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SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Lancaster House, London,
on Thursday, 15 August 1957, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. STASSEN

(United States of America)

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Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): At our last meeting I listened with some surprise to the various remarks in the Soviet representative's speeches. When I reviewed the verbatim record I found it confirmed that Mr. Zorin made a statement and asked a question — indeed, he repeated both the statement and the question several times in various forms — which suggested that he had a fundamental misunderstanding of the proposals by the four Western delegations on the question of force levels under a first-stage partial disarmament agreement. I am surprised because I thought that the four Western delegations had made their position quite clear during the many meetings of this session of the Sub-Committee. To remove any doubts from Mr. Zorin's mind, I would like to make some comments both on his statement and on the question that he asked.

Mr. Zorin's statement, or I should say allegation, seems to be most clearly stated on page 12 of the verbatim record of our 147th meeting, where he is reported as saying:

"The position adopted by the Western Powers has in fact given the revanchiste forces of Western Germany a veto in the settlement of all disarmament problems, and in the framing of all disarmament measures from the very outset."

I would like to underline those last words, "from the very outset". In other words, if I may paraphrase Mr. Zorin — I think correctly — he is saying that the West is stipulating political preconditions before embarking on the first stage of disarmament. The answer to this is very plain; we are not.

As for the question which developed directly from Mr. Zorin's thesis, I choose the version on page 23 of the same verbatim record, where he says:

"...are the Western Powers prepared to include in the agreement a firm and definite undertaking by States to reduce their armed forces to a level below 2.5 million men, without any prior conditions or special negotiations?"

The answer to this is just as plain; we are not.

I think that after the many hours that have been spent by the five Powers sitting at this table together discussing a first-stage, partial disarmament agreement -- the type of agreement in which Mr. Zorin still affirms his Government's interest -- it must be abundantly clear that we attach no political conditions to this whatsoever. This should have been clear from the very beginning of this session, for as early as during the meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly on 15 January of this year the representative of the United Kingdom, my colleague Mr. Noble said: "A start in disarmament can undoubtedly be made in the world as it is today". (A/C.1/PV.822, p. 11) If we wish to come down to a more recent date, the United Kingdom's understanding of the position was expressed even more clearly by Mr. Noble in the House of Commons on 3 July when he said:

"There is general agreement in the Disarmament Sub-Committee that no political conditions should be attached to the initial reduction of armed forces as part of a first-stage disarmament agreement."

I do not know whether Mr. Zorin was present in the House of Commons on 3 July, but I will now remind him of a speech in Parliament during the recent debate on disarmament on 23 July when, if I recall correctly, he was present as a distinguished guest. On that occasion the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, said -- and Mr. Zorin may refresh his memory by turning to column 264 of the House of Commons Official Report for that day --

"The one thing which is agreed by everybody so far as a first-stage agreement is concerned is that no political settlements of any sort are conditions precedent to that."

I cannot possibly state the position more plainly than that, and I can only repeat that this has been the position of the United Kingdom since we started considering a first-stage disarmament agreement.

I would like now to return to Mr. Zorin's question. When I looked at page 12 of the English version of the verbatim record of the last meeting I was surprised to see him interpreting the position of the Western Powers in the following words:

"It has emerged from our discussions that the Western Powers are ready to reduce their armed forces below 2.5 million men under a partial disarmament agreement;"

Of course, this is not correct. We are prepared to accept the figures of 2.5 million men for the United States and the USSR and 750,000 men for the United Kingdom and France as the force levels for a first-stage agreement, and I must point out that we are prepared to go farther in being willing to state what levels of forces could be achieved in the second and third stages of disarmament, namely, 2.1 million and 1.7 million men for the United States and the Soviet Union and 700,000 and 650,000 men for the United Kingdom and France. But we hold firmly to the principle stated in our White Paper issued in July -- and, indeed, quoted by Mr. Zorin -- that manpower reduction for the second and final stages would be dependent on progress in reaching settlement of major international political problems.

We believe that the first stage of disarmament can be undertaken straight away but, as Mr. Moch pointed out so admirably during our last meeting, in referring to the Anglo-French Plan of March 1956, we have always insisted that the necessary conditions of confidence should exist before proceeding from the first stage to the second stage, and this atmosphere of confidence can come only if we can see some

(Mr. Ormsby-Gore, United Kingdom)

progress in resolving the political tensions which threaten the peace of the world today. We do not say that we should try to resolve these political problems only when a first-stage disarmament agreement has been fully implemented; indeed, it is our earnest hope that the very fact that the major Powers of the world are agreed on a first step in disarmament will so reduce international tension that a start can be made immediately on resolving the political differences between us.

Mr. Zorin has suggested that we are complicating the task of reaching a first-stage disarmament agreement by including in it political conditions which are out of place. As I have already said, we are doing nothing of the sort. We have never suggested that progress in the settlement of political questions is necessary before we can arrive at a first-stage disarmament agreement. Indeed, it is Mr. Zorin himself who is complicating matters by insisting that we should include in a first-stage agreement provisions for comprehensive reductions in manpower without the political conditions which, as he well knows, are in our view essential if such comprehensive reductions in manpower are to be accepted.

Our position is perfectly clear. We are prepared to have a first-stage disarmament agreement which will include manpower reductions to the agreed first-stage levels. We are also prepared to agree that such a first-stage agreement should include a provision for further reductions in manpower, but these further reductions must be accompanied by progress in political settlements. There is nothing new in this; I am well aware that it has always been our position.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other representative wishes to speak at this particular time I will make a statement as representative of the United States. I have reviewed the provisional verbatim record of the 147th meeting and I will make some comments related to the statements made on that occasion and to our situation generally.

(The Chairman)

First of all, I should like to re-state my support for the statement made by the French representative at the 147th meeting. I wish also to comment favourably upon the clarification, re-emphasis and correction of any possible misunderstanding which the United Kingdom representative has just made.

The United States is prepared to proceed without delay with serious negotiations for an agreement with the Soviet Union, Canada, France and the United Kingdom for partial measures for a first step of disarmament.

During the implementation of such a first step the United States will make its best efforts to reach accord on further steps and on a comprehensive agreement. I emphasize this at the opening of my statement today because of the kind of questions which are sometimes raised and which were inherent in part of the discussion at the last meeting of whether our concentration on these immediate steps meant that we were rejecting any interest in matters which went beyond them. That is not at all the case. It has been because of its view on the importance of reaching agreement, and because of the eleven years of failure to agree, that the United States has concentrated on these immediate measures, in the belief that attaining such immediate measures of agreement would improve the prospects and that we should make every effort to reach accord on further steps and on a comprehensive agreement.

Wide studies and careful reviews have been carried out. Extensive consultations have been conducted. This has been constructive. The views of other Governments have been taken into account. We are confident that, if all here agree, many other States will join in the moves and the cause of a lasting and desirable peace will be served.

(The Chairman)

The Government of the United States takes an affirmative attitude towards a mutually sound and reciprocally safeguarded agreement for partial measures for a first step in the field of disarmament. The President of the United States has not only made his position clear but has also expressed and demonstrated his devoted interest in this objective. The Secretary of State has provided his effective leadership, and there should be no doubt of the widespread and decisive backing of the people of America.

The occasional speaker or writer heard or read in dissent is simply a healthy manifestation, day by day, of the immediate public expression of any diverging views which individuals have the opportunity to express under our system. This should not in any way give rise to an erroneous estimate of the situation in my country. Just as the United Nations Charter was supported after it was negotiated, just as the International Atomic Energy "Atoms for Peace" Agency was backed after it was negotiated, so would a first-step treaty for disarmament be sustained.

It has been agreed that the first reduction in the level of armed forces for the United States should be to the figure of 2.5 million. The United States is prepared to enter into an agreement to reduce to this level, and to implement such an agreement promptly and without any political preconditions provided all the other States concerned reduce to their corresponding levels under the partial measures agreement.

The emphasis which the United States has placed upon the establishment of a first reduction without political preconditions has caused the question to be asked whether this is the only reduction which the United States is willing to make. The question is

(The Chairman)

asked whether the intent is to limit the reduction in armed forces only to the level of 2.5 million men for the United States. This is not the case. It is the intention of the United States to limit the reduction to the level of 1.7 million men. The further reductions below the 2.5 million would be made on a basis taking into account progress towards solution of major political issues. Such further reductions would take into account also satisfactory progress in the fulfilment of the agreement for partial measures.

Taking these matters into account would not be for the purpose of preventing or hindering further reductions. On the contrary. The United States is not a militaristic nation; its manpower generally prefers civilian occupations to military service. It has what it considers to be a very outstanding force of career officers and men in each of its armed services which forms the basic core of its defence position; but these officers and men of the career service are relatively small in number. The great majority of the armed force of the United States is made up of officers and men who prefer civilian occupations, and who look forward, while they are in service, to returning to their civilian occupations.

At the end of the Second World War the United States had more than 12 million men in its armed services. Within a short time it reduced those armed forces to approximately 1.4 million men and continued at this very low level until the Korean War started. With this breach of the peace and its serious threat to the security and stability of the world the force level rose. So that I would emphasize that it is only necessary that the conditions be right and reasonable for the United States

(The Chairman)

to move wholeheartedly with the other States in the reduction of armed forces -- in reduction to below 2.5 million and not lower than 1.7 million.

The successive figures stated of 2.1 and 1.7 million are considered by the United States to reflect a logical and gradual method. The United States has welcomed the acceptance of these levels in principle by the USSR, and it suggests that further review should lead to the conclusion that it will be only natural and wise that the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, in relation to the four force levels, as well as Canada and the other States concerned, will in fact take into account progress towards the solution of major political issues and satisfactory progress in the fulfilment of the agreement in making such further reductions.

No public statements of any kind which have been made since 25 May 1957 have been intended to change in any way this favourable decision towards agreement by the United States Government, and no such statements have had the effect of changing this policy in any manner adverse to agreement. I have noted the clear emphasis given by the representative of the United Kingdom in that respect, and statements issued in other connexions should not be given extreme interpretations in any reflection upon the clear policy decisions which have been stated in the Sub-Committee on behalf of the United States Government at the appropriate times.

The United States also welcomes the acceptance in principle by the USSR of the reduction of armaments in the first instance under an agreement for partial measures through reciprocal submission of specific lists of armaments to be reduced. The

(The Chairman)

United States agrees that this method of reaching agreement on reducing armaments according to lists in the first stage should not delay the implementation of the provisions in the agreement pertaining to reductions in armed forces and military expenditures. We inquire whether the USSR is prepared to exchange such proposed lists in the immediate processes of this negotiation. It is the view of the United States that such lists should become an annex which will be an integral part of the agreement for partial measures.

It is the intention of the United States to continue in every aspect to follow policies directed towards the end that there should not be a war in which nuclear weapons are used, nor any other war. The objective of the United States is peace. The United States will not be an aggressor. The United States does not seek territorial extension. The United States will defend itself and its vital interests. The United States will endeavour to fulfil its responsibilities to the United Nations and its responsibilities for peace.

As one of the partial measures of an agreement, the United States is prepared to refrain from all nuclear testing. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of the installation of inspection posts, with scientific instruments, within the Soviet Union to verify such cessation of testing is welcomed. On its part, the United States is prepared to accept in the agreement the installation of such inspection posts within the United States. It is also prepared to co-operate in the establishment of such posts in such other locations as may be required, acting, of course, through the appropriate international channels and with the indispensable consent of the States concerned.

(The Chairman)

The initial period for such cessation of testing should be brief so that it may be promptly determined whether the installation of the inspection is satisfactorily completed and whether conditions are favourable for further suspension of testing. The most important point is for the cessation of testing to begin, and that it should begin at an early date.

The United States has noted that the Soviet Union included the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons in its proposals of 18 March 1957 (DC/SC.1/49) as a matter which was to be carried out in the year 1959. We would like to have a further explanation by the Soviet Union of the manner in which, in the Soviet view, such cessation is to be fulfilled. We also inquire whether the Soviet delegation is prepared to agree to the study of the necessary inspection system by competent experts. The United States places great importance on a reasonable and practical working out of the method by which there should be a cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and, upon the fulfilment of such an agreement, the United States will also be prepared to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons reciprocally by transferring material used in such weapons to non-weapons purposes.

The United States joined with Canada, France, and the United Kingdom in presenting on 2 July a working paper (DC/SC.1/59) which outlined the position of the United States in this matter.

On 2 August, the United States joined with Canada, France and the United Kingdom in presenting a clear and definite outline of the position on the initial inspection provisions with regard to providing against the possibility of a surprise attack, an objective on which the Soviet Union and the other four members of the Sub-Committee have repeatedly expressed themselves -- an objective, in fact,

(The Chairman)

which has also been referred to by the heads of Governments of all five members of the Sub-Committee. The United States is prepared further to explain this proposal, if required, and it also looks forward to giving thoughtful and careful attention to the response of the Soviet Union.

The United States is prepared to agree that the control organization shall be established under the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations. It is the view of the United States that reaching such a first-step agreement would result in the lessening of tensions and in a steady reduction in armed forces, armaments and military expenditures. We would move from the 2.5 million towards the 2.1 million and 1.7 million levels, and that, as a direct consequence, would clearly lead to fewer military bases and fewer forces stationed beyond national borders.

Our conviction that a small first step, mutually agreed upon and faithfully executed, would hold good promise of further result in both disarmament and the solution of political problems is based upon a careful analysis of the world situation today. It also gains support from the experience of the United States in its own history. When sudden and sharp reductions in armaments and armed forces have been made, it has not contributed to a lasting peace. When international problems have been ignored, the ultimate consequences have been bad for peace.

On the other hand, when patient negotiations have resulted in initial mutual steps, and these have been followed up with continued negotiations, the results have been excellent on both sides. I will give again an example with

(The Chairman)

which the Sub-Committee is familiar, but I give it in this statement today in relation to the kind of questions that were raised at the last meeting of the Sub-Committee on Tuesday about the implication and the nature of United States policy and the reasons for it.

The example is that of the well-known instance of the unarmed and tranquil border between Canada and the United States, which, as the world knows, has been of great benefit to both countries. The living conditions of people on both sides of that border are the better for this unfortified and pleasant boundary. Few people realize today that it was not always so, and few know the history of how it came to pass. Shortly after the initial establishment of the United States of America there was another war, called the War of 1812. During that war there was extensive fighting along the Canadian border and on the Great Lakes between Canada and the United States.

Throughout that period there were also many unsolved political problems, including a very difficult boundary dispute. After the War of 1812, by means of years of negotiations, a treaty called the Rush-Bagot Agreement was concluded between Great Britain and the United States in 1817. This provided for a limitation of armaments on the Great Lakes. From that small beginning the negotiation of political problems improved, and within less than two years one of the boundary disputes, from the Great Lakes half-way to the Pacific Ocean, was settled amicably. The limitation of armaments on the Great Lakes spread in ensuing years to become the unarmed border. Other political problems were solved by negotiation. The original treaty is still in force, even though either side could have cancelled it at any time within the last 140 years by giving just six months' notice.

(The Chairman)

This is the kind of a result the United States seeks on the wider scope of the modern world situation. The beginnings need not be big, but they must be sound: they must be mutual, and they must be followed by other negotiations for the solution, genuinely and peaceably, of other problems.

The development of a durable peace could be likened in some respect to raising a good crop of maize or corn. Such a crop requires fine seed, skilful cultivation and a strong stalk in order to result in numerous neat rows of nutritious kernels of corn. It is not accomplished by a statement or by an undertaking. It requires attention and it requires work.

The United States is convinced that a first-step agreement in the field of disarmament, such as we are willing to negotiate, will pave the way in the direction of a lasting peace. It would be a peace in the mutual interest of all nations. It would provide greater opportunities for the economic advance of all peoples. Armaments would require less of the resources of States; and housing, schools, transportation and goods of all types for the people would receive more of the resources of all States. Improving conditions of peoples would in many instances in itself make it easier to negotiate solutions of difficult international problems, as well as leading to internal improvements. It would serve the goal of peace.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): I wish to say briefly, Mr. Chairman, that the French delegation fully agrees with the statement which you have just made.

(Mr. Moch, France)

Like you, we are not opposed to the idea of subsequent stages of disarmament. We understand the blessings of peace as well as you do -- or perhaps even better, because we suffered more directly during the recent wars. And it is a continental voice which you are now hearing after one from beyond the oceans.

We too have unarmed frontiers; we may not have had them for as long as you, but they have been there for many years. No fortification separates France from Belgium, Luxembourg or Switzerland; only some old, unguarded ones remain between France and Italy. Thus we have begun what you and your Canadian neighbours have already achieved. Our action is on a smaller scale, because we are smaller in area and our population is less than that of the United States. But, simply because we are continental, and because we have repeatedly been invaded, we attach great importance to a point which Mr. Zorin very rightly stressed some days ago. This point is that the entire operation which we must undertake, both in the first stage and in the subsequent stages, must not only protect us against all surprise attack but must also bring about a genuine and substantial reduction in armaments even more than in troops.

That is why we support a first stage in the form in which it has been put forward by all of us; for on this point, I think, our differences will be relatively small, provided it is understood that following a first step of limited range, one of the nature you have just indicated, there will be provision for one or more further stages which must embody measures of genuine disarmament such as to reduce the effective potential of all States by establishing a strict tie between the existing force levels, regarded as a sort of currency of account, and the levels of controlled armaments, which in our view are even more important

(Mr. Moch, France)

than the force levels, since in countries which have compulsory military service or have had wartime mobilization manpower can be improvised rapidly, whereas materiel, once destroyed, takes longer to reconstitute.

You will all understand -- for I am the only one among us who can claim to be a continental European in the full sense of the term -- that these considerations are of very great importance to us. I hasten to add that they are perfectly compatible with all that Mr. Stassen has just said, which, speaking as chairman of the French delegation, I fully support.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

I have listened attentively to the statements which have just been made by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Stassen, the representative of the United States and Mr. Moch, the representative of France. The Soviet delegation will read the verbatim record of these speeches with care, and may perhaps find it necessary to make a further statement regarding certain of the points put forward in them.

Today I should like merely to make some brief preliminary remarks in connexion with a number of points which came to my mind immediately as I listened to these statements.

One question which is of interest to the Soviet delegation, and which we raised at the last meeting, has to some extent been clarified, but this clarity unfortunately brings us no comfort, since it shows, unhappily, that our partners in these talks are standing on positions which cannot make for progress in the reduction of armed forces. I have in mind the observations made by Mr. Ormsby-Gore

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Mr. Stassen and, in general form, by Mr. Moch -- since he fully supported the position outlined by Mr. Stassen in regard to the reduction of armed forces.

The question I put at the last meeting, namely, are the Western Powers prepared to include in the agreement a firm and definite undertaking by States to effect reductions in armed forces to levels below 2.5 million men, without making each stage of reductions dependent on prior conditions or special negotiations, was answered by Mr. Ormsby-Gore in the negative.

Mr. Stassen, too, confirmed, although in less definite terms, that before any transition took place to reductions to 2.1 million and 1.7 million, progress in the settlement of political issues would have to be taken into account.

Thus the figures of 2.1 and 1.7 million are not firm and definite undertakings, on which further armed force reductions could be based, but are clearly conditional.

The settlement of major political issues is, unfortunately, retained as a condition. That, I repeat, is clear, but hardly comforting.

I feel bound to say that the explanations given today do not give the least indication of a desire to progress towards a solution of the problem of armed force reductions. I will venture to recall the history of our discussions of this problem in the Sub-Committee.

On the very first day of the Sub-Committee's session the Soviet delegation put forward, in its proposal of 18 March, a suggestion that armed force reductions should be effected in two stages: first to 2.5 million for the United States and the USSR and correspondingly to 750,000 for the United Kingdom and France; and secondly to 1-1.5 million for the United States and the USSR and correspondingly to 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France. The whole point of our first-stage discussions was that

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

we insisted on the necessity of laying down not only the first reduction figure but also the figure for the subsequent reduction. We explained why the Soviet Union considers it necessary to indicate the later reduction figures as well as the earlier figures.

Then we introduced our proposal of 30 April. In this Memorandum we again confirmed our position on this matter, and elaborated our argument that it is impossible to accept just the single figure of 2.5 million: in the first place because it would really mean hardly any reduction for several of the countries taking part in these talks; and secondly because it would put the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union on the same level although their respective frontier and defence situations are unequal. We argued this point in detail. In my recollection, moreover, Mr. Stassen, the United States representative, said on more than one occasion that the United States was taking account of the considerations which we had expounded, and thinking about how to reach an agreement which would allow for these important factors affecting the security of the Soviet Union and other countries.

After that the United States representative declared, and the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Canada later corroborated, that the United States was taking a step to meet the Soviet Union, and that the United Kingdom, France and Canada were supporting that "step to meet" us. That step to meet us, according to their declaration, consisted in the fact that the United States was ready to write into the agreement which we were to sign -- the agreement for an initial reduction of armed forces -- its readiness to reduce its armed forces in the future to 2.1 and 1.7 million, and that the United Kingdom and France would correspondingly reduce their forces to 700,000 and 550,000. But at the same time a vague reference was made to the need for somehow taking certain conditions into account before moving on to these new figures.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Throughout this period the Soviet delegation tried to find out what these conditions were, and what real meaning the figures put forward as a concession by the United States and the other Western Powers had.

After lengthy discussion and many questions from our side, the picture gradually grew clearer; and now, if I am not mistaken, it is entirely clear.

The figures 2.1 and 1.7 million do not at present have any real significance.

They were mentioned, apparently, simply to reassure us, for according to one version -- that of the White Paper -- the transition to these figures will depend entirely on progress in reaching settlements of major international political problems, while according to Mr. Stassen's more moderate statement, it will be necessary to "take into account progress towards the solution of major political issues." But these two formulae, it seems to me, are in essence absolutely identical. If there is any difference between them then we should like to have it explained. We should like to hear an immediate answer to two questions; the first, what is the difference between the two formulae, and the second, what position does each of the Western Powers take, which is the formula it stands on? Thus, the transition to the new figures, announced as a concession to the Soviet Union, is not in fact ensured, since to say that the transition will depend on progress in the settlement of major international political problems means that at each stage further discussions will take place on whether or not such progress has been made. One of the States participating in the negotiations could then say -- as probably the United Kingdom would do -- that it considered the problem of the Near and Middle East a vital political problem on which progress was necessary. Another country might say -- as perhaps the United States would do -- that the major political issue was the unification of Germany on the conditions put forward by Adenauer. All

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

sorts of other points could be put forward on this matter of progress in the settlement of political problems. In these circumstances, it is perfectly obvious that the transition to each successive figure will be accompanied by protracted new negotiations of unforeseeable duration and doubtful prospects of success.

What, then, is the position? Are the five States participating in our negotiations agreed to reduce armed forces, in the first instance, to 2.5 million and 750,000, respectively, and subsequently to 2.1 and 1.7 million; or is it your position merely that you are agreed on a reduction to 2.5 million and 750,000, but that for the rest you have mentioned the figures of 2.1 million and 1.7 million for our consolation, but whether we move on to them or not will depend on your willingness or otherwise to do so, so that the prospects of further reductions in armed forces will remain in doubt.

To reassure us, Mr. Ormsby-Gore told us today: "This is nothing new; this has always been our position". If that is so, then may I ask what we have been talking about for five months, why we have held these protracted discussions, and why Mr. Moch told us at the last meeting "We have taken a much bigger step forward than you: you have conceded 200,000, but we have conceded 800,000"? What are these concessions? Mr. Ormsby-Gore said plainly "This is nothing new; this is our old position". My congratulations. This means that after five months spent in discussing reduction of armed forces you still stick to your old position -- only I should say it was worse. Why is it worse? Because your original position was 1-1.5 million and now you have made it worse by speaking of 1.7 million. And that is what you call a step forward. I can see no progress in your position. If you regard this as progress, I put you to proof; but what I have said just now is fact, and

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

cannot be ignored. In other words, all declarations that you have come nearer to position, that you are meeting us half-way, are groundless: the facts disprove them.

Those are the few remarks which I have desired to make about the statements which we have heard today on the reduction of armed forces.

I regret, however, that neither of Mr. Ormsby-Gore's speeches, at the last meeting or today, in which he enumerated the measures which the Western Powers think should be included in a partial disarmament agreement, mentioned one measure which we consider important and to which the United Kingdom Government also at one time attached some weight. That is the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of the great Powers stationed in Europe, and especially in Germany.

The Western Powers admit -- for example, in the statement which Mr. Dulles made on the United States television network on 22 July -- that Europe is an area where the main armed forces of two military groupings face one another at particularly short range. This, as everyone can understand, produces a tense situation fraught with danger of an outbreak of hostilities in this vitally important area of the world.

Some relaxation of the tension in this area is essential if we are to consolidate peace and remove the danger of war.

A relaxation of tension in Europe would be greatly assisted by measures such as the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the European countries, in particular the forces stationed in German territory.

The Soviet Union has long advocated these measures, which it regards as the true road to the strengthening of peace in Europe and throughout the world.

In the Soviet Government's disarmament proposals which we put forward at this session of the Sub-Committee on 18 March and 30 April, we set forth practical measures for the progressive reduction of the armed forces of the four Powers stationed in German

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

territory, the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territories of the NATO countries, and the armed forces of the USSR stationed in the Warsaw Treaty countries.

We proposed, as a first step, a reduction of the armed forces of the four Powers stationed in Germany by one-third as compared with their levels obtaining on 31 December 1956.

We adopted a flexible position in order to facilitate the drafting of an agreement, and suggested that the extent of subsequent reductions of the armed forces stationed in Germany, and of the armed forces of the four Powers in the territories of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries should form the subject of a reciprocal agreement.

The adoption of these proposals by the Western Powers would in our opinion help considerably towards the removal of all foreign forces from the territory of the States both of Western and of Eastern Europe, and thereby towards the restoration of normal peacetime conditions on the continent of Europe, which we have consistently advocated.

The attitude of the Western Powers to our proposals is not consistent with their declarations of willingness to undertake measures likely to remove the threat of war. Nearly five months have gone by since the introduction of the Soviet Government's proposals on this question. Up to now, however, we have had no clear answer from the Western Powers. Nor do we see any concrete proposals made from their side on these issues.

It is impossible not to recognize this evident tendency of the Western delegations to evade this problem and put off its solution. This is the real meaning of the statements we have heard here to the effect that the present is not the time to consider this matter, and that the reduction of the armed forces of the four Powers in Germany cannot take place until some time in the future, as a consequence of a decrease of international tension.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But such arguments obviously fly in the face of logic. The very fact that powerful armed forces are stationed face to face in Germany is, as the Western Powers themselves recognize, one of the main sources of tension in Europe. To evade an agreement for the reduction of the forces of the great Powers stationed in Germany and in other European countries is in fact to help to maintain a situation of tension in Europe; and that, of course, cannot but impede a settlement of the disarmament question.

At the same time, a reduction of the armed forces of the four Powers in Germany and in the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries would undoubtedly reduce international tension, lessen the danger of the outbreak of war and as a result create a more peaceful situation and one more favourable to the solution both of the disarmament question and of political problems.

If the disarmament talks taking place in this Sub-Committee are to reach a successful conclusion, it is essential that the Western representatives should give a clear and definite answer to the question whether they are ready to co-operate with the Soviet Union in seeking an agreement regarding the withdrawal of the armed forces of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France from Germany and the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

Any failure to give a straight answer to this question may be taken as indicating a lack of desire on their part to deal in business-like fashion with this question, on which depends, to a large extent, the restoration of normal conditions in Europe and a real lessening of the danger of war.

Liquidation of bases on foreign territory is one of the problems which must be solved before there can be any question of strengthening the peace and security of peoples and States. The presence of foreign bases, now numbering several

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hundred and dispersed over the entire globe, is one of the principal sources of tension in relations between States. This tension and suspicion are intensified today by the fact that many of these bases are either already used or are intended to be used for stationing atomic units. In recent times there has been increasingly open talk of the need for stationing atomic weapons in other countries, and particularly in the territory of certain European States in the North Atlantic bloc.

If we consider the statements made by the chiefs of NATO and by representatives of certain Western Governments about plans for using atomic weapons in a future war, and the steps being taken to station atomic units and atomic weapons on foreign territory in order to use those foreign countries and the bases therein for the preparation and execution of "atomic blows", then the importance of the question of liquidating military bases on foreign territory becomes obvious.

In the course of discussion the Soviet delegation has pointed out that the existence of military bases in foreign countries, the establishment of new bases intended for atomic warfare, and the stationing of atomic weapons in foreign territories, place the people of the countries in which the bases are situated or are being established in an extremely dangerous position.

It cannot be denied that the existence of foreign bases in a country's territory creates for that country a threat that it may be dragged into a new war against its will and desire. That is particularly true of Western Germany, whose territory is becoming NATO's principal military base in the centre of Europe.

Should the forces of aggression succeed in unleashing an atomic war, the countries which have made their territory available to foreign Powers for military bases will become the first targets for atom bombs. Considering that

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the liquidation of foreign military bases on the territory of foreign countries would serve the national interests of all countries and would help to reduce international tension and remove the threat of atomic war, the Soviet Government introduced a proposal that such bases should be liquidated. In addition, the Soviet Government proposed that States should refrain from siting atomic weapons on foreign territories, in particular, the territory of both parts of Germany. The Soviet Union's position in this matter has been set forth in a number of Soviet proposals which are under consideration by this Sub-Committee.

As in other problems of disarmament, the Soviet Government has given due consideration to the Western Powers' position on the liquidation of foreign bases in the territories of other countries. It would, of course, be a good thing if we could succeed in reaching agreement on the liquidation of all foreign military, naval and air bases in the territories of other countries in the course of the next few years. That indeed was the solution advocated by the Soviet Government when it submitted its well-known proposals of 10 May 1955.

These proposals were repeated in substance in our proposals of 18 March submitted to this Sub-Committee. However, the Western Powers did not accept these proposals. But they put forward no suggestions of their own for the solution of this problem. I cannot, of course, regard as a proposal Mr. Stassen's observations today when he referred in passing to this question in the course of his statement. So far as I can gather from what has been said, the United States, according to Mr. Stassen, holds the view that the conclusion of a first-stage agreement would result in a lessening of tensions and a steady reduction in armed forces, armaments and military expenditures, the direct consequence of which would be a decline in the number of military bases and armed forces stationed beyond the national borders. But this, of course, was not a proposal; it was, I might

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say, a pious hope which has no foundation whatever and bears no relation to any real steps. Such vague hopes and assumptions, of course, do absolutely nothing really to diminish the threat of war resulting from the presence of large concentrations of armed forces face to face in the centre of Europe and from the existence of military bases in foreign countries.

The Soviet Union, for its part, desiring to bring about a positive solution of the problem of liquidating bases in foreign countries, adopted a more flexible attitude. Realizing that the Western Powers are not yet ready to consent to the complete liquidation of their bases abroad, the Soviet Government has proposed that we should first agree on which of these bases could be liquidated during a period of, say, one or two years.

The Soviet delegation maintains that any agreement on disarmament, whether broad or partial -- if, indeed, we are seriously discussing such an agreement -- must include appropriate provisions for the progressive liquidation of foreign bases.

Nevertheless, during our discussions the Western delegations have by every possible means avoided giving a specific answer to this proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on 30 April for a liquidation of bases on foreign territory, and have generally endeavoured to evade any discussion of the question. Furthermore, they have not themselves submitted any concrete proposal about it whatsoever.

Wishing to see some progress in the matter, the Soviet delegation would like to know the real position of the Western Governments on which and how many bases in foreign countries could be liquidated during the first stage of execution of the provisions of a partial disarmament agreement. In our opinion a concrete answer to this question would be a real contribution by the Western Governments to our discussions about partial disarmament and would undoubtedly help to reduce tension in international relations and above all, to strengthen peace in Europe.

These are the points which I have felt it necessary to make today to my distinguished colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN: If no other representative wishes to speak I might make this comment. I listened with close attention to the statement that Mr. Zorin just made, and I shall, of course, review it in the verbatim record. I understood him to say that the levels of 2.1 million and 1.7 million men must be recorded in the agreement. We are prepared to agree that those levels should be recorded in the agreement. I do not know whether Mr. Zorin understood from previous discussions that our position was that those levels could not be recorded in the agreement, but as I say, we are in fact willing that they should be so recorded.

As to the manner in which they are recorded and the manner in which they are implemented, those are subjects of our current negotiation. I might invite the Soviet delegation to present some draft language relating to the levels of 2.5, 2.1 and 1.7 million, or to agree to the proposal of the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom that we should ask some of our experts to meet in a committee of five to ascertain whether language can be agreed for recording, in a first-step agreement, levels for later agreement — specifically, of course, the levels of 2.1 and 1.7 million involved between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I would also assure Mr. Zorin that if he has any concrete proposals to make in connexion with the other matters he discussed today we would welcome an opportunity to consider such concrete proposals.

Finally, I thought I caught from the simultaneous interpretation one phrase which said something about the unleashing of an atomic war. If such a phrase was used I do not wish to delay an emphatic statement that the entire concentration of the policy of the United States — and, we know, also the policy of those associated with us in collective security agreements — has been on preventing, safeguarding against and ensuring against an atomic war or any other war.

(The Chairman)

I appreciated the remarks of the French representative relating to the statement that I had made earlier today on behalf of the United States. I shall review them in the verbatim record as we move forward in the concrete negotiation of the remaining issues between us.

Mr. MOCH (France) (translated from French): If you had not done so, Mr. Chairman, I should have drawn attention to the same remark; according to my notes, it was phrased as follows: "If the forces of aggression unleash atomic war, etc.".

What are these forces of aggression? They are not in France. Mr. Stassen has just told us, and we all believe him, that they are not in the United States. We know that they are not in the United Kingdom or in Canada. What then does that expression mean?

I should like, if I might venture to do so, to ask Mr. Zorin an indiscreet question: What did he have in mind in his last statement and today's statement? Their tone was so different from that of his earlier statements that I really wonder what he is aiming at.

This is the only question that I shall ask. I could of course take up many points in what we have just heard. I will not, however, do so today, nor probably at our next meeting, since as things stand it would serve no useful purpose.

The CHAIRMAN: Are representatives ready to consider the question of our next meeting? As Chairman I would suggest that we are at the point where some informal work might be more fruitful than a formal meeting. Perhaps our next meeting could be held on Tuesday at 3.30 p.m. unless any delegation makes a specific request for an earlier formal meeting in the meantime. The United States delegation is always ready to attend at reasonably short notice in response to any delegation's specific request for a formal meeting on an important matter.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translated from Russian):

I need hardly say that the Soviet delegation is prepared to meet tomorrow and, if need be, on Saturday and Monday also, in order to make progress in the discussion of our problems -- if, of course, there is anything to discuss. In particular, we have long been awaiting the completion of Mr. Stassen's presentation of his position. If he can finish it in the next few days, we are ready to take part in discussing it. If that is not possible and he cannot continue the presentation of his position until Tuesday, then we have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN: I might say also that, while I realize that 2 August is still quite recent, I wish to state specifically that the United States delegation would be ready to meet tomorrow, on Saturday or on Monday if it was a question of the Soviet delegation's being prepared to respond to the Western Powers' proposals (DC/SC.1/62/Rev.1) of 2 August. I do not make this point with any intention of pressing because, as I say, I realize that for a proposal of that importance, containing alternatives as it did, the time from 2 August until today is quite brief.

Is Tuesday at 3.30 p.m. generally agreeable on the condition suggested?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translated from Russian):

I am prepared to agree to what you, Mr. Chairman, have just proposed. With regard to your brief comment I should like to say that the Soviet delegation -- as we stated on 2 August -- is examining the proposal submitted on behalf of the four Western delegations as part of a comprehensive plan of armaments reduction and disarmament in general. Naturally, it is a matter of not inconsiderable importance to us that we should have some idea of the nature of that comprehensive plan in considering a part of the plan.

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That is why I have lately been so persistent in repeating that we should like to hear the completion of the presentation of its comprehensive plan for partial measures of disarmament which the United States delegation is making. That would undoubtedly be of assistance to us in our consideration of the points which the other delegations have now raised. The delay in presenting the remaining parts of the plan is making it difficult for us to study the proposals submitted.

The CHAIRMAN: I agree that the proposals of 2 August are part of a combined group of partial measures to be fitted together into a first-step treaty. We all take into account the interrelationship of one proposal and another. At the same time, we do make progress as we constantly give each other further information on our views, proposals, counter-proposals and reactions. For instance, the United States made a very important move in the matter of nuclear testing even though it fitted it in with a partial measures agreement and did not await the other items. In fact, the way in which any one item among the various partial measures is responded to by one side affects the other side in turn, so that I can, I know, state on behalf of the four delegations which presented the proposals of 2 August that we agree that those proposals should be considered only as one part of a combined group of partial measures. At the same time, any response that the Soviet delegation finds itself prepared to give at any time will be helpful in our further work.

I would agree with the comment of the Soviet representative that it is difficult to respond on these matters. I am not aware of anything on which we are working which is not difficult. The subject itself is difficult, but despite that we are clarifying the situation and, in a broad sense, moving closer together; I believe we shall continue to do so.

(The Chairman)

I take it that it is agreed that we should meet again at 3.30 p.m. on Tuesday. There is the usual communique, which reads:

"The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission held its one hundred and forty-eighth meeting on 15 August 1957, at 3.30 p.m. at Lancaster House, under the chairmanship of the Honourable Harold E. Stassen and continued its discussions.

"The next meeting will be held on Tuesday, 20 August 1957, at 3.30 p.m."

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.