



# General Assembly

Seventy-fifth session

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### Fifth Committee

#### Summary record of the 8th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 30 December 2020, at 6 p.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Amorín ..... (Uruguay)  
*Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions:* Mr. Bachar Bong

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*The meeting was called to order at 6.25 p.m.*

**Agenda item 120: Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments**  
(continued)

**(e) Appointment of members of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee** (continued)  
(A/75/583; A/75/105/Rev.1/Add.1)

1. **The Chair** drew the attention of the Committee to a note by the Secretary-General (A/75/105/Rev.1/Add.1) informing the Assembly of the passing of Mr. Thembekile Kimi Makwetu of South Africa, who had originally been recommended by the Fifth Committee for appointment to the Independent Audit Advisory Committee for a three-year term of office beginning on 1 January 2021 (see report of the Fifth Committee, A/75/583). In his note, the Secretary-General had also informed the Assembly that the Government of South Africa had nominated Mr. Imran Vanker to fill the resulting vacancy. He took it that the Committee wished to recommend the candidate's appointment by acclamation.

2. *Mr. Vanker (South Africa) was recommended by acclamation for appointment to the Independent Audit Advisory Committee for a term beginning on 1 January 2021 and ending on 31 December 2023.*

**Agenda item 138: Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors** (continued) (A/C.5/75/L.4)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.4: Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors*

3. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.4 was adopted.*

**Agenda item 142: Programme planning** (continued)  
(A/C.5/75/L.5 and A/C.5/75/L.7)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.5: Programme planning*

4. **Mr. Chumakov** (Russian Federation), introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, said that all narratives and references regarding the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 should be deleted from programme 6, Legal affairs, of the proposed programme budget for 2021, because the establishment of the Mechanism and its

subsequent inclusion in that budget and the previous budget had been accompanied by flagrant violations of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of procedure of the General Assembly related to financial matters and the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2018/3), which had been adopted by the Assembly.

5. Clearly, the reason for the inclusion of the Mechanism in the proposed programme plan was not a lack of funding, a fact confirmed by the Mechanism's expenditure in 2020, but the desire of the Secretary-General, who had been drawn into a political adventure by a group of States, to lend that illegal body more legitimacy. The Russian Federation considered General Assembly resolution 71/248 to be invalid, did not recognize the Mechanism, and would take that into account in planning related to its financial obligations.

6. The Russian Federation called on all delegations to vote in favour of the draft resolution. Those that decided to abstain from the voting would be supporting an initiative that seriously undermined the basic principles of cooperation at the United Nations and the Organization's funding, and threatened the financing of mandates that were fully supported by all Member States.

7. **Mr. Ammann** (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of Liechtenstein, said that the two delegations regretted the submission of draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.5, which was intended to undermine the expressed will and authority of the General Assembly. The Assembly had repeatedly and by a wide margin affirmed its intention to finance the Mechanism from the regular budget, from the point at which it had established the Mechanism to the point at which it had called on the Secretary-General to include the necessary funding in the regular budget for 2020, welcoming every step along that path. Over time, the Mechanism had become an integral part of the Organization's regular budget. The two delegations regretted that a small group of countries continued to challenge the will expressed by the Member States, setting a bad precedent for the Fifth Committee. His delegation was calling for a recorded vote on draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.5, and would vote against that proposal as a mark of support for the integrity and authority of the Assembly. In addition, it intended to vote against draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.6, pertaining to the programme budget, which would be introduced later at the current meeting.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

8. **Mr. Almansouri** (Qatar) said that the Mechanism played an important role as the fundamental structure for the provision of information on crimes committed in Syria. The Mechanism's own reports to the General Assembly showed that it had made progress in implementing the mandate conferred on it. It deserved praise and recognition for having adhered to the most advanced standards and having used new technologies to improve its efficiency. If the Mechanism was to fulfil its mandate as the Assembly wished, it must be allocated resources from the 2021 budget, in accordance with the terms of resolution 71/248. Qatar would therefore vote against draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.5.

9. **Mr. Bientzle** (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States; the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the Fifth Committee, as the Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters, should focus on administrative and budgetary aspects of the issues under consideration and refrain from political discussion which belonged in other United Nations forums. Since the Committee strove to take decisions by consensus, resorting to a vote was unfortunate. The General Assembly, in its resolution 71/248, had approved the mandate of the Mechanism and, in its resolution 72/191, had called on the Secretary-General to include the necessary funding in the proposed budget for 2020. It was the Committee's responsibility to ensure that those decisions were adequately implemented. The European Union was committed to respecting a decision taken by one of the principal organs of the Organization, but the adoption of the draft resolution currently before the Committee would directly violate that decision by resulting in the deletion of all narratives and references related to the Mechanism from the proposed programme budget. For that reason, the European Union would vote against the draft resolution and called on others to do likewise.

10. *At the request of the representative of Switzerland, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.5.*

*In favour:*

Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic,

Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe.

*Against:*

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen.

*Abstaining:*

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam.

11. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.5 was rejected by 92 votes to 21, with 45 abstentions.\**

12. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Syrian Arab Republic had not, and would not, recognize the Mechanism, which was an illegitimate body established by General Assembly resolution 71/248, a resolution that had not gathered consensus. That was an obvious example of a violation of the Charter of the

\* The delegation of Ethiopia subsequently informed the Committee that it had intended to abstain.

United Nations, including its Article 12, as well as of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and other rules. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had made no request for technical assistance from the United Nations to establish a body such as the Mechanism, and the United Nations had not consulted or sought the agreement of that Government on the matter. The Organization had exceeded its powers and infringed on the mandate of the Security Council. The Member States could not logically expect the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to accept the collection of evidence, or what purported to be evidence, by the Mechanism, which had been established with no agreement or consultation of the country concerned, and failed to offer even minimum guarantees of preservation of the chain of custody.

13. His delegation wished to draw the attention of the Member States to the fact that the Mechanism's latest report, its fifth, contained nothing of a verified or legal nature. It simply repeated assumptions and presumptions, manipulating legal facts. The supporters of the Mechanism were trying to raise its profile, in order to promote what was a body with no further relevance or validity. However, the manipulation and trickery had dangerous consequences. Those leading the Mechanism, along with the Governments supporting it, should be bearing the substantial cost associated with it. As they had done in 2020, they were trying to rid themselves of the financial burden and pass the task of maintaining that illegal structure on to the Member States by funding it from the regular budget. The Secretary-General had warned in a number of letters that the Organization was facing its worst financial crisis in many years. That bitter truth had not prevented the supporters of the Mechanism from continuing their bid to involve the Organization in funding an illegitimate body which had no future.

14. The political situation in the Syrian Arab Republic was at a delicate crossroads. Despite that, and despite all the challenges involved, Syrians themselves were charting their own legal course, without foreign intervention, through national mechanisms rather than through a distorted entity based thousands of kilometres away in Geneva, and, as previously indicated, lacking any standards to safeguard the chain of custody of evidence. His delegation called on all Member States that retained respect for the Charter of the United Nations to withhold recognition of the Mechanism, an aberrant entity which had nothing in common with other United Nations bodies, and which, having no legitimacy,

should not be allowed to draw on the regular budget of the Organization.

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.7: Programme planning*

15. **Mr. Almansouri** (Qatar) said that his delegation wished to propose an oral amendment to the draft resolution, consisting of the insertion of the following:

*Further approves* the programme plan for programme 6, Legal affairs, of the proposed programme budget for 2021, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/75/6);

16. **Mr. Chumakov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation, which opposed the proposed oral amendment, wished to call for a recorded vote on it, and to encourage all delegations to vote against it.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

17. **Ms. Grace Leigh Levin** (United States of America) said that those familiar with the Mechanism were aware how critical its work was, and those familiar with the informal consultations in the Fifth Committee on the current agenda item were aware that a small number of delegations had repeatedly insisted on depriving the Mechanism of the resources it needed to effectively complete its mandate. The United States had an unwavering commitment to accountability in Syria, because without accountability, the stable, just, enduring peace that was being sought, and that the Syrian people deserved, would remain elusive. It supported the proposed oral amendment, and called on all delegations that supported the Mechanism and accountability efforts in Syria to vote in favour of it.

18. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation supported the request of the representative of the Russian Federation for a recorded vote on the proposed oral amendment, as the Syrian Arab Republic, for the reasons he had already stated, rejected the inclusion in the proposed programme budget for 2021 of the illegitimate entity that was the Mechanism. In her statement, the representative of the United States had revealed the real motivation behind the Mechanism, which was to serve as a political instrument to place pressure on the Syrian Arab Republic, a country which was striving for stability and a return to normality.

19. *At the request of the representative of the Russian Federation, a recorded vote was taken on the oral amendment to draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.7 proposed by the representative of Qatar.*

*In favour:*

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen.

*Against:*

Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe.

*Abstaining:*

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam.

20. *The oral amendment was adopted by 89 votes to 17, with 48 abstentions.*

21. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.7, as orally amended, was adopted.*

22. **Mr. Chumakov** (Russian Federation) said that, in the interests of preserving consensus, his delegation had not asked for a recorded vote on draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.7](#), as orally amended, as a whole. However, it disassociated itself from the consensus on the paragraphs of the draft resolution regarding the Mechanism, an entity which it did not consider legitimate.

23. **Mr. Pye Soe Aung** (Myanmar) said that he wished to state the position of his delegation regarding the so-called Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar appearing in the programme plan for programme 6, Legal affairs, of the proposed programme budget for 2021, referred to in the draft resolution just adopted. Since the establishment of that entity, Myanmar had repeatedly indicated its refusal to recognize or cooperate with the Investigative Mechanism, because of the intent of the latter's illegitimate mandate. That mandate, which included building individual case files for future criminal proceedings, was a blatant violation of the principle of respect for the sovereignty of the Member States. The Human Rights Council, which had created the Investigative Mechanism, lacked the authority to establish such a prosecutorial mandate. It had placed no limit on the duration of the entity's activity. The establishment of the Investigative Mechanism, the first such entity to have been put in place by the Human Rights Council, was an unwarranted attempt, using the pretext of accountability, to turn the Council into a quasi-judicial body.

24. Moreover, the programme plan for the Investigative Mechanism failed to fit into the existing programmatic framework of the Organization, because its activities were unrelated to the Organization's legal affairs activities. In fact, the ongoing activities of the Investigative Mechanism, conducted under the guise of accountability, were none other than those of a prosecutor, and took no account of the efforts of the Government of the country concerned. However, the opposition of Myanmar to the Investigative Mechanism did not mean that it was ignoring the issue of accountability. On the contrary, it took that issue seriously, and had, in July 2018, long before the establishment of the illegitimate entity that was the Investigative Mechanism, established the Independent Commission of Enquiry, to investigate alleged violations of human rights following terrorist attacks in Myanmar. Since the submission of the Independent Commission of Enquiry's final report, the criminal investigation and prosecution body headed by the Myanmar attorney-general had been engaged in



thorough investigation and in prosecution of the alleged violations identified by the Independent Commission. The office of the attorney-general had reported that 110 criminal cases had been opened in connection with those accused of killings, arson and destruction of property, with those individuals including border guards, police and civilians. The Government of Myanmar was determined to take action to hold them accountable. The Independent Commission of Enquiry's final report had also been reviewed by the military, and a court of enquiry had been established to investigate alleged crimes by the security forces. On the basis of the findings of the court of enquiry, the military had held court-martial proceedings to punish the perpetrators of crimes, had issued statements on the actions of the court-martial and had stated its intention to continue to investigate the remaining allegations contained in the report of the Independent Commission of Enquiry.

25. Any attempt to externalize the accountability of a Member State risked undermining the domestic criminal justice processes of the country concerned, and no such dangerous precedents for the future work of a United Nations human-rights body should be set. The Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar was just such an example; it undermined the domestic justice system of Myanmar, which was willing to address the issue of accountability. Such prejudice, combined with selectivity and double standards, was not just unwarranted, but was likely to be exploited for political purposes in the future. United Nations mechanisms to promote human rights and seek accountability should be established only at the request of, and with the consent of, the country concerned, not as a response to the desire of certain ill-intentioned countries. Myanmar was disappointed to see a non-transparent mechanism, targeted against a single country, employing dozens of staff and spending millions of dollars from the regular budget of the Organization every year. That was unacceptable, especially at a time when the Organization was in dire need of resources to help Member States to overcome a global pandemic. Myanmar would continue to work with the United Nations, but was unable to cooperate with a mechanism created in infringement of its national sovereignty. Therefore, although it had joined the consensus on the draft resolution regarding the Organization's package of programmes for 2021, it disassociated itself from the consensus in connection with the Committee's approval of the programme plan for the Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar.

26. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that although the Syrian Arab Republic had joined consensus on the draft resolution on programme planning, it disassociated itself completely from that consensus in connection with the inclusion in the programme plan of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. He wished to remind the members of the Committee that the Mechanism was not connected with the Syrian Arab Republic, but rather with the proponents of the Mechanism, who wished to rid themselves of the financial burden associated with it and transfer that burden to the other Member States.

27. **Ms. De Armas Bonchang** (Cuba), **Mr. Bayley Angeleri** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), **Ms. Llano** (Nicaragua), **Mr. Kim Nam Hyok** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and **Mr. Al Habib** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that their delegations had joined consensus on the draft resolution on programme planning, but wished to disassociate themselves from that consensus in connection with the wording relating to the Mechanism.

28. **Mr. Cheng Lie** (China) said that China supported the consensus regarding the draft resolution on programme planning, but also the position expressed by the delegation of the Russian Federation, and therefore disassociated itself from that consensus in connection with the wording relating to the Mechanism.

**Agenda item 144: Pattern of conferences (continued)**  
(A/C.5/75/L.8)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.8: Pattern of conferences*

29. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.8 was adopted.*

**Agenda item 148: United Nations common system (continued)** (A/C.5/75/L.12)

**Agenda item 147: Joint Inspection Unit (continued)**  
(A/C.5/75/L.12)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.12: United Nations common system*

30. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.12 was adopted.*

**Agenda item 149: United Nations pension system**  
(continued) (A/C.5/75/L.10)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.10: United Nations pension system*

31. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.10 was adopted.*

**Agenda item 151: Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services** (continued)  
(A/C.5/75/L.13)

**Agenda item 139: Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations** (continued) (A/C.5/75/L.13)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.13: Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services*

32. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.13 was adopted.*

**Agenda item 152: Administration of justice at the United Nations** (continued) (A/C.5/75/L.9)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.9: Administration of justice at the United Nations*

33. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.9 was adopted.*

**Agenda item 153: Financing of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals**  
(continued) (A/C.5/75/L.16)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.16: Financing of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals*

34. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.16 was adopted.*

**Agenda item 166: Financing of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Middle East** (continued)

**(b) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**  
(continued) (A/C.5/75/L.3/Rev.1)

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.3/Rev.1: Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon*

35. **Ms. Austin** (Guyana), introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the aim of the draft proposal, like that of its predecessors, was to seek accountability on the part of Israel for the 1996 incident at Qana. It also sought conversion into an appropriation of the commitment authority regarding the financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) approved at the second part of the resumed seventy-fourth session (see General Assembly resolution 74/292).

36. **Ms. Zilbergeld** (Israel) said that her delegation wished to remind the Committee that, at the second part of the resumed seventy-fourth session, resources for UNIFIL had been secured, via a commitment authority, until 30 June 2021. The draft resolution proposed by the Group of 77 and China had no implications whatsoever for the financial capabilities of UNIFIL. The draft resolution was therefore clearly nothing more than a political attempt to use the Committee as a platform to single out Israel. The position of Israel on the issue was well-known, and had not changed; it deplored the unjustified bias displayed by the draft proposal.

37. Israel appreciated the important work of UNIFIL in particular, and United Nations peacekeeping forces in general, and contributed to peacekeeping efforts by making financial contributions and by collaborating with the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Operational Support to share its expertise in relevant areas including medicine and capacity-building. It maintained excellent relations with all the peacekeeping forces in the region, including UNIFIL. What it did not appreciate was the politicization of the resolution regarding the financing of UNIFIL. The third preambular paragraph and paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the current draft resolution contained the same politicized wording that appeared in the draft resolution on the financing of UNIFIL at the second part of the resumed session of the Assembly every year and which led to requests from Israel for an amendment to the draft resolution every year. Israel wished to call for a vote on the paragraphs concerned, and intended to vote against their retention.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

38. **Ms. Grace Leigh Levin** (United States of America) said that her delegation supported UNIFIL in implementing its important mandate. The use of funding resolutions to pursue claims against a Member State, however, was procedurally incorrect, and her delegation opposed the inclusion in such resolutions of paragraphs that required Israel to meet the costs stemming from the Qana incident of 1996. Such resolutions were not consensus resolutions. The procedure followed since shortly after the founding of the United Nations had been for the Secretary-General to pursue settlement of the Organization's claims against States. Using a funding resolution to legislate a settlement was inappropriate, politicized the work of the Committee, and should be avoided on the present occasion and in the future. Accordingly, the United States delegation would vote against the retention of the paragraphs concerned.



39. *At the request of the representative of Israel, a recorded vote was taken on the retention of the third preambular paragraph and paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.3/Rev.1.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

*Against:*

Canada, Israel, United States of America.

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay.

40. *The third preambular paragraph and paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.3/Rev.1 were adopted by 95 votes to 3, with 55 abstentions.*

41. **Ms. Austin** (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that she wished to express thanks to all the delegations that had seen merit in sustaining UNIFIL and supporting the call made by the Group for accountability on the part of Israel, despite the efforts made to use semantics to work against those efforts.

42. **Ms. Zilbergeld** (Israel) said that she wished to reiterate the request made in writing by her delegation for a vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

43. **Ms. Austin** (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole. It urged others to do likewise.

44. *At the request of the representative of Israel, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.3/Rev.1 as a whole.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman,

Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

*Against:*

Canada, Israel, United States of America.

*Abstaining:*

Papua New Guinea.

45. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.3/Rev.1 was adopted by 152 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.*

46. **Ms. Mudallali** (Lebanon) said that the approval of the financing of UNIFIL had not escaped the difficulties that had beset all of the work of the Committee in 2020, having taken the form first of a commitment authority adopted in June, and now of a draft resolution uniting the budgetary and political components of the financing of the Force. The leadership of the General Assembly and the Fifth Committee, and the support of the Member States, particularly those of the Group of 77 and China, had been vital. UNIFIL, one of the oldest and largest of the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations, had been exemplary. Its achievements had gone beyond peacekeeping to include peacebuilding, helping host communities, and measures focusing on the environment, health, culture and other fields. Following the explosion at the port of Beirut on 4 August 2020, UNIFIL had played a prominent role in cleanup and recovery. However, its most valuable contribution remained its provision of a peaceful environment in which individuals could thrive after years of war and occupation in southern Lebanon.

47. Her delegation wondered whether everyone recalled the nature of what was referred to as the 1996 incident at Qana. It was an Israeli attack on a United Nations compound that had killed 106 civilians and injured a further 116. Four Fijian United Nations staff had lost their lives. The central issue was one of protecting civilians in conflict and war, and preventing

them from being deliberately targeted, as the United Nations investigation concluded had occurred.

48. **Mr. Bientzle** (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States; the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that it was fortunate that the Committee, by agreeing at the second part of the resumed seventy-fourth session on a temporary expenditure authority, had enabled UNIFIL to continue functioning without interruption. That had occurred despite the problems brought by the pandemic-related arrangements, including the absence of an electronic voting procedure. The European Union was pleased that the commitment authority would now be converted into a budget allocation for UNIFIL.

49. The States members of the European Union were concerned at the trend towards voting on the agenda item pertaining to the financing of UNIFIL because of political elements which continued to be introduced into the work of the Committee. They had abstained from the voting on the third preambular paragraph and paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, as they considered the text inappropriate in the context of the financing of UNIFIL. The broader political aspects of the events referred to, including the incident at Qana, had been debated extensively in the plenary Assembly in April 1996, and reflected in resolution 50/22C, at which time the States members of the European Union had made clear their position. They would have preferred the Committee's consultations on the matter to have been confined to the budgetary aspects of the financing of UNIFIL, but had voted in favour of the resolution as a whole, as it provided for the appropriation of resources which were crucial to enable UNIFIL to fulfil its important mandate.

#### **Agenda item 169: Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (A/C.5/75/L.17)**

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.17: Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*

50. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.17 was adopted.*

#### **Agenda item 141: Proposed programme budget for 2021 (continued)**

*Programme budget implications relating to the proposed programme budget for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.15)*

*Draft decisions contained in document A/C.5/75/L.15: Programme budget implications relating to the programme budget for 2021*

51. **Mr. Mills** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to propose, as an oral amendment to section G of document A/C.5/75/L.15, concerning the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.3/75/L.50/Rev. 1, the deletion of all the amounts indicated, meaning that they would be reduced to zero.

52. While the United States remained firmly committed to combating racism and racial discrimination in all its forms, and to working with civil society, international mechanisms and all nations in pursuit of that goal, it could not agree to the holding of an official event, during the general debate at the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly, commemorating the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and calling for its full implementation and follow-up. His delegation had no wish to celebrate the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action's restrictions on freedom of expression, its antisemitism, or its anti-Israel bias.

53. The Durban Conference and its outcomes remained as poisonous as ever, having set back international cooperation to combat racism and racial discrimination for nearly two decades. Commemorating the Declaration served to prolong the divisions caused by the Conference instead of providing a comprehensive and inclusive way for the international community to combat the scourge of racism and racial discrimination. It was inappropriate for the General Assembly to host that divisive event. Accordingly, the United States requested all Member States to support the proposed amendment.

54. **Ms. Austin** (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group was in favour of section G of document A/C.5/75/L.15, concerning the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.3/75/L.50/Rev.1. On behalf of the Group, her delegation wished to request a recorded vote on the amendment proposed by the representative of the United States, and to urge all delegations to vote against that amendment.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

55. **Ms. Zilbergeld** (Israel) said that her delegation would vote in favour of the amendment proposed by the United States representative. It could not support an official commemoration of the Durban Declaration and

Programme of Action or a call for the full implementation and follow-up of the latter. The Durban conference, like so many other United Nations forums claiming to advance human rights and combat racism, achieved the very opposite, by promoting antisemitism and anti-Israel hatred. Israel remained fully committed to eliminating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and worked unceasingly to protect and uphold human rights. Accordingly, it could not in good conscience support a forum that served to spew intolerance and hatred, rather than combat them. It was not appropriate for the General Assembly to embrace and glorify such a contentious event.

56. *At the request of the representative of Guyana, a recorded vote was taken on the oral amendment to section G of document A/C.5/75/L.15 proposed by the representative of the United States of America.*

*In favour:*

Israel, United States of America.

*Against:*

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

*Abstaining:*

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uzbekistan.

57. *The oral amendment was rejected by 105 votes to 2, with 50 abstentions.*

58. *The draft decisions contained in document A/C.5/75/L.15 were adopted.*

59. **Mr. Mills** (United States of America) said that, in the light of the vote, and for the reasons previously stated, his delegation wished to disassociate itself from the consensus on section G of document A/C.5/75/L.15.

60. **Ms. Zilbergeld** (Israel) said that her delegation likewise wished to disassociate itself from the consensus on section G of document A/C.5/75/L.15, not because it did not support concrete action to eliminate racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, but because it did support such concrete action. Israel had a strong and positive record on those issues, and continued to work to improve its record in regard. However, it could not embrace the Durban Declaration, as the Durban conference itself had been used as a platform to promote hatred and antisemitism, in complete dissonance with the avowed goals.

*Questions relating to the proposed programme budget for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.6 and A/C.5/75/L.11)*

*Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.6: Proposed programme budget for 2021: Section 8, Legal affairs*

61. **Mr. Chumakov** (Russian Federation), introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, said that the purpose of the draft proposal was to delete all narratives and references regarding the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 from the proposed programme budget for 2021.

62. The establishment of the Mechanism and its subsequent inclusion in the proposed programme budget for 2021 had been accompanied by flagrant violations of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the rules of procedure of the General Assembly related to financial matters and the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2018/3), which had been adopted by the Assembly.

63. Clearly, the reason for the inclusion of the Mechanism in the proposed programme plan and the proposed regular budget was not a lack of funding, a fact confirmed by the Mechanism's expenditure in 2020, but the desire of the Secretary-General, who had been drawn into a political adventure by a group of States, to lend that body – which was illegal and had no right to exist – more legitimacy. The Russian Federation considered General Assembly resolution 71/248 to be invalid, did not recognize the Mechanism, and would take that into account in planning related to its financial obligations.

64. The Russian Federation called on all delegations to vote in favour of the draft resolution. Those that decided to abstain from the voting would be supporting an initiative that seriously undermined the basic principles of cooperation at the United Nations and the Organization's funding, and threatened the financing of mandates that were fully supported by all Member States.

65. **Mr. Bientzle** (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States; the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that his delegation wished to request a recorded vote on the draft resolution. The Fifth Committee, as the Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters, should focus on administrative and budgetary aspects of the issues under consideration and refrain from political discussion which belonged in other United Nations forums. Since the Committee strove to take decisions by consensus, resorting to a vote was unfortunate. The General Assembly, in its resolution 71/248, had approved the mandate of the Mechanism and, in its resolution 72/191, had called on the Secretary-General to include the necessary funding in the proposed budget for 2020. It was the Committee's responsibility to ensure that those decisions were adequately implemented. The European Union was

committed to respecting a decision taken by one of the principal organs of the Organization, but the adoption of the draft resolution currently before the Committee would directly violate that decision by resulting in the deletion of all narratives and references related to the Mechanism from the proposed programme budget. For that reason, the European Union would vote against the draft resolution and called on others to do likewise.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

66. **Mr. Almansouri** (Qatar) said that, as his delegation had previously stated, the Mechanism must be provided with funding from the regular budget for 2021 in order to be able to fulfil its mandate. Qatar would therefore vote against draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.6](#).

67. *At the request of the representative of Germany, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.6](#).*

*In favour:*

Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe.

*Against:*

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen.

*Abstaining:*

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam.

68. *Draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.6](#) was rejected by 89 votes to 18, with 51 abstentions.*

69. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation regretted the unbalanced approach adopted by some delegations at the current session. That approach was seeking financial and political polarization regarding the so-called International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, in order to see it included in the regular budget. His delegation rejected the Mechanism and its financing from the regular budget, and would not recognize any action undertaken by that illegitimate body, which had been established by resolution [71/248](#), a resolution that had not gathered consensus. That had occurred without consultation or the approval of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, in an obvious violation of the Charter of the United Nations, including its Articles 10, 11, 12 and 28. The General Assembly lacked any mandate to establish such an investigative body or mechanism, as that ability rested with the Security Council. The Syrian Arab Republic would not cooperate with, or be involved in the funding of, the Mechanism, given that the latter was established without its consent. The Mechanism would produce no concrete results, and existed to serve its own interests and the interests of the countries that had created it, rather than the interests of the Syrian people.

*Draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.11](#): Revised estimates relating to the proposed programme budget for 2021 under section 11, United Nations support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and section 36, Staff assessment: Office of the Special Adviser on Africa*

70. **Ms. Austin** (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group wished to withdraw draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.11](#).



*Draft report of the Fifth Committee*  
(A/C.5/75/L.14, A/C.5/75/L.18, A/C.5/75/L.19,  
A/C.5/75/L.20, A/C.5/75/L.21 and A/C.5/75/L.22)

71. **The Chair** said that, in the light of the withdrawal of draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.11, the Committee would take action on draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.14 in the context of the draft report of the Fifth Committee. In that connection, he wished to draw the attention of the Committee to that draft report, contained in document A/C.5/75/L.22, and in particular to section III, containing the recommendations of the Committee. He invited the Committee to take action on the recommendations in section III of the draft report.

*Draft resolution I: Questions relating to the proposed programme budget for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.14)*

72. **Mr. Bientzle** (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States; the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that he wished to propose an oral amendment to draft resolution I, consisting of the insertion of the following paragraphs:

*Takes note* of paragraph III.54 of the report of the Advisory Committee;

*Decides* that regular budget resources for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 under section 8, Legal affairs, for 2021, amount to 17 million dollars before recosting.

73. **Mr. Chumakov** (Russian Federation) said that that his delegation was opposed to the proposed oral amendment, and wished it to be put to a vote. Some had argued that the issue under discussion was political, while others had taken the opposite view; his delegation wished to reiterate that even solely from a financial standpoint the issue was illegitimate, and urged delegations to vote against the proposal.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

74. **Mr. Mills** (United States of America) said that his delegation supported the provision of funding for the Mechanism from the regular budget of the Organization through assessed contributions, in order to ensure that the important work of that body remained on a firm financial footing. It called on all delegations to support the

Mechanism and efforts to pursue accountability in Syria, and to vote in favour of the proposed oral amendment.

75. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation supported the request of the delegation of the Russian Federation for a recorded vote on the proposed oral amendment, and reiterated the firm and principled opposition of the Syrian Arab Republic to any recognition of the Mechanism. That opposition had already been explained in earlier statements made at the current meeting. He wondered how any Member State could expect the Syrian Arab Republic to accept evidence collected by a body located thousands of kilometres away and established without the country's consent. Despite the terrorist war being waged against it, the Syrian Arab Republic took pride in its national judicial institutions, and had the will and ability to achieve justice, accountability and redress. Those goals would not be achieved through an illegitimate body in Geneva which gathered so-called evidence without regard to procedural, legal or international criminal norms. Accordingly, he called on all delegations to vote against the proposed oral amendment.

76. *At the request of the representative of the Russian Federation, a recorded vote was taken on the oral amendment to draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.14 proposed by the representative of Germany.*

*In favour:*

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen.

*Against:*

Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe.

*Abstaining:*

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam.

77. *The oral amendment was adopted by 91 votes to 16, with 50 abstentions.*

78. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.14, as orally amended, was adopted.*

79. **Mr. Chumakov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation wished to thank the facilitator of the informal consultations on the draft resolution for his efforts, which had not been in vain. In the interests of preserving consensus, his delegation had not asked for a recorded vote on draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.14](#), as orally amended, as a whole. However, it disassociated itself from the consensus on the paragraphs of the draft resolution regarding the financing of the Mechanism.

80. Welcoming the adoption by consensus of the recommendation regarding the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), he thanked delegations for their constructive approach and said that his delegation would await appropriate proposals from the Secretary-General. In connection with the review and evaluation of the activity, performance and results of staff support provided to the human rights treaty body system, his delegation stressed that treaty body staff should confine their action strictly to the areas covered by the conventions and covenants. It expected that the review would not lead to a request for additional resources, but rather result in savings.

81. **Mr. Pye Soe Aung** (Myanmar) said that, for the reasons he had explained during discussion of the draft resolution on programme planning, his delegation disassociated itself from the consensus regarding draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.14](#) in respect of the so-called Independent Investigative Mechanism on Myanmar, referred to in part III of draft resolution I. It opposed any decision to approve post or non-post resources for that entity for 2021.

82. **Mr. Cheng Lie** (China) said that his delegation supported the adoption of the draft resolution, but wished to emphasize that its position regarding what was termed the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 remained unchanged: the international community should respect the sovereignty, independent unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and play a positive and constructive role in promoting a political solution to the situation in that country. The establishment of the Mechanism had been surrounded by controversy, had involved no consultation of the country concerned and had not had the support of that country's Government. The views of the Member States regarding the body's work were divided, and its reports had attracted criticism.

83. China did not support the inclusion of the Mechanism in the programme plan, or its funding from the regular budget. Consensus decision-making was a hallmark of the Fifth Committee. The fact that a vote was taken on the budget for the Mechanism for 2020 had set an undesirable precedent. Taking the same path in connection with the budget for 2021 emphasized the lack of consensus on the matter and challenged the methods and principles of the work of the Committee. That expedient was neither fair nor impartial. His delegation disassociated itself from the consensus in respect of the wording referring to the Mechanism. Lastly, it wished to express its support of the statement made by the representative of Myanmar.

84. **Ms. De Armas Bonchang** (Cuba) said that, as it had done with the draft resolution on programme planning, her delegation wished to disassociate itself from the consensus in respect of the provision of funding for the Mechanism. There was a clear absence of consensus among the Member States in that regard. Her delegation urged continued efforts to find consensus solutions rather than imposed solutions in connection

with the budget. The use of regular budget resources for the Mechanism had been imposed, and the failure to obtain the agreement of the State concerned had been a violation of its sovereignty.

85. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that, for the reasons explained in his earlier statements, his delegation disassociated itself fully from the consensus with respect to the funding of the Mechanism from the regular budget of the Organization. The Syrian Arab Republic would fulfil its financial obligations to the United Nations in 2021 accordingly.

86. **Ms. Zilbergeld** (Israel) said that her delegation wished to disassociate itself from the consensus in respect of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee regarding UNRWA included in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/75/7, part VI, section 26), which were endorsed in the draft resolution on the proposed programme budget.

87. **Ms. Llano** (Nicaragua) said that her delegation wished to reiterate its belief that resolution of the Syrian conflict must be reached through dialogue and a political agreement reflecting the position of the Syrian people and Government, without international outside intervention, consistent with the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. While it supported the draft resolution as a whole, it wished to disassociate itself from the consensus with respect to the funding of the Mechanism.

88. **Mr. Eboa Ebongue** (Cameroon) said that his delegation would like a clarification from the Secretariat regarding the proposed programme budget. Until 2017, presentation of the chapter relating to human rights had given a clear breakdown of the attribution of resources among regional centres. However, that presentation seemed to have been eliminated, without any request having been made by the General Assembly to alter it. His delegation would like that situation to be corrected without delay.

89. **Mr. Bayley Angeleri** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that his delegation welcomed the adoption of the draft resolution, and thanked the facilitators of the informal consultations devoted to it. However, Venezuela wished to disassociate itself from the consensus in respect of the provision of funding for the Mechanism, an entity which did not respect the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic.

90. **Mr. Kim Nam Hyok** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that his delegation regarded the establishment of the Mechanism to be a clear violation

of the Charter of the United Nations and other international norms. Nothing could justify allowing that illegal entity to carry out its activities under the umbrella of the United Nations, or allowing the financing of those activities from the Organization's regular budget. The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic should be addressed in a peaceful way and by political means, without foreign interference, in conformity with demands and interests of the Syrian people. Accordingly, his delegation wished to disassociate itself from the consensus on the draft resolution in respect of the provision of funding for the Mechanism.

*Draft resolution II: Special subjects relating to the proposed programme budget for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.18)*

91. **Ms. De Armas Bonchang** (Cuba) said that, in connection with estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, her delegation had been pointing out for over a decade that there was no legal basis for activities relating to the responsibility to protect, because there was no intergovernmental agreement, negotiated by the Member States, to define that concept. For that entire period of time, the Secretariat had failed to produce a legislative mandate from the Member States to move forward with activities relating to that concept. Moreover, the resources requested for the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect could not be distinguished from those requested for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. In line with her Government's position of principle against genocide, her delegation fully supported the functions of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the oral amendment it wished to propose was not intended to undermine that Office. The budget estimates and related narrative for the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect should be removed from the budget document until the General Assembly took decisions on the concept, its implementation and scope, and other related matters.

92. She proposed that two new preambular paragraphs and two new operative paragraphs be inserted in section XVIII of draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.18. The first new preambular paragraph would read, "Recalling that the General Assembly has not decided on the concept of responsibility to protect, its scope, implications and possible ways of implementation"; the second new preambular paragraph would read,

“Noting that the estimates for thematic cluster I comprise narratives, functions, strategy and external factors, results, performance measures, deliverables and other information related to the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect”. The first new operative paragraph would read, “*Decides* to delete the narratives, functions, strategy and external factors, results, performance measures, deliverables and other information related to the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, as contained in the strategic framework and the related narratives of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, which is contained in the report [A/75/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.2](#)”; the second new operative paragraph would read, “*Requests* the Secretary-General to issue a corrigendum to his report [A/75/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.2](#)”. She asked delegations to consider, and vote in favour of, the proposed oral amendment, with a view to ensuring that appropriate funding was provided for mandates that were the subject of intergovernmental consensus, given the Organization’s acute lack of liquidity.

93. **Mr. Tan** (Canada) said that his delegation wished to request a recorded vote on the oral amendment to section XVIII of draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.18](#) proposed by the representative of Cuba. It urged all delegations to vote against those amendments.

*Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

94. **Mr. Bientzle** (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States; the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, expressed support for the request for a recorded vote made by the representative of Canada, and said that the Fifth Committee, as the Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters, should focus on administrative and budgetary aspects of the issues under consideration and refrain from political discussion which belonged in other United Nations forums. The mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide had been approved in Security Council resolution [1366 \(2001\)](#). It was the responsibility of the Committee, given its budgetary remit, to ensure that that Office was adequately funded, to enable it to implement effectively its mandate and all of the functions related to the Office. The proposed oral amendments would greatly reduce the capacity of the Office to do so, and would in particular hamper the performance of that mandate by the Office

in close collaboration with other United Nations entities, particularly the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, who focused on developing the conceptual, political and operational aspects of the responsibility to protect. The European Union would vote against the proposed amendments, and called on other delegations to do likewise.

95. **Ms. Llano** (Nicaragua) said that her delegation fully supported the amendment proposed by the representative of Cuba, being firmly opposed to the provision of resources for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect. As there was no consensus among the Member States on the concept of the responsibility to protect, resources should not be assigned to the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, still less resources combined with those assigned to the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. She called on all delegations to vote in favour of the proposed oral amendments.

96. **Mr. Kim** Nam Hyok (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) said that his delegation supported the amendment proposed by the representative of Cuba, and would vote in favour of it. As members of the Committee were aware, there was still no consensus among the Member States on the concept of the responsibility to protect, and there was therefore no legal basis for activities in that connection. The responsibility to protect was a variant of humanitarian intervention that had been rejected by the international community in the past. His delegation requested the deletion from the regular budget of the estimates allocated for the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. They should only be considered once the General Assembly had reached a decision on the concept by consensus.

97. **Mr. Bayley Angeleri** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that his delegation fully supported the oral amendment proposed by the representative of Cuba. He wished to reiterate the firm opposition of Venezuela to the provision of resources for the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. As there was no intergovernmental consensus among the Member States on the concept of the responsibility to protect, no resources should be allocated for the Special Adviser, all the less so at a time of serious liquidity difficulties in the Organization.

98. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation supported the oral amendment proposed by the representative of Cuba. The concept of the



responsibility to protect was one of the most controversial to the Member States, and it had not gathered any consensus among them. The General Assembly had yet to adopt a resolution to define the principle, context and method of implementation of the responsibility to protect, and there was therefore still no legal agreement on it. Some Governments were taking advantage of the controversy, in blatant violation of the Organization's principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, of national sovereignty and of respect for the territorial integrity of the Member States.

99. *At the request of the representative of Canada, a recorded vote was taken on the oral amendment to section XVIII of draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.18 proposed by the representative of Cuba.*

*In favour:*

Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burundi, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe.

*Against:*

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

*Abstaining:*

Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Kazakhstan,

Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen.

100. *The oral amendment was rejected by 80 votes to 18, with 55 abstentions.*

101. **Mr. Mills** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to propose an oral amendment to draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.18](#). The United States had made clear, in previous statements and in a letter to the President of the Security Council in September 2020, that it had reimposed previously-lifted United Nations sanctions measures on Iran, pursuant to the process outlined in Security Council Resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In the light of that reinstatement, the United States delegation was disappointed that the Secretary-General had not taken steps to facilitate the snapback of previously lifted sanctions measures, including by reducing resources for the resolution 2231 team and taking necessary steps to facilitate the establishment of a panel of experts and sanctions committee, under Security Council Resolutions [1929 \(2010\)](#) and [1737 \(2006\)](#), respectively. Accordingly, his delegation proposed the addition of two paragraphs to the draft resolution:

*“Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary administrative and budgetary actions following the issuance of [S/2020/927](#), including but not limited to, facilitating the re-establishment of the Panel of Experts ([S/RES/1929 \(2010\)](#)) and the Sanctions Committee ([S/RES/1737 \(2006\)](#)).”*

*“Decides to reduce the staffing complement of the 2231 Team by one P-5 Team Leader/Senior Political Affairs Officer, one P-4 Political Affairs Officer, and one P-3 Political Affairs Officer, as necessary to facilitate the significantly narrowed reporting requirements remaining in place, and requests the Secretary-General to reduce the operational costs for the 2231 Team accordingly.”*

102. The wording, which the United States had proposed at the beginning of the consultations on the issue, was fully consistent with the country's decision to initiate a snapback and reimpose previously lifted United Nations sanctions measures on Iran. The United



States wished to remind fellow Member States that its steps to reimpose those sanctions measures were well within its rights, as outlined by the snapback process in Security Council Resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which it had followed faithfully.

103. The proposed amendment would provide the Secretariat with significantly greater resources and personnel to monitor compliance with the recently reimposed United Nations sanctions measures on Iran, which included the arms embargo extended through the snapback of sanctions. Those increased resources would advance international peace and security by strengthening mechanisms to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable for its malign actions throughout the Middle East and across the world. The United States believed that it was taking the right action in proposing the amendment, which was consistent with the reimposition of sanctions on Iran, and called on all Member States to support that amendment.

104. **Mr. Chumakov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation opposed, and wished to call for a recorded vote on, the oral amendment proposed by the representative of the United States. That request was supported by the delegation of China. United States proposals to fund from the 2021 budget what it was calling an Iran sanctions committee, and to reduce the duties of the Secretariat's 2231 Team because of a "snapback", conflicted with reality and were quite simply absurd. His delegation had no wish to reproduce all the details of the discussion of the issue in the Security Council, but the fact was that no snapback by the United States had been triggered, however much Russia's United States colleagues were seeking to prove the opposite.

105. An overwhelming majority (13) of the members of the Security Council had declared with one voice that the United States did not have a right to use that mechanism. The Presidents of the Security Council for August and September 2020 had unequivocally indicated that they did not consider that they had any entitlement to take action of any kind to advance the illegitimate claims of the United States. The Secretary-General had unambiguously echoed that position. The Russian Federation, which had assumed the presidency of the Security Council on 1 October 2020, had publicly declared that no snapback had taken place. Moreover, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States that were signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action had confirmed that conclusion in a joint statement made

on 21 December 2020. That meant that, for the international community, the matter was closed.

106. The international legal arrangements established by Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) remained fully in force, and the resolution itself continued to be implemented in accordance with the previously-agreed conditions and time-frames. The Security Council had thus given no mandate for the restoration of an infrastructure for sanctions against Iran. His delegation hoped that the majority of members of the General Assembly would now show the same degree of common sense as the members of the Security Council, and reject, and vote against, the United States proposals.

107. **Mr. Al Habib** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that it was extremely disappointing to hear new proposals from the United States delegation at such a late stage in the Committee's budget discussions, particularly as the same delegation had urged, during informal consultations, that all new proposals regarding special political missions should be put aside. Under the current new circumstances, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran wished to support the call for a recorded vote on the oral amendments to draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.18](#) proposed by the United States.

108. He wished to provide a clear picture of the overall background to the proposals, which were unrelated to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a historical achievement of multilateral diplomacy which had helped to end an unnecessary decade-long crisis over his country's peaceful nuclear activities. The Security Council had endorsed the Plan of Action in 2015 through its unanimous adoption of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), declaring that the Plan of Action marked a fundamental shift in its consideration of Iran's nuclear programme. The resolution had marked the termination of all previous resolutions regarding that nuclear programme, and the introduction of a new mechanism replacing the sanctions committee and panel of experts established by those previous resolutions.

109. The United States had remained a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action until May 2018, when it had unlawfully withdrawn from it, and reneged on all the commitments it contained. Since that time, the United States had been in material breach of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and had wasted no time or opportunity to destroy the Plan of Action and the resolution. In the middle of 2020, the United States had put forward in the Security Council a draft resolution seeking to extend indefinitely some of the implementation timelines in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Security Council had

obviously rejected that proposal, as it ran counter to resolution 2231 (2015). A few days later, the United States had attempted to activate a mechanism connected to the Plan of Action and embedded in resolution 2231 (2015) in order to reinstate all previous Security Council resolutions against Iran. As was well known, the Security Council once again rejected the attempts of the United States. In the view of 13 members of the Security Council, the United States was not a participant in the Plan of Action, and was therefore not legally eligible to use a right which had been reserved for those participants.

110. Bearing in mind that background, the United States proposal to allocate financial and administrative resources for the implementation of terminated resolutions of the Security Council was a repetition of the approach that had been defeated in the Security Council earlier in 2020. In the light of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 2231 (2015), the amendments being proposed lacked even the slightest legal basis. Despite being made in the setting of resources for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in 2021, the proposals were perversely in complete contravention of that resolution. They were also in absolute contradiction of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the General Assembly and its relationship with the Security Council. His delegation wondered what legal grounds could be invoked for the General Assembly to allocate resources in the absence of any decision by the Security Council, and whether the Assembly intended to act – in violation of Article 12 of the Charter of the United Nations – on an issue of which the Security Council continued to be seized.

111. In support of its proposal, the delegation of the United States had referred to a letter sent to the President of the Security Council in the middle of 2020. The Security Council, as the relevant competent body, by absolutely rejecting the eligibility of the United States to make a request of the nature of that contained in the letter, declined to consider, let alone take a decision on, the contents of the letter. The inclusion of the United States proposals would be an unprecedented and heretical measure. The Committee should not permit the General Assembly to be misused. Respect for the rule of law, multilateralism and diplomacy demanded rejection of the United States proposals. His delegation sincerely appreciated the position of the States and groups of States that had already expressed their opposition to those proposals, and called on all delegations to vote against them, not just on grounds of

United States animosity against Iran, but as a matter of principle, integrity, credibility and legitimacy of the Charter of the United Nations, and as a matter of adhering to the legal process of decision-making in the General Assembly.

112. **Mr. Cheng Lie** (China) said that his delegation opposed, and wished to support the request for a recorded vote on, the oral amendment proposed by the representative of the United States. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a significant result of multilateral diplomacy endorsed and made legally binding by the Security Council through its resolution 2231 (2015). The United States, having unilaterally withdrawn from the Plan of Action in 2018, did not have the right to request the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. The members of the Security Council, upholding a position of objectivity and fairness, did not recognize the steps taken by the United States as having any political, legal or practical effects, and the Council presidencies had declined to take any action as a result of them. The most important role of the Fifth Committee, as the Main Committee of the General Assembly responsible for administrative and budgetary matters, was to guarantee support for all the mandates of the Organization. The proposal of the United States to reinstate the Iran sanctions committee and its panel of experts and to reduce the budget and posts attached to the mechanism for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) lacked any Security Council authorization and was not in line with the principles and working methods of the Committee. In the interests of fairness and justice, and maintain the credibility of the work of the Committee, China called on all delegations to vote against the oral amendment.

#### *Statements made in explanation of vote before the voting*

113. **Mr. Bientzle** (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States; the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova, said that the Fifth Committee, as the Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with responsibilities for administrative and budgetary matters, should focus on administrative and budgetary aspects of the issues under consideration and refrain from political discussion which belonged in other United Nations forums. Since the Committee strove to take decisions by consensus, resorting to a vote was unfortunate. The objective of the special political mission being discussed remained to ensure the full implementation by all Member States and regional and international organizations of resolution

[2231 \(2015\)](#) as indicated in the note of the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 ([S/2016/44](#)). In its resolution, the Security Council had endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and had called upon all Member States and international and regional organizations to support its full implementation. The European Union and two of its States members, France and Germany, were participants in the Plan of Action. The mandates and decisions adopted by the principal organs of the United Nations must be respected and implemented. It was therefore vital, and the Fifth Committee's responsibility, to ensure the allocation of sufficient resources to enable the adequate funding and full implementation of all of the mandates of the special political mission concerned.

114. In the light of the letter of 19 September 2020 addressed by the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council ([S/2020/921](#)), and of the fact that the Security Council had taken no action in connection with the process set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the European Union believed that the amendments proposed by the United States would greatly hamper the capacity of the resolution 2231 team to implement its current mandate fully. For that reason, the European Union would vote against the proposed amendments and called on others to do likewise.

115. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation was completely opposed to, and would vote against, the oral amendment proposed by the representative of the United States. The proposal was simply the latest in a series of political attempts to target Iran, undermine the existing nuclear agreement, and destabilize the region. That policy revealed the disregard of the United States for international law, and its lack of respect for its obligations under international agreements.

116. **Mr. Bayley Angeleri** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that his delegation would vote against the oral amendment proposed by the representative of the United States, as it contravened the Charter of the United Nations, violated Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and lacked any legal basis. It should be remembered that the United States had unilaterally given up the rights reserved solely for the participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. His delegation believed that the use of illegal unilateral coercive measures against a sovereign State was also a contravention of the Charter of the United Nations whose effects were worsened by the deadly pandemic that was affecting the world. His delegation rejected the

illegal and arbitrary action taken by the United States outside international law, and believed that the international community, when discussing such matters, must preserve the authority of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

117. **Ms. Llano** (Nicaragua) said that her delegation wished to express its full support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which must be respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and its solidarity with the people and Government of Iran. Continued efforts should be made to safeguard, and ensure the full implementation of, the Plan of Action and the resolution, which remained in force. Under no circumstances could a mandate of the Security Council be undermined. Her delegation therefore urged all delegations to vote against the proposed amendments.

118. **Ms. De Armas Bonchang** (Cuba) said that her delegation echoed the request for a vote on the amendments proposed by the representative of the United States in connection with the activation of sanctions against Iran and the framework for the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Having failed in its efforts in the Security Council, the United States was attempting, through the General Assembly, to have sanctions imposed on another member of the Organization. The Committee should be aware not just of the considerations which had led a majority of the members of the Security Council to reject the attempts made there, but of the dangerous precedent that accepting the amendments proposed by the United States would represent, because that would amount to usurping the prerogatives of another principal organ of the United Nations, namely the Security Council. Her delegation would therefore vote against the proposed amendments, and urged all delegations to do the same.

119. *At the request of the representative of the Russian Federation, a recorded vote was taken on the oral amendment to section XVIII of draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.18](#) proposed by the representative of the United States of America.*

*In favour:*

Bahrain, Djibouti, El Salvador, Haiti, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, Yemen.

*Against:*

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.

*Abstaining:*

Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Togo, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay.

120. *The oral amendment was rejected by 110 votes to 10, with 32 abstentions.*

121. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.18 was adopted.*

122. **Ms. Zilbergeld** (Israel) said that her delegation wished to disassociate itself from the consensus in respect of section XVIII of draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.18](#).

123. **Mr. Pye Soe Aung** (Myanmar) said that, in connection with section VII of draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.18](#), his delegation wished to point out that the existence of redundant reporting obligations regarding Myanmar from the Human Rights Council revealed inconsistencies in applying budgetary discipline. There was no justification for approving additional resource requirements resulting from Human Rights Council resolution [43/26](#), given that the task requested was no different to that assigned in the previous year to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who had recently produced a report on the same matter. The responsibility of the Fifth Committee was to set the appropriate level of resources, but it should take as a basis a holistic assessment of multiple mandates regarding country-specific situations.

124. In the case of Myanmar, unrealistic assumptions were often made that multiple reporting mandates were complementary and mutually reinforcing. However, those mandates clearly overlapped, and resulted in the production of redundant reports year after year. From a budgetary standpoint, it was important and necessary to ensure that, whenever new proposals resulted in new resource requirements, every effort was made to meet those requirements within existing resources. The case of Myanmar was no exception to that principle. Accordingly, his delegation wished to disassociate itself from the consensus in respect of the allocation of any additional resources for the implementation of Human Rights Council resolution [43/26](#).

125. **Mr. Mills** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to disassociate itself from the consensus in respect of section XVIII of draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.18](#) in connection with the implementation of Security Council [2231 \(2015\)](#), in the light of the fact that it failed to take into account of the reimposition of measures, resulting from the application of snapback by the United States.

126. **Mr. Alshahin** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his delegation had supported the adoption of the draft resolution, but wished to disassociate itself from the consensus regarding section VII with respect to the allocation of funds for the implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions [21/44](#) and [28/43](#). It rejected the politicization of human rights to serve the interests of foreign countries that intervened in the internal affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the misuse of the United Nations to adopt country-specific resolutions, contradicting the principles of neutrality and objectivity, and perpetuating the use of double

standards. No resources from the regular budget should be allocated to the so-called International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

*Draft resolution III: Proposed programme budget for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.19)*

127. **Mr. Ramanathan** (Controller) said that he wished to inform the Committee of technical updates to draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.19](#) consequent on the adoption of the oral amendment to draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.6](#). The latter would lead to an increase of \$766,700 under Section 8, Legal affairs, of the proposed programme budget. Accordingly, the total programme budget for 2021 would amount to \$3.21 billion. Parts A, B and C of draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.19](#) would be technically adjusted to reflect the change.

128. **Mr. Mills** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to call for a recorded vote on draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.19](#), as technically updated. The United States could not in good conscience support a budget that further perpetuated antisemitism and anti-Israel bias and refused to recognize the rightful reimposition of sanctions on Iran. While his delegation appreciated the tireless efforts of delegation staff and the Fifth Committee Secretariat – particularly in the midst of a pandemic – it could not set aside its principles for the sake of consensus.

129. The United Nations was supposed to stand for peace, security and freedom, but the proposed programme budget failed to take steps to hold Iran, the world's top State sponsor of terrorism, accountable for its actions. Moreover, in its 75th year, instead of reflecting on the reason for its creation, the Organization was funding the 20th commemoration of a conference outcome with antisemitism and anti-Israel bias at its core. He recalled that matter of the Durban conference had given rise to a request from the United States for a recorded vote in similar circumstances in 2007, and that a former representative of his country had described that event as noxious, and a disgrace to the international community.

130. **Ms. Austin** (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group was disappointed at the request for a vote on the proposed programme budget, as it had always advocated the provision of resources at a level sufficient for the implementation of mandates. The possible

repercussions of failing to adopt the budget were alarming.

131. *At the request of the representative of the United States of America, a recorded vote was taken on draft resolution [A/C.5/75/L.19](#), as technically updated.*

*In favour:*

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

*Against:*

Israel, United States of America.

*Abstaining:*

None.



132. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.19, as technically updated, was adopted by 151 votes to 2.*

*Draft resolution IV: Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.20)*

133. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.20 was adopted.*

*Draft resolution V: Working Capital Fund for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.21)*

134. *Draft resolution A/C.5/75/L.21 was adopted.*

*Draft report of the Fifth Committee on the proposed programme budget for 2021 (A/C.5/75/L.22)*

135. *The draft report of the Fifth Committee on the proposed programme budget for 2021, as technically updated, was adopted.*

**Agenda item 139: Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations (A/C.5/75/L.23)**

*Draft decision A/C.5/75/L.23: Questions deferred for future consideration*

136. *Draft decision A/C.5/75/L.23 was adopted.*

**Completion of the work of the Fifth Committee at the main part of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly**

137. **The Chair**, having thanked the interpreters and the Secretariat staff for their assistance throughout the year, said that, if he heard no objections, he would take it that the Committee agreed to hear the remaining speakers in English only.

138. *It was so decided.*

139. **Ms. Austin** (Guyana), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that 2020 had been one of the most difficult years in recent human history, and undoubtedly in the history of the United Nations. Member State representatives had been called upon to serve their countries and the international community under very challenging circumstances, with the day-to-day intergovernmental process of the Committee drastically altered due to restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

140. The main part of the seventy-fifth session had proven that increased use of virtual platforms and other technologies, while important, could not replace the face to face engagement between delegations, the

coordination among groups of countries, or the creation of in-person connections and relationships, all at the heart of multilateral deliberations; their absence had affected the proper, effective and efficient functioning of the Committee. Despite that, the Group had maintained its commitment to constructive action to provide a successful outcome for all items on the Committee's agenda.

141. The Committee had succeeded in adopting a programme budget that ensured a level of resources sufficient to enable the United Nations to deliver fully on all mandated programmes and activities. However, the viability of that budget depended on the Member States' collective commitment to honouring their legal and financial obligations, and to paying assessed contributions in full, on time and without conditions.

142. The Group wished to emphasize the importance it attached to reform, in the interests of having a United Nations that was effective, fit for purpose and structured appropriately to deliver fully on intergovernmentally-agreed mandates. However, those reforms must not erode accountability and transparency within the Organization. Unfortunately, despite having received opportune and insightful recommendations from the Advisory Committee, the Committee had found itself unable during the session to reach consensus regarding the reviews of the implementation of management reform and peace and security pillar reform, including a proposal to change the funding model for the Department of Operational Support/Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance.

143. In the context of the operation, on a trial basis, of an annual programme budget, it was unfortunate that the Committee on Programme and Coordination had once again in 2020 been unable to provide the General Assembly with recommendations on the totality of the Programme Plan. That situation had led to loss of valuable time and the Committee tried to determine how best to deal with the programmes for which there was no guidance. The Group hoped that the wording of the latest draft resolution on programme planning would help, as it proposed that any such programmes should be placed under the consideration of the corresponding Main Committees of the General Assembly, and not only of the Fifth Committee.

144. The Group wished to reiterate that the reforms should not alter the sequential nature of the review of the proposed programme budget conducted by the Committee for Programme and Coordination and the Advisory Committee, and that that the role of the

Committee for Programme and Coordination must be preserved and further strengthened. In that regard the Group was disappointed that the Committee had been unable to agree on, and had been obliged to defer to the main part of the seventy-sixth session, the report on that sequential review. The Group believed strongly in preserving the established regulations and practices whereby requests for resources were formulated on the basis of an intergovernmentally-approved Programme Plan, and it hoped that further discussion would result in the matter being addressed successfully before the end of the trial period for annual budgeting.

145. **Mr. Traore** (Mali), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, said that, in the light of the need to ensure smooth functioning and effective discharge of the mandated programmes and activities of the Organization, the Group welcomed the successful conclusion of the Committee's business at the main part of the seventy-fifth session, marking its third period of virtual meetings since March 2020.

146. While the African Group commended the flexibility shown by delegations in challenging times, it had been surprised that the discussion of the financing of special political missions had resulted in a draft proposal which had paid scant attention to the level of financial resources available, and had not given the Member States the opportunity to include policy-related wording. As well as needing funding, those missions needed proper guidance from the Member States, through the General Assembly. The adherence to consensus because of exceptional circumstances should not be taken as a precedent.

147. While the African Group commended the Secretary-General's commitment to continuing open and transparent consultation with the General Assembly on his interlinked reform initiatives, as well as his reaffirmation of the intergovernmental processes as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the General Assembly, it regretted the lack of consensus in the Committee on the review of progress in the implementation of management reforms and peace and security reform, which were critical to supporting the efforts by the Secretary General to create a United Nations for the twenty-first century that was better equipped to address the complex contemporary challenges facing humankind.

148. The late submission of documentation was an ongoing concern to the Group; the difficulties caused by the submission of a number of documents late in the session had been compounded by the current

arrangements for conducting meetings virtually. Moreover, interpretation services which were vital for the participation of the Group had been lacking once again during the session, limiting the active participation of many delegations.

149. **Mr. Camelli** (Observer for the European Union) said that the States members of the European Union welcomed the Committee's compliance with its responsibilities; by adopting the proposed programme budget for 2021 on time, it had enabled the Organisation to operate without discontinuity, to continue to deliver on its mandates, and to serve the those who need the United Nations now more than ever. They would continue their vigilance to ensure adequate financing of all mandates across all pillars of the Organization, given that none of those pillars could be fully addressed without addressing the others. The Committee's assumptions and deliberations should always be based on resource requests made by the Secretary-General, to avoid arbitrary decisions, and further politicization and fragmentation of the budget.

150. The shorter, annual, cycle made the budget more effective, efficient and agile; it had already improved the Organization's responsiveness to the pandemic. The European Union stood firm in its support for the reform of the United Nations, but regretted that the circumstances under which consultations had taken place had not allowed for in-depth exchanges of views. The European Union also reiterated its strong commitment to reaching decisions by consensus, a principle which must remain central to the operation of the Committee. That required Member States to engage in a spirit of good faith, collegiality and constructive cooperation to find middle-ground positions that all could join and support, even when they did not correspond to Member States' preferred choices.

151. **Mr. Mills** (United States of America) said that he wished to provide context for his delegation's call for a vote, and to set out its view on the draft resolution regarding the proposed programme budget. His delegation regretted that the Committee had made the decision to retain in the budget funding that ran counter to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and against the sincere requests of its most generous donor. It objected strongly to funds from United States taxpayers being used to support a follow-up event to the Durban conference; as he had pointed out earlier in the current meeting, that conference, and its outcomes, remained as poisonous as ever, and had set back

international cooperation to combat racism and racial discrimination for two successive decades.

152. His delegation was moreover disappointed in the response to its proposed wording supporting the re-establishment of a sanctions committee pursuant to Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) and a panel of experts pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010), as both provided important checks on sanctions violations by Iran and its regional allies. It wished to reiterate to those who continued to challenge the ability of the United States to trigger the reimposition of sanctions on Iran that it had followed faithfully the process outlined in Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). It was not the United States that had politicized the process, but rather those States members of the Security Council that continued to reject the rightful reimposition of sanctions by the United States because that action interfered with their political considerations outside the Council.

153. The United States nevertheless appreciated the fact that the total level of the proposed programme budget had been lower than that calculated to take into account the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, and recognized the inclusion in the proposed programme budget of a number of provisions that it believed essential to further strengthening and implementing reform throughout the United Nations while enhancing and maintaining efficiency and budget stewardship. Those provisions included granting Member States access to key accounting information – namely total monthly expenditures and cash-on-hand by budget section. Sharing the Secretariat's concerns about liquidity, the United States took the view that that measure would enable Member States to better determine the root of the liquidity problem.

154. Furthermore, given that the use of an annual budget was still in its trial period, his delegation was encouraged that the Committee had ultimately protected that important reform from unnecessary changes. It welcomed the agreement reached to facilitate watchful oversight of construction projects while avoiding micromanagement of them, and the proposed review and evaluation of the activity, performance and results of staff support provided to the human rights treaty body system with a focus on adhering exclusively to mandated tasks.

155. He wished there to be no misrepresentation of his delegation's vote on the proposed programme budget. Since the inception of the Organization, it had had no greater or more reliable partner than the United States. That would not change as a result of the vote, a vote

requested because the United States could not stand by and watch as the Committee failed to live up to its core mission and values.

156. **Mr. Mmalane** (Botswana) said that, at the conclusion of the main part of the seventy-fifth session, a period of unique and unprecedented circumstances, it was important to recognize the resilience of the Fifth Committee in the execution of its mandate. His delegation hoped to see the Organization and its regional and sub-regional entities operate in partnership on the most pressing peace and security issues, especially on the African continent, in order to avoid duplication of effort and maximize gains.

157. **Mr. Cheng Lie** (China) said that China remained committed to working with all Member States to ensure the provision of the necessary resources for the Organization. His delegation urged the major contributors to fulfil their financial obligations in full, on time, and without conditions. Lastly, his delegation wished to underscore the need to improve the efficiency and working methods of the Committee.

158. **Ms. Akatsuka** (Japan) said that the Committee had dealt with many difficult issues under extraordinary circumstances. Her delegation welcomed the adoption of a proposed programme budget that allowed the Organization to deliver fully on its mandates in a more effective, efficient and sustainable manner. It hoped that the transparency and predictability of the budget proposal for 2022 would be improved, inter alia from the standpoint of addressing the so-called “add-ons” for construction projects. With regard to the United Nations pension system in particular, her delegation welcomed the provision of clear guidance to the Pension Fund on the matter of submitting concrete reform plans to address the long-standing governance issues of the Pension Board. It looked forward to receiving those plans, to further the best interests of Fund participants and beneficiaries.

159. The long-established practice of achieving agreement by consensus in the Fifth Committee was critically important. Building consensus was sometimes difficult, but the Committee had always exhausted its efforts to that end. The Member States should seek to move forward in a spirit of consensual compromise and to renew their commitment to acting constructively and in good faith. Meanwhile, the Committee must continue to review its working methods to make deliberations more efficient and effective.

160. **Mr. Croker** (United Kingdom) said that the main part of the seventy-fifth session had been predictably

challenging as a result of the remote working methods imposed by the pandemic and of the scale and complexity of the agenda. His delegation regretted the late conclusion of the session and the fact that the spirit of compromise had not always been universal, leading to division and indecision. As the President of the General Assembly had reminded the Committee, all Member States shared an obligation to support the United Nations in fulfilling its mandates. The global impact of the pandemic had made reaching a timely consensus more urgent than ever.

161. The Committee's deliberations must be careful, but they must not jeopardise the continuity of mandated activities. Concluding the session so late in December had done just that. The Committee must learn lessons from the past weeks and months, and in future sessions demonstrate that it could arrive at consensus decisions in a timely manner. His delegation reiterated its strong support for the Secretary-General's reform agenda, and recalled that the Committee had already heard during the current session how those reforms had produced a positive impact on the United Nations operations, including by enabling a more agile and timely response to the pandemic. Recalling the concerns expressed by the Secretariat and Member States about the impact of the continuing liquidity challenges, his delegation regretted that no agreement had been reached on new measures to help mitigate the resulting pressures. It continued to encourage the Secretariat to propose new and innovative options in future.

162. His delegation appreciated the holding of initial discussions regarding the working methods of the Advisory Committee, as, given the importance to the Committee's deliberations of that body's recommendations, it should continue to refine those methods and collaborate with the Secretariat and the Committee to ensure the provision of the required technical advice.

163. **Mr. Al-dabag** (Iraq) said that, as the facilitator of the informal consultations on the resolution on the proposed programme budget, he wished to thank delegations for their efforts and spirit of cooperation, and to thank members of the Secretariat for their support, including their support to ensure that the work of the Committee could continue during the pandemic.

164. **The Chair** declared that the Fifth Committee had completed its work at the main part of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly.

*The meeting rose at 10.45 p.m.*