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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAÚNDE (Peru).

Palestine: repatriation of Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due to them (A/1323, A/1324, A/1325, A/1326, A/1346, A/1349, A/1366, A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/L.30, A/AC.38/L.57, A/AC.38/L.60, A/AC.38/L.62) (*continued*)

[Item 20 (c)]*

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the fact that a great many speeches had already been made and asked speakers to be as brief as possible. He did not think, for example, that it was necessary to repeat arguments already put forward.

2. Mr. SIMIC (Yugoslavia) stressed the great importance his delegation attached to the question of the Palestine refugees. He recalled the part it had taken in the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and emphasized that it had always considered that a question of such international importance should be settled in the best interests of both the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine.

3. In the Yugoslav delegation's opinion, the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine could live in a single free and independent State on the basis of equality of constitutional, political and economic rights. Establishment of a democratic order in Palestine should make it possible to establish friendly relations between the independent State of Israel and the neighbouring Arab States, and the latter should benefit from the cultural and technical advantages which Israel would be in a position to bring them.

4. It was on the basis of these considerations that the Yugoslav representative on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine had drawn up a plan for a federal system in Palestine.¹ The Committee had not approved the plan, which the representatives of

India and Iran had supported. Subsequently, during the third session of the General Assembly, the delegations of India and Iran had left the minority which favoured a federal system and had supported the plan for the partition of Palestine. His delegation had been surprised at the indifference of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Palestinian question to the federal solution in 1947.

5. That reminder of history shed light on the mistake the General Assembly had made in November 1947 in adopting resolution 181 (II). At that time, the General Assembly had taken a decision unrelated to the objective reality, to the principles of the Charter, and to recognized human rights. The Yugoslav delegation had been clear-sighted at that time, and it regretted that events had proved it right.

6. At the present time, there was one urgent question and that was the deplorable situation of the Arab refugees. That question must be settled and the Yugoslav delegation would support any measure to that end. However, the solution must take the facts into account. An independent State, the State of Israel, had been established and organized. New immigrants were still arriving in that State. Lastly, the relations between the State of Israel and the Arab States were governed by an armistice, and that made the situation abnormal.

7. In the circumstances, the Yugoslav delegation felt that the question of the Palestine refugees could be settled in the course of direct negotiations on all outstanding questions. That idea was expressed in the draft resolution submitted by Israel (A/AC.38/L.60), as well as in the draft resolution submitted by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/AC.38/L.57). In addition, the joint draft resolution clearly recognized the Palestine refugees' right to repatriation, which was fully in accordance with the resolutions the General Assembly had previously adopted.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, vol. II, appendix V.*

8. The Yugoslav delegation shared the views of the authors of draft resolution A/AC.38/L.57 on the question of whether it would be more appropriate to deal with sub-items 20 (c) and (d) of the agenda together, or to try first to settle sub-item 20 (c).

9. In conclusion, he said that the maintenance of peace between the countries of the Middle East, i.e. those of the Mediterranean basin, was an essential factor in the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

10. Mr. PATIJN (Netherlands) emphasized the humanitarian nature of the refugee problem and the fears which the recent discussions had aroused in his delegation. He made clear his delegation's position on the draft resolution submitted by Egypt (A/AC.38/L.30) and on the four-Power draft resolution.

11. The Egyptian draft resolution urged, among other things, the need to repatriate the refugees. The Netherlands delegation considered that such repatriation could take place only as part of a general settlement, after the parties had entered into negotiations. The General Assembly could not take a decision without first providing the safeguards of careful preparation and being assured of the existence of mutual good-will. News from Egypt showed that there was growing agitation among the Palestinian Arab refugees; and uncontrolled mass movements of refugees would be a threat to the security of the Middle East. The Arab States should therefore do all in their power to prevent that threat from becoming a reality. However, the terms of paragraph 7 of the Egyptian draft resolution, whereby the refusal by any government or authority to comply with the provisions of the resolution would prove the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, bore no relation to the situation. Despite its importance, the problem of the Palestine refugees could not be compared with other problems now before the Organization, which truly threatened to provoke a breach of peace.

12. The Netherlands delegation was in favour of the four-Power draft resolution because it was convinced that negotiations undertaken under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission could give concrete results. The Netherlands delegation was not sure that the present discussion in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee was particularly constructive, but hoped that the Israel Government would understand how great was its moral responsibility and see that the Palestine Arabs did not suffer by Israel's accession to independence.

13. With regard to the question of repatriation or resettlement with compensation, the Netherlands delegation preferred not to take any stand. In its opinion, a realistic approach was to be preferred to a dogmatic one.

14. In conclusion, he stressed that it would be better not to continue the lengthy exchange of accusations and acrimonious remarks to which the discussion had given rise.

15. Mr. AMMOUN (Lebanon) agreed with the Netherlands representative that the discussion should be constructive. To that end, it was essential to remove the many obstacles which had been placed in the way of settlement, both during the negotiations at Lausanne and in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee itself—as the statements of the Israel Minister for

Foreign Affairs and of the Israel representative, Mr. Eban, had shown. After the Israel representative's speech (66th meeting), and in order to make the discussion clear, the Lebanese delegation felt that it must recapitulate certain points.

16. First, he invited the members of the Israel delegation to keep themselves informed of the successive statements of their various representatives. If Mr. Eban had taken that elementary precaution, he would have realized that the remarks which he attributed to the Lebanese representative had in fact been made by the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs at a preceding meeting. It was in fact the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs who had upheld the argument of the "historical process of the redistribution of population", a process which was to be substituted for the principles of the Charter and which would take mankind back to the darkest and most distant times in the history of civilization. It was not the Lebanese representative who had said that human rights should not be respected in Israel, nor was it he who had tried to justify the crime. The Israel representatives' arguments thus turned against them.

17. Returning to the substance of the question, Mr. Ammoun said that the Israel representative's statement that the Arab delegations had voted against resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 was mistaken. In point of fact, the Arab delegations had voted in favour of the internationalization of Jerusalem and the repatriation of the refugees, and, in any case, a new factor—the Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949 (A/1367, chapter I, para. 12)—had come into play later. That document, signed by the Arab delegations and the Israel delegation, referred to the resolution 194 (III). The signatories of the Protocol had accepted the three following conditions: internationalization of the Jerusalem area within the limits and according to the terms set forth in resolution 181 (II); repatriation of the refugees and payment of compensation to those who decided not to return; and, lastly, the fixing of territorial boundaries in accordance with the map attached to the Protocol. Israel had therefore agreed on 12 May 1949 that those conditions should be taken as a basis for the negotiations entered into under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission.

18. He maintained that those negotiations had failed because of Israel. The Israel delegation's denials had no foundation.

19. First, with regard to the internationalization of Jerusalem, the Israel delegation had categorically opposed the Jerusalem Committee set up by the Conciliation Commission; at the same time, the Israel Government had declared before the National Assembly that the Holy City would become the capital of Israel. Reinforcements had been sent to the city for that purpose, and public services and government departments had been established there. Israel therefore had lost no time in going back on its signature of the Lausanne Protocol.

20. In addition, in their memorandum of 23 May 1949 to the Conciliation Commission, the Arab delegations had requested the return of the refugees to territories which according to the map attached to the

Protocol did not belong to Israel. The fact was confirmed by the Conciliation Commission itself in paragraph 13 of chapter III of its report (A/1367). Thus, the Arab delegations had simply requested that the Protocol should be given effect. On the other hand, in its memorandum of 23 May 1949, the Israel delegation had proposed that its frontier with Lebanon in the north, and with Egypt in the south, should be identical with those of Palestine under the British Mandate (A/1367, chapter IV, para. 9). Subsequently, on 26 and 31 May 1949, the Israel delegation had proposed that the frontier of Israel with Jordan should be the same as under the Mandate, except in the central part where it would follow in principle the demarcation line between the armed forces of Jordan and those of Israel (A/1367, chapter IV, para. 10). Those extravagant proposals had suggested little less than an annexation of territory which would result in doubling the area as given in the map attached to the Protocol. Once more Israel had refused to honour its signature, for its proposals were obviously contrary to the terms of the Protocol.

21. Referring to the refugee question, he said that on 28 July 1948 the Israel delegation had suggested that the territorial question should be discussed simultaneously with the refugee question (A/1367, chapter III, para. 18), and had added that if the Arab delegations accepted that suggestion the Israel delegation would submit new proposals on both questions, in accordance with the Protocol of 12 May 1949. Although they had little hope, the Arab delegations had accepted, on the recommendation of the Conciliation Commission. Subsequently, in a letter sent to the Conciliation Commission on 31 August 1949 (A/1367, chapter IV, para. 16) the Israel delegation had claimed all the other regions falling under the control and jurisdiction of Israel under the terms of the armistice agreements concluded between Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan and Syria. Those were the exact terms of that letter. The Israel delegation's attitude had thus been confirmed; its intention was to annex territory which would double the area of Israel and would include Jerusalem and Nazareth. The Israel representative on the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee could not deny that the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission had addressed to the Israel delegation on 5 September 1949 a letter protesting against the fact that the Israel proposal was improperly based on the armistice agreements (A/1367, chapter IV, para. 17). A copy of that letter had been sent to the Arab delegations for their information.

22. Moreover, on 3 August 1949, the Israel delegation had told the Conciliation Commission that its government was prepared to receive 100,000 refugees. That figure apparently included the 25,000 refugees who had already returned to Israel, as was shown by paragraph 20 of chapter III of the Conciliation Commission's report and the statement made on 1 August 1949 before the Israel Parliament by that country's Minister for Foreign Affairs. In that way Israel would only be accepting 75,000 refugees, less than one-tenth of those awaiting recognition of their rights. Moreover the probable fate of those refugees in Israel, as the Pakistan representative had mentioned (66th meeting), was that they would be absorbed into the economic

system of Israel and resettled according to the needs of Israel's security. They would therefore not be returning to their homes but would be kept in servitude in labour camps. Long before the Minister for Foreign Affairs had put forward his theory of the redistribution of populations, the Israel representative had said at Lausanne that during the last twenty years efforts had been made throughout the world to get rid of minority groups and that, consequently, to create a minorities problem in Israel through the return of the Arab population would be a retrograde step. But surely the Palestine Arabs could not be regarded as a minority group.

23. In reply to the allegation by the Israel representative that the Arab States had refused the proposal contained in the Conciliation Commission's memorandum of 29 March 1950 (A/1367, annex II), he said the Arab States had made their acceptance of the proposal conditional on the acceptance by Israel of the principle of the return of the refugees. Accordingly all they had done was to ask that effect be given to the resolution 194 (III) and the Protocol of 12 May 1949. The Conciliation Commission had not considered it advisable to transmit those conditions to the Israel delegation, in view of the reception which the latter had previously given to any proposal for the return of the refugees.

24. In the circumstances, he wondered how the fate of the refugees could be linked to the success of peaceful negotiations.

25. He then quoted passages from paragraphs 23 and 25 of chapter I of the Conciliation Commission's report to show that the Arab States had proposed that the Conciliation Commission should itself make recommendations and that the Israel delegation had objected. That evidence could not now be denied.

26. Accordingly, the Arab States were obliged to maintain the attitude which they had clearly defined after the Conciliation Commission's memorandum of 29 March 1950: the principle of the return of the refugee must be recognized.

27. He thanked the representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America for their explanations of their joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.57). He hoped that the attitude adopted by those delegations would help to settle the problem of the refugees in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the principles of right and justice and the decisions of the Organization.

Mr. Kyrou (Greece) (Vice-Chairman) took the chair.

28. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the list of speakers should be closed at the end of the meeting.

It was so decided.

29. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that, as his name came later on the list of speakers than that of the Israel representative, he would like to speak after him.

30. Mr. EBAN (Israel) pointed out that the Committee had heard twenty-eight speeches by representatives of the Arab States. In all fairness, he asked for permission to speak last.

31. The CHAIRMAN said that, according to rule 114 of the rules of procedure, he could grant the right of reply to any member if a speech delivered after the list of speakers had been closed made it desirable.

32. Mr. TAFAZZUL ALI (Pakistan) said he would like to speak once again simply to answer criticisms of the draft resolution submitted by his delegation jointly with the delegation of Ethiopia (A/AC.38/L.62). He therefore reserved the right to speak after the speakers on the list had had an opportunity of stating their views on the draft resolution.

33. Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia) wished to comment on some of the remarks made early in the general debate (61st meeting) by the United Kingdom representative who had doubted if it was in the best interest of the refugees to return to their homes and whether the refugees would wish to return to Palestine when once they realized the conditions awaiting them in that country.

34. That statement would bring to the mind of every Arab the part played by the United Kingdom. There was no doubt that the refugee problem had its origins in the decision taken by the United Kingdom during the First World War, when it had imposed on the people of Palestine a decision which it regarded as being in their best interests. However praiseworthy the United Kingdom's intentions had been, it was nevertheless true that that decision had involved the people of Palestine in the most tragic consequences. It might therefore be expected that the United Kingdom would adopt an attitude of neutrality. The same was true of the other great Powers whose intervention in Palestine had been the source of so much misfortune. The test of "the interest of the population" which had made its first appearance in the Conciliation Commission's report was rather surprising, not to say dangerous. It would surely be more suitable and equitable to let each refugee decide for himself whether he preferred to return to Palestine or to remain in the Arab country which had taken him in. The refugees should of course be told all the details of the situation awaiting them in Palestine, but it would be inhuman to deprive them of their sacred right to choose.

35. The problem of compensation also raised very serious difficulties. The Israel representative had proposed (35th meeting) that the compensation granted to refugees for property abandoned in Palestine should be paid to a reintegration fund instead of directly to the refugees concerned. But the value of the property of the refugees varied considerably and besides, the refugees, who had owned extensive property in Palestine, had mortgaged it, contracted loans secured thereby, and were heavily in debt. It was likely that the reintegration fund would not have the necessary funds to pay all the compensation due. Moreover, the refugees whose property had been seized would be the first to receive compensation, though purely nominal, whereas the rest might wait for years for a final settlement of their cases. Nor would it be possible to compensate refugees who had invested their capital in some enterprise or those who were heavily in debt. For all those reasons, the method of compensation through a reintegration fund seemed neither equitable nor wise. By contrast, if the compensation was paid directly to the refugees concerned, they would be able to use it accord-

ing to their needs; and the international contributions could be used to resettle refugees who had not much property or who had not received a compensation sufficient to enable them to start a new life. The second method seemed both just and reasonable and should be adopted and put into effect without delay. Thus, those refugees who did not wish to return to Palestine could be resettled, either with the help of the contributions paid into the fund, or with the assistance of compensation paid for property left behind in Israel.

36. He proceeded to comment on the speech made at the 66th meeting by the Israel representative. Apparently the view was held in some quarters that the refugees were essentially the concern of the Arab States, who should be ready to make all the concessions needed in order to reach a solution. That was a strange point of view, and the representative of Israel himself had said that the refugee problem was a world problem. All States had a share in the responsibility and the United Nations as a whole would be failing in its duty if it linked the fate of the refugees to other matters entirely unconnected with refugees and so created a situation which precluded a solution of the refugee problem forever. Obviously the Arab States had a great interest in the problem, but not a selfish one: their interest reflected the sympathy which bound those States to the refugees, whose sufferings they could see every day. He asked whether, if the Committee were to hear the representatives of the refugees, it would refuse to give effect to their request, on the pretext that the Arab States were rightly or wrongly refusing to settle the political problems outstanding between Israel and those States.

37. Certain representatives had asked the Arab States to hasten the settlement of all those problems in order to maintain peace in the Middle East and also to settle the refugee problem, the solution of which was all the more necessary because it seemed increasingly difficult to obtain contributions for refugee relief. The Arab States were doing their utmost to help the refugees and preserve peace. However, the maintenance of peace did not depend on them alone; in view of the worldwide repercussions of a breach of the peace in the Middle East, it was clearly the responsibility of the international community to ensure a speedy solution of the refugee problem.

38. In that connexion the Israel representative had said that his country could not be asked to apply the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) while the neighbouring Arab countries refused to negotiate a peace settlement; but in another connexion the Israel Government had declared flatly that the maximum number of refugees it could repatriate was 100,000 and that the repatriation in question could be considered only as part of a general settlement. Thus, even if the Arab States consented to enter into direct negotiations, Israel would not consider itself in any way bound to carry out paragraph 11 of the resolution. Furthermore, according to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, even the figure of 100,000 refugees would no longer be considered by the Israel Government. In the light of all those facts, it was hardly arguable that the solution of the refugee problem should be linked to that of all the other outstanding questions.

39. The real reason for Israel's refusal to repatriate the refugees lay neither in the absence of a general peace settlement nor in security considerations: it was that Israel wished to lay hands on the property of the Arab refugees. After taking possession of Palestine with the blessing of the United Nations, Israel now wished to obtain United Nations sanction for its seizure of Arab property. He had previously had occasion to demonstrate how that purpose was to be accomplished: he had quoted an article from the *New York Times* of 1 August 1950, according to which 25,000 acres of expensive urban property would be sold by the Development Authority of Israel to private buyers, a transaction that was expected to yield the Israel Treasury large sums of money, including some very useful foreign exchange. The financial situation of Israel would clearly be adversely affected by the restoration of all that wealth to its rightful owners. That was why Israel could not consent to give it up, above all after stating the principle of compensation in a form which was tantamount to the confiscation of property. Israel's attitude had been encouraged by the General Assembly's reluctance to take the necessary action, by the good faith shown by certain delegations and by the tacit approval of certain others. No one acquainted with the facts could say he was convinced that Israel wished to implement paragraph 11 of the resolution, and no delegation had stated its willingness to stand surety for the payment by Israel of all the sums due as compensation.
40. Referring to the argument of some delegations that the principle of direct negotiation was "realistic", he said that resolution 194 (III) had recommended that negotiations should be undertaken through the Conciliation Commission. Attempts at conciliation having proved fruitless, there was no possibility that direct negotiations would be any more successful. To urge the contrary was certainly not realistic, and the persistent efforts that were being made to link that impossible task to the solution of the refugee problem seemed to conceal a plan to abolish the rights of the refugees.
41. Various draft resolutions had been presented to the Committee. His delegation supported the draft submitted by the Egyptian delegation (A/AC.38/L.30). It advocated a practical solution of the refugee problem which would not entail any difficulties concerning organization since the Egyptian delegation had declared its willingness to alter the relevant provisions if necessary. If the Egyptian draft resolution failed to obtain the necessary majority, the Saudi Arabian delegation would cast its vote in support of the joint draft resolution of Ethiopia and Pakistan (A/AC.38/L.62). But it would vote against the four-Power joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.57), which—as he had explained—contained provisions having nothing to do with the refugee problem.
- Mr. Belaúnde (Peru) resumed the chair.*
42. TUQAN Bey (Representative of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) commended the representatives of Syria and Pakistan for their remarks during the preceding meetings. The question of the Palestine refugees had been presented very completely to the Committee. In particular, the exposition of Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan at the 66th meeting had clearly established the existence of the Arab refugees' right to repatriation and had dispelled any possible doubt conveyed by other speeches.
43. Referring to the draft resolutions before the Committee, he said his delegation considered the four-Power draft resolution unacceptable because it made the repatriation of the refugees conditional on the final settlement of other outstanding questions. The same objection applied to the draft resolution presented by the Israel delegation (A/AC.38/L.60).
44. On the other hand his delegation was in full agreement with the draft resolution presented by Egypt and that submitted by Pakistan and Ethiopia. Although differently worded, those two draft resolutions were fundamentally the same, being based on the same general principles and pursuing the same objects.
45. Mr. DARMASETIAWAN (Indonesia) said the repatriation of the Arab refugees had been presented as something complicated. It involved, actually, restoring to nearly one million human beings the full exercise of their rights. There seemed to be a gulf between the parties, which many political, economic, military, social and psychological factors had helped to widen.
46. The Committee should be guided by the humanitarian principles set forth in the United Nations Charter. It should also remember that the tragic situation of the refugees demanded prompt action. The delegations represented not only the governments of sixty States but also the population of the whole world. That conferred a special responsibility upon them, and to exchange arguments and accusations did not help.
47. The reports presented to the Committee showed clearly that paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) had not been put into effect. For purely humanitarian reasons and because peace and security must be maintained in the area, his delegation felt that the problem of the repatriation of the Arab refugees should be solved without awaiting the negotiation of a general settlement; in fact when once repatriation had been settled, a general settlement might be easier. His delegation therefore favoured the proposal, made in a number of draft resolutions, to establish a special agency or office with the specific task of dealing with repatriation. The different levels of economic development of the parties concerned were not an insurmountable difficulty. Some adjustment would be necessary but with patience and understanding it was possible. Whatever measures were taken by the General Assembly, their success would depend upon the good will of the parties concerned.
48. With those considerations in mind the Indonesian delegation had studied the draft resolutions before the Committee. It intended to vote for the draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and Pakistan. If that resolution did not receive the necessary majority the Indonesian delegation would have to reserve its position concerning the others.
49. Mr. MAYRAND (Canada) regretted that after several days of discussion the Committee was still faced with two contrary views: one, that the refugee problem could be settled only subject to the establishment of normal relations between Israel and the Arab States, and the other, that it should be the object of a

separate settlement based on paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III).

50. If paragraph 11 were taken literally, it was true, as the Syrian representative had said, that it provided an answer to all the questions before the Committee; it contained a statement of principle both on the right of refugees to return to their homes or to receive compensation and also on the procedure to be followed in applying the principle. However, when law ceased to be in harmony with reality, to apply the law literally could produce the greatest injustice.

51. In that connexion he felt bound to point out that when Mr. Pearson, the Chairman of the Canadian delegation, had said that the decision taken by the General Assembly in 1947 was a political one, he had used that word in the widest sense, to express the idea that the Palestine question was not an exclusively legal one, and not in the pejorative sense of a political expedient, as some delegations had understood the term. It was because the Canadian delegation considered the question as not being a purely legal one that it had thought it inappropriate to submit it to the International Court of Justice.

52. The problem of refugees was legal and humanitarian as well as political. It was clear that, from the point of view of human rights, refugees had an inalienable right to return to their homes and all the parties concerned ought to make the necessary efforts to enable them to exercise that right if they wished to do so. It was equally true, on the other hand, that the State of Israel was bound to take into account such elements as its absorptive capacity and its security requirements. The problem was a practical and human one which could not be solved merely in the abstract.

53. The Canadian delegation, while recognizing the urgency of the matter, thought that general negotiations could not fail to have a beneficial influence. Repatriation and compensation of the refugees should go together with the establishment of normal relations between Israel and the Arab States. What was needed was action on both sides; preconceived ideas benefited no one and were harmful to the refugees whose fate still remained in suspense.

54. Proceeding to deal with the draft resolutions, he said his delegation thought that the Israel draft resolution, based solely on the reports of the Conciliation Commission, and the Egyptian draft resolution, based solely on paragraph 11, resolution 194 (III), were both too narrow. The joint draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and Pakistan referred to both those texts, but its operative part was only concerned with the non-application of paragraph 11. The four-Power draft resolution was more comprehensive and hence preferable to the Canadian delegation, though it regretted that the text was not more explicit and that the terms

of reference of the Conciliation Commission, both regarding repatriation and compensation and the general *rapprochement* between the parties, were not more precise. But in the course of its conversations with other delegations, the Canadian delegation had realized that such suggestions might sharpen the conflict of principles and it had finally decided to adhere to the four-Power draft resolution.

55. The spirit in which the resolution which was to be adopted was applied was as important as its wording, possibly even more important. He hoped that the Conciliation Commission would bring all its energy to the task and that the parties concerned would give evidence of a sincere desire to reach a settlement, so that the refugee problem might be solved and harmony re-established in the Middle East.

56. The CHAIRMAN explained that, in compliance with a request of the Cuban delegation (65th meeting), the sponsors of almost all the draft resolutions had met and studied a number of questions put by him with the object of combining all the drafts into one or two proposals.

57. The Committee had almost completed its general discussion. The Chairman was glad that it had taken place in an atmosphere of moderation and dignity and hoped that the delegates still to speak would do their utmost to maintain the same atmosphere, so that he himself would very shortly be able to invite the Committee to vote, without further discussion, on a solution which had the support of many delegations.

58. Answering a question by the Chairman, Mr. TAFAZZUL ALI (Pakistan) explained that his only reason for asking to speak was to answer any criticisms of the draft resolution he had sponsored.

59. The CHAIRMAN called on Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) who, however, pointed out that his turn to speak came after that of the Israel representative.

60. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said he would leave it to the Chairman's sense of equity to settle whether a State represented by a single delegate had the right of final address to the Committee, when it was involved in a controversy with six or seven other States. If the Chairman could not alter the order of speakers, he would speak at the beginning of the following meeting, but reserved the right to answer any comments which he thought affected the interests of his government.

61. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that under rule 114 of the rules of procedure the right of reply existed even after closure of the discussion. The Chairman would do everything possible to apply that rule with the greatest equity. He announced that the list of speakers was closed.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.