



Tuesday, 26 October 1982,  
at 3.40 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Imre HOLLAI (Hungary).

**AGENDA ITEM 3**

**Credentials of representatives to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly (continued):\***

**(b) Report of the Credentials Committee**

1. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Finland on a point of order.
2. Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): My point of order, made on behalf of the Nordic countries—Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and my own country—is in connection with the amendment in document A/37/L.9 submitted yesterday by the representative of Iran. The amendment proposes to reject the credentials of the representatives of Israel.
3. On behalf of the Nordic countries, I formally move that no action be taken on the amendment, and I ask you, Mr. President, to put the motion [A/37/L.11] to the vote immediately.
4. The motion is moved within the terms of rule 74 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. I wish to specify that it relates only to the Iranian amendment, and not to other aspects of the report of the Credentials Committee [A/37/543].
5. In putting forward the motion the five Nordic countries are motivated by their dedication to upholding the capacity and authority of the United Nations to act in fulfilment of its primary purpose—the maintenance of international peace and security. We believe further that concern for the future of the Organization and its task of bringing peace to the Middle East is in the overwhelming interest of all Member States.
6. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Finland, on behalf of the Nordic countries, has moved a motion, in the context of rule 74 of the rules of procedure, that the General Assembly decide not to take a decision on the amendment before the Assembly in document A/37/L.9.
7. Under rule 74, in addition to the proposer of the motion two representatives may speak in favour of it and two against, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.
8. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I speak against the motion just presented by the representative of Finland simply because a vote for or against it is in fact an expression of a position on the amendment. We think that it is the amendment

that is important, not the procedural motion concerning it.

9. We believe also that the justifications given by the representative of Finland for his motion are really reasons for voting in favour of the amendment.

10. You know very well, Mr. President, and I presume that all representatives here also know, that peace and security in the Middle East can be achieved only when justice prevails. We all have a great deal of information about the carnage and massacres wrought against the Lebanese people by the Zionist régime. In view of that information, we hope that all representatives will vote for the amendment in order to maintain justice and security in the area.

11. I see no reasonable justification for ignoring the amendment, which serves the same purpose as the procedural motion. Therefore there is obviously no need for the motion.

12. The PRESIDENT: As no other representative has asked to speak in favour of or against the motion submitted by the representative of Finland [A/37/L.11], on behalf of the Nordic countries, I shall put it to the vote. A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:* Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

*Against:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Cuba, Grenada, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nicaragua,<sup>1</sup> Viet Nam.

*Abstaining:* Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Niger, Pakistan, Poland, Rwanda, Saint Lucia,<sup>2</sup> Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Uganda,

\* Resumed from the 43rd meeting.

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania.

*The motion was adopted by 74 votes to 9, with 32 abstentions.*<sup>1,2</sup>

13. The PRESIDENT: We shall now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 25 of its first report [A/37/543].

14. Taking duly into account the views expressed by delegations, may I take it that the General Assembly adopts the draft resolution contained in paragraph 25 of the report?

*The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 37/5 A).*<sup>3</sup>

15. The PRESIDENT: I call now on those representatives who have asked to explain their votes in respect of all aspects of the first report of the Credentials Committee.

16. Mr. ULRICHSEN (Denmark): I should like briefly to explain the vote of the Danish delegation on the amendment contained in document A/37/L.8 and Add.1. In the present circumstances, my Government would clearly have preferred a neutral solution to the problem: because of legal principles and for procedural reasons, we voted against the amendment, which would have left the seat of Kampuchea vacant.

17. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): The fact that my delegation voted against the amendment contained in document A/37/L.8 and Add.1 does not imply any change in the British Government's position on this matter. In casting our vote last night we had no intention of contributing to the re-establishment of the Pol Pot régime, from which the United Kingdom withdrew formal recognition in 1979; nor do we see any grounds for expecting this to happen. On the contrary, we welcome the recent formation of a coalition of resistance forces as an important step towards a comprehensive political solution on the basis envisaged by last year's International Conference on Kampuchea.

18. I should also like to emphasize that the fact that my delegation has not objected to the credentials of the delegation of Afghanistan does not mean that my Government regards the Babrak Karmal régime as a Government.

19. Miss DEVER (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): The Belgian delegation wishes to explain its vote on the amendment contained in document A/37/L.8 and Add.1.

20. It is Belgium's constant policy to approve in principle the reports submitted by the Credentials Committee.

21. Despite our aversion to the Khmer Rouge régime, we have voted in past years in favour of the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea. Belgium could not accept Viet Nam's violation of the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of a foreign State. However, at the thirty-sixth session [*4th meeting*], Belgium indicated that it would be very difficult for it to repeat that vote in 1982 if a coalition government had still not been formed to replace the Government of that time, which was made up exclusively of members of the Khmer Rouge. The Coalition Government

has been formed, with Prince Norodom Sihanouk as President and Mr. Son Sann as Vice-President.

22. Those two persons with their adherents represent two thirds of the members of that Government. They are patriots who are absolutely representative of the Cambodian people, and Belgium wishes to express its confidence in them. This explains my delegation's negative vote on the amendment contained in document A/37/L.8 and Add.1.

23. As regards Afghanistan, I should like to explain that my delegation's having expressed no reservations regarding the credentials of the Afghan delegation should in no way be construed as recognition of the present régime in Afghanistan, which has been imposed on the Afghan people from outside.

24. Mr. van HOUTUM (Netherlands): The Netherlands delegation wishes to explain its vote on the amendment in document A/37/L.8 and Add.1. My delegation is in favour of a comprehensive political solution of the question of Kampuchea, as envisaged by last year's International Conference on Kampuchea. We regard the coalition of resistance forces under the presidency of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Democratic Kampuchea as a step towards such a comprehensive solution, based on a total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and the exercise by the Kampuchean people of their right to self-determination.

25. However, it should be made clear that our vote against the amendment was in no way intended as a contribution to the re-establishment of the Pol Pot régime.

26. Mr. van WELL (Federal Republic of Germany): The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany wishes first to address the question of the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea.

27. While reiterating our condemnation of the Pol Pot régime, we feel that it was right to uphold the decision of last year's session of the General Assembly, particularly taking into consideration the formation of the coalition headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

28. As to the credentials of the delegation of Afghanistan, we should like to reiterate our view, as expressed on previous occasions, that the Credentials Committee has the important, though limited, legal task of examining whether the credentials of a delegation correspond to the requirements laid down in rule 27 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. However, we do not want our position regarding the Babrak Karmal régime to be misunderstood. Our vote in favour of the Credentials Committee's report does not imply that we recognize the legitimacy of a régime installed and kept in power by foreign intervention.

29. Mr. BLUM (Israel): Now that the assault on the Organization by the forces of irrationality and lawlessness has been thrown back, it is appropriate to take stock of the developments that surrounded the discussion of the agenda item before us.

30. The first report of the Credentials Committee makes it perfectly clear that the credentials of the delegation of Israel, having been examined by the Committee in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of

procedure of the General Assembly, were found by it to be in due form and proper order. Accordingly, they were accepted by the Committee and recommended for approval by the Assembly alongside the credentials of some 90 other delegations. This notwithstanding, certain spokesmen of irrationality and lawlessness, most notably the representatives of Iran and Libya, and aided by those who have been traditionally fanning anti-Israeli obsessions in a cynical attempt to advance their sinister aims, have seen fit to make a gratuitous and completely unfounded attack on Israel's credentials both in statements in the Assembly and in the perverse letter circulated as document A/37/563 and Add.1.

31. The statements that we have heard from the representatives of such enlightened régimes as those of Iran and Libya were completely out of order, utterly irrelevant to the report of the Credentials Committee, and nothing more than a ritualistic incantation of well-worn clichés designed to waste the time of the General Assembly and the present discussion alike in order to introduce matters completely extraneous and irrelevant to the agenda item before us.

32. While I do not wish to be drawn into this evident abuse of the credentials procedure, I cannot refrain from pointing out the arrogant, frivolous and ironic character of the various anti-Israel statements made in the course of this debate.

33. My country has been the target of ongoing aggression by a group of States ever since its establishment in 1948. That group of States has over the past 34 years flagrantly and continuously violated the Charter of the United Nations and the basic principles of international law *vis-à-vis* Israel, most specifically Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which prohibits the use and even the threat of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State, and Article 2, paragraph 3, which enjoins all Members of the United Nations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means.

34. The countries which engineered the move that culminated in the anti-Israel statements made in the course of the discussion of the item before us have done everything in their power over the past three decades and more not only to harass my country in every conceivable manner, including the recurrent recourse to the unlawful use of force, but also to annihilate it and to wipe it off the face of the earth. They have even created a terrorist organization for the specific purpose of promoting their unrelenting efforts to destroy Israel. Having failed in their criminal designs against my country, they have been fulminating against it in the United Nations and in the specialized agencies and abusing the Organization by standing truth on its head and by attributing to Israel their own sins through a process known to psychologists as "projection". There can be no better explanation for the bizarre fact that notorious aggressors like Libya, Iraq, Syria and Viet Nam have the arrogance to pose here as peace-loving nations and to accuse Israel on this score simply because the intended victim of aggression has had the temerity to resist, and to resist successfully, the criminal designs of the aggressors. What is more difficult to explain is the cynical exploitation of Arab obsession with Israel by a group

of countries beyond the Middle East which have been fishing for two decades and more in the troubled waters of our region. I wish to assure the aggressor régimes and all their assorted cohorts in the Middle East and beyond, in the eastern hemisphere and in the western hemisphere, that Israel does not intend to accommodate them in this regard in the future either, and that it will resist and repel any attempt aimed against Israel's sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and dignity.

35. Incidentally, it is difficult to escape an intriguing question in this regard. If the criteria posited by such legal luminaries as the representatives of Libya and Iran are indeed relevant for the approval of credentials here, how is it that they, as well as the representatives of Iraq, Syria and so on, have seen fit to submit credentials in the first place? And if these criteria were indeed valid, how many seats in this hall would have to remain empty? Would not this hall become a pretty desolate place? Therefore let the aggressor nations search themselves first, before attributing their own sins to countries that are not guilty of them, especially their intended victims.

36. The discussion of the report of the Credentials Committee is not the occasion for any country to engage in polemics of the kind contained in the anti-Israel statements made here earlier. The impropriety of those statements was of course further compounded by their utterly mendacious character. Unjustified aspersions cast on credentials which are in due form and have been accepted as such by the Credentials Committee are in clear violation of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. The approach reflected in the anti-Israel statements made here is also incompatible with the principles supposedly guiding the United Nations, including the duty incumbent upon all Members of the United Nations to use it, as Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Charter enjoins us, as "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations".

37. The reprehensible approach reflected in those statements does not merely redound to the discredit of the United Nations system as a whole; it is also liable to affect adversely the ability of the United Nations to perform its primary functions for the maintenance of international peace and security.

38. The countries that engineered the move that eventually led to the illegal attempt to tamper with my country's credentials may also wish to ponder how much their own prestige has been enhanced within and outside the Organization as a result of their antics and machinations of recent weeks. The answer is quite obvious to any observer of the United Nations scene.

39. Before concluding I wish to register my surprise and regret that speakers should have been permitted, especially in a discussion relating to the report of the Credentials Committee, to refer to a State Member of the United Nations by any other than its official designation and that this kind of name-calling should have been tolerated. This practice does not and cannot reflect on its target; but it does reflect on the name-callers themselves as well as on the institution that countenances such conduct.



40. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, when you asked the question "Any objections?" the hammer came down more quickly than I expected. I remember that I was raising my hand to bring up a very simple point which concerned an amendment to my amendment. I think I had every right to do so, and I feel that my rights here have been violated. I am quite confident that your speed with the hammer was completely accidental. But in the circumstances how can my delegation, whose first amendment was so blatantly smashed by a procedural conspiracy, be deprived of its right?

41. I think that from the moment the President asked the question "Any objections?" whatever has been done or said in the Assembly has been contrary to the procedures and is therefore invalid.

42. The other point I wish to raise concerns the very peculiar and insidious statement made just now by the well-known aggressor. I believe that the statement was a masterpiece of banality, because the producer of that statement simply wanted to deceive the whole Assembly and to conceal the carnage his country has on many occasions wrought on the oppressed people of the Middle East.

43. I am quite confident that all the representatives know very well why the motion was passed and how the conspiracy succeeded. I think all the representatives, at least as far as personal opinion is concerned, are fully convinced that the Assembly is still not decent enough to remove the elements of indecency from the scene of the international body. We have to suffer and work more and more for the revival of principles of morality here—I do not know for how long but I believe that we are ready to work long enough.

44. The contention of the speaker was that he was going to deal with the content of the report of the Credentials Committee. I think that position was entirely irrelevant because once it was decided that the amendment would not be put to a vote all the rhetoric that was produced in order to conceal the criminal acts of Israel in the Middle East was irrelevant. I am sure the individuals here know this very well, and we are quite happy that as far as the individuals are concerned our position has a great deal of support. However, we can understand the difference between the constitutional position and the personal position.

45. Mr. KESSELY (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): Chad has just supported the proposal made by Finland that the amendment contained in document A/37/L.9 not be put to a vote. That signifies that if the text had been put to a vote my delegation would not have supported it, but it does not in any way mean that Chad supports the actions and the behaviour of Israel. We all know indeed that Israel undoubtedly holds the record for violations of the Charter and resolutions; yet it is unfortunately the only one that combines with this behaviour arrogance and contempt for the Organization. Thus, not content with occupying Arab and Palestinian territories, it has gone so far as to invade peaceful Lebanon, where it has perpetrated massacres which have caused indignation and horror throughout the world.

46. My country, Chad, has condemned that act of genocide, which is a crime against humanity. The behaviour of the Tel Aviv authorities has aroused general condemnation not only throughout the world but even in Israel itself, where millions of persons demonstrated against the invasion of Beirut and called for the opening of an inquiry into the responsibility for the massacres of Shatila and Sabra.

47. However, a decision to reject the credentials of the delegation of Israel at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, far from supporting the cause to be defended, would have had negative effects. The solidarity that we wished to show thereby with regard to Palestine thus would have been only an illusion, because it would have had no practical effects.

48. The universal character of the Organization prohibits the adoption of such serious measures with regard to Member States. The United Nations is quite correctly considered to be a family. That being so, are we justified, when a member of the family has acted wrongly, in casting him out? It would be neither reasonable nor responsible to adopt such an attitude.

49. Mr. THUNBORG (Sweden): It is the Swedish view that in the present circumstances no Government can be regarded as a legitimate representative of the people of Kampuchea. Hence Sweden does not support the credentials of any group or régime claiming the right to speak for Kampuchea at the United Nations. The abstention of my delegation on the amendment contained in document A/37/L.8 and Add.1 and our subsequent joining in the consensus approving the report of the Credentials Committee should be seen in that light.

50. Mr. TREIKI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): First of all I wish to express my country's regret, and the regret of the Group of Arab States, at the manner in which the Finnish proposal was considered.

51. The Arab position is very clear, as I have stated. The Arab group has reservations concerning the credentials of the representatives of the Fascist Nazi Zionists, whose presence in the General Assembly is a disgrace to the international community and also a violation and even a betrayal of the Charter and the principles of the Organization.

52. The document containing those reservations [A/37/563 and Add.1], which has been distributed and which is endorsed by 49 signatories, expresses the views of the majority of countries and emphasizes that this international body does not accept the presence of the Sharon-Begin-Shamir gang—which cannot in any way be called a State. However, by means of an underhanded method—I would even say unacceptable method, with all due respect to those that proposed it, the Assembly has taken a decision concerning the Iranian amendment. This does not in any way indicate direct or indirect support on our part as Arab States, as is made clear in the document containing our reservations and reasons; nor does it indicate our agreement with or acceptance of the presence of the neo-Nazi Israelis among us.

53. We stated in the document in which we expressed our reservations that it was a warning to the repre-

representative of the Nazi gang that in the future, if the Fascist Nazi Israelis did not withdraw from Lebanon and the occupied Arab territories, and refused to implement the resolutions of the Organization, we would once again refer the matter to the General Assembly, which, I reiterate, is dishonoured by the presence of the representative of the Fascist Zionist Israeli régime. That foolhardy representative, who is himself regarded as a killer, a Nazi and a Fascist, has uttered unethical words and statements with regard to the countries which are signatories to this document. We consider his utterances as honouring us because we are proud to say that we are against terrorism, fascism, zionism and nazism.

54. I assure the Assembly once again of the determination of the Arab nation to go on until the occupied Arab territory is liberated and the Palestinian people regain their rights. Neither the voting manoeuvres used here nor the support of some super-Powers for the Zionists can block the advance of the ranks of the Palestinian people.

55. Just as Rhodesia has disappeared, Ian Smith has vanished from the scene and Zimbabwe has become a member of the Assembly, so Begin too will disappear and Palestine will become a Member of the Organization.

56. Mr. AL-ASHTAL (Democratic Yemen): When the vote on the procedural motion by Finland was taken in the General Assembly the Group of Arab States was meeting downstairs in room 8 to discuss this very issue. Somehow we learned during that meeting that the vote was being taken somewhat surreptitiously, I may say. I think a discourtesy to the Arab group was committed in that such an important procedural vote was taken in the absence of the countries most concerned with this issue.

57. My delegation, which is a small delegation, could not occupy its seat here in the General Assembly Hall; therefore we did not vote on that procedural motion. I want it to be recorded that, had we been here, we would have voted against the Finnish procedural motion.

58. But before I conclude my statement, I wish to request you, Mr. President, to give me a clarification on the nature of the motion proposed by Finland. The motion says that no action should be taken on the Iranian amendment. My question is, does this mean that no action should be taken at all, or that no action should be taken at this meeting? That clarification will enable my delegation to make further remarks on this issue.

59. The PRESIDENT: I think the clarification could be found in the proceedings of the Assembly.

60. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like very briefly to explain my vote on the Finnish motion as a purely procedural one. This vote should in no way be interpreted as affecting the very well-known and repeatedly stated position of my Government against the Israeli policies in the Middle East and in favour of the Palestinians.

61. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic is of the view that it is the duty of the General Assembly to reject the credentials of the

representative of Israel, the Israel of occupation, expansion and racism, which commits war crimes and crimes against humanity in the same way as racist régimes such as that of South Africa. Israel has assassinated the people of Palestine and today is assassinating the people of Lebanon. We do not understand how it can have the right to remain in the Organization and in this very Hall.

62. We are fully confident that the Organization will not rest content with criticizing the credentials of Israel but will also very soon expel Israel, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

63. My country's delegation was not able to be present in this Hall when the Finnish proposal was voted on because we were busy with other work. If we had been present we would have voted against the proposal of Finland. We were determined to support the proposal submitted by Iran.

64. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Democratic Yemen on a point of order.

65. Mr. AL-ASHTAL (Democratic Yemen): The first sentence of rule 74 states that "During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion".

66. It is the understanding of my delegation that the present adjournment is only a temporary one.

## AGENDA ITEM 20

### The situation in Kampuchea: report of the Secretary-General (*continued*)

67. Mr. WOOLCOTT (Australia): The problem of Kampuchea touches upon the essence of the Charter of the United Nations. It involves the principle of the inadmissibility of the threat of or the use of force. It involves the rights of peoples to determine their own national Governments and it involves non-interference in the internal affairs of States. But beyond these important and established principles, there is also the human dimension to this problem: for more than a decade the Khmer people have suffered tremendous deprivation. They have experienced a disastrous civil war, human rights violations on a massive scale, famine and, now, foreign occupation.

68. Thanks in the main to a swift and effective emergency relief programme, it seems that the survival of the Kampuchean people is now assured. But if at present the lives of millions of people are no longer threatened by starvation, the need for a solution to the political problems, which remain, becomes all the more clear. In addition to humanitarian relief, the international community must assume responsibility for restoring to the Kampuchean people their basic right to determine their own future free of outside pressure or coercion.

69. An essential first step for returning Kampuchea to normalcy must be the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. Not only is their presence a continuing affront to international law, but the travail of the Kampuchean people will continue as long as foreign military intervention persists. Effective measures must be taken to ensure that after the withdrawal no armed group can



either seize power by force or use the threat of force to intimidate the Kampuchean people and so deprive them once again of their right to determine their own future.

70. In this respect, let there be no doubt about Australia's attitude to the Pol Pot régime and the Khmer Rouge, whose violations of human rights surely disqualify them from again exercising effective authority and power over the Khmer people. Australian opposition to the Khmer Rouge has been clear and firm. We have frequently and categorically condemned its record of brutality and misrule. In no circumstances would we provide them with any support or have any direct dealings with them. It is, of course, for the people of Kampuchea themselves to choose their own Government. But we have no doubt that given the chance they will reject Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.

71. Australia's attitude is consistent. It stands in marked contrast to that of some of the others who today affect disgust for the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary régime and its misdeeds but who only four years ago were championing its cause in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, when Governments such as my own were trying to persuade the international community to investigate the atrocities of that régime. But the history and record of Pol Pot gives no legitimacy in our view to the Heng Samrin régime or to the manner by which that régime was installed in Phnom Penh.

72. The Australian Government is not in favour of what might be called tutorial aggression—that is, the use of force to punish a neighbour for its misdeeds or the use of external force in the name of removing a régime whose actions might be regarded as improper. If military intervention could be condoned on the pretext of improving the complexion of a neighbouring Government, the established principles of international law would be eroded and ultimately destroyed. The result could be global anarchy, in which the security of smaller and weaker States would be at the mercy of more powerful neighbours.

73. So Australia's position is clear. We found repugnant the Khmer Rouge régime in Kampuchea and we regard as inadmissible the Heng Samrin régime imposed on the suffering and weakened people of Kampuchea by force.

74. Australia's attitude is consistent with the principles elaborated in three General Assembly resolutions [34/22, 35/6 and 36/5] and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea.<sup>4</sup> It is an approach related in the draft resolution before us [A/37/L.1/Rev.1], and is one which would involve a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.

75. We have noted the recent formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. This is a coalition which has as its purpose the implementation of the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea and the restoration of a national Kampuchean Government through United Nations-supervised elections. For Australia, however, the question of recognizing the coalition does not arise. Indeed, we have long made it clear that Australia will not recognize any Government in Kampuchea until an act of self-determination has been

held in accordance with the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea.

76. Nevertheless, my Government has welcomed the formation of the coalition. Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Prime Minister Son Sann are patriotic national leaders who seek to preserve Kampuchea's endangered national identity. For Kampuchea, ravaged by years of turmoil, including the rule of Pol Pot and the subsequent occupation by Viet Nam, the re-emergence of these leaders is a ray of hope, a prospect of an eventual free choice, other than that of living indefinitely under a Vietnamese-controlled régime or facing the return to power of the Khmer Rouge.

77. Australia has given moral and political support to the two nationalist leaders. We have and will continue to have contacts with them. In response to their appeals, we have already provided substantial humanitarian assistance. We will continue to watch developments carefully. In close consultation with the member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] and others, we remain prepared to consider what further humanitarian relief we might be able to provide.

78. Australia recognizes that in recent months the Government of Viet Nam has gone to some lengths to project an image of flexibility on the Kampuchean issue. But in reality its recent statements and actions have fallen short of the requirements set by the international community. They do not seem to indicate any substantial change in Viet Nam's policies.

79. Viet Nam's proclaimed partial withdrawal of troops appears to be no more than a case of taking advantage of a planned seasonal rotation of troops, particularly those units thinned by disease and casualties or suffering problems of morale. Those withdrawn have been replaced by fresh troops. Indeed, there are indications that Viet Nam has used the current wet season to strengthen its forces in Kampuchea.

80. Viet Nam has also proposed again the possibility of establishing a safety zone, or a demilitarized zone, along the Thai Kampuchean border. It has been a long-standing objective of the Vietnamese Government to define the Kampuchean issue in terms of a border problem between Thailand and Kampuchea. However, the armed conflict in Kampuchea is not between Thailand and Kampuchea, but between Vietnamese forces and Kampuchean forces. As the Foreign Minister of Thailand perceptively observed in the course of the general debate last month [10th meeting], if a demilitarized zone is to be established, then why not along the Kampuchean/Vietnamese border?

81. Viet Nam has proposed an international conference on South-East Asia. This would be a separate conference to be held outside the framework of the International Conference on Kampuchea established by the General Assembly. Any willingness to discuss and negotiate on Viet Nam's part must be welcomed, but we wonder whether this proposal is more than a tactical response, designed to gain time during a period of renewed scrutiny of the issue in the United Nations. The Vietnamese proposal is vague, and important questions have not been answered. Is it accepted, for example, that Kampuchea would be the central issue for negotiation at such a conference? There are

also important questions relating to participation on which Viet Nam's proposal is silent or ambiguous. Other countries must be satisfied that the objective is not simply to legitimize the Heng Samrin régime and the continued Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.

82. This is not to deny the merits of active and early discussions. My delegation would wish to encourage Viet Nam to spell out in more detail what it has in mind. Some gesture acknowledging the goal of a steady withdrawal of its forces from Kampuchea would clearly go some way to allay present misgivings.

83. Meanwhile Australia, like most members of the international community, believes that the International Conference on Kampuchea already provides an adequate framework for the negotiation of a comprehensive political settlement. The International Conference on Kampuchea is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the interests of all parties, including Viet Nam. An important point is that it envisages the emergence of a neutral, independent and non-aligned Kampuchea maintaining friendly relations with all of its neighbours. The Conference looks beyond that to the longer term goal of establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia as a whole.

84. Australia harbours no hostility towards Viet Nam and its people. We have made it clear to Viet Nam that there is no issue disrupting our relations, other than the intervention in Kampuchea. What saddens my Government is that Viet Nam, which fought with such tenacity and for so long for its independence, should now itself be seeking to dominate its neighbour.

85. Viet Nam should come to realize that its present policies in Kampuchea undermine rather than bolster its own security. It is these very policies which have produced its isolation, which have helped to bankrupt its economy, and which have increased threats to it from various quarters, including—we would contend—the threat Hanoi perceives from China. Through the International Conference on Kampuchea, however, ASEAN and the international community have offered Viet Nam an honourable way out of the dilemma in which it finds itself.

86. So, Australia joins many other countries in appealing to Viet Nam to reassess, at this already late stage, the course which it has followed for the past four years. One speaker from a member country of ASEAN noted in this same debate last year that the International Conference on Kampuchea opened the door through which Viet Nam could walk without loss of face to the negotiating table. We would urge Viet Nam to walk through that door and agree to come to the negotiating table without further delay.

87. In conclusion, the Australian Government looks forward to the day when the problem of Kampuchea can be put behind us, when the member countries of ASEAN and the three independent States of Indo-China can develop co-operative and cordial relationships, and when the tensions generated by the involvement and intrusion of major Powers has been reduced. Such a situation would be to the advantage of the South-East Asian region as a whole. But the fundamental conditions for such a situation remain, however, the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from

Kampuchea and the re-establishment of a fully independent Kampuchean nation.

88. The PRESIDENT: I now wish to announce additional sponsors to draft resolution A/37/L.1/Rev.1. They are Antigua and Barbuda, Equatorial Guinea and Saint Lucia.

89. Mr. FISCHER (Austria): In the course of the past years the United Nations has dealt intensively with the situation in Kampuchea. It has done so because the problem of Kampuchea touches upon fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The principle of the inadmissibility of the threat or the use of force, the principle of equal rights and of self-determination of peoples as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States have been grossly violated. The people of Kampuchea has suffered human rights violations on an inconceivable scale and has been victimized by famine of catastrophic proportions.

90. The international community has responded to the plight of the Kampuchean people with solidarity and sympathy and those feelings have been translated into an efficient and swift emergency relief programme. We understand that the situation in Kampuchea with regard to food supply and basic living conditions has much improved. This is in no small measure the result of the determined effort of the United Nations. We express our gratitude to all the donor countries, as well as to the international organizations and voluntary agencies involved in this vital relief operation. We hope that this humanitarian obligation will continue to be recognized as long as the situation requires.

91. But now, as the lives of millions of people are no longer threatened by extinction, the need for a solution to the political problems which still prevail becomes all the more apparent. The international community should support every effort to restore to the Kampuchean people their basic right of self-determination, in order to enable them to decide their own political future freely, without coercion and outside interference. As the tangible expression of this commitment, the International Conference on Kampuchea was convened in July 1981. The Conference, under the chairmanship of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, did valuable work in paving the way for a peaceful and negotiated political settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

92. In its Declaration it laid down the necessary elements for a peaceful solution to the Kampuchean problem. Those elements are, above all, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the restoration of the political independence and territorial integrity of Kampuchea, free election of a Government and the safeguarding of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

93. Furthermore, the Conference decided to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee, which has since taken up its substantive work. Austria is pleased to note that the *Ad Hoc* Committee, under the energetic chairmanship of Mr. Sarré of Senegal, has charted a course of action which aims at the initiation of a negotiating process with all parties concerned, leading to the peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem and creating conditions for lasting peace, stability and co-operation in the whole region.



94. In addition to these efforts on the international level, we have seen over the past year the beginning of a dialogue between the countries of South-East Asia. We welcome this development and hope that it will have a positive bearing on our common goal.

95. In conclusion, I would refer to the report which the Secretary-General has presented on this agenda item [A/37/496]. In paragraph 14 of this report the Secretary-General states that: "Over the last three years, it has become increasingly clear that the problems of the region cannot be solved by military means" and that "only a comprehensive political solution, reached through genuine negotiations, will ultimately allow the countries of the region to undertake the reconstruction of their economies and to look to a future of peace, stability and co-operation".

96. Austria fully shares and supports that assessment.

97. Mr. LE KIM CHUNG (Viet Nam) (*interpretation from French*): The General Assembly is once again called upon to debate the so-called situation in Kampuchea, without the approval or the participation of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the sole legal and authentic representative of the people of Kampuchea. This is flagrant interference in the domestic affairs of an independent and sovereign State. It violates one of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and goes against the legitimate aspirations of a people which, having escaped genocide, is in the process of overcoming innumerable difficulties and obstacles in order to reconstruct its country and build a new life in human dignity.

98. The delegation of Viet Nam believes that it would be better for the General Assembly to discuss, in order to take a position and adopt appropriate measures, the need to put an end without any delay to all attempts and acts designed to hamper the resurgence of the Kampuchean people and to restore the genocidal Pol Pot régime in Kampuchea.

99. Having been victorious in 1975 in resisting American aggression and defending its national well-being, the Kampuchean people should have been able to enjoy peace, independence and freedom, and to devote all of its energies to reconstructing its country, ravaged by war, and building a prosperous and happy life. But, following the instructions of Peking, the Pol Pot clique, equipped with Chinese weapons and buttressed by some 20,000 Chinese "advisers", for more than three successive years engaged in unprecedented genocide, exterminating almost 3 million Kampucheans. At the same time, it launched military attacks against Viet Nam and perpetrated odious massacres of Vietnamese along the entire Viet Nam-Kampuchea border.

100. Indeed, China took the place of the United States in Kampuchea and was using the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique as agents in order to fulfil its criminal designs of making Kampuchea an inferno and a springboard for carrying out its expansionist and hegemonist ambitions in South-East Asia. A plan of attack against Viet Nam, involving a two-front pincer operation—in the south-west and in the north—was quickly developed and put into effect.

101. But all those perfidious designs failed dismally. By the end of 1978 the Pol Pot clique was using four fifths of its military forces in the attack on Viet Nam and had suffered heavy losses as a result of Vietnamese counterattacks. The people and the patriotic forces of Kampuchea took advantage of this to expand the fighting fronts. There were uprisings everywhere in the country and, as a result, the genocidal régime of "Democratic Kampuchea" was overthrown and tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers disguised as advisers were chased out of the country, freeing the Kampuchean nation from the peril of extermination and restoring the fatherland's independence and sovereignty.

102. After its historic victory of 7 January 1979, the Kampuchean people took control of its own destiny, and it has fully realized its right to self-determination. Under the direction of the people's Government, it began to carry out the two major national tasks—the rebirth of the country and the defence of the fatherland and of the life of the people.

103. For nearly four years, with a country ravaged by genocide, with more than a third of its population slaughtered and with a society ravaged and cast back into medieval times, the people and the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea have overcome famine, rapidly normalized life and made great achievements in all fields, earning themselves the well-deserved tribute of having effected a "miraculous rebirth".

104. Only two years after Kampuchea's liberation from genocide, free democratic general elections were organized, with the participation of more than 97 per cent of the voters. On 27 June 1981 the first democratic constitution of Kampuchea saw the light of day. Order and security are assured throughout the country. The people's Government has all the country's affairs, both domestic and external, well in hand, and is dealing with the life of the people diligently and effectively.

105. In 1981 agricultural production reached 1.6 million tonnes of paddy. The harvest of the 1982 dry season is virtually double last year's. Hundreds of industrial installations and cottage industries have been restored, and many communications and transport networks, including posts and telecommunications, have been put back into service. The national currency has been in circulation since March 1980. Trading services, both private and public, have been expanded throughout the country.

106. Achievements in various fields—educational, cultural and social—are very encouraging, as they have been brought about since the genocidal criminals of the Pol Pot clique massacred from 80 to 90 per cent of the teachers, doctors, pharmacists, writers, artists and intellectuals, and turned the schools and pagodas into prisons, places of torture and arms depots. In the school year 1981-1982 there were more than 1.5 million pupils at the primary level. All the high schools and universities have resumed their activities. Ninety per cent of the villages now have clinics and maternity wards. The outstanding feature of life under the new régime is the spreading of cultural and artistic activities among the masses of the people. The people's Government is ensuring the



protection of the country's historic, cultural and artistic heritage. With the assistance of the people's Government, thousands of Buddhist priests, rescued from the forced labour of the genocidal period, have resumed their religious activities throughout the country.

107. The miraculous rebirth of the country and of the Kampuchean people has been highlighted by numerous impartial foreign observers. At the beginning of 1980 William Shawcross described the deep impression made on the journalists who visited the country of the temples of Angkor, and made the succinct statement in *The Washington Post* of 18 March 1980 that Kampuchea had come back to life under the Government of Heng Samrin. The following year Françoise Corrèze wrote, in *Un an après—Kampuchea 1981—Témoignages*, of a surprising rebirth after the crushing physical and moral oppression of the dark years. Whilst in the 21-27 May 1980 edition Chris Mullin simply commented in *The Times* that smiles were reappearing upon the lips of a people that had forgotten how to smile, Daniel Southerland gave a lively example of the new kind of life in Kampuchea in an article in *The Christian Science Monitor* of 3 February 1982, in which he said that courting, which had been discouraged under the Khmer Rouge régime, had once again become a part of normal life—and that there were plenty of babies.

108. Needless to say, this rebirth is all the more miraculous as it took place, and is still taking place, in a difficult context, in which Peking and its agents, the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique, have tried to sabotage it by all possible means. This is evidence both of the unshakeable determination of the Kampuchean people to become master of its own destiny and of the stability of the people's Government in the face of all trials. This makes it possible for the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea to go ahead with the implementation of its domestic policy of national unity and its foreign policy of peace, friendship and non-alignment.

109. The following are some tangible proofs of what I have just said. On 18 September, the Foreign Minister, Hun Sen, reaffirming the policy of clemency of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea said that:

“All Kampuchean people who are still in the ranks of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique, or who are collaborating with it directly or indirectly by opposing the rebirth of the Kampuchean people and by helping the plans of the Chinese hegemons, but who have now left the ranks of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique, cease collaborating with it and respect the Constitution of the People's Republic of Kampuchea will be given the opportunity to enjoy the rights of citizenship, including the right to vote, and will be eligible to take part in free general elections, as the Constitution stipulates. Foreign observers will be invited to observe the general elections in Kampuchea.”

That attitude of broad national reconciliation is further evidence of the solid popular support for the new régime.

110. The Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea has worked to develop relations of friendship and co-operation with all countries that respect Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and support the rebirth of the Kampuchean people. In particular, it has spared no effort to establish good neighbourly relations with Thailand and to help to bring about peace and stability in South-East Asia. The good will of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea has been magnificently demonstrated in its attitude of active and effective co-operation with the various humanitarian international organizations recently operating in Kampuchea, as well as its part in the concerted activities of the three countries of Indo-China to promote peace and stability in South-East Asia.

111. The achievements of almost four years are the best refutation both of the false allegations of Peking and Washington and of the insane fabrications of the genocidal Pol Pot clique. Those facts have given ample proof that, strengthened by the miraculous rebirth of the Kampuchean people, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which grows more confident and vigorous every day, has truly become an active factor for peace and stability in South-East Asia.

112. One fact is greatly deserving of our attention: that the rebirth of the Kampuchean people is unacceptable to the ruling circles of Peking. One has only to see them in action to realize that their goals, both short-term and long-term, regarding Kampuchea and South-East Asia, remain unchanged. For them, Kampuchea must always be a bastion for the purpose of weakening Viet Nam and a springboard for achieving their expansionist and hegemonist goals in South-East Asia. That is why the Pol Pot clique, their henchmen, remain an irreplaceable tool for them, especially in terms of the brutal and adventurous behaviour of those criminals, and in spite of the fact that their odious genocidal image is detested by the whole of progressive mankind.

113. The efforts of the Peking leaders to supply and equip Pol Pot's armed rabble, sheltering in the Thailand sanctuary, and their attempts to impose their views on the so-called International Conference on Kampuchea and to retain the genocidal Pol Pot clique's seat in the United Nations by means of that farce they are calling a “Coalition Government”, are all parallel manoeuvres to implement the consistent policy I have described.

114. My delegation considers that it is necessary at this time to make the following fact clear: as the Peking authorities raise the hue and cry that Viet Nam must withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, with the intention of isolating it politically in the eyes of the world, they are in fact doing everything they can to keep the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. In fact, by increasing their assistance—above all military assistance—to Pol Pot's armed rabble for the purpose of repeated incursions into Kampuchean territory from their sanctuaries in Thai territory, the Chinese authorities expect to achieve several aims at a single stroke: first, to maintain a continual state of tension on the Kampuchea-Thailand border, which, in practice, prevents the Vietnamese troops from withdrawing from Kampuchea; secondly, to inflict a continuing haemorrhage and economic weakening on

Viet Nam; and finally to sabotage the inclination for a dialogue which has come about between the countries of Indo-China and those of ASEAN.

115. In fact there is no such question as "The situation in Kampuchea". If there is any question, it is instead that of revealing the intentions and activities of Peking, in close collusion with Washington and other reactionary forces, aimed at blocking the rebirth of the Kampuchean people and at re-imposing the genocidal régime on Kampuchea. The international community is now faced with the following choice; either to declare itself in favour of the rebirth of the Kampuchean people, or to promote the restoration in Kampuchea of the genocidal régime of "Democratic Kampuchea".

116. All those who truly wish to defend human rights, the independence of peoples, justice and peace made their choice long ago. But if for one reason or another it is not yet possible for any country to make the choice of promoting the rebirth of the Kampuchean people, which has already suffered such genocide, conscience and morality would demand at least that it should do nothing to block that rebirth.

117. The policy of hegemony of the Middle Kingdom constitutes the chief threat to the three countries of Indo-China and also the chief threat to peace and stability in South-East Asia. The realities of the past four years have shown that China is determined to resort to military means, through the Pol Pot clique, to oppose the rebirth of the Kampuchean people and that it is ceaselessly massing troops along its borders with Viet Nam and Laos for the purpose of exerting constant pressure on those countries. Furthermore, Peking is constantly recruiting supplying and training reactionary Vietnamese, Lao and Kampuchean elements to undertake intervention and subversion against the legal Governments of the three countries of Indo-China. At the same time, Peking is making every attempt to oppose reconciliation and dialogue between the countries of Indo-China and those of ASEAN, to isolate the countries of Indo-China, and to maintain tension in South-East Asia.

118. In these circumstances, the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, by the terms of a treaty between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea, is aimed only at blocking this threat by China. Once that threat is removed, the Vietnamese troops will no longer be needed in Kampuchea.

119. Lastly, taking into account the situation in Kampuchea, which is daily improving and growing more stable, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam have decided unilaterally to withdraw a considerable portion of the Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. If Thailand reacts positively to this act of goodwill by no longer permitting China, the Pol Pot clique and other reactionary Khmer forces to use its territory against the rebirth of the Kampuchean people, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam could consider the withdrawal of further units of Vietnamese troops. And if China puts an end to its threats to the security of the three countries of Indo-China by signing with them treaties of

non-aggression, non-intervention and peaceful co-existence, as those countries have so often proposed, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea would not hesitate to agree on the withdrawal from Kampuchea of all Vietnamese troops.

120. At this moment we await positive signs from the countries concerned in response to our legitimate concerns. For its part, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam reaffirms once again from this rostrum that it is ready to honour all proposals put forward by the Foreign Ministers of the three countries of Indo-China in the communiqué issued at their Sixth Conference, held at Ho Chi Minh City on 6 and 7 July 1982 [A/37/334, annex]. In this connection, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to add a few words addressed to China.

121. Men of conscience are seriously questioning the right of the Peking authorities to supply and maintain the Pol Pot clique so that it can return to Kampuchea again to commit genocide, while denying the friends of the Kampuchean people the right to come to the aid of that people in defence of its rebirth and its destiny.

122. We might also ask by virtue of which principle the Peking authorities arrogate to themselves the right to threaten the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and of the other countries of Indo-China while denying those countries the right to adopt the measures required to defend themselves.

123. If the leaders of China wish to act in accordance with their customary declarations, they should end their policy of hegemony and all threats against Viet Nam and the other two countries of Indo-China, and work towards the normalization of relations with them.

124. For its part, the Vietnamese people remains ever faithful to the friendly relations that have traditionally bound it to the brother people of China. The Vietnamese people is very aware of the importance of those relations, which are a major factor of peace and stability in South-East Asia and accord with the vital interests of the peoples of the region, particularly the people's of Viet Nam and China. That is why it is to be expected that the leaders of China will respond positively to the constructive positions of Viet Nam, which have been repeated on numerous occasions, in favour of the resumption as soon as possible of negotiations between Viet Nam and China with a view to settling problems pending between the two countries and normalizing relations between their peoples.

125. From the foregoing it is evident that the present situation with respect to Kampuchea means that the international community must make the following choice: it can take effective measures designed to put an end to Peking's threat to the rebirth of the Kampuchean people, to the peoples of the other countries of Indo-China and to peace and stability throughout the whole of South-East Asia, which would resolve the question of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea; or it can require that Viet Nam withdraw its troops in order to open the way for Peking to reinstate the Pol Pot clique in Kampuchea



so that those hangmen can continue their genocidal crimes, with all the horrors of which we all know and all the unforeseeable serious consequences for peace and stability in South-East Asia.

126. This choice brings in to the light of day the difference between those who are genuinely concerned for the independence of Kampuchea and the happiness of its people and those who hypocritically speak of the right of self-determination and human rights in Kampuchea only to conceal their dark designs to interfere in the domestic affairs of that country and block the rebirth of its people.

127. History has amply demonstrated that any solution that is imposed upon a people, by whatever means and even under the aegis of the United Nations, will inevitably be doomed to failure because it goes against the legitimate aspirations and inalienable rights of that people. In the specific case of Kampuchea, any unilateral solution by the United Nations would only complicate the situation in the interests of those who wish to "fish in troubled waters", and would further prevent the United Nations playing the positive role expected of it in bringing about peace, stability and co-operation in South-East Asia.

128. As for the three peoples of Indo-China, which fought shoulder to shoulder and made supreme sacrifices to overcome the most powerful aggressive forces of our era and defend the independence and freedom of their countries, any new attempt to impose domination on them at the expense of their fundamental national rights will certainly be vain. The rebirth of the Kampuchean people is irreversible. Any manoeuvre aimed at restoring the genocidal régime to Kampuchea will certainly be doomed to failure.

129. If the United Nations is genuinely concerned about the destiny of the Kampuchean people, the least it can do for it at this time is to stop intervening in its domestic affairs and imposing on it decisions and resolutions that are erroneous and arbitrary and capable only of maintaining tension between Kampuchea and Thailand and throughout the whole of South-East Asia. In addition, the Kampuchean people, which is in the process of rebirth, is entitled to expect the United Nations to encourage the trend towards dialogue which is now gaining ground in the region as a result of the peaceful proposals of the countries of Indo-China, in particular those made at the Sixth Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three countries. Additional explanations concerning those proposals were given in the letter dated 15 September last from the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to the five States members of ASEAN [A/37/477, annex I]. For it is by encouraging the countries of Indo-China and ASEAN to follow this realistic course that all the problems that still divide those two groups of countries can be solved appropriately and to the benefit of the work of the peaceful reconstruction and rebirth of Kampuchea and the cause of peace, stability and co-operation throughout South-East Asia.

130. That is why this discussion of the so-called "situation" in Kampuchea which the General Assembly has begun today is highly inappropriate. In this connection, on 17 September 1982, in his telegram

addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly [A/37/481, annex], the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hun Sen, already indicated the position of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. This position was emphasized in a new message to the Secretary-General dated 22 October, in which he said:

"all discussions on the so-called "situation in Kampuchea" shall constitute a gross and inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of the Kampuchean people and it runs counter to the Charter of the United Nations. All decisions relating to Kampuchea to be adopted without the consent and the presence of the representatives of the People's Republic of Kampuchea will be considered illegal, null and void." [A/37/575, annex.]

131. That is the confident and authoritative voice of the principal party concerned, the sole legal and authentic representative of the Kampuchean people which is, however, absent from these precincts at the moment for reasons beyond its control. The delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam declares that it firmly and totally supports that just position of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

132. Mr. ZAKI (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): After four long years the militant people of Kampuchea are still suffering under the yoke of foreign military occupation, and today once again we are considering this dangerous situation, which now threatens the peoples of South-East Asia as a result of the continuing Vietnamese military invasion of Kampuchea. Indeed what is perhaps most regrettable is that, despite unceasing international efforts, ever since the inception of this problem, to put an end to the abnormal situation, we are still unable to eliminate this aggression and allow the Kampuchean people to regain their legitimate rights. Egypt, which is giving special attention to this problem, is following closely the ceaseless international efforts aimed at ending the aggression and restoring peace in Kampuchea and stability in South-East Asia.

133. Egypt has recognized with appreciation and support the positive achievements of the United Nations in its continuous efforts to arrive at a political settlement of this problem, which were discussed in the debates on the problem during the last three sessions of the General Assembly as well as during the International Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981 and at a meeting held at Geneva. Despite these positive aspects, there have been negative aspects ever since the inception of the problem that still impede the finding of a solution to the problem.

134. Perhaps the foremost among the negative aspects is the regrettable position adopted by a super-Power in 1979 when it used the right of veto in the Security Council to prevent the adoption of a resolution designed to put an end to the aggression launched by Viet Nam against Kampuchea and calling for the withdrawal of its forces from that territory. The negative aspects followed one after another, as reflected in the positions of Viet Nam and a number of the countries supporting it during the consideration of this problem in the General Assembly at previous



sessions. Perhaps the most prominent of the negative aspects that we have witnessed recently is the boycott by Viet Nam and several other countries of the International Conference on Kampuchea that was held in July of last year. I sincerely fear that these aggressive trends and negative positions will mean that the problem of Kampuchea will be included in the collection of chronic international problems brought annually before the General Assembly without the achievement of any positive and decisive results, because of the disregard by those States for the decisions of the United Nations and their flagrant defiance of the will of the international community.

135. It is time the international community, as represented by the Organization, decided not to permit those States to persist in their positions. It is time the international community firmly confronted these dangerous trends. We should not permit Viet Nam to ignore the decisions of the Organization and to persist in suppressing the will of the Kampuchean people. The General Assembly has adopted several resolutions since the inception of this problem in 1978, resolutions that contain just principles and a basis for arriving at a permanent political solution of the problem. What has been the result? Viet Nam has failed to implement any of these resolutions, while several countries have supported its position and defended it.

136. The large-scale international support enjoyed by the Kampuchean people in its heroic struggle to regain its legitimate rights is indeed the best evidence of the fairness and justice of its cause. The three previous sessions of the General Assembly saw a noticeable increase in international concern over the Kampuchean problem. This increasing concern was expressed in the overwhelming majorities by which General Assembly resolutions 34/22, 35/6 and 36/5 were adopted, as well as in the large-scale international support for the Declaration and resolution adopted by the International Conference on Kampuchea,<sup>5</sup> which offered a positive and practical basis for a comprehensive settlement of the Kampuchean problem in such a manner as to guarantee the protection of the legitimate rights of all parties concerned in the problem and provide the necessary guarantees.

137. There has been an important positive development recently in regard to the Kampuchean problem, namely, the formation of a Coalition Government of Kampuchea headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Egypt, like all countries supporting international legality, welcomes the formation of this coalition and regards it as the sole legitimate representative of Kampuchea and its people.

138. There is no doubt that this is a positive step along the path to a comprehensive settlement of the problem, one worthy of the appreciation and support of the international community. In this regard, I must pay a tribute and express appreciation respecting the persistent efforts made by the countries of ASEAN to arrive at a fair settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

139. Egypt, in supporting the just Kampuchean cause, is doing so not because it is biased towards one side or wishes to defend any régime or rulers.

Rather Egypt, in doing so, is motivated by the unchanging principles in which it believes and which it upholds. Egypt's belief in the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the right to freedom, independence and sovereignty motivates it to call for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and to call on Viet Nam to refrain from intervention in the affairs of the Kampuchean people. Egypt's belief in the right of every people to self-determination impels it to persist in efforts to enable the militant Kampuchean people to achieve self-determination and to choose the régime it wishes, far removed from any outside interference. Egypt's belief in the necessity of commitment to the principles of human rights impels it to support the Kampuchean refugees and their right to repatriation in dignity to their homeland. Egypt's belief in the right of all States to peaceful coexistence impels it to demand a solution of the Kampuchean problem by peaceful means so as to remove tension from the region and enable all the States there to live in peace and devote their efforts to social and economic development.

140. Egypt's unqualified commitment internationally to these noble principles is the firm basis of its position with regard to this problem as well as other international problems. On the basis of this position, Egypt voted in favour of accepting the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea, while reaffirming its constant position stemming from its commitment to international legality and its rejection of the recognition of any régime imposed on a free people by foreign military intervention.

141. The situation of the Kampuchean people under the present occupation of their country and the threat imposed by this dangerous situation to the security of the peoples of South-East Asia makes it incumbent on the international community to take decisive action to put an end to this situation by means of a comprehensive political settlement of this problem.

142. Egypt's policy concerning the settlement of this problem is based on its belief in the need for the following conditions to be fulfilled: the total and unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea on the basis of a specified timetable; the restoration of Kampuchea's independence and sovereignty over all its territory; the possibility for the Kampuchean people to exercise their right to self-determination, under the auspices of the United Nations and free from any outside or foreign interference; the possibility for all Kampuchean refugees to return to their homeland in safety; respect by all States for the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, and a guarantee of the right of all States in the region to live in peace.

143. Egypt fully appreciates the persistent efforts exerted by the Secretary-General to bring about a political solution to the Kampuchean problem, as well as his efforts concerning humanitarian aid to the people of Kampuchea. We also appreciate the efforts exerted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea to start a dialogue between the parties concerned as an initial step towards negotiations on implementing the Declaration of the International Conference on Kam-

puchea and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

144. Egypt, in supporting the efforts exerted by the United Nations to find a just, comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem, believes that the elements of draft resolution A/37/L.1/Rev.1, which is before the General Assembly and is sponsored by 48 States, provides a fair basis on which to resolve this problem.

145. Operative paragraph 1 reaffirms previous General Assembly resolutions and calls for their full implementation. Those resolutions were supported by the majority of Member States.

146. Operative paragraph 2 reiterates the basic elements of a just and lasting settlement of the problem. These are elements imposed by the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, to which we are all bound as Members of the international Organization; consequently there is no justification for opposing them.

147. Operative paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the draft resolution reaffirm the decision to reconvene a new meeting of the International Conference on Kampuchea and the appeal that it be attended by all States of South-East Asia and others concerned.

148. Egypt's delegation supports the noble and humanitarian objectives referred to in operative paragraphs 10 and 11 of the draft resolution. There is no doubt that such humanitarian assistance is of vital importance to the Kampuchean people, who are being subjected to oppression and suffering of all kinds. I must, in this connection, place on record Egypt's appreciation of the efforts of UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross in providing assistance to Kampuchean refugees and of the role played by all countries that contribute to the financing of a relief operation for that stricken people.

149. Operative paragraph 12 deals with the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia. This is the desire of the countries of this region and it deserves support, for the creation of such a zone would be a positive factor for the achievement of the political and economic stability of the countries of this region.

150. For these reasons, and on the basis of the positive components and elements of the draft resolutions, Egypt will vote in favour and calls on all representatives also to support it, in the interest of peace.

151. Egypt, which believes in peace and considers it the sole means of resolving all problems among nations, invites the United Nations and the Governments of peace-loving nations to exert further joint efforts to arrive at a just, comprehensive settlement of the Kampuchean problem which will restore stability and security to the region.

152. Mr. LING Qing (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The General Assembly has, at three consecutive sessions, adopted resolutions calling for the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea so that free elections may be held by the Kampuchean people without outside interference. Owing to the obstruction and sabotage by the Vietnamese author-

ities, however, these resolutions have not been implemented. The question of Kampuchea remains an important item on the agenda of the current session.

153. How the Kampuchean issue is to be solved not only concerns the survival of a small and weak nation but also affects the security of the whole region of South-East Asia and world peace. Therefore, the international community has all along followed closely the development of the situation in Kampuchea and strongly demanded a correct solution to the Kampuchean question. We sincerely hope the United Nations will adopt effective measures to put an end to Viet Nam's war of aggression against and military occupation of Kampuchea.

154. The past year has witnessed new developments in Kampuchea. Conscious of their national aspirations and historical responsibilities, Kampuchean patriots and leaders of insight proclaimed in August 1982 the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, rallying all Kampuchean patriotic forces resisting Vietnamese aggression. This significant event has dealt a heavy blow to those who manoeuvre to legalize the Heng Samrin puppet régime and given tremendous encouragement to the Kampuchean armed forces and the people fighting at the battlefield. Therefore, the Coalition has received universal approval and support in Kampuchea and from world public opinion.

155. On the battlefield, the aggressors have stepped up their military deployment, launched one offensive after another, and even thrown in several divisions of troops and large numbers of tanks, guns and aircraft in massive mopping-up operations against territories held by Democratic Kampuchea. However, as the saying goes, "An army fighting for a just cause has high morale, while that fighting for an unjust cause is in bad shape". The fourth dry-season offensive mounted by the aggressors has once again ended in a fiasco. The Kampuchean patriotic armed forces have not only maintained their strength but have wrested control of more rural territories, thereby extending the liberated areas and guerrilla zones. The myth about the "irreversibility" of the situation in Kampuchea has thus been shattered. We are convinced that under the leadership of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, with Prince Norodom Sihanouk as its President, so long as the Kampuchean people strengthen their unity and persist in the struggle, they will surely realize their nation's sacred aspiration—to expel the invaders and win complete victory in their patriotic war.

156. The Vietnamese authorities, although facing serious difficulties, have not abandoned hegemonist ambitions in their region. With the support of a super-Power, they have not shown the least restraint in their aggressive expansionism. In order to extricate themselves from their predicament and to deceive their own people and parry world censure, they have resorted to a few new tricks.

157. To begin with, they announced that they would effect a "unilateral partial withdrawal" of troops. As a matter of fact, this is nothing new. Two years ago, at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Viet Nam already talked about a "partial withdrawal", but up till now there has been no reduction



in the occupation forces in Kampuchea. Then, it was only after the three Kampuchean patriotic factions had formed a coalition and the thirty-seventh session was about to begin that the Vietnamese authorities renewed the "partial withdrawal" gesture. Thus, it is not difficult to see that their real aim is none other than to offset the impact of the coalition of the Kampuchean patriotic forces and, by dangling the offer of a conditional partial withdrawal, to head off a United Nations resolution calling for the unconditional, total withdrawal of their troops from Kampuchea. In point of fact, Viet Nam needs to rotate a part of its forces after sustaining defeats in its fourth dry-season offensive. In recent months, Viet Nam has reinforced, rather than reduced, its troop strength along the Thai-Kampuchean borders. Is such "partial withdrawal" worth anything if it means pulling out some troops for a rest during the rainy season and calling in reinforcements to step up the offensives in the following dry season?

158. Secondly, Viet Nam calls for an international conference on South-East Asia. Everybody knows that the General Assembly has, at consecutive sessions, adopted resolutions, and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea has also laid down the basic principles for solving the Kampuchean issue. The Vietnamese authorities have refused to implement these resolutions and the Declaration, and now they want to have another international conference and suggest that prior consultations be carried out on matters regarding the conference between the countries of ASEAN and Indo-China, including the Heng Samrin régime. Viet Nam's occupation of Kampuchea is the key issue in South-East Asia. To talk about questions of South-East Asia without touching on this key issue is clearly a ruse designed to forestall the application of the United Nations resolution on the Kampuchean issue and then remove that issue altogether from the agenda of the world forum. Another purpose of the proposed international conference is to impose the Vietnamese-installed Phnom Penh puppet régime on the participants and to legitimize it so that Viet Nam can perpetuate its occupation of Kampuchea and justify its control and domination of Indo-China. Thus, the proposed international conference on South-East Asia is nothing but a rehashed version of the regional conference once promoted by Viet Nam.

159. Thirdly, Viet Nam continues to harp on the so-called "China threat", alleging that "the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea is aimed at countering this threat by China", and that "the Kampuchean problem is essentially one between China and the Indo-Chinese countries". This is a downright lie and utterly untrue. It is a plain fact that Kampuchea became an issue only after Viet Nam launched armed aggression against that country and that it is not the consequence of a dispute between China and Viet Nam. Viet Nam had always regarded China as its friendly neighbour until it invaded Kampuchea. As recently as 1977, the Vietnamese leader Le Duan kept saying: "Having a brother like China on Viet Nam's side, we feel quite at ease and have nothing to worry about; we will surely surmount all difficulties". It was not until the Vietnamese authorities had launched the aggression against Democratic

Kampuchea, which was condemned by all quarters including China, that they started to concoct lies about a "China threat". Now what did they mean by this? Did they mean China had threatened Viet Nam from the north?

160. If so, why should Viet Nam have struck south and occupied a weak neighbour like Kampuchea? If they meant China was threatening Viet Nam when it offered assistance to the Kampuchean patriotic forces and supported the Kampuchean peoples' struggle against aggression, then whom did China threaten when it supported the Vietnamese people's struggle against aggression during all those years in the past? If they meant China wanted to control Kampuchea in order to threaten Viet Nam from the south, that would be even more absurd because there was not a single Chinese soldier in Kampuchea. China has never controlled and never wishes to control Kampuchea. The resolutions of the General Assembly and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea have specifically provided for the independent and neutral status of Kampuchea after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. As long as the Kampuchean problem is settled in accordance with these principles, no one can threaten Viet Nam from Kampuchea. The Chinese Government has made it clear on many occasions that after Viet Nam withdraws its troops from Kampuchea so that the Kampuchean people may exercise their right to self-determination, China is willing to join the other countries concerned in a guarantee that no State shall occupy Kampuchean territory and use it to violate the independence and sovereignty of any other State, or in any way interfere in the internal affairs of Kampuchea. We want to ask: Do the Vietnamese authorities have the courage to make such a pledge and to act accordingly?

161. Another argument of Viet Nam is that the so-called "China threat" can be removed only if China agrees to resume talks and conclude a bilateral agreement on peaceful coexistence with it. That is a ruse which Viet Nam has habitually employed. Problems between China and Viet Nam should not have been difficult to resolve. The Chinese people have always cherished a profound friendship for the Vietnamese people and wished that the two countries can live in peace. We are merely against Viet Nam's regional hegemonism and expansionism. If only Viet Nam withdraws all its troops from Kampuchea, renounces aggression and expansionism and abandons its anti-China position, the Chinese Government is ready to resume talks with it and to negotiate and adopt measures to restore friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

162. Viet Nam's invasion of Kampuchea has brought untold sufferings to the Kampuchean people. It has posed a grave threat to the peace and stability of South-East Asia and seriously violated the basic norms of international relations. The Chinese Government has always advocated an early political settlement of the Kampuchean question on a fair and reasonable basis. However, any political settlement should strictly adhere to the correct principles set forth in the General Assembly resolutions and the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea. That is to say, it must insist on the complete



withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea so that the Kampuchean people may exercise the right of self-determination under United Nations supervision. Under no circumstances should it recognize the *fait accompli* of foreign aggression. Any political settlement at the expense of Kampuchea's independence and sovereignty would be a violation of the Charter and the norms of international relations and, therefore, unacceptable to the international community.

163. We highly appraise the untiring efforts of ASEAN and other justice-upholding countries to maintain peace in South-East Asia. We have carefully studied the draft resolution jointly sponsored by ASEAN and others. We consider it positive. It reaffirms the basic principles contained in the resolutions of the three previous sessions and in the Declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea, and will lead to a fair and reasonable solution to the Kampuchean problem. We endorse this draft resolution and call on all Member States to vote for it.

164. Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): Although yet another year has come and gone, the deplorable situation in Kampuchea remains unresolved. Kampuchea continues to be the victim of foreign military intervention and its people are still denied the right of self-determination. As an Asian nation, my country is profoundly concerned by the situation, which threatens the peace and security, as well as the stability and prosperity, of the entire South-East Asian region.

165. I wish to take this opportunity to outline the Government of Japan's position on the Kampuchean problem. Military intervention by one country in the affairs of another country and the obstruction of the latter country's right of self-determination are intolerable. The opportunity for the Kampuchean people to enjoy fully the right to choose their own political future without outside interference must be ensured. These elements are contained in General Assembly resolutions 34/22, 35/6, and 36/5, as well as the Declaration and resolution of the International Conference on Kampuchea, and thus Japan would like to stress their importance. Japan believes that the best way of finding a just and lasting solution to the Kampuchean problem is to hold negotiations among all parties concerned in accordance with the Declaration and the resolutions, which have been adopted with the support of the overwhelming majority of the international community. Japan is of the view that a comprehensive solution of the Kampuchean problem should be achieved through the prompt implementation of the Declaration and the relevant resolutions.

166. During the past three years my country has joined with the member countries of ASEAN in co-sponsoring a number of General Assembly resolutions on the Kampuchean situation. It also contributed positively to the International Conference on Kampuchea in July of 1981. In addition, Japan has been making diplomatic efforts to implement these resolutions and the Declaration. In this connection, Japan has participated in the activities of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the International Conference on Kampuchea since it was established last autumn, for

example, by joining the mission it dispatched to Thailand. Japan will continue to support the Committee's activities in exploring means of bringing about a peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem.

167. Furthermore, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, Japan suggested [8th meeting] that a representative of the Secretary-General be sent to the countries concerned. We are gratified that this suggestion was carried out during the course of this year. We would like to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts towards a solution of the Kampuchean problem. Japan too will continue to work actively towards this end.

168. It is indeed regrettable that, in spite of the efforts of the international community towards a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, foreign forces remain in Kampuchea and a solution of the problem through negotiations does not appear to be imminent.

169. Japan fully supports and has joined the ASEAN countries in sponsoring draft resolution A/37/L.1/Rev.1, as it has similar draft resolutions in the past. We urge all Member States which respect international justice and seek world peace to support it, in the recognition that armed intervention in another country must be rejected and the right of self-determination of the Kampuchean people respected. Furthermore, we strongly appeal to Viet Nam to respond positively to the voice of the overwhelming majority of Member States as reflected in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as in the Declaration and resolution of the International Conference on Kampuchea, and thus enter into negotiations.

170. I should like to take this opportunity of welcoming the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. We are pleased to note that Democratic Kampuchea has thus widened its base and hope that this development will lead to a comprehensive political solution.

171. Japan has a high regard for the United Nations relief activities for Kampuchean refugees and hopes that the United Nations will continue to play an effective role in this field. My Government has contributed positively to these activities for humanitarian reasons, and also in the hope of alleviating the burden borne by Thailand. Japan will continue to the best of its ability to co-operate with such activities. However, it is not enough to provide relief assistance for refugees. In order to resolve the refugee problem it is of urgent importance to find ways to eradicate its root cause. Japan thus renews its appeal to Viet Nam to abandon its military interference and to take part in negotiations aiming at a peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem.

172. Mr. RÁCZ (Hungary) (*interpretation from French*): There are a number of items on the agenda of the Assembly that are likely to arouse emotions in this Hall. Among these are in particular the problem of Kampuchea, the subject of our present debate.

173. I do not wish to dwell on our position, which is well known now, on the inclusion of the item entitled

“The situation in Kampuchea” in the agenda. Although we know that in South-East Asia there is a problem, or even many problems, we nevertheless think that the Organization should have been able to deal with the complexities of this region in a fundamentally different way.

174. But what is emerging once again is an exercise of hypocrisy carried on by those who, consciously or not, allow themselves to be drawn into this game. They persist in closing their eyes and their ears to the facts in that part of the world.

175. And what are these facts? They are the stabilization of life and the internal constitutional order in the People's Republic of Kampuchea, born out of the ashes of a régime that has gone forever and that was hated by all; the work of reconstruction undertaken by a Government supported by the popular masses who still remember only too vividly the bloodbath of yesterday; and the foreign policy initiatives and openings of a State that has been able to establish relations of trust with its Indo-Chinese neighbours and that is fully willing and able to discharge its obligations under international law.

176. To claim to be trying to defend the “just cause” of Kampuchea by lending support to views that have nothing to do with the real situation in the country and that are reflected in the draft submitted to the Assembly in document A/37/L.1/Rev.1 means not only deliberate ignorance, whether feigned or real, not only flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country, but also a defence of those who are guilty of the genocide of the Khmer people and whose very presence here among us is a complete aberration and an intolerable challenge to the sense of justice and reason that should inspire us all.

177. It is particularly regrettable that there are political factors, individuals and States that have let themselves be drawn into these thinly disguised manoeuvres. One can only hope that sooner or later they will understand the real meaning of these manoeuvres that they have been taken in by, and that they will realize the meaning of the actions of those who are ardently working to find an honourable *modus vivendi* for all the countries of South-East Asia.

178. All those who have been good enough to heed my words will have fully understood that the creation of a so-called “Kampuchean Coalition Government” has not changed by one iota our position on the problem of Kampuchea. One would have to be blind not to see that, beneath the mantle of respectability so hurriedly stitched together by a group of tailors on the order of their established customers, more or less hidden is the same monster that can no longer count the number of its victims, millions of innocent people, that same monster which for many years has been usurping the name of Kampuchea within the United Nations.

179. But events cannot be held back; time passes, and at last we see those who support the so-called “new Coalition Government” admitting that the Pol Pot régime was in fact a murderous régime, and that what they call the intervention of the Vietnamese

troops made it possible to put an end to that régime. One would have been only too willing to listen to such statements and such an evaluation of the events of 1979 from those who, at the time, so eloquently defended the rights of the so-called “Democratic Kampuchea” and who so forcefully condemned the military assistance given by Viet Nam to the Khmer patriots to help them rid the country of a system which had flouted the most elementary rules of human rights and international law in general. Today, they have taken a less crude attitude and, consequently one that is closer to reality. We welcome this. But then they add that now there is nothing that justifies the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. One might wonder whether they sincerely believe this categorical statement.

180. Here I would just say in passing that the military presence is based on a treaty concluded between two sovereign States, Kampuchea and Viet Nam, and that this matter regards only those two countries which signed the treaty.

181. But to come back to the question: is it really true that “nothing justifies” the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea? Those who say so would seem to wish to make us believe that the land of the Khmers is just a piece of land taken out of the context of South-East Asia, floating in the air, suspended in some mysterious vacuum. Is there really any need to recall once again that wretched state in which Kampuchea and its people found themselves when they were liberated from Pol Pot's hangmen?

182. Must we refer to the situation in the western border zones of Kampuchea, where the remnants of the Pol Pot clique receive everything they need in the way of military and other equipment to continue their sabotage and harassment of the new Government of the country and the local people, who suffered enough at the hands of these armed elements when they controlled Kampuchea's fate? Can we forget that those armed elements survive because of the manoeuvres of those in certain foreign circles that are doing all they can to prevent the lasting stabilization of the situation in South-East Asia?

183. The formal proposals of the countries of Indo-China in this connection are in no way ambiguous. Among other matters, they deal with the situation in the border area and the withdrawal of foreign troops. In our view, if there were really a desire to create a situation, an atmosphere, in which “nothing would justify” the presence of Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, negotiations should be begun immediately on the contentious elements in the Indo-Chinese proposals. That would be the most practical way to bring all the countries in the region to peace, stability and mutually advantageous co-operation.

184. To insist on the withdrawal of foreign troops, to persist in accepting actively or even passively, a compromise group claiming the label of a government and including in its ranks criminals judged and condemned by virtually the whole international community, to believe that the exclusion of the countries most closely concerned from the solution of the problems of the region could lead to positive results—all this shows that in certain circles illusions are still

harboured about the prospects of efforts to lead the countries of Indo-China to the negotiating table in such conditions. I repeat "in such conditions", for Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, far from rejecting the constructive approaches of the other countries of South-East Asia, have often given proof of their serious intention to find a solution to this problem. They have demonstrated their flexibility and their initiative in trying to avoid the stumbling-blocks that the efforts to reach a settlement have come up against so far.

185. It is necessary to respect the legitimate interests of all and to work together, with the participation of all the countries concerned. Draft resolution A/37/L.1/Rev.1 moves in a different direction, and the delegation of Hungary cannot support it.

186. The PRESIDENT: I remind representatives that, in accordance with the decision that we have

taken, the list of speakers on this item will be closed at noon tomorrow.

*The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.*

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NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The delegations of Mali and Nicaragua subsequently informed the Secretariat that they had intended to abstain in the vote on the motion.

<sup>2</sup> The delegations of Bolivia, Malawi, Saint Lucia, Solomon Islands and Venezuela subsequently informed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour of the motion.

<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, at the 110th meeting, on 17 December 1982, resolution 37/5 B was adopted.

<sup>4</sup> *Report of the International Conference on Kampuchea, New York, 13-17 July 1981* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.20), annex I.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, annexes I and II.