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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAÚNDE (Peru).

Palestine: Repatriation of Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due to them (A/1323, A/1324, A/1325, A/1326, A/1346, A/1349, A/1366, A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/L.30/Rev.1, A/AC.38/L.57, A/AC.38/L.60, A/AC.38/L.62, A/AC.38/L.64; report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1, A/1367/Add.1, A/AC.38/L.65) (continued)

[Item 20 (c) and (d)]*

1. TUQAN Bey (Representative, Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) noted that the report of the Conciliation Commission (A/1367, A/1367/Corr.1) gave a clear account of the efforts that had been made to reach a solution of the Palestine question. Some delegations had felt that the document did not reveal any appreciable progress, but it should be stressed that the task entrusted to the Conciliation Commission was an extremely arduous one; it had in fact been instructed to seek a formula which would enable the parties concerned to reach an agreement.

2. The problem over which those parties were opposed had grown increasingly complicated over the past thirty years. The difficulties had reached their climax with the termination of the United Kingdom Mandate for Palestine, finally provoking the impact for which the Arabs of Palestine had been totally unprepared and which had such disastrous consequences for them.

3. The Arabs of Palestine had been in no way responsible either for that impact or for the existence of the problem. They had been unexpectedly faced with a calamity unparalleled in history. The magnitude of their tragedy could be seen in the lamentable situation in which the Arab refugees from Palestine now found

themselves. For those reasons the task of the Conciliation Commission was singularly delicate and complicated. It had not the power to impose an agreement and it was certainly not responsible for the fact that there had been no progress to that end. The blame should be placed on those who had created the problem, who had provoked the outbreak and were now witnessing the disastrous consequences of their actions, who had placed obstacles in the way of a settlement, who denied their own signature, who now based their arguments on an agreement dictated by purely military considerations in such a way as to aggravate a situation which was already tense and pregnant with danger and constituted a threat to peace.

4. That was not the policy of the Arab States but of the State of Israel, whose interests it served. The State of Israel had opened its frontiers to new immigrants, and had settled them, not on the uncultivated land which the Zionists claimed to be able to transform into a Garden of Eden, but on land from which the Arabs had been driven out. They were housed in the dwellings which the Arabs had built for themselves and to which they could not return. That was why the solution of the Palestine problem had been delayed. Peace would continue to be threatened in Palestine and the re-establishment of a normal situation would be retarded unless that policy was abandoned.

5. The Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan had informed the Conciliation Commission of its position regarding a final settlement. At a meeting held recently at Amman, the Prime Minister of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan had told the Commission that a final settlement was closely related to the co-ordination of the joint policy of the Arab States and was dependent on Israel's respect for the Lausanne Protocol (A/1367, chapter I, para. 12), and its willingness to negotiate a territorial settlement on the basis of that document.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

6. The Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan also felt that the final settlement depended on Israel's readiness to accept the United Nations resolution on the refugees, their repatriation and the payment of compensation due to them, the safeguarding of their natural rights and the preservation of their property. That attitude, as stated by the Prime Minister, reflected all sectors of public opinion throughout the Kingdom.

7. At the same meeting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan had stressed that the Arabs in general and the Arab States in particular had made substantial concessions in approving the Lausanne Protocol and the document attached thereto, which had been signed by the parties concerned under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission as the basis for discussions on the territorial question. The document complied with General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and should have been regarded as a gentlemen's agreement, to be applied scrupulously by both parties with a view to achieving a lasting peace.

8. Unhappily, that was not what had occurred. The other party had not remained faithful to it. It had claimed that the demarcation line drawn at the conclusion of the armistice should be regarded as final and had based that claim on its military occupation of the Arab zones, although a military occupation did not confer any right.

9. Moreover, the Jews had occupied numerous Arab towns without effort; some had been handed over to them by a foreign authority and others had been occupied by them in violation of the armistice. They had tried to substitute for the principles on the basis of which a final settlement should have been realized the recognition of a *de facto* situation and a military occupation, contrary to the Security Council resolution on the conclusion of the armistice.¹

10. The opinion of the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan was in complete conformity with that of the other Arab States.

11. Moreover, paragraph 40 of chapter I of the Conciliation Commission's report (A/1367) revealed the circumstances in which, in the opinion of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan and the other Arab States, the negotiations for the settlement of outstanding questions should have taken place. Nothing had occurred since the statement of that attitude which was likely to alter it. The delegation of the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan felt, therefore, that there was no need to make any change in the procedure hitherto adopted by the Conciliation Commission.

12. Mr. AMBY (Denmark) appealed to the Committee to find some common ground for agreement with regard to the draft resolutions before it.

13. The Danish delegation had carefully examined the Chinese amendment (A/1838/L.64) to operative paragraph 1 of the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.57). It felt that if that amendment were adopted the resulting text would obtain general support and would also receive the agreement of the parties directly concerned. He urged the delegations of the Arab States and Israel to accept the amendment and to withdraw

their own draft resolutions. He also urged the four Powers to accept the Chinese amendment. In that way, the Committee would be able to take a single vote on the revised text of the four-Power draft resolution.

14. Lastly, he felt that before continuing the general discussion, the Committee should examine the Chinese amendment and decide whether it would make it possible to adopt a resolution having the support of all the parties concerned.

15. Mr. ANZE MATIENZO (Bolivia) recalled that he had already had occasion to emphasize (65th meeting) the need for the Committee to reconcile conflicting interests and to adopt a resolution which would have some chance of being applied. Similarly, he had already pointed out that a compromise should be based on principles which were universally recognized as just and imperative, such as those set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). The refugee problem was of course different from the general political problem, but that did not mean that they were entirely unconnected.

16. In the same conciliatory spirit, he associated himself with the wise words of the Danish representative. If the four Powers adopted the Chinese amendment, it was possible that the revised text of their draft resolution would have the support of a considerable majority and particularly of the parties concerned. In that way, the wish of all delegations to adopt a resolution which would be acceptable to all and hence constructive might be realized.

17. Mr. CHENG (China) thanked the Danish and Bolivian representatives for their support.

18. In reply to various requests for an explanation, he said that the word "authorities" in the text of his amendment did not mean the Government of Israel; the Chinese Government had been among the first to recognize the State of Israel. It meant the Arab League or any other organization which might be or which had been consulted during the negotiations. He hoped that his explanation would enable more delegations to support his amendment.

19. Mr. SHARETT (Israel) said that in the statement he had made at the 70th meeting, the Egyptian representative had repeatedly affirmed the loyalty of the Arab States to the authority of the United Nations, and also repeatedly denounced the policy of the *fait accompli* allegedly pursued by Israel. He wondered whether the manner in which the Arab States had proved their obedience to the United Nations by invading the territory of Palestine in order to destroy Israel, thus flouting an international decision, had really represented a rejection of the policy of the *fait accompli*.

20. The Egyptian representative had also said that the Arab States had always loyally carried out the decisions of the Security Council, particularly the resolution of 15 July 1948.² That resolution, however had noted that the States which were members of the Arab League had rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator and of the Security Council for the extension of the truce, thus prolonging hostilities; the same resolution had determined that the situation in Palestine

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948*, document S/1080.

² *Ibid.*, *Supplement for July 1948*, document S/902.

constituted a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.

21. Likewise, by putting a certain number of questions to the Acting Chairman of the Conciliation Commission, the Egyptian representative had brought forth replies which amounted to denials.
22. With regard to the question of Jewish immigration into Israel, he felt that the United Nations was not competent in the matter since it involved the policy pursued by the State of Israel on its own territory in the exercise of its sovereign rights. However, if the States neighbouring on Israel viewed that immigration with great anxiety because of its potential threat of invasion, they should become even more determined to safeguard the integrity of their territory against those external dangers, whether real or imaginary, by negotiating a peace settlement under the auspices of the United Nations. He wondered what credence there could be in the sincerity of those fears when those who professed them obstinately refused to negotiate with a view to fixing the frontiers.
23. He then dealt with the question of the repatriation of refugees. In his opinion, repatriation was an illusory and chimerical solution; even its most enthusiastic advocates were certainly aware of that. He appealed to members of the Commission not to do unto others what they did not want to be done unto them: indeed to accept the repatriation solution would amount to an act of suicide for the State which carried the burden of such repatriation. Furthermore, there was no longer a vacuum to be filled. To advocate the return of refugees to homes which no longer existed amounted to false humanitarianism. His delegation expressed itself with such realism because, unlike some others, it was guided by humanitarian considerations and did not wish to make promises it could not keep.
24. The immediate repatriation of a number of Arab refugees would impose upon Israel a gigantic task that it could not undertake at a time when it was already shouldering the full burden of Jewish immigration. Furthermore, considerations of security were paramount and it was obvious that the aim of the proposed measure was to destroy the State of Israel from within. Consequently, to regard repatriation as a primary aim to be attained would lead to an impasse. Since the repatriation problem could not be solved, to make the peace settlement depend on the previous settlement of that problem would prevent any headway being made with either of the two questions.
25. The attitude of the Arab States was somewhat strange: on the one hand they insisted on the repatriation of refugees to Israel and, on the other, they alleged that the Israel Government's policy towards the Arab community was one of discrimination, spoliation and even extermination. It was rather difficult to reconcile those two arguments. The delegation of Israel did not believe it was under any obligation to account to the Committee for the way in which its government treated the population of Israel as a whole or any group of that population, but since the charges against the Israel Government had been voiced before an international body, he would give the Committee some precise facts and figures to show how unfounded the Arab accusations really were.

26. Regarding the voting rights of women, he emphasized that all women in Israel, whatever their religion and whatever the population group to which they belonged, were entitled to vote and had exercised that right at elections. He asked whether the same could be said of Egypt, for instance. According to some experts, the introduction into the Syrian Constitution of a clause granting suffrage to women was the result of the measures taken by Israel in that field. The aim of the Syrian Government's action had been to emulate the example set by Israel.

27. With regard to education, the most recent statistics concerning the situation under the United Kingdom Mandate related to the school year 1944-1945. At that time 45 per cent of Arab children of school age had been attending school. During the school year 1949-1950, 83 per cent of Arab children of school age had regularly attended school. That increase was the result of legislation providing for free compulsory education for all children in Israel without any discrimination on grounds of race, religion or sex. Perfection had not yet been reached, but on the basis of the progress already made it could be safely assumed that all children of school age would soon be attending school. It should also be noted that in the areas populated by Jews, the government paid only 60 per cent of all the expenditure pertaining to education, because it was a tradition of Jewish communities to defray part of that expenditure by means of special taxation; in the areas populated by Arabs, however, the State of Israel bore the whole burden of expenditure for education purposes, namely, the maintenance of schools, the work of training schools for teachers and other expenses. The same applied to the health services: in Jewish sectors the major part of the expenditure was defrayed by the communities themselves while in the Arab sectors all the expenditure was borne by the State. In that connexion he recalled the progress made in the field of hygiene and health since the end of the mandate system; that progress had made it possible to provide much better hospital treatment than in the past and to give full hospitalization, for all cases of contagious disease.

28. As for wages, statistics covering the period of the Mandate showed that the wages of an unskilled Arab worker had represented 40 per cent of the wage paid to a Jewish labourer. That proportion had now increased to 85 per cent, and in the field of skilled labour there was complete equality between wages earned by Jews and Arabs. It was more difficult to achieve equality in the case of unskilled labour, but it should be noted that the ratio between the wages earned by Arabs and those earned by Jews had already been doubled.

29. He then dealt with the essence of the problem, namely, the question of peace. He was sorry to introduce a discordant note in the atmosphere which had been created by the statements of previous speakers. While paying a tribute to the sincerity and the lofty motives underlying those statements, he thought it was his duty to call the Committee's attention to facts as they were, because they constituted the very substance of the problem and could not be disregarded with impunity.

30. The problem was not only to solve the parliamentary complications which had arisen within the

Committee, but also to achieve something concrete and to make tangible progress on the path leading to peace. If after careful consideration the Committee came to the conclusion that peace could not be achieved, it would be better to drop the subject and to leave it to time and normal processes to heal the wounds caused by the conflict rather than to try to hide the truth under vague formulae which could lead to no real progress. The crux of the problem was whether the Arabs wanted peace with Israel or not. To want peace with Israel meant accepting the State of Israel as it was. If the Arab States were ready to do so, then there was hope; otherwise it was useless to prolong the debate and to adopt ineffectual resolutions. The time had come for the Arab States to say clearly what they wanted and then to act in conformity with their statements. If they were not prepared to accept Israel and consequently to restore peace, to prolong the debate in the General Assembly would only be a waste of time.

31. The Conciliation Commission could serve as a valuable instrument to promote peace, but it could also serve to cover up the true attitude of those who only paid lip service to peace. Indeed, the Arab States could argue that they had not adopted a negative attitude and that they were co-operating in the solution of the problem since they were in contact with the Conciliation Commission, but at the same time they could raise new problems each day in connexion with refugees, frozen assets in banks or human rights in Israel, to prevent any peace settlement. That comedy should cease. The Conciliation Commission could play no useful role unless there were direct negotiations, for readiness to meet the other party was the prerequisite to any peace agreement.

32. He hoped that this statement would not be misunderstood and that the Conciliation Commission would not regard it as belittling the great efforts it had made. It was out of respect for the Commission and in order to safeguard its dignity that the delegation of Israel had expressed itself so frankly. The Conciliation Commission could do useful work only if it helped all the parties concerned to start negotiations; otherwise the Commission would not only be useless but even harmful, for its existence would disguise the truth and enable those who were really responsible for the Commission's failure to conclude a peace settlement to justify themselves in the eyes of public opinion.

33. He then recalled past events. As early as July 1948 he had approached the United Nations Mediator, the late Count Bernadotte, and had asked him to transmit to the governments of the Arab States Israel's offer to negotiate. That approach had remained unanswered. The Acting Mediator, Mr. Bunche, had succeeded in initiating armistice negotiations. It had looked at first as if that attempt was doomed to failure, but the representatives of the four Arab States concerned had established contact with the Government of Israel and it had been possible to reach an agreement. There had been no progress since then because the Arab States had refused to negotiate. Their refusal was based on the irrational attitude they had adopted by refusing to accept the fact of Israel's existence. Negotiations did not always lead to agreement, but it was undeniable that no agreement could be reached if the parties concerned refused to negotiate. There were other facts

which could not be denied. The Conciliation Commission's report submitted to the General Assembly on 14 December 1949 (A/1252), as well as later reports, showed that the delegation of Israel had reaffirmed its desire to open direct peace negotiations with each of the interested parties and that the Arab delegations had not been prepared to do so. It was obvious therefore that the Arab States were responsible for the absence of a final peace settlement.

34. Arab representatives had gone to Geneva, Lausanne, New York and Beirut, but none of them had been empowered to negotiate a final and lasting settlement either directly with Israel or through the Conciliation Commission. In the circumstances the Conciliation Commission could hardly be expected to play a useful part. He wondered how governments of other Member States would react if during negotiations for the final settlement of a conflict the other party refused to have any kind of contact with them and announced that it would only consider proposals made by some third party. Yet that had been the attitude of the Arab States; they had appeared before the Conciliation Commission and asked it to make proposals. The Conciliation Commission could hardly be expected to predict the broad outline of an acceptable settlement. History contained many examples of mediation, but it had never been associated with a stubborn refusal by one of the parties to have any contact with the other. By their refusal the Arab States had laid themselves open to the charge of insincerity, and the burden of proving their good faith was upon them.

35. The United Nations could wash its hands of the entire matter and could leave the Member States directly concerned to settle their dispute by direct negotiation. It could be argued that if peace were threatened in the Middle East the Security Council was fully empowered to deal with the situation and to take necessary measures. The United Nations had, however, rightly decided that it ought not to be indifferent and that was why the Palestine question was before the General Assembly and why the Conciliation Commission had been set up. The purpose of all those efforts was to achieve real progress, no matter how slow. But no progress was possible if the parties lacked a sincere desire to enter into negotiations, as only those who knew all the circumstances thoroughly and whose fate depended on a settlement could weigh up the possibilities of a settlement. Without such a free exchange of views between those directly concerned no progress would be possible and no purpose would be served by referring the question to another body. Moreover, refusal to reach a peaceful settlement made one wonder whether it was worth while continuing the work so far accomplished.

36. In view of all those considerations the Israel delegation was convinced that if a General Assembly resolution were to serve a useful purpose it must be plain and impose clearly defined obligations. His delegation was therefore unable to accept the Chinese amendment (A/AC.38/L.64) although it appreciated the sincerity and good will behind the statements made in its support by the representatives of Denmark and Bolivia. The Chinese proposal would only lead to an impasse as it clung to a course which had led nowhere.

Contrary to the Conciliation Commission's conclusions, the Chinese proposal failed to call on the two parties to enter into direct negotiations without delay; if adopted it would only prolong the existing situation without achieving any progress or preparing public opinion for peace.

37. Moreover, negotiations might prove extremely delicate. They might be broken off and then resumed, as had happened between the Netherlands and Indonesia. In the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia agreement had been reached through the efforts made by both governments during direct negotiations: there had been a commission on the spot to supervise the truce but without power to mediate in negotiations on its own initiative. If the parties to the dispute were allowed to choose between direct and indirect negotiations, they could refuse to negotiate directly and still be acting in accordance with the requirements of the United Nations.

38. His delegation appreciated the Chinese representative's explanation of the word "authority"; actually there could have been no doubt about its meaning since the State of Israel had existed for over two years and had for some time been a Member of the United Nations. Yet, the term "authority" still led to confusion as the question of peace could only be solved by negotiation between the States concerned; such questions as frontiers could only be settled by governments. Self-styled authorities had no part in such matters.

39. But the outlook was not so dark as it might appear. Peace was not merely an idealist's dream; it was also a vital necessity to the life of a nation. That was the feeling of the masses not only in the Middle East but throughout the world and many thinking people in the Arab States had given it free expression. People nowadays desired peace more than war. That feeling was manifest throughout the world and influenced the Middle East. Some leaders, slaves of their own prejudices, did not share it and must be saved from themselves. If, however, world opinion plainly commanded them to give up that unreal and unconstructive attitude they would be more easily able to abandon any hatred and resentment which they might still harbour. No one would any longer be able, in face of such a decree of public opinion, to oppose the will to peace. When that will appeared, means of expressing it in action could always be found.

40. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the four draft resolutions before the Committee (A/AC.38/L.30/Rev.1, A/AC.38/L.57, A/AC.38/L.60, A/AC.38/L.62) had one feature in common; they all attributed a preponderant role to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. He did not think the Commission had performed its duty. It should have assisted the interested parties in achieving a final settlement of all questions upon which no agreement had been reached. Actually, it had contributed to a worsening of relations between those parties.

41. In August 1949 the Commission, under the pretext of seeking the best means of assisting the refugees, had requested the Arab States and Israel to facilitate the task of the Economic Survey Mission which, if established, was to investigate the situation in the coun-

tries of the Middle East. Without awaiting a reply from the Arab States and Israel, the Commission decided to establish the Economic Survey Mission although nothing in its terms of reference had authorized it to do so. The governments of the Arab States replied to the Commission in vague terms and the Government of Israel stated that it could not undertake to give effect to the proposals offered by the Mission.

42. The initiative taken by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had served the interests of the United States rather than those of the people of Palestine. The Government of the United States had used the Economic Survey Mission to gather strategic and political information in the countries of the Middle and Near East. Very significantly the Chairman of the Economic Survey Mission had been appointed by the United States and not by the United Nations.

43. On 14 June 1949 the Conciliation Commission had set up another organ, the Technical Committee, the purpose of which also was to gather technical information likely to be of use in the study of the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees. Thus, the methods of work adopted by the Commission had not been those of a conciliation commission but rather of an independent agency intent upon imposing its will upon the parties concerned.

44. The Conciliation Commission had adopted a similar attitude when it decided to set up mixed committees under its authority. Chapter IV of the report of the Conciliation Commission indicated that the Commission had not engaged in conciliation but in activities detrimental to the interests of the parties concerned. It had, for instance, in no way contributed towards initiating direct negotiations between the parties; it had failed in its task both with regard to the problem of refugees and to the peaceful settlement of issues in Palestine. The recent resumption of military activity in that country confirmed the failure of the Conciliation Commission in every phase of its work.

45. For the reasons stated his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.66) proposing the termination of the activities of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, of which the text was as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Taking into consideration that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has proved incapable of coping with its task of settling the disputes between the parties in Palestine.

"Resolves to terminate the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine."

46. For the same reasons, the delegation of the USSR proposed the deletion in the other draft resolutions before the Committee of all references to the Conciliation Commission. That applied in particular to the deletion in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/AC.38/L.57 of the words "under the auspices of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, or . . .", and to all references to the Conciliation Com-

mission in paragraph 2.³ Similar changes should also be made in the other three draft resolutions before the Committee.

47. To give the Conciliation Commission new terms of reference would not serve any useful purpose. A different method should be followed, and hence his delegation would vote against the four draft resolutions concerned unless they were amended in accordance with its proposal.

48. Mr. ANZE MATIENZO (Bolivia) said the issue ought to be settled by conciliation.

49. The USSR representative had proposed that by a single stroke of the pen, the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine should be destroyed. That was unacceptable. Having studied the report of the Conciliation Commission, he felt, on the contrary, that it had lived up to the hopes placed in it by the United Nations. Moreover, the Organization could hardly discharge its duties in Palestine except through an organ established for that particular purpose.

50. Conciliation was indeed not an easy task to undertake. The parties had to be brought together and to negotiate, but the success of the negotiations depended primarily upon the efforts of the organ responsible for conciliation. Accordingly the Conciliation Commission should not be terminated, but rather the means at its disposal should be strengthened.

51. The amendment proposed by China (A/AC.38/L.64), though expressed in different terms, sought to achieve the same objectives as the four-Power draft resolution. The chief concern of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should be to guarantee peace and security in Palestine, and he therefore supported the amendment. He hoped that the four-Power draft resolution, thus amended, would command a sufficient number of votes to give tangible expression to the desire of the international community for a settlement. The terms of the draft resolution offered new prospects of a settlement in Palestine. He felt that the confidence of the United Nations in the Conciliation Commission should be reaffirmed in the hope that negotiations would be undertaken. That was the most practical solution.

52. Mr. COOPER (United States of America) said his delegation had spoken early in the debate (61st and 62nd meetings) to explain why it had joined the delegations of France, Turkey and the United Kingdom in submitting the joint draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.57). His delegation was anxious to see an improvement in the relations between the parties concerned and to contribute to the settlement of the problems dividing them.

³ The text of the USSR amendment (A/AC.38/L.61) to the four-Power draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.57) provided for the deletion of the first paragraph of the preamble "Recalling its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948"; the deletion, in operative paragraph 1 of the words "under the auspices of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, or"; and the deletion of paragraph 2.

53. The USSR delegation proposed to terminate the activities of the Conciliation Commission; but it was difficult to see how a peaceful settlement could be reached except through the Conciliation Commission. The delegation of the Soviet Union, far from offering a constructive proposal, had merely made comments which, in part, were irrelevant to the debate. So far as the Economic Survey Mission was concerned, he said the General Assembly had adopted a number of recommendations made by the Mission with the object of helping the refugees. In that connexion, the Soviet Union had offered no contribution to the assistance of the refugees.

54. He associated himself with the statements made by the representatives of Denmark and of Bolivia and appreciated the intentions underlying the amendment proposed by China. The terms of the Chinese amendment largely reproduced paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III). It was a pity that the resolution had not produced the expected results. The supplementary report submitted by the Conciliation Commission (A/1367/Add.1) had stated that the General Assembly should urge the parties concerned to engage without delay in direct discussions under the auspices and with the assistance of the United Nations, in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement. The Committee should follow that suggestion. The parties concerned should be urged to undertake preliminary conversations during which each side would directly explain its attitude to the other.

55. His delegation had explained its views on the right of the refugees to return to their homes. The settlement of the question of refugees was not dependent on the solution of the other problems but could be achieved in the course of the conversations relating to the overall problem.

56. Referring to the draft resolutions before the Committee, he said the United States delegation would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution which had been submitted following conversations with the parties concerned and with members of the Conciliation Commission. It sought to strike a balance between the points of view of the parties and to support the recommendations of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. It was an attempt to strengthen peace in the Near East.

57. The United States delegation would vote against the other three draft resolutions, not on account of the motives underlying them—for it fully appreciated the concern felt by the delegations of Egypt, Ethiopia and Pakistan for the refugees and the desire of the Government of Israel to achieve a settlement of all outstanding issues in the Near East—but because the draft submitted by the four Powers offered better prospects of help for the refugees and a settlement in the Middle East.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.