



*President:* Mr. Imre HOLLAI (Hungary).

**AGENDA ITEM 33**

**Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa  
(continued):\***

- (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*;
- (b) Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against *Apartheid* in Sports;
- (c) Reports of the Secretary-General

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the announcement made at the 36th plenary meeting, I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the request by the Group of African States, contained in document A/37/552, for the urgent consideration, under agenda item 33, of the application of South Africa for credit from IMF. A draft resolution on the subject has been distributed under the symbol A/37/L.5. I call on the representative of Guinea, in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of African States, to introduce the draft resolution, on which the Assembly will take a decision tomorrow afternoon.

2. Mr. COUMBASSA (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): The outrageous and incredibly stubborn attitude of the racist Republic of South Africa, which not only continues to exploit the Coloured South African population but persists in its illegal colonial domination of Namibia and in maintaining a state of war on its border with and in the southern part of Angola, is a challenge which we cannot pass over in silence. It would be impossible to say too much about the repeated violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the blatant arrogance of those that promote the shameful system of *apartheid* in South Africa with the support of certain Powers.

3. South Africa's loathsome policy of *apartheid* and the threat which it poses to international peace and security have prompted the international community to consider a number of enforcement measures, such as the arms embargo, against the racist régime of South Africa. In order to compel South Africa to put an end to its inhuman policy of *apartheid*, the international community adopted decisions on foreign investments in South Africa in resolution 36/172 D and 36/172 O of 17 December 1981; in the first resolution, the General Assembly requested IMF, *inter alia*, to terminate loans or credits to South Africa.

4. It is in this context that I have the pleasant duty of introducing, on behalf of the Group of African States, draft resolution A/37/L.5 for approval by the

Assembly. In introducing this document, which is moderate in content and simple in form and which raises no difficulty whatsoever, we are convinced that the Assembly will adopt it by consensus in order once again to express its support for the aspirations of Africa to liberty and peace. Indeed, the draft resolution, in its four operative paragraphs, simply states:

"1. *Again requests* the International Monetary Fund to refrain from granting any credits or other assistance to South Africa;

"2. *Urges* States members of the International Monetary Fund to take appropriate action towards that end;

"3. *Urges* the Security Council to consider the matter as soon as possible with a view to taking appropriate action;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake urgent consultations with the International Monetary Fund and to report to the General Assembly as soon as possible, on the implementation of the present resolution."

5. In relation to this moderate and concise draft resolution on a question of such capital importance as that of the policy of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa, Africa—the Group of African States, which represents it in the United Nations—is entitled to know who are its true friends. I know it has many.

**AGENDA ITEM 15**

**Elections to fill vacancies in principal organs (concluded):\***

- (b) Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council

6. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now proceed to the election of 18 members of the Economic and Social Council to replace those members whose term of office expires on 31 December 1982. The 18 outgoing members are: Australia, Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Thailand, United States of America, Yugoslavia and Zaire. These 18 countries are eligible for immediate re-election.

7. I should like to remind the members of the Assembly that after 1 January 1983 the following States will remain as members of the Economic and Social Council: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Fiji, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, India,

\* Resumed from the 14th meeting.

\* Resumed from the 36th meeting.

Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saint Lucia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and Venezuela. The names of those 36 States should therefore not appear on the ballot papers.

8. According to paragraph 4 of resolution 2847 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971, and taking into account the number of States which will remain members of the Council after 1 January 1983, the 18 members should be elected as follows: five from African States, four from Asian States, three from Latin American States, four from Western European and other States and two from the socialist States of Eastern Europe. The ballot papers take that pattern into account.

9. The required number of candidates which receive the largest number of votes and the majority required will be declared elected. In the case of a tie vote for the last place, there will be a restricted ballot limited to those candidates which have obtained an equal number of votes. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to that procedure?

*It was so decided.*

10. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with rule 92 of the rules of procedure, the election shall be held by secret ballot and there shall be no nominations.

11. Ballot papers marked A, B, C, D and E will now be distributed. I request representatives to use only those ballot papers and to write on them the names of the Member States for which they wish to vote in each Group. Ballot papers containing more names than the number assigned to that Group will be declared invalid. I call upon the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who wishes to raise a point of order.

12. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I should like to remind representatives that my country maintains its candidacy. In the Group of Asian States two days ago, when we decided to withdraw, it was simply because we had assumed that only four Members would be candidates and that there would be no voting. Since there is to be voting on the Group's candidates, we maintain our candidacy.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Akhtar (Bangladesh), Mr. Aguilar Frenzel (Honduras), Mr. Craig (Ireland), Mr. Murargy (Mozambique) and Mr. Grecu (Romania) acted as tellers.*

*A vote was taken by secret ballot.*

13. The PRESIDENT: I propose to suspend the meeting while the ballots are being counted.

*The meeting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed at 5 p.m.*

14. The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting for the election of 18 members of the Economic and Social Council is as follows:

#### GROUP A

<i>Number of ballot papers:</i>	146
<i>Number of invalid ballots:</i>	0
<i>Number of valid ballots:</i>	146

<i>Abstentions:</i>	2
<i>Number of members voting:</i>	144
<i>Required majority:</i>	96
<i>Number of votes obtained:</i>	
Algeria .....	139
Congo .....	137
Sierra Leone .....	135
Djibouti .....	134
Botswana .....	131
Uganda .....	3
Comoros .....	1
Nigeria .....	1
Zaire .....	1

#### GROUP B

<i>Number of ballot papers:</i>	146
<i>Number of invalid ballots:</i>	0
<i>Number of valid ballots:</i>	146
<i>Abstentions:</i>	1
<i>Number of members voting:</i>	145
<i>Required majority:</i>	97
<i>Number of votes obtained:</i>	
Saudi Arabia .....	116
Lebanon .....	114
Malaysia .....	107
Thailand .....	84
Iraq .....	82
Iran (Islamic Republic of) .....	40
Sri Lanka .....	2
Bahrain .....	1

#### GROUP C

<i>Number of ballot papers:</i>	146
<i>Number of invalid ballots:</i>	0
<i>Number of valid ballots:</i>	146
<i>Abstentions:</i>	1
<i>Number of members voting:</i>	145
<i>Required majority:</i>	97
<i>Number of votes obtained:</i>	
Suriname .....	134
Mexico .....	133
Ecuador .....	129
Chile .....	6
Cuba .....	1

#### GROUP D

<i>Number of ballot papers:</i>	146
<i>Number of invalid ballots:</i>	0
<i>Number of valid ballots:</i>	146
<i>Abstentions:</i>	8
<i>Number of members voting:</i>	138
<i>Required majority:</i>	92
<i>Number of votes obtained:</i>	
Luxembourg .....	130
Netherlands .....	127
New Zealand .....	127
United States of America .....	126
Belgium .....	2
Malta .....	2
Italy .....	1

## GROUP E

Number of ballot papers:	146
Number of invalid ballots:	0
Number of valid ballots:	146
Abstentions:	11
Number of members voting:	135
Required majority:	90

Number of votes obtained:	
Bulgaria .....	129
German Democratic Republic .....	126
Yugoslavia .....	7
Hungary .....	2
Albania .....	1
Czechoslovakia .....	1
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic .....	1

15. The PRESIDENT: There remains one vacancy to be filled from Group B. We shall now proceed, in accordance with rule 94 of the rules of procedure, to a second ballot, restricted to two candidates, Iraq and Thailand, the two countries which were not elected but which obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot.

16. The ballot papers are now being distributed. May I remind representatives to write on the ballot paper the name of the one country for which they wish to vote. Any ballot paper containing the name of any State other than Iraq or Thailand or containing more than one name will be declared invalid.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Akhtar (Bangladesh), Mr. Aguilar Frenzel (Honduras), Mr. Craig (Ireland), Mr. Murargy (Mozambique) and Mr. Grecu (Romania) acted as tellers.*

*A vote was taken by secret ballot.*

17. The PRESIDENT: I propose to suspend the meeting while the ballots are being counted.

*The meeting was suspended at 5.20 p.m. and resumed at 5.30 p.m.*

18. The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting is as follows:

Number of ballot papers:	152
Number of invalid ballots:	1
Number of valid ballots:	151
Abstentions:	0
Number of members voting:	151
Required majority:	101

Number of votes obtained:	
Thailand .....	79
Iraq .....	72

19. The PRESIDENT: As neither of the two candidates obtained the required two-thirds majority, the General Assembly will now proceed to a second restricted ballot. As in the case of the first restricted ballot, only Iraq and Thailand are eligible. Any ballot papers containing the names of other States or more than one name will be declared invalid. Ballot papers will now be distributed.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Akhtar (Bangladesh), Mr. Aguilar Frenzel (Honduras), Mr. Craig (Ireland), Mr. Murargy (Mozambique) and Mr. Grecu (Romania) acted as tellers.*

*A vote was taken by secret ballot.*

20. The PRESIDENT: I propose to suspend the meeting while the ballots are being counted.

*The meeting was suspended at 5.40 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m.*

21. The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting is as follows:

Number of ballot papers:	151
Number of invalid ballots:	0
Number of valid ballots:	151
Abstentions:	1
Number of members voting:	150
Required majority:	100

Number of votes obtained:	
Thailand .....	82
Iraq .....	68

22. The PRESIDENT: Before we proceed to a third restricted ballot, I call on the representative of Iraq on a point of order.

23. Mr. AL-QAYSI (Iraq): To save the Assembly's time and so as not to prolong the election process, I should like to announce that my delegation withdraws from this election. We wish the Thai delegation every success as one of the representatives of the Group of Asian States in the Economic and Social Council.

24. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Thailand.

25. Mr. KASEMSRI (Thailand): My delegation is deeply moved by and most appreciative of the very kind, friendly and brotherly gesture of the Iraqi delegation in not pressing the candidature of Iraq and we should like to express our deep appreciation to the Iraqi delegation.

26. The PRESIDENT: I should like to thank both representatives for their kind co-operativeness. But, in spite of the withdrawal of Iraq, since this is a question of membership in a major United Nations body we still have to proceed to the third restricted ballot, which this time I presume will be an easy matter. The ballot papers will now be distributed.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Akhtar (Bangladesh), Mr. Aguilar Frenzel (Honduras), Mr. Craig (Ireland), Mr. Murargy (Mozambique) and Mr. Grecu (Romania) acted as tellers.*

*A vote was taken by secret ballot.*

27. The PRESIDENT: I propose to suspend the meeting while the ballots are being counted.

*The meeting was suspended at 6 p.m. and resumed at 6.05 p.m.*

28. The PRESIDENT: The result of the voting is as follows:

Number of ballot papers:	149
Number of invalid ballots:	2
Number of valid ballots:	147
Abstentions:	9
Number of members voting:	138
Required majority:	92

*Number of votes obtained:*

Thailand .....	126
Iraq .....	12

*Having obtained the required two-thirds majority, Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, the Congo, Djibouti, Ecuador, the German Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Suriname, Thailand and the United States of America were elected members of the Economic and Social Council for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 1983 (see decision 37/307).*

29. The PRESIDENT: I congratulate the countries which have been elected members of the Economic and Social Council. I also thank the tellers for their assistance in this election.

30. I now call on the representative of Albania, who I understand wishes to speak on a point of clarification.

31. Mr. BALETA (Albania) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, when you announced the results of the voting concerning the election to the Economic and Social Council of two members belonging to the Group of Eastern European States, you said that Albania had received one vote. Apparently one delegation made a mistake—or perhaps cast that vote deliberately. Hence I want to make it clear and to emphasize that Albania is not a member of the Group of Eastern European States. As a matter of fact, Albania does not belong to any of the so-called geographical or regional groups at the United Nations.

32. If the delegation which voted in favour of Albania was not aware of that fact, I want to thank it for its kind sentiments towards my country. However, if that delegation acted with other motives, I want to remind it that elections are to be taken seriously.

#### AGENDA ITEM 134

##### Consequences of the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq

33. Mr. AL-QAYSI (Iraq): Since 4 September 1980 Iraq has set forth the causes of the armed conflict with Iran on numerous occasions in international forums, including that of the General Assembly. Ever since, we have faced a relentless war of aggression imposed upon us by Iran. We were left with no choice but to exercise our inherent right of self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law in order to preserve our sovereignty, territorial integrity and security.

34. The item before the General Assembly calls for the consideration of the consequences of the prolongation of the armed conflict. Within this context, it is not necessary to repeat in detail all the facts. What is of the utmost importance, however, is to recall those that are relevant to our consideration.

35. It is a well-established fact that since the early days of the war Iraq has never ceased to pursue peace with Iran in the form of a just and honourable settlement. I should like to recall that we offered Iran peace on 28 September 1980, one week after the

Iraqi forces repulsed the initial Iranian attack. We declared that what we sought was to regain our legitimate national rights in our land and waters. We also declared our full readiness to withdraw from Iranian territories and to establish normal relations with Iran on the basis of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Iran rejected that offer.

36. We accepted Security Council resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously on 28 September 1980. We also welcomed and accepted the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and co-operated with him fully. Resolution 479 (1980), as the Assembly is aware, was rejected by Iran.

37. We unilaterally declared a cease-fire from 5 to 8 October 1980 in response to a request from the President of Pakistan, who was undertaking a good offices mission in his capacity as Chairman at the time of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Iran rejected that offer and intensified the war.

38. We welcomed the efforts of President Fidel Castro of Cuba, in his capacity as Chairman of the non-aligned movement, and actively sought an early settlement. Those efforts also were frustrated by Iran.

39. Unlike Iran, we participated in the Third Islamic Summit Conference of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, held at Mecca-Taif in January 1981, accepted its decision and worked actively with its Goodwill Committee to achieve an honourable settlement. Up to this date Iran has continued to obstruct those efforts.

40. At the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi in February 1981, Iraq promptly accepted the letter and spirit of the decision of the Conference on the modalities for settling the conflict. However, the representative of Iran intervened to reject the substance of that decision, which had been worked out in intensive consultation.

41. Last March President Saddam Hussein suggested that the Goodwill Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference should set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the question of which side started the war. It is worth noting that this suggestion was put to us by President Sékou Touré during a visit with the Committee last year. It was accepted by Iraq in a letter dated 22 April 1981. So far, we have had no response from Iran.

42. On 9 June last the Islamic Goodwill Committee, in view of the Zionist aggression against Lebanon, called upon us and Iran to cease fighting immediately and face the Zionist aggression. On 10 June the Iraqi Revolution Command Council issued a statement containing the following points. First, it expressed Iraq's immediate readiness to cease fire and put an end to all hostilities as soon as Iran agreed to do so. Secondly, it expressed Iraq's immediate readiness to withdraw within two weeks to the international frontiers all of its military forces from all Iranian territories and cities occupied in defence of Iraqi territory and towns. Thirdly, it said that in case a direct agreement with Iran on the issues pertaining to the conflict was not possible through the organizations mediating between the two countries, Iraq was ready to accept an

arbitration decision to be rendered by an extraordinary session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and, should Iran refuse such arbitration, Iraq would accept arbitration by the non-aligned movement or the Security Council.

43. On 20 June President Saddam Hussein announced a further decision of the Revolution Command Council which, despite the negative response of the Iranian Government to the foregoing statement, went further and called for the commencement and the completion of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces to the border within a maximum period of 10 days. The withdrawal operation was completed on the target date. The Iranians, however, announced that the withdrawal was a lie and part of an imperialist plot orchestrated in conjunction with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

44. Throughout late June and early July last we actively sought within the Security Council to regenerate a momentum for peace. The deliberations of the Council culminated in the unanimous adoption on 12 July of resolution 514 (1982). Iraq promptly accepted that resolution. However, despite the fact that the Council was acting strictly within its responsibility under the Charter, Iran boycotted the Council and rejected its resolution.

45. On the day following the adoption of Security Council resolution 514 (1982), the Iranian forces launched a large-scale armed attack against Iraqi territory in the south, in the area east of Basrah. Between that date and 29 July 1982 four similar attacks were carried out in the same area and with the same intensity, all of which were mounted in a desperate attempt to cross the international frontier and invade Iraq. We have already reported the details of these attacks to the Assembly, and they appear in document A/37/428. The attacks were costly failures for Iran.

46. Very recently, Iraq requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the serious deterioration of the situation as a result of the major armed attack launched by the Iranian forces early on Friday, 1 October, which was followed by three more up to 4 October. The Iranian offensive this time took place in the Sumar sector, which is the middle sector of the frontier, near the Iraqi town of Mendeli. Like the previous one, it also failed. At any rate, the Council responded with the unanimous adoption of resolution 522 (1982), which was accepted by Iraq. Iran again chose to boycott the Council and reject its resolution.

47. In order to assess these well-established facts for the purpose of the consideration of the item before us, we should look into the grounds upon which the Iranian Government is basing its position. We shall do this setting aside the standard Iranian rhetoric.

48. In its reply to the letter of the Secretary-General transmitting to it Security Council resolution 514 (1982), the Iranian Government considered<sup>1</sup> the action of the Council inconsistent with the Charter and consequently dissociated itself from it. To substantiate this claim, reference was made to paragraph 2 of Article 24 of the Charter, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 33 and paragraph 1 of Article 37. The conclusion was drawn that "Resolution 479 (1980) of the Security Council fails to recognize that armed aggres-

sion and occupation has taken place. It also fails to condemn the aggressor and demand that it restore the conditions prevailing before the initiation of aggression."

49. In the same reply, the Iranian Government has a similar point of view concerning Security Council resolution 514 (1982). It has stated that that resolution is "in complete harmony with the general thrust of the Council's handling of [the] question, which has so far been the disguised support of the aggressor".

50. It is obvious that these claims do not stand the test of objective scrutiny, and they do not offer the Iranian Government any refuge. To begin with, Member States, in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, conferred upon the Security Council in Article 24 of the Charter primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. They moreover agreed that in the discharge of those duties the Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, on its own behalf, through the specific powers granted to it in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII. Chapters VIII and XII do not concern us here as they deal with regional arrangements and the international trusteeship system. This leaves Chapters VI and VII, which deal with the peaceful settlement of disputes and action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The provisions of these two Chapters contain a wide range of powers granted by Member States, including Iran, to the Security Council for the purpose of preventing any dangers or threats to international peace and security and ensuring the maintenance or the restoration thereof.

51. Looking at Security Council resolutions 479 (1980) and 514 (1982), it is significant that the Council referred to Article 24 of the Charter in both resolutions. There is, moreover, a reference in both resolutions to Article 2 of the Charter. This is a strong indication that while the Council was acting within its primary responsibility as conferred upon it by Member States, including Iran, it did not neglect the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as the Iranian Government alleged. In so acting the Council called upon the two parties to the conflict to follow a specific framework of peaceful settlement. This the Council has ample power under Chapter VI to do—in particular on the basis of those very provisions referred to by the Iranian Government in its reply to the communication of the Secretary-General to which I have referred. Iraq accepted that framework. The Iranian Government rejected it on baseless grounds, as I have already shown.

52. In essence, the argument of the Iranian Government boils down to saying that the provisions of the Charter referred to empower a Member State to boycott the action of the Council unless it adopts a resolution on that State's own terms. Indeed, the Iranian Government did say this quite specifically in the penultimate paragraph of its reply. It said that "We stand ready to co-operate with the Council in case in the future it deems it appropriate to take its responsibilities seriously and deal with the realities existing on the scene".<sup>1</sup>

53. In addition, the Iranian Government should remember its explicit obligation as a Member State, under Article 25, "to accept and carry out" the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter.

54. As to the Iranian argument of an alleged aggression, this also does not hold any credibility. Aside from questions of merits and demerits, I have already pointed out that President Saddam Hussein proposed that the Goodwill Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the question of which side started the war. This means that Iraq accepts without any *a priori* position an impartial determination of the question by a third party. The Iranian Government has not responded so far to this proposal. Obviously one is entitled to ask why, if the Iranian Government is sure of what it alleges to be the case, does it not accept an impartial investigation of this question. We in Iraq are sure of the justice of our case and are ready to proceed in this procedure.

55. Let us now consider the position of Iran towards resolution 522 (1982) as set out in the note verbale to the Secretary-General from the representative of Iran.<sup>2</sup> In dealing with that position, I shall again set aside the standard Iranian rhetoric and, this time also, the inappropriateness of its language and the ignorance it conveys.

56. The Iranian Government considers the Council's resolutions to be non-binding upon it, basing itself on the same arguments as I have already outlined in connection with Security Council resolutions 479 (1980) and 514 (1982) and which I have shown to be baseless. The only additional element which the Iranian Government set forth was the allegation that the region in which the recent military operations had taken place was "well inside the territories" of Iran and that those operations were "aimed at liberating Iranian territories occupied by Iraqi forces at the beginning of the war".

57. This allegation is not new. The Iranian Government has since last June continued to cast doubt as to the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces to the international frontiers. In this connection, I should like to recall that my Foreign Minister strongly reaffirmed before the Security Council<sup>3</sup> on 4 October 1982 that our forces had withdrawn completely to the international frontiers. He stated that Iraq was so sure of the legality of its position that it was ready to accept the arbitration of the Security Council. The Iranian Government has so far rejected this proposal and, in view of this rejection of an impartial third-party settlement, it is reasonable to consider the Iranian allegation suspect and unworthy of serious consideration.

58. It is clear from what I have stated that the grounds upon which the Iranian Government bases its position are mere pretexts for continuing the war against Iraq. In pursuing this policy the Iranian Government aspires to invade Iraq and set up a new régime in the country. Not only have there been ample pronouncements from Iranian officials to this effect, but it is well established also that the Iranian Government has in fact attempted to carry out such a policy through the large-scale offensives of last July and early this month. Herein lies the real reason why the Iranian Government rejected the action of the Security Council.

59. In his statement at the 27th meeting of the General Assembly, held on 12 October, the Foreign Minister of Iran considered it "strange" to request the inclusion of the item before us because it was a pretext for saying that the measures adopted by his Government violated the principles of the Charter and threatened peace and security.

60. This is a very short-sighted view, to say the least. It is abundantly clear that there is an international consensus on ending the war, whether in the United Nations, amongst the non-aligned countries or in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. It is also clear that Iraq is part of that consensus and that only Iran stands outside it, continuing its war without any justification. We are not alone in saying that this war threatens international peace and security. The three unanimous resolutions of the Security Council and the two statements of its President,<sup>4</sup> as well as the statements of the meetings of the non-aligned countries and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, all made this judgement. To say that that is a pretext boils down to an official confession that Iran is in defiance of the collective judgement of the international community. If the situation is otherwise, it is incumbent upon the Iranian Government to prove its good intentions, if any, and this can only be done by remaining within the mainstream of the international community and following the Charter norms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, as we have been repeatedly calling upon it to do since the early days of the war.

61. In his statement of 12 October the Foreign Minister of Iran said that they stand "for close and friendly relations based on mutual respect, with all the countries of the region". If this is really the policy of his Government, how does that fit in with the threats he made to the countries of the region on the basis of so-called might? How does this fit in with the self-assigned responsibility for the security of the Arab Gulf and of the Strait of Hormuz? Is this not the discredited policy of the Shah?

62. In the Arab world deep alarm has been created by the destabilizing and destructive policies of the Iranian Government and profound pain is felt at the continuation of the war. The Arab countries are now more than ever united against these policies. They affirmed, during the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, held at Fez, their desire to live in peace with their neighbours but at the same time they declared their obligation to defend all Arab territories, considering any aggression against any Arab country and aggression against Arab countries as a whole [see A/37/696, annex, sect. III]. It remains now for the Iranian Government to draw the necessary lessons and to prove its allegation that it genuinely desires peace and tranquillity.

63. Within the context of the item before it, it is not difficult for the General Assembly to draw the necessary conclusions on the basis of the well-established facts which we have endeavoured to set forth.

64. An armed conflict has been going on for over two years. The international community has judged it a threat to international peace and security. One party to the conflict has remained all along faithful to its commitment under the Charter to seek a peaceful settlement, based on the principles of international

law and justice. The other party has not so far responded favourably; in particular it has rejected the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council concerning the settlement of the conflict and has dissociated itself from its action. In this connection, it is significant to recall the views of the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization, when he said:

“There is a tendency in the United Nations for Governments to act as though the passage of a resolution absolved them from further responsibility for the subject in question. Nothing could be further from the intention of the Charter. In fact, resolutions, particularly those unanimously adopted by the Security Council, should serve as a spring-board for governmental support and determination and should motivate their policies outside the United Nations. This indeed is the essence of the treaty obligation which the Charter imposes on Member States. In other words the best resolution in the world will have little practical effect unless Governments of Member States follow it up with the appropriate support and action.

“Very often the Secretary-General is allotted the function of following up on the implementation of a resolution. Without the continuing diplomatic and other support of Member States, the Secretary-General’s efforts often have less chance of bearing fruit. Concerted diplomatic action is an essential complement to the implementation of resolutions. I believe that in reviewing one of the greatest problems of the United Nations—lack of respect for its decisions by those to whom they are addressed—new ways should be considered of bringing to bear the collective influence of the membership on the problem at hand.” [A/37/1, p. 3.]

65. On this basis, then it is our responsibility to employ collectively all the means at our disposal to gain respect from Iran for the decisions of the United Nations. This is the only guarantee for the strength of our commitments under the Charter. If we waver in our resolve to achieve that end we shall be violating those commitments, since we shall be permitting the persistence of a grave threat to international peace and security, with untold damage to the interests of all.

66. The PRESIDENT: I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed tomorrow, Thursday, 21 October, at 1 p.m. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Assembly agrees to that proposal.

*It was so decided.*

67. Mr. ROA KOURÍ (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The regrettable war which has been going on for more than two years between Iraq and Iran, two members of the non-aligned movement, has already taken a heavy, irreparable toll in human lives and has caused material damage amounting to tens of billions of dollars. The economies of both countries have been seriously damaged and this painful conflict has had a negative political impact on the belligerents, on the region and indeed on all the developing countries.

68. In the report on the efforts made by Cuba, as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, to con-

tribute to the search for a solution to the conflict between Iran and Iraq, Cuba’s Minister for External Relations, Isidoro Malmierca, stated:

“Ever since we noted the beginning of the deterioration in relations between two member States of the Movement, the Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran, we have given careful attention to this disturbing situation.

“Immediately after the hostilities became widespread towards the end of September, we visited the heads of State of Iraq and Iran, at the request of the President of the non-aligned movement, President Fidel Castro, ... to transmit to them letters offering Cuba’s good offices in order to achieve a peaceful, just and honourable political solution to the conflict between two full-fledged member States of the non-aligned movement.”

69. Between September and November 1980 Minister Malmierca visited Baghdad and Teheran four times and on two occasions President Fidel Castro sent personal letters to the Presidents of Iraq and Iran.

70. In February 1981, at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi, the Ministers who met there requested the Ministers for Foreign Relations of Cuba, India and Zambia and the head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] to make all possible efforts to contribute to the implementation of the principles of non-occupation or non-acquisition of the territory of a State by another by the use of force, non-aggression, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States, non-interference or non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes between States.

71. In compliance with that mandate, the Ministers I have mentioned and the head of the Political Department of the PLO have been working very hard but, regrettably, have not yet been able to bring the war to an end.

72. The parallel efforts to the same end of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have not achieved the desired result either.

73. Notwithstanding the existing difficulties, the four persons designated by the New Delhi Conference met in New York on 5 October last and reiterated their conviction that efforts to achieve speedily a peaceful and just settlement of the conflict should continue and reaffirmed their readiness and their determination to do everything possible to contribute to achieving that objective, in accordance with their mandate.

74. From this rostrum we wish to repeat Cuba’s appeal and that of the non-aligned movement to the Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran to put an end to the conflict and find a peaceful, just and honourable political solution in keeping with the principles of the non-aligned movement and the Charter of the United Nations; to replace confrontation with dialogue and then to go from dialogue to solutions benefiting the peoples of Iraq and Iran and all member States of our Movement as well as the cause of peace in the region and in the world.

75. Mr. ABDEL-MEGUID (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): All wars and all armed struggles must be regarded as regrettable and painful, but the regret and the pain we feel about the conflict between Iraq and Iran are even greater because of the special conditions of that conflict and because of its evil consequences.

76. First of all, this armed conflict is between two neighbouring States that have many more reasons for *rapprochement* and co-operation than for fighting and estrangement.

77. Secondly, this armed conflict has generated grave new threats to and pressures on the security and stability of the whole region of the Middle East. Members are aware of the threats and dangers to which that region is already subjected as a result of another old conflict which has been long-lasting and increasingly dangerous. Moreover, this conflict opens wide the door to the intervention and influence of other foreign forces less interested in the stability, security and prosperity of the region than in safeguarding their own interests, particularly tactical or strategic ones.

78. Thirdly, both States are third-world developing States endowed by nature with important economic advantages of which many other developing countries are completely deprived and which could very well be used and exploited in the interest of their economic and social development. However, as a result of the long war between those two countries, much of their wealth has been wasted in providing for the enormous expenditures on arms and the war effort in general. Moreover, development projects in both countries run the risk of coming to a standstill and sometimes even of being destroyed.

79. Egypt has from the beginning of the hostilities clearly declared its position in respect of the present war between Iraq and Iran, and that position remains firmly established and unchanged. We have always made it clear beyond any doubt that we are opposed to the use of force in settling conflicts among States. We consider that all conflicts should be settled by peaceful means, and in the first place through negotiations. We strongly condemn any measure that could result in the loss of lives or destruction of property.

80. Moreover, we have always affirmed our determination to assist Iraq in the event of its security within its international boundaries being endangered. That firm position of principle, as well as other factors, stems from the fact that Egypt has always respected its contractual commitments. In this connection, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, in his statement to the General Assembly, held on 28 September of this year, very clearly outlined the position of Egypt, when, speaking of the war between Iran and Iraq, he said:

“We know all about the latest of the repeated Iranian invasions of Iraq. We are also familiar with Iran’s rejection of all attempts at a settlement and of all peace mediations. Iran, instead, is determined to continue the war against Iraq. We do not understand why. Iraq has already withdrawn or at least is ready to withdraw from all Iranian territory. Iraq has also made public its readiness to accept peace mediations and its responsiveness to efforts for a settlement. We call upon the Iranian Government

to opt for peace and to revoke all claims that could engender conflicts and rekindle the conflagration.

“As an Arab country which believes in the territorial integrity of the Arab nation, and confident of the Government of Iraq’s acceptance of peace initiatives, Egypt declares that it will support Iraq in defence of the Iraqi people and territory.”  
[8th meeting, paras. 183 and 184.]

81. Furthermore, Egypt reaffirms its support for the position taken by the non-aligned countries in respect of this war as reflected in the communiqué published after the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries and heads of delegation held in New York from 4 to 9 October 1982 [A/37/540, annex].

82. In the light of the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Iranian territory, and since Iraq is ready to begin negotiations with Iran, our delegation can only reiterate its appeal to the Iranian Government to respond to this initiative, put an end immediately to the military operations in the territory of Iraq and begin negotiations with Iraq to reach an equitable and lasting settlement of all the outstanding differences between the two States. Reprisals and vengeance are no justification for continuing bloodshed and destruction.

83. It may be appropriate here to draw attention to an important fact which is often lost sight of—namely, that experience has proved and continues to prove that the use of force in international relations may sometimes be successful in achieving some immediate objectives but will never succeed in establishing in the long term lasting peace and justice. For there is no alternative to solutions based on dialogue and negotiation.

84. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

85. Mr. MAHALATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am replying to the representative of Egypt. We shall reply to the Iraqi allegations tomorrow, in our statement on this item.

86. I should like to express our views on an experience that is not very unusual in this body. As a matter of fact, it is the usual practice of all invaders and tyrants, while they invade other countries and collaborate with tyrant régimes, to adopt a very peaceful tune when they speak.

87. The representative of Egypt has quoted his Foreign Minister’s appeal to Iran to stop the war. It is very interesting that last year while Iraqi troops were in our land burning and razing many villages and cities and destroying many other places important to our economy, he did not utter one word. But this year, when, as a matter of fact, in our own land we have captured Egyptian prisoners of war and found Egyptian ammunition, the representative of Egypt says that we should take the initiative for peace. I thank him very much.

*The meeting rose at 7 p.m.*



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1982, document S/15292, annex.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid., Supplement for October, November and December 1982, document S/15448.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year, 2399th meeting.*

<sup>4</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1980, p. 23; and ibid., 1982, p. 19.*