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**Письмо постоянных представителей Ирландии и Нигера
при Организации Объединенных Наций от 6 декабря 2021 года
на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности**

Имеем честь настоящим препроводить девятый выпуск обновленного доклада “Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations” («Мониторинг продовольственной безопасности в странах, находящихся в конфликтных ситуациях»), совместно подготовленного Продовольственной и сельскохозяйственной организацией Объединенных Наций и Всемирной продовольственной программой для членов Совета Безопасности (см. приложение)*.

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(Подпись) Джеральдин **Бирн Нейсон**
Постоянный представитель Ирландии

(Подпись) Абду **Абарри**
Постоянный представитель Нигера

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**Приложение к письму постоянных представителей Ирландии
и Нигера при Организации Объединенных Наций от 6 декабря
2021 года на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности**



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations



World Food
Programme

Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations

A joint FAO/WFP update for the members
of the United Nations Security Council


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
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Abbreviations and acronyms

CARI	WFP's Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CDR	Crude death rate
CH	<i>Cadre Harmonisé</i>
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCT	Federal Capital Territory (Abuja)
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FRC	Famine Review Committee
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
IDP	Internally displaced people
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IRG	Government of Yemen
LGA	Local Government Area
NSAG	Non-state armed group
NSIA	National Statistics and information Agency of Afghanistan
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PREGEC	<i>Dispositif régional de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires</i>
rCARI	WFP's Remote Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security
SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VAM	WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme



Introduction

This is the ninth update of the *Monitoring Food Security in Countries with Conflict Situations*, a twice-yearly report on the acute food insecurity situation in countries where conflict and insecurity are primary drivers of acute food insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have jointly been producing this report for the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since June 2016.

This issue covers twenty countries and territories affected by major food crises and countries of concern, that are experiencing extremely grave hunger caused by protracted conflict and insecurity as reported in the 2021 Global Report on Food Crises (FSIN and GNAFC, 2021a) and the FAO/WFP Hunger Hotspots report (FAO and WFP, 2021a). It features the same countries and territories that were covered in the previous update issued in April 2021 (FAO and WFP, 2021b), and Myanmar based on the last issue of the FAO/WFP Hunger Hotspots report (FAO and WFP, 2021a).

Box 1. Countries and territories covered by the update

Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, the Niger, Nigeria (21 states and Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) [FCT]), Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

The analysis builds on the linkages between conflict, insecurity and their repercussions on livelihoods and food security of affected populations in combination with other key food insecurity drivers. According to the various editions of the Global Report on Food Crises, conflict is currently the primary driver of food crises globally. In recent years, conflict has triggered major increases in the global number of people estimated in Crisis or worse situations (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/*Cadre Harmonisé* [CH] Phase 3 or above), along with economic shocks, including the socio-economic impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, weather extremes and natural disasters.

By September 2021, around 161 million people were estimated to be in Crisis or worse situations (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent classification)¹ in 42 out of the 55 countries/territories included in the 2021 edition of the Global Report on Food Crises – already surpassing the figure of 155 million reported in 2020, when almost two-thirds of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity were primarily affected by conflict and insecurity (FSIN and GNAFC, 2021b).

This update seeks to respond to the call for the provision of relevant information to the members of the UNSC within the framework of the Resolution 2417, which was unanimously adopted by the UNSC on 24 May 2018 to address conflict-induced hunger. It aims at providing UNSC members with a concise, up-to-date overview that may inform the formulation of short- and long-term actions needed to break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity.

¹ For countries where IPC/CH analyses were not conducted, acute food insecurity estimates were primarily derived from IPC-compatible analyses carried out by FEWS NET and from WFP analyses based on the CARI methodology.

Section 1 highlights the overall trends in acute food insecurity in the 20 countries/territories affected by conflict and insecurity.

Under Section 2, the report spotlights the situation in three countries – the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Yemen – facing critical (or even catastrophic) levels of acute food insecurity and particularly worrying trends. In these three countries, conflict is clearly driving humanitarian assistance/intervention needs. In addition, the actions of humanitarian assistance and development partners to assess the situation through early warning systems and to adequately respond and intervene are severely hampered by humanitarian access constraints in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.

This report is part of the range of analytical products generated within the framework of the Global Network Against Food Crises, which aims to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises. In 2022, the Global Network Against Food Crises, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, will release the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises – which will provide further information on global acute food insecurity figures for 2021. The 2022 Global Report on Food Crises will be available at fightfoodcrises.net and fsinplatform.org.

Methods and data sources

The acute food insecurity estimates provided in this report are mainly based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)² and the *Cadre Harmonisé* (CH)³ scales or – where not available – on WFP’s Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodologies.⁴ This update provides information on the number of people who are in the three most severe phases of acute food insecurity according to the IPC/CH classification – Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) – and who are in need of urgent assistance to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition.

When in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3), people start facing increasing malnutrition due to lack of access to food, or they are only able to access food by selling off assets or through other harmful coping strategies. People in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) face high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality due to lack of food, or resort to emergency coping strategies to mitigate large food consumption gaps. People in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) do not have any means left to access food and are facing starvation and death. Famines should be avoided at all costs. Although further deaths can and should be prevented by urgent action, it is evident that responding to famine situations will be, de facto, a late response because many will have died by the time a famine is declared. In the countries where IPC/CH processes are in place, therefore, Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is already to be taken as indicative of an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods (IPC Global Partners, 2021).

Estimates of the size of populations facing Stressed conditions (IPC/CH Phase 2) are also reported where relevant, although this would require a more diverse set of actions than emergency response – ideally longer-term resilience-building and disaster risk reduction to protect livelihoods.

² Ten countries: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen.

³ Six countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria (21 states and FCT). CH analyses use standards similar to those of the IPC to classify acute food insecurity. The IPC and CH Phase scales and descriptions are comparable to one another (see “Food security terms”, for more details).

⁴ This update also refers to estimates provided by WFP for four countries for which neither IPC nor CH classifications are available. For three countries (Iraq, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic) estimates are based on the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) and for one country (Myanmar) the estimate is derived from the WFP remote-Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (rCARI). For more information on these estimates (see Box 2 for more details).

Figure 1. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objective
Phase 1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
Phase 2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
Phase 3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
Phase 4 Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.
Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.) Famine and Famine Likely classifications are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement. URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

Source: FSIN and GNAFC, 2021a

IPC/CH analyses provide several country estimates per year, and numbers are expected to fluctuate in each period notably due to seasonality. To allow for comparability between different years, either peak numbers (the highest number observed in that year) can be used – as for example in the case of the Global Report on Food Crises – or data needs to be compared to a similar point in time in the past year. To provide a recent picture of the situation, the present report is based on the most recent estimates (if available, last quarter of 2021) and comparable data from late 2020. Data covering the last quarter of 2021 were not available for Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, and Yemen due to the absence of IPC updates in these countries. The latest data covering at minimum up to mid-2021 were used in these cases.

The analysis in Section 1 provides the latest IPC/CH acute food insecurity estimates for sixteen countries and territories as of late 2021 that can be compared with those reported in Issue no. 8 of this update, covering late 2020. The 2021 peak numbers as reported in the 2021 Global Report on Food Crises and its September update (FSIN and GNAFC, 2021a, b) are also indicated when the latest IPC/CH estimates do not already correspond to the peak of acute food insecurity. Wherever available, projected estimates for mid-2022 are also provided. As of late November 2021, an IPC acute food insecurity analysis for Mozambique covering late 2021 and early 2022 is pending release and, therefore, is not included in this update. For the other four countries and territories acute food insecurity estimates are based on other sources and presented even though the availability of updates (in the case of Iraq, Palestine and the Syrian Republic) or comparability with IPC/CH (in the case of Myanmar) can be limited. The analysis contains concise information on the main drivers of the acute food insecurity situation in these countries and territories in 2021 and 2022 based on a review of relevant sources.

Section 2 provides a more in-depth analysis of the impact of conflict on food security for three countries of particular concern.

Box 2. Note on the acute food insecurity estimates available for specific countries

For **Ethiopia**, the estimates presented in this report for the period May–June 2021 and July–September 2021 reflect the merger of the IPC analysis results released in October 2020 and May 2021. This merger was conducted to consider the dramatic deterioration of the food security situation in northern Ethiopia due to conflict. This includes the results for the areas/woredas for which the analysis was conducted in October 2020 and then subsequently updated in May 2021. However, certain areas analysed in May 2021 were not subsequently covered in the projections for July–September 2021. To note that the IPC analysis for Ethiopia conducted in May 2021 is an IPC global product and it is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC Technical Working Group. The Government of Ethiopia has not endorsed the May 2021 IPC analysis.

For **Iraq, Palestine, and the Syrian Arab Republic**, there are no acute food insecurity estimates available for 2021. For these three countries, the update features the estimates for 2020 based on the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI).

For **Myanmar**, the estimates for 2021 are based on the WFP remote-Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (rCARI).⁵ Therefore, no comparisons are made across these countries and territories and/or periods of analyses in this document.

For the analysis of drivers of food insecurity in each of the countries and territories covered in the update, a wide range of secondary data sources was used to offer more details on the information provided in the IPC/CH analyses themselves, which already collate information from these various sources. These include qualitative information extracted from the key early warning information systems, such as WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), FAO’s Dynamic monitoring of the impact of shocks of agricultural livelihoods in high priority countries, and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). Data on displacement were provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Latest updates on conflict are also complemented by information from the Assessment Capacities Project and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

⁵ The WFP reduced-CARI (rCARI) methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. (Preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9-10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity). Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed.

Section 1. Overview of the acute food insecurity situation

Overview

As civilians continue to withstand the worst of conflicts and insecurity, agriculture is often caught in the middle of hostilities and armed clashes, and it is among the first economic sectors affected. In countries and territories covered by this update, farming fields, crops, agricultural inputs, livestock, other assets, and food storage capacities were purposely destroyed, stolen, or occupied by parties to the conflict.

In countries and territories with food crisis situations, conflict and insecurity are often compounded by other shocks, acting as a multiplier of negative effects on food security and nutrition. In 2021, poor and erratic rainfall, in some contexts linked to La Niña phenomenon, also contributed to decreased crop and livestock production and further added strain on market supply and food access of the most vulnerable. Economic shocks were particularly prevalent in 2021, especially due to the prolonged effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on economies and livelihoods. In these contexts, vulnerable households, such as displaced populations and host communities, face limited livelihood and income opportunities, leading to increased pressure on natural resources, which in turn can elevate social tensions and insecurity.

Between late 2020 and late 2021, acute food insecurity deteriorated significantly in sixteen of the twenty countries and territories facing food crisis or concern regarding hunger primarily because of conflict/insecurity (see Figure 1 and 2). In these countries,⁶ the population facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) increased to around 30 million people in late 2021 – representing a 35 percent rise compared to 22 million reported as of late 2020. The population in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4) is expected to continue increasing by mid-2022 in most countries that have available data up to this period.

The **Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Yemen** registered significant increases in the population facing Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 or above) between late 2020 and late 2021 – by 52, 99 and 39 percent respectively – reaching between 13 and 17 percent of the population analysed in all three countries.⁷ In all of them, some subnational areas had 35-55 percent of the local population facing Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 or above).⁸

⁶ Comparable data were available for late 2021 in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mali, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria (21 states and FCT), Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Yemen. Data covering mid-2022 were available for Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria (21 states and FCT).

⁷ In terms of absolute increase in the number of people in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above), only Afghanistan exceeded the rising levels registered in Ethiopia and Yemen. In terms of prevalence increase, the Central African Republic was the worst affected country only after Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, South Sudan, and Yemen. While Afghanistan will be covered in the April 2022 issue no. 10 of this update, in Haiti, acute food insecurity deteriorated as a result of the combined effect of economic shocks, weather extremes and insecurity, rather than due to conflict and insecurity alone like in the other countries covered here.

⁸ In the Central African Republic, in Kouï and Bocaranga sub-prefectures (Ouham-Pende); in Ethiopia, in four areas of Tigray (Central, cluster 1; Eastern, cluster 1; Northwestern, cluster 1; and Southeastern, cluster 1); and in Yemen, in ten districts of Hajjah, five districts of Amran, two districts of Al Jawf and one district of Sa'ada governorate.

By September 2021, the global population affected by catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5) increased more than fourfold against the previous year – from 133 000 people in **Burkina Faso, South Sudan and Yemen** in 2020, to 584 000 people across **Ethiopia’s Tigray region, southern Madagascar, South Sudan, and Yemen** in 2021 – mainly as the result of intensifying conflict and insecurity (FSIN and GNAFC, 2021b).

Between late 2020 and mid-2021, the populations facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) increased threefold in Yemen to 47 000 people and from zero to 401 000 people in **Ethiopia**. In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, although the evolving conflict dynamics render it difficult to determine a most-likely scenario for the coming months, the IPC Famine Review Committee projected a medium-to-high Risk of Famine in three out of four scenarios, including a worst-case scenario during July–September 2021 (IPC, 2021h).

Box 3. Countries with major increases in people facing Crisis levels or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) of acute food insecurity⁹

Trend analysis of population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) between late 2020 and late 2021 and projected evolution in mid-2022

Trends between late 2020 and late 2021

- **Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria** (21 states and FCT), **South Sudan** and **Yemen** experienced the largest increases in population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in absolute terms between late 2020 and late 2021 – with increases larger than 1.4 million people.
- **Chad, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria** (21 states and FCT), and **Somalia** experienced the largest increases in population facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in percentage terms relative to late 2020 – with increases higher than 40 percent.
- **Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Haiti, South Sudan** and **Yemen** had the largest share of population in high acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) out of the total population analysed – with a prevalence larger than 40 percent.

Projections by mid-2022

- **Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria** (21 states and FCT) are expected to face the largest increase in the number of people facing high acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) between late 2021 and mid-2022 – increases larger than 200 000 people.

⁹ For Afghanistan, the IPC estimates presented in this issue reflect the Flowminder population data to allow better comparability over the different time periods and alignment with the annual Humanitarian Response Plans. These estimates, therefore, differ from those presented in issue no. 8, which were based on the population data of the National Statistics and Information Agency of Afghanistan (NSIA). IPC data reported as of mid-2022 reflect the same period of analysis as for late 2021 (November 2021–March 2022). For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the significant increase in the acute food insecurity numbers in 2021 and 2022 is mainly explained by the considerable increase in population and areas analysed by IPC over the years – from 67 million people located in 85 territories and 18 urban areas analysed in July 2020 to 102 million people in 131 territories and 48 urban areas in November 2021. For Ethiopia, the analysis covering October–December 2020 in the *Belg* and *Meher*-dependent areas is not directly comparable with the latest analysis available for the country, covering July–September 2021, which only examined populations in selected *Meher*-dependent areas of Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNP regions. For Mozambique, the IPC available for 2021 is valid up to September. For Nigeria, the increase between late 2020 and late 2021 is also due to a larger geographical and population coverage of the CH analysis – from 15 states and FCT to 21 states and FCT representing respectively 103 million and 159 million people. For South Sudan, the IPC data available for 2021 is valid up to July. For Yemen, the IPC data available for 2021 is valid up to June.

Box 4. Countries with major increases in people facing Emergency levels or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) of acute food insecurity

Trend analysis of population in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) between late 2020 and late 2021 and projected evolution by mid-2022¹⁰

Trends between late 2020 and late 2021


- **Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen** experienced the largest increases in the population facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) in absolute terms – with increases larger than 400 000 people.
- **Afghanistan, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, the Niger and Somalia** faced the largest increase in population in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) in percentage terms relative to late-2020 – with increases larger than 50 percent.
- **Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen** had the largest share of the population analysed facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) in late 2021 – with a prevalence higher than 10 percent.

Projections by mid-2022

Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria (21 states and FCT) are expected to face largest increase in the number of people facing Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) in absolute terms – with increases around 70 000 people or more.

¹⁰ Same comparability issues observed in Box 3.


Figure 2. Five countries and territories experiencing the largest increase in the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) ordered by increase in prevalence between late 2020 and late 2021 with projections for mid-2022



Source: FAO and WFP 2021; IPC, 2021c; IPC, 2021i; IPC, 2021j; IPC, 2021m; CILSS-RPCA, 2021.

Notes: Comparability of data from late 2021 and mid-2022 might be limited due to the effects of seasonality. For Afghanistan, the IPC estimates presented in this issue reflect the population data of Flowminder to allow better comparability over the different time periods and better alignment with the annual Humanitarian Response Plans. These estimates, therefore, differ from those presented in the previous issue of this update and were based on the population data of the National Statistics and information Agency of Afghanistan (NSIA). IPC data reported as of mid-2022 reflect the same period of analysis as for late 2021 (November 2021–March 2022). For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the significant increase in the acute food insecurity numbers in 2021 and 2022 is explained by the considerable increase in population and areas analysed by IPC over the years – from 67 million people located in 85 territories and 18 urban areas analysed in July 2020 to 102 million people in 131 territories and 48 urban areas in November 2021. For Nigeria, the increase between late 2020 and late 2021 is also due to a larger geographical and population coverage of the CH analysis – from 15 states and FCT to 21 states and FCT representing respectively 103 million and 159 million people. For South Sudan, the IPC data available for 2021 are valid up to July. For Yemen, the IPC data available for 2021 are valid up to June. IPC projections for mid-2022 are not available for both South Sudan and Yemen.

Figure 3. Five countries and territories experiencing the largest increase in the prevalence of the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) ordered by increase in prevalence between late 2020 and late 2021 with projections for mid-2022



Source: FAO and WFP 2021; FEWS NET and FSNAU, 2021a; CILSS-RPCA, 2021; IPC, 2021p; IPC.2021r.

Note: Comparability of data from late 2021 and mid-2022 might be limited due to effects of seasonality. For Ethiopia, the analysis covering October–December 2020 in the Belg and Meher-dependent areas is not directly comparable with the latest analysis of the country for the period July–September 2021, which only examined populations in selected Meher-dependent areas of Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNP regions. IPC projections for mid-2022 are not available for both Ethiopia and Somalia.

Snapshots

Central and Southern Africa

In the **Central African Republic**, around 2.1 million people – 43 percent of the population analysed – were estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 620 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), between September 2021 and March 2022. In this period, nine sub-prefectures were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 59 in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Compared to the same period one year earlier, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) increased by 9 percent. These concerning results correspond to the post-harvest period and consider the provision of humanitarian food assistance in July–September 2021. The situation is expected to worsen during the lean season with 2.4 million people – 48 percent of the population analysed – facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) for the period April–August 2022. During this period, 20 sub-prefectures are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 40 in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) (IPC, 2021a).¹¹ In addition, around 214 000 children under five years of age are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition from September 2021 to August 2022, including 67 000 of them facing severe acute malnutrition (SAM). More than 98 000 pregnant or lactating women will also likely suffer from acute malnutrition (IPC, 2021b).

Persisting conflicts and displacements, coupled with restrictive measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic and its socio-economic impacts, continued affecting agricultural activities and limited farmers' access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2021 crop production (FAO, 2021a). From March to April 2021, large population movements were recorded in Bossangoa, Nana-Bakassa and Markounda (Ouham) following armed clashes, and armed groups occupied agricultural fields and villages through September. Up to 30 percent of farmers in some parts of Ouham and Ouham Pende reported lack of access to their fields. As of late August 2021, around 713 000 people were estimated to be internally displaced, including most of them (73 percent) among hosting communities, adding pressure on already strained natural resources. Protracted armed violence continued hindering markets and trade with negative impact on prices and supply chains in certain parts of the country (IPC, 2021b). In 2021, high international food prices and the impact of COVID-19 related restrictive measures, including border closures, restricted access to markets and the disruption of the country's main supply route from Cameroon during the first quarter of the year curtailed import flows and exerted upward pressure on food prices (FAO, 2021a). In 2021, agricultural production was also negatively affected by poor rainfall in Ouham, Ouham-Pende, Bamingui-Bangoran, intercommunal violence between farmers and herders, and crop pests and diseases (IPC, 2021b).

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, over 27 million people – or 26 percent of the population analysed – faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 6.1 million people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) from September to December 2021. Out of 179 areas analysed, five areas in Ituri, Kasai and Kasai Central were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), 120 were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and the remaining 54 areas in Stressed (IPC Phase 2). During the projection period January–June 2022, a slight improvement is expected as 25.9 million people – or 25 percent of the population analysed – will likely face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) even though the situation remains concerning, notably with 5.4 million people in

¹¹ It also constitutes an increase compared to the same period in 2021 when the acute food insecurity peak was reached with 2.3 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹² Although the numbers of acutely food insecure people in need of urgent assistance increased since late 2020 – from 21.8 million – this is mainly due to a larger analysis coverage both in terms of population and geographical areas,¹³ as the prevalence of population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) within the population analysed decreased from 33 percent a year earlier (IPC, 2021c). In addition, nearly 860 000 children under the age of five and nearly 470 000 pregnant or lactating women are likely to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2022. Among the children, more than 200 000 are expected to be severely malnourished and will urgently require treatment (IPC, 2021d).

Ongoing conflicts and displacements, coupled with the measures implemented to control the COVID-19 pandemic, continue to affect agricultural activities and limit farmers' access to crop growing areas and agricultural inputs, and these factors will have a negative impact on the 2021 crop production. Increasing violence in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri since early 2021 caused new displacements (FAO, 2021b), as well as in the Tanganyika and Kasai Central provinces more recently. The situation remains particularly volatile and cyclical in the eastern provinces, driving millions into high levels of acute food insecurity. The country hosts around 5.2 million internally displaced people, 1.4 million returnees, and more than half a million refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries in late 2021. The impact of conflict on food security is long lasting, with over 120 active armed groups in the eastern provinces often preventing civilians from accessing their fields (IPC, 2021c). The impact of conflict on production also translates into reduced food access through significant price increases and lack of availability of certain products, for instance in Beni and Goma markets or across regions depending on supply from these markets (WFP, 2021a).

On average, in late 2021 around 47 percent of surveyed households reported decreased incomes compared to the pre-COVID-19 situation in March 2020, with urban areas particularly affected. In addition, in 2021, erratic rainfalls, crop pests and diseases, and low access to agricultural inputs also affected crop production, which particularly constrained food access in rural areas where livelihoods remained limited in a context of high food prices (IPC, 2021c).

In **Mozambique**, around 1.7 million people – or 9 percent of the population analysed – were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and September 2021, representing an improvement during the harvest period compared to late 2020 (IPC, 2021e). During the lean season (October 2021–February 2022), the number of people among the internally displaced people (IDPs) and host populations facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in seven districts of Cabo Delgado is projected to reach about 363 000 – or around 47 percent of the population analysed – including around 100 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) if no food assistance is provided. This represents a significant increase compared to the harvest period when 228 000 – or 30 percent of the population analysed – were estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in these areas. In terms of malnutrition, it is estimated, that about 75 000 children under the age of five are suffering and will likely suffer from acute malnutrition through January 2022 and consequently need treatment in the 16 areas analysed in the province of Cabo Delgado (IPC, 2021f).

Although in 2021 the cereal harvest in Mozambique was close to the average, poor rains and the effects of the ongoing conflict in northern provinces resulted in localized production shortfalls. In the province of Cabo Delgado, the situation is particularly critical due to the persisting conflict that has

¹² It also constitutes a decrease compared to the same period in 2021 when the acute food insecurity peak was reached with 27.3 million people – or 28 percent of the population analysed – in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).

¹³ From 67 million people located in 85 territories and 18 urban areas analysed in July 2020 to 102 million people in 131 territories and 48 urban areas in November 2021.

disrupted livelihoods and agricultural activities (FAO, 2021b). As of September 2021, an estimated 745 000 people were estimated to be internally displaced in six northern and eastern provinces, including 642 000 IDPs in Cabo Delgado (IOM, 2021a). In this province, attacks and clashes continued driving displacements as well as humanitarian and protection needs in September 2021, particularly affecting the northeastern districts (OCHA, 2021a).

Eastern Africa

In Ethiopia, around 7.4 million people – or 37 percent of the population analysed – were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in selected *Meher*-dependent areas of Tigray, neighbouring areas of Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR regions, in the period July–September 2021. In this period, 2.4 million people were estimated to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and particular concern arises for the Tigray region where over 401 000 people faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity as a result of the conflict that began in November 2020 (IPC, 2021g). In comparison to the October–December 2020 analysis conducted before the beginning of the Tigray conflict and considering the same *Meher*-dependent areas, despite changes in seasonality, these figures represent an additional 4.8 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 401 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Compared to the May–June 2021 period (after the beginning of the Tigray conflict), this represents an increase of 500 000 people in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in the *Meher*-dependent areas. A Risk of Famine exists, as famine could occur in the following months if the conflict further escalates or if, for any other reason, the planned delivery of humanitarian assistance is hampered.¹⁴ The deterioration of the food security situation is due to conflict affecting the lives and livelihoods of people in the analysed areas, causing destruction of property, of crops and of infrastructure, loss of livelihoods, and large-scale displacement (IFRC, 2021). As of December 2021, around 2.1 million people have been internally displaced in Tigray (UNHCR, 2021a), with an additional estimated 2.2 million IDPs in Amhara and 376 500 IDPs in Afar (OCHA 2021b; International Medical Corps [IMC], 2021). According to the Tigray Agricultural Bureau, an estimated 1.3 million hectares of crops were damaged due to the destruction of land and plundering as a result of the crisis (FAO, 2021c). Farmers are also facing challenges with access to agricultural land to cultivate, while displacement and looting have led to pastoralists and agropastoralists losing their livestock (FAO, 2021c). For most of the households in Tigray, stocks had been depleted by the end of May 2021. In this context, it is expected that humanitarian assistance will vary in consistency within the regions, being absent in others because of logistical and financial constraints (IPC, 2021h). In other areas of Ethiopia, the humanitarian situation remains concerning, such as in the North Shewa and Oromia Special zone of Amhara region, where episodes of violence resulted in the displacement of 358 000 people. There are also concerns regarding the deteriorating situation in Benishangul-Gumuz, where armed groups are gaining momentum in western areas of the region and restricting access (IFRC, 2021).

¹⁴ The IPC estimates presented in this report for Ethiopia in May–June 2021 and July–September 2021 reflect the merger of the October 2020 and May 2021 IPC analysis results. This merger was conducted in order to take into account the dramatic deterioration of the food security situation in the Tigray region due to conflict. This includes the results for the areas/woredas for which analysis was conducted in October 2020 and then subsequently updated in May 2021. However, certain areas were analysed in May 2021 that were not subsequently covered in the projections for July–September 2021. The IPC analysis conducted in May is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. The Government of Ethiopia has not endorsed the May 2021 IPC analysis. The Belg and *Meher*-dependent areas analyzed in the analysis covering October–December 2020, which contained the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2020, and the areas analysed in the merged May–June 2021 analysis period are comparable. However, the latest analysis available for Ethiopia, covering July–September 2021, only examined populations in selected *Meher*-dependent areas of Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNPR regions. It is, therefore, not directly comparable to the October–December 2020 analysis.

In addition, crop yields were severely affected by delayed and erratic rainfall, leading to a near failure of the harvest that was gathered in July 2021, with about a one-month delay. As of November 2021, in Tigray region, crop production of the main *Meher* harvest, currently underway, is estimated to be 58 percent below the already poor 2020 main harvest, resulting in the third consecutive season with reduced production since the start of hostilities in November 2020. The production shortfall is also the result of crop losses due to desert locusts as control operations could not be carried out due to insecurity (FAO, 2021d). The expansion of the conflict to Amhara region raises a particular concern as the region accounts, on average, for about 30 percent of the national cereal output. The conflict in Afar region resulted in livestock looting and slaughtering, a major concern for a predominantly pastoral area (FAO, 2021e).

The economic situation also continues to constrain access to food as high food prices were sustained by the continuous depreciation of the country's currency and by the poor performance of the secondary season *Belg* harvest (FAO, 2021b). The general inflation rate is at very high levels, with its food component estimated at 42 percent in September 2021, the highest rate recorded during the last nine years, resulting in severe food access constraints for vulnerable households across the country (FAO, 2021e).

In **Somalia**, food insecurity is expected to deteriorate in late 2021 and possibly in early 2022. Without sustained and scaled up humanitarian food assistance, around 3.5 million people across Somalia are expected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October and December 2021, including around 640 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (FEWS NET and FSNAU, 2021a).¹⁵ The worst affected areas are expected to be the pastoral livelihood zones in central and northern Somalia, most agropastoral and riverine livelihood zones, and most poor rural, urban and displaced populations (FEWS NET, 2021a). The number of acutely food insecure people in need of urgent assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2021 is therefore projected to be 65 percent larger than the number in the same period a year earlier (October–December 2020). Moreover, approximately 1.2 million children under the age of five are likely to be acutely malnourished, with nearly 213 400 who are likely to be severely malnourished (FEWS NET and FSNAU, 2021a).

This deteriorating food security situation is mainly due to an erratic temporal distribution of the *Gu* rains, including a late start and mid-season heavy rains, which curtailed plantings, lowered yields and caused crop losses (FAO, 2021b) in a context of protracted conflict and insecurity. In 2021, around 593 000 internal displacements were reported, including more than 70 percent because of the conflict (UNCHR, 2021b). Among the estimated 2.9 million IDPs across Somalia, the majority are poor with limited livelihood assets, few income-earning opportunities, low communal support, and high reliance on external humanitarian assistance (FEWS NET and FSNAU, 2021a).

The October–December 2021 short rains have turned out to be below average in most parts of central and southern Somalia. As a result, significant crop and livestock production losses are expected. Long-range forecasts of the April–June 2022 *Gu* rains also suggest elevated chances of a fourth below-average rainfall season. Somalia experienced a four-season drought in 2016/17, which led to severe acute food insecurity. Pastoralists in central, southern and northeastern Somalia are encountering water and pasture shortages, rapidly weakening livestock body conditions and declining livestock reproduction prospects. Many poor households lack adequate resources to cover the increased costs of protecting their herds. There are already reports of significant and widespread

¹⁵ The latest forthcoming joint analysis from FEWS NET and FSNAU further anticipates rising acute food insecurity with 3.83 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in the current period in Oct 2021–Jan 2022 and 4.57 million in the projection during Feb–May 2022.

livestock deaths from starvation and disease in Jubaland and other areas, especially among cattle and sheep (FEWS NET and FSNAU, 2021b).

In **South Sudan**, the food security situation deteriorated in April–July 2021 with 7.2 million people – or 60 percent of the population analysed – facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above). These figures represented 1.4 million more people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) compared to the period between December 2020 and March 2021, when 5.8 million people – or 48 percent of the population analysed – were facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity (IPC, 2021i).

Particular concern exists for households in Jonglei, Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states and in neighbouring Pibor Administrative Area, where 60 to 85 percent of the population were estimated to be in high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), with a total of 108 000 people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity. The western areas of Pibor county (Gumuruk, Pibor, Lekuangole and Verteth payams) were projected to face Famine Likely (IPC Phase 5) at least until July 2021. It is also likely that Famine may occur in the conflict-affected populations (displaced and host populations) in the eastern-central parts of Pibor (especially Labarab in Kiziongora payam and the Maruwa Hills in the Marow payam) if conflict escalates to the levels witnessed in June and July 2020 (IPC, 2021j).

Growth in agricultural production has been curtailed in 2021 by the impacts of conflict, significant macroeconomic challenges, and notable rainfall deficits in southern bi-modal rainfall areas of the country (FAO, 2021b). Persistent inter-communal attacks have led to asset and livelihood destruction, as well as massive displacement. Since June, nearly 80 000 people have been displaced by inter-communal fighting in Tambura County alone, with many civilians being killed or wounded (OCHA, 2021c). Thousands of heads of livestock were looted, affecting the resilience of communities in coping with ongoing shocks and sustaining their livelihoods (FSC, 2021a). Agricultural production was also impeded by the lingering effects of the 2020 floods, such as in Jonglei State, which was the most affected and several areas remained inundated in 2021 making planting impossible (FAO, 2021b). On average, around 426 000 people have been affected and displaced by floods in South Sudan since May 2021 (FSC, 2021b).

The difficult macroeconomic situation faced by the country springs from low foreign currency reserves, the weak national currency and COVID-19-related shocks, which triggered disruptions to local markets and trade. As of September 2021, the prices of sorghum and maize were around 70 percent above the already elevated levels of the previous year (FAO, 2021f).

In the **Sudan**, the food security situation is projected to improve slightly between late 2021 and early 2022, specifically during the October 2021–February 2022 period, which corresponds to the harvest season. However, the magnitude of acute food insecurity will remain significant despite the improvement. In this period, around 6 million people – or 13 percent of the population analysed – were estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity compared to the 7.1 million people – or 16 percent of the population analysed – recorded a year earlier between October and December 2020 (IPC, 2021k). This also marks a significant improvement compared to the 2021 lean season, when 9.8 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between June and September 2021. Thirty-seven localities remained, however, classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), and 1.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in late 2021 (IPC, 2021k).

Intercommunal conflicts, soaring prices, low purchasing power and seasonal floods are projected to remain the key drivers of food insecurity during the October 2021–February 2022 period.

Inter-communal conflict is likely to persist through both the harvest and post-harvest seasons and will probably increase during the harvest in parts of Darfur, Kordofan and eastern Sudan as livestock herders will start a seasonal movement, likely increasing clashes with farmers along the animal routes. Al Gedarif, Kassala and Blue Nile states are expected to continue receiving refugees from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and tensions over this border are likely to persist, with increased military presence. Periodic attacks by armed militia in eastern Sudan are likely to increase (IPC, 2021k).

Macroeconomic effects will continue influencing food security, such as the seasonal decrease of prices during the October 2021–February 2022 harvest period. Yearly inflation is estimated to remain as high as 194.6 percent in 2021 (IMF, 2021a), and prices are still above the five-year average, though with progressive stabilization and seasonal decrease of prices, especially for sorghum and millet (IPC, 2021k).

West Africa and the Sahel (including Cameroon)

In **Burkina Faso**, around 1.6 million people were facing high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) including 117 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) during the period October–December 2021. This corresponds to an improvement compared to the same period last year, when 2 million people were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above). However, the situation is expected to deteriorate during the lean season, with 2.6 million people in high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above), including 436 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CILSS-RPCA, 2021).

The areas most affected by the deterioration of the food security situation throughout 2021 are the conflict-affected Centre-Nord, Nord, Sahel, and Est regions. Since early 2021, these areas experienced a growing number of violent events perpetuated by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) as well as inter-communal conflict which curtailed farmers' access to inputs and labour and led to widespread abandonment of fields among many rural households (FAO, 2021g). The northern areas of the country affected by conflicts and localized dryness are forecasted to have an early start of the pastoral lean season in February 2022 due to limited fodder availability and pasture access (FAO, 2021g) with agricultural declines of up to 50 percent expected in some regions (WFP, 2021b). High levels of conflict also led to large numbers of displaced populations in the country. As of 30 September 2021, the number of IDPs was at about 1.4 million (CONASUR, 2021), about 40 percent higher compared to the level a year before. In the commune of Madjoari (eastern region), for example, almost 85 percent of the population (12 000 people) were displaced in July following an ultimatum to leave the locality or face reprisals (OCHA, 2021d). The majority of IDPs in the country is concentrated in the Centre-Nord and Sahel regions, where about 20 000 refugees, mostly from Mali, also sought shelter (FAO, 2021g). Widespread disruption of livelihoods and markets have led to high prices, and limited access to food especially among the vulnerable populations namely IDPs and poor households, thus contributing to the deterioration of food security (WFP, 2021b).

In **Cameroon**, around 2.4 million people – or 9 percent of the population analysed – were estimated in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 157 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) between October and December 2021. This represents a decrease compared to the same period in 2020, when 2.7 million people – or 10 percent of the population analysed – were facing high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above),¹⁶ even though acute food insecurity remains significant particularly in conflict-affected areas. The acute food insecurity situation is not expected to improve by mid-2022, as

¹⁶ It also constitutes a decrease compared to March–May 2021 when the acute food insecurity peak was reached with 2.6 million people – or 10 percent of the population analysed – in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above).

the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) is projected to remain mostly unchanged through June-August 2022 (CILSS-CH, 2021a).

The main causes of acute food insecurity in 2021 remained the conflict and insecurity in northwest and southwest regions, as well as in the Far-North affected by the Lake Chad Basin crisis. In these areas, agriculture, markets and livelihoods were severely disrupted by insecurity, which continued triggering large population movements (FAO, 2021b). As of November 2021, around two million people were displaced across the country including 1.1 million IDPs, close to 462 000 refugees and asylum seekers and 478 000 returnees, with most of them located in conflict-affected areas (UNHCR, 2021b). In the Far North region, 82 percent of displaced households reported to have abandoned their homes because of armed conflict – the remaining population being mainly affected by weather extremes (IOM, 2021b). In northwest and southwest regions, UN and humanitarian actors were compelled to stop their operations in the second half of September 2021 due to a lockdown imposed by the non-state armed groups (NSAGs) (OCHA, 2021e). In addition, the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in significant income losses that substantially reduced households' purchasing power. While most of the country faced rainfall deficits, southwestern regions also experienced prolonged dry sequences of over 21 days during the 2021 rainy season (WFP, 2021c).

In **Chad**, approximately one million people were estimated to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) and in need of urgent food assistance, including 23 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) between October and December 2021. This represents a 60 percent increase compared to late 2020 when around 601 000 people were facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the country. The situation is expected to further deteriorate through the 2022 lean season (June–August) with around 1.7 million people projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 143 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CILSS-RPCA, 2021).

Key drivers leading to such high level of acute food insecurity include increase in conflict and insecurity, thefts and physical assault, rainfall deficits, flooding and soaring food prices (OCHA, 2021f). The persistent violent incidents and civil attacks have been recorded in the Lac and Tibesti regions in Chad. About 400 000 people were displaced in the Lake Chad Basin areas due to insecurity between August and September (IOM, 2021c). In addition, 520 000 refugees mostly from the Central African Republic, Nigeria, and the Sudan reside in the country due to conflicts (OCHA, 2021g). The protracted insecurity also continued affecting severely livelihood activities including agricultural activities, limited access to agricultural inputs, disruptions of trade and markets amidst the COVID-19 situation (OCHA, 2021g). Significant price increases in June and July 2021 were recorded in southern and northern parts that were affected by floods, while in conflict-affected areas of the Lac and Tibesti regions recorded the highest grain prices in the country.

Between May and June 2021, rainfall deficits occurred specifically in the Lake Chad Basin, while southern Chad experienced above-normal number of days without rainfall (WFP, 2021c). Central Chad area was also affected by long dry-spells between September and October 2021. These rainfall deficits and dry-spells led to overall production to deteriorating in the affected regions. Torrential precipitation also resulted in localized flooding between June and August 2021 in northeastern Chad (OCHA, 2021h).

In **Mali**, around 1.2 million people were estimated to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of food insecurity, including 47 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) between October and December 2021. This represents almost three times the population affected in late 2020, an increase

mainly driven by conflict and insecurity.¹⁷ The increase in acute food insecurity is projected to continue at least through June–August 2022, with an estimated 1.8 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) (CILSS-RPCA, 2021).

Overall, the food security situation has deteriorated in 2021, particularly in conflict-affected central and northern areas, which experienced increased violent events by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), banditry and inter-communal clashes (FAO, 2021h). In 2021, the conflict also spread to southern areas, leading to higher levels of displacement than in 2020. In fact, the number of IDPs increased to 401 736 people in September 2021 due to worsening security conditions in the regions of Ségou, Mopti and Tombouctou during the last two months (Protection Cluster Mali, 2021). The upsurge of violence has disrupted agricultural livelihoods and labour migration as characterized by the abandonment of crops by rural populations and limited farmers' access to agricultural land, labour and inputs (FAO, 2021h). These disruptions have affected the availability of and access to food, especially for IDPs and poor households in the most affected regions of Mopti and Tombouctou, and in northern parts of the Segou region (FAO, 2021h). The COVID-19 containment measures have also curtailed income-generating activities and reduced remittances, further constraining households' purchasing power and increasing their dependence on food assistance (FAO, 2021h).

In addition to insecurity, adverse weather, including erratic rainfall in parts of the northern and southern regions, led to a significant contraction in planted rice crops in 2021, and as a result, production of paddy rice is anticipated at 14 percent below the previous five-year average. Limited access to pastures and fodder availability in northern areas disrupted pastoralist activities and curbed local production prospects, as a result of insecurity and localized dry spells (FAO, 2021h).

In the **Niger**, about 2.6 million people were estimated to face acute food insecurity and urgent need of assistance (CH Phase 3 and above), including about 149 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), between October and December 2021. The food security situation significantly deteriorated during the post-harvest season, as the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) more than doubled since the same period in 2020. It is expected a further increase through mid-2022 with around 3.6 million people projected in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in June–August 2022 [CILSS-RPCA, 2021].

Persistent insecurity and civil conflict in southern Niger continued affecting severely agricultural activities and constrain farmers' access to agricultural fields and inputs, curbing overall production expectations in the affected areas, and adding pressure to prices notably through market disruptions. This resulted in many households reducing the planted area and/or abandoning their crops in the fields in the Liptako-Gourma area and the Lake Chad Basin (FAO, 2021i). An estimated 281 000 people have been internally displaced in Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabery regions due to the civil conflicts as of September 2021. In addition, the country hosts 250 000 refugees, mainly from Nigeria and Mali (UNHCR, 2021c).

Cereal production is expected to be below average in 2021 mostly due to the combined effects of unfavourable weather conditions and a deterioration of the security situation that resulted in a significant decline of yields and plantings. An early cessation of seasonal rains in key producing western, southern and eastern parts, combined with pest attacks in several districts, negatively affected crops. In some pastoral areas in central and eastern parts of the country, poor rainfall, bushfires and the upsurge of violence in 2021 also contributed to curbing local livestock production prospects (FAO, 2021i). Since the start of the rainy season in July, floods affected more than

¹⁷ However, compared to the 2021 peak figure corresponding to the lean season (June–August), this figure indicates a slight improvement in the harvest period – with a decrease from 1.3 million to 1.1 million people.

250 000 people in 47 departments with loss of goods, crops and livestock and caused 77 deaths (OCHA, 2021i). The region of Maradi is the most vulnerable with more than 104 000 people affected as of October 2021. In this period, persistent disruptions of markets and agricultural activities were reflected through food prices well above their year-earlier values, particularly in remote and conflict-affected areas (FAO, 2021i).

The cholera epidemic persists in the centre east and east of the country, in the regions of Maradi (epicentre of the epidemic), Tahoua and Zinder, bordering neighbouring Nigeria (OCHA, 2021j).

In **Nigeria**, across 21 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), around 12.9 million people – or 8 percent of the population analysed – were estimated in high acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) between October and December 2021 (CILSS-CH, 2021b). This represents 41 percent increase compared to the same period a year earlier due to a wider geographical coverage of the analysis (from 16 states and FCT to 21 states and FCT). However, by comparing the same areas analysed, the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) appears to have decreased between late 2020 and late 2021, with the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) decreasing by 65 percent but remaining significant with around 229 000 people still in that phase. The situation is expected to deteriorate severely during the next lean season period (June–August 2022). Across the 21 states and FCT, around 18 million people will likely face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), including 619 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). Of greater concern are the 14 000 people expected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 5) in the inaccessible areas of Bama, Gubio and Magumeri in Borno State, primarily because of conflict. However, the CH analysis did not integrate the situation in three Local Government Areas (LGAs), namely Abadam, Guzamala and Marte, that were and still are inaccessible. Therefore, the magnitude of food insecurity in these three LGAs cannot be estimated. The three northeastern states are expected to house almost all the population – 75 percent – estimated in Emergency or worse (CH Phase 4 or above) during the period of the analysis (CILSS-RPCA, 2021).

Insecurity continued driving acute food insecurity among the population, especially in the northeastern states due to the insurgency, as well as in northwestern and northcentral states because of armed banditry (CILSS-RPCA, 2021). As a result of the civil conflict in the northeast, around 2.2 million people were internally displaced across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, as well as Taraba, Bauchi and Gombe, as of mid-2021 (IOM, 2021d). In addition, by July, there were also around 833 000 IDPs in the states of Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau (North Central) and Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara (North West) [IOM, 2021e]. Protracted insecurity conditions in northeastern and northcentral parts curbed plantings and hampered agricultural activities, with expectations of a below-average coarse grain output in 2021, adding further pressure on already high prices. While the stability of the prices in September was seen as a temporary relief due to the harvest, consumers' purchasing power was still compromised with cereal prices having risen year-on-year, notably due to the combined effects of the COVID-19 containment measures and the difficult macro-economic conditions, including a sharp depreciation of the national currency (WFP, 2021d). During the 2021 rainy season, northern Nigeria was also affected by poor temporal distribution of rainfall and dry spells, which also affected planting activities (WFP, 2021c). In addition, cholera outbreaks were declared in both Borno and Adamawa states. According to the recent SMART survey conducted in some Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno and Yobe, global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates exceeded the critical threshold (15 percent) in 2021 (OCHA, 2021k).

According to the national Famine Monitoring System, significant deficits in food consumption (61 percent), limited diet diversity and extreme use of emergency (50.3 percent) coping strategies to meet their food needs were assessed among the surveyed inaccessible LGAs. Overall, 77 percent experienced Crisis or higher levels of food deprivation and hunger. Acute malnutrition rates among

newly arrived IDPs from inaccessible areas were critical (GAM 22, SAM 9), while GAM and SAM rates among children between 0-17 months were as high as 29.7 and 9 respectively, depicting a near catastrophe-like situation. Overall, of the 22 LGAs covered, 7 are classified at high famine risk while the remaining 15 LGAs are classified as moderate famine risk (Famine Monitoring System, 2021).

Asia and the Middle East

In **Afghanistan**, the food security situation is expected to deteriorate during the November 2021–March 2022 period, which corresponds to the winter lean season, with 22.8 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), the highest ever recorded in the country by the IPC. It includes 8.7 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). These figures represent a significant year-over-year increase, from 16.9 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 5.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in late 2020-early 2021.¹⁸ The number of areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is also expected to increase to 32 areas of the 45 analysed – up from ten areas in the same period of the previous year (IPC, 2021). The food security situation is highly concerning by any measure. People are experiencing spiralling levels of acute food insecurity in both rural and urban Afghanistan and need urgent lifesaving support to prevent catastrophic levels of food insecurity, and livelihood assistance to help households recover.

The already fragile political, social and economic situation of the country was exacerbated with increased conflict and related displacements in the months leading up to the Taliban taking over as the de facto government in August 2021. Between January and October 2021, almost 683 000 people were displaced by conflict, which was more than twice the number of people in the same period last year (OCHA, 2021). According to UNHCR, by the end of August 2021, 2.22 million Afghan refugees were registered in neighbouring countries, in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran (UNCHR, 2021e). The number of both registered and non-registered refugees is set to increase through early 2022 (FAO, 2021b).

Household food access between the end of winter and the following spring season is likely to deteriorate due to the continuing La Niña climatic episode bringing below-average winter precipitation for the second consecutive year. Twenty-five out of 34 provinces were affected by a severe drought since late 2020 (IPC, 2021). The projected deteriorating food security situation will also result from a worsening financial situation and profound economic crisis, which compounded the lingering economic impact of COVID-19. In late 2021, Afghans' food access was notably curtailed by the reduced income and employment opportunities deriving from severe disruptions of the banking system, slowdown of business and industry, frozen government assets, lower international and domestic remittances, and currency depreciation, while food prices significantly increased compared to the previous year. Continuing obstacles to humanitarian assistance, many related to the financial crisis and limited physical access during the winter period, are expected to contribute to the deterioration of food security (IPC, 2021).

¹⁸ The IPC estimates presented in this issue reflect the Flowminder population data to allow better comparability over the different time periods as well as alignment with the annual Humanitarian Response Plans. These estimates, therefore, differ from those presented in issue no. 8 of this update, which were based on National Statistics and information Agency of Afghanistan (NSIA) population data.

Box 5. Update on countries and territories with no available acute food insecurity estimates for 2021 and 2022¹⁹ – Iraq, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic

In **Iraq**, around 731 000 conflict-affected people were acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance in 2020, mostly among the displaced populations (OCHA, 2021m). In 2021, intermittent conflict continued disrupting food security and livelihoods. Millions of people are returning from protracted displacement since 2018 (WFP, 2021e). As of September 2021, around 4.9 million returnees were identified across the country, alongside 1.2 million IDPs (IOM, 2021f). In addition, rainfed crops completely failed in the most important producing provinces of Ninewa. The high price and limited availability of fuel also prevented farmers from irrigating cereal crops, resulting in lower yields of the irrigated winter crops (FAO, 2021b).

In **Palestine**, around two million people were acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance in 2020 (OCHA, 2021n). Between 10 and 21 May 2021, hostilities escalated in Gaza, with destructive strikes from air, land and sea targeting government buildings, houses and public service facilities. As the economic situation was already critical in the territory, the conflict contributed to increasing food insecurity, notably among 2 000 internally displaced families and 20 000 farmers who lost access to incomes (WFP, 2021f). Around 158 hectares of greenhouses, irrigated and rainfed crops and orchards were estimated to have sustained damages (FAO, 2021i). Food prices increased considerably compared to the previous year, also in combination with increasing international prices (WFP, 2021g).

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, around 12.4 million people – or 60 percent of the population – were food insecure in late 2020, based on the WFP Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology (OCHA, 2021o). In 2021, food security was significantly affected by drought in combination with a profound economic crisis, protracted displacement, and severely affected livelihoods after 10 years of conflict. The general security situation remained volatile in October 2021, with intensified hostilities reported in northern Aleppo (WFP, 2021h). High inflation rates, weakening currency and shortages of basic products, including fuel, prevail. The impact of sanctions has worsened matters for millions of Syrians, directly or indirectly (FAO, 2021j). In October 2021, the national average price of WFP's standard reference food basket reached its highest ever recorded level since monitoring started in 2013 (WFP, 2021i). Insufficient and poorly distributed rainfall in the 2020/21 agricultural season, together with several heatwaves, the high cost of inputs, limited availability of irrigation water, and high cost of fuel for pumping, resulted in a contraction of the harvestable cereal area and the 2021 crop production (FAO, 2021j).

¹⁹ For Iraq, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic, only the 2020 acute food insecurity estimates based on the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) were available.

In **Myanmar**, the food security situation deteriorated significantly following the 1 February 2021 military takeover, subsequent civil unrest, and intensified conflict, combined with other factors such as the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 (FAO and WFP, 2021a). In 2021, around 13.2 million people were food insecure according to the WFP remote Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security (rCARI) methodology.²⁰ In 2021, the security situation deteriorated considerably in the northwestern states/regions of Chin, Magway and Sagaing, in the northern and southern parts Shan state, in the southeastern state of Kayah, as well as in Kavin state, already affected by large-scale protracted displacement. Between February and mid-November 2021, around 234 600 people were internally displaced and 15 000 crossed the border to neighbouring countries, particularly to Bangladesh and India (UNHCR, 2021d) – reaching a total of almost one million refugee and asylum-seekers in neighbouring countries, and around 600 000 protracted and new IDPs (UNHCR, 2021e). Most IDPs suffer from high levels of food insecurity as the conflict has limited people's movements and disrupted their livelihoods, making them highly dependent on humanitarian assistance. Around 55 percent of households (53 percent rural and 62 percent urban) were affected by shocks in mid-2021, in particular economic shocks, violence and conflict. Around 50 percent of crop producers reported facing challenges in crop production, and 44 percent reported producing less, particularly in Kayah and Rakhine states (FAO and WFP, 2021c). Humanitarian access in the country remained severely hampered by insecurity, administrative impediments, and COVID-19-related restrictions after a deadly third wave of contagion between June and August 2021 (OCHA, 2021p). In addition, income losses due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have already had a severe and adverse impact on the food security situation of vulnerable households (FAO, 2021b).

Yemen remains one of the ten countries with the worst food crises in the world (FSIN and GNAFC, 2021a). Despite the constant delivery of humanitarian assistance, an alarming increase in the population experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) reached 16.2 million people – or 54 percent of the total population analysed – between January and June 2021. Out of these, 5.1 million people were projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and the number of those in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) was projected to increase to 47 000 (IPC, 2021m). This represents a significant increase compared to the October–December 2020 period, when about 13.5 million – or 45 percent of the population analysed – were facing high levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). In addition, over 2.25 million cases of children aged 0 to 59 months, and more than a million cases of pregnant and lactating women, were projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in the course of 2021 in Yemen (IPC, 2021n).

The recent upsurge of hostilities and armed fighting in 2020 and 2021, notably in Ma'rib, Shabwah and Al Bayda governorates since early September, has led to civilian casualties, widespread displacement and humanitarian access constraints (OCHA, 2021q), as well as the disruption of public services, fuel crisis, blockade and restrictions (IPC, 2021o). There are more than four million IDPs in Yemen who faced comparatively worse food insecurity and malnutrition conditions than the rest of the population (UNHCR, 2021f). Reductions in humanitarian food assistance and deficits in funding have led

²⁰ For Myanmar, the 2021 estimates were based on the WFP reduced-Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (rCARI). The WFP rCARI methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing. Therefore, there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. For instance, preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9-10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity. Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed. In Myanmar, rCARI data were collected in the frame of a Joint FAO-WFP Food Security and Livelihood Survey. The results were triangulated with other food security indicators, some of them part of the IPC reference table. Despite some differences, there is a general convergence of these indicators in terms of outcomes on coping and food consumption.

to increased levels of vulnerability for most of the population, who rely on humanitarian assistance. Agricultural livelihood activities have been hindered by conflict through reduced availability and access to inputs albeit favourable weather conditions (IPC, 2021m; FAO, 2021b). Following more than five years of protracted conflict, the economy of the country is advancing toward collapse, with the exchange rate of the Yemeni rial to the US dollar in continued deterioration as of September 2021. This has led to further negative impacts on food systems, with increased costs of the minimum food basket due to accelerated increases in imported food commodity prices (WFP, 2021j). Deteriorating socio-economic conditions brought increasingly widespread and violent protests between January and September 2021, further hindering the circulation of goods, services, and access to income (ACAPS, 2021a).

Latin America and the Caribbean

In **Haiti**, the food security situation continued deteriorating in 2021, as around 4.3 million people were estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between September 2021 and February 2022. This represents 44 percent of the population analysed in the country – compared to 41 percent during the same period in 2020. Most significantly, around 1.3 million people were estimated to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity and required urgent action to save lives and livelihoods. Five areas were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during this period, in the rural areas of Sud, Nippes, Nord-Ouest and Centre departments and in the urban poor areas of Cité Soleil. The rest of the country is classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). These estimates consider the large-scale provision of humanitarian food assistance. The situation is expected to further deteriorate, as around 4.6 million people – or 46 percent of the population analysed – are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) from March until June 2022 (IPC, 2021p).²¹

Crop losses resulting from below-average rainfalls in the spring season, combined to poor macro-economic performances, widespread insecurity, as well as the recent earthquake and tropical storm impacts on livelihoods severely affected access to food for the most vulnerable households. Since mid-2021, gang violence displaced around 19 000 people in the urban areas of Port-au-Prince. The related insecurity and possible social unrest could further hinder the circulation of food in the country, notably in urban areas at least until mid-2022 (IPC, 2021p). The country has faced an economic slowdown since 2018 notably due to socio-political instability and socio-economic impact of COVID-19. The annual inflation rate remained high at 20.5 percent in 2021 (IMF, 2021b), significantly affecting food prices – the cost of a basic food basket increased by 30 percent between January and July 2021 alone (IPC, 2021p). The national currency steadily depreciated, with a reduction of more than 30 percent of its value during the first nine months of 2021 (FAO, 2021i). The increasing prices of agricultural input also lowered farmers' access to seeds, affecting the planted area of cereals and beans. Since 2018, the country has experienced several poor agricultural campaigns due to the lack of access to seeds and/or unfavourable climatic conditions. This strongly deteriorated the resilience of affected farmers, for whom several successive good agricultural campaigns are required to restore their livelihoods. In August 2021, a 7.2-magnitude earthquake and a tropical depression have caused losses of lives and severe damages to infrastructure in Sud, Grand'Anse, Nippes and Sud-Est departments, and further diminished livelihood opportunities of the affected households (FAO, 2021b).

²¹ It also constitutes an increase compared to the same period in 2021 when the acute food insecurity peak was reached with 4.4 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in March-June.

Section 2. Highlighted countries of concern

Conflict and insecurity triggered severe deteriorations in acute food insecurity between late 2020 and late 2021, with populations in Emergency or worse (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above) significantly increasing in certain countries and territories. In particular, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Yemen faced among the largest increases during this period.²² In Yemen and Ethiopia, the population in Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 or above) increased by over 1.4 million in both countries, including increases of 30 000 people in Yemen and 401 000 of people in Ethiopia facing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5). In the Central African Republic, the share of the population analysed in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increased from 9 percent late 2020 to 13 percent in late 2021.

There has been a sharp conflict-related deterioration in food insecurity in these three countries and territories, documented humanitarian access constraints in reaching food insecure populations and evidence of conflict-specific food system damage. The UNSC Resolution 2417 condemns both the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. The Resolution calls on parties to conflicts to grant humanitarian access and provides the Security Council with options for responding to situations in which access is denied. It also reminds all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the protection of civilians, highlighting that armed conflict, violations of international law and related food insecurity can also be drivers of displacement.

The Resolution 2417 stresses that “...objects necessary for food production and distribution, such as farms, markets, water systems, mills, food processing and storage sites” must not be attacked and that “...objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets...and irrigation works”,²³ must not be destroyed, targeted or rendered useless.

The evolution of the situation in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Yemen between late 2020 and late 2021 is particularly worrying.

This section seeks to contribute to the monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2417 in these three countries and territories. It explores some of the impacts of armed conflict on food security from the perspective of protecting civilians, as well as the challenges of securing safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access, both of which are addressed by resolution 2417. Any further deterioration in these areas over the coming months could lead to a risk of famine.

For each of these countries and territories of concern, three distinct conflict-related impacts referenced in Resolution 2417 are examined:

²² In terms of absolute increase, only Afghanistan exceeded the increasing levels reached in Ethiopia and Yemen; in terms of increase in prevalence, the Central African Republic was the worst affected country after Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, South Sudan, and Yemen. While Afghanistan will be covered in the April 2022 issue no. 10 of this update, and South Sudan was covered in issue no. 8 of this update, in Haiti the deterioration was due to economic shocks, weather extremes and the combination with insecurity, rather than due to conflict and insecurity alone like in the three countries covered here.

²³ Security Council resolution 2417 of 24 May 2018 (S/RES/2417), para. 1.

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Mass-displacement due to conflict and conflict-induced hunger continues to proliferate in crises around the world. New and existing displacement remains a major concern in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Yemen. Although population movement is primarily linked to violence, the inability to provide food for family members is also a clear factor in displacement. Fighting has cut off many communities from infrastructure, transport routes and markets, leaving people food insecure, particularly during lean seasons. This phenomenon has accelerated population movements in all three countries and territories of concern.

Impact of conflict on food systems

One of the most worrying aspects of contemporary conflicts is their impact on essential food systems and objects indispensable to the survival²⁴ of civilian populations. Farms, crops, grazing pastures, fisheries, irrigation systems, livestock, mills and food processing and storage sites are all targeted with alarming regularity. Such actions are specifically referenced in Resolution 2417 and continue to be encountered by United Nations agencies in crises around the world, including in all the three countries and territories of concern.

Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarianists' ability to work


Humanitarian access remains one of the most critical issues affecting aid agencies operating in complex emergencies and underpins Resolution 2417. As in so many other contexts, obstacles to reaching people in need are significant and contribute directly to food insecurity in each of the three countries and territories examined in this section. Furthermore, constantly shifting political and security landscapes are a major source of disruption for humanitarianists in protracted conflicts. There is compelling evidence of interference and disruption faced by humanitarianists in all three countries and territories of concern.

²⁴ Objects indispensable to survival are non-exhaustively defined in article 54 of Additional Protocol I (applicable in international armed conflicts) and article 14 of Additional Protocol II (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as "...foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works."


Central African Republic

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | September 2021–March 2022



Projected | April–August 2022



IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Areas not included in the analysis
- Displaced population in camps (colour depicts phase classification)
- At least 25 percent of households meet 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance
- At least 25 percent of households meet over 50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance

Source: Central African Republic IPC Technical Working Group, October 2021. Preliminary results pending official release at national level.

- Around 2.1 million people – representing 43 percent of the population analysed – were estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between September 2021 and March 2022. This is a worrying deterioration compared to the same post-harvest period a year earlier given that the population in high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) increased by 9 percent or 167 000 people.
- During this period, nine sub-prefectures were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) located in Ouham Pende, Ouaka, Basse Kotto and Haut Mbomou. The rest of the country was classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) – except four sub-prefectures not analysed for lack of evidence. All the areas classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) also face serious levels of acute malnutrition (IPC, 2021b).

- Around 620 000 people were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and were mainly located in the prefectures of Ouham Pende, Bangui, Ouham, Ouaka, Basse Kotto, Ombella M’Poko and Mambéré-Kadei, even though all prefectures analysed had population facing the same critical level of acute food insecurity.
- Between April and August 2022, acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate with 2.4 million people – or 48 percent of the population analysed – in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), and the population in Emergency (IPC phase 4) increasing to 689 000 people. Twenty sub-prefectures are expected to face Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) and 17 others are expected to be on the threshold of slipping into this phase (IPC, 2021a).

Overview of conflict impact on food security

Since 2013, the Central African Republic has witnessed continuous fighting of varying intensity (International Crisis Group, 2021). Conflict and its consequences have disrupted livelihoods and food security and they continue to limit humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. They also constrain economic and agricultural activities in a country in which agriculture and livestock account for 50 percent and more than 12 percent of the gross domestic product respectively.

In the run-up to presidential elections in December 2020, a new surge in violence erupted in the country. Different non-state armed groups formed the Coalition of Patriots for Change aiming to overthrow the re-elected President Touadéra. Following initial advances by the Coalition of Patriots for Change, the Central African Armed Forces, supported by their allies, carried out a counteroffensive. As key towns have been gradually seized from rebel forces, armed groups continue to control several key roads. Widespread violence and insecurity threaten the safety of civilians, many of whom are small-scale farmers who have lost their productive assets when their villages were attacked, leaving them extremely vulnerable, and hamper the flow of essential commodities into and throughout the country (Refugees International, 2021).

The humanitarian emergency in the Central African Republic has reached levels not seen since 2015 (OCHA, 2021r). Conflict has further deteriorated an already fragile security situation, affecting market functionality, food production and access to humanitarian assistance. The number of people facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) is expected to reach 2.1 million between September 2021–March 2022 (IPC, 2021a). Persistent conflict and displacement, coupled with restrictive measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic, continue to affect agricultural activities and limited farmers’ access to crop growing areas and inputs, with a negative impact on 2021 crop production (FAO, 2021a).

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Between September 2020 and May 2021, widespread violations of international humanitarian law have been reported by the UNSC Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, including excessive use of force, indiscriminate killings, torture and sexual violence (UNSC, 2021a). Such violations continued after the release of the Panel of Experts’ report, as documented by the UN Secretary-General (UNSC, 2021b).

The fear of attacks and extortions by armed groups significantly limits people’s mobility and access to fields and forests to cultivate, gather and hunt (OCHA, 2021s). Access to land declined as the conflict has progressed, negatively affecting cultivation and harvesting. Throughout 2021, fields and villages were occupied by armed groups, preventing some households from accessing crops and opportunities to harvest safely (OCHA, 2021t). A significant increase in sexual and gender-based

violence has been observed against women and girls, especially in fields, forests and on the road, highlighting the risk they face in their daily chores and whilst farming (OCHA, 2021u). Widespread violence has also caused massive and frequent displacement. It is estimated that about 1.4 million people – almost one-third of the country's population – are either internally displaced or refugees in neighbouring countries (FAO, 2021a). Limited access to agricultural land and the abandonment of crops due to forced displacement have been identified as major causes leading to a 40 percent decrease in harvests compared to 2020 (FAO, 2021m). The decrease in agricultural production is likely to have a significant impact on livelihoods, diminishing the ability of poor households to purchase commodities, medication and access basic services, given that agriculture is the main source of income in the Central African Republic (OCHA, 2021t).

Areas with high IDP populations were characterized by a high prevalence of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity, particularly Basse Kotto, Haute-Kotto, Ouham, Ouham Pende and Ouaka provinces. IDPs interviewed in preparation of the 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview ranked access to food as their primary need (OCHA, 2021t). Reduced access to seeds and fertilizers, pest and plant diseases, were also reported as major food security related challenges. This situation is even more worrying given that armed groups near, or even inside, IDP sites have been observed exerting pressure and making threats during humanitarian assistance distributions (OCHA, 2021t). Pockets of acute malnutrition have appeared among populations living in IDP sites (e.g. in Bambari, Bouar and Dékoa) as well as in host communities where access to health care, food, and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services is limited or non-existent. The lack of basic social services and social safety nets in already vulnerable host communities have strained local resources and weakened social cohesion (IPC, 2021a).

Conflict has largely contributed to the degradation of WASH services. Displacement and insecurity have caused the abandonment of WASH structures, when they were not deliberately vandalized, or corpses did not contaminate wells. Access to drinking water remains a serious concern throughout the country, mainly for IDPs, returnees and host communities (OCHA, 2021v).

Conflict and violence in the Central African Republic have affected people's access and ability to produce food through different channels. The disruption of transport routes, including through blockades, had a disproportionate impact on national food supplies given the country's high dependence on imports of food and agricultural inputs. Blockades along the Douala Corridor, the main supply road between the Central African Republic and Cameroon, led to shortages of basic items in local markets and caused severe price hikes (up to 240 percent for imported staple foods and 44 percent for local goods) (NRC, 2021a). Similar market disruptions took place in remote areas of the country, affecting local trade routes with neighbouring countries. In eastern areas, insecurity along supply routes to and from South Sudan was identified as a major factor driving price hikes in Obo prefecture, which recorded the highest monthly spike in August 2021 (REACH, 2021a). Local traders identified insecurity as the primary cause of food price hikes in the first three months of 2021 (REACH, 2021b).

Decreasing access to agricultural production inputs, including seeds, pest management and extension services, is another cause of food security deterioration. This will likely lead to below-average harvests in the north of the country. The presence of armed groups in northwest and southeast prefectures is also expected to cause below-average harvests, as they limit access to land and crops, and increase the risk of looting (FEWS NET, 2021b). Negative coping strategies such as selling seeds, begging, survival sex, forced marriage and child labour have also emerged among populations affected by conflict and food insecurity (OCHA, 2021t).

The capture and killing of livestock, including large animals and small ruminants, is also particularly concerning, given their critical role in agricultural production and use as complementary sources of

food. The UNSC's Panel of Experts reported several incidents (e.g. in Bakouma, Bangassou, and Bouar), implicating all parties to the conflict, including cattle theft. The Panel reported widespread accounts of looting of houses and buildings, as well as theft of chickens and goats (UNSC, 2021b).

The prefecture of Ouham-Pendé, a key hotspot of violence in the northwest, is a key example of conflict affecting local food systems significantly. Since December 2020, it recorded one of the sharpest increases of food insecurity nationwide, with three sub-prefectures falling into Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and the projected number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) more than doubling – from 50 920 between September 2020 and April 2021 to 110 526 between September 2021 and March 2022 (IPC, 2021q). In Ouham-Pendé, up to 30 percent of local farmers reported their inability to cultivate due to insecurity and consequent lack of access to agricultural fields (FEWS NET, 2021b).

Impact of the conflict on humanitarian access and humanitarian workers' ability to work

Since December 2020, the resurgence of violence has resulted in reduced humanitarian access and a more dangerous working environment for humanitarian workers. Armed clashes, direct targeting of humanitarian assets and facilities, suspected presence of improvised explosive devices, military operations, denials of access and logistical constraints have all resulted in frequent restrictions on movement and suspension of humanitarian operations. There were 364 incidents affecting humanitarian personnel or property between January and October 2021, corresponding to a seven percent increase from the same period in 2020 (OCHA, 2021w).

The targeting of aid workers and humanitarian assets by all parties to the conflict remains a pressing concern. Between January and October 2021, 24 humanitarian personnel were injured in attacks and three were killed (OCHA, 2021w). Insecurity and direct targeting pushed several NGOs to scale back or suspend their interventions, including Médecins Sans Frontières whose facilities were ransacked and destroyed (MSF, 2021). The UNSC Panel of Experts also reported incidences of looting targeting humanitarian organizations (UNSC, 2021b). Overall, between January and October 2021, theft, robbery, looting, threats and assaults accounted for nearly two-third of incidents, while the remaining third were interference and restrictions, all affecting the safety and work of humanitarian actors and organizations (OCHA, 2021w).

The use of explosive devices has increased significantly with the intensification of conflict since mid-April, particularly in the west of the country, limiting humanitarian staff movement and people's access to aid and services (ACAPS, 2021b). This is particularly affecting roads in the border areas with Cameroon and Chad (OCHA, 2021w). As of November 2021, roads and transportation hubs in Mambéré, Mambéré-Kadéï, Nana and Ouham Pendé are considered at high risk for explosive devices and remain almost impassable, risking cutting off these areas from food and other humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2021w).

Humanitarian access in several areas of the country has been prevented by both armed groups and national defence forces, and other security personnel, which is in violation of the status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and the Government (UNSC, 2021a). Non-governmental organizations operating in remote rural areas face disproportionate difficulties in providing support to vulnerable populations (IPC, 2021q).


Overall, armed conflict is the major factor contributing to food insecurity in the Central African Republic. Areas severely affected by insecurity and logistical constraints are also those where food insecurity is of greatest concern (IPC Phases 3 and 4). Humanitarian monitoring systems indicate a direct link between conflict, growing access challenges and the sharp increase in food insecurity (OCHA, 2021t). With no end of the conflict in sight, the vast majority of conflict-affected people will continue to rely on humanitarian assistance in the coming months. Without safe, sustained and

unimpeded humanitarian access to the areas with the highest acute food insecurity, a quarter million people are expected to slip into a food security disaster (OCHA, 2021x).




Ethiopia

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | May–June 2021



Projected | July–September 2021



IPC acute food insecurity phase classification



Note

The IPC estimates for Ethiopia in July–September 2021 reflect the merger of the October 2020 and May 2021 IPC projection results. This merger was conducted in order to take into account the dramatic deterioration of the food security situation in the Tigray region due to conflict. This includes the results for the areas/woredas for which analysis was conducted in October 2020 and then subsequently updated in May 2021. However, certain areas were analysed in May 2021 that were not subsequently covered in the projections for July–September 2021. The IPC analysis conducted in May is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. The Government of Ethiopia has not endorsed the May 2021 IPC analysis.

Source: Ethiopia IPC Technical Working Group, October 2020 and June 2021.

- Lack of information on the food security situation in Afar, Amhara and Tigray is a cause of major concern.
- According to the June 2021 analysis, food insecurity has rapidly and significantly deteriorated since the conflict in Northern Ethiopia erupted, with up to 5.5 million people in acute food insecurity (IPC Phase and worse), including 353 000 people in Tigray in catastrophic levels (IPC Phase 5) between May and June 2021 (IPC, 2021r).

- The IPC analysis of June 2021 projected that approximately 401 000 people would suffer from famine-like conditions in Tigray by end of September 2021 (IPC, 2021r).²⁵
- The risk that the food security situation has further deteriorated in northern Ethiopia is high, considering impeded movement of commercial and humanitarian cargo into Tigray, and access challenges in other conflict-affected areas.
- Close to 20 million people require humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia. Eighteen million of these require urgent food assistance – 5.2 million people in Tigray and 12.8 million in other regions. This represents a 53 percent increase in people targeted for food assistance when compared to the same period in 2020 (OCHA, 2021y; OCHA, 2021z).

Overview of conflict impact on food security

In November 2020, conflict broke out between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopian National Defense Forces and their respective allies in Tigray region, northern Ethiopia. Since mid-2021, the conflict has escalated to neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara. The conflict has resulted in the death of thousands, the internal displacement of millions of people and caused refugees to flee to the Sudan, alongside widespread destruction and looting of basic infrastructure.

Lack of updated information on the food security situation in Afar, Amhara and Tigray is a cause of major concern, given that the previous analysis projected approximately 401 000 people suffering from famine-like conditions, bringing the total to 4.4 million people in need of urgent food and livelihoods assistance in northern Ethiopia by September 2021. Considering the changing context, the food security situation is now unknown in some areas, however the risk of deterioration in the food security situation in northern Ethiopia is high, considering the current blockade in Tigray and access challenges in other conflict-affected areas.

Humanitarian access remains extremely restricted across northern Ethiopia. In some parts of Tigray, northern Afar, northern and northeastern Amhara, conflict-affected populations are inaccessible to humanitarian actors due to ongoing hostilities and bureaucratic impediments. In July 2021, the IPC Famine Review Committee warned that a further intensification of the conflict, humanitarian access issues and intermittent private and informal supply lines would lead to a high ‘Risk of Famine’ to occur by the end of 2021 (IPC, 2021h). While the security situation within Tigray has improved since July 2021, humanitarian access and movement of commercial supplies to the region continue to face major restrictions.

²⁵ The figures for the rest of the country were informed by the HEA analysis, which was undertaken in August. For Tigray the food cluster maintained 5.2 million figure, a figure which the food cluster was using before the release of the IPC findings. IPC projected a figure of 3.9 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Tigray alone between July-September 2021, of which 401 000 were projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

Box 6. Risk of Famine in northern Ethiopia

The IPC analysis update for Tigray and neighbouring zones within Afar and Amhara regions was conducted in May 2021. Following the disagreement expressed by the Ethiopian Government regarding the IPC analysis process, methodology and subsequent reporting of the results, the IPC Global Steering Committee activated the IPC Famine Review Committee to determine the plausibility of the IPC classification and, considering newly available data, provide their perspective on the acute food insecurity situation going forward.

In July 2021, the IPC Famine Review confirmed the conclusions on the IPC classification reached by the country's IPC Analysis Team for the current and projected periods, regarding both the severity and magnitude of the acute food insecurity situation. It supported the IPC Analysis Team's findings that roughly 401 000 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), in addition to 4 million people in Crisis or Emergency (IPC Phase 3 or 4) located in Tigray and neighbouring zones of Afar and Amhara regions between July and September.

The IPC Famine Review Committee further highlighted that the crisis has been caused by human activities and could be prevented with effective negotiation and commitments to peaceful reconciliation.

The IPC Famine Review Committee further identified that there was a risk that Famine would occur by end of 2021, depending on: (1) the intensity of the conflict; (2) sustained humanitarian access and level of operations; and (3) functionality of the private sector and informal supply lines, including availability of commercial goods and services. As of 29 November 2021, humanitarian access remains low to sporadic, and commercial supply lines and services intermittent, while the conflict inside Tigray has effectively ceased but spread to Afar and Amhara (IPC, 2021g; IPC, 2021h).

Almost two months after the projected period, no assessment has been undertaken to update the food security situation in Tigray, Afar and Amhara. A *Meher* multisectoral assessment and REACH assessment to establish the food and nutrition situation are currently ongoing.

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

The conflict has caused large-scale internal movement of people in Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions. As of December 2021, around 2.1 million people have been internally displaced in Tigray (UNHCR, 2021a), with an additional an additional estimated 2.2 million IDPs in Amhara and 376 500 IDPs in Afar (IMC, 2021). While refugee movements continue at a low rate, this could increase if fighting escalates in western Tigray (UNHCR, 2021g).

In Tigray, major displacement was in the Central, Eastern, Northwestern and Western zones, especially in districts (*woredas*) bordering Eritrea (OCHA, 2021b; IMC, 2021). In Amhara, forced displacement occurred in North Gonder, Wag Hemra, North and South Wello zones as well as in and around Baati, Dessie, Kamissie and Kombolcha (OCHA, 2021b). In Afar, an additional 500 000 people in Awsi, Kilbati and Fanti zones are at high risk of displacement if the conflict continues (OCHA, 2021aa). Once displaced, people are likely to return to their place of origin based on three key factors: (1) security; (2) availability of services, especially health; and (3) areas expecting over 50 percent of the normal harvest. Thirty eight of the 84 districts (*woredas*) in Tigray were found to meet these requirements²⁶, and there are signs that some IDPs have started to return. Support for larger-scale returns in Tigray will be informed by a pilot that is underway in Samre *woreda*.

²⁶ FAO generated data based on information provided by the Tigray Bureau of Agriculture showing high and low *Meher* production areas, produced 28 November 2021, available on request.

Population displacement has been driven by attacks against civilians and fear of persecution. It is widely reported that forcibly displaced populations are unable to return to their places of origin due to fear of violence, loss of or damage to public and private property, including objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, and limited livelihood opportunities (OCHA, 2021bb). In November 2021 the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation Team stated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict have undertaken direct or indiscriminate attacks on civilians (EHRC and OHCHR, 2021).

Farms have been attacked, crops destroyed and livestock killed or looted across northern regions of Afar, Amhara and Tigray, directly affecting the food security of local populations, forcing them to move (EHRC and OHCHR, 2021). Due to uncertainty over the conflict's evolution, concerns that humanitarian assistance will not reach rural areas and, given the level of destruction of infrastructure, health and water services, returns have to date been minimal. Consequently, large populations remain displaced and unable to access normal livelihood activities.

Internal displacement has directly contributed to the deterioration of food insecurity in conflict-affected areas and internally displaced populations remain particularly vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition. Many internally displaced people left farmland behind, affecting food security and agricultural productivity. Agriculture is the main source of food and livelihood for over 80 percent of the population in Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions. Poor households in northern Ethiopia rely on their own crop production and income earned through agricultural and non-agricultural labour to meet basic food needs (ACAPS, 2021c). In addition to the impact on the agricultural sector, displacement has caused economic downturns and affected trade across conflict-affected areas, reducing people's ability to generate income and access services. Seasonal labour migration, traditionally essential to cope with inadequate access to food in difficult periods, has also been hampered due to insecurity, displacement and movement restrictions (IPC, 2021r).

Conflict-induced displacement has also impacted the functioning of social protection systems. In 2018, around 18 percent of the Tigrayan population, including many of its most vulnerable and food-insecure households, received payments under the Productive Safety Net Programme (ACAPS, 2021c). While most of the Programme's beneficiaries received distributions between February and July 2020, roughly 250 000 permanent direct support beneficiaries receive year-round assistance. It is not clear whether these beneficiaries have received a distribution since August 2020. The Programme's distributions are likely to be limited in the short to medium term as the resumption of deliveries require the transfer of funds from the federal government to the regional government (FEWS NET, 2021c). An estimated 1.7 million Programme's beneficiaries in Afar (290 000) and Amhara (1.4 million) are not able to access their entitlements due to the conflict.

Impact of conflict on food systems

Conflict and the conduct by parties to the conflict have reduced the ability of families to produce food and earn income to access food, thus leaving people destitute. Belligerents have attacked objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, contributing significantly to food insecurity in Tigray, and more recently in the neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions.

In November 2021, according to the Joint Investigation Team, all parties to the conflict have engaged in direct or indiscriminate attacks against objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, including food stores, crops and livestock (EHRC and OHCHR, 2021).

In early November 2020, farms were attacked in areas near to Mai Kadra in Tigray. The attackers burnt the harvest of 5 620 quintals of sesame (EHRC and OHCHR, 2021). Similarly in Axum, sugar and flour were looted from the Guna Trading store, and truckloads of sugar, cooking oil, lentils, flour and animal fodder were stolen from the Dejen Flour Factory. In Amhara, there have been reports of several warehouses being looted and completely emptied (U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, 2021).

More recently, boys looking after cattle near Mekelle were killed and other civilians injured when airstrikes hit farmland in October 2021 (EHRC and OHCHR, 2021). In another incident on the same day, seven civilians were injured following airstrikes near a market in Mekelle. Between August and September 2021, in the South Gondar and North Wollo zones of Amhara region, parties to the conflict killed at least 184 civilians, and have systematically committed large-scale looting and destruction of public and private properties (EHRC, 2021).

Conflict is the primary driver of a projected poor harvest in northern Ethiopia. In Tigray, between February and May 2021, few farmers were able to engage in the planting season, which is estimated will reduce the 2021 cereal yield by more than half (WFP, 2021k). As in 2020, the escalation of conflict is occurring at the peak of the 2021 *Meher* harvest season, hence hindering harvesting in conflict-affected areas. Parts of Amhara region are expected to face similar losses due to the ongoing conflict (OCHA, 2021cc). It is projected that food assistance will be required until the next harvest in October 2022 (IPC, 2021g).

The conflict has severely inhibited economic activity through various pathways. The functionality of markets, the second key source of food in Tigray (IPC, 2021r), and supply lines have been seriously disrupted by attacks, insecurity, and roadblocks, reducing the availability of food, fuel and other essential goods. Checkpoints have been set up on roads by all parties to the conflict, both intermittently and for extended periods, affecting the movement of goods (EHRC and OHCHR, 2021). As of September 2021, infrastructure in 85 of the 200 markets in Tigray were non-functional or destroyed (WFP, 2021k). Overall, this resulted in rising prices and left local markets at or near collapse. The lack of commercial supplies arriving to Tigray has led to severe shortages of essential commodities. The price of essential commodities in Mekelle and Shire has significantly increased since mid-June 2021, making them unaffordable for most of the population. The cost of petrol has increased by 2 300 percent in Shire, cooking oil by 433 percent in Mekelle, and rice by over 100 percent in both towns (OCHA, 2021dd).

In conflict-affected areas in Afar and Amhara regions, market disruption has affected cattle farmers who rely on these markets for trading animals and purchasing food. Food prices have significantly increased while livestock prices have remained low due to decreased demand (OCHA, 2021ee). High food prices contribute to reducing households' purchasing power, and as a result, the most vulnerable groups such as IDPs rely heavily on humanitarian food assistance (WFP, 2021k).

In Tigray, seasonal labour migration has been hampered due to insecurity and movement restrictions (IPC, 2021r). Blackouts and disruptions of electricity, telecommunications and banking services have been persistent concerns throughout the conflict that hampered economic activities. Since the end of July 2021, these have become more severe (ACAPS, 2021d).

In addition, across northern Ethiopia, desert locust control operations remain compromised due to insecurity, with flights grounded. Fortunately, the impact of the desert locusts on the *Meher* harvest has been minimal (OCHA, 2021ff).

Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarian workers' ability to work

In July 2021, the IPC Famine Review Committee warned that, with regards to Tigray, "...unfettered humanitarian access and uninterrupted influx of sufficient humanitarian supplies" was one of the critical factors to mitigate the risk of a famine to occur within the end of 2021 (IPC, 2021g; IPC 2021h). However, between mid-July and mid-October, only 14 percent of humanitarian supplies needed to meet the needs have entered the Tigray region (OCHA, 2021ee; UN, 2021a).

Since the beginning of the conflict, humanitarian access constraints have persisted in different forms, such as high levels of insecurity and fighting, movement restrictions due to roadblocks and checkpoints, bureaucratic impediments, and logistical issues (ACAPS, 2021d).

By March 2021, access within Tigray improved beyond main roads, and administrative processes eased. However, between July and September 2021, while there was relatively good access inside Tigray, sporadic denials of movement by armed elements remained a challenge, alongside a persistent lack of fuel, cash and supplies for operations (OCHA, 2021ff). Insecurity, changes in local administration and multiple checkpoints along major roads continue to impede safe and free movement of humanitarian goods and workers (ACAPS, 2021d). Also, access to rural areas, western Tigray and areas along the border with Eritrea remains difficult. The majority of conflict-affected areas in Afar and Amhara are not accessible.

Since July 2021, access to Tigray from outside the region has been restricted by logistical and bureaucratic impediments including long delays for clearance of humanitarian supplies (UN, 2021b; ACAPS, 2021d; OCHA, 2021ff). Road access is only possible through Afar region (OCHA, 2021gg). Between 24 and 30 November 2021, four convoys totalling 157 trucks with humanitarian supplies arrived in Mekelle (OCHA, 2021b). These were the first supplies to get into Tigray by road since 18 October 2021. As of 2 December 2021, fuel has not arrived in Tigray via the Afar route since 2 August, with eight tankers currently in Semera (Afar) waiting for clearance to proceed (OCHA, 2021ee; UN, 2021a). An estimated 100 trucks with food, non-food items, and fuel must enter Tigray daily to meet critical humanitarian needs (OCHA, 2021ee).

In Tigray, blackouts and disruption to electricity, telecommunications and banking services have persistently affected humanitarian operations, becoming more severe since the start of the blockade (ACAPS, 2021d). In Amhara, electricity and telecommunications have been cut in Dessie and Kombolcha since 30 October and commercial flights to Kombolcha have been suspended since mid-October (OCHA, 2021hh).


The lack of access to cash is hampering humanitarian work, including payment of staff salaries and for goods and services. Internet and telecommunications network shutdowns prevent civilians from receiving information about food and shelter, and also impede humanitarian work, including efforts to identify people in need (ACAPS, 2021d).

The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service's (UNHAS) flights provide the only form of transport for humanitarian works, and to move cash into Tigray. These have been frequently postponed, cancelled or humanitarian workers have been barred from boarding because of bureaucratic procedures (ACAPS, 2021d). UNHAS's flights into Tigray were suspended on 22 October, after proximity with an airstrike forced a United Nations Humanitarian Air Service's flight bound for Mekelle to return to Addis Ababa (ACAPS, 2021d). UNHAS's flights to Mekelle resumed on 24 November 2021 after additional reassurances for their safety were received. Other destinations which are now included on the UNHAS monthly plan are not yet operationalized as similar assurances have not yet been obtained.



Yemen

Acute food insecurity situation

Current | October–December 2020*



Projected | January–June 2021*



IPC acute food insecurity phase classification



*Note

Nearly 260 districts out of 333 received significant humanitarian food assistance, from which at least 25 percent of households were meeting 25–50 percent of their caloric needs.

Source: Yemen IPC Technical Working Group, December 2020.

- In 2021, the population projected in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) reached 16.2 million (54 percent of the total population analysed) – a 20 percent increase compared to 13.5 million people in late 2020.
- Between January and June 2021, around 5.1 million people were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 47 000 were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Overall, this represents a 28 percent increase since late 2020.
- The populations with catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) were located in 11 districts of Al Jawf, Hajjah and Amran Governorates.
- The districts classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) were located in Abyan, Al Bayda, Al Dhale'e, Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, Amran, Dhamar, Hadramaut, Hajjah, Ibb, Ma'rib, Raymah, Sa'ada, Shabwah and Ta'izz Governorates.

Overview of conflict impact on food security

Ongoing conflict between the internationally recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) and the De-facto Authority (DFA), Ansar Allah (a Zaidi Shia political and armed group also known as the Houthi movement) escalated in 2015. Following the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sana'a, the Saudi-led coalition intervened militarily in support of the IRG. The conflict has resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis with over 18 000 civilian casualties between March 2015 and November 2020, up to 4.3 million people displaced, severe access constraints and an economic downturn leaving more than 20.7 million people (66 percent of the population) in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2021ii; kk; Yemen Data Project, 2020a). Since the internationalization of the conflict in March 2015, 233 000 Yemenis have lost their lives, including 131 000 people who died from indirect causes such as complications arising from lack of food, health services and infrastructure (OCHA, 2021ii). This is partially due to the naval blockade imposed in April 2015, hampering commercial shipping and at times the delivery of essential goods, has distorted market functionality, and contributed to rising food prices (Human Right Watch, 2017a; Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).

Yemen is 90 percent import-reliant for food (World Bank, 2021), with restrictions on air and sea imports continuing to contribute to shortages of fuel and food, causing price increases (UN, 2021c). Approximately 50 percent of all Yemenis are completely reliant on humanitarian food assistance (OCHA, 2021jj). Currently, the Houthis control the majority of northern and central Governorates, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) controls part of southern Yemen (mainly Aden and Socotra), and the IRG controls the remainder of southern and eastern Governorates. In 2020, the conflict intensified, and the number of frontlines increased from 33 to 49 (OCHA, 2021jj). Since early 2021, escalation in the conflict has led to dynamic front lines, most notably in the north-west and in the Al Hodeidah Governorate (OCHA, 2021kk).

Conflict, combined with the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions – with accelerated inflation – are the main drivers of food insecurity in Yemen (IPC, 2021m). Since the conflict started there has been widespread infrastructural damage, population displacement, disrupted livelihoods, falling household incomes, humanitarian access constraints, disruption of public services, and severe fuel shortages.

Impact of conflict on population movement and acute food insecurity

Conflict is the main driver of displacement in Yemen. More than four million people have been displaced since 2015, mostly due to airstrikes and violence, including 172 000 who fled their homes in 2020. Yemen has the world's fourth largest internally displaced population (OCHA, 2021jj).

Since 2015, over 23 000 airstrikes have been launched, with 10 airstrikes per day on average. Over ten percent of all air raids hit residential areas resulting in 40 percent of all civilian casualties (Yemen Data Project, 2021b). The use of airstrikes, shelling attacks and siege tactics by parties to the conflict, has caused massive and multiple displacement, and by impeding the delivery of food assistance it has likely contributed to increased food insecurity and starvation (UN, 2021c).

Another driver of displacement and killing of civilians has been the laying of landmines by one party to the conflict (Mwatana for Human Rights, 2021). At the start of 2021, almost 50 percent of IDP's hosting sites were within five kilometres of areas with active hostilities, landmines and explosive remnants of war. Over a million displaced people live in informal settlements representing ninety-three percent of overall settlements, where basic services, including food distribution and water are not provided and which are not reached by humanitarian actors (OCHA, 2021ii). One million IDPs in

Ma'rib are scattered across 130 camps, where their safety remains precarious due to ongoing fighting (NRC, 2021b).

IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants are likely to remain in extremely vulnerable situations. Protracted displacement of IDPs is very likely to continue, affecting resilience and exacerbating existing vulnerabilities, resulting in higher needs and negative coping mechanisms.

Impact of conflict on food systems

The current economic crisis is a direct and significant manifestation of the protracted conflict (IPC, 2021m). Since the start of the conflict, the economy has shrunk by more than half, with 80 percent of the population living below the poverty line in 2021 (OCHA, 2021jj). The steep depreciation of the Yemeni Rial in the south means it is now worth half of the currency's value in the north.

Food prices have generally continued to increase in all areas, with IRG-controlled areas continuing to be worst-affected. This is due primarily to depreciation of the currency, which coupled with fuel price increases in 2021, has put additional upward pressure on food prices (FEWS NET, 2021d).

The challenges in importing fuel through Hodeida and Saleef ports – which have registered a 70 percent decrease between January and September 2021 as compared to 2020 levels – account for the fuel price increase and their reverberation on the food basket (WFP, 2021l).

Conflict has severely reduced the ability of families to produce food and to earn income to access food. Key conflict related drivers affecting food security include direct attacks on farms and agricultural infrastructure, reduced access to water, agricultural inputs and markets, and the collapse of governance. Rural agriculture dependent households face low production associated with high input prices and diesel for irrigation, reduced agriculture labour opportunities, and limited access to farmland (Conflict Environment Observatory, 2021).

Independent reports have repeatedly identified military operations impacting food production and farms in areas known to be affected by food insecurity, and recommended parties to the conflict to cease attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (UN, 2021c; Mwatana for Human Rights, 2021).

The use of landmines in Ta'izz Governorate without demarcation has resulted in residents having to stop herding, logging, and agriculture, and access to land and water has been cut off (Mwatana for Human Rights, 2021; UNSC, 2021c). Similarly, in 2020 alone 42 attacks occurred against civilians in marketplaces (Mwatana for Human Rights, 2021).

Airstrikes have been documented on farms in Abs District in Hajjah Governorate, on water facilities in Sa'ada Governorate, and on artisanal fishing boats and equipment in Alluheyah District in Al-Hodeidah Governorate (Mwatana for Human Rights, 2021). Numerous reports have evidenced military operations impacting food production and farms in areas known to be affected by food insecurity, including airstrikes on the Salif Grains Port, in Hodeidah Governorate (CNN, 2021), and two commercial poultry farms in Amran Governorate, amongst other infrastructure (UN, 2021c).

Since 2015 - with few interruptions – there has been a de facto, selective naval and aerial blockade on Yemen's seaports and airports, in a country where 90 percent of food was imported before the war (World Bank, 2017). This has severely restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine to civilians. As a consequence of the blockade and the wider conflict, fishing has fallen to 50 percent or less of pre-war levels (Global Agricultural Monitoring, 2021). As most fishermen lack a secondary means of earning wages, they are particularly vulnerable to acute food insecurity.

Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarian workers' ability to work

The conflict in Yemen has impacted humanitarian assistance in a variety of ways, including restrictions on food, fuel, other imports, blocking the movement of humanitarian workers and critical supplies, looting, diversion of aid, intimidation and arrest of, or violence against, humanitarian personnel, as well as highly restrictive bureaucratic regulations.

The conflict has decimated public services and infrastructure with many roads, including major supply lines, closed or damaged and unreliable telecommunications and internet services (OCHA, 2021jj). The UN Group of Eminent Experts stressed that parties to the conflict have impeded humanitarian operations and the population's access to food (UN, 2021c).

As of 2021, the provision of life-saving assistance to the 20.1 million in need - including over 16 million acutely food insecure in 2021 - remains restricted. For example, all entry points into Yemen entry points were closed via a total air, sea and land blockade in 2017 after a missile attack on Riyadh airport. Instances of siege-like warfare impeding humanitarian access and aid delivery include around Ta'izz city since August 2015 and in Hajjah since the end of 2018, and more recently in October 2021 against 35 000 inhabitants of al-Abdiyah district for three weeks. The UN Group of Eminent Experts notes that "the siege-like conditions" in the "context of dire humanitarian needs" gave rise to "legitimate concerns" regarding whether these actions contributed to starvation (Mwatana for Human Rights, 2021).

In 2020, humanitarian actors reported 4 848 humanitarian access-related incidents, the vast majority of which were bureaucratic impediments including restrictions on movement – a considerable increase compared to 2019. Access incidents continued in 2021 (OCHA, 2021ll), with nearly 500 reports made within the first two months of the year, mostly related to restrictions of movement (OCHA, 2021ll).

Overall, violence and threats against humanitarian actors have decreased in 2020–2021 compared to 2019. In 2021, there were 28 incidents of violence against humanitarian personnel and assets reported from January to April (2-3 percent of all incidents) [OCHA, 2021ll; mm]; including physical assault, detention, intimidation, confiscation of humanitarian assets and occupation of humanitarian premises (OCHA, 2021jj).

While bureaucratic constraints were the most widely reported access issue in 2020 (OCHA, 2021jj; OCHA, 2021mm) independent reports have also stressed that overly restrictive bureaucratic measures have delayed relief operations and programmes in 2021 (OCHA, 2021jj; UN, 2021c).

Food security terms

The following glossary provides the definitions of the food security terms used in the update. The terms and definitions in this glossary have been compiled from existing glossaries and other reference material available to the public.

The **Cadre Harmonisé (CH)** is a unifying tool that allows for a relevant consensual, rigorous and transparent analysis of the current and projected food and nutrition situation in West Africa and the Sahel. It allows to classify the severity of food and nutrition insecurity according to the international classification scale through an approach referring to well-defined functions and protocols.

The CH and the IPC have the same analytical framework for analysing acute food insecurity and share the same core functions that form the fundamental bases of the analytical process.

The **Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)** is a common global scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition. It is the result of a partnership of various organizations at global, regional and country levels dedicated to developing and maintaining the highest possible quality in food security and nutrition analysis. Increasingly, the IPC is the international standard for classifying food insecurity and malnutrition in the context of emergency assessments. This report uses mainly the IPC acute food insecurity phase classification scale, which identifies populations and areas with food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as well as the need for urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect lives and livelihoods.

IPC/CH classification terms and definitions:

- **None/Minimal (IPC/CH Phase 1)**

People have stable access to food. Action is required to reduce people's vulnerability to disasters/shocks and to build resilience, so they can stay food secure.

- **Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2)**

People have erratic economic access to food and are vulnerable to disasters/shocks. Action is required to improve people's stability of access to food and to reduce their vulnerability to disasters/shocks.

- **Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3)**

People are malnourished due to inadequate access to food or they only have enough food by selling off their assets or through other harmful coping strategies. Urgent action is required to protect livelihoods and increase access to food to avoid a food emergency.

- **Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4)**

People are malnourished due to lack of food or mitigate large food consumption gaps by selling off their assets or through other emergency coping strategies. Urgent action is needed to save lives. If nothing is done, people could face extreme hunger or death.

- **Catastrophe/Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

People are malnourished due to lack of food and do not have any means left to access food. At area level, the population is in a situation of Famine (see definition below). Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) are considered as facing high levels of acute food insecurity and requiring urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition.

- **Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

Famine is the most severe phase of the IPC. It exists in areas where at least one in five households has or is most likely to experience an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or is likely to be occurring. The IPC only permits classification of Famine when all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols are met. The special protocols are the following:

- The requirement of reliable evidence on three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition (GAM) and crude death rate (CDR) – all of which are either currently above or projected to be above Famine thresholds (>20 percent of households with extreme food gaps, >30 percent of children acutely malnourished and CDR > 2/10 000/day).
- Undergoing a famine review process to validate the classification.
- Development of IPC Famine Alert adhering to pre-determined standards.

- **Famine-likely (IPC/CH Phase 5)**

The IPC permits the classification of Famine-likely when all regular and special protocols are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for the three outcomes. Areas can be classified as Famine-likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that Famine may be occurring or will occur. When an area is classified as Famine Likely, it should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

- **Risk of famine**

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most likely scenario, it is a scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring. It complements the Famine and Famine Likely projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated.

More information on the IPC Famine classification available at the following link:
www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf.

More information on the IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale at:
<https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/resources-details/en/c/1152890/>

WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI)

The WFP CARI methodology is used to classify individual households according to their level of acute food insecurity. All five indicators included within the CARI approach (Food Consumption Score, Food Energy Shortfall, Poverty Status, Food Expenditure Share, Livelihood Coping Indicator) can be incorporated within IPC analysis. The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator fits within the IPC analytical framework. The CARI is an analytical method designed to be an input to the IPC process. While the CARI approach is implemented through a single household survey intended to accurately measure household level food insecurity, the IPC approach built on the technical consensus among key stakeholders and consolidates wide-ranging evidence to classify severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition.

More information available at the following link:

www.wfp.org/publications/consolidated-approach-reporting-indicators-food-security-cari-guidelines.

The WFP remote-CARI (rCARI) methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web-based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results of traditional CARI methodology are ongoing, therefore there is uncertainty at this stage regarding the degree of over- and under-estimation biases. (Preliminary studies comparing the use of CARI and rCARI for Syrian refugees in Lebanon suggested around 9-10 percent under-estimation of acute food insecurity). Caution in reading the corresponding numbers should be observed.

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
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Contact

FAO Office of Emergencies and Resilience
OER-Director@fao.org
fao.org/emergencies | @FAOemergencies

World Food Programme
wfp.org | @WFP

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
and World Food Programme
Rome, Italy
