



President: Mr. Imre HOLLAI (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 20

The situation in Kampuchea: report of the Secretary-General

1. The PRESIDENT: Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed tomorrow, Wednesday, 27 October, at 12 noon. May I take it that the Assembly agrees to that proposal?

It was so decided.

2. Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): In the summer of 1982 an event of great significance took place in Kuala Lumpur. In that historic city the anti-Vietnamese forces of Kampuchea formally signed the document which gave birth to the Coalition Government headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The formation of the Coalition Government is significant for a number of reasons. First, it signalled the unity of the Kampuchean people in the common effort to liberate their country from the yoke of foreign invaders. Secondly, it disproved the myth that the Heng Samrin régime is in complete control of Kampuchea. And, thirdly, it put Viet Nam on notice that, while Kampuchea prefers a peaceful solution along the lines set forth in various resolutions of the General Assembly, it is prepared to defend its sovereign rights as long as Viet Nam remains recalcitrant with regard to the expressed wishes of the Assembly.

3. The decision of the General Assembly yesterday [43rd meeting, para. 222] in rejecting overwhelmingly and by a larger majority than before the credentials of the Heng Samrin régime proves beyond any doubt which of the two Governments has, in the eyes of the international community, the sole and legitimate right to the allegiance of the people of Kampuchea.

4. Thus, a new and potent element has been added to the efforts to resolve the problem of Kampuchea. A rallying point has been created for the innumerable nationalist patriots who dispute the claims of the Phnom Penh régime to be the true representative of the Kampuchean people.

5. In a moving address to the Assembly, Prince Norodom Sihanouk said that

“despite the efforts of a powerful Vietnamese army in control of Kampuchean territory, we have liberated and solidly held large zones not only near the Thai frontier, but also in several regions of the

south-west and the north-east of our country” [11th meeting, para. 6].

6. Confirmation of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's words is amply provided by numerous observers, and most recently by *The New York Times*, which, in its issue of 13 October 1982, reported that soon after the formation of the Coalition Government thousands of Kampuchean left refugee camps in Thailand and moved across the border to rendezvous in a Kampuchean town now known as Sihanoukville. Many more await the call, and it is on record that Prince Sihanouk himself had to urge caution in the reverse exodus currently under way.

7. It would be inaccurate to say that the forces of the Coalition Government are, at this point, a match for the Vietnamese occupation troops. What is accurate is that a spark has been ignited and a momentum generated in the struggle of the Kampuchean patriots to regain their homeland. Voiceless Kampucheans have suddenly discovered the power of speech and are prepared to translate their words into practical courses of action. Of equal significance is the fact that these recent developments provide incontrovertible proof that the Heng Samrin régime is a paper government, a façade with a frame but without a structure.

8. I quote again from Prince Norodom Sihanouk:

“Here [in the General Assembly] everyone—including those who support its candidature for this seat—knows that that régime has no real existence, that it is under the control of Vietnamese occupying authorities, and that it depends in everything and for everything on the protection of two foreign nations.” [Ibid., para. 8.]

9. In May this year a functionary of the Heng Samrin Foreign Ministry, Dy Lamthol by name, decided to defect. His example was followed in September by a colleague who headed the régime's information office in Stockholm. Kept under wraps for several months, Dy Lamthol finally spoke out early this month. His credentials are impeccable. He had been the personal secretary of Phnom Penh's Foreign Minister and had been the chairman of the American and West European department of his ministry. What he had to say, as reported by the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in its issue of 15-21 October 1982 and by *The New York Times* of 9 October 1982, has the impact of a sensational revelation. It depicts an alleged Government completely in the grip of the tentacles of Viet Nam. According to the *Times*, day-to-day decisions of the Heng Samrin Foreign Ministry are dictated by Vietnamese political advisers. It adds that every morning the Vietnamese Ambassador to Phnom Penh instructs

Heng Samrin's Foreign Minister on the appropriate responses to the problems of the day.

10. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* adds even more telling details. It reports Dy Lamthol as having said that in three Indo-Chinese conferences which he said he attended, the declarations had already been drawn up by the Vietnamese and were merely rubber-stamped by the Lao and Cambodian representatives without discussion. And on occasions when he and other officials were required to talk to foreign diplomats, they were armed with Hanoi-composed instructions in either French or English, never Khmer. So much for Heng Samrin's pretensions. He knows what we had long suspected: his Government is the dummy of the ventriloquists from Viet Nam.

11. We are here to discuss the situation in Kampuchea and to continue the search for a comprehensive political solution to a problem which has raised the temperature of tension in South-East Asia and has constituted a potent threat to international peace and security.

12. Last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/5, the third in a series of such resolutions, by 100 affirmative votes. In that resolution the Assembly asserted that the principal components of a just and lasting solution to the Kampuchean problem are as follows: first, withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea; secondly, restoration and preservation of Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; thirdly, the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny; and, fourthly, commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea. In the same resolution the Assembly approved the report of the International Conference on Kampuchea,¹ held in July 1981, with the admonition to the States of South-East Asia and others concerned to attend future sessions of the Conference.

13. It is a matter of profound regret that the responses to these two basic elements of the resolution have been of an entirely negative character. One year later, foreign forces are not only still in Kampuchea, but have initiated massive military operations in an effort to achieve the total subjugation of the Kampuchean people. Kampuchea's independence remains compromised and its territorial integrity violated. The Kampuchean people continue to be the unwilling subjects of a spurious régime maintained by a foreign military force. They yearn for peace, for a new beginning under their own auspices, but their hopes continue at this stage to be beyond the reach of the people of that hapless land.

14. At the end of the tunnel we perceive no light, but if this is the case it is not for lack of trying on our part. The past year has been spent in feverish efforts to start the process of negotiations that could lead to the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. So many have been involved in the difficult search for the key that could unlock the door to negotiations, and to all of them we express our deeply-felt appreciation for their selfless endeavours: to Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar; to his able Special Representative, Mr. Rafeuiddin Ahmed; to Mr. Willibald Pahr, Foreign Minister of Austria and President of the International Conference

on Kampuchea; and to the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea, and especially its Chairman, Mr. Massamba Sarré of Senegal.

15. The States members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] have added their own considerable efforts. We have kept the channels of communication constantly open, particularly with respect to the Indo-Chinese States. Over the course of the past year we have had high-level official contacts with the Indo-Chinese States and with other countries concerned with the Kampuchean problem.

16. In many ways we have accomplished much in the way of constructive proposals. Regrettably, we have run into a blank wall of indifference on the part of Viet Nam. We should like to accentuate the positive, but the results of the initiatives undertaken by so many in so short a period have been best summarized by the Secretary-General in his report, when he says that

"in spite of the efforts and initiatives undertaken at various levels, wide differences continue to exist between the positions of the parties concerned, both on the nature of the problem and on the modalities for a peaceful solution." [A/37/496, para. 9.]

17. There are thus two issues on which the deadlock persists: first, the nature of the problem and, secondly, the modalities for a peaceful solution. I propose to take a closer look at each of these two issues.

18. What is the position of the international community with respect to the nature of the Kampuchean problem? I shall quote from the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea:²

"3. The Conference expresses its concern that the situation in Kampuchea has resulted from the violation of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in international relations.

"...

"6. The Conference stresses its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting solution to the Kampuchean problem."

19. That, in sum, is how the international community views the nature of the Kampuchean problem: gross violation of the principles of the Charter; the invasion and continued occupation of Kampuchea by foreign military forces; and the denial to the Kampuchean people of the free exercise of their right to self-determination.

Mr. Cinéas (Haiti), Vice-President, took the Chair.

20. Viet Nam, however, views the issue in a different light. The Kampuchean problem, we have been told by it in effect, is only a sideshow to a bigger and more complex drama of big-Power involvement. Bring

the main show to a happy ending, it tells us, and the little Kampuchean show will fade away. It is laughable. We are also assured that Kampuchea is free and independent, with a Government of the people's choosing. Such assurances lose all credibility as we daily witness thousands upon thousands of Kampuchians fleeing to the Thai-Kampuchean border, obviously preferring the uncertain existence of refugees to life in their own country.

21. On the issue of modalities for a peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem, the position of the international community is also defined in the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea, namely, negotiations within the framework of the International Conference on Kampuchea on the following elements: a cease-fire; verified withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea; and United Nations-supervised free elections parallel to appropriate arrangements to ensure non-interference in the electoral process by armed Kampuchean factions and to maintain law and order pending the establishment of the elected Government. In addition, the Declaration recognizes the legitimate security concerns of all States in the region and calls for big-Power guarantees to ensure the neutral and non-aligned character of Kampuchea.

22. The position of the international community on these two issues is therefore clear and reasonable. But we have yet to hear clear and reasonable responses from the other side. We perceive the proposals thus far advanced on their side to be designed simply to improve their tarnished international image while preserving the status of continued foreign military occupation of Kampuchea. The announced unilateral withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea is a fake; it has no basis in fact. And the proposal to establish a security zone in the Thai-Kampuchean border area is an unacceptable imposition on Thailand, which is not a party to the conflict. In addition, the proposed international conference on Kampuchea does not address itself primarily to the Kampuchean problem. Moreover it is envisaged that this will be held outside the United Nations, a move which in no way serves to strengthen the authority of the Organization.

23. The stand of ASEAN and its supporters on the question of Kampuchea has received the overwhelming support of the Assembly. Let me recall some facts that we sometimes tend to forget. In 1979, resolution 34/22 on this agenda item received 91 affirmative votes. In 1980 resolution 35/6 received 97 votes in favour. In 1981 resolution 36/5 received 100 favourable votes. In July 1981 the International Conference on Kampuchea adopted a Declaration and a resolution by consensus. Ninety-three States participated in that Conference or attended as observers, and the total population of those countries is one eighth of the total world population.

24. I submit that the fact that ASEAN and its supporters are obtaining such overwhelmingly and progressively increasing majorities means that we must be charting the right course on the question of Kampuchea. I propose that we stay on course.

25. I have been entrusted with the duty of introducing on behalf of the 45 sponsors the draft reso-

lution on Kampuchea [A/37/L.1/Rev.1] now before the Assembly. I take pride in announcing those sponsors: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gambia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Swaziland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the Upper Volta, Uruguay and Zaire, which, I have been informed, will be joined by additional countries. That is a good cross-section of the international community. As will be noted, we have more sponsors this year than in any previous year. In our view this reflects the ever growing concern of the world over the flagrant violation of Kampuchea by Viet Nam.

26. This draft resolution, may I say, stays close in substance to resolution 36/5 which the General Assembly adopted last year. In its preambular paragraphs, the Assembly recalls the Declaration² and resolution³ of the International Conference on Kampuchea and takes note of the report of the Secretary-General [A/37/496] and the recent developments resulting in the Coalition with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic Kampuchea. It also deplores that foreign armed intervention and occupation continue in Kampuchea and that foreign forces have not been withdrawn from that country.

27. In the operative paragraphs, the draft resolution, among other things, takes note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea, requests that the Committee continue its work pending the reconvening of the Conference and authorizes the *Ad Hoc* Committee to convene when necessary and to carry out the tasks entrusted to it in its mandate. The draft resolution reaffirms the Assembly's decision to reconvene the Conference at an appropriate time and renews its appeal to all States of South-East Asia and others concerned to attend future sessions of the Conference.

28. It also urges the countries of South-East Asia, once a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean conflict has been achieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, and reiterates the hope that, following a comprehensive political solution, an intergovernmental committee will be established to consider a programme of assistance of Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic and social development of all the States of the region.

29. The 45 sponsors respectfully submit this draft resolution for the consideration of the General Assembly and request that it be accorded the support of all its Members.

30. The world knows that the so-called weaknesses of the United Nations have in large measure been due to the failure of its Members to abide by its decisions. In the words of our perceptive and objective Secretary-General,

“There is a tendency in the United Nations for Governments to act as though the passage of a resolution absolved them from further responsibility for the subject in question. ... In fact resolutions, particularly those unanimously adopted by the Security Council, should serve as a springboard for governmental support and determination and should motivate their policies outside the United Nations. This indeed is the essence of the treaty obligation which the Charter imposes on Member States.” [A/37/1, p. 3.]

The Secretary-General continues:

“Concerted diplomatic action is an essential complement to the implementation of resolutions. I believe that in reviewing one of the greatest problems of the United Nations—lack of respect for its decisions by those to whom they are addressed—new ways should be considered of bringing to bear the collective influence of the membership on the problem at hand.” [*Ibid.*]

31. In the Assembly, before the representatives of the entire human community, let it be known that the foreign invaders of Kampuchea, through their arrogant and continued defiance of the wishes of the Assembly, certainly bear a heavy share of the responsibility for contributing to the erosion of the Charter of the United Nations. We should not allow that in any circumstances.

32. Prince NORODOM SIHANOUK (Democratic Kampuchea) (*interpretation from French*): Before I address the situation in Kampuchea, allow me, on behalf of the people and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, as well as on my own behalf, to express profound gratitude to the very many States Members of the United Nations whose delegations yesterday afternoon acted with justice in the General Assembly and gave their invaluable and firm support to the just cause of the Kampuchean people and to an independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea. That extremely significant political gesture will always be inscribed in gold in the annals of our country and of our national struggle for the total liberation of our unhappy country.

33. Permit me now to express my profound gratitude to the United Nations, which by a vast majority of its Members, has for three successive years, in 1979, 1980 and 1981, adopted resolutions seeking a just solution to the problem of Kampuchea. Briefly, those resolutions called for the total and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchean territory, recognition of the sovereignty and right to self-determination of the Kampuchean people and the holding of general elections under the supervision of the United Nations.

34. As a sovereign State, Kampuchea would have been absolutely within its rights to reject the clause about supervision by the United Nations. In accepting that clause, my country seeks to give a public guarantee of honest and truly democratic election proceedings. In this way it seeks to remove any pretext that Viet Nam may have for refusing to withdraw from our country and restore Kampuchea's independence.

35. There is much talk in many parts of the world of a political solution to the problem of Kampuchea. Let me state that this solution has been found. It is the solution based on the resolutions of the United Nations of which I have spoken, as well as the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea of 1981, in which 93 countries voluntarily participated. The solution is there and it is good, just and equitable: there is nothing to add to it or to subtract from it. All that remains to be done is its implementation by the Power that for almost four years has been unjustly occupying, controlling and colonizing Kampuchea. That Power—the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam—is a Member of the United Nations. It has accepted the Charter and, if it is honest and consistent with itself, it should comply with the resolutions of the United Nations. What is it doing in the Organization it flouts United Nations principles and rules and contemptuously rejects the decisions taken by the overwhelming majority of Member States?

36. As we all know, the reason why Viet Nam is maintaining a massive army of occupation in Kampuchea, and sending its settlers to install themselves in the areas which have been depopulated, is that it wants, by incorporating Laos too into its empire, to bring into being the “Indo-Chinese federation” for which the Party of Hanoi, called Viet Minh has fought so strenuously. But this “federation”, in which Viet Nam would play the role of master and Kampuchea and Laos the roles of docile satellites, we cannot accept at any price. Our people and our Government will never renounce our struggle for national liberation until complete withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from our territory and the restoration of our right to self-determination.

37. The Vietnamese and those who support them are beginning to understand that their difficulties in Kampuchea will continue to grow. The Vietnamese economy, hardly brilliant in normal times, is now bled white by the cost of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. The morale of the Vietnamese army operating in our territory is sinking lower and lower; many amongst the Vietnamese military are not proud of the repressive role that their leaders impose on them and require them to play against a small country which did much for Viet Nam when Viet Nam was itself struggling for its own liberation. Those same Vietnamese soldiers are even less proud of serving as praetorian guards to the régime of Phnom Penh, whose unpopularity and lack of any recognition in the political field they fully realize. They are, furthermore, all too aware that our resistance fighters are inflicting hardships on them and making the soil of Kampuchea burn under their feet.

38. We Kampuchean patriots have no other choice if we want to win back our country; we must fight. The Vietnamese leaders have a choice. Nothing impels them to maintain their forces in our territory at the price of such heavy sacrifices except excessive ambition and misplaced pride. If they are realists, they can immediately accept in good faith the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea of 1981, and if they do so the problem of Kampuchea is *ipso facto* resolved. It is important that the Vietnamese should know that, in this war which they have imposed on us, we feel no hatred towards the Viet-

namese people. We wish only to live in peace and friendship with all our neighbours, starting with Viet Nam, as with all the other countries in the world.

39. In relation to this debate on the "situation" in my country, it is extremely useful to listen to the views of the high-ranking officials and diplomats of the pro-Vietnamese régime in Phnom Penh who have now chosen freedom and prefer to live today in very harsh physical conditions in refugee camps outside the Kampuchea of Mr. Heng Samrin.

40. In my most recent statement from this rostrum [42nd meeting], I had the honour of reading to the Assembly *in extenso* the overwhelming testimony sent by cablegram on 16 October last from Munich by Mr. Prom Ieng, former Director of the Information Office of the so-called "People's Republic of Kampuchea" in Stockholm.

41. Today permit me, in concluding my present statement, to read some extensive excerpts from an interview given to the press in Bangkok by another deserter from the Phnom Penh administration, the puppet of Hanoi. I quote from *The Nation Review*, Bangkok, Friday morning, 8 October 1982:

"Viet Nam has imposed absolute control on the foreign policy of its puppet régime in Phnom Penh, whose Foreign Ministry receives daily instructions from Hanoi through Vietnamese advisers, a former Kampuchean official said yesterday. Dy Lamthol, who was Chairman of the Department of America and Western Europe of the Heng Samrin Government before his defection in May. He was accompanied on his flight by his wife, Neang Seda, 33, and his two sons, 7 and 9. 'I dislike the Heng Samrin régime, which supports the Vietnamese aggression of our country', he said when asked about the reason for his defection. He said 17 Vietnamese advisers were posted in the Foreign Ministry and they were parts of the Vietnamese officials from the so-called 'B-68 Unit' in Hanoi. Dy Lamthol described the unit as one that controls Vietnamese experts and advisers working in Kampuchea. Dy Lamthol explained how the Vietnamese advisers exert control on the foreign affairs of the Kampuchean Foreign Ministry. Every morning, the Vietnamese advisers would call a meeting with high-ranking officials of the Foreign Ministry and read them 'secret telegrams' from Hanoi. He described the secret telegrams as instructions which told the Kampuchean leaders how to deal with specific issues or how to conduct their daily foreign affairs. Foreign Minister Hun Sen, his vice and assistance ministers were normally present at the daily meeting, he said. The instructions from the Vietnamese advisers would then be passed on to heads of various departments concerned who could carry out their duties according to the letters.

"Hun Sen, whom he described as being 'not very intelligent', had two personal advisers. One of them was Vietnamese Ambassador to Phnom Penh Ngo Dien and the other was identified as Cau. He said Cau was the head of the Vietnamese advisers in the Kampuchean Foreign Ministry, who took orders directly from Hanoi. The Vietnamese control on the Foreign Ministry also reached the department level, he said. Dy Lamthol said when-

ever he travelled overseas or held discussions with foreign delegates he would be given advance policy papers or documents prepared by the Vietnamese advisers. His discussions would then be based on the papers provided him by the Vietnamese, he said. ... Commenting on the Ho Chi Minh [City] declaration of the three Indo-Chinese countries, Dy Lamthol said it had been drafted by the Vietnamese alone. The Kampuchean leaders only had to sign it when it was ready, he said. 'So the conference was only for the sake of image', he said, referring to the Conference of the Indo-Chinese Foreign Ministers in Ho Chi Minh City early this year to launch the declaration purported to be solutions to the conflict in Kampuchea. ... Dy Lamthol said there were many others who were planning to defect [from] the Heng Samrin Government. He said Kampuchean people in Phnom Penh were against the Communist régime in power and welcomed the formation of the Kampuchean coalition. 'The cadres working in the Foreign Ministry don't like instructions from the Vietnamese, but they are too afraid to protest', he said. Dy Lamthol ... said he had a feeling Hun Sen was not a man of good education. Hun Sen, who is about 32, had no independent thinking and worked under directives from Hanoi, he said. Dy Lamthol's wife, Neang Seda, had worked as an interpreter in the Foreign Ministry before the defection. She said she also had access to 'secret telegrams' sent to Phnom Penh from Hanoi and sometimes translated them. Neang Seda said she was also present when [Foreign Minister] Hun Sen held talks with his Vietnamese advisers. She was sent to East Germany in February 1981 as secretary of the Kampuchean Embassy before returning in November of the same year.

"Dy Lamthol told reporters during the two-hour interview that the [Heng Samrin] Kampuchean Government in Phnom Penh was practically being run by the Vietnamese. 'The authority of the Heng Samrin régime is all controlled by Viet Nam', he said. Dy Lamthol, who speaks both English and French, ... is believed to be the most senior official of the Heng Samrin régime to have defected to Thailand. Dy Lamthol said Vietnamese had become a compulsory subject for all schools in Phnom Penh and students had to study the language two hours a day. Government officials, he said, also had to take Vietnamese courses for four hours a week."*

42. At present, there are almost 1 million Kampuchean refugees, men and women, who, while remaining absolutely loyal to their motherland, Kampuchea, refuse absolutely to leave the countries of their asylum: Thailand, France, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Hong Kong, Macao, and so on—and to live under the yoke of the colonialists from Hanoi.

43. In Kampuchea my compatriots, including the peasants who are so devoted to their rice fields and

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

lands, are only waiting for a suitable opportunity to flee from the false "paradise" of Heng Samrin-Hun Sen, the pitiful quislings of Hanoi and Moscow.

44. In the liberated zones of Kampuchea the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea receives every day a considerable number of compatriots coming from areas still occupied by the Vietnamese army. Each day also the problems become more acute: the problems of the distribution of food and medicines, and the problem of weapons for the tens of thousands of young volunteers who ardently wish to participate on the battlefield in the just and vitally necessary struggle for national liberation.

45. Having said that, I want to state once again to the Assembly that my Government and my people are and will always be faithful to the United Nations ideal of peace, which is also the ideal of our race and our nation and has been since the beginning of our existence.

46. If, in conformity with United Nations resolutions, the Vietnamese withdraw all their troops from Kampuchea, my Government, for its part, is ready to sign with the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam a treaty of peace and non-aggression, including recognition of and respect for the territorial integrity of the two neighbouring countries within their existing borders. Thus, peace and concord will be re-established in our Indo-Chinese peninsula and the prospect of wider conflicts will disappear.

47. This year, for the fourth time, the General Assembly has to take a decision on a draft resolution submitted by various sponsoring countries which reiterates the appeal to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to cease its aggression against my country and to withdraw all its forces from Kampuchea so as to enable the people of Kampuchea freely to determine their own destiny, in accordance with previous United Nations resolutions on Kampuchea and with the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea.

48. On behalf of the people of Kampuchea, who have already suffered so cruelly from the Vietnamese invasion and occupation, and of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, I should like to express my warm thanks to all the sponsoring countries, among them the members of ASEAN, the initiators of draft resolution A/37/L.1/Rev.1, which has just been brilliantly introduced by Mr. Carlos Romulo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. I ask all representatives of countries which cherish peace and justice to give their invaluable support to that draft resolution. Their massive vote in favour of it will contribute to bringing the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to its senses and to making it respect the principles and rules governing international relations between States. I thank all those representatives in anticipation of their invaluable support, which the people and nation of Kampuchea will always remember.

49. Mr. SARRÉ (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): For the fifth time in three years, we are considering the situation in Kampuchea. This demonstrates the concern of the international community with respect to this matter, as evidenced by the statements that we have heard during the past few

weeks, all of which have made reference to it. Since the beginning of the conflict, relying on the principles and purposes of the Charter, this international community has done everything it can to contain it.

50. Thus, the International Conference on Kampuchea held under the auspices of the United Nations in July 1981 in New York aroused great hopes since it set forth an objective and realistic framework which would make it possible to find a global, just, lasting and honourable solution to this question. That framework comprised four indispensable elements for the achievement of the aforementioned objective: first, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea; secondly, the restoration and preservation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea; thirdly, a pledge by all countries not to intervene in the internal affairs of Kampuchea; fourthly, the establishment, once the problem is resolved, of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the region.

51. In resolution 36/5 of 21 October 1981, the General Assembly, while reaffirming resolutions 34/22 and 35/6, also endorsed the four conditions that I have just enumerated, which form an appropriate framework for the search for a just and lasting solution to the Kampuchean problem in all its aspects.

52. During the debate on the question of Kampuchea at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, I stated at the 40th meeting, held on 21 October 1981, that, in the opinion of the Senegalese delegation, the question of Kampuchea is essentially one of international law. It is a problem of law since the events which contributed to the creation of that situation arose as a consequence of the failure to respect three fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations: the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States; the principle of territorial integrity and the political independence of other States; and finally, the principle of the non-use of force in international relations.

53. History and past experience have taught us that failure to respect those principles jeopardizes international peace and stability. Consequently, whatever pretexts may be adduced in favour of it, the intervention of foreign troops in a country, without the consent of the legal authorities of that country, cannot be condoned by my country. In this particular case, there was a deliberate use of force against the political independence and territorial integrity of a sovereign State. Such an intervention not only runs counter to the principles and objectives of the Charter but, were it sanctioned or legalized, risks setting dangerous precedents for the security of the world in general and for that of small countries in particular.

54. The Senegalese delegation once again advocates the rejection of foreign intervention in Kampuchea but at the same time wishes to emphasize that this position, far from being directed against any particular country, is only the logical consequence of the devotion of Senegalese diplomacy to sacrosanct principles, including respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. The latter should freely determine their own future.

55. It is in the name of those same principles of law that my country remains resolved to support the

Kampuchean people in the search for a just and lasting solution to this conflict. While remaining faithful to those principles, my delegation—in accordance with the instruction of the Senegalese head of State, Mr. Abdou Diouf—remains receptive to any dialogue or compromise that would make it possible for those principles to prevail.

56. In that spirit it is heartening to note that, as stressed by the Secretary-General in the report which he submitted to us, that

“... consultations among the countries of the region, as well as with other States, have acquired a new impetus. These consultations, of which I have been kept regularly informed, regrettably did not achieve any substantial progress towards a resolution of the problem. They constitute, however, a positive development in so far as they have led to a better perception of the respective positions and encouraged a process of dialogue. To be truly productive, this dialogue should be developed further, with a view to initiating negotiations on the fundamental issues involved.” [A/37/496, para. 8.]

57. Thus, since the adoption of resolution 36/5, a spirit of dialogue seems to have prevailed over high feelings and attitudes of suspicion which had been evinced up until that time on both sides. This spirit of dialogue, which is a prerequisite to negotiation or dynamic compromise, is something we owe, on the one hand, to the Secretary-General, who has spared no effort to bring this about, for which we congratulate him, and, on the other hand, to the support of the international community and to the attitude taken by the parties involved, which, with the heightened awareness of the scope of the event and its possible consequences for international peace and security, have made positive gestures—albeit inadequate ones—which could, if wisely taken advantage of, help us to assemble the elements needed for a settlement of the conflict. Among those, we can refer to the decision taken by the Government of Viet Nam to withdraw part of or all its troops in Kampuchea. It is now essential to study that decision and its implementation within the framework of the pertinent resolutions on the question of Kampuchea. We can also refer to, and express satisfaction at the formation of the Coalition Government headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in that it is trying to reunite the entire Kampuchean people and to have them share in the search for a just and honourable solution to this conflict.

58. For its part, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Kampuchea, creation of the International Conference on Kampuchea, over which my country has the honour of presiding, is stepping up its efforts to involve public and governmental opinion in all countries in the search for a solution to the problem and to obtain the support of such opinion for efforts by the United Nations in this area.

59. Similarly, the visits to Moscow and Peking by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of the International Conference on Kampuchea, as well as missions sent by the *Ad Hoc* Committee to France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Austria and Thailand, were essentially aimed at giving a hearing to the parties involved or interested in the

problem in order better to identify common ground and to convince them of the need to find a negotiated solution to the problem of Kampuchea. The *Ad Hoc* Committee, in accordance with the mandate given to it by the General Assembly in resolution 36/5, will continue its efforts to help the Conference to find an overall political settlement to the Kampuchean question.

60. In this connection, paragraph 26 of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, states:

“In this context, the *Ad Hoc* Committee wishes to stress that, in accordance with its mandate, it is determined to continue its efforts towards the implementation of the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea and the relevant General Assembly resolutions. It will seek, in particular, to develop further consultations in order to contribute to the initiation of a negotiating process leading to the peaceful resolution of the Kampuchean problem and creating the conditions for a lasting peace, stability and co-operation in the whole region. The Committee expresses the hope that all parties concerned will co-operate towards the early achievement of this goal.”⁴

61. It is true, as the Secretary-General has emphasized in his report, that “wide differences continue to exist between the positions of the parties concerned, both on the nature of the problem and on the modalities for a peaceful solution” [*ibid.*, para. 9], but all of the positive facts to which I have referred, which appear in the report of the Secretary-General and that of the *Ad Hoc* Committee are, on the whole, encouraging elements which may lead to an honourable solution to the conflict. With the support of the international community, this positive evolution of the situation in Kampuchea could be expedited.

62. That is why I should like to launch an appeal to all Member States of the Organization, asking them to do more to help to find a global political solution to the question. Furthermore, they should endeavour to increase their contributions to the United Nations programmes for humanitarian assistance to refugees. In this regard, it is a great pleasure for me to pay a tribute to the Government of Thailand for what it has done for these refugees.

63. The international community, through the actions that I have just outlined, will thus have helped the countries in that part of the world to undertake together, motivated by the same faith, efforts to bring about a future marked by peace, stability and co-operation in renewed unity.

64. Mr. LÓPEZ DEL AMO (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Some ten years ago the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea were involved in an heroic and exemplary common struggle against imperialism, for independence and a future of peace, friendship and co-operation. All of the progressive and peace-loving peoples of the world, including the best elements in the United States of America, gave their support and solidarity to the struggle of those three peoples. In the face of that, the Yankee imperialists suffered their greatest military defeat.

65. It is an unquestionable historical truth that the Vietnamese people bore the greatest burden of that

confrontation. The enemy launched on its territory a quantity of explosives equal to that used during the Second World War; it tested and used its most modern weaponry, and more than half a million of its soldiers and seamen participated in the aggression. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese people defeated the aggression, and with its victory—an inseparable part of the struggle of the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea—gave fundamental support to the cause of national liberation and peace.

66. When victory was already at hand, the People's Republic of China came onto the scene in a novel way, taking over with the approval of the Yankees, the Paracel Islands, an integral part of Vietnamese territory from the former Saigon puppet administration. Was this not a cunning blow against the territorial integrity of victorious Viet Nam?

67. Soon after that victory the People's Republic of China began to exert an influence which, in time, became decisive in Kampuchea. The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia became the barbarous Pol Pot régime. Sihanouk's allies at the time, the very same Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary of today changed him from a President into a prisoner and assassinated many members of his family.

68. The followers of Pol Pot turned the country into a giant enslaved commune, assassinating 3 million patriots and citizens, destroying everything which meant civilization.

69. This insane scourge turned its own people into the victims of genocide and wiped out its history and age-old culture.

70. For more than three years the Pol Pot forces, armed with Chinese weapons and helped by thousands of Chinese advisers, turned against neighbouring Viet Nam, the ally of the Kampuchean people in the anti-imperialist struggle and unleashed an undeclared war along the border with that country, concentrating in that area 20 of its 24 divisions.

71. The repeated efforts of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to bring about peace were continuously rejected by the Pol Pot régime.

72. Successive uprisings of Kampuchean patriots against Pol Pot's tyranny finally led to the establishment of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea. Pol Pot's army, which was waging a border war against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, was defeated by the glorious armed forces of Viet Nam. An end was thus put to the nightmare of the Kampuchean people, and to the slave labour camps. The survivors returned to their homes, families were reunited; factories schools and pagodas reopened: freedom and fundamental rights were restored. In short, a start was made on Kampuchea's revival.

73. One would have expected this event to be jubilantly welcomed and the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea and the People's Government of Kampuchea, who were beginning the heroic task of reconstructing their land and emerging from a life of hell to one of hope, to have received well-deserved international recognition. However, the temporarily converging interests of the Govern-

ments of the United States and of the People's Republic of China, aided and abetted by certain countries, accomplices in the Yankee aggression against Viet Nam, mobilized all of their resources in order to hinder and obstruct the work of reconstruction which was beginning both in Kampuchea and in Viet Nam.

74. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam also had then to face and defeat along its northern borders the aggression by more than half a million troops of its powerful neighbour who, furthermore, imposed upon it a total economic blockade, which is still in force, depriving Viet Nam of its main traditional market.

75. Some representatives speaking from this rostrum, deliberately misrepresenting the fraternal unity forged in a common struggle, have sought to portray the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam as a small hegemonistic Power eager to gobble up its neighbours, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. To those who say this we might ask: what property does the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam have in Laos or Kampuchea? What resources of those nations are being exploited by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to its advantage?

76. No slander can conceal the sincere aid which the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam gives to Laos and Kampuchea. Steeped in poverty as it is, a poverty which was the legacy of colonialism, Yankee aggression, and the aggression and blockade by China, the heroic people of Viet Nam shares with its neighbours the little it has, and nourishes with the blood of its children the defence of the best causes of those peoples.

77. We have heard voices in this Hall claiming to show concern for the fate of the people of Kampuchea and for peace and stability in the region. Those who sincerely desire the welfare of the Kampuchean people and wish the region to become one of peace, stability and co-operation, must demonstrate this by their actions.

78. To offer the territory of their country as a base of operation for aggression by the Pol Pot gangs and their ilk does nothing to help the Kampuchean people nor does it contribute to peace and stability in the region. To invent a fiction such as the so-called "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea" and disregard the legitimate People's Government in Phnom Penh, which has authority over all the territory of Kampuchea, is no help to the Kampuchean people, nor does it contribute to peace and stability in the region. To deny the People's Government of Kampuchea its legitimate representation in the United Nations and to maintain the Democratic Kampuchean phantom in the seat it has usurped does not help the Kampuchean people, nor does it contribute to peace and stability in the region.

79. The People's Government of Kampuchea, in a responsible and generous gesture, has declared that the doors are open for all Kampucheans, even those who today follow Pol Pot, to take part in the life of the country, recover their citizenship and exercise their right to participate in the general elections provided for in the Constitution of the country, at which there will be international observers, as announced on 18 September by Foreign Minister Hun Sen.

80. While leading its people along the path of national unity and endeavouring to carry out the super-human task of reconstruction of the country, the People's Government of Kampuchea has reiterated on many occasions its desire to live in peace with its neighbours and to establish relations based on mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

81. Dialogue and negotiation between the parties concerned provide the only sensible and beneficial way for all countries of the region to ensure that it becomes a region of peace, stability and co-operation.

The meeting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and resumed at 12.45 p.m.

Mr. Hollai (Hungary) returned to the Chair.

Address by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco

82. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now hear an address by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco, President of the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, whom, on behalf of the General Assembly, I have the honour to welcome to the United Nations and to invite to address the Assembly.

83. His Majesty King HASSAN II (Morocco) (*interpretation from Arabic*): It is an honour for me to address the Assembly today as President of the most recent Conference of Arab States, held at Fez, and also as Chairman of the group appointed by the Conference to visit some of the world's capitals to explain our position and obtain clarification of the positions of others.

84. I am proud to be the spokesman today of the Arab States, which have shown themselves to be in step with the times and doing serious and positive work, within the framework of their authentic cultural traditions and in association with all other States, to strengthen human civilization.

85. The Fez Conference can be divided into two parts. The first part was held in 1981, and the second this year. I emphasize that the Conference had two phases. We met a Fez the first time to consider our programme of work, which at that stage consisted of Prince Fahd's plan. We studied the various points of that plan, including point 7 [*see A/37/696, annex, sect. I*] but we decided to suspend our work—not because we had decided to reject the plan but because we thought it should be thoroughly studied by our States so that they could unhesitatingly express their unanimous final opinion on it.

86. Thus, in the first phase of the Conference last year, the Prince Fahd plan became a document of the League of Arab States, and subsequently became known as the "Arab plan". I should like to stress this point to make it clear to everyone that our call for peace, coexistence and security is not based on a position of weakness and is not the result of the events in Lebanon. From the moment when we decided to concentrate on this programme, and especially on point 7, we had free scope for action, free of any military, geographical or occupation-based pressure. If anyone claims or believes that the Arabs did not come to their senses until after the events in Lebanon, I refute any such assertion. Since 1981, the Arabs

have declared, openly and in written form, that they are capable of innovation, of creation, of new ideas.

87. When our ideas had crystallized, and the contacts among our delegations and ministers had become more extensive, we saw that it was time to meet again this year. Through a fortunate convergence of circumstances, fate decreed that President Reagan of the United States should announce his peace initiative. We accordingly consulted together in Fez, and studied the situation. Despite the occupation of Lebanon, and despite the tragedies and massacres that occurred there, the Arabs remained true to themselves and faithful to their mission, the mission bequeathed to them by their history, a mission of wisdom, virtue and insight. We did not allow ourselves to be overcome by emotion, despite all the blood spilt and all our mourning; we did not give way to the arguments of passion; we tried to bring our emotions under control and to appear before the whole world, and above all before our peoples; in the noble guise of statesmen—that is, those capable of dealing with the present hour and the future, but who do not stop to weep amid the ruins and mourn for what has gone for ever. The Conference lasted two days longer than was expected, but, as the Arabic proverb says, "in the morning we praise the brightness of the day". After four days of discussion, joint studies and free and democratic consultations, the Arabs were able, for the first time in their history, to produce, on the basis of justice and legality, a programme on the following lines. First, there was an Arab plan that was unanimously adopted by all the Arab leaders at the highest levels. Here I want to emphasize that all those who represented their kings or heads of State were constitutionally authorized to undertake the commitments in question. It was therefore a joint commitment at the highest level. The second feature of the Conference was that its positive aspects were free of any emotion or of any philosophy extraneous to the problem. The points were all notable for the fact that they meant exactly what they said without rhetoric or ambiguity. The third feature was that our programme was in no way Utopian, and we never wished it to be so. On the contrary, if any international group had wished to use it as a programme to be implemented and put into practice, it is my personal belief, and the belief of all of us, that the programme could be implemented, and very successfully. Those are the features I wished to emphasize, because for too long the Arabs have been described as poets of fertile imagination, speaking without logic, too often swayed by passion and emotion. Secondly, we did not wish one side to have the monopoly of positive solutions that were rationally and politically valid. Consequently, the Arabs, too, wished to make their contribution to building peace and consolidating security.

88. Once the work of the Conference had been concluded, the kings and heads of State of the Arab countries decided to form a committee to tour the various capitals of the world for discussions and enquiries. But there is still a long way to go, and we do not imagine that a war that has bathed the whole area in blood for the past 40 years can be ended in one or two months. What is important is that the Arab

character and the Arab philosophy both emerged from all this as responsible and committed.

89. What we decided upon at Rabat in 1974, namely, that the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] was the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, was a resolution adopted unanimously. It has been confirmed at every summit conference. This resolution is the reason behind our travels around the world. Despite the fact that the United States of America has not yet recognized the PLO, the clarity and integrity of our talks with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz led us unhesitatingly, with wisdom and seriousness, to the conclusion that our position was the same and that Morocco and the Arab States still consider the PLO as possessing legitimately, philosophically and humanly, even well inside occupied territory, the legality and popularity which make it the responsible spokesman able to enter into commitments in view of its sense of responsibility and awareness of what should and should not appear in human and international relations.

90. We wished to emphasize this fact. That is why we expanded the programme of the group, and when I say "group" I mean my brothers the Foreign Ministers representing the seven States who are travelling with me. We wished to come to the Assembly, in this building dedicated to brotherhood, peace and security, to assure you that we depend on each one of you to be faithful apostles of our will and determination for peace and our desire to contribute to the building of a world community based on equality and the safeguarding of the rights of all, and to state once again that our plan and our desire are not born out of war or pressure. We, on our side, decided to follow this path a year ago, when we were free of any occupation or defeat.

91. There is no doubt that you, the representatives members of the Assembly, will again provide us, as in

the past, with strong support. I am confident that, on being informed of our decisions and our plans, you will be even more determined in your support of our cause.

92. We seek inspiration from the teachings of Islam. I shall therefore end with the following verse from the Koran:

"... Repel (Evil)
With what is better:
Then will he between whom
And thee was hatred
Become as it were
Thy friend and intimate!

And no one will be
Granted such goodness
Except those who exercise
Patience and self-restraint,
None but persons of
The greatest good fortune."

[Sura 41, verses 34 and 35.]

93. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly I wish to thank His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco for the important address he has just made.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

NOTES

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.20.

² *Ibid.*, annex I.

³ *Ibid.*, annex II.

⁴ A/CONF.109/6, para. 26.