



Security Council

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Letter dated 4 October 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June 2021, in which the Council encouraged a more robust examination of alternative support for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, with detailed and operational options for that support, including through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and organizations other than the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and with the consideration of all appropriate funding options, and requested me to also include an assessment of the implementation of paragraph 13 of Council resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#), including on the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, in a report to be issued by no later than 30 September 2021, without prejudice to any future Council decision.

To that end, an assessment was conducted from 12 July to 31 August by a team comprised of representatives from the Department of Peace Operations; the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; the Department of Operational Support; the Office of Legal Affairs; MINUSMA; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. The team held a series of consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council, the permanent representations of the States members of the Group of Five for the Sahel in New York, the Executive Secretariat and the Support Committee of the Group of Five in Nouakchott, the Ministers of Defence of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the leadership of the Joint Force, the African Union, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Germany.

I remain convinced that a dedicated United Nations support office funded through assessed contributions is the most effective approach to provide sustainable and predictable support to the Joint Force. At the same time, support models should be designed to promote regional ownership and enhance the capacity of the Joint Force to become self-sufficient. In that spirit, identifying further steps that the States members of the G5 Sahel could take to improve the operational effectiveness of the Joint Force and make the support and technical assistance of international partners more efficient is also crucial. Those parameters have informed the assessment and shaped the development of the options detailed in the present letter and its annex (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) António Guterres



Annex

Assessment of support to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

I. Context

1. The security situation in the Sahel remains volatile, with high levels of violence further constraining the ability of Governments in the Sahel region to sustain the delivery of social services while ensuring the safety and security of their populations. Terrorism continues to spread throughout the region and has reached coastal States. Parts of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger are affected by outbreaks of intercommunal violence resulting in mass displacements, providing a vacuum in which terrorist groups proliferate, further eroding State authority. Chad is grappling with incursions by Boko Haram and “Islamic State West Africa Province” in the Lake Chad basin and with instability along its borders. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Sahel region is facing an exceptional crisis. In 2021, almost 29 million Sahelians will need assistance and protection, 5 million more than was the case in 2020.

2. The anticipated return of foreign fighters and the huge influx of small arms from Libya add more challenges that will further burden the armed and security forces composing the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. Meanwhile, the Force is to operate in the context of the reconfiguration of international forces in northern Mali and the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area shared between Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger.

3. In addition to the creation of the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force, several other regional initiatives to counter terrorism have been developed in recent years, including the Nouakchott Process on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan region in 2013, the Accra Initiative of 2017, and the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) of 2019, which was aimed at mobilizing the ECOWAS Standby Force. Some of the initiatives have remained declarations of intent, while others lack funding or mechanisms for follow-up. Against that backdrop, and given the deeply concerning developments in the Sahel, the creation of the Joint Force, despite the persisting challenges, is a strong manifestation of political will by the five core States of the Sahel that merits the support of the international community.

II. Key findings

A. Capacities of the Group of Five for the Sahel

4. The assessment team carried out an evaluation of the operationalization of the Joint Force, the strategic vision of the G5 Sahel and the desired end state for the Force. The team enquired about concrete steps and timelines for achieving the end state, as well as about planned operations and resulting needs, with the objective of determining a baseline and developing costed options for future support. In the strategic concept of operations for the Force, the operationalization is broken down into two phases, the second of which is to be launched at a later time and anticipates its transformation into a regional security operation. On the basis of information made available to it, the assessment team concluded that refining and honing a shared vision for the future of the Sahel to guide and inform the full operationalization of the Force would merit further consultations among Governments of the Group of Five.

1. Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

5. In March 2021, the Joint Force launched Operation Sama 3 in Sector Centre, a long-term operation conducted in several phases in coordination with other partners. The same month, the Force was reinforced with the arrival of the eighth Chadian battalion, comprising 1,200 elements and currently based in Téra, Niger. Its deployment brought the total number of Force troops to 5,535 soldiers. However, on 21 August, Chad announced the withdrawal of some of the troops for strategic reasons. As at 15 September, Chad had repatriated at least 400 troops, leaving 800 in Téra. The Force leadership informed MINUSMA that the Force planned to conduct two major operations per sector per year, coupled with other ad hoc operations. In that regard, the Force provided a budget table, enclosed with the present letter, with an overview of annual funding needs.

2. Executive Secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel

6. The G5 Sahel has taken steps to increase its autonomy and administrative capacity and to improve organizational governance, including regarding the Joint Force.

7. The Commander of the Joint Force plans his operations on the basis of the strategic and equipment plans received from the Defence and Security Committee, an entity that brings together the military chiefs of staff of the G5 Sahel. The Commander has two reporting lines: one to the Executive Secretariat of the Group, the other to the Committee. The secretariat is not authorized to conduct its own procurement exercises. The Force depends entirely on material and equipment from individual member States, through the Committee, as it cannot procure or obtain those supplies directly. Consequently, the role of the domestic military chiefs of staff is essential.

8. Following the Pau Summit of January 2020, the G5 Sahel strengthened the prerogatives of the then Permanent Secretariat and transformed it into an executive secretariat. Additional staff were recruited to enhance the coordination in the security and development interventions of the Group of Five. The Executive Secretary increased international fundraising and advocacy efforts on behalf of the Joint Force. The European Union coordination hub, a mechanism created in 2018 to match the needs of the Force with donor pledges, was transferred from Brussels to Nouakchott in 2020 and was absorbed by the Support Committee, a multilateral body that acts as an interface between the Force and the Executive Secretariat. The Committee also manages the trust fund of the Group of Five. In 2020, it carried out its first independent procurement exercise and purchased 44 vehicles worth \$13.5 million. According to interlocutors of the Group of Five, the fund is currently depleted. During its extraordinary summit held in N'Djamena in February 2021, the Group of Five created an operations fund for the Force, to which several West African countries have contributed.

9. As part of measures to strengthen institutional governance and capacity, the Executive Secretariat of the Group of Five called for greater involvement of the African Union to accompany the aforementioned processes. African Union interlocutors indicated interest, but noted their own limited capacity, which would require the support of another partner.

B. Implementation of the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces and the operationalization of the compliance framework of the Joint Force

1. Progress

10. Through the implementation of the compliance framework and the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces,

anchored in the commitments of the States members of the G5 Sahel, steady progress has been made by the Joint Force to integrate human rights into its structures and operations, including through the enhanced application of the compliance framework at the battalion level. This is critical given, inter alia, the impact of human rights violations on efforts to fight impunity and rebuild trust between national and regional security forces and the population.

2. Challenges

11. Nevertheless, integrating human rights into United Nations support for the Joint Force remains a challenging endeavour. Difficulties common to implementing the human rights due diligence policy and the compliance framework include scarce information on the impact of Force operations and a general lack of communication to differentiate operations conducted in a national capacity and those conducted under the command of the Force. Consequently, it remains difficult to determine responsibility in cases involving civilian harm or damages. The crucial issue of accountability is further affected by the limited visibility of pending investigations and the lack of appropriate follow-up to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law allegedly committed by members of the Force.

C. International support

12. The assessment team mapped existing support provided by various partners to the Joint Force in order to determine the options that could be leveraged or expanded upon. It found that the most consistent and systematic direct operational support, albeit limited in scope, is currently provided by MINUSMA pursuant to Security Council resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#) and its operative paragraph 13, as well as resolutions [2359 \(2017\)](#), [2480 \(2019\)](#), [2531 \(2020\)](#) and [2584 \(2021\)](#).

1. Support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

13. To date, MINUSMA has delivered 3.9 million litres of fuel and lubricants and 67,000 ration packs to the Joint Force in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy. The Mission also supported the construction of the Force headquarters, procured medical supplies in response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and conducted three medical evacuations in Mali.

14. In August and September 2021, MINUSMA carried out verification missions to all countries of the G5 Sahel, accompanied by the contractors for fuel and rations delivery, to (a) map supply routes; (b) assess storage capacity; (c) discuss tax exemption matters; and (d) identify venues and plans for training on the human rights due diligence policy, in preparation for the implementation of its enhanced support mandate pursuant to Security Council resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#).

15. MINUSMA found that none of the eight battalions had adequate storage capacity. During follow-up meetings, national authorities committed to providing equipment for storage and expressed their willingness to grant tax exemption on all supplies for the benefit of the battalions. The Mission also found that initial estimates provided by the Joint Force did not meet its operational requirements. The quantities of fuel, ingredients and rations have therefore been increased, and drinking water, which was not initially included in planning, has now been included. In addition, during meetings with the leadership of national armed forces, MINUSMA learned that States members of the G5 Sahel provided air support to assist during operations but lacked Jet A1 aviation fuel to increase offensive air support.

2. Other support

16. The European Union remains the most important donor to the Joint Force, with contributions totalling €256.6 million. In addition, the trust fund of the G5 Sahel received contributions from Rwanda (\$1 million), Turkey (\$5 million), the United Arab Emirates (\$12 million) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (\$867,000).

17. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently exploring options for enhanced support for the G5 Sahel, including through its Support and Procurement Agency. The organization plans to conduct its own assessment, which will inform its future engagement in the Sahel region.

18. Several Member States provide bilateral support to the States members of the G5 Sahel, while others are piloting a hybrid model that combines bilateral support with a coordination role for regional entities. In interactions with the assessment team, bilateral donors stated that, until the organizational and institutional capacity of the Group of Five, including its capacity to receive financial support, was strengthened, bilateral support remained the only viable option for the time being.

19. The team found it challenging to obtain a comprehensive overview of all contributions by partners and donors to the Joint Force. In order to provide more effective long-term support, there is a need for better coordination and for the centralization of such information to avoid duplication and improve complementarity.

D. Challenges

20. While all interlocutors underscored their strong support for the Joint Force as an exceptional initiative that warrants international help, there is no convergence of views within the international community on how best to provide it. The assessment team identified several issues that have made it challenging to establish a more coordinated, comprehensive, sustainable and predictable support mechanism for the Force, including the question of whether the Force is the best option under the prevailing circumstances in the Sahel; its governance mechanism; accountability and compliance; transparency and access to information; and financial reporting.

21. In that context, Member States and regional organizations have championed different approaches across a whole spectrum of options, ranging from bilateral support to a full-fledged, dedicated support office based in the Sahel. Despite those challenges, all interlocutors agreed that any support provided to the G5 Sahel as a whole, and the Joint Force as its military arm, made sense only if local capacities were strengthened at both the regional and national levels. All interlocutors also expressed strong support for a strengthened oversight role for the Executive Secretariat.

III. Measures to be taken by the Group of Five for the Sahel

22. Independently of any support provided by international partners, the G5 Sahel could take a number of steps to further operationalize the Joint Force and increase its effectiveness and reach, through enhanced coordination and information-sharing in the face of a common and complex security challenge. Such steps would build upon relevant African Union instruments, including the Common African Defence and Security Policy of 2004 and the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact of 2005, both of which call for enhanced security and defence cooperation among African Union member States, including in the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

23. Specifically, this enhanced cooperation could include the pooling and sharing of services and military equipment, including air assets. Other modalities could also be

envisaged by learning from relevant international experiences, including the conducting of joint procurement exercises and arrangements regarding mutual support services for spare parts. Lastly, and as part of the drive to enhance the effectiveness of the Joint Force, the Group of Five countries could consider developing clear rotation schedules and clarifying command and control structures, as well as developing specialized capacity based on comparative advantage and location. For instance, medical evacuations could be provided by the member States with the air assets most suited to such operations, whereas others might provide offensive air support, transport or storage equipment. In this respect, it is encouraging to note that the chiefs of defence staff of the Group of Five have tasked their respective heads of air forces to come up with recommendations on how to pool their capabilities to cut costs and foster greater effectiveness. Those recommendations are to feed into the next meeting of the chiefs of defence staff, scheduled to take place in Burkina Faso in November 2021.

24. The arrangements mentioned above, if proactively and effectively pursued, will go a long way in reducing costs, achieving economies of scale and ensuring an efficient use of the limited resources available to the Group of Five countries. The same approach should be considered in other areas, including human rights, to maximize the impact of collective efforts by the countries. The efforts will also foster greater cooperation among the countries and signal further political commitment towards collectively addressing the security challenges at hand while creating conditions for more effective international support.

25. Achieving that objective would require a joint stocktaking exercise and a thorough review of relevant international experiences, on the basis of which practical and feasible modalities for enhanced cooperation could be proposed. A United Nations advisory office (see below), working closely with the African Union, the European Union and other partners, could provide valuable support in that regard by facilitating the conduct of the aforementioned exercise and review and identifying comparative advantages.

IV. Options for enhanced international support

26. In the immediate to medium term, strengthening the ownership and capacity of the G5 Sahel should be a key component of any support provided to the Joint Force. This would ensure that the Group of Five further builds the political consensus and develops the institutional capacity necessary to drive the regionalization of the Force and tackle the multiple challenges facing the Sahel in a comprehensive manner. Furthermore, and irrespective of the support model, it is essential that the Force be guided by an overarching political and strategic framework. A dedicated political forum, comprising representatives of the Group of Five and other international and regional organizations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, the United Nations and the European Union, as well as members of the Security Council, could be envisaged. It would both promote regional ownership and foster enhanced international support while ensuring that the operations of the Force were aligned with important political processes, such as the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.

27. On the basis of the findings outlined above, the Secretary-General proposes two options for enhancing support for the Joint Force.

1. Option 1: advisory office to the Executive Secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel

28. The United Nations advisory office would aim to provide technical and expert assistance to the Executive Secretariat of the G5 Sahel in the areas of political affairs, human rights, operational planning and administrative planning, including on modalities

for the adequate pooling and sharing of resources, excluding logistical and material support. The advisory office would be modelled on the former African Union Peacekeeping Support Team of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which successfully provided expert advice to the African Union on the planning and management of its peace operations and was eventually – alongside other United Nations support and liaison mechanisms – subsumed into the present United Nations Office to the African Union. Building upon the comparative advantage of the African Union in peace enforcement and the leveraging of relevant African Union instruments on defence and security cooperation, the advisory office would include a joint United Nations-African Union planning team to also provide guidance and assistance on cross-cutting issues such as military doctrine and training and to coordinate within the United Nations and with other partners the provision of support for the capacity-building of the Joint Force. Technical and expert assistance could be envisaged in the areas of military operations; force generation; medical assistance; aviation; police; public information; procurement; human resources; human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces; finance; contingent-owned equipment; and information and communications technology. Under that option, the human rights and protection mechanism, as established under the compliance framework and the human rights due diligence policy, would remain unchanged and would therefore constitute the support that MINUSMA is currently authorized to deliver.

29. It is envisaged that the advisory office would be co-located with the Executive Secretariat in Nouakchott. Funding could be envisaged through a multi-donor trust fund.

30. Should the Security Council consider this option favourably and a formal request be forthcoming from the States members of the G5 Sahel, it would be necessary to identify further capacity-building requirements, as well as the duration of the assistance and benchmarks against which to measure progress towards the desired objective.

2. Option 2: dedicated United Nations support office

31. A dedicated United Nations support office for the Joint Force would aim to support the implementation of its strategic concept of operations by providing logistical support to operations conducted under the auspices of the Force. It would provide the most sustainable and predictable funding, empower the G5 Sahel by establishing a foundation for the planning and conduct of operations and provide a strong framework for the protection of human rights.

32. A dedicated support office would entail the expansion of the support currently provided by MINUSMA (water, rations, fuel and medical evacuation within the borders of Mali) to cover engineering services, maintenance services, information and communications technology services, cargo transportation, medical supplies, and medical and casualty evacuations in all areas of operation. There are two basic models for the design of the support office, irrespective of whether it is funded through assessed contributions or donor funding:

(a) A model with a heavier reliance on United Nations-provided service delivery, entailing a heavier United Nations staff footprint;

(b) A model based on the maximum use of outsourcing, with a lighter United Nations footprint focused mostly on supply chain functions, contract management and quality assurance, in addition to reporting.

33. Both models would seek to establish support arrangements in the most effective and efficient manner, building upon the expertise developed through the provision of support to the Joint Force by MINUSMA and using, to the extent possible, existing

United Nations support arrangements in the region. The support office would promote transparency and accountability through its fair and transparent processes, flexibility and scalability, and would be more suited to supporting kinetic operations in the area of operations. It could be tailored to the operational needs and capacity of the Group of Five as it enhances its own capacity over time.

34. Regardless of the mode of delivery of support, it is envisaged that the support office headquarters could be situated in Niamey to take advantage of its central location and the ready availability of commercial services. A smaller liaison office would be established in Nouakchott to ensure coordination with the secretariat of the Group of Five. Further operational offices are envisaged in Bamako, Ouagadougou and N'Djamena to ensure that operational planning, prioritization and coordination are synchronized with the support requirements across the area of operations. An operations cell would be established in Bamako to work with the Joint Force headquarters.

35. A key feature of the design of a United Nations support office would be to ensure that Joint Force operations are overseen by a coordination mechanism that would govern the operations of the office, involving the secretariat of the Group of Five, the Force headquarters and the office, through which a common understanding of the operations to be supported could be established and monitored. The coordination mechanism would be essential in ensuring that the office supports only those operations conducted under the auspices of the Group of Five.

36. A support office would apply the same principles and approaches to continue to reinforce the human rights and protection agenda, including by ensuring human rights compliance, as established under the compliance framework and the human rights due diligence policy.

37. Should the Security Council consider this option favourably and the requisite resources be available, it is envisaged that advance phase implementation could begin immediately, with the aim of reaching full operational capacity by the end of 2022 or early 2023. The establishment of a support office would require dedicated resources to conduct planning in appropriate detail before costs, staffing, modes of support delivery, the United Nations footprint and governance arrangements could be finalized.

3. Other considerations

38. The assessment team held several discussions with regional organizations, such as the European Union and the African Union, to explore options for their increased engagement in the region. The European Union is currently considering options for enhanced support through its newly created European Peace Facility for 2022–2023, including for security sector reform, training and military equipment, including some lethal equipment but excluding small arms, but it stressed that it was too early to provide an indication of the modalities, scope and scale of such support.

39. The African Union expressed its willingness for and interest in an enhanced role, especially in relation to encouraging deeper cooperation among the Group of Five countries and supporting their efforts in the area of governance. However, it stressed that it would require the financial support of another donor to provide practical logistical support to the Joint Force.

40. The assessment team also explored options for an enhanced coordination of bilateral support. The United Nations, with its convening power, could potentially play a role in that regard, either through the dedicated political forum mentioned above, as part of options for enhanced international support, through MINUSMA, or within the framework of the Coalition for the Sahel. The team found that enhancing coordination would be crucial but should by no means be mutually exclusive of any of the options outlined above.

4. Recommendations to enhance the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces and the human rights compliance framework

41. Under both the compliance framework and the human rights due diligence policy, improved structures and internal practices to address human rights concerns must continue to be developed together with the Joint Force. This approach should start with operationalizing a mechanism with the Force and the military personnel of the five countries that would help to bring about deconfliction between operations conducted in a national capacity and operations under the command of the Joint Force, and help with the subsequent determination of responsibility for human rights violations. As a matter of priority, enhancing the capacity of the provost deployed to battalions of the Group of Five to conduct independent, impartial investigations and ensure accountability for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by elements of the Force remains essential. Meanwhile, it will be important to strengthen the national and regional ownership of the compliance framework by the Group of Five, including by building the human rights capacity of its Executive Secretariat and the headquarters of the national forces and by further supporting civil-military cooperation and relations between the Force and local populations. Lastly, strong and continuing political will and commitment on the part of the States members of the Group of Five and the Force will be crucial, in addition to the support from international actors.

V. Conclusion

42. The Joint Force is a critical initiative that should be seen as a tool complementing the multifaceted United Nations engagement in the Sahel that the United Nations should more effectively support. When considering how best to support the Joint Force, the guiding questions should concern how to address the challenges faced by the Sahel in a sustainable and effective manner and how best to support national actors in their efforts to implement the initiatives that they have devised themselves. A fully autonomous Group of Five with the capacity to support its various entities, including the Force, remains the shared objective of the States members of the Group of Five – an objective shared by the Security Council. Consequently, that element should be the first consideration for any support option to the Force.

43. The establishment of a United Nations advisory office could help to build this capacity and provide urgently needed, albeit not logistical, support, while simultaneously providing the political space for dialogue on long-term solutions. At the same time, it is the deep conviction of the Secretary-General that a dedicated United Nations support office would be best suited to providing the predictable, sustainable and reliable support that the Group of Five merits. I call upon the members of the Security Council to consider this option once more, taking into account the flexibility and scalability of the detailed proposal contained in the present assessment and its enclosure. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General wishes to stress the need for continuing engagement and support from bilateral and multilateral partners to the Group of Five, including the European Union and the African Union.

44. Regardless of any support provided, addressing governance challenges will be critical to ensuring lasting stability in the Sahel. Military and security solutions, while necessary given the scale of violence and armed threats in the region and their repercussions for security elsewhere in Africa and beyond, cannot be successful on their own. They must be complemented by equally determined efforts to improve governance and foster inclusion. The Secretary-General welcomes the efforts being made by the countries of the region to invest not only in security and defence but also in good governance, human rights, infrastructure, resilience and human development,

and encourages them to enhance those efforts. He calls upon the international community to capitalize on efforts made to improve governance by regional actors, including the African Union, and to intensify their support in that regard. Only that will bring about the results that are hoped for. For its part, the Secretariat will reach out to the African Union Commission to examine how best to work together in support of governance-related efforts by the Group of Five countries, building upon the relevant African policies and norms.

Enclosure

Overview of annual funding needs

<i>Description</i>	<i>Amount (United States dollars)</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Dry and fresh food	25 000 000	Lump sum
Diesel	4 200 000	4 million litres
Fuel	3 570 000	3.4 million litres
Ingredients	4 440 000	1.48 million litres
Mine protective vehicles	51 200 000	16 vehicles at each of 8 locations
Vehicle maintenance and servicing	2 000 000	Lump sum
Vehicle spare parts	2 500 000	Lump sum
Field defence, accommodation, kitchen	32 000 000	2 camps at each of 8 locations
Camp maintenance	16 000 000	\$1 million per camp per year
Generators and solar power	10 000 000	Lump sum
Generators, servicing	400 000	Lump sum
Generators, spare parts	2 000 000	Lump sum
Water and sanitation	48 000 000	2 camps at each location at \$3 million per camp
Rubber bullets	2 000 000	For training
Quick-impact projects	5 000 000	Lump sum
Troop allowances	94 110 912	5,492 soldiers at \$1,468 per month each for 12 months
Military staff officer allowances	16 224 000	152 military staff officers at Joint Force headquarters and 186 military staff officers (62 at each command post in 3 sectors), \$4,000 per month per military staff officer
Force Commander (D-2)	111 502	Annual salary
Deputy Force Commander (D-1)	100 800	Annual salary
Chief of Staff (P-5)	88 162	Annual salary
Drones	8 000 000	Lump sum
Helicopter for medical evacuation	2 100 000	20 evacuations per sector per year plus mobilization and crew fees, 3 sectors
Reconnaissance aircraft	4 000 000	3 aircraft (1 per sector)
Attack helicopters	25 020 000	Fire support, 6 aircraft (2 per sector)
Telecommunications	20 000 000	Radios, satellite telephones, prepaid communication, etc.
Furniture, stationery and equipment	5 000 000	Lump sum
Information-gathering (intelligence)	840 000	\$70,000 per month
Troop- and police-contributing country reimbursement	7 058 993	Self-sustainment and major equipment for 8 battalions
Total	390 964 369	