Social Development Report 3

Leaving No One Behind: Inclusion of Marginalized Groups in Some Arab Countries

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Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

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Acknowledgments

Executive Summary

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) focus on the principle of "leaving no one behind" and on the importance of a development process, inclusive of all excluded and marginalized community groups. There are multiple development approaches on how to translate the principle of leaving no one behind into reality. Is it sufficient, for example, to adopt an inclusive approach to address the issue of marginalization? Or is it enough to ensure active participation in public policies to eliminate marginalization? Or can the rights-based approach to sustainable development ensure that no one is left behind? Are there public policies actively implemented to address exclusion and marginalization? To answer these questions and to capture realistic examples from the Arab region, the report presents three case studies from Egypt (inhabitants of Cairo cemeteries), Tunisia (inhabitants of Kasserine, Kairouan and Sidi Bouzid governorates in the Central-West Region), and Lebanon (inhabitants of the Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood in Tripoli city). Those regions have faced chronic marginalization and their inhabitants suffer from severe exclusion, neglect of their life demands and development needs by local authorities and governments, and suppression of their persistent yearning for active political participation.

The report begins with a brief critical review of the theories of social exclusion, inclusion and social justice and their correlation with the development process. It presents a comparison between implementing economic liberalism and addressing structural imbalances in economies that produce inequality, marginalization, exclusion and impoverishment. The report's analytical approach follows the framework developed, in 2018, by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and entitled "What does it means to leave no one behind?" to help implement the 2030 Agenda. The framework identifies five factors contributing to exclusion, namely: discrimination, geography, governance, socioeconomic status and shocks such as wars and conflicts. Based on these factors, the report addresses the issue of marginalization and exclusion by monitoring its public policy precursors in the cases studied, particularly in periods of political competition during elections (in Egypt and Lebanon) and in the context of political transition (in Tunisia). The report concludes with a set of recommendations for each of the three cases and provides general recommendations to reduce marginalization and exclusion and to implement policies that contribute to social inclusion and ensure that no one is left behind.

In the case of Egypt, the report analyses the situation of the inhabitants of Cairo cemeteries, who amount to more than 1.5 million people, and examines public policies and repeated attempts to attract this segment of the population without necessarily improving its living conditions or pulling it out of extreme poverty towards better positions in the social development ladder. The report details the multiple forms of housing in cemeteries, where

the geographical factor plays a key role in determining the form of housing and thus the level of participation and ability to access rights. Residential areas overlapping with and located within graveyards and cemeteries have a role to play in determining the economic and professional conditions of inhabitants. The report also examines the quality of services reaching the inhabitants of cemeteries. Cairo, for example, is one of the most unequal governorates in terms of the provision of basic and public services. Hence, spatial inequality is higher in the cemetery area, where inhabitants lack health, education and housing services. The work of most cemetery dwellers in the informal, seasonal or daily sector, as well as the social stigma attached to them as cemetery dwellers, and the insecurity and permanent fear of the vast majority of them deepen social disparities and inequalities they suffer. This case study concludes with a set of recommendations on providing protection and social services, improving economic and social conditions, including those of women, and proposing different approaches to dealing with different residential areas within cemeteries.

In the case of Tunisia, the report addresses the situation of the inhabitants of the Central-West Region, which has suffered for decades from a development imbalance and, therefore, from an increasing regional gap. This region is inhabited by around 1.5 million people, and is rich in natural resources. The report shows the failure of local administrative and democratic decentralization to lift the region out of poverty and inequality and to bridge the gap with other regions, although the regional development plan treats this part of the country as an essential component of the regional development agenda. The reasons behind deprivation and exclusion are attributed to historical and geographical factors and to

successive development policies adopted since the 1970s, which have led to the impoverishment of peasants, an increased impoverishment of destitute classes as well as migration and displacement to other regions. The report clarifies the importance of the State's role in regional development, and calls for deepening strategic planning for regional development, promoting public investment, modernizing the legislative and regulatory framework of the region, activating support and framing mechanisms, and fostering community responsibility to contribute to the reduction of poverty and socioeconomic disparities.

In the case of Lebanon, the report focuses on a situation from Tripoli, a Mediterranean city located in northern Lebanon, namely the situation of the inhabitants of Bab al-Tabbaneh, one of the city's poorest, most disadvantaged and marginalized neighbourhoods where armed conflicts and mobile wars have exacerbated living conditions and led to increased unemployment, school dropouts, low school enrolment, lack of preventive health services, and other problems. All Bab al-Tabbaneh residents suffer from these factors, and attribute the reasons for marginalization to the lack of political will to develop the region in a sustainable manner and to the mere provision of relief and in-kind assistance. The conservative environment and the prevailing beliefs and practices that marginalize young people and women, including early marriage, have further aggravated the situation. In addition to the critical security situation, successive development initiatives for the city as a whole have not helped to employ the unemployed, stimulate tourism and boost the economy of Tripoli. The report monitors the shortcomings faced by the Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood in the areas of education, housing, health, participation and repeated development

attempts, which have always been related to short-term political purposes and therefore have not succeeded in improving living conditions. It concludes with recommendations on providing protection and safety, developing an inclusive and equitable development strategy for all regions, particularly peripheral ones, rehabilitating infrastructure, buildings and public facilities, strengthening the municipality's capacity to play a participatory development role, improving health services, upgrading the quality of education and treating the causes of dropouts, promoting employment opportunities, integrating persons with disabilities, devising local development programmes, adopting a national and local drug control policy, and promoting political and social participation for all.

The report concludes that the recommendations of the three case studies agreed on the importance of a participatory development approach based on social justice that includes all marginalized groups, and on the importance of adopting a development concept based on the principle of leaving no one behind, to address the causes and consequences of discrimination, while paying attention to the geographical dimension of development, particularly peripheral regions. The report also recommends adopting a development approach based on justice, strengthening the central role of the State so as to adopt a participatory approach with target communities, focusing on local development, enhancing the role and capacities of elected local councils, activating laws that promote social justice, as they represent one of the most important components and conditions of any development process, achieving equality in education opportunities, improving the quality of education and establishing an educational structure based on the concept of justice and the principle of leaving no one behind. The report stresses the need to ensure freedom of representation, expression and participation, improve working conditions and workers' rights, develop social protection systems that provide the most marginalized segments with a safety net, reform laws and legislation, and move towards democratic and equitable governance to achieve sustainable development.

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Introduction

The topic of justice and social inclusion has gained increasing importance particularly in the past two decades, with the set off of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). With the beginning of what has been known as the Arab Spring, which unveiled the extent of inequality and marginalization that large groups in Arab societies suffer from, in addition to the following wars, repression, displacement, imprisonment, and poverty in some Arab countries, and attempts to transition to democracy in a few of them, development and social justice have become an urgent necessity to ensure stability and security.

Social justice and social inclusion are the most prominent pillars of stability, development, and peace in the region. As the region faces increased challenges in this regard, it has also become vital to rethink the components and definitions of development, justice, and social inclusion. During the last five years in particular, ESCWA has attached importance to development and social justice, reflected in a series of studies and reports on social development in the Arab region, and these addressed certain aspects of development and sustainability, such as the economy, poverty, technology, judiciary, governance, and migration, or focused on excluded social groups, such as persons with disabilities, women, and the elderly.

The report on social development in the Arab region, entitled "Leaving no one behind: Integrating marginalized groups in some Arab countries", is the latest in a series of social development reports that began with a 2013 report entitled "The promises of spring: citizenship and civic engagement in democratic transitions", highlighting popular uprising trends and democratic transition outcomes in some Arab countries by comparing political travails at the time with similar experiences from around the world. A report was issued in 2015, entitled "What is left of the spring? The long road to social justice in the Arab region", and it included research on the situation of social justice in the region, particularly in the period after the political changes that took place therein, and following the adoption of new constitutions in some countries, namely Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. The report defined four components of social justice: equality, equity, human rights, and engagement. In 2018, ESCWA released a report entitled "Inequality, autonomy and change in the Arab region", which examined the impact of inequality and limited personal autonomy on the "political settlement" prevailing in the region, and called for improving public services, providing access to good jobs, aligning personal autonomy with a sense of control over one's life, and enhancing social cohesion.

Background and conceptual framework

The countries of the world in general have made unprecedented social progress in the past few decades. "Poverty levels have

declined significantly around the world, and people have become healthier, better educated, and more connected".[1] However, this progress has been uneven, as socioeconomic inequality has not only persisted, but has even exacerbated in many countries. Marginalized groups continue to face serious obstacles hindering their full and genuine engagement in the economic, social, cultural, and political life. In this context, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), adopted by 193 United Nations member States in 2015, focused on inclusiveness and shared prosperity, with a pledge to ensure "no one will be left behind", and to first reach out to the "poorest and most marginalized". The 2030 Agenda reflects the contents of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, emphasizing the need for involving all in the development process, and "empowering and promoting the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, gender, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, and economic status".

This third issue of the Social Development Report is based on the principle of "leaving no one behind" underlying the 2030 Agenda. It is also based on the framework proposed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2018 discussion paper entitled "What does it mean to leave no one behind?" aimed at helping to achieve the 2030 Agenda. The framework defined five main factors that evoke a sense of neglect or exclusion: discrimination, geographic location, governance system in place, socioeconomic situation, and shocks such as conflicts and wars. It highlighted examples of excluded groups and segments in the Arab region, and ways to include them in the sustainable development process by engaging

them, representing them, and promoting their civil, social, political, economic, and cultural role, so as to achieve social justice. To this end, population groups and areas suffering from poverty and marginalization in three Arab countries, namely Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, were chosen as case studies in which field research was conducted to explore the different aspects of exclusion, its causes, as well as local initiatives and policies to address it.

The report consists of five chapters. The first chapter previews theories of a number of intellectuals about social development, and exclusion, inclusion, and social justice concepts therein, as well as the different approaches to study social development and related issues, in order to illustrate the approach adopted by the present report in the study of marginalized groups and social development in a way that aligns with the challenges facing the Arab region.

The following three chapters are devoted to the study of three cases of exclusion in three Arab countries, mainly resulting from the geographic location of the social groups under study, as well as the correlation of the main causes of exclusion (defined by UNDP and mentioned above), in particular weak governance, socioeconomic situation, and shocks such as wars and conflicts.

The second chapter looks into the state of cemetery inhabitants in Egypt. Cemetery inhabitants are considered to be among the poor segments, as they lack adequate housing and basic services such as electricity, water, and sanitation; they also suffer from defamation for living "among the dead". According to the National Statistics Agency in Egypt, inhabitants of Cairo cemeteries alone amounted to about 1.5 million persons in 2008.

However, this figure has not been updated since then, as the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics in Egypt reported in September 2017 that the number of cemetery inhabitants was indefinite. Unlike slum dwellers, the state of cemetery inhabitants has not been widely examined in research and studies. Therefore, the chapter in question examines the socioeconomic situation of this group, and presents the policies adopted and initiatives made by the State and other local and international stakeholders to address the situation of this population. It proposes policy options to empower cemetery inhabitants and guarantee their fundamental rights.

Chapter 3 deals with the exclusion of the inhabitants of the Central-West Region of Tunisia, who are suffering from a lack of economic opportunities, adequate infrastructure, and access to basic services. It should be noted that the coastal areas of Tunisia have historically enjoyed significant geographical privilege (and sometimes other privileges resulting from colonial and post-colonial practices). However, the interior and remote areas, including the Central-West Region, have remained underdeveloped, impoverished, and deprived of socioeconomic opportunities. The present chapter focuses on three governorates: Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan, and presents the socioeconomic conditions of the inhabitants of these marginalized areas, and the policies pursued by the Government at the subnational/local levels to address these conditions, particularly policies relating to unemployment and access to services. The chapter also looks at public institutions and their practices in order to define the appropriate means to ensure social inclusion and sustainable and equitable development, and proposes a number of policies and corrective measures.

Chapter 4 examines the state of inhabitants of the Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood in northern Lebanon, one of the poorest and most severely conflict-affected areas in Lebanon. The Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood is located in Tripoli, which the World Bank considers the poorest Mediterranean city,[2] as its inhabitants suffer from a lack of economic and social opportunities. Bab al-Tabbaneh inhabitants in particular suffer from poor living conditions as a result of the absence and inadequacy of basic services, namely electricity, water, and sanitation, as well as the lack of adequate and even safe housing, as many homes and buildings are deteriorating or prone to collapsing. They also face the impact of shocks, such as the armed conflicts that broke out between Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood, and the demographic changes caused by the influx of Syrian refugees fleeing the armed conflict in their country; this has added to the socioeconomic pressures that have in turn increased the population's vulnerability. The chapter in question studies the socioeconomic state of Bab al-Tabbaneh inhabitants, assesses the recent socioeconomic policies developed for this area, and concludes with a set of recommendations on how to develop integrated and comprehensive social policies to ensure that the population of the area enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms.

Chapter 5 includes a summary of the three case studies, as well as general recommendations on policies to address the exclusion of marginalized individuals and social groups. It calls for adopting a holistic approach in making social policies, and for reforming institutions that discriminate against and exclude some segments of society, and for specifying targeted measures to address fundamental barriers to the advancement of disadvantaged, marginalized, or excluded social groups.

Methodology

The methodology of this report previews theories of a number of intellectuals about social development, and exclusion, inclusion and social justice concepts therein, as well as the different approaches to study social development and related issues, to illustrate the approach adopted by this report in the study of the marginalized and social development in a way that aligns with the challenges facing the Arab region. It presents case studies of exclusion incidents in Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia, based on three national publications that draw out findings from interviews with stakeholders in Egypt and Tunisia, and focus group discussions in Lebanon. Although each case study adopts a different methodology, all aim to answer the two research questions that follow:

(a) What is the socioeconomic situation of these marginalized groups?
(b) What policies should be put in place to ensure the social inclusion of these groups and safeguard the fundamental human rights?

1. Social Development:

Inclusion and Justice in Lieu of Exclusion

1. Social Development: Inclusion and Justice in Lieu of Exclusion

The attempts of uprising and making a change in several Arab countries have been referred to by various nominations, being called "spring" and "autumn" at times, and "revolution" and "conspiracy" at others, an oscillation between "liberal" promises at one end and an "Islamic" vision at the other. Despite the many debates in the political, media, and academic circles that have intensified in the last 10 years, the social reality of millions of people in the Arab region has not witnessed much change. Most Arab societies continue to suffer from increasing marginalization and exclusion. Democratization attempts in several Arab states, including Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen, turned into a bitter nightmare that has claimed thousands of victims. Conflicts in the region were internationalized, thus becoming more difficult to end. The Syrian crisis has displaced millions, while Libya is still in a mire of internal tribal and regional conflicts, as well as external ones. In Yemen, thousands of civilians and children have fallen victim to the conflict. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and the Sudan continue to witness tensions in their democratization attempts, while Tunisia is an exception, as it is witnessing a peaceful popular revolution that continues to move gradually towards justice. In the light of this reality, social inequality and injustice are exacerbating in most Arab societies, and restlessness and anticipation are on the rise every day and in different ways.

Several social development studies have focused on excluded groups, being the main segment targeted by the development process. There have been varied concepts explaining the terms: exclusion, social inclusion, social justice, and social cohesion. These concepts meet on certain aspects, and disagree on others, but all offer a chance to study exclusion and its phenomena, categories, manifestations, causes, and remedies. It is important to consider these concepts, reflect on the epistemology and theoretical premises comprising their foundation, and re-establish them to understand their contents and desired objectives.

The present chapter presents different approaches to the study of social development and related issues, such as exclusion, inclusion, equality, and justice, to illustrate the approach adopted by this report in the study of the marginalized and social development in a way that aligns with the challenges facing the Arab region. The present presentation includes the definitions of social development and their theoretical foundations, as well as the concepts of exclusion, inclusion, and social justice therein. It also includes the explanation by UNDP of the factors contributing to exclusion: discrimination, geographic location, governance, socioeconomic situation, and shocks such as wars and conflicts.

Social Development

Despite their many differences, development schools agree that development means improving living standards represented by an income increase (growth), which in turn translates into improved health, nutrition, education, and autonomy. Researchers have disagreed on how to measure development levels, as some preferred to use World Bank statistics, which focus on economic indicators, while others favoured the use of the UNDP Human Development Index. Despite numerous criticisms of development, which some now consider it time to be declared deceased,[3] there is no doubt that the debate over it is still raging, especially with the announcement of the 2030 Agenda. It is useful to consider the criticism of development and look into the prospects it opens.

Vincent Tucker, Ziauddin Sardar, and Aram Ziai's studies[4] summarize the most prominent criticisms of development as follows: the roots of development originate from the West. Rather, development represents a Western capitalist ideology that has tried to attract formerly-colonized countries in Africa and Asia, and promised them material wealth in order to prevent them from joining the communist camp and to maintain the colonial division of the world. Although the field of development has evolved since its inception and reproduction in different forms and visions, it remains for some a Western product having "imperialist" roots. Development has been criticized for globalizing the way of life of developed countries, thus viewing other States in an inferior light, after being classified as "less developed" than "modern and developed" states portrayed as the ideal model that other peoples must follow. Development categorizes non-Western, non-modern, and non-industrial ways of life as inferior and in need of development. Development has been criticized for being based on an economic mentality centred on the capitalist accumulation and logic in economic activities based on special privileges, and that make money from the market while downgrading all other forms of social existence and the idea of home economics. Finally, development has been criticized for being a concept that legitimizes intervening in the lives of people who are classified as "less developed".

The post-development theory came as a response to development that, under the pretext of improving human life, has led to greater domination. Arturo Escobar, one of the most prominent post-development theorists, explains that the post-development theory fundamentally rejects the classical model of evolution, prioritizes local knowledge and culture, and encourages pluralistic popular movements.[5] However, this theory has also been criticized, including for being greatly influenced by the ideas of the philosopher Michel Foucault, particularly those concerning the importance of dismantling the structures of domination and power, but without offering the tools and mechanisms to achieve this. Although it is important to value local knowledge and resistance, this may lead to a non-critical view of local traditions, and thus marginalize certain segments of society or perpetuate an undemocratic authoritarian hierarchy. In other words, local forms of repression would be ignored.[6]

Notwithstanding the scientific critique the post-development theory has received, it pointed to an important hypothesis, i.e. development does not necessarily reflect an improvement in living standards, as integrating local economies in official and international commodity trade

networks poses a challenge to the concept of development that is worthy of being addressed. The post-development theory criticized the focus on per capita income growth for not taking into account other variables, such as increased job insecurity, additional labour efforts, and benefits. Gustavo Esteva[7] criticizes the focus on economic digital indicators as a tool for measuring development and comparing countries based on unified indicators such as education, growth, and inclusion.

Therefore, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been widely criticized for their narrow approach to the concept of development and its process, as it was generally limited to meeting basic requirements of societies and individuals. The SDGs, launched in 2015 to replace the MDGs, have focused on ending inequality and poverty by 2030, so they have greatly sought a broader understanding of development to include social, economic, political, and environmental aspects. However, the SDGs, though widely welcomed, have also been criticized, particularly for neglecting structural barriers to justice and focusing on economic liberalism and liberal feminism,[8] which favours economic growth at the expense of addressing structural drivers that produce inequality, injustice, and marginalization.[9]

Some stakeholders have attempted to produce a better visualization of this issue, overstepping the development hurdle and beyond. These include UNDP and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, by designing the Multidimensional Poverty Index. ESCWA has produced a version of this index for the Arab region in the Multidimensional Poverty Index for middle-income countries. The Multidimensional Poverty Index measures families' actual life conditions more accurately as it examines a range of key indicators pertaining to health,

education, and living standards, including nutrition, child mortality, years of schooling, sanitation, electricity, and drinking water.

As the present report proposes to address social exclusion using social inclusion for the achievement of social justice in its various components, each of these concepts ought to be presented.

1. Social exclusion

The 2016 United Nations Report on the World Social Situation defines social exclusion as follows: "Overall, social exclusion describes a state in which individuals are unable to participate fully in economic, social, political, and cultural life".

The definitions of social exclusion generally focus on poverty, unemployment, low educational attainment, and barriers social and political institutions face. Social exclusion or marginalization is a complex multidimensional process, entailing a shortage of resources, goods, and services, deprivation of rights, as well as the inability to participate in normal relationships and activities in the economic, social, cultural, or political arenas. Exclusion affects individuals' quality of life and social cohesion, and thus impedes justice.

According to the 2018 UNDP framework, "What does it mean to leave no one behind?" aimed at helping achieve the 2030 Agenda, five factors contribute to exclusion: discrimination, geography, governance, socioeconomic situation, and shocks such as wars and conflicts. The framework defines these factors as follows:

Discrimination: Persons who face biases, exclusion, or mistreatment based on one or more aspect of their identity, including

prominently gender as well as ethnicity, age, class, disability, sexual orientation, religion, nationality, indigenous, and migratory status.

Geography: Those who endure isolation or poor public services, such as transportation, the Internet, or other infrastructure gaps due to their place of residence.

Governance: People who face disadvantage due to ineffective, unjust, unaccountable or unresponsive global, national, and/or sub-national institutions, who are affected by unjust laws and policies, as well as inequitable or inadequate processes or budgets, and who are unable to influence or participate meaningfully in the decisions that impact their lives.

Socioeconomic status: Persons whose socioeconomic status deteriorates and face deprivation in all its forms, such as lack of access to nutrition, educational attainment, and competition in the labour market, or who do not benefit from health care, clean water, sanitation, energy, social protection and financial services.

Shocks such as wars and conflicts: People who are most vulnerable to setbacks due to the impacts of climate change, natural hazards, violence, conflict, displacement, health emergencies, economic downturns, price movement or other shocks.

2. Social inclusion

The concept of social inclusion is commonly used for being a simple means to indicate providing individuals with access to resources and institutions in order to meet their needs. In its 2016 Report on the World Social Situation, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines social inclusion as providing access to economic, social, and

political resources, as well as providing institutional access for all, and allowing them freedom of expression and participation in decision-making. Social inclusion is also the process of improving the terms of participation in society for people who are disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, religion, or economic or other status, through enhanced opportunities, access to resources, voice, and respect for rights.

The World Bank Group also defines social inclusion as:

- The process of improving the terms on which individuals and groups take part in society;
- The process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of those disadvantaged on the basis of their identity.[10]

The standard definitions of social inclusion may be commensurate with the political conditions in the Arab Region, which is undemocratic and suffers from many structural barriers that produce different types of exclusion and marginalized groups.

3. Social justice

A deeper problematic is put forward with regard to social justice, whose presence or absence leads to the exclusion or inclusion of different groups, segments, and regions. It is therefore important to look at the definitions of social justice and the approaches of some schools of thought that have addressed this issue.

The first ESCWA report on social development, released in 2015, defined four components of social justice: equality, equity, human rights, and participation. The concept

of equity specifically focused on the importance of the distribution of wealth as a tool for achieving justice in what is known as "distributive justice".

This emphasis on distribution results from the predominance of the theory of capitalism in justice proposals, which saw that inequality stemmed from the maldistribution of wealth or capital. However, this theory has been largely criticized for ignoring the structural aspects that hinder different social segments' access to wealth and capital (such as material, social, and cultural capital), and to equal opportunities of interest. Free mandatory education is one of the policies of the distributive justice theory put forward as an effective tool to achieve justice. Although free mandatory education policies have started off successful in closing the gap between society segments in terms of access to education, their outcomes are still largely varying in terms of fairness in the quality of education and its desired returns such as work, wage, or social status, as opportunities in this regard are influenced by various structural factors, such as social capital, laws, and customs that are unfair to some groups, or prevalent relations that limit different groups' access to justice. Therefore, access to education does not necessarily translate into integrating students and enabling them to have equal access to the labour market, wages, or representation.

Iris Marion Young[11] points out that the term social justice is usually used in its narrow traditional sense to refer to the way services, opportunities, or capital are distributed in society, but this distributional perspective ignores institutional norms and relationships. For Young, injustice is practiced through five forms of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, helplessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. In her view, distributional injustice may contribute to these forms of injustice and may result from them, but nothing can be reduced to distribution, since injustice and unfairness entail social relations and structures that go beyond distribution. In other words, Young and Sharon Gewirtz attach great importance to two components or conditions of justice: distribution and relationships. According to Gewirtz, the relational dimension of justice highlights the nature of the relationships underpinning the structure of society, and helps to understand micro-interactions in macro-socioeconomic relationships mediated by institutions such as the State and the market.[12] The relational concepts of social justice focus on the form of social cooperation and call for a return to the political/relational system in which social and economic goods, rights, and responsibilities are distributed. Young suggested the concept of enabling justice, so that justice is not limited to distribution, but extends to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities, collective communication, and cooperation. In this context, injustice refers primarily to two types of constraints: oppression and domination. These two types of constraints, as well as distribution patterns, entail issues that cannot be easily grasped in terms of the logic of distribution: decision-making procedures, division of labour, and culture. Moreover, oppression should be addressed as a structural concept.[13]

However, this is not simply a matter of the distribution of power relations, or the distribution procedures of goods in society (commonly referred to as procedural justice). Relational justice may include procedural justice, but it is not limited to it. Relational justice focuses on the nature and order of social relationships, and the formal and informal rules

governing how members of society treat each other at both the macro and personal levels. Therefore, it refers to the practices and procedures governing political systems, economic and social institutions, families, and individual social relations. The relational dimension of justice includes what Nancy Fraser calls cultural justice, which includes cultural independence, tolerance, and respect, as well as economic justice. For instance, restructuring the division of labour, and subjecting investment to democratic decision-making.[14]

Fraser, a leading contributor to justice studies, argues that ensuring equal participation with others as full partners in social interaction requires not to assume that an economic solution is the only solution to the redistribution of resources and opportunities, but it should also include means for social and cultural equity, recognition of the other, and political representation. Fraser defines justice as equal participation and emphasizes that overcoming injustice can be achieved only by dismantling institutional barriers that prevent some people from participating on an equal footing with others, as full partners in social interaction.[15]

The aim of addressing the concept of social justice is to highlight the importance of adopting a comprehensive and normative approach to economic development, rather than limiting discussion to exclusion and inclusion without addressing the structure and relationships they result from. The absence of a clear debate about a normative view of justice is a problematic of development. Despite the prevalence of the neoliberal outlook, albeit in an implicit manner, it does not address the challenges of the region, most notably the structural and relational foundations that are a major obstacle to achieving social justice and fighting injustice. The present report adopts this comprehensive outlook, especially when offering recommendations and solutions to reduce exclusion and marginalization.

In the following three chapters, based on the United Nations framework "Leaving No One Behind", the report presents examples from Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia on the role the five exclusion factors defined by the present framework, particularly geography, play in marginalizing certain social groups: (a) cemetery inhabitants in Egypt, (b) the inhabitants of Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan governorates in Tunisia, and (c) the inhabitants of the enclave of poverty and deprivation, the Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli.

2. The Marginalized in Egypt:
Case Study
of Cemetery
Inhabitants

2. The Marginalized in Egypt: Case Study of Cemetery Inhabitants

A. Introduction

In Egypt, many citizens live in rooms annexed to cemeteries. These cemeteries are owned either by the State or by individuals, and are used for burial purposes.[16] These rooms have increased, their population has grown, and they have become residential areas called the "City of the Dead"[17] or residential pockets within cemeteries.

According to the 2008 report of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, the number of Egyptians who lived in Cairo cemeteries amounted to 1.5 million.[18] According to Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics data, at the time of the report release, Egypt's population amounted to 72.6 million, and it reached 94.8 million in 2017, recording an increase of about 22.2 million or 30.5 per cent in 10 years.[19] Applying the same percentage, the population of cemeteries in 2017 is estimated at 1,958,677 inhabitants.

In his book Planet of Slums, Mike Davis argues that the cemeteries represent an inherited residence. The Qarafa area in Cairo is an example of such a residence, and it hosts, as per Davis' estimates, one million poor people who benefit from the Mamluk Necropolis for being ready-made residential complexes. The vast Qarafa is the burial site of princes and sultans. It is a walled urban pocket surrounded by several busy roads. According to Davis, the natives of the Qarafa were initially the cemetery sentries from Cairo, after whom came quarry workers who took up the cemeteries as residences. In the aftermath of the war of 1967, the cemeteries were a haven for citizens who had been forced to leave their areas and cities of origin in Sinai and Suez.[20] Waves of migration from rural areas to Cairo in search of better opportunities in the city followed, as a result of a combination of economic and social push factors.[21]

The present chapter observes the economic and social conditions of cemetery inhabitants in Egypt as one of the marginalized social groups in terms of social justice and inequality. The present study is characterized by attempting to provide data that is not available on the present subject, in the light of the significant inconsistency in the available data and the absence of other data necessary for analysis and interpretation. By selecting the figures available through the natural evolution of past data, deriving data from overall rates in Egypt, and testing this data on a partial scope of the regions concerned, the present study attempts to provide the data needed to analyse the phenomenon of cemetery inhabitants, and find ways to deal with it.

The case study of the cemetery inhabitants was carried out by identifying their economic,

social, and political situation, as well as defining the policy gap that has led to exacerbating exclusion of all kinds, so as to shape policies that can achieve social, economic, and political inclusion, provide these inhabitants with social services, and ensure they enjoy basic human rights as they should. Exclusion is generally regarded as a deliberate or unintended neglect or exclusion of a group of individuals, groups, or even States, by limiting their access to different resources. The reasons for limited access to resources may be historical or cultural, or relate to the social, economic, and political choices made by those in control of the local, national, or global system.[22] The concept of exclusion is closely linked to the issue of unfair development and urban inequality, and takes interlocking forms of socioeconomic inequality and individuals or communities' systematic deprivation of enjoying rights, opportunities, resources, and participating in decision-making. It is also a multidimensional process that includes the economic dimension (such as restructuring policies), the social dimension (such as impoverishment, discrimination, and stigmatization), and the political dimension (such as exclusion from decision-making and dependency), leading to the emergence of marginalized areas.[23]

Geographic exclusion is another form of exclusion that is linked to the geographic location of marginalized groups and how far they are effectively from services and the economic life. This often undermines full participation in the economic and social life. According to a number of international reports, poverty and social exclusion in Egypt are linked to the lack of infrastructure and services, as well as the consequent dropping out of education and child labour.[24]

B. Methodology for the case study of cemetery inhabitants in Egypt

The methodology used in the case study of the marginalized cemetery inhabitants in Egypt is based on the review and analysis of previous studies on the cemetery populations in Egypt, as well as on the consideration of official figures and statistics on cemetery inhabitants, and of statistics and figures produced by previous field research. The case study also relied on a number of interviews that included the following categories:

1. Academics and researchers specialized in urban issues and interested in the issue of cemetery inhabitants in Egypt, to learn about the problems facing the inhabitants of these areas from an academic perspective.
2. An employee at the Ministry of Social Solidarity, to learn about the Governmental and official dealing with the problem of cemetery inhabitants.
3. Due to the difficulty of interviewing representatives of the cemetery inhabitants in the light of the general context in Egypt, this was compensated for by interviews with members of civil society organizations who had previously worked in cemetery areas, as well as press investigations.

Knowing that the phenomenon of cemetery inhabitants is spread in several governorates, the focus was on a specific geographical scope, i.e. Cairo, because it hosts the highest percentage of 76.4 per cent, according to estimates of the 2017 census issued by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. The study adopts a specific definition of cemetery inhabitants based on the survey of previous studies, and subsequently proposes specific policies to deal with these areas as per the definition adopted.

C. Phenomenon of cemetery inhabitants in Egypt: A history

The problem of cemeteries is not a product of the second half of the twentieth century, although it worsened considerably during that period. In fact, like informal housing, it is a reflection of the exacerbation of contemporary urban problems, including the housing problem that has driven thousands to the "City of the Dead" instead of resorting to the open or shantytowns.[25]

This phenomenon exacerbated in the 1960s and 1970s. In her book "Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious",[26] Janet Abu-Lughod noted that according to the 1960 census nearly 100,000 people lived in parts of Cairo that included cemeteries. The number of people living in cemeteries, or so-called the "City of the Dead", according to Cairo Governorate information, reached 1 million,[27] recording a tenfold increase in less than 20 years. Other studies say that the beginning of the phenomenon goes back to the 1960s, as the availability of public services and the emergence of extensions for the city of Cairo rendered cemetery areas close to the urban ones, so the cemetery sentries and caretakers started bringing their families to live with them, and in most cases they did not pay rent, rather provided guard for cemeteries in exchange for the owners allowing them and their families to live there.[28] With the displacement that came with the June 1967 war, some residents of the canal cities (Suez, Ismailia, and Port Said) found no shelter in Cairo except the yards of these cemeteries. The third wave of resorting to living in cemeteries came with policies to transition to a free-market in the early 1970s. By mid-decade, a new segment emerged, suffering from a deteriorating social situation that coincided with a severe housing crisis resulting from policy changes in that

sphere. These three waves explain the huge increase in the cemetery population during that period. The change in the 1980s and 1990s was the transformation of the areas in question into residential areas in the usual sense for the economically poor of course. These areas also began to host workers and Government employees because of the severe decline some interpreted as being a result of neoliberal policies that have made many middle-class social groups economically classified as poor.

D. Housing types in cemeteries

There are various housing types in cemeteries and they can be classified into three:[29]

1. Residential areas overlapping with graveyards/cemeteries

Residential areas overlapping with the graveyards/cemeteries emerged as a result of the large growth the city witnessed in a relatively short period of time. Residential neighbourhoods crept towards cemeteries and vice versa until they converged, overlapped, and no separation was left between them. This overlap is evident in the areas of al-Qadiriyya and Arab Quraish to the north of Imam al-Shafi'i cemetery, and Arab al-Yasar at the foot of al-Qal'a, as well as in Bab al-Wazir and al-Basatin areas. As for Bab al-Nasr cemetery, residential neighbourhoods surrounded it until they became completely contained within it.

2. Residential pockets within graveyards/cemeteries

The term residential pockets is used to refer to residential clusters that have been constructed within graveyard/cemetery areas. These have been built in empty spaces therein, and in

recent years, parts of the graveyards have been transformed into residential areas by converting their yards into houses, raising their walls vertically, and erecting buildings in the spaces between them. These clusters are not very different in their urban fabric and population structure from informal housing areas and from the popular and old neighbourhoods in Cairo. They host the bulk of the total cemetery population.[30]

3. Housing in cemetery yards

Burial site/cemetery yards amount to approximately 250,000 in Cairo's cemetery area, and may be used for habitation without making any significant modifications on them. The yards adjacent to cemeteries include living rooms and services, allowing the establishment of permanent neighbourhoods. The area of some yards amounts to several hundred metres. In general, populated yards are concentrated around residential pockets and in areas bordering them. The fact that yards contain a water system is without doubt an important pull factor for living there.[31]

The cemetery inhabitants community is also divided into a number of categories based on the place of residence: those living in cemetery yards are the least fortunate, those living in residences adjacent to the cemeteries are better off than yard inhabitants, and the undertakers group is largely influential in cemetery areas.[32]

Defining each of the three housing types may explain the different estimates of the number of people living in cemeteries. Research and studies estimate that the number of Egyptians living in cemeteries is close to 5 million, while other estimates, notably the 2008 report of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, state that the number is less than

5 million, but is somewhere between 1 million and 2 million.[33]

However, Egypt's latest population census in 2017 estimates that approximately 660 families live in cemeteries, the majority of which are concentrated in Cairo, followed by al-Qalyubiyya Governorate, which together with Giza Governorate constitute what is known as the "Greater Cairo" metropolitan area.[34] The 2006 census estimated the families living in cemeteries nationwide at approximately 2,763, equivalent to 10,465 persons.[35]

The problem here is the difference in estimates; whereas an official in the Ministry of Youth and Sports stated that almost 5 million citizens were living in cemeteries (in a talk he had given on the seriousness of this phenomenon on February 20, 2018),[36] the 2017 census figures were completely different, raising many questions about the methodology of conducting the census with regard to the cemetery population.

This is also evident in census estimates in previous years, for example, the population of cemeteries in Cairo alone was estimated at 179,000 in the 1986 census, 7,930 in the 1996 census,[37] and 8,300 in the 2006 census.

This indicates problems with the methodology used to count the cemetery population, and in the definition of the latter. In the 2017 census, only inhabitants of "burial site yards" were counted, without counting residents in the other two housing types in cemeteries: residential areas overlapping with graveyards/cemeteries and residential pockets within cemeteries. Therefore, the present study will adopt the definition of cemetery inhabitants as residents in the three housing types mentioned above without ignoring any of them.

E. Economic and professional conditions of cemetery inhabitants

It is important to present the economic and professional conditions of cemetery inhabitants by learning the nature of inhabitants and the unemployment rate among them, as well as analysing deprivations and changes in their professions, including work related to cemeteries and burial rites, in addition to the various industrial, commercial, and artisanal activities they practice.

The problem here lies in the dominance of the informal sector in cemetery areas, both professionally and economically, and the difficulty of identifying its sub-sectors and workers, and classifying them on the basis of age and gender. Accordingly, the study addresses previous studies in a critical manner to determine the main elements of professional and economic conditions in the light of the historical context.

Deteriorating economic conditions and population swells have forced a number of Egyptians to live in cemeteries due to a lack of public facilities and services. Citizens have resorted to living in cemeteries for many reasons, including the intersection between increasing types of informal housing, including settling in cemeteries, and growing trends of informal economy. Cemetery inhabitants consider that living there is better for them than in modern dwellings in the desert, and therefore cemeteries usually lie at the heart of the city's economic and social centre.[38] It should be noted that some cemeteries have access to basic services such as electricity and water, considering they are part of planned residential clusters, but lack public services.[39] During the past 20 years, there have not been projects to improve the condition of these areas by making public services available therein.

Cemetery inhabitants' professions and economic conditions have not been consistent over time, as they have undergone many changes. After professions related to cemeteries and burial rites, other professions emerged associated with economic, industrial, commercial, and artisanal activities when cemeteries became a repository of small workshops that no longer fit in the southern and south-eastern parts of Cairo in the aftermath of the urban growth witnessed there. Therefore, those seeking cheap housing to escape the city's congestion turned to cemeteries, as well as those who immigrated from rural areas and Upper Egypt to escape poverty and seek employment.[40]

Those who came from different areas within the city and did not have direct employment in the graveyard/ cemetery areas had resorted to them for several compelling factors, including the worsening of housing problems since the mid-1970s as a result of economic openness policies, the demolition of old houses in popular neighbourhoods and the construction of buildings in their place,[41] leading to what is known as gentrification, and the migration of the lower class towards graveyards/ cemeteries, as well as the deterioration of buildings in old neighbourhoods and the collapse of many of them due to an increased amount of water seepage, particularly sewage. These factors resulted in a massive exodus to graveyard/ cemetery areas, both to the residential pockets and the yards. Residence collapses in Cairo is the main factor that has driven people to cemeteries, followed by the factor associated with administrative eviction and expropriation, which have accompanied many projects such as

main road construction, so the poor found no alternative to living in cemeteries. These residential pockets have added to their economic services and structures, thus becoming complete small cities within the scope of the graveyards/cemeteries, with their schools, police stations, markets, and various artisanal activities.[42]

The economic and professional characteristics of the cemetery population community have been shaped over the decades, and a key part of this community has consisted of cemetery caretakers since the 1980s. Cemetery caretakers, also known as "undertakers" are those who control cemetery yards and have influence over the population. According to cemetery inhabitants, caretakers usually receive 150 Egyptian pounds for every new tomb for poor families, and between 400 and 500 pounds for wealthier clients. The gravedigger then receives a sum between 50 and 70 pounds.[43] Some small businesses have also spread to meet the needs of living residents, allowing them to buy vegetables and milk from vendors and even grab a quick shave from the barber who set up a shop with a chair on one of the graves.[44]

Moreover, many cemetery inhabitants rely on manufacturing marble used in building tombs. They believe that the deteriorating economic conditions have deepened their marginalization, as "the economic situation we are living in, the lack of work opportunities, and high rents are some of the reasons that made us live here. Getting an actual apartment requires a lot of money and having a job, so I cannot get one. We are forgotten by the Government and they do not care about us. They consider us to be cemetery beings; we too are dead to them".[45] In addition to artisanal and vocational activities, religious activities are common, such as the commemoration of the famous births, including

the births of Sayyida Nafisa, Sayyida Zeinab, and Sayyidna al-Hussein, during which the yards and cemeteries are rented to the visitors and attendees of these commemorations.

Work in these areas can be defined by three basic types:

The first type relates to the nature of the area and the "burial" profession, which includes guarding cemeteries, undertaking, and related religious services (including Qur'an recitation, dictating the testimony), and industries associated with cemeteries such as manufacturing marble and selling flowers and baked goods. Income levels in this type vary according to the work hierarchy within this system, as well as additional income from visitors and the families of the deceased.

The second type is the service provision, and includes small workshops for car repair and small handicrafts. This type mostly relies on incomers seeking services, and the resulting income is subject to general market prices. This type also includes selling popular foods and baked goods, as well as beverages and other products the inhabitants of these areas need. This work type and the resulting income are linked to the capacities in these areas.

The third pattern includes employees, pensioners, and workers, and their income pattern is mostly linked to income patterns in public employment.

These types have created wide class gaps. The upper class includes those who occupy the "most sophisticated" professions in the first type and the first category of the second type, while the middle class includes workers in the third type and the second category of the service type. The lower class includes workers,

pensioners of low incomes in the State structure, and those who provide "menial" services in the first category. Economic insecurity is one of the most prominent problems from which cemetery inhabitants suffer, as they do not have fixed jobs and fixed incomes when working on a daily basis.[46]

A study of two urban cluster areas in Cairo cemeteries, Izbat Barquq and Qaitbay of the Manshiyat Naser ward, showed that the proportion of the working age population (15 years and above) was about 65.5 per cent, of whom 64.2 per cent were males and 37.6 per cent female. The proportion of employed persons was about 78.9 per cent of the total population of the sample, of whom 78.9 were males and about 21.1 per cent female. Whereas the proportion of unemployed persons stood at about 31.1 per cent of the total population, of whom 26 per cent were males and 74 per cent were female.

This data shows that the unemployed and those outside the labour force make up about two thirds of the population, i.e. each cemetery inhabitant provides for two others and men constitute the highest proportion of the labour force, which is largely equivalent to unemployment among women.

The sample study also shows that the majority of employed persons in Izbat Barquq and Qaitbay areas work in artisanal and vocational jobs, with a proportion of 28.3 per cent, of whom 79.2 per cent are males and 20.8 per cent female. Services come second with a proportion of 14.2 per cent, of whom 58.2 per cent are males and 47.2 per cent female. The transportation sector employs 14.2 per cent, all of whom are male, in alignment with the nature of the profession, particularly on taxis operating

between these two areas and the city centre. According to the sample study, 13.6 per cent of the employed persons practice administrative work, of whom 62.7 per cent are males and 37.3 per cent female. A proportion of 12.3 per cent work in construction, all of whom are males. The proportion of entrepreneurs stood at about 9.4 per cent, of whom 80 were males and 20 per cent female. Workers in the private sector constituted about 80.75 per cent of the total employed population, while workers in the public sector constituted about 19.3 per cent.[47]

Based on the three types, the population of these two regions can be economically divided as follows:

The majority of working women economically belong to the second type, working in services, often in the same area. The proportion of those with occupations outside the region is roughly equal to that of those working in the burial profession and associated works, increasing the proportion of women working within the two regions studied to 18.2 per cent of their labour force. The economic situation of women is largely linked to the region itself and its social level, which means that they are more marginalized than men, 22.7 per cent of whom work outside the region. This is due to the nature of occupations prevailing in these areas having a religious dimension and a male heritage. Additionally, the social stigma associated with living in cemeteries hinders women's entry into many jobs outside their region.

No information is available on child labour in cemetery population communities, but cases can be monitored of children working at an early age to assist their parents in burial-related work, and other cases in which children work in artisanal workshops near cemetery areas.[48]

F. Basic services and public services and their impact on the status of cemetery inhabitants as marginalized persons

The bulk of statistics on service delivery in Egypt are collected at the governorate level, which may mask the extent of spatial inequality in service delivery, especially in urban areas, where levels of inequality are high. In fact, the level of inequality in Cairo is higher than any other governorate in Egypt.[49]

A distinction must be first made between basic services and public services; basic services are those associated with providing core requirements, such as electricity, gas, drinking water, and communications, whereas public services are associated with providing health, education, and housing services.[50]

1. Basic services

Several studies indicate that most cemeteries have access to electricity and water services, considering they are part of planned residential clusters. However, these areas completely lack public services.[51] In the absence of statistics, one of the available indicators based on the 2017 census can be used for basic services. Table 1 shows the number of households (out of a total of 660 households living in cemetery yards only) that own electrical home appliances.

In this sample of statistics, there are indications that households in cemetery yards have no access to the natural gas service, as evidenced by the fact that none of the households have a gas heater and that a large number of households rely on electricity using electric ovens and heaters (table 1). This can be considered an additional burden on these households because the cost of electricity is higher than that of gas. In addition, the figures show that nearly one third of households do not have any electrical appliances (33.7 per cent of the total number of households).

Basic services also vary from one region to another, as some do not have legal access to water or electricity, so residents illegally establish connections to networks in nearby areas. Some residents live in cemetery yards owned by wealthy families that have basic services such as electricity and water.[52] According to the case study of Izbat Barquq and Qaitbay areas, 88.7 per cent of households included in the sample have access to the main water network, whereas 11.3 per cent of these households do not have access to clean water, and rely on neighbours in the same house to meet their needs. About 98.7 per cent of the households have access to the main electricity grid, and 97.4 per cent are connected to the main sanitation network in the area.

Table 1. Cemetery households' possession of electrical appliances

Appliance type	Number of households (Total 660)	Percentage
Electric refrigerator	426	64.5
Electric washing machine	0	0
Electric oven	46	7
Conditioning	0	0
Gas heater	0	0
Electric heater	123	18.6
Households having no electric appliances	223	33.7

Source: Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 2017.

2. Public services

Cemetery inhabitants suffer from a lack of public services such as the right to adequate housing. In this regard, some issues are raised related to the housing tenure security and urban deprivation that involves poor public services such as education and health.

(a) Education

Cemetery inhabitants suffer from a lack of educational services, as most schools, if any, are only up to the primary level. There is also a lack of the necessary means of transport, as most are individual transport vehicles and are not suitable for human use because they do not comply with basic safety and security standards.[53] The facilities already available require maintenance and renovation, especially unlicensed buildings.

According to the study on urban clusters within cemeteries,[54] about 69.5 per cent of families with primary school children confirmed that the nearest primary school was only 300 metres from the area, while the remaining 30.5 per cent confirmed that the nearest primary school was between 300 and 400 metres away. About 68.1 per cent of households with children in lower secondary confirmed that the nearest lower secondary school was only one kilometre away. Secondary schools of all kinds are 2 to 4 kilometres away from the area.

These ratios vary by region. For example, the area where al-Tonsy cemeteries are located has six schools, while others have only one, causing problems with access to schools due to transportation difficulties.[55]

Table 2 shows the number of schools in the wards in which cemetery areas are located,

and the gap is evident when it comes to secondary schools, which are few compared to primary and lower secondary schools.

The financial capacity of this area's inhabitants is not a problem when it comes to education expenses, as the surrounding schools are low-cost public schools. However, by reviewing distances and numbers, it can be said that the problem of primary education lies mainly in quality, which leads to a high dropout rate, as quality is not only related to curricula, but also to the schooling system, teacher qualifications, and the way they deal with pupils.[56] At the lower secondary level, the number of schools remain suitable for the population, but the problem is in the ability of lower secondary school-aged children to get to these schools. The apparent lack of secondary schools indicates a problem with the general trend to deal with the issue of education in the first place, which hinders these groups from accessing higher education.

Table 2. Availability of schools for cemetery inhabitants

Ward	Number of secondary schools	Number of lower secondary schools	Number of primary schools
Al-Darb al-Ahmar	1	5	11
Al-Jamaliya	2	5	9
Manshiyat Naser	1	7	18
Al-Basatin	5	10	25
Al-Khalifa	3	10	16

Source: According to the e-portal of the Ministry of Education, Egypt. http://emis.gov.eg (last updated in January 2019).

Girls are the most marginalized in terms of education, especially because of the difficulty in reaching schools. This makes them drop out of education, especially in the lower secondary and secondary levels,[57] despite the existence of the "No Illiteracy" programme (eradicating illiteracy among women), linked to the "Takaful" programme concerned with providing monthly cash sums to the poorest citizens, while working to educate households before applying the conditionality associated with supporting education, namely: the need for family members (aged 6 to 18 years) who receive "Takaful" support to be enrolled in education (recording an attendance of no less than 80% per cent of the school year). The sum increases with the different educational stages (the sum in lower secondary education is more than that in primary education, and the sum in secondary education is more than that in lower secondary), as the dropout rate increases with age. This support is provided up to two children per family. The problem is that conditionality cannot be applied if the school is too far from the place of residence.[58] Moreover, schoolchildren who live in cemeteries suffer from the problem of social stigma in schools and among their colleagues for being cemetery inhabitants. They are usually harassed by their colleagues for living in cemeteries next to the dead.[59]

(b) Health

An example of the problem of disparities in health services in Cairo in general is that beds in public and private hospitals in Cairo governorate amount to 29,600,[60] while its population is about 10 million. In countries with good health systems, this rate falls between 25 and 30 beds per 1,000 citizens: for example, in Denmark (30 beds/1,000 citizens), in Switzerland

(48 beds/1,000 citizens), and in the United States of America (29 beds/1,000 citizens).[61]

As for health services, according to the study of urban clusters in cemeteries, around 43.2 per cent of the total sample confirmed that public hospitals, especially El Hussein University Hospital, was the designated place for them to receive treatment, while 33.7 per cent of the total sample confirmed that comprehensive clinics annexed to places of worship in the area was the place designated and suitable for them to receive treatment.[62] "There are also regional health units, but the problem is that they are sometimes difficult to reach, and also the poor quality of the services they provide. The population relies more on clinics or charitable dispensaries annexed to places of worship".[63] Women are the most affected by the lack of health services, especially given that health units are far from residential areas and are difficult for them to reach.[64]

Another problem is that the health units or comprehensive clinics annexed to places of worship provide primary health care services, while surgeries and intensive care are available only in large Government and university hospitals, which cemetery inhabitants cannot afford,[65] despite their availability in cemetery areas (e.g. El Hussein University Hospital in al-Jamaliya district and Ahmed Maher Teaching Hospital in al-Darb al-Ahmar district). Residents of these areas also do not receive some services, including ambulances that do not enter them.[66]

Of course, there is no need to state that the inhabitants of cemetery areas cannot afford health services in private hospitals or clinics, even if they were available within cemetery areas. Therefore, some elements such as availability, access, and quality are lacking in

terms of health services needed by the inhabitants of cemetery areas.

(c) Housing

The situation varies according to the type of housing. There are those who live in unsafe apartments or dangerous dwellings (dilapidated or prone to collapse) in residential areas adjacent to cemeteries as a result of poor control over buildings. There is also the psychological aspect because living next to the dead has a significant impact on the situations and conditions of the inhabitants of these areas.[67] The residents of cemeteries in Cairo do not have any of the basic components of a decent dwelling with all that entails, namely tenure security, affordability, habitability, location, and cultural expediency, which are provided for by the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing issued by the United Nations.

With regard to tenure security, for example, the case study of the residents of Bab al-Nasr cemeteries (considered to be of the cemetery yard housing type) indicates that the cemetery caretaker acts like a landlord vis-à-vis the residents; he rents out the space as a subcontractor, and cemetery inhabitants cannot request legal tenure documents to be able to gain access to basic services.[68]

In residential areas overlapping with cemeteries or residential pockets therein, tenure is divided into rent and ownership, and has legal documents. However, these areas remain unsafe due to poor housing conditions therein.[69]

Moreover, some cemetery inhabitants pointed out that the cost of rent was between 200 and 500 pounds and could sometimes be as high as 900 pounds,[70] and that they were unable to afford such costs for a dwelling that did not

have the basic components of adequate housing. These dwellings are usually considered uninhabitable, as they consist of small rooms of only 2 metres by 1.5 metres, which is a manifestation of urban deprivation in terms of overcrowding and unsanitary housing. Living in cemeteries has a negative direct impact on physical and mental health. Additionally, poor infrastructure in these areas, such as the lack of sidewalks, bike paths, and recreational areas, contributes to reduced physical activity, leading to many diseases and imposing pressures on mental health, such as violence and social isolation.[71] This housing type also causes increased unemployment, as well as widening income disparities and social gaps among the population of a single city.[72]

Moreover, women are further marginalized, as a result of past conditions under hierarchy and societal masculinity in these areas, especially "in the light of insecurity, which exposes them to pestering such as harassment".[73] This type of housing also imposes an additional burden on women, as dwellings are often shared with families, so women are forced to use shared bathrooms, which is a breach of their privacy.[74]

G. Social conditions in cemeteries

As mentioned above, several social groups live in cemetery areas including the group employed in work related to excavation and burial, the group of medium traders, skilled craftsmen, and cemetery caretakers' assistants, the group of public sector employees and workers, as well as the group of pensioners, the elderly, the disabled, day labourers, and the unemployed. The social segments of residential clusters in cemeteries also include individuals and families whose livelihood has been associated with

burial sites, such as Qur'an reciters, as well as those who work in quarries near these areas, such as those in al-Mokattam and al-Basatin.[75]

Conversations with a number of cemetery inhabitants show that there is an intersection between the mentioned economic classes and the social situation of inhabitants, with the exception of small employees who belong to the middle or even poor economic class. However, these are referred to by "mister", and enjoy along with their wives a special social status, in contrast with workers at the base of the social scale, alongside of poor burial workers and cheap service providers.

Cemetery inhabitants suffer from enormous problems, such as fear, insecurity, high crime rate, marginalization, and social stigma. Women particularly suffer at the social, professional, and economic levels in cemeteries, in addition to the high illiteracy and unemployment rate among them, the nature of the occupations in which they work, and the proportion of women who are breadwinners.

"We are human beings too, and we feel afraid", Nariman, a resident of the cemetery area, said in a press report about the inhabitants of Cairo cemeteries. "Sometimes I stay up all night, especially when someone is freshly buried". Nariman says she fears passing through the burial sites for a whole week after someone is buried.[76]

Myths also prevail among cemetery inhabitants, as well as stories about jinn, goblins, evil spirits, and ghosts that embody the dead, especially those who were killed or who were in the morgue. However, they do not tell anyone about these fears, stating that thieves, thugs, undertakers (cemetery caretakers), and other yard inhabitants may take advantage of their fears. Therefore, they live with a chronic feeling of insecurity.[77]

A number of residents also spoke of mobbing by so-called "thugs". One of the residents said, "We have lost the sense of security; mobbing has increased, criminals are spreading, and yobs are harassing females, especially schoolgirls, with very obscene catcalls, while the police do not move a muscle... We have complained a lot, but to no avail, and the Government is irresponsive. For example, there is a point belonging to al-Khalifa ward (one of the neighbourhoods housing cemeteries) with only two security personnel. We have only seen them once or twice, and they do nothing. There are many common crimes in cemeteries, namely, forced robbery, child abduction, and harassment of women. The police do nothing. They opened a station and then closed it, and it is clear that the security personnel themselves are afraid of staying here".[78]

Although only Salah Salem Street separates one of the cemetery areas from the "Darrasa" Central Security Camp, one of the largest police camps in Cairo, cemetery residents do not feel safe at all. One resident says: "We are within reach of any thief. If we contact the police, they ignore us completely. We only see them when a minister is visiting the main street. Then, they would tell us not to go out onto the main street, and to go inside the cemeteries".[79]

Social stigma has a major role in determining the expected forms of social behaviour. The problem here lies in the mutual perception between cemetery inhabitants and city inhabitants. Cemetery inhabitants feel that they are dead and "buried alive". They are always subjected to the social stigma for living next to the dead.[80] In their view, society has wronged them and has imposed a social and

psychological siege on them, thus making them feel inferior to city residents, whom they view as "happy people" who do not care about the poor like them. Cemetery inhabitants hold the city and Government responsible for their resorting to live in cemeteries.[81]

The position of Government officials and the police of cemetery inhabitants is no different from that of the rest of the city's residents, as they treat cemetery inhabitants in a way that is mostly both hostile and indifferent.[82] The official discourse of State officials reinforces the social stigma of cemetery inhabitants and the stereotype against cemetery areas, which they regard as criminal hotbeds. For example, one official stated that there should be an expansion in the construction of new residential cities, such as al-Asamrat complex, to accommodate the residents of Cairo cemeteries, and to place these residents in the squatter areas that are being developed so that the capital can regain its historical and cultural status. The official noted that cemetery inhabitants were on the rise and faced many risks, including the increasing crime rate and the distortion of the capital's features, rendering it necessary to find a radical and rapid solution to that phenomenon. He called for the provision of spaces in the desert outskirts, to move cemetery neighbourhoods scattered in central Cairo outside the residential blocks, especially in the light of the high construction rate of new urban cities at that time, and which did not align with the dreadful presence of cemeteries inside Cairo. He also stressed the need to take into account, when establishing new residential cities, planning for the construction of cemeteries 200 meters away, like the Wadi al-Raha cemetery along Qatamiyah road, as a partial solution to help get rid of ancient Egypt cemeteries, which had been created hundreds of years ago, and

had turned into random clusters and criminal hotbeds.[83]

H. The situation of women in cemeteries

Due to increased crime in these areas, a number of problems facing female cemetery inhabitants can be identified: social stigma, insecurity, violence, and sexual harassment.

Women are the most affected in the poorest and most marginalized regions, particularly women who are breadwinners responsible for the entire household expenditure.[84] The majority of cemetery inhabitants are families, and in most cases, men work either in cemeteries, or directly in the vicinity (artisanal workshops). Visits by "Ahya Belesm Fqt" (Alive by Name Only) campaign revealed that in some areas, female breadwinners were more than male ones.[85]

Regarding labour, the proportion of women (aged 15 and above) amounts to 22.3 per cent of the total labour force,[86] where the proportion of women working in vulnerable employment, those working without social guarantees or fixed wages, is 31.6 per cent,[87] knowing that, according to the current census, the proportion of women is 48.4 per cent, and this amplifies the marginalization of this group in particular.

As for the social stigma, some of the women who live in cemeteries stated that the city's inhabitants, even those who knew them personally, continued to brand them as the "Qarafa people". When the people present hear that they are of the "Qarafa people", they look at them as if they had been dead and came back to life. Students residing in cemetery areas and attending schools outside

these areas speak of the same case: that their classmates do not cease to call them in a condescending tone the "Qarafa people". This negative mutual view can produce many social and psychological problems, as well as cultural distortions.[88]

Women also speak of the impact of insecurity on them particularly; they suffer a heightened sense of insecurity and fear of harassment, violence, or assault by thugs and drug addicts who are prevalent in these areas, taking advantage of the lack of security.[89]

Women in these areas are doubly marginalized in terms of the right to education and the right to work. They are also doubly affected by poor housing conditions, such as limited space and inadequate sanitary facilities, as well as the ensuing lack of privacy. For example, the unavailability of a bathroom for each household and the use of shared ones with neighbours pose great difficulties for the population in general, and women in particular when using the toilet or bathing.[90]

The social and psychological siege suffered by the cemetery inhabitants in general and women living there in particular is reflected in the issue of marriage. As soon as a suitor learns that the girl is a cemetery inhabitant, he withdraws immediately.

I. The political situation and the political participation of cemetery inhabitants

It should be noted first that there is no database or statistics on cemetery inhabitants. Therefore, what can be done within the scope of the present study is to define zones that fall within the official areas and follow their wards, and to rely on the measurement of electoral participation therein.

1. Geographical distribution of cemetery inhabitants within Cairo

Cairo has nearly twenty cemetery areas, most of which are located in the east of the Old Cairo within a semi-connected scope. The overall view of cemetery areas and their geographical classification shows that there are three groupings:

The first grouping is located in the south-east of Cairo and is one of the most prominent cemeteries in the city, and includes cemeteries of Sayyida Nafisa, the Mamluks, Umar ibn al-Farid, Imam al-Shafi'i, Sidi al-Shatbi, Sidi Ali Abu al-Wafa, Imam al-Laythi, al-Tonsy, Sayyidi 'Uqba, and al-Basatin. This grouping of cemeteries is administratively subordinate to al-Khalifa ward.

The second grouping is located in the centre and east of Cairo and includes Bab al-Wazir, al-Mujawereen, Qaitbay, al-Ghafir, eastern Qarafa for Muslims, and Bab al-Nasr. This cemetery grouping is administratively subordinate to three wards, namely al-Darb al-Ahmar, Manshiyat Naser, and al-Jamaliya.

The third grouping is generally dispersed and small in size. It is divided into two parts, one of which is located in the north and includes Masr El-Gedida Cemetery east of the Faculty of Girls, Ain Shams Cemetery belonging to the Ain Shams ward, and Nasr City Cemetery east of the seventh district.[91]

2. Results and rates of electoral participation

The following is a review of the results of the most prominent elections from 2011 until 2018 and the participation rates therein, according to the distribution of wards to which the aforementioned cemetery areas are administratively subordinate.

It should be noted that the focus was on elections held at the national level, such as constitutional referendums or presidential elections, because parliamentary elections were held at the constituency level, and constituencies and wards overlap. According to the National Election Authority, the 2018 voter database included 59 million voters.

(a) The 2011 referendum on constitutional amendments

The overall voter turnout was 34.8 per cent in the 2011 referendum on constitutional amendments. Table 3 shows the number of men and women voters of the cemetery population, and the participation rate for each ward to which the groupings of cemetery areas are administratively subordinate.

Table 3. Cemetery voters and participation rates in the 2011 referendum on constitutional amendments

Ward	Number of voters	Participation rate (Percentage)
Al-Darb al-Ahmar	86 751	32.4
Al-Jamaliya	100 911	26.3
Manshiyat Naser	93 539	21.6
Al-Basatin	272 308	27.0
Al-Khalifa	128 327	29.3

Source: Egypt, the official website of the National Election Authority. https://www.elections.eg (accessed on December 16, 2019).

(b) The 2012 presidential election

Table 4. Cemetery voters and participation rates in the 2012 presidential election

Ward/Committee Headquarters	Number of voters	Participation rate (Percentage)
Al-Khalifa	128 625	50.8
Al-Basatin	259 700	48.7
Manshiyat Naser	88 376	39.8
Al-Jamaliya	103 467	45.9
Al-Darb al-Ahmar	86 942	53.4

Source: Egypt, the official website of the National Election Authority. https://www.elections.eg (accessed on December 16, 2019).

The overall voter turnout was 55.6 per cent in the 2012 presidential election. Table 4 shows the number of men and women voters of the cemetery population, and the participation rate for each ward to which the groupings of cemetery areas are administratively subordinate.

(c) The 2014 presidential election

The overall voter turnout was 47.4 per cent in the 2014 presidential election. Table 5 shows the number of registered men and women voters of the cemetery population, and the participation rate for each ward to which the groupings of cemetery areas are administratively subordinate.

Table 5. Cemetery voters and participation rates in the 2014 presidential election

Ward/ Committee Headquarters	Number of registered voters	Number of attendees	Participation rate (Percentage)
Al-Khalifa	126 541	67 293	53.18
Al-Darb al-Ahmar	85 666	48 619	56.75
Al-Jamaliya	96 042	50 599	52.68
Manshiyat Naser	102 758	47 644	46.37
Al-Basatin	269 694	124 277	46.08

Source: Egypt, the official website of the National Election Authority. https://www.elections.eg (accessed on December 16, 2019).

(d) The 2018 presidential election

The overall voter turnout was 35 per cent in the 2018 presidential election. Table 6 shows the number of registered men and women voters of the cemetery population, and the participation rate for each ward to which the groupings of cemetery areas are administratively subordinate.

The increase in the participation rate of cemetery inhabitants in the present areas from one election to another reflects the pre-2011 prevailing situation of marginalization and exclusion from the public arena. These results can be looked at from two different perspectives: the first links this rise to increased integration into public life and increased awareness of the importance of participation; the second relates the high participation rate of the cemetery population in elections to the general context in which these electoral processes were conducted, namely, in the light of the mobilization organized by the political system. The participation rate of the cemetery population had been low in the 2012 presidential election, in which the overall participation was the highest at the national level. However, the participation increased due to the mobilization during post-2013 electoral processes compared to the general rates. Looking at the political problems voiced by inhabitants of these areas may help understand the situation more accurately.

Cemetery residents are generally marginalized, including politically. The following is a presentation of the issue of politically exploiting cemetery inhabitants, such as vote buying, particularly in cemeteries that fall within the official and planned areas. Here, voter databases in zones within official areas were relied upon.

Table 6. Cemetery voters and participation rates in the 2018 presidential election

Ward/ Committee Headquarters	Number of attendees	Number of registered voters	Participation rate (Percentage)
Al-Khalifa	43 451	117 950	36.84
Al-Darb al-Ahmar	29 227	79 731	36.66
Al-Jamaliya	28 052	69 787	40.20
Manshiyat Naser	51 598	149 303	34.56
Al-Basatin	92 248	306 576	30.09

Source: Egypt, the official website of the National Election Authority. https://www.elections.eg (accessed on December 16, 2019).

One cemetery resident stated, "Below my room, there is another room for the dead, made of stone, and there is a number of bodies therein. I want to tell you something: I am an illiterate man. I don't know how to read and I don't know what's going on in Egypt. I only know when someone like you comes to me and tells me there are clashes in a certain area, but that wouldn't matter to me. I live here. I don't support anyone, and I don't interfere in politics".[92]

Cemetery caretakers usually exercise some kind of influence over the population before the Government, preventing it from reaching the population. Sometimes, caretakers are resorted to in elections to force cemetery inhabitants to vote for a particular candidate, or not to give the police crime statements.[93]

Voting in elections, specifically parliamentary elections, is one of the most common forms of political participation, as a result of the absence of local councils since dissolving them in 2011. One of the most important obstacles to cemetery inhabitants' participation in elections is the poor level of education, especially among older persons. Some young people who have attained some education have been very interested in participating, especially in the elections immediately after the revolution. In the meantime, however, the political context plays a big role in the reluctance to participate.[94]

Reluctance to participate and political exploitation in elections outweighs the second perspective in interpreting the participation rates of cemetery area inhabitants, although the official mobilization disappeared during 2011 and 2012. It cannot be said that other parties did not mobilize using the same means based on electoral bribes; some residents say that political forces used to offer certain goods as gifts during election periods, but even these forces did not oblige them to participate, and they neither had a mechanism to ensure that residents voted for their candidates, nor did they have the capacity at that time to punish those who did not oblige.[95] In addition, there are the security situation and the problem with the security forces.[96]

Moreover, some political structures have formed within cemetery areas, such as the "Cemeteries Guard Association", which includes cemetery caretakers and burial workers.[97]

The Cemeteries Guard Association was called the "Cemeteries Guard Sect", a historical order founded nearly 100 years ago by a worker in the burial profession to regulate its status and workers. It includes nearly 1,000 undertakers in cemeteries of Imam al-Shafi'i, Imam al-Laythi, al-Tonsy, al-Basatin, al-Mujawereen, Bab al-Nasr, Manshiyat Naser, al-Abageyah, Sayyida Nafisa, Bab al-Wazir, Zayn al-Abidin, al-'Afifi, Masr El-Gedida, Sayyidi 'Umar, Sayyidi 'Uqba, and Sidi Abdallah, excluding the cemetery of the 6th of October City. The Association now includes highly qualified professionals, doctors, and engineers.[98]

Since about 10 years, joining the Association has become through the Undertakers' Affairs Committee, an official committee composed of the executive and chaired by a judge of the South Cairo Court. It includes the undertakers' Sheikh (Association President), the General Director of the Governorate Cemeteries, the General Director of Awqaf Property, the Deputy Governor, and police delegates. The committee is convened on Thursdays each week, and the applicant is tested in reading and writing, memorizing verses from the Qur'an and hadith, and knowing the fundamentals of burial. If the

applicant meets these conditions, he becomes a member of the Association and pays an annual membership fee as a contribution in any financial hardship or crisis an undertaker goes through.[99]

Cemetery inhabitants are involved in charitable and symbiotic activities, which play a major role in their community, as there is internal support among members of the community and its various groups. The groups of this society follow a clear hierarchy; the top is reserved for the relatively wealthier persons, especially those engaged in burial-related work, while the base of the scale is, of course, for the poorest.[100]

J. Policies and initiatives regarding cemetery populations

1. Patterns of dealing with informal housing areas

The patterns of dealing with informal housing areas are:

(a) Resettlement

The process of moving residents from one area to another in the same city. Usually the new area is not close to the original location. In this process, residents evict their homes, which are then demolished, and they are given new apartments in State-owned buildings, usually at a low rent. Resettlement is voluntary or forced. Voluntary resettlement applies when the population agrees on their own to the evacuation conditions proposed by the Government. Forced resettlement applies when residents are not given the opportunity to choose, rather, are forcibly evicted from their homes by security forces prior to their demolition.[101] International practices for

voluntary resettlement provide for the following conditions: (a) applying resettlement as a last resort and after all other options have been exhausted; (b) providing residents with compensation amounting to the full value of their property when resettlement is inescapable; (c) providing resettled households with Government assistance to achieve their former living standards, in addition to the Government making sure that these households earn a regular living.[102]

Examples on resettlement include the move to Masākin `Uthmān on the outskirts of the 6th of October City. As of 2011, about 14,000 people have been living in that area, and many residents of central Cairo were relocated there. The area suffers from a lack of public transport lines, has very few job opportunities, and includes only one Government service building. After ignoring the commercial spaces in the map of the new site, the residents themselves opened shops in the area after arriving there.[103]

A 2009 study on resettlement programmes in the squatter areas of Delhi and Mumbai in India illustrates the size of the economic burden borne by the population covered by these programmes. The study showed that resettled families' income had declined, unemployment had increased, especially among women, and the average value of family property had decreased. As a result of the decline in income, the average of household expenses decreased and families spent less on necessities such as food, clothing, education, and, of course, entertainment, while their spending on transportation, health, electricity, and water increased.[104]

This pattern is most prevalent in the Egyptian Government's approach that considers that the

appropriate solution to informal housing crises, including cemetery inhabitants, is to evacuate cemetery areas and move the population elsewhere. International institutions interested in Cairo development projects point to the need to pay attention to cemetery areas and turn them into parks and public gardens, referring to their special heritage nature, but at the same time emphasize the need to find alternatives for the inhabitants of these areas. The civil society, however, expresses concerns about the economic and occupational effects of resettlement on the population, particularly since the population is usually moved to uninhabited areas far from the city centre.

(b) Rehousing

The Government takes on providing temporary accommodation for community members, while demolishing their original dwellings and building condominiums on the same site, whose apartments are distributed among original residents.[105] The rehousing process usually takes two forms. In one, the Government is the responsible and implementing entity, and the operation is financed by public funds. The population is temporarily relocated and Government housing is built covering the entire area of the original site. After the completion of the construction phase, the Government uses one of the following means to hand over the new units to the population: handing them over free of charge, providing the population with subsidized loans, or renting out units at subsidized rents.

The second form of rehousing is through a Government-private sector partnership. In Egypt and other countries with large informal communities, the Government views this form of rehousing as an inexpensive intervention for urban development, and a means of attracting new investment to low-income areas while "liberalizing" the capital value of land. The construction form in existing societies plays an important role in that process. The target community is usually characterized by low-rise homes. If the community itself were to be resettled in high-rise buildings, the same population would occupy only a limited proportion of the available land area. This form of rehousing involves three steps requiring Government intervention in cooperation with one or more private investors. Once the community is identified as fit for rehousing, the Government relocates its population to temporary accommodation outside the area, and demolishes all the old dwellings. The Government then gives land use rights to a private investor in exchange for the construction of apartments for the original residents on the same site. The investor usually presents the Government with some buildings for it to sell or rent out to the community. The private investor is therefore entitled to undertake the development of vacant land in any way they deem appropriate.

Cairo, for example, is characterized by the scarcity of land near the centre of the city as well as the high price of such land, so investors are eager to undertake such projects, since once original residents are moved to apartments in high-rise buildings, the remaining land available for private investment may amount to up to 90 per cent, which means they can make huge profits.[106]

The Egyptian Government, therefore, sees these projects as a means of attracting investments without incurring a high cost. The Zeinhom Housing Project (which began in 1999 and ended in 2007) is an example of this form of

rehousing that has already been carried out in Egypt.[107] International institutions have always stressed the need to ensure transparency in these types of rehousing.

The civil society considers that rehousing entails a certain extent of danger, because attracting investments to a particular neighbourhood or region can alter its social and class fabric and sometimes lead to indirect gentrification.

(c) Development and rehabilitation

This process involves gradually improving existing buildings and infrastructure in an informal area to an acceptable level, while avoiding the destruction of the urban fabric or the displacement of the population to another area or to another location in the same area.[108]

Development is aimed at improving the conditions of the already existing society in a way that causes minimal urban and social confusion for the community. It may include a wide range of potential interventions. Limited development may include improving street lighting, levelling road ways, or painting home facades. Broader development may include establishing a natural gas infrastructure, connecting all homes to a sanitation network, providing health, education and other public services, or renovating a significant number of dwellings.[109]

Examples of development programmes implemented in different countries include the Kampung Improvement Programme in Jakarta, Indonesia, the urban development programme for popular areas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and the Collective Housing Project in Baan Mankong, Thailand.

The most common features that contributed to the success of these programmes can be summarized in the following three points: First, the Government's recognition of the value of the contribution of communities and the importance of putting the population at the centre of the improvement process, which requires citizens' participation at every stage of project planning and implementation. Second, the Governments' avoidance of costly housing programmes that provide people with ready-made units at highly subsidized prices, and instead seeking low-cost local solutions based on local knowledge, materials, and employment. Third, recognizing the importance of an integrated social and urban approach to informal areas in the aforementioned programmes, as none of them focuses solely on urban improvements. Even the Kampung Improvement Programme in Indonesia, which began with a focus on urban improvement, came to recognize the social and economic value of existing communities. Recognizing that link between the existing environment and social networks eliminates the alternative of relocating communities.[110]

Development is generally a good international practice for improving the conditions of informal housing areas, as it ensures the participation of civil society and local communities, and usually does not disrupt the local economy or the community fabric. It is less expensive than rehousing or resettlement and can have a rapid and noticeable effect in improving the state of communities. Development is also a good way to ensure that the target community benefits from the project by mobilizing its own resources or attracting external investment.

This pattern is rarely used or advocated for in Egypt, where the Government's approach

to informal housing areas and urban development is generally based on two basic principles. The first is that informal areas pose a problem. According to this principle, these areas are negatively defined and described, and treated as a phenomenon that must be limited or eliminated. The second principle is that urban growth must be directed away from existing cities and agricultural land to desert areas, so that the State can achieve proper development and accelerate economic growth. The Government also adopts two approaches to dealing with informal housing areas: a preventive approach aimed at halting the expansion of these areas, and an intervention-based approach through which the Government seeks to improve or remove these areas,[111] although some proposals within the Government see the improvement and rehabilitation of these areas as a better solution to the informal housing crises.

In the 1970's, international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have begun to take a leading role in setting standards and criteria for urban housing policies, usually aimed at building new urban communities under the title of development. Urban development loans from the World Bank increased from merely $10 million in 1972 to more than $2 billion in 1988. Between 1972 and 1990, the World Bank helped fund plans for the development of informal housing areas (so-called slums) in 55 countries.[112]

2. State interventions for cemetery inhabitants

The Government's policies mix official definitions of cemetery inhabitants and residents of informal housing areas, resulting in a mix-up in programmes for each case. Despite the existing intersections, there are clear factors that distinguish the case of cemetery inhabitants from that of residents of informal housing areas. A number of Government proposals has been issued to resolve the cemetery population crisis, but so far the Government has not launched a clear plan to deal with this phenomenon. The following are the most prominent proposals in question, their expected implications for the situation of cemetery inhabitants, and the reasons for the delay in their implementation.

(a) 2050 Plan

The "Cairo 2050 Plan", developed in 2007,[113] includes the transformation of Cairo's cemetery areas into public parks, and providing cemetery inhabitants with alternatives, but without clearly indicating what these alternatives are.

While a number of officials at the Ministry of Housing confirmed that the development plans were in the Ministry's drawers waiting for someone to put them into effect, another official said that the Ministry had no steps at that time regarding transferring Cairo cemetery neighbourhoods to nearby desert areas. The "Cairo 2050 Plan" involves moving Cairo's cemeteries outside residential blocks and providing adequate housing for their residents, but it runs counter to the law stipulating that cemeteries could not be built upon until they have been evacuated and out of use for 40 years. Therefore, some called on al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf to work to change this law.[114]

The "Cairo 2050 Plan" entailed evacuating the unsafe areas of Cairo, decreasing population densities in overpopulated informal areas, and relocating Cairo's cemeteries, except archaeological and heritage sites known as the City of the Dead, to the outskirts of the city,

and allocating that space to gardens and green spaces. However, the plan has been on hold since the January 2011 revolution.[115]

The Egyptian Government devised the "Cairo 2050 Plan" in 2007 in collaboration with the General Authority for Urban Planning, the UNDP, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the World Bank, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation GTZ, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

As part of the "Cairo 2050 Plan", the German Agency for Technical Cooperation divided informal areas in the Greater Cairo metropolitan area into categories and proposed making development interventions in each category. It called for participatory action in cooperation with local authorities in the three relevant governorates (Cairo, Giza, and al-Qalyubiyya). The United Nations Human Settlements Programme and UNDP recruited advisers, organized workshops, brought equipment, developed a communication strategy, encouraged transparency, and ensured the participation of key stakeholders, in accordance with the Urban Development Strategy for Greater Cairo devised by the Egyptian Government in cooperation with these programmes in 2012.

(b) "Sakan Karim", "Takaful" and "Hayat Karima" Programmes

One of the State's projects is the "Sakan Karim" programme, which is designed to complement the "Takaful" programme. "Sakan Karim" provides water, gas, sanitation, and roof construction to families in poor areas, starting from Upper Egypt in the poorest governorates, namely Minya, Assiut, Sohag, Qena, and Luxor, with the intention to spread to other regions.[116] Providing services under the "Takaful"

programme is based on information on the assessment of the family situation collected through registration in the programme, which is carried out through the national ID card as per the address registered therein. Another State project is the "Hayat Karima" initiative to provide the main needs for the poorest, including improving housing conditions.[117]

According to the official definition of the "Sakan Karim" programme and the "Hayat Karima" initiative, they do not specifically target cemetery areas, rather the poorest areas of the Republic, focusing on housing infrastructure in terms of basic services, without addressing the right to housing in its broader sense.

(c) Decisions to evacuate cemeteries and move them outside the residential block

According to the General Director of Cairo's cemeteries, the governorate is currently working to finish the stages of eliminating housing hazards of categories one and two, but without including cemetery inhabitants, although housing research has counted a large number of them as a start to move them to alternative places. Evacuation orders were issued for these residents, but neighbourhood authorities were unable to implement them because of the lack of alternative accommodations. The only radical solution is to provide them with housing so they get out of cemetery areas. He added that his authority had prevented the entry of facilities into cemeteries to prevent living therein, but it turned out that the old cemeteries, including Sayyida Nafisa, Imam al-Shafi'i, al-Tonsy, al-Basatin, al-Abageyah, and Sidi Abdallah, had been granted the right to facilities entry as visiting them was a family trip. Eventually, these areas turned into permanent residences, which are difficult to evacuate before alternative accommodations are provided.[118]

(d) Experts' view

A number of urban reconstruction and coordination experts believe that the cemetery population suffers from neglect, and the phenomenon of people living alongside of the dead should be brought to an end, for being one of the most severe human rights violations that is increasing daily. Experts stress the need to amend the laws to allow the removal of these cemeteries and the establishment of investment projects over their vast areas, not just increasing the greenery therein. These experts criticize the issuance of permits and approvals by neighbourhood authorities for workshops and shops scattered within cemeteries, pointing out the need to find alternative places and markets for cemetery inhabitants and moving them there, as well as the need to provide spaces in the desert outskirts to relocate cemeteries scattered in central Cairo outside the residential blocks, especially in the light of the high rate of construction of new urban cities currently under way, which do not align with the "dreadful" presence of cemeteries in Cairo.[119]

The solution does not only lie in providing alternative housing as the success of any cemetery relocation project also depends on how adequate the location of these dwellings is to the requirements of residents' lives and work. In a comment on the project to move the residents of Bab al-Nasr cemeteries to Badr city, as part of making the area uncrowded, a member of the "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign said, "Some residents agreed to the move, but others vehemently rejected it because they would lose their jobs and their only sources of income in the event of relocation, as Badr city is very far from central Cairo, and they would incur the hassle of transportation in terms of money and time".[120]

The head of the Central Department for Studies, Research, and Policies in the National Organization for Urban Harmony explained that the transfer of cemetery inhabitants was very difficult, as it was better to provide large areas with complete facilities for them to build houses in, as per a special architectural style that aligned with their nature, in addition to providing them with livelihoods and a transportation network linking them to Cairo's neighbourhoods. She stressed that the most important measure was the development of regional units and rural areas using projects that prevented the migration of their residents to Cairo, which had been an attraction for them over the past decades because of the narrow living conditions and livelihoods in their villages.[121]

(e) Archaeological and heritage importance of cemeteries

Interest in cemetery areas in terms of the level of social support varies as per different stakeholders. The interest of the Ministry of Antiquities, the European Union, and a number of international organizations focuses on heritage for the development of the region, and therefore includes projects for the preservation of heritage buildings, economic-oriented projects supporting community education (such as heritage-related crafts and industries), and solid waste management projects.[122]

Cairo cemeteries include the Mamluk Necropolis and the tombs of the royal Alawite family, which in accordance with Law 44 of 2006 are archaeological and historical tombs listed among the UNESCO World Heritage Sites. The Ministry of Antiquities and Cairo Governorate authorities are requested to work on their restoration, renovation, and

preservation as unique tourist and archaeological attractions.[123]

3. Civil society organizations initiatives for cemetery residents

Some civil society organizations have put forward a number of initiatives to assist cemetery residents, but these initiatives remain limited given the lack of data on these populations, as it is difficult to reach these areas and connect with their inhabitants. The following is a preview of some of the initiatives taken by civil society organizations or associations to tackle the phenomenon of cemetery inhabitants.

(a) "The World My Home" Association

Founded in 2005, "The World My Home" is a non-profit association that seeks to provide development and health services to cemetery inhabitants as part of its activities aimed at sustainably developing society in all areas, taking into account gender equality and integrating marginalized groups into society, and enabling them to obtain their rights, in partnership with Government agencies and employers. The Society's activities during the elections following the 25 January 2011 revolution included seeking to put an end to vote buying from cemetery inhabitants by holding educational seminars for residents in the cemeteries of Bab al-Nasr and Imam al-Shafi'i. "The World is My Home" Association also organizes cultural and artistic activities for cemetery residents such as theatre workshops and sightseeing visits.[124]

(b) "Watan Insani" (A Human Homeland) Initiative

 "A Human Homeland" initiative put forward by Hajar Mahmoud and a five-person team (as part

of her 2014 graduation project from the Faculty of Mass Communication), and supported by the Ministry of Youth and Sports, is aimed at helping develop the capabilities of young people and cemetery inhabitants, in the following areas:

- Empowering women by helping them to set up small enterprises, conducting educational seminars, and providing training in occupations such as sewing;
- Supplying health care by providing medicines and psychosocial rehabilitation;
- Providing education through literacy programmes and cultural activities such as youth camps at the Ministry of Youth and Sports.

In an interview, Hajar Mahmoud pointed to the problem of the classist manner in which families in cemeteries dealt with one another, and this increased psychological and social pressures on lower-income families. On the difficulties she faced, she spoke of the small number of volunteers, especially since they felt threatened for their lives in places like the cemeteries. They also faced scepticism in terms of their credibility, as "some cemetery dwellers do not believe that we are helping them for nothing in return, and believe that we are exploiting them".[125]

(c) "Ahya Belesm Fqt" (Alive by Name Only) Campaign

The "Ahya Belesm Fqt" Campaign operates in the area of Bab al-Nasr, Al-Ghafir, and Imam al-Laythi cemeteries. It was launched in July 2012 following a flare-up in Ramlet Bulaq, due to the conflict between the State and the region's inhabitants over a land that the State was seeking to evacuate to turn into an investment project. The campaign has sought to highlight the economic and social rights of the marginalized, and made its slogan "support

right holders" in reference to the right to a decent life for every human being. The campaign's objectives include conveying the voices of the marginalized and the poor to society and the authority, enhancing collective awareness of the social goals of the 25 January 2011 revolution, which are equally important as its political objectives, and helping the marginalized and hard-working to organize themselves into popular committees to defend their causes. The campaign activities include the areas of Ramlet Bulaq, Jazirat al Qursayah, the cemeteries of Bab al-Nasr, Al-Ghafir, and Imam al-Laythi, as well as Masaken El-Thawra.

The campaign held a conference with residents in January 2013 to present their demands from the State for adequate housing, either through State-implemented social housing projects, or through amending rent regulations so that rents would not be influenced by supply and demand.[126]

K. Recommendations on policies for social inclusion and ensuring the basic human rights of cemetery inhabitants

Social inclusion is the process of reversing the mechanisms that place certain groups or categories of people at an unfair disadvantage and deprives them of benefits of socioeconomic development, gains of poverty reduction strategies, and means for improving their quality of life.[127]

Inequality is evident when poverty is concentrated and services and infrastructure are scarce in certain geographical areas, limiting the ability of the population to change their situation economically and socially. This is what characterizes the situation of cemetery inhabitants in Cairo. This report sets out the priorities of the cemetery population, and proposes approaches or policies on social inclusion and the guarantee of the basic human rights of cemetery inhabitants.

1. Protection and social services

The main priority for cemetery inhabitants is to improve their housing conditions and ensure their relocation to better accommodations, as they lack decent living conditions, including decent housing and tenure security, and they suffer from poor basic services and facilities, a lack of public services such as health care and education, insecurity, especially for children and women, as well as child labour, as 11-year-olds work in occupations related to cemeteries or burial. The problems they may face if they are moved from cemetery areas include the difficulty of adapting to the new reality, loss of livelihood, and change of professional conditions, yet many seek obtaining housing units in State-implemented social housing projects.[128]

A member of the "Ahya Belesm Fqt" Campaign emphasizes the need to provide adequate housing in all respects to maintain professions, and to provide facilities, public services, markets, and transportation to ensure easy access to the city.

Therefore, "policies adopted to improve the conditions of cemetery inhabitants should ensure that they are resettled within the area but not in cemeteries, ought to involve them in decision-making and not just community participation, and must guarantee the fundamental rights of both the dead and the living. Providing adequate housing in all respects, professions, facilities, easy access to the city, public services, public markets, and transportation must also be guaranteed".[129]

A number of cemetery residents want access to social protection services, including assistance from the "Takaful and Karama" programme, which provides monetary support to help the poorest in the villages of Upper Egypt and in some areas adjacent to Cairo and Giza governorates. Here, it should be noted that the Manshiyat Naser ward, within which there are cemeteries inhabited by residents, is included among the geographical areas covered by the second category of the "Takaful and Karama" programme. The programme consists of two sections targeting two groups:

- The first section "Takaful" targets families with children enrolled in different levels of education up to secondary school, or youngsters in need of health care and follow-up;
- The second section "Karama" targets older persons over 65 who are unable to work and have no fixed sources of income, or have a disability that prevents them from working and making a living and do not have a fixed income.

The programme included cemetery inhabitants in the Manshiyat Naser ward, who lived in areas adjacent to cemeteries and residential pockets within cemeteries, yet it did not include yard residents as their homes were registered as part of the cemeteries.[130] Therefore, the "Takaful and Karama" programme could serve as a doorway to improve the conditions of some cemetery inhabitants in terms of public services such as education and health care. However, residents whose official documents, specifically national ID cards, prove that they are living inside cemeteries, remain outside the programme's coverage.

The State's plan for these areas should therefore focus on improving the quality of primary education to stop dropouts, by expanding the "Takaful and Karama" programme to include all residential areas in cemeteries, and by providing financial, geographical, and security elements that enable pupils, especially girls, to access lower secondary schools, as well as increasing the number of secondary schools in these areas and areas surrounding them. "These must be comprehensive policies that begin with developing education infrastructure in terms of the number of classrooms, improving teacher qualifications, and developing curricula".[131] In terms of health, "the Government must begin to improve the conditions of doctors and nurses, and build partnerships with civil society institutions to facilitate access to the poorest and most vulnerable".[132] The eligibility conditions for "Takaful and Karama" programmes can be expanded, for example, and more access can be provided to cemetery areas where residents cannot define their place of residence on national ID cards, while maintaining the conditionality of enrolment in education and health care.

2. Economic and political conditions

Unemployment is one of the main economic problems cemetery inhabitants suffer from, and it must be dealt with rationally to correct the social structure, through projects that raise the living standard and level of education of the poor, and motivate families to educate children, thereby expanding the middle class. Therefore, in terms of improving the professional and economic conditions of the cemetery population, it is a priority to provide access to education at various stages for all, particularly girls and the most vulnerable, specifically at secondary levels, which are a condition to access to higher education. Subsequently, higher education reduces unemployment by

opening up opportunities for professional and economic development, and for improving housing, living, and health conditions, which in turn provide better professional and economic opportunities for the population, and free them from their poverty and the social stigma associated with them.

Political participation is linked to political circumstances and context. There are currently no mechanisms for communicating with the residents of these areas to work with them, or to further understand their demands.[133] The civil society must act at this level not only by providing support, but also by involving the population and preparing local leaders who can work on raising the social and political awareness of the population, as population involvement cannot be limited to community participation, rather representatives of the population must be empowered to take part in decision-making.[134]

3. Socioeconomic conditions of women

Women residing in cemeteries usually bear the brunt of marginalization. Therefore, they consider it a priority to obtain decent and adequate housing in terms of tenure, social security against violence and crimes spread in cemetery areas due to insecurity, enhanced access to education and health services, and improvement of their professional and economic opportunities.

Work patterns inside cemeteries either exclude women as jobs are limited to men, or jobs are unstable, unpaid, lowly paid, or do not offer any social guarantees. This makes it imperative to focus the main objective of the development processes in these areas on the provision of employment opportunities for women, including in fields like handicrafts or small

industries. The fact that only charitable organizations are the only ones working to this end is not a defect in its own, but it is insufficient to develop these areas. Rather, their development is a shared responsibility between competent State agencies, civil society organizations, and women's organizations particularly whose work, as the study shows, is quite far from these areas. Therefore, extensive awareness campaigns are required to remove the social stigma against the population of these areas, as well as campaigns to raise awareness of women's issues such as female genital mutilation and domestic violence.

The private sector must treat these areas as part of its social responsibility rather than as investment opportunities, and it can certainly benefit from the areas' surroundings if development policies are successful, without bringing prejudice to the nature of the region by turning it into investment areas in a manner that is not suitable for their populations or for the community's need for these cemeteries to continue to serve as usual.

4. Proposed approaches to dealing with residential areas in cemeteries

Three approaches to dealing with residential areas in cemeteries can be proposed: development and rehabilitation, rehousing, and resettlement. It may be worthwhile to combine the three approaches according to what each region needs, ensuring that citizens' fundamental rights are safeguarded.

Areas adjacent to cemeteries: The best approach for these areas is development and rehabilitation, i.e. to gradually improve or develop existing buildings and infrastructure to reach an acceptable level, while avoiding the destruction of the urban fabric or the

displacement of the population to another area or to another location in the same area.

In this case, the responsibility of the development process falls on the State's behalf, with the need to involve citizens in this process through coordination with the private sector to contribute to investment in the process, and with the civil society to help reach different groups of citizens.

Residential pockets in cemeteries: The appropriate approach here is rehousing, provided that the State provides temporary accommodation for citizens while demolishing their original residences and building condominiums in the same site, whose apartments are distributed among the original residents. This is achieved in partnership with the private sector, which provides the necessary investments, and with the civil society, whose

studies on the areas and engagement therein allows it to provide advice to the State and the private sector, and to monitor the rehousing process to ensure that it is conducted in a manner that preserves citizens' rights.

Cemetery yards: The needed approach here is resettlement, because it is anyway unacceptable for people to live in cemeteries, even if they are relatively better off than informal housing areas. In resettlement, residents are relocated from cemetery yards to another area in the same city, preferably not within walking distance of the original location, provided that the State provides accommodations at low rents (which may be done in partnership with the private sector). It is important not to carry out resettlement in a coercive or violent manner, and this is where the role of civil society comes in; it can monitor the process to ensure that it proceeds smoothly without any violations of citizens' rights.

3. Economic and Social Exclusion and Regional Development in Tunisia:

A Case Study of the Central-West Region

3. Economic and Social Exclusion and Regional Development in Tunisia: A Case Study of the Central-West Region[135]

A. Introduction

Regional inequality is one of the most prominent shortcomings of Tunisia's development approach during the post-independence decades. The various economic and social development schemes that the Government has been regularly devising and implementing every five years since the beginning of the 1960s have not been able to achieve the desired regional balance or reduce the gap between inland and coastal regions, despite the undeniable comparative gains recorded and achieved.

The main shortcomings of the national approach to regional planning is the dominance of the sectoral view of regional development, and this has prevented taking into account the specifics and characteristics of each governorate and sub-region, and also prevented optimizing the potential of inland areas and making the required qualitative shift.

The insufficient quantity and quality of State interventions through public investments in inland areas has contributed to deepening gaps between these areas and other sub-regions at the level of various indicators of economic and social development, primarily industrial, technological, and logistical infrastructure, which remains below the hoped-for patterns and standards required at the international level. This is a major impediment to developing the private investment climate, and starting the economic movement necessary for social upgrading and improving living conditions in these sub-regions.

The July 2011 revolution revealed the depth of inequality between regions, and highlighted various manifestations of exclusion, marginalization, unemployment, poverty, deprivation, and school dropout. It is quite telling that the first spark of the revolution was in one of the poorest inland areas, Sidi Bouzid governorate, which is the most delayed in the development indicators ranking.

Despite the proximity of the Central-West region to the eastern coastal strip and the border areas with Algeria, its three sub-regions have continued to suffer from a severe lack of inclusive development, and have even been the most prominent example and most important manifestation of the regional imbalance in Tunisia.

The need to bridge the development gap between Tunisia's other regions has become a real challenge and a top priority for post-revolutionary public policies, given the institutional developments of decentralization and free management, increased political

pressure in the circulation of power, as well as the expansion of social claims within the framework of revolution demands, namely work, dignity, and social justice.

This problem has been particularly acute as the development gap between sub-regions has significantly widened since 2011 due to the reduced capacity of the State to implement investment plans in the light of the pressure on the public budget and the growing GDP deficit.

In this context, the present report examines the realities and prospects for regional development in Tunisia by first addressing the problem of regional development in general, then analysing the specificity of development in the Central-West region as a model, considering it is the least fortunate region, and examining the impact of public policies in reducing the development gap between sub-regions, as well as finally putting forward a new vision for advancing regional development in Tunisia.

B. The problem of regional development in Tunisia

Regional balance is one of the most important major national balances that are taken into account when formulating the contents of economic and social development plans in terms of development policies, programmes, and projects. The various schemes implemented during more than five decades since independence have contributed to a number of gains in regional development.

At the institutional level, administrative organization has consecrated decentralization by establishing regional representations of various central public administrations in different governorates to make public utility services closer to citizens, in addition to giving regional councils some powers within the framework of the gradual establishment of decentralization in the 1980s.

At the economic level, after independence, and based on the idea of developing "regions lagging behind in terms of development", the so-called "development pillars" were fixed in a number of sub-regions from north to south, according to the differential advantage of each region, enabling the development of a number of strategic sectors related to natural resources the country abounded with, and also enabling the construction of major national industrial institutions that still play an important role in the national and local economy in terms of production, export, and employment.

After the failure of the socialist experiment or the so-called "synergy" experiment in the 1960s, there was an incline in the early 1970s towards economic openness, followed by enhancing this openness within the framework of implementing the structural reform policy targeting the economy in the mid-1980s. This enabled attracting many foreign fully-exporting institutions and advancing the national private sector, enhancing economic dynamics in several sub-regions thanks to generous fiscal incentives in the form of investment grants and tax cuts to encourage establishing and developing institutions, as well as through forming industrial zones, constructing roads, and developing specialized public institutions to support and inform investments.

In the social sphere, State policies since independence have focused on paying special attention to the human element as both the means and the objective, as the State's efforts have focused on investing in education, health, and women's empowerment. As of the

beginning of the 1990s, State policy has taken a new turn in terms of financial allocations for basic services and communal facilities such as drinking water supply, electrical lighting, road paving, establishing youth and cultural institutions, and attending to social groups with special needs and low income.

These policies have certainly improved the overall social situation in all sub-regions with time and over the development epochs the country has witnessed. The question is, however, to what extent have the achievements met the level of the defined goals and aspirations, first and foremost the goal of regional balance, in all national development plans without exception?

In this context, several studies on regional development in Tunisia highlighted the pros and cons of public policies adopted since independence, showing that the gains achieved at the institutional, economic, and social levels did not include the generalization and spread of development in all regions, as the interior regions continued to suffer from a significant lack in terms of comprehensive development, which was below the levels recorded in the eastern coastal areas.

The studies in question were generally partial in nature and did not provide an integrated and comprehensive idea of the reality of development between the various geographical regions of the country, until, for the first time in 2012, an aggregate index of regional development was constructed as a tool for measuring development disparities between sub-regions, and a tool for distributing State budget appropriations between different governorates, particularly distributing the funds of regional development programmes in a scientific manner that ensures equity and equality.

The problem with regional development is mainly the imbalance between the sub-regions, the lack of real decentralization, and the weakness of regional integration.

1. Regional disparity in Tunisia on the basis of the regional development index

During the three pre-revolutionary decades, Tunisia experienced significant growth rates of around five per cent, while maintaining the macroeconomic fundamentals and progress in economic liberalization, and international organizations saw it as a model for success in its distinctive economic performance in the region and in achieving some social goals. However, the benefits of growth were not fairly distributed among different groups and sub-regions. Inequality between the eastern coastal regions and western interior ones has become the main feature of the prevailing development approach in Tunisia.

The regional development index showed the depth of the development gap between the eastern coastal governorates on the one hand, and the western inland governorates on the other. The overall national average of the index declined between 2015 and 2018, reflecting the difficulties the country had recently gone through (table 7).

The regional development index in Tunisia

The regional development index is a composite index covering four main dimensions and 17 standard variables. These dimensions are as follows:

1. Living conditions and infrastructure: access to health services, infrastructure and basic services.

2. Social state: number of families targeted by the cash-transfer scheme, poverty rate, illiteracy rate, dependency ratio, migration, and access to public services.

3. Human capital: the rate of the number of pupils per class, the number of pupils per teacher, and the proportion of the educated population.

4. Employment and labour market: labour market capacity and range, and indicators of labour market pressures.

The regional development index is calculated as a weighted average of the four specified dimensions using the main component analysis technique to find the following equation:

$$\text{Overall indicator} = 0.33 \text{ of the living conditions and infrastructure}$$
$$+ 0.24 \text{ of the human capital}$$
$$+ 0.21 \text{ of the social state}$$
$$+ 0.22 \text{ of the labour market}$$

The index is assessed on a scale of 0 to 1 (from very bad to excellent), and the closer the index rate is to 1, the higher the level of development.

The regional development index was first built in 2012 and has been revived twice in 2015 and 2018.

Table 7. Evolution of Tunisia's overall regional development index rate between 2015 and 2018

	2015	2018
National rate	0.502	0.486
Minimum	0.402	0.388
Maximum	0.628	0.593

Source: Tunisian Institute of Competitiveness and Quantitative Studies, 2018.

The index shows that Kasserine, Kairouan, Jendouba, and Sidi Bouzid governorates are the least developed, while Tunis is the most favoured governorate, followed by the coastal governorates. The present report therefore focuses on the governorates of Kasserine, Kairouan, and Sidi Bouzid, considering they are the least developed and the most marginalized.

The evolution of the regional development index between 2015 and 2018 shows that Kasserine governorate maintained the worst index in the overall ranking, recording a decline from one period to another. It was directly preceded by Kairouan governorate, and then Sidi Bouzid. However, Kasserine maintained the same level in 2015 (table 8).

Table 8. The ranking of Tunisian governorates, by regional development index in 2015 and 2018

	2015	Ranking	2018	Ranking	Evolution
Tunis	0.628	1	0.593	1	0
Ariana	0.578	4	0.58	2	-2
Ben Arous	0.6	2	0.577	3	1
Monastir	0.589	3	0.553	4	1
Sousse	0.572	5	0.533	5	0
Nabeul	0.559	6	0.531	6	0
Sfax	0.531	8	0.52	7	-1
Manouba	0.545	7	0.513	8	1
Gabès	0.511	11	0.501	9	-2
Bizerte	0.513	10	0.494	10	0
Medenine	0.517	9	0.493	11	2
Tataouine	0.478	16	0.484	12	-4
Tozeur	0.497	12	0.483	13	1
Kebili	0.478	15	0.47	14	-1
Mahdia	0.493	14	0.469	15	1
El Kef	0.465	18	0.468	16	-2
Gafsa	0.467	17	0.453	17	0
Zaghouan	0.493	13	0.452	18	5
Siliana	0.446	20	0.449	19	-1
Béja	0.452	19	0.439	20	1
Sidi Bouzid	0.419	21	0.419	21	0
Jendouba	0.41	23	0.409	22	-1
Kairouan	0.414	22	0.398	23	1
Kasserine	0.402	24	0.388	24	0

Source: Tunisian Institute of Competitiveness and Quantitative Studies, 2018.

Four main factors caused the regional development index to decline between 2015 and 2018: health services, after a decline in the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants; human capital, due to the significant increase in the number of pupils in the classroom in some areas; and the exacerbation at the level of the economic situation and the labour market due to weakness of the production system and high unemployment in many sub-regions.

2. Lack of decentralization and local democracy

Decentralization cannot be seen as a goal per se, but rather a means that all experiences have

proven to be useful in advancing regional development, and an optimal mechanism for establishing a participatory approach and enshrining the principles of good governance.

The main reasons for the regional imbalance in Tunisia are the reluctance and slowness in establishing effective decentralization and granting real powers to sub-regions, the inability of regional councils in their previous form to carry out their functions, the absence of a developed local tax policy that lays the groundwork for a responsible and balanced centralization, and the limited powers assigned to sub-regions in terms of regional budget disposition and concluding public transactions for major projects at the national/local level, which delay the completion of many projects.

The regional development approach was based on a vertical methodology and excessively centralized decision-making when managing programmes and defining development projects. Moreover, the "district" was given a bigger role at the expense of that of the "sub-region", despite the experiences gained and accumulated by the latter in terms of planning and development projects regulation. Future development policies have been often devised, and development plans and budgets prepared without the real involvement of actors from the civil society, private sector, and professional structures.

The absence of a well-defined institutional system that regulates the relationship between public and local groups on the one hand and the State on the other, in the framework of performance contracts that regulate common responsibilities, has not helped establish effective regional authorities having the necessary mechanisms for development work at the regional level.

3. Poor regional integration and utilization of available resources

Despite the importance of the differential advantages of various sub-regions in Tunisia, the stock of resources and natural, cultural, financial, and human assets has neither provided adequate returns nor created a regional economic and social dynamic capable of staffing the large numbers of unemployed higher degree holders, and improving living conditions, especially in the interior. Low growth has been accompanied by mono-production, which goes against the concept of sustainable development and the conservation of natural resources.

Additionally, not aligning the investment fostering programme with the particularities of each sub-region in terms of the valuation of natural resources, as well as the absence of integration relations between the various sub-regions by virtue of the administrative division based on the elements of similarity between sub-regions within the same region, have prevented the valuation of each sub-region's resources and the utilization of economic systems that can increase the added value of the various products, boost private investment, and improve living conditions in all sub-regions.

The descriptive analysis of the reality of regional development has allowed considering the most important aspects of regional disparity. While this description in itself is a diagnostic tool that necessarily limits reform and change trends, it does not accurately present the root causes of marginalization suffered by internal sub-regions so as to figure out what public policies need to be implemented to advance regional development.

4. Root causes of marginalization

The structural reasons that internal sub-regions are lagging behind stem from a number of factors related to the history of the region and its geographical nature, as well as the political dimension and the regional development choices that have been in place for epochs.

(a) Historical factor

Since pre-colonial times, Tunisia has been characterized by a duality in terms of development; on the one hand, the coastal areas have been more economically dynamic due to maritime traffic and trade, and on the other hand, the western regions have been less favoured in terms of development.

This legacy deepened during the colonial era, when colonizers exploited the country's natural and agricultural resources, particularly in the interior, and employed its inhabitants to serve their own interests, and made these inhabitants workers in their lands and servants in their estates.

After independence, politics has been one of the factors that has, to some extent, perpetuated the deep disparity between sub-regions. It is undeniable that, for abhorrent cultural and factional reasons, coastal sub-regions have been favoured for decades at the level of apportioning many development programmes, at the expense of internal sub-regions that have suffered from poverty, deprivation in all its manifestations, and economic marginalization.

Many sociological interpretations of the situation in question have argued that one of the reasons of regional disparity has been the "mentality" that has prevailed in the Tunisian society for a long period of time, as internal sub-regions have long been regarded as a "reservoir" of primary resources and labour that can be exploited to produce wealth in the major centres of activity in the capital and the coastline. Therefore, privileging eastern sub-regions and the dependency of western ones is an undeniable historical legacy.

Several sociological studies also highlight that the "mutual reliance" mentality, prevailing among a large segment of the population of the interior farming areas, has played a role in the deterioration of the development situation in these areas exclusively, unlike urban populations in coastal areas who have been more inclined towards action, production, and entrepreneurship.

(b) Geographical factor

Despite the constant natural advantages of the interior, the geographical location of western sub-regions has been a major obstacle to facilitating the integration of this region and its interaction with major economic poles.

The dominance of the rural agricultural nature in all its sub-regions has prevented the diversification of its economic base and the expansion of the scope of wealth produced therein; this has kept many of its cities on the margins of the economic and social cycle, and has caused an imbalance within governorates in terms of regional space regulation and utilization.

The internal nature of these governorates and the large distance between them and the coasts have deprived them of vital features, or attractive conditions for economic focus, trade, multimodal transport, or even personal accommodation and entertainment. One of the reasons always cited for explaining the

weakness of private investment and the scarcity of good human resources in vital sectors is the lack of life facilities that everyone aspires to, and of modern life elements in the interior compared to the coastal areas and the capital.

Moreover, some western sub-regions have taken a new nature, particularly the central governorate of Kasserine, and the northern governorates of El Kef and Jendouba, due to their sprawling rugged mountain ranges, in which terrorist organizations active in the Maghreb countries have settled. The security factor has become today one of the main challenges facing the western region of Tunisia and undermining development efforts. Despite the incentives offered by various Governments after 2011, private investors have avoided these areas in the light of the ongoing terrorist operations, and the settling of terrorists in the mountains of the region. Considering that the private sector is unable to fill the investment gap in the internal sub-regions, the State must envisage a new development approach based on non-"dogmatic" solutions, such as cooperating with the private sector to establish large structured companies capable of injecting regular incomes in these areas, allowing in the long run to ensure the increase of the aggregate demand and improving the economic density, and thus making these areas dynamically able to attract private investment, increase employment opportunities, and break the vicious cycle of poverty and displacement towards Grand Tunis and coastal areas.

(c) Development policies factor

The regional disparity shown by the various economic and social development indicators reflects the failure of the development experiment during the 1960s. It relied on the State's establishment of industrial poles in various internal sub-regions, and the modernization of the agriculture sector by adopting synergies. It also demonstrates the nature of the development pattern that has been adopted since the 1970s and developed in the mid-1980s, as part of the liberalization of national economy, which has become dependent on advancing the fully-exporting sectors (textiles, clothing, footwear, and mechanical and electrical industries), which derive their differential advantages from cheap labour, thus pushing the population to emigrate from western regions to the eastern ones. These policies have contributed to the impoverishment of small-scale and family farming in inland regions, and this was reflected in the surplus labour in the agricultural sector switching to the industrial sector, thus affecting the population mobility, particularly in the Central-West Region.

The lack of strong political will for developing internal sub-regions has prevented allocating significant proportions of the development budget to advance investments there. Moreover, the distribution of public projects and programmes among different governorates has not been subject to objective and scientific measures that took into account poverty and unemployment levels and the availability of public facilities, communal facilities, and infrastructure in the less privileged sub-regions.

The development and delivery of private programmes and projects have not taken into account the regional and non-material factors that ensured the success and sustainability of interventions, such as real estate issues, training, technical briefing, promotion, beneficiary wishes, integration with other programmes, maintenance, undertaking, and outstanding human resources.

As a result, it can be said that the limited size and effectiveness of investment in internal sub-regions, in most of its ramifications related to the economic and social structure, is mainly due to the absence of a national vision to adopt an industrial policy in marginalized areas, particularly in the Central-West Region. The policies currently adopted are still based on private initiatives to drive investment in the interior, and this poses many challenges to internal sub-regions, especially the Central-West Region, in terms of their ability to create the elements of self-reliant development.

C. The specificity of economic and social development in the Central-West Region

The present part of the report deals with demographics and the realities of economic and social development in the Central-West Region.

1. About the Central-West Region

The Central-West Region comprises three provinces: Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid, and Kasserine. As an economic zone, it is an integral part of the homogeneous area of Tunisia's interior. The Central-West spans an area of 22,000 square kilometres, i.e. 14 per cent of the country's area. The region is located in the semi-dry wastelands, in the middle of the country and has a 200 km common border with Algeria, close contact with the southern governorates, as well as a connection to the country's most important economically dynamic sites, particularly the Sahel.

Geographically, the Central-West Region is situated on two interlocking natural landforms: the lower wastelands from the east, which encompass Kairouan, and the upper

wastelands[136] from the west, as well as the territories of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine governorates. The Central-West Region occupies an intermediate position between two distinct geographical areas, bordered by high humid hills in the north and dry desert areas defined by the Gafsa Mountains in the south. Having this quality, the Central-West Region has enormous natural potential that has made it an ideal area for large-scale dry farming of grain, fruit trees agriculture, and sheep breeding.

As crops intensified through irrigation and agricultural activity diversification, the formerly semi-nomadic population gradually gathered in the Central-West that witnessed an explicit transition from a "pastoral community to a farming one" for nearly half a century.

2. Population characteristics

According to the 2014 overall population census, Tunisia's Central-West Region is home to 1,439,000 people, accounting for about 13 percent of the total population. The Central-West is rural in nature, having 64.7 per cent of its population living in the countryside, whereas the population in rural areas at the national level amounts to 32.1 per cent (table 9).

The population growth in the Central-West Region over the past years has seen a significant slowdown, largely exceeding the rate recorded at the national level. Demographic data for the period 1999-2004 indicates the beginning of a real decline in the size of its population, ranging between a complete decline in Kairouan governorate, and a near stagnation in Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid governorates. During the period 2004-2014, the Central-West recorded a demographic growth of 0.63 per cent compared to 1.08 per cent at the national level.

Table 9. Demographic indicators for the Central-West Region of Tunisia, 2014

	Kairouan	Sidi Bouzid	Kasserine	At the national level
Population size (in thousands)	570	430	439	10 982
Population density (per km²)	87.6	57.9	53.6	71
Municipal population rate (Percentage)	35.3	27.1	43.6	67.7
Population growth rate 2004-2014 (Percentage)	0.44	0.84	0.64	1.08

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2015.

It has become a matter of concern that many municipal areas have not only lost their role as poles of attraction for migrants, but have also tended to send surplus population elsewhere. Therefore, the Central-West has had a negative net internal migration since 30 years.

Population growth trends in the Central-West Region are explained by the decrease in the rate of natural population growth on the one hand, and the increased scope of the phenomenon of migration outside the region in a pursuit of livelihoods and a better life on the other.

"The city has almost become a ghost town due to the migration flux to major cities", Rashad, a resident of Nasrallah city in Kairouan governorate who has been unemployed for years, tells "Inkyfada" website. "A textile factory opened months ago, but it offers wages of about 300 dinars per month to women, equivalent to 10 dinars a day. Would this wage give people a decent and dignified life?".

3. Economic status

The Central-West Region is characterized by the richness and diversity of natural resources, including a stock of construction materials such as marble and stone-pits that can be used and manufactured, large arable green spaces and pastoral plains, large herds of livestock, and the abundance of water resources that have allowed the development of the irrigation sector in this region.

In this sense, the region's economy is based on agricultural activity, particularly vegetal produce, which has contributed significantly to the development and diversity of agricultural products, most notably vegetables, fruits, red meat, and dairy. As a result, the region has become a major agricultural pole.

Therefore, the agricultural sector is the main employer in the region, where about 37 per cent of the employed population work in agriculture, compared to 17.6 per cent at the national level.

For example, at the national level, Sidi Bouzid contributes with 18 per cent of the vegetable production, 11 per cent of the dairy production, 10 per cent of the red meat production, 14 per cent of the olive oil production, 13 per cent of the almond production, and 20 per cent of the pistachio production.

Despite the importance of the agricultural sector in the socioeconomic development of the region, it suffers from many obstacles and challenges in the light of the complexity of the real estate situation, indiscriminate exploitation of the forest

area, and excessive depletion of water resources, in addition to the appearance of desertification signs in some areas and soil salinization and waterlogging in others, not to mention the dispersal of ownership, small areas of agricultural holdings, high indebtedness, absence of organized distribution routes, and the limited support of farmers and investors in the sector.

In this regard, the industrial sector is the weakest link in the economic fabric of the Central-West sub-regions, given the limited number of industrial enterprises there, and, if any, their concentration in the governorates' main centres, in addition to the limited diversity of industrial activities (figure 1).

For example, 90 per cent of all industrial enterprises in Kasserine governorate are concentrated in the delegations of Northern Kasserine, Southern Kasserine, Fériana, and

Sbeitla, which attract the textile, clothing, construction materials, ceramics, crystal, and food industries.

The industrial sector therefore needs further development by supporting industrial infrastructure and utilizing the agricultural potential available in the context of the development of agricultural systems and the stock of construction materials.

Despite the rich historical, civilizational, and cultural inventory, as well as the multiple natural and archaeological sites in the Central-West sub-regions, primarily the historical Kairouan governorate, they have not yet reached the optimal employment of these components, which would make them a leading service pole in the fields of cultural tourism, traditional industries, and the environment, thereby promoting private initiatives and advancing the development trajectory.

Figure 1. Medium-sized and large enterprises (over 50 employees) in Tunisia, by governorate

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2017.

Figure 2. Structuring public investments in Tunisia in 2011-2015, by governorate (Percentage)

Source: Tunisia, Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation, 2016-2020 Development Plan.

While the infrastructure sector has seen several achievements, such as rehabilitating the national, regional, and local road network, paving rural and inner-city agricultural routes, as well as establishing industrial zones, the Central-West sub-regions still need more support to de-isolate their dispersed rural areas, improve living conditions, and rehabilitate their business climates to advance their attractiveness and competitiveness.

Despite the increase in the volume of public investment allocated for western regions in the areas of infrastructure, services, and communal facilities after the revolution, it remains less than what has been allocated to the country's major poles. This puts the region at the lowest ranks in terms of most indicators of improving the population's living conditions, especially in rural areas (figure 2).

Weak private investment in the interior regions, especially the Central-West Region, is one of the biggest economic challenges presented (figure 3), as fiscal and tax benefits granted after 2011 to encourage investments have not advanced private initiatives and economic dynamics in these areas, in addition to other challenges. These include organizational redundancy in terms of tasks entrusted to support structures and their overlapping roles, the multiplicity of programmes and interventions without coordination and integration, and administrative complications in issuing investment licenses. In this context, it should be noted that three quarters of the private enterprises nationwide, which amounted to 771,000 in 2017, are located in the North-East (49.3 per cent) and the Centre-East (24.8 per cent).

Figure 3. Structuring private investments in Tunisia in 2011-2015, by governorate (Percentage)

Source: Tunisia, Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation, 2016-2020 Development Plan.

4. Social and demographic characteristics

The structural economic vulnerability of the Central-West Region has affected its social and demographic situation, which would have been worse off without State interventions to buffer the severity of imbalances with the country's most privileged sub-regions. The most prominent indicators revealing the reality of social conditions in the region are those associated with unemployment, poverty, education, health, and social services.

(a) Unemployment

The Central-West Region has the highest unemployment rates in the entire country.

It is true that the economic legacy in terms of the weak fabric of institutions in the region imposes a burden on young people and hinders the development of employment offers. However, youth unemployment indicators remain complex, because unemployment is linked to multidimensional features that Government structures have not been able to take into account when constructing mechanisms for implementing active employment policies, and these dimensions include characteristics of age, gender issues, and geographical areas of population residence. The overall rate of unemployment in the Central-West Region was 19.4 per cent, and amounted to 24.1 per cent in Kairouan governorate, compared to 15.3 per cent at the national level (table 10).

Table 10. Labour market indicators in the Central-West in 2018

	Kairouan	Sidi Bouzid	Kasserine	At the national level
Population capable of working (in thousands)	130	114.6	185.3	
Holders of higher education degrees among them (in thousands)	23.6	22.2	24.3	
Working population (in thousands)	98.7	93.8	155.4	3392.1
Holders of higher education degrees among them (in thousands)	13.6	10.6	17.2	
Unemployed population (in thousands)	31.3	20.8	29.9	
Holders of higher education degrees among them (in thousands)	10	11.6	7	
Unemployment rate	24.1%	18.2%	16.1%	15.3%
Unemployment rate for those who have attained higher education	42.4%	52.4%	29%	

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2015.

Like in all regions of the country, the Central-West Region records a high rate of youth unemployment (15-39 years) at dangerous levels of about 40 per cent for the 25-29 age group. This can negatively affect job seekers' behaviour in terms of actively seeking employment, contributing to wage dumping, and even working in the informal economy.

As part of a study conducted on the marginalized city of Nasrallah in Kairouan governorate, where poverty and unemployment are at very high levels, Adel, a 29 year old, told "Inkyfada" website, that he had tried to commit self-immolation saying, "I lost hope, and I don't see any glimmer of hope for the future". Adel was unemployed and provided for his daily needs by selling alcoholic beverages clandestinely, and that led his father to confiscate his motorcycle to keep him away from this activity. "The main source of pocket money for young people is either selling alcohol or selling hashish, and that made me consider suicide... I want to change and work in another field".

The accumulated number of the unemployed shows that 87.8 per cent fall into the 15-39 age group, in addition to an accelerated trend in the 25-29 and 30-34 age groups. The Central-West sub-regions are not excluded from the general characteristics of Tunisia's labour market, namely, the great extent of unemployment among females and holders of higher education degrees, as well as in rural areas.

Figure 4. Unemployment rate in the Central-West Region, by sub-region, gender, and area (Percentage)

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2015.

Figure 5. Unemployment in the Central-West Region, by sub-region and educational level (Percentage)

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2015.

(b) Poverty

Poverty in Tunisia is defined as a state of material and social deprivation that prevents individuals from acquiring their basic needs, and that is by adopting an approach to material poverty. The material poverty line is estimated as the lowest level of consumption between the poor and the non-poor population. The poverty line is determined for each area separately, i.e. a poverty line for each: the major cities, the local areas, as well as non-local areas, taking into account the pattern of consumption and the living cost in these areas.[137]

The study of poverty by region has showed a decline in poverty and extreme poverty in all regions, particularly in the western regions and Grand Tunis.

Despite the downward trend in extreme poverty levels over more than a decade, they have remained very high compared to the rest of the regions, and compared to the overall poverty rate at the national level, as the western regions and southern Tunisia have recorded the highest poverty rates, with poverty in the west of the country amounting to six times that in Grand Tunis.

Table 12 shows the significant disparity in poverty rates between governorates, ranging from 3.5 per cent in Tunis to 34.9 per cent in Kairouan, i.e. a difference of more than 30 points. Poverty has been concentrated mainly in the western regions and some southern governorates, where poverty rates have far exceeded the national average, thus confirming all economic and social indicators recorded in these areas that include El Kef (34.2 per cent), Kasserine (32.8 per cent), Béja (32 per cent) and Siliana (27.8 per cent).

Table 11. Poverty in Tunisia at the local, non-local and national levels

	Poverty headcount ratio (Percentage)				Extreme poverty rate (Percentage)			
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2000	2005	2010	2015
Local	16.6	14.8	12.6	10.1	3.4	3.0	2.1	1.2
Non-local	40.4	38.8	36.0	26.0	15.2	15.5	13.6	6.6
At the national level	25.4	23.1	20.5	15.2	7.7	7.4	6	2.9

Source: Tunisia, Statistique Tunisie, "Flash consommation et niveau de vie", No. 1 (December, 2016).
Note: In the administrative divisions of Tunisia, the geographical area of a municipality is referred to by local. Spaces outside the municipal area, such as slums, are called non-local.

Table 12. Poverty in Tunisia for 2015, by governorate

Governorate	Poverty headcount ratio (Percentage)	Extreme poverty rate (Percentage)
Tunis	3.5	0.3
Ariana	5.4	0.1
Ben Arous	4.3	0.2
Manouba	12.1	0.6
Nabeul	7.4	0.4
Zaghouan	12.1	1.2
Bizerte	17.5	3.5
Béja	32.0	6.9
Jendouba	22.4	3.6
El Kef	34.2	8.3
Siliana	27.8	8.8
Sousse	16.3	3.2
Monastir	8.3	0.3
Mahdia	21.1	4.0
Sfax	5.8	0.9
Kairouan	**34.9**	**10.3**
Kasserine	**32.8**	**10.2**
Sidi Bouzid	**23.1**	**4.1**
Gabès	15.9	1.2
Medenine	21.7	4.7
Tataouine	15.0	1.5
Gafsa	18.0	3.6
Tozeur	14.7	1.0
Kebili	18.5	1.7

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2018.

Table 13. Poverty in the Central-West Region for 2015 relative to the national level

	Kairouan	Sidi Bouzid	Kasserine	National rate
Poverty headcount ratio (Percentage)	32.8	23.1	34.9	15.2
Rank at the national level	3	6	1	
Extreme poverty rate (Percentage)	10.2	4.1	10.3	2.9
Rank at the national level	2	7	1	

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2018.

Although extreme poverty is relatively absent in the major cities of Grand Tunis, Nabeul, Monastir, and Sfax, it is still prevalent in the governorates of Kairouan (10.3 per cent), Kasserine (10.2 per cent), Siliana (8.8 per cent) and El Kef (8.3 per cent). Poverty translates into a wide disparity in expenditure across the country, as the difference between the highest and lowest average per capita expenditure exceeds 3,500 dinars (the lowest being 2,269 dinars in Kairouan, and the highest 5,810 dinars in Tunis).

Table 14. Average per capita expenditure in Tunisia for 2015, by governorate

Governorate	Average per capita expenditure (TD)
Tunis	5 810
Ariana	5 461
Monastir	5 115
Ben Arous	4 878
Sfax	4 698
Manouba	4 377
Nabeul	3 919
Sousse	3 774
Tataouine	3 539
Medenine	3 315
Mahdia	3 196
Tozeur	3 188
Gafsa	3 155
Zaghouan	3 052
Gabès	3 040
Jendouba	2 943
Siliana	2 932
Bizerte	2 868
Kebili	2 834
Sidi Bouzid	**2 664**
Kasserine	**2 543**
Béja	2 472
El Kef	2 363
Kairouan	**2 269**
At the national level	3 871

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2018.

Table 15. Education in the Central-West Region

	Kairouan	Sidi Bouzid	Kasserine	National rate
Education ratio	99.1%	99.2%	99.8%	
Annual number of dropouts	5 700	5 184	4 416	106 817
Rate at the national level	5.34%	4.85%	4.13%	14.32%
Illiteracy rate	32%	29.9%	35.01%	18.8%

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2015.

Tunisia's universal free education policy adopted since independence has enabled achieving very positive results, which have been reflected in raising the education rate at the age of six in the Central-West Region to levels close to the overall rate recorded at the national level. However, the major problem relates to the poor internal rates of return of the educational system due to the high levels of early school dropouts and failures in the various Central-West governorates. The fact that the Central-West Region ranks lowest at the level of passing rates in the baccalaureate examination is the greatest evidence of the low level and quality of education in the region compared to other regions.

These phenomena have negatively and directly contributed to the high illiteracy rates, particularly among young people in the population. The illiteracy rate in the western regions, particularly in the Central-West Region, has amounted to more than 30 per cent, well above the national rate (19 per cent), and those recorded in coastal areas.

(d) Health care coverage

Since independence, the State efforts have given great attention to the health and family sectors in various governorates. The Central-West Region was provided with the necessary health infrastructure to ensure minimum health services, through the construction of the primary health care centre and health service locations, and the map of local and regional hospitals was expanded.

Despite these achievements, health services in different parts of the region remain below expectations and less than what is available elsewhere, as highlighted by various health indicators for 2015, including maternal mortality rates in rural areas (70 deaths per 100,000 live births), i.e. more than three times higher than in urban areas (20 deaths per 100,000 live births).

In view of the deterioration in the health care sector services, particularly after the revolution, due to the lack of medical equipment in health care institutions, particularly heavy equipment, and the severe lack of human resources, particularly the lack of specialists in internal delegations especially, the health care sector in the Central-West Region remains in dire need of further support and development on the three health care levels[138] to provide comprehensive and modern services, in addition to motivating private sector doctors to set up multi-service hospital clinics that would spare citizens going outside the governorate for treatment.

Table 16. Health indicators in the Central-West Region

Indicator	Kairouan	Sidi Bouzid	Kasserine	National rate
Population size per physician	2 472	2 940	5 044	808
Physicians per 100,000 inhabitants	65.5	41.7	62.1	130.1
Hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants	1.33	1.1	1.2	2
Average distance to reach a regional hospital (km)	50	44	46	
Average distance to reach a comprehensive care hospital containing all specialties	257	157	98	
Population per pharmacy	10 807	11 738	9 914	6 523

Source: Tunisia, Ministry of Health, 2015 Health Map.

Problems related to health care coverage are present, particularly in western regions that lack health facilities that provide adequate and quality health services, so citizens have to go to the eastern governorates, particularly Sousse when it comes to residents of the Central-West governorates. Several studies have shown that patients from these areas often find themselves incapable of getting treatment because they are unable to afford transportation costs. A report by the "Inkyfada" website on "The Women Who Survived at the Foot of Mount Mghilla" showed that their social situation was dire, and that several women had spoken of their daily battle for survival, including Basma. Basma did not work because she had to care for her two young children, while her husband, a farmer, was the breadwinner of the family. However, she does not hide her anger at the dire state of transportation in their sub-region, especially since her daughter has allergies, and needs to receive treatment in Sousse. "To take her to the hospital in Sousse, I have to pay 100 dinars for transportation".

"I can't afford that", complains Basma, as she throws a bunch of prescriptions and documents on the floor. "The allergy treatment ointment

alone costs me 14 dinars! When I go to the pharmacy, I have to pay this sum, and no one reimburses my expenses". Therefore, because she is unable to move around, Basma settles for these costs, hoping that her daughter's illness does not worsen.

(e) Infrastructure

The infrastructure of drinking water supply, electricity, and connection to the sewage network is one of the most important elements of improving the citizens' living conditions, as well as programmes for social groups with special needs, public housing schemes, and programmes for neighbourhood arrangement and integration in urban areas.

Thanks to public investment allocated by State companies, especially in the early 1990s as part of the National Solidarity Fund interventions, advanced results were achieved in general, particularly in terms of connection to drinking water networks and lighting in rural areas, which exceeded 90 per cent according to the latest statistics in the various Central-West governorates, thus approaching national averages.

Table 17. Access to social services in the Central-West Region (Percentage)

	Kairouan	Sidi Bouzid	Kasserine	National rate
Electricity	99.8	99.6	99.5	99.8
Access to safe drinking water	94.6	93.5	94	98.2
Connection to sewage network (local)	75	70	76.6	58.2

Source: According to the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia, 2015.

However, isolated communities in the rural areas of the poorest inland governorates still need more efforts to become connected to the national water and lighting network, to enhance the public sewage network in the various cities, and to support maintenance, configuration, and preparation investments to advance communal facilities in various parts of the country, primarily the Central-West Region.

The low level of development in the Central-West Region has been reflected in various economic and social indicators. It is important to consider the impact of public policies in terms of facing the development gap, so as to know the shortcomings and miscalculations in the content of these policies.

Fatma, from Blahdiya roundabout in Kasserine governorate, spoke in the "Inkyfada" report on "The Women Who Survived at the Foot of Mount Mghilla" of the poor situation caused by public service facilities in some areas in the Central-West. "We have not received any assistance from them", she said. "What are they doing here if they can't help us? Even if the village is served by electricity, the water boreholes installed are often broken, forcing Blahdiya's residents to walk several kilometres to reach the collective standpipe installed by the Ministry of Agriculture".

D. The role of public policies in reducing the development gap in Tunisia

The study of the impact of public policies at the level of addressing regional inequality and poverty reduction is based on two main programmes, the Regional Development Programme and the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families. This choice in particular is based on two factors, the first relating to the integration of the economic and social dimensions of the programmes, and the second to the comprehensive and in-depth evaluations the two programmes undergo.

1. Regional Development Programme

The kernel of the Regional Development Programme dates back to the early 1970s, when in 1973 the public authorities established the "Rural Development Programme" as a tool for regional adjustment and maintaining a minimum level of social cohesion. The programme was enhanced in the early 1980s with the launch of other new programmes, such as the regional development programme for construction workers, the Productive Family Programme, and the Youth Employment Programme.

In the face of the multiple public programmes, the issue of the effectiveness of interventions and usefulness of mechanisms adopted back then to achieve regional development was raised, so in 1987, it was decided to integrate the various programmes mentioned above into a unified programme called the Regional Development Programme, which had the following objectives:

- Accelerate the pace of regional development;
- Follow up the development effort in priority delegations (the smallest administrative division in a governorate);
- Contribute to reducing inequalities between sub-regions and within a single sub-region;
- Improve the living conditions of the population, and reduce poverty and unemployment;
- Consolidate the foundations of decentralization.

In fact, decentralization was initiated, albeit at face value, through creating the Regional Development Programme, supported by the establishment, in 1989, of regional councils at governorate level, which were entrusted with the management of the Programme budget. Then, in 1994, there was the establishment of local development councils aimed at enhancing the role of public groups in managing regional affairs, primarily devising development projects and programmes and following-up their implementation.

In this context, the Regional Development Programme is one of the most prominent regional development programmes, as it has, since the beginning of the 1990s, accounted for at least 30 per cent of the total State budget appropriations allocated to the development of the sub-regions.

The Regional Development Programme interventions include four main areas: creating and supporting employment opportunities through the provision of loans and grants, improving living conditions, especially in rural areas, providing vocational training for young people in rural areas, and assisting the unemployed through regional employment associations.[139]

Figures highlight significant developments in terms of programme interventions and their size, particularly after the revolution, with the programme's financial allocations reaching 200.9 million dinars in 2011, compared to only 51.6 million dinars in 2010, i.e. an increase of 289 per cent. Therefore, more than three quarters of the funds allocated to the Regional Development Programme during the period 1997-2017 were completed between 2011 and 2017.

The dynamics of the Regional Development Programme have evolved in accordance with the development of the economic situation, events, and realities that Tunisia has experienced over the past decades, responding to needs that have sometimes been of an urgent and special nature.

In parallel with the increase in the size of the Regional Development Programme, the criteria for budget apportionment among governorates have enshrined the principle of positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged areas. According to the latest control report on appropriation distribution, 69 per cent of the State budget was allocated to 16 governorates with the lowest Regional Development Index rates, and 31 per cent of the Regional Development Programme budget for the top eight governorates. As of 2012, the budget items have been allocated among different governorates according to a calculation formula based on the Regional Development Index.

Figure 6. The size of appropriations allocated to the Regional Development Programme (in 1,000 dinars)

Source: Tunisia, Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation, 2017b.

The analysis of the structure of Regional Development Programme interventions highlights the importance of support for improving the living conditions of the rural population through paving roads and routes, providing lighting, supplying drinking water, and improving housing, as this type of interventions receives the lion's share, i.e. 88 per cent of the total fiscal appropriations allocated to the programme as a whole throughout the years from 1997 to 2017. The rest of the funding allocated to the programme is used for activities to modernize livelihoods, vocational training for young people, as well as other interventions related to the creation of industrial zones, compensation for flood damage, and some other management-related expenses. It can be concluded therefore that the programme interventions are predominantly social, due to poor living conditions, particularly in the interior.

With regard to the geographical structure of the Regional Development Programme, statistical data for the evaluation period 1997-2018 shows that the Central-West Region ranks first in terms of the nominal value of appropriations, as the governorates of Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid, and Kairouan collectively received 554.7 million dinars of the appropriations allocated to the Regional Development Programme during the period 1997-2017, while the total budget allocated to the programme for all the governorates of the Republic amounted to 2,692.9 million dinars during the same period.

The relative distribution of appropriations between the regions shows that the Central-West Region ranks third in terms of the share received from the total appropriations, following the North-East and the South.

On this basis, the regional development paradox is reaffirmed, between the State's ongoing attempts and efforts to bridge the rift between the various regional areas on the one hand, and the failure in making a fundamental change at the level of the "inherited" formula of wealth distribution between regions. This re-raises the depth of the problem of regional inequality and of favouring the more fortunate governorates at the expense of others, primarily the Central-West governorates.

Figure 7. The size of appropriations within the Regional Development Programme for the period 1997-2017, by governorate

194,114.00	Kasserine
190,345.57	Kairouan
170,230.05	Sidi Bouzid
152,833.34	Sfax
143,976.33	Jendouba
135,712.09	Medenine
127,353.33	Nabeul
122,918.22	Siliana
120,597.78	Gafsa
114,527.80	Bizerte
112,737.18	Gabès
106,227.81	Mahdia
105,469.30	Béja
102,389.87	El Kef
102,122.29	Sousse
89,458.96	Tataouine
88,671.17	Tunis
83,468.41	Monastir
80,830.75	Ariana
79,815.95	Zaghouan
78,440.74	Manouba
73,761.27	Ben Arous
72,437.30	Kebili
44,504.39	Tozeur

In 1,000 dinars

Source: Tunisia, Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation, 2017b.

Figure 8. Distribution of Regional Development Programme appropriations between regions in Tunisia

23.9% 21.4% 20.6% 16.5% 17.6%

■ South ■ Central-West ■ Central-East ■ North-West ■ North-East

Source: Tunisia, Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation, 2017b.

In this context, the effectiveness assessment of interventions under the Regional Development Programme shows that the interior has always recorded the lowest completion rates, considering the difference between appropriations allocated to the programme and those that have actually been disbursed. The completion rate in both the Central-West and North-West regions was only 70 per cent in the period 2000-2016, compared with 75.2 per cent in the North-East and 77.4 per cent in the Central-East Region. With the exception of Kairouan, which recorded a completion rate of about 78 per cent, the completion rate in Kasserine was 59 per cent, and in Sidi Bouzid 68.3 per cent.

Taking the regional development index as an indicator of the level of development in several economic and social areas, the governorates of the Central-West and North-West come at the bottom of the ranking as previously indicated.

By combining measures on the size of allocations, the extent of programme completion, and development disparities between sub-regions, the evaluation study of the Regional Development Programme decided to build a comprehensive composite index for each sub-region of the country using simple formulas, to give an overview of the impact of the programme's interventions on regional development. As a result of this process, the governorates of the Central-West Region, with the exception of Kairouan, ranked low in the overall rankings.

Despite decades of efforts and some improvement in the overall conditions of internal disadvantaged sub-regions, the interventions of the Regional Development Programme in particular, and other State interventions in general have not been able to bring about the required change on the ground, and several sub-regions, primarily the central and north-western governorates, have remained marginalized compared to others.

2. National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families

As part of the implementation of the structural reform programme for the economy with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the mid-1980s, the Tunisian authorities established the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families, to provide supplementary minimum income that maintains a certain level of purchasing power for the poor and vulnerable, in recognition of the role of direct social remittances in achieving optimal income distribution and correcting market economy imbalances.

Based on the results of the 1985 National Institute of Statistics survey of household consumption, budget, and standard of living, 78,000 families were found to be in need and destitute, and could benefit from compensatory remittances in the form of constant cash grants paid on a quarterly basis.

In addition to constant cash assistance, needy families receive free health care in public hospitals. Health insurance in public facilities at low costs also benefit workers with no contributory capacity, those who are dismissed for economic reasons, the long-term unemployed, as well as low-income families.

During the first year of the programme, the Ministry of Social Affairs was able to identify 60,000 families eligible for constant cash assistance. The total number of beneficiaries quickly increased from 78,000 in 1987 to 100,000

in 1990. This number then experienced a period of stagnation from 1991 to 1996, before a slight increase in 1997, and then a continued rise until it reached 118,309 families in 2010.

Following political changes in Tunisia in 2011, under the pressure of unprecedented popular protests as part of the "revolutionary tide", the Government was made to increase the number of families benefiting from the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families to a total of 176,000 beneficiaries in 2011, i.e. an increase of more than 50,000 families in one year.

Even as popular pressure declined, the number of beneficiaries has continued to rise, as decisions by successive Governments since the revolution to increase funds for regional social affairs departments have led to an increase in the number of families benefiting from the programme, not to mention successive rises in the monthly amount of remittances allocated to families.

The National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families has undergone profound transformations as of 2011, so the number of beneficiary families has reached 235,000 at the end of 2014, up from 202,000 in 2012 and 176,000 in 2011. In 2018, the Government decided to add 35,000 needy families to the programme, bringing the total number to 285,000.

Figure 9. Evolution of the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families in Tunisia

Source: Based on Tunisia, Ministry of Social Affairs, "Administrative Data from the Social Security General Direction" (accessed September 10, 2019).

The analysis of the administrative register of the programme managed by the "Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale" (CNSS) [National Social Security Fund] provides interesting information on the structure of programme interventions by beneficiaries' sex, and age. The evaluation of the programme in 2013 reached the following conclusions:

- Males account for 49.7 per cent of the beneficiaries, while females account for 50.3 per cent, thus reflecting a gender balance in the structure of programme interventions. Beneficiaries over the age of 60 account for 62 per cent of the total number of beneficiaries;
- About 14.7 per cent of beneficiaries joined the programme during the first three years of its creation and are elderly in their majority;
- The population that joined the programme after 2010, who made up 50.2 per cent of all beneficiaries in 2013, consists of two basic segments: the 40-59 age group,

which accounts for 20.2 per cent of the total, and the 60-79 age group representing 17.6 per cent. This means that one in five beneficiaries of the programme after the 2011 revolution belongs to an age group that is still active in the labour market (40-59 years), which reinforces suspicions of significant errors in determining eligibility for the programme;
- The geographical distribution of beneficiaries indicates that 50.9 per cent live in western regions of the country, namely the North-West (21.2 per cent), the Central-West (19.4 per cent) and the South-West (10.4 per cent), knowing that the western regions account for 30 per cent of the total population in Tunisia;
- The regional distribution of beneficiaries shows that 40 per cent of half of those benefiting currently (50.2 per cent), who have started benefiting from the programme after the 2011 revolution, live in the North-West and Central-West Regions, and together account for 21.3 per cent of all beneficiaries.

Table 18. Age distribution of beneficiaries of the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families in Tunisia, by gender

	Male	Female	Total
Percentage			
<20	0.0	0.0	0.1
20-39 years	2.1	2.9	5.0
40-59 years	14.5	18.4	33.0
60-79 years	20.2	17.6	37.8
80-89 years	9.8	8.1	17.9
90 and above	3.0	3.2	6.2
Grand total	49.7	50.3	100.0

Source: Based on Tunisia, Ministry of Social Affairs, Directory of Social Statistics 2014.

Table 19. Age distribution of beneficiaries of the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families in Tunisia, by year of use

|		Year of use					
		87-89	90-94	95-99	00-04	05-10	11-13	Total
		Percentage						
Age of beneficiaries	<20	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
	20-39 years	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.6	4.1	5.0
	40-59 years	1.4	0.8	2.1	3.1	5.3	20.2	33.0
	60-79 years	6.6	1.8	3.7	3.5	4.5	17.6	37.8
	80-89 years	4.3	1.0	2.5	1.5	1.9	6.7	18.0
	90 and above	2.2	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.5	1.5	6.2
	Total	14.7	4.1	9.4	8.8	12.8	50.2	100.0

Source: Based on Tunisia, Ministry of Social Affairs, Directory of Social Statistics 2014.

Figure 10. Distribution of beneficiaries of the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families in Tunisia, by region

Source: Based on Tunisia, Ministry of Social Affairs, "Database of the General Direction for Social Promotion" (accessed September 10, 2019).

Table 20. Distribution of beneficiaries of the National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families in Tunisia, by region and year of use

		Region							
		Grand Tunis	North-East	North-West	Central-East	Central-West	South-East	South-West	Total
		Percentage							
Benefitting in	87-89	1.5	1.6	3.2	2.1	2.6	1.6	2.1	14.7
	90-94	0.5	0.5	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.3	4.2
	95-99	1.4	1.0	2.2	1.0	1.9	0.8	1.0	9.4
	00-04	1.5	1.0	1.6	1.5	1.4	0.9	1.0	8.8
	05-10	2.1	1.4	2.4	1.5	2.4	1.5	1.6	12.8
	11-13	8.2	5.6	10.7	6.4	10.6	4.4	4.4	50.2
	Total	15.3	11.0	21.2	13.1	19.4	9.7	10.4	100.0

Source: Based on Tunisia, Ministry of Social Affairs, Directory of Social Statistics 2014.

It is important to note the modular diversity of beneficiaries of the Programme of Assistance to Needy Families. It is possible for the heads of households to benefit from cash assistance, thereby making available the right to free health care for all those entitled with them (children, parents, and persons of whom they are legal guardians). The programme also benefits the elderly, people with special needs who live alone or with their families, and are considered vulnerable in terms of financial capabilities necessary for life. The family can benefit from two cash remittances, in cases of extreme poverty and deprivation, which usually result from the head of household being totally disabled, or from a severe disability of children or persons under the head of household's legal guardianship.

Balance between sub-regions is a necessary condition for achieving an overall balance in the country, and maintaining social stability and cohesion. In this sense, it has become more necessary than ever before to rethink the regional development strategy so as to adopt a new and comprehensive vision that goes beyond the prevailing sectoral outlook and sole reliance on the State, notwithstanding its central role, which must always exist in the development process.

E. Conclusion

Tunisia's economic and social challenges in the field of regional development have accumulated and become more complex over time due to inherited historical factors, wrong choices in the content of public policies, and slowness in the development process, despite attempts and some gains recorded over time.

Integrated regional development combined with economic, human, and technological development have become a pressing necessity so as to overcome obstacles to local development, and accelerate it. It may be beneficial to build the reform required to bring about fundamental change in the realities of the country's internal sub-regions on the following three pillars:

- Develop strategic planning for regional development to overcome the disadvantages of the sectoral view of regional action, and adopt a comprehensive and integrated view of the dimensions and parties involved in area development;
- Enhance the role of the State in the regional development process by increasing the size and quality of its interventions to reduce the large gap between sub-regions;
- Activate community responsibility in achieving regional development, by encouraging voluntary work and constructive participation of all community forces, including institutions, individuals, and professional and non-governmental organizations, in supporting the State to advance local development.

F. Recommendations on regional development in Tunisia

Supporting regional development in Tunisia and seeking to achieve balance between different regions have been the subject of numerous studies and researches to find radical solutions that establish a developmental pattern that puts an end once and for all to exclusion and marginalization, and eliminates dependency between the interior and coastal regions. The task of achieving development is not limited to the State and its institutions, but includes all

stakeholders in the society, and this is called community responsibility.

1. The central role of the State in regional development

State intervention in support of the development effort in the least privileged sub-regions is a necessary condition for reducing the disparities between different regions. This intervention materializes in increasing strategic planning for regional development; enhancing public investment in priority areas, primarily the Central-West Region; modernizing the legislative and regulatory framework; and activating support and framing mechanisms.

State responsibility could include strategic planning for regional development; enhancing public investment; modernizing the legislative and regulatory framework; and activating support and framing mechanisms.

(a) Increasing strategic planning for regional development

Sound and effective strategic planning for regional development is based on three pillars characterized by integration and interdependence between national, regional, and local levels, which has been absent for decades in Tunisia, where regional development schemes have been predominantly sectoral, without taking into account the special aspects and potential of each region. These pillars are as follows:

- Developing a national strategy for medium and long-term development based on the interdependence of economic, social, and spatial dimensions, and which identifies institutional, security, sectoral, environmental, and human options within a

comprehensive national vision of regional development, and enshrines the values of solidarity and cohesion between all groups and regions;

- Devising a regional development strategy that includes sub-strategies for each region or group of governorates that varies from region to another according to their respective characteristics and particularities. In this regard, Tunisia's regional division must be reviewed to achieve integration and complementarity between different governorates, and overcome the shortcomings and obstacles of regional division, which takes into account the factors of similarity and convergence, not difference;
- Developing a strategy for each governorate, while ensuring integration of visions and programmes to optimize the utilization of energies, and to develop all spaces without exception.

This strategic course is based on responsible and constructive consultation and participation between the various forces and actors at the central, regional, and local levels, so as to align free management within local or decentralized governance on the one hand, and the authority of the central State constantly looking out for unity of regions on the other.

The management of this course requires a strong institutional framework that precisely defines the roles and responsibilities of all parties from the State to regional and local councils so as to properly organize national, sectoral, and regional consultations. It also requires issuing performance contracts between the State on the one hand and the regions or sub-regions on the other, to redistribute roles between the State and sub-regions within governorates, through a decentralized approach

to manage regional affairs, while the State continues providing financial support for regional development. These contracts reflect Tunisia's new approach to managing public capital by ensuring accountability, independence, and flexibility.

(b) Enhancing public investment

It is necessary to intensify development projects and programmes to achieve interconnectivity and communication between sub-regions so as to de-isolate the interior and remote areas, link delegations and production areas with urban communities and State centres, and facilitate integrating sub-regions in their regional and national surroundings. This requires increased investment in enhancing infrastructure for transportation, logistics, and communication (strengthening the road and rail network, ensuring access to high-capacity Internet connection, etc.); it also requires increased investment in communal facilities and vital health and education facilities, access to drinking water supplies, lighting, and sanitation, as well as providing recreational and cultural spaces.

The State's role at the level of development also includes supporting targeted programmes, particularly in rural and border areas, such as the Regional Development Programme, the Programme for Integrated Development, the National Programme for Rehabilitation of Neighbourhoods and the Social Housing Programme.

The development of free trade zones with neighbouring countries, particularly Algeria and Libya, contributes to securing the presence of State institutions in the border areas, thus helping to enhance security, root the population, and reduce the phenomenon of smuggling that supports terrorism.

To distribute public investments among sub-regions objectively and fairly on the basis of positive discrimination, a provisional regional development indicator can be adopted, and the effectiveness of targeted development programmes can be enhanced by reviewing their components and increasing coordination among them within an integrated monitoring system to coordinate, evaluate, and correct interventions.

(c) Modernizing the legislative and regulatory framework

It is important that all Tunisia's sub-regions enjoy full powers and potentials that serve development in accordance with the principle of independent administration, thereby enshrining the principles of local democracy in writing and in practice, particularly with regard to regional and local councils' financial independence.

In this context, the development of domestic tax legislation is a major challenge that must be overcome given sub-regions' enormous need for funding, particularly the least developed ones, so as to achieve their development goals.

There is also an urgent need to adopt a new division of Tunisian territory into regions and sub-regions, in a manner that ensures their complementarity, and that aligns with the requirements of regional and local development to reduce regional inequality; there is also a need to review the urban framework, and to apply the municipal system throughout the Republic.

(d) Activating support and framing mechanisms

It is important that efforts focus on developing the public financing system at the regional level by strengthening the budgetary resources allocated to local communities and improving the effectiveness of existing financing institutions such as investment funds, public banks, and security institutions, in addition to developing microfinance and solidarity finance.

In parallel, human resources must be developed by raising the rates of framing and training in public departments and institutions in the internal sub-regions in particular, so as to support sub-regions' capabilities to plan, program, implement, monitor, and evaluate, as well as to introduce the advantages of promising sub-regions and sectors, and investment opportunities therein.

The performance of the public structures charged with framing private investment in sub-regions should be improved, so as to develop their capacity to publicize investment policies, follow-up with economic institutions, frame young start-up entrepreneurs, and lead economic and financial feasibility studies for investment projects.

It is also necessary to optimize the structure of the territorial and urban space in sub-regions, by supporting the role of territorial planning in devising general trends, and optimizing the distribution of the population and economic activities on the national soil in line with new trends in terms of decentralization and sustainable development requirements.

2. Community responsibility

While strengthening State intervention is necessary to advance regional development, it alone is not sufficient to reduce inequality and achieve the desired balance. Various parties from the private sector and community forces at the central and local levels should be involved in achieving regional development goals, and

this is called community responsibility. In this context, the following steps can be followed:

- Activating the public-private partnership in the implementation of major structured projects required by the internal sub-regions in various vital areas. The process of regional development requires reviving the role of the private sector, and rebalancing its role with that of the State in a genuine partnership for the greater national interest. Neither State guardianship nor the private sector's pursue of material gain solely is capable of achieving regional development objectives. Therefore, it is important for private sector institutions to take on community responsibility, and to direct their work towards and invest in regional development;
- Taking on responsibility autonomously by local communities to ensure the success of the decentralization and local democracy experience, and to reject partisan, factional, and regional intolerance, so as to ensure effective and constructive civic and political participation. The democratic development method, in which citizens voluntarily contribute to choices and participate in implementation through their representatives in elected councils, is the optimum means of change. This requires good leadership and governance and the development of local institutions' ability to manage local affairs, including visualization, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, to achieve the desired development goals;
- Increasing the responsibility of civil society organizations in supporting the efforts of the State and the private sector, given the important role of social and solidarity economic institutions that are gradually proving themselves in the process of economic development as a third sector alongside the public and private sectors. Development in its new comprehensive concept must include activating civil society institutions in all civil society sectors to work together with State institutions, and participate in decision-making, planning proposals, framing, revitalization, awareness spreading, monitoring, accountability, and answerability.

This integration of the role of the State and that of civil society is essential for all sub-regions to benefit from the available human capacities, as well as to put an end to the dependency mentality in terms of giving, and to establish a sense of citizenship.

4. The Marginalized in Lebanon:

Case Study of
Bab al-Tabbaneh

4. The Marginalized in Lebanon: Case Study of Bab al-Tabbaneh

The present chapter discusses marginalization in Lebanon through a field case study of the Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood in the northern city Tripoli. The study explored the views of segments of Bab al-Tabbaneh's population, including young men, women, and a number of workers in associations active in the area. Prior to presenting the results of the case study of Bab al-Tabbaneh for the purposes of the present report, a detailed overview of the situation of Tripoli and Bab al-Tabbaneh is provided by previewing the highlights of some of the previous studies thereof.

A. An overview of Tripoli and Bab al-Tabbaneh through available studies

Tripoli is located in northern Lebanon and is the capital of the North Governorate. It is the second largest city nationwide, and has the second largest port after the capital Beirut. Tripoli was established by the Phoenicians,[140] yet despite its long history, it has gone from being an important trading centre in the 1950s to one of the poorest cities in the region.[141]

The Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood is located in the north-eastern part of Tripoli. It was formerly known as the "Gold Market", but it has become Lebanon's poorest and most deprived region. Today, Bab al-Tabbaneh is an incubator for all kinds of violence.[142]

Tripoli, and Bab al-Tabbaneh in particular, are no longer of the poorest areas in Lebanon, but also in the whole of the Middle East, as they have been excluded from political and socioeconomic development priorities, given the burden that their deprived areas place on the State. Today, Bab al-Tabbaneh is a miserable region due to destruction, unemployment, poverty, and massive deterioration in terms of infrastructure, as well as working, housing, and living conditions.

The population of Bab al-Tabbaneh is estimated at 24,000, most of whom are Lebanese (82.9 per cent), while the rest include refugees, of whom are Syrians and Palestinian refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic.[143] According to the map drawn up by the Lebanon Support Association in 2008, the concentration of disadvantaged families in Tripoli, compared to the total Lebanese population, ranges between 6 and 8 per cent, without counting Palestinian refugees in this sample.

In terms of age distribution, young people under the age of 24 make up about 54 per cent (11,000 young people) of the total population of Bab al-Tabbaneh, while children under the age of 14 account for about 32 per cent.[144] Those of working age in the 15-63 age group make up 62 per cent of the population of Bab al-Tabbaneh.

Although Bab al-Tabbaneh is a residential neighbourhood, many of its residential

buildings include shops and workshops. Bab al-Tabbaneh is surrounded by agricultural land and industrial areas that play an important role in shaping its economic structure, which is dominated by vegetable markets and mechanics' workshops.[145] The 2018 study of the UN-Habitat and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) indicated that 77 per cent of companies surveyed were active shops and workshops, while 23 per cent were vacant or out of work, owing to the deteriorating economic situation and the fact that occupants had to close their stores or move out of the neighbourhood because some were unable to pay rent.[146]

1. History of armed conflicts in Tripoli and Bab al-Tabbaneh

Lebanon in general and Tripoli in particular have suffered from a series of historic events that have greatly affected the city's situation, and have led to security, political, and economic instability. In the light of the civil war that broke out in 1975, Tripoli began to lose its role as a source of food and household needs, and experienced a decline in its industrial role and a deterioration in infrastructure such as railway disruptions, causing population migration that changed Tripoli's face commercially and demographically, and allowed political parties and militias to take control of the city.[147] The demographic change has continued in recent times, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanese territory, and the Israeli-Lebanese war in July 2006, which led to the displacement of southerners to the suburbs of Beirut and to other cities, including Tripoli, which received 40,000 people.[148] In 2007, the Nahr al-Bared clashes in Tripoli between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Fatah al-Islam group prompted a large number of Tripoli's

residents to move to the vicinity. In 2008, clashes between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh resulted in considerable material and human damage.[149] In 2011, war broke out in the Syrian Arab Republic, and its consequences have affected all the Lebanese people, and exacerbated the conflict between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh. This conflict dates back to 1980, when Bab al-Tabbaneh supported the Palestine Liberation Organization while Jabal Mohsen supported the Syrian regime. The conflict in question resulted in the death of 300 people from Bab al-Tabbaneh at the hand of the Syrian army.[150]

The deteriorating security situation in the region has affected its economic, social, health, and educational conditions, limiting the progress of young people in terms of attaining higher education levels, improving their skills, or getting jobs.[151] Some groups and individuals in both regions have taken advantage of the absence of authority to arm themselves, and exercise force and thuggery.[152] Syrian refugees in Tripoli because of the Syrian war are estimated at around 70,000.[153]

A study including a large sample of Tripoli's population, including Bab al-Tabbaneh,[154] shows that Tripoli is a poor city that includes pockets of wealth, with a middle class accounting to only 20 per cent of its population, while 57 per cent of the population is disadvantaged, of which 26 per cent are severely disadvantaged. The proportion of disadvantaged families ranges from 87 per cent in Bab al-Tabbaneh and al-Swaika to 19 per cent in Basatin neighbourhood. This figure rises to 90 per cent in some neighbourhoods, such as Hay al-Tanak. About 30 per cent of the population is below the poverty line, and has a daily income of less than $2. Moreover, the unemployment rate among youth in Tripoli has reached a high level

exceeding 70 per cent. The UNDP's Millennium Development Goals: Lebanon Report[155] showed that 20.7 per cent of Lebanon's population resided in the north, but represented 38 per cent of the country's poor, and 46 per cent of the poorest.[156]

2. Housing and the living conditions

Lebanon is officially a middle-income country. However, it contains many problems related to poverty and inequality.[157] North Lebanon is one of the poorest governorates, within which patterns of poverty and opportunities vary. Tripoli is particularly the most deprived city in Lebanon, and competition over resources and services is heightened therein.[158]

It is estimated that there are approximately 45,000 working children in Lebanon aged 9-10. However, the figures vary between regions, and the north records the largest number of working children, mostly in Minieh and Tripoli.[159]

Many buildings in Bab al-Tabbaneh have been damaged due to the numerous conflicts the neighbourhood witnessed, and the lack of maintenance. The population of the region suffers from difficult living conditions due to problems in electricity services and water networks, as well as the region's deprivation of a large number of development services. Overcrowding is a major problem, and the region is no longer able to accommodate the population and its needs.[160] In terms of overcrowding, it is estimated that 10 per cent of Lebanese homes are overcrowded, compared to 32.1 per cent for overcrowded non-Lebanese homes.[161] The UN-Habitat and UNICEF study indicates that the area contains about 765

buildings with an average Syrian occupancy of 6.0 per housing unit, and a Lebanese one of 4.9 per unit. The majority of units are rented.[162]

According to the same study, 47 per cent of Bab al-Tabbaneh buildings were built between 1944 and 1970, 28 per cent between 1922 and 1943, and 19 per cent between 1976 and 2000. The rest were built either before 1920 or after 2000. On the condition of the buildings, the study showed that 68 per cent of its roofs were in urgent need of repair, while 49 per cent of buildings had extensive failure of doors and windows, resulting in water intrusion and damage to buildings. The study also estimated that 4 per cent of buildings were at risk of collapse. All those surveyed used untreated drinking water, compared to the national average of 12.4 per cent. The majority of households surveyed (95 per cent) use a sanitation facility that consists of pipes in most times, and two per cent do not have sanitation facilities, while approximately 99 per cent of Lebanese people nationwide use improved sanitation.

Therefore, the situation of housing, infrastructure, and sanitation in the Bab al-Tabbaneh area is in dire need of treatment.

3. Education

Both the public and private sector contribute to the education system in Lebanon. The public sector accommodates 30 per cent of students, while the private sector accommodates 70 per cent. North Lebanon hosts the largest number of public or official schools, perhaps because it is one of the poorest regions, and has the second largest number of students enrolled in public schools (35 per cent).

Table 21. Distribution of students in Lebanon, by educational sector and governorate

Governorate	Total	UNRWA	Private education	Tuition-free private education	Public sector
Percentage	7.1	0.3	4.7	0.5	1.6
Beirut	21.6	0.2	16.3	2.4	2.7
Mount Lebanon and the suburbs of Beirut	11.4	0.2	7.5	0.9	2.8
Mount Lebanon without the suburbs of Beirut	15	0.4	6.3	1.9	6.4
North	8.5	0.2	4.3	1.2	2.6
Beqaa	11.9	1.5	4.5	1.3	4.7
South	7.4	0	2.8	1.5	3.2
Nabatieh	9.9	0.6	3.5	1.3	4.5
Akkar	7.4	0.1	2.6	2.2	2.5
Baalbek-Hermel	100	3.4	52.6	13.1	30.9
Total					

Source: Lebanon, Center for Educational Research and Development, 2019.

Although the North Governorate has the largest number of public schools, it records the lowest enrolment and attendance rates, amounting to only 20 per cent in kindergarten, compared with 92 per cent in Mount Lebanon. The North Governorate has the lowest primary school completion rate, and many schools suffer from poor infrastructure.[163] A new UNICEF study on Bab al-Tabbaneh showed that enrolment was 84 per cent in primary education, 40 per cent in secondary education, and 6.5 per cent in kindergarten.[164] A survey conducted by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education in Lebanon in 2011 of public school buildings showed that the state of schools in the North was the worst in terms of the condition of buildings and equipment.[165] The North Governorate records the highest dropout and failure rates. With the Syrian crisis and the influx of refugees, the school system has become overburdened with refugee students, and its capacity had to be expanded to deal with this reality. Therefore, some issues were reviewed, such as faculty members, the availability of space in schools, as well as educational tools and equipment, as public schools in Lebanon are designed to accommodate 300,000 students, but have had to accommodate 400,000 Syrian refugee children.[166]

4. Health

The Lebanese health care system is based on curative rather than preventive care. It is characterized by the high cost of health service

compared to the financial capacity of the population. The influx of Syrian refugees as of 2011 has revealed weaknesses in the health-care system, as most refugees benefit from the services provided by primary health care facilities.[167] Tripoli has some specialized care centres that are not available in other northern areas, such as Akkar, so residents have to go to Tripoli to get to them.[168] Bab al-Tabbaneh has one dispensary, a primary health care centre, and a secondary health care centre. Psychological support services are not available in primary health care centres and dispensaries. Health insurance cannot be joined by 80.9 per cent of the Lebanese and 89.9 per cent of the non-Lebanese, making it difficult for them to access health services.[169]

The most common diseases in Bab al-Tabbaneh are chronic illnesses (14 per cent). The proportion of persons with disabilities amounts to 2.5 per cent. More than 50 per cent of children under five years of age have received treatment for diarrhoea. Narcotic drug abuse appears to be widespread in Bab al-Tabbaneh for reasons related to tension, violence, unemployment, and poverty.[170]

5. Employment and unemployment

Studies on the labour market in Bab al-Tabbaneh are few. One indicates[171] that the working-age population of Bab al-Tabbaneh (15-63 years) is about 12,750, including 10,830 Lebanese and 1,890 non-Lebanese, and that unemployment rates of the Lebanese and non-Lebanese are very similar, as the unemployment rate among the Lebanese is slightly lower, and they work on average fewer hours per week than the non-Lebanese. More specifically, 58.8 per cent of the Lebanese reported being unemployed, while 35.8 per cent stated that they were wage employees.

Likewise, 62.8 per cent of the non-Lebanese reported being unemployed, while 31.8 per cent stated that they were wage employees. On average, Lebanese staff work between 24 and 30 hours per week, while the non-Lebanese work between 25 and 32 hours per week. However, there are wide discrepancies in the unemployment rate between genders and age groups. The majority of heads of household working in Bab al-Tabbaneh are vocational workers (18.8 per cent), and working in services, shops, and markets is one of the most popular occupations (6.9 per cent), in addition to drivers (4.5 per cent). The unemployment rate in Lebanon is 20 per cent, and this shows how bad the economic situation in Bab al-Tabbaneh is compared to the overall situation. The unemployment rate among young people in Lebanon is estimated at somewhere between 20 and 24 per cent.[172] Youth unemployment rates are higher among females,[173] while ILO statistics indicate that youth unemployment reached 34 per cent in 2017.[174]

The vast majority of those who work in Bab al-Tabbaneh work in low-quality, low-productivity jobs and in institutions with fewer than ten employees. The majority of workers work in the wholesale and retail trade sector, which is characterized by low productivity. The total labour force in the North is expected to rise from 289,000 to 362,000 by 2025, owing to current trends in working-age population growth and current labour market participation rates. This means that the regional economy will need to create an average of 8,000 jobs each year just to maintain a stable status in the labour market.[175]

The World Bank's 2017 report on Tripoli, "Jobs for North Lebanon", notes that the North hosts the absolute majority of the poor in Lebanon, equivalent to about 290,000 or 36 per cent,

a rate much higher than the national average. The report notes that about 90 per cent of workers in Tripoli work in the informal sector and are not registered in social security. These account for about 38 per cent of the workforce of Tripoli's population. The small size of investment projects leads to a lower employment rate, thus the number of job applications exceeds the size of offered employment opportunities. A rate of 54 per cent of employees work for companies with less than 9 employees, and 41 per cent for companies with a maximum of 5 employees. Even when jobs in private sector companies are available, they are below the qualification level of most of their applicants. The report considers that the mismatch between educational degrees and employment opportunities to also be a cause of weakness. It stresses the importance of overcoming this obstacle, to achieve greater and better productivity. It addresses an important issue, namely, that the search in the labour market depends primarily on private networks. The positive aspect of this lies in the flexibility of workers, who agree to work even in occupations different from their educational attainment.

6. Participation, recognition, and representation

Few studies have addressed participation, representation, and recognition at the national level in general, and in Tripoli and Bab al-Tabbaneh in particular. According to a study conducted by Lebanon Support,[176] Tripoli had one of the lowest voting rates, with only 11 per cent, while Matn recorded 54 per cent, and Koura 47 per cent. This is often due to hopelessness among the population, as well as in the civil society about the possibility of change. The vote in the municipal elections was 26 per cent in 2016, reflecting a degree of political indifference.

The law sets the age of voting and candidacy at 21, which is considered high. Despite putting in place a youth policy for Lebanon, many of its provisions remain unimplemented. There are many laws that limit the participation and recognition of different segments of society. For example, the law deprives the children of Lebanese women married to non-Lebanese men of their civil and political rights. Lebanese laws also do not give Palestinian refugees a number of social, economic, and political rights. Lebanon's sponsorship system violates the human rights of foreign workers, as the authorities prevent them from establishing a union to represent them, and two of the founders of such a union were deported. The internal regulations of public schools prohibit students from electing representatives, and ban students and teachers from joining political parties or participating in demonstrations. Moreover, women's participation in Parliament and Government remains very low. Gender discrimination practices are witnessed in institutions such as the Social Security, and in prejudicial custodial laws against women. Persons with disabilities suffer numerous violations of their rights due to the lack of structural equipment that renders the environment accessible, thus allowing them to participate in society. In recent elections, thousands of violations against persons with disabilities have been recorded for not equipping polling stations and for compromising their dignity. In addition, textbooks of school curricula are full of negative representation and stereotypes of women and people with disabilities, in violation of the principle of equality.[177]

7. Development attempts

Some actors, including the municipality and local, ministerial and political actors, with the support of international organizations, have tried to launch development initiatives and strategies for Tripoli, including Bab al-Tabbaneh. Two strategies were developed in the last two decades: "Tripoli 2020" and "Towards social and economic security in Bab al-Tabbaneh, Jabal Mohsen, and al-Qubba". The Tripoli 2020 initiative aimed to improve employment opportunities, education, health, urbanization, infrastructure, and social inclusion, especially for people with disabilities, as well as to raise media awareness to reflect a positive image of Tripoli. Some political actors initiated a plan for economic and social development ahead of the elections, but it was not implemented. The Ministry of Social Affairs devised a plan to save the city in 2014, and it included economic, social, health, and cultural development, but it also had not seen the light of day for political reasons, as one of the people who took part in devising the plan pointed out. The strategy, "Towards social, economic, and political security in Bab al-Tabbaneh, Jabal Mohsen, and al-Qubba", developed by the Tripoli municipality, has been accompanied by the launch of a series of projects and initiatives to improve infrastructure, building facades, and sanitation services, but the size of these projects remains modest, interviews show.

B. Case study of Bab al-Tabbaneh

1. Study methodology

The present study adopted a dialogue methodology consisting of three focused discussion groups with low-income young persons and women from Bab al-Tabbaneh,

activists in associations concerned with the marginalized in the fields of health, human rights, social aspects, and education, as well as an interview with a member of the Tripoli Municipal Council. Each discussion group consisted of six to 10 people. A sample of some marginalized segments of society was selected, including 10 women from the Bab al-Tabbaneh community from modest social backgrounds, most of whom only occasionally worked in making and selling food supplies, and one of whom was a widow and the provider for her family. The sample also included a number of young people, some of whom were still in school, some who had graduated from university, and some who had not completed their education. Some work, but most are unemployed. A group of workers in activist associations were interviewed.

The focused interviews and discussions touched upon areas such as public services, housing, health, education, employment, and political and social participation. The results are as follows:

2. Study outcomes:

The present section presents the conclusions drawn from the focused discussions held with the three discussion groups, addressing the background of the marginalized Bab al-Tabbaneh, the reasons for their marginalization, the difficulty they face accessing services, as well as other aspects of the social, economic, and political exclusion from which they suffer.

(a) Who are the marginalized in Bab al-Tabbaneh?

Women who were part of the discussion groups noted that day labourers, youth, the elderly, and

people with disabilities were the groups most at risk of being severely marginalized. Day labourers are denied health insurance, work leave, and fixed income. They are the most likely to be late in paying their house rent, and therefore face the possibility of being evicted from their homes for default. Most of them receive an income too low to cover medical expenses. As for the elderly, some of whom are sent to nursing homes and are not visited by anyone, while others cannot be taken to hospital for treatment because ambulances are unavailable, or because their families cannot afford their treatment. The women indicated that some elderly people searched for leftovers in trash cans.

As for people with disabilities, most of them are locked indoors, as the local environment lacks accessibility requirements, including educational and health facilities and services, sidewalks, and shops that take their condition into account, additionally because the labour market is not equipped to accommodate them. The general public's perception of them also contributes to further marginalizing them. Although they enjoy some exemptions, such as municipal taxes, the application of such measures remains marred by many problems and obstacles. "I have a brother who had an accident and could no longer work", one woman said. "And my mom helps him. We asked the municipality if he could open a small kiosk to sell goods, but the municipality refused. If my mother dies, he would have no one to provide for him". Association representatives agreed that persons with disabilities were among the most marginalized segments of society. They noted that non-registered persons were subject to a lot of repression, and did not have access to the most basic services such as health, education, jobs, or even travel.

Young people felt that the unemployed young persons were marginalized, as they were unable to participate in society because of the social, political, cultural, and informal structure. Marginalization affects university students, students in non-university institutions, professionals, and specialties, due to the lack of opportunities and the dominance of a political, social, and cultural segment that limits their participation.

Young people also felt that the elderly suffered from marginalization, and the lack of health care, and material support to provide for their most basic needs for food, drink, and housing. They noted that children in Bab al-Tabbaneh were also marginalized because there were very few free good learning opportunities, and they suffered from violence, early marriage, and a patriarchal society. They are also enticed by political actors who involve them in political and illegal acts, or by those who drive them to delinquent actions, such as hashish and drug abuse. Some thugs and gangsters belonging to political parties, and who have been involved in illegal acts, tend to confiscate some public spaces, and are protected and covered by influential actors who use them in conflicts and violence in the region. These entice young people to commit illegal acts.

Workers in the local, regional, and international associations in Bab al-Tabbaneh pointed out that women and juveniles who had been previously imprisoned consist one of the most marginalized groups as they cannot find work, in addition to children who drop out of school as they have to work to support themselves and their families. Women suffer from a lot of violence and cannot seek help as the society is a patriarchal one. The population of Bab al-Tabbaneh has been further marginalized due to the refugee crisis.

A member of Tripoli municipality confirmed that all members of the Bab al-Tabbaneh community from women to children, the elderly, and juveniles were marginalized. The region suffers from extreme poverty, wrecked infrastructure, as well as inadequate health and education services. Moreover, the economic crisis and security situation have impoverished even the middle class.

The most disadvantaged areas include the so-called al-Mankoubin area, [the area of the afflicted], which has become inhabited since the Abu Ali River flood in 1965. Everyone confirmed that conflicts in Bab al-Tabbaneh had further impoverished it and neglected its need for services and development, and that the socioeconomic situation had worsened after violence had come to an end, as funds were no longer being injected to sustain the conflict. Disadvantaged places have been historically disadvantaged and neglected, and continue to be as such. As Governments change, and in the presence of various political parties and movements, those places are becoming poorer and more disadvantaged.

(b) Causes of marginalization

All agreed that marginalization was the result of a lack of political will to sustainably develop the region instead of only providing relief and in-kind assistance. The conservative nature of the environment and the prevailing beliefs and practices that marginalize young people and women, including early marriage, have contributed to exacerbating the situation. The lack of interest in education is an obstacle to development. Political parties that suffer from endemic corruption, and protect those who break the laws with the aim of using them, have made Bab al-Tabbaneh an area with rampant law-breaking, nepotism, as well as sectarian,

partisan, and familial intolerance. The absence of development and law have led to a lack of employment opportunities, and the Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood has become as if it were outside Lebanon. The influx of refugees due to the Syrian crisis has led to an increase in house rents, and has intensified competition for employment. State officials such as police and army personnel are considered to be more fortunate because they benefit from health insurance and schooling subsidies.

The municipality member noted that development initiatives in Tripoli, such as the Karami Exhibition, the port, and the free zone, had not had the resources to support their launch and sustainability. Tourism has not been invested, and the authorities did not care about operating the airport. The political situation following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 led to a deterioration in the security situation and delayed development prospects. A number of Chinese investors are currently interested in the port of Tripoli, but the Government's decision to make the Beirut port the only one to inspect and control ships and impose customs hindered developing the port of Tripoli, and opening it for import and export. Investors fear that the Syrian crisis will spill over into the region. The fact that the region's wealthy population is reluctant to invest therein discourages potential investors from outside the region to invest in it.

(c) Education

The lack of public schools, universities, and vocational colleges that provide quality education has been a major reason for the dropout of many students, some of whom have since been involved in illegal practices, or have taken on jobs that do not suit their age and abilities in exchange for very small sums.

Mothers participating in the discussion noted that their children had been beaten and insulted by teachers.

Participants summarized the problems of education as poor quality, violence in schools, lack of psychosocial support for children, deficient ministerial oversight, and inadequate school structure, particularly bathrooms, which specifically led females to absence and dropout. Civil society associations are active through programmes of homework, supplementary schooling, and psychological support. These programmes are popular with marginalized Lebanese children and refugee students. Activists in the associations said parents of students needed support in how to deal with their children, positive parenting, and the importance of education. They also needed awareness on drug abuse risks. They also noted the poor quality of education available to Syrian students in evening schools. Additionally, security problems pose a challenge that called for the presence of military forces in front of some schools and universities. Moreover, sectarian screening in schools is a challenge for parents, students, and teachers.

With regard to university education, participants reported that the situation of the Lebanese University was poor because, in terms of security, its location did not encourage students to attend. The new building is good, but some students cannot afford the transportation cost of going there, because it is located outside the city. One young woman said she would not be able to complete her university studies because of the cost of tuition and transportation. Participants also noted that the lack of some specializations in public and local universities required students who choose these disciplines to either go to the capital or change their specialization. It should be noted that most of

the young people interviewed were unemployed even though they had finished their university education, or worked as teachers in a field other than their specialization. Participants recommended the need to develop a system for evaluating schools, provide professional and university counselling, and develop curricula and school activities.

(d) Housing

Housing was a major concern for all those interviewed. One of the most prominent problems is infrastructure and poor services in the most parts of Bab al-Tabbaneh. Most of the buildings have not been repaired or renovated in decades. There are no services of road cleaning or repair, sanitation, and waste removal, and some homes lack bathrooms. Some buildings are at risk of collapse, and numerous collapses have resulted in casualties.[178]

Rents and the high cost of buying houses are, for many, an obstacle to renting or buying a house. The lack of permanent employment renders it impossible to cover the housing cost. The majority of women expressed that they always had difficulty paying rent. One had to share the house with her in-laws because she and her husband were unable to afford a residence of their own. A widowed mother divided her home into two, so that her hearing-impaired son could marry and start a family because he could not obtain a house of his own.

Young people have great difficulty covering housing expenses because of the high cost. The lack of public transport makes it difficult to leave Bab al-Tabbaneh. There are no initiatives by the municipality or the State to provide subsidized housing. Some said that the Awqaf was constructing buildings and selling them at market prices without any discounts.

The municipality member said 1,000 homes in Bab al-Tabbaneh were at risk of collapse, and many were in dire need of renovation. After the influx of refugees due to the Syrian crisis, a number of grants and projects were provided for house restoration and basic service provision, such as water, bathrooms, and sanitation. The appearance of some neighbourhoods, streets, and houses was improved as part of projects focused on building facades. Participants mentioned a number of good initiatives by organizations such as UNICEF, Oxfam, and associations working in this field. The Ministry of Social Affairs surveyed the buildings and renovated some houses of the surrounding villages, but this did not include Bab al-Tabbaneh. Participants agreed that Bab al-Tabbaneh, al-Qubba, al-Mankoubin, Dahr al-Maghr, and the centre of the Old City were among the areas with most buildings at risk of collapse, or which lacked sanitation structures.

Participants revealed the poor relations between neighbourhood residents in terms of waste management and disposal, cleanliness of common spaces, lack of control and law enforcement by the municipality and police. In their view, development priorities in the area in question should focus on sanitation, home renovation, bathroom provision, electric grid repair, drinking water provision, and waste collection and management.

(e) Health

There is no public health system in Lebanon, so many people are forced to buy private health insurance. Moreover, some unions provide various private insurances. The Social Security provided by the State covers part of the medical cost for employees registered therein. Most of the informal sector workers, who make up the majority of the economically active people in Lebanon, suffer from being unable to afford medical expenses. The Ministry of Health covers medical expenses for some cases, but the number of beds allocated to the Ministry in hospitals is very limited. Because of the high cost of medication, some turn to local clinics, which provide poor services, as participants have agreed. All complained that medical services in most hospitals in the region were inadequate, and that patients died at hospital doors because they could not pay the cost of admission.

Parents complained that free vaccination campaigns were weak, and that vaccines available in clinics were of a bad quality. The Ministry of Health does not provide treatments or support for cancer patients. A number of women indicated that they avoided going to the doctor because they could not afford medication and treatment. Parents receiving treatment through army insurance complained of the poor quality of the provided medication. Participants recommended launching child vaccination awareness campaigns, and improving the quality of health services by enhancing oversight and promoting decentralization.

(f) Participation

Although young participants are active in social and political associations, they feel that it is difficult and sometimes impossible to make an impact because of Lebanon's system and Tripoli's special political situation. They have participated in numerous anti-corruption campaigns, and many female participants have demonstrated weekly by taking a stand in front of the municipality to pressure officials into improving economic conditions, but their attempts have not yet yielded results. Unemployment limits participation in political

activity and demonstrations, because it holds people hostage to politicians in hopes of getting a job or receiving material assistance.

The women pointed out that the Syrian crisis, the resulting influx of refugees, and the rush of associations and the local community to implement projects and activities supporting refugees provided them with many opportunities to participate in those activities. However, this participation is limited to economic activities or social, psychological, and health education. These courses usually provide a transport allowance that encourages women to participate. As for political participation, female participants said that some of them had boycotted the elections because they were not convinced of the candidates, while some participated in protest stands and demonstrations. Some joined political campaigns and then withdrew because they had not been convinced, while some felt that the male culture, along with corruption and nepotism limited women's participation in politics. Women proposed the introduction of a female quota in parliament and the municipality. One reported that she had applied for a municipal police post.

According to a social activist, the low voter turnout in Bab al-Tabbaneh was due to the fact that the majority of the population in the region did not vote there, while the majority of the people who voted there had left and lost interest in the election because they did not believe in their ability to make a difference.

(g) Development attempts

The Bab al-Tabbaneh region has witnessed some attempts at development and limiting exclusion and marginalization. Participants in the discussions thought that the most effective

initiatives were those that had financial continuity and community member participation, such as the Operation Salam, which included former fighters in Bab al-Tabbaneh and al-Qubba, who were trained on how to restore the facades of streets, neighbourhoods, and shops in these areas that had witnessed conflicts. After the completion of the restoration work, a private for-profit company was established; it employs former combatants in construction and restoration, thereby ensuring financial sufficiency for all its employees. Small development projects such as the provision of kiosks or shops for people with disabilities to sell coffee or juice were a solution for these persons after attempts to recruit them had failed, because of their low level of education and not having the required specialties.

Less effective initiatives were mostly by political actors, who had no sooner invested them in attaining political gains in elections. High-cost projects are considered ineffective and have a limited impact on improving the quality of life of marginalized segments. Former members of the municipality and civil society activists therefore stressed the need for in-depth field studies to define the priorities of the population in general and the marginalized in particular, and to devise development plans based on the results of these studies.

C. Conclusion

It must be clarified that the present case study is not representative given the studied sample, but it aimed to learn aspects of the experience of marginalized groups, the marginalization causes, access and quality of services, and the extent of their participation and representation. The study showed that the history of marginalization in Bab al-Tabbaneh dates back

to the emergence of the Lebanese State. Development attempts have been made in the context of governmental or charitable initiatives, or civil society or United Nations organization initiatives, but most did not succeed because they had entailed projects of a limited size and impact, or merely aesthetic projects. The majority of initiatives and projects have not addressed the structural causes that deepen marginalization, exclusion, and injustice, such as the enforcement of legislation, accountability, and the enactment of new legislation that contribute to equality and countering the influence political parties and actors who impede development attempts. As for the successful local initiatives implemented by the civil society, they were characterized by being independent initiatives that adopted more sustainable approaches. These initiatives focused on rehabilitating some marginalized people, such as fighters or persons with disabilities, and preparing them for the labour market. However, the scope of these initiatives remains limited.

Dismantling the pillars of oppression and injustice requires economic and social development that is truly working towards achieving social justice through providing participation and representation opportunities, as well as access to services. Achieving social justice in Bab al-Tabbaneh requires dismantling and rebuilding relations between official, local, and informal authorities on the one hand, and Bab al-Tabbaneh residents on the other. In order to attain sustainable development for the Bab al-Tabbaneh population, the State should allocate significant investments to provide key services such as medication, education, infrastructure, and services, in addition to achieving local reconciliation.

It is almost impossible for development strategies to come to existence in the light of conflicts between local leaderships whose authorities influence the street and municipal work. Discussion participants considered that the control of local leaderships, their conflicts, and the State's neglect of its responsibilities were among the main obstacles to development. Participants expressed an urge for development projects and a great willingness, especially among women, to engage in the labour market, and in social and development work.

In any development plan for Bab al-Tabbaneh, priority must be given to infrastructure and buildings, as well as to young people by increasing opportunities for academic or vocational education that is of a good quality and creates employment opportunities. Social protection remains one of the most prominent conditions for development in Bab al-Tabbaneh, given the large numbers of elderly people, children, non-registered persons, and delinquents who are the most in need of protection. Development projects should also include raising awareness about a number of malpractices, particularly child marriage.

D. Recommendations on integration and development policies in Bab al-Tabbaneh

Based on the results of individual and group interviews, the review of studies on the Bab al-Tabbaneh region, and the framework of the UNDP "Leaving No One Behind" programme, the report proposes the following recommendations for sustainable development of Bab al-Tabbaneh.

Devising a comprehensive and equitable development strategy for all regions, especially peripheral ones: this strategy addresses the structural and developmental causes that lead to marginalization, by amending civil and personal status laws that have contributed to the marginalization of many groups such as persons with disabilities, the elderly, workers, and women, as well as removing barriers to their full participation in various areas of life, and to the fulfilment of their right to basic services of health, education, and entertainment. This strategy can be developed in partnership with the local civil society that is experienced enough and knows the reality and problems Bab al-Tabbaneh faces, and may have already provided sustainable solutions in various social and economic areas.

Health services can be improved by making Bab al-Tabbaneh one of the Ministry of Health's priorities in terms of building health facilities or contributing to their cost, such as hospitals and clinics that respect the particularities of all segments of society, and also in terms of providing rehabilitation services, and the necessary equipment for the mobility of persons with disabilities, so as to facilitate their integration in society. Moreover, health services can be improved through the development of a joint action plan between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs, to enhance the qualifications of the medical and nursing staff, as well as the social workers.

To improve the quality of education and tackle dropouts, the Ministry of Education can make the necessary infrastructure reforms that respect the rights of all segments of society, especially those with disabilities. It can also review school curricula, and work on providing free education, and additional supplementary programmes for children facing educational

difficulty. The Ministry can also engage with civil society organizations to conduct awareness campaigns on the importance of public education, as well as education and vocational training, its impact on the future of young people, and the risks that may result from school dropouts, child labour, and early marriage.

Promoting employment and reducing unemployment requires clear policies and effective mechanisms for job creation, and promoting investment and special initiatives in the area. The municipality and civil society organizations play a key role in facilitating the establishment of small enterprises that provide employment opportunities in the service, tourism, industrial, and agricultural sectors.

To combat the phenomenon of increasing drug abuse among young people, it is proposed to adopt a national and local drug control policy, in coordination with a number of ministries, including the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth. A body involving Government and private sectors and civil society organizations can also be established to provide the necessary support to address the issue.

Promoting political and social participation for all: this requires that the municipality and community organizations develop local policies and projects that enable all segments of society, especially women, youth, and persons with disabilities, to participate in social and political work.

Rehabilitating damaged infrastructure, public utilities, and damaged buildings that are at risk of collapsing, and providing the necessary and basic services

of usable water and sanitation: the municipality has a key role in designing a civil development plan that provides solutions to the problems of the population and corrects the conditions of the neighbourhoods. The plan must cover public facilities, such as parks, and entail rehabilitating them for the benefit of all the population, including children, young people, families, individuals, persons with disabilities, and the elderly.

Strengthening the municipality's capacity to play a participatory development role: that is achieved by developing the capacity of the municipality and its employees to play the developmental role, through a participatory approach, supervise the implementation of the development plan, and follow up on its goals.

Protection and security: Development requires security and stability. That being said, local leaderships are one of the main obstacles to security, and thus to development in Bab al-Tabbaneh. It is therefore essential that there be a political and local will to achieve reconciliation between the conflicting parties in Bab al-Tabbaneh, and that this reconciliation be accompanied by a local security plan containing a development aspect.

5. Summary and General Recommendations

5. Summary and General Recommendations

A. Conclusion

The road to equitable development in the Arab region remains fraught with difficulties. Many social groups are still marginalized on various levels: legal, institutional, and cultural, and lack access to basic services. The history of marginalization dates back more than half a century, reflecting the failure of development attempts in the region over the past decades. The three case studies show that the situation has worsened, particularly as most economic systems have tended to adopt liberal policies that have proved to deepen wealth disparities among groups of the same society, while the social benefits provided by the State have lessened. As the political situation deteriorates and democracy falters in a number of Arab countries, it is becoming increasingly difficult to address the roots of injustice from laws and policies. Any attempt to tackle marginalization requires the State and its institutions to adhere to the values of democracy and social justice. It is difficult to tackle marginalization in Arab region by means of free market policies, especially considering the prevalence of corruption and nepotism, and the lack of equal opportunities. The study shows that the sphere of political participation in the Arab region, especially in Egypt and Lebanon, is constantly shrinking. A glimmer of hope no sooner emerged from the popular uprisings in some Arab States in recent years, than it was extinguished by the great difficulties of change. It is quite difficult to dismantle authoritarian regimes infiltrated by corruption and nepotism.

As local conflicts have been transformed into regional and international ones, the attempt at reform has become more difficult. However, the civil society continues to take the initiative and resist.

The three case studies also show that the chances of individual and group participation in the social, economic, and political life, or even claiming the right to do so, are very limited. Exclusion includes not only denial of participation, but also denial of access to basic services. Poverty, marginalization, and deprivation are increasing, and youth unemployment rates are on the rise. Although some progress has been made in women's rights in terms of their participation in the labour market, many difficulties still face women, such as discriminatory laws and the negative stereotypical culture that deny them their rights. Persons with disabilities, non-registered persons, the elderly men and women are in a similar situation as a result of institutional, legal, structural, cultural, and relational barriers.

B. General recommendations

It should be noted that the recommendations of the three case studies agreed on the importance of a participatory development approach based on social justice that includes all marginalized groups, and on the importance of adopting a development concept based on the principle of leaving no one behind, to address the causes and

consequences of discrimination, while paying attention to the geographical dimension of development, particularly the peripheral regions. The results of the three case studies confirm that equitable development cannot be achieved without policies and governance systems adhering to the principle of justice and equality.

Therefore, in addition to the recommendations or proposals made at the conclusion of each of the three case studies relating to the situation of Egypt's residential areas in cemeteries, Tunisia's Central-West Region, and Lebanon's Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood, the present report makes a set of general recommendations concerning integrating marginalized groups and including them in the pursuit of sustainable development and the achievement of social justice.

- Adopt a development approach based on justice. The framework proposed by the United Nations in 2018, which identifies five key factors that lead to a sense of neglect and marginalization, provides an approach that helps to this end. According to this framework, discrimination, geographical location, governance system, socioeconomic situation, and shocks such as wars and conflicts lead to marginalization and a sense of neglect and exclusion;
- Strengthen the central role of the State, so as to adopt a participatory approach with target communities, focus on local development and enhance the role and capacities of elected local councils;
- Activate laws that promote social justice, as they consist one of the most important

components and conditions of any development process. Unfair laws often create a fertile environment for marginalization, and are thus one of the effective mechanisms for shaking the foundations of injustice and inequality. Some may question the importance of laws in the light of the weakness of the judiciary in some Arab countries. However, combined with a just judiciary, the law remains the cornerstone of any attempt to combat exclusion, marginalization, and inequality;
- Achieve equality in education opportunities and quality; the three cases studied showed the urgent need to develop education, improve its quality, and establish an educational structure based on the concept of justice and the principle of leaving no one behind;
- Ensure freedom of representation, expression, and participation, as well as improve working conditions and worker rights. Parties, unions, professional associations, and federations have a prominent role in achieving equitable and democratic development. Their effectiveness, however, depends on the extent of freedom they are provided. Economic development is contingent on creating jobs compatible with the labour force competencies;
- Develop social protection systems that provide the most marginalized segments with a safety net;
- Reform laws and legislation, and move towards democratic and equitable governance to achieve sustainable development.

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Endnotes

Introduction

1. World Bank, 2018.
2. World Bank, 2017.

Chapter 1

3. John, 2004.
4. Ziai, 2007; Sardar, 1999.
5. Escobar, 1992.
6. Ziai, 2007.
7. Esteva, 2010.
8. Liberal feminism is a theory that focuses on women's ability to ensure equality through their own actions and choices, and emphasizes making women's legal and political rights equal to those of men. It stands at the opposite end to the radical feminism theory.
9. Struckmann, 2018.
10. World Bank, 2013.
11. Young, 1990.
12. Gewirtz, 1998, 2000.
13. Young, 1990.
14. Fraser, 1997.
15. Fraser, 2005.

Chapter 2

16. Soliman, 2007.
17. Sims, 2011, p. 20.
18. الجزيرة، 2008؛ المصري اليوم، 2009.
19. مصر، الجهاز المركزي للتعبئة العامة والاحصاء، 2017أ.
20. ديفيز، 2012، ص. 89.
21. جاد، 2012، ص. 81-83.
22. Dwivedi, Khator and Nef, 2007, p. 62.
23. Bernt and Colini, 2013.
24. For more on exclusion in Egypt, see: Verme and others, 2014; E/ESCWA/SDD/2011/2.
25. راجح، 2008، ص. 139.
26. Abu-Lughod, 1971.
27. Sims, 2011, p. 32.
28. Egyptian-German Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas, 2009, p. 51.
29. عبده، 2006.
30. Rajah, 2008, pp. 140-141.

31. Ibid., pp. 141-142.
32. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, an academic, architect, and founder and chair of Built Environment Collective (Megawra), on Tuesday, February 26, 2019.
33. Studies on the subject include: Fahmi, 2014; Zayed, 2014.
34. Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 2017.
35. Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 2008.
36. فكري، 2018.
37. Sims, 2011.
38. Ibrashy, 2000.
39. Khalifa, 2011, p. 4.
40. جاد، 2012، ص. 69.
41. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
42. Ibid., p. 87.
43. Dickerman, 2016.
44. Ibid.
45. Euronews, 2013.
46. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
47. عبده، 2006.
48. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.; And a personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, who does not wish to be named, on February 28, 2019.
49. تضامن، 2016.
50. For more definitions, see: Spicker, 2009.
51. Khalifa, 2011.
52. A personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, op. cit.
53. عياد، 2015.
54. عبده، 2006.
55. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
56. For more on the problems of access to education for the poor, see: Varoujan, 2013.
57. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
58. A personal interview with an employee in the Ministry of Social Solidarity, who did not wish to be named, on February 25, 2019.
59. Egyptian-German Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas, 2009, p. 51.
60. Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, 2016, 2017b.
61. World Health Organization, 2017.
62. عبده، 2006.
63. A personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, op. cit.
64. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
65. Public and university hospitals require patients to pay for some services provided to them, such as inpatient booking tickets or a visit tickets, to pay off part of their debt to pharmaceutical and medical supplies companies and medical device maintenance companies.
66. علي الدين، 2017.
67. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
68. Zayed, 2014.
69. عبده، 2006.
70. حجي، 2018.
71. Ernie Hood, 2005.
72. LI, 2014.

73. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
74. A personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, op. cit.
75. جاد، 2012، ص. 90-91.
76. علي الدين، 2017.
77. مساهل، 2016.
78. Ibid.
79. علي الدين، 2017.
80. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
81. جاد، 2012، ص. 97.
82. Ibid., p. 99.
83. مساهل، ومعوض، 2018.
84. A personal interview with an employee in the Ministry of Social Solidarity, op. cit.
85. A personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, op. cit.
86. World Bank, 2019b.
87. World Bank, 2019a.
88. جاد، 2012، ص. 98.
89. علام، 2015.
90. عياد، 2015.
91. عبده، 2006.
92. Euronews, 2013.
93. جاد، 2012، ص. 87.
94. A personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, op. cit.
95. The reference here was to the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.
96. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
97. Ibid.
98. السويدي، 2012.
99. Ibid.
100. A personal interview with May Ibrashy, op. cit.
101. Patel, 2013.
102. Miranda, 2014.
103. تضامن، 2015.
104. Khosla, 2009.
105. Patel, 2013.
106. Giridharadas, 2006.
107. تضامن، 2014.
108. Del Mistro and Hensher, 2009.
109. Patel, 2013.
110. تضامن، 2015.
111. Ibid.
112. ديفيز، 2012، ص. 155.
113. مصر، وزارة الإسكان والمجتمعات العمرانية، برنامج الأمم المتحدة للمستوطنات البشرية والبرنامج الإنمائي للأمم المتحدة، 2012.
114. مساهل ومعوض، 2018أ.
115. مساهل ومعوض، 2018ب.
116. Egypt, State Information Service, 2019.
117. A personal interview with an employee in the Ministry of Social Solidarity, op. cit.

118. .مساهل ومعوض، 2018ج

119. .خبراء يطالبون، مرجع سبق ذكره

120. A personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, op. cit.

121. .خبراء يطالبون، مرجع سبق ذكره

122. Personal interview with Amr Abu Tawila, researcher and academic specializing in urban issues, on February 20, 2019.

123. .مساهل ومعوض، 2018أ

124. .رويترز، 2011

125. Deutsche Welle, 2018.

126. .حملة أحياء بالاسم فقط، 2013

127. .عوض، 2012

128. .علي الدين، 2017

129. A personal interview with Amr Abu Tawila, op. cit.

130. A personal interview with an employee in the Ministry of Social Solidarity, op. cit.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. A personal interview with a member of "Ahya Belesm Fqt" campaign, op. cit.

134. A personal interview with Amr Abu Tawila, op. cit.

Chapter 3

135. The references used for this chapter are the following: (1) Tunisia, Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation, 2017a, 2017b; (2) Tunisia, Ministry of Social Affairs, 2019; (3) Tunisia, Ministry of Health, 2016. (4) Tunisia, General Commission for Regional Development, 2011; (5) Tunisia, National Institute of Statistics, 2018; (6) Tunisia, National Institute of Statistics, 2017. (7) Tunisian Institute for Competitiveness and Quantitative Studies, 2018; (8) Tunisia, National Institute of Statistics, 2015.

136. Wastelands refer to vast lands, and is used to describe the geography of some regions of Tunisia.

137. Tunisia, Statistique Tunisie, 2016.

138. The first level of health care is the primary health care centres in villages and delegations; the second level is clinics; and the third level is regional and university hospitals.

139. The mechanism of working in regional associations emerged after independence within the framework of development policies adopted by the State to reduce unemployment and poverty among the simple labour force lacking academic or professional qualifications. Regional associations provide temporary employment for the unemployed in some areas of public intervention the State undertakes within the framework of infrastructure construction (public lighting, potable water, roads and rural/agricultural routes...), farmland protection, combating desertification and soil erosion, forest guarding, reforestation, among others. Work of regional associations covered all the country's regions.

Chapter 4

140. UN-Habitat, 2016.

141. UN-Habitat and Unicef, 2018.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

147. UN-Habitat, 2016.

148. Rajab, 2015.

149. United Nations Development Programme and the Council for Development and Reconstruction, 2009; Rajab, 2015.

150. UN-Habitat and UNICEF, 2018.
151. United Nations Development Programme, 2018a.
152. UN-Habitat and UNICEF, 2018.
153. Lebanon Humanitarian Fund, Utopia Organization and International, 2018.
154. نعمة، 2014.
155. UNDP, 2009.
156. لوفيفر، 2014.
157. UNICEF and Consultation and Research Institute, 2012.
158. UN-Habitat, 2016.
159. United Nations Development Programme and the Council for Development and Reconstruction, 2009.
160. UN-Habitat and UNICEF, 2018.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. UNICEF and Consultation and Research Institute, 2012.
164. UN-Habitat and UNICEF, 2018.
165. Lebanon, Ministry of Education and Higher Education, 2011.
166. UN-Habitat, 2016.
167. Ibid.
168. Mouchref, 2008.
169. UN-Habitat and UNICEF, 2018.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. Abou Jaoude, 2015; Chaaban and El Khoury, 2016; Kawar and Tzannatos, 2013; World Bank, 2014.
173. Dibeh, Fakih and Marrouch, 2016.
174. International Labour Organization, 2017.
175. UN-Habitat and UNICEF, 2018.
176. Lebanon Support, 2016.
177. Shuayb, 2015.
178. UN-Habitat and UNICEF, 2018.

Unprecedented social progress has been recorded around the world in the past few decades, with significant drops in poverty levels. However, this progress has been uneven as social and economic inequalities persist, or are increasing, in many countries. Marginalized groups still face numerous obstacles that prevent their full and real participation in economic, social, cultural and political life. To assess the situation on the ground in the Arab region, the present report provides three case studies from Egypt (residents of cemeteries in Cairo), Tunisia (residents of Kasserine, Kairouan and Sidi Bouzid in the Midwest region) and Lebanon (residents of the Bab al-Tabbaneh in Tripoli). These areas have endured chronic marginalization and their inhabitants suffer from extreme exclusion, with Government and local authorities ignoring their development needs.

The report is based on the principle of "leaving no one behind", which underpins the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The international community pledged to achieve prosperity for all, especially the poorest and most marginalized groups. The report also builds on the framework proposed by the United Nations Development Programme to help achieve the 2030 Agenda, entitled "What does it mean to leave no one behind?". The report also makes policy recommendations to address the exclusion of marginalized social groups, calls for a holistic approach to social policymaking and institutional reform to eradicate discrimination and exclusion, and presents targeted measures to address the fundamental obstacles that prevent the advancement of disadvantaged, marginalized or excluded social groups.