The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK

Volume 38 (Part II): 2013

Office for Disarmament Affairs
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The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK

Volume 38 (Part II): 2013

Guide to the user

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, in print and electronic format, is designed to be a concise reference tool for diplomats, researchers, students and the general public on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues under consideration by the international community.

Part I of the 2013 Yearbook was published in April this year. It contains all the resolutions and decisions of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Part II is divided among the main multilateral issues under consideration throughout the year. It presents developments and trends on the issues; a convenient issue-oriented timeline; and short summaries of First Committee and General Assembly actions taken on resolutions and decisions.

As much of the background information is condensed, it is helpful to consult previous editions for expanded historical knowledge. Factual information, presented where possible in tabular form, is provided in the appendices. Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations appear as footnotes.

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. These documents are available in the official languages of the United Nations at http://ods.un.org. Specific disarmament-related documents can also be accessed through the disarmament reference collection at http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/library.shtml.

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Foreword

Welcome to the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* for 2013.

Our previous readers will recognize its scope and content: it offers a comprehensive and descriptive overview of disarmament-related developments at the United Nations in the previous year, as well as other relevant events occurring outside the organization. It is the flagship publication of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which also produces numerous other papers, speeches, films and exhibitions that together comprise our information and outreach activities in disarmament.

Our new readers will find this to be a useful, even indispensable, resource for understanding and assessing the recent history of the multilateral diplomacy of disarmament. These readers will be introduced to the work of—and the persisting challenges facing—the Disarmament Commission, the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and other entities that together comprise the United Nations disarmament machinery.

The primary purpose of this Yearbook is to inform and to serve as a reference text for diplomats, researchers and the public. While its focus is largely on the activities of our Member States, it also addresses contributions from civil society. By offering a chronicle of the progress and setbacks at the United Nations in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, the Yearbook is useful in identifying evolving trends in specific fields—these are insights that help us all to prepare for what to expect in the year to come.

As in the past, the record of achievement last year in the field of nuclear disarmament was at best mixed. The five recognized nuclear-weapon States continued to meet and to discuss the implementation of their nuclear disarmament commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Yet they also continued their efforts to modernize their respective nuclear arsenals, and another year has passed without negotiations on nuclear disarmament, which are required by that Treaty.

There were some positive diplomatic developments in alleviating international concerns over the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, although there were also some additional disappointments elsewhere. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted its third nuclear test. There was no international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. With respect to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, four additional States ratified, but eight others needed for entry into force failed to do so.

The most significant positive development was the growth of support worldwide for the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament. This was most notably illustrated at the international conference in Oslo on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, attended by representatives of 127 States and many civil society groups. Other highlights from 2013 included the convening of the General Assembly's Open-ended Working Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and the first High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament. The humanitarian theme was prominent at both of these gatherings.

In the field of chemical weapons, there were several historic developments in the Syrian Arab Republic. Following government allegations of the use of such weapons, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established a team to investigate these claims. While the United Nations Mission was present in the Syrian Arab Republic, sarin nerve gas was used resulting in several hundred civilian casualties. The Mission confirmed this attack and later concluded that such weapons had also been used on other occasions. With the investigation well under way, the Syrian Government announced its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and its acceptance of a proposal by the Russian Federation and the United States to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal. An Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)–United Nations Joint Mission was set up for this purpose.

By the end of the year, most of the chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic had been secured, a significant number of munitions and facilities had been destroyed, and a plan was in place to complete this work by mid-2014. This was not only a welcome achievement for chemical disarmament, but also a milestone in cooperation among international organizations, including the United Nations, the OPCW, and the World Health Organization.

The highlight of the year in conventional arms control came with the historic adoption by the General Assembly of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a subject addressed in over a decade of past *United Nations Disarmament Yearbooks*. The Treaty established the highest possible multilateral standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms and for eradicating the illicit trade in such arms.

When it enters into force and is widely implemented, it will bring some welcome accountability and increased transparency to the global arms trade. Following the adoption of the Treaty, Governments, regional organizations and civil society groups have been working to encourage additional States to sign and ratify it.

Another welcome development was the adoption by the Security Council of its first resolution on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons—a trade that has sustained or aggravated armed conflicts in many countries, with devastating effects on citizens and entire national economies. Regional

organizations have also been expanding their assistance in strengthening the capacities of States to prevent this illicit trade.

Growing attention has been directed worldwide to addressing a host of cross-cutting issues that do not fit into the traditional dichotomy between conventional and unconventional weapons. These include deliberations at the United Nations over the implications of lethal autonomous weapon systems (often called "killer robots") and the humanitarian impact of the use of explosive weapons in densely populated areas. There was also progress last year in addressing the link between gender and disarmament, as the ATT included a legally binding criterion aimed at stopping the supply of weapons that may be used to commit acts of gender-based violence.

While 2013 was neither an *annus horribilis* nor an *annus mirabilis,* the pages that follow will document both the triumphs and the setbacks of the international community as it continues to grapple with some of the most difficult challenges on the global security agenda. This Yearbook has much to offer those who are sincerely working for a world free of all weapons of mass destruction and for effective limits on transfers and stockpiles of conventional weapons. I dedicate this Yearbook to all those in governments, international organizations and civil society who are pursuing these worthy goals.

Angela **Kane**
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
August 2014

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Curtis J. **Raynold**
Editor-in-Chief
New York, August 2014

Multilateral disarmament timeline Highlights, 2013

Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (centre) addresses the opening of the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, with Angela Kane (left), United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Peter Woolcott, President of the Conference.

Credit: UN Photo/Devra Berkowitz

A view of the voting panels as the United Nations General Assembly votes to approve the Arms Trade Treaty.

Arms Trade Treaty adoption (2 Apr.)

Arms Trade Treaty opening for signature (3 Jun.)

Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (8-19 Apr.)

Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (18-28 Mar.)

1925 Geneva Protocol entry into force, 85th anniversary (8 Feb.)

January | **February** | **March** | **April** | **May** | **June**

Chemical Weapons Convention opening for signature, 20th anniversary (13 Jan.)

Conference on Disarmament, 1st session (21 Jan.-29 Mar.)

United Nations Disarmament Commission session (1-19 Apr.)

Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (22 Apr.-3 May)

Conference on Disarmament, 2nd session (13 May-28 Jun.)

At the Jobar area in Damascus in September 2013 during the site visit of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Credit: UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferré

The Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons holds its second session at the United Nations Office in Geneva.

Credit: UN Photo/Win Khine

United States Secretary of State John F. Kerry signs the Arms Trade Treaty.

Credit: World Future Council/Rick Bajornas

Jakob von Uexkull (left) and Alexandra Wandel of the World Future Council (right), with Gioconda Úbeda Rivera (centre), former Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, receiving the Gold Award.

High-level event—The Arms Trade Treaty: Towards Entry into Force (25 Sept.)

High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament (26 Sept.)

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials entry into force, 15th anniversary (1 Jul.)

Ceremony of the Future Policy Award 2013: Celebrating the World's Best Disarmament Policies (23 Oct.)

Partial Test Ban Treaty entry into force, 50th anniversary (10 Oct.)

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons entry into force, 30th anniversary (2 Dec.)

July | **August** | **September** | **October** | **November** | **December**

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opening for signature, 45th anniversary (1 Jul.)

Conference on Disarmament, 3rd session (29 Jul.-13 Sept.)

The Syrian Arab Republic accedes to the Chemical Weapons Convention (14 Sept.)

Security Council adopts resolution 2117 (2013), the first resolution on small arms and light weapons (26 Sept.)

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (27 Sept.)

Convention on Cluster Munitions opening for signature, 5th anniversary (3 Dec.)

Sixty-eighth session of the First Committee of the General Assembly (7 Oct.-5 Nov.)

Credit: UN Photo/Amanda Voisard

The Basel City Police Brass Band performs at United Nations Headquarters to mark the opening of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Chapter I

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

An inspector from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) checks a fuel assembly in a transport container located in the fresh fuel storage of the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant in Slovakia during a comprehensive inspection training exercise that took place from 17 to 21 January 2005.
Credit: Dean Calma/IAEA

CHAPTER I

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

> *Some might complain that nuclear disarmament is little more than a dream. But that ignores the very tangible benefits disarmament would bring for all humankind. Its success would strengthen international peace and security. It would free up vast and much-needed resources for social and economic development. It would advance the rule of law. It would spare the environment and help keep nuclear materials from terrorist or extremist groups. And it would remove a layer of fear that clouds all of human existence. Let us also remember that failure carries a heavy price.*
>
> **BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL**[1]

Developments and trends, 2013

IN 2013, THE HUMANITARIAN APPROACH to nuclear disarmament continued to gain prominence. The renewed discourse on this approach, centred on building a better public understanding of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, grew out of frustration over the lack of progress in disarmament forums and the perceived slow pace in the implementation of agreed commitments. These trends pushed Governments and civil society to seek new and innovative initiatives, both inside and outside the United Nations, aimed at advancing the disarmament agenda and facilitating collective action to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

A total of 127 States attended the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo. The Open-ended Working Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012, took stock of existing commitments and proposals, and discussed various new approaches for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. The historic convening of the first High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, which included the participation of 12 Heads of State or Government and 48 ministers, was also considered to be a clear manifestation of support for nuclear disarmament and the sense of urgency States continue to afford to the accomplishment of that objective.

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[1] The Secretary-General's opening remarks at the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, New York, 26 September 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nucleardisarmament/pdf/opening_Ban_en.pdf (accessed 29 May 2014).

The implementation of the commitments agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[2] remained a central focus at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, chaired by Cornel Feruta (Romania). In this regard, the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which was supposed to have been held in Helsinki, cast a major shadow over the meeting, as the facilitator, conveners and participating States of the region were unable to agree on a common approach to move forward. The proceedings also underscored the growing importance of the humanitarian approach, with approximately 80 States parties endorsing the joint statement delivered by the representative of South Africa. Many States parties raised new expectations for concrete progress by the nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their disarmament commitments. States parties also continued their discussions on increasing safeguards standards and on specific non-proliferation cases of concern.

The nuclear-weapon States continued to report incremental progress in the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament and related undertakings. Following their meeting in April in Geneva, they announced their intention to present a glossary of nuclear terms to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, as part of the fulfilment of their disarmament commitments undertaken pursuant to the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Russian Federation and the United States continued to exchange information required under the implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START).[3] The United States, upon completing a mandated review of its nuclear weapons employment strategy, announced that beyond the reductions required under the New START, it would be willing to consider cuts of up to one third of its deployed nuclear warheads pursuant to negotiations with the Russian Federation. The two sides remained unable, however, to initiate such negotiations despite the United States announcing the cancellation of the fourth phase of its European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense programme.

The international community continued to afford high priority to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).[4] Although the United States initiated a new effort in the Senate intended to support its ratification of the CTBT, eight States still needed to ratify the Treaty before it could enter into force. On 26 September, the ratifying and signatory States convened the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, where they, inter

[2] The treaty text and status of adherence are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (accessed 29 May 2014).

[3] United States Department of State, "New START: Treaty Text", 8 April 2010. Available from http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm (accessed 29 May 2014).

[4] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt/text (accessed 29 May 2014).

alia, welcomed the achievements of the international monitoring system and the establishment of a new Group of Eminent Persons to promote the Treaty.

Following the postponement in November 2012 of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, the facilitator and conveners intensified their efforts to seek a common way forward among the States of the region. Towards the end of the year, the facilitator was able to bring the States of the region together for the first time for informal discussions aimed at reaching agreement on the agenda, modalities and rules of procedure for the Conference. Through two rounds of informal meetings in Glion, the regional parties were able to directly exchange views on their respective visions for the establishment of the zone and to discuss the details for the Conference.

There were significant breakthroughs with respect to the situation regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the inauguration of a new government in the Islamic Republic of Iran in August, the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran renewed and intensified their engagement, reaching agreement in November on a Joint Plan of Action. The agreement included a set of initial confidence-building measures intended to give the parties time to reach agreement on a permanent settlement. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also agreed in November to a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation, which included initial measures aimed at resolving the outstanding issues.

The situation with respect to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula deteriorated further in 2013. In February, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted its third nuclear explosive test. In reaction to the international response condemning the act, and amidst tension over the annual military exercises conducted by the Republic of Korea and the United States, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea repudiated the Six-Party Talks and took steps to reconstitute its plutonium production capability. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also continued efforts to advance its ability to launch larger ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles.

Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

From 22 April to 3 May, the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference held its second session in Geneva, with Cornel Feruta (Romania) serving as Chair. Representatives from 111 States parties,[5] 1 observer,[6] 5 international organizations[7] and 53 non-governmental organizations[8] participated in the session. On 29 April, the representative of

[5] Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[6] State of Palestine.

[7] Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, European Union, International Committee of the Red Cross, League of Arab States, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

[8] Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmament Nucléaire, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Arab Thought Forum, Armes Nucléaires STOP, Ban All Nukes generation, Beati I costruttori di pace, British American Security Information Council, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies), Centre for Science and Security Studies (King's College London), Chatham House, Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Global Action to Prevent War, Global Security Institute, Hidankyo/Hibakusha organizations of Japan, Institute for Science and International Security, Institute for Security Studies, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, International Panel on Fissile Materials, International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, Le Mouvement de la Paix, Mayors for Peace, Mutlangen Peace Workshop (Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e.V.), Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and

Egypt announced that Egypt would not participate in the remainder of the session.

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane, in her statement to the Preparatory Committee, reminded delegates to focus on the implementation of commitments made to the Treaty's three pillars—nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The High Representative expressed the need to revive a sense of progress regardless of the pace and difficulties in the disarmament field. She further emphasized that, in order to improve the Treaty's regime, both a "diagnostic instrument" and a means for "making prescriptions" were needed.[9]

At its first meeting, the Committee confirmed Enrique Román-Morey (Peru) to serve as Chair of its third session. The Committee also decided to hold its third session in New York from 28 April to 9 May 2014.

Five meetings were set aside for a general debate related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee, in the course of which 75 statements were made. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, and recalled their resolve to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty. States parties underlined the fundamental importance of effective and balanced implementation of the Treaty across its three pillars, full compliance with all the Treaty's provisions and universal adherence to the Treaty. They emphasized that strengthening implementation of the Treaty and of decisions taken by States parties, complying with the Treaty, effectively addressing compliance issues and achieving universal adherence to the Treaty were key challenges for the review process.

States parties underlined the necessity of the implementation of decisions 1 and 2[10] and the resolution on the Middle East[11] adopted at the

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Disarmament, Pax Christi International (International Catholic Peace Movement), PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Peace Boat, Peace Depot, People for Nuclear Disarmament, Project Ploughshares, Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (Nagasaki University), Rissho Kosei-kai, Royal United Services Institute, Russian Center for Policy Studies, Simons Foundation, Soka Gakkai International, Strategic Concept for the Removal of Arms and Proliferation, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, Visions Solidaires, Western States Legal Foundation, Women for Peace, Sweden, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

[9] Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, opening remarks at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, 22 April 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2013/2013-04-22-NPT_PrepCom_opener.pdf (accessed 29 May 2014).

[10] *1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), pp. 8-12.

[11] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document[12] adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.[13] While acknowledging some progress in the implementation of the commitments contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, States parties recognized that greater implementation efforts were required. Many States parties made a number of recommendations for further implementation efforts as well as recommendations for possible consideration and adoption at the 2015 Review Conference in further pursuit of the Treaty's objectives, including a world without nuclear weapons.

The Committee devoted 11 meetings to the discussion of substantive issues, which were organized into three clusters and three specific blocs of issues. The clusters of issues were the following: (a) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security; (b) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and (c) the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the NPT. The specific blocs of issues addressed the following: (a) nuclear disarmament and security assurances; (b) regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and (c) peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty including improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

Cluster 1

States parties recalled the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament and underlined the need for the full implementation of concrete actions leading to nuclear disarmament, as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. Many States parties expressed their concern that the continued possession of nuclear weapons might provide an incentive for additional States to acquire nuclear weapons.

States parties recalled their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. Many States parties referred to the unacceptable harm that would result from a detonation and expressed further concern about the wider and longer-term impact on socioeconomic development. They also expressed their expectation that the humanitarian

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[12] *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vols. I-III (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)).

[13] *2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), pp. 19-31.

consequences would continue to be addressed during the current review cycle. Many States parties referred to the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo on 4 and 5 March and stressed their serious concern that, in the event that nuclear weapons were used, the humanitarian consequences would be unavoidable and emergency relief could not be provided to affected areas. The same States parties looked forward to the follow-on conference to be hosted by Mexico in order to deepen understanding on this matter through a fact-based dialogue.

The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties about the outcome of their conference, held in Geneva on 18 and 19 April, to review progress towards fulfilling their commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference and to discuss reporting on their activities at the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee. They also spoke about their progress in developing a glossary of key nuclear terms.

Many States parties stressed the need for the negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention. Some States parties called for the elaboration of a comprehensive framework of mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification, including clearly defined benchmarks and timelines, for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

States parties reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. States parties recalled that non-nuclear-weapon States had a legitimate interest in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Non-nuclear-weapon States expressed concerns regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines, noting that quantitative reductions in nuclear weapons should be accompanied by steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in all such concepts, doctrines and policies. Some States parties called for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, which continued to be stationed outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States.

States parties expressed deep concern at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the persistent failure to agree on and implement an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, despite further attempts to achieve consensus. Many States parties welcomed the decision of the United Nations General Assembly to convene a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament on 26 September.

The States parties underlined the urgent importance of bringing the CTBT into force. States parties welcomed the recent ratifications of the Treaty by Brunei Darussalam and Chad. All States that had not yet done so

were called upon to ratify the CTBT without delay. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, all States were urged to maintain or implement declared moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions or other nuclear explosions.

States parties recognized the valuable role played by civil society in the implementation of the objectives of the Treaty and in promoting accountability. They welcomed the increased interaction with civil society and expressed appreciation for the information and monitoring reports made available by civil society and academic organizations. A number of States parties expressed interest in intensifying engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty.

Cluster 2

States parties reaffirmed that the IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements. They welcomed the fact that seven additional States had brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2010 Review Conference, and urged the 13 States parties that had not yet done so to bring them into force so as soon as possible.

States parties also welcomed the fact that 119 States parties had brought the additional protocol into force, 18 of which did so after the 2010 Review Conference. They encouraged all States that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force additional protocols. Many States parties noted that comprehensive safeguards agreements were not sufficient for the IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. A number of States parties considered comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to be the current verification standard. Many States parties noted that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol and emphasized the need to distinguish between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures.

Many States parties expressed concern with respect to matters of non-compliance with safeguards obligations, and a number of States parties emphasized that responses should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. Delegations underlined the significance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality with respect to safeguards information.

States parties recalled the need to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A number of States parties expressed the view that export controls were a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty. States parties noted the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and the need to strengthen international cooperation

in this respect. States parties recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations. States parties considered that the IAEA had an essential role in efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and to promote its implementation.

Many States parties expressed concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Delegations acknowledged the new national commitments made at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul and noted the continuing efforts to implement the Seoul Communiqué. A number of States parties looked forward to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague to further strengthen nuclear security.

Wide support was expressed for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. States parties welcomed the efforts to consolidate the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, as well as the parallel declarations[14] on 17 September 2012 adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia concerning Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. They also welcomed progress towards consolidating existing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

States parties recalled the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the practical steps to that end endorsed at the 2010 Review Conference. In this context, States parties emphasized the importance for the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene a conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. States parties noted the report of the facilitator,[15] Jaakko Laajava (Finland), and expressed appreciation for his tireless efforts, including his extensive consultations with the States of the region and other stakeholders, aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 resolution and undertaking preparations for the convening of the conference.

The States parties expressed disappointment and regret at the postponement of the 2012 conference. A number of States parties noted the position paper[16] circulated by the League of Arab States pertaining to the organization, agenda, outcome document, working methods and other issues

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[14] For information on the parallel declarations, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197873.htm (accessed 21 April 2014).

[15] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/10.

[16] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.34.

related to the conference. They expressed appreciation for the constructive engagement of the Arab States with the facilitator. They also rejected arguments for postponing the conference, which a number of States considered a violation of commitments agreed to in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.[17] These States expressed concern about negative repercussions to the Treaty resulting from the uncertain situation pertaining to the conference. Discussions on the failure to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons resulted in the Egyptian delegation announcing its withdrawal from the remainder of the session. Many States parties expressed support for convening the conference as soon as possible and no later than the end of 2013.

On other regional issues, States parties again called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions and to bring into force safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty. States parties also called on South Sudan to accede to the Treaty. States parties condemned the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February, and expressed serious concerns about the 12 December 2012 space vehicle launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Serious concern was also expressed about its uranium enrichment programme. States parties called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from restarting the operation of all nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. States parties urged them to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete, verifiable and irreversible abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement,[18] to return at an early date to the Treaty and to its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. States parties urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully comply with its obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The States parties welcomed the meetings held between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3+3 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and reiterated the urgency of taking concrete steps, guided by a step-by-step approach and the principle of reciprocity, to reach a sustainable solution that would effectively address specific concerns regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that its nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes and was in conformity with the Treaty. Many States parties called for outstanding issues regarding the nuclear activities of the Syrian Arab Republic to be resolved, including through full cooperation with the IAEA. The Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was committed to its comprehensive safeguards agreement and that it was awaiting the implementation of a work plan with the Agency.

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[17] NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I).

[18] United States Department of State, "Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China", 19 September 2005. Available from http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm (accessed 5 June 2014).

Cluster 3

States parties recalled that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and that this right constituted one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Many delegations stressed that this right must be exercised in conformity with their obligations under the Treaty.

States parties emphasized the value and importance of the IAEA technical cooperation programme, particularly in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources, environmental protection, industrial application, nuclear and radiation safety, and nuclear energy. States parties recalled the need to strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States parties emphasized the need for continued efforts, within the IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of its technical cooperation programme and to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities were sufficient, assured and predictable.

States parties emphasized the important role of the IAEA in sharing the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and in promoting international cooperation as well as in coordinating international efforts to strengthen global nuclear safety, including its role in the development and promotion of nuclear safety standards. States parties welcomed the convening of the second extraordinary meeting of the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety,[19] in August 2012, and noted the establishment of the Working Group on Effectiveness and Transparency. States parties also welcomed the outcome of the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, hosted by the Government of Japan, co-sponsored by the IAEA, and held in Fukushima Prefecture, in December 2012.

Many States parties noted the continuing efforts of the IAEA related to implementing the decisions of the Board of Governors pertaining to assurances of supply, including the reserve of low-enriched uranium in the Russian Federation and the Model Nuclear Fuel Assurance Agreement.[20] Preparations for Kazakhstan to host the low-enriched uranium bank under the auspices of the IAEA were also noted. A number of States parties encouraged further discussions on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

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[19] IAEA, document INFCIRC/449. Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf449.shtml (accessed 8 April 2014).

[20] See IAEA, "Assurance of Supply for Nuclear Fuel", 31 October 2011. Available from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NEFW/Assurance-of-Supply/nuclear-fuel-assurance.html (accessed 29 May 2014).

A number of States parties called for further discussion of article X (1) of the Treaty, including possible responses to a notice of withdrawal, the continued application of IAEA safeguards and the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or developed under safeguards while Party to the Treaty, in the event of a withdrawal. States parties affirmed that they did not support efforts to reinterpret or restrict the sovereign right of withdrawal, as these could be detrimental to the implementation of the Treaty.

States parties continued their examination of means to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty. They welcomed the implementation of the PaperSmart documentation system and encouraged its further development. Many States parties expressed support for measures aimed at reducing costs and increasing the efficiency of the review process. States parties exchanged views on a number of specific proposals, including, inter alia, the venue of meetings, transitioning from summary records to digital audio recordings, making better use of information technology and webcasting, enhancing interactive discussions and engagement with civil society, focusing discussions on the implementation of commitments undertaken at previous review conferences and enhancing the link between each session of the Preparatory Committee as well as with the Review Conference. A number of States parties looked forward to the continued development and consideration of various proposals over the remainder of the review cycle as well as for appropriate action at the 2015 Review Conference.

At the conclusion of the Preparatory Committee session, the Committee adopted its report[21] and the Chair's factual summary was issued as a working paper.[22]

Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Entry into force and universality

Momentum towards the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)[23] was sustained in 2013, as evinced by the ratification of the Treaty by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Guinea-Bissau and Iraq. With 183 signatory States and 161 ratifying States as at December, there is near universal support for the Treaty in the international community, as well as a recognition that the Treaty is a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and thus essential for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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[21] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/12.

[22] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.49.

[23] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt/text (accessed 29 May 2014).

Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty

The eighth biennial Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT took place at the United Nations in New York on 27 September.[24]

During the meeting, foreign ministers and high-level representatives from CTBT ratifying and signatory States reiterated that a universal and effectively verifiable Treaty constituted a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and stressed their commitment to promoting the entry into force and universalization of the Treaty at the highest political level. Participating States joined the United Nations Secretary-General in urging the eight remaining Annex 2 States—China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States—to sign and/or ratify the Treaty without delay in order to achieve its earliest entry into force.

The Conference was convened by the United Nations Secretary-General in his capacity as the depositary of the Treaty and was co-presided over by the Foreign Minister of Hungary, János Martonyi, and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Marty Natalegawa. In addition to foreign ministers and high-level representatives, the Conference was attended by officials from international organizations, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations. The Secretary-General called on all members of the international community "to break the stagnation in the disarmament process" and "secure the CTBT's entry into force, enforce a complete ban on nuclear testing and take further concrete steps towards creating a world without nuclear weapons".[25]

The Conference unanimously adopted the Final Declaration,[26] which contained 11 concrete measures to accelerate the Treaty's entry into force. These measures include support for bilateral, regional and multilateral outreach initiatives, capacity-building and training activities, and cooperation with civil society and international organizations.

Group of Eminent Persons

To ensure an innovative and focused approach to advance CTBT ratification in the remaining Annex 2 States, Lassina Zerbo, the Executive

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[24] Conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT were also convened in Vienna in 1999, 2003 and 2007 and in New York in 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2011 in accordance with article XIV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. Background information, statements and documents related to the conferences are available from http://goo.gl/oJ7IuZ (accessed 27 January 2014).

[25] Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, remarks at the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, New York, 27 September 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7159 (accessed 27 January 2014).

[26] Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, "Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", 27 September 2013. Available from http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2013/Statements/Final_Declaration.pdf (accessed 14 April 2014).

Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), launched a group comprising eminent personalities and internationally recognized experts[27] on 26 September at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Through their expertise, experience and political standing, the Group of Eminent Persons will support and complement efforts to promote the Treaty's entry into force and reinvigorate international endeavours to achieve this goal. This initiative has received widespread support from Member States and was referenced in both resolution 68/68 of 5 December 2013 and the Final Declaration of the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT.

International Day against Nuclear Tests

To commemorate the International Day against Nuclear Tests in 2013, the United Nations General Assembly held a special meeting on 5 September. The Executive Secretary participated in a panel discussion following the meeting. On 4 September, the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations, in cooperation with the United Nations Department of Public Information, organized an exhibition entitled "Peace Now: Abolish Nuclear Tests and Weapons" at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Lassina Zerbo, former Director of the International Data Centre Division, took office as Executive Secretary on 1 August. He succeeded Tibor Tóth who had held the position for two four-year terms.

The fortieth and forty-first sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization were held on 13 and 14 June and from 28 to 30 October, respectively. Both sessions were chaired by Jan Petersen (Norway). During the fortieth session, the President of Burkina Faso became the first Head of State to address the Preparatory Commission.

Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission in 1997, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) has made substantial progress in building the Treaty's verification system, which will comprise 337 monitoring facilities and 250 communications assets upon completion. As at December, 278 facilities and 18 Noble Gas systems had been certified, with 4 facilities and 6 Noble Gas systems certified in 2013. A further 38 facilities were installed or are under construction, with another 21 planned.

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[27] For information on members of the group, see http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/2013-conference-on-facilitating-the-entry-into-force-of-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-united-nations-new-york-usa/group-of-eminent-persons-gem/ (accessed 21 April 2014).

With nearly 85 per cent of International Monitoring System (IMS) stations operational and steadily increasing detection and location capabilities, the CTBT verification regime continues to provide credible assurance to Member States that the Treaty is effectively verifiable, underscoring the value of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

In addition to fulfilling the core nuclear test verification requirements as established by the Treaty's provisions, the monitoring technologies and data have proven their utility for civil and scientific applications, including tsunami early warning, disaster mitigation and management, earthquake detection, earth sciences and environmental studies. For example, monitoring data contributed to the detection of and response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, as well as the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident of 2011.

In October, the Commission concluded a tsunami warning agreement with the Russian Federation, enabling the provision of data from certain IMS stations almost in real time to issue more timely and precise tsunami warnings. As at December, 11 Member States had concluded tsunami warning agreements with the Commission, including Australia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Thailand, Turkey and the United States.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced nuclear test and efficiency of the verification regime

On 12 February, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea carried out its third declared nuclear test explosion, the seismic and acoustic signals of which were detected by IMS stations around the globe. Because of the increased number of certified stations and the larger magnitude of the event compared to those of 2006 and 2009, it was possible to identify the location with more accuracy than in previous declared tests. The 2013 test was recorded by 96 stations and was estimated to be located within an area of 181 km^2. For comparison, the previous two declared tests of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were located with estimated areas of 880 km^2 in 2006 and 265 km^2 in 2009.

In April, a radionuclide station in Takasaki, Japan, detected radioactive isotopes of the noble gas xenon (xenon-131m and xenon-133) consistent with the announced nuclear test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February. By using Atmospheric Transport Modelling, which calculates the three-dimensional travel path of airborne radioactivity on the basis of weather data, the test site of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was identified as a possible source for the emission. The results demonstrated the significant progress in the full operationalization of the verification regime.

Science and Technology 2013 Conference

The Science and Technology 2013 Conference took place from 17 to 21 June in Vienna. The Conference provided an opportunity for the Commission to strengthen its relationship with the scientific community, capitalize on technological innovations for verifying CTBT compliance and engage scientists in test-ban monitoring. More than 750 conference participants attended, with over 80 presentations and 250 poster presentations addressing three main themes: the Earth as a complex system; events and their characterization; and advances in sensors, networks and processing.

The Secretary-General, in his video message, renewed his call for the earliest entry into force of the CTBT and underlined the role of the Treaty in strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. A special session was convened on the announced test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to describe the response of the Commission to the event and highlight the technologies involved in the detection.

A screening of the play *Reykjavik*, followed by a panel discussion, was held on the margins of the Conference. While re-enacting the meeting in 1986 between United States President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on the possibility of abolishing all nuclear weapons, the play also offered the opportunity for a discussion on how science can play a role in the efforts to accelerate the entry into force of the CTBT.

In addition to the Science and Technology Conference series, the Commission also initiated the Technology Foresight project, which aims to promote the participation of the wider scientific community in information gathering and vision building, thereby enabling the PTS to anticipate and react to scientific developments that will shape the next generation of CTBT verification techniques and technologies. In April, the PTS launched the Foresight Explorer, a novel and intuitive tool to review and assess a growing number of future technologies and future technological needs related to nuclear test monitoring.

Integrated Field Exercise 2014—build-up exercises

Preparations for the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14) to be held in Jordan progressed throughout 2013. The various events focused on extensive build-up exercises to test the preparedness of launch, pre-inspection and post-inspection activities. The Build-up Exercise III, held from 26 May to 7 June in Hungary, was focused on the inspection phase in which the inspection techniques, procedures and search methodologies were successfully tested in the field. A total of 147 experts from 40 signatory States and the PTS participated. The PTS also conducted two parallel pre-IFE14 field tests in Jordan from 17 to 22 November using ground-based communications and multi-spectral infrared equipment, with the objective of testing the operation

of the newly integrated airborne sensors and identifying and addressing any technical or operational issues that might arise.

From 1 to 3 December, Executive Secretary Zerbo made a visit to Jordan to participate in inaugural events for the official launch of IFE14, which will be conducted in November and December 2014 in an inspection area of up to 1,000 km^2 on the banks of the Dead Sea, some 100 km southwest of Amman.

Outreach activities

During the year, the Commission maintained its active engagement with the international community, including States, international organizations, civil society, academic institutions and the media, to promote universalization and entry into force of the Treaty, as well as to enhance understanding of the Treaty, its verification regime and the scientific applications of CTBT verification technologies. Information visits to the PTS were arranged for representatives from Angola, China, Congo, Iraq, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Participants were briefed on the political aspects of the Treaty and the verification work carried out by the Commission, as well as membership benefits, capacity-building and capacity-development opportunities, and technical and legal support programmes offered by the PTS.

On 30 and 31 October, the Executive Secretary and a PTS delegation attended a national seminar on the CTBT that was organized in Luanda by the Government of Angola in partnership with the European Union. Designed to raise awareness about the CTBT and its verification regime, the seminar was attended by key lawmakers and a wide range of senior government officials involved in Angola's ratification process of the CTBT.

With a view to strengthening the engagement of States with the Commission, the former Executive Secretary made official visits to Belgium, Croatia, France, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since taking office in August, the current Executive Secretary visited Angola, China, France, Japan, Jordan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to take part in high-level events and bilateral meetings.

The organization was also officially represented by the former and current Executive Secretaries at various international and regional conferences, seminars and workshops, including the following: the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science; the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF); the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference; the World Summit on the Information Society Forum; the session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction; the WEF Advisory Meeting on Global Risks; a workshop on arms control and strategic stability; a board meeting of the European Leadership Network; the second European Union Non-Proliferation

and Disarmament Conference; the International Workshop on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and Capacity Development at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; and a round-table discussion at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.

CTBT education

In 2013, the Commission continued its educational activities[28] aimed at increasing understanding of the Treaty and the science and technology that underpin its verification system. The Commission launched the CTBT online tutorial, a brief introductory e-learning resource on the basics of the CTBT covering the following topics in five modules: Introduction to the Treaty; Entry into Force and Universalization; International Monitoring System; International Data Centre; and On-site Inspections. The tutorial is available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish.[29]

From 18 to 20 March, more than 40 academics from 20 countries gathered in Vienna for the CTBT Academic Forum with a view to promoting CTBT education and a particular focus on e-learning. The event provided the opportunity to informally discuss innovative educational methods and share experiences in teaching CTBT-related topics. During the Academic Forum, an online community—the Test-Ban Academic Network—was launched with the purpose of enabling dialogue and encouraging exchange between academics and researchers across the globe engaged in CTBT-relevant fields and disciplines. The Commission also offered a CTBT Diplomacy and Public Policy Course from 15 to 19 July. The course was comprised of online e-learning modules and a week-long live lecture seminar style course held in Vienna and streamed online. Topics included, among others, the role of the CTBT in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the CTBT in a regional context, the negotiating history of the Treaty, multilateral arms control and verification, and the third announced nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February. A substantial component of the course was a simulation of a future CTBTO Executive Council deliberation on the authorization of an on-site inspection. While simulating the procedures and emulating the positions of countries assigned, the participants reached a deeper understanding of the Treaty and the on-site inspection component of the verification regime.

In September, the Commission also hosted a special seminar for participants in the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament. During the seminar, 25 junior diplomats engaged with experts on topics related to the CTBT and its verification regime. The programme

[28] The CTBT Education Portal is available from http://education.ctbto.org (accessed 27 January 2014).

[29] The CTBT Tutorial is available from http://goo.gl/Kap522 (accessed 27 January 2014).

culminated in a full-day simulation session of deliberations by the Executive Council of an on-site inspection request.

Bilateral agreements, multilateral discussions and other issues

Implementation of disarmament commitments by the nuclear-weapon States

On 18 and 19 April in Geneva, the nuclear-weapon States held another round of talks aimed at implementing the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Russian Federation chaired the meeting, which built upon previous rounds held in this format in Washington, D.C., in 2012, Paris in 2011 and in London in 2009.

At the meeting in Geneva, the nuclear-weapon States discussed the current status of global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. They also reviewed the progress in implementing their obligations with a view to reporting to the 2014 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, as provided for in action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.[30] The participants welcomed the progress they had made in developing a glossary of key nuclear terms, which they considered would facilitate mutual understanding and discussions on nuclear matters. They reaffirmed their goal of submitting this glossary to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The nuclear-weapon States announced their intention to hold a fifth meeting in this format in 2014 and to continue to meet at all appropriate levels to promote further dialogue and mutual confidence on nuclear issues.

Implementation of the New START

The Russian Federation and the United States continued to work towards the implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START),[31] including the exchange of telemetric information for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 2013. The fourth and fifth rounds of the Bilateral Consultative Commission of the New START were convened in Geneva, respectively from 6 to 19 February and from 11 to 21 November. Aside from the decision on telemetric information, the two sides did not make any other significant announcements.

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[30] NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 24.

[31] "New START: Treaty Text", http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm (accessed 29 May 2014).

According to the data published by the parties pursuant to the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty, as at 1 September, the Parties possessed the aggregate total numbers of strategic offensive arms as laid out in the table below.

Table 1. Aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms

Category of data	*United States*	*Russian Federation*
Deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers	809	473
Warheads on deployed ICBMs, on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers	1,688	1,400
Deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers	1,015	894

Further to the above information required to be published under the Treaty, the United States continued to publish a detailed breakdown of the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers as well as the number and types of test launchers.

Review of strategic deterrence doctrines

French defence white paper

On 29 April, France released the White Paper on Defence and National Security,[32] prepared by the Ministry of Defence, which outlined its strategic orientation over the next 15 years. The white paper was the fourth such review to be issued by France and the first since 2008. The updated policy was designed to take into account recent significant global and regional developments, including the financial crisis affecting Europe, the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, and the strategic shift of the United States towards the Asia-Pacific region. In this connection, it described the priority of French defence policy as ensuring stability in Europe and in the North Atlantic region, particularly through cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union.

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned developments, the white paper set forth overall reductions in military spending and force levels, although it did not include any changes with respect to the policy or budgetary requirements for the nuclear force. The white paper reaffirmed that retaining

[32] See Ministère de la Défense de France, "Le Livre blanc 2013 rendu public", 14 July 2013. Available from http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/livre-blanc-2013 (accessed 15 April 2014).

credible nuclear deterrence would remain a paramount component of the three pillars of the French defence strategy, which included protection, deterrence and intervention. The document also affirmed France's long-established policy of maintaining its nuclear forces at the "ultimate guarantee" of its sovereignty. The white paper did not address in detail the composition or modernization of France's nuclear forces.

United States nuclear employment review

During his address on 19 June in Berlin[33] (see also the section entitled "President Obama's speech in Berlin", page 57), President Barack Obama announced the completion of the revised nuclear employment strategy[34] of the United States, as mandated by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The revised strategy set forth the policy of the United States on the use of nuclear weapons, including guidance on targeting and corresponding requirements for strategic force levels. The revision marked only the third time the United States has modified its nuclear employment strategy since the end of the cold war.

The strategy reiterated that the President had the sole authority to order the use of the nuclear weapons of the United States. Further, it established the principles that would guide the role of nuclear forces of the United States, including that, inter alia: the fundamental role the nuclear weapons of the United States would be to deter the use of nuclear weapons on the United States, its allies and partners; the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend vital interests; and the United States would maintain a credible deterrent, with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with its current and future security needs.

The guidance reiterated the policy set forth in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that the United States would not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against States parties to the NPT that were in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. It affirmed that the United States would maintain significant counter-force capabilities and would not rely on a strategy of counter-value or minimum deterrence. For the first time, the guidance included language on international humanitarian law and affirmed that all employment plans must be consistent with the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict, including the rule of proportionality and the requirement to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and objects.

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[33] Barack Obama, United States President, remarks at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, 19 June 2013. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany (accessed 15 April 2014).

[34] United States Department of Defense, "Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.", 12 June 2013. Available from http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=739304 (accessed 15 April 2014).

The United States affirmed that it would not intentionally target civilian populations or objects.

While the United States stated that it was not in a position to make deterrence of nuclear weapons the sole purpose of its nuclear forces, the guidance directed the Department of Defense to undertake concrete steps towards reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Those steps included conducting deliberate planning for integrated non-nuclear strike options and for theatre missile defence. It also directed the Department of Defense to examine options for reducing the role of the policy of "launch under attack", while retaining such a capability.

Finally, the new strategy allowed for, but did not direct, up to a one third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the 1,500 warheads established pursuant to the New START—cuts intended to be achieved through negotiations with the Russian Federation. With respect to non-deployed nuclear warheads, the new guidance confirmed the policy set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review for a large stockpile to be maintained as a hedge against technological problems or changes in the international security landscape, to be gradually replaced with a yet-to-be-implemented responsive production infrastructure. Pending the development of such infrastructure, the guidance required a large hedge of non-deployed nuclear weapons, including legacy weapon types and an "adequate" capacity to upload warheads to delivery platforms across multiple legs of the triad.

Other issues and developments

Missile defence in Europe

On 15 March, United States Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a significant restructuring of the missile defence programme of the United States, which included four steps. First, the United States will deploy 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, bringing the total number of such interceptors to 44, including four deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Second, the United States will deploy a second radar system in Japan to provide improved early warning and tracking of any missile launched from the west. Third, the United States will conduct an environmental impact study of an additional Ground-Based Interceptor site in the United States. Fourth, United States will effectively terminate the fourth phase of its European Phased Adaptive Approach, including the development of Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block II-B interceptors in order to shift funds to the deployment of additional Ground-Based Interceptors and the three remaining variants of the SM-3. The United States reaffirmed its intention to proceed with the remaining three phases of the plan, including the deployment of interceptors in Poland and Romania to provide coverage of all European NATO territory by 2018.

In response to the announcement, the Russian Federation affirmed that its concerns related to the missile defence plan of the United States remained. On 18 March, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated, "That is not a concession to Russia, nor do we regard it as such. ... All aspects of strategic uncertainty related to the creation of a United States and NATO missile defence system remain. Therefore, our objections also remain." Nonetheless, arms control experts in both countries assessed that the decision could pave the way for further negotiations between the two countries on nuclear arms reductions, including discussions on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Islamic Republic of Iran

In 2013, the diplomatic efforts aimed at restoring confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran received a considerable boost following the inauguration of a new Iranian Government in August. The reinvigorated discussions between the E3+3[35] and the Islamic Republic of Iran culminated in agreement in November on a Joint Plan of Action, which specified temporary and reversible measures to be undertaken over a period of six months while the parties continued to negotiate a long-term solution (see also the section entitled "Joint Plan of Action" below). As at the end of the year, the two sides were engaged in ongoing expert-level talks aimed at implementing the Plan of Action. The IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran, having decided to abandon efforts to reach agreement on the structured approach document, also achieved a breakthrough in their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues of concern by signing a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation in November (see also the section entitled "Verification activities" below for more information). Throughout the year, the Islamic Republic of Iran slowed its production of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent U-235, somewhat easing international concerns associated with that material prior to the conclusion of the Plan of Action, while it continued to make progress on the construction of the IR-40 heavy-water research reactor at Arak.

Diplomatic efforts

In early 2013, the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran continued their previous efforts based on the proposal of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, as reflected in her letter dated 21 October 2011 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi. Under that approach, the overall goal would have been a comprehensive, negotiated and long-term solution that restored international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while

[35] China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

respecting its right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy consistent with the NPT. To facilitate such a process, the parties would have sought initial confidence-building measures as a means to facilitating a constructive dialogue on the basis of reciprocity and a step-by-step approach. Under this approach, the parties held two further rounds of political-level talks before the Iranian Presidential election in June.

The parties held their fourth round of political talks on 26 and 27 February in Almaty. At the meeting, the E3+3 presented the Islamic Republic of Iran with a revised proposal, reportedly offering to suspend certain sanctions of the United States and the European Union, not including measures on the financial and petroleum sectors of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In exchange, the Islamic Republic of Iran would have been expected to stop its production of up to 20 per cent enriched uranium, to suspend its activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in a manner that constrained its ability to quickly resume operations there, and to enact enhanced IAEA monitoring measures to promote greater transparency to provide early warning against the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The E3+3 would also have pledged not to seek any additional sanctions by the Security Council. The parties agreed to follow-up on the talks at the expert level and to meet again in April.

The parties held a further round of political talks on 5 and 6 April in Almaty, but failed to make any progress. Whereas, prior to the meeting, some members of the E3+3 had expressed the expectation that the Islamic Republic of Iran would provide a response to their proposal tabled at the February meeting, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly made a counter-proposal. After the meeting, European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton concluded that the positions of the two sides remained far apart on substance and that they had agreed to refer the matter back to their respective capitals to evaluate the current status of the process. Although the parties maintained contact through various channels, no further political talks were scheduled in anticipation of the Iranian Presidential election in June.

Following his inauguration, President Hassan Rouhani prioritized the nuclear issue as a key foreign policy. On 6 August, in his first press conference, President Rouhani said he was prepared for "serious and substantive" negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue and expressed openness to engaging in direct talks with the United States towards that end. In this connection, he pledged to defend the rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran while removing international concerns, particularly by increasing transparency and building confidence within existing international frameworks. President Rouhani appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, who also became the primary nuclear negotiator of the Islamic Republic of Iran, thus elevating that function to a higher political level.

On 14 and 15 October, the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran resumed their political talks in a two-day meeting, held for the first time on the premises of the United Nations Office at Geneva. Leading the Iranian delegation, Foreign Minister Zarif presented a new three-step plan, which proposed a one-year time frame to resolve the issue. Under the proposal, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly offered to accept increased inspections and limits on its uranium enrichment activities, as well as to ratify the additional protocol. Following a historic one-on-one meeting held between Foreign Minister Zarif and United States Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of the annual session of the General Assembly in September, the Iranian and United States delegations held bilateral discussions on the sidelines of the talks.

The parties followed up with expert-level talks at the end of October before holding a further round of political talks in Geneva from 7 to 10 November. These talks focused on a draft agreement on initial-phase confidence-building measures, which would be put into place for a period of six months while the parties undertook negotiations on a final settlement. The foreign or deputy foreign ministers from France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States joined their Iranian counterpart in the talks in anticipation of finalizing agreement on interim measures. While agreement on a text appeared to be imminent at one stage, the two sides were unable to overcome last-minute differences of views. Underscoring how close they were to agreement, the parties decided to continue their talks in one week's time.

Joint Plan of Action

Following further talks in Geneva, on 24 November the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran announced agreement on a Joint Plan of Action,[36] which contained reciprocal confidence-building measures to be undertaken over a period of six months. Under the Plan of Action, the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed: to halt enrichment of uranium above 5 per cent U-235 through physical disablement of its centrifuges and to either dilute or convert its existing stockpile of all such uranium; not to increase its stockpile of 3.5 per cent enriched uranium; to halt advancement of its enrichment capacity, not to put into operation any additional centrifuges that are already installed, and not to construct any new enrichment facility; to stop progress on the IR-40 heavy-water reactor at Arak; and to accept additional IAEA monitoring, including daily visits to its centrifuge plants, access to its centrifuge workshops and uranium mines and mills, and more access to the Arak reactor.

In exchange, the E3+3 agreed to "limited, temporary, reversible" sanctions relief. This included lifting restrictions affecting the ability of the

[36] IAEA, document INFCIRC/855. Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2013/infcirc855.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014).

Islamic Republic of Iran to trade in precious metals and petrochemicals, suspending some sanctions on its automotive industry and giving the Islamic Republic of Iran access to $4.2 billion in seized financial assets. The parties agreed to establish a Joint Commission to work with the IAEA to monitor implementation of the Plan of Action and to address issues that may arise.

For the remainder of the year, the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran held a series of three expert-level meetings aimed at implementing the Plan of Action before referring the remaining issues back to their capitals for consideration at the political level.

Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency

Attempts by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA to cooperate on the resolution of outstanding issues stalled, resumed and eventually resulted in a breakthrough, mirroring the progress in the political talks between the E3+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In January, meeting again in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA resumed their talks aimed at reaching agreement on the so-called "structured approach" to resolving the outstanding issues pertaining to a possible military dimension to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The IAEA continued to prioritize access to the Parchin military complex, where the Islamic Republic of Iran was alleged to have conducted hydrodynamic experiments using non-nuclear materials. The two sides held two subsequent rounds of talks in Vienna, in February and May, ending without setting a date for future talks.

The two sides took steps to resume their talks in September. They held a final round of talks on the structured approach document in October, concluding that their negotiations had become deadlocked and that a new approach was needed.

On 11 November, following a one-day meeting in Tehran between Director General Yukiya Amano and the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, the two sides signed the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation.[37] In the statement, they pledged to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues. Cooperation from the Islamic Republic of Iran would include providing the IAEA with timely information about its nuclear facilities and the implementation of transparency measures. Activities were to proceed in a step-by-step manner. The IAEA, in turn, agreed to continue to take into account the security

[37] See IAEA, "IAEA Press Release 2013/21: IAEA, Iran Sign Joint Statement on Framework for Cooperation", 11 November 2013. Available from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/prn201321.html (accessed 15 April 2014).

concerns of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through the use of managed access and the protection of confidential information.

As a first step, the two sides agreed to the following initial practical transparency measures to be taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran within three months: providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas; providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant; providing information on all new research reactors; providing information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants; clarifying the announcement made by the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities; and further clarifying the announcement made by the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology.

Developments in the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The year 2013 was marked by incremental progress in the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran without any major new development. Throughout the year, its accumulation of uranium gas enriched up to 20 per cent U-235 continued to slow down due to its conversion of the material for the manufacture of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. At its industrial-scale enrichment plant at Natanz in January, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the IAEA that it would begin the use of a second and more efficient generation of centrifuges. The Islamic Republic of Iran started installation activities in February. While it continued throughout the year to install the new machines, as at December it had not made use of them to conduct enrichment activities. It continued to make progress on the construction of the IR-40 heavy water research reactor at Arak, which it expected to bring online in the second half of 2014.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The international effort to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula remained deadlocked and experienced further setbacks in 2013, particularly following the international response to the December 2012 space launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conduct of its third nuclear test in February, the reconstitution of its plutonium production capability and renewed tension over annual military exercises by the Republic of Korea and the United States. Throughout the year, due to lack of access to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the IAEA remained unable to confirm the status of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Although several of the parties, in particular China and the Russian Federation, made attempts to achieve the resumption of multilateral dialogue in the second half of the year, none of these efforts resulted in a return to talks on denuclearization.

In January, the Security Council continued its consideration of a response to the launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Kwangmyŏngsŏng 3-2 satellite using an Unha-3 rocket from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station on 12 December 2012. On 22 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2087 (2013) in which it, inter alia, condemned the launch as a violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), added to the list of individuals and entities subject to travel bans and asset freezes, and directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to take steps to respond to reported violations of sanctions. Those steps include authorization for the Committee to issue Implementation Assistance Notices in situations where a vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection has been authorized by the vessel's Flag State or if any vessel flagged by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has refused to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009). The steps also include authorization for the Committee to review reported violations of the Council's decisions and to take action as appropriate, including through designating entities and individuals that have assisted the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). The Council expressed its determination to take significant action in the event of a further launch or nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea responded to the adoption of resolution 2087 (2013) by declaring that the September 2005 Joint Statement[38] of the Six-Party Talks had become defunct and that it considered the prospects for denuclearization to be diminished. On 24 January, the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it would conduct a nuclear test "of a higher level" in response to the Security Council resolution.

Third nuclear test

On 12 February, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted its third nuclear test. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) confirmed that it had detected a seismic event with explosion-like characteristics measuring 5.0 in magnitude. CTBTO estimated that the explosive force was twice as powerful as the nuclear test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2009 (magnitude 4.52) and much larger than 2006 (magnitude 4.1). CTBTO determined that the coordinates of the test were consistent with the location of the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri. The Korean Central News Agency claimed that the device used was smaller than in previous tests. Government and non-government sources gave widely divergent estimates for the possible

[38] United States Department of State, "Six-Party Talks, Beijing, China", 19 September 2005. Available from http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm (accessed 5 June 2014).

yield of the explosion. The Ministry of National Defense estimated that the yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons, compared to estimates of between 2 and 6 kilotons for 2009 and below 1 kiloton for 2006. Estimates by various non-government experts ranged from 4 to 40 kilotons.

The Security Council immediately held urgent consultations to address the situation. In a press statement[39] read by Security Council President Kim Sung-hwan (Republic of Korea), the Council strongly condemned the test, which it considered to be a grave violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), and determined that there was a clear threat to international peace and security. On 7 March, it adopted resolution 2094 (2013), condemning the test in the strongest terms and demanding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea return to the NPT and to its IAEA safeguards agreement. It also condemned all ongoing nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including uranium enrichment. It adopted additional punitive measures, listing additional individuals and entities subject to travel bans and asset freezes and tightening restrictions to prevent Member States from providing financial services to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that might contribute to its nuclear or ballistic missile programmes. It also decided, inter alia, that all States should inspect all cargo in its territory that had originated in, that was destined for, or that had been brokered or facilitated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Further escalation

In March and April, the situation with respect to the nuclear and ballistic programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea further escalated in reaction to the annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle military exercise conducted jointly by the Republic of Korea and the United States. According to the United States Department of Defense, the 2013 event included participation by 10,000 United States forces. The Defense Department described the exercise as a deterrent designed to enhance the security and readiness of the Republic of Korea in the spirit of the Republic of Korea–United States Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953[40] and in accordance with the Armistice Agreement of 1953.[41] As part of the 2013 exercises, the United States flew nuclear-capable

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[39] United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Press Statement on Nuclear Test Conducted by Democratic People's Republic Of Korea", 12 February 2013. Available from https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10912.doc.htm (accessed 29 May 2014).

[40] United States Department of State, "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea", *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, Department of State Publication 6446, vol. II (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 897-898.

[41] United States Department of the Army, "Agreement between the Commander-In-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other

strategic bombers over the Republic of Korea, including B-52s and, for the first time, B-2s.

On 29 March, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that its National Defense Commission had decided to place its missile forces on a state of readiness to launch, citing the joint Republic of Korea–United States military exercise. In statements to United Nations disarmament bodies, including at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea asserted that its strategic rocket and long-range artillery units were assigned to strike United States bases in Guam, Hawaii and on its mainland, as well as targets in the Republic of Korea. In early April, press reports stated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had loaded intermediate-range ballistic missiles onto mobile launchers and moved them to a possible test-launch site on its east coast. The escalating situation prompted the United States, which cited its interest not to exacerbate tensions with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to temporarily postpone the planned test launch of a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California to its missile test range at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. In May, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reportedly withdrew those missiles, a sign interpreted by non-government analysts as possibly intended to facilitate a reduction of tensions.

Developments in the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea took steps from April onward to reconstitute its military nuclear programme. On 1 April, it announced that it would reactivate its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in order to boost its electricity production and nuclear weapons capability, including the restoration of its disabled 5-megawatt plutonium production reactor and its plutonium reprocessing facility (radiochemical laboratory). It had completed steps to shut down and disable its plutonium production reactor in 2008 pursuant to the Six-Party Talks. Non-government experts assessed that six to eight weeks would be required for the reprocessing plant and 6 to 12 months would be required to restart the reactor.

In September, non-government analysis of satellite images showed steam rising from a building near the reactor hall that housed steam turbines and electric generators, a likely sign that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had restarted the reactor. Making use of commercial satellite imagery,

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hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea", *Treaties Governing Land Warfare*, pamphlet No. 27-1, appendix B, pp. 197-215 (Washington D.C., 1956). Available from http://www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/p27_1/main.asp (accessed 30 May 2014).

the IAEA noted in its annual report[42] on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, submitted to the Board of Governors and General Conference on 28 August, that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had reconfigured the reactor's cooling system. That allowed the reactor to be restarted without having to rebuild the cooling tower, which it demolished in 2008. The reactor was believed to be capable of producing 6 kilograms of plutonium per year. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was believed to have continued work throughout 2013 on its experimental light water reactor at Yongbyon, although the IAEA noted in August that major reactor components had yet to be delivered to the site.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea also continued existing efforts and initiated new projects aimed at upgrading its ability to launch larger ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles. This work included the construction, initiated in October 2012, at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (also known as Musudan-ri) of a new launch pad capable of accommodating larger launch vehicles that it had previously flown and of a launch control building. In October 2013, non-government analysis of satellite imagery indicated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had initiated work to upgrade its Sohae Satellite Launching Station (Tongchang-ri), including construction of a new launch area for mobile missiles.

International Atomic Energy Agency verification[43]

A major pillar of the IAEA programme involves activities that ultimately enable the IAEA to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by verifying that States are complying with their safeguards obligations.[44]

Strengthened safeguards system

Safeguards conclusions

At the end of each year, the IAEA draws safeguards conclusions for each State with a safeguards agreement in force, based on the evaluation of all safeguards-related information available to it for that year. For a "broader conclusion" to be drawn that "*all* nuclear material remained in peaceful

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[42] IAEA, document GOV/2013/39-GC(57)/22. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-22_en.pdf (accessed 27 May 2014).

[43] The text in this section was provided by the IAEA.

[44] For a description, see "The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Available from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014). See also article III (1) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text).

activities", a State must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)[45] and an additional protocol (AP)[46] in force, and the IAEA must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities for the State. For States that have CSAs but not APs in force, the IAEA draws a safeguards conclusion regarding only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, as the IAEA does not have sufficient tools to draw credible safeguards conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

In the case of those States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn and a State-level integrated safeguards approach has been approved,[47] the IAEA was able to implement integrated safeguards to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in meeting its safeguards obligations.

In 2013, safeguards were applied for 180 States[48,49] with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. Of the 117 States that had both a CSA and an AP in force, the Agency concluded that *all* nuclear material remained in peaceful activities in 63 States;[50] for the remaining 54 States, as all the necessary evaluations remained ongoing, the Agency was unable to draw the same conclusion. For these 54 States, and for the 55 States with a CSA but with no AP in force, the Agency concluded only that *declared* nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

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[45] CSAs are based on "The Structure and Content of Agreements between the IAEA and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected). Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

[46] APs are based on "Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards", document INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

[47] IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors from 1992 to 1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards: an optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under CSAs and APs to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the IAEA safeguards obligations.

[48] These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

[49] And Taiwan Province of China.

[50] And Taiwan Province of China.

Integrated safeguards were implemented during the year for 53 States.[51,52]

In the case of the three States in which the Agency implemented safeguards pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in the five nuclear-weapon States under their respective voluntary offer agreements and APs. For these five States, the Agency concluded that nuclear material to which safeguards were applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

As at 31 December, 12 non-nuclear weapon States parties[53] to the NPT had yet to bring into force CSAs as required by article III of the Treaty. For these States, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small quantities protocols

Safeguards agreements[54] and APs are the principal legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments therefore continues to be crucial to effective and efficient IAEA safeguards.

During the year, APs entered into force for Antigua and Barbuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark[55] and Vanuatu. Additional protocols were signed for Guinea-Bissau and Myanmar, but have not yet entered into force. An AP was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors for St. Kitts and Nevis.

A CSA with a small quantities protocol based on the revised standard text entered into force for Vanuatu. Such an agreement was signed for Guinea-Bissau, but has not yet entered into force.

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[51] Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

[52] And Taiwan Province of China.

[53] Benin, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Federated States of Micronesia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Timor-Leste.

[54] Specific types of safeguards agreements are defined in *IAEA Safeguards Glossary*, 2001 edition, International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 3 (Vienna, 2002), paras. 1.18-1.21 (available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014)).

[55] This AP is applicable to that part of Denmark that is covered by INFCIRC/176, i.e. Greenland (INFCIRC/176/Add.1).

Small quantities protocols (SQPs)[56] to CSAs were amended with Andorra, Gabon, Kuwait and Mauritania to reflect the revised standard text. Such amendments were concluded pursuant to the Board of Governors' September 2005 decision that SQPs should be modified in accordance with a revised standard text. In 2013, no State rescinded its SQP.

The IAEA continued to implement the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,[57] which was updated in September. On 30 April and 1 May, the IAEA organized an outreach event for the Pacific Island States in Nadi, Fiji, at which the IAEA encouraged the participating States to conclude a CSA and AP and to amend their small quantities protocol. National workshops on safeguards were conducted in August 2013 for Myanmar and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. In addition, consultations on the amendment or rescission of SQPs and the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs were held throughout the year with representatives from member and non-member States in Bangkok, Geneva, Nadi, New York and Vienna, and also during training events organized in Vienna and elsewhere by the IAEA.

Verification activities

Islamic Republic of Iran

In 2013, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors four reports[58] entitled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran".

Contrary to the relevant binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not do the following: implement the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implement the modified Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement; suspend all enrichment-related activities; or suspend all heavy water–related activities. Neither did the Islamic Republic of Iran resolve the Agency's serious concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme that is necessary to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.

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[56] See IAEA, "Board Moves to Strengthen Nuclear Safeguards System", 23 September 2005. Available from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2005/strengthening_sg.html (accessed 10 June 2014).

[57] For more information, see IAEA, "Plan of Action to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols". Available from http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sg_actionplan.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

[58] IAEA, documents GOV/2013/6, GOV/2013/27, GOV/2013/40 and GOV/2013/56. Available from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/iaea_reports.shtml (accessed 10 June 2014).

In October, following further rounds of talks aimed at reaching agreement on a structured approach document for resolving outstanding issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded that the negotiations had become deadlocked. As there was no prospect for agreement on the document, the two parties agreed that a new approach aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme should be developed.

On 11 November, the Director General, on behalf of the Agency, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Vice-President and President of the Atomic Energy Organization, on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran, signed a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation.[59] In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues, and to proceed with such activities in a step-by-step manner. The Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to take six initial practical measures within three months.

On 24 November, a Joint Plan of Action[60] was agreed between the Islamic Republic of Iran and China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, the aim of which is to reach a "mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution" that would ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme "will be exclusively peaceful". Under this Joint Plan of Action, the Agency was to be "responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures" contained therein.

The Director General welcomed the Joint Plan of Action, noting that it was an important step forward but that much more needed to be done. The Director General also indicated that, with the agreement of the Board of Governors, the Agency would be ready to fulfil its role in verifying the implementation of nuclear-related measures.[61]

While the Agency continued through the year to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency was not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran was in peaceful activities.[62]

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[59] See "IAEA, Iran Sign Joint Statement on Framework for Cooperation", http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/prn201321.html (accessed 15 April 2014).

[60] IAEA, document INFCIRC/856. Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2013/infcirc856.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

[61] On 24 January 2014, the Board endorsed the Agency undertaking monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action.

[62] As, for example, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not implement its Additional Protocol, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council.

Syrian Arab Republic

In August, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic". The Director General informed the Board of Governors that the Agency had not received any new information from the Syrian Arab Republic or other member States that would have an impact on the Agency's assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor, which should have been declared to the Agency by the Syrian Arab Republic.[63] The Director General renewed his call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. The Syrian Arab Republic has yet to respond to these calls.

While the Syrian Arab Republic invited the Agency to conduct an inspection at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in Damascus, the Agency decided not to conduct any in-field verification activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. In this regard, in June, the Agency informed the Syrian Arab Republic that, after considering the United Nations Department of Safety and Security's assessment of the prevailing security conditions in the country and the small amount of nuclear material declared by the Syrian Arab Republic at the reactor, the 2013 physical inventory verification at the reactor would be postponed until the security conditions had sufficiently improved. By the end of the year, the assessment of the security situation had not changed.

Based on the evaluation of information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic and other safeguards relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities. For 2013, the Agency concluded for the Syrian Arab Republic that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

In August, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and the fifty-seventh IAEA General Conference entitled "Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea",[64] which provided an update of developments since the Director General's report of August 2012.

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[63] The Board of Governors, in its resolution of June 2011 (adopted by a vote), had, inter alia, called on the Syrian Arab Republic to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its Safeguards Agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

[64] IAEA, document GOV/2013/39-GC(57)/22. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-22_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the NPT Safeguards Agreement for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able to implement any verification measures in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the country.

Since April 2009, the Agency has not implemented any measures under the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement agreed upon between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and foreseen in the initial actions agreed upon at the Six-Party Talks. Statements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about it having conducted a third nuclear test and its intention to readjust and restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, together with its previous statements about uranium enrichment activities and the construction of a light water reactor, were considered by the IAEA to be deeply regrettable.

Although not implementing any verification activities in the field, the Agency continued to monitor the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2013 by using open source information (including satellite imagery) and trade information. The Agency continued to observe building renovation and new construction activities at various locations within the Yongbyon site, although, without access to the site, the Agency cannot confirm the purpose of these activities. The Agency also continued to further consolidate its knowledge of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the objective of maintaining operational readiness to resume safeguards implementation in the country.

Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East

As requested in operative paragraph 13 of resolution GC(56)/RES/15 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East adopted at the fifty-sixth regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA in 2012, the Director General submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its fifty-seventh regular session a report[65] on the implementation of this resolution. The report on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East describes, inter alia, the steps undertaken by the Director General in his efforts to further the implementation of his mandate conferred by the IAEA General Conference in resolution GC(56)/RES/15 and by decision GC(44)/DEC/12 (2000).

In light of the discussions of the report at the September 2013 meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General provided to member States of the IAEA the "background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding

[65] IAEA, document GOV/2013/33-GC(57)/10. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-10_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

modalities for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems".[66]

Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel

In December 2010, the work to establish an IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank[67] was authorized by the IAEA Board of Governors. Following the IAEA solicitation for a host State, Kazakhstan expressed interest in hosting the IAEA LEU Bank, which will be located at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. The IAEA LEU Bank will be a physical stock of LEU under IAEA jurisdiction and control with enrichment levels of up to 4.95 per cent, and will serve as a supply mechanism of last resort in the event that an eligible member State's supply of LEU is disrupted and cannot be restored by commercial means. Funds in excess of $150 million have been pledged for the IAEA LEU Bank by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the United States, the European Union, Kuwait, Norway, the United Arab Emirates and Kazakhstan. These funds will permit acquisition of LEU sufficient for up to three reloads for a 1,000 MW(e) reactor. In 2013, the IAEA continued work on the legal and administrative aspects of the IAEA LEU Bank and carried out comprehensive technical site assessments of the proposed IAEA LEU Bank site and infrastructure.

Nuclear safety and security (IAEA)[68]

Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013

At the end of the year, the IAEA completed the implementation of the third Nuclear Security Plan, which covered the period 2010-2013. In September, the Board of Governors and the General Conference adopted the fourth Plan,[69] which covers the period 2014-2017. The objective of the Plan is to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective security wherever nuclear and other radioactive materials are in use, in storage and/or in transport. The Plan provides for support to States, upon request, in their efforts to meet their national responsibilities and international obligations to reduce risks and to respond appropriately to threats.

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[66] IAEA, document GOV/2013/33/Add.1-GC(57)/10/Add.1. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Documents/English/gc57-10-add1_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014). The 2010 Review Conference of the NPT endorsed that the IAEA and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 30, para. 7 (d)).

[67] Other assurances of nuclear fuel supply mechanisms are described in previous editions of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*.

[68] The text in this section was provided by the IAEA.

[69] IAEA, document GOV/2013/42-GC(57)/19. Available from http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/nuclear-security-plan2014-2017.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

In order to promote global nuclear security, the IAEA convened the International Conference on Nuclear Security, entitled "Enhancing Global Efforts", at IAEA headquarters in Vienna from 1 to 5 July. This was the first IAEA conference of its kind. Participants included government ministers, senior officials and policymakers responsible for nuclear security, as well as experts and representatives from a wide range of technical disciplines, specialist organizations that contribute to nuclear security, representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives with relevant competences. Additionally, regulatory bodies, other national competent authorities and other entities that were engaged in activities relevant to nuclear security participated in the Conference. These included agencies dealing with national security, crisis management, law enforcement and border control. On 1 July, ministers adopted a Declaration[70] emphasizing the importance of nuclear security.

International nuclear security framework

Together with the nuclear security guidance—developed and published in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series—the global nuclear security framework encompasses binding and non-binding international legal instruments. These instruments and their implementation through, inter alia, training, information exchange, legislative assistance and capacity-building will bring about an effective nuclear security regime within a State.

The primary binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Other binding international instruments include United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). The non-binding international instruments are the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the IAEA Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. In addition, document INFCIRC/225/Revision 5, containing recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, provides a comprehensive basis for guiding States on the requirements that should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.

[70] Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2013/cn203/cn203MinisterialDeclaration.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

Table 2. Status of key international instruments relating to nuclear security

(As at 31 December 2013)

Instrument	*Binding*	*Adherents*
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	Yes	149
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	Yes	71
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources	No	117
Code of Conduct's Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources	No	84
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	Yes	90

Nuclear security guidance for member States

In 2013, the IAEA published the primary publication in the Nuclear Security Series, the Fundamentals document entitled *Nuclear Security Fundamentals: Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime*,[71] which had been approved by the Board of Governors in September 2012.

During the year under review, the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and two Implementing Guides were issued, *Establishing Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme* (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 19)[72] and *Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control* (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 21).[73] The IAEA continues to develop implementing guidance in the Nuclear Security Series with support from its Member States.

The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, a standing body of senior representatives open to all Member States, which was established in 2012 to make recommendations on the development and review of IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications, met twice. The Committee reviewed and approved publications proposals for and drafts of these publications, and also reviewed and commented on a proposed road map for future guidance.

[71] Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1590_web.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

[72] Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1591_web.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

[73] Available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1613_web.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

Incident and Trafficking Database

The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) contains data on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events from 1993 onward. The membership of the IAEA ITDB programme continued to expand, with 124 member States and 1 non-member State by the end of the reporting period.

At the end of 2013, States had reported—or otherwise confirmed via the ITDB—2,477 incidents since the database was established in 1995, with 146 incidents reported in 2013. Of these incidents, 424 reportedly involved illegal possession of and attempts to sell nuclear material or radioactive sources. In 664 cases, thefts or losses of radioactive sources were reported. A total of 1,337 incidents involved discoveries of uncontrolled material, unauthorized disposals and the inadvertent, unauthorized movement or storage of nuclear material, radioactive sources and/or radioactively contaminated material. In 2013, four incidents involved Category 1 to 3 radioactive sources[74] in unauthorized activities, three of which were thefts.

Nuclear security human resource development

Education and training continues to be essential to sustainable improvement in nuclear security. In 2013, the IAEA conducted some 88 training events covering all aspects of nuclear security, involving more than 2,000 people.

In the course of the year, six national Nuclear Security Support Centres were established by member States. The International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres established by the IAEA to facilitate collaboration between such centres continued to develop and currently has 98 members from 39 States and seven international organizations.

The IAEA recognized the need for different levels of nuclear security expertise in a State. Depending on the national infrastructure, not only well-trained people in certain areas of nuclear security are needed, but also specialists and highly educated experts with in-depth knowledge in all areas of nuclear security. In 2013, five European universities, with support from the IAEA, launched a pilot European Master of Science degree programme, using the curriculum, teaching materials and textbooks prepared by the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), established in 2010 under IAEA auspices to promote nuclear security education. In addition, Chulalongkorn University in Thailand launched a Master of Science

[74] Category I, risk of being close to an individual source: extremely dangerous to the person; Category II, risk of being close to an individual source: very dangerous to the person; Category III, risk of being close to an individual source, dangerous to the person. The categorization of radioactive sources and further information are available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf (accessed 10 June 2014).

programme on nuclear safeguards and security, based largely on INSEN material and curriculum.

Nuclear security peer reviews

The IAEA continued to implement peer reviews and advisory services to help States evaluate their nuclear security systems and needs. Such missions were conducted with a focus on physical protection and the legal, regulatory and practical measures for controlling nuclear and other radioactive material.

In 2013, the IAEA completed three International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions on detection and response systems and measures to Albania, Chile and Tunisia; one INSServ mission on institutional infrastructure to Chile; and six INSServ missions on nuclear security at major public events to Belarus, Cambodia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In addition, the IAEA undertook four International Physical Protection Missions (IPPAS) to Australia, Hungary, the United States and the IAEA laboratories at Seibersdorf, the first at an IAEA facility. In order to share experiences as well as lessons learned and to discuss the improvement of the service, the IAEA organized an international seminar on IPPAS in December in Paris.

The importance of peer reviews was noted in a number of forums. In addition to helping a State to identify best practices and areas where improvements were required, they also served as a useful confidence-building measure to provide assurance that a State was meeting the requirements and guidance set out in the nuclear security framework and supporting IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents.

Risk reduction

The IAEA continued to advise States on formal threat characterization and assessment, the development, use and maintenance of Design Basis Threats, vulnerability analysis and the development of methodologies for performance assessment of physical protection systems. In particular, the IAEA provided assistance to Cuba to upgrade physical protection systems and it continued to work with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to assist in ensuring that all high activity sources were appropriately secured. The IAEA secured 16 disused high activity radioactive sources in the Philippines using mobile hot cell technology. The Agency also helped upgrade 50 sites housing high activity sources in six States, and has completed a security upgrade of a radioactive waste disposal facility in another State. It donated three remote monitoring systems, bringing the total number of such systems deployed in member States to 21. It also continued to be involved in the repatriation of high-enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel. Within the framework of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Programme, the IAEA assisted in the return to the Russian Federation of nearly 44 kg of fresh HEU fuel and

nearly 203 kg of spent HEU fuel from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Uzbekistan.

Export controls

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The twenty-third Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),[75] chaired by Veronika Kuchyňová Šmigolová (Czech Republic), was held in Prague on 13 and 14 June. The Plenary welcomed Mexico and Serbia to their first Plenary Meeting as NSG Participating Governments.

First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Karel Schwarzenberg made a welcome statement on behalf of the Czech Government. He expressed his Government's strong support for NSG activities and noted the significant contribution of the NSG to global efforts to counter the ever-evolving nuclear threats, thus substantially reinforcing the spirit and purposes of the NPT.

The NSG completed a fundamental review, launched by the 2010 NSG Plenary in Christchurch, New Zealand, of its Trigger and Dual-Use Lists to keep pace with advances in technology, market trends and security challenges. As a result, the 2013 NSG Plenary in Prague adopted 28 amendments to the NSG control lists and a request will be made to the IAEA to publish all 54 agreed amendments in revised versions of INFCIRC/254/Parts 1 and 2.

Participating Governments reiterated their firm support for the full, complete and effective implementation of the NPT, as well as its universalization.

While reaffirming their commitment to fully effective export controls, participating Governments discussed information and good practices in licensing and enforcement, as well as best practices in membership applications, and pointed out growing challenges to the international non-proliferation regime.

Within the framework of the NSG mandate, the Group shared deep concerns associated with global proliferation activities. In particular, grave concerns were noted about the proliferation implications of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the nuclear

[75] Currently the Participating Governments of the NSG are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as permanent observers.

test it conducted on 12 February. Also, Participating Governments remained concerned about the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The NSG reiterated its long-standing support for diplomatic efforts for a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue based on the NPT and the full implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of United Nations Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions without further delay. The Group also supported diplomatic efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a solution to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue in a peaceful manner consistent with the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

Participating Governments called upon all States to exercise extreme vigilance and to make best efforts to ensure their effective implementation of all United Nations Security Council resolutions relevant to the purposes of the NSG.

The NSG also took stock of developments since the 2012 NSG Plenary in Seattle and discussed how to further its activities. At the Plenary Meeting, the NSG also:

- Continued to consider all aspects of the implementation of the Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India[76] of 2008 and discussed the NSG relationship with India;
- Agreed to amend the relevant part of paragraph 3 (a) and annex C of part 1 of the Guidelines to reference recognized IAEA recommendations for physical protection;
- Discussed a framework for industry engagement to be published on the NSG website as an example of a best practice;
- Agreed to launch the new and revised NSG public website to facilitate information sharing with the public in multiple languages;
- Discussed a report on the NSG outreach programme and agreed to strengthen the outreach efforts;
- Provided additional guidance to the NSG Chair in conducting the NSG outreach programme, including with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on brokering and transit activities, as they relate to the implementation of the NSG Guidelines;[77]
- The NSG Plenary invited all nuclear supplier States to express their responsible approach to nuclear exports by adhering to the NSG Guidelines.

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[76] IAEA, document INFCIRC/734 (Corrected). Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc734c.pdf (accessed 30 May 2014).

[77] NSG, "Guidelines". Available from http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines (accessed 30 May 2014).

Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its twenty-seventh Plenary Meeting in Rome from 14 to 18 October to review and evaluate its activities and to further intensify its efforts to prevent the proliferation of delivery means of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Plenary was inaugurated by Foreign Affairs Minister Emma Bonino and chaired by Carlo Trezza, who will remain in charge until the next Plenary session in 2014 in Norway. A congratulatory message was received from the President of the Italian Republic. The meeting was held 25 years after the first MTCR plenary meeting, held in Rome in 1988.

MTCR Partners[78] reiterated the concept that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery constituted a threat to international peace and security, as recognized in United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). They had a thorough exchange of information regarding existing and possible missile proliferation developments that had taken place since their last Plenary Meeting in Berlin.

Within the framework of the MTCR mandate, members conducted extensive discussions on various country issues including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran and expressed concerns associated with global missile proliferation activities, in particular regarding ongoing missile programmes in the Middle East, North-East Asia and South Asia, which could fuel missile proliferation activities elsewhere. They confirmed their commitment to implement relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions on non-proliferation, including 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1874 (2009), 1929 (2010), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). Other critical situations, with regard to WMD delivery means and their operational use, were also considered. Partners agreed to continue exchanging views on missile programme developments.

With regard to the Guidelines and policy issues, partners welcomed the fact that the MTCR Guidelines and control lists[79] constituted an international export control standard that was increasingly adhered to by non-members of the MTCR and included in United Nations documents. They also agreed to redouble their efforts to inform and assist interested parties that are supportive of missile non-proliferation and of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR and called on all countries to exercise extreme vigilance to prevent the transfer

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[78] The MTCR has 34 members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

[79] MTCR, "MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex". Available from http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidelines.html (accessed 30 May 2014).

of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD missile programmes of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law.

Partners reaffirmed the critical importance of the ongoing technical work of the MTCR. They noted the rapid evolution of relevant technologies and the related need to take forward-looking actions to address these developments. They recognized that the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex was a cornerstone of the work done by the MTCR to prevent illegal transfers of missile technologies. They also expressed deep appreciation for the accomplishments of the Technical Experts Meeting, as well as for the work of the Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM) and the Information Exchange Meeting.

Partners also discussed procurement activities and strategies in support of programmes for WMD delivery means; the risk of intangible technology transfers and the challenges it entails; key technology trends in missile programmes; and catch-all controls for non-listed items. These discussions showed that constant updating on export controls by MTCR countries could have an even greater impact. They also underlined the importance of focusing on brokering, transit and transshipment issues and on efforts to exploit them to evade export controls.

Partners expressed appreciation for the outreach activities conducted by the outgoing MTCR Chair, Jörg Ranau. The new MTCR Chair was encouraged to conduct further outreach activities and contacts in order to increase transparency about the Regime and promote its objectives. The MTCR partners also encouraged the continuation of individual, collective and regional efforts to assist non-member countries and other interested parties in implementing missile-related export controls as mandated under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In that regard, partners noted the usefulness of the MTCR Annex[80] and Guidelines in providing an international benchmark for best practices in export controls on missile-related items. They agreed that the Guidelines should not impede technological advancement, development and space programmes as long as such programmes could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The partners welcomed the activities of applicant countries already implementing MTCR Guidelines and those of other non-member countries in support of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR.

Partners reviewed a number of key aspects of the internal functioning of the Regime, including issues related to the continuity and effectiveness of MTCR presidencies. They welcomed and approved the announcement of Ukraine of its offer to chair the MTCR in 2015 and 2016.

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[80] MTCR, "Equipment, Software and Technology Annex". Available from http://www.mtcr.info/english/annex.html (accessed 30 May 2014).

Partners also exchanged views on issues related to future membership, including their overall approaches to membership evaluation. Individual applications for membership were also thoroughly discussed. The membership issue will continue to be on the agenda.

Missile-related issues

The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The twelfth annual Regular Meeting of the Subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) took place in Vienna on 30 and 31 May, with the participation of 65 registered delegations.

The participants recognized the importance of the Code as a unique multilateral confidence-building and transparency instrument, which was also underscored in the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Code.

The Republic of Korea, as outgoing Chair of the HCOC, outlined the efforts made during the past year to promote the universalization of the HCOC and to reinforce its implementation by Subscribing States.

Japan, elected during the last plenary meeting as Chair for 2013-2014, introduced the objectives of its presidency for the next year: the full and comprehensive implementation of the Code in all its aspects, and strengthening outreach activities for advancing the process of HCOC universalization.

As at the end of 2013, 134 States[81] had subscribed to the Code. Subscribing States appreciated the outreach activities conducted by the

[81] The 134 Subscribing States: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.

outgoing Chair, as well as by interested Subscribing States and the European Union, inter alia, to mark the tenth anniversary of the Code.

The Subscribing States reaffirmed the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, which constitutes an ongoing concern of the international community in some regions. In that regard, they noted the launch on 12 December 2012 of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea using ballistic missile technology, which the United Nations Security Council duly reacted to in its resolution 2087 (2013).

In this context, they considered encouraging new subscriptions to the Hague Code of Conduct especially in these regions.

The Subscribing States reiterated the importance of General Assembly resolution 67/42 of 3 December 2012 in support of the HCOC. They welcomed its adoption by 162 United Nations Member States at the sixty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, showing the potential for the universalization of the Code, which the Subscribing States will continue to support.

The Subscribing States stressed the importance of the full implementation of the Code, in particular with regard to pre-launch-notifications and the timely submission of annual declarations.

Implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

Status of implementation

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee) submitted to the Council in December the review of the implementation of the resolution for 2013.[82] The Committee's activities covered the following key areas: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with regional, subregional and international organizations, including the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), as well as transparency and media outreach. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued to provide support to the 1540 Committee.

The 1540 Committee continued its facilitation and monitoring efforts, encouraging States that had not yet done so to submit, as required by the resolution, a first report on their implementation efforts. Two more States, Liberia and South Sudan, submitted their first reports, bringing the number of initial reports from States to 171 of the 193 Member States. Twenty-two

[82] S/2013/769.

Member States[83] have yet to submit a first report to the Committee. During the year, 28 Member States[84] provided additional information on their efforts to implement the resolution.

In resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council encouraged States to prepare, on a voluntary basis, national implementation action plans (NIAPs), mapping out their priorities and plans for further implementing resolution 1540 (2004). Kyrgyzstan and the United Kingdom submitted their NIAPs, bringing the number of such plans received by the Committee to eight. UNODA organized and supported activities to facilitate the preparation and implementation of NIAPs. The 1540 Committee experts were involved in efforts to prepare NIAPs in Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Upon the invitation of Governments, the 1540 Committee visited Burkina Faso, Grenada, the Republic of Korea and Trinidad and Tobago, giving it access to updated information on achievements and challenges, as well as on assistance needs. Representatives of the Committee and its experts met relevant national representatives, including high-level officials. The Committee also received invitations to visit Mozambique, Niger and the Republic of Moldova.

Member States continued to seek new cooperative ways to achieve the resolution's objectives. For example, Croatia and Poland, with UNODA support, conducted a peer review of their efforts to implement the resolution. This first peer review identified effective practices and facilitated the exchange of experiences. A seminar for the identification of effective implementation practices was later hosted by Croatia in cooperation with the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre and UNODA, with the cooperation of 10 participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.[85]

By its resolution 2118 (2013) on the chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Security Council decided to require Member States to immediately inform the Council of violations of resolution 1540 (2004),

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[83] Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[84] Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Singapore, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, United Kingdom and United States.

[85] Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and United States.

including the acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, in order to take necessary measures.

Assistance

In resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council recognized "that some States may require assistance in implementing" the resolution, and that it "invited States to offer such assistance". The Committee continued to improve its assistance procedures while focusing on identifying and analysing assistance needs; facilitating the matching of assistance requests and offers; furthering the dialogue on assistance with international, regional, subregional and, as appropriate, non-governmental organizations; and increasing awareness of assistance issues.

The Committee received assistance requests from Kyrgyzstan, Grenada, Iraq, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Central American Integration System, which were forwarded to assistance providers. To further facilitate technical assistance for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the Committee continued its dialogue with the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Cooperation between the 1540 Committee and international organizations

In line with resolution 1977 (2011),[86] the Committee intensified its collaboration with the IAEA on strengthening nuclear security through participation in outreach events, including the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security and regional workshops on effective border control coordination for Asia Pacific, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries.

The Committee increased its collaboration with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through discussions on technical assistance and collaboration within the framework of the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. In addition, it continued to engage with the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons Convention, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Financial Action Task Force, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization.

The Committee strengthened its interaction with parliamentary organizations. The Chair of the Committee delivered a keynote address[87] to

[86] Resolution 1977 (2011) urges the 1540 Committee to continue to engage with States and international, regional and subregional organizations to promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned and effective practices, in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004).

[87] Oh Joon (Republic of Korea), Chair of the United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee, statement to the 2013 Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva,

the Inter-Parliamentary Union at its 2013 Assembly, opening a new phase of high-level cooperation between the 1540 Committee and Union.

With support from UNODA and the Conflict Prevention Centre of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States convened in January a regional workshop on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in Minsk. Its participants adopted a set of informal recommendations promoting the resolution's implementation.

The Organization of American States and the Government of Mexico, with UNODA support, organized a workshop on licensing and export controls to support the Mexican national workplan on the implementation of the resolution.

With the support of UNODA, the African Union organized a workshop in Addis Ababa in December. It focused on the benefits of universal reporting, country visits by the 1540 Committee and NIAPs.

Cooperation with civil society and the private sector

Industry and the public were the subject of outreach efforts by the 1540 Committee to raise awareness of the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) and its implementation. The Committee and its experts also participated in a number of events organized or attended by civil society.

With UNODA support, Austria hosted the first Civil Society Forum on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), entitled "Opportunities for Engagement", held in January in Vienna. Representatives of 45 non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, think tanks and industrial associations worldwide, as well as several international and regional organizations, attended. The Forum stressed that civil society groups and organizations could contribute through cooperation and interaction with national Governments to promote the resolution's effective implementation.

In cooperation with the Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia, United States, UNODA published two new issues of the *1540 Compass*,[88] an interactive online journal created in 2012 for the use of Member States, international and regional organizations, and civil society and industry. The journal shared information and practices related to resolution 1540 (2004) among its target audience.

The conference entitled "Risks, Challenges and Responses: Industry's Effective Practices in Responding to Biosecurity Risks" was held in Wiesbaden in December, organized by Germany in cooperation with UNODA within the framework of the "Wiesbaden Process". The Conference

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7 October 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/transparency-and-outreach/outreach-events/pdf/ChairStatementAssemblyIPU2013.pdf (accessed 5 May 2014).

[88] Available from http://cits.uga.edu/publications/compass/ (accessed 30 May 2014).

sought to develop sustainable cooperation between the 1540 Committee, the United Nations and the private sector. This conference brought together representatives of pharmaceutical companies, regional and national biosafety industry associations, think tanks and academic institutions, Member States and international organizations.

Other collaborative events with industry included the 2013 Summit of the Union of Arab Banks, held in Vienna in June, which featured a special session on resolution 1540 (2004) organized with UNODA. The special session was attended by approximately 100 banking institutions and several international and regional organizations. That session raised awareness of the resolution's requirements to prevent the financing of WMD proliferation by non-State actors.

A regional workshop on maritime and port security infrastructure and facilitating secure trade in the Caribbean was organized in October by the Bahamas and CARICOM, in collaboration with UNODA. Attended by a dozen CARICOM member States,[89] potential donors, international and regional organizations, investment institutions and private sector entities, the conference underlined the need to strengthen national capacities to avert the security threat of WMD proliferation by non-State actors.

UNODA organized and supported some 20 events focusing on facilitating national implementation activities (including through regionally coordinated approaches), cooperation between international, regional and subregional organizations, and effective partnerships with civil society and the private sector.

During 2013, Kazakhstan, Norway, the United States and the European Union provided grants to UNODA to support activities related to resolution 1540 (2004). In July, the European Union renewed its own financial support to UNODA for the implementation of the resolution.[90]

Political declarations and other initiatives

Humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament

The humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament gained considerable momentum in 2013. On 4 and 5 March, the Government of Norway hosted the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo. A total of 127 States, the United Nations, the International Committee

[89] Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago.

[90] See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/391/CFSP of 22 July 2013, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 198 (23 July 2013), pp. 40-44. Available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0391&qid=1401474000274&from=EN (accessed 30 May 2014).

of the Red Cross, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and representatives of civil society attended the Conference. The objective of the Conference was to promote a fact-based understanding of the humanitarian impact of the detonation of a nuclear weapon and to facilitate an informed discussion of these effects with stakeholders. Presentations focused on possible preparedness and first response in the event of a nuclear detonation, as well as on the medium-term and long-term economic, social and environmental consequences.

The Chair's summary of the Conference highlighted a number of key points, including the unlikelihood that any State or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by the detonation of a nuclear weapon in an adequate manner or provide sufficient assistance to those affected. It also conveyed the conclusions that the effects of a nuclear detonation would be felt across national borders with significant regional and global impacts. During the Conference, a number of States expressed interest in further exploring the issue and in broadening the discourse on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Government of Mexico offered to host a follow-up conference in 2014.

At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the representative of South Africa delivered a joint statement[91] on behalf of 80 States parties[92] that built upon the joint statements issued on behalf of 16 States at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference[93] and on behalf of 35 States, including 1 observer State, at the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly First Committee.[94] In the joint statement, South Africa declared that past

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[91] Abdul Samad Minty (South Africa), joint statement on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 24 April 2013. Available from http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom13/statements/24April_SouthAfrica.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014).

[92] Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Cuba, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Serbia, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

[93] Benno Laggner (Switzerland), joint statement at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Vienna, 2 May 2012 (available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT2015/PrepCom2012/statements/20120502/SwitzerlandOnBehalfOf.pdf (accessed 28 May 2014)).

[94] A/C.1/67/PV.12, pp. 3-4.

experience from the use and testing of nuclear weapons had demonstrated the unacceptable harm caused by their uncontrollable and indiscriminate nature. It echoed the key messages of the Oslo Conference and asserted that it was in the interest of the survival of humanity that nuclear weapons were never used again under any circumstances. It underscored the shared responsibility of all States in preventing the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons and in achieving their disarmament.

A total of 123 States endorsed the joint statement[95] delivered by the representative of New Zealand at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly First Committee. That statement rearticulated a number of key points, including those described above, from the joint statement delivered at the 2013 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee. Eighteen States, including 13 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, endorsed a separate joint statement[96] delivered by the representative of Australia at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly First Committee. Those States welcomed the statement delivered by the representative of New Zealand and reaffirmed with a sense of urgency their unwavering commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, they emphasized that that goal would require a high level of political will by countries, especially the nuclear-armed States, and that it would also require all States to work together.

Other initiatives

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative

The members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) continued their engagement at the ministerial and working levels. The NPDI issued its sixth and seventh ministerial statements respectively following its meeting at The Hague in April and at the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament in September. In the latter half of the year, two additional States, Nigeria and the Philippines joined the 10 original members of the group, Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

Beyond their political declarations, in 2013 the NPDI continued its outreach, individually and collectively, with the nuclear-weapon States on their proposed draft reporting form in accordance with actions 5 and 21 of the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The NPDI also for the first time issued a number of working papers to the NPT Preparatory Committee which, as reflected in the Chair's summary, made a substantive impact on the work of States parties.

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[95] A/C.1/68/PV.13, pp. 21-23.
[96] Ibid., pp. 24-25.

The NPDI also embraced the humanitarian approach on the use of nuclear weapons and participated in the Oslo Conference. In its September ministerial statement,[97] the NPDI announced its intention to meet in Hiroshima in 2014 to discuss its contribution to the third session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in April 2014 and, in light of the historic significance of the meeting location, to focus on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

President Obama's speech in Berlin

On 19 June, United States President Barack Obama delivered an address[98] at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin intended in various respects as a follow-up to his landmark speech in Prague in April 2009. Speaking on the theme of peace with justice, President Obama stated that this concept meant "pursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons—no matter how distant that dream may be". He announced a number of additional steps forward. On nuclear reductions, he stated that the United States could maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while reducing its number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads by up to one third. He announced his intention to seek negotiated cuts with the Russian Federation to move past cold war nuclear postures. President Obama also pledged to work within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to seek bold reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the Russian Federation in Europe. He also announced his intention to host a further Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 in Washington, D.C., as well as to support ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a treaty that would end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

New op-ed from former senior government officials

On 5 March, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn issued an op-ed in *The Wall Street Journal*,[99] which focused more

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[97] Frans Timmermans, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, statement at the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, New York, 26 September 2013. Available from https://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nucleardisarmament/pdf/NL_en.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014).

[98] Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany (accessed 15 April 2014)

[99] Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William J. Perry and George P. Shultz, "Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The pace of nonproliferation work today doesn't match the urgency of the threat", *The Wall Street Journal*, 5 March 2013. Available from http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324338604578325912939001772 (accessed 21 April 2014). See also the following past op-eds by H. A. Kissinger, S. Nunn, W. J. Perry and G. P. Shultz in the *The Wall Street Journal*: "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons", 4 January 2007 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html (accessed 21 April 2014)); and "Toward a Nuclear-Free World", 15 January 2008 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120036422673589947.html (accessed 21 April 2014)); "How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent: Maintaining confidence in our nuclear arsenal is

narrowly on reducing nuclear risks rather than on disarmament objectives per se. They suggested four areas where urgent attention was needed. First, secure nuclear materials to prevent nuclear terrorism, including the development of a global nuclear material security system at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Second, remove all nuclear weapons from prompt-launch status. Third, reduce nuclear arsenals, especially non-strategic weapons, in the Russian Federation and the United States below the levels in the New START on the basis of reciprocity and verification and provided that sufficient support for stockpile stewardship is provided. Fourth, the United States should launch a verification initiative to facilitate future measures.

High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/39 of 3 December 2012, the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament was convened as a one-day plenary meeting, with the stated aim of contributing to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. The resolution encouraged Member States to participate in the meeting at the highest level. The meeting took place on 26 September and constituted the first such meeting of the General Assembly devoted solely to the topic of nuclear disarmament.

Seventy-four statements were made by Heads of State and Government, ministers and representatives at the meeting. The following 12 Heads of State and Government delivered statements: the President of Austria, Heinz Fischer; the President of Costa Rica, Laura Chinchilla Miranda; the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani; the President of Mongolia, Elbegdorj Tsakhia; the President of Namibia, Hifikepunye Pohamba; the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina; the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Jiří Rusnok; the Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe; the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Motsoahae Thomas Thabane; the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak; the Prime Minister of New Zealand, John Key; and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

Statements were made by 48 speakers at the ministerial level and by representatives from five international organizations: the League of Arab States; the Inter-Parliamentary Union; the International Committee of the Red Cross; the IAEA; and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive

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necessary as the number of weapons goes down", 19 January 2010 (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704152804574628344282735008 (accessed 21 April 2014)); and "Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation: The doctrine of mutual assured destruction is obsolete in the post-Cold War era", 7 March 2011 (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414 (accessed 21 April 2014)).

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Two representatives from civil society also addressed the meeting.

States welcomed as a historic gathering the convening of the High-level Meeting for the first time in the history of the United Nations. They expressed appreciation to Indonesia, acting on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, for carrying this initiative forward and to the Secretary-General for his active and continuing engagement on disarmament issues.

States recalled that nuclear disarmament had been on the international agenda since the first use of nuclear weapons and that the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly had sought the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable for mass destruction. States reaffirmed with a sense of urgency their unwavering commitment to achieving and maintaining the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Many States considered the participation of many world leaders in the High-level Meeting to be a clear manifestation of support for nuclear disarmament.

Many States called for the establishment of an international day for nuclear disarmament and called for the convening of a high-level conference in 2018 to review progress achieved on nuclear disarmament. Those States considered that that conference could identify ways and methods to eliminate nuclear weapons with the briefest possible delay. The objective of such a conference would be to agree on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame in order to ban the development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and provide for their destruction.

To that end, the General Assembly adopted on 5 December resolution 68/32, through which it decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard. In addition, it declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament

Deeply concerned by the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and, in an effort to establish a momentum conducive to the commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, the sixty-seventh General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on 3 December 2012 resolution 67/56 entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations". Pursuant to the resolution, an open-ended

working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons was established to meet in Geneva in 2013 for up to 15 working days, with the contribution of international organizations and civil society. The group was requested to submit a report[100] on its work to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.

The Open-ended Working Group convened an organizational meeting on 14 March in Geneva. It elected Manuel Dengo (Costa Rica) as Chair and adopted its agenda.[101] It was agreed that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly would be applied mutatis mutandis, in light of the mandate of the Group as contained in resolution 67/56. The Group also agreed on the modalities for a broad participation of civil society in its work.[102]

Following intensive informal consultations, the programme and the structure of work of the Group as well as the specific topics for the May discussions were identified. At the suggestion of the Chair, the Group focused on two main topics as follows:

(a) Taking stock of the existing unilateral, bilateral and multilateral nuclear disarmament commitments, as well as of nuclear disarmament proposals already put forward. These included, inter alia, the United Nations Secretary-General's five-point plan[103] and the Rajiv Gandhi initiative. Existing verification regimes, transparency and confidence-building measures were also considered.

(b) Various aspects and perspectives of nuclear disarmament and multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, as well as inherent challenges.

Under the second main topic, attention was focused on the impact of nuclear weapons and of a possible nuclear detonation (developmental, economic, financial, humanitarian, security, etc.), the legal status of nuclear weapons, the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and other States, and the way forward.

The Group met in May, June and August as mandated, as well as during the 24-week-long session of the Conference on Disarmament, primarily as an informal interactive panel or open discussions, moderated by senior diplomats.[104] These meetings also featured international experts and non-governmental organization representatives as panellists.

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[100] A/RES/ 67/56, paras. 1-3.

[101] A/AC.281/2, para.7.

[102] All organizations with consultative status with the Economic and Social Council or accredited to the United Nations Department of Public Information, as well as "other interested organizations relevant and competent to the scope of this Group", were invited to participate in the work of the group.

[103] Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/sg5point.shtml (accessed 5 May 2014).

[104] See also A/68/514, para. 13.

Working papers containing proposals were also introduced by a number of Member States and non-governmental organizations.[105]

The proposals considered by the Group were organized into six clusters[106] as follows:

(a) Approaches on how to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons;

(b) Elements to consider in taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons;

(c) Reviewing the role of nuclear weapons in the security context of the twenty-first century in order to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons;

(d) The role of international law to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons;

(e) The role of States and other actors in taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons; and

(f) Other practical action that could contribute to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

The Group's participants expressed their views on a range of issues relating to these clusters, including on the current status of and future prospects for nuclear disarmament and multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, existing commitments and initiatives, elements to consider in and possible approaches to multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and the roles and responsibilities of all actors, among other issues to be addressed for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. Following these discussions, the Group adopted its final report[107] on 30 August regarding the work it had accomplished.

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[105] Austria, Cuba, Egypt (on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition), Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan (on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden), Malaysia (on behalf of Costa Rica and Malaysia), Mexico and, jointly, by Ireland and Switzerland as well as by Reaching Critical Will, the Basel Peace Office, Mayors for Peace, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the United Nations Youth Association of Romania.

[106] The moderators of the clusters were the following, respectively: the Chair; Mohamed Hatem El-Atawy (Egypt); Kelly Anderson (Canada); Roland Sturm (Austria); Laurent Masmejean (Switzerland); and Alexander Ben-Acquaah (Ghana).

[107] A/68/514.

In considering the report of the Open Ended Working Group, the United Nations General Assembly[108] noted with satisfaction that the Group had engaged in discussions in an open, constructive, transparent and interactive manner to address various issues related to nuclear disarmament and welcomed its report reflecting the discussions and proposals made during its deliberations. The Assembly recognized the value of the contribution that international organizations, civil society, academia and research made to taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, as demonstrated during the work of the Working Group. It emphasized that the universal objective of taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations remained the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, and also emphasized the importance of addressing issues related to nuclear weapons in a comprehensive, interactive and constructive manner, for the advancement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

The General Assembly called upon all Member States, international organizations and civil society to continue to enrich the discussions on how to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and encouraged them to take into account the report of the Working Group and the proposals contained therein in the discussions in other forums in which humanitarian, health, human rights, environmental and development issues were addressed.

It concluded consideration of the Group's report by requesting the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on how to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including on steps that Member States had already taken to that end, and to submit a report on that subject to the General Assembly. At its sixty-ninth session, the General Assembly will review progress and further explore options for taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including, if necessary, through the Working Group.

[108] See General Assembly resolution 68/46 of 5 December 2013. See also appendix II for more information on the resolution.

Chapter II
Biological and chemical weapons

Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, speaks to journalists on the work of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Also pictured is Åke Sellström (centre), the head of the Mission, and Maurizio Barbeschi (far left), the team leader of the World Health Organization component of the investigative team.
Credit: UN Photo/Amanda Voisard

CHAPTER II

Biological and chemical weapons

My aim will be, in 2013, to bring more voices to the table, both by expanding the range of countries represented, and broadening the membership of individual delegations.

JUDIT KÖRÖMI, CHAIRMAN OF THE 2013 MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Developments and trends, 2013

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS HIGHLIGHTED 2013 as an extraordinary year for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[1] These included the decision by the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (United Nations Mission)[2] following separate requests by Member States to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons; the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize 2013 to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); and the decision by the OPCW Executive Council on 27 September, which was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), regarding the accelerated programme to eliminate the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Both the United Nations Mission and the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission) were unprecedented undertakings, to be carried out in an active war zone and in accordance with ambitious target dates, and further demonstrated the close collaboration between the United Nations and the OPCW, particularly in the context of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Such close cooperation was also evident in the United Nations Mission, to which the OPCW, as well as the World Health Organization (WHO), made vital contributions at the request of the United Nations Secretary-General.

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[1] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc (accessed 16 July 2014).

[2] The establishment of the United Nations Mission was based on the Secretary-General's authority under General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987 and Security Council resolution 620 (1988).

Furthermore, the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and the subsequent actions led to renewed interest in the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Before the advent of the Syrian chemical weapons issue, two investigations were conducted under the Mechanism during the early 1990s.[3] Since then, the Secretary-General's Mechanism had mostly remained out of global attention except for some interested countries before being reactivated as a result of the events in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The year was also marked by the accession of two States, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic, to the CWC, bringing the membership of the OPCW to a total of 190 member States.

These developments were preceded by another milestone in the implementation of the Convention in 2013. On 19 April, the Third Review Conference of the CWC[4] concluded successfully with the adoption of a substantive and forward-looking outcome document, providing guidance on future policy.

Meetings of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[5] were convened in 2013 in the context of the 2012-2015 intersessional work programme mandated by the Seventh Review Conference in 2011.

The second Meeting of Experts of the 2012-2015 intersessional programme was held in Geneva from 12 to 16 August and its report was adopted by consensus. The Chairman expressed satisfaction with the results of the Meeting, noting that it was encouraging to hear the views of new contributors to the debate such as Benin, Ecuador, Ghana, Mongolia and Myanmar, among others. The Meeting of States Parties to the BWC was held in Geneva from 9 to 13 December. States Parties identified a wide range of common understandings across the full spectrum of topics covered by the Meeting. The Meeting of States Parties, inter alia, devoted a working session on the Chairman's report on universalization activities, considering progress towards the universalization of the Convention. It welcomed the four new States parties joining the BWC in 2013—Cameroon, Guyana, Malawi and Nauru.

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[3] These investigations were related to separate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Mozambique and Azerbaijan in 1992. See S/24065 and S/24344.

[4] The full title of the conference is the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

[5] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc (accessed 18 June 2014).

Biological weapons

Intersessional work programme on the Biological Weapons Convention

Meetings of the BWC were convened in 2013 in the context of a four-year intersessional work programme mandated by the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. This programme's objective is to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and improve its effectiveness as a practical barrier against the development or use of biological weapons; its mandate is to "discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action" on specific topics related to the implementation of the BWC. It is based on three standing agenda items considered every year: (a) cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under article X; (b) review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention; and (c) strengthening national implementation. Each of these includes a number of sub-items (see table 1). In addition, there is a biennial agenda item, which for 2012-2013 was how to enable fuller participation in the confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Table 1. Topics covered by the standing agenda items of the 2012-2015 work programme of the Biological Weapons Convention

Standing agenda item		
Cooperation and assistance	*Review of developments in the field of science and technology*	*Strengthening national implementation*
Reports on implementation of article X, and the operation of the assistance and cooperation database	Developments that have potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention	Specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention
Challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology	Developments that have potential benefits for the Convention	Ways and means to enhance national implementation, sharing best practices and experiences
Specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of article X	Measures for strengthening national biological risk management	Regional and subregional cooperation
Ways and means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to address gaps and needs	Voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry	National, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and biosecurity
	Education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology	Any potential further measures

Standing agenda item		
Cooperation and assistance	*Review of developments in the field of science and technology*	*Strengthening national implementation*
Education, training, exchange and twinning programmes and other means of developing human resources Capacity-building in biosafety and biosecurity and for detecting, reporting, and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks Coordination of cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations, and other stakeholders	Developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations such as the WHO, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Plant Protection Convention and the OPCW Any other developments of relevance to the Convention	

BWC States parties discussed these items at the technical level at the Meeting of Experts in August and the information generated at this Meeting was reviewed, formulated into common understandings at the Meeting of States Parties in December. The 2013 meetings were chaired by Judit Körömi (Hungary) with Urs Schmid (Switzerland) and Mazlan Muhammad (Malaysia) serving as Vice-Chairs.

Meeting of Experts

The second Meeting of Experts of the 2012-2015 intersessional programme was held in Geneva from 12 to 16 August. A total of 88 States took part, including 83 States parties,[6] 3 signatory States[7] and 2 States from outside the regime,[8] which were granted observer status. The national delegations

[6] Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

[7] Myanmar, Nepal and United Republic of Tanzania.

[8] Israel and Namibia.

were joined by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, eight specialized agencies and other international organizations,[9] including those dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation, crime and justice, law enforcement, international humanitarian law, technology and public, and animal and plant health. At the invitation of the Chairman, and in recognition of the special nature of the topics under consideration, seven scientific, professional and academic organizations and experts[10] participated in the Meeting as guests of the Meeting of Experts. Thirteen other non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the Meeting. In total, over 350 individuals, including nearly 200 technical experts, gathered in Geneva to consider the standing agenda items and the biennial item. As in previous years, this large number and diverse range of participants allowed the Meeting of Experts to draw upon expertise from independent, national, regional and international perspectives. The substantive work of the Meeting began with a formal session offering opportunities for States to make introductory comments. Nineteen States, some on behalf of broader groups, made statements. Seven non-governmental organizations and research institutes also addressed delegations on the opening day. Two working sessions were then devoted to each of the standing agenda items and the biennial item on how to increase participation in the CBMs. A total of 59 presentations or statements were made by States parties, 11 by international organizations and 5 by guests of the Meeting during these sessions.

The Meeting of Experts benefited from a full schedule of events held on the margins of the Meeting that were organized by the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), professional, academic and other non-governmental groups, States and guests of the Meeting.

Delegations also drew upon a variety of other resources that included 18 working papers circulated during the Meeting. The ISU prepared background papers on advances in science and technology related to the Convention,[11] and challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange.[12] During the course of the Meeting, the Chairman compiled a list of considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the discussions and resources available, and this document was annexed to the report.

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[9] United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee), European Union, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), OPCW, WHO and World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).

[10] International Federation of Biosafety Associations, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, Developing Countries Vaccines Manufacturers Network, Nanabiosys, Sanofi, Cheng Zhu and Simon Wain-Hobson.

[11] BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.1/Rev.1.

[12] BWC/MSP/2013/MX/INF.2.

The report of the second Meeting of Experts[13] was adopted by consensus and the Meeting closed on 16 August. Speaking at the close of the Meeting, the Chairman noted her satisfaction with the results, saying, "It was especially encouraging to hear some new voices: for me as Chairman it was very useful to hear the contributions this week from Benin, from Ecuador, from Mongolia, from Ghana, and from Myanmar, among others."

Meeting of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention

The Meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva from 9 to 13 December. The representatives of 102 States parties participated,[14] as well as 2 signatory States[15] and 1 non-State party.[16] Additionally, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 8 specialized agencies, other international organizations[17] and 15 non-governmental organizations and research institutes participated. In total, nearly 500 participants took part in the Meeting.

The Meeting of States Parties held a general debate, in which 35 States parties made statements. Three observer organizations, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), also participated in the general debate. Following the general debate, representatives of 10 non-governmental organizations and research institutes delivered statements during an informal session.

States parties then devoted working sessions to each of the three standing agenda items, and to the biennial item on how to enable fuller participation in the CBMs. During these sessions, States parties identified a broad range of common understandings across the full scope of topics covered by the Meeting. The Meeting of States Parties also devoted a working session on the

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[13] BWC/MSP/2013/MX/3.

[14] Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.

[15] Côte d'Ivoire and Myanmar.

[16] Israel.

[17] 1540 Committee, European Union, ICRC, INTERPOL, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), OPCW, WHO and OIE.

Chairman's report[18] on universalization activities and the report of the ISU (see also section entitled page 72).

The Meeting of States Parties benefited from a full schedule of events held on the margins of the Meeting that were organized by professional, academic and other non-governmental groups, as well as States, guests of the Meeting and the ISU.

Delegations were also able to draw upon a variety of other resources. Eleven working papers were circulated during the Meeting.

Regarding building capacity through international cooperation and assistance, States parties reached a broad range of new understandings, including on the following: the value of developing and facilitating twinning programmes and other means of international exchange in education and training for capacity-building, and sharing of advanced expertise and for improving global capacity for disease detection and control; the importance of promoting inter-agency coordination and multisectoral cooperation to prepare for, detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks; and the importance of coordination with relevant international and regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders.

On developments in science and technology, States parties reviewed a number of recent developments, identified and discussed those with potential benefits for the Convention and others with potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the BWC. Concepts such as the responsible conduct of science were discussed as an overarching theme to be promoted in States parties' efforts on education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology. There was a shared recognition of the valuable contribution of associated stakeholders in science, academia and industry to the work of States parties and the importance of continuing to encourage them to participate in the intersessional programme.

On national implementation, States parties highlighted their willingness to find ways to improve how they work domestically. Delegations shared the view that, while they should take into account differences in national circumstances and legal and constitutional processes, there were many common responsibilities in the area of national implementation. States parties were encouraged to continue to learn from each other by sharing national experiences, and to think collectively about ways and means to enhance national implementation, including through regional and subregional cooperation.

States parties identified common understandings on how to increase participation in annual exchanges of information under the CBMs, including the following: the value of regional seminars and workshops to promote

[18] BWC/MSP/2013/3.

awareness of the CBMs and to provide an opportunity for States to report on their difficulties and needs for assistance; the importance of States parties actively encouraging those not participating to do so and to share information on the specific reasons for not participating; and the possibility of making the annual reports available in more United Nations languages.

The Chairman welcomed the identification of these common understandings and the adoption by consensus of the report,[19] which recorded them, noting that "[w]e had interactive and lively discussions, in a constructive and cooperative manner. Delegations demonstrated both their interest in the topics and their respect for each other, while pursuing common understanding on practical measures to strengthen the operation of the Convention."

The Meeting also considered progress towards the universalizaton of the Convention, and welcomed the four new States parties that joined the BWC in 2013—Cameroon, Guyana, Malawi and Nauru. The Chairman urged States that were not yet party to join the Convention, highlighting the role of the BWC as one of the main pillars of the international community's efforts against weapons of mass destruction. The Chairman also encouraged the States parties to promote the Convention and to provide assistance to States that were preparing to join the BWC.

Work of the Implementation Support Unit

At the Meeting of States Parties, the ISU presented its annual report.[20] The report included a summary of the Unit's efforts to provide support for the administration of the Convention, national implementation, CBMs, universalization, maintaining the database for assistance requests and offers, and the sponsorship programme.

The Unit's support for the administration of the Convention included acting as the substantive secretariat of the Meeting of Experts and the Meeting of States Parties; preparing background information documents for those meetings; developing and expanding its website; following and reporting on scientific and technological developments; keeping in regular contact with relevant international organizations, as well as professional, commercial and academic institutions and associations; and organizing and participating in relevant workshops, seminars and meetings.

As part of its efforts under national implementation, the Unit revised the restricted access section of its website to facilitate communication among States parties; continued to interact with providers of relevant assistance; and continued to collect and distribute details of national contact points.

On the CBMs, the Unit maintained capabilities for electronic reporting; compiled and distributed submissions; provided routine administrative

[19] BWC/MSP/2013/5.
[20] BWC/MSP/2013/4.

assistance and advice; took part in or organized workshops promoting the CBMs; and wrote to States parties reminding them of the deadline for submission.

The ISU supported the Chairman of the 2013 Meeting of States Parties in her activities to promote universalization, assisting her with correspondence with States not party to the Convention, and preparing for and participating in meetings between the Chairman and representatives of non-States parties. The Unit also supported States parties in promoting universalization, coordinating their activities and informing them on progress with accession or ratification. The Unit promoted universalization during many of the seminars and events in which it participated. The ISU provided information and advice on the Convention to several signatories and non-States parties, as well as consolidated and published information in the restricted area of its website on progress towards universality.

The Unit further developed an online database to store offers to provide assistance and requests for assistance relevant to the Convention. Information provided by States parties was added to the database. Technical development of this resource continues as staff and information technology resources permit. As at 1 November, the database contained 23 offers of assistance from five States parties and two requests for assistance from two States parties. The ISU was informed that assistance had been provided as a result of a request in the database.

The ISU also administered the sponsorship programme designed to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme. As at 1 November, three States parties and the European Union had provided voluntary funding for this programme. Twelve States parties, three signatories and one non-State party applied for support to participate in the Meeting of Experts. In accordance with the mandate for the programme decided upon at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, priority was given to States parties that had not participated previously in the meetings, or had been unable to send experts regularly. Consideration was also given to participation by non-States parties, in order to promote universalization of the Convention. As a result, six States parties[21] and two signatories[22] were sponsored to participate in the Meeting of Experts. Due to lack of funds, no States were sponsored to participate in the Meeting of States Parties.

The report of the ISU also provided details of the submission of information under the CBMs. In recent years, levels of participation in this international transparency exercise have increased, peaking in 2010 at 72 States parties. Participation held steady throughout 2011 and 2012 at

[21] Benin, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Montenegro.
[22] Myanmar and Nepal.

69 States parties, representing about 42 per cent of the membership of the BWC. However, participation in 2013 slightly decreased to 63 States parties, representing 37 per cent of the BWC membership (see figure I).

Figure I. Participation in BWC confidence-building measures



Chemical weapons

The use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law and an affront to our shared humanity. We need to remain vigilant to ensure that these awful weapons are eliminated, not only in Syria, but everywhere.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General[23]

Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

The Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Third Review Conference) was convened from 8 to 19 April in The Hague. A total of 122

[23] Remarks upon receiving the final report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, New York, 12 December 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7353 (accessed 17 July 2014).

States parties[24] attended the Conference. Two signatory States[25] and one non-signatory State[26] of the CWC attended as observers. Representatives of 8 international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies,[27] as well as 70 non-governmental organizations,[28] were also in

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[24] Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[25] Israel and Myanmar.

[26] Angola.

[27] African Union, Caribbean Community secretariat (CARICOM), ICRC, International Criminal Court (ICC), Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Parliamentary Assembly of the NATO, Permanent Court of Arbitration and League of Arab States (LAS).

[28] Accademia delle Scienze–Academy of Science, Amman Center for Peace and Development, Argentina Calidad de Información, Asser Institute, Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, Bülent Ecevit University, CBW Events, CEFIC–European Chemical Industry Council, Center for International Security and Arms Control Studies, Center for Non-proliferation and Export Control, Chatham House/Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chemical Industries Association of the Philippines, Chemical Weapons Working Group, City of The Hague, Colorado Citizens' Advisory Commission for Chemical Demilitarization, Consejo Argentino Para Las Relaciones Internacionales, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Environmental Protection and Population Care Organisation, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Fundación NPSGlobal (No-proliferación para Seguridad Global), Global Green USA, Green Cross International, Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland, Halabja Chemical Victims Society, Halabja Human Rights Office, Hamburg University/Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Harvard Sussex Programme, Image and Pictures Communications, Indian Chemical Council, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, Institute for Security Studies, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons–Arab World, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons–Bahrain, International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security, International Centre for Health Interventions and Research in Africa, International Council of Chemical Associations, International Council of the Life Sciences, International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions–Caribbean Islands, International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions–Europe, International Dialogues on Underwater Munitions–USA, International Peace Bureau, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Monterey Institute of International Studies, Kenyatta University, Kurdish Genocide Victims Organization, Kurdistan Sociologists and Psychologists Association, Kurdistan Without Genocide Association, Kurdistan Women's Legal Network, National Committee of Responsible

attendance. The Conference elected Krzysztof Paturej (Poland) as its Chairperson. The Conference also elected representatives of 10 States parties[29] as Vice-Chairpersons of the Conference, as well as Sa'ad Abdul Majeed Ibrahim Al-Ali (Iraq) as Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole. Following the opening statement[30] by OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü, the Conference was also addressed by the United Nations Secretary-General stressing the past achievements and continued importance of the global chemical weapons ban at a critical juncture.

The Third Review Conference concluded successfully with the adoption of a substantive and forward-looking final outcome document[31] that reaffirmed States parties' commitment to the global chemical weapons ban. The document contained a comprehensive review of the implementation of the Convention since 2008 and provided future policy guidance.

The Conference highlighted the role of the Convention as a bulwark against chemical weapons and, in this context, supported the promotion of outreach, capacity-building, education, awareness-raising and public diplomacy. The Conference further highlighted, inter alia, the importance of monitoring developments in science and technology and the strong commitment of States parties to continue to deepen engagement and interaction with a broad range of stakeholders of the Convention, including the chemical industry.

Eighteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties

The Eighteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention was held in The Hague from 2 to 5 December. A total of 130 States parties[32] attended the Conference. One signatory

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Care Indonesia, National Research Council/US National Academy of Sciences, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, NGO Development Centre, Okan University, Omega Research Foundation, ONG Rafudesc Benin, Parliamentarians for Global Action, PUC–Institute of International Relations, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Qestas For Peace, Development and Human Rights, Society for African Safety and Development, Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support, Society for Defending the Right of Veterans and Victims of Chemical Weapons of Fars Province, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Royal Society, Uganda National Bureau of Standards, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, University of Leeds and Verification Research, Training and Information Centre.

[29] Algeria, Armenia, Canada, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka and United States.

[30] OPCW, document RC-3/DG.4. Available from http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16327 (accessed 4 June 2014).

[31] OPCW, document RC-3/3. Available from http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16406 (accessed 4 June 2014).

[32] Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,

State[33] and two non-signatory States[34] of the CWC attended as observers. Representatives of 7 international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies,[35] as well as 39 non-governmental organizations,[36] were also in attendance. The Conference elected Sa'ad Abdul Majeed Ibrahim Al-Ali (Iraq) as its Chairperson. The Conference also elected representatives of 10 States parties[37] as Vice-Chairpersons of the Conference, as well as Odette Melono (Cameroon) as Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole.

The Secretary-General, in his message[38] to the Conference, highlighted 2013 as an extraordinary year for the Convention and noted the successful

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Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

[33] Israel.

[34] Angola and South Sudan.

[35] CARICOM, ICC, ICRC, LAS, NATO, OSCE, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.

[36] Accademia della Scienze Bologna, Amman Center for Peace and Development, Arms Control Association, Biochemical Security 2030 Project at University of Bath, Bradford Disarmament Research Centre, CBW Events, Centre for Legal Assistance and Movement for Development, Danish Institute for International Studies, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (University College), Environmental Protection and Public Care Organisation, Green Cross CWC Coalition Advisor, Green Cross International, Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland, Halabja Chemical Victims Society, Harvard Sussex Program, Indian Chemical Council (Mumbai, India), Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Institute for Security Studies, International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions, Kenyatta University, Kurdish Organisations Network Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Kurdistan Genocide Victim Organisation, Kurdistan Without Genocide, Lawyers Organisation for Genocide Issues, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), Okan University Center for Eurasian Studies, Organisation for Defence of Rights of Sardasht Chemical Victims, Pakistan House, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Scientists Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons, Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support, Society for Defending the Right of Veterans and Victims of Chemical Weapons of Fars Province, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Trench, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre and YASNA.

[37] Algeria, Armenia, Canada, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka and United States.

[38] Statement to the Eighteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, delivered by Jarmo Sareva, Deputy Secretary-General of Conference

conclusion of the Third Review Conference; the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW; the accessions of Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic to the Convention; and the emergence of a strengthened global norm against chemical weapons.

The Secretary-General condemned the use of chemical weapons in 2013. He welcomed the contribution by OPCW expert teams to the subsequently established United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (United Nations Mission). The Secretary-General also highlighted the cooperation between the United Nations and the OPCW in the context of the recently established OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Underscoring the strong commitment by the United Nations to the promotion of the universality of the Convention and its full implementation, the Secretary-General called on the six States[39] that still remained outside of the Convention to accede to it without delay.

In his opening statement,[40] the Director-General of the OPCW welcomed the decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee to award the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW. He noted that this represented a clear recognition of 16 years of past achievements of the OPCW and its valuable contribution to global peace and security.

Reiterating his condemnation of the confirmed sarin gas attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta on 21 August, the Director-General recalled that the OPCW had placed its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General in the context of the United Nations Mission. He noted that 2013 witnessed an unprecedented undertaking for the Organisation in the form of the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons and provided an overview on the progress made to date. Stressing that that historic mission remained the focus of the Organisation's efforts, he noted that several milestones were yet to be achieved to reach the targeted completion date of 30 June 2014.

The Director-General also welcomed the accession to the Convention by Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013 and reiterated his call on the six States remaining outside of the Convention to join without further delay or preconditions.

The Director-General also noted the successful conclusion of the Third Review Conference conducted in April of that year and its adoption

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on Disarmament, The Hague, 2 December 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=7319 (accessed 17 July 2014).

[39] Angola, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar and South Sudan.

[40] OPCW, document C-18/DG.17. Available from http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16971 (accessed 17 July 2014).

of a forward-looking and substantive outcome document and future policy guidance.

Following the OPCW Director-General, the Special Coordinator of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic, Sigrid Kaag, addressed the Conference.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Regarding chemical demilitarization and verification activities, as at 31 December, the OPCW verified the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons amounting to 57,597.246 metric tons or 82 per cent of the declared amount; the destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons amounting to 919.931 metric tons or 45 per cent of the declared amount; and the destruction of all declared Category 3 chemical weapons. The total Category 1 and 2 chemical weapons amounted to 58,517.177 metric tons or 81 per cent of the declared amount. These figures include the declaration made by the Syrian Arab Republic upon its accession to the Convention in 2013. The Russian Federation, the United States and Libya continued to make progress towards completing the destruction of their respective declared stockpiles. The OPCW also continued to work with Iraq with a view to achieving the earliest possible destruction of the remaining stockpiles.

The industry verification activities of the OPCW continued throughout 2013. During the year, 229 inspections of chemical industry facilities were conducted in accordance with article VI of the Convention. Since the entry into force of the Convention in 1997, a total of 2,599 inspections had been undertaken worldwide.

The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board continued to carry out its activities with a view to advising the Director-General on developments in science and technology relevant to the implementation of the Convention. The two Temporary Working Groups of the Board, on "Convergence of Chemistry and Biology" and on "Education and Outreach in Science and Technology Relevant to the Convention", continued to meet in 2013. A new Temporary Working Group was formed in 2013 to consider verification-related matters.

The Technical Secretariat continued to assist States parties in achieving full and effective implementation of the Convention and in developing relevant national capacities in the areas of assistance and protection against chemical weapons, national implementation, and assistance and international cooperation. The Technical Secretariat delivered 77 courses, workshops, seminars and events for over 2,050 participants from around the world.

The OPCW continued to strengthen its interaction with a wide range of stakeholders in the Convention, including the chemical industry, science and academia, and other representatives of civil society. As requested by a recommendation by the Third Review Conference, the Technical Secretariat

further enhanced its interaction with representatives of the chemical industry through, inter alia, engagement with the International Council of Chemical Associations.

The accessions of Somalia on 29 May and the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 September increased the number of States parties to the Convention to 190. With only six States remaining outside of the Convention, the OPCW moved closer to achieving its objective of full universality. The Director-General, on several occasions, reiterated his call upon these six States to join the Convention without delay or preconditions. In 2013, the OPCW also continued to carry out activities to promote accession to the Convention by maintaining contacts with representatives of non-States parties and providing sponsorships to these representatives to attend OPCW events and courses.

Throughout the year, the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General continued to conduct bilateral visits and meetings and addressed various international, academic and scientific forums.

Awarding of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize

On 11 October, the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced its decision to award the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW "for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons". The Director-General, accompanied by a delegation comprising representatives of States parties and staff members of the Technical Secretariat, received the prize in Oslo on 10 December on behalf of the Organisation. In his speech at the award ceremony, the Director-General highlighted the practical achievements of the OPCW and the States parties in disarmament against the backdrop of the legacy of chemical warfare and ongoing efforts to address emerging challenges.

The Director-General also announced that, to commemorate the historic event, the money awarded by the Norwegian Nobel Committee would be used to create a fund for annual OPCW awards. These awards will recognize outstanding contributions in advancing the objectives of the Convention.

United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

In 2013, the tragic use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic reminded the international community of the dangers posed by these weapons. The international community, including the United Nations Secretary-General and the OPCW Director-General, condemned, in the strongest possible terms, the confirmed sarin attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta on 21 August. At the request of the Secretary-General, the OPCW placed its resources at his disposal and provided experts to deploy with the United Nations Mission. Two teams of OPCW experts participated in this mission. The OPCW also provided facilities for the analysis of the data and samples collected. (See also

the section entitled "United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic" on page 86.)

OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic

On 27 September, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a historic decision[41] entitled "Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons" on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. This decision was endorsed by United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the same day. These decisions were informed by the Framework Agreement[42] negotiated in Geneva by the Russian Federation and the United States on 14 September. On that day, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted its instrument of accession to the Convention, requesting the provisional application of the Convention until its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 October.

The accelerated programme of destruction agreed upon by the Executive Council represented an unprecedented challenge, to be undertaken in an active war zone and meeting ambitious target dates. On 16 October, following close consultations between the OPCW Director-General and the United Nations Secretary-General, the establishment of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic was announced. That same day, Sigrid Kaag was appointed as Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission.

The Joint Mission successfully completed the crucial initial tasks assigned to the team by the target dates of 27 October and 1 November. These included providing assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic in submitting the initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme, verifying disclosed sites and completing the functional destruction of chemical weapons production, mixing and filling facilities.

On 15 November, the Executive Council adopted a follow-up decision[43] setting forth detailed requirements for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons and the chemical weapons production facilities. The decision of the Executive Council also included the relevant completion dates for such destruction. The Council approved the removal of chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic to a location outside its territory for destruction. The target

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[41] OPCW, decision EC-M-33/DEC.1. Available from https://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16747 (accessed 17 July 2014).

[42] United States Department of State, "Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons", 14 September 2013. Available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm (accessed 4 June 2014).

[43] OPCW, decision EC-M-34/DEC.1. Available from http://opcw.unmissions.org/Portals/0/E_EC-M-34DEC.1_e_.pdf (accessed 18 July 2014).

date for completion of the destruction of all declared chemicals was set to be no later than 30 June 2014.

At the request of the Council, the Director-General prepared a "Plan for the Destruction of the Syrian Chemical Weapons outside the Territory of the Syrian Arab Republic".[44] This Plan outlined, inter alia, necessary arrangements for the removal of Syrian chemical weapons and subsequent destruction thereof, and also indicated the prerequisites for its effective implementation.

Successful implementation of the Plan was predicated on the decisions of a number of States parties to provide substantial assistance. The United States indicated that it would provide facilities necessary to neutralize the priority chemicals on board a vessel at sea. Contributing to a major multination maritime transport operation to enable the removal and transport of the Syrian chemicals at sea, Denmark and Norway provided two cargo ships, which were envisaged to be accompanied by Danish and Norwegian naval security escorts. China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the Syrian Arab Republic offered additional naval security escorts. Italy agreed to allow use of the port of Gioia Tauro for priority chemicals brought from the Syrian Arab Republic by cargo vessels to be transferred onto the United States ship *MV Cape Ray* for destruction at sea.

As requested by the Council, the Technical Secretariat also pursued the option of the destruction of chemicals removed from the Syrian Arab Republic in commercial chemical disposal facilities. This included binary chemical weapon components and any associated reaction masses. On 21 November, the Technical Secretariat issued a call for expressions of interest from commercial companies, with a view to initiating tenders for the treatment and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and inorganic chemicals and related packaging materials and containers.

In November and December, a massive procurement and delivery operation was executed to provide the Syrian Arab Republic with the materials and equipment necessary for the safe packaging and transportation of chemicals to the port of embarkation. By the end of December, major elements to enable the safe packing, transport and removal of chemical weapons material were by and large in place. The Syrian Arab Republic provided a plan for the transportation of the chemicals from the storage sites to the port, as well as a security and safety plan during the movement of materials within its territory.

Some delays in the removal process occurred in December, which were caused by a combination of security concerns, the procurement and delivery of large quantities of packaging and transportation materials and equipment,

[44] OPCW, document EC-M-36/DG.3.

and adverse weather conditions. The target completion date of 31 December for the removal of the priority chemicals[45] was not met.

The Director-General provided the Executive Council detailed monthly reports on the progress made in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. The reports were sent to the United Nations Secretary-General for his subsequent transmission to the United Nations Security Council. The OPCW and the United Nations collaborated effectively within the framework of the Joint Mission and between the offices in New York, The Hague, Cyprus and Damascus.

The OPCW established a trust fund for facilitating the technical activities of the OPCW in support of the verification of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. At the request of the Council, the Organisation also established a special trust fund for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. The generous financial contributions by States parties, as well as their in-kind assistance, remained instrumental to the successful implementation of the decisions. A third trust fund was separately established by the United Nations.

Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Under the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, the Secretary-General is authorized to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law. The original mandate derives from General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987. Related guidelines and procedures[46] for such an investigation were adopted in 1990. The United Nations Security Council also reaffirmed the Secretary-General's investigative mandate in its resolution 620 (1988). The Secretary-General undertakes such investigations in order to ascertain the facts and to promptly report the results of any such investigations to all Member States. The technical guidelines and procedures for the conduct of such investigations were developed in the late 1980s[47] and their appendices were updated in 2007.

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[45] The priority chemicals for removal were mustard agent and the key binary chemical weapon components DF, A, B, and BB, including BB salt, as declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

[46] See A/44/561.

[47] In 1987, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts provided by Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available for him for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons (resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987). In 1990, the Assembly endorsed the proposals of the

In 2013, the Secretary-General's Mechanism received renewed attention from the international community as a result of events in the Syrian Arab Republic and the decision by the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Before the advent of the Syrian chemical weapons issue, two investigations had been conducted under the Mechanism during the early 1990s. These investigations were related to separate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Mozambique and Azerbaijan in 1992.[48]

Under the Mechanism, the Secretary-General is required to compile and maintain lists of qualified experts and laboratories nominated by Member States to undertake such investigations at short notice. This roster is maintained by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and is composed of over 300 experts, nominated by nearly 50 Member States, including over 120 experts in the biological area. The roster also includes over 40 analytical laboratories, nominated by several Member States. In the event that an investigation is triggered, this roster would permit the Secretary-General to respond with the rapid identification of specialized knowledge and expertise required for a specific fact-finding mission. Two States submitted new or updated nominations to the roster in 2013.

The Secretary-General is the main decision-making authority under the Mechanism. Based on the assessment of the information provided by Member States concerning allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons, the Secretary-General decides whether an investigation is warranted and has to quickly inform all Member States about his decision. Should an investigation be warranted, the Secretary-General has the responsibility to immediately secure access for the team of qualified experts from the Member State on whose territory the investigation is to be conducted and report promptly the results of such an investigation to all Member States. The selection and appointment of a core team of qualified experts, the notification of laboratories whose service may be required in the course of an investigation and the securing of the necessary equipment are also part of the Secretary-General's responsibilities.

Member States can designate qualified experts and laboratories whose services may be required in the event of an investigation. They can also provide specialized training or courses to qualified experts in order to assure a common basis of understanding and operation in carrying out investigations. Any Member State on whose territory an investigation is requested must prepare to receive the team of experts and provide them with the necessary assistance to enable the finalization of their work. Although all Member

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group of qualified experts established in pursuance of its resolution 42/37 C contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/44/561) of 4 October 1989 and its addenda (resolution 45/57 C).

[48] See S/24065 and S/24344.

States are called upon not to refuse the Secretary-General's request for an investigation, the Member State on whose territory the investigation is to be carried out does have the right to deny access.

The CWC, which entered into force in 1997, created the OPCW, which is the implementing body of the Convention. If requested, the OPCW can put its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. While the OPCW implements the CWC and is authorized to conduct an investigation in the case of an alleged use of chemical weapons, the BWC, which entered into force in 1975, has no such equivalent verification body. Therefore, only the Secretary-General is currently authorized to launch an international on-site investigation in case of allegations of use of biological weapons and the functionality of the Secretary-General's Mechanism is therefore particularly important in the field of biological weapons.

In 2013, UNODA continued to serve as the focal point within the United Nations Secretariat to facilitate the administrative and substantive support and coordination for the smooth functioning of the Mechanism.[49] In order to ensure that experts on the roster were well-trained and able to operate efficiently as a United Nations team under potentially challenging field conditions, UNODA facilitated specialized training for these experts. In May, Denmark hosted a "table-top" exercise.[50] A number of Member States have also expressed interest in hosting similar training exercises in the future.

The United Nations also increased its cooperation with other relevant international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the OPCW, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), by establishing cooperative relations and agreements in support of the Secretary-General's Mechanism. In 2012, the United Nations and the OPCW concluded a Supplementary Arrangement to their 2001 relationship agreement[51] that set out the modalities for cooperation for conducting an investigation. The United Nations also signed separate memorandums of understanding with the WHO[52] and the OIE[53] to enhance collaboration, exchange information and develop technical capabilities.

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[49] More information is available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/.

[50] The first training course was held in Umeå, Sweden, in 2009. France hosted a second training in 2012.

[51] A/55/988.

[52] "Memorandum of Understanding between the World Health Organization and the United Nations Concerning WHO's Support to the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of the Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxin Weapons", 31 January 2011. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/UN_WHO_MOU_2011.pdf (accessed 17 July 2014).

[53] "Memorandum of Understanding between the World Organisation for Animal Health and the United Nations Concerning OIE's Cooperation with the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of the Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxin

United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

Following a request by the Syrian Arab Republic on 19 March and subsequently by other United Nations Member States to investigate separate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretary-General decided to establish on 21 March the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic based on his authority under General Assembly resolution 42/37 C and Security Council resolution 620 (1988). The purpose of this impartial fact-finding Mission was to establish evidence related to the allegations of chemical weapons use. The Secretary-General appointed Åke Sellström (Sweden) as the Head of Mission. Upon the request of the Secretary-General, the OPCW and the WHO put their resources at the disposal of the United Nations Mission to support the investigation activities. At the time of 19 March when the allegation was first made by the Syrian Government of the use of chemical weapons by opposition forces, the Syrian Arab Republic was not a State party to the CWC.

Between April and August, the Mission assembled in The Hague and deployed an advance team to Cyprus in order to complete the logistical arrangements for the on-site activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Mission, however, was not granted access by the Syrian authorities to conduct its activities for an extended period due to differences over the modalities. Pending agreement on the modalities of the Mission's deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic, the Mission monitored developments and collected and analysed information made available by Member States. During that time, the Head of Mission and some team members visited capitals and conducted fact-finding activities in neighbouring countries.

At the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, both the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Head of Mission visited Damascus on 24 and 25 July to consult with high-level representatives of the Syrian Government on the modalities of cooperation. The modalities were finally agreed upon on 13 and 14 August following subsequent consultations at United Nations Headquarters. Consequently, the United Nations Mission arrived in Damascus on 18 August and began its fact-finding activities in the Syrian Arab Republic on 19 August into the first reported incident of Khan Al Asal and two other alleged incidents. On 22 August, however, the Secretary-General called for the Mission to swiftly investigate the chemical weapons attack incident that occurred in the Ghouta area of Damascus on the morning of 21 August. On 24 August, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs arrived in Damascus to negotiate with the Syrian authorities access to the site to allow for another investigation of the 21 August incident. The

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Weapons", 25 June 2012. Available from http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About_us/docs/pdf/accords/UNODA_ANG.pdf (accessed 17 July 2014).

Syrian Government granted, as a priority, the United Nations request on 25 August. Inspectors worked from 26 to 31 August investigating the site of the attack. The Mission investigated, as a priority, the Ghouta incident starting 26 August, only five days after the attack. The planning for the Mission was complex and highly delicate with routes of entry into the relevant areas and other crucial elements remaining uncertain until the last minute. The Mission was also the victim of a sniper attack on the first day. Despite these difficulties and challenges, the Mission was able to carry out extensive activities on site in the limited time it had available.

As part of its activities, the Mission followed traditional investigative methods. They went on site, interviewed survivors, witnesses and clinicians, reviewed medical records and took samples. The selection of interviewees was guided by a standardized checklist that aimed to identify individuals who either demonstrated moderate to severe symptoms and signs, or were able to provide a clear and detailed history of the event. Physicians were also asked to provide medical records of patients with significant symptoms. The team interviewed numerous survivors, nurses and treating physicians, several of whom responded immediately to the incident.

The team also collected biomedical samples, including from hair, urine and blood, documented and sampled impact sites and munitions, and collected 30 soil and environmental samples. The Mission departed from the Syrian Arab Republic on 31 August with the collected samples and finalized its report on the Ghouta attack. The samples were sent for analysis to four laboratories designated by the OPCW.

The results of the analyses of the Ghouta incident demonstrated the widespread nature of the attack. Of the blood samples tested, 85 per cent tested positive for sarin. The results were corroborated by the clinical assessments, which documented symptoms and signs consistent with nerve agent exposure. The samples taken from the impact and surrounding areas also tested positive for sarin. The team was also able to examine impacted and exploded surface-to-surface rockets that are capable of carrying a chemical payload. A majority of the rockets or rocket fragments recovered were found to be carrying sarin.

On 16 September, the Secretary-General presented the Mission's report[54] on the 21 August Ghouta incident, which concluded that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. When he reported to the Security Council, the Secretary-General expressed the view that this use of chemical weapons constituted a grave violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other rules of customary international law and was a war crime.

The Mission, led by Åke Sellström, returned to the Syrian Arab Republic on 25 September to follow up on and conclude its investigation of all pending credible allegations. After completing its fact-finding activities, the Mission

[54] A/67/997-S/2013/553.

left the country on 30 September with a view to preparing its final report,[55] which was submitted to the Secretary-General by the Head of Mission on 12 December. The report was promptly transmitted to both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Secretary-General briefed the General Assembly and the Security Council on the report on 13 and 16 December, respectively. A total of 16 allegations of separate incidents involving the alleged use of chemical weapons were reported to the Secretary-General by United Nations Member States. On the basis of the sufficiency and credibility of the information received, the United Nations Mission decided to investigate seven allegations reported to the Secretary-General.[56] The Mission concluded that chemical weapons had been used in the conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, not only in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August, but also on a smaller scale in Jobar on 24 August, Saraqeb on 29 April, Ashrafiah Sahnaya on 25 August and Khan Al Asal on 19 March. The Secretary-General stressed then that use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was a deplorable offense against the universal values of mankind.

A succession of significant events took place right before and immediately after the issuance of the report of the United Nations Mission on the Ghouta incident. On 14 September, the Russian Federation and the United States agreed to a framework for the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons. This framework included an ambitious set of deadlines for the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons. In an important development, the Syrian Arab Republic deposited its instrument of accession to the CWC on that same day. In accordance with the CWC, the treaty entered into force for the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 October.

On 27 September, the Executive Council of the OPCW adopted by consensus a decision[57] on an accelerated programme for achieving the complete elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons by mid-2014. The decision required inspections in the Syrian Arab Republic to begin by 1 October and called for ambitious milestones for destruction, which would be set by the Security Council by 15 November 2013. The decision was subsequently annexed to Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), which was unanimously adopted also on 27 September. The resolution called for the full implementation of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council which contained special procedures for the speedy and verifiable destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons. The resolution also mandated the complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014 and required the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully

[55] A/68/663-S/2013/735.

[56] Khan Al Asal of 19 March 2013; Sheik Maqsood of 13 April 2013; Saraqeb of 29 April 2013; Ghouta of 21 August 2013; Bahhariyeh of 22 August 2013; Jobar of 24 August 2013; and Ashrafiah Sahnaya of 25 August 2013.

[57] OPCW, decision EC-M-33/DEC.1.

with all aspects of the implementation of the decision, including by providing OPCW personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in the Syrian Arab Republic. Should the Security Council find that the Syrian Government was not abiding by its responsibilities under resolution 2118 (2013), the Council would reconvene in order to consider appropriate responses under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

On 16 October, the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic was formally established. The Joint Mission, headed by a Special Coordinator, Sigrid Kaag, was mandated to oversee the timely elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, to be completed in three established phases by 30 June 2014, in the safest and most secure manner possible. (See also the section entitled "OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic" on page 81.)

Export controls

Australia Group

From 3 to 7 June, the Australia Group[58] held its annual plenary meeting in Paris. The meeting was chaired by Australia and hosted by France.

At the 2013 plenary meeting, the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic featured prominently in the Group's discussions. Following a press statement on 28 January, which had expressed concern about developments in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Group reaffirmed its view that chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic had continued to pose a serious threat of further destabilizing the Middle East and a challenge to global non-proliferation norms. The Australia Group plenary underlined that the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances was unacceptable and against the legal norms of the international community. It urged support for the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Group urged all parties to the Syrian conflict to renounce chemical weapons and their use in

[58] The Australia Group is a cooperative and voluntary group of countries seeking to counter the spread of technologies and materials that may facilitate the development or acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by States and non-State actors. Australia Group participants are committed to ensuring that their export controls do not hinder legitimate trade and technical cooperation in the chemical and biological sectors. Participants include the European Commission and 41 member States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. More information is available from www.australiagroup.net.

any circumstances and to take steps to eliminate all stocks of those weapons. It also stressed that the Syrian Government must assure the international community about the security of its chemical weapons stockpiles. Building on its appeal at the 2012 plenary, the Group stressed the need for all States to exercise increased vigilance with regard to dual-use exports to the Syrian Arab Republic of items potentially relevant to chemical and biological weapons.

During the meeting, participating experts continued their review of lists of chemical and biological items that were to be made subject to export control. The Group also noted that its control lists had been increasingly used as the benchmark for global best practice controls on sensitive dual-use chemical and biological materials, equipment and related intangible technologies. The Australia Group plenary affirmed its commitment to ensuring that its export controls did not hinder legitimate trade and technical cooperation in the chemical and biological sectors.

The Group continued its process of review of the proliferation risk associated with new and emerging technologies, with a view to identifying materials and equipment that might warrant inclusion at some future date in national export control lists. Major areas of focus were developments in chemical agents, as well as recent advances in the life sciences and nanotechnology, and developments in dual-use chemical and biological production equipment.

The Australia Group participants agreed to deepen cooperation through greater information-sharing on approaches to visa vetting, experience in the implementation of catch-all provisions and other measures to further enhance the effectiveness of the Group. They also reiterated their commitment to engaging industry and academic sectors in support of the Group's work, including raising awareness of controls on proliferation sensitive transfers of intangible technology and brokering services. The Group agreed to continue an active programme of international outreach and engagement in 2013 and 2014, with a view to the wider adoption of control lists and practices and to further enhance efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

On 12 August, Mexico formally became the forty-second member of the Australia Group. This was a result of the consensus and strong support expressed for Mexico's membership at the Group's plenary held in June. In welcoming Mexico, the other members recognized the Government's steadfast efforts to bring its export control system fully into line with the Australia Group common control lists and guidelines, and its determination to contribute even more effectively to the global effort to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Chapter III
Conventional weapons issues

Top photo: Members of a team from the African Union Mission in Somalia prepare a box of plastic explosives to detonate munitions captured from al-Shabaab militants.
Credit: UN Photo/Tobin Jones

Bottom photo: A member of the Burundian contingent of AMISOM stands guard at an underground weapons bunker in Dayniile.
Credit: UN Photo/Tobin Jones

CHAPTER III

Conventional weapons issues

I wholeheartedly welcome the adoption, today, of a first-ever Arms Trade Treaty by the General Assembly. It is a historic diplomatic achievement—the culmination of long-held dreams and many years of effort. This is a victory for the world's people. The ATT will make it more difficult for deadly weapons to be diverted into the illicit market and it will help to keep warlords, pirates, terrorists, criminals and their like from acquiring deadly arms. It will be a powerful new tool in our efforts to prevent grave human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law. And it will provide much-needed momentum for other global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General[1]

Developments and trends, 2013

The year 2013 marked the historic adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by the United Nations General Assembly. The adoption of the long-awaited ATT was the culmination of over a decade of efforts and many years of complex negotiations within the United Nations framework, including three sessions of a group of governmental experts, an open-ended working group, four sessions of a preparatory committee, and two diplomatic conferences.

The twin goals of the ATT, as stipulated in its article 1, are to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion. It is expected that the Treaty will bring more accountability and transparency to the global arms trade.

The ATT will make it more difficult for human rights abusers, Governments transferring arms for illicit use, arms traffickers and armed groups to obtain weapons and ammunition. The ATT is the first global treaty to link humanitarian and human rights considerations to decisions on arms exports.

Following the adoption of the ATT, Member States, the United Nations and civil society organizations engaged in an active campaign throughout

[1] Statement on the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 2 April 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1805#.U7LLC_ldXTY (accessed 1 July 2014).

the remainder of the year to encourage States to sign and ratify the ATT, in order to enable its early entry into force. The implementation of the ATT will require its States parties to take various measures to improve their national import and export regulations and controls, to engage in the exchange of information with other States parties, and to prevent the diversion of weapons. Aware that compliance with the Treaty will pose serious challenges for many of the Treaty's prospective States parties, various international, regional and non-governmental organizations began in 2013 to design projects and activities to assist interested States parties in implementing the Treaty after it enters into force.

Another major development in 2013 was the adoption by the Security Council of its first resolution on small arms and light weapons.[2] The resolution reaffirmed the Security Council's recognition of the negative impact of illicit flows of small arms and light weapons, which often undermined the Council's efforts to help restore peace and stability in conflict and post-conflict areas on its agenda.

Increasing concern was also registered over the growing trend towards 3D printing of firearms, which may have significant implications for weapons marking and tracing and the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument.[3]

The 2013 Group of Governmental Experts to review the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was again unable to agree on the issue of the formal inclusion of small arms and light weapons as a reporting category. The Group also could not reach agreement on any of the proposals made by experts during its three sessions to expand the scope of the Register. In its final report, adopted by consensus, the Group did agree on detailed descriptions of armed unmanned aerial vehicles and encouraged Member States to report on their transfers of these weapons.

Arms Trade Treaty

The adoption of the landmark ATT[4] in April marked the culmination of a long and complex process that began in the 1990s at the behest of civil society. The conclusion of the ATT was hailed as the major achievement in the area of disarmament and arms regulation in 2013.

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[2] Security Council resolution 2117 (2013).

[3] The full title of the instrument is International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. The text is available from www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/ITI_English.pdf (accessed 7 July 2014).

[4] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (accessed 14 May 2014).

Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty

The Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade, which took place at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York from 18 to 28 March, concluded its session of work without reaching a consensus on the draft treaty text that was submitted by the President of the Conference, Peter Woolcott (Australia), on 27 March 2013. Consequently, a group of States moved to submit the draft treaty text for adoption by the United Nations General Assembly. Sixty-four sponsors submitted on 28 March a draft resolution, by which the General Assembly would adopt the ATT.

Adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty

On 2 April 2013, the General Assembly adopted the ATT with no substantive change to the above-mentioned draft submitted close to the end of the Final Conference. An overwhelming majority of 154 countries voted in favour, with 3 against (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic) and 23 abstaining.[5]

The following are the important aspects of the Treaty:

- The ATT scope covers all important weapons systems from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms,[6] as well as small arms and light weapons. Moreover, each country is encouraged to "apply the treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms".
- Ammunition is addressed under a separate article, which provides that States, prior to authorizing the export of ammunition or munitions, shall apply the same prohibitions and assessment provisions that are applicable to the arms included in the scope of the Treaty (see below). The Treaty also contains similar provisions for critical parts and components.
- The Treaty contains clear prohibitions for States parties exporting conventional weapons and ammunition if such exports would violate arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations Security Council or if the exporting State has information that those items would be used in the commission of acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,[7] or attacks against civilians.

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[5] For the resolution text, see General Assembly resolution 67/234 B of 2 April 2013.

[6] The United Nations Register includes the following categories: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; missiles and missile launchers.

[7] The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners in Time of War; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); and 1977 Protocol

- The ATT requires States parties, prior to authorizing an export of arms or ammunition, to assess if the export would contribute to peace and security or, on the contrary, undermine these goals. The exporting State party would also have to assess the risk that the export items could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law, or offenses under international conventions or protocols related to terrorism or transnational organized crime. That assessment should also take into account the risk of the export items being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children. The exporting State party is to deny the export if, after conducting the risk assessment and considering available mitigating measures, it considers that there is an overriding risk that the export items could lead to any of the negative consequences listed in article 8, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, some of which are mentioned above.
- States parties are required to take measures to regulate the transit and trans-shipment of conventional weapons, as well as arms brokering. They also are obliged to take measures to prevent the diversion of arms.
- The ATT also contains reporting provisions: an initial report on the status of the State party's regulatory system; and annual reports of exports and imports of conventional arms. Provisions encouraging international assistance and cooperation to facilitate implementation and compliance are also included.

Opening for signature and entry into force

The ATT was opened for signature on 3 June 2013. Remarkably, 67 States signed the Treaty on the day it opened for signature. At the end of 2013, the ATT had 115 signatories, of which 9 had already deposited instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the depositary of the Treaty. The ATT is to enter into force 90 days after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the depositary.

Small arms and light weapons

The illicit trade and uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons remained a serious threat to international peace and security, as the easy availability of arms diverted from government stockpiles directly impacted the security situation in countries such as Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic. Small arms continued to fuel violence in conflict zones and to provide the enabling tools for armed crime and violence in all regions of the world, with grave consequences for millions of civilians and

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Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).

for efforts to promote national reconciliation and socioeconomic development in countries emerging from armed conflict. The United Nations, as well as various regional, subregional and non-governmental organizations, continued to actively encourage and support Governments in the implementation of various global and regional instruments for preventing and combating the scourge of the illicit flow and proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Security Council

In situations of conflict and post-conflict worldwide, acts of violence are carried out using small arms and light weapons, which are widely available owing to a lucrative illicit trade in such goods and poor regulation and controls, including of government stockpiles. Africa remained an area of particular concern in this regard. Many African countries continued to be particularly affected by the adverse consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, with new hotspots emerging and new cross-border flows of weapons threatening the fragile stability of areas still recovering from past conflicts or facing escalating political tensions.

In 2013, the Security Council paid special attention to the issue of small arms and light weapons. On 26 September, the Council held its biennial open debate focusing on the impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons on international peace and security. Following the debate, the Security Council, for the first time in its history, adopted a resolution[8] focusing exclusively on this issue. In the resolution, the Council reminded Member States of their obligation to fully and effectively comply with Council-mandated arms embargoes and to take a range of measures to facilitate their implementation, such as improved weapons and ammunition stockpile management and weapons marking. The Council reaffirmed its intention to take appropriate measures to strengthen arms embargo monitoring mechanisms, such as assigning dedicated staff or monitoring units to relevant United Nations Missions to effectively monitor arms embargoes.

Furthermore, the Security Council recognized that the misuse of small arms and light weapons had a range of negative humanitarian, human rights, development and socioeconomic consequences, in particular on the security of civilians in armed conflict. The Council made a connection between such misuse and violence against women and girls, sexual and gender-based violence, and the recruitment of children by parties to armed conflict. It is also noteworthy that the Security Council urged Member States, relevant United Nations entities, and intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations to cooperate and share information on suspected traffickers and trafficking routes, on suspect financial transactions and on brokering activities

[8] Security Council resolution 2117 (2013).

that could facilitate diversions, illicit transfers, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons

The implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects[9] and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)[10] continued to be a priority for the international community. After the successful conclusion of the Second Review Conference on small arms,[11] States started in 2013 to prepare for the fifth Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action and its ITI, which will be held in June 2014.

The adoption of the ATT was seen as a most welcome development in the context of efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; it further supplemented and complemented the Programme of Action. The inclusion in the ATT of the provision that States parties should take measures to regulate brokering in arms and ammunition, as well as the provisions on diversion, helps strengthen efforts to combat trafficking in small arms and light weapons—the main goal of the non-legally binding Programme of Action. At the same time, the ATT requires States parties to take measures to prevent illicit flows of ammunition, an issue which was missing altogether in the Programme of Action.

Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms

In its resolution 68/48 of 5 December 2013, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects", the General Assembly decided to hold the next biennial meeting of States from 16 to 20 June 2014. In line with past practice, the fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (BMS) will include a separate segment on the ITI.

On 29 August 2013, Member States nominated Zahir Tanin (Afghanistan) as Chair-designate of the fifth BMS, with a mandate to provide leadership to the preparatory process for the meeting. The Chair-designate requested

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[9] *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 9-20 July 2001 (A/CONF.192/15), para. 24.

[10] "International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons". Available from http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/ITI_English.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014).

[11] The Second United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held in New York on 27 August to 7 September 2012.

Anthony Simpson (New Zealand) to undertake the role of moderator for the ITI segment of the fifth BMS.

After several rounds of constructive informal consultations in New York, Member States informally agreed on the provisional agenda for the fifth BMS, which would address a number of important themes such as stockpile management of small arms and light weapons, capacity-building and, for the first time in the history of those biennial meetings, transfer of technology and equipment.

United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms

Throughout 2013, the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), an internal inter-agency coordination mechanism, continued to address relevant disarmament, arms control and regulation issues from a multidisciplinary perspective involving interlinked facets related to peace and security, development, rule of law, governance, public health, crime prevention, citizen security, counter-terrorism, human rights, children's and women's rights, migration, forced displacement and humanitarian aid.

In the course of the negotiations towards the ATT, the Secretary-General broadened the scope of CASA,[12] to enable the mechanism to function as a forum for consultation and coordination on a wide range of conventional arms issues, including small arms, the arms trade and ammunition regulation. In support of the negotiations, the Secretary-General requested CASA to undertake an inter-agency study, which was published in March, on the adverse effects of unregulated arms transfers on States and citizens, and their impact on the work of the United Nations.[13]

Moreover, as a result of CASA deliberations, those United Nations entities responsible for reporting on humanitarian and human rights issues were requested to take into account the relevant provisions of the ATT in their reporting on situations in the areas of their concern.

Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures

The concept of practical disarmament originated from "An Agenda for Peace" and its supplement,[14] to fill the gap between the traditional multilateral negotiations in disarmament and the actual needs of States affected by conflicts, as exacerbated by the uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons. Effective measures in practical disarmament include the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition, and the promotion of

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[12] Currently CASA consists of 23 United Nations entities, a list of which is available from www.poa-iss.org/CASA/CASA.aspx (accessed 7 July 2014).

[13] CASA, *The Impact of Poorly Regulated Arms Transfers on the Work of the United Nations*, UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 23, March 2013 (New York, 2013). Available from www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/23/ (accessed 7 July 2014).

[14] A/47/277-S/24111 and A/50/60-S/1995/1.

an integrated weapons management policy.[15] The Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (GIS) was established by the General Assembly to function as an informal, open and transparent forum to promote and support such measures that assist affected States in their efforts for consolidation of peace.[16]

The GIS organized a gathering of Member States, relevant United Nations entities and regional and civil society organizations to share lessons learned from recently implemented practical disarmament initiatives, including collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition in East Africa,[17] reduction of armed violence in Central America[18] and practical application of small arms control standards.[19] It also discussed ATT-related issues such as regional initiatives in Africa and the role of parliamentarians in this context.

Another key function of the GIS was to facilitate the matching of assistance needs with available resources in the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms. In this regard, the GIS supported the establishment of the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and served as a platform to promote UNSCAR to potential donors, beneficiary States and non-governmental organizations.

International Small Arms Control Standards

During the Second Review Conference on the Programme of Action, the United Nations launched the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS),[20] a result of three years of intensive development in collaboration with partners worldwide. These standards were designed to streamline policymaking, programming and practice on small arms and light weapons control across the 23 United Nations entities that make up the CASA mechanism, as well as in the global small arms control community.

The standards provide clear and comprehensive guidance on fundamental aspects of small arms and light weapons control, including legal, policy and operational issues, and were modelled on standards that the United Nations had already developed in the areas of mine action[21] and of disarmament,

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[15] See General Assembly resolution 67/50 of 3 December 2012.

[16] See General Assembly resolution 52/38 G of 9 December 1997.

[17] "Securing army ammunition depots in East Africa", presentation by the Mine Advisory Group.

[18] "Mitigating the diversion of illicit weapons as an effective and preventive measure to reduce armed violence in Central America", presentation by UNLIREC.

[19] "Enhancing the practical application of the International Small Arms Control Standards", presentation by United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

[20] Available from www.smallarmsstandards.org (accessed 7 July 2014).

[21] The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are available from http://www.mineactionstandards.org (accessed 7 July 2014).

demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.[22] ISACS fit within the framework created by existing global instruments on small arms and light weapons control (i.e., the Programme of Action, the ITI and the Firearms Protocol) and build upon best practices that have been elaborated at the regional and subregional levels.

ISACS were developed in collaboration with a global network of experts drawn from the United Nations, governments, international and regional organizations, civil society and the private sector. At the launch of the new standards, all operational modules (eight in total) were presented.

Armed violence and development

As at 31 December, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development[23] was endorsed by over 100 States. The Declaration, which recognized armed violence as a cause and consequence of underdevelopment, was designed to support States in achieving measurable reductions in armed violence in conflict and non-conflict settings by 2015.

In May, the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda issued its report,[24] in which the Panel proposed the inclusion of security-related themes as a new goal for the post-2015 agenda.

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) addressed the issue of armed violence by developing guidelines on how to establish and maintain gun-free zones (GFZs). Although GFZs may be known by different names in different places, the concept is the same: geographically limited spaces—in addition to those areas where most national legislation already create a gun-free environment such as court houses or airports—where the carrying or possession of guns is prohibited for civilians in order to reduce armed violence and promote public safety. Providing comprehensive guidance on how to establish and maintain a GFZ will assist national governments, local authorities and international development and peacebuilding organizations in their efforts to prevent and reduce armed violence.[25]

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[22] The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards are available from www.unddr.org (accessed 7 July 2014).

[23] "The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development", Geneva, 7 June 2006. www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GD-Declaration-091020-EN.pdf (accessed 7 July 2014).

[24] High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development* (New York, Bocoup, 2013). Available from http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf (accessed 1 July 2014).

[25] UNODA, "Guidelines: How to establish and maintain gun-free zones", March 2014. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/gfz-guidelines/ (accessed 7 July 2014).

Conventional arms ammunition

During the past decade, inadvertent explosions of unstable ammunition stockpiles have occurred in more than 60 countries. Thousands of people have died and the livelihoods of entire communities have been disrupted. Unsecured or poorly monitored national ammunition stockpiles also led to massive diversion into illicit markets. Diverted conventional ammunition was increasingly used to assemble improvised explosive devices, used in many acts of terrorism.

Improving the whole-life management of conventional ammunition stockpiles requires action at the national and regional levels. In 2013, UNODA, in close cooperation with the United Nations Mine Action Service, continued implementing the United Nations Saf*er*Guard Programme, which oversees the dissemination of International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).[26] IATG are compatible with the above-mentioned ISACS. The aim of the IATG is to assist national authorities, industry and others in efforts to enhance the safety and security of ammunition stockpiles—thus reducing the dual risks of explosions and diversion. The guidelines are structured to offer three levels of ascending comprehensiveness, to be applied according to the specific needs of a particular country or situation. The basic level presents the most expedient ways to apply the essential principles of safe and secure whole-life ammunition management. Subsequent levels detail progressive measures that can be taken so that the highest standards are attained. The General Assembly adopted, by consensus, the resolution entitled "Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus",[27] which endorsed important steps forward in the implementation of the IATG and welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Saf*er*Guard quick-response mechanism. This mechanism allows ammunition experts to be deployed rapidly to assist States, upon request, in the urgent management of ammunition stockpiles, including in the aftermath of unintended explosions of ammunition, and encourages States in a position to do so to provide technical expertise or financial support to the mechanism.

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[26] These guidelines, which are detailed standards for voluntary use by countries that wish to improve the safety and security of their ammunition storage sites, were developed in response to General Assembly resolution 63/61 of 2 December 2008. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/ (accessed 14 May 2014).

[27] General Assembly resolution 68/52 of 5 December 2013.

Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

The goal of the United Nations Register is to promote transparency in the international transfer of conventional arms. Member States of the United Nations voluntarily report to the Register their imports and exports of conventional arms in the following seven categories: (a) battle tanks; (b) armoured combat vehicles; (c) large-calibre artillery systems; (d) combat aircraft; (e) attack helicopters; (f) warships; and (g) missiles and missile launchers. In addition, as part of background information, Governments are encouraged to provide additional information, such as their military holdings, procurement through national production, and international transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

2013 Group of Governmental Experts

To maintain the relevance of the Register and to keep it up to date with the changing military environment and technical developments, the Register has been reviewed by a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) every three years since its inception. The seventh such review was held in 2013, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 66/39 of 2 December 2011. As in the previous GGE, UNODA prepared an informal concept paper on the operation of the Register, which provided background information to the experts and facilitated their discussion.

The GGE analysed data and information concerning recent participation of States in the Register and expressed concern regarding the decline in participation in recent years. The Group considered a number of proposals for expanding the existing seven reporting categories, including small arms and light weapons, and for including procurement through national production as an integral part of the Register. The Group was unable to reach agreement on any of the proposals.

In its report,[28] the Group recommended the enhancement of support to the Secretariat in order to increase its role in the maintenance and promotion of the Register. The GGE recommended that Member States report armed unmanned aerial vehicles in a manner consistent with relevant paragraphs in the report, and continue providing the Secretary-General with their views on whether the absence of small arms and light weapons as a main category in the Register had limited its relevance or directly affected decisions on participation. The Group also noted that the smaller size of the GGE in 2013, compared with previous years, had negatively affected its work. It thus

[28] A/68/140.

recommended that future GGEs consist of at least 20 experts representing countries with diverse perspectives on transparency in armaments.

Global reported arms trade

Since its launch in 2011, the web-based "Global Reported Arms Trade" platform,[29] which, at the end of 2013, contained all information submitted by Member States to the Register, has contributed to greater openness on international arms transfers, as it visualizes the reported trade patterns for any user in academia or otherwise. In 2013, UNODA updated the database by adding several new functions aimed at further enhancing its utility. These include a statistics section that shows the number of reports submitted, searchable by region and by year, and the total number of weapons exported or imported, searchable by category, by year and by region. In addition, a quick-search function was added that allows users to conduct a targeted search for transfers of weapons of a specific category to a specific country in a given period. Thirty-nine per cent of reporting States submitted their national information online.

Annual report on the Register

The twenty-first consolidated report[30] by the Secretary-General was issued in 2013. The report and its addendum contained information provided by 57 Governments on their conventional arms transfers in 2012. After the issuance of the addendum of the report, 13 more States provided information, bringing the total number of submissions in 2013 to 70. This figure was slightly higher than in 2012. Of the 70 reports received in 2013, 22 were "nil reports", indicating no transfers of weapons in the seven categories of the Register, while 32 contained information on exports and 30 contained information on imports in the seven categories respectively. In addition, 23 States provided additional background information on military holdings, 12 on procurement through national production and 37 on international transfers of small arms and light weapons, including two "nil reports". A table listing all replies received by the Secretary-General is included in annex I to this chapter. The percentage of reports containing information on transfers of small arms and light weapons remained above 50 per cent (see figure I). Annex II to this chapter presents a complete list of States that have provided information on international transfers of small arms and light weapons since 2004.

As in the previous years, the rate of participation by Member States from Africa (3 of 54 States), Asia and the Pacific (13 of 53 States), and Latin America and the Caribbean (9 of 33 States) remained rather low, while

[29] Available from http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx (accessed 7 July 2014).

[30] A/68/138 and Add.1.

Western Europe and other States (26 of 30 States) and Eastern Europe (19 of 23 States) registered higher percentages of participation (see table 1).

Figure I. Reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons as a percentage of total submitted reports



Table 1. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2001-2013

	2001	*2002*	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*
African States (total: 54)	11	17	17	10	16	16	15	8	4	4	2	2	3
Asian States (total: 53)	31	30	29	32	31	27	26	21	18	16	18	11	13
Eastern European States (total: 23)	21	21	22	20	21	21	22	22	19	19	21	16	19
Latin American and Caribbean States (total: 33)	23	26	24	21	18	21	20	11	13	8	17	6	9
Western European and other States (total: 30)	30	30	29	30	29	30	30	29	26	25	27	21	26
Total	**116**	**124**	**121**	**113**	**115**	**115**	**113**	**91**	**80**	**72**	**85**	**56**	**70**

Note: The table shows participation in the Register based on the years in which the national report was submitted.

Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

Member States are called upon to report annually, through the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures,[31] information on their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available. While the rate of participation by Member States in this instrument is lower than that of the Register, the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures remains the primary global instrument in the area of transparency in military expenditures. Since its establishment in 1980, over 120 States have participated in the instrument at least once.

Annual report on military expenditures

In 2013, UNODA received 56 national reports on military expenditures for the latest fiscal year (2012), including two "nil reports". This figure was slightly higher than that of 2012, when only 49 submissions were recorded, the lowest since 2001. The number of States participating in 2013 was considerably higher than the first two decades of the instrument's operation, when typically 20 to 35 States participated every year. A table listing all replies received by the Secretary-General is included as annex III to this chapter.

As with the Register in previous years, the rate of participation in 2013 varied widely across regions. Of the 56 reports received in 2013, 3 came from Africa, 4 from Asia and the Pacific, 21 from Eastern Europe, 6 from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 22 from Western Europe and other States. Regional participation in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures is reflected in table 2.

Table 2. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures: 2001-2013

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Africa (total: 54)	1	6	4	4	1	4	2	5	2	3	3	2	3
Asian and the Pacific (total: 53)	11	15	16	16	16	17	15	13	9	13	11	8	4
Eastern Europe (total: 22)	17	18	16	20	19	19	19	21	19	17	20	14	21
Latin America and the Caribbean (total: 33)	8	15	13	9	11	14	14	11	7	5	10	9	6

[31] It was originally called the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures and was renamed in 2011 to the present name as a result of a review of the instrument by a Group of Governmental Experts.

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Western Europe and other States (total: 30)	24	26	26	29	28	26	28	27	21	20	23	16	22
Total	**61**	**80**	**75**	**78**	**75**	**80**	**78**	**77**	**58**	**60**	**67**	**49**	**56**

Note: The table shows participation in the instrument based on reports on military expenditures submitted by Member States, which generally contain information on the latest available fiscal year. This information is requested by UNODA through an annual note verbale, as mandated by the relevant General Assembly resolution.

United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation

On 7 June, the United Nations launched the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), which is a flexible, multi-donor facility to support all aspects of the ATT implementation, as well as projects for the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Facility also has provisions for funding rapid-response activities related to the ATT and the Programme of Action implementation, both in conflict prevention and immediate post-conflict situations. Entities eligible for funding under UNSCAR are United Nations CASA members, international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and research institutions.

The objectives of the Facility are:

- To support the preparation for ratification and implementation of the ATT, including through South-South cooperation;
- To ensure the complementarity of implementation activities of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons;
- To improve effectiveness of assistance through better coordination, monitoring and matching of resources; and
- To promote increased sustainability through more predictable sources of funding.

Decisions on UNSCAR priorities and funding are made by a Strategic Planning Group made up of donor Governments and UNODA. In its first year of operation, UNSCAR decided to fund 9 projects, including a "special circumstances project", which aimed at providing urgent assistance to the Government of the Philippines in clearing munitions that had been scattered after the destruction of an ammunition depot by Typhoon Haiyan.

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

> *At the same time, you must remain vigilant in addressing the implications of new and emerging weapons and their technologies. I particularly encourage you to further engage in dialogue on all aspects of the issue of autonomous weapons systems, to better understand their potentially grave humanitarian impact and to consider their implications in the context of international humanitarian law and the Convention.*
>
> **Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**[32]

Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention

The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)[33] prohibits or restricts the use of conventional arms that are considered to be too cruel in their effects, causing indiscriminate damage to civilians or unnecessary suffering. The annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, held in Geneva on 14 and 15 November, provided an opportunity to address the potential misuse of certain conventional weapons, including those that benefit from the rapid development of technology. The High Contracting Parties agreed to set up a four-day informal meeting of experts in 2014 to discuss questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems in the context of the objectives and purposes of the CCW.[34] Chairperson Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel (France) organized broad-based consultations in the lead-up to the Meeting on the possibility of adopting a mandate on this topic, firstly by organizing a lunchtime seminar in Geneva on 3 September on autonomous weapons featuring two presentations by Nils Melzer of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Kathleen Lawand of the International Committee of the Red Cross, respectively, and subsequently through consultations carried out in New York, on the periphery of the First Committee, and in Geneva. Many countries supported the idea of holding the informal meeting, underlining that the CCW was the most appropriate forum to tackle this issue. This also reflected the international community's increasing desire for such weapons to be urgently addressed in all their aspects. Lethal autonomous weapons systems have never been deployed in warfare, but machines that operate without direct human control or supervision may become a reality in the future. The meeting is expected to promote a better understanding of this technology and

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[32] Message to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 14 November 2013.

[33] The treaty text and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc (accessed 14 May 2014).

[34] See CCW/MSP/2013/10.

to consider the implications of autonomous weapons for international law and in particular international humanitarian law.

Some States also continued to raise concerns about allegations of use of incendiary weapons against civilians. The implementation of existing international humanitarian law, in particular the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, was also raised. These issues were reflected in the Final Report.[35]

A discussion on the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM), also known as anti-vehicle mines, also took place. The Meeting heard a presentation on a global study on anti-vehicle mines co-authored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining,[36] which mapped all casualties of MOTAPM around the world, setting the scene for an interactive debate. Despite the efforts of the Chair to encourage a positive exchange among the High Contracting Parties, however, it was difficult to overcome the continuing divergences of views on this matter. In spite of many years of substantive discussions, some countries still called for further evidence of the humanitarian costs of MOTAPM. This issue will again be on the agenda of the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties.

The High Contracting Parties also stressed the importance of achieving greater adherence to the Convention in accordance with the Accelerated Plan of Action on Universalization.[37] They also called for the United Nations Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the 2014 Meeting to exercise their authority to increase adherence to the Convention and its Protocols. The important contribution of the CCW Sponsorship Programme to the universalization and implementation of the Convention was acknowledged by the Meeting. The report of the CCW Implementation Support Unit (ISU)[38] was presented to the Meeting. It reported in detail the activities carried out by the Unit to enhance universalization, promote the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols, support the Sponsorship Programme and further improve the CCW website, including the reporting databases. The Unit continued to report in a transparent manner on the estimated and actual costs of activities of the previous year to the High Contracting Parties.

The Final Report of the Meeting,[39] containing the mandate for activities in 2014, including the designation of Remigiusz A. Henczel (Poland) as the Chairperson of the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the

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[35] Ibid., paras. 16-18.
[36] CCW/MSP/2013/SR.2, paras. 36-41.
[37] CCW/CONF.IV/4/Add.1, annex I.
[38] CCW/MSP/2013/5.
[39] CCW/MSP/2013/10.

Convention and the decision on the dates and duration of the 2014 CCW meeting of experts and annual conferences.[40]

Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II)

> *The United Nations will also continue to support efforts towards the elimination of booby-traps and other explosive devices which are being employed with greater frequency by various groups. I welcome ongoing work to address the challenges of affected States in dealing with the prevalent use of improvised explosive devices. Amended Protocol II is an essential element of this process. I call for greater efforts to address the diversion or illicit use of materials that could be used for these devices, and to engage with those who employ them to improve compliance with international humanitarian law.*
>
> **Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**[41]

The High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II continued to focus on strengthening the implementation of the Protocol. The important decisions of the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II built on the fruitful exchange among the High Contracting Parties guided by the Coordinators and the ISU to help revitalize the Protocol's implementation mechanism. This provided an opportunity for States to interact and share their expertise, experience and best practices on the two main topics[42] of the Protocol. The complex issue on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continued to be a focus as States acknowledged the serious humanitarian worldwide impact of these devices. They are often the weapon of choice when resources and access to other weapons are limited.

Fifteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II

The Fifteenth Annual Conference was held in Geneva on 13 November and was presided over by Luis Gallegos Chiriboga (Ecuador), who was assisted by three Vice-Presidents.[43] The main task of the Conference was to consider the work of the Group of Experts and agree on mandates for future work. It adopted an appeal by the High Contracting Parties to promote

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[40] Meeting of Experts to discuss the questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (13-16 May 2014); Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention (13-14 November 2014); Eighth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V (10-11 April 2014); and Sixteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II (12 November 2014).

[41] Message of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 14 November 2013, Geneva.

[42] Status and operation of Amended Protocol II; and improvised explosive devices.

[43] Mikhail Khvostov (Belarus), Wu Haitao (China) and Päivi Kairamo (Finland).

universal adherence to Amended Protocol II and recommended that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Conference exercise their authority towards this end. Recent accessions[44] to Amended Protocol II have raised the number of the High Contracting Parties to 100. A total of 57 countries[45] submitted their national annual reports on the implementation of the Protocol.[46]

Improvised explosive devices

The importance of the work on IEDs was acknowledged by the High Contracting Parties, as these devices continue to pose serious humanitarian impacts. The Coordinator on the issue underscored that IEDs, by their very nature, are versatile due to the multiple methods available for their construction, delivery and initiation. They can be deployed in a variety of ways and are constructed with whatever useful components are available. As some source materials, such as military and commercial grade explosives, have become more difficult to acquire, bomb-makers have become increasingly creative by making IEDs from home-made explosives. The degree of complexity and sophistication of an IED is limited only by the ingenuity of and the materials available to the bomb-maker. As Governments sought to identify and implement effective measures to counter such devices, the characteristics, composition and method for initiating IEDs constantly changed. Therefore, the work on IEDs remained critically important as these weapons continued to pose considerable humanitarian problems and caused a significant number of casualties among both civilians and military personnel.

The work undertaken by the Group of Experts,[47] which convened in Geneva on 8 and 9 April, focused on four topics: information exchange on IEDs; developing best practices aimed at helping to address the diversion or illicit use of materials that can be used for IEDs; efforts on how to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and prevent violations of existing IHL rules with respect to IEDs; and assistance for victims of IEDs.

Firstly, on the sharing of experience on IED incidents, case studies were presented by a number of experts who provided information on experiences with IED incidents, their prevention and their humanitarian effects within the CCW framework, its norms and implementation. The complexity of the problem faced by States in intercepting the supply chain and the serious efforts to prevent the manufacture and use of IEDs were conveyed through case studies by 12 experts focusing on their specific national and regional dimensions.

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[44] Kuwait (24 May 2013) and Zambia (25 September 2013).

[45] CCW/AP.II/CONF.15/8, para. 12.

[46] See CCW website http://www.unog.ch/ccw.

[47] The work on IEDs was guided by the Coordinator, Namdi Payne (Australia), and Co-Coordinator, Laurent Masmejean (Switzerland).

A number of presentations pointed out the global scale of the IED threat.[48] The humanitarian impact would continue to increase, keeping pace with the perceived military utility of IEDs, in particular to non-State actors. Presenters noted that for some actors, IEDs were among the most accessible weapons. They also underlined the dynamic and constantly evolving nature of the threat, pointing to the improvement of terrorist techniques in recent IED incidents. They underscored the need for a more comprehensive and holistic approach at the national, regional and international levels in responding to the threat of IED use. Porous borders and limited border control capacities posed significant challenges as IEDs were a transnational problem. Experts also highlighted the nexus between the movement of components used in IEDs and other criminal activities, such as human and drug trafficking and the illicit arms trade.

Secondly, the Group discussed the compilation[49] of existing IED-relevant guidelines, recommendations and best practices aimed at addressing the diversion or illicit use of materials that can be used for IEDs. The compilation remained a useful reference tool for delegations to draw from as needed. The experts outlined the challenges to understanding the movement of materials that can be used for IEDs, which included the fact that IEDs cover a broad range of weapons with a vast number of designs and components that are often available for legitimate purposes.[50] UNODA drew attention to the implementation tools developed as part of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines to address diversion of ammunition and invited States to use recommendations made in these Guidelines to extend the reach of work to address IEDs.

Thirdly, under IHL rules applicable to IED use and to the protection of civilians, the Coordinator encouraged participants to consider how to promote IHL compliance and prevent violations of existing IHL. An independent researcher shared the results of her field research in Afghanistan on civilian casualties resulting from the use of victim-operated IEDs, which by their nature did not distinguish between civilian and military targets. Furthermore, the research revealed that fundraising by suicide-bomb facilitators was carried out in a neighbouring country with donations received from persons unaware that they were facilitating suicide bombings,[51] underlining the importance of raising awareness of civilian casualties from these weapons. Moreover, the

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[48] According to the Action on Armed Violence, casualties caused by IEDs increase to almost 21,000 in 2012 compared to the previous year. Civilians accounted for 81 per cent.

[49] Available from http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/55E574B550D10D00C1257A78006B2196/$file/IEDs+Compilation.pdf (accessed 8 July 2014).

[50] The expert from the Geneva Academy considered that in light of the broad definition in the Amended Protocol II of an IED, it would be helpful if States could provide examples of weapons that would, and would not, fall within the scope of an IED for the purposes of guidelines or best practices.

[51] The majority of the victims were civilian bystanders rather than military targets.

United Nations Mine Action Service and the United Nations Children's Fund shared experiences in mitigating the devastating effects of IEDs on civilians and in protecting civilians.

Fourthly, discussions[52] focused on the importance of international assistance to victims of attacks by explosive weapons, including by IEDs, and encouraged States to keep in mind the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance under Protocol V adopted in 2008.[53]

Taking note of the report by the Coordinator and Co-Coordinator on IEDs, the Annual Conference considered experts' views that IEDs continued to pose humanitarian challenges as these weapons are often used indiscriminately both during and outside armed conflict. A positive outcome of the Conference was an agreement to work on best practices to address IEDs in 2014, and to explore the possibility of setting up an information exchange database to improve information sharing on illicit use of materials that can be used for IEDs.

The Conference noted the Coordinators' compilation of existing guidelines, best practices and other recommendations aimed at addressing the diversion or illicit use of materials that can be used for IEDs, and requested the ISU to disseminate the compilation and to maintain and update it on a regular basis.

The Conference also decided on further work on this issue in 2014, notably for the Group of Experts to take the following steps:

(a) Continue information exchange on IEDs, IED incidents, their prevention, including public awareness and/or risk education campaigns, and their humanitarian effects, in light of the significance of the CCW framework, its norms and implementation with respect to the IED threat;

(b) Continue developing best practices aimed at helping to address the threat of IEDs, including by doing the following:

(i) Exploring the possibility of an information exchange database, portal or platform as a tool for improving information sharing on the diversion and illicit use of material that can be used for IEDs and other means of reducing the threat of IEDs;

(ii) Examining ways to reduce the risk of military munitions stocks, explosive remnants of war or commercial explosive stocks being used for IEDs;

(iii) Promoting international cooperation and assistance to help strengthen national capacities of the High Contracting Parties, when

[52] This segment was chaired by the Co-Coordinator on IEDs, Laurent Masmejean (Switzerland). Due to time constraints during the meeting, only one presentation was made.

[53] CCW/P.V/CONF/2008/12, annex IV.

requested, to address the IED threat, while bearing in mind commercial confidentiality, national security requirements, the legitimate interests in trade of such materials, and taking into account existing and related work of international and regional organizations, including those referred to in the compilation; and

(c) Continue discussions on victim assistance so that those providing assistance bear in mind the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance, as well as on promoting the provision of assistance to IED victims under the framework of the Plan of Action.

Operation and status of Amended Protocol II

Discussions on the issue of the status and operation of Amended Protocol II continued under the responsibility of the President. The High Contracting Parties continued to address the Protocol's implementation and universality, including the issue of the relationship of the original Protocol II to the Amended Protocol II. A long-term plan of phasing out the original Protocol proposed by a State party was considered by many to be the best course of action. It constituted a gradual process that could help States consider this issue in a comprehensive way.[54] On national reporting under Amended Protocol II, the experts focused on the information submitted under the National Annual Report's Form C on technical requirements and relevant information.[55] On universality, the Coordinator announced that 100 States had so far notified their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II, and that, since the 14th Annual Conference, there had been two new accessions to the Protocol: Kuwait and Zambia.

The Annual Conference took note of the report[56] by the President-designate, which highlighted the work of the Group of Experts, focusing on matters arising from the national annual reports by High Contracting Parties under article 13 (4) of Amended Protocol II; the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines; and universalization.

On the issue of increasing the universality of Amended Protocol II, and as part of the overall strategy of CCW universalization, the Group recalled the increasing irrelevance of the original Protocol II. The President and the remaining High Contracting Parties to the original Protocol II that were not

[54] This option continued to be discussed in detail among the High Contracting Parties to the original Protocol II.

[55] Of the 98 High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, 48 per cent submitted information under Form C and did so in the correct manner according to the Guide to reporting, available on the CCW website.

[56] CCW/AP.II/CONF.15/2.

party to Amended Protocol II[57] continued their dialogue, focusing on how best to address the irrelevance of original Protocol II and to find ways to encourage them to consider becoming parties to Amended Protocol II. The Conference agreed that the High Contracting Parties to the Convention should continue their contacts with the remaining High Contracting Parties to the original Protocol II.[58]

The Conference decided that the Group would analyse the High Contracting Parties' implementation of their obligation to submit national annual reports and to study their content, focusing on the information submitted in Form D regarding "Legislation related to the Protocol". The Conference also mandated the Group of Experts to consider the "Guide to reporting" of Form D, which offers detailed guidelines on how States should complete the form. Since the adoption of Amended Protocol II, much progress has occurred in mine action; hence, updating the information contained in the Guide was seen as increasingly important.

In addition, the Conference also decided that the Group of Experts would review the operation and status of the Protocol and consider matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties, as well as the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines.[59] It was also decided that the Group of Experts would continue to explore the issue of IEDs.[60] The outcomes of the work of the Group of Experts would be considered by the Sixteenth Annual Conference in 2014.[61]

The Conference also took decisions on two procedural issues. Firstly, it decided that at future conferences rule 2 of the rules of procedure, requiring the submission of formal credentials, would be suspended, except for when an amendment to Amended Protocol II or the adoption of a new instrument were being proposed. Secondly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, rule 12 of the rules of procedure on costs was deleted and that, in future, only paragraph 5 of article 13 of Amended Protocol II would apply in determining cost sharing at all future conferences. The rules of procedure were subsequently renumbered and reissued.[62]

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[57] Burundi, Cuba, Djibouti, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Togo, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

[58] The High Contracting Parties agreed that any action with respect to the termination of the original Protocol II should be taken with the consent of the High Contracting Parties to the Protocol.

[59] Under the overall responsibility of the Coordinator, Dávid Pusztai (Hungary).

[60] Under the overall responsibility of the Coordinator, Namdi Payne (Australia), assisted by Erwan Roche (France) as Co-Coordinator.

[61] The Conference agreed on the provisional agenda for the Sixteenth Annual Conference in 2014 and its presiding officers: Päivi Kairamo (Finland) to be assisted by three Vice-Presidents representing Albania, China and Guatemala.

[62] CCW/AP.II/CONF.15/8, paras. 24 and 25.

The Conference dealt with the ongoing issue regarding the participation of one NGO in the meetings of Amended Protocol II. It was decided that the President would address the issue in informal consultations in order to find a solution acceptable to all High Contracting Parties prior to the next meeting of Amended Protocol II.[63]

Finally, the issue on the usefulness of the summary records with regard to their cost was noted by the Conference. Informal consultations on this matter would be conducted by the President ahead of the Sixteenth Annual Conference.[64]

Protocol V on explosive remnants of war

> *Explosive remnants of war can impede the delivery of humanitarian aid, the return of refugees and displaced persons and undermine development. Avoiding these consequences must be at the forefront of the work carried out under Protocol V.*
>
> **Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**[65]

The High Contracting Parties to Protocol V continued their efforts to enhance the implementation of the Protocol. The recommendations previously agreed to under Protocol V built on the intensive exchange between the Coordinators, the ISU and the affected countries regarding their priorities and challenges. These recommendations included, inter alia, encouraging the High Contracting Parties to implement, on a voluntary basis, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) under the topic of generic preventive measures; to continue capacity-building on the issue of clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW); and to continue to address the obligations of States parties under article 4 of the Protocol concerning the recording of the use and abandonment of explosive ordnance during an armed conflict. The recommendations agreed to under Protocol V also called for the merging of Forms E and F of the national reporting template[66] to address an overlap, with the intention that all information on requests for assistance and support for cooperation and assistance would be provided in only one form. This particular recommendation was made since a number of countries had treated the provision of assistance for existing ERW in article 7 in exactly

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[63] Ibid., paras. 10 and 26.

[64] Ibid., para. 27.

[65] Message of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, delivered by Jarmo Sareva, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 14 November 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=7276 (accessed 8 July 2014).

[66] Form E pertains to steps taken to implement the provisions of article 7 on assistance with respect to existing ERW. Form F concerns steps taken to implement article 8 on cooperation and assistance.

the same manner as they had the provision of assistance under the terms of article 8.

Seventh Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V

The Seventh Conference on Protocol V took place on 11 and 12 November in Geneva and was presided over by Jan Knutsson (Sweden).[67] On universalization, Bangladesh, Kuwait and Zambia were welcomed as the latest High Contracting Parties to accede to Protocol V, bringing the total to 84.

The Conference had before it 52 national reports from the High Contracting Parties. It also considered reports submitted by the Coordinators of the substantive topics, conveying the results of the discussions held during the Meeting of Experts in Geneva from 10 to 12 April. The Meeting had addressed efforts to prevent and remedy the humanitarian problems posed by ERW, which causes a higher number of casualties than that caused by landmines or cluster munitions. The meeting focused on clearance; cooperation and assistance; generic preventive measures; national reporting; recording the use of explosive ordnance during an armed conflict; and victim assistance.

Cooperation and assistance.[68] A fruitful small-group meeting among affected States and invited donor States to provide information on their efforts to assist affected States was organized during the Meeting of Experts, at which a variety of concerns and needs were raised. One concern was the challenging prospect for donor countries to maintain their funding for ERW and mine action, which appeared to be declining.[69] This continuing trend remains a challenge for the High Contracting Parties. On the one hand, the world's most heavily ERW-affected country, Lao People's Democratic Republic, had intended to seek increased funding in order to set a foreseeable deadline for its clearance programmes. On the other hand, other affected States such as Croatia and Zambia, which did not experience new ERW casualties, found it difficult to attract donor attention despite considerable ERW contamination problems that have hampered their economic development. The overall purpose of the small-group meeting was to discuss the priorities and challenges of fulfilling the obligations of Protocol V, as well as to discuss the status of national action plans.

Based on the recommendations of the Coordinator, the Conference decided to encourage those High Contracting Parties, and relevant international organizations and institutions in a position to do so, to provide

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[67] He was assisted by two Vice-Presidents: Kateřina Sequensová (Czech Republic) and Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo (Cuba).

[68] The work on cooperation and assistance was carried out by the Coordinator, Yevgen Lisuchenko (Ukraine).

[69] CCW/P.V/CONF/2013/4, paras. 1 and 2.

cooperation and assistance for addressing the impact of ERW; to encourage States that had expressed their needs for assistance[70] to ensure they had specified their exact needs and to provide regular updates on the status of those requests; to continue the small-group meeting format with affected States and donor countries to discuss the challenges and needs in the area of cooperation and assistance; and to encourage both donor and affected High Contracting Parties to submit information relating to articles 7 and 8 in their national reports.

Generic preventive measures.[71] The global problems related to the safe storage and handling of ammunition resulted in the development in 2012 of the IATG. The Guidelines,[72] currently at the second phase of implementation, were presented to the meeting by two UNODA experts.[73] Developing countries and organizations raised some concerns about the guidelines that they considered too high a standard to reach. On the other side of the debate, some developed countries had enacted their own national procedures that went beyond the Guidelines. The meeting found it important to draw more affected States into the discussion as, in reality, the debate on this issue had always been dominated by developed countries. The need to raise further awareness of the IATG in the mine action community worldwide was also considered important as less than half of the delegations present were aware of their existence.

To minimize the failure rate of ammunition, the Conference decided to encourage the High Contracting Parties to carry out measures to ensure the safe storage of their munitions and, in particular, to pay special attention to the quantity of munitions being stored, aging munitions, the adequacy of storage infrastructure and facilities and ongoing management of storage munitions sites. The Conference also invited the High Contracting Parties to implement part 3 of the Technical Annex to Protocol V and to report on such work in their Protocol V national annual reports and encouraged High Contracting Parties to voluntarily implement the IATG. Furthermore, the Conference decided, with the view to minimizing the failure rate of ammunition, to continue the exchange of views on the management of munitions sites during the 2014 Meeting of Experts. The CCW ISU was tasked to follow-up on key issues with High Contracting Parties that had not yet reported on their implementation of generic preventive measures.

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[70] Requests have been expressed officially or in statements to the meeting of experts.

[71] The work on generic preventive measures was carried out by the Coordinator, Mario Amadei (Italy).

[72] The Guidelines were developed by UNODA with the full involvement of the United Nations Mine Action Service.

[73] Gillian Goh and Alexander Riebl.

Article 4 on recording, retaining and transmission of information.[74] High Contracting Parties are required to record the use or abandonment of explosive ordnance during an armed conflict. Once active hostilities have ceased, such information is subsequently conveyed to the party in control of the contaminated territory. The Meeting of Experts in April found the level of compliance with article 4 to be quite low as many States needed to be further informed of the requirements under these provisions. In 2012 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) hosted an expert workshop on article 4,[75] with the purpose of clarifying the requirements of article 4 and examining the current implementation practices of States. The workshop also focused on the main challenges to article 4 implementation. At the Protocol V Meeting of Experts, the recommendations provided by the ICRC workshop opened the way to a useful interactive debate, during which many saw the recommendations as having very high standards and some States parties perceived them to be overwhelming. More work was required to encourage States to implement article 4, in cooperation with the ICRC together with the ISU. Discussions also focused on how States operating under coalitions or alliances would ensure that article 4 information was being collected and transferred to the concerned party.[76]

The Conference decided to continue the consideration of clearance, removal or destruction of ERW. The affected High Contracting Parties were encouraged to report on their authorities responsible for ERW; on awareness-raising and educational campaigns for the public; and on both progress towards and challenges in surveying, clearing and destroying ERW. The Conference also encouraged donor and affected High Contracting Parties to further support capacity-building for the surveillance, clearance and destruction of ERW at the community and national levels, as a means of ensuring that such programmes are strengthened and sustainable. The 2014 Meeting of Experts was tasked with further addressing all aspects of the obligations of article 4 in conjunction with article 11 with a view to supporting all High Contracting Parties in the implementation of appropriate operating procedures and instructions and providing training to their personnel. The Conference emphasized that the obligations of article 4 were a national responsibility even

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[74] The work on clearance, removal or destruction of ERW and the article 4 generic electronic template was carried out by the Coordinator, Ivan Grinevich (Belarus), and Gerfried Elias (Germany) as Friend of the Coordinator.

[75] The meeting, entitled "Operationalizing the recording requirements of Protocol V", was held in Geneva on 8 and 9 November 2012, and heard a presentation by Raymond Smith (Military-Technical Adviser, Arms Unit, ICRC) on the results of the ICRC meeting of experts.

[76] A brief presentation was delivered by Frank Cremer of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, which stressed that international humanitarian law obligations of States were taken into account when preparing for and organizing a NATO operation, and everything possible was done to ensure compliance with article 4.

when participating in coalitions or alliances, hence sharing of experience in this regard should be continued.

National reporting.[77] There has been an encouraging gradual increase in the number of reports submitted by High Contracting Parties each year. This trend was partly due to the direct contacts made by the Coordinator with States that had not yet submitted their reports.[78] In terms of improving the quality of reporting, the Coordinator emphasized the need for States to go beyond merely stating in their reports that an obligation had been implemented, but to provide specific information on such implementation. Aside from the Coordinator providing a briefing during the session on clearance, efforts to help States improve the quality of reporting also included a presentation by the ISU of a paper entitled "Making the most of national reporting".[79] The overlap between Forms E and F of the National Reporting Form was also the focus of discussion. Whereas Form E addresses reporting on the implementation of article 7 and specifically the issue of existing ERW, Form F enables States to inform on the range of cooperation and assistance activities listed in article 8 which they support. Both forms provide an opportunity for affected States to detail their challenges and needs for assistance.

The Conference called on all High Contracting Parties and observer States to submit national reports and encouraged them to use the Guide to National Reporting.[80] A consolidated form merging current Forms E and F of the National Reporting Form was to be developed for approval at the 2014 session of the Eighth Conference of the High Contracting Parties. The Coordinator, with the support of the CCW ISU, would ensure that the Guide to National Reporting reflected the recent changes made to the National Reporting Form and would examine the reporting under article 3 of the Protocol.

Victim assistance.[81] The focus of the discussion was on social and economic reintegration and efforts to further promote the Plan of Action on Victim Assistance under Protocol V, including how to create a culture of implementation and what should be the next focus under this thematic topic. Social inclusion is about ensuring that survivors and their families can participate in the social, cultural, sporting and political life of their communities, while economic inclusion pertains to the ability to earn an income and be a productive member of a community. Both of these elements

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[77] The work on national reporting was carried out by the Coordinator, Lode Dewaegheneire (Belgium).

[78] This year Albania, Chile and Cuba submitted their initial national annual report, an effort recognized and congratulated by the Coordinator during the meeting.

[79] CCW/P.V/CONF/2013/6, annex I.

[80] The Guide to National Reporting was adopted by the Fourth Conference.

[81] The work on victim assistance was carried out by the Coordinator, Fernando Guzman (Chile), and Caroline Woergoetter (Austria) as Friend of the Coordinator.

are essential to promoting self-sufficiency and independence.[82] The experts also discussed the importance of including victims into decision-making and planning processes, as well as exchanging experiences with other relevant international legal instruments. Due to the large participation of military experts in the meeting, there was limited interaction in the debate on victim assistance. This prompted organizers to suggest that in future meetings the work programme could be restructured to include a small-group round-table discussion solely among victim assistance experts that would report its results to the Plenary.

The Conference encouraged High Contracting Parties to support the social and economic reintegration of victims of ERW and to report on practical and policy measures undertaken either in their national annual reports or directly to the 2014 Meeting of Experts. The Conference also strongly encouraged affected High Contracting Parties to report on their efforts to support victim assistance in reporting Form F (a) of the Protocol V national annual reporting form template, as well as during the meetings of High Contracting Parties. The exchange of practical experiences and lessons learned with other relevant international legal instruments would continue in 2014, as well as the focus on the implementation of the commitments made to victims of ERW under the Protocol V Plan of Action and article 8(2) of the Protocol.

Finally, on the overall work under Protocol V, the Conference decided that in implementing the Accelerated Plan of Action on Universalization of the Convention and its annexed Protocols,[83] the 2014 Meeting of Experts should consider the issue of the universalization of Protocol V under the overall responsibility of the President-designate of the Eighth Conference.

The Conference also decided that at future conferences rule 2 of the rules of procedure requiring the submission of formal credentials would be suspended, except when an amendment to Protocol V or the adoption of a new instrument were being proposed. Furthermore, at the recommendation of the General Committee, the Conference decided to delete rule 12 of the rules of procedure, to renumber the rules and reissue them. Only paragraph 3 of Protocol V's article 10 would apply in determining cost sharing at all future conferences.

The Conference adopted its Final Document,[84] containing the mandate for 2014 activities, including the designation of Kateřina Sequensová (Czech Republic) as the President of the Eighth Conference in 2014, the appointment

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[82] CCW/P.V/CONF/2013/7, para. 3.

[83] As adopted by the Fourth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. For the text, see CCW/CONF.IV/4/Add.1, annex I.

[84] CCW/P.V/CONF/2013/11.

of the Coordinators responsible for each substantive issue,[85] and the decision to hold the next Meeting of Experts in Geneva on 3 and 4 April 2014.

Implementation Support Unit

The ISU presented its annual report[86] at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. The Unit's report included the following topics: efforts related to the promotion and universalization of the Convention and its Protocols; support to the Meetings of Experts and Conferences on Amended Protocol II, Protocol V and the Convention; support to the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols; efforts to facilitate communications among the High Contracting Parties and maintenance of the database and website; and the Sponsorship Programme.

In 2012, the High Contracting Parties had requested the ISU to continue to report annually on its activities, as well as on the difference between its estimated and actual costs, where the latter was consistently lower than the former. The Unit made an effort to ensure that the breakdown of costs was clear both in the estimates and in the final expenditures of the previous year's activities and that cost estimates contained a more realistic projection—in particular with regard to the amount of documents to be issued. This level of transparency in reporting on the costs will continue in the future.

The promotion of universalization, including through the support of office holders efforts in this regard, continued to be one of the Unit's priority areas. This included preparing and sending universalization-related correspondence from the officeholders, providing background papers and briefs on accession to the CCW and organizing bilateral meetings. The ISU also followed up with individual States and regional groups to explain the background of, and the procedures for accession to, the CCW.[87] The Unit also prepared and dispatched a joint message from the three office-holders[88] addressed to the foreign ministers of States not yet party to the Convention. In

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[85] Ivan Grinevich (Belarus) on clearance, removal or destruction of ERW (article 3), and the generic electronic template (article 4); Maria Victoria Picazo (Argentina) and Friend of the Coordinator, Fernando Guzman (Chile) on victim assistance (article 8 (2)); Lode Dewaegheneire (Belgium) on national reporting (article 10 (2) (b)); the President-designate of the Eighth Conference will be responsible for the issues on cooperation and assistance and requests for assistance (article 7) and generic preventive measures (article 9 and the Technical Annex of the Protocol).

[86] CCW/MSP/2013/5.

[87] This included attending a regional seminar of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries: Regional workshop on International Humanitarian Law Development (Manila, Philippines, 9-12 July 2013); drafting and facilitating the message of the United Nations Secretary-General; briefing visiting delegations; providing detailed briefs to non-States parties; and following up with Pacific Island countries that are not yet States parties.

[88] The Presidents-designate of the 2013 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, and the Seventh Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V.

addition to these universalization efforts, the Unit also assisted in dispatching a letter from the United Nations Secretary-General urging the ministers of foreign affairs of States not party to the Convention to join.

The ISU supported the CCW Sponsorship Programme by organizing regular meetings of its Steering Committee, which decides on the persons to be sponsored. The Unit conducted the necessary follow-up action in contacting the candidates, in coordination with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining as the Programme's day-to-day operator. During the 2013 Meetings of Experts, a targeted briefing on universalization was organized where each participant was requested to share information on the prospects of their country joining the CCW. The Steering Committee of the Programme[89] met three times to deliberate on potential beneficiaries and to discuss efforts on how to move forward in advancing universalization of the CCW and its Protocols.

The ISU organized and supported the work undertaken during the two Meetings of Experts. In this connection, it assisted with the preparation and communication of the workplans of the Co-coordinators for the Amended Protocol II Group of Experts, and prepared briefings and statements for the President-designate, who is also responsible for the issue on the operation and status of the Protocol. It helped with the preparation of the President-designate's report and carried out an analysis of Form C of the national annual reports on technical requirements and relevant information. The Unit also assisted the Co-coordinators on IEDs in implementing their mandate and in maintaining the compilation of existing guidelines, best practices and other recommendations aiming at addressing the diversion or illicit use of materials that can be used for IEDs, currently posted on the CCW website.

In preparation for the Meeting of Experts on Protocol V, the Unit assisted the Coordinators in preparing for the substantive discussions focusing on all the thematic issues, i.e., clearance and article 4, cooperation and assistance, generic preventive measures, national reporting and victim assistance. In order to improve the quality of national reporting and to assist States in this area, the Unit prepared and presented a paper entitled "Making the most of national reporting"[90] at the Meeting of Experts. The paper facilitated the High Contracting Parties' completion of their national annual reports. The ISU also assisted the Coordinator on national reporting in dispatching a message to High Contracting Parties regarding Protocol V national reporting. It also assisted the victim assistance Coordinators on the issues of cooperation with other international instruments, advancing social and economic development and advocacy of victim assistance across all CCW instruments.

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[89] Chaired by the Coordinator, Arturas Gailiunas (Lithuania).

[90] CCW/P.V/CONF/2013/6, annex I.

In its third year of operation, the ISU continued to work in accordance with its mandate and made further progress in key aspects of that mandate. It endeavoured to assist the High Contracting Parties in enhancing understanding of the limits of international humanitarian law through interactive discussions on autonomous weapons systems and new weapons technologies. At the same time, it maintained the importance of meeting the needs of High Contracting Parties in servicing two meetings of experts and three annual conferences, promoting universalization, and implementing the Convention and its Protocols.

Cluster munitions

Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions[91] prohibits under any circumstances the use, development, production, stockpiling or transfer of cluster munitions, and establishes clear deadlines for the destruction of the existing stockpiles and for the clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas. Article 11 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions provides as follows:

> "1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
>
> (a) The operation and status of this Convention;
>
> (b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
>
> (c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention;
>
> (d) The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants;
>
> (e) Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and
>
> (f) Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
>
> 2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened

[91] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster_munitions (accessed 14 May 2014).

by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference. […]"

In this connection, the General Assembly by resolution 63/71 of on 2 December 2008 requested the Secretary-General "to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be necessary to fulfil the tasks entrusted to him by the Convention on Cluster Munitions."

Against this background, Meetings of States Parties to the Convention were held in Vientiane, Lao People's Democratic Republic, from 9 to 12 November 2010, Beirut; in Lebanon from 13 to 16 September 2011; and in Oslo, Norway, from 11 to 14 September 2012. In accordance with the decision[92] of the Meeting in Oslo, the Fourth Meeting of States Parties was convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Lusaka from 10 to 13 September 2013.

Preparations for the Fourth Meeting of States Parties were facilitated by an informal intersessional meeting in Geneva from 16 to 18 April 2013. This meeting focused on the core Convention implementation topics: general status and operation of the Convention; victim assistance; clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education; stockpile destruction including retention; universalization; transparency reporting; national implementation measures; and cooperation and assistance. The intersessional meeting was preceded by a day of technical workshops on clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance and cooperation and assistance. Representatives of 111 States, the United Nations, international and regional organizations and civil society participated in the workshops and the intersessional meeting.[93]

The Fourth Meeting was opened by Steffen Kongstad (Norway), President of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention. Over 100 States participated in the Meeting, including 48 non-signatory States. In addition, the United Nations, ICRC and a number of other relevant organizations and institutions attended. The opening ceremony featured messages from the President of Zambia, Michael Chilufya Sata; the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon; the Vice-President of the ICRC,

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[92] CCM/MSP/2012/5, para. 31.

[93] In accordance with the relevant decision of the Third Meeting of States Parties, the new Coordinators that will guide the intersessional work programme from the end of the Third Meeting of States Parties were the following: Working Group on the General Status and Operation of the Convention—Zambia and Costa Rica; Working Group on Universalization—Portugal and Ghana; Working Group on Victim Assistance—Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan; Working Group on Clearance and Risk Reduction—Ireland and Lao People's Democratic Republic; Working Group on Stockpile Destruction and Retention—Croatia and Spain; Working Group on Cooperation and Assistance—Mexico and Sweden; Reporting—Belgium; and National Implementation Measures—New Zealand.

Olivier Vodoz; and a representative of the Cluster Munition Coalition, Robert Mtonga.

The Meeting was chaired by Wylbur C. Simuusa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia, assisted by Encyla Sinjela, Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations Office at Geneva. The bureau also included four Vice-Presidents elected by acclamation by the Meeting,[94] as well as by the group of Coordinators of the informal intersessional meeting.

The primary focus of the Fourth Meeting was on the universalization of the Convention, in particular in Africa, as well as on the stigmatization of cluster munitions. On this latter issue, concerns were expressed over cases of alleged use of cluster munitions in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2012 and 2013. As in previous meetings, States affected by cluster munitions and States with stockpiles of cluster munitions reported on their efforts to implement the Convention.

Another issue receiving close attention was the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in accordance with the decision of States Parties to establish, preferably no later than the Third Meeting of States Parties an independent ISU, hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and led by a Director.[95] States parties had also mandated the negotiation of a funding model to cover the costs of the ISU activities, and to present these proposals to the States parties for their approval. Despite the efforts of the presidents of the Second and the Third Meetings of States Parties and the number of informal consultations held on this issue, there was no agreement on an appropriate funding model. By the time of the Fourth Meeting, States parties had not managed to bridge the gap between the divergent positions of those looking for a partially or entirely assessed contribution model (based on mandatory contributions by all States parties) and those favouring an ISU entirely funded through voluntary contributions. Following an intensive debate and last minute exhaustive consultations by its President, the Fourth Meeting decided to establish an ISU that would be hosted at GICHD and funded through voluntary contributions until the First Review Conference in 2015. Meanwhile, the existing interim solution consisting of an Executive Coordinator based in the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the United Nations Development Programme should continue to provide implementation support to the States parties. Noting that it was not possible, at this stage, for the States parties to agree on a funding model for an ISU, the Meeting agreed to continue with the consultations on the funding model with the purpose of agreeing, by 2015, on a financial model that would secure the sustainable functioning of the Unit.[96]

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[94] Costa Rica, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon and Norway.
[95] CCM/MSP/2011/5, para.29.
[96] CCM/MSP/2013/6, paras. 29-35.

The Fourth Meeting welcomed the Lusaka Progress Report[97] on the implementation of the 66 concrete steps and goals contained in the 2010 Vientiane Action Plan,[98] as well as the national papers submitted by a number of delegations on universalization, clearance, transparency measures and cooperation and assistance. It appointed six additional coordinators of the informal intersessional activities for 2013-2014.[99] It decided to convene in 2014 an informal intersessional meeting in Geneva from 7 to 9 April 2014. It nominated the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, assisted by the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva, as the President-designate of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to be held during the first week of September 2014 in San Jose, Costa Rica.

By the time of the Fourth Meeting, the Convention had been signed by 108 States[100] and ratified by 84.

Anti-personnel mines

Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,[101] in article 11, paragraph 1, provides for regular meetings of the States parties to consider any matter relating to the application or implementation of this Convention, including the following: (a) the operation and status of this Convention; (b) matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; (c) international cooperation and assistance in accordance with article 6; (d) the development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines; (e) submissions of States parties under article 8; and (f) decisions relating to submissions of States parties as provided for in article 5.

Moreover, pursuant to article 12:

> "1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more

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[97] CCM/MSP/2013/6, annex I.

[98] CCM/MSP/2010/5, annex II.

[99] Netherlands on the General Status and Operation of the Convention; Norway on Universalization; Mexico on Victim Assistance; Switzerland on Clearance and Risk Reduction; Albania on Stockpile Destruction and Retention; and Chile on Cooperation and Assistance.

[100] Pursuant to its article 15, the Convention is no longer open for signature.

[101] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/mine_ban (accessed 14 May 2014).

States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

(a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;

(b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;

(c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and

(d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention."

Against this background and pursuant to the relevant decisions of the 2009 Cartagena Summit for a Mine Free World,[102] the Twelfth Meeting of the States parties took place in Geneva, Switzerland, from 3 to 7 December 2012. Pursuant to a decision[103] of the Twelfth Meeting, the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties was convened in Geneva from 2 to 5 December. The latter was followed by the First Preparatory Meeting for the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, held on 6 December.

In accordance with the established practice, the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties was preceded by a series of preparatory meetings and informal consultations, such as:

(a) The 2013 meetings of the Standing Committees held in Geneva from 27 to 30 May;

(b) The monthly meetings of the Coordinating Committee;

(c) The mechanism established to analyse the article 5 requests for extensions of the mine clearance deadlines;

(d) The traditional one-day preparatory informal meeting, held on 19 September, convened by the President-designate at which all States parties, observer States and interested international organizations were invited to participate.

In particular, the 2013 Intersessional Work Programme focused on the substantive reports, submitted by the States parties that were granted extension periods under article 5 of the Convention, on steps taken to implement the respective recommendations and to meet the new extended deadlines. A number of relevant implementation issues were also discussed:

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[102] APLC/CONF/2009/9, para. 29.
[103] APLC/MSP.12/2012/10, para. 32.

- The continuing non-compliance by three States[104] with their obligations under article 4 on stockpile destruction, as well as the relevance of this article to the States parties in which previously unknown stocks of anti-personnel mines have been discovered;
- The completion by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Bhutan of their article 5 obligation to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
- The alleged use of anti-personnel mines by States parties, which would represent a major violation of the Convention;
- The persisting low reporting rate under article 7 and the poor quality of some national transparency reports, in particular compared to the detailed information provided in the article 5 extension requests;
- The universalization of the Convention, which continues to be a challenge.

The Thirteenth Meeting was opened by Matjaž Kovačič (Slovenia), the President of the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties, who presided over the election of the President of the Thirteenth Meeting, Boudjemâa Delmi (Algeria). The Meeting heard messages by the Acting Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Michael Møller, who delivered a message on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; the Vice-President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Christine Beerli; the representative of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Jody Williams; and the President of the Council of Foundation of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Barbara Haering.

Representatives of 100 States parties and 15 observer States, as well as the United Nations and a number of international, regional and non-governmental organizations, participated in the work of the Meeting.

The violation of the Convention's main provision on non-use of anti-personnel mines in Yemen, as well as the alleged use of anti-personnel mines in three other States parties were the focus of attention of the Meeting. The Meeting expressed concern about these allegations and reaffirmed the determination of the States parties to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by these weapons. It also welcomed the commitment of the Government of Yemen to investigate the case and present a report on its investigation, the identification of those responsible for deploying anti-personnel mines, the origin of the used anti-personnel mines and how those mines were obtained (given that Yemen had long ago reported the destruction of all its stockpiled anti-personnel mines), clearance of the mined areas, and action to prevent and suppress any future prohibited activities.[105]

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[104] South Sudan, Sudan and Turkey.
[105] APLC/MSP.13/2013/6, paras. 23-25.

The Thirteenth Meeting emphasized the evolution and vitality of the mine ban process and focused on the evaluation of the final stage of implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014.[106] The Geneva Progress Report[107] was warmly welcomed as an important tool supporting the application of the Cartagena Action Plan by measuring progress and highlighting priority areas of work.

At the initiative of the Algerian presidency of the Thirteenth Meeting, a special session was devoted to cooperation and assistance in the context of the Convention. In particular, two panel discussions, on assessing the Convention's existing cooperation and assistance machinery and on other forms of partnership for implementing the Convention's provisions, were held. However, no formal recommendation or action was considered or proposed for adoption.

The Meeting granted six States parties[108] an extension to their article 5 deadlines. In accordance with the applicable procedure, all requests were considered by the Analysing Group chaired by Matjaž Kovačič. The Meeting heard updates on the status of implementation of article 5 from the States granted extensions in the past. Declarations of completion of the implementation of article 5 of the Convention were submitted by four States parties.[109]

The delicate financial situation of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the Convention continued to be a concern in 2013. Since the States parties' Task Force, established after the Second Review Conference on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, had failed to reach agreement on the Unit's financial model, the lack of sustainability and predictability of the funding of the ISU work, based on voluntary contributions, remained an issue of concern and absorbed a considerable amount of time of the Coordinating Committee. Pursuant to the "Directive from the States parties to the ISU"[110] adopted by the Tenth Meeting, the Meeting approved the "Implementation Support Unit 2014 Work Plan and Budget"[111] for the activities of the ISU in 2014, as endorsed by the Coordinating Committee, and the "Interim report on the 2013 activities, functioning and finances of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and preliminary 2013 financial report".[112]

The Meeting reiterated its concern about the persisting unsatisfactory level of submissions of national transparency reports by the States parties

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[106] Available from http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf (accessed 14 May 2014).
[107] APLC/MSP.13/2013/6/Add.1.
[108] Chad, Mozambique, Niger, Serbia, Sudan and Turkey.
[109] Bhutan, Germany, Hungary and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
[110] APLC/MSP.10/2010/3, paras. 13-17.
[111] APLC/MSP.13/2013/3.
[112] APLC/MSP.13/2013/4.

under article 7 of the Convention in terms of overall compliance rate (less than 50 per cent for 2013) and content.

It was decided that the Third Review Conference will be held in Maputo from 23 to 27 June 2014, with two short one-day preparatory meetings in Geneva on 6 December 2013 and 10 April 2014. Henrique Banze, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mozambique was designated as President of the Conference.

Given the short period of time between the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties and the Third Review Conference, the Meeting agreed that intersessional work in 2014 would only take place in the afternoon of 9 April 2014 and, if necessary, on 11 April, with a view to considering primarily the extension requests under article 5. In addition to the five States parties[113] that were serving as Co-chairs, five more States parties[114] were elected to serve as Co-chairs of the Standing Committees from the end of the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties for a two-year term and without prejudice to any decision the Third Review Conference may wish to take with respect to the Convention's committee structure or its meeting programme.

The Meeting also decided that Belgium would preside over the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties in Geneva.

Pursuant to the decision[115] taken by the Thirteenth Meeting, the First Preparatory Meeting in advance of the Third Review Conference took place in Geneva on 6 December. The meeting was presided over by Henrique Banze. The Meeting considered elements for the draft political declaration, the review of the operation and status of the Convention for the period 2010-2014, the plan of action for the period 2015-2019 and a proposal for possible post-Conference meetings.

By the time of the Thirteenth Meeting, the Convention had been signed by 133 States[116] and ratified by 161.

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[113] New Zealand (Status and Operation of the Convention), Austria (Victim Assistance), Mozambique (Mine Clearance), Ecuador (Resources, Cooperation and Assistance) and Norway (Stockpile Destruction).

[114] Belgium (General Status and Operation of the Convention), Costa Rica (Victim Assistance), Japan (Mine Clearance), Indonesia (Resources, Cooperation and Assistance) and Poland (Stockpile Destruction).

[115] APLC/MSP/13/2013/6, para. 32.

[116] Pursuant to its article 15, the Convention is no longer open for signature.

Export controls

Wassenaar Arrangement

The nineteenth plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement[117] was held in Vienna on 3 and 4 December. The Arrangement reported that the meeting agreed to conduct further work on addressing new challenges, including emerging technologies of concern, to keep pace with advances in technology, research and innovation. Progress was made on a comprehensive and systematic review of the Wassenaar Lists to ensure their continued relevance.

The Arrangement also reported that in 2013, new export controls were agreed upon in a number of areas, including surveillance and gathering tools for law enforcement and intelligence and Internet Protocol network surveillance systems or equipment. Participating States further clarified existing controls relating to inertial measurement equipment or systems and relaxed some controls, such as those for instrumentation, tape recorders and digital computers. The Plenary decided to continue to offer an enhanced technical briefing on changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement control lists to a number of non-Participating States in 2014.

Furthermore, Participating States welcomed the adoption of the ATT by the United Nations General Assembly on 2 April. The Participating States expressed their readiness to share their export control experience and expertise with other States, as suggested in the ATT.

[117] The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established on the basis of the Initial Elements adopted in July 1996 (see website: www.wassenaar.org). Meetings are normally held in Vienna, Austria, where the Arrangement is based. Currently the Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

Annex I

Composite table of Member States that reported in 2013 to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

				Background information		
	State	*Data on exports*	*Data on imports*	*Military holdings*	*Procurement through national production*	*International transfers of small arms and light weapons*
1.	Albania	✓	nil			✓
2.	Andorra	nil	nil			✓
3.	Argentina	nil	✓	✓	✓	✓
4.	Australia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
5.	Austria	✓	✓			
6.	Belarus	✓	nil			
7.	Belgium	✓	✓	✓		
8.	Bhutan	nil	nil			
9.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	nil	✓			
10.	Brazil		✓			✓
11.	Bulgaria	✓	✓	✓		✓
12.	Cambodia	nil	nil			
13.	Canada	✓	✓	✓		✓
14.	Chile	nil	✓		✓	✓
15.	China	✓	nil			
16.	Comoros	nil	nil			
17.	Croatia					✓
18.	Cyprus	nil	✓			
19.	Czech Republic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
20.	Denmark	nil	nil	✓	✓	✓
21.	El Salvador	nil	nil			
22.	Estonia	nil	nil	✓		
23.	Finland	nil	nil	✓		
24.	France	✓		✓	✓	✓
25.	Germany	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
26.	Greece	✓	✓	✓		
27.	Grenada	nil	nil			

	State	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information: Military holdings	Background information: Procurement through national production	Background information: International transfers of small arms and light weapons
28.	Hungary	✓	nil	✓		✓
29.	India	nil	✓			
30.	Ireland	nil	nil			nil
31.	Jamaica	nil	nil			
32.	Japan	nil	nil	✓	✓	✓
33.	Kazakhstan	nil	✓			✓
34.	Latvia	nil	nil			✓
35.	Liechtenstein					✓
36.	Lithuania			✓		✓
37.	Luxembourg	nil	nil			
38.	Malaysia					✓
39.	Malta	nil	nil			nil
40.	Mauritius	nil	nil			
41.	Mexico	nil	✓			✓
42.	Monaco	nil	nil			
43.	Nauru	nil	nil			
44.	Nepal	nil	nil			
45.	Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
46.	Norway	✓	✓			✓
47.	Pakistan	nil	✓			
48.	Poland	✓	✓	✓		✓
49.	Portugal	✓	nil		nil	✓
50.	Republic of Korea	✓	✓			✓
51.	Republic of Moldova	nil	nil			
52.	Romania	✓	✓	✓		✓
53.	Russian Federation	✓				
54.	San Marino	nil	nil			
55.	Serbia	✓	nil			✓
56.	Singapore	✓	✓			
57.	Slovakia	✓	✓	✓		✓

	State	Data on exports	Data on imports	Background information: Military holdings	Background information: Procurement through national production	Background information: International transfers of small arms and light weapons
58.	Slovenia	nil	nil			✓
59.	South Africa	✓	✓			
60.	Spain	✓	✓			
61.	Sweden	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
62.	Switzerland	✓	nil	✓		✓
63.	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	nil	nil			
64.	Trinidad and Tobago			✓		✓
65.	Turkey	✓	✓			✓
66.	Ukraine	✓	✓			✓
67.	United Kingdom	✓		✓	✓	✓
68.	United States	✓		✓	✓	
69.	Uruguay	nil	nil			
70.	Viet Nam		✓			

Annex II

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Participation of Member States in reporting on transfers of small arms and light weapons, 2004-2013

Year of Secretary-General Report	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
No. of reports on SALW transfers	5	5	4	37	48	47	42	49	32	36
Albania				✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Andorra								✓		
Antigua and Barbuda				✓	nil	nil	nil			
Argentina[a]					nil	nil	nil	nil	✓	✓
Armenia					✓	✓	✓			
Australia					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Austria								✓		

Year of Secretary-General Report	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*
No. of reports on SALW transfers	*5*	*5*	*4*	*37*	*48*	*47*	*42*	*49*	*32*	*36*
Bangladesh				✓	✓	✓				
Belgium						✓				
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)						✓				
Bosnia and Herzegovina				✓	✓		✓	✓		
Brunei Darussalam					✓					
Bulgaria						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Canada				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Chile					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Colombia					✓		✓			
Comoros							nil			
Croatia					✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Cyprus				✓	nil	nil				
Czech Republic				✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Denmark				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
El Salvador					nil					
Fiji					nil					
Finland		✓								
France		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Ghana					nil					
Georgia				✓	✓					
Germany				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Greece				✓	✓		✓	✓		
Grenada								✓		
Guyana								nil		
Haiti				✓						
Hungary				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Iceland								✓		
Indonesia					✓	✓				

Year of Secretary-General Report	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*
No. of reports on SALW transfers	*5*	*5*	*4*	*37*	*48*	*47*	*42*	*49*	*32*	*36*
Ireland						✓	✓	✓		nil
Italy					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Jamaica				✓						
Japan[b]		PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP	PNP	✓	✓
Kazakhstan						✓	✓		✓	✓
Latvia	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Lebanon						nil	nil			
Liechtenstein				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Lithuania				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Luxembourg					✓					
Malaysia									✓	✓
Mali				nil						
Malta					nil	nil	nil	nil	nil	nil
Mexico				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mongolia								nil		
Montenegro					✓			✓	✓	
Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
New Zealand				✓	✓	✓				
Norway					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panama				✓		✓				
Peru						✓	✓			
Philippines				nil		✓				
Poland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Portugal				✓	✓	✓	nil	✓	✓	✓
Republic of Korea				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Republic of Moldova				nil	nil	✓	✓			
Romania					✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Saint Lucia				nil						

Year of Secretary-General Report	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*
No. of reports on SALW transfers	*5*	*5*	*4*	*37*	*48*	*47*	*42*	*49*	*32*	*36*
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines						✓				
San Marino							✓			
Senegal				✓						
Serbia							✓	✓		✓
Slovakia				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Slovenia					✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Spain							✓	✓		
Swaziland				nil	nil	nil				
Sweden	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Switzerland						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Thailand							✓		✓	
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia							✓			
Togo				nil	nil					
Trinidad and Tobago				✓				✓[c]		✓
Turkey				✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
Ukraine					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
United Kingdom	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

[a] In 2008-2010, Argentina also reported on military holdings of SALW.
[b] Japan reported procurement of SALW through national production (PNP) in the years 2004-2009. It is not counted into the total number of States that reported on SALW transfers.
[c] Trinidad and Tobago provided information on military holdings in small arms and light weapons.

Annex III

Composite table of reports from Member States to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures in 2013

		Form of submission		
	Reporting States	*Standardized*	*Simplified*	*"Nil report"*
1.	Albania	✓		
2.	Armenia		✓	
3.	Australia	✓		
4.	Austria	✓		
5.	Belarus	✓		
6.	Belgium	✓		
7.	Bosnia and Herzegovina		✓	
8.	Bulgaria	✓		
9.	Burkina Faso	✓		
10.	Canada	✓		
11.	Chile		✓	
12.	China		✓	
13.	Comoros		✓	
14.	Costa Rica			✓
15.	Croatia	✓		
16.	Cyprus	✓	✓	
17.	Czech Republic		✓	
18.	Denmark	✓		
19.	Dominican Republic		✓	
20.	El Salvador		✓	
21.	Estonia	✓		
22.	Finland	✓		
23.	Georgia		✓	
24.	Germany	✓		
25.	Hungary		✓	
26.	Iceland			✓
27.	India		✓	
28.	Ireland	✓		
29.	Italy	✓	✓	

		Form of submission		
	Reporting States	Standardized	Simplified	"Nil report"
30.	Japan	✓		
31.	Latvia	✓		
32.	Liechtenstein			✓
33.	Lithuania	✓		
34.	Luxembourg	✓		
35.	Malaysia		✓	
36.	Malta	✓		
37.	Mexico	✓		
38.	Montenegro	✓	✓	
39.	Netherlands	✓		
40.	New Zealand		✓	
41.	Paraguay	✓		
42.	Poland	✓		
43.	Portugal	✓		
44.	Republic of Moldova	✓		
45.	Romania	✓		
46.	Russian Federation	✓		
47.	Senegal		✓	
48.	Serbia	✓	✓	
49.	Slovenia	✓	✓	
50.	Spain		✓	
51.	Sweden	✓		
52.	Switzerland	✓		
53.	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	✓		
54.	Turkey		✓	
55.	Ukraine	✓		
56.	United States	✓		

Chapter IV
Regional disarmament

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean provided equipment and training to the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic to destroy small arms and light weapons.

CHAPTER IV

Regional disarmament

> *The ATT [Arms Trade Treaty] will make it more difficult for deadly weapons to be diverted into the illicit market, and it will help to keep warlords, pirates, terrorists, criminals and their like from acquiring deadly arms. ... And it will provide much-needed momentum for other global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.*
>
> BAN KI-MOON, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL[1]

Developments and trends, 2013

A LANDMARK DEVELOPMENT IN 2013 was the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)[2] by the United Nations General Assembly with an overwhelming majority of Member States voting in favour of resolution 67/234 B of 2 April 2013 after an extended negotiating process.[3] Considerable efforts were made by regional and subregional organizations, with technical and funding assistance from international agencies, to mobilize governmental and non-governmental organizations in support of the ATT during the preparatory process and for signature and ratification after its adoption.

The challenges posed by the continued proliferation and illicit use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) continued to be the focus of attention of a wide range of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Numerous programmes and projects were implemented or launched aimed at building institutional capacity at the national and regional levels to deal more effectively with those challenges and to further strengthen cooperation and coordination. Notably, these and other activities included stockpile management, disposal of surplus or obsolete arms and ammunition, security sector reform, personnel training, empowerment of women, SALW-related awareness-raising, reduction of armed violence, and community security involving local authorities and civil society.

The Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

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[1] Statement on the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, New York, 2 April 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/sgsm14919.doc.htm (accessed 23 June 2014).

[2] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (accessed 6 May 2014).

[3] ATT was opened for signature on 2 June and, as at the end of 2013, 115 Member States had become signatories to the Treaty and 9 had ratified it.

and Mongolia, which will be held in 2015, was an important milestone as it further strengthened the foundation laid by the previous two conferences, held in Mexico in 2005 and in New York in 2010.

Consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty made concrete progress, raising the prospects of a positive outcome. Consultations on the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia also moved forward.

The holding of a regional conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), however, failed to materialize despite the agreement at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to convene it originally in 2012. Intensive consultations took place in 2013 but consensus on procedural and substantive issues among the regional States and the nuclear-weapon States continued to prove difficult.

With the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international agencies, institutional development and capacity-building to ensure compliance with security and safety obligations under the NPT and the chemical and biological weapons conventions, as well as under the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, continued to make progress during the year.

The empowerment of women moved forward in the context of the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in post-conflict and transitional situations; and disarmament and development. In this regard, United Nations Security Council's landmark resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security continued to play a significant role.

In addition to a further strengthening of institutional structures and expertise in 2013, arms control activities were also characterized by higher technical standards and criteria, such as the guidelines and procedures contained in the International Small Arms Control Standards,[4] which played a significant role in this connection.

[4] The International Small Arms Control Standards were launched in August 2012. They were developed by the United Nations together with its international partners. See http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20120829a/ (accessed 23 June 2014).

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The role of nuclear-weapon free zones (NWFZs) as a regional approach for pursuing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was recognized in article VII of the NPT[5] and reaffirmed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference.[6]

The NWFZs in the four regions of Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia and Africa collectively exclude the deployment or possession of nuclear weapons in virtually all of the land-based territories in the southern hemisphere, while the entry into force in 2009 of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia created the first NWFZ located entirely north of the equator.[7]

In addition to these regional instruments, a number of international treaties respectively exclude the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the moon, on the seabed, in outer space and in the Antarctic region.[8]

In his opening remarks to the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament in New York on 26 September, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for increased denuclearization, stressing that "States without nuclear weapons have much to contribute, as seen in the expanded cooperation between members of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones".[9]

Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia

The Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia took place in Geneva on 26 April, on the margins of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The Meeting was co-chaired by Juan José Gómez Camacho (Mexico) and Luvsantseren Orgil (Mongolia) and was attended by representatives of 28 States from NWFZs, two observer States, the United Nations, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the

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[5] The Treaty and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (accessed 6 May 2014).

[6] The Conference reaffirmed the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region concerned, enhanced global and regional peace and security, strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

[7] The treaties and their adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/ (accessed 23 June 2014).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nucleardisarmament/pdf/opening_Ban_en.pdf (accessed 23 June 2014).

Caribbean and civil society. The participants highlighted the contribution of NWFZs to maintaining international peace and security, while stressing that such zones were neither ends in themselves nor substitutes for other efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. They also encouraged further cooperation among NWFZs in the areas of common interest and expressed support for the establishment of NWFZs in other regions, including the Middle East. Participating nuclear-weapon States informed the meeting of progress towards their signature and ratification of the relevant protocols.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The twenty-third regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)[10] was held in Buenos Aires on 22 and 23 August. As the host country, Argentina chaired the General Conference with Cuba and Costa Rica serving as Vice-Presidents.

The General Conference adopted resolution CG/Res.554 on the Strategic Agenda of OPANAL.[11] According to the OPANAL press release on the subject,[12] the guiding principles of the Strategic Agenda were "to reach negative security assurances by nuclear-weapon-States to all States in the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean; to effectively contribute to total and general nuclear disarmament by promoting actions in the multilateral arena that support the negotiation and adoption of a legally binding instrument aimed at banning nuclear weapons; and to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, as well as the dissemination of the work of the Agency".

The General Conference also adopted resolution CG/Res.563, entitled "Urgent Need for General and Complete Nuclear Disarmament",[13] which called on the nuclear-weapon States "to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons from their doctrines and security policies" and to cease the "development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their vector systems, including related facilities". It also urged the Conference on Disarmament "to demonstrate the necessary political will in order to ensure the commencement without delay of substantive work through the adoption and implementation of a balanced and comprehensive program of work that advances the agenda

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[10] The Treaty of Tlatelolco created OPANAL to ensure that the obligations of the Treaty were met. The Treaty and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tlatelolco (accessed 5 May 2014).

[11] Available from http://opanal.org/Docs/cg/res/en/CGRes554%20Strategic%20Agenda.pdf (accessed 12 November 2013).

[12] Available from http://www.opanal.org/Docs/SBP/SBP57_en.pdf (accessed 12 November 2013).

[13] Available from http://opanal.org/Docs/cg/res/en/CGRes563%20Nuclear%20Disarmament.pdf (accessed 12 November 2013).

of nuclear disarmament". The General Conference recognized the work of the Open-Ended Working Group established by the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012, to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including the proposals and contributions made in the Working Group by the OPANAL member States and the Secretary-General.

At its twenty-second special session, held in Mexico City on 7 November, the General Conference unanimously elected Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares Guimarães (Brazil) as Secretary-General of OPANAL for the period 2014-2017.

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

The forty-sixth Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), held in Brunei Darussalam on 29 and 30 June, adopted a revised Plan of Action[14] to strengthen the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty[15] for the period 2013-2017. The revised Plan encouraged all States parties to the Treaty that had not yet done so to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty[16] and to conclude additional protocols of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Meeting agreed to continue engaging the nuclear-weapon States on outstanding issues with regard to the signing of the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty without reservations as early as possible.[17]

The first meeting of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) was held in Phuket from 2 to 5 September and the terms of reference of ASEANTOM[18] were formally endorsed by the ASEAN senior officials later in the month. The twenty-third ASEAN Summit, held in Bandar Seri Begawan on 9 October, welcomed the establishment of ASEANTOM to enhance regional cooperation in nuclear safety, security and safeguards.

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

The African Union Commission facilitated the convening of the third ordinary session of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy

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[14] Available from http://www.asean.org/images/Statement/poa%20to%20strengthen%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20seanwfz%20treaty%202013-2017_adopted.pdf (accessed 9 October 2013).

[15] The Treaty and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bangkok (accessed 6 May 2014).

[16] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt (accessed 6 May 2014).

[17] See ASEAN, "Joint Communiqué, 46th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 29-30 June 2013". Available from http://goo.gl/ntobNY (accessed 9 October 2013).

[18] Available from http://aseantom.blogspot.com/p/blog-page.html (accessed 23 June 2014).

(AFCONE),[19] which took place on 10 and 11 November. The Commission considered the status and progress made towards the finalization of the Host Country Agreement between the African Union and the Government of South Africa on the establishment of the headquarters of AFCONE, the status of recruitment of the AFCONE Executive Secretary and the States parties' contribution to the assessed budget of AFCONE. It also endorsed the establishment and composition of two working groups for implementing relevant aspects of the guidelines for the programme of work of AFCONE. One working group was assigned to address monitoring States parties' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, as well as nuclear and radiation safety and security. The other working group was entrusted with nuclear sciences and applications, as well as partnerships and technical cooperation.

In 2013, the European Union provided support for the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and for the establishment and work of AFCONE.

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

The twelfth session of the Islamic Summit Conference was held in Cairo on 6 and 7 February. In its Final Communiqué,[20] the Summit welcomed the nuclear-weapon-free status of Central Asia as a significant contribution towards strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and called upon nuclear-weapon States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty.[21]

On 27 May, the Foreign Ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organization[22] issued a joint statement expressing support for the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. They also welcomed the readiness of China and the Russian Federation to provide security assurances through the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty, as well as the willingness of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to engage in a substantive discussion of the matter with the parties to the Treaty.

Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction

Following the announcement in November 2012 of the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD, the facilitator, Jaakko Laajava (Finland), and the

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[19] AFCONE was established to ensure that the obligations of the Treaty were met. The Treaty text and status of adherence are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/pelindaba (accessed 6 May 2014).

[20] Organization of Islamic Cooperation, document OIC/SUM-12/F.C./FINAL. Available from http://goo.gl/gHgnV2 (accessed 10 February 2014).

[21] The Treaty and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/canwfz (accessed 6 May 2014).

[22] The Collective Security Treaty Organization comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

conveners[23] renewed their efforts to bring the regional States closer together and proposed extended consultations. By the end of the year, they succeeded in holding two rounds of informal meetings with the regional States with a view to reaching agreement on the arrangements for the conference, including its agenda, modalities and rules of procedure.

In January, the Council of the League of Arab States (LAS) stated that it considered the postponement to be a breach of the obligations agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and called for the conference to be convened prior to the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The Council also decided to consider the proposal for extended consultations, subject to certain conditions.[24] The facilitator made intensive efforts in the first quarter of 2013 aimed at holding his proposed multilateral consultations, however, he was unable to hold these consultations prior to the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee.

At the 2013 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, States parties expressed disappointment over the postponement of the conference. Many delegations also called for the conference to be held in 2013. As mandated by the 2010 Review Conference, the facilitator delivered his report to the Committee. In his report,[25] he stated that further convergence of views by the regional States was needed to convene the conference without delay and that he, along with the conveners, would continue to consult with the regional States and all relevant parties for a constructive dialogue that could advance the objective of the Middle East zone.

On 29 April, the delegation of Egypt announced its withdrawal from the remainder of the session of the Preparatory Committee in protest at the failure to implement the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East.

During the following months, the facilitator and conveners made renewed efforts to bring the States of the region on a common platform. On 16 August, they held separate, informal consultations in Vienna with the Arab States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel to discuss the conference agenda, rules of procedure and outcome.

As decided by the LAS Council in March, the Group of Arab States in Vienna reintroduced the draft resolution "Israel's Nuclear Capabilities"[26] at the fifty-seventh session of the IAEA General Conference. In the draft resolution, the General Conference expressed concern over Israel's nuclear capabilities, called for it to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under

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[23] The four conveners represent the United Nations, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

[24] LAS, Arab Ministerial resolution 7580. For the text of the resolution, see A/68/124 (Part 1).

[25] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/10.

[26] IAEA, document GOV/2010/49-GC(54)/14. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/GC54Documents/English/gc54-14_en.pdf (accessed 23 June 2014).

comprehensive IAEA safeguards. On 20 September, the General Conference rejected the draft resolution by a vote of 46 to 51 with 32 abstentions.[27]

At the IAEA General Conference, the facilitator and conveners announced their intention to meet in Switzerland in October to discuss the agenda and modalities for the conference. They welcomed the participation and feedback of all the regional States. On 21 and 22 October and on 25 and 26 November in Glion, Switzerland, the facilitator chaired two rounds of informal meetings with regional States to reach agreement on the arrangements for the conference, including its agenda, modalities and rules of procedure. At these meetings, the regional States engaged in a constructive dialogue and exchanged views on various aspects of the conference and the establishment of the zone. The parties agreed to continue their discussions in the same format in January 2014.

New initiative by Egypt

At the general debate of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy announced a new initiative,[28] including the following three measures. First, all States of the Middle East and the permanent members of the Security Council should deposit with the Secretary-General expressions of support for the zone. Second, the States of the region that had not yet done so should join the three principal international instruments dealing with WMD and deposit letters with the Security Council affirming their intention to do so, in order to enable the Secretary-General to make arrangements for simultaneous accessions. Third, the facilitator and conveners should further intensify their efforts to convene the conference. On 10 November, the LAS Council adopted a resolution endorsing the Egyptian initiative and decided to work towards its political and practical implementation (see also the section entitled "League of Arab States" on page 167).

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs regional centres

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

During the year, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) continued to provide support to African regional and subregional organizations in their efforts to promote disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, focusing particularly on SALW. UNREC also provided such support bilaterally to various countries.

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[27] See IAEA, document GC(57)/OR.9. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Records/English/gc57or-9_en.pdf (accessed 23 June 2014).

[28] Statement available from http://gadebate.un.org/68/egypt (accessed 23 June 2014).

The Regional Centre focused its efforts, in particular, on promoting the participation of African Member States of the United Nations in disarmament instruments, most notably the ATT. Following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 67/234 A of 24 December 2012, mandating the holding of the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in New York from 18 to 28 March 2013, UNREC organized an African regional seminar on the Treaty in Addis Ababa with support from the International Action Network on Small Arms. The seminar served as a platform for African Member States to engage substantively with their peers and international experts to develop a collective, comprehensive and effective regional position for the Final Conference. In January 2013, UNREC also provided technical support during subregional consultations of the Economic Community of Central African States in Libreville.

When the General Assembly adopted the ATT on 2 April, Africa contributed with 46 votes[29] in favour of the Treaty. By 31 December, 31 African Member States had signed the ATT and two (Mali and Nigeria) had ratified it. UNREC continued to interact with civil society in support of the ATT. In May and October, it worked with Parliamentarians for Global Action to promote the Treaty among parliamentarians from several African countries. In Togo, the Regional Centre engaged local non-governmental organizations and journalists to promote the ATT and stressed the importance of their role in raising awareness.

UNREC also provided direct support to Member States in their arms control activities. It assisted Mali in its efforts to rebuild its arms control capacities and commenced a project to revitalize the Mali national commission to combat the proliferation of light weapons. The Regional Centre rendered technical support to re-establish operations of the national commission throughout the country and the necessary technical assistance to draft a new National Action Plan on SALW for the 2014-2018 period.

UNREC continued its engagement with the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in its efforts to enhance the country's capacities in arms control and raise them to international standards. The Regional Centre provided support to the Côte d'Ivoire national commission to combat the proliferation and circulation of SALW. In the first half of 2013, UNREC concluded a diagnostic study on private security firms in Côte d'Ivoire, which identified the types of weapons and storage standards that private security companies use. The Regional Centre also rehabilitated and provided equipment for four Gendarmerie armouries in the Abidjan area and undertook another project with the ComNat-CI, producing standard procedures for stockpiling sites, thus improving the country's physical security and stockpile management.

[29] Subsequent to the voting, the Republic of Angola informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

The project employed international arms control standards detailed in the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.[30]

As part of its activities to promote arms control, UNREC provided technical support to a workshop hosted by the Togolese Government in Lomé with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) on implementing United Nations sanctions. The Regional Centre focused its role on how best it could support the implementation of international instruments on disarmament by contributing to States' compliance with sanctions measures. The workshop provided a platform for West and Central African member States to discuss with international experts the challenges, lessons learned and best practice standards in implementing sanctions.

During the course of the year, UNREC participated in different initiatives in support of small arms control. In May, it supported the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in developing training manuals on SALW proliferation in the Sahel as part of the Centre's arms control training in the subregion. The Regional Centre also contributed substantively to the Conference on Smart Technology in SALW Control that took place in June in Berlin. In addition, the Centre continued to work with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in order to promote African expertise in arms control.

UNREC also made efforts to address security sector reform from a disarmament perspective, particularly with regard to the use of SALW during elections. Ahead of national elections, the Regional Centre co-organized a training programme for 60 commanders of the defence and security forces in Madagascar. UNREC drew from its earlier experience in training law enforcement and security officials in the context of elections. It strengthened the capacity of participants through its "Security Forces' Guide on the Maintenance of Law and Order during Elections". In addition, the Regional Centre provided instruction on international principles relating to the proportionate use of force and firearms, as well as on promoting respect for the physical integrity of individuals, their rights and gender sensitivities for detainees.

UNREC continued to provide substantive support to the United Nations Standing Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (UNSAC) and took part in its 36th and 37th meetings, respectively, in Rwanda and Chad, focusing on the security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. The Regional Centre made presentations on the status of the implementation of international, regional and subregional

[30] Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/ (accessed 6 May 2014).

instruments, including the Kinshasa Convention on SALW[31] and the Central African Code of Conduct for Security Forces. At the initiative of UNREC, the UNSAC declaration[32] on the situation in the Central African Republic included reference to the need to prevent the illicit proliferation and cross-border trafficking of SALW.[33] During the UNSAC meeting in Rwanda, Cameroon indicated that its ratification process of the Kinshasa Convention was nearly complete.

UNREC also carried out different activities on the issue of WMD. In December, jointly with the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the Regional Centre organized national workshops on the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[34] in Benin and Burkina Faso. The two workshops enabled all the national stakeholders and implementing authorities in the two countries to consult with regional and international experts with a view to developing and identifying future activities as part of an assistance programme in 2014. The Centre also participated in the African Union workshop on implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was held in December in Addis Ababa. The workshop provided an opportunity to African Member States to discuss implementation strategies. In addition, UNREC worked in collaboration with the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of UNODA in order to develop a project, to be implemented in 2014, to improve the reporting capacities of African countries on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) contributed to public security in the region by assisting States to destroy their surplus, obsolete and confiscated weapons, enhancing the capacity of their security

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[31] The full title of the treaty is the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly. Its text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/kinshasa (accessed 19 June 2014).

[32] Thirty-seventh Ministerial Meeting of UNSAC, "Appel de N'Djamena", 22 December 2013. Available from http://unoca.unmissions.org/Portals/unoca-french/Documents/Appel%20de%20NDJamena.pdf (accessed 25 June 2014).

[33] See UNREC, "Thirty-seventh ministerial meeting of UNSAC". Available from http://unrec.org/index/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=312:37ieme-reunion-ministerielle-de-lunsac&catid=69:unrec-news&Itemid=45&lang=en (accessed 23 June 2014).

[34] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc (accessed 6 May 2014).

sector personnel to combat illicit trafficking in SALW, and by providing legal firearms assistance to State authorities responsible for arms control.

As part of the UNLIREC stockpile management and weapons destruction activities, over 40,000 firearms and 50 tons of small arms ammunition were destroyed throughout the region. The Regional Centre also expanded its technical assistance and training portfolio with the establishment of the Caribbean Regional Armoury Management Training Centre in Trinidad and Tobago. The two UNLIREC-led armoury management courses that took place in 2013 contributed to the creation of a pool of professionals responsible for weapons storage, management and accountability, thus contributing to reducing the risk of proliferation.

The Armoury Management Course complemented the training imparted to 122 security sector personnel who benefited from the UNLIREC Inter-institutional Training Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives.[35] All the training programmes were in accordance with the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

With regard to addressing the threat posed by illicit firearms, UNLIREC responded to a request by Honduras to provide legal recommendations on its draft legislation related to firearms. The Regional Centre also provided legal assistance to the Dominican Republic through its specialized training programme for judicial operators in combating impunity in cases of illicit firearms trafficking.

In addition to SALW assistance delivered in 2013, UNLIREC launched its first comprehensive assistance programme, which was undertaken at the request of Member States, for the Caribbean States on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The Regional Centre also collaborated with the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre and the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological and Weapons Convention to deliver legal assistance to States from the Andean region for improved implementation of the BWC and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Colombia and Ecuador were the first recipients of this joint assistance.

Institutional aspects (organizational and administrative)

UNLIREC implemented numerous activities in response to official requests for assistance from Member States. The increasing number of requests for assistance required continual expansion of the Centre's pool of experts on public security and firearms. The year also marked the consolidation and

[35] For more information, see http://www.unlirec.org/IITC_eng.aspx (accessed 24 June 2014). The Training Course was selected as the best regional practice for firearms control. See also http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/factsheet/rdb/UNLIREC.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

launching of the first expert team of UNLIREC on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

The Regional Centre continued to maintain its partnership with the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the British High Commission in Belize and the United States Department of State on public security activities in the Andean, Caribbean and Central American subregions. Financial and in-kind contributions made to UNLIREC by States in the region were sustained in 2013, while the Ministry of Security of Argentina bilaterally funded UNLIREC for the second consecutive year for the delivery of technical assistance to its State authorities.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD), recognizing the challenges posed by WMD and the illicit trade in SALW, continued to advance the disarmament dialogue in the region and promote the effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.[36] UNRCPD also facilitated regional dialogue on the ATT as well as supported regional and national activities relating to the BWC.

WMD-related activities

With regard to WMD, the Regional Centre organized its two annual conferences, entitled the "12th United Nations–Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues" and the "24th United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues". The former, which took place in Jeju, Republic of Korea, in November, focused on a range of non-proliferation issues, with a special emphasis on United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The latter, which was held in Shizuoka City, Japan, in January and February, was themed "Creating a Peaceful and Safe Future: Pressing Issues and Potential Solutions". It dealt mainly with various key nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

Both conferences generated in-depth and interactive discussions among the participants comprising senior-level representatives from Governments, intergovernmental organizations, policy institutes, academia and other civil society organizations. These events also provided an opportunity to exchange views and present ideas on pressing regional non-proliferation and disarmament challenges.

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[36] *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 9-20 July 2001 (A/CONF.192/15), para. 24.

In addition, UNRCPD actively participated in a regional workshop held in Kuala Lumpur in September, which examined the needs, approaches and solutions with regard to the national implementation of BWC. The Regional Centre also made a presentation at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum workshop dealing with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was held in Bangkok in May.

Conventional-arms related activities

In February, shortly before the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, UNRCPD organized a meeting in Kuala Lumpur to facilitate regional dialogue on issues regarding the ATT and its negotiation. Aided by international experts, the meeting enhanced clarity and provided useful information about the Treaty to almost 50 participating senior delegates from 19 Member States of the Asia and the Pacific region as they contemplated their national positions. The meeting also provided opportunity to the regional States to meet directly and discuss informally ATT issues of mutual interest to them.

In November, following the adoption of the ATT, UNRCPD organized its second regional meeting, which was held in Manila, to further facilitate dialogue on the Treaty among the regional States.[37] Over 35 senior-level delegates from 19 Asia-Pacific countries participated in the meeting, which enabled the States to identify priority areas and to discuss common issues and concerns regarding the ATT as they moved towards signing and ratifying the Treaty. The meeting also succeeded in providing opportunity to States to assess where they stood in their various decision-making processes, the challenges they faced and the technical assistance they may require.

In its effort to reduce the negative impact caused by the illicit possession and use of small arms in Nepal, the Regional Centre continued to substantively support the Nepal Working Group on Armed Violence Reduction.[38] Meetings were held during the course of the year involving representatives from the Nepalese Government, the United Nations and civil society organizations to discuss and raise awareness about various conventional arms issues.

UNRCPD also actively participated in the following events on conventional weapons: (a) a Pacific Islands Forum capacity-building workshop in Suva in December, which assisted Pacific countries to coordinate efforts to meet their commitments under the United Nations Programme of Action; (b) an ATT workshop in Auckland in December, which considered model legislation that would assist Pacific island States to meet the requirements

[37] For more information, see the press release on the event available from http://unrcpd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Rgl_ATT_PR.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

[38] For details on the Working Group, see http://www.eldis.org/go/latest-news/news/new-policy-brief-on-armed-violence-in-nepal#.U0ansunNtjo (accessed 24 June 2014).

of the Treaty; and (c) a European Union seminar in Geneva in June, which focused on the implementation of the ATT.

Activities related to general security and disarmament

The Regional Centre also undertook three peace and disarmament education initiatives for children and youth during the year. In Saitama City, Japan, it engaged in an event in August for high-school students, who made presentations on disarmament issues. In Nepal, an art competition on children and peace was organized for the second year during the summer. The competition had grown to include nearly a thousand students from 12 schools, reflecting enhanced awareness of peace and disarmament issues among young people.

In addition, UNRCPD initiated in cooperation with the Nepal Ministry of Education a pilot project, which was aimed at integrating peace and disarmament education concepts into the national school curricula that could ultimately reach out to more than 300,000 children per year. Related to that project, the Regional Centre produced a promotional video, entitled "Learning Peace",[39] that was screened at the observance of the International Day of Peace 2013 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York and in Geneva.

Disarmament and arms regulation at the regional level

Africa

African Union

For the African Union (AU), arms control remained a key element in the strategy to maintain peace, security and stability in the continent. The following issue areas received focused attention in 2013.

Fight against illicit trafficking and circulation of small arms and light weapons

The AU–Regions Steering Committee on SALW, which coordinates support to member States in combating illicit SALW, made plans for the year during its regular meetings held in January, and in December it reviewed and evaluated the implementation of various activities in line with the AU Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons.[40]

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[39] UNRCPD, "UNRCPD Video: Learning Peace", 18 September 2013. Available from http://unrcpd.org/news-item/unrcpd-video-learning-peace/ (accessed 24 June 2014).

[40] Available from http://unrec.org/docs/Strategy%20Final.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

Following the adoption of the ATT by the United Nations General Assembly on 2 April, the AU encouraged its member States to sign and ratify the treaty.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

The AU Commission continued to implement the AU-Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Capacity Programme to assist member States in implementing DDR. The objective of the capacity-building project was to create and strengthen the DDR capacity within the AU member States and the regional economic communities.

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

As part of the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty, the AU Commission facilitated the convening of the third ordinary session of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) on 10 and 11 November. AFCONE was established to ensure compliance with the obligations under the Treaty.

Another development to advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Pelindaba Treaty was the agreement signed between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa on 17 September on Practical Arrangements to enhance nuclear safety and security and to strengthen the regulatory infrastructure among the African IAEA member States.[41]

Enhancing the Chemical Weapons Convention

The AU Commission continued its collaboration with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) under the memorandum of understanding[42] signed in 2006 to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)[43] and achieve continent-wide adherence to it in Africa. The two institutions, together with the South African and United States Governments, organized a seminar in April in Pretoria on WMDs, non-proliferation and the implementation of the CWC in Africa. The seminar

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[41] For more information, see IAEA, "Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Africa", 17 September 2013, available from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/fnrba.html (accessed 24 June 2014); and Augustin Simo, Chairman of the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa, remarks at the Second Conference of States Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty, Addis Ababa, 12-13 November 2012, available from http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/fnrba-2-.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

[42] OPCW, document S/547/2006. Available from https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S_series/2006/en/s-547-2006.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

[43] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc (accessed 6 May 2014).

provided participants with information on various topics related to CWC, non-proliferation of WMD, the Pelindaba Treaty, SALW and safety and security issues.

In April, South Africa and the OPCW co-organized a CWC seminar on chemical safety and security management for States parties in the African region. Participants considered new approaches that could be adopted to enhance the capacities of chemical industries and regulatory authorities for chemical safety and security management. The event was sponsored under the Africa Programme of the European Union (EU)[44] with 36 representatives from 20 African States participating in the three-day event.

Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

Following the decision of the twenty-first ordinary session of the AU Assembly, the Commission, in collaboration with the 1540 Committee and with the support of UNODA, organized in December in Addis Ababa a workshop on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The workshop adopted a set of recommendations which the AU will continue to implement over the 2014-2015 period.

Regional Centre on Small Arms

During the year, the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) continued to provide training and support in arms marking and electronic arms record keeping to a number of its member States that were engaged in marking their State-owned arms and those held legally by civilians (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania). Similar support was given to countries in the Central African region where a regional conference was held in April for member States of the Economic Community of Central African States to discuss standards for arms marking. This support was funded by the EU/AU transregional project.[45]

Several small arms meetings were held to sensitize and build the capacity of senior government officials, law enforcement agencies (including national focal points and commissions on small arms), civil society and the media in several countries in Eastern, Western, Southern and Central Africa. Issues addressed included a review of SALW legislation (Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania), the ATT, the proliferation of SALW,

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[44] Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2012/166/CFSP of 23 March 2012, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 87 (24 March 2012), pp. 50-51. Available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:087:0049:0059:EN:PDF (accessed 24 June 2014).

[45] For more information on the project, see RECSA, "EU Funding for Trans-regional Small Arms Project in Africa". Available from http://www.recsasec.org/index.php/european-union-funding-for-salw (accessed 24 June 2014).

support for the establishment of a continental coordination mechanism for police chiefs (African Police Cooperation Organisation (AFRIPOL)), gender mainstreaming, the enhancement of inter-agency and cross-border cooperation, and the setup and operationalization of national commissions and focal points on SALW.

Regional and national training in gender mainstreaming in SALW-related work was carried out in collaboration with the Eastern African Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania.[46] Regional and national sensitization and advocacy forums were organized on the ATT, both before and after it opened for signature, in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Steps towards the establishment of AFRIPOL gained momentum in 2013.

Since success in SALW interventions hinges significantly on collaboration with different stakeholders, the RECSA secretariat collaborated with a number of other partners on various aspects of small arms–related work at the international, regional and national levels (United Nations, AU, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization, civil society organizations and media).

RECSA conducted a study on SALW issues in Africa. Its findings were disseminated to the AU and regional organizations and will be used to guide small arms interventions in the continent. The research was funded by the AU/EU transregional project, which is managed by RECSA.

During the year, RECSA organs—the Council of Ministers, the Ministerial Standing Committee and the Technical Advisory Committee—held several meetings to discuss various policy issues with regard to the orientation of the organization.

Economic Community of West African States

Strengthening management and security of the exemption procedures

In support of the efficient management of the exemption procedures under the subregional Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials,[47] the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) organized a meeting for focal persons in Banjul from 14 to 16 August. The meeting underscored the need

[46] For more information, see "RECSA Gender Policy 2009-2014" (RECSA, 2010). Available from http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/gender.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

[47] Available from http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

to involve focal persons in SALW transfers by member States, reviewed challenges in managing the exemption procedures and recommended effective ways to improve the entire mechanism.

Supporting the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW

The ECOWAS Commission, which is responsible for supporting and supervising the application of the Convention, consistent with article 25 of the Convention, provided member States financial and technical support for their implementation of related activities, such as the review of national legislations, the marking of weapons with armed forces and the promotion of a culture of peace in the region.

Promoting regional coordination and collaboration

The ECOWAS Commission supported and coordinated the hosting of two regional meetings of national commissions on small arms. At the first meeting, held in February, participants reviewed the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention, perspectives for the future and the exchange of information. At the second meeting, held in December, they reviewed the implementation of small arms control activities at the national and regional levels, planned activities for 2014 and discussed the way forward in formalizing a network of national commissions. Earlier, in February, the National Commissions on Small Arms in West Africa held their annual meeting in Abidjan to review the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms, as well as share information and experiences.

Participation at the ATT final negotiations, adoption and signature

Contributing to the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly of the ATT in April 2013, 13 ECOWAS member States signed the Treaty, with Nigeria and Mali also ratifying it. The Gambia and the Niger were the only ECOWAS member States that had not yet signed the ATT in 2013. (For more information on the ATT, see chapter III.)

Capacity-building and public awareness

In order to ensure that key stakeholders and the general public become more conversant with SALW-related issues in member States, the ECOWAS Commission organized one of its priority activities for the media in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Togo on sensitization and capital-building. This was part of the Commission's "Sensitization/Public Awareness" strategy being implemented since 2011. Over 200 media practitioners have been trained through this sensitization strategy. In February, it organized a round-table meeting in Abuja to help raise public awareness among representatives of member States and civil society about issues related to the ongoing ATT process.

Americas

Organization of American States

Conventional weapons

The Organization of American States recognizes that transparency in conventional weapons acquisitions is an important confidence and security-building measure that contributes to strengthening peace and security, both regionally and internationally. In 1999, the OAS member States adopted and opened for signature the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions[48] in Guatemala City. Since then, 21 of 34 States had become signatories to the Convention, of which 16 had deposited their respective instruments of ratification or accession.[49]

The Convention is legally binding and requires each State party to provide annual reports to the OAS regarding their imports and exports of conventional weapons. It also requires each State party to notify the depositary of their acquisition of conventional weapons covered under the Convention within 90 days of acquisition, whether this was acquired through import or national production. The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security of the OAS functions as the technical secretariat of the Convention and receives member State's reports.

On 1 March, a meeting was held with the National Points of Contact of the Convention. In that meeting, the State parties set out to examine the role and application of the Convention. In addition, further transparency measures were considered, including modifications to the categories of conventional weapons, pursuant to article XI of the Convention.

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

The OAS member States played a leading role by adopting in 1997 the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.[50] The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security of the OAS functions as the technical secretariat of the Convention. On 25 April, the Convention's Consultative Committee met in Washington, D.C., and provided

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[48] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/iac_transparency (accessed 6 May 2014).

[49] These 16 countries are Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

[50] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/iac_firearms (accessed 6 May 2014).

an update on the status of ratifications to the Convention, indicating that 31 of 34 States had deposited their respective instruments of ratification or accession, with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines being the most recent State to deposit its instrument of ratification in 2012.

Caribbean Community

In 2013, SALW continued to occupy a dominant position in the regional security agenda of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

Crime and security strategy

On 18 February, the CARICOM Conference of Heads of Government adopted the Regional Crime and Security Strategy.[51] It provides a common platform for the region to advance its fight against issues such as illicit trafficking, gang and youth violence, terrorism and cybersecurity, while simultaneously addressing the issue of crime prevention.

Arms Trade Treaty

CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) provided technical, advisory and coordinating support to its member States during the ATT negotiation process. CARICOM member States constituted four[52] of the nine States that had ratified the Treaty in 2013.

Strengthening regional cooperation

IMPACS continued to be active in strengthening cooperation among CARICOM members by advocating and providing technical assistance and support in combating the trafficking and illegal use of SALW in the region. Towards that end, the technical staff of IMPACS also participated in various national, regional and international seminars.

Strategic partnerships

IMPACS also continued to pursue its strategic partnership with INTERPOL during this period through the advancement of the Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network, a ballistic information mechanism that tracks guns and ammunition used in crimes. It seeks to increase member States' capacity to link firearms used by specific gangs and also enables them to trace the connections in the organized trade in illicit SALW and associated ammunition.

As part of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, two regional firearms advisors from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives of

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[51] Conference on Heads of Government of CARICOM, "CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013: Securing the Region", 18-19 February 2013.

[52] Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago.

the United States Department of Justice were stationed in CARICOM. Since August 2013, the Bureau had conducted firearms trafficking assessments in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago. These assessments will help member States with their firearm strategies.

Regional training

IMPACS was successful in securing funding under the tenth European Development Fund to deliver training to CARICOM firearm examiners and ballistic experts to strengthen their capacity and to promote standardization, certification and accreditation.

WMD-related activities and implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

Since the inception of the CARICOM–United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 Implementation Programme, the region has made significant progress in meeting obligations under the resolution and also in assuming responsibilities under the three non-proliferation regimes (NPT, CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention). CARICOM member States have developed and strengthened strategic trade-related and domestic export control legislation and associated regulations. More importantly, over the past two years, they more than doubled their membership in the IAEA and made unprecedented efforts towards developing and adopting legislation to implement the CWC.

In addition, member States strengthened existing anti-terrorism legislation and the implementation of controls to prohibit access to WMDs by non-State actors, as well as to prevent the transshipment, transit, transfer, export, re-export and brokering of strategic goods to these networks, notwithstanding significant challenges posed by resources and capacity.

Deepening cooperation with the international community also increased the capability of member States to respond to the deliberate or accidental use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, as well as enhanced their national capacities to detect and interdict dual-use goods and materials that can be used to develop WMD. Cooperation with the OPCW, the IAEA, the World Health Organization/Pan American Health Organization, among others, along with the significant support of UNODA and the United Nations 1540 Committee, enabled CARICOM member States to improve their emergency response capabilities to meet potential threats.

In October, the CARICOM UNSCR 1540 Implementation Initiative Committee, in cooperation with UNODA, organized a symposium on issues related to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons and the implementation of the resolution in the Bahamas. CARICOM member States also benefited from the OPCW Regional Training Course for Customs

Authorities of the States Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean, which was conducted in Colombia in September.

Asia and the Pacific

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

The Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty), which was signed in 1995 by 10 regional States and entered into force in 1997, made steady progress towards the implementation of its provisions as well as its Plan of Action.[53] The updated Plan of Action for the period 2013-2017 called for a stronger emphasis on concrete actions.

New developments in 2013 included the ratification by Brunei Darussalam of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in January and its application for membership in the IAEA, which was approved in September. Other developments included the accession of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident[54] and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency[55] in May. Viet Nam also acceded to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,[56] which it did in October.

The commitment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in implementing the Bangkok Treaty was also demonstrated in the sponsorship of a draft United Nations General Assembly resolution in 2013 that encouraged State parties of the Treaty to continue to engage the five nuclear-weapon States in resolving the remaining outstanding issues pertaining to the Protocol to the Treaty. Resolution 68/49 of 5 December 2013 was adopted at the 60th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.

Cooperation and networking among nuclear regulatory agencies in the region entered a new level with the establishment of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) at the twenty-third ASEAN Summit in October. ASEANTOM will endeavour to enhance

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[53] ASEAN, Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (2013-2017), 30 June 2013. Available from http://www.asean.org/images/Statement/poa%20to%20strengthen%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20seanwfz%20treaty%202013-2017_adopted.pdf.

[54] IAEA, document INFCIRC/335. Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc335.shtml (accessed 6 May 2014). For the adherence status, see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cenna_status.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

[55] The convention text and adherence status are available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cacnare.html (accessed 6 May 2014).

[56] Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointconv.html (accessed 24 June 2014).

regulatory activities and further strengthen nuclear safety, security and safeguards within the ASEAN community by enhancing cooperation and complementing the work of existing mechanisms at the national, bilateral, regional and international levels.

The ASEAN commitment to non-proliferation was also advanced through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2013, a number of activities in this area were conducted, namely the second ARF Seminar on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) in Bangkok in May, the fifth ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament in Manila in June, the second ARF Workshop on Non-Proliferation Nuclear Forensics in Bangkok in September, and the ARF Workshop on Countering Illicit Trafficking of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Materials in Manila in November.

Pacific Islands Forum

In 2013, the Pacific Islands Forum continued to prioritize regional advocacy and cooperation on disarmament-related issues, with a particular focus on SALW and the management and removal of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from the Second World War.

Forum participation in the Arms Trade Treaty

Most Forum members that were Member States of the United Nations actively participated in the negotiations for the ATT, advocating a common Forum position which, inter alia, sought the inclusion of SALW in the treaty.

At their annual summit, held in September in the Marshall Islands, Forum leaders encouraged all Forum members that were Member States of the United Nations to consider signing the ATT as soon as practicable. The Government of New Zealand subsequently initiated the development of a regional model legislation, in consultation with government lawyers from Forum Island States, to assist members in implementing the ATT. In this regard, it hosted an "Arms Trade Treaty: Pacific Model Legislation Workshop" in December in Auckland, to review and discuss the draft model law on the ATT for the Forum States.

Small arms and light weapons

During the year, combating the illicit trade and use of SALW remained a high priority for the Forum. To support its members in this regard, the Forum secretariat continued to: (a) offer assistance to members for national adaptation of the regional Model Weapons Control Bill; and (b) support members in implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW.[57] In December, the Forum secretariat convened a regional workshop

[57] A/CONF.192/15, para. 24.

to assist senior government officials from Forum States towards implementing the Programme of Action at the national level; to prepare national positions for the fifth Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action in 2014; and to acquire a general understanding of the ATT and its relationship with the Programme of Action. The workshop enabled officials to access expert advice and assistance from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and the Small Arms Survey.

Unexploded ordnance

Forum members continued to work closely under the Forum Regional UXO Strategy to manage and mitigate the threats posed by the widespread presence of UXO in the region. The Strategy was intended, inter alia, to improve coordination among national administrations, donors and demining organizations. Since its inception, the Strategy has generated a significant increase in demining activities in the region.

During the year, the Forum secretariat worked with member States and international partners to undertake UXO-related activities. Notably, it held a regional meeting in Brisbane on 27 and 28 June to help countries develop domestic UXO policies and national plans of action. It also organized a regional workshop in Koror, Palau, from 18 to 22 November to discuss the operational aspects of demining, with a focus on information management and the logistics of underwater clearance.

Forum support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

At their annual summit, Forum leaders considered the CTBT and included a statement in the Forum Communiqué[58] in which they "encouraged all States to sign and ratify the [CTBT] as a practical step towards nuclear disarmament, and noted the practical value and potential of the CTBT verification system, including for earthquake and tsunami warning networks in the Pacific".

Middle East

League of Arab States

One of the many roles of the League of Arab States (LAS) is to coordinate and elaborate a common Arab position on arms control and disarmament issues, regionally and internationally.

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[58] Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, document PIFS(13)8. Available from http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/2013_Forum_Communique_Final.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

WMD-related activities

The LAS held nine meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials to prepare a common Arab position vis-à-vis the developments regarding the postponed conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD. Based on its recommendations, the LAS Ministerial Council adopted the following resolutions: (a) resolution 7580 (Extraordinary Session—13 January 2013), entitled "Arab Stance Concerning the Postponement of the 2012 Conference on the Establishment of a ME Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other WMD";[59] (b) resolution 7605 (OS 139—6 March 2013), entitled "Threats of Israeli Nuclear Weapons and other WMD on International Peace and Arab National Security"; (c) resolution 7646 (Special Session—24 March 2013);[60] and (d) resolution 7678 (OS 140—1 September 2013).

In addition, the LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7718 (Extraordinary Session—10 November 2012), entitled "The Egyptian Initiative on implementing efforts aiming at the establishment of a zone free from all WMD in the Middle East Region, and adopting a unified Arab stance about how to deal with it and put it into practice". The resolution requested all Arab States to notify the United Nations Secretary-General, before 31 December, of their support to declare the Middle East as a zone free of all WMD (nuclear, biological and chemical).

Activities related to conventional arms

The LAS Regional Focal Point on SALW organized the Sixth Annual Meeting of Arab National Points of Contact on the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW, at its Headquarters in Cairo on 12 and 13 June.

The League also co-organized with UNODA a symposium entitled "Addressing the Proliferation of Small Arms: Instruments, Tools and Lessons Learned" at the LAS Headquarters in Cairo on 10 and 11 June.

In addition, the LAS co-organized with the German Federal Foreign Office the Workshop on SALW Control and confidence- and security-building measures at its Headquarters in Cairo on 13 and 14 May.

Other relevant activities or institutional development

The League presented to the 1540 Committee its report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). A workshop on the implementation of the resolution was organized in Riyadh on 14 and 15 January, which focused on reporting to the 1540 Committee by member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League.

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[59] A/68/124 (Part I), pp. 15-16.
[60] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

The League cooperated with Naif Arab University for Security Sciences which organized an international event entitled "Towards an Arab Strategy for Nuclear Security", which was held in Riyadh from 3 to 5 June. Its purpose was to exchange views on the status of regional implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and its overall objective was to generate recommendations for the development of an Arab Strategy for Nuclear Security.

Europe

European Union

The actions of the European Union (EU) in 2013 continued to be guided by the European Security Strategy (2003/2008);[61] the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003);[62] the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition (2005);[63] and in particular the principle of support to effective multilateralism.

In February, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton appointed the Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament at the European External Action Service in Brussels.

On 21 October, the EU Council adopted guidance on further EU efforts in combating the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery through actions that envisaged, inter alia, strengthening export controls on dual-use items, enhanced consular and scientific vigilance, and creation of a network of specialist think tanks on proliferation-related issues.

Upholding the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime remained a key priority for the EU. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the EU engaged actively and also presented a working paper[64] on priority issues for discussion and progress with regard to the implementation of the action plan agreed upon at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

By a new Council decision,[65] the EU enhanced its support to the IAEA in Vienna, inter alia, by raising its role as a key donor to the nuclear security activities of the IAEA and deciding to release financial resources

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[61] Álvaro de Vasconcelos, ed., *The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: building on common interests*, (Condé-sur-Noireau, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009). Available from http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-european-security-strategy-2003-2008-building-on-common-interests/ (accessed 24 June 2014).

[62] EU, document 15708/03, annex. Available from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

[63] EU, document 5319/06, annex. Available from http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st05/st05319.en06.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

[64] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.21

[65] Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP of 21 October 2013, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 281 (23 October 2013), pp. 6-13. Available from

amounting to more than €8 million. The first EU-IAEA Annual Senior Officials Meeting, involving representatives of the European External Action Service, the European Commission, the European Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA, was held on 25 January in Brussels to increase cooperation and coordinated action. Practical Arrangements were concluded to ensure complementarity between the activities undertaken by the EU CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) Centres of Excellence and the IAEA.[66]

The EU continued to actively promote the universalization and early entry into force of the CTBT by conducting outreach and démarches to all countries that had not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, and by organizing a regional seminar in Luanda in October.

The EU High Representative's intensive diplomatic efforts, together with the E3/EU+3,[67] played an essential role in reaching initial agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on 24 November in Geneva after many rounds of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Joint Plan of Action[68] agreed to in Geneva included a first step of initial reciprocal confidence-building measures for a period of six months together with a commitment to start negotiations towards a long-term comprehensive solution.

The EU remained firmly committed to the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially those capable of delivering WMD. This type of proliferation continues to be a serious concern and a threat to international peace and security, as reaffirmed in United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1887 (2009) and 1977 (2011). The EU, therefore, continued to promote efforts under Council decision 2012/423/CFSP (€930,000) against such proliferation, which included support for the universalization of The Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation through awareness-raising activities.

The EU continued to pursue the universalization of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and played an active role in the Third Review Conference of the CWC, which was held from 8 to 19 April in The Hague. The EU welcomed the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic and contributed funds in support of this effort.

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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0517&from=EN (accessed 24 June 2014).

66 For more information, see http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/mediaadvisory/2013/ma201302.html (accessed 24 June 2014).

67 China, European Union, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

68 Available from http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

In the area of arms export control, the EU actively engaged in the final negotiations of the ATT at the United Nations in March and promptly started to promote signature and ratification for the Treaty's early entry into force. The EU also adopted an ATT implementation support programme to assist a number of countries upon request to strengthen their capacity for the effective implementation of the Treaty.

In the field of conventional arms control, including SALW and their ammunition, the EU approved a project in November to establish the first global reporting mechanism by creating a publicly accessible online system to track illicit conventional weapons, specific weapon types, suppliers, transfer vectors and illegal recipients.[69] The project formed part of broader efforts by the EU and the United Nations to create monitoring and diagnostic capacity to better discern proliferation patterns and combat illicit diversion within the framework of the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW and in preparation for its fifth Biennial Meeting of States, to be held in New York from 16 to 20 June 2014. The EU also intensified the implementation of its Council decision on the Cartagena Action Plan[70] in the run-up to the 2014 Maputo Review Conference on the anti-personnel mines convention.

The EU actively promoted its initiative for an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities in a transparent and conclusive manner through two rounds of open-ended consultations on the draft Code, bringing together more than 60 countries in Kiev in May and in Bangkok in November. The EU welcomed the report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. The report noted the EU work on the Code of Conduct and its efforts to pursue political commitments, such as "a multilateral code of conduct to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space".[71]

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

In 2013, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and UNODA extended the memorandum of understanding[72] signed in

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[69] The project seeks to create a user-friendly global information management system on diverted or trafficked weapons and to conduct in-field research into weapons and ammunition circulating in conflict-affected areas. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/NewsWord/en/educ/139723.doc (accessed 24 June 2014).

[70] Available from http://www.cartagenasummit.org/fileadmin/pdf/review-conference-2nd/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf (accessed 6 May 2014).

[71] See A/68/189.

[72] For more information, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/docs/2011/UN-OSCE_Announcement.pdf (accessed 25 June 2014).

2011 on joint project activities to promote regional implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

The OSCE continued to assist interested participating States, in coordination with the 1540 Committee, its Group of Experts and UNODA, in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by, inter alia, the development of national implementation action plans. In addition, the OSCE, together with UNODA, organized regional workshops on the resolution, in particular in Belarus, Serbia and Ukraine. The events in Belarus and Serbia resulted in informal recommendations from the workshops.

Small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunitions

The OSCE completed a mapping study that contrasted OSCE commitments on SALW vis-à-vis relevant United Nations documents, such as the Programme of Action, the International Tracing Instrument, the Firearms Protocol and the newly adopted ATT. The study identified areas where OSCE commitments were more advanced than those at the international level as well as issues where further work was needed.

The OSCE organized a number of capacity-building activities on SALW, including a training seminar on enforcement of brokering controls on SALW and commodity identification training for military and dual-use goods. Highlighting its all-inclusive approach, OSCE also organized jointly with UNODA, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) an Inaugural Conference on Tracing Illicit SALW. Finally, the OSCE supported efforts by the Government of Montenegro in formulating the National Strategy on SALW.

The OSCE continued to provide assistance with destruction, stockpile management and security of SALW, as well as with Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition.[73] The implementation of four joint assistance programmes with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) continued during the year in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. Several key project activities were completed in Albania, Georgia, Montenegro and Serbia. The project on the disposal of the rocket fuel component in Ukraine will be completed in March 2014.[74]

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[73] For the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, see http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2010092008273785eng.pdf (accessed 24 June 2014).

[74] During 2012, 607,803 pieces of SALW were destroyed by participating States. Of these, 491,058 were deemed as surplus and 116,025 were seized from illegal possession and trafficking.

Activities related to general security and disarmament

In line with the Astana Commemorative Declaration[75] and the OSCE Ministerial Council decision 7/11, the Organization engaged in further discussions to update, revitalize and modernize confidence- and security-building measures. Following the establishment of a procedure for regular updating of the Vienna Document[76] every five years, the OSCE adopted two Vienna Document Plus decisions.[77]

In December, the OSCE participating States adopted the initial set of OSCE confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs).[78] These confidence-building measures are a significant show of goodwill among participating States for increased cooperation and exchanges of information to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation and conflict that may stem from the use of ICTs. In the field of cybercrime, the OSCE focused on awareness-raising and capacity-building activities.

Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation

During the year, the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC)–Centre for Security Cooperation continued to serve as an important subregional platform for arms control issues in South-East Europe, providing practical guidelines, professional knowledge and specialized training for personnel. In this regard, RACVIAC continued to assist the subregional countries to improve and harmonize their standards of implementation of arms control agreements and treaties and other confidence- and security-building measures.

Pursuant to its Programme 2013,[79] the Centre carried out the following eight activities, covering different areas of arms control and bringing together more than 220 experts during the year:

- Vienna Document 2011 Formation/Unit Commanders' Course. This course was designed to give participants an overview of the Vienna Document 2011. It was organized for the South-East European countries,

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[75] OSCE, "Astana Commemorative Declaration Towards a Security Community". Available from http://www.osce.org/node/74985 (accessed 20 June 2014).

[76] OSCE, document FSC.DOC/1/11. Available from http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true (accessed 24 June 2014).

[77] OSCE, document FSC.DEC/2/13/Corr.1 (available from http://www.osce.org/fsc/100233?download=true (accessed 24 June 2014)); and document FSC.DEC/4/13 (available from http://www.osce.org/fsc/103764?download=true (accessed 24 June 2014)).

[78] OSCE, document PC.DEC/1106. Available from http://www.osce.org/pc/109168?download=true.

[79] Available from http://www.racviac.org/activities/reports13.html (accessed 24 June 2014).

focusing on duties and responsibilities of formation/unit commanders engaged in the implementation of the aforementioned document;

- Chemical Weapons Convention Seminar. This event paid particular attention to article X of the CWC, national protection programmes in the South-East European countries, problems and developments, as well as inspection and verification activities and procedures;
- Workshop on the Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[80] It was organized for the purpose of sharing the latest developments in the South-East European subregion, particularly on national strategies, implementation plans, progress reports and need for support;
- Dayton Article IV Course. Its purpose was to instruct designated individuals coming from the four State parties on how to successfully perform their duties as inspectors and/or escorts pursuant to the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control;[81]
- Third International Arms Control Symposium. It provided a significant international platform for a comprehensive discussion on the latest developments and issues regarding arms control policy in Europe and beyond;
- The seventh RACVIAC activity on the Ottawa Convention.[82] It was aimed at fostering dialogue on the Convention's implementation and its obligations at the regional level and beyond, particularly in accordance with article 6 of the Treaty on International Cooperation and Assistance;
- Regional Commodity Identification Training for Military and Dual-Use Goods. It was an event that focused on commodity identification and on promotion of inter-agency and regional cooperation among licensing offices and customs services with a view to combating the proliferation of illicit weapons and dual-use goods;
- Seminar on effective practices of the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). It was conducted in cooperation with UNODA and was aimed at facilitating the identification of effective national practices in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

[80] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster_munitions (accessed 6 May 2014).

[81] Dayton Peace Accords, annex I-B, article IV. Available from http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=369 (accessed 24 June 2014).

[82] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/mine_ban (accessed 6 May 2014).

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons

South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC) works to strengthen the capacities of national and regional stakeholders to control and reduce the proliferation of SALW, thereby contributing to the enhanced stability, security and development of South-Eastern Europe.

During the year, SEESAC focused its efforts on demilitarization and disposal of surplus ammunition in the Republic of Serbia, while continuing to support activities aimed at improving arms export controls throughout the Western Balkans and assisting in the establishment of a South-East European firearms experts network.

In September, SEESAC completed the first activity envisaged under the Capacity Development Programme for Conventional Ammunition Stockpile Management for the Republic of Serbia when approximately 161 tons of napalm powder surplus were removed from the storages of the Ministry of the Defence of Serbia and sent to Sweden for disposal, according to the highest ecological standards. The demilitarization of white phosphorus–filled ammunition was also initiated during the year. The Programme, which is implemented by SEESAC, is a joint development programme of the Ministry of Defence of Serbia, UNDP and OSCE. Its aim is to improve the capacity for conventional ammunition stockpile management by enhancing security and safety of conventional ammunition storage facilities, disposing of surplus ammunitions and strengthening demilitarization capacities of the Ministry of Defence of Serbia.

In July, SEESAC received support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway to continue its work in arms exports control. As a result, SEESAC assisted in the publication of annual national reports on arms exports by Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the fifth regional report on arms exports. It also assisted in the further development of the Regional Brokering Database.[83]

In addition, SEESAC continued to act as the secretariat for the Regional Information Exchange Process (RIEP) on arms exports control and, within this framework, it organized the ninth regional meeting of government officials responsible for the development and execution of arms control policies in the countries of the Western Balkans.

In close cooperation with the law enforcement and judicial authorities of France, and in coordination with the European Commission Firearms Task Force and the European Police Office, SEESAC initiated a process aimed

[83] Available from http://www.seesac.org/project.php?l1=126&l2=154 (accessed 24 June 2014).

at the establishment of a South-East European Firearms Experts Network. The establishment of the network will ensure closer cooperation and better coordination at the regional level among firearms experts from the police and justice and customs services.

In December, the Council of the EU passed Council decision 2013/730/CFSP[84] in support of SEESAC disarmament and arms control activities in South-East Europe, which will be implemented in the 2014-2016 period.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remained deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD, as well as their means of delivery. It continued to implement its policy to prevent WMD proliferation and ensure that the Alliance had the appropriate capabilities to address and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

NATO strongly condemned the chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic in August 2013 and welcomed United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). In December, the NATO–Russia Council issued a statement[85] urging full cooperation with the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. They underscored the importance of the complete and verifiable elimination of all chemical weapons, materials and equipment in the earliest and safest manner, and declared the readiness of the NATO–Russia Council to consider providing assistance.

NATO continued to implement its arms control obligations, aided its partners with compliance issues and shared the lessons drawn from more than four decades of negotiation and implementation of arms control agreements. Allies continued discussions on the modernization of conventional arms control, with a view to engaging with partners in 2014.

At the same time, NATO continued to look forward to developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation, as set out in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,[86] with the goal of developing detailed proposals in this regard and increasing

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[84] Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/730/CFSP of 9 December 2013, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 332 (11 December 2013), pp. 19-30. Available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0730&from=EN (accessed 24 June 2014).

[85] NATO, "NATO-Russia Council Statement of Support for the OPCW-UN Joint Mission", 4 December 2013. Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_105470.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[86] Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed 24 June 2014).

mutual understanding of the non-strategic nuclear force postures of NATO and the Russian Federation in Europe.

In May, NATO convened in Croatia its ninth Annual Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, bringing together leading non-proliferation officials from more than 50 countries and international organizations.[87] NATO also supported the negotiation of the ATT and participated in the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention.

NATO continued its commitment of support for the implementation of the Programme of Action on SALW. It convened regular meetings with 26 partner nations on this topic and developed an online tool to track information on SALW and mine action projects by nations as well as regional and international organizations around the world. Further initiatives on regional SALW cooperation in Afghanistan and Libya were also undertaken.

During the year, the Alliance conducted nine courses on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, with a total of 245 participants from 32 nations.

United Nations Development Programme

In 2013, UNDP continued to provide support to countries in conflict or afflicted by high levels of armed violence in order to reduce armed violence and increase citizen and community security. Efforts to control small arms were complemented by addressing the demand for such weapons and the underlying causes of violence. Support included strengthening of institutional capacities to respond to crime and violence (police, justice, line ministries and local governments) and to tackle challenges posed by small arms proliferation. It also focused on increasing community security and managing conflict, as well as mitigating and preventing violence among high risk groups.

UNDP continued to advocate for a United Nations system-wide approach, including regional organizations and civil society, to support the host country's efforts to control the proliferation and use of illicit weapons as well as address the continued demand for small arms. With regard to United Nations assistance to States for the implementation of commitments under existing global and regional conventional arms control instruments, it advocated that such assistance be increasingly linked to broader support that strengthened the rule of law and security and that reduced armed violence.

During the year, UNDP provided support for the reduction of armed violence in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

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[87] For more information, see "NATO and its Partners to discuss non-proliferation and disarmament challenges", 6-7 May 2013. Available from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_100157.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 24 June 2014).

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Liberia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan.[88] This support was provided directly through "Armed Violence Reduction and Small Arms Control" programmes or as part of broader programmes on the rule of law, justice and security. Some examples of the results achieved are mentioned below.

Through its citizen security programme, UNDP contributed to a significant reduction of armed violence in El Salvador. Following the 2012 truce between gangs, UNDP enhanced its citizen security support to socially reintegrate some former gang members in order to prevent renewed armed violence.

In Nepal, UNDP supported the draft Nepal National Strategy and Action Plan on small arms control, in accordance with the International Small Arms Control Standards, as well as strengthened the capacities of relevant officials to implement this strategy. One of the challenges in Nepal was the collection and analysis of data regarding armed violence and small arms to inform policy development. To address this, UNDP provided support to plans for the establishment of an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism as well as a national data collection and analysis system within the Ministry of Home Affairs and the police.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, inter-agency United Nations Armed Violence Prevention Programme supported the creation of a platform to address challenges related to the proliferation of and the demand for small arms at community levels. UNDP support for this programme resulted in the establishment of citizen security forums and the development of community safety plans.

In Kenya, UNDP support further strengthened national mechanisms to control SALW in accordance with international standards. UNDP also supported consultations involving national authorities and civil society. This contributed to a draft bill on small arms control, which was submitted to the parliamentary committee in August. After a final review, it will be ready for enactment in 2014. In addition, UNDP supported the setting up of a crime observatory and research body in Nairobi to better understand the nature and dynamics of crime and to assist in planning and crime prevention strategies. UNDP support contributed to a decrease of armed violence and an increase in security at the community level.

In the Sudan, UNDP supported the development and adoption of the Darfur Community Security and Arms Control Strategy. As part of this strategy, a joint-coexistence committee consisting of Darfurians and Chadians was reinstated with UNDP support to conduct joint assessments of

[88] Country projects can be accessed individually on UNDP website at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html (accessed 24 June 2014).

community security challenges at local levels and to strengthen collaboration in addressing them. The first registration and marking of civilian arms in West Darfur officially began on 30 January (which was expected to register 30,000 arms). By the end of 2013, some localities had established community security and arms control committees and developed local security initiatives, which were implemented alongside the arms registration campaign.[89]

UN-Women

In March 2013, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) supported women's civil society groups to monitor and engage in the negotiating process that led to the adoption in April of the ATT by the United Nations General Assembly under its resolution 68/31. In particular, the support of UN-Women enabled the participation of women's rights activists from 26 countries in an international preparatory meeting on the ATT arranged by Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. UN-Women also supported the engagement by women's organizations at the national and international levels to lobby their Governments before the ATT meeting commenced in New York. As a result of civil society's efforts, the treaty text included strong provisions on gender-based violence among its criteria.[90]

UN-Women also supported the fifty-seventh session of the Commission on the Status of Women, the priority theme for which was the "Elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls". The Agreed Conclusions resulting from the Member States' negotiations included recognition by the Commission "that illicit use of and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons aggravates violence, inter alia, against women and girls".[91]

Gender and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in peacekeeping

Women play essential roles in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. Yet, they are often excluded from the planning or implementation stages of those processes. However, since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the integration of gender into DDR programmes and projects has been recognized as fundamental to effective peacekeeping operations.

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[89] For a summary of UNDP involvement in activities related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including arms registration, in Darfur, see UNDP, *Sudan DDR Despatch* (August-November 2013).

[90] See Arms Trade Treaty, article 7(4). Available from https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf#page=22 (accessed 24 June 2014).

[91] E/2013/27-E/CN.6/2013/11, para. 25, p. 4.

In 2013, African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) provided ongoing training and awareness raising on the role of women in disarmament for members of the Sudan DDR Commission and Darfur Security Arrangements Implementations Commission. UNAMID also developed a DDR programme to support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan to attend to the needs of "at risk" groups in camps of internally displaced persons and sedentary communities through community-based labour intensive projects.[92] Such projects seek to empower the direct beneficiaries, both females and males, to develop alternative livelihoods through labour-intensive public works projects, income-generating activities and vocational skills training. The projects also promote peacebuilding, especially community-based conflict resolution and mitigation.

Additionally in South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mainstreamed gender in the DDR support plan, reviewed reinsertion projects for ex-combatants to ensure gender responsiveness, supported public outreach strategies to include women and men as outreach providers, and developed a gender checklist for the DDR commission and the UNMISS DDR teams.[93]

Responding to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), which calls for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to support the Malian authorities to address the proliferation of and illicit trafficking in SALW, the MINUSMA gender adviser provided support for the establishment of the new National Commission on the proliferation of small arms.[94]

Over the coming year, peacekeeping missions will continue to work with DDR commissions to mainstream gender considerations into all areas of DDR in line with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) in order to take into account the different needs of male and female ex-combatants and their dependants.

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[92] For an overview of the UNAMID DDR role, see http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11011&language=en-US (accessed 24 June 2014).

[93] For the UNMISS role in gender mainstreaming and the activities of the Office of the Gender Advisor, see http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5468&language=en-US (accessed 24 June 2014).

[94] The national commission of Mali launched its action plan in early 2014 with technical assistance from UNREC. See http://unrec.org/index/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=317%3Amaliatelier-de-validation-du-pan&catid=66%3Aunrec-press-releases&lang=en (accessed 24 June 2014).

Chapter V

Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo prepares a Selex ES Falco unmanned aerial vehicle for use in surveillance operations.
Credit: UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti

CHAPTER V

Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

So the time is ripe for both Governments and civil society to conduct a thorough examination of the political, legal, technical and ethical implications of such weapons. In the meantime, States should exercise utmost restraint and maximum transparency in their activities related to these weapon systems, including development and testing.

To help guide this wider public debate, we should all keep in mind "The Three Laws of Robotics" put forward by Isaac Asimov back in 1942. The fundamental norm was that "A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm."

Asimov's precepts remain surprisingly relevant today. They offer the outlines of a code of conduct that countries could incorporate into artificial intelligence—and human intelligence—to ensure that military robotics fully comply with the laws of war."

ANGELA KANE, HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS[1]

Developments and trends, 2013

IN RECENT YEARS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY has become increasingly concerned about new and emerging disarmament and security issues that do not neatly fall into the traditional dichotomy of conventional and unconventional weapons. United Nations disarmament bodies addressed issues pertaining to armed, unmanned aerial vehicles and initiated a process to examine the implications of autonomous weapon systems. The First Committee, for the first time, heard calls from Member States interested in minimizing the humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas, building on several years of discussion within the Security Council on this matter. A common driver on many of these new issues has been a reinvigorated application of the humanitarian approach to disarmament—an approach which has also given a considerable boost to long-standing disarmament objectives (see chapter I).

The United Nations also made important advances in its consideration and work on established cross-cutting issues. The international community took a major step forward in addressing the link between gender and

[1] Angela Kane, "Killer Robots and the Rule of Law", *The World Post*, 15 July 2013. Available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/A-View-from-the-United-Nations-/killer-robots-and-the-rul_b_3599657.html (accessed 22 July 2014).

disarmament as the final text of the Arms Trade Treaty included a legally binding criterion aimed at stopping the supply of weapons that may be used to commit acts of gender-based violence. The General Assembly also carried forward the outcomes of two expert groups that concluded their work on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, as well as on information technology and international security.

Emerging issues

Autonomous weapons

Autonomous weapons rapidly emerged as a disarmament issue, boosted by a major new non-governmental organization coalition and the focused work of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters also discussed the matter extensively under its agenda item on emerging technologies and provided recommendations to the General Assembly. The First Committee also addressed this issue for the first time, though without taking any action. Consideration of this issue culminated in November, when the High Contracting Parties of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,[2] taking up a key recommendation in the aforementioned report to the Human Rights Council, decided to establish an informal meeting of experts in May 2014 to explore further various aspects of the issue.

While no country presently deploys any weapon system with the capability to select and attack targets without human intervention, recent advancements in robotics have moved the development of autonomous weapons beyond the realm of science fiction. Many countries already deploy weapon systems with semi-autonomous capabilities, such as cruise missiles, in which authorized human operators select and decide to attack a given target. Several countries have pursued research programmes aimed at developing concrete and practical concepts for autonomous systems. It is notable in this regard that in November 2012, the United States Department of Defense issued a directive establishing guidelines for the use of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures that could lead to unintended attacks. That directive limited the use of autonomous weapons to non-lethal, non-kinetic force (e.g., electronic warfare) against materiel (i.e., non-human) targets.

The discussions in various United Nations forums revealed a number of common questions and concerns pertaining to the possible deployment

[2] The full title of the treaty is Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The treaty text and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc (accessed 18 June 2014).

of autonomous weapons. These included the ability of robots to operate in accordance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict and international human rights law; how human accountability could be maintained, particularly in systems where operators are not "in the loop"; the likelihood and consequences of spoofing or other circumstances leading to a loss of control over a system; and the ethics of delegating to a machine the responsibility to apply lethal force.

The Secretary-General, in his annual report[3] to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, called for the discussion of such questions to "begin immediately and not once the technology has been developed and proliferated". He added that such a discussion "must also be inclusive and allow for full engagement by United Nations actors, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society".

Discussions in the Human Rights Council

On 30 May, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with Christof Heyns, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, on, inter alia, his report4 on lethal autonomous robotics. Of the 36 Governments and other participants that spoke at the interactive dialogue, at least 22 addressed the issue of autonomous weapon systems. Two non-governmental organizations devoted their statements to the issue.

In his report, the Special Rapporteur defined lethal autonomous robotics as systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without any further human intervention. His major conclusions included concerns over the far-reaching implications of such systems on the protection and value of life, as well as on international stability and security. He cautioned that the ease with which those systems could be used may lower the threshold for armed conflict and denigrate the value of life. Furthermore, he questioned how the use of such systems could be capable at present of satisfying the requirements of international human rights and humanitarian law.

The Special Rapporteur's report included three major recommendations. First, States should establish a moratorium on at least the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment and use of autonomous weapon systems, pending the establishment of an internationally agreed upon regulatory framework. Second, the High Commissioner for Human Rights should convene a high-level panel in order to examine the issue, including its legal, ethical and policy aspects, and to propose a suitable international framework for addressing these aspects. Third, the United Nations should emphasize the need for full transparency in the development of such systems and seek information from States with respect to their internal processes for

[3] S/2013/689.
[4] A/HRC/23/47.

determining whether new weapon systems are compatible with international humanitarian law.

During the interactive dialogue, many delegations expressed concern over the ethical, moral and legal implications of the possible use of unmanned weapon systems. They shared the concerns raised in the report over the possible negative implications posed by the development and use of such systems particularly in the areas of human rights, international humanitarian law, as well as international peace and security. Specific concerns raised included the risk that autonomous weapons would lower the threshold for the use of force, thereby increasing armed conflict, and the risk that they would lead to a new arms race. While a number of delegations called for prohibitions or restrictions on autonomous weapons, the view was also expressed that no ban was necessary and that existing international law was sufficient to regulate the use of such systems.

Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

At its fifty-ninth and sixtieth sessions, the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters focused on, inter alia, autonomous weapon systems during its deliberation on disarmament and security implications of emerging technologies (see A/68/206; see also chapter VI). The Board noted that the increasing trend towards automation of warfare gave rise to a wide range of legal, ethical or societal concerns that had to be addressed, including possibly through disarmament action. Members of the Board considered that new and emerging technologies may give rise to completely new challenges to international humanitarian law and therefore extensive discussions on the issue would be important. It was also pointed out that the international community had a rare opportunity to react preventively, but that such action would have to be undertaken quickly in light of the rapidly developing nature of the technology.

On the matter of autonomous weapons, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General should consider commissioning a comprehensive study, including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and other think tanks, which should contain an in-depth analysis on the emerging technological trends and the legal, ethical and other aspects of and limits to the development, proliferation and use of the increasingly autonomous weapons technology. The Board further recommended that, on the basis of this study, the Secretary-General should promote coordinated efforts within the United Nations framework or in an existing forum such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to address the possible need for disarmament measures in respect of potential fully autonomous weapon systems in the future. The Board considered that a consensus-oriented approach could result in a code of conduct or a road map, and that it should involve Governments and relevant stakeholders from industry, research, academia and civil society.

Informal expert meeting established within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

While a number of delegations raised the issue of autonomous weapons in their interventions at the First Committee of the General Assembly, no action was taken. Governments continued their discussion on the issue in November during the annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The Parties decided to convene an informal meeting, to be held from 13 to 16 May 2014, with a mandate "to discuss the questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention". The Chair of the meeting will be responsible for submitting a report to the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, objectively reflecting the discussions held.

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas

Interest continued to grow in minimizing the civilian harm caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effect in populated areas. Concern over the active use of explosive weapons in ongoing conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and elsewhere, had been a key driver behind the burgeoning effort aimed at addressing the issue in a comprehensive manner. Although there was no single, internationally accepted definition of an explosive weapon, these were typically considered weapons whose primary destructive effect was blast and fragmentation. This category of weapons could refer to a broad range of systems such as bombs, artillery or other munitions, missiles and rockets, mines, grenades and improvised explosive devices, although only some of these categories included weapons considered to have a wide-area effect.

Since 2009, the Secretary-General has annually expressed concerns over the humanitarian impact of these weapons in his reports to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. In these reports, the Secretary-General called for the parties to conflicts to refrain from using explosive weapons with wide-area effect in populated areas and for Member States and other relevant actors to intensify their consideration of the issue. He has also called upon States to support further research and data collection on civilian deaths and injuries and to engage in a process aimed at sharing and implementing best practices, including the voluntary adoption of operational guidance to reduce harm to civilians, and developing a political commitment not to use explosive weapons with wide-area effect in populated areas.

Governments, the International Committee of the Red Cross, civil society and the United Nations, principally through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), explored new ways to address this issue. On 23 and 24 May, Norway hosted an international conference in Oslo entitled "Reclaiming the Protection of Civilians under International Humanitarian

Law." Participants in the conference recommended that the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effect in densely populated areas should be avoided. Other interested Governments held follow-on regional workshops in Jakarta, Buenos Aires and Kampala. OCHA and the non-governmental organization Chatham House also followed-up with an expert-level meeting in London in September.[5]

A few delegations also raised the issue of explosive weapons at the annual session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. A number of States, including Austria, Costa Rica and the Lao People's Democratic Republic called for further work to minimize the humanitarian impact of these weapons in populated areas.

Cross-cutting issues

Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

In 2013, the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space activities, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/68 of 8 December 2010, continued its work and held its second session in Geneva from 1 to 5 April and its third session in New York from 8 to 12 July. The Secretary-General's report[6] with the study conducted by the Group was submitted to the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

The Group took stock of numerous proposals from States as well as of the developments in the political and technological environment since 1993. In its study, which was adopted by consensus at the third session, the Group recommended that non-legally binding TCBMs for outer space activities complement the existing international legal framework pertaining to space activities,[7] which also contains several TCBMs of a mandatory nature, without

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[5] See OCHA and Chatham House, "Expert meeting on reducing the humanitarian impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas", 23-24 September 2013. Available from https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Expert%20Meeting%20on%20EWIPA%20-%20Summary%20Report.pdf (accessed 22 July 2014).

[6] A/68/189.

[7] According to the report, the international legal framework pertaining to space activities include the following: the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; the Constitution and the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union and its Radio Regulations, as amended; the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, as amended; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States that have not yet become parties to the international treaties governing the use

undermining existing legal obligations. Similarly, the Group recommended that States and international organizations consider and implement the TCBMs contained in the report on a voluntary basis and without prejudice to the implementation of obligations deriving from existing legal commitments. The Group also recommended that coordination be established between the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the Office for Outer Space Affairs and other appropriate United Nations entities.

By its resolution 68/50 of 5 December 2013, entitled "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities", the General Assembly encouraged Member States to review and implement, to the greatest extent practicable, the proposed TCBMs contained in the report, through relevant national mechanisms, on a voluntary basis and in a manner consistent with their national interests. The General Assembly also decided to refer the recommendations contained in the report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament for consideration, as appropriate.

Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

The General Assembly, in resolution 67/27, adopted without a vote on 3 December 2012, invited all Member States, taking into account the assessments and recommendations contained in the report[8] of the Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on four issues: (a) general appreciation of the issues of information security; (b) efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in that field; (c) the content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 of the resolution; and (d) possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level.

Replies received from 12 Governments (Armenia, Canada, Cuba, Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Oman, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and United Kingdom) were included in the Secretary-General's report on the subject published in 2013.[9]

By the same resolution, the General Assembly also welcomed the commencement of the work of a new Group of Governmental Experts

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of outer space should consider ratifying or acceding to those treaties. The Group also recommended universal participation in, implementation of and full adherence to this existing legal framework.

[8] A/65/201.

[9] A/68/156 and Add.1.

(established pursuant to resolution 66/24 of 2 December 2011) and repeated its call for the Group to report to the Assembly at its sixty-eighth session in September 2013. This is the third group of governmental experts to be established to examine existing and potential threats in cybersphere and possible cooperative measures to address them.

In 2013, the Group held its second session in Geneva in January and its third and last session in New York in June. It managed to agree on a substantive report with recommendations for the General Assembly on norms, rules or principles of the responsible behaviour of States, as well as confidence-building measures and capacity-building in the State use of information and communication technologies. As mandated, the Group's report[10] was submitted to the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly in September.

The Group agreed that there was a need to promote international stability, transparency and confidence in cyberspace and that the United Nations should continue to play an important role in promoting dialogue among Member States on the issue of security in the use of information and communication technologies. It also agreed that confidence-building measures, such as high-level communication and timely information-sharing, could enhance trust and assurance among States and help to reduce the risk of conflict by increasing predictability and reducing misperception. The Group further agreed that capacity-building was of vital importance in enhancing global cooperation in securing cyberspace and that an open and accessible cyberspace was important since it enabled economic and social development. The combination of all these efforts, the Group agreed, supported a more secure cyberspace. The Group concluded that international law, especially the United Nations Charter, was applicable in cyberspace.

At its sixty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 68/243 on 27 December, which noted the outcome of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts and again invited Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the same questions set out in General Assembly resolution 67/27. The resolution, which was adopted without a vote, also requested the Secretary-General to establish a new group of governmental experts that would report to the General Assembly in 2015. The new group, with 20 experts, would schedule its first meeting in New York in July 2014.

For more information, refer to appendix II.

[10] A/68/98.

Other issues

Terrorism and disarmament

> *In a globalized society, terrorists are actively exploiting information technology, the Internet and social media networks to incite, recruit, finance and perpetrate terrorist acts. Violent terrorist crimes are being carried out in a wider range of countries, demonstrating that terrorism has no nationality, or religious affiliation, recognizes no borders and cannot be defeated by military or law-enforcement measures alone.*
>
> *Fortunately, we can use the spread of information technology and the other tools of our globalized world to connect communities and promote narratives that undermine messages of hate and division. We also need to intensify our efforts to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including by resolving prolonged conflicts, promoting the rule of law, protecting human rights, nurturing good governance, tolerance and inclusiveness and creating more opportunities for education, training and employment.*
>
> Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General[11]

Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism

In its resolution 68/41 of 5 December, the General Assembly expressed deep concern over the growing risk of linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The General Assembly called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD and their means of delivery. It also urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. The General Assembly also encouraged cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for the strengthening of national capacities in this regard.

In response to resolution 67/44 of 3 December 2012 requesting the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, 15 Member States, the European Union and 15 international organizations and bodies and agencies of the United Nations system provided contributions.[12]

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[11] The Secretary-General's message, delivered by Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to the international conference on strengthening cooperation in preventing terrorism, Baku, 18 March 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=6664 (accessed 22 July 2014).

[12] A/68/164 and Add.1.

UNODA activities related to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

As part of its efforts to support the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,[13] UNODA continued to maintain the roster of experts and laboratories provided by Member States, which the Secretary-General can call upon to carry out fact-finding activities to investigate reports of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons.

The various cooperative arrangements that the United Nations had signed with relevant international organizations[14] came into fruition with the Secretary-General's decision to promptly establish the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in March upon requests by Member States for an investigation. (See also chapter II.)

The capability of the Secretary-General's Mechanism has been continuously enhanced through training courses for the experts on the roster, particularly in the biological area. Following previous training courses for experts hosted by the Governments of Sweden and France in 2009 and 2012, respectively, a workshop on ways to increase the effectiveness of the field operations of the Secretary-General's Mechanism was hosted by the Government of Denmark in May. The event was attended by representatives of 10 Member States, as well as some international organizations. A number of Member States expressed interest in hosting future training events and table-top exercises in 2014 and 2015.

Contribution of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to global anti-terrorism efforts

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continued to support global anti-terrorism efforts within the parameters of its own mandate. The OPCW Technical Secretariat maintained contacts and exchanges with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations in the field of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, and collaborated with the United Nations, other relevant organizations and agencies.

During the period, the Technical Secretariat attended, together with other relevant international and regional organizations, including UNODA, three meetings of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as an observer. It also participated as

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[13] See General Assembly resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006.

[14] In order to increase cooperation with relevant international organizations, the United Nations signed a memorandum of understanding with the World Organisation for Animal Health in July 2012, as well a supplementary arrangement with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in September 2012.

an observer in the Chemical Security Sub-Working Group of the Global Partnership.

The Technical Secretariat continued to provide support to the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism of the OPCW Executive Council. The Group covered topics related to national, regional and global efforts in the fight against terrorism, as well as in enhancing capacity-building initiatives and cooperation between States and among international organizations. Representatives of regional and international organizations and experts in relevant fields were invited to brief the Group.

In the framework of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,[15] the Technical Secretariat also continued to carry out capacity-building activities related to protection and assistance against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. It provided, inter alia, national and regional courses in emergency response related to incidents involving toxic chemicals.

In the field of chemical safety and security, the Technical Secretariat continued to conduct seminars and workshops in the context of the Organisation's programme on chemical safety and security management. The events provided a forum for the exchange of best practices and lessons learned and covered, inter alia, initiatives and practices relevant to strengthening chemical safety and security in transport and at chemical plant sites.

Cooperation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

The OPCW continued to support the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including in the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Terrorist Attacks. The Working Group aims at strengthening the exchange of information and knowledge among relevant United Nations entities and international organizations related to the response to WMD attacks. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force approved a project proposal developed by the Technical Secretariat, as Co-Chair of the Working Group, which aimed at enhancing effective inter-agency collaboration as well as coordinated and effective communication in the event of chemical and/or biological attacks.

Cooperation in promoting the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

The OPCW continued to maintain regular contact with the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540

[15] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc (accessed 18 June 2014).

(2004). The Secretariat contributed to meetings, events and assistance visits related to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) at the international, regional and national levels. It also supported the Committee's clearing-house role with regard to requests for assistance from States.

Terrorism and disarmament (IAEA)

In resolution 10 of 20 September 2013, entitled "Nuclear Security," the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) took note of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/44 of 3 December 2012, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,[16] and international efforts in conformity with these instruments to prevent access by non-State actors to WMD and related material.

In this connection, resolution 10 of the IAEA General Conference recalled United Nations General Assembly resolution 67/44 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, in which the General Assembly stated that progress was urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism. All IAEA Member States were encouraged to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism if they had not yet done so.

The Conference also encouraged all Member States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).[17] It called upon those Member States as well as those already party to the CPPNM to also ratify, accept or approve the 2005 Amendment[18] to the CPPNM as soon as possible and encouraged them to act in accordance with the objectives and purpose of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force.

In resolution 10, the Conference recognized and supported the Agency's continuing work to assist, upon request, States' efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and to the 1540 Committee, provided that the requests are within the scope of the Agency's statutory responsibilities.

The Conference also noted the Agency's efforts to raise awareness of the threat of cyberattacks and their potential impact on nuclear security,

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[16] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 2445, No. 44004.

[17] IAEA, document INFCIRC/274/Rev.1. Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml (accessed 18 June 2014).

[18] IAEA, document GOV/INF/2005/10-GC(49)/INF/6. Available from http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49inf-6.pdf (accessed 18 June 2014).

and encouraged the Agency to make further efforts to improve international cooperation and to assist Member States, upon request, in this area by providing training courses and hosting further expert meetings specific to cybersecurity at nuclear facilities.

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Emphasizing the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 67/37 of 3 December 2012, entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control".

In that resolution, the Assembly called upon States to pursue unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to ensure the application of scientific and technological progress in international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to attaining sustainable development.

The resolution also invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolution, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session. The replies received from four Governments (Colombia, Cuba, Lebanon and Qatar) are contained in the Secretary-General's report on the subject.[19]

At its sixty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 68/36 on 5 December, in which it made a similar request to Member States for information and to the Secretary-General for a report containing that information to be submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session. For more information, refer to appendix II.

Disarmament and development

The annual resolution on disarmament and development, tabled by Indonesia, on behalf of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, as a lead sponsor, was adopted in a consensus vote by the General Assembly on 5 December (resolution 68/37). As in past resolutions, the General Assembly repeated its call for the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development. The resolution also encouraged the international community to achieve the Millennium

[19] A/68/118 and Add.1.

Development Goals and to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities.

In 2013, in response to a request made by the General Assembly in resolution 67/40 of 3 December 2012, the following Member States provided the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development: Armenia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Colombia, Iraq, Mexico, Portugal, Qatar and Spain.[20]

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

In its resolution 67/38 of 3 December 2012, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session. Replies received from six Governments (China, Colombia, Cuba, Iraq, Mauritius and Uruguay) were included in the Secretary-General's report on the subject.[21]

At its sixty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 68/38 on 5 December by 127 votes in favour to 5 against, with 52 abstaining, by which it decided to include the subject in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session. For more information, refer to appendix II.

Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

By its decision 68/516 of 5 December, the General Assembly decided, without a vote, to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament". For more information on the subject, refer to appendix II.

Gender and disarmament

In 2013, the international community experienced significant gains in its efforts to address the link between gender and disarmament.

Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control

In resolution 68/33 of 5 December 2013, entitled "Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control", Member States again recognized the importance of gender-sensitive disarmament policy and the contributions of

[20] A/68/119 and Add.1.
[21] A/68/152 and Add.1.

women to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The resolution, sponsored by Trinidad and Tobago and adopted without a vote, also welcomed the first report[22] of the Secretary-General on "Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control". Through the adoption of resolution 68/33, the Assembly further strengthened the mandate contained in its initial resolution on this subject adopted in 2010 (65/69 of 8 December 2010).

In resolution 67/48 of 3 December 2012, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on ways of promoting the role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Twelve Member States, as well as the European Union, and six entities provided inputs to the report of the Secretary-General contained in the document A/68/166.

Several Member States provided examples of their national policies on gender equality and offered recommendations on means of providing women a greater role in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control decision-making. The report also reflected the importance often attached by States and entities to the gender dimension of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their effect on the perpetration of acts of violence against women.

UNODA contributed to the report of the Secretary-General, highlighting some of its work on mainstreaming gender in disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The work of the regional centres was underscored in this regard. For example, in 2013, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean organized the Women-Only-Training Course to Combat the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives from 25 November to 6 December in San Salvador. This training underscored the commitment to gender balance in UNODA programming. The training sought to increase the opportunities for women officials to have access to specialized training, which is often characterized by a disproportionate bias in favour of male participation. This initiative also acknowledged the crucial role played by women in promoting peace and disarmament and how strengthening their capacities will contribute to small arms control.

Additionally, in support of gender-related activities, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa helped to organize, along with the United Nations country team in Togo, a capacity-building workshop on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.[23] The activity was aimed at training more than 30 young women

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[22] A/68/166.

[23] See *UNREC Focus*, no. 21, January 2014. Available from http://unrec.org/index/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=74%3Aunrec-focus&id=313%3Aunrec-focus-nd21-january-2014&lang=en (accessed 22 July 2014).

from the regions of Togo. The Regional Centre discussed provisions in order to prohibit gender discrimination and promote, inter alia, increased representation of women at all levels of decision-making, especially in the prevention, management and peaceful settlement of conflicts.

Like its other counterparts, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific also integrated a gender perspective in all of its activities, including ensuring the highest possible female participation at its events and selecting female experts whenever possible.

Arms Trade Treaty

The adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)[24] represented a significant gain in addressing the gender and disarmament linkage. Adopted through a General Assembly vote,[25] the ATT includes a legally binding provision related to gender-based violence. The gender-based violence criterion addresses violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law specifically related to gender-based violence. The ATT, therefore, represents the first international agreement to recognize the link between gender-based violence and the international arms trade.

Article 7 (4) under "Export and export assessment" requires that State parties, when making an export assessment, take into account the risk of the transferred conventional arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children. A State would be obligated to deny an arms transfer in the event that it determines that there is an "overriding risk" that weapons or items covered under the treaty would be used to commit or facilitate such acts of gender-based violence.

In the same vein, in his report on women, peace and security of September 2013,[26] the Secretary-General noted that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons poses a serious security concern for women and called upon States "to sign, ratify and implement the ATT and adopt national laws and policies that link arms control initiatives to the prevention of violence against women and girls".

In its resolution adopted on 8 October entitled "Impact of arms transfers on human rights in armed conflict",[27] the Human Rights Council further reinforced the linkage addressed in the ATT, noting that "such arms transfers can have a seriously negative impact on the human rights of women and girls,

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[24] The Treaty text and status of adherence are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (accessed 18 June 2014).

[25] The General Assembly adopted resolution 67/234 B on 2 April 2013.

[26] S/2013/525.

[27] A/HRC/RES/24/35.

who may be disproportionately affected by the widespread availability of arms, as it may increase the risk of sexual and gender-based violence".

Further recognition of the gender dimension of small arms control

Discussions in other parts of the United Nations system, including the Security Council, strengthened the nexus between gender and small arms control. At the conclusion of its fifty-seventh session in March, the Commission on the Status of Women adopted a set of agreed conclusions on the theme "Elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls". Conclusion 25 stated, "The Commission recognizes that the illicit use of and illicit trade in small arms and light weapons aggravates violence, inter alia, against women and girls".[28] Such a direct reference to the role of illicit small arms in perpetrating violence against women and girls provided an additional platform for strengthening gender-sensitive policies in the area of small arms and light weapons.

Furthermore, in his 2013 report[29] on small arms to the Security Council, the Secretary-General underscored the negative impact of arms on gender roles and relations. He noted, "Armed conflict often has a negative impact on gender roles and relations. In many cases, conflict disrupts traditional gender roles, contributing to the break-up of families and the social fabric of the community." He further encouraged "the informal expert group [of the Security Council] on the protection of civilians to consider ways in which relevant Council resolutions might better respond to challenges relating to the protection of civilians, in particular women and children, in situations created or exacerbated by illicit arms flows".

The Security Council also addressed this linkage through the adoption on 26 September of resolution 2117 (2013), the first resolution adopted in the Security Council on the issue of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. In the resolution, the Council integrated many aspects of the gender and disarmament linkage, explicitly recognizing the role played by small arms in violence perpetrated against women and girls as well as their exacerbating effect on sexual and gender-based violence. The Council also noted the importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes that were sensitive to the needs of women and children and women's full and effective participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

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[28] See E/2013/27.
[29] S/2013/503.

Chapter VI
Disarmament machinery

A view of a session of the Open-ended Working Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.
Credit: UN Photo/Violaine Martin

Chapter VI

Disarmament machinery

> *I am a strong believer in multilateralism. I want you to know that I have not given up hope for this noble body. I want to encourage you to live up to the international community's expectations. Even though your mandate is to disarm, today, I say, "Arm yourself, arm yourself with the spirit of [the] blue horse and run. Run fast and run far."*
>
> **Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**[1]

Developments and trends, 2013

The revitalization of the multilateral disarmament machinery remained a priority for Member States throughout 2013. Although the stalemate of the Conference on Disarmament persisted in 2013, there were increased levels of participation and engagement in this multilateral negotiating forum and within the two other principal multilateral disarmament bodies, namely the First Committee of the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

In particular, there were indications that a number of significant activities undertaken under new mandates given by the General Assembly in 2012 provided a fresh impetus to the international efforts to advance the disarmament agenda. In Geneva, an open-ended working group established by General Assembly resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", was convened to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. In New York, the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament was held on 26 September, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/39 of 3 December 2012, entitled "High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament". These activities generated new momentum for revitalizing the work of the disarmament machinery.

The Conference on Disarmament did not reach agreement on a programme of work in 2013 and, again, failed to start substantive work. However, there was a higher level of activity in the Conference. Consultations on a programme of work intensified under each of the six rotating presidencies of the 2013 session. With a view to building consensus on a programme of

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[1] Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 21 January 2014. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7415 (accessed 1 August 2014).

work, they produced a number of proposals, three of which were issued as formal documents of the Conference. Although none of the proposals was adopted, intense consultations among its members resulted in the decision by the Conference to establish an informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation. The group met three times during the 2013 session and another time in the intersessional period. These meetings provided further opportunities for all members of the Conference to discuss a programme of work, even though no agreement emerged from them.

During its 2013 substantive session, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) continued its deliberations on recommendations to the General Assembly. As 2013 was only the second year of its three-year cycle, the Commission did not aim to reach agreement on any recommendations at its present substantive session. Rather, the chairs of the two working groups issued working papers under their respective authorities, transmitting those documents to the 2014 substantive session and thereby achieving a productive outcome. The issuance of the working papers, although controversial, had a positive impact on delegations, enhancing their attendance and the level of engagement. No negotiating document in any working group had been issued as a working paper since 2006. The discussion on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) also injected a degree of dynamism into the work of Working Group I, as many Arab countries sought to increase international pressure on the issue prior to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[2]

The UNDC has not produced any substantive outcome since 1999. Member States expressed serious concern about its relevance and credibility, and that of the United Nations disarmament machinery as a whole. They stressed that, given the continued paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament, it was critical for the Commission to achieve a meaningful outcome at the end of the current three-year cycle in 2014. In the meantime, there was concern that the consensus-based working method and all-encompassing agenda items of the UNDC, particularly on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, were not conducive to forging consensus among Member States.

The First Committee also witnessed more intense engagement by Member States in its work in 2013. There were 101 statements made during the general debate and a record-breaking 241 statements during the thematic debates. The Committee's discussions were invigorated by widespread international concerns over the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab

[2] The Treaty and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (accessed 1 August 2014).

Republic, growing frustration over slow progress in nuclear disarmament, and increased expectations for the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).[3] The activities mandated by the General Assembly in its 2012 session, in particular, the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament and the Open-ended Working Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, also injected new dynamism into the work of the Committee. Furthermore, the initiative focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons infused new energy into the debate on nuclear disarmament, although it did not lead to formal action. The humanitarian initiative, along with the advocacy of a treaty banning nuclear weapons, highlighted the differences between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

First Committee of the General Assembly

Overall work of the Committee

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee) of the General Assembly held its sixty-eighth session from 7 October to 5 November. The Chair of this session was Ibrahim O. Dabbashi (Libya). The Committee carried out its work against the backdrop of many pressing international concerns, such as serious distress over the confirmed use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and frustration over the slow progress in nuclear disarmament, including the delay in convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD. Nevertheless, the First Committee statements and voting patterns indicated strong support for many aspects of the current disarmament and international security agenda, including nuclear disarmament and an early entry into force of the ATT.

The Committee held a total of 25 meetings, including 7 devoted to the general debate and 12 devoted to the thematic debates. Action on draft resolutions and decisions took place during the final segment of the Committee's work. Member States engaged in thematic debates on the following seven clusters: (a) nuclear weapons; (b) other WMD; (c) outer space (disarmament aspects); (d) conventional weapons; (e) other disarmament measures and international security; (f) regional disarmament and security; and (g) disarmament machinery. The Committee heard 101 statements during the general debate and a record-breaking 241 statements during the thematic debates. The Chair of the Committee noted in his closing statement that this indicated not only an increase in participation by Member States, but also greater awareness of the issues related to disarmament and international security.

[3] The Treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (accessed 14 May 2014).

Over the course of the thematic debates, the Committee held exchanges with the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, and other high-level officials in the field of arms control and disarmament, including from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Committee also held exchanges with the current President of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Chair of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, and the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. There were also briefings by the chairpersons of the groups of governmental experts (GGEs) on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development, and on developments in the field of information and communications in the context of international security. The President of the Final United Nations Conference on the ATT and the Chair of the Third Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention[4] also briefed the Committee during the thematic clusters of conventional weapons and other WMD, respectively. In addition, the directors of the three regional centres of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs briefed the Committee on their 2013 activities during the thematic cluster on regional disarmament and security. The regional centres are the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific; and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research also briefed the Committee on the work and activities of the Institute.

The participation of non-governmental organizations was also featured in the Committee's work. Members of civil society, on behalf of scores of non-governmental organizations, made seven statements on the issues of WMD; emerging technologies, including fully autonomous weapons; disarmament machinery; the ATT and small arms and light weapons; explosive weapons and toxic remnants of war; and anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions.

During its third and final segment, the First Committee approved 48 draft resolutions and 5 draft decisions under various disarmament and international

[4] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc (accessed 1 August 2014).

security agenda items. Of the 53 drafts adopted, 21 or 40 per cent were adopted without a vote.[5] On 5 December, the General Assembly adopted 52 of the 53 drafts approved by the First Committee, as well as a procedural decision on the provisional agenda of work and timetable of the Committee for 2014. Action on a draft resolution on information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which proposed the establishment of another GGE, was postponed pending consideration of its financial implication by the Fifth Committee. The Assembly adopted the resolution on 27 December without a vote. (See chapter V for more details on information and telecommunications in the context of international security.)

Overall, the Committee's deliberations during the sixty-eighth session shared many characteristics with its previous sessions—divisive voting on nuclear-weapon resolutions combined with strong support for more progress on nuclear disarmament, widespread recognition of the importance of measures to regulate conventional arms, especially the ATT, support for universal membership in the chemical and biological weapons conventions and concern over persisting divisions in the United Nations disarmament machinery.

Overview of key substantive discussions in the Committee

Nuclear weapons

Discussion in the First Committee of the progress in achieving nuclear disarmament was mixed as there was widespread praise for recent initiatives to take forward discussions, but also frustration over lack of concrete results. New initiatives, such as the Open-ended Working Group to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, generated energy among States, although discussions on how Member States should proceed thereafter indicated divergence in approaches to nuclear disarmament. Following adoption by the First Committee, the General Assembly adopted the resolutions entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations" (68/48), a follow-up to the Open-ended Working Group, and "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament" (68/32). In the latter, its sponsors, the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement, proposed three elements: (a) negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament; (b) designation of 26 September as the International Day for the total elimination of nuclear weapons; and (c) the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament by 2018.

[5] At the sixty-seventh session, the Committee adopted 59 drafts with 33, or 56 per cent, adopted without a vote.

During the general debate and the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, Member States, particularly Arab countries and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, expressed deep disappointment over the failure to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD pursuant to the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.[6] This dissatisfaction took centre stage in many interventions related to nuclear disarmament and the NPT framework. (See chapter I for more details on the proposed Middle East zone.)

References to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons were made in several First Committee resolutions and in two separate joint statements during the thematic debate on nuclear weapons.[7] Building upon the joint statements issued since May 2012 during meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the First Committee, New Zealand delivered a joint statement on behalf of 123 Member States and 1 observer State on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.[8] This statement endorsed the findings of the international conference hosted by Norway in March on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.[9] In parallel to the New Zealand statement, 18 States issued a separate statement delivered by Australia.[10] While welcoming and echoing elements of the other statement, the statement delivered by Australia stressed the need for a more moderate path grounded in the "step-by-step" approach. (See chapter I for more details on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament.)

Chemical weapons

In the context of the extensive international attention devoted to the issue of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013, Member

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[6] *2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vols. I-III (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vols. I-III)).

[7] The General Assembly resolutions adopted in 2013 that referenced the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons included the following: 68/32, "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament" (tenth preambular paragraph); 68/39, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (third and fourth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 2); 68/42, "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" (sixth preambular paragraph); and 68/51, "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs). Such references had been made in these resolutions since 2010 when the 2010 NPT Review Conference adopted its Final Document which included a reference to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

[8] See A/C.1/68/PV.13, pp. 21-23, for the list of States and the text of the statement.

[9] See Government of Norway, "Chair's summary, Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 4-5 March 2013". Available from http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2013/nuclear_summary.html?id=716343 (accessed 1 August 2014).

[10] See A/C.1/68/PV.13, pp. 24-25, for the list of States and the text of the statement.

States strongly condemned any use of chemical weapons. States welcomed the accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the adoption of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) regarding the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. The relevant resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention (68/45) was expanded in 2013 to reflect the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the conclusions of the Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention held in April 2013. (See chapter II for more details on issues related to chemical weapons.)

Conventional weapons issues

Many States took the First Committee session as an opportunity to underscore the importance of the early entry into force of the ATT and its full and effective implementation. Some States indicated their opposition to certain provisions of the Treaty, or its lack of others, and regretted its adoption by a vote rather than by consensus. Nevertheless, the majority of States expressed their intention to ratify the ATT in due course and to support its full implementation. Australia, together with the original ATT "co-authors",[11] presented the resolution on the ATT to the First Committee, which was later adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December (68/31). The resolution promoted further signatures and ratifications and called on States that were in a position to do so to provide assistance to requesting States in implementing its provisions. (See chapter III for more details on the ATT adoption and signing.)

In addition to the ATT, many States also stressed the need for full implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects[12] and reaffirmed the importance of the Outcome Document,[13] adopted at its Second Review Conference in August 2012. During interventions at the Committee, States also welcomed the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 2117 (2013) on the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, the first Security Council resolution on this topic.

Reaffirming the importance of transparency on military matters, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on transparency, entitled "Transparency in armaments" (68/43), "Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures" (68/23) and

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[11] The "co-authors" are the States that presented the original resolution on the ATT in 2006. They are Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya and the United Kingdom.

[12] *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001* (A/CONF.192/15), para. 24.

[13] A/CONF.192/2012/RC/4, annex I.

"National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology" (68/44). By adopting the first two resolutions, the General Assembly decided to re-establish GGEs on the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures, both to be convened in 2016. The discussion on the ATT resolutions also shed light on divergent views on the future role of the ATT in transparency in armaments, with a number of States questioning the linkage between the Treaty and greater transparency. (See Chapter III for more details on conventional arms issues, including small arms and light weapons.)

Other issues, including disarmament machinery

The General Assembly approved two resolutions on security in outer space, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" (68/29) and "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities" (68/50). By adopting the latter resolution, the Assembly welcomed the report[14] of the GGE on this subject, encouraged Member States to review and implement these measures contained in its report, and referred the recommendations therein to both the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament for consideration. (See chapter V for more details on outer space.)

Many Member States highlighted the importance of addressing emerging weapon systems, in particular autonomous weapon systems. More than a dozen States referenced the need to address the various legal, political and ethical implications of fully autonomous weapons, with some pointing to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)[15] as the appropriate forum for future discussions. (See chapter V for more details on autonomous weapons.)

In addition, as in previous sessions of the First Committee, many States recognized the urgent need to revitalize the work of the disarmament machinery, especially calling on the Conference on Disarmament to begin substantive work and for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to produce a substantive outcome during its 2014 substantive session.

A discussion of the establishment of GGEs, both in terms of composition and financial implications, also took place during the First Committee. Several States expressed dissatisfaction with the composition of previous groups, stating that they were not geographically balanced and often featured very few experts from developing States. The Non-Aligned Movement called upon the Secretary-General to "take concrete actions so as to ensure a more balanced

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[14] A/68/189.

[15] The full title of the treaty is the Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Its text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc (accessed 1 August 2014).

membership of future GGEs which can contribute to the effectiveness and participatory nature of their work". Other States also expressed concern over the financial implications of expanding membership.

United Nations Disarmament Commission, 2013

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held the second session of its three-year cycle of deliberations at United Nations Headquarters from 1 to 19 April, under the chairmanship of Christopher Grima (Malta). Prior to its substantive session, the Commission held its organizational session on 4 December 2012,[16] during which it considered questions related to the organization of work and substantive agenda items for the 2013 substantive session, and also took up the question of the election of its officers.[17]

At the beginning of the substantive session on 1 April, the Commission adopted the provisional agenda for the 2013 session.[18] In accordance with the decision taken at its 2012 substantive session, the Commission entrusted Working Group I with the mandate dealing with agenda item 4, entitled "Recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". Likewise, it entrusted Working Group II with the mandate dealing with agenda item 5, entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons". Naif bin Bandar Al-Sudairy (Saudi Arabia) continued to serve as Chair of Working Group I. On 1 April, the Commission elected Knut Langeland (Norway) Chair of Working Group II.

During its substantive session, the Commission held six plenary meetings[19] and, on 1 and 3 April, engaged in a general exchange of views on all agenda items.[20] From 3 to 17 April, Working Groups I and II each held 11 meetings.

On 1 April, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, delivered a statement[21] to the Commission, pointing out that many of the gravest challenges to international peace and security were mere reflections of the problem of "lack of confidence". She noted that this helped to explain the slow rate of progress in achieving global

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[16] See A/CN.10/PV.329.

[17] During the 2013 session, the Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows: Chair—Christopher Grima (Malta); Vice-Chairs—Representatives of Austria, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica and Lithuania; and Rapporteur—Charlene Roopnarine (Trinidad and Tobago).

[18] See A/CN.10/L.70.

[19] See A/CN.10/PV.330-335.

[20] See A/CN.10/PV.330-333.

[21] Statement before the Disarmament Commission, New York, 1 April 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2013/2013-04-01_UNDC_opener.pdf (accessed 1 August 2014).

nuclear disarmament and the robust growth of long-term nuclear-weapon modernization programmes; underlined the relentless expansion of military budgets; accounted for deeply divided votes in the General Assembly on many disarmament resolutions; and was a root cause of the stalemate of the Conference on Disarmament. The High Representative stressed that the entire United Nations disarmament machinery was intended to provide a process for building confidence through the establishment and elaboration of global norms in disarmament, and that the Disarmament Commission, through its purely deliberating role, served a vital role in the early stages of developing such norms. She also noted that many practical confidence-building measures (CBMs) were related to transparency, and encouraged all Member States to make good use of United Nations transparency measures, such as the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

Underscoring the importance of the administrative and procedural aspects of work, the High Representative noted that it would be a worthy cause to revive the productivity of the Commission as an international resource for cultivating the seeds of future global norms—guidelines, standards and recommendations. She recalled that in the 20 years since its re-establishment in 1979, the Commission was able to reach a consensus to adopt guidelines and recommendations on a variety of disarmament subjects on no less than 16 occasions, but that it had been unable to adopt any new guidelines since 1999. She emphasized that the Commission had a legitimate continuing interest in examining whether there were alternative procedures to assist the Commission in achieving concrete results.

In his opening statement,[22] the UNDC Chair noted that, in recent years, meaningful progress of the disarmament agenda had been accompanied by equally significant setbacks in others. He noted that while general and complete disarmament remained high on the agenda of the international community, the multilateral disarmament machinery continued to deliver very little. He further noted that nuclear disarmament continued to be a global priority, but, paradoxically, the international community continued, almost recklessly, to pursue a path that could lead to the destruction of humankind. The Chair stressed that it was critical that the Disarmament Commission make progress towards the adoption of recommendations concerning next steps for achieving nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As regards the other substantive item on the agenda of the Commission, "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms", he called on delegations to find the balance between the inherent right of all

[22] Christopher Grima (Malta), UNDC Chair, opening statement before the 2013 session of the Disarmament Commission, New York, 1 April 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/news/disarmament_commission_2013/statements/20130401_chair.pdf (accessed 1 August 2014).

States to defend themselves and the reduction of conventional arms in order to reduce risks to international peace and security.

Underlining that Member States had failed to adopt recommendations since 1999, the Chair stressed the need to inject fresh thinking and innovative ideas into their deliberations if they were to achieve progress by the end of its three-week session. He warned that the risk of this body becoming irrelevant drew ever closer with each failed attempt to reach consensus, and underscored the need to restore a common sense of purpose that transcended narrow national positions and to recognize that reaching common understandings on some of the world's most intractable problems was also very much in each Member State's national interest. The Chair called on delegations to muster the political will needed to move away from intransigent national positions that had blocked the work of the UNDC for far too long and to identify a middle ground in those specific areas in which progress could be made. He also reminded delegations that the Disarmament Commission was not a negotiating body, but a deliberative instrument, and that its value was its universal character and the possibilities it provided for frank and open debate. The Chair concluded his statement by stressing the need to restore the credibility of the UNDC.

More than 30 delegations made statements during the general exchange of views on 1 and 3 April.[23] Member States, in particular those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), reiterated their position on the principle and validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. They reaffirmed the important role of the Disarmament Commission as the sole specialized deliberative body in the United Nations disarmament machinery, and expressed concern that the Commission had not been able to agree on any recommendations to the General Assembly since 1999.

On nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Member States underscored the vital importance of strengthening the regime established by the NPT, and reiterated the need for full implementation of its provisions and the decisions of its review conferences, particularly the 64-point action

[23] See A/CN.10/PV.330-333. Representatives of the following countries made statements during the general exchange of views: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, China, Cuba (on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia (on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland (on behalf of the European Union and associated countries), Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon (on behalf of the Group of Arab States), Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria (in its national capacity and on behalf of the Group of African States), Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

plan adopted in 2010.[24] Non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly members of NAM, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Group of African States and the Group of Arab States, expressed deep concern over the slow pace of progress by nuclear-weapon States in accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. In this regard, they welcomed the convening of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, scheduled on 26 September. They reaffirmed the importance of the application by nuclear-weapon States of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and international verifiability in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and undertaking. A number of States, especially those of NAM and CELAC, expressed opposition to improving existing nuclear weapons and developing new types of nuclear weapons, which contradict the objective of achieving nuclear disarmament as a multilateral legal obligation, as well as the commitments undertaken by nuclear-weapon States in this regard. While reaffirming that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, many States reaffirmed the need for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon Sates as a matter of high priority.

Member States stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending its entry into force, urged all States to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing and other nuclear explosions. There were also many calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament. Many States also underlined that nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced global peace and security and strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regimes. They also called for the early establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not yet exist, particularly in the Middle East. In this context, a large number of States, especially those belonging to the League of Arab States, expressed serious concern about the delay in convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD, and urged the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to convene the Conference without further delay.

Speaking on behalf of NAM, Indonesia stressed that nuclear disarmament, as the highest priority established by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, should not be made conditional on CBMs or other disarmament measures. It underscored the need for nuclear-weapon States to implement the unequivocal undertaking that they took upon themselves in 2000 and reaffirmed in 2010 so as to accomplish

[24] NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), pp. 20-29.

the total elimination of nuclear weapons. NAM emphasized the necessity of starting negotiations without further delay on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention. It reiterated its commitment to work to convene a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction. NAM also emphasized the need to address proliferation concerns through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. It stressed that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participants by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on the access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development.

Cuba, on behalf of CELAC, noted that Heads of State and Government adopted at the founding summit of CELAC a special communiqué on the total elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with its long-standing position in support of a world free of nuclear weapons. It further noted that at the time of its establishment, CELAC confirmed the pride of its region in being the first densely populated area in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapons-free zone through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and urged the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw all reservations to the Treaty's protocols and respect the region's denuclearized character. The members of CELAC also reaffirmed that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, and the Charter of the United Nations. It observed that, as acknowledged by 127 States at the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo on 4 and 5 March, it was unlikely that a State or international body could adequately address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by detonating a nuclear weapon and provide sufficient assistance to those affected.

On behalf of the Group of African States, Nigeria stated that the African continent had remained a nuclear-weapon-free zone since the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, and African States would continue to observe and honour that status. The Group also encouraged remaining States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so, to ratify the Protocol without delay. It also reaffirmed the application of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability by nuclear-weapon States in relation to nuclear disarmament measures.

Lebanon, speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, noted that although nuclear disarmament was the highest priority, it had not been sufficiently reflected in the work of the disarmament machinery. It also

stressed that there was no higher priority than meeting the deadlines set in the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and that the first deadline for convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD had not been met. The Group stressed that the failure to fulfil the commitments made by the 2010 Review Conference undermined the non-proliferation regime, and that, despite the confirmation by all countries in the region except one, the conference was not held by the agreed date. The League of Arab States urged the convening parties to continue to fulfil their commitments, as that was the only way to restore the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and to guarantee the success of the 2015 Review Conference. Lebanon expressed the hope that the Commission's outcome would ensure the implementation of the obligations emanating from the 2010 Review Conference.

Ireland, on behalf of the European Community, reaffirmed that the NPT was the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT. It stressed that reinforcing the non-proliferation regime should be a priority for all Member States, and that non-compliance with the Treaty's provision by States parties to the Treaty undermined non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The European Union (EU) called on those States not yet party to the NPT to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their accession to the NPT, to adhere to its terms and to pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament. Japan stressed that, in order to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime, it was essential to take practical and realistic steps to promote both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It cited, for example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative it had promoted.

In the meantime, nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament and emphasized their efforts and achievements therein. China emphasized that it had been earnestly fulfilling its nuclear disarmament obligations and firmly pursued a nuclear strategy of self-defence. It noted that China had always exercised utmost restraint, had not participated, and would not participate, in a nuclear arms race in any form, and would maintain its own nuclear forces at the minimum level necessary for national security needs. China also reiterated its adherence to the policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and its unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. In promoting nuclear disarmament, however, China stressed the need for maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all, noting that countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to make drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

France, while acknowledging that the NPT nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility, stressed that all States must contribute to disarmament by creating the required security environment, which meant resolving two principal proliferation crises that threatened international peace and security, namely nuclear activities pursued by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran in violation of Security Council resolutions. France also stated that strengthening the non-proliferation regime continued to be a priority, particularly through reinforcing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and universalizing the additional protocol, and, in that regard, welcomed the entry into force of Iraq's and Viet Nam's additional protocols at the end of 2012. It stressed the need to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Russian Federation reaffirmed its commitment to its obligations under article VI of the NPT, and noted that the implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)[25] substantially contributed to the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, it stated that further reduction of nuclear weapons was impossible without proper consideration of all the factors of international security that could have a negative impact on strategic stability, such as the unilateral and unlimited build-up of the global anti-missile defence system; the lack of progress in the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the unwillingness to renounce the possibility of placement of weapons in outer space; and quantitative and qualitative imbalances in the field of conventional arms. The Russian Federation also noted that preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space remained a priority of its foreign policy, underscoring the need for a legally binging agreement to prevent weaponization of outer space. As an important step towards concluding such a treaty, the Russian Federation called on States to follow its example and commit themselves to a policy of non-first placement of weapons in outer space.

The United Kingdom reiterated its commitment to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and highlighted a number of new disarmament measures and a stronger security assurance set out in its 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. However, it highlighted the need for moving forward together through balanced and reciprocal disarmament in order to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, and stressed the need to build the mutual understanding needed to take forward the nuclear disarmament commitments. In this context, the United Kingdom emphasized the importance of the dialogue among the five permanent members of the Security Council, referring to their conferences held in Paris in 2011 and in Washington in

[25] United States Department of State, "New START: Treaty Text", 8 April 2010. Available from http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm (accessed 1 August 2014).

2012 and the forthcoming conference to be held in the Russian Federation in 2013. It also stressed the importance of building confidence between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, and provided information on its work with Norway on the verification of warhead disarmament. The United Kingdom stressed that the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol should be the universal verification standard for all NPT States parties, and urged all those who had not done so to sign and ratify it. The United Kingdom also expressed serious concern about the threat posed by the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It stressed that the international community must stand together in calling on them to comply with international law, to work with the IAEA, and to refrain from any further provocative actions.

While reaffirming its commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, the United States noted that President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague speech was not a call to unilaterally disarm but a road map to the future—a step-by-step, measured strategy that took into account the changed and changing security landscape of the 21st century. It stated that in addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, it had taken steps to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy of the United States, and that it was devoting its time, efforts, resources, and attention to create the conditions for the further reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Announcing its submission of a formal working paper entitled "Preventing the use of nuclear weapons" to the Disarmament Commission Working Group I, it stressed that United States arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament policies were predicated on preventing the use of nuclear weapons again, and the United States continued to accord the highest priority to avoiding such use.

Recalling that collective efforts towards disarmament are directly guided by Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, Austria noted that, in 2011 and 2012, it had pursued, together with Norway and Mexico, an initiative leading to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012, entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", and that the Open-ended Working Group set up by the resolution held its organizational session in Geneva in March. It also highlighted the catastrophic global effects resulting from any potential use of nuclear weapons, stressing the need to place more emphasis on taking into consideration their humanitarian, economic and ecological consequences. Austria also referred to the unanimous conclusion in the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which clearly stated the obligations to pursue in good faith to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Kazakhstan referred to its President's proposal for a universal declaration for a nuclear-

weapon-free world as the first step towards a convention aimed at the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Brazil expressed grave concern that nuclear weapons still played a central role in the security doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States and military alliances. Noting that their use was inconsistent with international humanitarian law, and their possession by some States contributed to the continued risk of proliferation, Brazil supported beginning discussions on the principles and elements of a nuclear weapons convention. The Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that the Disarmament Commission should establish as a principle that there was no legal, political or security reason to justify the possession of nuclear weapons by any country. It stated the strong belief that limited bilateral and unilateral arms reductions and the mere decommissioning of nuclear weapons were far short of real and effective steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which could never substitute for the obligation of nuclear-weapon States for the complete elimination of all their nuclear weapons.

India expressed the conviction that the goal of nuclear disarmament could be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework. It underscored the need for a meaning dialogue among all States that possessed nuclear weapons in order to build trust and confidence and to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. India referred to specific measures suggested in its working paper presented to the Commission in 2007, including a global no-first-use agreement and a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which were developed in the spirit of the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan.

Pakistan reiterated its call for evolving a new consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation, underlining the need to (a) recognize the right to equal security for all States; (b) address the motives to acquire weapons; (c) demonstrate a renewed commitment to achieving nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame; (d) provide non-nuclear-weapon States with the assurances against the threat of use of nuclear or conventional weapons through a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty; (e) evolve a universal and non-discriminatory agreement for addressing concerns arising from the development, deployment and proliferation of missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems; and (f) develop an agreed approach for the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy under appropriate international safeguards. Pakistan noted that a single-minded focus on an FMCT was not a panacea, calling for a balanced approach towards the four core issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Bangladesh noted that pending the ultimate goal of complete, irreversible, verifiable and transparent nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon States had the legitimate right to receive assurances from nuclear-weapons States. However,

it underlined that commitments in the form of negative security assurances made by nuclear-weapon States had not been adequate to dispel the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, due mainly to the non-binding nature of such commitments.

The Republic of Korea underscored that it was crucial for all Member States to implement practical measures step by step, as outlined in the consensus action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It also underscored the need to further strengthen the monitoring and verification mechanism of the NPT through the universalization of the IAEA additional protocol. The Republic of Korea emphasized the serious challenge posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, referring particularly to its missile launch in December 2012 and its third nuclear test in February 2013. It also noted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had further undermined peace by repeatedly making inflammatory remarks, such as the unilateral nullification of the Armistice Agreement and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and by threatening pre-emptive nuclear strikes. China called on all parties to continue efforts on the denuclearization of the peninsula within the framework of the Six-Party Talks.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea insisted that the delicate situation in which the danger of nuclear war threatened the Korean peninsula was due to the blackmail tactics increasingly being used by the United States, adding that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had issued no threat or provocations. It noted that after the United States questioned a sovereign State's legitimate right to a satellite launch, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had no other option but to conduct a third underground nuclear test in order to safeguard its sovereignty and security. However, the United States brought the nuclear test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Security Council as a basis for drafting another sanction resolution and opened joint military exercises with the Republic of Korea involving 200,000 troops and different types of strategic nuclear-strike delivery means. The military counteractions, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated, were just acts of self-defence in the face of provocations of war coming from the United States, explaining that in response to Operation Key Resolve by the United States and the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nullified the Korean Armistice Agreement on 11 March 2013, and had taken critical steps to nullify the non-aggression pact and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed by the two Koreas, while the Korean People's Army's supreme command had put on highest alert all the field artillery units, including strategic rocket units and long-range artillery units. It stressed that as long as the United States continued to pose an ongoing threat to the country, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would steadfastly cling to the almighty sword of nuclear weapons and would

expand and beef up its nuclear force qualitatively and quantitatively until the denuclearization of the world was realized.

With regard to other WMD, Member States expressed support for the Biological Weapons Convention,[26] welcomed the outcome of its seventh Review Conference, and called for the universalization and full implementation of the Convention. They also underscored the importance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and urged all States that had not yet ratified or acceded to it to do so. Referring to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, France remarked that the use of such inhumane weapons remained topical, and welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to launch an investigation into all allegations of the use of such weapons in the country.

In the field of conventional weapons, many States welcomed the successful conclusion of the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.[27] They expressed support for the text negotiated at the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in March, although many regretted the failure to adopt it by consensus at the conference. A number of States underscored the validity and importance of the existing CBMs adopted under United Nations auspices, particularly the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures.

The EU drew attention to its working paper on several types of practical CBMs in the field of conventional weapons. Underlining its belief that CBMs were a significant support for peace, security and stability, in particular at the regional, subregional and bilateral levels, Ecuador stated that the countries of the Union of South American Nations had been promoting and supporting confidence and security-building measures, which could be summed up in the following categories: information exchange and transparency regarding defence systems and defence expenditures; notification of military activities; a segment on security measures; a section on military assurances; and compliance and verification measures. Argentina noted that in joining efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and defining the post-2015 sustainable development goals, the work in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control should not be set aside. It added that, irrespective of one's point of view, world armaments expenditure of $1.7 trillion in 2012 could not be justified vis-à-vis public opinion when people were living in extreme poverty. India stated its belief that the initiation

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[26] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc (accessed 1 August 2014).

[27] A/CONF.192/15, para. 24.

of a confidence-building process must be decided upon by States freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty, and that CBMs must be a step-by-step process and should evolve at a pace that was comfortable to all participating States. It further noted that CBMs in a regional context should take fully into account the political, military and other conditions prevailing in that region, and they should be adopted at the initiation by and with full agreement of the States of the region concerned. India also mentioned the need to take advantage of the guidelines on CBMs endorsed by the General Assembly at its forty-first session upon the recommendation of the UNDC.

Pakistan noted the importance of addressing the issue of the excessive production and sales of conventional weapons and that of making concerted efforts for a balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. It emphasized the need for such negotiations to be conducted with a particular emphasis on militarily significant States, and underlined that the increased number and growing sophistication of conventional weapons had a direct causal relationship with continuing reliance on nuclear weapons. Egypt also underscored the need to address the overproduction and increasing stockpiles of conventional weapons in the hands of major arms exporters and producers, and called for mutual international accountability to guarantee that the existing imbalance between major arms producers and the rest of the world would not succumb to potential abuses. Referring to initiatives to prevent the accumulation of excessive amounts of weapons, Iraq affirmed the importance of the guidelines adopted by the Commission designed to limit conventional weapons and rid the world of excessive amounts of weapons, while acknowledging the legitimate interest of States in weapons for self-defence.

The Russian Federation stated that it championed a thorough modernization of the conventional arms control regime in Europe that should reflect the balance of interests of all participants. It stressed that an eventual agreement on such a regime should be in line with the current European realities and should prevent the prevailing military dominance of any party, as well as exclude the imposition of limitations on the deployment of weapons and military equipment within a national territory.

Japan noted that enhanced transparency on armaments in all States reduces miscalculation, miscommunication and mistrust among States, thereby building greater confidence, and that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures played an important role in promoting such transparency and confidence among States. While supporting necessary adjustments to the Register, China noted that one of the most pressing tasks was to increase the number of participating countries. The Russian Federation pointed out that the Register remained the only global instrument for transparency, making it possible to monitor and track the destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms, stressing the political significance of such an instrument as a CBM to develop

dialogue among States. Spain noted that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and information on small arms and light weapons were a key component in the fight against the unchecked spread of such weapons that fostered an atmosphere of trust and security, which could be further enhanced by greater transparency in military expenditures. South Africa noted that in 2013 a group of governmental experts (GGE) reviewed the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its possible expansion. Member States invariably expressed deep concern over the performance of the UNDC and called for a stronger political will and greater flexibility to achieve substantive outcomes. They all agreed on the need for the revitalization of the multilateral disarmament machinery, but expressed divergent views on the causes of their paralysis and stagnation. Some attributed the current impasse in the UNDC to the lack of political will, while others pointed to the need to examine the effectiveness of its current working methods.

Pakistan maintained that there was nothing wrong with the rules of procedure, the working methods or the institutions dealing with disarmament and their membership. As regards the extended stagnation at the Conference on Disarmament, the Russian Federation expressed the conviction that, rather than trying to radically reorganize this unique and respected forum or weaken it through efforts to establish alternative discussion formats, the international community should strive to mobilize joint efforts to unblock the work of the Conference with a view to fulfilling the strategic task of strengthening the multilateral disarmament mechanism and making it more efficient. In this regard, it referred to the joint statement by interested States in support of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva delivered at the First Committee on 2 November 2012. Ecuador noted that the future adoption of international security instruments without the required consensus would lead only to greater scepticism and mistrust among the international community.

Other States, however, expressed concern about the consensus rule. Mexico noted that the adoption by vote of the Arms Trade Treaty in the General Assembly confirmed that the undue reliance on consensus always led to logjam and paralysis in multilateral action. It stressed that consensus should never be understood as a rule but should be seen as a goal to which Member States should aspire without relinquishing their sovereign right to a vote. Norway and other States drew attention to the action taken by the General Assembly in 2012 to address the current impasse of multilateral disarmament machinery. Japan noted that the decisions by the General Assembly at its 2012 session to establish an open-ended working group to advance multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, to convene a High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, and to create a GGE on an FMCT were clear examples of making better use of that universal organ to reinvigorate disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Norway also mentioned progress made outside the traditional multilateral disarmament

machinery, referring to the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions[28] and the Mine Ban Convention,[29] as well as a growing recognition of the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, as illustrated at the conference on that subject held in Oslo in March. Expressing its firm commitment to strengthening the multilateral system, Spain noted that the strengthening of the authority of the United Nations and the regime of legally binding treaties must be a priority for all countries.

A number of States also suggested concrete ideas to improve the working methods of the UNDC. Reiterating that the Commission would benefit from introducing more flexible working methods, Norway proposed that it should have a more focused agenda and that the outcome of its meetings could be in the form of a Chair's summary if there were no agreed recommendations. Switzerland proposed that (a) there be only one topic on its annual agenda; (b) the Commission consider the possibility of opening up its deliberations to exchanges with representatives of the Secretariat, academia and civil society; and (c) the Commission submit to the General Assembly a report that reflected exchange of views on substantive issues. Egypt reiterated its earlier proposal to further strengthen the unique character of the Commission, particularly with the aim of enhancing its ability to make use of the vast knowledge base that it had built over the years, including developing a portal with links to all the previous proposals and working papers discussed at earlier sessions and holding events on the margins of Commission meetings.

Report of the Commission (A/68/42)

At its first meeting on 3 April, the Chair of Working Group I circulated a non-paper dated 17 April 2012 that served as a basis for the discussions on item 4 held from 3 to 8 April. Subsequently, the Chair circulated revised versions of the non-paper entitled "Recommendations" dated 8 April 2013 and "General guiding elements" dated 12 April 2013. Following discussions in Working Group I, the Chair decided to circulate, under his own responsibility, two working papers, one entitled "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons"[30] and the other entitled "General guiding elements for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".[31] On 15 April, Member States made various proposals and exchanged views on the first 10 paragraphs of the working paper on "Recommendations". On 16 April, the

[28] The treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cluster_munitions (accessed 1 August 2014).

[29] The full title of the treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/mine_ban (accessed 1 August 2014).

[30] A/CN.10/2013/WG.I/WP.2.

[31] A/CN.10/2013/WG.I/WP.3.

Chair presented the working paper on "General guiding elements" to the delegations, but no discussion on that document took place. At the request of Member States, a compilation of proposals made by them on these working papers was produced. Member States agreed that all working papers[32]—past, present and future—and the compilation of proposals could be considered as a basis for further deliberation. On 17 April, Working Group I considered and adopted, by consensus, its report on agenda item 4, and decided to make available to the Commission, at its 2014 substantive session, the working papers and the compilation of proposals.

At its first meeting on 3 April, Working Group II took up the second revision of the non-paper submitted by the Chair dated 17 April 2012 and decided to use it as a basis for discussion. Following discussions on that paper on 4 and 5 April, the Chair on 8 April circulated a non-paper entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons", and, taking into account the discussions thereof, he subsequently revised his non-paper on 9 and 12 April. After the Working Group considered the latest version of his non-paper on 15 and 16 April, the Chair circulated a third revision of his non-paper on 17 April and announced his intention to have it issued as a working paper under his own responsibility.[33] On the same day, Working Group II considered and adopted, by consensus, its report on agenda item 5.[34]

On 19 April, the Disarmament Commission concluded its work and adopted, by consensus, the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for 2013. The document contains the procedural reports of its subsidiary bodies and the conclusions contained therein. The Commission put forward no recommendations for adoption by the General Assembly.

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[32] In addition to the two working papers by the Chair, the United States submitted a working paper during the 2013 substantive session. See A/CN.10/2013/WG.1/WP.1.

[33] A/CN.10/2013/WG.II/WP.2.

[34] The report of Working Group II stated that the working paper did not represent negotiated positions nor did it command consensus and should not set a precedent. It also noted that all working papers—past, present or future—could be considered as a basis for future deliberations. In addition to the Chair's working paper, Ireland submitted, on behalf of the EU, a working paper during the 2013 session. See A/CN.10/2013/WG.II/WP.1.

Conference on Disarmament, 2013

> *The items on your agenda, which focus mainly on weapons of mass destruction, transcend the narrow national interests of any one State and have significant implications for international peace and security. I urge you to revive substantive negotiations without delay. As I stated last week in Monterey, the sequence of your work is for you to decide. But it is time for you to resume your primary task of negotiating multilateral disarmament treaties.*
>
> **Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**[35]

Compared to recent sessions, in 2013 the work of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was characterized by an increased level of activity by its member States, a sign of their growing awareness of the need to resume substantive negotiations in this forum. The six countries that held the rotating presidency (Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and Ireland) searched for new ways to reach consensus on a programme of work that would address the four core issues on its agenda. Such efforts, even if ultimately unsuccessful, led to three formal proposals on a programme of work: one submitted by Hungary in February,[36] one prepared by the Islamic Republic of Iran in June[37] and one drafted by Iraq in August.[38] While the Hungarian draft programme of work was formally tabled in a CD plenary for adoption, the other two were not submitted for approval but were nevertheless issued as official CD documents. In addition to those, a number of other drafts were developed by the other presidencies of the year, but were not turned into a formal document.

A positive development of the 2013 session was the establishment on 16 August of an informal working group (IWG) with a mandate to produce a programme of work that would be robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation. This reflected a proposal made on 18 June by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament at that time. The terms of the decision establishing the IWG,[39] which was submitted by the President of the Conference, Mohammad Sabir Ismail (Iraq), provided that the President would act as Chair of the IWG and that he would be assisted by Luis Gallegos Chiriboga (Ecuador) as Co-Chair and Peter Woolcott (Australia) as Vice Co-Chair. The IWG met during the CD

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[35] Message to the Conference on Disarmament, delivered by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 22 January 2013. Available from http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/143EC2B4C44EDA40C1257AFB004C6274/$file/1273SG.pdf (accessed 1 August 2014).

[36] CD/1948.

[37] CD/1952.

[38] CD/1955.

[39] CD/1956/Rev.1.

session on 26 August, 2 and 9 September, and during the intersessional period on 12 December. The IWG thus had very little time available for its work in 2013 and was not able to move beyond a very preliminary stage of a search for a programme of work. Its efforts were, however, useful in bringing the discussions on a programme of work out into the open for the benefit of all States members of the CD.

The Co-Chair of the IWG, Luis Gallegos (Ecuador), reported to the 1,300th plenary meeting on 10 September on the progress of the work of the group at the request of the President of the Conference, Gerard Corr (Ireland).[40]

Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear disarmament continued to dominate the agenda[41] of the Conference on Disarmament and was addressed mainly under agenda item 1, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and agenda item 2, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Throughout the session and, in particular during the plenary meeting devoted to nuclear disarmament under the presidency of Sujata Mehta (India) on 5 March, many States called for an early negotiation of a legally binding instrument on nuclear disarmament as an important objective for international security. Nevertheless, while there was broad agreement on this objective, States have continued to express differing views on the approach to its attainment.

The two main approaches that have continued to shape the views of the member States of the Conference on this subject are the step-by-step approach by which partial measures, such as a ban on nuclear testing or on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, create a road map towards a world free of nuclear weapons; and the comprehensive approach that advocates, without preconditions, immediate negotiations on a treaty for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Some States have called for a combination of practical steps within an overarching guiding framework that takes into account the two approaches.

A number of States also reiterated the dual commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation contained in the NPT and welcomed the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which took place in April in Geneva, as an opportunity to follow up on the implementation of the action plan adopted in 2010.[42] The importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones was reiterated and many States expressed regret and disappointment over the postponement of the conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD.

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[40] See CD/PV.1300.
[41] See decision CD/1946.
[42] NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), pp. 20-29.

During the plenary meeting devoted to nuclear disarmament mentioned above, some speakers highlighted the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons to global security. They also stressed that, in light of their indiscriminate and uncontainable effects, the use of nuclear weapons would run counter to international humanitarian law.

A number of States, mostly from the Group of 21 (G-21), reaffirmed the importance of multilateralism as the basic principle of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The need for the Conference to begin negotiations, in parallel, on a series of treaties prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, prohibiting an arms race in outer space and providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was also reaffirmed. Arguing for the step-by-step approach, many States indicated their support for the beginning of negotiations on a non-discriminatory multilateral treaty effectively and verifiably forbidding the production of fissile material. They added that the negotiation of a treaty on fissile material would be a positive but insufficient measure if further steps towards nuclear disarmament were not taken. Other States linked this point to what they described as an urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Many States also said that the conference on the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation, which took place in March in Oslo, had an important symbolic weight that might strengthen efforts towards the delegitimization of nuclear weapons. They commended Mexico for its offer to host a follow-on meeting on the subject in 2014.

Some States expressed the view that the objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons should be pursued and that nuclear-weapon States should fulfil, in good faith, their obligation to nuclear disarmament and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of such weapons. In addition, countries with the largest arsenals were called upon to continue to make drastic reductions of their arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner. It was argued that the principles of maintaining global strategic balance and stability, and undiminished security for all, should be upheld.

Efforts in reducing national nuclear stockpiles as described by the nuclear-weapon States, the multilateral measures that they have undertaken among themselves, and the bilateral efforts such as those undertaken by the United States and the Russian Federation under the New START[43] were all perceived as positive but insufficient progress.

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[43] United States Department of State, "New START: Treaty Text", http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm (accessed 1 August 2014).

To conclude, the debates of States during the 2013 session of the Conference on Disarmament reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament continued to be the highest priority in disarmament and non-proliferation and that there was an expectation for the Conference to play a leading role in this area as the single standing multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community.

Fissile materials

> *The Conference on Disarmament should take up the fissile material cut-off treaty as a top priority.*
>
> **Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**[44]

During the 2013 session of the Conference on Disarmament, a major priority for many of its member States continued to be the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

Throughout the session, several delegations expressed support for an early adoption of a programme of work that would include negotiations on banning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. On 12 March, the Conference devoted a plenary meeting to this topic under the presidency of India. The meeting provided an additional opportunity for the member States of the Conference to reiterate their support for the negotiation of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and legally binding instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

While some delegations have referred to a ban on the production of fissile material as the next logical step in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and as an important complement to the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the positions of a number of member States of the Conference have consistently highlighted key disagreements concerning the scope of such a treaty, in particular the question of including existing stockpiles, and have underlined other issues requiring close examination, such as definitions and verification. Some member States have expressed the view that a simple prohibition of future production of fissile material would create an asymmetric advantage and could lead to a diversion of existing stocks or special dispensations for nuclear production.

Others pointed out that a treaty on fissile materials should be seen as part of a comprehensive framework for the total elimination of nuclear

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[44] Statement to the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, New York, 26 September 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7140 (accessed 1 August 2014).

weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Several speakers stressed the importance of taking concrete practical steps for the promotion of nuclear disarmament and emphasized the solid technical and conceptual groundwork that had been laid out during a series of discussions on a possible fissile material cut-off treaty.

While emphasizing the continued important role of the Conference on Disarmament, many States welcomed the establishment by the General Assembly of a group of governmental experts (GGE) on this issue[45] and hoped that the recommendations of the Group, which would be submitted to the General Assembly at its seventieth session, would contribute to facilitating an early start of negotiations on a ban on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Negative security assurances

Throughout the 2013 session of the CD, a number of delegations made statements underlining the importance of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as contained in agenda item 4[46] of the 2013 CD session. Furthermore, in accordance with the proposal made by Sujata Mehta (India) and Triyono Wibowo (Indonesia) during their presidencies, the CD devoted a plenary meeting on this agenda item on 26 March.[47]

During the discussion, many States recognized the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States to receive unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. States, however, remained divided between those stressing that unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States and/or ratification/accession to the protocol(s) to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties were sufficient measures, and those in favour of a universal legally binding agreement to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The latter States called for such an agreement to be negotiated in the CD and suggested the creation of a subsidiary body for that purpose.

In particular, the G-21 States reaffirmed the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to not be attacked or threatened by the nuclear-weapon States with the use of nuclear weapons and called upon them to refrain from any such action or threat, whether implicit or explicit. Pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Group reaffirmed the urgent need to reach an early agreement on a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.[48]

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[45] See General Assembly resolution 67/53 of 3 December 2012.
[46] See decision CD/1946.
[47] CD/PV.1284.
[48] See CD/PV.1284.

A number of States stressed that positive and negative security assurances strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime and could ultimately lead to their abolition. Many called upon the nuclear-weapon States to formally reaffirm the existing security assurances as reflected in United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. With reference to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD, many States regretted the postponement of the Conference on the establishment of such a zone, which, in accordance with the decision of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, had been scheduled to take place in 2012. Broad support was expressed with regard to the ongoing preparations for the Conference and the efforts of the facilitator, Jaakko Laajava (Finland).

Other member States added that negative security assurances would be important to strengthen the non-proliferation regime of the NPT. They recalled that the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference provided that the CD should begin substantive discussions on negative security assurances. A number of delegations referred to General Assembly resolutions[49] that, every year since 1990, called upon the CD to launch negotiations on a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances. Furthermore, some States, recalling their policy of non-first use against nuclear-weapon States and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States, expressed their readiness to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.[50]

Outer space security

In accordance with the proposal made by Sujata Mehta and Triyono Wibowo during their presidencies, the Conference on Disarmament discussed the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" on 19 March.[51] Many delegations also addressed this topic in their statements during other plenary meetings throughout the 2013 session.

All States recognized that outer space and other celestial bodies were the common heritage of humankind and should be used in a spirit of cooperation, on a mutually agreed basis. However, States remained divided between those supporting the commencement of negotiations on a legally binding treaty banning the placement of any kind of weapon in outer space and those stressing that transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) and voluntary measures would be enough to encourage responsible actions in and the peaceful use of outer space.

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[49] General Assembly resolution 68/28 of 5 December 2013.

[50] India also recalled its working paper on nuclear disarmament contained in document CD/1816 of 20 February 2007, in which it had suggested specific measures including a global no-first-use agreement.

[51] See CD/PV.1283.

The draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects (PPWT), presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament on 12 February 2008 on behalf of the Russian Federation and China, was seen by several States as a good starting point for further discussions and eventual negotiations on this issue. The States favouring the development of TCBMs in outer space activities usually referred to the draft EU code of conduct for outer space activities and to the work of the GGE on TCBMs, which concluded its work in 2013 under the chairmanship of Victor Vasiliev (Russian Federation). The Chair attended the CD plenary meeting, briefing the CD on main directions undertaken by the Group in developing TCBMs. (See chapter V for more details on the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.)

Stressing their willingness to promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, member States of the EU said to be particularly sensitive to the issue of the safety of space systems and urged all States to take the necessary measures and actions aiming at mitigating the creation of space debris. Clearly stressing to be especially committed to the development and implementation of TCBMs as a means to achieve enhanced safety and security in outer space, the EU recalled that all its member States had supported General Assembly resolution 65/68 of 8 December 2010 and the creation of the GGE on CBMs in outer space activities, as a means conducive to achieving enhanced space security. The EU then presented the draft code of conduct on outer space activities, which was also supported by a large number of countries outside Europe. Such a code would be a voluntary measure applicable to all outer space activities conducted by States or non-governmental entities and would be applicable to both civil and military space activities. The EU stressed that the draft code did not include any provisions concerning the placement of weapons in outer space, but rather insisted on the importance of taking all measures necessary to prevent space from becoming an area of conflict and called on nations to resolve any conflict in outer space by peaceful means.

The United States recalled that, in accordance with President Barack Obama's 2010 National Space Policy,[52] it was pursuing bilateral and multilateral TCBMs to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space. At the same time, the United States recalled that, in January 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the decision of the United States to work with the EU and other space-faring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, as an effective,

[52] The White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America, 28 June 2010. Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf (accessed 1 August 2014).

pragmatic and timely way of strengthening the long-term sustainability, stability, safety and security of the space environment. The United States added that it believed that the latest draft of the EU was a useful foundation and constructive starting point for developing a consensus on an International Code.

The G-21, stressing that all States with major space capabilities had a special responsibility to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, stated that all States should refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation. It emphasized the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective verification provisions to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The G-21 expressed its concern at the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space, which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. With specific reference to the existing legal instruments, the G-21 highlighted the existence of legitimate concerns as to their inadequacy to deter the militarization of outer space, or prevent its weaponization and stressed the need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness. According to the G-21, the CD, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, should start negotiations on matters related to the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". At the same time, the G-21 welcomed the joint Russian Federation–Chinese PPWT initiative, as a constructive contribution to the work of the Conference and a good basis for further discussion towards adopting an international binding instrument.[53]

On 31 July, Indonesia and the Russian Federation transmitted the text of the joint statement[54] by their ministers of foreign affairs, declaring that the two countries would not, in any way, be the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space and that they would make all possible efforts to prevent outer space from becoming an arena for military confrontation and to ensure security in outer space activities.

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research annual space security conference was convened on 2 and 3 April, with the theme of "Enhancing Confidence, Ensuring Space Stability".[55]

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[53] See also CD/1961.

[54] CD/1954.

[55] Further information is available from http://www.unidir.ch/ (accessed on 7 August 2014).

Agenda items 5 to 7

As in previous years, agenda items 5 to 7 on "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons", "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", and "Transparency in armaments" gave rise to discussions at plenary meetings throughout the session. In addition, Triyono Wibowo, third President of the 2013 session, devoted two plenary meetings to these topics on 14 and 24 May.

These three agenda items were normally not considered core items. The statements made by delegations throughout the 2013 session reflected those of past years.

Revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament

> *It is essential to end this continued stalemate to avoid jeopardizing the credibility of the Conference and the machinery of disarmament.*
>
> **Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General**[56]

In 2013, the long stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament was, once again, the source of serious concern, leading to calls for revitalizing its work. Throughout the session, a large number of member States raised the issue in their plenary statements. In addition to being a recurring topic in the consultations conducted by the six presidents of the session, a plenary meeting was fully devoted to this subject on 11 June during the presidency of Iraq.

Views on the subject of revitalization have, however, continued to diverge. Some member States said that its rules of procedure, including the consensus rule, had not prevented the Conference from negotiating multilateral disarmament instruments in the past and that they should not be an impediment then. These States emphasized that it was, rather, the lack of political will inside and outside the Conference, and the interest of nuclear-weapon States in preserving the status quo, that had prevented progress. Other members, however, pointed out that the growing number of disarmament initiatives pursued outside of the Conference suggested that the decades-old rules were out of touch with contemporary reality.

In addition, many member States continued to call for the review and expansion of the membership of the Conference, as well as for greater interaction between the Conference and civil society in any revitalization process. There were also continued calls for the convening of a fourth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in order to fully address the main challenges facing the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery at large.

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[56] Message to the 2013 session of the CD, Geneva, 22 January 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=6562 (accessed 7 August 2014).

Many States argued that, after a 17-year-long deadlock, the Conference was in a critical stage and the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group to make recommendations on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which concluded its work in 2013, was a direct result. They emphasized that a revitalized Conference on Disarmament would still be highly desirable and would provide a suitable framework for making tangible progress in the field of disarmament.

Amidst increasing demands for greater progress on disarmament and parallel tracks, some States expressed the view that the main challenges facing the Conference were not procedural but substantive. In this regard, efforts towards the revitalization of the Conference should focus on generating momentum and political will. This view was reinforced by the argument that the situation in the Conference reflected the prevalent political realities, since no treaties could be negotiated in the Conference against the interest of States. The failure of the Conference could not be attributed to the same rules of procedure that had enabled the adoption of many instruments in the past.

During the plenary meeting devoted to the issue of revitalization on 11 June, the Czech Republic, speaking on behalf of the Informal Group of Observer States, argued that the revitalization of the Conference constituted a multidimensional process, which required strong political will, compromise and unceasing effort. The expansion of its membership was therefore an urgent aspect of this process. The Group argued that, since 1999, when the last enlargement took place, no further action had been taken on membership. It also expressed regret that not even a single informal or formal debate had been devoted to the topic of enlargement since 2002, when the last Special Coordinator was appointed. Nevertheless, as a response, some States expressed the view that the priority of the Conference was not the expansion of its membership but rather the revitalization of its work in a manner that would enable an early commencement of negotiations on core agenda items.

The revitalization debate was deepened during the presidency of Indonesia by a luncheon seminar organized on 15 May, entitled "Exploring Avenues to Address the Stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament", by the Indonesian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. The seminar brought together both member States of the Conference and civil society organizations. It enabled an intensive debate on all aspects of the revitalization, including the participation of civil society in the work of the Conference. The report of the seminar was published as CD document CD/1951.

In yet another attempt to overcome the protracted deadlock, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, presented on 18 June during the presidency of Iraq the following three proposals: (a) the establishment of an informal working group to produce a programme of work

robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation; (b) the establishment of a subsidiary body to examine the methods of work of the Conference; and (c) the designation of a Special Coordinator to review the expansion of the membership of the Conference, including the role that civil society may play in its work. In response to the first proposal, on 13 August, one month before the end of its 2013 session, the Conference adopted decision CD/1956/Rev.1, establishing the Informal Working Group to produce a programme of work.

While the Conference on Disarmament again failed to fulfil its mandate and commence substantive negotiations in 2013, there was no doubt that it had been more active and dynamic in comparison to recent years. This is evident in the efforts it made in producing three formal draft programmes of work and in maintaining a collegial atmosphere in search for a way out of the long impasse that has characterized its work. Towards the close of the session and during the intersessional period before the end of the year, member States of the Conference invested efforts in the Informal Working Group mentioned above. However, the limited time for the Group to carry out its work did not allow for a successful outcome in 2013.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its fifty-ninth session in New York from 27 February to 1 March and its sixtieth session in Geneva from 26 to 28 June (for a list of members of the Board, see annex I to this chapter). The Board focused its deliberations on the following substantive items on its agenda: (a) the relations between the nuclear-weapon-free zones in advancing regional and global security; and (b) disarmament and security implications of emerging technologies.

In July, the Secretary-General submitted a report[57] to the General Assembly summarizing the Advisory Board's deliberations and recommendations.

On the first agenda item, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General continue to emphasize the important role of the nuclear-weapon-free zones for regional and international peace and security, disarmament and non-proliferation, and that he take the lead in promoting and further strengthening the existing zones.

The Board also recommended that the Secretary-General encourage all nuclear-weapon States to extend formal endorsement to all zones, as appropriate, and promote closer interaction and cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the possible creation of a platform or forum that would allow representatives of the existing nuclear-weapon-free

[57] A/68/206.

zones to exchange experiences on the lessons learned from the zones, their benefits and limitations.

In addition, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General explore the challenges and all relevant aspects to the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones and encourage further participation of think tanks and civil society in the efforts aimed at exploring new avenues and searching for common ground in order to overcome current deadlocks.

With regard to the Middle East, it was recommended that the Secretary-General strongly support all efforts aimed at the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD in that region; take the lead in organizing a preparatory meeting for the conference on establishing such a zone; and encourage all steps to promote confidence-building and constructive dialogue among the States of the region to break the current impasse.

Finally, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General also consider appropriate action for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in North-East Asia, including by promoting a more active role for the regional forums in encouraging transparency and confidence-building among the countries of the region.

On the agenda item entitled "Disarmament and security implications of emerging technologies", the Board recommended that the Secretary-General take that issue in hand, emphasize the possible inherent dangers of weapon systems whose course of action was determined by machine algorithms, and encourage efforts aimed at promoting increased transparency in this field, but should also note the value of emerging technologies in the service of peace and security.

Emphasizing the importance of the respect for international humanitarian law, human rights and disarmament, the Board also recommended the commissioning of a comprehensive study that would constitute an in-depth analysis on the emerging technological trends and the legal, ethical and other aspects of and limits to the development, proliferation and use of the increasingly autonomous weapons technology.

In this regard, the Board recommended that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and other research institutions and think tanks be part of such an effort. On the basis of this study, it was recommended that the Secretary-General promote coordinated efforts in an existing forum, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or through the establishment within the United Nations framework of a structured intergovernmental dialogue and formalized exchange on the emerging technologies to address the possible need for disarmament measures in respect of potential future fully autonomous systems.

Annex I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

Desmond Bowen (Chair), Former Director of Policy, Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, London

Mely Caballero Anthony, Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Wael al-Assad, Ambassador, Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament and Regional Security and Director of Multilateral Relations, League of Arab States, Cairo

Choi Sung-joo, Ambassador for International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul

Rut Diamint, Professor of International Relations, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires

Trevor Findlay, Professor, William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa

Anita Friedt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear and Strategic Policy, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C.

István Gyarmati, President, Centre for Democracy Public Foundation, Head of the International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest

Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor, School of Science and Engineering at Lahore University of Management Sciences and Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad

Togzhan Kassenova, Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

Eboe Hutchful, Professor, Africana Studies, Wayne State University, Detroit

François Rivasseau, Deputy Head of Delegation, Delegation of the European Union to the United States, Washington, D.C.

Fred Tanner, Ambassador, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva

Wu Haitao, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland, Geneva

Vladmir I. Yermakov, Deputy Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow

Theresa Hitchens (ex officio member), Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva

Chapter VII
Information and outreach

Cesar Lopez, a musician from Colombia who transforms rifles into guitars called "escopetarra", performing during the ceremony of the Future Policy Awards that focused on disarmament, held at United Nations Headquarters in October 2013. Credit: Rick Bajornas/World Future Council

Chapter VII

Information and outreach

I will continue to use my moral authority and convening power to advocate for disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. That is why I was the first Secretary-General to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where I met with the survivors—the hibakusha. It is why I visited the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan. I have also been to Chernobyl and Fukushima, and convened high-level meetings at the United Nations on Nuclear Safety and Security and on Countering Nuclear Terrorism. In all I do, I rely on partners to help me spread the word.

Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General[1]

Developments and trends, 2013

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) continued to build upon its information and outreach activities, in particular by communicating and interacting with a global audience through the expansion of the Office's website. The Office also partnered with permanent missions to the United Nations, the Department of Public Information and non-governmental organizations in events, activities and publications to enhance outreach efforts and use multiple media outlets to promote the disarmament agenda of the United Nations.

UNODA published print and electronic versions of the two-part *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* and made it available on its website (www.un.org/disarmament). The disarmament website featured new content and was increasingly used by Member States, conference participants, non-governmental organizations and the general public to access daily updates of documents and statements, including video messages.

The web analytics of UNODA online media (website, Twitter account) showed increased traffic and time spent by visitors. Additionally, dedicated websites were designed for major disarmament-related conferences, including the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

[1] "Advancing the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agenda: Seeking Peace in an Over-armed World", remarks at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, 18 January 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6557 (accessed 6 August 2014).

Weapons (NPT) and the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The Office facilitated the participation of civil society organizations in disarmament-related meetings and conferences and collaborated closely with coalitions of non-governmental organizations that spearhead such participation.

The main vehicle for information and outreach is the Disarmament Information Programme,[2] which is administered by UNODA in close collaboration with the Department of Public Information.

The objectives of the Disarmament Information Programme reflect the overall orientation of UNODA, guided by the priorities of Member States as articulated in the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and with a particular focus on information campaigns for major disarmament-related forums, events and conferences. Funding for the Programme comes from the regular budget and from extrabudgetary resources through the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme.

The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, continued her advocacy of disarmament and non-proliferation issues with Member States and civil society and broadened her interaction with the media, think tanks, academia and civil society organizations, all of which played a vital role in building and encouraging public opinion in respect of disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

In the area of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament was held in New York on 26 September; the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference[3] was held in Geneva from 22 April to 3 May; and the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty[4] was convened in New York on 27 September, pursuant to article XIV of the Treaty. These events generated an increased interest for information by the diplomatic community, other international and civil society organizations, the media and the general public.

Additionally, throughout 2013, considerable work was undertaken to provide information to delegations, the media and the general public in connection with the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

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[2] See A/67/202.

[3] The Treaty text and its adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (accessed 24 July 2014).

[4] The Treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt (accessed 24 July 2014).

In the field of conventional weapons, the sessions of the Final United Nations Conference on the ATT[5] in New York from 8 to 28 March and the adoption of the Treaty on 2 April necessitated the mobilization of resources to meet the increased demand for information from various sectors.

In relevant resolutions adopted at its sixty-eighth session, the General Assembly reaffirmed the usefulness of the Office's three regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean in carrying out dissemination and educational programmes. Three separate reports to the General Assembly on the regional centres[6] provided detailed information on the activities of each centre.

The United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme continued to be the Office's largest annual training programme. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research organized a number of information and education activities.[7]

Disarmament and non-proliferation education

In paragraph 2 of resolution 67/47 of 3 December 2012, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The report, which is to be submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, should also contain a review of possible new opportunities for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education.

In this connection, some 1,500 students in 28 events received briefings on disarmament matters in 2013. Such briefings are usually given to college or graduate school students, but also include presentations to younger students. These events occurred at all locations where UNODA has offices, namely, New York, Geneva, Vienna, Lomé, Lima and Kathmandu.

Disarmament education website—resources for learning

A number of new content elements were added to the disarmament education website[8] in 2013. These included presentations on military

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[5] The Treaty text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att (accessed 24 July 2014).

[6] Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (A/68/134), the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (A/68/112), and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (A/68/114) were submitted to the Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.

[7] A/68/182.

[8] Available from www.un.org/disarmament/education (accessed 6 August 2014).

spending, small arms, the ATT and the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Conventional Arms Regulation.

In order to promote information-sharing, several new publications on disarmament topics produced by civil society organizations were added to the education website.

Specialized courses, such as the "Cyber threats and technology policy course" of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and interactive online tutorials developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative on nuclear non-proliferation and the NPT, were linked to the UNODA website as well. The film entitled "Before the Blast", a documentary about Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,[9] was also added to the films page.

The history of disarmament as written by Nobel Peace Laureates[10] was made available under the section "Peace and Disarmament Resources for Teachers and Students".

Training activities

UNODA offered opportunities for young professionals to receive disarmament experience under the United Nations Associate Expert Programme. In New York and Geneva, UNODA trained more than 30 graduate students through the United Nations 2013 internship programme.

UNODA, in collaboration with Hibakusha Stories, a New York–based non-governmental organization that brings atomic bomb survivors to New York City high schools to tell their stories, organized biannual briefings by hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors) for United Nations tour guides, staff and permanent mission interns.

On 5 November, UNODA co-sponsored a workshop, organized by Hibakusha Stories at the United Nations, on nuclear disarmament for 60 teachers from New York City public schools as part of their continuing education activities.

Disarmament Information Programme

Print and e-publications

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, which remains the flagship publication of UNODA, was distributed to all permanent missions and was

[9] The full title of the treaty is Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Its text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc (accessed 24 July 2014).

[10] Available from https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/special/nobelplgraphic.pdf (accessed 6 August 2014).

also produced in electronic format, which is accessible from the Office's website.

Three UNODA Occasional Papers were produced in 2013: *The Impact of Poorly Regulated Arms Transfers on the Work of the United Nations* (No. 23, March), *Contrasting Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Understanding the Current Debates* (No. 24, December), and *The Gun-Free Zone—A Tool to Prevent and Reduce Armed Violence* (No. 25, December).

In June, a new publication entitled *Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions* was published and widely disseminated. The report illustrated how the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs was able to achieve concrete results through partnerships with donors and how essential such support is in attaining important disarmament goals.

In December, UNODA released a publication under the Civil Society and Disarmament series entitled *NGO Presentations to the Open-ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations*. The publication contains the statements by representatives of NGOs that were delivered during the informal thematic discussions of the Open-ended Working Group in Geneva from 14 to 23 May.

As part of the "Blue Book" Study Series, a new report entitled *Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities* was published in December. This publication contains the study conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, as well as relevant General Assembly resolutions, views of Member States and expert papers.

The Office continued to produce the *UNODA Update* that highlights recent events and activities of UNODA and other disarmament forums while providing links to fuller material.

The *Basic Guide to Disarmament*, a 2012 publication that was released in English, was translated into the five other official languages of the United Nations and was electronically published in 2013.

A new feature on the UNODA website that began in 2013 is a series of fact sheets on various topics for which the Office is responsible. As at the end of 2013, there were 34 of these concise articles, which are to be updated on a quarterly basis.

See also annex I to this chapter for the reference information of the above-mentioned UNODA publications, including those of the UNODA regional centres.

Websites

UNODA maintained and improved the substantive content and technical delivery of its website in order to reach a broader audience that includes

both the general public and specialists in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The number of visitors to the UNODA website grew as evidenced by data analytics on traffic and time spent by visitors. Compared with the previous year, the number of visits to the site increased, averaging 64,000 visits per month. Page views increased to 90,000 per month in 2013. The greatest website traffic occurred at the time of the publication of the interim report into allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, when page views reached 30,000 in one single day.

During 2013, three new stand-alone websites were created for the United Nations Saf*er*Guard project (a tool kit supporting the implementation of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines); the ATT; and for the third Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) expanded its online legal reference tools with the creation of a virtual library. The online library contains various national legislations from Latin American and Caribbean States related to small arms and light weapons, as well as UNLIREC legal products, such as comparative legal studies and legal dicta. In addition, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific launched a new website in October.

Events

In 2013, there was significant media and civil society attention to a number of events requiring information and outreach support in New York. These included the Final United Nations Conference on the ATT from 18 to 28 March, the adoption of the ATT by the General Assembly on 2 April, the ATT signing ceremony on 3 June, the observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 5 September, the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament on 26 September, and the eighth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 27 September.

As part of its outreach efforts, UNODA has also continued to organize and host a number of advocacy and learning events. Some examples follow:

The scholar and author, Ward Wilson, came to the United Nations on 20 February to launch his new book, *5 Myths about Nuclear Weapons*,[11] pointing out that nuclear weapons were costly and dangerous and served practically no purpose as weapons. Before an audience of diplomats, United

[11] Ward Wilson, *5 Myths about Nuclear Weapons* (New York, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013).

Nations staff, scholars and representatives of NGOs, he provided arguments debunking nuclear weapons as having a useful military purpose.

The Office, in cooperation with the Global Action to Prevent War, launched on 9 April the UNODA publication *Applying a Disarmament Lens to Gender, Human Rights, Development, Security, Education and Communication: Six Essays*[12] with a panel discussion at the United Nations.

UNODA and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute–North America, with the sponsorship of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, organized a lunch-time panel discussion entitled "Military Expenditures: Trends and Challenges" on 15 April. The panel discussion explored how regional political developments are reflected in countries' military spending and budget priorities, and the implications of these trends.

On 8 May, two hibakusha from Hiroshima, Lee Jong-keun and Reiko Yamada, met with United Nations tour guides and interns in New York to share their testimonies on their experiences in Japan in August 1945. The meeting provided an opportunity for the participants to hear first-hand accounts from hibakusha who experienced the horrors of the use of nuclear weapons. This initiative was part of the Secretary-General's commitment to help preserve and disseminate the testimonies of the atomic bomb survivors to ensure that their stories are available for generations to come.

In association with the World Future Council and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, UNODA organized an event on 23 October to announce the winners of the Future Policy Award 2013 to showcase disarmament policies that contributed most effectively to the achievement of peace, sustainable development and security. A gala event with speakers, presentations and musical performances was held at United Nations Headquarters to honour the winners: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (1967),[13] the Argentine National Programme for the Voluntary Surrender of Firearms (2006) and the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act (1987). More information on these and many other events held in 2013 is available from the UNODA website.[14]

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[12] *Applying a Disarmament Lens to Gender, Human Rights, Development, Security, Education and Communication: Six Essays*, Civil Society and Disarmament 2012 (United Nations publication, eISBN 978-92-1-055949-2). Available from www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/CivilSocietyAndDisarmament/2012/NGO_pub_2012.pdf (accessed 6 August 2014).

[13] The treaty text and status of adherence are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tlatelolco (accessed 24 July 2014).

[14] See *UNODA Update*. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/ODAUpdate/ (accessed 6 August 2014).

Briefings

Staff members of UNODA undertook briefing engagements, which focused on education and training activities involving some 1,500 participants. The participants included the following: (a) student visitors within the framework of university programmes on the United Nations; (b) United Nations Association members from various countries; (c) foreign ministry trainees; (d) students preparing for the model United Nations exercises; (e) high school teachers for continuing education; and (f) visiting NGO members. Staff members also participated in numerous panels and events on arms control, disarmament and security issues organized by research- or university-related institutes or think tanks.

Media

Throughout 2013, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and her staff participated in interviews with television, radio and print outlets. Media interest in disarmament was particularly focused on the Secretary-General's investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and the decision by the Syrian Government to join the Chemical Weapons Convention,[15] followed by the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission).

Education

On 6 November, Hibakusha Stories, in collaboration with UNODA and Peace Boat, organized at the United Nations Headquarters a workshop on nuclear disarmament for teachers from New York City public schools. The educators participated in the workshop as part of their continuing education activities on Staff Development Day. Teachers specializing in social studies, global studies, government and history from a number of New York City high schools participated. The workshop included a substantive session that explored the subjects of nuclear disarmament and the role of the United Nations, the dawn of the nuclear age and the Manhattan Project, and the human dimensions of the Second World War and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Other information activities

For a list of events held on the margins of the 2013 meetings of the First Committee, see annex III to this chapter.

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[15] The full title of this treaty is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Its text and adherence status is available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/cwc (accessed 24 July 2014).

Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace on disarmament

The Secretary-General's Messenger of Peace on disarmament, Michael Douglas, continued to support the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. He was recognized for his efforts and received the 2013 Global Citizen of the Year Award by the United Nations Correspondents Association at a gala dinner in New York on 18 December.

Department of Public Information

The Department of Public Information (DPI) continued to make sustained and comprehensive efforts to help raise public awareness and understanding of the objectives and the work of the United Nations in the area of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and related fields, including by promoting and covering the Organization's conferences, meetings, events and observances.

Internet, press coverage, television and radio

During 2013, DPI continued to focus on disarmament as one of its priority issues in its multilingual radio, television, print, online and photo outlets. The Final United Nations Conference on the ATT was widely covered by the entire team of the United Nations Television and Video (UNTV), the United Nations Web TV, the United Nations Radio and the United Nations News Centre. In the lead-up to the conference, an op-ed[16] by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs was placed in the *Huffington Post*.

The High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament in September and the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission were also widely covered by UNTV, the United Nations Web TV, the United Nations Radio and the United Nations News Centre.

The Department's Web Services Section created a web page for the high-level plenary meeting on nuclear disarmament[17] and continued to maintain, in partnership with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee), the website of the 1540 Committee. Both websites were made available in the six official languages of the United Nations. During the reporting period, a total of about 2,100 website updates were implemented across the multilingual websites.

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[16] Angela Kane, "The Myth of the UN Gun Grab", *The World Post* (A partnership of the Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute on Governance), 19 March 2013. Available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/angela-kane/the-myth-of-the-un-gun-gr_1_b_2909469.html (accessed 6 August 2014).

[17] Available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/nucleardisarmament/ (accessed 6 August 2014).

United Nations Radio carried out interviews with disarmament officials across the full spectrum of disarmament-related issues and ran stories on the First Committee session, the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Disarmament Commission meetings, the annual observances of the International Day against Nuclear Tests and the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action.

During the year, the United Nations News Centre posted more than 350 stories on disarmament-related issues and carried out an interview with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs to be featured online in the Newsmakers interview series of the Centre. Several interviews were conducted in connection with the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission, including with the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission.

UNTV produced or co-produced a number of related pieces, such as a public service announcement on small arms for UNODA, a television feature on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and a television feature on "Robinson Crusoe Island" in Chile on reconstructing a nuclear testing monitoring station destroyed after a tsunami.

More than 80 news stories on disarmament and non-proliferation, ranging from updates on the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran to a feature from South Sudan on small arms tracking, were prepared and distributed to global broadcasters through UNifeed. United Nations Web TV provided live coverage of the high-level meetings and uploaded 110 videos that were then embedded in stories of the United Nations News Centre and the United Nations Radio.

United Nations Photo covered the full range of meetings and events at Headquarters, with more than 321 photos on United Nations activities on disarmament and non-proliferation accessioned, captioned and posted on the website of the United Nations. In addition, the DPI Multimedia Resources Unit continued to maintain an ongoing spotlight gallery, "Disarmament and the UN", highlighting selected photos from its collection. Furthermore, some 106 audio records of material related to disarmament and non-proliferation have been processed from Headquarters and the field, in a number of languages. In terms of research, the unit carried out at least two major requests related to disarmament, one on weapons of mass destruction and the other on victims of terrorism, as well as smaller research requests related to disarmament for internal and external projects.

The Department also provided close coverage of open intergovernmental meetings, press conferences and major statements through its Meetings Coverage Section. The section issued more than 290 press releases relating to disarmament in English and French, including more than 120 detailed, real-time summaries of intergovernmental meetings and some 91 relevant statements by the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General.

With the use of social media platforms, the Department's information and news products related to disarmament were disseminated in the six official languages and a number of local languages, including through Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, YouTube and Weibo.

Elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

The Department was actively engaged in conceptualizing and planning media activities for the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission set up by the Security Council in September 2013 to oversee the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Working closely with OPCW and the Joint Mission, the Department developed and managed a dedicated website[18] focusing on the activities of the Mission and the implementation of its mandate. In addition, DPI provided logistics and media support to the Special Coordinator of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Mission during her visits to United Nations Headquarters.

United Nations information centres, services and offices

The Department's network of 63 United Nations information centres, services and offices continued to carry out disarmament public information activities through media outreach, including placement of op-ed pieces on disarmament and arms control. They also produced and disseminated information materials in local languages and organized seminars, lectures, conferences and exhibitions. Below are some selected illustrations of the work done by DPI offices worldwide.

International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action

To commemorate the 2013 International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, the United Nations Office in Baku, jointly with envoys of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action and the International Eurasia Press Fund, briefed schoolchildren and teachers in a village school in Tartar district—one of the deadliest areas in the country for mine victims—and organized a tree-planting event in the Barda region. Some 200 students and civil society representatives were in attendance. The Secretary-General's message for the International Day was translated into Azerbaijani and widely disseminated.

International Day against Nuclear Tests

On the occasion of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, the Director of United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) Moscow delivered a statement at a round-table event, organized jointly with the Embassy of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation and the Moscow-based *Argumenty*

[18] Available from http://opcw.unmissions.org/ (accessed 6 August 2014).

i Fakty newspaper. In attendance were deputies of the State Duma, experts from the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, as well as journalists. UNIC Windhoek organized a mini-Model United Nations with 30 students discussing the issue of nuclear testing. Several information centres translated the Secretary-General's message on the International Day into local languages, including Armenian, Bahasa Indonesia, Persian and Polish, disseminated it to the media and posted it on their websites. (See also the section entitled "Fourth International Day against Nuclear Tests" on page 254.)

Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare

On the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare (29 April), the Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support and the Tehran Peace Museum, in cooperation with UNIC Tehran, organized a ceremony at the museum in 2013. The programme ended with the planting of an olive tree at Park-e Shahr in commemoration of the Day of Remembrance.

Disarmament fellowships, training and advisory services

Through the Disarmament Fellowship Programme, UNODA has trained nearly 900 public officials from 163 Member States. A large number of them hold important positions of responsibility in the disarmament field within their governments. The Programme has enabled former Fellows to participate more effectively in regional and global disarmament efforts, and, by creating an informal network spanning the various regions of the world, to work cooperatively and constructively in pursuit of disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

In 2013, young diplomats and other public officials from the following 25 Member States participated in the Disarmament Fellowship Programme: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, the United States and Uruguay.

The Programme's initial segment started in Geneva on 26 August and was aimed particularly at exposing the Fellows to issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. It also included a one-day study visit to Bern, organized by Switzerland's Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. During the second segment of the Programme, the Fellows participated in study visits to several international organizations related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. These included the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, as well as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. The Fellows also visited the

secretariat of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Vienna. At the invitation of the Governments of China, Germany, Japan and Kazakhstan, the Fellows also participated in country-specific study visits to those countries.

The third segment of the Programme took place at the United Nations Headquarters in New York during the month of October, where the Fellows followed the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and also became familiar with the substantive and technical activities undertaken by UNODA in support of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. After completing the nine-week Programme at Headquarters on 24 October, the 2013 Fellows were awarded certificates of participation by Angela Kane, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

Participants of the 2013 Fellowship Programme also engaged in several simulated negotiation exercises on some of the topical issues in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation. In helping to develop a better understanding of the concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and security, the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme has endeavoured to make a concrete contribution to the process of deliberations and negotiations on disarmament.

Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

In 2013, the Vienna Office cooperated with Vienna-based organizations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Working as a catalyst and facilitator, the Office focused on fostering partnerships to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education and outreach to Member States, civil society and academia. It also promoted the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) dealing with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors and the development of a comprehensive chemical, biological and nuclear security culture.

The Vienna Office participated in meetings, workshops, seminars and projects of relevant stakeholders. In cooperation with the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria and a steering committee of civil society representatives,[19] it organized the "Forum on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and Civil Society: Opportunities for Engagement", held in Vienna from 8 to10 January.

[19] Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria, Henry L. Stimson Center, Institute for Security Studies, National University of Malaysia, Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Stanley Foundation, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre and Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

Forty-five civil society organizations and seven international and regional organizations participated in the Forum. Participants reflected a broad geographical diversity, coming from the Americas, Asia, Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East and North and Southern Africa. In addition, representatives from a number of United Nations Member States attended as observers.

In cooperation with the Union of Arab Banks, the Vienna Office organized a special session on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) during the International Arab Banking Summit convened in Vienna on 27 and 28 June.

In collaboration with the Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, the Vienna Office of UNODA organized the second in a series of seminars entitled "Developing a comprehensive security culture", held on 8 October.

UNODA continued its cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to promote the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), inter alia, by the participation of its Vienna Office in technical facilitation visits to Member States and consulting with visiting delegations on their national implementation plans.

By establishing and maintaining close contact and interaction with relevant stakeholders, the Vienna Office contributed to enhanced cooperation and implementation of relevant disarmament and non-proliferation mandates.

Fourth International Day against Nuclear Tests

On 5 September, the President of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, Vuk Jeremić (Serbia), convened an informal meeting of the Assembly to mark the International Day against Nuclear Tests for the fourth consecutive year at United Nations Headquarters.[20] In his statement[21] at the meeting, the President emphasized the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and progress on all parallel fronts. "We may have travelled a long way on the 'Path to Zero', but we are still far from having arrived at our ultimate destination", he said.

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[20] The International Day was established by General Assembly resolution 64/35 of 2 December 2009 at the initiative of the Government of Kazakhstan. The preamble to the text emphasizes that "every effort should be made to end nuclear tests in order to avert devastating and harmful effects on the lives and health of people […] and that the end of nuclear tests is one of the key means of achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world".

[21] Address to the General Assembly on the observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 5 September 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/pdf/PGA%20statement_5%20September%202013.pdf (accessed 6 August 2014).

In his message,[22] delivered on his behalf by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Secretary-General said that we should all remember the terrible toll of nuclear tests. Nearly one and a half million people had been affected by the consequences of nuclear testing, and an immense territory had been contaminated with radiation. He believed that the event offered the world community an opportunity to reflect on the dangers posed by such tests and on the urgent need for additional efforts to prohibit them everywhere.

Vladimir Bozhko, Minister of Emergency Situations of Kazakhstan, in addressing the event, stated, "It is time that some countries overcome the misperception that nuclear weapons provide security and hence hold on to the delusive desire to possess them." He added that "29 August is not just a day to remember. It is a day to act. This commemoration is a small but significant step towards a shared conviction in a future without nuclear tests and weapons."[23]

The General Assembly event was followed by a high-level panel on the theme "The Path to Zero: The Role of the United Nations in Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation". The panellists, moderated by Eduardo Ulibarri, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations, covered a number of key issues, including necessary steps for further progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, confidence-building and other relevant concerns.[24]

An exhibition entitled "Peace Now: Abolish Nuclear Tests and Weapons", organized by the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations in cooperation with the Department of Public Information, was also held on the occasion of the observance of the 2013 International Day against Nuclear Tests. The exhibition portrayed the paintings of the Kazakh artist, Karipbek Kuyukov, who paints with his feet, being a victim of the effects of nuclear radiation. There was also a display of the ATOM (Abolish Testing Our Mission) Project, an official project of Kazakhstan, to end all nuclear weapons tests.

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[22] Message on the fourth observance of the International Day against nuclear Tests, New York, 5 September 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/pdf/SG%20statement_5%20September.pdf (accessed 6 August 2014).

[23] Message at the United Nations General Assembly informal meeting to mark the observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 5 September 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/pdf/Kazakhstan%20statement_5%20September.pdf (accessed 6 August 2014).

[24] For more details on the panel, see http://www.un.org/en/events/againstnucleartestsday/2013/events.shtml (accessed 6 August 2014).

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)[25] continued to carry out forward-looking research in its five programme areas. These programmes and a selection of the Institute's key activities in 2013 are briefly described below. A full account of its activities in 2013 and its proposed programme of work for 2014 and 2015 are contained in the Director's annual report to the General Assembly.[26] UNIDIR activities in 2013 included 13 individual projects, 21 conferences and seminars, and the issuance of 24 publications.[27] UNIDIR staff also participated in numerous conferences held by partner organizations.

The overall work of UNIDIR is divided into five research programmes: weapons of mass destruction, weapons of societal disruption, security and society, emerging security threats, and processes and practice. This structure ensured that UNIDIR addressed a wide range of security issues as foreseen in its mandate, provided easier entry points for users of the research conducted by the Institute and facilitated donor focus on their areas of interest.

The weapons of mass destruction programme supports progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and assists the international community in efforts to achieve a world free of chemical and biological weapons. In 2013, the Institute continued to address the issue of transparency and accountability in nuclear disarmament. It also promoted the implementation of the NPT and to that end organized several meetings in conjunction with the Geneva Forum and provided substantive support to a number of disarmament initiatives, most notably to the work of the Open-ended Working Group, established under General Assembly resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012, to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

The weapons of societal disruption programme seeks limits and controls on weapons that endanger societies on a daily basis, such as small arms, cluster munitions, landmines and explosive remnants of war. In 2013, UNIDIR continued to support the process of developing an arms trade treaty and worked closely with Member States to support regional dialogue on specific areas of contention within the draft treaty language.

The emerging threats programme anticipates future security challenges so that timely action can be taken to avert them. In 2013, the Institute

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[25] UNIDIR, an autonomous extrabudgetary entity within the United Nations, develops practical ideas for building peace and security and serves as a bridge between decision makers, researchers, practitioners, Member States and United Nations agencies by promoting creative thinking and dialogue on both current and emerging security challenges.

[26] A/67/169.

[27] Visit www.unidir.org for full access to books and reports, project descriptions and materials, as well as the quarterly journal *Disarmament Forum*, audio files of UNIDIR events and other resources. See also annex II to this chapter.

continued its work on the development of autonomous robotic weapons systems, the future conduct of warfare, and the societal, ethical and moral considerations. In this connection, it organized a seminar, held on 23 May, entitled "Lethal Autonomous Robots".

The UNIDIR process and practice programme assesses the implementation and results of disarmament instruments, develops targeted tools to assist implementation efforts and recommends improved processes and better methods of stakeholder cooperation and collaboration. The objective is to help policymakers and operational personnel to create more cost-effective programming that can achieve maximum impact. In 2013, UNIDIR continued its focus on the development of an evidence-based programme design tool to make reintegration programmes more effective and, in cooperation with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, further developed the self-assessment software tool for the International Small Arms Control Standards to facilitate the implementation of global commitments to control small arms and light weapons.

The security and society programme, which sees human security as predicated on economic and social development, seeks to integrate the ideas and actions of a wide range of security stakeholders in order to better understand the challenges and devise practical solutions for the greater security of all peoples, not only States. In 2013, UNIDIR continued to focus on project development, briefings and further dialogue on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Annex I

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs publications and other materials in 2013

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 37 (Parts I and II): 2012. New York: United Nations, 2013 (Sales Nos. E.13.IX.1 and E.13.IX.2). Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/yearbook/2012/.

The Impact of Poorly Regulated Arms Transfers on the Work of the United Nations. UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 23, March 2013. New York: United Nations, 2013 (Sales No. E.13.IX.5). Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/23/.

Contrasting Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Understanding the Current Debates. UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 24, December 2013. New York: United Nations, 2013 (Sales No. E.14.IX.4). Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/24/.

The Gun-Free Zone—A Tool to Prevent and Reduce Armed Violence. UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 25, December 2013. New York: United Nations, 2013 (Sales No. E.14.IX.6). Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/25/.

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. Disarmament Study Series, No. 34. New York: United Nations, 2013 (Sales No. E.14.IX.3). Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/studyseries/34/.

NGO Presentations to the Open-ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations. Civil Society and Disarmament: 2013. New York: United Nations, 2013 (Sales No. E.14.IX.5). Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/civilsociety/2013/.

Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions. New York: United Nations, 2013. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/xb-report/2010-2013/.

UNODA Update (quarterly e-newsletter): 1st Quarter, 2nd Quarter, 3rd Quarter, 4th Quarter. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/ODAUpdate/.

Fact Sheets on Disarmament Issues. Available from http://www.un.org/disarmament/factsheets/.

Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

UNREC Focus: No. 19 (April 2013) and No. 20 (July 2013). Available from http://unrec.org/index/index.php?option=com_phocadocumentation&view=category&id=74%3Aunrec-focus&Itemid=155&lang=en.

Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

UNLIREC Technical Guide for the Marking of Small Arms and Their Ammunition. Peru: UNLIREC, 2013.

Working Paper on National Authorities for BWC Implementation: Regional and Global Experiences. Peru: UNLIREC, 2013.

UNLIREC Newsletter: No. 11 (March 2013); No. 12 (June 2013); No. 13 (September 2013); and No. 14 (December 2013). Available from http://www.unlirec.org/newsletter_eng.aspx.

Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

Newsletter: Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 2013); Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 2013); and Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2013). Available from http://unrcpd.org/publications/newsletter/.

UNRCPD leaflet. Nepal: UNRCPD, 2013. Available from http://unrcpd.org/about/.

Annex II

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications in 2013[a]

Borrie, John and Tim Caughley, eds. *Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian Lens*. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013.

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[a] Available from http://www.unidir.org/publications.

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_____. The United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013.

_____. UNIDIR Cyber Security Conference 2012: The Role of CBMs in Assuring Cyber Stability. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013.

Annex III

Events held on the margins of the First Committee 2013 session

9 October	Cyberthreats: Information as a Weapon (organized by UNIDIR)
14 October	Briefing to Delegates on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and United Nations Report on Military Expenditures (organized by UNODA)

16 October	The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (organized by UNIDIR)
	Roundtable on Transparency in Military Spending (organized by UNODA)
21 October	Enhancing the Practical Application of the International Small Arms Control Standards (organized by UNIDIR)
22 October	Cesar Lopez, Inventor of the Escopetarra, Plays Songs of Peace (organized by UNODA)
	Lethal Autonomous Robotics: Shared Concerns, Different Approaches? A dialogue with special rapporteur Christof Heyns (organized by UNIDIR)
23 October	2013 Future Policy Award Ceremony: Celebrating the World's Best Disarmament Policies (organized by UNODA, the World Future Council and the Inter-Parliamentary Union)

Appendix I
Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The most up-to-date information on disarmament treaties and their status of adherence is available from the UNODA website at:

http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/

The data contained in this appendix has been provided by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements, as follows (inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the United Nations Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported):

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Arms Trade Treaty

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention)

African Union

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

Canada and Hungary

Treaty on Open Skies

France

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

Kyrgyzstan

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ Treaty)

Mexico

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Netherlands

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Organization of American States

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Pacific Islands Forum

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)

Thailand

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

United States

Antarctic Treaty

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2013

The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 2013 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.[1] The order in which the agreements are listed below are according to the date of signature or opening for signature. The total number of parties for each treaty or agreement has been calculated based on information received from the depositaries.

A new State party in the following list includes the date of deposit, to the respective depositary, of the State's instruments of ratification, and are further noted as follows, if applicable: (a) = accession, (A) = acceptance, (AA) = approval, (P) = consent to be bound, and (s) = succession.[2]

In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The following notation indicates where the reported action was completed: (M) = Moscow, (L) = London and (W) = Washington.

Certain treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (Bangkok Treaty, CANWFZ Treaty, Pelindaba Treaty, Rarotonga Treaty and Treaty of Tlatelolco) have associated protocols concerning security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States and some also have protocols for States outside the zone of application, but which have some territory within the zone. They are at different stages with regard to signature, ratification and entry into force. Full details can be found at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)

Signed at Geneva: 17 June 1925
Entered into force: 8 February 1928
Depositary: France
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 138

Antarctic Treaty

Signed at Washington: 1 December 1959
Entered into force: 23 June 1961
Depositary: United States
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 50

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[1] The texts of treaties concluded up to 1992 are contained in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition: 1992, vols. 1 and 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), in *Status*, 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3), and thereafter in the relevant volumes of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. The texts and status data are also available from the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/.

[2] Accession is a one-step process for becoming bound by a treaty after it has entered into force. A glossary of other terms relating to treaty actions is available from http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml (accessed 18 August 2014).

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty)

Signed by the original parties[3] in Moscow: 5 August 1963
Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 8 August 1963
Entered into force: 10 October 1963
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 126

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 27 January 1967
Entered into force: 10 October 1967
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: Lithuania —25 March (a) (W)
Total number of parties: 102

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Opened for signature at Mexico City: 14 February 1967
Entered into force: for each Government individually
Depositary: Mexico
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 33

Amendment to article 7[4]
New parties: Antigua and Barbuda —13 June

Amendment to article 25[5]
New parties: Antigua and Barbuda —13 June

Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20[6]
New parties: Antigua and Barbuda —13 June

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 1 July 1968
Entered into force: 5 March 1970
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 190

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[3] The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.
[4] Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.
[5] Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.
[6] Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 11 February 1971
Entered into force: 18 May 1972
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

New parties:	None	
Total number of parties: 94		

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC)

Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 10 April 1972
Entered into force: 26 March 1975
Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W)

New parties:	Cameroon	—18 January (a) (W)
	Guyana	—26 March (W)
	Malawi	—2 April (W)
	Nauru	—5 March (a) (W)
Total number of parties: 168		

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Opened for signature at Geneva: 18 May 1977
Entered into force: 5 October 1978
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New parties:	None	
Total number of parties: 76		

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

Opened for signature at New York: 18 December 1979
Entered into force: 11 July 1984
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New parties:[7]	None	
Total number of parties: 15		

[7] Article 19, paragraph 4, states:
"For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument."

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

Opened for signature at New York: 10 April 1981
Entered into force: 2 December 1983
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New parties:[8]	Kuwait	—24 May (a)
	Zambia	—25 September (a)

Total number of parties: 117

Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entered into force on 18 May 2004)

New parties:	Bangladesh	—26 September (a)
	Kuwait	—24 May (a)
	Zambia	—25 September (a)

Total number of parties: 79

Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998)

New parties:	Kuwait	—24 May (P)
	Zambia	—25 September (P)

Total number of parties: 100

Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998)

New parties:	Kuwait	—24 May (P)

Total number of parties: 102

Protocol V (entered into force on 12 November 2006)

New parties:	Bangladesh	—26 September (P)
	Kuwait	—24 May (P)
	Zambia	—25 September (P)

Total number of parties: 84

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)

Opened for signature at Rarotonga: 6 August 1985
Entered into force: 11 December 1986
Depositary: Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum

New parties: None
Total number of parties: 13

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[8] Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state:

> "2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. "3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention."

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Signed at Paris: 19 November 1990
Entered into force: 9 November 1992
Depositary: Netherlands
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 30

Agreement on Adaptation
Adopted and signed at Istanbul: 19 November 1999
Not yet in force[9]
New signatories: None
Total number of signatories: 30
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 3

Treaty on Open Skies

Signed at Helsinki: 24 March 1992
Entered into force: 1 January 2002
Depositary: Canada and Hungary
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 34

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)

Signed at Paris: 13 January 1993
Entered into force: 29 April 1997
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations
New parties: Somalia —29 May (a)
Syrian Arab Republic —14 September (a)
Total number of parties: 190

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty)

Signed at Bangkok: 15 December 1995
Entered into force: 27 March 1997
Depositary: Thailand
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 10

[9] Article 31, paragraph 3, states:
"This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form."

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

Signed at Cairo: 11 April 1996
Entered into force: 15 July 2009
Depositary: Secretary-General of the African Union

New parties:	Congo	—26 November

Total number of parties: 37

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Opened for signature at New York: 24 September 1996
Not yet in force[10]
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New signatories:	None	

Total number of signatories: 183

New parties:	Brunei Darussalam	—10 January
	Chad	—8 February
	Guinea-Bissau	—24 September
	Iraq	—26 September

Total number of parties: 161

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention)

Opened for signature at Ottawa: 3 December 1997
Entered into force: 1 March 1999
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New parties:[11]	None	

Total number of parties: 161

[10] Article XIV, paragraph 1, states:
"This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex II to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature."

[11] Article 17, paragraph 2, states:
"For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession."

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

Opened for signature at Washington, D.C.: 14 November 1997
Entered into force: 1 July 1998
Depositary: Organization of American States
New parties:[12] None
Total number of parties: 31

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

Opened for signature at Guatemala City: 7 June 1999
Entered into force: 21 November 2002
Depositary: Organization of American States
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 16

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ Treaty)

Opened for signature at Semipalatinsk: 8 September 2006
Entered into force: 21 March 2009
Depositary: Kyrgyzstan
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 5

Convention on Cluster Munitions

Opened for signature at Oslo: 3 December 2008
Entered into force: 1 August 2010
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New parties:	Andorra	—9 April (a)
	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	—30 April
	Chad	—26 March
	Iraq	—14 May
	Liechtenstein	—4 March
	Nauru	—4 February
	Saint Kitts and Nevis	—13 September (a)

Total number of parties: 84

[12] Article XXV, states:
"This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification."

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention)

Opened for signature at Brazzaville: 19 November 2010
Not yet in force[13]
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations
New signatories: None
Total number of signatories: 11
New parties: None
Total number of parties: 4

Arms Trade Treaty

Opened for signature at New York: 3 June 2013
Not yet in force[14]
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations

New signatories:	Albania	—3 June
	Angola	—24 September
	Antigua and Barbuda	—3 June
	Argentina	—3 June
	Australia	—3 June
	Austria	—3 June
	Bahamas	—3 June
	Bahrain	—21 November
	Bangladesh	—26 September
	Barbados	—25 September
	Belgium	—3 June
	Belize	—3 June
	Benin	—3 June
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	—25 September
	Brazil	—3 June
	Bulgaria	—2 July
	Burkina Faso	—3 June
	Burundi	—3 June
	Cambodia	—18 October
	Cabo Verde	—25 September
	Chad	—25 September

[13] Article 36, paragraph 1, states:
"This Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession."

[14] Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2, states:
"1. This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Depositary.
"2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession."

Chile	—3 June
Colombia	—24 September
Comoros	—26 September
Congo	—25 September
Costa Rica	—3 June
Cote d'Ivoire	—3 June
Croatia	—3 June
Cyprus	—3 June
Czech Republic	—3 June
Denmark	—3 June
Djibouti	—3 June
Dominica	—1 October
Dominican Republic	—3 June
El Salvador	—5 June
Estonia	—3 June
Finland	—3 June
France	—3 June
Gabon	—25 September
Germany	—3 June
Ghana	—24 September
Greece	—3 June
Grenada	—3 June
Guatemala	—24 June
Guinea	—29 July
Guinea-Bissau	—26 September
Guyana	—3 June
Honduras	—25 September
Hungary	—3 June
Iceland	—3 June
Ireland	—3 June
Italy	—3 June
Jamaica	—3 June
Japan	—3 June
Kiribati	—25 September
Latvia	—3 June
Lesotho	—25 September
Liberia	—4 June
Libya	—9 July
Liechtenstein	—3 June
Lithuania	—3 June
Luxembourg	—3 June
Madagascar	—25 September
Malaysia	—26 September
Mali	—3 June
Malta	—3 June
Mauritania	—3 June
Mexico	—3 June
Mongolia	—24 September
Montenegro	—3 June

Mozambique	—3 June
Nauru	—25 September
Netherlands	—3 June
New Zealand	—3 June
Nigeria	—12 August
Norway	—3 June
Palau	—3 June
Panama	—3 June
Paraguay	—19 June
Peru	—24 September
Philippines	—25 September
Poland	—1 July
Portugal	—3 June
Republic of Korea	—3 June
Republic of Moldova	—10 September
Romania	—3 June
Rwanda	—5 June
Saint Kitts and Nevis	—5 June
Saint Lucia	—3 June
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	—3 June
Samoa	—25 September
Senegal	—3 June
Serbia	—12 August
Seychelles	—3 June
Sierra Leone	—25 September
Slovakia	—10 June
Slovenia	—3 June
South Africa	—25 September
Spain	—3 June
Suriname	—3 June
Swaziland	—4 September
Sweden	—3 June
Switzerland	—3 June
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	—25 September
Togo	—3 June
Trinidad and Tobago	—3 June
Turkey	—2 July
Tuvalu	—3 June
United Arab Emirates	—9 July
United Kingdom	—3 June
United Republic of Tanzania	—3 June
United States	—25 September
Uruguay	—3 June
Vanuatu	—26 July
Zambia	—25 September

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 115

NEW PARTIES:	Antigua and Barbuda	—12 August
	Costa Rica	—25 September
	Grenada	—22 October
	Guyana	—4 July
	Iceland	—2 July
	Mali	—3 December
	Mexico	—25 September
	Nigeria	—12 August
	Trinidad and Tobago	—25 September

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 9

Appendix II
Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

Appendix II

Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter

At its sixty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted 48 resolutions and 5 decisions related to disarmament, which are outlined in the present appendix according to chapter topic. The summaries of each resolution and decision are presented below, followed by corresponding general statements and explanations of vote of Member States during the First Committee session. Additional voting information is found in the boxes,[a] including cross-references to Part I of the Yearbook.

Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

68/28. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Introduced by: Pakistan (18 Oct.)

GA vote: 127-0-57 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 120-0-58 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 18-22.

The General Assembly recommended that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula, that the various alternative approaches, particularly those considered in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), be further explored, and that the CD actively continue intensive negotiations to reach agreement and conclude effective international agreements on security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** reaffirmed its position that the security assurance received to date had been ineffective. In this regard, it stated that until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was achieved, there would be a need for an international legally binding instrument whereby nuclear-weapon States would provide universal and unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of those weapons. Cuba believed, moreover, that the policy of nuclear deterrence must be set aside as part of an unsustainable and unacceptable military doctrine.

After voting in favour, **Japan** said that it believed that discussions on ways to strengthen effective negative security assurances were essential to the realization of a

[a] Abbreviations used in the boxes: o.p. = operative paragraph; p.p. = preambular paragraph. The order of the numbers for the voting statistics indicates the votes in favour, the votes against and the abstentions, respectively.

world free of nuclear weapons. It pointed out, however, that the draft resolution should not prejudge discussions in the CD.

68/32. Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the CD for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons. The Assembly decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament and declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (4 Nov.)

GA vote: 137-28-20 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 129-28-19 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 36-39.

First Committee. Two States delivered general statements:

- **Cuba** said that the draft resolution was a good-faith initiative that sought to break the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. It reiterated, however, that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be their total elimination.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**, echoing other delegations, highlighted the imperative nature of nuclear disarmament stating that it was a pressing need and a task for all humankind in order to guarantee international peace and security. It noted in this connection that nuclear weapons had continued to exist, their stockpiles had continued to grow, and their modernization had continued incessantly. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea insisted that the total elimination of nuclear weapons should remain the top priority and task, and called for internationally binding legal instruments in this regard.

After voting in favour, three States took the floor.

- **China** underlined its position that it has always advocated for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it believed that nuclear disarmament should uphold the principles of maintaining the global strategic balance and stability as well as undiminished security for all. It added that all nuclear-weapon issues should be addressed within the framework of existing multilateral disarmament mechanisms.
- Also speaking on behalf of Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand and San Marino, **Ireland** stressed that the draft resolution was consistent with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The representative of Ireland said that their delegations were pleased that the States' deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons had been acknowledged in the resolution. He added that his delegation and the other delegations on whose behalf he was speaking did not see a comprehensive convention as the only option available for advancing the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons and were open to other approaches.

- While **Switzerland** saw the draft resolution as fully consistent with the NPT, it would have also liked to have seen explicit reference to the NPT outcome documents, including the 2010 action plan. It believed that the draft resolution's call for the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament commitments also extended to the need for compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Switzerland said that it did not see a comprehensive nuclear convention as the only option for achieving nuclear disarmament.

After voting against the draft resolution, three States spoke:

- **France**, which spoke also on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom, said that it believed that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was necessary to promote step-by-step progress towards nuclear disarmament. It added that the only reference to the NPT in the draft resolution was insufficient, incidental and unbalanced. France also noted that the 2010 action plan, which it considered to be the best road map for progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament, had not been mentioned in the draft resolution. Furthermore, the draft resolution called for the negotiation of an instrument that had not been referenced in the 2010 action plan. France stated that a practical and gradual process was the only way to make real progress disarmament while upholding global security and stability. It pointed out that planning another nuclear disarmament conference in 2018 was inconsistent with the NPT agenda and risked negatively affecting the outcome of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
- Speaking also on behalf of Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden to explain their vote against the resolution, the **Netherlands** said that they regretted that the various proposals made during the high-level meeting were not captured in the draft resolution, adding that there was only a limited reference to the NPT. The Netherlands expressed concern at the lack of clarity regarding the aim of the proposed 2018 meeting which could be interpreted as either another high-level meeting on disarmament to ensure continued profile to the issue, or a potential vehicle to negotiate a nuclear-weapons convention that could undermine their efforts to seek a positive outcome for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. They also called for the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work within the CD that would advance all the four core issues. The Netherlands stated that negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention without the participation of the nuclear-weapon States would not advance the goal of disarmament shared by the States on whose behalf it was speaking.
- In explaining its vote against the resolution, the **Russian Federation** pointed out that while in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Parties had undertaken "to pursue negotiations on general and complete disarmament", the draft resolution had focused only on the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under Article VI. In this regard, it argued that nuclear disarmament could only occur in the context of comprehensive and general disarmament and not specifically nuclear disarmament. It said that such interpretations undermined the Treaty and

would destroy any hope for nuclear disarmament. The Russian Federation proposed joining efforts to implement existing consensus decisions on bolstering the NPT, especially the plan of action of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, emphasizing that the focus must be on creating the conditions necessary for gradual progress towards nuclear disarmament.

After abstaining, **Spain** spoke on behalf of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, the Republic of Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain, and said that their delegations had abstained because the draft resolution did not reflect all the positions expressed in the high-level meeting. They believed that disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing goals to be pursued through gradual steps involving all nuclear-weapon States. Stressing that the NPT was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Spain stated that efforts should be directed towards implementing the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Spain also said that they did not see a nuclear-weapons convention as the first priority in the CD. The CD, it said, should rather have a comprehensive and balanced programme of work. While expressing concern about the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, Spain said that both the security and humanitarian dimensions must be recognized.

68/35. Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Introduced by: Iran (Islamic Republic of) (22 Oct.)

GA vote: 120-53-9; 124-5-50, p.p. 6; 125-5-47, p.p. 9 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 113-52-7; 116-5-49, p.p. 6; 115-5-46, p.p. 9 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 47-52.

The General Assembly recalled that the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NPT reaffirmed the continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Assembly also noted that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences had agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

First Committee. After abstaining in the action on the draft resolution, **Pakistan** said that, while it supported nuclear disarmament, it neither subscribed to nor was bound by the conclusions and decisions of the NPT, including those relating to universality.

68/39. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

Introduced by: Egypt (17 Oct.)

GA vote: 171-7-5; 168-5-3, o.p. 9; 172-4-4, o.p. 11 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 165-7-5; 161-5-3, o.p. 9; 164-3-5, o.p. 11 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 63-71.

The General Assembly called upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitment to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, expressed its profound disappointment at the failure to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass

destruction, called for the convening of the conference without any further delay, urged the CD to commence without delay substantive work that advanced the agenda of nuclear disarmament, and urged Member States to pursue multilateral negotiations in good faith towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

First Committee. After voting in favour, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it supported the draft resolution inasmuch as its content was in line with the Outcome Document of the Review Conference. Moreover it stressed that a reduction in deployment and operational status could not substitute for irreversible cuts in or the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

After voting against the draft resolution, three States delivered statements:

- **India** said that it believed that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing and that it supported a time-bound programme for nuclear disarmament. It stated that it could not accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State because nuclear weapons were an integral part of India's national security and would remain so pending global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. It added that it had abstained in the voting on paragraph 11 since it referred to the 2010 NPT action plan.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** said that it had been unfairly singled out in the resolution and believed that the obligation to denuclearize the Korean peninsula should be shared equally by all parties. It pointed out that, in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, all parties had agreed to take coordinated steps to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This, they said, also required the removal of external nuclear threats posed to the peninsula, based on the principle of simultaneous action.
- Speaking also on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom, **France** said that a number of elements in the draft resolution were inconsistent with the action plan of the NPT and lacked a balanced treatment of the three pillars of the NPT. They would have also liked to have seen greater emphasis on the importance of all nuclear-weapon States contributing to a safer and securer world. France stated that they also regretted that a step-by-step approach was absent. It added that they believed that it would have been better to focus on existing processes rather than parallel ones.

After abstaining, two States spoke:

- **Pakistan** said that it was disappointed by the call on Pakistan to unconditionally accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It could not accept references to NPT Review Conferences in the text, due to Pakistan's known position on the Treaty.
- While it supported the draft resolution's objective, **China** said that the text went beyond the agreed language from the action plan and the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

68/40. Reducing nuclear danger

Introduced by: India (21 Oct.)

GA vote: 125-50-10 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 117-49-11 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 72-75.

The General Assembly called for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in that context, for immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, and to continue encouraging Member States to consider the convening of an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it believed that the policy of nuclear deterrence must be set aside as part of an unsustainable and unacceptable military doctrine. It reaffirmed the need to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the one proposed in the Middle East, as a significant contribution by States and a tangible step towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

After voting in favour, **Brazil** expressed its belief that nuclear doctrines must be reviewed in order to reduce the risks of the accidental use of nuclear weapons. It viewed the very existence of nuclear weapons to be the most serious threat to humankind and to international peace and security and, in this regard, referred to the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in accordance with article 6 of the NPT.

68/42. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

Introduced by: Malaysia (21 Oct.)

GA vote: 133-24-25 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 127-24-27 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 79-83.

The General Assembly underlined the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Assembly called upon all States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

First Committee. After abstaining, two States spoke:

- **Japan** said that while it supported the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in good faith, it was convinced that realistic measures were required in order to achieve steady progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was of the view that conditions were not yet ripe to call upon all States to immediately fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to the early conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention.
- **Sweden** did not believe that immediate negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention was the most viable route to nuclear disarmament. It favoured,

instead, a step-by-step approach towards nuclear disarmament that involved the continued construction of an increasingly solid framework of reinforcing treaties and commitments. That framework, Sweden said, had also been proposed by the Secretary-General as reflected in the preamble of the draft resolution.

68/46. Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Introduced by: Costa Rica (18 Oct.)

GA vote: 158-4-20 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 151-4-21 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 109-112.

The General Assembly emphasized that the universal objective of taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations remained the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons, and also emphasized the importance of addressing issues related to nuclear weapons in a comprehensive, interactive and constructive manner, for the advancement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. The Assembly encouraged Member States and others to take into account the report of the Open-ended Working Group, and the proposals contained therein, in the discussions in other forums in which humanitarian, health, human rights, environmental and development affairs were addressed.

First Committee. After abstaining, **Belarus** affirmed its principled support for the multilateral process of nuclear disarmament with the participation of all interested parties. It emphasized, in this connection, that the CD was a unique forum for negotiating disarmament issues. Belarus supported the resolution of incongruities at the Conference, where the rule of consensus was a guarantee that all interests and national security concerns would be taken into account.

After voting in favour, six States explained their votes:

- **Pakistan** said that it supported nuclear disarmament and that it favoured the decision not to reconstitute the Working Group, which it believed had weakened the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It called for a renewal of the global consensus and for the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda and to revitalize the entire disarmament machinery.
- **India** said that it was satisfied that the consensus report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/68/514) reflected India's views; however, it was concerned about parallel initiatives that could have an impact on the established disarmament machinery. India viewed the CD as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum with the mandate, membership, credibility and rules of procedure to discharge that responsibility. The CD, it emphasized, was the forum for taking forward nuclear disarmament negotiations.
- Referring to the wording in the draft resolution, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** believed that nuclear disarmament was not a "wish" but the highest priority of the international community, and that welcoming the report of the work of the Open-ended Working Group should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the Group. It also stressed that negotiations on nuclear disarmament should

be carried out in the relevant international body and that it would not support any decision that undermined the CD.

- **Ecuador** reiterated that, until the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and until reforms were made to the disarmament machinery, the CD remained to be the only negotiating forum for such matters. It said that it would closely study any initiative that sought to replace or establish parallel negotiating mechanisms.
- **Brazil** stressed that its support for the work of the Open-ended Working Group was based on the understanding that it represented a useful step towards a comprehensive and effective negotiation process in the CD, the single multilateral body for negotiations on disarmament.
- **Kazakhstan** explained that it voted in favour on the understanding that the Open-ended Working Group would not serve as an independent platform parallel to the CD and the Disarmament Commission, and that its outcomes should be presented to both those multilaterally agreed and established entities of the disarmament machinery, within which all official actions and decisions would be taken.

After voting against the draft resolution, **France** delivered a statement, speaking also on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom. France said that the final report of the Open-ended Working Group (A/68/514) had no mention of the 2010 NPT action plan, and that the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament and the FMCT were presented as mere options, among others. It added that parallel processes detracted from the consensus-based approach and that they were concerned about processes that focused solely on nuclear disarmament. France explained that another report with States' views on taking forward multilateral nuclear-disarmament negotiations would only duplicate and undercut similar work being done by the CD and the Disarmament Commission and in the framework of the NPT.

After abstaining, two States explained their votes:

- **China** said that it believed that the international nuclear disarmament process should proceed in the framework of existing multilateral disarmament mechanisms, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission. Establishing new mechanisms to deal with nuclear disarmament would only undermine the authority of existing ones and divert limited resources, and cannot guarantee the participation of all major stakeholders.
- **Portugal** stated that while the draft resolution generally deserved its support, particularly with regard to the inclusiveness and the constructive work of the Open-ended Working Group, it believed that the draft should also have included a reference to the need to enlarge the CD membership. Portugal regretted that its proposal to include such a reference had not been considered.

68/47. Nuclear disarmament

Introduced by: Myanmar (4 Nov.)

GA vote: 122-44-17; 176-2-4, o.p. 16 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 117-44-18; 168-1-5, o.p. 16 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 113-122.

The General Assembly urged the CD to commence, as early as possible, its substantive work during its 2014 session. It welcomed the establishment of the informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation, on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work. This programme of work would take into consideration all the real and existing priorities in the field of disarmament and arms control, including the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices with a view to their conclusion within five years.

First Committee. Two States delivered general statements:

- **Cuba** said that it was of the view that the draft resolution addressed most comprehensively the issue of nuclear disarmament, which was and must remain the highest disarmament priority. The draft resolution dealt with significant matters connected to the needs, obligations and commitments related to the objective of achieving nuclear disarmament.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that the draft resolution deserved full support from all as nuclear weapons were the greatest threat to humankind. It viewed the total elimination of these weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their threat or use. It believed that the international community should take advantage of the momentum created by the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament to take forward multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

After voting in favour, two States explained their positions:

- **China** stated that nuclear-weapon issues should be addressed within existing multilateral disarmament mechanisms. All States parties, it said, should fulfil their NPT obligations in a comprehensive and balanced manner. It believed in the importance of substantive reductions in nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States and that the international community should develop, at the appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** said that nuclear disarmament should precede non-proliferation because the root cause of proliferation was the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. It believed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute solution and that nuclear-weapon States should lead the disarmament process in all sincerity.

After abstaining, three States delivered statements:

- **Japan** said that it shared the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It pointed out, however, that in order to steadily implement concrete measures for nuclear disarmament, united action on the part of the international

community, including nuclear-weapon States, was important. In this regard, Japan said, there remained a difference between its view and the approach of the draft resolution.

- **Pakistan** supported the call for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD, a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances, and emphasized the need to take into account the security interests of all States while negotiating disarmament treaties. Pakistan stated, however, it could not agree to calls for the full implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference because of its well-known position on the Treaty.
- **India** said that it supported the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timetable; however, it abstained because of certain references to the NPT. It favoured the draft's references to, inter alia, the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; the role and work of the CD, including the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD; the negotiation of an FMCT in the CD; and the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament.

68/51. United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

Introduced by: Japan (17 Oct.)

GA vote: 169-1-14; 176-3-3, o.p. 2; 178-1-3, o.p. 8; 173-3-7, o.p. 9; 174-1-7, o.p. 17 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 164-1-14; 168-3-3, o.p. 2; 171-1-4, o.p. 8; 166-3-8, o.p. 9; 167-1-8, o.p. 17 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 135-145.

The General Assembly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests and to comply fully with its commitments under the joint statement of the Six-Party Talks of 19 September 2005 and its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

First Committee. Before voting in favour, **Nicaragua** said that, for humanitarian reasons, it supported the request for the reduction and eventual elimination by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons. It welcomed recognition of the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving binding security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. It also reiterated the call for the peaceful promotion of peace and for all parties to the conflict to equitably meet their obligations in order to reunify the Korean peninsula step by step and in good faith.

Before voting against the draft resolution, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** asserted that the draft resolution did not correctly reflect the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, pointing out that its uranium-enrichment programme and light-water reactor construction were actually intended for peaceful purposes. It noted that the draft resolution had expressed concern about the peaceful nuclear activities of only one country and not those of other countries. Responding to the statement in the draft resolution that it could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea recalled that it had withdrawn from the NPT, was no longer a party to that Treaty and, therefore, not bound by its provisions.

Before abstaining in the action on the draft resolution, two States spoke:

- **Egypt** said that the draft resolution had disregarded Egypt's international and regional priorities, including the priority of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It believed that nuclear disarmament could be achieved only through a balanced and comprehensive approach that took into account all legitimate concerns.
- The **Russian Federation** expressed concern about the introduction of language in the preamble on the humanitarian consequences of using nuclear weapons. These consequences, it argued were self-evident and that it was, in its opinion, cynical to require confirmation of the sad truth of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, it recalled the nightmares of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and the perilous cold war. To achieve substantive progress towards nuclear disarmament, it said that energy and resources needed to be focused, instead, on creating the conditions for step-by-step progress towards comprehensive full disarmament pursuant to article VI of the NPT.

After voting in favour, **France** said that it wished to continue to see the NPT action plan reflected in the text in a balanced manner and believed that the efforts of the nuclear-weapon States in that sphere should be duly acknowledged. It explained that its deterrence doctrine was strictly defensive and that it prioritized the implementation of concrete measures that corresponded to a realistic and progressive approach.

After abstaining, six States explained their votes:

- **Pakistan** said that it rejected the unrealistic call to accede without condition to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and that it could not agree to the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. On the universalization of a comprehensive safeguards agreement, it underscored that such a measure applied only to States that had assumed legal obligations based on their free consent.
- **India** said that it remained committed to the goal of global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework, with a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework. It believed that the draft resolution fell short of that objective. India stated that it could not accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State as nuclear weapons were an integral part of India's national security.
- **China** said that it did not support the declaration of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It believed that a moratorium would not contribute to promoting the start of negotiations on an FMCT in the CD at an early date. China reaffirmed its firm support for launching negotiations on such a treaty as soon as possible.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** said the draft resolution highlighted issues such as nuclear security as if it were much more important than nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It could not accept linking the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations with the enhancement of international peace and security. It pointed out that the draft

resolution focused only in a biased manner on the FMCT and that the urgency of negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention had not been mentioned.

- **Ecuador** stated that the paragraph on an FMCT had failed to recognize the role of the CD and did not include in its scope future production and existing stockpiles in order to address the full range of the issue. It believed that the significance and relevance of a multilateral, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances were critical and would have preferred that the resolution include a clear reference supporting the establishment of an international, legally binding instrument prohibiting the development, use or possession of nuclear weapons.
- **Brazil** believed that the text had failed to adequately take stock of the compliance deficit that continued to exist with regard to nuclear-weapon States implementing their obligations under article VI of the NPT. For Brazil, it was precisely the irreversible and verifiable dismantling of nuclear weapons that would provide for the elimination of one of the greatest sources of mistrust and instability.

68/53. Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

The General Assembly took note of the Declaration of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security convened by the Secretary-General.

Introduced by: Nigeria, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 150-152.

68/58. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly reiterated its request to the CD to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and requested the CD to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

Introduced by: India (21 Oct.)

GA vote: 126-49-9 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 119-49-9 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 164-166.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that the existence of some 17,000 nuclear weapons worldwide underscored the need to immediately start negotiations within the CD on the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction.

After voting in favour, **Brazil** reiterated that the very existence of nuclear weapons constituted a threat to humankind and to international peace and security. It mentioned the proposals by the Secretary-General to consider negotiations on a

nuclear-weapons convention or an agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments backed by a strong system of verification. It believed that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which should include specific timelines.

After voting against the draft resolution, **Switzerland** said that the draft should have contained an appropriate reference to the pertinence and viability of the international non-proliferation regime. It said that in the absence of a legally binding instrument in that field, all States possessing nuclear weapons were encouraged to take practical measures to make the use of nuclear weapons less probable, including by refraining from further building up nuclear arsenals and by diminishing the role of nuclear weapons.

68/65. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

Introduced by: Egypt, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States (22 Oct.)[b]

GA vote: 169-5-6; 173-2-2, p.p. 5; 173-2-2, p.p. 6 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 158-5-9; 160-2-4, p.p. 5; 163-2-4, p.p. 6 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 189-194.

The General Assembly welcomed the conclusions regarding the Middle East coming out of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and called for the speedy and full implementation of the commitments contained therein.

First Committee. Before voting in favour, **Lithuania** delivered a statement on behalf of the European Union (EU). The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, Serbia, Albania, Norway and the Republic of Moldova aligned themselves with the statement. Lithuania said that they strongly supported the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in particular the provisions pertaining to the Middle East, and that they regretted the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Lithuania stated that the EU continued to fully support the ongoing preparations for a successful conference. The EU believed that the nuclear and missile programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran were of particular concern and called upon the Syrian Arab Republic to fully cooperate with the IAEA.

Before voting against the draft resolution, two States spoke:

- **Israel** said that the cases of non-compliance with the NPT that had taken place in the Middle East constituted a fundamental challenge to Israel's security and cast a dark shadow over the prospects of embarking on a meaningful regional security process. Referring to the cases of Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel said that it had expected a call for compliance by all States in the region with the relevant international non-proliferation obligations. According to Israel, the draft resolution had ignored relevant IAEA and Security Council resolutions relating to non-compliance with international non-proliferation obligations by States in the region and had singled out Israel in a biased manner.

[b] The State of Palestine also sponsored the draft resolution as a member of the League of Arab States.

- The **United States** said that it believed that the draft resolution was confined to expressions of concern about the activities of a single country, omitting any reference to serious nuclear proliferation concerns in the region. It noted that the draft resolution did not improve confidence in the region or prospects for a conference.

After voting in favour, four States explained their positions:

- **Pakistan** said that it believed that references to the recommendations and conclusions emanating from various NPT Review Conferences were lopsided. It expressed disappointment at the continuing but unrealistic goal requiring Pakistan to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State.
- **New Zealand** expressed concern regarding the absence in the draft resolution of any reference to other States in the Middle East that presented significant nuclear proliferation concerns. It regretted that it had not yet been possible to convene the conference on a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which would be very important for the ongoing health and well-being of the NPT regime.
- **Switzerland** said that it fully subscribed to promoting the universalization of the NPT in the Middle East. It supported the efforts to ensure the convening of a conference on establishing a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as soon as possible. It also noted that the draft resolution referred to only one aspect of the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and singled out one State in the region. Switzerland believed that States must take into account the current context and all developments affecting the full range of countries in the region.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that the draft resolution dealt with the most important aspect of security in the Middle East. It stated that it rejected all allegations against its exclusively peaceful and safeguarded nuclear programmes and that such allegations tried to divert the attention of Member States from the danger of Israel's nuclear arsenals and its non-compliance with its obligations under international law.

After voting against the draft resolution, **Canada** said that the draft resolution unfairly singled out Israel while failing to address serious non-compliance issues of States of the region that were already party to the NPT. It also believed that the draft resolution was deficient in that it ignored non-cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic with the IAEA.

After abstaining, two States delivered statements:

- **India** said that it believed that the focus of the draft resolution should be limited to the region it was intended to address. Recalling the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulating that States were bound by a treaty based on the principle of free consent, India considered the call to accede to the NPT and to accept IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear activities to be at variance with that principle and did not reflect current realities.

- **Australia** said that it was committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons; however, it believed that the draft resolution, which referred to only one country and made no reference to current deepening nuclear proliferation risks elsewhere in the Middle East region, was unbalanced.

68/68. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The General Assembly shared the grave concern of the Security Council about the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February 2013, recalled Council resolutions 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 and 1874 (2009) of 12 June 2009, called for full compliance with the obligations under the relevant resolutions, and reaffirmed its support for the Six-Party Talks.

Introduced by: Australia (18 Oct.)

GA vote: 181-1-3; 178-1-4, p.p. 6 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 175-1-3; 170-1-4, p.p. 6 (4 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 202-206.

First Committee. After voting in favour, two States explained their votes:

- **Pakistan** said that the promotion of signatures and ratifications leading to the Treaty's entry into force would be facilitated when major erstwhile proponents of the CTBT decide to ratify it and that the acceptance of CTBT obligations in South Asia would also help expedite its entry into force. It reiterated that it did not consider itself bound by any of the provisions of the NPT Review Conferences.
- **Israel** said that attempts to artificially force a linkage between the CTBT and the NPT would only jeopardize the CTBT and its noble cause. For Israel, the regional security situation in the Middle East was a major consideration for ratification, as well as the completion of the verification regime in order to ensure adequate coverage of the Middle East by the international monitoring system.

After voting against the draft resolution, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** said that the reason was because it rejected Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2094 (2013), which it deemed arbitrary and based on double standards. It stated that it conducted nuclear tests as a measure of self-defence. It believed that more attention should be given to taking practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which was at the top of its Government's agenda.

68/517. Missiles (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session the item entitled "Missiles".

Introduced by: Iran (Islamic Republic of) (28 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 217.

68/518. Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (decision)

Submitted by: Canada (31 Oct.)

GA vote: 179-1-5 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 172-1-5 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 218-219.

The General Assembly decided to welcome the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (A/68/154 and Add.1) containing a compilation of the views of Member States, and to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", the sub-item entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

First Committee. In a general statement, the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** expressed deep concern over the draft decision as it contained provisions for the pursuit of negotiations outside of the CD. It stated that any attempt to take the negotiations away from the CD would undermine the authority and confidence of that body.

Before voting against the draft decision, **Pakistan** said that a group of governmental experts on the FMCT was an ill-advised move that would add no value to the deliberations on the FMCT and would undermine the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating forum. It believed that changing the format or venue could not alter the underlying reasons for the stalemate and that a group of governmental experts on the FMCT needed the participation of all countries with the capability of producing fissile material.

After voting in favour, two States stated the following:

- **Iraq** said that it believed in the importance of achieving a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear-weapon devices, and in the need to deal with the related stockpiles in a way that would support the international community's efforts to completely eliminate nuclear weapons and thereby free the world from the disastrous threat they pose.
- **India** said that, without prejudice to the priority it attached to nuclear disarmament, it supported the negotiation in the CD of a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable FMCT. It stated that the group of governmental experts amounted to neither pre-negotiations nor negotiations on an FMCT, which should take place in the CD on the basis of the agreed mandate.

After abstaining, two States delivered statements:

- **Egypt** said that it considered a treaty on fissile material an important step towards achieving nuclear disarmament. It welcomed the creation of the group of governmental experts and looked forward to contributing substantively to its deliberations, with a view to ensuring that any potential fissile material treaty would take into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Egypt said that it would continue to seek within the CD the early adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

- **Israel** said that the inherent utility of an FMCT in addressing the current growing proliferation challenges, including non-compliance by States with international obligations in the nuclear domain, was far from proven, especially in the Middle East. Israel believed that the idea of an FMCT was subsumed in the concept of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, the essential prerequisites for which were far from being fulfilled.

Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons

68/45. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Introduced by: Poland (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 104-108.

The General Assembly emphasized that the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was essential to achieving its object and purpose and to enhancing the security of States parties, as well as to international peace and security. In this connection, it underlined that the objectives of the Convention would not be fully realized as long as there remained even a single State not party to the Convention that could possess or acquire such weapons. The Assembly called upon all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay. It reaffirmed that the obligation of the States parties to complete the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and the destruction or conversion of chemical weapons production facilities was essential for the realization of the object and purpose of the Convention. The Assembly recalled that the Third CWC Review Conference had expressed concern regarding the statement of the Director-General of the OPCW in his report to the Organization's Executive Council that Libya, the Russian Federation and the United States of America had been unable to fully meet the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 for the destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles, and also expressed determination that the destruction of all categories of chemical weapons should be completed in the shortest time possible. The General Assembly noted with concern that the international community also faced the danger of the production, acquisition and use of chemical weapons by non-State actors, including terrorists, concerns which had highlighted the necessity of achieving universal adherence to the Convention as well as the high level of readiness of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

First Committee. After joining consensus, **India** delivered a statement, saying that it believed that the draft resolution did not fully reflect the balance of points in the final report of the third special session of the CWC Review Conference. It believed that the consultations conducted could have been more comprehensive and called upon the sponsor of the draft resolution to act accordingly the following year so that the draft resolution would reflect the views of all Member States.

Pakistan also spoke after joining consensus. It said that it considered the draft text an important and consensus resolution. It shared the concerns regarding the overall balance of the draft text and regretted that a paragraph on the promotion of the

geographical representation, to review the operation and further development of the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures. The work of the group of experts would also include the establishment of a process for periodic reviews in order to ensure the continued relevance and operation of the Report, commencing in 2016. The expert group would take into account the views expressed by Member States on the subject and the reports of the Secretary-General on objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures. The Assembly requested that the report of the group of experts be transmitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its seventy-second session.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it did not support the use of a costly mechanism of a closely restricted expert group where there was little evidence of effectiveness. Instead, it favoured transparent and inclusive processes whereby all Member States could consider those important topics on an equal footing in the framework of the bodies of the United Nations disarmament machinery. It also highlighted its concern about increasing military expenditures and reiterated its call for a United Nations fund to which at least half of current spending on military expenditures would be devoted in order to respond to the need for economic and social development in countries in need.

After joining the consensus, **Pakistan** said that transparency was a means to an end and not an end in itself. It should be aligned, it said, with the broader goals of confidence-building, the mitigation of tensions and the resolution of conflicts through dialogue and mediation. Pakistan believed that the initiative for reduction of military expenditures should come from States with the largest arsenals, that reductions should not upset the global or regional military balance, and that, to maintain the equilibrium, the reduction of expenditures should be linked with clearly specified reduction of military personnel and hardware. It stated that the success of the concept would ultimately be determined by conflict resolution and the creation of confidence among States.

68/30. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Introduced by: Slovenia (29 Oct.)

GA vote: 165-0-19 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 154-0-18 (1 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 28-31.

The General Assembly invited all States that had not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention) to accede without delay. It urged the remaining State that had signed but had not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay. It stressed the importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention.

First Committee. Before voting in favour, two States delivered statements:

- Rather than abstain as it did in previous years, **Libya** said that it would vote in favour of the draft resolution due to humanitarian reasons. Referring to ongoing mine-clearing activities in its country, Libya expressed its thanks

peaceful uses of chemistry had not been included, thereby making the draft text a little lopsided.

68/69. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

Introduced by: Hungary (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 207-210.

The General Assembly noted with satisfaction the successful outcome of and the decisions on all provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention reached at the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, and called upon States parties to participate and actively engage in their implementation. It also noted with appreciation the decision of the Seventh Review Conference on the establishment of a database to facilitate requests for and offers of exchange of assistance and cooperation, and urged States parties to submit to the Implementation Support Unit, on a voluntary basis, requests and offers of cooperation and assistance. The Assembly encouraged States parties to provide, at least biannually, appropriate information on their implementation of article X and to collaborate to offer assistance or training upon request that would support States parties with implementation measures to ensure their compliance. It noted with satisfaction the decision of the Seventh Review Conference on the establishment of a sponsorship programme in order to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme. The General Assembly called upon States parties in a position to do so to offer voluntary contributions for the programme. The General Assembly also noted with appreciation the work of the Implementation Support Unit during the 2007-2010 intersessional process and the Seventh Review Conference, and welcomed the decision of the Seventh Review Conference to renew its mandate. The Secretary-General was requested to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention, to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the review conferences. He was also requested to provide the necessary assistance and services required for the meetings of experts and the meetings of States parties during the 2012-2015 intersessional process.

Chapter III. Conventional weapons issues

68/23. Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

Introduced by: Romania (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 1-5.

With a view to achieving the broadest possible participation, the General Assembly called upon Member States to provide the Secretary-General an annual report on their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available. It also requested the Secretary-General, to establish a group of governmental experts, within available resources and on the basis of equitable

to countries and civil society organizations that had offered technical assistance and financial aid to ensure the removal of landmines planted by the previous regime and to rehabilitate the victims that had been injured by those landmines.

- **Morocco** reiterated its support for the eminently humanitarian objectives of the Convention, in particular that of protecting civilians from unacceptable damage caused by anti-personnel mines. It said that it had applied the provisions of the Convention in the field of demining, destruction of stockpiles, outreach and training and assistance to the victims of anti-personnel mines. It stated that its accession to the Convention was a strategic goal linked to security imperatives with regard to respect for its territorial integrity.

Three States spoke before they abstained.

- **Egypt** stated that it had imposed a moratorium on the production and export of landmines since 1980. It said that the Convention lacked balance between humanitarian concerns related to the production and use of anti-personnel landmines and their legitimate military use in border protection. It also noted that the Convention did not impose any legal responsibility on States to remove anti-personnel mines that they had placed in the territories of others. Egypt said that the lack of universality of the Convention reflected the lack of international consensus on those provisions due, in part, to its finalization outside of the United Nations.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** said that although it was aware of the humanitarian effects of anti-personnel mines, it was not in a position to renounce their use for reasons of national defence. It stated that, in an environment where military tension and threats were its daily lot, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not in a position to accede to the Mine Ban Convention.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it shared the humanitarian concerns related to anti-personnel mines; however, the Convention did not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders that used those mines in a responsible and limited manner to defend their territories. It believed that, while defensive devices should be used under strict, established rules to protect civilians, more national and international efforts should also be made to explore new alternatives to landmines. It stated that international cooperation should be promoted to speed up mine-clearance activities for reducing civilian casualties and to establish sustained indigenous demining programmes.

After voting in favour, **Singapore** said that it supported initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially those directed at innocent civilians. It mentioned its indefinite moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines, implemented in February 1998. It stated that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State could not be disregarded and that a blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might therefore be counter-productive.

After abstaining, four States took the floor:

- **India** said that the availability of militarily effective alternatives that could cost-effectively perform the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines would considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel landmines worldwide. It pointed out that India was a High Contracting Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which took into account the legitimate defence interests of States with long borders, and India had fulfilled its obligations under that Protocol.
- **Cuba** said that it fully shared the legitimate humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines, was a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, including its Amended Protocol II, and strictly complied with the prohibitions and restrictions on the use of mines provided therein. It stated that, in order to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, it was not possible for Cuba to renounce the use of mines, based on the right to legitimate self-defence recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Cuba also added its voice to the call on all States to provide the financial, technical and humanitarian assistance needed for mine-removal operations and the economic and social rehabilitation of victims.
- The **Republic of Korea** said that, due to the security situation in the Korean peninsula, it was unable to accede to the Convention at this point. It was, nevertheless, committed to mitigating the suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines. It explained that it exercised tight controls over anti-personnel landmines, including an indefinite moratorium on their export, and that it was a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, its Amended Protocol II and Protocol V and was faithfully implementing all the relevant obligations. The Republic of Korea stated that it had contributed more than $8 million since 1993 for demining and victim assistance through the relevant United Nations programmes and would continue to do so.
- **Pakistan** said that, given its security requirements and the need to guard its long borders, the use of landmines formed an important part of its self-defence strategy. As such, it was not possible for them to agree to the demands for a complete prohibition of anti-personnel landmines until such time as viable alternatives were available. Pakistan was party to the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and implemented the Protocol with the greatest earnestness. It also referred to its record of assistance to other countries in the area of landmine clearance.

68/31. The Arms Trade Treaty

Introduced by: Japan (29 Oct.)

GA vote: 152-0-29; 153-0-28, o.p. 1; 153-0-29, o.p. 3 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 141-0-28; 137-0-27, o.p. 1; 136-0-28, o.p. 3 (1 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 32-35.

The General Assembly welcomed the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 2 April 2013 and called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and, thereafter, ratify, accept or approve the Treaty at the earliest possible date. It called upon those States in a position to do so to provide assistance, including legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building and

technical, material or financial assistance, to requesting States that intended to become parties to the Treaty, in order to facilitate its early entry into force.

First Committee. Before abstaining in the vote, two States explained their votes:

- **Ecuador** disapproved of the absence in the text of a call to consider signing the Treaty, which it believed would have served to recognize the necessary consideration and prerogative of sovereign States to decide whether or not to adhere to any international instrument. Ecuador pointed out that the ATT contained some deficiencies, in particular the imbalance between the rights and obligations of exporter and importer States, the importance of fundamental principles of international law and their position in the Treaty, the lack of an express prohibition of transfers to non-authorized non-State actors, the lack of an express reference to the crime of aggression, and the possibility that articles related to the criteria could be used as mechanisms for improper political pressure. It also criticized the attempt, in the final moments of the Conference held in March, to redefine the practice and use of consensus.
- **Belarus** said that the ATT did not fully resolve the issue of the uncontrolled trade in conventional weapons. In its view, the effectiveness of the Treaty would depend on the participation of major importers and exporters, on the taking of specific steps to prevent the illegal trade in such weapons, and on establishing reliable national systems for export control. Belarus said that it would follow this process and would consider its accession to the ATT.

After voting in favour, five States spoke:

- **China** said that it accorded top priority to addressing regional instability and humanitarian problems arising from the illicit trade in conventional arms and had supported and taken active part in ATT negotiations. China stated that it had no substantial difficulty with the provisions of the ATT; however, it believed that the Treaty should have been adopted by consensus and did not agree to adopting such a Treaty with an important bearing on international and national security by a vote in the General Assembly. It mentioned that it was seriously considering the possibility of signing the Treaty.
- **Mexico** expressed its full support for the ATT, which it considered a historic achievement, being the first legally binding instrument regulating the trade in conventional arms and preventing their diversion to the illicit market. As a State party to the ATT, Mexico reiterated its commitment to advocate the regime that it provided for. It urged other signatories to take the necessary measures within their national legislations for it to be fully implemented. Mexico believed that the text of the draft resolution should have included a reference to the provisional application of the Treaty.
- **Singapore** said that an ATT should be practical, effective and based on feasible and implementable obligations, so that it could be universally accepted. Although the ATT had been adopted by the General Assembly in April, Singapore noted that certain articles had been introduced late and incorporated into the final text with little opportunity for debate during the Final ATT Conference. In that regard, Singapore would need more time to study the Treaty obligations.

- **Pakistan** said that it shared the concerns regarding adopting by a vote multilateral treaties that had a direct bearing on the legitimate self-defence needs of States and strongly disagreed with attempts to reinterpret the principle of consensus. It also drew attention to the following: the Treaty text ignored the vital element of excessive production, an inseparable component of the entire chain of the international trade in conventional arms, which might impact the Treaty's effectiveness over the long run; the Treaty might be perceived by many as essentially a product of and by exporters only and not as striking the necessary balance of interests and obligations among exporters and importers, as well as the affected States; the Treaty glossed over two lacunae, including the absence of definitions, which might be used by some exporters to circumvent its provisions and result in a multiplicity of national definitions; and the Treaty did not contain a clear mechanism for the accountability of exporters in the event of violations of the ATT provisions, as it may reinforce the perception that the Treaty is unfairly tilted towards exporting States. Pakistan hoped that the ATT review process would address its concerns, which would be key to promoting the effectiveness and universality of the Treaty.
- **Canada** said that it was very important that the Treaty did not affect legitimate and responsible firearms owners, or that it be an obstacle to the legitimate and legal international transfer of conventional weapons. It stated that it consulted with national stakeholders concerned to ascertain their views on the Treaty and that it wanted to reassure them that the Treaty would not be an undue burden on legitimate firearms possessors in Canada.

After abstaining, five States explained their positions:

- **Egypt** pointed out that the ATT had been adopted by a vote of the General Assembly and that the vote had come after the failure to achieve a consensus at the Final ATT Conference on a text acceptable to all. It believed that the Treaty should have included important definitions of terms and concepts essential for implementation and a collective mechanism to identify the applicability of agreed criteria by which an exporter would determine the application of the Treaty. Egypt noted the lack of a reference to crimes of aggression and foreign occupation as part of the assessment that would have clarified the implementation process. It also called for addressing overproduction and increasing conventional weapons stockpiles of major arms exporters and producers. It said that international accountability was the only guarantee against the possible abuse of the existing imbalance between major arms exporters and the rest of the world.
- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that the Treaty fell short of meeting expectations for an effective, robust, balanced and non-discriminatory treaty aimed at reducing the human suffering resulting from the illicit trade in conventional arms. It expressed concern regarding the following points: that the Treaty failed to incorporate a prohibition on arms transfers to aggressors and foreign occupiers; that the Treaty did not apply to international arms movements by or on behalf of a State party for its use or to the transfer of arms between member States of a military alliance, while such arms transfers in some cases had been used to commit aggression and occupation that had

caused human losses and destruction of the infrastructure of a number of countries, including in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; that the ATT fell short of recognizing the inherent right of States to acquire, produce, export, import and transfer conventional arms, required for the realization of the inalienable right of any State to security, self-defence and territorial integrity; that there was no real safeguard in the Treaty to secure the rights of importing countries, and therefore it was highly susceptible to abuse, politicization, manipulation and discrimination; that the ATT did not prevent arms falling into the hands of criminals, illegal armed groups, terrorists and extremist groups; that the Treaty did not ask for a limitation on the production and transfer of conventional arms; and that the inclusion of parts and components in the Treaty in the absence of any clear definition ran the high risk of equating all simple dual-use goods and equipment with actual conventional weapons.

- **India** stated that it believed that there should be no conflict between national security objectives and a strong, balanced and effective ATT. It said that the Treaty was weak on terrorism and non-State actors, since it did not mention them in the specific prohibitions of the Treaty. It pointed out that the Treaty could not be an instrument in the hands of exporting States to take unilateral force majeure measures against importing States without consequences. India stated that, since the Treaty text did not meet its requirements on those counts, it was undertaking a thorough assessment of the ATT from the perspective of its defence, security and foreign policy interests and that, until that assessment was completed, India was not in a position to take a final view on the Treaty.
- **Cuba** said that it was unfortunate that a vote was forced on a Treaty text that did not respond to the just calls and needs of the international community. It believed that ambiguities, inconsistencies, a lack of definitions and legal gaps characterized the ATT. It stated that the Treaty was an unbalanced instrument that favoured arms-exporting States to the detriment of the legitimate interests of other States, including in defence and national security and of the alleviation of human suffering.
- The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** said that the Treaty did not reflect a fair and balanced context and it thus undermined the national security environment of countries. It believed that increased intervention of large arms dealers would result in more chaos, conflict and human suffering, as well as provide uncountable benefits to major arms-exporting countries and allow them to interfere in the legal framework of major world conflict areas.

68/34. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them

Submitted by: Sponsors (1 Nov.)[c]

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 43-46.

The General Assembly encouraged the international community to support the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, and encouraged the States in the Sahelo-Saharan region to facilitate the functioning of national commissions to combat illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The Assembly also encouraged the collaboration of civil society organizations in the efforts of the national commissions.

68/43. Transparency in armaments

Introduced by: Netherlands (29 Oct.)

GA vote: 154-0-28; 142-0-36, p.p. 6; 143-0-36, p.p. 7; 150-0-30, o.p. 3; 156-0-25, o.p. 4; 153-0-26, o.p. 5; 153-0-28, o.p. 6; 155-0-27, o.p. 6 (a); 155-0-26, o.p. 6 (b) (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 145-0-28; 134-0-36, p.p. 6; 135-0-34, p.p. 7; 143-0-28, o.p. 3; 147-0-23, o.p. 4; 148-0-23, o.p. 5; 145-0-26, o.p. 6; 144-0-27, o.p. 6 (a); 146-0-24, o.p. 6 (b) (1 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 84-97.

The General Assembly endorsed the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and the recommendations contained in the consensus report of the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts. It recalled its request to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the subject, including on whether the absence of small arms and light weapons as a main category in the Register had limited its relevance and directly affected decisions on participation, and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2016, within existing resources, with the broadest possible participation, in line with the recommendation contained in paragraph 76 of the 2013 report of the Secretary-General, to prepare a report on the continuing operation and relevance of the Register and its further development.

First Committee. Before abstaining on the vote, three States took the floor:

- The **Russian Federation** said that the reference in the draft resolution to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to the ATT were not in line with the draft's overall context. It did not believe that the entry into force of the ATT would lead to greater transparency. It pointed out that the Treaty provided for information exchanges only between States parties, with no stipulation on a disclosure of and free access to statistics on transfers on the part of the international community. The Russian Federation explained that the Treaty included exemptions that allowed States to refrain from providing information, a right that many Governments would, no doubt, make use of and that would contradict the goal of increased transparency.

[c] The initial draft resolution was introduced by Mali. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the Sponsors.

- The **Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that transparency in conventional arms without transparency in weapons of mass destruction was imbalanced and lacked comprehensiveness, particularly in the volatile region of the Middle East. It pointed out that the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was supposed to be a first step towards initiating transparency in all kinds of armaments, including weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons.
- Intending to abstain on the voting on the sixth preambular paragraph, **Belarus** said that it would keep to its views on the ATT in the voting on the draft resolution. It believed that the ATT did not fully resolve the issue of the uncontrolled trade in conventional weapons and that its effectiveness would depend on the participation of major importers and exporters and on establishing reliable national systems for export control.

Four States that voted in favour delivered statements:

- **Ecuador**, believed that transparency in armaments was an important element in developing confidence-building measures among States and, in this regard, said that the reference to the ATT in the preamble was irrelevant. It believed that reference to an instrument that had not been adopted by consensus was not helpful in the negotiation of draft resolutions in the First Committee.
- Recalling the role of the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament and that transparency in armaments had been part of its agenda since 1979, **Mexico** expressed concern at the lack of progress on that and other items on its agenda. It believed, therefore, that the language of operative paragraph 8 did not reflect reality.
- **Canada** said that it was very important that the Treaty not affect legitimate and responsible firearms owners, or that it be an obstacle to the legitimate and legal international transfer of conventional weapons. It stated that it consulted with national stakeholders concerned to ascertain their views on the Treaty and that it wanted to reassure them that the Treaty would not be an undue burden on legitimate firearms possessors in Canada.
- **Venezuela** said that it supported the need for transparency linked to confidence-building measures in security; however, it rejected the reference to the ATT in the preamble, which, it said, undermined the purpose and scope of the proposals that had been under discussion. Venezuela would have supported the draft resolution if more moderate language had been used and if the concerns about the ATT had been taken into account.

After abstaining on the draft resolution, three States spoke:

- **Morocco** said that it supported transparency in armaments and considered the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to be a very useful tool. It explained that transparency in armaments could be instrumental in confidence-building at the international and regional levels and that, in its region, clarity on capacities with regard to weapons of mass destruction and progress in disarmament were equally as important as confidence-building measures.

- With regard to the references to the ATT in the draft resolution, **Cuba** said that it was unfortunate that an agreement through consensus had been disregarded and that a vote had been forced on a Treaty text that had not responded to the just calls and needs of the international community. It believed that the ATT had been characterized by ambiguities, inconsistencies, legal gaps and a lack of definitions. It further described the Treaty as an unbalanced instrument that favoured the interests of arms-exporting States over those of the countries suffering from the effects of the arms trade.
- Speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, **Tunisia** underscored the need for transparency in armaments, arguing that, in order for the transparency mechanism to be successful, it must follow balanced, transparent and non-discriminatory guidelines. It noted, in this connection, that more than half of States had not been providing information to the Register and suggested in this regard that the Register be expanded to cover military technologies and applications on a more balanced and non-discriminatory basis. This approach, it suggested, would make it possible for more States to participate in the Register.

68/44. National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology

Introduced by: Netherlands (29 Oct.)

GA vote: 177-0-4; 162-0-17, p.p. 7; 162-0-14, p.p. 8; 164-0-13, o.p. 1 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 171-0-4; 156-0-17, p.p. 7; 158-0-15, p.p. 8; 157-0-15, o.p. 1 (1 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 98-103.

The General Assembly invited Member States that were in a position to do so, without prejudice to the provisions in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent relevant Council resolutions, to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, such as the ATT, and encouraged Member States to provide information on a voluntary basis to the Secretary-General on the above matters, as well as the changes therein. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue making that information accessible to all Member States.

First Committee. Two States intending to vote in favour spoke before the action on the draft resolution:

- Intending to abstain on the voting on the seventh preambular paragraph, **Belarus** said that it would keep to its views on the ATT in the voting on the draft resolution. It believed that the ATT did not fully resolve the issue of the uncontrolled trade in conventional weapons and that its effectiveness would depend on the participation of major importers and exporters and on establishing reliable national systems for export control.
- **Cuba**'s statement was related to its vote on the draft resolution on the ATT. It said that it was unfortunate that an agreement through consensus had been disregarded and that a vote had been forced on a Treaty text that had not responded to the just calls and needs of the international community. It believed that the ATT had been characterized by ambiguities, inconsistencies, legal gaps and a lack of definitions. It further described the Treaty as an

unbalanced instrument that favoured the interests of arms-exporting States over those of the countries suffering from the effects of the arms trade.

After voting in favour, four States took the floor:

- The representative of **India** said that while it had voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, it had abstained with respect to the references to the ATT in the draft resolution as they were inconsistent with India's approach to the Treaty. India believed that the Treaty should have ensured a balance of obligations between exporting and importing States. The final text of that Treaty, however, failed to meet India's requirements in this regard. India advised that it was currently assessing the ATT and was not in a position to take a final view on the ATT until its assessment was complete.
- **Ecuador** questioned how the draft resolution could be adopted by consensus when it contained references to a Treaty that had, itself, not been adopted by consensus.
- The **Sudan** affirmed in principle the importance of the national control of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology and also underscored the importance of national laws to ensure that such items were not transferred to unauthorized parties. However, it did not want constraints that could be used by some people in order to prevent their utilization for useful purposes in developing countries.
- The **Russian Federation** pointed out that paragraph 1 of the draft resolution had referred to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which dealt exclusively with weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and weapons-of-mass-destruction-related dual-use goods and technology, while the draft resolution dealt with conventional weapons. It thought, therefore, that reference to that resolution in the context of the draft resolution was inappropriate. In the Russian Federation's view, it would have been better to have referenced confidence and trust-building measures in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution.

68/48. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

Introduced by: Colombia (29 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 123-128.

The General Assembly encouraged States to take full advantage of the benefits of cooperation with the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, the World Customs Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in accordance with their mandates and consistent with national priorities.

68/52. Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus

Introduced by: Germany (30 Oct.)
GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 146-149.

The General Assembly welcomed the completion of implementation software and training materials that facilitated the application of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in the field. It encouraged the safe and secure management of ammunition stockpiles in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations, including through the training of peacekeepers, utilizing the Technical Guidelines. It welcomed the establishment of the Saf*er*Guard quick-response mechanism, which allowed ammunitions experts to be deployed rapidly to assist States, upon request, in the urgent management of ammunition stockpiles, including in the aftermath of unintended explosions of ammunition, and encourages States in a position to do so to provide technical expertise or financial support to the mechanism;

First Committee. After joining consensus, **Pakistan** said that the States with the largest stockpiles of conventional armaments should take the lead in assessing surplus stockpiles and their safe disposal. It believed that such efforts should be supplemented by action at the regional and subregional levels to prevent excessive accumulation in conventional armaments and military forces, and that some general guidelines could be established under the auspices of the United Nations.

The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela**, also joining consensus, said that the Antigua declaration adopted in May 2006 recognized that the trade in ammunition was intrinsically linked to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. It believed that marking ammunition before exporting or transferring it would prevent its diversion to groups acting outside of the law. Marking ammunition, it said, was a crucial aspect in the fight against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

68/66. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

Introduced by: Philippines (30 Oct.)
GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (4 Nov.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 195-197.

The General Assembly recalled the decision by the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on the continuation of the Sponsorship Programme within the framework of the Convention and, with recognition of the value and importance of the Sponsorship Programme, encouraged States to contribute to it. The Assembly noted that, in its final report, the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention did not make any recommendation or decision regarding the continuation of discussions on mines other than anti-personnel mines.

First Committee. After joining the consensus, **Germany** said that it would have preferred the inclusion of a recommendation or decision on the continuation of discussions on mines other than anti-personnel mines in paragraph 7 of the resolution. It also believed that the irresponsible use of moving target attack missiles posed a humanitarian threat, and that universalizing initiatives to limit the operational life span and ensure the detectability of such missiles were essential to protecting civilians from harm.

Chapter IV. Regional disarmament

68/24. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his informal consultations with Committee members and to report through the Committee to the General Assembly at its seventieth session.

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (5 Nov.)

GA vote: 130-4-45 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 127-4-45 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 6-8.

68/25. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

The General Assembly welcomed the convening of the first Conference of States Parties to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), in Addis Ababa on 4 November 2010, and of the second Conference of States Parties, also in Addis Ababa, on 12 and 13 November 2012.

Introduced by: Nigeria, on behalf of the Group of African States (21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 9-10.

First Committee. After joining the consensus, **India** said that it respected the sovereign choice of States parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba and welcomed the Treaty's successful entry into force. India stated that, as a nuclear-weapon State, it conveyed its unambiguous assurance that it would respect the status of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Having joined the consensus on the draft resolution, **Spain** stated, however, that it had not joined the consensus on operative paragraph 5 regarding Protocol III of the Treaty after taking into consideration the guidelines adopted by consensus in the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and in keeping with consensual rules and agreements freely reached between the countries of the region concerned. In this connection, Spain explained that the Treaty contained no provision, obligation, guarantee or safeguard in the sphere of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation that Spain had not already adopted in the context of the European Atomic Energy Community and the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Spain explained, moreover, that its territory had been nuclear-weapon-free since 1976.

68/26. Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Submitted by: Sponsors (5 Nov.)[d]

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 11-13.

The General Assembly encouraged States that had ratified the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to review any reservations in this regard, in accordance with action 9 of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Assembly also encouraged States members of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to continue its activities and efforts with a view to implementing the agreements reached at the first and second conferences of States parties and signatories to treaties that established nuclear-weapon-free zones.

68/27. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Introduced by: Egypt (22 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 14-17.

The General Assembly called upon all countries of the region that had not yet done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and requested the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States and to seek their views on the measures outlined in the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990 or other relevant measures.

First Committee. In a general statement, the **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** said that it regretted that the international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had not been convened in 2012. It reiterated that the convening of that conference had been a significant component of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It urged the parties to convene the conference as soon as possible.

Before joining the consensus, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** stated that the failure to convene the conference in 2012 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had seriously challenged the integrity and credibility of the non-proliferation regime and the consensus agreements of successive NPT Review Conferences. It reiterated its readiness to participate in the conference and stressed that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universalization of the NPT in the Middle East should be the highest priority at that conference.

After joining the consensus, **Israel** said that all the security concerns of regional members should be taken into account and addressed within the regional context. It said that the disturbing realities in the Middle East mandated a practical step-by-step approach that could realistically begin only with a modest arrangement of confidence-

[d] The initial draft resolution was introduced by Mexico. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.

and security-building measures in order to build the stable infrastructure and trust necessary for more ambitious security undertakings. In this regard, Israel regretted that no regional dialogue existed in the Middle East, and that there was no forum to develop confidence-building measures and defuse tensions. It stated that any regional security dialogue had to focus on tangible threats such as rockets and missiles, which were a vital aspect of any regional disarmament.

68/49. Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

Introduced by: Brunei Darussalam, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the States parties to the Bangkok Treaty (4 Nov.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 129-131.

The General Assembly encouraged States parties to the Treaty to continue to engage nuclear-weapon States to resolve comprehensively, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty, outstanding issues with a view to signing the Protocol thereto and its related documents expeditiously. The Assembly underlined the value of enhancing and implementing further ways and means of cooperation among the States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and the protocols thereto, with a view to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and to contributing towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament.

First Committee. After joining the consensus, **India** said that it respected the sovereign choice of States parties to the Bangkok Treaty. India stated that, as a nuclear-weapon State, it conveyed its unambiguous assurance that it would respect the status of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

68/54. Regional disarmament

Introduced by: Pakistan (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 153-154.

The General Assembly called upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels. It welcomed the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken at those levels, and supported and encouraged efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures, easing regional tensions and furthering disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels.

68/55. Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context

Introduced by: Pakistan (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 155-157.

The General Assembly called upon Member States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It also called upon Member States to pursue confidence- and security-building measures through sustained

consultations and dialogue, and urged States to comply strictly with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements, to which they were party. The Assembly encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures.

68/56. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

The General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles to serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looked forward to the subsequent report on the subject. It requested the Secretary-General, in the meantime, to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session.

Introduced by: Pakistan (30 Oct.)

GA vote: 182-1-2; 145-2-35, o.p. 2 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 174-1-2; 140-1-34, o.p. 2 (1 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 158-161.

First Committee. After voting in favour, **Mexico** said that the development of principles for the control of conventional arms went beyond the competence of the Conference on Disarmament, not only because of the subject matter but also because it did not fit within the negotiating mandate of the Conference. Mexico asserted that the Disarmament Commission should be the body to consider this issue, given its deliberative nature. It stated that, given the paralysis in the work of the Disarmament Commission, it was not a viable option to add another topic to the work of that forum.

After voting against the draft resolution, **India** said that the Conference on Disarmament had a vocation for negotiating disarmament instruments of global application. Recalling that in 1993 the Disarmament Commission had adopted by consensus guidelines and recommendations for regional disarmament, India argued that there was no need for the Conference to engage in formulating principles on the same subject, when it had several other priority issues on its agenda. India also felt that the security concerns of States extended beyond narrowly defined regions.

After abstaining on the draft resolution, the **Russian Federation** expressed concern regarding what it believed to be an inappropriate reference to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which it considered obsolete. It called for the establishment of authentic partnerships among all European States based on the principle of equitable, unified and undiminished security.

68/57. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament

The General Assembly appealed to Member States in each region and those that were able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives. It also requested the Secretary-General to provide all

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (5 Nov.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 162-163.

support necessary, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities.

68/59. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

Introduced by: Nepal (23 Oct.)
GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 167-169.

The General Assembly expressed its satisfaction with the activities carried out in the past year by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and invited all States of the region to continue to support the activities of the Regional Centre, including by continuing to take part in them, where possible, and by proposing items for inclusion in the programme of activities of the Centre, in order to contribute to the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament.

68/60. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Submitted by: Sponsors (5 Nov.)[e]
GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 170-173.

The Assembly encouraged the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean to further develop activities in all countries of the region in the important areas of peace, disarmament and development and to provide, upon request and in accordance with its mandate, support to Member States of the region in the national implementation of relevant instruments, inter alia, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** underlined its support for the work and revitalization of the regional centres for peace and disarmament, in particular the role played by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba said that, while it intended to join the consensus on the adoption of the draft resolution, it did not entirely share the interests or positions expressed regarding the ATT. The Treaty, it said, contained ambiguities, inconsistencies, imprecise definitions and legal loopholes. Cuba also considered the Treaty to be an imbalanced instrument that favoured the interests of weapon-exporting countries over the humanitarian suffering caused by the unregulated trafficking in arms.

Before joining the consensus, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it had joined the consensus based on the understanding that all measures, references and concepts contained in the draft resolution were applicable only to the countries in the region concerned. It stated that references to ammunition and explosives, armed violence and the ATT should not set a precedent for their inclusion in future draft

[e] The initial draft resolution was introduced by Peru. The revised draft resolution was submitted by the sponsors.

resolutions and decisions of the First Committee, or the scope of the issues or outcome documents of the other disarmament forums.

68/61. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

Introduced by: Nigeria, on behalf of the Group of African States (28 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 174-177.

The General Assembly welcomed the assistance of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa to the African Union Commission in the elaboration of the African Union Common Position on an ATT. It also welcomed efforts by the Regional Centre to promote the role and representation of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control activities. The Assembly noted with appreciation the impact of the assistance that it provided to Central and West African States in the elaboration of their respective common positions on the ATT, to West Africa on the implementation of the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (adopted by the Economic Community of West African States) and on security sector reform initiatives, and to East Africa on programmes to control brokering of small arms and light weapons, as well as the substantive support provided by the Centre to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The General Assembly called upon the Centre to provide, upon request, substantive support to African Member States in implementing the ATT.

First Committee. Before joining the consensus, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it had joined the consensus based on the understanding that all measures, references and concepts contained in the draft resolution were applicable only to the countries in the region concerned. It stated that references to ammunition and the ATT should not set a precedent for their inclusion in future draft resolutions and decisions of the First Committee, or the scope of the issues or outcome documents of the other disarmament forums.

68/62. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

Introduced by: Rwanda (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 178-183.

The General Assembly welcomed the adoption in June 2013 of the Code of Conduct concerning the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illegal Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, which defined the regional maritime security strategy and paved the way for a legally binding instrument, and the decision to establish, in Cameroon, an interregional coordination centre responsible for coordinating the implementation of the regional strategy. The Assembly expressed concern over the negative impact that poaching and illegal wildlife trafficking had on the ecosystem, human development and regional security, and decided to take steps to develop a regional approach to counter this phenomenon. It encouraged the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee to pursue their discussions on concrete conflict prevention initiatives.

First Committee. Before joining the consensus, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it had joined the consensus on the understanding that all measures, references and concepts contained in the draft resolution were applicable only to the countries in the region concerned. It stated that references to ammunition, armed violence, the ATT and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) should not set a precedent for their inclusion in future draft resolutions and decisions of the First Committee, or the scope of the issues or outcome documents of the other disarmament forums.

68/67. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Introduced by: Algeria (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 198-201.

The General Assembly reaffirmed that security in the Mediterranean was closely linked to that of Europe, as well as to international peace and security; called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation; and encouraged them to strengthen confidence-building measures by promoting openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

First Committee. Before the adoption of the draft resolution, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it would not participate in the Committee's action on the draft resolution. It explained that, given the continued crisis in the occupied territories of Palestine, the draft resolution had not factually reflected the situation in the occupied territory, and therefore was far from the reality in the region.

Chapter V. Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues

68/29. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Introduced by: Sri Lanka (31 Oct.)

GA vote: 180-0-2 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 175-0-2 (31 Oct.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 23-27.

The General Assembly invited the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working group under its agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" as early as possible during its 2014 session.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that it was important and necessary to continue to develop international transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space. It believed that the Disarmament Commission should play the leading role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

68/33. Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control

Introduced by: Trinidad and Tobago (5 Nov.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 40-42.

The General Assembly urged Member States, relevant subregional and regional organizations, the United Nations and the specialized agencies to promote equal opportunities for the representation of women in all decision-making processes with regard to matters related to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, in particular as it related to the prevention and reduction of armed violence and armed conflict. It welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the measures taken by Member States to implement General Assembly resolution 67/48 (A/68/166 and Add.1.). The Assembly urged Member States to support and strengthen the effective participation of women in organizations in the field of disarmament at the local, national, subregional and regional levels, and called upon all States to empower women, including through capacity-building efforts, as appropriate, to participate in the design and implementation of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts. It requested the relevant United Nations organs, agencies, funds and programmes to assist States, upon request, in promoting the role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, including in preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

First Committee. After joining the consensus, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that the draft resolution was acceptable to it only inasmuch as it was in line with its Constitution, laws, regulations and administrative procedures.

68/36. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 53-54.

The General Assembly called upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress within the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development. It invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly's sixty-ninth session.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that all States should contribute to ensuring compliance with relevant environmental standards when implementing treaties and conventions to which they were parties.

Before action was taken on the draft resolution, the **United States** said that it would not participate in the action on the draft resolution. It explained that it operated under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. It saw no direct connection, however, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control, and did not consider that a matter germane to the First Committee.

After joining the consensus, **France** delivered a statement, speaking also on behalf of the United Kingdom. It said that their countries operated under strict domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. France added that it saw no direct link between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.

68/37. Relationship between disarmament and development

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 55-57.

The General Assembly reiterated its invitation to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.

First Committee. **Cuba** said that it was unacceptable that $1.75 trillion was devoted annually to military expenditure when it could have been used to combat extreme poverty and promote development among all nations. It reiterated the proposal to establish a United Nations fund that would receive a sum equal to at least half the current total of military expenditure in order to address the economic and social development requirements of countries in need.

The **United States** said that it would not participate in the action on the draft resolution as it believed that disarmament and development were two distinct issues. It noted that it was not bound by the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, adopted on 11 September 1987.

After joining the consensus, **France** spoke on its own behalf and that of the United Kingdom, expressing support for the mainstreaming of disarmament issues into development policies, in particular, in the field of conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons, as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It believed, however, that the notion of a symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development was questionable. It pointed out in this regard that there was no automatic link but, rather, a complex relationship.

68/38. Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Introduced by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (5 Nov.)

GA vote: 127-5-52 (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: 123-5-50 (5 Nov.)

For text, sponsors and voting pattern, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 58-62.

The General Assembly reaffirmed multilateralism as the core principle in disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations and called, once again, upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It requested the Secretary-General to

seek the views of Member States on the issue and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that the complex international situation and the importance of working together in order to address the various problems that beset humankind underscored the importance of the draft resolution.

68/41. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Introduced by: India (21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (31 Oct.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 76-78.

The General Assembly called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and urged them to strengthen national measures in that regard. It appealed to them to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session.

First Committee. After joining the consensus, **Pakistan** stated that the fear of terrorists and non-State actors acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction needed to be evaluated and put into perspective. It pointed out, in this regard, that it was more likely for terrorists and non-State actors to acquire and use chemical and biological weapons than nuclear weapons. Pakistan urged the international community not to lower its guard to prevent the possibility of the development and use of dirty bombs. It therefore called for increased international cooperation, including the initiation of negotiations on a radiological weapons convention. Pakistan opined that the faithful and timely implementation of existing treaty regimes such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction could effectively address most of those threats. The control of biological weapons, Pakistan emphasized, should be of more concern. It suggested, in this regard, that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction should be strengthened, including by possibly concluding the verification protocol.

While it joined the consensus, the **Islamic Republic of Iran**, disassociated itself from the paragraph referring to the Nuclear Security Summit. It considered such summits to be closed selective gatherings based on the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons by a few countries should be continued and that the only problem was securing those weapons and the materials needed for their manufacture. It noted that nuclear security summits never mentioned nuclear disarmament. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that nuclear security should be addressed in an open, comprehensive and transparent manner, with the equal participation of all States.

68/50. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

Introduced by: Russian Federation (28 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (4 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 132-134.

The General Assembly encouraged Member States to review and implement the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (A/68/189), through relevant national mechanisms, on a voluntary basis and in a manner consistent with the national interests of Member States. It also encouraged relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system to coordinate, as appropriate, on matters related to the recommendations contained in the report. The Assembly decided, in order to further advance transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, to refer the recommendations contained in the report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament for consideration, as appropriate.

First Committee. In a general statement, **Cuba** said that the draft resolution was an important contribution to efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space but it believed that the Disarmament Commission should play the leading role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

After joining the consensus, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it strongly believed that outer space was the common heritage of humankind to be explored and used for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. As such, it fully supported the main thrust of the draft resolution, which focused on the exploration and uses of outer space by all States exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Islamic Republic of Iran, however, placed on record its understanding of some of the new paragraphs in the draft resolution. It cited, for example, the eighth preambular paragraph referring to the policy of some States of "not being the first State to place weapons in outer space", noting that, under relevant international treaties, States parties had already undertaken not to place in outer space objects carrying weapons of mass destruction. Such a policy, it suggested, should be pursued by the States parties to such treaties only as a complementary measure, without prejudice to their legal obligations under relevant treaties.

68/243. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

Introduced by: Russian Federation (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (27 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 211-214.

The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2014 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, taking into account the assessments and recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (see A/68/98), to continue

to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, including norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States and confidence-building measures, the issues of the use of information and communications technologies in conflicts and how international law applied to the use of information and communications technologies by States, as well as relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems, and to submit to the General Assembly at its seventieth session a report on the results of the study.

First Committee. Three speakers delivered general statements:

- Speaking on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay, **Sweden** highlighted several key recommendations in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the topic (see A/68/98). It said that individuals should have the same rights online and offline and that it would have preferred that a direct reference to Human Rights Council resolution 20/8 were contained in the draft resolution. It believed that an open, free and secure Internet used for peaceful purposes was essential to economic, social and political development in the twenty-first century. It explained that future discussions should be based on a multi-stakeholder approach that included private-sector and civil-society actors.
- **Cuba** said that the hostile use of information and communications technology to subvert the legal and political order of countries was a violation of international norms and standards, which could generate tensions and undermine the principles of international peace and security enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.
- The **Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela** highlighted the importance of improving the security of information and telecommunications networks at the international level in order to make it possible to ensure the sovereignty of States and the privacy of citizens. It drew attention to the expansion of the international espionage campaign and the pertinence of that behaviour with regard to friendly relations among nations.

Before joining the consensus, **Canada** associated itself with the explanation of position delivered by Sweden. It rejected the notion that the control of information available on the Internet was necessary for State security, arguing that freedom of opinion and expression kept democracy secure.

After joining the consensus, **Pakistan** stated that the misuse and unregulated use of information and communications technology could lead to serious implications for international peace and security in the event of a cyberattack launched against critical infrastructure, which could characterize the hostile use of cybertechnologies as a weapon of mass destruction and disruption. It called for an expanded and diversified membership of future groups of governmental experts in strict conformity with equitable geographic representation.

68/515. Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventieth session the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security".

Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (5 Nov.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 215.

68/516. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (decision)

The General Assembly decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

Submitted by: India (30 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 216.

Chapter VI. Disarmament machinery

68/63. Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly recommended that the Disarmament Commission continue the consideration of the following items at its substantive session of 2014: recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.

Introduced by: Malta, on behalf of the members of the Bureau of the Disarmament Commission (21 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 184-185.

68/64. Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to establish an informal working group with a mandate to produce a programme of work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation, appreciated the efforts that led to its submission and adoption, and took note of the provisions of that decision.

Introduced by: Ireland (24 Oct.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, pp. 186-188.

First Committee. After joining the consensus on the draft resolution, the **Islamic Republic of Iran** said that it believed that the CD was the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, and that there was no other alternative. It explained

that the main difficulty in the CD was the lack of political will to make progress and not the consensus rule. It added that the CD should consider negotiations on nuclear disarmament as its highest priority.

68/519. Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations (decision)

The General Assembly, recalling its resolution 66/66 of 2 December 2011, previous resolutions on this matter and its decision 67/519 of 3 December 2012, decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-ninth session the item entitled "Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations".

Introduced by: Switzerland (1 Nov.)

GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.)

1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.)

For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part I, p. 220.

Appendix III
Abbreviations and Acronyms

APPENDIX III

Abbreviations and acronyms

AFCONE	African Commission on Nuclear Energy
AFRIPOL	African Police Cooperation Organisation
AP	additional protocol
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANTOM	ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
BMS	Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
BWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; Biological Weapons Convention
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CASA	United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms
CBM	confidence-building measure
CCW	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
CWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; Chemical Weapons Convention
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPI	Department of Public Information

ERW	explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
FMCT	fissile material cut-off treaty
G-21	Group of 21
GFZ	gun-free zone
GGE	Group of Governmental Experts
GIS	Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures
HCOC	The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
HEU	high-enriched uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEDs	improvised explosive devices
IFE14	Integrated Field Exercise 2014
IHL	international humanitarian law
IMPACS	Implementation Agency for Crime and Security
IMS	International Monitoring System
INSEN	International Nuclear Security Education Network
INSServ	International Nuclear Security Advisory Service
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Mission
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
ITDB	Incident and Trafficking Database
ITI	International Tracing Instrument
IWG	informal working group
LAS	League of Arab States
LEU	low-enriched uranium
MOTAPM	mines other than anti-personnel mines
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New START	Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

NIAP	national implementation action plan
NPDI	Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zones
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PPWT	draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects
PTS	Provisional Technical Secretariat
RACVIAC	Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States; Regional Centre on Small Arms
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
SQP	small quantities protocols
TCBM	transparency and confidence-building measure
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIC	United Nations Information Centre
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNLIREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean UNRCPD
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
UNSAC	United Nations Standing Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa
UNSCAR	United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation
UNTV	United Nations Television and Video

UN-Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UXO	unexploded ordnance
WEF	World Economic Forum
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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