

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Cuba

I. Introduction

1. The position of Cuba with regard to nuclear weapons predates its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a State party on 4 November 2002. Cuba has never possessed, does not possess and has no intention to possess, or to manufacture, trade or supply, weapons of mass destruction of any kind. Cuba advocates the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and attaches the highest priority to this issue. This is enshrined in the foreign policy principles of the Republic of Cuba, as set out in the Constitution enacted on 24 February 2019, in which it is reaffirmed that the country “promotes general and complete disarmament and rejects the existence, proliferation or use of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction or other weapons with similar effects, as well as the development and use of new weapons and new forms of warfare, such as cyberwarfare, which violate international law”.

2. The State of Cuba does not exercise jurisdiction over a part of its sovereign territory, which is illegally occupied by the United States of America. Accordingly, the Government of Cuba does not know whether nuclear, chemical or biological materials, or even nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, have been emplaced at the United States naval base in Guantánamo, are currently there or are being maintained there, or whether there is an intention possess them there.

3. When it acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Cuba made a declaration setting out its position that the Treaty establishes a discriminatory international regime conducive to the existence of a “club of nuclear-weapon States”. Notwithstanding the years that have elapsed since the entry into force of the Treaty on 5 March 1970, the objective of the total elimination of such weapons has not been achieved. With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and our ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, we have renewed our commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

4. The success of the tenth Review Conference, scheduled for 2021, will depend in large part on whether its mandate is fully respected and whether the fulfilment of all commitments under the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty – disarmament,



non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – as a sine qua non for the legitimacy, integrity and effectiveness of the instrument is addressed, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner.

5. Cuba will continue to work together with the other States parties to the Treaty to achieve, as soon as possible, the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons, in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner.

II. Specific considerations relating to article III and its national implementation

6. The interest of Cuba in nuclear energy relates solely and exclusively to the peaceful uses of such energy, subject to verification by the competent authority, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

7. All Cuban programmes involving nuclear energy are strictly peaceful in nature. They have been and continue to be subject to strict control by the competent national authorities and have been monitored on a continuous basis by IAEA. This state of affairs predates the accession of Cuba to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as indicated by the partial agreements for the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a nuclear power plant by the then Soviet Union (INFCIRC/281), the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a nuclear research reactor by the then Soviet Union (INFCIRC/298) and the application of safeguards in connection with the supply of a zero-power nuclear reactor by the Hungarian People's Republic (INFCIRC/311), which entered into force on 5 May 1980, 25 September 1980 and 7 October 1983, respectively. The Board of Governors of IAEA authorized the Director General of the Agency to conclude with Cuba an additional protocol to its safeguards agreements, with the objective of ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards (GOV/1999/58). The additional protocol was signed in October 1999, strengthening the international safeguards regime. This step made Cuba the first country to sign an additional protocol to its safeguards agreements, the safeguards in question not being comprehensive safeguards.

8. Upon acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Cuba immediately began negotiations with IAEA¹ to establish agreements that would allow the Agency to verify the nuclear activities carried out in the country, in accordance with the commitments assumed under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.

9. As a result of those negotiations, and pursuant to article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty, on 9 September 2003 the Board of Governors approved the comprehensive safeguards agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/633) and the additional protocol to that agreement (INFCIRC/633/Add.1), which were signed by Cuba on 18 September 2003 and ratified on 27 May 2004, entering into force on 3 June 2004. These agreements were drafted and have been implemented in accordance with article III, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As part of its compliance with these responsibilities, Cuba carried out the following actions between the entry into force of the Treaty for Cuba and the 2015 Review Conference:

(a) Submission to IAEA of the initial report required under the comprehensive safeguards agreement, containing an inventory of the nuclear material in the country;

¹ Cuba is a founding and active member of the IAEA Board of Governors and has served 11 terms as a member of the Board, including 5 terms since its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(b) Suspension of the safeguards and reduction of the material balance area established for the Juraguá nuclear power plant, following the final decision to close down the facility, construction of which had been halted in 1992;

(c) Conclusion of the negotiations on the structure of the Cuban safeguards with two material balance areas as locations outside facilities and the establishment of key measurement points;

(d) Conduct of annual inspections of the elements subject to control pursuant to the partial safeguards agreements;

(e) Submission of all the reports and declarations required pursuant to the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol, and of responses in relation to all clarifications and communications requested from Cuba by the IAEA Department of Safeguards;

(f) Agreement with IAEA of a procedure for the issuance of multiple-entry visas to safeguards inspectors approved for Cuba;

(g) Implementation of integrated safeguards, which entered into force for Cuba on 1 January 2009;

(h) Conduct of inspections incorporating additional access, in accordance with the verification regime established by IAEA;

(i) Issuance of the multiple-entry visas requested pursuant to the arrangements in effect between Cuba and IAEA;

(j) Conduct of a physical inventory showing that no nuclear materials remain in the country.

10. In the past five years, the following additional actions were carried out:

(a) As a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and pursuant to article 14 of that Treaty, Cuba submitted semi-annual reports stating that it had complied with the provisions of the Treaty to the secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(b) As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and pursuant to its safeguards agreement with IAEA, Cuba submitted annual inventory accounting reports and ad hoc inventory change reports;

(c) As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and pursuant to the additional protocol to the safeguards agreement between Cuba and IAEA, Cuba submitted quarterly declarations concerning imports and/or exports of proliferation-sensitive items and an updated annual declaration. In all cases, the established terms were met;

(d) From 2015 to date, five IAEA inspections have been conducted, with satisfactory results (December 2016, January 2017, June 2018, June 2019 and January 2020), and the country's nuclear material accounting and control system has been recognized;

(e) In 2018, Cuba presented the results achieved with regard to the implementation of its nuclear material accounting and control system at the Symposium on International Safeguards.

11. As a result of all the actions carried out, the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report for 2007 placed Cuba for the first time among the 47 countries in respect of which it was able to draw conclusions about safeguards. IAEA verified all the information provided on the Cuban nuclear programme, and also that all the declared

nuclear material was intended for peaceful activities, and that there were no undeclared activities. It has come to the same conclusions every year since then.

12. The national legislation in force guarantees the strictly peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as of related equipment and technology, and is consistent with the nuclear conventions and treaties to which Cuba is party. Cuba has legal norms and procedures in place that regulate the activities of the various national organs and institutions engaged in the nuclear sector and ensure strict oversight of the use of nuclear materials.

13. In that regard, Decree-Law No. 207 of 2000 on the use of nuclear energy establishes the general precepts regulating the use of nuclear energy in the national territory, in order to ensure compliance with the relevant international commitments undertaken by the State of Cuba. The Decree-Law confirms that in Cuba, “nuclear energy shall be used for peaceful purposes that promote the economic and social development of the country”. Decree No. 208 of 1996, establishing the national nuclear material accounting and control system and the National Nuclear Security Centre, and Resolution No. 62 of 1996, establishing the regulations for nuclear material accounting and control, are evidence of the country’s commitment in this area.

14. Similarly, chapter IV of the Criminal Code of 1987, entitled “Violations of regulations concerning the use and storage of radioactive substances or other sources of ionizing radiation” defines all offences relating to those materials and establishes the penalties to be imposed on individuals who commit them. An amendment to the Criminal Code (Decree-Law No. 316/2013), of 7 December 2013, updated and completed the penalty framework.

III. Specific considerations relating to article IV

15. In Cuba, the use of nuclear technologies in critical areas of the economy is highly valued and particular importance is given to IAEA technical cooperation.

16. Decades of technical cooperation with the Agency have resulted in significant progress in Cuba, which is now a reference for other countries in the region and around the world, as indicated at the International Conference on the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, held from 30 May to 1 June 2017.

17. Cuba began its technical cooperation programme with IAEA In 1977. In the past five years, this programme has made it possible to develop national capacities in important areas, such as:

- The introduction of hybrid technologies for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer, a scourge that affects health indicators in many countries, including Cuba
- The development of a variety of grains of nutritional and pharmacological interest, resistant to water stress and salt stress, which have now been introduced, with favourable results, by our producers
- The conduct of a pilot study to validate the sterile insect technique as part of the national arbovirus control campaign
- Clinical and preclinical studies for the development of new radiopharmaceuticals
- The resumption of the use of high-impact radiation technology as a sterilization method in the food and health sectors
- The development of the legal and regulatory framework and of radiological protection services, in accordance with the good practices that IAEA recommends for its Member States

18. Over the past 10 years, Cuban experts have carried out 63 missions, 350 nationals have participated in workshops and courses, and the Agency has hosted 69 Cuban fellows and scientists. Over the past decade, Cuba has benefited from national and regional projects with a total budget of 11.5 million euros. It has also participated in interregional projects. Of particular note are the national projects “Restoring the irradiation capabilities of the Food Irradiation Plant”, “Improving the diagnosis and treatment of cancer through the introduction and enhancement of radioguided surgery applications” and “Promoting food safety through the mitigation of contaminants in fruit for human consumption”, which were successfully completed in 2018 and 2019.

19. At the end of November 2020, the country was involved in 28 regional projects and 3 interregional projects. At the national level, the following projects are worth highlighting: “Strengthening capacities for preclinical and clinical evaluation of radiopharmaceuticals”, “Demonstrating the viability of the sterile insect technique for vector and pest control”, “Strengthening national capacities to develop new crop varieties through induced mutation in order to improve food security and minimize the environmental footprint”, “Strengthening capacities for the production and clinical use of radiopharmaceuticals for the study and personalized treatment of chronic non-communicable diseases”, “Enhancing quality of care in radiotherapy and nuclear medicine in the eastern region”, “Enhancing national capacities to monitor the effects of climate change on the marine environment using nuclear and isotopic techniques” and “Strengthening the national radiation safety infrastructure”.

20. The Agency has provided assistance in the detection of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), including by donating four kits, worth 48,000 euros, to the Pedro Kourí Institute of Tropical Medicine. The kits contained equipment for reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) detection and sample preparation; consumables, primers and probes; and biosafety cabinets and personal protective equipment. 30,000 tests worth 600,000 euros were also received, enabling the country to strengthen its national capacities to address the pandemic.

21. Since 2015, many donations of equipment for the detection and identification of nuclear and radioactive material have been received, including radionuclide identification devices and personal radiation detectors, as well as portable spectrometers, gamma dose rate monitors with teleprobes and direct-reading electronic personal dosimeters, among other things. The country is currently working with IAEA and Canada to expand its nuclear detection and security architecture at its borders.

22. Cuba makes its capacity, in the form of its experts and facilities, available to help other Member States, in particular other countries in the region, introduce these technologies. It engages actively within the framework of the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean, which it has chaired since May 2019. This is evidenced by the fact that, during these years of cooperation under the Agreement, the number of Cuban experts who have provided services to other countries exceeds the number of missions to Cuba. It is also worth highlighting that every year an average of six fellows come to Cuban institutions and around six regional events are held.

23. However, the IAEA secretariat faces continued and increasing difficulties in acquiring scientific equipment approved for projects in Cuba. Companies in the United States of America, or those with capital investment from that country, cannot sell such equipment to Cuba, as they face the real possibility of penalties, owing to the unilateral and unjust economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, tightened further by the United States Government under Donald Trump. One consequence of this situation is that execution of our projects is more expensive, since equipment must be purchased from further afield.

24. This situation also has an impact with regard to courses organized by United States institutions and nuclear equipment sold by United States companies and subsidiaries located in third countries, which are embargoed in the case of Cuban experts and companies, in blatant violation of article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. One clear example is the increased cost of investment by Cuba in new positron technology for the treatment of cancer, the leading cause of death in the country. It would have cost approximately 30 per cent less to purchase this technology from the United States.

25. Cuba reaffirms its belief that IAEA technical cooperation should be free of political preconditions, as reflected in its statute. This is of vital importance to developing countries and small island developing States, such as ours.

IV. Specific considerations relating to article V

26. Cuba is firmly opposed to nuclear testing of any kind, including subcritical experiments and tests carried out using supercomputers or other sophisticated non-explosive methods.

27. It is alarming that several countries continue to test nuclear weapons using non-explosive methods, which is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Cuba, which is a signatory to the Treaty, has always complied with its provisions and has observed this instrument to the letter. Cuba has consistently voted for the General Assembly resolutions relating to the Treaty. Cuba underscored its resolute opposition to nuclear testing by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, on 4 February 2021, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, article 1 of which expressly prohibits testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

28. We reject efforts to enhance existing nuclear weapons or develop new types of such weapons, which are inconsistent with commitments to nuclear disarmament. We call upon all States to refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions, other nuclear explosions or any other related non-explosive experiments, including subcritical experiments, aimed at enhancing nuclear weapons. Such actions are contrary to the spirit, purposes and letter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and undermine its desired effect as a nuclear disarmament measure.

29. As a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which Cuba ratified on 23 October 2002, Cuba has submitted all the required semi-annual reports in a timely and proper manner, affirming that “no activity prohibited under the Treaty of Tlatelolco has taken place in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cuba”.

30. These reports have been verified by IAEA under the agreement between the Republic of Cuba and IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Tlatelolco (INFCIRC/633) and the additional protocol to that agreement (INFCIRC/633/Add.1), which were signed on 18 September 2003 and have been in force since 3 June 2004.

V. Specific considerations relating to article VI

31. Weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular, are a threat to humanity. In multilateral forums, Cuba has stressed the need for their total elimination, in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner, within a specified period of time.

32. Until the universality of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is achieved, negotiations must continue in the Conference on Disarmament on further nuclear disarmament measures. This multilateral forum is capable of negotiating several matters at the same time.

33. Cuba is in favour of beginning negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a treaty must contain both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament measures, given that it would represent a new step towards achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

34. Cuba has systematically cosponsored or supported various resolutions in the First Committee of the General Assembly that, directly or indirectly, advocate nuclear disarmament.

35. In our statements before the Disarmament Commission, we have consistently called on the States Member of the United Nations to demonstrate the necessary flexibility and political will to agree on specific recommendations on nuclear disarmament to the General Assembly.

36. On 26 September 2020, the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was commemorated for the sixth time, pursuant to General Assembly resolution [68/32](#), further to a proposal of the Non-Aligned Movement and on the initiative of Cuba. Cuba has taken part in events held on that date in New York, Geneva and Vienna. At these events, Cuba has stressed the need to adopt specific measures to bring about nuclear disarmament, drawn attention to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and emphasized that the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only way to ensure that humanity would never again suffer their terrible effects.

37. Cuba considers that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself, but a step on the road to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States are required, pursuant to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and together with the other States parties, to pursue and conclude negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament.

38. The outcome document of the tenth Review Conference must contain practical commitments that clearly reflect the responsibility and the role of the nuclear Powers in the disarmament process and address the long-standing demands of non-nuclear-weapon States.

39. In this regard, we are proud to be a party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which we signed on the day it was opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York and ratified on 30 January 2018, making Cuba the fifth nation to do so. The Treaty makes an effective contribution to general and complete disarmament and international peace and security by establishing a new norm of international law that categorically prohibits nuclear weapons in all circumstances and nuclear testing of any kind. It is a vital step on the road to the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. With the entry into force of the Treaty, the international community clearly established that nuclear weapons are not only inhumane, immoral and ethically indefensible, but also illegal.

40. Prolonged non-compliance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the main reason why the majority of States parties to that Treaty negotiated the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the General Assembly in 2017. The participation of more than 120 countries in the negotiations on the latter Treaty, seeking an explicit prohibition of nuclear weapons, demonstrated the shift in the

nuclear disarmament debate and the imperative need for this pillar to be given the same level of attention as the others.

41. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons does not undermine the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in any way. Its recent entry into force will help to achieve the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty through efforts that are complementary and compatible with article VI² of that Treaty: “each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

42. Cuba is deeply troubled at the lack of tangible progress in implementing most of the 13 practical steps for the implementation of article VI adopted at the sixth Review Conference in 2000 and the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference.

43. The nuclear-weapon States have shown no commitment to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons or to their eventual elimination. They have not lowered to the extent expected the state of alert of their nuclear-weapon systems, or reduced the role of such systems in their national security policies and doctrines. At present, approximately 14,000 nuclear weapons remain in their arsenals, of which approximately 3,750 are deployed with operational forces.

44. Since the 2015 Review Conference, there have been few developments to suggest that the nuclear-weapon States have a genuine desire to work towards completely dismantling their nuclear arsenals. Rather than refrain from developing new types of weapons, some of these States are pursuing long-term modernization programmes, are deploying new delivery systems or have programmes for carrying out such deployment, which suggests that nuclear weapons will remain a part of their security doctrines and strategies and that the risk of use of such weapons is growing.

45. Cuba is extremely concerned about the threat that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the existence of strategic defence doctrines based on the possession and use of such weapons poses to international peace and security. In addition, the deployment of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States is alarming, since this means that in practice many more States are “possessor” States.

46. The failure on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their undertaking to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament is regrettable.

47. The isolated and selective application of the principle of non-proliferation is insufficient to eliminate nuclear weapons.

VI. Specific considerations relating to article VII

48. In 2002, as part of its long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament, in addition to acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Cuba also ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

² In considering the interpretation of article VI in its 1996 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice unanimously concluded that the article not only provided for the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith, but that such negotiations must also be effective, resulting in nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

49. Latin America and the Caribbean, the first densely populated area in the world to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone, has been a political, legal and institutional model for the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world.

50. We urge, once again, the nuclear-weapon States that made interpretative declarations concerning the additional protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to withdraw them without further delay, so as to give full security assurances to the States comprising the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean.

51. We reaffirm the historic proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace, signed by the Heads of State and Government at the second Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, held in Havana, on 29 January 2014, which sets out the commitment to continue to promote nuclear disarmament as a priority objective, to contribute through general and complete disarmament, and to banish the use and the threat of use of force from our region forever.

52. Cuba strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different countries and regions of the world. In this regard, we reiterate the importance of implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, in order to promote and ensure peace and stability at the regional and international levels. We also support General Assembly decision 73/546 and the convening of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, believing that, in addition to being an important contribution to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament, such a zone would constitute a major step forward in the peace process in that region.

53. Cuba welcomes the fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, and the convening of the three previous conferences, in Mexico in 2005 and in New York in 2010 and 2015, since they provided an opportunity to explore and implement concrete methods of cooperation between the various zones and with other interested States. We call for this conference to be strengthened as a forum for shaping consensus on the expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, thereby supporting nuclear disarmament.

VII. Other considerations of interest to Cuba with regard to compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

54. Nuclear security is a matter which, owing to its significant implications, is of interest to all States. Its effective management cannot be partial or admit of exceptions. International nuclear security norms should be adopted under the auspices of IAEA as the outcome of multilateral, transparent and inclusive intergovernmental negotiations.

55. The conception and implementation of the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan, including the deployment of equipment recommended by IAEA, is a good example of collaboration between Cuba and the Agency. It ensures the continuous improvement of systems aimed at preventing, detecting and responding to harmful or terrorist acts that might involve nuclear and radioactive materials.

56. The progress made by Cuba is due in part to projects it is implementing with IAEA to strengthen detection of nuclear and radioactive material at the border and to update security measures at facilities with category 1 and category 2 radioactive sources. Cuba views as unacceptable any attempt to usurp or disregard the leading role of IAEA in this area.

57. Selective and non-transparent mechanisms that operate outside the United Nations and international treaties do not constitute an adequate response to the threat of international terrorism, including terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials.

58. It is the responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to ensure the security of their arsenals. However, we are convinced that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons and the risk that they might be used by terrorists is their total prohibition and elimination in an irreversible, transparent and verified manner.

59. Cuba strongly condemns all terrorist acts, methods and practices in all their forms and manifestations, by whomsoever, against whomsoever and wherever committed, including State terrorism, and reaffirms that it will not be possible to achieve genuine nuclear security at the global level until nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated from the face of the Earth.

VIII. Conclusions

60. Cuba has demonstrated, through concrete acts, its political will to comply strictly with each and every one of the provisions of the Treaty. Nuclear disarmament must continue to be the main priority in the area of disarmament and arms control.

61. The tenth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires political will, commitment and determined participation on the part of the international community, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, for progress to be made towards the elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, and for all States parties to the Treaty to set themselves new goals to achieve that objective.

62. There must be a balanced review of the implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

63. We are in favour of the Review Conference reaffirming the obligations under the Treaty and the commitments made in the Final Documents of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, and reaching an agreement on specific, tangible and action-oriented nuclear disarmament recommendations and specific timelines for their implementation. Specifically, the Review Conference should call for an immediate halt to the development of new nuclear-weapon systems and the modernization of existing forces and arsenals, and for the abandonment of the concept of nuclear deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in military defence doctrines and security policies. Positions based on the concept of strategic stability, the step-by-step approach, or on the need to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament must be abandoned once and for all.

64. The Review Conference should reject the United States Nuclear Posture Review, which lowers the threshold for considering the use of nuclear weapons, including in response to so-called strategic non-nuclear threats; increased military spending on nuclear arsenals; threats of military intervention; and disregard for international disarmament and arms control commitments.

65. The Review Conference should agree on further steps to ensure that, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional legal assurances, through a legally binding international instrument, that they will never under any circumstances use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

66. It should also encourage States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to proceed with the elimination of nuclear weapons in a verifiable, transparent and irreversible manner, in accordance with article 4 (Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons) of that Treaty.
