

UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT
COMMISSION



GENERAL

DC/SC.1/EV.157
6 September 1957

ENGLISH

SUB-COMMISSION OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Lancaster House, London,
on Friday 6 September 1957, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. NOBLE

(United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland)

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The CHAIRMAN: Since I am in the Chair, perhaps it would be convenient for me to make a few remarks about the discussion that we had yesterday, when we discussed the adjournment and future meetings of the Sub-Committee. I proposed then that the Sub-Committee should adjourn this week and meet again in New York either on 1 October or at the end of the general debate in the General Assembly, whichever date was the later, and my Western colleagues agreed with that proposal. Mr. Zorin agreed that there should be an adjournment, but proposed that the Sub-Committee should not meet again until after the debate on disarmament in the United Nations, and we did not come to any decision on that point yesterday.

That is the position as I see it. We still favour the proposal that I made yesterday, and perhaps I might ask Mr. Zorin whether he has anything further to say with regard to our future meetings.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I cannot add anything to what I said yesterday. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, it would be advisable to adjourn at this point and not to fix the date or place at which the Sub-Committee will be reconvened until all disarmament questions have been discussed in the General Assembly.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union to reconsider his position. I wish to make it clear that the United States delegation, in supporting the proposal that the Sub-Committee should reconvene on 1 October of this year, is not suggesting that any work done by the Sub-Committee should be a substitute for consideration of the subject in the Disarmament Commission, in the First Committee or in the plenary Assembly. Quite the contrary; it is our view that there should be thorough consideration of all matters relating to disarmament in the Disarmament Commission, in the First Committee and in the General Assembly. It does not seem probable that such discussion could begin by 1 October, and the timing of the Sub-Committee's meetings in New York can be adjusted to whatever schedule is adopted by the General Assembly.

We could make use of the time between now and 1 October. All Governments would have an opportunity to review the proposals that are before us. The Soviet Government could give further consideration to the very constructive and far-reaching proposals (DC/SC.1/66) of 29 August, advanced by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Our Governments could review the Soviet statements and proposals, and when we convened on 1 October we could rapidly ascertain whether we could make further progress in the Sub-Committee at that time.

As I say, this is not in any way a proposal to interfere with or suggest a substitute for consideration in the Disarmament Commission, the First Committee and the General Assembly. In fact, each of those bodies has a full right to take up the subject, and any member of any one of them can bring it up. There is thus no question but that it will be thoroughly considered by the Disarmament Commission, by the First Committee and by the General Assembly.

(Mr. Stassen, United States)

But we do not feel that we should delay. We feel that it would be in the service of our search for peace to persevere with this negotiation in every practicable way. Therefore, I would like to urge the Soviet delegation to reconsider its position or to make some counter proposal on exactly how we could best proceed with our work in the Sub-Committee so as to make further progress at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): If Mr. Zorin will let himself be moved by Mr. Stassen's statement and wishes to reply to him, I shall gladly let him speak first.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I think the proposal put forward by the United Kingdom delegation at our last meeting for the adjournment of the Sub-Committee's work is a sensible one and consistent with the present state of affairs. I do not therefore see any reason for changing it in any way now.

As to the date of our next meeting, I do not see how we can fix it now, since we cannot predict the results of the General Assembly's debate on disarmament; we do not know what conclusions it will come to. We cannot fix the date in advance. It would thus be inadvisable for us to decide now when to meet again.

I cannot suggest anything else at present. I fully support the proposal Mr. Noble made yesterday about the adjournment of the Sub-Committee's work.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): In his reply just now Mr. Zorin said in effect, "We cannot predict the General Assembly's decisions, and it would therefore be inadvisable to fix the date and place of our next meeting now". That is just where he and we do not see eye to eye; for what we should like is precisely to be able to hold yet one more session before the debate in the Assembly, in the hope that this little additional session might favourably influence the outcome of that debate. Mr. Zorin, however, will have none of this.

That being so, we must obviously close this session, for we are all agreed that we must call a halt to our work. I should like to make a few observations on behalf of the French delegation, some about the procedural matter just referred to, and some about the situation in general.

In the first place I am compelled to say that I deeply regret the way our talks have gone during this session. We began with perhaps too high hopes, and we are ending in a new stalemate reminiscent of the cold war. The approach of the United Nations General Assembly's session no doubt rouses in some a propaganda fever like that roused in certain political parties by the imminence of a general election.

I will not linger over the over-simplifications, exaggerations and injustices in some of Mr. Zorin's statements. I will confine myself to the facts. These may be summarized as follows. For the first time in five years the four Western delegations have replaced the general plans submitted by one or other of them by a joint plan subscribed to by all of them; and for the very first time this joint plan has commended itself to eleven other Governments. But once again the document thus submitted differs in certain important respects from Soviet ideas.

(Mr. Moch, France)

I will not dwell on the fact that the very existence of a common attitude among the Western Powers means that some of them have moved towards Soviet views and that the gulf between us today seems on the whole less wide than at the beginning of the session. It is because differences still exist that Mr. Noble, speaking on behalf of the Western delegations, urged that the Sub-Committee's work should be interrupted for as short a period as possible and that the session should be resumed on 1 October or, if the general debate was not over by then, immediately after the end of that debate.

The Soviet delegation yesterday rejected that suggestion. It has just rejected it again twice today, despite Mr. Stassen's pleading. It thus regards the session as closed and does not want another until after the disarmament debate in the Assembly, as Mr. Zorin has just reiterated. If I may be allowed to say so quite dispassionately it is assuming a heavy responsibility in adopting such an attitude. I very much regret that the USSR will not agree to the Sub-Committee's being reconvened at an unspecified date, because this will prevent us from making a final effort to reach agreement before the subject is examined by the Assembly. It will thus have to embark on that examination on the basis of present differences, that is to say with less chance of success, because I would remind you that in disarmament matters, as distinct from many other matters, no vote that is not unanimous can have any practical effect, since the majority cannot impose on the minority any measures which the latter consider would endanger their future. Do I need to remind you of the failure in 1948 of what was then known as the Baruch Plan? All delegations voted in favour of this Plan except the Soviet group which voted against it, and because of this dissent it has remained a dead letter for nine years to the very great detriment of humanity, since it is during these nine years that atomic production has been developed.

(Mr. Moch, France)

That is why we must, to the very end and without ever giving up hope, seek agreement among the five of us, for this is a necessary though by no means a sufficient condition for agreement among eighty-one. By its unwillingness to make this effort, the Soviet delegation is weakening the chances of arriving at an agreement in the General Assembly, and thereby sacrificing, if I may say so, efficiency to propaganda, and possible success to certain but futile gestures.

We cannot force the Soviet delegation to agree to an early resumption of the Sub-Committee's session or to new negotiations before the General Assembly begins its general debate. We must therefore give up the idea of a resumption, unless Mr. Zorin changes his mind. But we would most regretfully declare the Soviet delegation responsible for this continuation of the world's present insecurity.

Those are the procedural remarks which I wished to make.

In order not to have to speak again at this meeting -- which should be the last of this session -- I should like to say a few words on the general situation as I see it.

I do not wish to lay too much stress on the differences between us, which might have been the subject of those new talks which we regret we cannot have. I will, however, outline the chief points of divergence.

In the first place, it is not true that by rejecting unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons we are legalizing their use. Anyone who respects the United Nations Charter will be protected from any threat. If Mr. Zorin

(Mr. Moch, France)

admits that every signatory of the Charter will always observe it, then the two texts — his and *curs* — have exactly the same meaning. If, however, a State commits an aggression, how can we, without violating Article 51 of the Charter, deny the victim the means of self-defence? How, by forbidding him to resort to certain means, could we envisage the encouragement of aggression in violation of the Charter? No answer has been given to those questions.

The second point is that cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes is the only way of halting the nuclear armaments race. The Soviet delegation will not agree to it. Ask the man in the street what he would think of a system which would let everyone continue to produce fissionable material for military purposes without limitation and to give or sell it to his neighbours or friends. He would say that the other measures were worth nothing at all. The Soviet delegation says: "I reject this cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes unless accompanied by destruction of existing stocks." It knows, however, that this destruction could not be controlled, and for that reason could only work properly in more favourable circumstances, in which the establishment of effective control in other spheres had restored a minimum of confidence. If carried out as an isolated measure, the stopping of tests will not therefore in any way slow down the nuclear arms race nor prevent the accumulation of such arms both by the Powers which have been conducting experiments and by others which will obtain them from the former.

(Mr. Moch, France)

Fourth point. The force levels we are proposing are real, and not fictitious as Mr. Zorin alleges. Had he agreed to the procedure we propose, we could have continued our session in New York in October and together tried to work out a detailed procedure which would enable us to pass on from the first to the second and then to the third level. But it is impossible to undertake any large-scale disarmament so long as disharmony between the great Powers leaves seeds of war scattered in various parts of the world. That is only reasonable, as the Soviet Government must be the first to admit.

Fifth point. We are as anxious as Mr. Zorin to secure a reduction in military budgets. We want it as much as he does, and France probably more than he, for the French Government intends to make sizeable cuts in its military budget in 1958. It is, however, impossible to work out in advance a valid formula, applicable to all countries, linking a percentage reduction in appropriations with the reductions in force levels and equipment provided for in the treaty. Honesty bids us say this, but our frankness must not be interpreted as meaning that we refuse to reduce our national defence budgets.

The sixth point of difference is this. The Western Powers are aware that the USSR desires to dismantle the defensive organization called NATO, to reduce the number of bases on foreign soil -- to adopt, in a word, everything that we have described as regional measures. But such decisions, which in an entirely different climate and after a start had been made with controlled disarmament would be auspicious in themselves, can be only a result, not a cause, of a rebirth of mutual confidence. If adopted too soon they would, far from creating security, increase the feeling of insecurity of peoples who, so long as the world is not disarmed, rely on collective security to safeguard their liberty and independence.

(Mr. Moch, France)

My seventh point. The Soviet delegation has never defined control except in vague, summary, incomplete fashion: one line in one plan, five lines incompatible with this in another; four types of fixed ground posts at one moment, three only today. All this gives those who are most deeply devoted to the pursuit of a disarmed and controlled peace the impression that the USSR speaks of control but refrains from specifying what it would be, so as to avoid supporting it in fact. We of the West — the United Kingdom, France, both together, and the United States — submitted in 1955 and 1956 documents constituting **fairly detailed if not exhaustive studies** of what the control organization and its functions, powers and duties should be. We have never had a word of reply; and when we have pressed our Soviet colleague he has said: "Let us begin by reaching agreement on what the control organ will have to inspect, and then we shall see how to inspect it."

That is a concept which we cannot share. We believe that control, precisely because it would demonstrate the sincerity of all parties, would be the most powerful and effective way of re-establishing a modicum of confidence among us and thereby enabling us to make further progress towards disarmament.

We note that to this day our Soviet colleagues' definition of control is contained in a few dozen completely vague words.

For all these reasons the gaps between us are still both numerous and important. That is why — just because we are resolutely determined to make progress — we were anxious to go on trying to bridge them during the short time we should have between the end of the general debate in the Assembly and

(Mr. Moch, France)

before the beginning of the disarmament discussions in the First Committee. The Soviet Government's refusal to continue the discussion before the end of the Assembly's session will delay, as I have already said, the further effort we should have liked to make. On behalf of the French Government and with very deep and sincere regret, I will merely put that fact on record.

But I wish to conclude as I did eight days ago, when I presented the four-Power document together with my three colleagues. On 29 August 1957 I indicated that we sincerely considered it impossible to propose more in the present uncertain and mistrustful state of the world, but that we were certain that what we were offering was of immense scope and that Soviet acceptance would open very wide the way towards peace along which we had been trudging for so many years. The Soviet reply was given immediately and was then repeated, each time as incisive as a knife thrust. It reminded me in many ways of the equally trenchant and concise reply Mr. Malik gave us here three years ago. Now that I have heard the reply, I would repeat what I said earlier on the assumption that it would be less completely negative. We retain intact our ideal of peace and our will to achieve peace by disarmament, and we shall continue to walk through the real towards the ideal, if I may again follow Jean Jaures, as I did eight days ago.

Come what may, the French delegation, saddened though it is by the failure of the long negotiations which are ending today, will never abandon its efforts to secure a start on disarmament, that is, to diminish the deadly perils now threatening mankind as a result of human folly.

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder whether it would be convenient if we could deal now with the point which is at issue, namely, the question of the adjournment and the time and date of our next meeting. After that, we could make any further statements we have to make.

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): I agree with your proposal, Mr. Chairman. It would be better to discuss this matter now. Afterwards, I should like to make a short statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any representative wish to make a further statement on my proposal and on Mr. Zorin's counter-proposal?

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): I should like to say a few words. We were very sorry to hear the proposal made by the Soviet representative that the Sub-Committee's meetings should be brought to a close without any date being set for the resumption of our work. We agree that now would be a suitable time to suspend our meetings for a short period, but we see no reason why we should not use any time that may be available to us to continue in the Sub-Committee to seek agreement on substantial measures for a first stage of disarmament.

Yesterday Mr. Zorin made some reference to the attitude of the smaller Powers in the General Assembly. I do not want to argue with the Soviet delegation about which is the greater Power, the Soviet Union or Canada, but I think I have quite as much right as the chairman of the Soviet delegation to refer to the attitude of the smaller and middle Powers in the General Assembly. For our part, we are looking forward to the opportunity which the General Assembly, both in its plenary meetings and in its Committees, will afford to explain the Western proposals in detail. We feel sure that many of those smaller and middle Powers like Canada will consider

(Mr. Ritchie, Canada)

these proposals to be eminently reasonable and to offer a real chance of progress in the field of disarmament.

The middle and the smaller Powers will I believe -- and there is already a good deal of evidence of this -- be particularly interested in our proposals for putting a stop to the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, while at the same time putting an immediate stop to the testing of nuclear weapons. What they would not understand, if I may so suggest, would be the indefinite postponement of the Sub-Committee's work at the suggestion of the Soviet delegation.

We, for our part, would welcome every opportunity to continue in the Sub-Committee, after a reasonable recess, to explore the possibility of reaching some measure of agreement, and for us to continue our work on the tasks entrusted to us by the General Assembly would, of course, in no way interfere with the right or the ability of the General Assembly to discuss disarmament at any time its Members wished to do so. After all, this Sub-Committee is the creature of the General Assembly, and we have been meeting to carry out the tasks which the General Assembly has assigned to us. We should, in our view, continue to do everything to join with the Soviet delegation in attempting to make progress on those tasks until the discussion on disarmament takes place in the General Assembly.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): I also would express regret, on behalf of the United States delegation, that the Soviet Union is not willing to resume our negotiations at the earliest possible date. As we see it, that date would be approximately 1 October, and the most convenient place would be the United Nations Headquarters in New York. If the Soviet Union is not willing to agree to that -- and since, of course, our negotiations can go forward only by unanimous agreement -- may I ask what is its counter-proposal if we are to conclude this particular series of meetings by declaring a recess?

(Mr. Ritchie, Canada)

We wish to make more progress, and we feel that the United Nations would like us to make more progress. The draft report which we have before us contains, in paragraph 7, the following:

"The Sub-Committee has decided to recess and to reconvene at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 1 October 1957 or, in the event that the general debate in the plenary meetings of the twelfth session of the General Assembly is not concluded by that date, then immediately after its conclusion."

As I indicated, we would be willing to add a specific sentence, if that seemed desirable, as follows:

"The meetings of the Sub-Committee shall in no event interfere with the consideration of disarmament by the Disarmament Commission, the First Committee or the General Assembly."

If the Soviet representative continues to refuse to agree to that paragraph 7, what does he propose with regard to its wording? Would he agree to state that the Sub-Committee has decided to recess and to reconvene at a mutually convenient date in January, or would he agree to state that the Sub-Committee has decided to recess and to reconvene at the earliest possible date to be established by mutual agreement in the Disarmament Commission or in the General Assembly? I would ask what wording the Soviet Union proposes for this paragraph, so that we might give consideration to its position?

We recognize, of course, that we can proceed fruitfully only by means of unanimity in the Sub-Committee. We have ironed out many procedural questions during these months, and by so doing we have made progress on the substance. Therefore, while I regret the position of the Soviet delegation, I invite it to make a specific presentation of its proposal so that we may now consider it.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): For the moment, I merely wish to speak on the question we have to settle; and I reserve the right, after this question has been discussed and settled, to return to what has been said by Mr. Moch and my other colleagues.

As regards the adjournment of the Sub-Committee's work, I must call attention to what Mr. Stassen said a little earlier. He made two points. It does not seem probable, he said, that consideration of disarmament matters could begin in the General Assembly on 1 October. His second point was that the disarmament problem could not be solved so rapidly, which means that the question of how our Sub-Committee's report will be submitted to the General Assembly cannot be settled so rapidly.

I think these two sentences reveal the crux of the matter: they show that the United States, and apparently also the other delegations, are in fact presuming that the General Assembly will take disarmament last.

What does that expression mean: "It does not seem probable that consideration of disarmament matters could begin on 1 October?" Why does it not seem probable? If we submit our report today, 7 September, we have three weeks to 1 October. Surely during these three weeks the report can be considered by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. That can certainly be done. There are no obstacles, since the Commission already has before it all the documents relating to the first part of our session; and on the second part it will unfortunately have very few documents to examine and can therefore deal with them rapidly. In other words, so far as the progress of our work is concerned, the question can be considered on 1 October or immediately after the end of the general

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly, provided only that the major Powers, which are participating in the Sub-Committee's work, desire the report to be examined. But this depends on all of us.

Mr. Stassen said yesterday that in the last analysis it is not we who will settle the issue, but the First Committee of the General Assembly and subsequently the General Assembly itself. This is correct. But all the Powers represented here are members of the General Committee; and if after our five months' work we all state that we want the disarmament problem to be placed at the top of the First Committee's agenda, does Mr. Stassen really believe that any one in the General Committee will object? I am convinced that they will not. The crux of the matter therefore is that consideration of the disarmament problem in the General Assembly primarily depends on our good will. The United States representative's assertion that it is "not probable" that consideration of disarmament problems will begin on 1 October and that this question cannot be decided so quickly is merely proof of the United States Government's unwillingness to discuss this question in the General Assembly at an early date and as a matter of priority. That is the crucial issue.

In the circumstances, there are absolutely no grounds for accusing the Soviet Union of not wanting an early debate or progress in disarmament. On the contrary, the Soviet Union could accuse the United States and the other Western Powers of not wishing to discuss the disarmament question in the General Assembly as an item of first priority, and of attempting to use a continuation of the Sub-Committee's work to hinder a priority discussion of the question by the Assembly. That is the crux of the matter.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The Soviet Union therefore cannot consent to a device of this sort to hinder the discussion of questions in the General Assembly. We are in favour of their discussion, and those who favour their discussion cannot object to the wise proposal which has been put forward: that we should adjourn our work and submit all the documents of our Sub-Committee to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and subsequently to the General Assembly. This is a sound proposal and in line with the whole course of our work, which, as Mr. Noble said at yesterday's meeting, has not been very constructive. That is a truthful statement. It is the fact, and we should not waste time discussing questions here when it is perfectly clear that the Western Powers' proposal cannot help matters forward. That is our firm conviction. This question must therefore be debated between all those countries which are interested in disarmament no less than ourselves. The question has been included in the General Assembly's agenda, and it depends chiefly on us whether this item is discussed early or put off till the end of the Assembly. Unless you want to delay it until the end of the Assembly, you cannot object to the submission of the report at once and its discussion by the General Assembly as soon as the First Committee starts its work.

One comment on what Mr. Moch said about this. He said that the Western delegations desired to seek further agreement before the debate opened. Who is preventing this? Submit your new proposals, if you are seeking agreement, and give Governments a chance to discuss them. As soon as the General Assembly begins its work we can have a preliminary discussion and submit a joint proposal to the General Assembly, if you want to. By all means. Who is objecting? If you are

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really looking for agreement, submit new proposals and discuss them in the General Assembly. Submit them on the first day: please do. In that forum we shall perhaps find more common ground. But to think that after five and a half months' work we shall, as Mr. Moch and Mr. Stassen suggest, be able to consider problems for two weeks and reach an agreement which we could not reach in five and a half months is in my view naive -- unless, of course, the Western delegations do in fact seriously reconsider their positions. If they do so, then we can debate the matter in the First Committee; this will not be very difficult. We seek agreement, we desire it. We have shown this more than once during the Sub-Committee's work. If there are suitable proposals from your side, we shall never refuse to discuss them. However, what you are now proposing for discussion we consider quite pointless at this stage, because these proposals have already been discussed for four months and their unreality, and in particular their irrelevance to effective disarmament, have been demonstrated. You may not agree with that, but it is our view. It therefore seems to me that this argument, too, falls to the ground. What, then, is proposed? In the draft which has been distributed there is a paragraph 7. I propose that this paragraph 7 should stop at the end of the first sentence: "The Sub-Committee has decided to recess", and that there we should put a full stop. That is my proposal. I think it is an entirely sensible one. We should not thereby be preventing a speedy discussion of the question in the General Assembly; we should not be tying either ourselves or the General Assembly by fixing dates for the Sub-Committee's next meeting, and we should be enabling the General Assembly to discuss the question properly during the opening days of its session.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

This seems to me to be entirely sound and to arise out of the real state of affairs. Consequently all the regrets which the Western representatives have been expressing seem to me somewhat far-fetched. The thing to regret is not this, but our failure to reach an agreement owing to the position taken up by the Western Powers. This the Soviet delegation genuinely regrets.

That is all I wanted to say on this matter.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): I wish to make clear a fact of which I assume everyone is aware, namely, that the subject of disarmament will, without question, be discussed in the General Assembly even before 1 October. The various Foreign Ministers, chairmen of delegations and permanent representatives of the eighty-one Members will be taking up this very important subject even in the general debate. There is no question of delaying consideration of disarmament. That consideration can begin with the very first address in the general debate, and can continue in any manner that the United Nations General Assembly or its Committees may decide. Therefore, the comments of the Soviet representative in that connexion seem to me to be entirely beside the point.

It seems to me, further, that unless the position of the Soviet Union is more far-reaching than would appear from the way in which it has been expressed so far, paragraph 7 needs some words in addition to the first phrase: Is it suggested that the Sub-Committee should reconvene when mutually agreed, depending on the agenda or the course of consideration in the United Nations General Assembly? In other words,

(Mr. Stassen, United States)

the Soviet representative's observations are not borne out by his suggestion for paragraph 7. Does he have no further words to suggest -- no further formulation for embodying his proposal in the form of the report?

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder whether I might just make one suggestion to my colleagues. I agree with Mr. Stassen. It would seem to me to be a pity that paragraph 7 should just say that the Sub-Committee had decided to recess without, perhaps, giving any hope for the future. I wonder whether my colleagues might not find acceptable some sentence such as this: "The Sub-Committee has adjourned its session" -- or whatever words are preferred -- and expresses the hope that it will be authorized by the Disarmament Commission to resume its meetings at the earliest possible date." I wonder whether something to that effect would be acceptable.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): You have said exactly what I was just going to say. I should simply like to point out that the wording proposed by Mr. Zorin is the best that could be devised for discouraging the entire world from continuing to work for disarmament. This report, which will be published -- it will be public -- will then end with the words "The Sub-Committee has decided to recess" -- full stop. It will not resume its work. There is no question of that. There is no mention of it. It has decided to recess. That is all. Well, I cannot accept this; I shall not vote for it. If we could find a formula along the lines suggested by our Chairman, which is, strictly speaking, more accurate than Mr. Stassen's, since the Sub-Committee has no authority to meet again before the Disarmament Commission instructs it to do so, for its mandate expires with the opening of the Assembly -- if

(Mr. Moch, France)

Mr. Zorin will agree to some such addition indicating that we are not suspending our work indefinitely, then I will agree. But if we are asked to use this guillotine formula "The Sub-Committee has decided to recess", my answer is No.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

I am a little surprised at this inaccuracy on Mr. Moch's part. The interpretation may perhaps have been at fault, but he appeared to be saying that the proposed text of paragraph 7 states that the Sub-Committee has decided to stop, to terminate its work. Mr. Moch is most experienced and has been a member of the Sub-Committee for a long time. I feel sure, therefore, that there must have been a mistake in interpretation. That is not what paragraph 7 says. The Russian text of the paragraph states that the Sub-Committee decided to adjourn. I know that Mr. Moch is perfectly well aware of the difference between the words "adjourn", "stop" and "terminate". They are different words with different meanings and, in my view, the text before us correctly conveys the action we are taking. Incidentally, I am not responsible for the wording. The text was drafted by the Secretariat on the basis of our preliminary talks on the subject of adjournment. In my opinion the Secretariat has correctly expressed the idea we all have in mind, which is that the Sub-Committee has decided to adjourn. The text does not say that the Sub-Committee has concluded its work, that it has brought it to a complete close; it simply says that the Sub-Committee has adjourned. That is exactly what we are doing -- we are adjourning. The additional phrases which have been suggested do not help matters. They attempt to place a

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different construction on the action we are now taking. They are intended, I might say, to set a certain trend for the future interpretation of our intentions, our ideas and so forth. That, in my opinion, is quite out of place. We must state what we are doing at the present time. We are adjourning at the request of the Western delegations. We agree to do so. We associate ourselves with this proposal. I consider that no useful purpose would be served by spending any more time on the discussion of this question.

The CHAIRMAN: The last time the Sub-Committee submitted a report on a rather similar occasion the final paragraph read: "This report was approved by all members of the Sub-Committee at the 86th meeting" -- and here the date was given -- "and is hereby submitted to the Disarmament Commission as a report on the Sub-Committee's work to date."

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): Is that the end of the report?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, that is at the end of the report.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): May I ask whether the representative of the Soviet delegation is opposed to expressing the hope that the Committee would resume its work?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): If I am not mistaken, and as far as I understand, Mr. Noble has read out approximately the wording used in the third report: "This report was approved by all members of the

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Sub-Committee at the ... meeting and is hereby submitted to the Disarmament Commission as a report on the Sub-Committee's work to date." If this is correct, I have no objection.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): I, too, accept this wording.

The CHAIRMAN: I would be prepared to accept this wording too.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): Does that mean, then, that the whole of paragraph 7 would be omitted?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, that is what I understood.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): In other words, the report would end with the words "work to date"?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Are there any objections to our concluding our report at the end of paragraph 6 as it appears in the draft?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I am sorry, but I think that paragraph 6 merely repeats the same point. I therefore think that this wording should be substituted for paragraph 6.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): I take it then, Mr. Chairman, that we are combining the paragraph you have just read out from our third report with paragraph 6 of the present draft by simply adding to the end of paragraph 6 the words "to date".

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): May I ask you to read out the full text?

The CHAIRMAN: I think I have made it clear throughout our discussion of this subject that I would like to see some mention of our future meetings, and I have made it clear also that I thought it a pity that we should not usefully employ the interval -- however long or however short it may be -- between the general debate and the disarmament discussions in the United Nations. Again I would say that it seems to me a pity that we are not going to use that time. However, as we cannot agree, I would be prepared to agree that the report should finish with paragraph 6, that is with the words "the Sub-Committee's work to date". Is there any objection?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I did not quite understand Mr. Noble. I took it that you read out last time the wording which was used in the third report. If it is the wording of the third report, it is acceptable and I have no objection.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the wording that I read out, which was the last paragraph of the third report in our draft which Mr. Protitch gave us, is paragraph 6, which is the same wording.

Mr. MOCH (France) Except for "to date".

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): No, this is not quite correct.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps Mr. Protitch could explain.

Mr. PROTITCH (Representative of the Secretary-General): In the case of the third report, submitted in 1956, the position was not the same because the Sub-Committee had not then submitted a previous progress report as it has this year. Thus the paragraph 6 included in the draft which was circulated yesterday is quite an obvious one, because it refers to the further progress report, namely the fifth report, which the Sub-Committee is submitting this session. The wording has to be different from that used in the third report. But what is the same, as I understood the Chairman to point out, is the last phrase of that paragraph, namely, the phrase which reads: "report on the Sub-Committee's work to date". That is exactly what is contained in paragraph 6 of the present draft. The reference to a further progress report is necessary because this is another report of the session.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I agree with what Mr. Protitch has suggested, and will read out the text as follows: "This report was approved by all members of the Sub-Committee" -- on a certain date -- "and is hereby submitted to the Disarmament Commission as a further report on the Sub-Committee's work to date." Is that correct? No, that is not paragraph 6. I am reading paragraph 5 of the third report. Paragraph 6 does not read like that in Russian.

On the whole I am in favour of the text I have read out from the third report, as amended by you. That is the text I favour.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): If all the other representatives are agreed, I can accept the language which is contained in paragraph 6 of the draft report before us and agree to the omission of paragraph 7.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In other words, I understand that there is disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom delegations. If, however, the United Kingdom agrees with the United States, then I will agree too.

The CHAIRMAN: I think there is agreement.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): On the basis of the English text -- I have not looked at the other versions -- I would suggest that the Secretariat should now produce a fresh draft, omitting paragraph 7.

The CHAIRMAN: We just need to cross out paragraph 7.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The new text Mr. Stassen is referring to, the final text, that is, must, of course, include the additional material we have decided to insert in our report. This has not yet been inserted because this was not requested until yesterday. This, of course, must be done in the final text.

I do not think there is any need for us to delay a decision on this question any longer. We have agreed on the text. Let us leave the Secretariat to put it into final shape so that it can be distributed to us today.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there general agreement, then, that the report should be brought up to date to include material that was asked to be included yesterday, and that it should finish at the end of paragraph 6.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): I assume it will include today's material?

The CHAIRMAN: I take it, Mr. Protitch, that it will include any of today's material that it is wished should be included.

Mr. PROTITCH (Representative of the Secretary-General): Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Now that we have disposed of that problem, are there any further statements to be made on the general points of disarmament?

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): At yesterday's meeting the Soviet representative made a rather extensive statement expressing some views upon our negotiations and our situation, and upon the position of the United States in these negotiations. I will not make an extensive reply. I have read the provisional verbatim and have previously expressed my regrets that there is not agreement to resume the session at an earlier time, but I will make this brief comment.

It is our view that we have made substantial progress towards agreement in this series of meetings. We have taken time; we have at times moved slowly; but we have moved towards agreement -- towards a significant agreement for partial measures.

(Mr. Stassen, United States)

We have the outlines of agreement on a two-year suspension of tests under international control, with inspection posts in the respective territories of our States. We have agreement on levels of forces of 2.5 million, 2.1 million and 1.7 million for the Soviet Union and the United States, and 750,000, 700,000 and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom. We have the outlines of agreement for a first reduction of armaments through lists to be exchanged and negotiated, the armaments then to be placed in disarmament depots under international control. We have agreement to begin an inspection system that will include both ground and air components, and which will safeguard against concentrations and against surprise attack, but we are without agreement as to just where those initial zones are to be.

In our view the most important difference and the most important obstacle to the successful conclusion of our work in this series of meeting, has been the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to agree to the ending of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of more weapons -- atomic and hydrogen bombs, rockets and missiles and other weapons of that nature. This appears to us to be really the key difference in relation to reaching a conclusion on partial measures.

There are many points of difference, and on those areas where we have moved close together there are still matters to be resolved; but it seems to us, as we review the record, and as we review the most recent statement of the Soviet representative, that all the other issues are within what would seem to be a manageable range of negotiations.

However, on the matter of the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, which is the one key, practical move towards the ending of the manufacture of nuclear weapons -- and which, in our proposals, is to be followed by the

(Mr. Stassen, United States)

reductions in the quantity of nuclear weapons, the removal of material from nuclear weapons and the transference of this fissionable material to peaceful purposes -- the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respond on this issue in an affirmative way is the most important factor that has prevented agreement. This is a proposal first advanced by President Eisenhower on 1 March 1956. It has been discussed and considered at length. We have endeavoured to moderate it, to vary it, in the hope of obtaining the agreement of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has tended to object that it would require too much inspection. We have proposed that the first step should be simply the meeting of scientifically qualified technicians in an endeavour to work out an acceptable inspection system.

The Soviet Union has not been willing to make that first move in that direction, even though it could be safeguarded by the requirement that the Soviet Union itself must agree on the resulting inspection design.

We have expressed a willingness to defer the beginning of the cessation -- that is, the time of the cut-off -- even as long as two years after the agreement became effective. The Soviet Union has not given any suggestion of a date. The Soviet Union has constantly complicated this by endeavouring to connect it with other measures which it has agreed are impossible of attainment, and which its officials have agreed cannot be controlled. It is a practical measure; it is one on which we believe all the Members of the United Nations, except the Soviet Union, would wish to see accomplished. It would change the outlook of the world. It would be a very important step.

I make this brief comment not for the purpose of being critical but, rather, for the purpose of emphasizing that it is our hope that in these coming days, while we are in recess, the Government of the Soviet Union will thoroughly review its position

(Mr. Stassen, United States)

in this matter, and consider whether it cannot be affirmative on this key issue in the General Assembly, in the Disarmament Commission, in the Sub-Committee or in the First Committee — wherever it may decide to present its further position.

It would seem clear to us that the Soviet Union has an ample quantity of nuclear weapons for purposes of defence. This is not a matter of making a proposal that the Soviet Union should weaken its defences. Its government and military leaders have often said that it had an ample quantity of nuclear weapons for purposes of defence. It does not appear to us, then, that there should be any insuperable difficulty in agreeing first in principle to the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, then, concretely, to co-operation and to scientists meeting to design the system, and, finally, to moving towards the actual cut-off, if these preliminary moves can be successfully implemented.

If the Soviet Union would move on this one very important point, I believe that all the nations of the world would applaud the move, and that we would find that the remaining issues were definitely in the range of manageability, so that the remaining gaps could be quickly negotiated through, treaties could be drafted and we could move to the point of the cessation of nuclear testing, the reduction in force levels, the reduction in armaments, the reduction in military expenditures, the reciprocal safeguards against concentrations of military forces and the potential danger of surprise attack, the lessening of tensions, the release of more resources and manpower for peaceful and constructive purposes, and a mutually desirable result in the interest of all nations.

(Mr. Stassen, United States)

When the extensive comment of the representative of the Soviet delegation is analysed, it seems to me that this is the issue which stands out, and it is the one which, without indulging in any extreme of claims or making any assertions or any charges, we simply summarize for the consideration of the Soviet Government in the coming days.

At the same time, and in the same spirit, I say that the United States Government will review all the other matters that have come up in the various proposals and the gaps which remain for consideration, and that it will look forward to our advance, at the earliest possible date and in any available manner, towards a sound, safeguarded and mutually desirable agreement that will improve the prospects of peace.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

I do not intend to make a lengthy speech either, for much has been said during all these months of the Sub-Committee's work, and it is hardly likely that we shall succeed in convincing each other now that, so to speak, the whistle has gone.

I should only like to make a few observations on the statements of Mr. Moch and Mr. Stassen, since they touched upon certain points relating to the substance of our work, and also to try to some extent to assess the results of our work.

First, as to the assessment of the situation. I must say that Mr. Moch's estimate did not coincide with Mr. Stassen's.

Mr. Moch stated quite frankly that the divergencies remaining between us were many and important.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Mr. Stassen, on the other hand, tried to convince us that we have really made some progress, that we have already prepared the outline of an agreement, that we are agreed upon many questions, and that there is only one question on which we have not yet reached agreement.

It seems to me that this is a rather different estimate. It should impel us to consider what is the real situation in the Sub-Committee. This is the first thing I wanted to say.

Secondly, regarding what Mr. Stassen said on the most important or "key" issue as he called it. The most important obstacle to agreement, he said, was the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to agree to ending production for military purposes. This is unquestionably a misrepresentation of the Soviet position. The Soviet Union is in favour of cutting off production of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, at the same time, of banning atomic weapons and eliminating them from the arsenals of States. This is precisely the task set us by the General Assembly. I would remind you all of the well-known unanimous General Assembly resolution 808 (IX), which proclaimed as a task the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in order to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. It also set the task of prohibiting the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type.

The whole trouble is precisely that the United States and the other Western Powers do not wish to fulfil this most important task laid upon us by the General Assembly and by life itself. They isolate one aspect

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

of this whole problem of banning atomic weapons and try to deal with it separately. This, not any opposition of ours to a cut-off of production, is the core of our disagreements. It does not fit the facts. We have repeatedly expressed in the Sub-Committee our regret and displeasure at this very fact that the Western Powers, headed by the United States, do not even wish to shoulder the task of banning atomic weapons and eliminating them from the arsenals of States. What is more, they do not wish to adopt a decision to renounce the use of atomic weapons; in essence they now also oppose a realistic settlement of the issue of halting atomic weapons tests. That is where we disagree. When Mr. Moch asserts that latterly there has been a note of propaganda in the speeches of the Soviet representative, then I must reply that what Mr. Moch said and what we have been hearing from the Western delegations throughout these last few weeks is itself propaganda against your position. The fact that you say that you cannot renounce or prohibit the use of atomic weapons will not be to your advantage; of that we may be quite sure.

You say that you cannot halt tests as an isolated, a separate measure because this would not end the armaments race; that will not help you either. You yourselves supply propaganda against your own position. We do not need special propaganda in this matter; we need only show the position which you occupy.

If you say that force level reductions are real on your side, and add that you may later state more precisely how transition from one stage to the next is to be effected, that, too, is against your case; that is your propaganda against yourself. Everyone now realizes that transition from one stage to the next is linked to the settlement of major political issues, and that the transition

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

is by this very fact delayed, because everyone understands that major political issues cannot be settled overnight but that time and immense effort will obviously be required from all Powers interested in their settlement. Hence the transition to subsequent stages, if viewed from your position, is in practice not feasible. We propose simple steps —to draft our text in such a way that there shall be no obstacles except the actual execution of each stage. That is all. Mr. Moch's allegation of propaganda, therefore, is in my view devoid of any serious foundation, and may rather be turned against yourselves.

I should now like to say a few words more specifically about the Sub-Committee's work and some of its results.

The Sub-Committee's present session has gone on for more than five months. It must, alas, be acknowledged that it has proved incapable of carrying out the important task entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly. It has failed to arrive at a constructive decision on any problem of disarmament, not even on the urgent and acute problem of stopping atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. What is the cause of this abnormal situation which is giving rise to profound concern among the widest circles of the world community? As, in my view, the whole course of the Sub-Committee's discussions has irrefutably shown, the cause lies in the fact that, while the Soviet delegation has untiringly directed its efforts towards setting the Sub-Committee's work on a businesslike footing and mobilizing all available resources with a view to a practical settlement of the urgent problems of disarmament, the Western delegations have unfortunately impeded progress by setting various conditions for the settlement of the key problems of disarmament, thereby creating artificial obstacles to the attainment of agreement.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The Soviet Union's proposals, which were based on a sober appraisal of the situation and which, in the interests of facilitating agreement, were motivated by a desire to take account of its Western partners' wishes, did not meet with the reception they deserved from the Western Powers. Instead of responding to the Soviet Union's efforts at conciliation by making corresponding concessions, the Western Powers unfortunately resorted to delaying tactics and laid down innumerable conditions obstructing agreement.

In the belief that in present circumstances the execution of practical measures of disarmament cannot be further postponed, the Soviet Union put forward a programme of minimum and, even in present conditions, wholly practicable measures of partial disarmament.

The Western delegations were compelled to recognize the great practical value of the Soviet proposals of 30 April which opened the door to an agreement between the members of the Sub-Committee. In view of the pressing need to put a stop to hydrogen weapons tests the Soviet Union introduced on 14 June a straightforward and clear proposal to suspend such tests for two or three years. This proposal would have permitted an early settlement of the problem of halting nuclear tests, had the Western Powers evinced any real desire to halt them.

But unfortunately the Western Powers have not evinced such a desire in relation either to the halting of tests or to other highly important partial disarmament

measures. As a result of this attitude of theirs to the talks, the Sub-Committee has been uselessly marking time, frittering time away, and now its work has come to a standstill.

The unwillingness of the Western representatives to consider the views of States which have displayed their anxiety to consolidate peace and to settle the urgent problems of disarmament with all speed is graphically demonstrated, too, by their opposition to the Soviet Union's proposal that an opportunity should be given to countries which are not represented in the Sub-Committee but have submitted proposals on disarmament, to explain their views to the Sub-Committee.

While denying these States Members of the United Nations their lawful right to contribute to the solution of the disarmament question, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada have at the same time conducted negotiations behind the scenes with the leaders of the NATO military bloc, whose plans are all directed, not towards furthering disarmament and creating conditions favourable to it, but on the contrary towards preparations for war.

The Western Powers have made the Adenauer Government virtually the arbiter in the settlement of the question whether or not there is to be a serious agreement on disarmament. The Western Powers' obstinacy in defending their old positions, which allow no progress towards disarmament, and their continuation of fruitless discussions in the Sub-Committee, have spread illusion and deceived world public opinion.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The Soviet Union therefore considers it essential that there should be an open and general debate on the disarmament problem in the United Nations General Assembly, of which Mr. Ritchie has said the Sub-Committee is the creature.

We are anxious for such a debate so that all countries, large and small, may present their views and make their contribution to the settlement of the disarmament problem.

A general debate will serve to highlight the obstacles now blocking the road to agreement and enable us to find means of removing them. Any attempts to impede a free and open debate on disarmament problems in the General Assembly, however they may be camouflaged, will merely indicate that those who resort to them fear a general discussion of the disarmament problem and clearly have no desire to solve it constructively.

The Soviet Union, for its part, is in favour of a broad discussion of the disarmament problem in the General Assembly and of an attempt to find the best way of concluding an agreement through which effective steps towards disarmament could be taken without delay.

The Soviet Union will, as always, make strenuous efforts to secure such an agreement and to settle the pressing problems of disarmament in the interests of peace and the security of peoples. Although we are not satisfied with the Sub-Committee's work, and although, especially of late, the approaching end has made the discussions rather more acrimonious, I feel bound to say on behalf of the Soviet delegation that the co-operation shown by

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

the various delegations -- I would say all the delegations -- in the Sub-Committee deserves high praise. I should also like to express my personal thanks to all the participants in our common work; we are, of course, all entitled both to criticize one another and to maintain the positions which our respective Governments consider the most correct. In my view the common task of us all is to display a spirit of co-operation in future discussions, so as to facilitate settlement of the enormous problem now confronting us, the solution of which concerns literally millions of persons. That problem is to halt the armaments race, prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons, renounce their use, and take measures necessary to relax as early as possible the present tension in international relations -- first and foremost in Europe -- and to establish and consolidate peace, which concerns the whole of mankind.

We believe that the settlement of all these problems -- or at least a first step towards it -- especially the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, could establish a new climate in international relations and eliminate many of the causes of friction, and so facilitate international co-operation in the interests of peace and the progress of mankind.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): The rather short speech we have just heard fell into two parts: one typed and prepared in advance, the other handwritten and improvised in the course of the meeting. If I may say so, I much prefer the second, which introduced a new note, to the first, which merely restates ideas we have heard before. But the second impels me to answer Mr. Zorin in a kindly vein.

(Mr. Moch, France)

A long parliamentary life -- I was first elected thirty years ago -- has taught me to be dispassionaté. When I was young, I believed that everything my party proposed was admirable and everything that anyone else proposed was execrable. I have grown up a good deal since then. As for Mr. Zorin, he has remained young, very young. He believes that everything that the USSR proposes is "realistic", "concrete", perfect and that everything the Western Powers propose is bad -- this is the line he takes in the typed part of his speech -- contributes nothing towards the Sub-Committee's progress, is designed to impede its work, testifies to the Western Powers' unwillingness to disarm, or to call a halt to atomic explosions, and so on. But in these matters polemics must give place to a dispassionate approach.

I wanted to tell Mr. Zorin in a friendly spirit that the situation in the world at large is not as he sees it, that public opinion is neither wholly nor unanimously favourable to his ideas, as he believes, and that living as he does somewhat in isolation and within a rather circumscribed milieu, even when in the United Kingdom, he may perhaps not be fully aware of what people think outside.

I should like to give a brief example. One day a high-ranking Soviet official with whom I was speaking cited the example of a little town in France, which I will not name, and to prove to me that public opinion was favourable to his Government, he drew my attention in passing -- we were in a car -- to inscriptions insulting one of the countries represented here, whitewashed on a wall. There were a dozen of these on our route. "You see", he said, "this is what French public opinion says". I made a few enquiries and learned that in that community of 35,000 inhabitants the political group favourable to the USSR numbered exactly twenty-three, including five youngsters who spent their nights, with great

(Mr. Moch, France)

devotion to the cause, in walking about with a pot of white paint and a brush and defacing walls by painting offensive slogans on them. As these slogans could be seen, it was concluded that public opinion favoured that line of policy, which it did not.

I apologize for introducing this detail, which is not directly relevant to our work. But I should like to tell Mr. Zorin that one of our very great difficulties is precisely to get public opinion in our countries to admit that serious work can be done with the USSR. A few days ago I went into my departement, where I saw militant workmen who reproached me for wasting my time here and said: "How do you suppose anyone can ever agree with the USSR? Look at what is happening in other countries next to the USSR, what has happened in Hungary; how can you have the slightest trust in the USSR?"

I do not say this to offend Mr. Zorin and the Soviet delegation. I want him to understand that much will have to be done to stem the current, and that we shall have to restore confidence in both directions, not only in one.

When I hear Mr. Zorin say, for example, that the Western countries, headed by the United States, do not want atomic weapons banned, I take leave to reply that his words as used are both unfair and untrue. They are untrue because the United States is not at our head. I do not consider myself in any way the subordinate of my friend Mr. Stassen. The French Government is entirely independent of the United States Government. These two Governments are allies and friends but have equal rights. This notion is perhaps a little difficult to understand in some parts of the world. I can assure Mr. Zorin that it is the one we hold in the West.

(Mr. Moch, France)

When he adds that negotiations have been conducted behind the scenes with the heads of Governments and the military leaders of NATO, and is surprised, I must express surprise too, for I am compelled to conclude from his surprise that when he proposed to us certain aerial inspection zones mostly covering States within the Soviet group and excluding all but a very small piece of the Soviet Union, these Governments had not been consulted previously and had not given their assent. That is not our way of working in NATO; and when we speak strongly on behalf of a certain number of Governments, that means that they have given their prior assent to the proposals we are putting forward. Between that and saying that we have made the head of one of these Governments our arbiter in matters of disarmament there is a whole world of difference, an infinite gulf which I will not attempt to bridge.

To revert to public opinion. It is very difficult to persuade the non-Communist world that continuing to produce fissionable materials for military purposes helps to put an end to the nuclear arms race. You have been very kind to us: you have shown us that we were making propaganda against ourselves. Allow us to be the better judges of what we ought to say, because what we say we believe to be the truth. The Soviet proposal would mean either that tests were stopped while the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, with all its dangers, went on; or that this cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes was linked to measures (for instance, the elimination of stocks) quite outside the realm of control -- in other words, with measures which would pre-suppose a confidence between you and ourselves which, as I showed you just now, does not exist. I can assure you that wherever I go and explain this, public opinion will be on my side and not against me. But I do not want to dwell on this.

I now come to the improvised part of Mr. Zorin's statement. I think it reflects him as he is much more than the printed word. In regard to this first part, I will merely reiterate our hope that the Soviet Government will change during the coming weeks to which I have often referred. My most fervent hope is that the man who represents his country on disarmament questions in the First Committee -- I do not know whether we shall have the pleasure of seeing Mr. Zorin or some other representative of the Soviet Government on the other side of the table -- will make a violent and inflammatory statement against us twenty-five or thirty pages long, ending with two pages of concessions to show the Soviet Union's good will. That is what Mr. Vyshinsky did in 1954, and I, already fairly familiar with his method, was delighted to hear his violent attacks rolling forth throughout the first part of his speech, because I was waiting for the second part, the conciliatory one. This is the hope aroused in me by the first part of Mr. Zorin's statement.

As regards the second, I said just now that it introduced a new note. Mr. Zorin said that all delegations have shown a spirit of co-operation -- I thank him for these words on behalf of the French delegation and I do not think I shall be trespassing upon the province of the other three Western countries if I associate them with my thanks -- that he was grateful to all his fellow negotiators for their efforts in that direction. I, in turn, admit that our discussions with Mr. Zorin, though sometimes animated, have generally been amicable. I am convinced -- and in this matter I am perhaps one of the

(Mr. Moch, France)

Westerners least ill-informed on Soviet opinion -- that the Soviet Government, for a series of reasons which I do not propose to elaborate, sincerely desires peace. I think that it has not so far taken the right road because it has failed to realize the depth of that ocean of mistrust I mentioned just now. But I believe, I still cherish the hope, that, better informed by Mr. Zorin on his return to Moscow, it will appreciate the need to modify its position in order to narrow the gulf between us. At any rate, we for our part will untiringly pursue the search for peace through controlled disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other representative wishes to speak now, perhaps I might say a brief word on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation.

Now that we have decided to adjourn we must present the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly with our report and with an account of the differences which exist between us as they exist now. We shall welcome the comments and the views of both those bodies. We have no hesitation in thus submitting our proposals to the appraisal of world opinion. We know that these proposals are an honest attempt at disarmament, and we are confident that the United Nations will recognize them as such. As Mr. Moch said, it is disarmament that we are interested in, and not propaganda.

May I close on a note of realism? We have made some progress this year in the Sub-Committee, if only in that we now understand each other's positions better, but there is still a long way to go. There are major differences to be reconciled before we can reach agreement, even in principle, and if such an agreement in principle were reached a vast amount of detailed expert work would remain to be

(The Chairman)

done -- work of the highest importance -- before agreement in principle could be translated into agreement in fact. My delegation has constantly advocated a start on this detailed work in those areas where we have been nearest agreement, and we regret that the Soviet Union has not yet felt able to agree to this. Real disarmament will never be achieved as long as it is sought as a means of military or political advantage. Real disarmament must give a roughly comparable increase of security to all, and must demand roughly comparable sacrifices from all. We believe we have achieved such a balance in the Western proposals, and it is the lack of such a balance that constitutes our main objection to the Soviet proposals. If we can come to agree on this concept of balanced disarmament we shall have made a really decisive step forward.

Finally, Gentlemen, it happens by coincidence that I am the representative today of the host Government and that I am also occupying the Chair, and therefore it remains for me in both these capacities to express the warmest thanks of the whole Sub-Committee, if I may, to the members of the United Nations Secretariat for the most efficient and helpful service that they have given us throughout this session. I fear that we have kept them here a great deal longer than they expected, and we have at times imposed some heavy labours upon them. They have responded to the task nobly, and we are very grateful to Dr. Protitch and all his colleagues for all they have done for us.

Finally I would like to thank my four colleagues and the members of their delegations for the pleasant personal relations that have always existed between us. I wish my colleagues good luck and I look forward to seeing them again as soon as possible in the hopes of a fruitful resumption of our work.

Mr. STASSEN (United States of America): May I make a very brief comment on substance? I wish to take note of the comments made by the Soviet representative, and particularly his allusions to our consultations with other States. I would like to say that the United States delegation took part in consultations with many other States during these five months; in every instance it was for the purpose of advancing and facilitating our work towards agreement. The consultation was not only with other States associated together in NATO, but also with many other States not associated with NATO. In every instance we found that the Governments of the other States consulted were in favour of reaching an agreement for partial measures of disarmament. No Government we consulted was opposed to agreement. No other Government was given a veto in any way over the policy of the United States in these negotiations. Other Governments were consulted in deference to their views and in deference to their rights in relation to their own sovereign territory, where it might be involved in inspection zones or otherwise. I might add that every one of the States consulted, so far as I recall, is in favour of the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Every one supports this key aspect which I referred to earlier, and which is so important for the successful conclusion of our work.

We, too, look forward to resuming our work at the earliest possible time and under the best constructive circumstances. It is our understanding that, as the matter has now been left, at any time the five of us are in agreement on a constructive resumption of work, whether it is for one day or for a number of days, the juridical situation will permit some such resumption, at least until such time

(Mr. Stassen, United States)

as there is some other decision of a parent body to the contrary. We would hope that the situation might arise in which we could mutually take advantage of our juridical rights and continue our work.

We deeply appreciate the hospitality of Her Majesty's Government, and I wish to express to our Chairman of today, the representative of the United Kingdom delegation, and through him to his Government, the appreciation of the Government and the delegation of the United States for the exceptional facilities, the gracious hospitality, and the efficient arrangements that have been provided during these many months in London. I presume that it is not only the Secretariat that we have utilized longer than was expected, but also the facilities that the United Kingdom has provided -- these excellent facilities at Lancaster House which we have used for a longer period than was foreseen when we were originally invited to meet here.

I would like also to take note of the generous comment that the representative of the Soviet Union made on our working relationships. I express appreciation of that comment and I reciprocate with thanks for the co-operation in our work together during these long months, and appreciation also of the manner in which we attained better understanding of views and formed the working basis for advancing in these important problems.

I should like to add, from the standpoint of the United States delegation, a further word of appreciation to each of my associates and to each of the members of all the delegations in the Sub-Committee who assisted in these long endeavours. In addition, I state our appreciation to the Secretariat, to Mr. Protitch and his staff, to the interpreters and translators, to the verbatim reporters and to all of those who have performed such efficient and effective service.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I have not asked for the floor to speak on a point of substance, but merely -- and very briefly -- to associate my delegation with your words of appreciation, which have been endorsed by Mr. Stassen, to Mr. Protitch, his immediate staff, the secretaries and translators, not to mention the simultaneous interpreters in their glass cages who bear the brunt of our discussion and to whom we owe a great debt of gratitude.

I should like to add that, for the third time in succession, we have all been particularly grateful for the welcome accorded us by the United Kingdom Government, for the accommodation it has provided in this building which is so well suited to our needs that we have remained in it much longer than we expected, and for the kindness shown by all representatives of the host Government to the foreign delegations whose members never had the impression that they were exiles on British soil but really felt themselves almost at home. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): I would just like to say, as a very recent newcomer to the Sub-Committee's work, what a privilege it has been for me to be associated with those who have so much longer an experience in this field in the pursuit of our common aims.

I should like, on behalf of the Canadian delegation, to echo the thanks expressed by Mr. Stassen and Mr. Moch for the hospitality extended to us by the United Kingdom Government. We are rather in the position of people who came to stay perhaps no more than a few weeks and who stayed for five and a half months, which might be expected to put a slight strain on the host. But our host's kindness has been equal to the occasion, and we are very grateful for it.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

I would merely add a few words to express the Soviet delegation's gratitude to Her Majesty's Government for inviting us here, and to all the staff of the Foreign Office, who have attended to all our problems and needs and provided us with pleasant and comfortable premises and all the necessary conditions for our work, which has unfortunately not been as fruitful as it might have been in such good conditions.

At the same time I wish to thank all members of the Secretariat who have ensured the continuity of our work and seen that the documents were accurate and properly circulated; this has helped us find our bearings in all our work more quickly.

Before we close the meeting, I should like to ask another minor practical question. We must, I think, agree on the date of publication of the report. This is what we did last time, and I think we must decide this question now. What can Mr. Protitch tell us on this point?

The CHAIRMAN: May I say how much my colleagues and I appreciate the thanks of the other delegations for the services which we have, of course, been happy to provide here in Lancaster House in London. We look upon it as a great privilege to have the Sub-Committee working here in London.

Before declaring the 157th meeting closed, I was going to ask Mr. Protitch the very question that Mr. Zorin has just raised, and to ascertain what he suggests with regard to the publication of the report.

Mr. PROTITCH (Representative of the Secretary-General): Will you first allow me to express, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, my thanks to you all for the kind words you have said about the Secretariat's work here, and modestly to tell you that we were very proud to assist you in your important work on the problem of disarmament.

So far as the report is concerned, my understanding is that it has been approved, with six paragraphs in all, as they appear in the draft before you, and that we have to add to the existing draft the three documents whose circulation was requested yesterday -- namely, the document requested by the representative of the USSR, containing his statements of 4 and 5 September, and that requested by the representative of France containing his statement of 5 September.

Regarding the question of release, I think the only suggested date could be next Wednesday at noon, New York time. The reason for that is to give us sufficient time to fly these documents and the report to New York and to reproduce them there. Of course, the records will be reproduced as quickly as possible, as has been done in connexion with the fourth report.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

Does that mean the tenth or the eleventh?

Mr. PROTITCH (Representative of the Secretary-General): At 12 o'clock noon, New York time, Wednesday, 11 September.

The CHAIRMAN: I gather that today's communique will follow the usual lines but that instead of saying when we shall meet again it will state that the Sub-Committee adopted the report and recessed.

I gather there are no objections to Mr. Protitch's suggestion with regard to the report.

The communique will read:

"The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission held its one hundred and fifty-seventh meeting on 6 September 1957, at 3.30 p.m. at Lancaster House, under the chairmanship of the Right Hon. Allan Noble, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and continued its discussions.

The Sub-Committee adopted its fifth report and recessed."

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.