the facts presented by my delegation regarding its destabilizing arms build-up and aggressive military policies.

Let me also remind the Indian delegation that Jammu and Kashmir is neither an integral part of India, nor is it India's internal matter. In accordance with several UN Security Council resolutions, it is an internationally recognised disputed territory, whose final status is to be decided through a UN supervised plebiscite, and in line with the wishes and aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

As for India's unmerited claim about its support for FMCT:

After amassing tons of unsafeguarded fissile material as a so-called "strategic reserve", directly aided and abetted by discriminatory waivers from the NSG and nuclear cooperation agreements with several supplier countries, India's declaratory position in favour of commencement of FMCT negotiations is nothing more than grandstanding.

For Pakistan, these declarations ring hollow. If India claims to support FMCT, then why does it insist on basing the negotiations on the restrictive Shannon Mandate? Why is it unwilling to include existing stocks in the treaty's scope, in a manner that would genuinely contribute to global and regional stability as well as to nuclear disarmament – which India also claims to support?

Pakistan's position on an FMCT is guided by our national security interests. The treaty should provide undiminished security for all States, as recognized by SSOD-I.

It should contribute both to the objectives of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation in all its aspects.

Pakistan is open and constructive in our engagement to find a solution that addresses the concerns of all affected countries.

In this regard, Pakistan has offered many proposals and ideas, both bilaterally as well as in the CD, which have been repeatedly rejected by India. Pakistan reiterates its willingness to go along with negotiations on a fissile material treaty that expressly includes existing stocks in its scope.

I thank you.

**UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 76TH SESSION
FIRST COMMITTEE
GENERAL DEBATE
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RIGHT OF REPLY**

The United Kingdom wishes to exercise its right of reply in response to allegations made in the written statement by Indonesia concerning the UK's nuclear weapons policy, as set out in the UK's Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy published in March 2021.

As outlined in our letter of 10 June to the Secretary-General, the UK firmly rejects the assertion that it is not complying with its obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Maintaining the UK's nuclear deterrent capability at a minimum level that is credible, taking into account the international security environment, is fully consistent with our international legal obligations, including those under Article VI.

The UK has taken a consistent and leading approach to nuclear disarmament. The UK possesses the smallest stockpile of the five Nuclear Weapon States recognised under the NPT and is the only one to operate a single delivery system. The UK is not adding new capabilities or introducing destabilising new delivery systems. We initiated and participate fully in the P5 Process, building trust and confidence amongst Nuclear Weapon States. We play a leading role in developing technical solutions for verifying nuclear disarmament.

In response to the evolving security environment, the UK announced that we would increase the limit of our overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 260 warheads, from our previously set ceiling of no more than 225 warheads. This figure is a ceiling, not a target, and it is not our current stockpile number. We are the only Nuclear Weapon State to have published such a limit on our nuclear stockpile. We will continue to keep this under review in light of the international security environment.

We are strongly committed to the full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The UK looks forward to continuing constructive dialogue with States Parties ahead of the NPT Review Conference and beyond.
