



## 安全理事会

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### 安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会在第 [2515\(2020\)](#) 号决议第 2 段中请第 [1874\(2009\)](#) 号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交一份中期报告，并提出其结论和建议。

因此，主席特此分发从专家小组收到的报告(见附件)。



附件

2020年8月26日第1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安全理事会第2515(2020)号决议第2段转递关于其工作的中期报告。

该报告已于2020年8月3日向安全理事会第1718(2006)号决议所设委员会提交，委员会于2020年8月25日审议了该报告。

请提醒安全理事会成员注意本函及报告并将它们作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第1874(2009)号决议  
所设专家小组

附文

2020年8月3日第1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

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请提醒安全理事会第1718(2006)号决议所设委员会成员注意本函及报告为荷。

安全理事会第1874(2009)号决议  
所设专家小组

## 第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组的报告

## 摘要

2020 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反联合国安全理事会决议，重申致力于保留和发展其核计划和弹道导弹计划的承诺。自 2017 年 9 月以来，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国没有宣布进行核试验；但朝鲜民主主义人民共和国保留了核设施，并继续生产裂变材料。它继续为其弹道导弹计划发展基础设施和能力。在本报告所述期间，它没有进行洲际导弹或中程导弹发射，但在 2020 年 3 月，它对 2019 年测试的短程弹道导弹系统进行了四次发射试验，发射了至少八枚导弹。安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为这些计划从海外采购材料和技术的努力。

为了应对冠状病毒病(COVID-19)，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国宣布关闭边境、限制和特别检疫措施。这些措施影响了货物的跨境运输和海、陆、空的人员流动。本国国民重新进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和外国国民进入该国仍然是普遍禁止的。目前没有国际航班。海上货运减少但从未完全停止，现已经恢复。仅有有限的铁路货运和公路运输。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反安全理事会决议，通过船对船转运和直接交货非法进口精炼石油产品。在本报告所述期间进行非法直接运输的悬挂外国国旗的油轮包括专家小组于 2020 年 3 月发布的上一份最后报告(S/2020/151)中调查过的许多船只。专家小组收到了 43 个会员国的报告，其中载有 2020 年 1 月 1 日至 5 月 30 日期间的图像、数据和推测。会员国估计，仅在此期间向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付的精炼石油产品就已远远超过安全理事会设定的 2020 年年度上限 50 万桶。中国和俄罗斯联邦回应称，该报告是基于假设和估计，信息和证据不足以得出超过上限的结论。美利坚合众国答复说，证据的质量和数量都很充分。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和悬挂外国国旗的船只及其船东继续精心策划逃避做法。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续藐视安全理事会决议，通过非法海运出口煤炭，尽管它在 2020 年 1 月底至 3 月初暂停了这种出口。一个会员国提供的卫星图像和资料显示，在此期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的多艘船只继续在另一个会员国水域进行船对船转运，并运送煤炭(见第三节)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续从非法转让捕鱼权中赚取收入。

专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口的奢侈品，如车辆和酒类。专家小组获得了关于以前报告的案件的新资料。报告所述期间内的奢侈品进口是零星的。

专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用国际银行渠道，包括通过其自己的银行代表、合资企业、空壳公司和使用虚拟资产的情况。专家小组继续调查和报告朝鲜民主主义人民共和国如何将虚拟资产兑换成法定货币。

专家小组调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反制裁的网络活动，主要由被指认的侦察总局领导。除了违反制裁获得法定货币和虚拟资产外，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还通过有针对性地攻击在联合国安理会成员国和专家小组成员国的官员来逃避制裁。

专家小组调查了关于被指认的朝鲜劳动党军需品工业部派遣朝鲜信息技术人员和其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人到海外赚取收入的报告。它还调查了有关朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在 2019 年 12 月 22 日遣返截止日期后继续在海外赚取收入的报告，包括作为专业运动员、医疗专业人员以及工厂、餐馆和建筑工人。迄今为止，只有大约 40 个会员国提交了关于遣返要求的最后执行报告，报告的截止日期为 2020 年 3 月 22 日。

专家小组报告了与禁运和被指认实体有关的调查情况，其中包括与万寿台海外开发会社、朝鲜矿业开发贸易公司海外代表有关的案件、黄金走私、朝鲜外交官曾试图采购国防物资未果的案件，以及据称的军事合作案件。专家小组更新了对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国企图从其海外外交房产的商业用途中赚取收入的调查情况。

制裁决议无意给平民带来不良后果，也无意对人道主义组织在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的行动产生负面影响。然而，毫无疑问，它们产生了负面影响，尽管这很难说与其他外部和内部因素无关。针对疫情采取的措施使这些影响进一步复杂化，这些措施还限制了联合国和其他机构组织在该国境内开展和监测人道主义行动的能力。安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会加快审议与疫情有关的人道主义豁免请求，并对延长豁免期持灵活态度。

专家小组提出一系列实际措施建议，为安全理事会、委员会和会员国提供更多工具，用于应对相关决议执行方面的挑战和不足。

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\* 附件只以提交的语文分发，没有正式编辑。

## 一. 引言

1. 安全理事会在第 2515(2020)号决议第 2 段请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会提交一份载有调查结果和建议的中期报告。本报告所述期间为 2020 年 2 月 8 日至 8 月 3 日。本报告所述期间恰逢出现冠状病毒病(COVID-19)疫情,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对此迅速采取边境管制和其他措施(见附件 1)。

## 二. 与核计划和弹道导弹计划相关的近期活动

### 核计划

2. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在继续其核计划,包括生产高浓缩铀和建造试验性轻水反应堆。一个会员国评估说,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在继续生产核武器。

3. 几个会员国表示,宁边的铀浓缩设施仍在运作。一个会员国报告说,2020 年 3 月拆除了这个铀浓缩设施的六个冷却装置中的一个,不过,该会员国没有确定这项工作的目的或结果。几个会员国表示,宁边轻水反应堆的建造正在进行中(见附件 2)。平山的铀矿和黄饼生产工厂正在运营(见附件 3)。

4. 关于钚生产,专家小组没有获得信息表明,在 2016 年年中至 2018 年年中期间,5 兆瓦(e)反应堆重新开始运行或提取上一个运行周期辐照的乏燃料棒,不过暂停运行的时间足以冷却和提取乏燃料。<sup>1</sup>这可能是与钚生产运动有关的活动之间间隔最长的一次。

5. 在报告所述期间,通过卫星图像观察到在丰溪里核试验场的间歇性活动,包括主要行政支助区域的扫雪、通往入口处的连续步行脚印以及人员和车辆的存在。这些活动表明,该试验场地位于禁区内,并进行了地面保护和监测活动。由于只知道隧道入口被毁,而且没有迹象表明隧道被全面拆除,一个会员国评估说,一旦作出决定,2 至 3 个月就足以重建其中一条隧道,重新安装支持试验所需的基础设施,并安装试验装置(见附件 4)。

6. 几个会员国转达了他们对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核能力发展情况的评估,指出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过开展活动,包括过去六次试验,很可能已经开发出可装在其弹道导弹弹头上的微型核装置。一个会员国评估说,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能寻求进一步发展小型化装置,以便纳入技术改进,如穿透辅助包,或可能开发多弹头系统。

7. 几个会员国答复专家小组说,它们没有资料证实降仙的设施(见 S/2019/171,第 172 段)是用于铀浓缩的(见附件 5)。一个会员国指出,它从未观察到可能的主要生产大楼附近储存六氟化铀钢瓶。

<sup>1</sup> 一个会员国指出,燃料可以储存在 5 兆瓦(e)反应堆的燃料池大楼内或后处理设施燃料棒储存楼内。

8. 据一个会员国称,2018 年底,第二经济委员会(KPe.032)试图采购可用于核计划和弹道导弹计划的多种两用物品(见附件 6)。这表明,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续努力从外国来源采购军民两用“关键物品”(见 S/2020/151,第 200 段)。

9. 据报道,在金正恩委员长领导的朝鲜劳动党第七届中央军事委员会第四次扩大会议上,提出了“进一步提高国家核战争威慑力,使战略武装力量处于高度戒备状态的新政策”。<sup>2</sup>

### 弹道导弹

10. 自 2020 年初以来,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续紧锣密鼓地发展其弹道导弹计划,以使 2019 年披露的新型弹道导弹达到作战武器系统的水平,并加强其弹道导弹基地和与弹道导弹计划相关的工业基础设施。对该计划来说,在海外寻找特定技术和部件仍然是一项挑战。

11. 在 2020 年 3 月进行的一系列四次发射试验中,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发射了至少八枚固体推进剂短程导弹,结合了弹道导弹和制导技术。<sup>3</sup> 这是特定时间内的高频率试验。特别是,在一次试验中发射相同导弹之间的间隔大大缩短(见表 1 和附件 7)。2020 年的发射试验很可能是一次开发或训练演习,旨在验证导弹系统的性能(见 S/2020/151,第 194 段和表 3,以及下文表 1)。

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<sup>2</sup> 朝鲜中央通讯社,2020 年 5 月 24 日。

<sup>3</sup> 两名专家表示,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2020 年 3 月发射的导弹的性质和技术尚不清楚。



表 1

2020 年 3 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运用弹道导弹技术发射的弹道导弹或系统(导弹着陆地点在其东海岸附近)  
(见附件 7)

日期和时间(当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射距离(公里)	据报远地点(公里)	备注	朝鲜中央通讯社分类
一. 3月2日12时37分	短程弹道导弹(KN-25), 与二和四(2019年8月24日、9月10日、10月31日和可能11月28日)相同	2	元山地区	240	35	可能是纳入军事演习的作战训练试验轮式4个发射管发射装置(如果朝中社图片是真实的; 图片类似于2019年11月28日) 发射间隔时间: 20秒	多弹头发射火箭-远程火炮
2月28日至3月2日	多管火箭炮系统(KN-09) 240毫米至300毫米		元山地区以东14公里 北纬39°9'19.66" 东经127°36'26.85"	—	—	“联合打击军事演习”期间火炮和多管火箭炮作战训练试验(见附件7, 图7-1)	联合打击军事演习
二. 3月9日07时36分	短程弹道导弹(KN-25); 与一和四相同	2或3	宣德地区	200	50	可能有一枚KN-25导弹发射失败, 会员国只计算了两枚弹道导弹 发射间隔时间: 20秒和1分钟	前线远程火炮
	多管火箭炮系统(KN-09) 240毫米至300毫米	2	宣德地区	—	—	可能还发射了两枚KN-09导弹	前线远程火炮
三. 3月21日06时45分	短程弹道导弹(KN-24); 与2019年8月10日和16日相同	2	据一个会员国说, 在平安地区; 宣川附近	410	50	可能因拉起轨道而降低 发射间隔时间: 5分钟	战术制导武器
四. 3月29日06时10分	短程弹道导弹(KN-25); 与一和二相同	2	元山地区	230	30	履带式运输竖起发射装置(如果朝中社照片是真实的; 图片显示一个履带式6个发射管发射装置, 而不是轮式4个发射管发射装置) 发射间隔时间: 20秒	超大型多弹头火箭

资料来源: 会员国, 专家小组。

12. 自 2020 年 5 月以来, 在新浦南方海军造船厂安全船池观察到的活动可能与潜射弹道导弹的处理或进一步潜射弹道导弹发射试验的准备工作有关。自 2020 年 5 月 27 日以来, 在雨篷附近探测到一个集装箱(长约 16-17 米, 宽约 2.5 米, 足以搭载北极星-1 型或北极星-3 型导弹), 位置几乎与 2019 年 9 月 23 日(即 2019 年 10 月 2 日潜射弹道导弹发射试验前 10 天)探测到集装箱的位置相同<sup>4</sup> (见附件 8 和 S/2020/151, 附件 58.7, 图 58.7.1 和 58.7.3)。

13. 据一个会员国称, 专家小组提到的 6 个弹道导弹基地的活动水平是稳定的<sup>5</sup> (见 S/2020/151, 第 198 段; S/2019/691, 附件 32, 第 5 段; 以及 S/2019/171, 附件 84, 第 3 段)。这些基地正在运作, 它们的许多工作仍在进行中(见附件 9)。

14. 在沙门洞生产大厅<sup>6</sup> 附近沙门洞科学和弹道导弹研究中心建筑群内, 观察到 2020 年 1 月至 6 月期间的具体活动(见附件 10)。

15. 平城 316 汽车厂的升级(见 S/2020/151, 第 198 段)仍在继续。自 2018 年以来, 毗邻新大楼<sup>7</sup> 周围的环境已经清理完毕, 西楼的翻修工作仍在继续, 同时发现了大型车辆的活动, 可能是运输车架设发射器留下了宽拱形轮胎的痕迹(见附件 11)。

16. 位于平壤顺安国际机场西南 2 公里处、目前正在建设中的新设施<sup>8</sup> (称为“西里弹道导弹支助设施”)<sup>9</sup> 可能与弹道导弹计划基础设施有关。对卫星图像的分析以及与已知弹道导弹设施的比较(考虑到该场址最近修建的建筑物、纳入该建筑群的地下走廊离该场址很近, 以及在弹道导弹计划中使用平壤顺安国际机场的情况), 表明该场址可能相当于一个弹道导弹组装设施或一个训练设施(见附件 12)。

17. 西海(东仓里)卫星发射场的升级工程仍在继续, 从 2020 年 3 月初开始翻修发射场周围和内部的道路和通道(见附件 13 和 S/2020/151, 第 198 段和附件 62)。

#### 技术无形转让

18. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过国际科学合作等无形转让办法获取技术<sup>10</sup> 所使用的各种手段(见 S/2020/151, 第 201 段), 并确定了一种风

<sup>4</sup> 地点: 北纬 40°-1'33.70" 东经 128°-9'57.69"。

<sup>5</sup> 基地名称通常指“Sino-ri 导弹运行基地”(北纬 39°38'41.52"东经 125°21'19.71"); “Yeongjeo-dong 导弹基地”(北纬 41°19'31.57"东经 127°5'42.56"至北纬 41°19'36.94"东经 127°5'53.94"); “Hoejung-ri 导弹基地”(北纬 41°22'44.93"东经 126°54'38.16"); “Kumchon-ri 导弹运行基地”(北纬 38°57'52.48"东经 127°35'11.98"); Sakkamjol 导弹运行基地(北纬 38°36'10.20"东经 126°3'57.43"); 以及 Sangnam-ri 导弹运行基地(北纬 40°50'7.46"东经 128°32'47.42")。经纬度不代表整个基地。

<sup>6</sup> 地点: 北纬 39°8'30.32"东经 125°46'0.11"。

<sup>7</sup> 地点: 北纬 39°16'52.08"东经 125°52'12.76"。

<sup>8</sup> 地点: 北纬 39°10'50.56"东经 125°39'50.01"。

<sup>9</sup> 2020 年 5 月 5 日, 战略和国际研究中心与简氏情报评论杂志发表的一份题为“超越三八线”的联合调查报告提供了一个分析, 该分析表明该地点是弹道导弹组装设施。见 Joseph Bermudez, “Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility”, 2020 年 5 月 5 日, 可查阅: <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sil-li-ballistic-missile-support-facility>。

<sup>10</sup> 见附件 6, 涉及弹药工业部第二经济委员会最近的采购活动。

险，即在国际科技期刊编辑组工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国研究人员可能成为技术无形转让的渠道。这些研究人员可能收集和确定关于具体研究和研究人员以及尖端科学机构的信息(见附件 14)。

### 三. 部门制裁和海上制裁

#### 油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运货

##### 直接交货和船对船转运

19. 在冠状病毒病疫情期间，前往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的海上运输虽然受到影响且暂时减少，但并未停止，该国继续通过非法船对船转运和非法直接交付进口精炼石油。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮和其他油轮继续主要在南浦的海洋进口码头通过码头或石油浮标码头外的石油运输线卸下精炼石油。<sup>11</sup>

20. 安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段决定，会员国应禁止直接和间接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应所有精炼石油产品。安理会还决定，本规定不适用于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 12 个历月期间采购总量不超过 50 万桶的精炼石油产品，<sup>12</sup> 但会员国须按照该段的要求将这些货物通知安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会。因此，只允许按照第 5 段通知的运输，无论通知的运输是否已达到总上限。<sup>13</sup>

21. 2020 年 7 月 24 日，专家小组收到 43 个会员国提交给委员会主席的报告副本(见附件 15)。该报告载有油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油产品的数据(涵盖 2020 年 1 月 1 日至 5 月 30 日)以及相关的卫星图像。<sup>14</sup> 这些会员国报告称，2020 年前 5 个月，(朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮和其他油轮)共有 56 次精炼石油产品非法交付朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口，与 2019 年相比有所下降，2019 年前 3 个月有 56 艘油轮交付了精炼石油产品。<sup>15</sup> 尽管船只数量减少，但会员国评估，考虑到容量较高的油轮(以前是悬挂外国国旗的油轮)所占比例，<sup>16</sup> 这

<sup>11</sup> 连接卸载浮标的水下管道被用来将燃料从船只转移到南浦港口综合体的终端。(另见 S/2019/171，第 24 段)。

<sup>12</sup> 委员会尚未商定如何将通知书中的吨转化为桶的换算率(见 S/2020/151，第 4 段和脚注 3)。中国通知委员会，2020 年 1 月至 5 月运货量为 1 813.64 吨。俄罗斯联邦通知委员会，在该期间装运货物总额为 11 481.523 吨，使得该期间共计 13 295.163 吨。在 2020 年 7 月 24 日提交委员会的报告中(见下文第 21 段)，43 个会员国计算结果相当于 106 094.17 桶。7 月 27 日，俄罗斯联邦和中国答复说，由于委员会内没有商定的换算率，因此从吨到桶的转换没有适当地建立起来。

<sup>13</sup> 两位专家认为，这句话不必要地扩大了对决议的解释。

<sup>14</sup> 数据和图像的汇编与专家小组自 2018 年以来从一个会员国收到的以前报告一致，包括 2020 年 5 月 15 日收到的报告，其中涉及 2020 年 1 月 1 日至 3 月 31 日期间的报告以及专家小组调查的内容。

<sup>15</sup> 据一个会员国称，2019 年头 10 个月内油轮运送的总数为 221 艘(见 S/2020/151，附件 1)。

<sup>16</sup> 在会员国计算非法运送总数的基础上，由于在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口停靠的较大容量油轮，2020 年 1 月至 5 月期间的数量等于 2019 年 1 月至 5 月的数量(见附件 15 和 S/2019/691，附件 1)。

些非法交付的数量没有太大差别，可能在 60 万至 160 万桶左右，<sup>17</sup> 超过了第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段规定的总上限。似乎没有一批货物按照该段的规定通知委员会。中国回应说，43 个会员国 7 月 24 日提交的报告“没有提供每批精炼石油产品运货的准确数量，报告的结论只是基于假设和估计”。中国还回应称：“根据估算得出年度超限的结论既不科学，也不审慎”。俄罗斯联邦回应说，该报告“没有提供客观、准确和可核实的信息，也没有足够确凿的图像证据”。美利坚合众国回应说：“报告中包含的图像在质量和数量上都很可靠，清楚地表明违反了上限”。中国、俄罗斯联邦和美国的全部答复载于附件 16。

### 建议

22. 专家小组再次建议，委员会商定精炼石油产品的吨和桶之间的换算率。<sup>18</sup>

23. 专家小组再次建议，请会员国完全按照第 2397(2017)号决议报告任何已知的向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转让精炼石油产品的情况。

### 规避办法

24. 专家小组在调查过程中观察到的可疑船只采用的规避方法详情载于附件 17。

### 悬挂外国国旗和不明旗帜的船只直接交货

25. 专家小组建议将直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油产品的现在和以前悬挂外国国旗的油轮列入被指认违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段的油轮名单(见 S/2020/151，第 10-27、43 和 44 段及附件 1)。在这些油轮中，“邦沃伊 3”号(国际海事组织编号 8978784)、“钻石 8”号(海事组织编号 9132612)、“和空”号(海事组织编号 9006758)、“森林 01”号(又称“广春 2”号)(海事组织编号 8910378)、“天佑”号，又称“Sin P(h)yong 2”号(海事组织编号 8817007)、“Subblic”号(海事组织编号 8126082)、“Unica”号(海事组织编号 8514306)和“云虹 8”号(海上移动业务识别号 413459380)已被会员国报告，在 2020 年 1 月至 5 月的观察期限内继续上述运输(见附件 15)。<sup>19</sup> 这些船只在进入其他国家的港口或领水时可能会被扣押(见第 2397(2017)号决议，第 9 段)。

### 转变为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只

26. 专家小组前几份报告中点名的两艘油轮随后作为悬挂国旗的船只加入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队。2019 年 8 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国将“天佑”号

<sup>17</sup> 43 个会员国估计，从 2020 年 1 月至 5 月期间，观察到的船只向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付的石油产品数量达到：近 600 000 桶载重量为 33%，超过 900 000 桶的载重量为 50%，超过 160 万桶载重量为 90%。

<sup>18</sup> 两位专家认为，没有必要重申已经列入委员会议程的建议。

<sup>19</sup> 在 2019 年观察到直接交货的船只中，被指认的“New Regent”号(海事组织编号 8312497)和“Vifine”号(海事组织编号 9045962)在 2020 年头 5 个月期间没有被报告交付精炼石油，“Viet Tin 01”号(海事组织编号 85088385)自 2019 年 12 月以来一直在马来西亚被拘留。

注册为“Sin P(h)jong 2”号，<sup>20</sup> 2019年8月20日在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国南浦的一个干船坞设施的卫星图像中记录了“森林 01”号(见 S/2020/151，第 14 段)于 2019 年 10 月注册为“广昌 2”号。<sup>21</sup>

转变为直接运送船只

27. 2020 年,悬挂不明旗帜的“新康克”号(海事组织编号 9036387)(见 S/92020/151 号,第 32 段)开始直接向南浦运送非法货物(见图一)。据会员国报告,从 2020 年 1 月至 5 月,这艘船至少在南浦进行了六次交货。继 2019 年 6 月与直接送货船“Vifine”号(国际海事组织编号 9045962)进行船对船转运后,2019 年 10 月,“新康克”号从塞拉利昂船旗注册处被取消注册。<sup>22</sup>

图一

“新康克”号在南浦卸载精炼石油产品



资料来源：会员国。

28. “新康克”号与“Vifine”号拥有相同的登记船东、船舶管理人和经营者(见 S/2020/151，第 18、19 和 32 段)。专家小组继续调查新康克海洋国际有限公司(下称新康克海洋公司)，该公司自 2019 年 5 月以来一直是该船的注册船东、船舶管理人和运营者。<sup>23</sup> 新康克海洋公司尚未对专家小组的问询作出答复。根据香港公司注册处的记录，中国公民钱女士<sup>24</sup> 曾担任该公司的董事。专家小组要求中国就

<sup>20</sup> 2020 年 5 月一个会员国告知是“Sin Pyong 2”号；根据埃信华迈随后关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国旗下悬挂的船只的最新情况记录，2020 年 7 月由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提交的船名将该船只称为“Sin Phyong 2”号(2020 年 7 月 22 日查阅)。

<sup>21</sup> 埃信华迈(2020 年 7 月 22 日查阅)。

<sup>22</sup> 埃信华迈(2020 年 11 月 28 日查阅)。

<sup>23</sup> 来自海事组织的信息。

<sup>24</sup> 钱女士的住址在中国云南省。

钱女士以及她可能掌握的有关该船交货的信息提供协助。中国回复说，到目前为止，调查还没有完成。

#### 继续直接交货

29. 据观察，以前和现在悬挂外国国旗的、容量更大的油轮在 2020 年向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行了多次交货。这些油轮包括有记录以来最大的直运油轮——悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的“钻石 8”号油轮(海事组织编号 9132612)，其载重量<sup>25</sup>约为“Saebjol”号油轮(也被称为“Chong Rim 2”号(海事组织编号 8916293))的 8 倍，是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最活跃的油轮之一。专家小组评估，与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮在返回港口前用较小船只进行的船对船转运相比，使用容量较大的直运油轮是一种更有效的交货方法。


#### “钻石 8”号

30. 专家小组继续观察到，“钻石 8”号船于 2019 年 10 月 27 日或前后在南浦运送精炼石油产品后，进行了可疑的航行(见 S/2020/151，第 21 和 44 段及附件 1)。一个商业海事平台显示，这艘船在 2020 年 2 月和 3 月分别有 14 天和 10 天没有自动识别系统信号，当时正通过黄海向北航行。钻石 8 号 2020 年 2 月的航程在路线、位置和自动识别系统传输信号的丢失方面与 2019 年 10 月的航程表现出明显的相似之处。一个会员国提供的图像证实，钻石 8 号在 2020 年 2 月和 3 月至少两次停靠南浦港口，以运送精炼石油产品(见图二)。专家小组已写信给塞拉利昂，正在等待答复。自 2019 年 10 月以来，钻石 8 号似乎主要在高雄港附近海域徘徊。2020 年 5 月 26 日，专家小组注意到，该船于同一天早些时候报告了预定在南通的港口停靠，并寻求中国的协助。

<sup>25</sup> 指的是船舶可以运输的货物、补给品、压舱物、船用燃料和船员。

图二

从左至右(上、下): 钻石 8 号在 2019 年 10 月和 2020 年 2 月航行的相似性;  
2020 年 2 月和 3 月在南浦港口的“钻石 8”号<sup>26</sup>



资料来源: 会员国, Windward 公司。

31. 专家小组继续调查为该船只活动提供便利的个人和实体。一家注册地址在印度尼西亚的 Vanguard 轮船管理有限公司(以下称 Vanguard 轮船公司)自 2019 年 9 月起被列为这艘船的船舶管理方和经营方, 同时也是“钻石 8”号注册船东的“转交”地址。<sup>27</sup> 印度尼西亚称, Vanguard 轮船公司不是在印度尼西亚经营的注册航运代理, 既没有许可牌照, 也没有颁发给它相关许可证件, 该公司和该船都没有列入印度尼西亚的数据库(见附件 18)。

32. 专家小组注意到, 根据自动识别系统的历史数据, 当时作为 Royal Ace 公司的船只于 2017 年 6 月 4 日和 8 月 30 日左右驶往元山港, 并于 2017 年 11 月 10

<sup>26</sup> Windward 公司在报告中提供的所有资料日期均采用美国东部标准时间。

<sup>27</sup> 提交给各种海事数据库的地址信息, 包括在 Vanguard 轮船公司下注册的另一艘船的信息。

日左右驶往清津港，表明该船过去与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易历史。专家小组尚未确定该船前任和现任船东和管理人之间的任何联系。

### 船对船转运

33. 专家小组评估说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续利用船对船转运作为获取精炼石油产品和逃避安全理事会规定的配额的主要手段。附件 19 显示了据一个会员国报告并经专家小组观察到的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行非法船对船转运的相关地区。专家小组正在调查几个会员国报告的下列与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮在东海通过掩饰和夜间转运进行的非法船对船活动(详情见附件 20):

- “Sam Jong 2”号(国际海事组织编号 7408873)<sup>28</sup> 和一艘身份不明的船只于 2020 年 1 月 9 日左右。
- “Myong Ryu 1”号(国际海事组织编号 8532413)<sup>29</sup> 和悬挂巴拿马国旗的“Infinite Luck”号(国际海事组织编号 9063811)于 2020 年 1 月 10 日左右。巴拿马向专家小组提供了专家小组正在审查的文件。“Infinite Luck”号的注册船东香港统一船务有限公司尚未回复专家小组。调查还在继续。

### 扣押的船只

“勇敢”号，也被称为“Sea Prima”号

34. 专家小组继续调查“Sea Prima”号船(海事组织编号 8617524)，该船于 2019 年 9 月，即“Sea Prima”号从上次船旗登记处删除一个月后，与“Saebyo1”号进行了船对船的转运。<sup>30</sup> 有记录表明，这艘船于 2020 年 1 月更名为“勇敢”号，并在喀麦隆国旗下航行，此前的记录表明，该船至少有两个月没有国旗。<sup>31</sup> 专家小组已就该船的船旗状况和相关登记信息致函喀麦隆，正在等待答复。柬埔寨当局在 2020 年 2 月 6 日左右发现该船未经必要当局许可悬挂柬埔寨国旗时扣留了该船。专家小组注意到，自 2015 年 8 月柬埔寨关闭船舶登记以来，船只在柬埔寨国旗下航行的任何声称都是虚假的。

35. 2017 年至 2019 年期间，该船还被发现五次从较大的供应商油轮进行船对船转运。这艘船随后将精炼石油产品转移到中国台湾省附近海域的较小船只上。<sup>32</sup> 柬埔寨当局报告说，该船曾有一次直接向南浦运送精炼石油产品，并证实了专家小组早些时候关于该船与一艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行船对船转运的报告。需要进一步调查，以确定与较小船只发生的任何转运是否与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的逃避制裁活动有关。

<sup>28</sup> 2018 年 3 月被指定为列入资产冻结和港口禁令名单上。

<sup>29</sup> 由专家小组建议指定(见 S/2020/151，第 40 和 46 段，以及 S/2019/171，第 50 段)。

<sup>30</sup> 埃信华迈资料(2019 年 11 月 25 日查阅)。

<sup>31</sup> 海事组织网站。

<sup>32</sup> 两位专家认为，这一信息可以进一步得到证实。



36. 该船被扣留时载有 16 名船员，没有石油货物。船舶资料文件(见附件 21)确认船东为注册地址在中国厦门的新东方航运有限公司(下称新东方船运)，船舶管理公司为在伯利兹注册成立的 Courage Maritime 公司。<sup>33</sup> 这艘“勇敢”号船只的船东和管理公司似乎没有在线商业网站，也没有公开披露他们的联系方式。专家小组在调查过程中获得的信息显示，该船是 2019 年 7 月通过新加坡和高雄市的经纪人和代理人分别从前船东手中购买的。

37. 对与“勇敢”号有关联的个人的初步调查表明，至少这艘船与新加坡的几个人之间存在关联。一名 Kwek 先生的公司在“Viet Tin 01”号船于 2019 年 1 月和 2 月停靠港口时为该船提供港口和其他相关服务，据称他在准备船只移交期间代表买方新东方船运公司。专家小组请 Kwek 先生就他与该船以及新东方船运或其合伙人有关的作用和活动提供协助。Kwek 先生回答说，由于目前的冠状病毒病疫情，答复一般要慢得多，并表示他将回复并作出答复。

38. 一家总部设在高雄市的船运代理公司(KC 公司)据称曾担任新东方的代理。KC 公司回应称，不认识新东方船运，也不知道与新东方船运或其代表进行任何接触并担任“只为该船在 9 月下锚的船运代理”的情况(2019 年)。KC 公司进一步表示，“无法获得”专家小组要求为勇敢号提供服务的付款记录和银行账户详细信息。专家小组要求 KC 公司进一步澄清。调查还在继续。

#### “Viet Tin 01”号

39. 专家小组继续调查 2019 年 2 月 26 日及前后悬挂越南国旗的“Viet Tin 01”号(海事组织编号 8508838)在南浦停靠港口的情况，以及为该船活动提供便利的个人和实体的情况(见 S/2020/151，第 43 段和附件 12，以及 S/2019/691，第 10-12 段)。据 Kwek 先生说，他的公司(K 公司)是由船东(越南越信船务公司，以下简称越信公司)和承租人(中国幸福船务有限公司)共同指定的。在 2020 年 1 月 31 日至 2 月 3 日该船舶在新加坡港口期间担任港口航运代理。船东和承租人都指示他在船只离开前在港口通关证书上申报下一个停靠港为中国香港(见附件 22)。<sup>34</sup>

“Viet Tin 01”号船上购买精炼石油产品的文件日期为 2019 年 1 月 29 日至 2 月 1 日，该文件显示，T 能源国际有限公司(以下简称 T 能源公司)是买方。越南以前曾告知专家小组，船东是外国实体欺诈性和非法挪用船只的受害者。

40. 在 K 公司于 2018 年 11 月终止与 T Energy 公司的合同后，<sup>35</sup> T Energy 公司从大陆平台 PTE Ltd.(以下简称大陆平台公司)购买了“Viet Tin 01”号上的精炼石油产品。专家小组继续调查 T Energy 向 K 公司的美元账户付款与从 K 公司转账到大陆平台公司持有的新加坡元账户之间的差异。专家小组尚未收到 Kwek 先生

<sup>33</sup> 该公司在海事数据库平台上被列为该船只持有合规文件公司和技术管理人。

<sup>34</sup> 该船随后在驶往南浦之前传输了几个不同的目的地。商业海事数据库中的航程跟踪数据和专家小组可查到的港口数据没有显示任何进入港口信息，也没有表明该船曾靠近其报告的一些港口目的地。

<sup>35</sup> 根据 Kwek 先生提供的信息。

的答复。T Energy 公司尚未对专家小组的问询作出答复。专家小组继续追踪该船货物的历史。

41. 马来西亚确认自 2019 年 12 月 8 日以来扣留了“Viet Tin 01”号，理由是該船停泊在海上航道时存在潜在的障碍物危险。除了甲板航海日志(2019 年 7 月至 8 月的条目)、船长夜间命令航海日志(2018 年 9 月至 2019 年 6 月的条目)和船员名单外，没有发现专家小组要求的航运和航行文件、通信和证书方面通常船上携带的相关记录。专家小组注意到甲板航海日志日期不在小组的调查期内。夜间命令航海日志没有登记 2019 年 2 月 26 日和 27 日左右的条目，并将该船记录为在紧接日期之前和之后在“黄海航行”和“渤海航行”。专家小组注意到，没有在船上发现的其他日志和文件能告知该船只在这些日期或前后的位置。

42. 马来西亚当局通过船只的航运代理发出了一封信，要求船只的船东认领、接管和移动该船只。船东表示，由于健康状况不能旅行，他打算出售该船，以结清尚未支付的收费和费用。将该船出售给新船东的交易于 2020 年 3 月敲定，以便为该船于 2020 年 8 月底离开马来西亚做好准备。在 2020 年 6 月的一次法庭听证会上，对两项被指控的违规行为处以罚款，这两项罪行由船东代理代表船东达成和解。对船东处以罚款，以支付营救该船只的费用，并在船只放行之前结清罚款。

43. 在比较从各方收到的文件时，专家小组注意到，“Viet Tin 01”号船长是缅甸国民，与勇敢号船长的姓名、国籍和出生日期相同。“Viet Tin 01”号上的另外两名船员也被列入“勇敢”号船员名单。<sup>36</sup> 调查还在继续。

#### 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的海运出口

44. 继续违反安全理事会禁止从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口煤炭的决议。一个会员国报告称，从 2020 年 1 月底左右至 3 月下旬已暂停煤炭出口，这段时间正值公开报道朝鲜民主主义人民共和国限制国际贸易和旅行以遏制冠状病毒病蔓延之际。虽然当时已经在运送煤炭的大多数朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只继续进行这些运送工作，但在暂停期间，数十艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只似乎停泊在南浦船闸外，很可能导致在此期间贸易的受制裁货物发货量减少。专家小组观察到大同江上船只闲置的类似现象(见附件 23)。该会员国报告称，在暂停期间，一些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只开始从中国进口食品和化肥等人道主义援助物资。<sup>37</sup>

45. 该会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国于 2020 年 3 月下旬恢复煤炭出口，当时三艘船在清津装载煤炭，驶往宁波-舟山区域，并在中国领海卸煤。大同江沿线

<sup>36</sup> 根据 Windward 的记录，在 2019 年 8 月至 12 月自动识别系统传输信号出现间隙之后，2020 年 2 月中旬，“勇敢”号从高雄港驶往柬埔寨西哈努克港。

<sup>37</sup> 在此期间，专家小组观察到，若干朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只在航行于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和中国的一些港口之间时发射了自动识别系统信号。其中一些船只通常有一段时间不发送自动识别系统信号，最长时两年不发送。

港口的煤炭出口活动于 2020 年 4 月下旬恢复。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国恢复煤炭出口的这一时间范围与专家小组在其调查案件中观察到的船只动向一致。

46. 专家小组继续调查多艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只在宁波-舟山附近水域的存在情况，这些船只仍然在某个特定时间点上被观察到在这些水域(见 S/2020/151，第 69 段和 S/2019/691，第 19 段)。一个会员国提供的卫星图像记录了一些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只在抵达中国水域之前在南浦和大安港装载煤炭的情况，其中几艘船抛锚停泊，货舱打开，所装货物似乎是煤炭(见附件 24)。记录到其中一些船只在中国海岸数公里范围内<sup>38</sup> (见附件 25)。<sup>39</sup>

47. 该会员国称，自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国恢复煤炭出口以来，至少有 32 艘船满载煤炭离开该国；截至 2020 年 5 月 7 日，至少进行了 33 次运送。该会员国评估认为，这些货物中的绝大多数(如果不是全部)是通过船对船移交的方式运往中国并在宁波-舟山区域卸货的。

48. 商业卫星图像、公开来源材料以及专家小组对船只的评估总体上与该会员国提供的信息一致。该会员国记录到的正在进行船运的一些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只以前就被专家小组报告过有移交或转运煤炭行为。这些船只包括“Kal Ma”号(海事组织编号 8503228)(见 S/2019/171，附件 13)、“Jang Un”号(海事组织编号 8822260)(同上，附件 15)、“Phyong An”号(海事组织编号 8606410)(见 S/2020/151，图 15)、“Jin Hung 9”号(海事组织编号 9035967)(同上，附件 15)、“Un Bong 2”号(海事组织编号 8913186 号)(见 S/2018/171，第 59 段)、“Hae Song 1”号(海事组织编号 8995990)(见 S/2020/151，图 15)、“Su Song”号(海事组织编号 9024889)(见 S/2019/691，第 19 段)、“Nam Dae Chon”号(海事组织编号 9138680)(见 S/2019/171，附件 15)和被指认的“Ji Nam San”号(海事组织编号 9114555)(见 S/2018/171，第 59 段)，后者于 2018 年因在以“Ul Ji Bong 6”号名义航行期间从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转运煤炭而受到安全理事会的制裁。在某些情况下，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船只与通常用于在海上船对船移交时卸货的驳船和浮吊一起出现。在相关调查期间，这些船只似乎均没有在商业海事平台上发送自动识别系统信号，大多数船只在很长一段时间内没有发送过这种信号，<sup>40</sup> 这表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续避免提供其船只贸易所涉航线和水域的追踪数据。

#### “Kal Ma”号和“Jang Un”号

49. 据卫星图像记录，2020 年 4 月 21 日前后“Kal Ma”号(海事组织编号 8503228)在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大安装载煤炭。同一天，记录到另一艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只“Jang Un”号(海事组织编号 8822260)在南浦装载煤炭。卫星图像记录了 2020 年 5 月 3 日前后这两艘船停泊在宁波-舟山区域；该会员国评估认为，这两艘船在那里卸煤(见图三)。专家小组先前关于出口朝鲜民主主义人民共

<sup>38</sup> 卫星图像记录显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船只停泊在距中国海岸线 1 海里或不到 2 公里的范围内。

<sup>39</sup> 两位专家认为，本段和下一段中的信息不妨予以进一步查证。

<sup>40</sup> 自动识别系统信号的发送至少存在一年的间隔。

国原产煤炭的报告中提到了“Kal Ma”号和“Jang Un”号(见 S/2019/171, 附件 13 和 15)。

图三

从左往右(最上方和最下方): 2020年4月“Kal Ma”号和“Jang Un”号装煤; 两艘船均于2020年5月在宁波-舟山附近抛锚; 2018年9月, 在北部湾附近进行船对船移交的“Jang Un”号



资料来源: 会员国; 地图: 专家小组; 商业海事平台: Windward 公司, 专家小组作了说明。

50. 专家小组还调查了2020年4月位于宁波-舟山的下列朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只, 并寻求中国的协助(见附件 26):

- 2020年4月“Jin Hung 9”号(海事组织编号 9035967)从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口煤炭。
- 2020年1月至2月和4月至5月, “New Dawn”号(海事组织编号 9135494)进行可疑航行并发送虚假识别信息。

51. 中国答复称, 关于专家小组信函中提及的涉嫌进行船对船移交的船只, 目前尚未完成调查, 并答复称, 如果任何中国船只、个人或实体被证实参与非法船对船移交, 中国执法部门将依照法律法规对其起诉。

## 将散装货船转移到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国以进行非法活动

“Tae Pyong”号，又名“Great Wenshan”号

52. 专家小组正在调查 2020 年将“Tae Pyong”号又名“Great Wenshan”号(海事组织编号 9018751)转移到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国<sup>41</sup> 及其非法出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的情况。安全理事会在其决议中禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过供应、出售或转让直接或间接获得新船或二手船，并禁止非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民拥有、租赁、经营、包租朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只、为这些船只配备船员和提供其他相关服务。该案突出表明，这艘船首航前往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，并在从第三国船旗登记处注销登记后不久更改了识别信息；在该船往返朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运输煤炭的整个航程中操纵识别信息；船东和管理层信息有限。

53. 2019 年 12 月下旬，以前悬挂巴拿马国旗的“Great Wenshan”号在中国厦门港外登记发送了一条自动识别系统信息，目的地未知，标注为“订单”，然后驶离厦门港区。<sup>42</sup> 这艘船的历史航线显示，自 2018 年 12 月以来，它主要在南海和东海部分海域作业，但表明其于 2019 年 12 月 29 日前后向北驶向黄海，偏离了正常的贸易路线。这艘船于 2020 年 1 月 5 日从巴拿马注销，有在 2020 年 1 月 6 日前后在南浦发送自动识别系统信息的记录。在 2020 年的某个时候，这艘船更名为“Tae Pyong”，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗航行。

### 操纵船只识别信息

54. 自动识别系统信息发送记录显示，一艘与“Tae Pyong”号具有相同标识信息、以“Pak”号名义发送信息的船只于 2020 年 4 月 24 日前后在南浦进行港口停靠，三天后驶入杭州湾地区中国水域，并于 2020 年 5 月 4 日前后返回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。这艘船继续操纵它的识别信息，包括冒用另一艘船只的识别信息，随后以“Tae Phyong”号名义发送信息。<sup>43</sup> 在专家小组的调查过程中，一个会员国提供的卫星图像显示，“Tae Pyong”号于 2020 年 1 月 18 日前后在南浦装载煤炭，在 2020 年 4 月驶往宁波-舟山区域以前一直满载停留在大同江上。该会员国评估称，“Tae Pyong”号在中国水域卸载煤炭(见图四)。该船于 2020 年 5 月 5 日前后返回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。这艘以“Pak”号名义发送信息的船只于 2020 年 5 月 30 日进行了前往宁波-舟山区域的类似航行，五天后返回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。


<sup>41</sup> 海事数据库和国际海事组织网站。

<sup>42</sup> 根据 Windward 公司的资料。

<sup>43</sup> 埃信华迈公司上记录的“Tae Phyong”号更名情况(2020 年 7 月 22 日查阅)。

图四

“Tae Pyong”号出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的航线



资料来源：会员国；地图：专家小组；商业海事平台：Windward 公司，专家小组作了说明。

有关所有权的数据有限

55. 伟山航运有限公司<sup>44</sup> (以下简称“伟山航运”)自 2018 年 9 月起被列为该船的注册船东，福建省恒丰船务有限公司<sup>45</sup> (以下简称“福建恒丰船务”)为该船的船舶管理人、经营者、技术管理人和公司合规文件持有人。两家公司似乎都没有网上商业网址。越南确认，该船已于 2018 年 11 月出售并交付给伟山航运。巴拿马确认，这艘以“Great Wenshan”号名义航行的船只于 2020 年 1 月 5 日从其船舶登记处注销登记，据报注销原因是该船转售给了另一家有不同香港地址的实体，而且据报该船将旗帜改为在另一个第三国登记处登记。<sup>46</sup> 调查还在继续。

<sup>44</sup> 中文名称：伟山航运有限公司。

<sup>45</sup> 中文名称：福建省恒丰船务有限公司。

<sup>46</sup> 专家小组注意到，该船被记录到在从巴拿马注销注册一天后在南浦以朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的名义发送信息。

56. 香港公司注册处记录显示,一位刘先生<sup>47</sup>是伟山航运的公司董事,另一位刘先生<sup>48</sup>是福建恒丰船务的大股东。专家小组已致函伟山航运和福建恒丰船务,并寻求中国协助,中国答复称尚未完成调查。该船的注册船东及其管理公司尚未对专家小组的询问作出答复。

#### “Samzin 8”号和“Ri Hong”号

57. 卫星图像记录显示,“Samzin 8”号(海事组织编号 8810578)和“Ri Hong”号(海事组织编号 9162318 号)于 2020 年 4 月 29 日前后与其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只一起在宁波-舟山区域附近的岛屿一带出没(见附件 24)。卫星图像还记录到“Samzin 8”号在 2020 年 5 月 3 日前后与其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只一起在同一区域出没。一个会员国评估称,这些船只在宁波-舟山区域卸载朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭。专家小组分析了已收到的公开资料 and 文件,分析结果总体上与该会员国的评估结果一致。塞拉利昂告知专家小组,“Samzin 8”号于 2016 年 5 月被注销注册,原因是其在一个受制裁国家(朝鲜民主主义人民共和国)非法入境。自 2019 年 8 月起,该船悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗,成为“Sam Jin 8”号。<sup>49</sup> 巴拿马证实,其船舶登记处已于 2019 年 12 月 20 日注销“Ri Hong”号,原因是该船转挂另一种船旗。<sup>50</sup> 自那以后,一个会员国评估认为该船是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只。

58. 吉辰国际贸易有限公司(以下简称“吉辰国际贸易”)是“Samzin 8”的注册船东,它与包括“Infinite Luck”号的注册船东 Uniform Shipping 在内的数十家其他公司共用一个公司注册服务公司地址(见上文第 33 段)。<sup>51</sup> 吉辰船舶管理有限公司(以下简称“吉辰船舶”)被列为该船的实益所有人,自 2015 年 7 月起管理并运营“Samzin 8”号。<sup>52</sup> 专家小组注意到,2016 年和 2017 年,吉辰船舶曾经在相关船只加入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队之前管理过这些船只,其中包括“Kum Song 3”号(海事组织编号 8661850)和“Kum Song 7”号(海事组织编号 8739396)。

59. “Ri Hong”号的注册船东 Li Hong Shipping Co. Ltd.(以下简称 Li Hong Shipping)<sup>53</sup> 由 Hong He Shipping Co. Ltd.(以下简称 Hong He Shipping)负责管理,后者是该船的船舶管理公司和合规文件持有公司,地址在中国山东省。“Samzin 8”号和“Ri Hong”号的上述船东和管理公司尚未对专家小组的询问作出答复。

<sup>47</sup> 伟山航运的刘先生的地址在中国福建省。

<sup>48</sup> 福建恒丰船务的刘先生的地址在中国上海。

<sup>49</sup> 根据埃信华迈公司的资料(2020 年 7 月 23 日查阅)。

<sup>50</sup> 国际海事组织的网站将这艘船列为以未知船旗航行。专家小组已致函上述船旗登记处,正在等待答复。

<sup>51</sup> 该船于 2018 年 1 月从香港公司注册处记录中注销。

<sup>52</sup> 根据埃信华迈公司的资料(2020 年 6 月 1 日查阅)。

<sup>53</sup> 2014 年 1 月至 2020 年 6 月, Li Hong Shipping 在马绍尔群岛注册为非居民国内公司,通讯地址在中国大连。

60. 专家小组还在调查悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Su Ri Bong”号，也称“Pu Zhou”号(以前称“Fu Xing 12”号)(海事组织编号 8605727)，该船出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭(见 S/2020/151，第 73 至 77 段)。专家小组请中国协助提供有关该船所列买方以及该船航次和货物的信息；请菲律宾协助提供涉及在英属维尔京群岛注册成立的 Honour Sail Limited 公司董事长的信息，该公司是这艘船出售后的管理公司；请一家总部设在高雄市的管理公司协助提供信息，在该船悬挂塞拉利昂国旗期间，该公司曾在短期内担任该船的合规文件持有公司。<sup>54</sup> 中国答复称，调查尚未完成，并称，如果任何中国船只、个人或实体被证实参与非法船对船移交，中国执法部门将依照法律和法规对其起诉。菲律宾答复称，一有信息便立即提供。管理公司表示，其对船东一无所知，它是通过一家中国经纪公司签订安全管理服务合同的(见附件 27)。

### 捕鱼权转让

61. 根据一个会员国提供的信息，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续向第三国的实体出售捕鱼权，允许它们在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域作业。截至 2020 年 5 月底，该会员国观察到共有约 70 艘渔船驶向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域。该信息来源还发现了一个互联网网站上的帖子，该帖征集捕鱿鱼渔船在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域作业。专家小组确认了该会员国告知它的一则广告的内容。这则广告由一家互联网网站的某个账户持有人在 2020 年 3 月下旬张贴，广告中有一份合同范本和一份朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商会出具的证书，证实平壤的松山贸易公司获得了国家当局的批准，有权在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域联合捕鱼。张贴的合同规定，船员每月起薪 2 500 元，<sup>55</sup> 并规定外国对口单位应提供 100 艘渔船和配套船只(见附件 28)。调查还在继续。

### 建议

#### 向委员会提出建议

62. 专家小组建议指认下列船只违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段：

- “New Konk”号(海事组织编号 9036387)，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗

63. 专家小组重申其载于文件 S/2020/151 号文件第 44 段的建议，即指认所列船只违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段。除被扣留的“Viet Tin 01”号(海事组织编号 8508838)<sup>56</sup> 以及“Vifine”号(又称“Tealway FV”号)(海事组织编号 9045962)外，S/2020/151 号文件第 44 段列名的以下所有船只在 2020 年 1 月至 5 月观察期间均继续向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油，进一步违反了第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段：<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> 2019 年 7 月至 9 月悬挂船旗(埃信华迈公司)。

<sup>55</sup> 356 美元(2020 年 7 月 8 日汇率)。

<sup>56</sup> 截至 2019 年 12 月。

<sup>57</sup> 两位专家认为，没有必要重申委员会议程上已有的建议。



- “Bonvoy 3”号(海事组织编号 8978784), 船旗不明
- “Diamond 8”号(海事组织编号 9132612), 悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Hokong”号(海事组织编号 9006758), 以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Kwang Chon 2”号(以前称“Sen Lin 01”号)(海事组织编号 8910378), 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗
- “Sin P(h)jong 2”号(以前称“Tianyou”号)(海事组织编号 8817007), 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗
- “Subblic”号(海事组织编号 8126082), 以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Unica”号(海事组织编号 8514306), 以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Yun Hong 8”号(海事移动业务标识号 413459380), 悬挂中国国旗

就针对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国活动的最佳做法向会员国提出的建议

64. 非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮继续直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油, 这使得船旗登记处、船东和船只运营商以及相关航运实体更有必要加强尽职调查。专家小组建议会员国和业界考虑以下最佳做法。

关于船旗国之间的信息共享

65. 专家小组建议船旗登记处考虑加入《船旗登记信息共享契约》, 该契约是巴拿马、马绍尔群岛和利比里亚提出的一项行业倡议,<sup>58</sup> 旨在实现信息共享正规化, 警示船旗国注意可能带来与制裁有关问题的船只, 从而有可能拒绝这些船只的申请。

关于提高透明度

66. 专家小组回顾其建议, 即会员国应努力收集拥有或控制每艘船只所属外国实体的每个人的身份和联系信息, 并应请求与专家小组分享这些信息, 以促进对把空壳公司用作注册船东以逃避制裁的各种网络的调查工作。

关于船舶自动识别系统及船舶远程识别和跟踪

67. 专家小组建议会员国鼓励本国航运业遵循相关部门(包括船舶保险和再保险企业、商品贸易公司、银行和船旗登记处)已经采取的最佳做法措施, 这些措施在签订新合同之前或审查正在进行的业务时, 调查自动识别系统和(或)远程识别和跟踪系统对答机被操纵的迹象和报告。

68. 专家小组还建议会员国鼓励港口国管制部门、海事部门和船舶交通服务部门根据《国际海上人命安全公约》, 颁布和监督对进出其管辖范围的油轮和散装货船继续使用自动识别系统广播的要求, 并考虑调查涉嫌篡改其识别信息的船只的有效性及其活动, 以确保其不违反制裁决议。

<sup>58</sup> 截至 2020 年 4 月, 圣基茨和尼维斯、科摩罗、洪都拉斯、帕劳和瓦努阿图的船旗登记处也加入了该契约。

### 关于加强审查

69. 专家组再次建议，鉴于在与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行船对船移交时使用驳船和浮吊，会员国应确保港口和有关当局更加严格地审查驳船和浮吊，包括核查其货物的来源和单据，特别是在登记有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只存在的地点。

70. 专家组建议，任何接收交付或转运煤炭货物的会员国必须采取强化措施，验证这些货物所附单据。

71. 专家组建议会员国对从事受限制或被禁止商品贸易的船只的动态保持警惕，特别是在已知发生非法船对船移交的水域。

### 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计数据

72. 专家组继续从基于会员国海关数据的已公布贸易统计数据(可查阅国际贸易中心(国贸中心)贸易图)，分析朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反相关决议的进出口情况(专家组调查的全部结果见附件 29)。与前一年相比，2019 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的出口有所增加，但贸易逆差扩大(见表 2)。

表 2

#### 2017-2019 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易状况

(千美元)

	2017	2018	2019
出口	2 059 244	336 637	414 346
进口	3 555 782	2 326 272	2 718 854
<b>贸易差额</b>	<b>(1 496 538)</b>	<b>(1 989 635)</b>	<b>(2 354 508)</b>

资料来源：国贸中心贸易图(2020 年 6 月 24 日查阅)。

73. 专家组注意到该国在 2020 年上半年关闭边境的影响(见附件 1)以及在此期间没有举办一年两次的平壤国际贸易博览会。会员国提供的信息表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进行未列入国际贸易数据库的煤炭等商品的非法出口(见上文第 44 至 60 段)。这可以解释为何近几年贸易逆差的增加可能已得到部分抵消。

## 四. 禁运、被指认的实体和个人以及海外工人

### 禁运

捷克、另一个欧洲联盟成员国和尼日利亚

74. 一家媒体在 2020 年 1 月 29 日的报道称,<sup>59</sup> 2012 年和 2013 年, 捷克情报部门成功阻止了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的采购企图, 包括挫败了一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的武器走私阴谋。

75. 捷克在答复专家小组的询问时称, 2012 年至 2013 年, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻捷克大使馆经济商务处一位秘书和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻另一个欧洲联盟成员国大使馆经济商务处一位秘书试图确定在哪些欧洲联盟成员国可以买到 T-54 和 T-55 发动机、BMP-2、BRDM 和 BTR 装甲车的备件、喷气式飞机备件和无人侦察机备件。捷克与外国伙伴合作, 发现这些活动于准备阶段; 没有发生违反联合国制裁的行为。

76. 另一个欧洲联盟成员国答复称, 时任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻该国大使馆商贸一等秘书 Hong Yong Su 试图采购武器零部件, 目的是将其运往非洲一个国家。

77. 据一个会员国评估, Hong 先生是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国侦察总局(KPe.031)前成员或现任成员。该会员国认为, 2020 年 1 月 Hong 先生在尼日利亚。专家小组尚未收到尼日利亚的答复。

伊朗伊斯兰共和国与阿拉伯联合酋长国之间的黄金走私

78. 关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻德黑兰大使馆官员在德黑兰机场和阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜机场之间走私黄金和现金的报告(见附件 30 和 S/2020/151, 第 108 段), 专家小组获得的信息是, 阿拉伯联合酋长国境内涉嫌参与这个走私团伙的三名伊朗国民在中国和保加利亚拥有多个以他们及其家人名义开立的银行账户。中国答复称: “这三个人中有两个曾经在中国开户。在 2018 年 11 月之前, 他们的所有账户都已关闭。这些个人及其账户和交易与安全理事会指认的任何个人或实体都没有关系, 与朝鲜没有任何关系。” 保加利亚答复称, 这些伊朗人在保加利亚拥有多家公司和银行账户。专家小组尚未收到三个伊朗国民对其询问的答复。<sup>60</sup>

阿拉伯叙利亚共和国境内的军事合作

79. 据一个会员国称, 2019 年 8 月, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的技术人员在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国境内的叙利亚 SA-3(S-125)地对空导弹部队开展工作。专家小组尚未收到阿拉伯叙利亚共和国对其询问的答复。

<sup>59</sup> Oliver Hotham, “Czech gov’t foiled North Korean arms smuggling plot, intelligence service says”, 朝鲜新闻网站, 2020 年 1 月 29 日。<https://www.nknews.org/2020/01/czech-govt-foiled-north-korean-arms-smuggling-plot-intelligence-service-says/>。

<sup>60</sup> Mohammad Mehrchian(出生日期: 1969 年 2 月 23 日)、Mohsen Fahad(出生日期: 1981 年 6 月 5 日)和 Heidar Saheh (或 Saheb) Farajidana (Faraji-Dana)(出生日期: 1976 年 9 月 23 日)。

### 3M 公司和杜邦公司

80. 据媒体报道，2020 年 3 月，朝鲜中央电视台的资料显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一些检疫人员身穿 3M 防化服(包括似乎是 3M 化学防护套装 4570 和 3M 一次性防护套装 4510 的防化服)以及两种不同型号的杜邦 Tyvek 防护服(见图五和六)。

81. 在回应专家小组询问的答复中，3M 公司和杜邦公司均指出，他们无法核实资料显示的工作服是否是他们的真品，并强调他们遵守国内法律，没有将其产品出口到受制裁国家(见附件 31 和 32)。<sup>61</sup>

#### 图五

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的检疫人员穿着似乎是 3M 4570 防护套装



资料来源：朝鲜中央电视台。

<sup>61</sup> Jeongmin Kim, “North Korean quarantine workers wearing U.S.-brand protective suits: state media”, 朝鲜新闻网站, 2020 年 3 月 19 日。 <https://www.nknews.org/2020/03/north-korean-quarantine-workers-spotted-wearing-u-s-brand-protective-suits/>。

图六

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一名公共卫生工作者穿着一件似乎是杜邦 Tyvek 防护套服



资料来源：Sogwang 和杜邦 Tyvek 目录。

### 滥用使馆财产

82. 专家小组调查了违反安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议第 18 段、企图利用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交财产创收的行为，安理会在该段中决定所有会员国均应禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国把它在会员国境内拥有或租赁的不动产用于不是外交或领事活动的其他任何用途。<sup>62</sup>

#### 德国

83. 专家小组对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻德国大使馆非法创收活动进行了数年的调查。在答复专家小组的询问时，德国证实，柏林行政法院维持关闭位于大使馆房产的城市旅馆的命令(见附件 33)，自 2020 年 5 月初以来，该旅馆已停止运营。

#### 波兰

84. 专家小组要求波兰提供有关一些商业实体继续将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交财产用于商业目的的报告的资料。波兰在答复中解释称，由于采取了机构间协调一致的做法，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交房产不再用于商业用途。

#### 罗马尼亚

85. 专家小组要求罗马尼亚提供关于将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆财产租赁给 IMA Partners SRL 的最新情况和补充资料。专家小组尚未收到答复。罗马尼亚以前提供过关于修订其内部制裁文书以处罚金的资料。

<sup>62</sup> 关于专家小组的上一次报告，见 S/2018/171，第 203 至 210 段。

## 保加利亚

86. 有关数据和图像显示，拥有“Terra Residence”的公司仍然租用似乎是专家小组调查过的前大使官邸的房舍，据此，专家小组要求保加利亚提供相关资料。此外，广告宣传称，一家名为“Lora Catering”的公司(见附件 34)在该地址经营。由于冠状病毒病疫情，保加利亚要求给予更多时间进行必要的调查。

## 建议

87. 专家小组建议会员国警惕朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交使团可能利用其财产来获取非法收入。

## 奢侈品禁令执行情况

88. 专家小组注意到，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续试图绕过第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)(三)段规定的禁令，获取奢侈品。专家小组还获得了有关前几次调查的新资料。

89. 在 2020 年上半年的大部分时间，边境和贸易渠道(包括黑市渠道)关闭，从而限制了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口奢侈品的机会。据报道，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关部门决定限制进口包括电子物品在内的“非必需品”，<sup>63</sup> 该决定也阻止了商业实体进口奢侈品进行零售，留下的唯一窗口是根据特别许可进口奢侈品，该窗口为供朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最高权力阶层消费的商品保留，在大多数情况下涉及被指认的实体。

90. 专家小组的调查表明，尽管大多数汽车制造商的合规方案<sup>64</sup> 旨在阻止与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行贸易，该国仍有能力获得豪华汽车，往往是通过精心设计的供应链获得。例如，根据从一个会员国收到的信息，2020 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续试图使用设在第三国的公司进口梅赛德斯-奔驰 S 级豪华轿车。

## 奥迪

91. 专家小组已收到关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内有奥迪轿车存在的资料，包括一张位于马息岭度假胜地、留给非常重要人士使用的奥迪汽车的图片(见附件 35)。制造商告知专家小组，Q7 型轿车是在 2012 至 2015 年间生产的，无法追踪到这辆车资料(见附件 36)。但专家小组知道，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内有相当多的奥迪轿车。

## 梅赛德斯-奔驰

92. 专家小组继续调查涉及非法将两辆梅赛德斯-奔驰 S-600 Long Guard VR9 轿车进口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的案件，获得了有关供应链的进一步信息(见附件 37)。European Cars & More 公司告知专家小组其与 Logistica & Spedizioni 公

<sup>63</sup> Jeong Tae Joo, “N. Korea announces all ‘trivial’ imports restricted until end of year”, 《每日朝鲜》，2020 年 4 月 23 日。<https://www.dailynk.com/english/n-korea-announces-all-trivial-imports-restricted-until-end-year/>。

<sup>64</sup> 包括被调查车辆制造商的合规方案。

司打交道的情况，该公司就是将这些车辆运出欧洲联盟的幕后企业(见附件 38)。前者披露，它还向 Logistica & Spedizioni 公司出售了若干豪华轿车，这些轿车的品牌就是已观察到的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领导人正在使用的品牌(见附件 39 和 40)。后者未对专家小组的询问作出答复。

丰田

93. 专家小组注意到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领导人使用雷克萨斯豪华轿车 (LS)460L 和日本雷克萨斯 LX570 车辆以及将一辆丰田科斯特大巴用作移动办公室的公开照片。根据从丰田汽车公司获得的信息，雷克萨斯 LS 车型于 2009 年 10 月至 2012 年 6 月在日本生产。丰田表示，它没有生产任何装甲版本的雷克萨斯 LS，也没有专门为第三方装甲车辆定制雷克萨斯 LS 车型。

94. 根据专家小组掌握的资料，自 2020 年初以来，向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送酒精饮料(威士忌、干邑白兰地、白兰地、伏特加、葡萄酒和啤酒(并非所有会员国都将这些酒精饮料归类为奢侈品))的工作一直不规律。

图七

平壤“大成百货商店”出售的进口酒精饮料



资料来源：高丽旅行社。

95. 专家小组继续调查大连明海国际贸易有限公司。<sup>65</sup> 一个会员国指出，该公司以前曾参与向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应奢侈品。据一份公开来源报告<sup>66</sup> 记录，该公司专注于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国市场，其所有者的运营记录涉及被指认船只以及与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行受禁贸易。该公司以及设在大连明海国际贸易有限公司注册地址的某些子公司进口包括名牌产品和电子产品在内的各种货物，在可能时再出口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。没有收到该公司的答复。中国答复称，根据专家小组提供的信息，没有发现任何违规行为。

96. 新加坡向专家小组通报了专家小组所调查案件的进一步法庭诉讼情况，包括相关判决(见附件 41 和 42)；这些案件涉及新加坡“T Specialist”公司和“OCN”公司向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 Bugsae 商店非法供应奢侈品(见 S/2019/171，第 142-144 段和附件 72，以及 S/2020/151，第 157 段和第 161 至 162 段)。

### 建议

97. 专家小组再次建议，委员会应拟制一份更详细的被禁奢侈品清单(如有可能，须附有具体的协调制度商品编号)，供安理会审议。

98. 专家小组再次建议，会员国应鼓励本国出口奢侈品的实体和国民在合同中列入防止转售给受制裁法域的合同条款。

99. 专家小组再次建议，会员国应统一出口管制清单，以反映被禁奢侈品清单。

100. 专家小组再次建议，会员国和有关国际组织应鼓励船务和运输公司在考虑到转运风险的情况下，建立全面的检查收货人制度。

### 被指认的实体和个人

#### 伊朗伊斯兰共和国境内的朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司(KPe.001)代表

101. 一个会员国告知专家小组，截至 2020 年初，朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司的代表 Ha Won Mo 和 Kim Hak Chol 均在伊朗伊斯兰共和国(见 S/2020/151，第 106 段)。Kim 先生继续使用 108210148 号护照，但 Ha 先生现在似乎使用 108210147 号护照，而不是 836310022 号护照(同上，附件 24)。专家小组尚未收到伊朗伊斯兰共和国的答复。

<sup>65</sup> 地址：中国辽宁省大连市中山区文苑酒店 2102 套房(根据其他现有信息，或者是 202 套房)。

<sup>66</sup> Helen Koo, Edmund Xu and Samuel Rubinfeld, “Beer shipments uncapped multi-million dollar North Korea trade network: how a multinational trade network defied U.N. sanctions and moved millions”, Kharon, 2020 年 4 月 26 日。可查阅：[https://brief.kharon.com/updates/beer-shipments-uncap-multi-million-dollar-north-korea-trade-network/?utm\\_medium=email&\\_hsmi=87215898&\\_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9u2KEsSaVxyJtmKD0HIRAD9u87XBmp-lTuCOKD3kcKUTckluePmEkRq2VJcAfrKFD7iqHY&utm\\_content=87215898&utm\\_source=hs\\_email](https://brief.kharon.com/updates/beer-shipments-uncap-multi-million-dollar-north-korea-trade-network/?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=87215898&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9u2KEsSaVxyJtmKD0HIRAD9u87XBmp-lTuCOKD3kcKUTckluePmEkRq2VJcAfrKFD7iqHY&utm_content=87215898&utm_source=hs_email)。



## 万寿台海外开发会社(KPe.050)(万寿台)

### 中国

102. 专家小组就拥有 2019 年 12 月在香港展出的万寿台艺术品的情况询问了西安荣皇文化传媒有限公司<sup>67</sup> (见 S/2020/151, 第 102 段)。一位姓“金”的人答复说,他/她租赁了这些艺术品,而且自 2017 年 8 月以来没有购买过万寿台艺术品。

### 大韩民国

103. 对于专家小组的询问,大韩民国答复称,关于在仁川机场没收的万寿台艺术品,这些艺术品是韩国商业协会世界联合会一些成员在 2018 年 11 月访问平壤期间购买的(见 S/2019/691, 第 40 段),当局已经“以违反[大韩民国]国内法的指控”对一些成员进行了调查。调查结束后,一些成员受到起诉并被罚款。大韩民国还答复指出,根据其刑事诉讼法,不能披露每起案件的补充裁决。

### 纳米比亚

104. 关于万寿台在纳米比亚的子公司——“万寿台海外开发会社建筑和技术服务公司(纳米比亚)”前代表 Kim Tong Chol 多次再次进入纳米比亚一事,安哥拉告知专家小组, Kim 先生于 2018 年 8 月 8 日持公务签证和公务护照从埃塞俄比亚进入安哥拉,并于 2018 年 8 月 24 日前往纳米比亚(见附件 44)。2020 年 1 月,纳米比亚告知专家小组,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国已与纳米比亚联系,提议将纳米比亚当局冻结的两宗不动产出售给纳米比亚控制的一个信托基金,因为这两宗不动产属于万寿台在纳米比亚的子公司。专家小组回顾 Kim 先生再次访问纳米比亚的目的是出售这些财产(见 S/2019/691, 第 35 段),因此请纳米比亚提供进一步的资料。

### 贝宁和几内亚的雕像建造

105. 专家小组获得了关于可能在贝宁和几内亚建造青铜雕像的项目资料,万寿台可能模糊处理其身份进行参与(见附件 45)。

## 军需工业部(KPe.028)

106. 专家小组继续调查被指认军需工业部的非法活动,该部是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核计划和导弹计划的政策和监督组织,职能包括通过其下属贸易公司<sup>68</sup>向海外派遣信息技术工人和其他工作人员。据一个会员国称,军需工业部派遣的工人在 2019 年为工作目的进入多个国家,并违反相关决议,2020 年继续留在那里,这往往得到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交使团的协助。<sup>69</sup>

<sup>67</sup> 中文名称:西安荣皇文化传媒有限公司。地址:中国陕西省西安市高新区科技路 48 号先锋广场 1 号楼。

<sup>68</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军需工业部下属贸易公司名单见附件 46。

<sup>69</sup> 会员国关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人在中国和俄罗斯联邦工作方式的信息见附件 47。

## 在中国的信息技术工人

107. 根据一个会员国提供的信息，专家小组调查了在中国吉林省延吉市工作的 4 组不同的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人。资料显示，所有这些小组均隶属于军需工业部，这些工人违反相关决议，于 2020 年初仍留在中国境内。有 2 个组与一家名为延吉银星网络科技有限公司(延吉银星)的公司有密切联系。<sup>70</sup>

108. 资料显示，第一组 16 名工人，位置是延吉开发区科技产业园，几乎可以肯定是为延吉银星工作，2019 年赚取近 100 万美元。第二组由 15 名工人组成，他们于 2020 年 1 月从柬埔寨迁往中国东北，由延吉银星赞助进入中国。<sup>71</sup> 第三组由 Kim Ryu Song 率领，他是隶属于军需工业部的一个信息技术工人代表团的团长，他的小组中有 7 名工人，同时他还控制着另一个 5 人小组，这两组人员 2020 年初均留在中国。第四组有 7 名信息技术工人，由 Kwon Kwang Ho 率领，于 2019 年 8 月抵达延吉，2020 年初仍留在那里。

109. 对于专家小组的询问，中方答复说，中方“忠实执行了安全理事会决议关于遣返所有在国外赚取收入的朝鲜国民的规定。截至 2019 年 12 月 22 日，所有朝鲜国民在中国的雇佣合同均已到期。中国也提交了关于安全理事会第 2397(2017) 号决议第 8 段执行情况的报告。中国仍在调查延边银星网络科技有限公司朝鲜工人案”。柬埔寨尚未回复。

110. 专家小组根据一个会员国提供的信息，对大连欣路科技有限公司<sup>72</sup> 进行了调查。资料显示，该公司与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Ma Tong Hyok 有关。Ma 据称是常驻大连的一名关键信息技术管理人员，<sup>73</sup> 他在 2019 年 9 月直接参与将更多信息技术工人从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国带到中国。与他一起参与此事的还有另一名常驻中国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工作人员、多个在华团队的主管 Kim Han-su。资料显示，向中国派遣这些工人的实体名为“朝鲜信息技术公司”，这些人很可能隶属于军需工业部。专家小组尚未得到答复。

111. 专家小组调查了设在沈阳的金色光芒科技有限公司。<sup>74</sup> 根据一个会员国提供的信息，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Ri Il Jin 与金色光芒所在的一个沈阳办

<sup>70</sup> 专家小组认为，延吉银星网络科技有限公司是延边银星网络科技有限公司(中文名称：延边银星网络科技有限公司)的别名。据一个会员国称，该公司由军需工业部设立(见 S/2020/151，第 123-125 段)。据该会员国称，延吉银星是 2019 年数百名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人进入中国的当地赞助人。

<sup>71</sup> 据该会员国称，这些工人很可能声称是作为学生或工业实习生来中国的。

<sup>72</sup> 中文：大连欣路科技有限公司。

<sup>73</sup> 根据一个会员国的信息，Ma 先生一直在与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和其他在中国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术管理人员协调，将信息技术工人临时送回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，并在重新办理签证和(或)获得新的工作许可后再送回中国工作。该信息还称，截至 2020 年 1 月下旬，Ma 先生和他监管的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人小组仍留在中国，他一直与在中国的个人和实体合作，以获得信息技术工作。

<sup>74</sup> 中文：沈阳金色光芒科技有限公司。

事处有关联。Ri 与第三国的一个人合作，以欺诈方式获得信息技术自由职业工作并进入支付网站。专家小组尚未收到该公司的答复。

#### 在中国的隶属军需工业部的其他工人

112. 根据一个会员国提供的信息，军需工业部下属朝鲜长光山贸易公司向吉林省珲春拉波尼服饰有限公司<sup>75</sup>派遣了约 500 名工人。截至 2020 年 3 月，这些工人仍留在那里。专家小组还进一步发现资料，<sup>76</sup> 证实在 2020 年 3 月，工人们贴在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政治宣传海报的一座厂房内作业。<sup>77</sup> 该公司尚未答复专家小组关于其工厂中有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人的询问。

#### 在俄罗斯联邦的信息技术工人

113. 专家小组调查了 3 组朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在俄罗斯联邦的信息技术工人，其中 2 组隶属于军需工业部。根据一个会员国提供的信息，2020 年 3 月，在符拉迪沃斯托克的一组约 50 名工人赚取了约 23 万美元。这些人由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Ri Kyong Sik(护照编号 927332193)和 Pak Kwang Hyok 管理，其中 Ri 负责 6 个软件开发团队。另一组也隶属于军需工业部，截至 2020 年 3 月仍在俄罗斯联邦运作，由 Jang Ho Yong 领导。第三组大约有 15 名工人，2020 年 2 月赚取约 4 万美元，该组的管理者是 Ri Yong Min，据报地址为符拉迪沃斯托克 Kyrlatyy Pereulok 9 号。

114. 对于专家小组的询问，俄罗斯联邦答复说，虽然在 Primorskiy krai 一度有几组朝鲜民主主义人民共和国移民工人，但这一类别的大多数人，包括 Ri Kyong Sik、Pak Kwang Hyok 和 Ri Yong Min 在内，都已按照第 2397(2017)号决议，于 2019 年底之前离开了俄罗斯联邦。然而，“由于冠状病毒病疫情，进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的运输暂停”，其余人员终止在俄罗斯联邦的就业后，无法返回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。调查还在继续。

#### 在越南的军需工业部特工人员

115. 专家小组调查了 Kim Su Il(出生日期: 1985 年 3 月 4 日; 护照编号: 108220348; 过期日期: 2023 年 5 月 18 日)的各种非法活动。他是军需工业部在越南的特工人员。根据一个会员国的信息，Kim 先生自 2016 年以来一直担任军需工业部的采购代理，据称仍常驻胡志明市，继续从事与该部商业活动有关的经济、贸易、采矿和航运活动，为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国赚取外汇。信息显示，截至 2019 年初，Kim 先生一直负责出口被禁止的原产于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭和钛矿石，从事租船和其他违反相关决议的经济活动。专家小组尚未收到越南的答复。

<sup>75</sup> 中文：珲春拉波尼服饰有限公司。

<sup>76</sup> 见 [https://www.sohu.com/a/382387060\\_100143758](https://www.sohu.com/a/382387060_100143758)(2020 年 7 月 29 日访问)。

<sup>77</sup> 两位专家认为，这一信息和上述脚注中链接的任何图像都是推测性的，并非结论性信息。

## 侦察总局(KPe.031)

116. 专家小组继续调查据报朝鲜民主主义人民共和国侦察总局下属网络行为体(如 Lazarus 和 Kimsuky)发动的网络攻击,<sup>78</sup> 包括企图违反相关决议获取敏感军民两用技术而对关键基础设施发动的网络攻击(见 S/2020/151, 第 115-119 段)。

117. 在答复专家小组关于库丹库拉姆核电站遭到攻击事件的询问时, 印度转达了其相关机构提供的信息, 即用于攻击核电站的恶意软件已被确认为“DTrack”, 据报这是 Lazarus 使用的一款恶意软件。印度告知专家小组, 正在对该恶意软件进行进一步分析。调查还在继续。一个会员国告知专家小组, 在 2020 年观察到针对航空和国防部门的新行动。根据一家网络安全公司发布的报告, Lazarus 攻击者首先冒充其他航空航天和国防公司的人力资源人员, 从假 LinkedIn 账户发送消息, 联系多个目标公司的员工。调查还在继续。<sup>79</sup>

118. 根据另一个会员国提供的信息, 至少 28 人(包括来自 6 个安全理事会成员国的至少 11 名官员)成为 2020 年鱼叉式网络钓鱼行动的目标, 该行动似乎是由一个 Kimsuky 高级持续性威胁小组进行的。根据该信息, 这些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的网络行为体在 3 月中旬对目标个人的 Gmail 账户发起了以“安全警报”为主题的鱼叉式网络钓鱼行动, 方法是利用一个链接绕过潜在受害者的垃圾邮件拦截器, 在电子邮件中放置恶意链接。调查仍在继续。

119. 该会员国还报告说, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体不断以该国官员为目标, 发起各种网络行动。2020 年整个 3 月及 4 月初, 一个行政部门的 40 多个官方电子邮件地址成为鱼叉式网络钓鱼信息的目标; 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体还将该国官员的个人 WhatsApp 账户作为攻击目标(见图八)。<sup>80</sup>


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<sup>78</sup> 关于侦察总局和其他组织在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行动中的作用, 见附件 48。

<sup>79</sup> Dominik Breitenbacher 和 Kaspars Osis, “Operation In(ter)caption: targeted attacks against European aerospace and military companies”, ESET Research 白皮书, 2020 年 6 月。可查阅: [https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET\\_Operation\\_Interception.pdf](https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_Operation_Interception.pdf)。

<sup>80</sup> 该会员国进一步告知专家小组, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体以其政府部门的雇员为目标, 并且“在一些人的整个职业‘生涯’中一直追踪他们”。

图八  
发送给某会员国官员的鱼叉式网络钓鱼邮件和 WhatsApp 消息



资料来源：会员国。

120. 针对专家小组的网络攻击仍在继续。一名专家收到一封带有假的联合国安全警报的网络钓鱼邮件。多名专家收到电子邮件，攻击者在邮件中冒充某期刊编辑人员，向专家征集文章。专家小组注意到 2020 年针对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国问题专家界的类似网络攻击。<sup>81</sup>

121. 专家小组再次表明，考虑到攻击的持续性和高度破坏性，过去和目前对委员会和专家小组等负责监测联合国制裁执行情况的联合国机构的攻击等同于逃避制裁。

#### 在海外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民

122. 根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段，对赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的遣返工作本应在 2019 年 12 月前完成。一些国家向委员会报告说，由于 2020 年 1 月下旬针对冠状病毒病采取的措施，遣返工作出现延误。另据报告，2019 年末和 2020 年初，非工作签证发放量增加(见 S/2020/151，第 145-147 段)，派遣朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的新合同数量也有所增加。根据专家小组的审查，在一些情况下，决议中的义务没有得到充分履行。专家小组重申，必须确保在筛查所有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民时保持警惕，并在提交给委员会的执行情

<sup>81</sup> 例如，见 Min Chao Choy, “Phishing emails targeting North Korea watchers grow increasingly sophisticated”, 朝鲜新闻, 2020 年 7 月 1 日。 <https://www.nknews.org/2020/07/phishing-emails-targeting-north-korea-watchers-grow-increasingly-sophisticated/?t=1595471041622>。

况报告中列入实质性信息。专家组一直在调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民违反相关决议在国外赚取收入的疑似案件，无论其签证类别或所述主要入境目的为何。

#### 会员国报告

123. 截至 2020 年 7 月，约有 40 个会员国提交了应于 2020 年 3 月提交的最后报告，只有不到 50 个会员国提交了应于 2019 年 3 月提交的中期报告(见图九)。此外，安哥拉、亚美尼亚、白俄罗斯、智利、埃及、老挝人民民主共和国、拉脱维亚、缅甸、尼泊尔、新西兰、秘鲁、圣文森特和格林纳丁斯和塞尔维亚提交了报告，但没有具体说明这些报告是最后报告还是中期报告。中国、老挝人民民主共和国、蒙古和泰国<sup>82</sup> 的报告没有发表。阿尔及利亚、马耳他、莫桑比克、巴拿马和突尼斯在其他执行情况报告中列入了关于遣返的信息。

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<sup>82</sup> 泰国发表了最后报告。

图九

## 未根据安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段提交报告的国家

<b>非洲组</b>	突尼斯*	格鲁吉亚
阿尔及利亚*	乌干达	匈牙利
贝宁	坦桑尼亚联合共和国	立陶宛
博茨瓦纳	赞比亚	黑山
布基纳法索	津巴布韦	北马其顿
布隆迪	<b>亚太组</b>	摩尔多瓦共和国
佛得角	阿富汗	斯洛伐克
喀麦隆	巴林	斯洛文尼亚
中非共和国	孟加拉	<b>西欧组</b>
乍得	不丹	安道尔
科摩罗	文莱达鲁萨兰国	希腊
刚果	柬埔寨	冰岛
科特迪瓦	塞浦路斯	以色列
刚果民主共和国	斐济	马耳他*
吉布提	伊朗	摩纳哥
厄立特里亚	伊拉克	葡萄牙
斯威士兰	约旦	圣马力诺
埃塞俄比亚	哈萨克斯坦	<b>拉丁美洲和加勒比组</b>
加蓬	基里巴斯	安提瓜和巴布达
冈比亚	吉尔吉斯斯坦	阿根廷
加纳	黎巴嫩	巴哈马
几内亚	马尔代夫	巴巴多斯
几内亚比绍	马绍尔群岛	伯利兹
肯尼亚	密克罗尼西亚	玻利维亚
莱索托	瑙鲁	哥伦比亚
利比里亚	阿曼	哥斯达黎加
利比亚	帕劳	古巴
马达加斯加	巴布亚新几内亚	多米尼克
马拉维	菲律宾	多米尼加共和国
马里	萨摩亚	厄瓜多尔
毛里塔尼亚	沙特阿拉伯	萨尔瓦多
毛里求斯	所罗门群岛	格林纳达
摩洛哥	阿拉伯叙利亚共和国	危地马拉
莫桑比克*	塔吉克斯坦	圭亚那
纳米比亚	东帝汶	海地
尼日尔	汤加	洪都拉斯
卢旺达	土库曼斯坦	牙买加
圣多美和普林西比	图瓦卢	尼加拉瓜
塞内加尔	乌兹别克斯坦	巴拿马*
塞舌尔	瓦努阿图	巴拉圭
塞拉利昂	也门	圣基茨和尼维斯
索马里	<b>东欧组</b>	圣卢西亚
南非	阿尔巴尼亚	苏里南
南苏丹	保加利亚	特立尼达和多巴哥
苏丹	克罗地亚	乌拉圭
多哥	捷克共和国	委内瑞拉

注：带星号(\*)的国家在其他执行情况报告中陈述了部分遣返信息。

124. 并非所有报告都载有实质性信息，如遣返工人人数、会员国采取的行动以及会员国在遵守遣返要求方面面临的困难。<sup>83</sup> 约有 10 个会员国或者只报告了工作许可吊销的情况，而不是实际遣返的情况，或者表示，因为未发放工作许可，所以没有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在其国赚取收入。专家小组一直在要求会员国作出澄清，因为他们担心朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民实际上可能在没有工作许可或持非工作签证的情况下赚取收入。<sup>84</sup> 意大利在执行情况报告中表示，根据适用的国内法和国际法，据信不能对其余 2 人采取遣返措施(见 S/AC.49/2020/15)。俄罗斯联邦和越南在其报告(S/AC.49/2020/21 和 S/AC.49/2020/30)中表示，由于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为应对冠状病毒病关闭了边境，因此无法完成遣返工作。

125. 各国采取了法律行动。例如，爱沙尼亚修正了立法，以确立国际制裁规定的拒绝给予临时居留许可的法律依据(见 S/AC.49/2020/12)。泰国采取措施处理非法务工的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(见 S/AC.49/2020/20)。

#### 在欧洲的足球运动员

126. 意大利答复专家小组说，这 2 名足球运动员中有一人(见 S/2020/151，第 132 段)，韩光宋，已于 2020 年 1 月离开意大利；而截至 2020 年 7 月，另一名球员崔成赫由于国际航班暂停而留在意大利。据意大利称，自 2018 年至 2020 年 1 月上半月，韩先生每年从尤文图斯足球俱乐部获得约 520 000 欧元的毛收入。到 2020 年 1 月为止，崔先生每年从阿雷佐体育协会获得大约 20 000 欧元的毛收入。意大利重申在欧洲联盟制裁条例的范围<sup>85</sup> 和国内法允许遣返的权力方面存在法律挑战。韩先生于 2020 年 1 月从尤文图斯转会到卡塔尔的杜海勒。文件显示，尤文图斯和杜海勒在 2020 年 1 月就韩先生的转会达成一致。虽然专家小组在转会消息公布后立即联系了意大利和卡塔尔，但转会并未取消，尤文图斯向杜海勒索要了转会费。根据为期 5 年的合同，杜海勒总共向韩先生支付 4 310 000 欧元，从 2020 年 2 月至 4 月，他收到了 270 000 欧元(见附件 49)。截至 2020 年 7 月，韩先生仍在卡塔尔踢球。据卡塔尔称，杜海勒没有其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国球员。专家小组向卡塔尔重申了与此案有关的决议。

127. 奥地利足球俱乐部圣珀尔滕体育俱乐部的网站显示，截至 2020 年 6 月，朴光龙被列为该俱乐部球队成员(见附件 50)。奥地利答复专家小组说，朴先生目前在奥地利，他与圣珀尔滕的工作合同已于 2020 年 7 月 5 日到期且不再延长。奥地利进一步表示，“由于冠状病毒病疫情，朝鲜所有边境都已关闭，目前无法前往朝鲜”。根据奥地利于 2020 年 7 月提交的最后报告(S/AC.49/2020/43)，奥地利对 6 个案件进行了审查，并启动了遣返程序，相关上诉程序尚待审理。

<sup>83</sup> 为解决这一问题，专家小组以前建议就报告义务发出执行援助通知。一些会员国分享了它们的执行援助通知工作草案，以支持执行决议中的措施。委员会审议意见保密。

<sup>84</sup> 例如，新加坡在 2020 年 7 月 10 日的信中向专家小组澄清说，“目前在新加坡没有持长期居留证(即为逗留、学习或工作目的)的朝鲜国民”。

<sup>85</sup> 意大利在根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 17 段提交的执行情况报告(S/AC.49/2018/60)中，将欧洲联盟理事会第 2018/293 号决定列为遣返义务的依据之一。



#### 在非洲和南美的医务工作者

128. 安哥拉答复专家小组说，它已放弃双边医疗合作，并将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的医生及其家属遣返回国(见 S/2020/151，第 133 段)。安哥拉进一步答复说，在 2019 年 11 月至 2020 年 2 月期间，该国遣返了 296 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，并建立了新的法律框架(见附件 51)。

129. 专家小组调查了邀请朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医务人员前往厄瓜多尔的协议。专家小组收到皮钦查省政府的答复，称有 3 名针灸师和 3 名翻译在一家私营公司工作，但他们的合同应在 2020 年 5 月结束(见附件 52)。

130. 莫桑比克答复专家小组说，分配到奔巴省医院进行医疗合作的 Jong Il Son 医生在未经政府授权的情况下将其住所用作私人诊所(见 S/2020/151，第 134 段)。政府关闭了该诊所，终止了他的合同，并将他遣返回国。据莫桑比克称，截至 2020 年 3 月，在双边医疗合作的基础上，有 97 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的医生在莫桑比克工作。虽然有关决议没有禁止医疗交流，但莫桑比克决定取消这种交流并减少医生的人数(见附件 53)。

#### 海外餐厅

131. 泰国报告说，除了吊销 24 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的工作许可外，“2019 年 11 月 29 日，泰国当局对 3 家朝鲜餐厅进行了现场检查，在其中一家餐厅<sup>86</sup>发现了 6 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法劳工。当局以非法务工的指控逮捕了这些人并处以罚款。他们于 2019 年 12 月 6 日被遣返回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国”(见 S/AC.49/2020/20)。

132. 一个会员国向专家小组通报了印度尼西亚一家餐厅关闭的情况。专家小组注意到媒体有关“平壤餐厅”关闭的报道。据另一媒体报道，印尼当局已对据称侦察总局使用的一家餐厅展开调查。印度尼西亚向专家小组答复说，该餐厅已于 2017 年关闭。

133. 专家小组继续调查在老挝人民民主共和国的餐馆。截至 2020 年 5 月，其中一家餐厅——平壤餐厅(注册为 Pyngyang 餐厅)在老挝国家企业数据库中登记为正在营业的餐厅。该餐厅与信息技术公司 Lao Tosho 共用一个地址，两家实体以同一个人的名字(Pak Yun Il (Pak Yunil))注册。媒体报道，这家餐厅在原址附近作为一家新餐厅继续运营。该可疑餐厅于 2020 年 1 月 13 日以不同的名称和董事注册。老挝人民民主共和国报告说，包括 Pak 在内的所有 28 名进入老挝人民民主共和国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民都已遣返回国，并提供了遣返人员名单。

#### 2019 年和 2020 年的新合同

134. 据一个会员国称，朝鲜南港建筑总公司隶属于安排派遣朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人的南港贸易公司，在 2018 年和 2019 年参与了阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的多个建设项目。2019 年 10 月，一家叙利亚公司要求朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的

<sup>86</sup> Haemaji 餐厅(见 S/2020/151，第 141 段)。

对口单位向阿拉伯叙利亚共和国派遣 800 多名建筑工人。被怀疑参与此案的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体是朝鲜海阳工业贸易公司。专家小组尚未收到阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的答复。

135. 据一个会员国称，沈阳金际酒店管理有限公司<sup>87</sup> 于 2019 年 11 月雇用了 40 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，这些工人可能仍在中国赚取收入。安排工人就业的公司是“朝鲜 Ryomyong 技术总公司”，该公司可能隶属于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人民安全部，可能使用不同的名称。专家小组尚未收到沈阳金际的答复。<sup>88</sup>

136. 据一个会员国称，“丹东万捷服装有限公司”<sup>89</sup> 2020 年 1 月雇用了 292 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，2019 年 8 月雇用了 190 名。负责雇用这些工人的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对口单位是“朝鲜 51 贸易公司”，但这家公司可能使用不同的名称。丹东万捷 2019 年 10 月从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口了纺织材料。专家小组尚未收到丹东万捷的答复。

137. 据一个会员国称，江苏泓泉文化传播有限公司<sup>90</sup> 与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国签订合同，在 2019 年 9 月至 12 月期间安排了一批朝鲜民主主义人民共和国劳工到中国从事中国和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体之间的“商业活动”。提供这一信息的会员国认为，这些劳工可能在 2019 年 12 月中旬作为学生或以文化交流为由进入中国工作，并且很可能仍在中国的几个工作场所(包括该公司)工作。该会员国还告知专家小组，朝鲜檀君贸易公司(KPe.008)安排了这些工人务工；但可能使用的是一个不同的名称，如“Kuryonggang 贸易公司”。专家小组尚未收到江苏泓泉公司的答复。

#### 签证类别

138. 专家小组要求提供关于俄罗斯联邦内政部 2020 年 4 月公布的统计数据的信息。该数据显示，有 753 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民因工作原因留在该国境内<sup>91</sup> (见附件 54)。针对专家小组的询问，俄罗斯联邦答复说，附件中的数字在国籍和入境目的方面有错，已经对该部官方网站上的统计数据进行了必要更正，现在的统计数据显示，2020 年第一季度没有人出于“工作”目的从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进入俄罗斯联邦。俄罗斯联邦进一步指出，“只有 160 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民持有有效期至 2019 年 12 月 22 日的工作许可(他们目前在俄罗斯联邦境内，没有有效的工作签证、工作许可或适当的雇佣合同)。由于冠状病毒

<sup>87</sup> 中文名称：沈阳金际酒店管理有限公司。地址：中国辽宁省沈阳市沈阳经济技术开发区。

<sup>88</sup> 两位专家认为，本段和随后两段中的信息不妨予以进一步查证。

<sup>89</sup> 中文名称：丹东万捷服装有限公司。地址：中国辽宁省丹东市振兴区金华路 3-1-1。

<sup>90</sup> 中文名称：江苏泓泉文化传播有限公司。地址：中国江苏省南京市秦淮区太平南路 305 号。

<sup>91</sup> 根据官方统计，2020 年 1 月至 3 月期间，总共向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民发放了 1 596 份签证，3 067 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民目前为旅游目的在俄罗斯逗留，1 975 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民目前为学习目的在俄罗斯逗留。在修订后的数据中，关于留下来工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民人数的部分留白。

病疫情，平壤对与其他国家的运输联系实行了限制，他们的遣返因而继续受阻”（见附件 55）。

139. 专家小组要求大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国提供资料，说明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民作为学生(第 4 级签证类别，该国执行情况报告没有涵盖这一类别)在联合王国居住期间赚取收入的可能性。联合王国答复说，目前有 2 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在联合王国学习，持有第 4 级签证类别的学生只能在有限的时间内工作。联合王国进一步表示，“在考虑到课程费用和生活费支出以及第 4 级签证附带的就业限制后，目前在英国学习的少数朝鲜国民不太可能赚得实际净收入”。此外，为了防止外国公民滥用学生签证进入英国工作和赚取收入，赞助人必须监督持有第 4 级签证的学生。

### 建议

140. 会员国应继续保持警惕，审查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的各类签证申请，并在其整个逗留期间保持警惕，以防止规避遣返在海外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的要求。

141. 由于目前的法律和行政框架无法使几个会员国履行安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段规定的义务，专家小组建议，如果认为适用，会员国应采取必要的法律步骤，包括修订现有立法或通过新立法，以便能够履行这些义务。

142. 专家小组注意到安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段要求会员国在 2020 年 3 月之前提交最后报告，重申建议会员国按照该段的要求提交执行情况报告，并鼓励每个会员国在其执行情况报告中列入实质性信息。

## 五. 金融

143. 根据会员国提供的信息、专家小组调查获得的文件和开源材料，专家小组评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续在通过合资企业、离岸账户、空壳公司及使用虚拟资产(例如加密货币)进入国际金融系统。对专家小组以前报告的回顾和正在进行的调查表明，与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有联系的实体和个人继续使用东亚和东南亚的中小型银行，这些银行提供了更广泛的国际代理银行服务。<sup>92</sup> 会员国没有充分处理其国内公司注册规则，使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国能够继续躲在不透明的公司结构后面行事，导致上述问题变得更加严重。由于这些漏洞的存在，金融机构几乎不可能做到合规及执行“了解客户”入账流程和程序。

### 通过网络手段逃避制裁

144. 据几个会员国以及开源报告称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续以虚拟资产服务提供商(例如加密货币交易所)和金融机构为目标发起攻击，以逃避联合国制裁。关于针对金融机构的网络攻击的报告总体上有所下降，但专家小组无法评估

<sup>92</sup> 从金融业的角度概述区域关切问题，见 Emil Dall 和 Justine Walker 著，“Royal United Services Institute-Association of Certified Anti-Money-Laundering Specialists proliferation finance survey”，2020 年。可查阅：<https://rusi.org/PFSurvey2020>。

没有报告的原因是攻击减少，还是会员国和金融机构无法明确将此类攻击归咎于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。

145. 一个会员国报告说，与对金融机构的攻击相比，对虚拟货币交易所的攻击产生了更多的非法收益。金融机构的信息技术基础设施通常不太容易受到网络入侵。专家小组继续评估认为，虚拟资产服务提供商和虚拟资产仍将是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国创收和开采加密货币的有利可图的目标。<sup>93</sup>

146. 截至 2020 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体从事了多种形式的虚拟资产交易，包括使用多种形式的替代硬币（“替代币”）。<sup>94</sup> 据一个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专门锁定匿名增强的加密货币，以便提供额外的安全层并阻碍可追溯性。

147. 专家小组在 2019 年和 2020 年的最后报告中强调了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国用来非法获取加密货币的若干战术和技术，包括开展复杂的社会工程行动以及利用恶意软件(见 S/2019/171，第 109-115 段和 S/2020/151，第 179-182 段)。专家小组正在继续调查的一个未决问题是，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国是如何将其虚拟资产洗成法定货币的。

148. 根据专家小组获得的信息以及一个会员国最近诉讼程序中的资料，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用监管松散的虚拟资产服务提供商网络和“场外”中介服务，将非法获得的虚拟资产兑换成法定货币(见附件 56)。这些交易突显了全球金融体系在逃避制裁活动方面存在的一些薄弱环节，包括虚拟资产服务提供商很少或根本没有“了解客户”协议，一些会员国对“场外”经纪服务缺乏监管，<sup>95</sup> 金融机构内部加密货币到法定货币的兑换缺乏透明度。

149. 专家小组注意到，根据安全理事会有关决议，会员国有义务冻结由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府或朝鲜劳动党的实体直接或间接拥有或控制，或代表其行事或按其指示行事的个人或实体直接或间接拥有或控制的资产，包括虚拟资产。<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup> 根据一家总部位于美国的网络安全公司的报告，自 2019 年 5 月以来，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的比特币开采活动至少增加了 10 倍(与同期比特币开采相比)。比特币是一种类似比特币的虚拟货币，但它提供了额外的匿名增强协议，而且不一定需要同样的高性能计算机来进行挖掘。见 Insikt Group, “How North Korea revolutionized the Internet as a tool for rogue regimes”, 2020 年 2 月 9 日，第 3 页，“未来网络威胁记录分析”系列。可查阅：<https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0209.pdf>。

<sup>94</sup> 替代币被宣传为比特币等更知名加密货币的替代品，通常以更低的价格买卖。众所周知，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从事了几种替代币交易，包括 FlowChain、永恒币、芬奇币、Consentium、Ripple 和 Tether。Ripple 和 Tether 也称为“稳定币”(即它们的价值与基础资产挂钩)。

<sup>95</sup> 场外经纪商通过为买家和卖家牵线搭桥，帮助提供加密货币市场的流动性。

<sup>96</sup> 第 2270(2016)号决议第 12 段没有特别针对虚拟资产做出规定，在这一段中，安全理事会申明，第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(d)段所述“经济资源”包括有可能被用来获取资金、物品或服务的各类资产，例如船只(包括海船)，不论它们是有形资产还是无形资产，动产或不动产，实际资产或潜在资产，因此会员国可能没有能力控制虚拟资产。

利用合资企业和海外信息技术工人

150. 据几个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续利用合资企业和(或)合作实体以及海外工人创收，以支持其被禁止的计划和活动(见上文第 106-115 段和 122-139 段)。

151. 根据几个会员国提供的资料、专家小组获得的开源报告和文件，专家小组评估说，“朝鲜 Narae 贸易公司”从事与逃避制裁有关的活动，目的是赚取收入，支持朝鲜民主主义人民共和国被禁止的活动(见附件 57)。据一个会员国称，朝鲜 Narae 贸易公司是一家设在平壤的实体，协助“以提供技术劳动力或田间工作(农业工人)作为交换条件，购买采矿和碳氢化合物等各种行业的设备和技术，该公司还促进朝鲜食品和稀土等产品的出口”。专家小组还发现，朝鲜 Narae 贸易公司至少有一次使用了与朝鲜友好协会会长有关的财务账户。

海外银行代表和外交人员

152. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的海外银行代表。

### 建议

153. 专家小组鼓励会员国执行金融行动特别工作组的标准，特别注意建议 15，即为了管理和减少虚拟资产产生的风险，各国应确保虚拟资产服务提供商受到反洗钱和反恐融资监管，获得许可或注册，并遵守有效制度，以监测和确保遵守金融行动特别工作组建议中要求的相关措施。

154. 专家小组继续建议会员国努力解决可能使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国各实体匿名的不透明的公司注册规则和条例。

## 六. 制裁的意外影响

155. 安全理事会在第 2397(2017)号决议第 25 段中重申，联合国制裁的目的并不是要对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成不利的人道主义后果，也不是为了负面影响或限制相关决议没有禁止的活动，包括经济活动与合作、粮食援助和人道主义援助，并强调朝鲜民主主义人民共和国负有充分满足其人民生活需要的首要责任和需要。

156. 正如专家小组以前所指出，很难将联合国制裁与包括单边制裁制度和国内社会经济和政治因素在内的其他因素区分开来，但毫无疑问，联合国制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内的人道主义局势和援助行动产生了意料之外的影响。<sup>97</sup>此外，根据一个会员国的说法，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“政府早前为应对(与冠状病毒病有关的)医疗准备能力低下的问题而颁布政策封锁措施，对经济造成了打击，而仅仅制裁似乎是不会带来这种打击的”。

<sup>97</sup> 专家小组的最新报告见 S/2020/151，第六节。

157. 专家小组注意到，有几个非政府组织对联合国制裁对平民造成的影响表示关切。例如，一个令人担忧的问题是，制裁可能会如何进一步限制有限的农业资源(如运输、机械和化肥生产)以及用于粮食进口的财政资源分配，从而导致粮食“可供性”减少(即降低粮食安全)。雪上加霜的是，根据朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的政治优先事项对所需资源重新进行调拨，更降低了资源的“可获得性”。

158. 根据一些评估，行业制裁可能会对那些在这些行业工作的人带来负面社会经济后果，包括收入损失。<sup>98</sup> 然而，这种影响的程度在很大程度上是未知的，因为没有准确的经济数据汇编，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的财政和货币政策优先事项也可能产生重大影响。还有人担心遣返工人的工资损失，特别是那些可能受到冠状病毒病相关隔离措施影响的工人。

159. 冠状病毒病相关措施影响到必需品的进口和人道主义组织的活动(见附件 60 和 61)。

160. 金融机构和私营部门实体对遵守制裁制度的关切继续影响人道主义行动。恢复在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的联合国人道主义组织的银行业务渠道并提供持续可靠的融资渠道的工作继续进行，但由于大流行病，进展甚微，危及供应链业务，也给人道主义人员造成了风险。

161. 在此期间，尽管存在冠状病毒病相关挑战，但安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会仍利用为期两天的决策程序，加快了冠状病毒病相关人道主义援助的豁免程序。此外，该委员会还例外地给予了较长期限的豁免，从标准的 6 个月变成最长 1 年。为了评估冠状病毒病对在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内活动的人道主义组织的影响，专家小组调查了包括联合国人道主义组织和非政府组织在内的 37 个组织，并在等待答复(见附件 61)。

## 建议

162. 委员会应继续努力，通过确定银行转账的几种选择，迅速恢复人道主义活动的稳定银行业务渠道。

163. 专家小组注意到，联合国相关实体每半年通报一次制裁对平民及各实体在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内行动的意外影响，是有益的，并建议委员会继续这一做法。

164. 专家小组建议，安全理事会继续处理涉及减轻制裁对朝鲜民主主义共和国平民和人道主义援助行动的意外不利影响的问题和进程，以造福朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的弱势民众，并克服冠状病毒病疫情的后果。

165. 委员会应继续简化根据第 7 号执行援助通知申请豁免的流程和程序，并在适当情况下更新执行援助通知。

<sup>98</sup> 朝鲜民主主义共和国人权状况特别报告员，媒体声明，日内瓦 / 首尔，2020 年 6 月 9 日。  
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25929&LangID=E>。

## 七. 国家执行情况报告

### 会员国报告有关决议执行情况的状况

166. 截至 2020 年 7 月 31 日，61 个会员国提交了关于第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段执行情况的报告，80 个会员国提交了关于第 2397(2017)号决议第 17 段执行情况的报告，94 个会员国提交了关于第 2375(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，90 个会员国提交了关于第 2371(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，107 个会员国提交了关于第 2321(2016)号决议执行情况的报告，115 个会员国提交了关于第 2270(2016)号决议执行情况的报告。

## 八. 建议

167. 关于综合建议清单，见附件 62。


**Annex 1: COVID-19, Democratic People's Republic of Korea border measures**

The reporting period has coincided with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea responded rapidly with border closures and quarantine measures. Flights to and from China and Russia were suspended in late January (except for a single flight to Vladivostok on 9 March). Passenger rail services to China and Russia were also suspended at around the same time, as was cross-border road transportation. Maritime deliveries to the refined petroleum facility at Nampo port continued. Maritime container shipments to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were largely suspended from late January, resuming in late March with frequency increasing from April. Outward shipments of coal, also largely suspended for over a month, have increased since March. Inward transportation of goods and commodities has resumed by road, and reportedly also by rail freight, though not at pre-COVID-19 levels. The Rajin to Khasan rail freight line has remained in operation. Goods, including humanitarian aid shipments, arriving in the country remain subject to special measures. Aside from the restricted entry of hauliers and crews, there reportedly continues to be almost no movement of people into or out of the country. Diplomatic missions, UN humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations are unable to bring in staff.



## Annex 2: Yongbyon nuclear complex

(1) Fuel fabrication building, uranium enrichment workshop and reprocessing plant  
(39°46'13.84"N 125°44'58.94"E / uranium enrichment workshop, 39°46'52.67"N  
125°45'10.84"E/reprocessing plant)



Source: Planet Labs (Skysat Collect, 14 July 2020)

(2) Yongbyon nuclear complex: 5MW (e) reactor and experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon (39°47'44.53"N 125°45'19.05"E / light water reactor)



Source: Planet Labs (Skysat Collect, 28 June 2020)

**Annex 3: Uranium mine and yellow-cake production plant in Pyongsan (38°19'05.41"N  
126°25'58.12"E / plant)**

**(1) Overview**



Source: Planet Labs (Skysat Collect, 14 April 2020)

**(2) Yellow-cake production plant in Pyongsan**



*Source:* Planet Labs (Skysat collect, 14 April 2020)

**Annex 4: Punggye-ri nuclear test site**

**(1) Portals and main administrative area (41°16'40.65"N 129°05'14.67"E / main administrative area)**



*Source:* Planet Lab (Skysat Scene, 1 June 2020)

(2) Punggye-ri Test Site: Command Center (41°22'67.96"N 129°10'93.86"E)



Source: Planet Lab (Skysat Collect, 2 April 2020)

**Annex 5: Suspected uranium enrichment facility in Kangson (38.96° N, 125.61° E)**



*Source:* Planet Labs (Skysat Scene, 15 March 2020)

## **Annex 6: Member State information on procurement of dual-use items by the DPRK**

### Recent procurement activity by Second Economic Committee of Munitions Industry Department of the DPRK

It is reported that at the end of 2018, Second Economic Committee of Munitions Industry Department intended to procure via third countries the materials, which can be easily diverted to the manufacturing of nuclear and missiles program. It is not confirmed whether or not these materials have been actually shipped to the DPRK, but it is highly likely to be related to the development and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and missiles by the DPRK.

Those materials intended to be procured:

(1) Lithium hydroxide

Lithium hydroxide is added to reactor coolants and functions to curb metal corrosion of nuclear reactor cooling pipes in military use.

(2) High purity graphite

High purity graphite is produced by applying purity-raising treatment to artificial graphite, and is used as moderator of nuclear reactors.

(3) Tris (1-(2-methyl) aziridiny) phosphine oxide) (MAPO)

MAPO is a bonding agent used for propellant of solid fuel missiles.

(4) Martensitic stainless steel

Martensitic stainless steel is used for equipment such as turbine blades of aircraft and nozzles. It is assumed to be used as material for rocket engine parts.

(5) Austenitic stainless steel

Austenitic stainless steel is used as material for nuclear reactors. It is assumed to be used as material for rocket outer shell.

*Source:* Member State



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**Annex 7: The series of four SRBM launch tests in March 2020**

These four tests contributed to improving the tactical missile systems. In addition to the coordination of the fire sequences, the firing intervals were significantly reduced in comparison with 2019 test series. In that respect, the Time Between Launch (TBL) for KN-24 that was 20 minutes on 10 August 2019 and 16 minutes on 16 August 2019 went down to five minutes on 21 March 2020.

The TBL for KN-25 was 17 minutes (24 August 2019), 19 min (10 September 2019), three minutes (31 October 2019), 30 seconds (28 November 2019) and went down to 20 seconds (2 March 2020), 20 seconds (after the 1<sup>st</sup>) – one minute (after the 2<sup>nd</sup>) (9 March), and 20 seconds (29 March 2020) (see [S/2020/151](#), para.194 and Table 3, and Table 1 of this report).

The 2020 firing trials appear to have tested successfully the reliability of the BMs, as well as the capacity of the guidance system to reproduce the same strike result after their ballistic and/or aerodynamic trajectories.

From reports of some Member States one trajectory tracking, the reliability of the guidance system of the ballistic missiles was indicated by the fact that the two or three missiles fired during a sequence seemed to reach the same target.

**Figure 7-1: Operation training from 28 February to 2 March 2020**

The “joint strike military drills” carried out from 28 February to 2 March 2020 at a location 6km east from Wonsan could have been a demonstration of the DRPK’s operational capacity to combine and coordinate different types of artillery fire power up to the SRBMs final launch on 2 March. These tests contributed to improving the tactical missile system. The artillery was deployed on the beach (NW: 39° 9'19.66"N 127°36'26.85"E; SE: 39° 8'36.01"N 127°37'0.51"E). On 2 March the SRBM KN-25 TEL was probably located inland a few kilometers from the front.



*Source:* Planet Labs. 23 Feb. 2020, 02 22 19 UTC; 5 Mar. 2020, 24 07 23 UTC; KCTV image, 29 Feb. 2020; Rodong Sinmun 2 March 2020

**Figure 7-2: Ballistic missile launches in March 2020 (1)<sup>1</sup>**

Date	Provocation	Location	Type of missile*	Flying distance etc.
03.02.20	Launched two ballistic missiles	Near Wonsan	Short Range Ballistic Missile	Approx. 240km
03.09.20	Launched two ballistic missiles	Near Sondok	Short Range Ballistic Missile	Approx. 200km at maximum
03.21.20	Launched two ballistic missiles	Near Soncheon	Short Range Ballistic Missile	Approx. 400km
03.29.20	Launched two ballistic missiles	Near Wonsan	Short Range Ballistic Missile	Approx. 250km

Source: Member State

**Figure 7-3: Ballistic missile launches in March 2020 (2)<sup>2</sup>**

Date	Missile Name	Missile Type	Facility Name	Apogee	Distance Travelled
02/03	KN-25	SRBM	Wonsan	35 km	240 km
09/03	KN-25	SRBM	Sondok	50 km	200 km
21/03	KN-24	SRBM	Pyongan	50 km	410 km
29/03	KN-25	SRBM	Wonsan	30 km	230 km

Source: Member State

**Figure 7-4: DPRK missile launches in March 2020 (3)<sup>3</sup>**

DPRK missile launches in 2020							
Year	#	Date	Launch Location	Type (as announced by the DPRK)	Rds.	Apogee (approx.)	Flight Distance (approx.)
2020	1	Mar. 2	Wonsan, Kangwon Province	multiple-launch rocket	2	35km	240km
	2	Mar. 9	Seondeok, South Hamgyong Province	frontline long-range artillery	2	50km	200km
	3	Mar. 21	Suncheon, North Pyongan Province	tactical guided weapon	2	50km	410km
	4	Mar. 29	Wonsan, Kangwon Province	super large multiple rocket	2	30km	230km
Total	4 launches				8		

Source: Member State

<sup>1</sup> The missile landing locations are off the DPRK's eastern coast.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

## **Annex 8: Activity observed at the Sinpo naval south shipyard's secure boat basin since May 2020**

After the set-up of a container (around 16-17 m long and around 2.5 m wide, large enough to carry a Pukkuksong-1 or Pukkuksong-3) in May 2020 near the secure boat basin, neither a crane nor support vehicles are currently visible on the site.

Moreover, the third submersible barge detected and described by a Member State during the 2 October 2019 test (see [S/2020/151](#), annex 58.7) has not been visible since that test. It was different from the two currently observed at Sinpo and Nampo.

**Figure 8-1: Sinpo south shipyard close to the secure basin, a container has been visible since 27 May 2020 near the canopy almost at the same location (40° 1'33.70"N 128° 9'57.69"E) where a container was detected on 23 September 2019.**



Source: Planet Labs. 22 Jun. 2020, 04 53 00 UTC; 4 Jun. 2020, 01 54 20 UTC; 5 Jul. 2020, 04 53 55 UTC; 27 May 2020, 02 06 51 UTC; 1 May 2020, 04 52 34 UTC


## Annex 9: Ballistic missile bases activity

The six ballistic missile bases referred to below, among others, are operational with considerable work in progress, focusing on:

- Increasing the underground storage capacity;
- Increasing the storage capacity under sheds or bunkers;
- Increasing the number of support facilities or their replacement.

An effort is made at some sites to enhance the undetectability and the camouflage of the existing or recently built infrastructures.

**Figure 9-1: Sino-ri missile operating base (39°38'41.52"N 125°21'19.71"E)**




Source: Planet Labs. 8 Jul. 2020, 02 05 07 UTC

**Figure 9-2: Yeongjeo-dong missile base activity** whose confirmed underground gallery entrances are located along the track from - 41°19'31.57"N 127°5'42.56"E – to - 41°19'36.94"N 127° 5'53.94"E with a last entrance at 41°20'15.15"N 127° 7'43.37"E



Source: Planet Labs. 27 Mar. 2020, 05 04 59 UTC

**Figure 9-3: Hojung-ri missile base activity (41°22'44.93"N 126°54'38.16"E) and the construction of a massive underground facility (41°21'56.37"N 126°55'41.91"E) (see S/2019/171, annex 84-3)**



Source: Planet Labs. 29 May 2020, 02 12 52 UTC – 26 Mar. 2020, 02 47 37 UTC




**Figure 9-4: Kumchon-ri missile operating base activity (38°57'52.48"N 127°35'11.98"E) certain of whose underground gallery entrances are located along the valley from - 38°57'56.59"N 127°36'6.52"E – to - 38°57'57.29"N 127°36'23.58"E**



Source: Planet Labs. 22 Jun. 2020, 01 50 30 UTC

**Figure 9-5: Sakkanmol missile operating base activity, (38°36'10.20"N 126° 3'57.43"E).**  
The underground gallery entrances which are located along the valley from - 38°34'42.04"N 126° 6'43.67"E- to - 38°34'14.31"N 126° 7'21.64"E-, are identifiable because of the protective berms in front.



Source: Planet Labs. 13 Jun. 2020, 02 02 31 UTC

**Figure 9-6: Sangnam-ri Missile operating base activity (40°50'7.46"N 128°32'47.42"E).** Confirmed underground gallery entrances are located along the valley from - 40°49'35.89"N 128°33'15.41"E - 40°49'38.57"N 128°33'12.70"E - 40°49'42.22"N 128°33'9.32"E - 40°49'43.90"N 128°33'7.39"E – are identifiable because of the protective berms in front.



Source: Planet Labs. 8 Jul. 2020, 01 53 59 UTC

## Annex 10: Sanum Dong scientific and ballistic missile research complex

**Figure 10-1: General view of Sanum Dong scientific and ballistic missile research complex.**

Near the Sanum Dong production hall (39° 8'30.32"N 125°46'0.11"E), specific activities were observed from January to June 2020. Given a potential relation between this complex and the Ippul-Tong site (39° 9'11.05"N 125°47'52.10"E) located 3 km north eastern thereof, the movements of tanker trucks on the roads of the storage area from March 2019 to June 2020 were also of interest.



Source: Planet Labs. 22 Jun. 2020, 02 06 09 UTC

**Figure 10-2: Sanum Dong production hall (1)**

Between 5 and 16 January 2020, truck and other vehicle activity was noted near the hall with in particular the movement of a container (color blue, length around 11m) ( $39^{\circ} 8'30.32''N 125^{\circ}46'0.11''E$ ) appearing between 3 and 5 January, removed on 10 January, returning on 15 or 16 January and definitively removed between 17 and 19 January.



Source: Planet Labs. 5 Jan. 2020, 05 19 06 UTC; 16 Jan. 2020, 02 10 01 UTC

**Figure 10-3: Sanum Dong production hall (2)**

A new canopy (length around 50 m width around 6 m) ( $39^{\circ} 8'29.70''N 125^{\circ}45'58.96''E$ ) was erected between 29 February and 5 March 2020 probably to conceal and protect the equipment temporarily stored before being moved.



Source: Planet Labs. 5 Mar. 2020, 02 13 30 UTC

**Figure 10-4: Sanum Dong Ippul-Tong**

In Sanum Dong Ippul-Tong storage buildings, on the 18 Apr 2020, one tanker truck (camouflage color length around 10 m), was moving on the ring (39° 9'20.86"N 125°47'56.64"E) which surrounds the various storage warehouses. There were movements of tanker trucks on the roads of the storage area from March 2019 to June 2020.




*Source:* Planet Labs. 18 Apr. 2020, 05 08 31 UTC

**Annex 11: Developments at the Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant**

The transformation of the site continues and the activity of large vehicles has been detected with wide-arc traces from tires possibly left by a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) in front of the building where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in 2017 before the ICBM test launch on 29 November 2017. They could correspond to traces left by TEL movements in August 2018, and March and April 2020.

**Figure 11-1:** The surroundings of the new adjacent building ( $39^{\circ}16'52.08''\text{N}$   $125^{\circ}52'12.76''\text{E}$ ) are cleared (see area 1); the renovation of the western building has been under development since 2018 (see area 2). The activity of big trucks is detected because wide-arc'd tire traces (see area 3) appear at the front of the building where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in 2017.



*Source:* Planet Labs. 16 Jun. 2020, 05 16 00 UTC; Planet Labs. 7 Jun. 2020, 05 01 06 UTC; Google Earth. 4 Apr. 2020; Google Earth. 11 Apr. 2020; Planet Labs. 19 Dec. 2019, 02 09 00 UTC




**Annex 12: New facilities located 2 km southwest of the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E)**

**Figure 12-1: General overview of the possible BM support facility in June 2020**



Source: Planet Labs. 11 Jun. 2020, 02 27 08 UTC


**Figure 12-2: Evolution of the possible BM support facility site from 4 May 2018 to 28 June 2020**  
 (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E)



*Source:* Planet Labs. 4 May 2018, 01 50 51 UTC; 22 Jun. 2018, 01 53 38 UTC; 5 Sep. 2018, 01 55 04 UTC; 1 Apr. 2019, 02 30 52 UTC; 8 Oct. 2019, 24 40 32 UTC; 11 Nov. 2019, 01 53 22 UTC; 15 Mar. 2020, 02 13 44 UTC; 11 Jun. 2020, 02 27 08 UTC; 28 Jun. 2020, 02 04 39 UTC


### Figure 12-3: Comparison with well-known ballistic missile facilities

The infrastructure and buildings (in particular, the tallest building aka high-bay, the railway with a sheltered station and the network of wide stabilized roads) erected on the site could correspond to a BM training facility or to a BM assembly facility because they have an architecture comparable to that of the other BM facilities such as inter alia, **Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant** (fig. 12-4), **Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite rocket launch site** (fig. 12-5), **Sinpo south shipyard** (fig. 12-6), **Sanum Dong scientific and ballistic missile research complex** (fig. 12-7), **Tonghahe satellite rocket launch site** (fig. 12-8), **Jonchon (Mupyong-ni) No 65 factory** (fig. 12-9). These infrastructures are adapted to allow the assembly of large BM and rockets.




Source: Planet Labs. 11 Jun. 2020, 02 27 08 UTC

**Figure 12-4:** Comparison between the structure of the possible ballistic missile support facility aka -Sil-li ballistic missile support facility (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E) and **the Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant** (39°16'52.55"N 125°52'15.75"E); (see S/2020/151, para.198 and annex 65).




Source: Planet Labs. 16 Jun. 2020, 05 16 00 UTC (left) – 11 Jun. 2020, 02 27 08 UTC (right)

**Figure 12-5:** Comparison between the structure of the possible ballistic missile support facility aka - Sil-li ballistic missile support facility (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E) and at the **Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite launching ground**: the horizontal processing building (39°40'9.79"N 124°42'25.96"E) and the covered rail terminal (39°40'18.83"N 124°42'29.08"E); (see S/2020/151, paras.198 and 199 and annex 62)



Source: Planet Labs. 16 Jun. 2020, 05 16 00 UTC (left) – 2 May 2020, 05 17 53 UTC (right)

**Figure 12-6:** Comparison between the structures of the possible ballistic missile support facility (aka Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility) (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E) and the **Sinpo south shipyard, covered rail terminal** (40° 1'49.76"N 128° 9'49.32"E) which is near the secure boat basin infrastructure where SLBMs are prepared for the Sinpo-class experimental ballistic missile submarine and the submersible barge (40° 1'31.98"N 128° 9'56.67"E) (see S/2020/151, para.198 and annex 58.7.3)




Source: Planet Labs. 2 Jul. 2020, 02 56 47 UTC; 16 Jun. 2020, 05 16 00 UTC (left) – 14 Jan. 2020, 05 00 14 UTC

**Figure 12-7 :** Comparison between structures of the possible ballistic missile support facility (aka Sil-li ballistic missile support facility) (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E) and at **the Sanum Dong scientific and ballistic missile research complex**, the Sanum Dong production hall (39° 8'30.32"N 125°46'0.11"E)



Source: Google Earth. 28 Oct. 2011 – 1 Dec. 2013 – 27 Jan. 2014 – 26 Oct. 2017; Planet Labs. 16 Jun. 2020, 05 16 00 UTC (left) - Jun 3, 2020, 05 00 22 UTC (right)

**Figure 12-8:** Comparison between structures of the possible ballistic missile support facility (aka Sil-li ballistic missile support facility) (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E) and at the **Tonghae satellite rocket launch site**, the Horizontal processing building (40°51'20.91"N 129°39'32.99"E) and the unfinished processing building (40°51'3.12"N 129°40'1.92"E).



Source: Planet Labs. 29 May 2020, 04 46 58 UTC (top); 16 Jun. 2020, 05 16 00 UTC (centre left); 29 May 2020, 04 46 58 UTC (centre right); Google Earth. 22 Jun. 2013 (bottom left); 11 Feb. 2018 (bottom centre); Planet Labs. 2 Apr. 2020, 05 01 16 UTC (bottom right)




**Figure 12-9:** Comparison between structure of the possible ballistic missile support facility (aka Sil-li ballistic missile support facility) (39°10'50.56"N 125°39'50.01"E) and at the **Jonchon-Mupyong-ni No 65 factory**, the southern building involved in the TEL upgrading (40°36'42.77"N 126°25'34.74"E) and the various underground galleries located along the westside of the mountain from south (40°36'48.06"N 126°25'35.59"E) to north-east (40°38'0.43"N 126°26'21.20"E). A Hwasong-14 was tested on 28 July 2017 from a near-by launch pad (40°36'40.21"N 126°25'33.31"E) (see S/2019/171, para. 174; S/2018/171, paras. 9,11,12 and 13; S/2017/742, para. 7)




Source: Planet Labs. 14 Apr. 2020, 02 20 07 UTC; Google Earth. 3 Jan. 2012; Planet Labs. 14 Apr. 2020, 02 20 07 UTC; Google Earth, 31 Aug. 2018

**Figure 12-10: The main facility composed of 3 interconnected drive-through buildings is connected to a nearby large underground facility which could be used for storage of TEL and sensitive BM components.**



Source: Planet Labs. 21 Mar. 2020, 02 29 41 UTC (top); Google Earth. 30 Dec. 2006, 11 Nov. 2006

**Figure 12-11: The Pyongyang-Sunan international Airport has already been ‘dual-used’ for the BM programme. It was used on 29 August (39°15'40.96"N 125°40'32.79"E) and 15 September 2017 as a launch test site for the IRBM Hwasong-12 (see S/2019/171, para. 174).**



Source: Planet Labs. 4 Jun. 2020, 05 12 47 UTC

### Annex 13: The Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite launching ground

**Figure 13-1:** The upgrading of the Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite launching ground has continued with the renovation of the roads and pathways around and inside Sohae satellite launch site from early March 2020 (see S/2020/151, para.198 and annex 62).



Source: Planet Labs. 4 Jun. 2020, 02 30 29 UTC, 27 Mar. 2020, 02 28 44 UTC, 2 Mar. 2020, 05 14 46 UTC

## Annex 14: Intangible transfer of technology (ITT)

The Panel has identified a risk that DPRK researchers working in international scientific and technical journal editorial teams might be a channel for ITT. Such researchers could collect information and identify specific studies and researchers as well as cutting-edge scientific institutes.

As an editorial board member, such a researcher's task might involve, inter alia, reviewing papers and creating a network of scholars who could contribute to his/her mission. A DPRK scientist might benefit from gaining familiarity with the latest research in the field of his/her specialty. He/she might participate in academic exchanges with other academics in the field. He could more easily receive invitations to events or conferences as well as access to other scientific institutes.

The Panel's investigation<sup>4</sup> into one case has been carried out thanks to the cooperation of a scientific journal which had requested a DPRK researcher to become a member of the editorial board with tele-worker status.

The case concerns a DPRK national, Dr. Kim Chol-Hyon, affiliated to Kim Chaek University of Technology Pyongyang, DPRK, who obtained M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in optical measurement from the same university, in 2009 and 2018, respectively. Upon graduation, he joined its Laser Engineering Department, where he remains a Professor.

His research interests included laser-related techniques, the manufacturing of gaseous, liquid and solid lasers, laser applications as well as the material of fibre lasers and solid lasers.<sup>5</sup>

Some of Kim's publications related to optical research are listed below:

Immediate estimation of feedback factor and linewidth enhancement factor from measured self-mixing signals under moderate or strong regime. CM Ri, **CH Kim**, YN Oh, SC Kim - Measurement Science and Technology

Available at <https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1361-6501/ab6c27/meta>

<sup>4</sup> Paragraph 11 of resolution 2321 (2016) decides that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges, unless the 1718 Committee receives advance notification or grants an exemption.

<sup>5</sup> S/2014/253: Update to the items contained in the lists specified in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 2087 (2013).

Excerpt of the Items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic missile programmes:

- 9.A.2. Gyro-astro compasses and other devices which derive position or orientation by means of automatically tracking celestial bodies or satellites, and specially designed components therefor
- 10.A.1. Pneumatic, hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical, or electromechanical flight control systems (including fly-by-wire and fly-by-light systems) designed or modified for the systems specified in 1.A
- 10.A.3. Flight control servo valves designed or modified for the systems in 10.A.1. or 10.A.2., and designed or modified to operate in a vibration environment greater than 10 g rms between 20 Hz and 2 kHz
- 11.A.1. Radar and laser radar systems, including altimeters, designed or modified for use in the systems specified in 1.A.  
*Technical Note: Laser radar systems embody specialised transmission, scanning, receiving and signal processing techniques for utilisation of lasers for echo ranging, direction finding and discrimination of targets by location, radial speed and body reflection characteristics...*
- 11.A.4. Electronic assemblies and components, designed or modified for use in the systems specified in 1.A. or 19.A. and specially designed for military use and operation at temperatures in excess of 125°C
- 12. Fiber Optic Gyro Coil Winding Machines.
- 12.A.5. Precision tracking systems, usable for systems specified in 1.A., 19.A.1. or 19.A.2. as follows:
  - A. Tracking systems which use a code translator installed on the rocket or unmanned aerial vehicle in conjunction with either surface or airborne references or navigation satellite systems to provide real-time measurements of inflight position and velocity
  - B. Range instrumentation radars including associated optical/infrared trackers with all of the following capabilities:
    1. Angular resolution better than 1.5 mrad;
    2. Range of 30 km or greater with a range resolution better than 10 m rms; and
    3. Velocity resolution better than 3 m/s

Effect of linewidth enhancement factor on displacement reconstruction and immediate estimation of feedback factor for weak feedback. **CH Kim** - Optics Communications, 2020 – Elsevier

Available at <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030401819311733>

High-speed joint estimation of strong feedback regime with fringe loss. HS Hong, **CH Kim**, JH Kim, UH Song, HS Li... - Optics Communications, 2020 – Elsevier

Available at <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030401820305782>

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## Annex 15: Member States' letter and report to the 1718 Committee: North Korea's Breach of the UNSCR 2397 Refined Petroleum Cap, 24 July 2020

July 24, 2020

Dear Ambassador Heusgen,

On behalf of the Republic of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Palau, Peru, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom, we have the honor to submit to the 1718 Committee a request for the Committee Secretary to take the actions described in operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 because the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2020 has breached the annual cap of 500,000 barrels. Attached, please find a report, sponsored by the above Member States, detailing observations of illicit North Korean refined petroleum imports. None of these imports were reported to the 1718 Committee. When these observed illicit refined petroleum imports are combined with imports that have been reported to the 1718 Committee, the aggregate amount of refined petroleum imported into the DPRK is in excess of the 500,000 barrel refined petroleum cap set in UN Security Council resolution 2397. In total, we have documented 56 shipments between January 1, 2020 and May 30, 2020. For 20 of these 56 cases, we are presenting imagery as evidence. Just these 20 cases when combined with the amounts already reported to the 1718 Committee, exceed the 500,000 refined petroleum cap set in UN Security Council resolution 2397.

Specifically, we request the following actions be taken:

- We request the 1718 Committee Secretary issue a public note verbale to all UN Member States that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2020 has exceeded the cap set by the Security Council and inform Member States that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year.
- We request the Chair to issue a Committee press release to inform the general public of this information.
- We further request this note verbale and press release include a call for all Member States to immediately exercise enhanced vigilance regarding the DPRK attempting to procure additional refined petroleum products and to prevent illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to vessels owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of or working in cooperation with the DPRK.

- We further request the 1718 Committee Secretary update the website to include the illicit refined petroleum imports in our report and show that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2020 has exceeded the cap set by the Security Council using the conversion rate and other information in the report.

We request the Chair circulate our report and our proposals to the 1718 Committee for action by today, July 24, 2020 under the regular 5-day NOP process. We thank you in advance for your assistance.



Naureda Breshanaj  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the United Nations



Mitch Fifield  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations




Alexander Marschik  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations



Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations





Georgi Panayotov  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic Bulgaria to the United Nations



Louise Blais  
Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations



Milenko Skoknic Tapia  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations



Ivan Simonović  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations



Andreas D. Mavroyiannis  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations



Karel Komárek  
Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations



Martin Bille Hermann  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations



José Singer  
Special Envoy of the Dominican Republic to the Security Council  
Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations




Sven Jürgenson  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Estonia to the United Nations




Sofie Sandström  
Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations



Nicolas de Rivière  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations



Christoph Heusgen  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations




Maria Theofili  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations




Irma Rosa  
Deputy Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Honduras to the United Nations



Katalin Annamária Bogyay  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Hungary to the United Nations



Jörundur Valtýsson  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Iceland to the United Nations



Ambassador Noa Furman  
Chargée d'affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations



Antonini Maurizio  
First Counselor  
Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations



ISHIKANE Kimihiro  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations



Krista Raupa  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the United Nations



Dee-Maxwell Saah Kemayah, Sr.  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations




Dalia Šalkausienė  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Lithuania to the United Nations




Fabien Raum  
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of Luxembourg to the United Nations



Vanessa Frazier  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malta to the United Nations



Amatlain E. Kabua  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations



Jane J. Chigiyal  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Federated States of Micronesia to the United Nations



Karel J.G. van Oosterom  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations



Craig J. Hawke  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations




Mona Juul  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations



Ngedikes Olai Uludong  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Palau to the United Nations




Néstor Popolizio  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations



Agata Duda-Plonka  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations



Cho Hyun  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations



Michal Mlynár  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations



Darja Bavdaž-Kuret  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations



Agustín Santos Maraver  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations



Sergiy Kyslytsya  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations



Kelly Craft  
Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of United States to the United Nations



Jonathan Allen  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
Permanent Mission of United Kingdom to the United Nations

His Excellency  
Christoph Heusgen,  
Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)  
New York, NY.



**REPORT TO THE UN 1718 COMMITTEE:****NORTH KOREA'S BREACH OF THE UNSCR 2397 REFINED PETROLEUM CAP**

The Republic of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Palau, Peru, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine, the United States, and the United Kingdom remain gravely concerned regarding large-scale evasion of restrictions the UN Security Council has imposed on the Democratic Republic of Korea's (DPRK) import of refined petroleum products. UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2397 operative paragraph (OP) 5 restricts the DPRK to importing no more than 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per year. Any Member State supplying, selling, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK is required to submit reports to the UN 1718 Committee informing it of the transfers every 30 days in order to allow the Committee to maintain an accounting of the DPRK's imports.

UNSCR 2375 OP 11 prohibits UN Member States from engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with any DPRK-flagged vessel of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK. Nevertheless, DPRK-flagged vessels continue to conduct STS transfers on a regular basis as the DPRK's primary means of importing refined petroleum. This report demonstrates that the DPRK has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 annual 500,000 barrel cap for 2020. This submission acknowledges previous submissions from 2018 and 2019 (see S/AC.49/2018/NOTE.213 and S/AC.49/2019/NOTE.134) and Panel of Experts reporting (see maritime section of S/2018/171, S/2019/171, S/2019/691, and S/2020/151) that exhaustively demonstrated and detailed the illicit practices employed by the DPRK to circumvent UNSCR-mandated restrictions on its ability to import refined petroleum products. As a result, this report will not seek to repeat in detail the specific information the DPRK's evasive practices previously outlined in formal submissions to the UN 1718 Committee. These practices continue unabated, but the DPRK utilizes an ever-evolving fleet of vessels under its flag or its direct control to perpetrate pervasive and ongoing sanctions evasion.

This report demonstrates that the DPRK continues these illicit practices, namely UN-prohibited STS transfers and unreported imports, and again this year has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 OP 5 refined petroleum products cap of 500,000 barrels per annum. This report supplies images and import volume data for vessels that continue to make deliveries of refined petroleum into DPRK ports, but not report them to the UN 1718 Committee. STS transfers of any cargo are explicitly prohibited by UNSCR 2375, so the perpetrators involved in supplying refined petroleum products to DPRK tankers fail to report these volumes to avoid self-incrimination. As a result,

the UN 1718 Committee's official accounting of the DPRK's imports vastly underrepresents the volume of refined petroleum products that actually enter the DPRK. The overarching purpose of UNSCR 2397's provision limiting the DPRK's ability to import refined petroleum products is to limit the DPRK's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, which are a threat to international peace and security and are prohibited by numerous UNSCRs. The restriction on the DPRK's refined petroleum products imports is critical to ensuring that the DPRK returns to sustained negotiations with the United States. If the DPRK is able to flagrantly evade international sanctions, it will have little incentive to engage in serious negotiations. As long as the DPRK continues to import refined petroleum products in excess of the UN-mandated cap with limited accountability at the UN, UNSCR 2397 OP 5 will remain ineffectual.

These deliveries have significantly contributed to a substantial breach of the 500,000 barrel annual cap set by UNSCR 2397. We estimate that, this year alone, the DPRK has imported over 1.6 million barrels via 56 tanker deliveries as of May 30. The ongoing utilization of larger, foreign-flagged tankers in its illicit import efforts has allowed the DPRK to import more than three times the allowed volume of refined petroleum products in just the first five months of 2020.

To continue documenting the illicit practices the DPRK utilizes to import refined petroleum products, this report provides two imaged instances of STS transfers this year in which DPRK tankers received refined petroleum products from feeder tankers. Neither of these instances have been reported to the 1718 Committee for its official accounting of the DPRK's imports. Each of these STS transfers are described below.

1. On 9 January 2020, the North Korean-flagged tanker SAM JONG 2 (IMO: 7408873) was observed moored alongside JIANG NING 3 (flag and IMO unknown) to conduct an STS transfer in the East China Sea (report image 1). Following the STS transfer, the SAM JONG 2 returned to the DPRK port of Nampo for delivery of its cargo. On 18 January 2020, SAM JONG 2 was observed at the Nampo center pier with a petroleum delivery line, leading to Nampo's storage facilities (report image 2).
2. On 10 January 2020, the North Korean-flagged tanker MYONG RYU 1 (IMO: 8532413) was observed moored alongside Panama-flagged INFINITE LUCK (IMO: 9063811) to conduct an STS transfer (report image 3). On 11 January 2020, MYONG RYU 1 was observed moored alongside North Korean-flagged tanker CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313) to conduct an STS transfer (report image 4). Following this transfer, the MYONG RYU 1 returned to the DPRK port of Haeju to deliver its refined petroleum cargo on 23 January 2020. The CHON MA SAN later returned to the port of Chongjin West for delivery on 4 February 2020.

As each of these STS transfers and deliveries of refined petroleum products into DPRK ports make clear, the DPRK is continuing to utilize illicit methods to procure refined petroleum products -- as it did in 2018 and 2019. Given that these import volumes have not been reported

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to the 1718 Committee, it is necessary to account for these volumes in order to ensure that UNSCR 2397's import quota is properly implemented.

As discussed in previous submissions on the DPRK breaching the import cap in 2018 and 2019, this report cannot provide an exact figure for each delivery of refined petroleum products to the DPRK, as that information is not readily available to any UN Member State other than the DPRK. This report instead seeks to establish three scenarios that track the degree to which any given tanker unloading refined petroleum into the DPRK is laden, at various levels based on each ship's dead weight tonnage – we provide estimates for each ship at the levels of one-third laden (33 percent full), half laden (50 percent full), or completely laden (90 percent full). It is highly unlikely that DPRK tankers deployed in search of fuel via STS transfers, or those tankers engaging in direct deliveries, would arrive in DPRK ports with less than one third of their cargo capacities filled. The expenditure of resources and fuel consumption by the tanker itself during these journeys would not be justified if the tanker in question delivered less than one-third of its cargo capacity. Therefore, a one-third laden delivery volume is employed as the floor baseline for this report.

In addition to the SAM JONG 2 delivery on 18 January described above, we are providing 19 additional images of tanker deliveries into DPRK ports that have not been reported to the UN. These 20 deliveries alone represent a sufficient volume (740,198.47 barrels) of refined petroleum imports to breach the UNSCR 2397 annual cap of 500,000 barrels, if all deliveries were made by fully-laden tankers. Even if each of these tankers delivered only 50 percent of their full capacity in these 20 deliveries, which would not be financially sound, that volume (411,221.37 barrels) would still represent a breach of the annual cap when combined with reported exports to the DPRK in 2020 (106,094.17 barrels) as of July 1. The deliveries for which we are also providing images are denoted with a "\*" in Table 1.

Table 1 below documents each of these 56 deliveries and provides an associated volume for each of the three scenarios.

Table 1: 2020 DPRK and Other Tanker Deliveries and Associated Volumes								
Delivery Date	Port of Delivery	Ship Name	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tons	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden (BBL)	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden (BBL)	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden (BBL)
1-Jan-20	Wonsan	Kum Un San	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,450.34	8,259.30	14,866.74
1-Jan-20	Nampo West	Kwang Chon (Yu)	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	5,179.02	7,844.34	14,119.81

-4-

		Phyong 5)						
5-Jan-20	Nampo SW Offshore	Hokong	9006758	Formerly SLE	3,995.00	10,520.43	15,940.05	28,692.09
9-Jan-20	Nampo West	Unica	8514306	Formerly SLE	4,865.00	12,811.49	19,411.35	34,940.43
10-Jan-20*	Nampo SW - E Pier	New Konk	9036387	Formerly SLE	8,057.00	21,217.30	32,147.43	57,865.37
11-Jan-20*	Nampo SW Offshore	Sen Lin 01	8910378	Formerly SLE	1,159.00	3,052.11	4,624.41	8,323.94
11-Jan-20*	Nampo SW Offshore	Subblic	8126082	Formerly TGO	5,989.00	15,771.43	23,896.11	43,013.00
13-Jan-20	Nampo SW Offshore	Kwang Chon (Yu Phyong 5)	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	5,179.02	7,844.34	14,119.81
14-Jan-20	Nampo SW Offshore	An San 1	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,908.10	11,981.97	21,567.55
18-Jan-20*	Nampo SW - Ctr Pier	Sam Jong 2	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,601.93	10,002.93	18,005.27
21-Jan-20	Nampo SW Offshore	Unica	8514306	Formerly SLE	4,865.00	12,811.49	19,411.35	34,940.43
22-Jan-20	Nampo SW - E Pier	Hokong	9006758	Formerly SLE	3,995.00	10,520.43	15,940.05	28,692.09
23-Jan-20	Nampo Shipyard	Kum Jin Gang 3 (Wan Heng 11)	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	13,119.12	19,882.17	35,787.91
23-Jan-20	Haeju	Myong Ryu 1	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,154.60	3,259.83	5,867.69
30-Jan-20*	Nampo SW - Ctr Pier	Sam Jong 1	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,384.61	6,643.35	11,958.03
30-Jan-20*	Nampo West	Subblic	8126082	Formerly TGO	5,989.00	15,771.43	23,896.11	43,013.00
31-Jan-	Munchon	Chil Bo	8711021	DPRK				

-5-

20	Up	San			1,999.00	5,264.17	7,976.01	14,356.82
4-Feb-20	Chongjin West	Chon Ma San	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	9,384.48	14,224.35	25,603.83
7-Feb-20	Nampo SW Offshore	New Konk	9036387	Formerly SLE	8,057.00	21,217.30	32,147.43	57,865.37
9-Feb-20*	Nampo West	Unica	8514306	Formerly SLE	4,865.00	12,811.49	19,411.35	34,940.43
10-Feb-20*	Songnim East Pier	Hokong	9006758	Formerly SLE	3,995.00	10,520.43	15,940.05	28,692.09
13-Feb-20	Chongjin West	Sam Ma 2	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,558.42	6,906.69	12,432.04
13-Feb-20*	Hungnam	Sin Pyong 2	8817007	DPRK	2,105.00	5,543.31	8,398.95	15,118.11
15-Feb-20	Chongjin East	Yu Jong 2	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	3,107.41	4,708.20	8,474.76
20-Feb-20	Nampo SW Offshore	Pu Ryong	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,634.36	13,083.21	23,549.78
23-Feb-20*	Nampo West	Subblic	8126082	Formerly TGO	5,989.00	15,771.43	23,896.11	43,013.00
26-Feb-20	Nampo SW Offshore	Chil Bo San	8711021	DPRK	1,999.00	5,264.17	7,976.01	14,356.82
27-Feb-20*	Nampo SW Offshore	Diamond 8	9132612	SLE	9,273.00	24,419.52	36,999.27	66,598.69
27-Feb-20	Songnim East Pier	Hokong	9006758	Formerly SLE	3,995.00	10,520.43	15,940.05	28,692.09
5-Mar-20*	Nampo SW Offshore	Unica	8514306	Formerly SLE	4,865.00	12,811.49	19,411.35	34,940.43
5-Mar-20	Nampo SW Offshore	Bonvoy 3	8978784	Formerly HND	2,855.00	7,518.36	11,391.45	20,504.61
16-Mar-20*	Nampo SW Offshore	New Konk	9036387	Formerly SLE	8,057.00	21,217.30	32,147.43	57,865.37
17-Mar-20	Nampo Shipyard	Yun Hong 8	UNK	CHN	2,900.00	7,636.86	11,571.00	20,827.80
23-Mar-20*	Nampo West	Hokong	9006758	Formerly SLE	3,995.00	10,520.43	15,940.05	28,692.09
24-Mar-20*	Nampo SW Offshore	Subblic	8126082	Formerly TGO	5,989.00	15,771.43	23,896.11	43,013.00


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24-Mar-20*	Nampo SW Offshore	Diamond 8	9132612	SLE	9,273.00	24,419.52	36,999.27	66,598.69
25-Mar-20	Nampo SW - E Pier	Unica	8514306	Formerly SLE	4,865.00	12,811.49	19,411.35	34,940.43
31-Mar-20	Nampo SW Offshore	Bonvoy 3	8978784	Formerly HND	2,855.00	7,518.36	11,391.45	20,504.61
8-Apr-20*	Nampo West	New Konk	9036387	Formerly SLE	8,057.00	21,217.30	32,147.43	57,865.37
12-Apr-20*	Nampo West	Subblic	8126082	Formerly TGO	5,989.00	15,771.43	23,896.11	43,013.00
20-Apr-20	Songnim East Pier	Unica	8514306	Formerly SLE	4,865.00	12,811.49	19,411.35	34,940.43
21-Apr-20*	Nampo West	Hokong	9006758	Formerly SLE	3,995.00	10,520.43	15,940.05	28,692.09
24-Apr-20	Nampo West	New Konk	9036387	Formerly SLE	8,057.00	21,217.30	32,147.43	57,865.37
29-Apr-20	Nampo SW - W Pier	Run Da	8511172	MNG	4,999.00	13,164.37	19,946.01	35,902.82
15-May-20	Nampo West	New Konk	9036387	Formerly SLE	8,057.00	21,217.30	32,147.43	57,865.37
18-May-20	Najin	Song Won	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,532.77	8,382.99	15,089.38
24-May-20	Nampo SW - Ctr Pier	Sam Jong 2	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,601.85	10,002.93	18,005.27
24-May-20	Chongjin West	Subblic	8126082	Formerly TGO	5,989.00	15,771.43	23,896.11	43,013.00
24-May-20	Wonsan	Sin Pyong 2	8817007	DPRK	2,105.00	5,543.71	8,398.95	15,118.11
25-May-20	Songnim East Pier	Ji Song 6	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,291.75	4,987.50	8,977.50

-7-

25-May-20	Wonsan	Yu Jong 2	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	3,107.41	4,708.20	8,474.76
25-May-20	Wonsan	Chon Myong 1	8712362	DPRK	2,750.00	7,241.85	10,972.50	19,750.50
26-May-20	Chongjin West	Yu Son	8691702	DPRK	3,398.00	8,947.97	13,558.02	24,404.44
28-May-20	Nampo West	Sam Jong 1	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,385.01	6,643.35	11,958.03
28-May-20	Kimchaek	Nam San 8	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	8,295.21	12,568.50	22,623.30
29-May-20*	Nampo West	Ji Song 6	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,291.75	4,987.50	8,977.50
<b>TOTAL</b>						<b>597,625.39</b>	<b>905,494.59</b>	<b>1,629,890.26</b>

Note: “\*” Denotes imagery available for these deliveries into the DPRK. The deliveries from the imagery alone breach the 2020 cap.



As Table 2 above demonstrates, even if only illicit imports via STS transfers are analyzed, the DPRK has clearly surpassed the UNSCR 2397 refined petroleum products import cap in 2020. In the scenario in which all of the 56 deliveries included fully laden tankers, the DPRK has already imported more than triple the UNSCR 2397-allowed import volume for the year, with 1,629,890.26 barrels of imported as of May 30. If all the DPRK deliveries were conducted by tankers only half laden – a highly unlikely scenario – the DPRK has still already exceeded the UNSCR 2397 import cap for the year, with non-reported import volumes of more than 905,494.59 barrels. Even in the most unlikely of scenarios, in which each tanker in the 56 observed deliveries unloaded only one-third of its capacity, the DPRK has still exceeded the annual cap, with 597,625.39 barrels in illicit imports. As of the submission of this report, China and Russia collectively have reported 106,094.17 barrels of refined petroleum product transfers to the UN 1718 Committee for the months of January through May, bringing the DPRK's overall total of refined petroleum product imports in 2020 to more than 1.735 million barrels, as of May 30, 2020.

Given the evidence provided herein and that under all three scenarios of illicit import volumes clearly show that the DPRK has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 refined petroleum products import cap, we request that the 1718 Committee immediately make an official determination that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2020 has exceeded the 500,000 barrel annual cap and inform Member States that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year. Similarly, the Panel of Experts is requested to review this report's analysis and underlying evidence in order to make a determination in their 2020 mid-term report on the volume of refined petroleum product imports to the DPRK and the associated implications for the implementation of UNSCR 2397's refined petroleum product import cap.





SAM JONG 2 – JIANG NING 3 STS TRANSFER  
EAST CHINA SEA  
JANUARY 9, 2020




MYONG RYU 1– INFINITE LUCK STS TRANSFER  
EAST CHINA SEA  
JANUARY 10, 2020





INFINITE LUCK	
FLAG	PANAMA
SHIP TYPE	CHEMICAL/PETROLEUM PRODUCT TANKER
GROSS TONNAGE	4,646/7,902
IMO	9063811
MMSI	3541520
SHIP OWNER	UNIFORM SHIPPING CO LTD (HONG KONG)


























Source: Member States

**Annex 16: Communications dated 27 July 2020 from the delegations of China, the Russian Federation and the United States addressed to the 1718 Committee**

**(1) Communication from the delegation of the People's Republic of China**

Dear colleagues,

We would like to make the following comments on this proposal:

Firstly, any decision and action of the Committee should be made on the basis of solid evidence and sufficient facts. The report in this proposal did not provide an accurate amount of refined petroleum products in each shipment, and the conclusion of the report is only based on assumptions and estimations. It is neither scientific nor prudent to reach a conclusion that the annual limit has been exceeded based on estimations. In addition, the report mentioned 56 suspected illicit deliveries, but only a small portion of them were provided with imagery.

Secondly, the report included an unfounded converted amount of refined petroleum products China and Russia provided to the DPRK in barrels. I would like to point out that the notifications of China and Russia were in tons, and the Committee has yet to reach an agreement on the conversion rate between ton and barrel.

We request the Panel of Experts fully reflect the above comments in its 2020 mid-term report. Please also be noted that further action is to be taken on this proposal in due time.

Best regards,

Xin

**(2) Communication from the delegation of the Russian Federation**

Dear colleagues,

We would also like to share our views on this proposal.

1. We would like to recall the provisions of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397, which stipulates that the Committee notifies all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75, 90 and 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts of 500 000 barrels have been reached, and only in the latter case (95 per cent), such notification is accompanied by an information about the requirement to immediately cease further deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year. Without the aforementioned notification, export of refined petroleum products to the DPRK is fully in line with the requirements of the 1718 sanctions regime.

2. We are carefully studying the report that is attached to the proposal. At the same time we've already noticed that it does not provide objective, accurate and verifiable information or have enough solid imagery evidence.

3. Russia and China provide its information on the petroleum exports to the DPRK in tons. The conversion rate issue is still under the consideration in the Committee. Attempts to convert the amount in barrels are ill-founded.

4. We request the Panel of Experts to fully reflect our considerations on that in its 2020 mid-term report. Our action on this proposal will follow in due course.

Best regards,

Alexey

**(3) Communication from the delegation of the United States of America**

Colleagues,

1) China and Russia's annual obstructionist response to these reports is intended to prevent the UN from accounting for the large-scale, illicit refined petroleum product imports that the DPRK maintains while offering no alternative for how to reflect these volumes, which are being documented with irrefutable evidence.

2) The images included in the report are robust in their quality and quantity and clearly demonstrate a breach of the cap. 43 countries affirmed that this evidence is beyond sufficient for the Committee to affirm that the cap has been surpassed. The only countries that have issue with this are Russia and China.

3) The United States, other Committee Members, and the Panel have made extensive efforts to resolve the ton to barrel conversion issue. China and Russia's refusal to enter those discussions in good faith to reach a resolution and its comments in response to this report only reinforce that their intentions are to obstruct the Committee's responsibility to maintain an accurate accounting of the DPRK's actual refined product imports. As has been demonstrated meticulously to the Committee, there is nothing preventing China and Russia from submitting its reports in barrels, as UNSCR 2397 OP 5 requires. Chinese and Russian energy companies use the same conversion rate that has been proposed, as seen in the attached.

4) We note that the Panel of Experts is fully independent and should not be swayed by the Russian and Chinese requests to incorporate their erroneous and deficient complaints in the midterm report. However, if they are included, we request that the above considerations and attached documentation also be included.

Best regards,

Jonathan

---

Attachment to the Communication from the United States of America

The BP conversion chart, which is used in the 43 Member State proposal, is cited by industry participants as an authoritative source for energy modeling, projections, and data. The [Platts conversion factors](#), which are used in China and Russia, even cite BP. The conversion table provided in its annex is a clean, simple, and user-friendly guide for conversion rates for the most frequently consumed and traded refined petroleum products. These conversion rates are not BP proprietary opinions but are rooted in the scientifically measurable conversions between different units of measurements employed in the international refined petroleum products trade.

As further evidence of the uniformity with which these standards are applied, please find examples of conversion rates utilized by Chinese and Russian companies that are identical to those cited in the BP energy outlook document and the 43 Member State proposal. Please find four examples attached.

-----  
Exhibit 1: A bill of lading for a PetroChina transaction involving 284,793 barrels or 38,136.253 metric tons of gasoil, representing a conversion rate of 7.46 barrels per metric ton (same as BP);

Exhibit 2: A bill of lading for a Sinochem transaction involving 125,096.44 barrels or 16,764.862 metric tons of gasoil, representing a conversion rate of 7.46 barrels per metric ton (same as BP);

Exhibit 3: A bill of lading for a China National United Oil Corporation transaction involving 313,267.50 barrels or 41,759.920 metric tons, representing a conversion rate of 7.5 barrels per metric ton (negligible disparity to BP), but which provides multiple units of measurement in the contractual documents;

Exhibit 4: A bill of lading for Russian oil major Rosneft involving 61.340 metric tons or 424 barrels of heavy petroleum fuel with both units of measurement referenced.

-----  
We note that all these bills of lading provide numerous units of measurement for the refined product in question, most notably both barrels and metric tons, which is indicative of the frequency and necessity within the global oil market to provide such data. China's decision to put the conversion rate proposal on hold, or draw doubt about the conversion rate in the 43 Member State proposal, does not represent a legitimate finding of fault with the conversion methodology; rather, it obstructs the Committee from finding a solution and renders UNSCR 2397 OP 5 meaningless.

It is unacceptable that for three years, we have not been able to implement UNSCR 2397 OP5 because two Member States refuse to notify the Committee of their transfers in barrels or agree to a conversion rate.

U

# TANKER BILL OF LADING B/L No. 1

Shipped on board in apparent good order and condition by (shipper) PETROCHINA INTERNATIONAL NORTHEAST CO., LTD on board the tanker **NORD OCEANIA** /VOY 0005 at the port of DALIAN, CHINA where of CAPT SAWANT ONKAR NANDKUMAR is the Master, to be delivered to the port of ONE OR MORE SAFE PORTS, AUSTRALIA Consigne/Order of:

Notify: \*\*\*\*\*

ORIGINAL

PACKING IN BULK, GASOIL 10PPM	NET WEIGHT:	38136.253 METRIC TONS 37535.682 LONG TONS 45253.685 KILOLITRES @ 15 DEG C 284793 US BBLs @ 60 DEG F 45831.334 KILOLITRES @ 30 DEG C 45892.001 KILOLITRES @ OBSERVED TEMP
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FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY CLEAN ON BOARD

\*\*\*\*\*

The quantity, measurement, weight, gauge, quality, nature and value and actual condition of the cargo unknown to the Vessel and the Master, to be delivered at the port of discharge or so near thereto as the Vessel can safely get, always afloat upon prior payment of freight as agreed. This shipment is carried under and pursuant to the terms of the Charter dated at And as Charterer, and all the terms whatsoever of the said Charter except the rate and payment of freight specified therein apply to and govern the rights of the parties concerned in this shipment. Copy of the Charter may be obtained from the Shipper or Charterer. The freight is earned concurrent with loading, ship and/or cargo lost, or not lost or abandoned.

The Owner shall have an absolute lien on the cargo for all freight, deadfreight, demurrage/detention and costs/expenses including attorney's fees, of recovering the same, which lien shall continue after delivery of the cargo into the possession of the Charterer, or of the holders of any bills of lading covering the same, or of any stevedorman. In the event the charter party is not sufficiently incorporated above, any and all disputes arising out of this bill are to be arbitrated in London or New York, at Owner's/Carrier's option, subject to the Exonvoy 84 arbitration clause.

If this Bill of Lading is a document of title to which the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States, approved April 16, 1936 or similar legislation giving statutory effect to the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading at Brussels of August 25, 1924, applies by reason of the port of loading or discharge being in territory in which the said Act or other similar legislation is in force, this Bill of Lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the said Act or other similar legislation, as the case may be, which shall be deemed incorporated herein, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed a surrender by the carrier of any of its rights or immunities or an increase of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said Act or other similar legislation. If any term of this Bill of Lading is repugnant to the said Act or other similar legislation as so incorporated, such terms shall be void to that extent but no further. [The contract of carriage evidenced by this Bill of Lading is between the shipper, consignee and /or owner of the cargo and the owner or demise charterer of the vessel named herein to carry the cargo described above. It is understood and agreed that, other than said ship owner or demise charterer, no person, firm or corporation or other legal entity whatsoever, is or shall be deemed to be liable with respect to the shipment as carrier, bailee or otherwise in contract or in tort. If, however, it shall be adjudged that any other than said shipowner or demise charterer is carrier or bailee of said shipment or under any responsibility with respect thereto, all limitations of or exonerations from liability and all defenses provided by law or by the terms of the contract of carriage shall be available to such other.]

In Witness Whereof, the Master has signed THREE/THREE(ORIGINAL)

Bills of Lading of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the others will be void.

Dated at DALIAN, CHINA this 6<sup>th</sup> day of JAN 2020  
MASTER

  
**NORD OCEANIA  
MASTER**



出口舱单

EXPORT MANIFEST



大连金田船务代理有限公司  
GOLDENFIELD SHIPPING AGENCY DALIAN CO., LTD

SHIPPER; CONSIGNEE; NOTIFY PARTY	BL NO.	MARKS AND NUMBERS	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	GROSS WEIGHT	MEASUREMENT	FREIGHT	REMARK
SHIPPER: PETROCHINA INTERNATIONAL NORTHEAST CO., LTD CONSIGNEE: [REDACTED] LTD. NOTIFY : *****	1	NM	GASOL, 10PPM CLEAN CN BOARD	38136253.00 KGS		FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY	
		TOTAL:		38136253.00 KGS			

NAME OF SHIP NORD OCEANIA	VOY. NO. 0005	PORT OF LOADING DALIAN, CHINA
NATIONALITY OF SHIP PANAMA	NAME OF MASTER SAVANTONKAR MANOJUMAR	PORT OF DISCHARGE ONE OR MORE SAFE PORTS, AUSTRALIA

PAGE 1	FINAL DESTINATION ONE OR MORE SAFE PORTS, AUSTRALIA	DATE SAILING FROM LOADING PORT 2020.01.05
--------	---	--

NORD OCEANIA  
MASTER



东北中石油国际事业有限公司  
*PetroChina International Northeast Co., Ltd*

**CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN**

*COPY*

DALIAN, CHINA

SHIPMENT No.: 0005 6-Jan-2020


MARKS & NOS.	COMMODITY	QUANTITY	
N/M	GASOIL 10PPM	38136.253 284793	MT BBL

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED COMMODITIES WERE PRODUCED OR MANUFACTURED IN CHINA.

东北中石油国际事业有限公司  
PETROCHINA INTERNA-  
TIONAL NORTHEAST CO., LTD.

PETROCHINA INTERNATIONAL NORTHEAST CO.,LTD.

**COPY**  
**NON-BILL OF LADING**

Consignor <b>SINOCHEM INTERNATIONAL OIL (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD</b>	Bill No. <b>ZS1</b> Nationality of Ocean Vessel		
Consignee [REDACTED]	Shipped on board the vessel named herein in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise indicated) the goods or packages specified herein and to be discharged at the above mentioned port of discharge or as near thereto as the vessel may safely get and be always afloat. The weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value, being particulars furnished by the Shipper, are not checked by the Carrier on loading. The Shipper, Consignee and the Holder of this Bill of Lading hereby expressly accept and agree to all printed, written or stamped provisions, exceptions and conditions of this Bill of Lading, including those on the back hereof. One of the Bills of Lading duly endorsed must be surrendered in exchange for the goods or delivery order. In witness whereof, the Carrier or his Agents has signed Bills of Lading all of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void. Shippers are requested to note particularly the exceptions and conditions of this Bill of Lading with reference to the validity of the insurance upon their goods.		
Notify Party			
Pre-charge by   Place of Receipt by Pre-charge			
Ocean Vessel   Port of Loading <b>CHAMPION POMER   ZHOUSHAN, CHINA</b>			
Port of Discharge <b>ONE OR MORE SAFE PORT(S), KOREA</b>	Final destination of goods to be transhipped at port of discharge Freight payable at Number of original B/L's <b>THREE/THREE</b>		
Marks & Nos. / Container Nos. <b>N/M</b>	Number and kind of packages, description of goods <b>IN BULK GASOIL</b>  16764.862 16500.074 125096.14 19878.661 19844.055 20127.498  <b>CLEAN ON BOARD</b>	Gross weight kgs METRIC TONS LONG TONS US BBLs @60 DEG F KL @ 15 DEG C KL @ OBSERVED TEMPERATURE KL @ 30 DEG C	Measurement m <sup>3</sup>
TOTAL PACKAGES (IN WORDS)	Date of Bill of Lading issued <b>ZHOUSHAN CHINA / MAR.13,2020</b>		
Freight and charges <b>FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY</b>	Signed for the Carrier <b>AS MASTER SVORINIC BRANISLAV</b> 		

\*) Applicable only when document used as a Through Bill of Lading

Shipper

CHINA NATIONAL UNITED OIL CORPORATION

**BILL OF LADING**

Bt. No.	1
Nationality of Ocean Vessel	

Consignee

Notify Address

Pre-carriage by \_\_\_\_\_ Place of Receipt by Pre-carrier \_\_\_\_\_

Ocean Vessel **ARDMORE EXPORTER** Port of Loading **DALIAN, CHINA**

Port of Discharge **MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE FOR ORDERS** Final destination (if goods to be transhipped at port of discharge) \_\_\_\_\_ Freight payable at \_\_\_\_\_ Number of original B(s)/L **THREE (3)**

Shipped on board the vessel named herein in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise indicated) the goods or packages specified herein and to be discharged at the above mentioned port of discharge or as near thereto as the vessel may safely get and be always afloat.

The weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, contents and value, being particulars furnished by the Shipper, are not checked by the Carrier on loading. The Shipper, Consignee and the Holder of this Bill of Lading hereby expressly accept and agree to all printed, written or stamped provisions, exceptions and conditions of the Bill of Lading, including those on the back hereof. One of the Bills of Lading duly endorsed must be surrendered in exchange for the goods or delivery order.

In witness whereof, the Carrier or his Agents has signed Bills of Lading all of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void.

Shippers are requested to note particularly the exceptions and conditions of this Bill of Lading with reference to the validity of the insurance upon their goods.



Marks & Nos./Container Nos.	Number and kind of packages, description of goods	Gross weight kgs	Measurement m <sup>3</sup>
N/M	<p>IN BULK</p> <p>GASOIL</p> <p><b>TOTAL WEIGHT:</b></p> <p>41,759.920 METRIC TONS</p> <p>41,102.057 LONG TONS</p> <p>313,267.50 US BBLS AT 60 DEG F</p> <p>49,781.338 KILOLITRES AT 15 DEG C</p> <p>50,959.285 KILOLITRES AT OBSERVED TEMP</p> <p>"CLEAN ON BOARD"</p>		
TOTAL PACKAGES (IN WORDS)			

Particulars Furnished by Merchants

Freight and charges  
**FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY**

Place of B(s)/L Issue **DALIAN, CHINA** Dated **2020.3.14.**

Signed for the Carrier  
**MASTER: DEV TUHIN KUMAR**  
*[Signature]*  
**ARDMORE EXPORTER**

Ⓢ (Applicable only when document used as a Through Bill of Lading)

辽宁中外运航务代理有限公司  
 CHINA MARINE SHIPPING AGENCY LIAONING COMPANY LIMITED  
 出口舱单  
 EXPORT MANIFEST

船名: 阿穆尔  
 M. V. AMURE EXPORTER

航次: SA2036  
 Voy. SA2036

从: DA LIAN  
 From

到: HAPUTO  
 to MOZAMBIQUE FOR ORDERS


开航日期: Sailed

页码: 1/1  
 Page No.

标志和号码 Marks Numbers	件数及包装 No. of packages	货名 description of goods	重量 Weight 公斤 Kilograms	体积 measurement 立方米 Cu. M.	发货人/收货人/通知方 Shippers/Consignees/Notifies	备注 Remarks
N/M	IN BULK	GASOIL	KGS		SHIPR: CHINA NATIONAL UNITED OIL CORPORATION NO. 27 CHENGANG STREET, XICHENG DISTRICT, BEIJING USCI+91110090100012666T 010-66227099 CN	
Subtotal			4759,925 KGS			
Total:			4759,920 KGS			

*Green*  
 IN BULK MASTER  
 IN BULK MASTER



<b>MASTER'S RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS</b>																									
I, the undersigned Master of the _____ «ELBRUS»																									
Hereby acknowledge from the Representative of <b>«TRANSBUNKER-VANINO» CO. LTD</b>																									
in <b>port Vanino</b>																									
for further delivery to _____ SINGAPORE FOR ORDERS																									
Messrs. _____																									
Enveloped document as listed below:																									
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bill of Lading</li> <li>2. Manifest</li> <li>3. Certificate of Quantity</li> <li>4. Certificate of Quality</li> <li>5. NOR</li> <li>6. Tanker's Time-Sheet</li> <li>7. Ullage Report</li> <li>8. Master's Receipt of Samples</li> <li>9. Certificate of Dry and Cleanliness of Vessel's Tanks/Lines/Pumps</li> <li>10. Certificate of Origin</li> <li>11. MSDS</li> </ol>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 50%;">Originals</th> <th style="width: 50%;">Copies</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>-</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>*</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>-</td><td>1</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Originals	Copies	-	5	-	5	-	5	-	*	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	5	-	1
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*will be released on receipt from independent inspector																									
Master of the Port: VANINO, RUSSIA Date: MAY, 27, 2020																									

Shipper Отправитель	ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY, JSC "ANGARSK PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY" ADDRESS:115035, RUSSIA, MOSCOW, SOFIYSKAYA NABEREZHNYA, 26/1 ПАО «НК «РОСНЕФТЬ», ООО «АНГАРСКАЯ НЕФТЕХИМИЧЕСКАЯ КОМПАНИЯ» АДРЕС:115035, РОССИЯ, МОСКВА, СОФИЙСКАЯ НАБЕРЕЖНАЯ, 26/1			BILL OF LADING № VS-1 КОНОСАМЕНТ
Consignee Грузополучатель	[REDACTED]			COPY
Notify address Извещать по адресу Shipowner Судовладелец	«СОРА НАВИГАЦИОН ЛИМИТЕД» «КОРА НАВИГЕЙШН ЛИМИТЕД»	Flag Флаг	MALTA МАЛЬТА	
Vessel Судно	«ELBRUS» «ЭЛЬБРУС»	Port of loading Порт погрузки	VANINO, RUSSIA ВАНИНО, РОССИЯ	Number of Orig. Bs/L Количество оригиналов коносамента
Port of discharge Порт выгрузки	SINGAPORE FOR ORDERS СИНГАПУР ПО РАСПОРЯЖЕНИЮ			THREE ТРИ
	Kind of packages and description of goods Наименование груза	Number of Pieces Количество мест	Gross weight Measurement Вес, объем	
	EXPORT HEAVY PETROLEUM FUEL (VGO) ТОПЛИВО НЕФТЯНОЕ ТЯЖЕЛОЕ ЭКСПОРТНОЕ (ВГО)	IN BULK НАЛИВ	61.340 IN MT (VAC) 61.268 IN MT (AIR) 60.30 LONG TONS 424 US BBLs AT 60 DEG F 67.340 CUBIC METERS AT 15 DEG C 17,797 US GALLONS AT 60 DEG F	
			Say: 61.340 (Sixty-One & 0.340 IN MT(VAC)Only) 61.268 (Sixty-One & 0.268 IN MT(AIR)Only) 60.30 (Sixty & 0.30 LONG TONS Only) 424 (Four Hundred Twenty-Four US BBLs AT 60 DEG F Only) 67.340 (Sixty-Seven & 0.340 CUBIC METERS AT 15 DEG C Only) 17,797 (Seventeen Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Seven US GALLONS AT 60 DEG F Only)	
			Provisio: 61.340 (шестьдесят один и 0.340 Метрических тонн вакуум) 61.268 (шестьдесят один и 0.268 Метрических тонн воздух) 60.30 (шестьдесят и 0.30 Длинных тонн) 424 (четыреста двадцать четыре Барреля при 60° F) 67.340 (шестьдесят семь и 0.340 КУБ.М. при 15° C) 17,797 (семнадцать тысяч семьсот девяносто семь Галлонов при 60° F)	
Freight and charges	The goods taken on board of the vessel in apparent good order and condition unless noted herein at the port of loading for carriage to the port of discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get, always afloat. All particulars (weight, measure, marks, numbers, quality, nature, color and size) thereof being as stated by the Merchant but unknown to the Carrier who undertakes to deliver the goods as they were actually loaded. In accepting this Bill of Lading the Merchant accepts and agrees to all stipulations, exceptions and conditions on both pages, whether written, printed, stamped or otherwise incorporated. One of these Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods. Neither the weight nor the measure of goods carried in bulk are checked by the Carrier on loading. This Bill of Lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Code, 1999 or the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, or as the case may be any other international convention applicable at the port of shipment. In witness whereof number of stated above original Bills of Lading have been signed, one of which being accomplished, the others to be void.			
"FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY"/ "CLEAN ON BOARD"  "ОПЛАТА ФРАХТА ПО ЧАРТЕРНОМУ СОГЛАШЕНИЮ"/ "ЧИСТО НА БОРТУ"	VANINO, RUSSIA MAY, 27, 2020 ВАНИНО, РОССИЯ МАЙ, 27, 2020			GRIDCHIN SERGEI  Master's signature Подпись капитана
	Place and date of issue Место и дата подписания			ELBRUS SHUB7 GT29327

Source: Member States

## Annex 17: Evasion methods

### *Identifier and AIS manipulation*

1. The Panel continues to observe suspect vessels displaying suspicious behaviour such as transmitting falsified or inconsistent identifiers on Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and reporting false destinations<sup>6</sup> It also observes vessels trading in restricted or banned commodities and exhibiting AIS transmission gaps while sailing in and around waters where illicit ship-to-ship activities typically occur. Such practices may provide grounds for further investigations by the relevant public and private sector parties of the vessels they flag, charter, operate, insure, class or finance.
2. Few, if any, non-DPRK vessels appear to transmit AIS signal in DPRK waters based on commercial maritime database platforms. Suspect vessels instead have been observed to lose their AIS signal while sailing towards DPRK waters and re-transmit once back in external waters. To obscure the DPRK connection, complicit actors also falsify shipping documentation to conceal cargo's origin or destination.

### *Flagging*

3. A number of foreign-flagged vessels that conduct sanctionable activities have been recorded as falsely flagged, as having changed flag registries in quick succession (so called flag-hopping), continued to use a country's flag following removal from a registry, or flown a flag without proper authorization, seeking to mask their illicit activity.<sup>7</sup> Some formerly foreign-flagged vessels have been reported to join the DPRK's fleet. In at least one case, a vessel that was sold on and deleted from a flag registry transmitted as a DPRK vessel shortly thereafter.

### *Fuel supply chain*

4. Suspect foreign-flagged tankers associated with illicit shipments to the DPRK have also been observed<sup>8</sup> operating outside of identified affected waters exhibiting uneconomical sailing behavior and AIS transmission gaps that suggest possible illicit ship-to-ship transfers or loading at ports.

### *Owners, operators and managers*

5. The Panel's investigations demonstrate the DPRK continues to leverage shipping companies, corporate registration services, entities and individuals across multiple jurisdictions to facilitate its activities.
6. Complicit actors have been known to not submit owner and management information on commercial maritime platforms or may be listed as undisclosed interests in the vessel's onward sale, likely to disguise the ultimate beneficial owner and to evade sanctions. Other characteristics include layered ownership and management structures, use of front companies and shell companies, and engaging multiple intermediaries removed from the actual owner.
7. In tracing the ownership and management history of suspect vessels, some vessels appear to show commercial relationships, linkages, or shared corporate secretary addresses between a vessel's historical and current owners and / or managers. In some cases, previous managers have linkages with DPRK-related shipping networks.
8. In a number of cases, the vessels' management companies manage(d) other vessels with similar risk profiles. Vessels' registered owners may be incorporated in a variety of jurisdictions but typically list operational or businesses addresses in East Asia and in Southeast Asia.

*Source:* The Panel

<sup>6</sup> Panel investigations and data on commercial maritime platforms.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.



## Annex 18: Correspondence from Indonesia



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

No. 209/POL-202/VII/20

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to the latter's letter No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.45 has the honor to enclose the response from the Government of Indonesia.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 23 July 2020



Panel of Experts established pursuant  
to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)  
New York


325 East 38<sup>th</sup> Street, New York, NY 10016 • Tel.: (212) 972-8333 • Fax: (212) 972-9780  
www.indonesiamission-ny.org • email.ptri@indonesiamission-ny.org

**Information on the Vanguard Ship Management Co. Ltd**

1. With regard to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1874 (2009) letter No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.45 dated 1 May 2020, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia would like to convey further relevant information, as follows:
  - a. Vanguard Ship Management Co. Ltd. is not a registered shipping agency operating in Indonesia. Accordingly, Indonesian law does not recognize '**Co. Ltd.**' as the standard format of individual and non-individual business entity as specified in the company's name of Vanguard Ship Management Co. Ltd.
  - b. Neither licenses nor appropriate permits have been issued on behalf of the said company by relevant authorities. The Vanguard Ship Management Co. Ltd and the Sierra-Leone-Flagged ship of Diamond 8 (IMO: 9132612) are not listed in relevant authorities' databases and thus no other supplementary information is available. In the absence of national law violations, the Government is unable to share further information.
2. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia reiterate its continued commitment to the implementation of relevant UNSC resolutions on DPRK in accordance with prevailing national laws and regulations.

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 19: Areas affected by illicit ship-to-ship transfers by DPRK tankers**



*Source:* Member State

## Annex 20: DPRK vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfer in the East China Sea

### *Sam Jong 2 and an unidentified vessel*

1. The designated DPRK vessel *Sam Jong 2* (IMO: 7408873)<sup>9</sup> was photographed at night in the East China Sea on or around 9 January 2020 moored and with hoses connected to an unidentified vessel with a Chinese name reported to be transliterated as the *Jiang Ning 3* (figure 20-1). The Member State that provided the information assessed that refined petroleum transfers had occurred. The *Sam Jong 2* was captured on satellite imagery delivering refined petroleum at Nampo's center pier nine days later.

Figure 20-1: *Sam Jong 2* ship-to-ship transfer with *Jiang Ning 3*

### SAM JONG 2 – JIANG NING 3 STS TRANSFER EAST CHINA SEA JANUARY 9, 2020



Source: Member State

### *Myong Ryu 1 and the Infinite Luck*

1. The Panel is investigating a ship-to-ship transfer between the DPRK vessel *Myong Ryu 1* (IMO: 8532413)<sup>10</sup> and the Panama-flagged *Infinite Luck* (IMO: 9063811) on or around 10 January 2020 according to information from a Member State (figure II).

Figure 20-2: *Myong Ryu 1* ship-to-ship transfer with *Infinite Luck*

### MYONG RYU 1– INFINITE LUCK STS TRANSFER EAST CHINA SEA JANUARY 10, 2020




Source: Member State

<sup>9</sup> Designated for an asset freeze and port ban in March 2018.

<sup>10</sup> Recommended by the Panel for designation. See paragraphs 40 and 46, S/2020/151, and paragraph 50, S/2019/171.

3. Panama has provided documentation on the *Infinite Luck* including positional data which the Panel is reviewing. The *Myong Ryu I* has no tracking data on commercial maritime databases. The *Infinite Luck*'s registered owner is listed as Uniform Shipping Co Ltd HK (hereafter Uniform Shipping).<sup>11</sup> The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Uniform Shipping. Investigations continue.
4. The *Chon Ma San* was reported by another Member State to have conducted another ship-to-ship transfer on or around 12 January 2020 in the East China Sea with a vessel with “明波 5” painted on its hull (Figure III). The Panel had prior reported the *Chon Ma San* conducting ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum with direct delivery vessels the *Tianyou* (aka *Sin P(h)yong 2*) in March 2019, and a suspected transfer with the *Subblic* when it was sailing as the *Xin Yuan 18* in February 2018.

Figure 20-3: Chon Ma San ship-to-ship transfer with unidentified vessel



Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

<sup>11</sup> Companies Registry (Hong Kong), Integrated Information System.

Annex 21: Ship particulars for the *Courageous* (IMO: 8617524)SHIP PARTICULARS

VESSEL	:	MT COURAGEOUS
OWNER	:	NEW EASTERN SHIPPING CO., LTD
MANAGER	:	COURAGEOUS MARITIME S.A
PORT OF REGISTRY	:	KRIBI
TYPE	:	STEEL TANKER
FLAG	:	CAMEROON
OFFICIAL NO	:	K-73/IP/2019
IMO NO	:	8617524
CALL SIGN	:	TJMC83
YEAR BUILT	:	1988
WHERE BUILT	:	JAPAN
CLASS	:	
VESSEL'S BOTTOM	:	SINGLE HULL, DOUBLE BOTTOM
FULL SPEED	:	12 KNOTS
SERVICE SPEED	:	10 KNOTS
REGISTERED DIMENSIONS --		
LENGTH	:	95M
BREADTH	:	18M
DEPTH	:	6M
LOA	:	90M
AIR DRAFT	:	23M
LOCAL FREEBOARD		
TROPICAL	:	1.122M
SUMMER	:	1.222M
SUMMER DEADWEIGHT,	:	3912 M/TONS
LOADED DISPLACEMENT,	:	5342 M/TONS
LIGHT WEIGHT,	:	1430 M/TONS
LIGHT DISPLACEMENT,	:	2900 M/TONS
GRT / NRT	:	2734 / 1349
DEADWEIGHT	:	4418 MT
CAPACITY	:	4707 M <sup>3</sup>
DISPLACEMENT	:	5342.09 MT
NUMBER OF TANKS	:	5 X 2
NUMBER OF MANIFOLD	:	4 UNITS
CARGO TANK CAPACITY	:	4700 CBM
BOW TO CENTRE MANIFOLD DISTANCE	:	46.4 M
BALLAST TANK CAPACITY	:	NO
TYPE OF MANIFOLD	:	ANSI 8 x1 6 x3
MAX SHORE LOADING RATE	:	600 CBM/HR
GENERATORS	:	2X YANMAR
MAIN ENGINE	:	HANSHIN DIESEL 6 EL 35
TRADE LIMIT	:	A1 + A2 + A3
COATING / TYPE	:	YES / EPOXY
HEATING / COIL TYPE / MAX TEMPERATURE	:	NOY FITTED COILS,
CARGO PUMP CAPACITY / TYPE	:	3 x GEAR HORIZONTAL / 300 CBM /HR
NO. OF GRADE	:	3
DOUBLE BOTTOM / COATING	:	YES / EPOXY
MAIN ENGINE,	:	HANSHIN- 6EL35
BHP	:	3200PS / 2354 KW x 260 RPM
SPEED / CONSUMPTION	:	ABT. 10 KNOTS / ABT 6.8MT PER 24 HRS RUNNING
TYPE OF FUEL	:	M.G.O
GENERATOR NO. / TYPE,	:	2 x YANMAR. SL165 YANMAR
CONSUMPTION	:	ABT. 1.36 MT PER 24 HRS RUNNING
TYPE OF FUEL	:	M.G.O


Source: Member State

Annex 22: Port clearance certificate of the *Viet Tin 01*

 <b>MARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE</b> <b>REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE</b> <small>THE MARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE ACT (CHAPTER 170A)</small> <b>PORT CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE</b>	
Certificate No.	E75954
GDV No.	052687
Name Of Vessel	VIET TIN 01
IMO No.	8508838
Gross Tonnage	2998
Flag	VIET NAM
Name Of Master	[REDACTED]
Cargo	1472 Freight Tonnes
Next Port Of Call	O P HONG KONG HONG KONG
Date And Time Of Departure	03/02/2019 0100 hrs
Date And Time Of Issue	02/02/2019 1921 hrs
Remarks	Valid Till 04/02/2019 1920 hrs And For One Trip ONLY
<p>TO CONFIRM THE AUTHENTICITY OF THIS DOCUMENT, PLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE AT:  <a href="https://marinet.mpa.gov.sg/jpsmn2/cv/public_service/pcc/loadEnquiryPCC.action">https://marinet.mpa.gov.sg/jpsmn2/cv/public_service/pcc/loadEnquiryPCC.action</a></p>	
<p>THIS IS A COMPUTER GENERATED CERTIFICATE  NO SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED</p> <p>_____  FOR PORT MASTER</p>	

Source: The Panel

### Annex 23: Estimated number of vessels at anchor in four locations at the Taedong river, January to June 2020




Satellite imagery (January to June 2020) : Nampo coal docks (38°43'33.83"N 125°24'53.81"E); Nampo Oil Terminal (38°42'56.98"N 125°22'7.42"E); West Sea Barrage (38° 40' 53" N 124° 54' 57" E - 38°40'35.55"N 125°10'33.33"E); Taean coal docks (A.38°49'12.38"N 125°31'45.81"E - B.38°49'31.34"N 125°31'26.74"E - C.38°50'32.46"N125°31'18.47"E - D.38°50'49.38"N 125°31'20.62"E)

Source: The Panel




## Annex 24: Satellite imagery of DPRK vessels loading coal at Taean, DPRK and near Ningbo-Zhoushan, China



Source: Member State; Map: The Panel

### Annex 25: DPRK vessels at anchor near islands off Ningbo-Zhoushan, China




Source: Member State

## Annex 26: DPRK vessels conducting illicit activity at Ningbo-Zhoushan, China

### *Jin Hung 9*


1. The DPRK vessel *Jin Hung 9* (IMO: 9035967) was recorded on satellite imagery at anchor near Ningbo-Zhoushan on or around 20 April 2020 in the vicinity of a barge with what appears to be coal visible in its cargo bay, as well as a floating crane typically used to assist in the transfer of cargo (figure 26-1). The Member State assessed the vessel had offloaded DPRK-origin coal. The Panel's investigations show the *Jin Hung 9* transmitted an AIS signal near Shidao, China on or around 25 April 2020<sup>12</sup> a few days later. From 16 to 25 April 2020, the vessel was recorded on the same maritime platform with a 9-day gap in AIS transmission, during which time the activity could have taken place, as the period between the *Jin Hung 9*'s prior and subsequent recorded AIS transmissions (figure 26-2)<sup>13</sup> allowed ample time for the voyage. During this period the vessel reported a draft decrease, indicating a discharge of cargo. China replied that on vessels in the Panel's letters which are suspected to make STS [*sic*: ship-to-ship] transfers, so far the investigations have not completed yet. China has always implemented the Security Council resolutions in a faithful and strict manner, and if any Chinese vessel, individual or entity is proved to be involved in illegal STS transfers, the Chinese law enforcement authority will prosecute them in accordance with laws and regulations

Figure 26-1: *Jin Hung 9* at anchor



Source: Member State

Figure 26-2: AIS transmission gap



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

### *New Dawn*


2. The Panel is investigating a case of possible sanctions evasion involving identity tampering by a DPRK-flagged vessel, *New Dawn* (IMO: 9135494). The Panel continues to observe this form of sanctions evasion activity. On and around 22 January to 3 February 2020 and on and around 30 April to 2 May 2020, the vessel was observed on a specialized maritime database as transmitting falsified identifiers while in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area where other DPRK vessels have been observed, potentially to mask its sanctionable activities (figure 26-3). The vessel transmitted as the “S K”, allegedly Comoros-flagged, and with a call sign and MMSI inconsistent with those of the *New Dawn*, but with a Commercial Manager listed as “Korea Sokwang Shipping Co”, consistent with the DPRK's ownership and management of the *New Dawn*. On other occasions, the vessel was reported to transmit as the “*So Kwang*”. The vessel also

<sup>12</sup> Windward.

<sup>13</sup> Traveling at a service speed of 12 knots, it would take approximately two days travel time between the two transmission points.

recorded drafted changes outside of port on different occasions in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area, suggesting that cargo had been off-loaded in ship-to-ship transfers. The vessel was recorded in May 2020 sailing north through the Yellow Sea in the direction of the DPRK before dropping its AIS signal in an area where vessels transporting illicit cargo have been observed to lose their AIS transmission. China replied that on vessels in the Panel’s letters which are suspected to make STS [sic: ship-to-ship] transfers, so far the investigations have not completed yet. China has always implemented the Security Council resolutions in a faithful and strict manner, and if any Chinese vessel, individual or entity is proved to be involved in illegal STS transfers, the Chinese law enforcement authority will prosecute them in accordance with laws and regulations.

Figure 26-3: *New Dawn* as ‘*S K*’ and ‘*So Kwang*’



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Source: The Panel

## Annex 27: DPRK vessels conducting illicit activities

### *Su Ri Bong aka Pu Zhou*

1. The Panel continued to investigate the individuals and entities that facilitated the activities of the *Pu Zhou* (former *Fu Xing 12*) (IMO: 8605727). The vessel, listed on maritime platforms sailing as the DPRK-flagged *Su Ri Bong* in September 2019,<sup>14</sup> travelled to the DPRK two months after its sale in June 2019 to export DPRK coal.<sup>15</sup> The *Su Ri Bong* was recorded at Nampo on or around 7 February 2020, recorded a change in identifiers back to the *Pu Zhou* before sailing back to the Ningbo-Zhoushan area, arriving on or around 14 June 2020 where it registered a draft change. The vessel sailed as the *Hu Hai* with a falsified Chinese identifier (MMSI) in early July before it reverted to sailing as the ‘SRB’ while sailing towards Nampo.<sup>16</sup>
2. The Panel corresponded with a company based in Kaohsiung City (management company-PZ) that had provided services to the *Pu Zhou*. According to management company-PZ, it did not have knowledge of the vessel owner nor of its voyage or cargo. The company stated it was a ship management consultant that provided safety management related services to vessels. Its services were reportedly procured in July 2019 by an individual in China, the company’s contact for China-related businesses. Management company-PZ delivered ship safety manuals to the Master of the vessel while it was at a shipyard on an island in Zhoushan, China. The company reportedly told its Chinese business contact to cancel its contracted services as ISM manager and Document of Compliance holder following notification from then flag state, Sierra Leone, of the vessel’s voyage to the DPRK and cancellation of flag.<sup>17</sup> The Panel confirmed the *Pu Zhou* was no longer managed by the company following de-registration by Sierra Leone in September 2019.
3. Ms Liu, the recorded buyer of the *Pu Zhou*, is recorded on a Chinese business registry aggregator<sup>18</sup> to have run several businesses including in the Zhoushan area. The Panel was separately unsuccessful in contacting Ms Liu on publicly listed contact details and sought China’s assistance on information into the individual. China prior informed the Panel it was conducting investigations into the matter. China replied that so far the investigations have not completed yet.
4. A Philippines national was registered as the Director/Shareholder/Beneficial Owner of Honour Sail Limited (hereafter Honour Sail), a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Honour Sail was recorded as the vessel’s registered owner, operator and manager following its sale. The Philippines responded that it would provide information as soon as available.

Source: The Panel

<sup>14</sup> IHS Markit, accessed 22 July 2020.

<sup>15</sup> S/2020/151, paras. 73-77.

<sup>16</sup> Data from Windward. Accessed on 5 July 2020

<sup>17</sup> The vessel was flagged under Sierra Leone from July to September 2019. Data from IHS Markit.

<sup>18</sup> Tianyancha.com

### Annex 28: Internet posting to invite fishing in DPRK waters

回复贴, 共1页

有没有渔船想去朝鲜捕捞鱿鱼的? 只看楼主 收藏 回复

 有没有渔船想去朝鲜捕捞鱿鱼的?

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送TA礼物 

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△平报 来自Android客户端 2楼 2020-03-26 10:24 回复

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△平报 来自Android客户端 3楼 2020-03-26 10:24 回复

**조선민주주의인민공화국**  
**상업회의소**  
*DPR Korea Chamber of Commerce*

号码: KCC-75/2019  
日期: 2019.3.26

确 认 书

兹确认, 法定地址为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平壤市万景台区  
祝典1街的圣山经济贸易联合会社已经得到国家许可, 可在朝鲜东海  
的指定海域同中方开展合营捕捞。

特此证明。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商业会议所  
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平壤市公证所

조선민주주의인민공화국 평양시 중구역 중성동  
Junggyong-dong, Central District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea  
P.O. Box: 89

Tel: 850.2.41-9626  
Fax: 850.2.41-9627  
E-mail: cchcc@prk.net.kp

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 zhe10615  
默认头像 

7. 支付方式:  
船舶联检和识别器安装结束的同时乙方将捕捞费给甲方指定的银行账号转账或支付现金。

8. 其他

- 1) 甲方负责捕捞船和运输船负责合营捕捞所需的所有手续、海上指挥和安全事宜,乙方负责提供渔船、运输船、网具、燃油、海上作业费用。
- 2) 若乙方的要求甲方派遣船员时,船员工资每人每月人民币 2500 元以上,每季度发放一次。乙方向甲方船员提供与乙方船员同等的住宿条件、劳保物资、通讯利用条件。
- 3) 乙方所有作业船、运输船应彻底遵守朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的法律,如有脱离作业区域、使用禁止网具现象时应受处分包括罚款。对于乙方船只非法进入其他国家海域而产生的后果甲方不负任何

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 zhe10615  
默认头像 

朝鲜圣山经济贸易联合会社(以下称甲方)与中国 XXXX 贸易有限公司(以下称乙方),本着互利互惠的原则就在朝鲜东海经济水域合营捕捞经过磋商,签订如下合同:

1. 船舶数量:作业船 100 艘、运输船 2 艘、给油船 1 艘,指挥船 1 艘  
※ 合营捕捞期间,指挥船由乙方提供。

2. 捕捞水域  
北纬 39 度 05 分 00 秒,东经 129 度 52 分 00 秒  
北纬 39 度 29 分 00 秒,东经 133 度 22 分 00 秒  
北纬 41 度 29 分 00 秒,东经 133 度 24 分 00 秒  
北纬 39 度 05 分 00 秒,东经 133 度 06 分 00 秒  
※ 若捕捞水域改变,另签合同附件。

3. 捕捞期间:  
2020 年 4 月 - 2020 年 12 月

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Source: <https://tieba.baidu.com/p/6576026746> (last visited on 8 July 2020)

## Annex 29: Recorded trade between the DPRK and some Member States

### 1. Methodology

To monitor prohibited exports and imports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2016), paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2371 (2017), paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2375 (2017) and paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel analysed Member States' customs data as reported to the International Trade Centre (ITC). The Panel used the list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) in annex 4 of S/2018/171 (amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1).<sup>19</sup>

The Panel's analysis covers the period between October 2019 and March 2020. Where available statistics indicate trade in prohibited items, the Panel wrote to Member States for additional information and verification. While the Panel observed that more countries conducted trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during this period, it was unable to obtain full trade statistics covering the entire period for each of them with sufficient time for the right of reply. The Panel intends to continue its inquiries when the data becomes available.

The Panel notes that the DPRK does not release statistics on its external trade and only mirror statistics are available on DPRK exports and imports. This analysis does not include any exports and imports of banned items by the DPRK that were undetected or unreported by Member States to the ITC, or erroneously reported as trade with third countries other than the DPRK.

The figures listed in part 3 of this annex are the total of all exports and imports of ostensibly prohibited items by the DPRK between October 2019 and March 2020, as obtained by the Panel prior to its requests for information to the relevant Member States between May and June 2020.

### 2. Update on the Panel's past inquiries in 2020 final report (S/2020/151, annex 19)

Several Member States responded to the Panel's inquiry after the completion of its 2020 final report (S/2020/151) for recorded trade with the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019. Below are the results of the Panel's analysis on additional replies from Member States. The Panel appreciates the Member States' cooperation and their efforts to implement relevant resolutions.

#### Algeria

Algeria replied to the Panel that the iron and steel imported from the DPRK do not fall under the HS code categories covered by the sectoral sanctions provisions contained in the relevant Security Council resolutions, and it was investigating its import of machinery and textiles from the DPRK.

#### Brazil

Brazil submitted its second reply to the Panel in which it concluded that the data recording trade with the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019 were inaccurate.

#### Colombia

Colombia replied the Panel with a comprehensive analysis based on customs data of the recorded trade with the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019. The Panel perused the reply from Colombia but could not find evidence that the cases of imports in question have not originated from the DPRK, provided the initial data entry was accurate.



**Costa Rica**

Costa Rica replied to the Panel based on the initial report from its General Directorate of Customs of the Ministry of Finance. Costa Rica stated that there had been 91 customs declarations of import from 2017 to 2020 in which products were declared originating in the DPRK, and further reported that “it is assumed that there is a typing error of the information in said declarations, confusing the declarant of the country of origin and provenance” between the DPRK and the ROK.

**El Salvador**

El Salvador submitted a reply to the Panel explaining its efforts to implement relevant resolutions.

**Guatemala**

Guatemala submitted its second reply to the Panel and stated that its Tax Administration Superintendency had “determined that no trade had taken place with the [DPRK]” in the periods specified by the Panel.

**Honduras**

Honduras replied to the Panel that its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation had compiled the information as requested.

**India**

India replied to the Panel that the relevant Indian agencies have confirmed that no imports or exports of the item/goods referred to in the Panel’s letter have taken place from or to the DPRK, and “in a few instances where the goods were declared as originated from DPRK or destined for DPRK, the consignments were interdicted to verify the country of origin/destination. In all such cases, the goods were found to have actually originated from or be destined for the [Republic of Korea.]”

**Indonesia**

Indonesia replied to the Panel that it was currently conducting an investigation that involves an inter-agency process and the result of the investigation will be conveyed to the Panel in due course.

**Kazakhstan**

Kazakhstan submitted relevant original documents to the Panel and clarified that the imports recorded as from the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019 were the result of mistaken reports. The Panel assesses that there had been no import from the DPRK by Kazakhstan during the said period.

**Luxembourg**

Luxembourg submitted a reply to the Panel explaining that the recorded trade with the DPRK was a coding error originated from confusing the DPRK with the ROK.

**South Africa**

South Africa submitted its second reply to the Panel stating that it was “currently investigating the alleged transgression of the sanctions regime, in order to determine if the items were in fact traded with the DPRK [...] our investigations are also aimed at establishing whether item codes and the destination/origin countries are entered correctly.”

**Uruguay**

Uruguay submitted its second reply to the Panel including detailed customs documents specifying the cases of imports from the DPRK. The Panel perused the reply from Uruguay but could not find evidence that the cases of imports in question have not originated from the DPRK, provided the initial data entry was accurate.

**3. Results of the Panel’s inquiries (for the period between October 2019 and March 2020)**

Below is the result of the Panel’s analyses of Member States’ recorded trade with the DPRK between October 2019 and March 2020 found in the ITC Trade Map. The Panel reiterates that this is not a complete list of countries that traded with the DPRK during the said period, and the Panel is preparing further inquiries concerning other Member States as full trade data for this period becomes available.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Bosnia and Herzegovina replied to the Panel with original documentation that the total value of its import of machinery (HS 84) from the DPRK during the last quarter of 2019 was approximately 2,075 USD, instead of 27,000 USD.

**Brazil**

Brazil replied to the Panel with its analysis that the data recording trade with the DPRK between October 2019 and March 2020 were inaccurate, and the errors were caused by customs brokering agents while inserting data in the import or export declarations submitted through SISCOMEX (Integrated Foreign Trade System). Brazil explained that the Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB) ascertained such errors through a comparison between the information in import and export declarations and the bills of lading or air waybills of the transacted cargo.

**Canada**

Canada confirmed in its reply to the Panel that the trade data reported to the ITC was inaccurate and that the items were not imported from or exported to the DPRK, and the inaccuracy was the result of miscoding of the country of origin by the relevant Canadian statistical agencies. Canada further explained that the information has been corrected and the changes would be reflected in subsequent submissions of trade data reported to the ITC.

**China** (For China’s reply on these inquiries, see Annex 58)

The Panel asked China for data on import of iron, iron and steel products (HS 72-73) and textiles (HS 50-63) worth of \$ 9,557,000 from the DPRK, and export of metals (HS 72-83) and industrial machinery (HS 84-85) worth of \$ 2,724,000 to the DPRK for the period between October 2019 and March 2020.

## [ Import ]

- 1) Import of \$9,534,000 worth of iron, iron ore (HS 72-73): China replied that it “did not import these prohibited items from the DPRK in the time frame of October to December of 2019 and March of 2020. Import of iron or steel articles (HS code 73) is not prohibited. Ferro-silicon is not a prohibited item either, and importing and re-exporting ferro-silicon does not violate Security Council resolutions.”<sup>20</sup>

**Iron and iron ore (HS codes 72 and 73)<sup>21</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	China	DPRK	72	2,789,000
November 2019	China	DPRK	72	2,842,000
			73	20,000
December 2019	China	DPRK	72	3,762,000
			73	35,000
March 2020	China	DPRK	72	86,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 2) Import of \$23,000 worth of textiles (HS 50-63): China replied that it “imported a batch of commodities under the HS code 5302 in October 2019. They are raw materials, not textiles prohibited by the Security Council resolutions.”

**Textiles (HS codes 50 to 63)<sup>22</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	China	DPRK	53	23,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

## [ Export ]

- 3) Export of \$196,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83) and of \$2,528,000 worth of industrial machinery (HS 84-85): China replied that the “steel, copper and other metals exported to the DPRK between October and December 2019, and the industrial machinery exported to the DPRK between January and March 2020, were all humanitarian goods exempted by the 1718 Committee and diplomatic goods ordered by foreign missions in the DPRK. Among them, 5 batches of goods were from the UNICEF, 3 batches of goods were from the ICRC, 8 batches of goods were from different NGOs, and 12 batches of goods were ordered by diplomatic missions in the DPRK.”

<sup>20</sup> The Panel notes that some Member States’ views on HS Code allocation are not same with the Panel’s list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions, which the World Customs Organization (WCO) has recommended to the Panel (see S/2017/150, para. 257, S/2018/171 annex 4 and S/2018/171/Corr.1). The Panel also inquired China on possible re-export of DPRK-origin ferro-silicon to third countries, based on a media report on the 2019 General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) data which indicated that 1,370 metric tons of ferro-silicon worth of 31 million USD had been re-exported in the form of customs warehousing trade and entrepot trade.

<sup>21</sup> **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), para. 8.

<sup>22</sup> **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), para. 16.

**Metals (HS codes 72 to 83)<sup>23</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	China	DPRK	73	33,000
			74	27,000
			83	88,000
November 2019	China	DPRK	73	10,000
			82	14,000
December 2019	China	DPRK	76	24,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Industrial Machinery (HS codes 84 and 85)<sup>24</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2020	China	DPRK	84	32,000
			85	2,448,000
March 2020	China	DPRK	84	34,000
			85	14,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Germany**

The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Export ]

**Industrial Machinery (HS codes 84 and 85)<sup>25</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2020	Germany	DPRK	84	10,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Madagascar**

The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[ Import ]

**Machinery (HS code 84)<sup>26</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2020	Madagascar	DPRK	84	54,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

<sup>23</sup> **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), para. 7.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

**Textiles (HS codes 50 to 63)<sup>27</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2019	Madagascar	DPRK	52	358,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Mozambique**

Mozambique replied to the Panel and requested an extension for its reply.

[ Import ]

**Electrical equipment (HS code 85)<sup>28</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	85	4,000
March 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	85	19,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Machinery (HS code 84)<sup>29</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2019	Mozambique	DPRK	84	7,000
November 2019	Mozambique	DPRK	84	18,000
December 2019	Mozambique	DPRK	84	4,000
January 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	84	45,000
February 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	84	12,000
March 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	84	55,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

**Seafood (HS codes 03, 1603-1605)<sup>30</sup>**

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2019	Mozambique	DPRK	03	87,000
January 2020	Mozambique	DPRK	03	256,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

<sup>27</sup> **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16

<sup>28</sup> **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> **Applicable resolution:** Resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 9.

### **Annex 30: Relevant resolution provisions applicable to gold and cash smuggling between Tehran airport and Dubai airport**

Smuggling gold and cash could be in violation of multiple sanctions measures stipulated in relevant resolutions including:

Paragraph 11 of resolution [2094 \(2013\)](#) prohibited transfer of financial assets, including bulk cash, to and from the DPRK, which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by relevant resolutions. Paragraph 14 of resolution [2094 \(2013\)](#) clarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of this resolution to transfers of cash, including through cash couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK.

Paragraph 37 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#) clarifies that all States shall apply the measures set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution [2094 \(2013\)](#) to transfers of gold, including through gold couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK.

Furthermore, although the Panel is still investigating the route of the transfer of gold, it notes that paragraph 30 of resolution [2270 \(2016\)](#) prohibits the supply, selling or transfer of gold, regardless of whether it is directly or indirectly, from the DPRK territory or by DPRK nationals.

## Annex 31: Response from 3M



June 5, 2020

3M Legal Affairs

3M Center, Building 220-9E-02  
St. Paul, MN 55144-1000 USA  
Phone: (651) 736-7776  
Email: [uneclakantan@mmm.com](mailto:uneclakantan@mmm.com)

Via Email. [REDACTED]@un.org

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)  
United Nations  
United Nations Headquarters  
405 East 42nd Street  
New York, NY 10017

**Re: 3M Company's Response to the April 30, 2020 Request for Information  
from the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874  
(2009)  
Reference: S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.43**

[REDACTED]

On behalf of 3M Company ("3M"), I am writing to respond to your letter of April 30, 2020 regarding efforts by the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) ("the Panel") to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of measures imposed by the Security Council on the Democratic Republic of North Korea ("DPRK"). In particular, 3M understands that the Panel is investigating a recent report on Korean Central Television ("KCTV") showing DPRK quarantine workers in what appear to be 3M Protective Coveralls (hereinafter, "KCTV Report").

Consistent with United States and United Nations sanctions against the DPRK, it is 3M policy not to sell, either directly or indirectly, any products into the DPRK unless specifically authorized by the U.S. government. As part of its comprehensive trade compliance program, 3M also implements measures, including trade compliance provisions in contracts and restricted party screening, to ensure that distributors and other customers do not sell 3M products into sanctioned countries or to sanctioned parties.

While the KCTV Report shows DPRK workers in what appear to be 3M Protective Coveralls, 3M is unable to verify the authenticity of the pictured coveralls absent access to the coveralls and their original packaging. Nevertheless, after receiving the Panel's request for information, 3M has reviewed its global sales of all 3M Protective Coveralls since 2017, and has not identified any sales of coveralls, either directly or through distributors, into the DPRK.

In addition, through its social investment arm, 3M gives, 3M donates products to U.S.-based humanitarian aid organizations to support emergency relief efforts and urgent medical care needs around the world. 3M has confirmed that neither of its partner

June 5, 2020  
Page 2

humanitarian aid organizations shipped 3M Protective Coveralls to the DPRK. Thus, to the extent that the coveralls pictured in the KCTV Report are authentic 3M products, 3M has no knowledge of how these coveralls may ultimately have been routed to the DPRK.

Provided below are responses to the Panel's specific requests for information.

**1. *The authenticity of the abovementioned media report.***

3M is unable to comment on the authenticity of the information contained in the KCTV Report. The report suggests that the coveralls visible in the photographs are 3M™ Protective Coverall 4570 ("4570 Coverall") and 3M™ Protective Coverall 4510 ("4510 Coverall"). However, absent access to the coveralls and original packaging, 3M is unable to verify whether the coveralls shown are genuine 3M products and if so, the specific coverall models.

**2. *If the report is authentic, information related to the type and model number, country (or place) of production, countries of distribution (or place of wholesale), and period of production of the 3M personal protective equipment (PPE) shown in the report.***

As explained in response to Question 1 above, 3M is unable to verify the authenticity of the coveralls pictured in the KCTV Report. Nevertheless, for purposes of cooperating fully with the Panel, 3M herein provides information related to its production and sales of 4570 Coveralls and 4510 Coveralls.

3M began manufacturing 4510 Coveralls in 2010 and 4570 Coveralls in 2013. These coveralls are manufactured to 3M's specifications in China. The coveralls are then shipped to 3M distribution centers in Germany, the United Kingdom, Singapore, China and the United States, and ultimately sold to hundreds of distributors around the world. These distributors, in turn, sell the coveralls to end users. 3M does not sell coveralls, either directly or indirectly, into the DPRK.

**3. *Details of the transfer of the abovementioned 3M PPE (e.g. date of transfer, importer and/or consignee, end-user and end-use), including a copy of the contract and invoice. If you do not have this information, please provide the Panel with any other information which might suggest the possible route of transfer of the PPE to the DPRK.***

As explained previously, 3M does not sell any products, either directly or indirectly, into the DPRK. To the extent that the coveralls pictured in the KCTV Report are authentic, 3M has no knowledge of the possible route of transfer to the DPRK.



June 5, 2020  
Page 3

4. *Information about 3M's internal screening of end-users. If 3M has contractual arrangements with end users to track the products (such as requirements for the purchaser to notify 3M in the case of resale or relocation, or any device to detect relocation), please provide the Panel with this information.*

3M employs a comprehensive trade compliance program, and regularly conducts due diligence on its business partners. As part of this due diligence, 3M conducts restricted party screening of parties to its transactions, including but not limited to, suppliers, distributors, logistics providers, and, where applicable, end users. To do so, 3M employs comprehensive screening software to screen parties against all applicable restricted party lists, including the United Nations Consolidated List and the U.S. Department of the Treasury's List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.

As explained in response to Question 2 above, 3M generally does not sell coveralls directly to end users but instead sells through distributors around the world. These distributors are subject to the aforementioned due diligence and screening procedures relevant to the country or countries in which they are authorized by 3M to distribute 3M products. In addition, 3M works to include in its distributor agreements and/or terms and conditions of sale clauses requiring compliance with applicable legal requirements, such as economic sanctions and export control laws and regulations, including the trade embargo against the DPRK. Finally, 3M collects point-of-sale data from many of its coverall distributors, and a review of available data does not indicate any sales of 3M Protective Coveralls into the DPRK.

Please let us know if we can be of any further assistance in your investigation into this matter.

Sincerely,

A large black oval redaction covering the signature of the sender.

Source: The Panel

## Annex 32: Response from DuPont



DuPont de Nemours, Inc.  
974 Centre Road, CRP 730  
Wilmington, DE 19805

May 27, 2020

[REDACTED]  
United Nations Security Council  
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts Established  
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)  
United Nations  
New York, NY 10017

RE: Inquiry of United Nations Security Council: Your Reference: S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.44

[REDACTED]

With reference to your communication of April 30, 2020 to Mr. Edward Breen CEO of Dupont de Nemours, Inc., I am responding on the Company's behalf as Senior Vice President and General Counsel. In your letter you provided clipped images from a media report allegedly identifying protective gear worn by workers whom were reported to be in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPKR"). In addition, the media report hypothesized that the branding on some of the garments was similar to branding found on protective garments fabricated from DuPont Tyvek non-woven fabric. To that end you asked DuPont to respond to the following four questions. We replicate and respond to your questions below.

*1. The authenticity of the abovementioned media report (see Annex 1);*

We cannot speak to the authenticity of the media report, the information reported therein nor to the provenance of any material shown in the associated photographic materials.

*2. If the report is authentic, information related to the type and model number, country (or place) of production, countries of distribution (or place of wholesale), and period of production of the DuPont personal protective equipment (PPE) shown in the report;*

See response above.

*3. Details of the transfer of the abovementioned DuPont PPE (e.g. date of transfer, importer and/or consignee, end-user and end-use), including a copy of the contract and invoice. If you do not have this information, please provide the Panel with any other information which might suggest the possible route of transfer of the PPE to the DPRK;*

Under the laws of the United States, transfer or sale of U.S.- origin materials by U.S. persons to sanctioned parties or countries, such as the DPRK, is prohibited and companies, like DuPont, are required to have policies and procedures in place to detect and avoid such occurrences. To that end, DuPont has a Policy on Trade with Potentially Sensitive Countries that identifies DPRK as a "Tier I" country with which all trading is prohibited. Compliance with the laws and restrictions represented in the Policy is also a requirement made of our distribution partners. Furthermore, any direct financial transactions, as identified in our procurement systems, with such Sensitive Countries, is immediately flagged and any attempted transaction is blocked before consummation. We have no evidence of direct or indirect sales of DuPont materials into DPRK. As noted above, we cannot ascertain the veracity of the media report, if the garments shown were in-fact branded as a DuPont product or if counterfeit branding was applied to product made by others. We simply have no information relative to the events described in the media report.

*4. Information about DuPont's internal screening of the end-users. If DuPont has contractual arrangements with end users to track the products (such as requirements for the purchaser to notify DuPont in the case of resale or relocation, or any device to detect relocation), please provide the Panel with this information.*

Besides complying with our trade policy and ensuring that contractual requirements placed on our distribution chain likewise follow all relevant laws and restrictions, DuPont does not do internal screening of the ultimate end users of these products outside of our distribution chain nor do the products contain devices to detect relocation.

We appreciate the work undertaken by the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts to ensure that the Security Council resolutions and the implementation of appropriate trading sanctions be enforced. As noted above, DuPont's policies and practices are entirely aligned with the Council's goals and efforts in this area. Should we identify any relevant information relative to your inquiry we will immediately revert such information to you.

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of the Senior Vice President and General Counsel.

Senior Vice President and General Counsel

Source: The Panel


## Annex 33: Publicly available information on City Hostel Berlin

### 1. Image



Source: The Panel  
(URL: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Tea-Leaves>)

### 2. Screenshot of the website of City Hostel Berlin



https://www.cityhostel-berlin.com/gb/reservation-hostel-online.aspx

ation & Extras Personal Information & Payment

### Price & Availability Calendar - Cityhostel Berlin

Price and availability will be displayed per room type. Please choose your desired category:

Single room with shower and toilet, NON-REFUNDABLE with breakfast


April 2020

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	1	2	3
May 2020						
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24

Source: The Panel

(URL: <https://www.cityhostel-berlin.com/>)

## Annex 34: Advertisement by Terra Residence, located at the address of the DPRK Embassy in Bulgaria



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://www.terraresidence.com/>. The website features a navigation menu with the following items: НАЧАЛО, ЗАЛИ, ГРАДИНИ, ГАЛЕРИЯ, and МЕДИЯ. The main image is a wide-angle shot of a grand, empty hall with a high ceiling, multiple large chandeliers, and several framed artworks on the left wall. Large windows on the right side offer a view of greenery outside.

ЗА НАС:

"Резиденция Тера" е разположена в южната част на София, недалече от Бизнес парк София, в тих район, с изглед към Витоша. Лесно за комуникация местоположение, но същевременно оазис на красота и спокойствие. Заобиколена е от дървесна растителност и зеленина, които придават допълнително усещане за уединение с природата.

Ние сме изцяло на Ваше разположение за да обсъдим всички Ваши идеи и да направим Вашето събитие по начин, който задоволява и най - изтънчения вкус.

С усет към детайлите и прецизни в подготовката сме готови да посрещнем всяко Ваше желание.

Source: <https://www.terraresidence.com/105710421040105810411048.html>)

Advertisement for catering hall, located at the address of the DPRK Embassy in Bulgaria

Младост 1, бул. Андрей Сахаров 56  
Sofia  
1784



**Catering Hall**

Catering hall for all occasions.

Paris Caterers

24 of 24 - Clipboard

Source: <https://www.evepla.com/BG/Sofia/100084117957/Lora-Catering>

**Annex 35: Image of Audi Q7 car in Masikryong resort, DPRK, December 2019**



*Source:* The Panel



## Annex 36: Letter from Audi



AUDI AG - 85045 Ingolstadt - Germany

██████████  
*Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established  
 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874  
 (2009)*

S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.30  
 Your letter of 17 April 2020

I/FS-41

Sign  
 Message  
 Our department/ref.  
 Ext.  
 Fax  
 e-Mail

06.05.2020 Date

**With reference to your request S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.30 of 17 April 2020 regarding the presence of an Audi Q7 model in the DPRK**

██████████  
 We are grateful for your information regarding the presence of the Audi Q7 vehicle in the DPRK. At the same time we regret that this Audi vehicle is subject to a apparent violation of paragraph 8(a)(iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 23 and Annex IV of resolution 2094 (2013), prohibiting the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of luxury automobiles (and motor vehicles)1 to the DPRK. Audi explicitly shares the interest clarify and prevent such activities.

Therefor we would like to provide you with the following information:

- The car shown on the photography is an Audi Q7 model, built from 2012 to 2015
- Prevailing markets for the Audi Q7 are EU, USA and China but in relation to the overall market volume e.g. Australia and Saudi Arabia, too
- There is no special visible customization to be identified based on the photography
- The annual volume of production of this model regularly is close to 100.000 units
- The Q7 is mainly assembled at Volkswagen Slovakia but only sold by AUDI AG; for local market supplies this model was assembled at Volkswagen Group Rus (Kaluga, Russia) and at SAIPL (Aurangabad, India), too. These locally produced vehicles were sold by the local sales organizations in those local markets.

Audi does not supply any cars directly or knowingly indirectly to the DPRK. Furthermore, Audi did not have any evidence for the presence of Audi products in the DPRK yet. At Audi compliance with all applicable national and international export control and sanction regulations is treated as key compliance topic with high management attention. Export compliance is assured by an internal compliance program.

Yours faithfully,

**AUDI AG**

85045 Ingolstadt

Delivery entrance:  
 Ettinger Straße  
 Tor 10

Phone +49 841 89-0  
 www.audi.com

Honorary Chairman of the  
 Supervisory Board:  
 Carl H. Hahn

Chairman of the  
 Supervisory Board:  
 Herbert Diess

Board of Management:  
 Markus Duesmann,  
 Chairman  
 Arno Antlitz  
 Dirk Große-Loheide  
 Peter Kössler  
 Sabine Maaßen  
 Hans-Joachim Rothenpieler  
 Hildegard Wortmann

AUDI Aktiengesellschaft  
 Registered office:  
 Ingolstadt  
 Entered in the  
 Commercial Register of the  
 Local Court of Ingolstadt  
 No. HR B 1

Source: The Panel

### **Annex 37: Chain of supply of luxury cars**

MB Roma, a Daimler dealer, delivered the vehicles on 9 February 2018 to European Cars & More, SRL with a contract condition that they should be registered in the name of the buyer at least for 6 months. European Cars & More, SRL cooperated with the Panel and stated that upon receipt of the vehicles it in fact immediately re-sold them, under a preliminary contract signed in December 2017 (Annex 39), to LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL (a.k.a. LS Logistics & Shipment, Hong Kong) (hereafter Logistica).

The sale included an informal agreement with the client that the cars will be bought back eventually and thus they were not deregistered in Italy. Associated documents stated that the two Mercedes in question were to be exported to Hong Kong on 19 February 2018 (Annex 40). In its answer to the Panel's inquiry, the Netherlands confirmed that the goods were shipped by road from Italy to the Netherlands. Logistica dispatched the vehicles from Rotterdam to Dalian, changing the consignee several times, with eventual destination to DPRK.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> [S/2020/151](#), para. 155.

**Annex 38: Letter from the lawyer of European Cars & More**

*Avv. Paola Zulli*

*Patrocinante dinanzi alle Magistrature Superiori  
Via Pietro Pollidori n°4 - 66034 Lanciano (CH)  
el. 0872.711778 pers. 339-6086512 p.iva: 02138420696 - c.f.: ZLLPLA77A55E435Z*




To:  
DPA-POE1874



Lanciano, 15.07.2020

c.c.



*Ref: European Cars e More s.r.l.; Panel Document dated 20 April, 2020; Panel Document dated May 22, 2020.*

Dear 

following our video telephone conference of July 7, 2020, in order to reply to the specific questions you have done during the call and to give the Panel the information requested, European Cars and More ("European") intends to describe once again the whole operation of the two Mercedes Sedan S600 with Ls Logistica & Spedizioni LTD.

We refer also to your communication dated April 29, 2020 ("Panel Document April 2020") (in annex the communication dated November 19, 2020: "Panel Document November 2019") and your communication dated May 22, 2020 ("Panel Document May 20202) and to the information requested in such communications.

Our letters dated May 8 and May 23, 2020 are be considered integral part of this letter.

A. European Cars & More s.r.l.

European is since 2001 a leader company in High Security armored vehicles and operates on the global market of the security with vehicles certified in the entirety of all the components of armoring and subjected to the ballistic tests of the most qualified international entities.

The excellent international references are inevitably linked to security, reliability, seriousness and the extreme transparency of the service and its economic-commercial relations with all suppliers and customers, exclusively composed of Heads of State, Diplomatic Representatives, National and International Law Enforcement Forces and large industrial groups.

European's main activity is that of the short and long term rental of armoured cars; the cars are purchased by European from excellent car manufacturers and are provided with armor either directly

from the production company or through work carried out on the direct assignment of European.

The sale of armoured cars by European is a secondary and possible activity and is usually carried out after European has owned the cars as the first registration for a reasonable period of time.

In special circumstances, such as those of interest here, when the values of cars are particularly high, it may happen that the sale of cars replaces the rental and is accompanied by buyback pacts taken formally or informally by European.

Cianci Armoring is a brand of European.

European operates through its ceo Mrs. Maria Lucia Paolini and its commercial director Mr. Sandro Cianci.

B. Period 2017 - February 2018.


- 1) European is in contact during 2017 with [REDACTED] with offices in Roma, [REDACTED] in connection with advertising published on website of European.
- 2) During 2017 European signs an cooperation agreement with [REDACTED], with its office in Rome [REDACTED] in person of its legal representative [REDACTED] in order to promote European's activity exclusively in China.
- 3) European does not subscribe any contract with [REDACTED]
- 4) At the end of 2017 [REDACTED] introduces European to LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL with its office in Rome, Viale Charles Lenormant no. 236 ("LS Italia") e to LS LOGISTIC & SHIPPING Ltd with its office in Hong Kong Suite 2301, 23/F Chenamen Hollywood ("LS Hong Kong").
- 5) As checked on Internet, both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] are involved as representatives and shareholders of LS Italia e LS Hong Kong.
- 6) European has been informed by [REDACTED] that he operates for the account of other clients that are interests in European vehicles.

C. The February 2018 Vehicles Operation

1. LS Hong Kong, in person of [REDACTED] phisically present in European offices in Lanciano, subscribes a preliminary agreement ("*contratto preliminare acquisto auto nuova*") (Prot. 121/17/MPL/ds, December 27, 2017) for the two Mercedes S600 Sedan Long Guard VR9 ("Vehicles") (doc. no. 1).
2. European buys the Vehicles from Mercedes Benz Roma on February 8, 2018 at euro 421.926,23 each (doc.no.2) (information in the Certificato Cronologico del Pubblico Registro Automobilistico dated October 8, 2019, Annex 2 e Annex 3 of Panel Document November 2019 in the Panel Document April 2020: doc. no. 3).

3. The acquisition from Mercedes Roma is made as a rental without driver for special use ("*locazione senza conducente per uso speciale*", information in the Certificato Cronologico del Pubblico Registro Automobilistico dated October 8, 2019, Annex 2 e Annex 3 of Panel Document November 2019 in the Panel Document April 2020: doc. no.3).
4. European receives an advance payment from LS Hong Kong of euro 240.000,00 (Payment Order Unicredit: doc. no. 4) and issues invoice no. 4 of January 19, 2018 (doc. no. 5).
5. LS Hong Kong pays euro 960.000,00 on February 7, 2018 (doc. no. 6).
6. European issues invoice no. 9 of February 8, 2018 for the total payment (doc. no.7).
7. The Vehicles are registered on February 9 and 15, 2018 in name of European (see Annex 2 e Annex 3, sub doc. no. 3).
8. European receives instruction from LS Hong Kong on February 12, 2018 in order to the deliver of the Vehicles to personnel appointed by LS Hong Kong (doc. no. 8).
9. European physically delivers the Vehicles to the appointed person on February 19, 2018 (doc. no. 9).
10. European appoints LS Italia for the shipping of the Vehicles and SCL Cargo for the transport by sea from Rotterdam to the final destination HONG KONG (CMR no. 272721 dated 19 February, 2018: doc. no. 10).
11. European makes with the Public Automobilistic Register in Chieti a Complaint of Termination of Movement of the Vehicles on February 12, 2020, giving to the Register the relevant licence plates of the Vehicles (doc. no. 11 e doc. no. 12).

D. Period After February 2018





Vehicle	Car Chassis	Plate	N. Contr.	Date Contr.	Invoice No.	Invoice Date	Delivery	Termination Date
Mercedes S600 Guard	WDD2221761A35648 8	FN035C H	121/17	27/12/17	20	03/04/1 8	13/02/18	10/01/20
Mercedes S650 MAYBACH	WDD2229801A35165 5	FR839RD	62/18	25/06/18	44	07/08/1 8	10/12/18	10/01/20
Mercedes S600 PULLMAN	WDD2229761A33335 7	FN144YT	27/18	06/03/18	49	26/09/1 8	12/03/19	10/01/20

For these three Mercedes the Complaint of the Termination of Movement with PRA has been made on January 10, 2020.

European actually has no more contractual relationship with LS Italia and LS Hong Kong.

The cooperation contract with [REDACTED] has been expired in March 2018.

E. Awareness of the final destination

As the Panel can easily check, European was not initially aware of the final destination of the shipping of the Vehicles. European has been informed by LS representatives only that the final destination should have been China.

Only during the month of February 2018 European has been informed that the Vehicles should have been shipped to Hong Kong.

European declares under its own responsibility that it was aware that the final destination for European was Hong Kong as certified in the official document attached to this letter and no other information has been given to European for what concerns other destination of the Vehicles.

#### F. Further Information

We have been asked to specify any issue concerning the registration of the Vehicles on European name even after the operation made in February 2018.

In general, it should be noted that in the case of export to a non-EU country, the final export of the vehicle obliges the interested party to request the PRA's termination of movement under Art. 103, c. 1, *Codice della Strada*.

The same article of the Codice stipulates that, at the same time as the request, the licence plates and other vehicle documents are returned to the PRA, if the export has not been followed by the re-registration of the vehicle with a foreign number plate.

In the February 2018 operation European had agreed informally with [REDACTED] that the initial transaction was a sale, but had given his willingness to buy back the Vehicles and replace them with new ones, once LS Hong Kong had finished using them or considered replacing them.

In essence, it was a trading transaction with an un formalized buyback agreement.

In this way, European could maintain its commercial relationship with LS Hong Kong in a profitable and ongoing manner.

For these purposes, European kept in its hands the licence plates in order to be able to reuse them on the Vehicles when they would be returned (resold) by LS Hong Kong.

#### G. Final Declaration

European declares under its own responsibility and confirms once again that there has never been any relationship between European, its personnel and managers and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of any Security Council resolution.

European believes to have given any relevant information about its position and its activity in this specific case concerning the February 2018 operation with reference of the Vehicles with LS Hong Kong.

European is confident that it will be beyond any reasonable doubt not considered by the Panel part of any supply chain for the illegal introduction of luxury goods in DPRK and that this conclusion will be confirmed with the publication by the Panel of Expert of a positive Report and noticed to the relevant entities of such case (i.e., Daimler AG, Mercedes Benz Italia e Mercedes Benz Roma, Italian Government).

This letter is addressed for any convenience to the Italian Government representatives.

Yours faithfully



Source: The Panel

## Annex 39: Preliminary contract between European Cars & More and LS Logistics & Shipment



②

Prot. 121/17/MLP/ds

### CONTRATTO PRELIMINARE ACQUISTO AUTO NUOVA

Il sottoscritto Tupone Marco, abitante in Roma, Via Armando Crisciani 72 - 00121 - nato il 09/10/1975 a Roma - Tel. 339 6059612,  
Direttore della società **LS Logistic & Shipping Limited** con sede presso:  
Suite 2301, 23/F Chinachem Hollywood Centre 1-13 Hollywood Road, Hong Kong

### ACQUISTA

presso la sede della: **EUROPEAN CARS & MORE SRL**  
in Lanciano (CH), Via Villa Martelli 299/A  
Telefono +39 872 724440 - Fax +39 872 716567 - email: [commerciale@veicoliblandati.it](mailto:commerciale@veicoliblandati.it)

*EUROPEAN CARS & MORE SRL*

### Due (n. 02) Auto nuove:

- **marca:** MERCEDES BENZ
- **modello:** S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD VR9
- **anno fabbricazione:** modello 2018
- **dotazione e optional:** Vedere allegato A
- **data di consegna:** 09 febbraio 2018
- **prezzo EXW:** € 600.000,00 cadauna (esente IVA)

### Prezzo di acquisto netto :

€ 1.200.000,00 (esente IVA )


Il venditore resta proprietario del veicolo fino all'intero pagamento del prezzo.

### Condizioni di pagamento:

- 20% all'ordine con bonifico bancario
- 80% (saldo) 5 gg prima della consegna della vettura, con bonifico bancario

**Termine di consegna:** come da accordo, la consegna avviene entro e non oltre il 09/02/2018.

European Cars & More Srl  
Sede operativa: Villa Martelli, 299/A - 66034 Lanciano (CH) - T.1 - 39 0872 724440 - Fax - 39 0872 728006  
PIVA 01985340692 - [commerciale@veicoliblandati.it](mailto:commerciale@veicoliblandati.it) - [www.veicoliblandati.it](http://www.veicoliblandati.it)





**In caso di mancata consegna nella data sopra citata (termine di consegna) il Venditore:**

- 1- Pagherà una penale del 10% sul totale fatturato per ogni settimana successiva alla data di consegna non rispettata
- 2- Non potrà recedere, rinegoziare, cancellare e né contestare il contratto stipulato in data 27/12/2017.


**Il venditore garantisce che:**

- la garanzia del venditore viene estesa tramite garanzia supplementare da 2 anni (DL 206/2005) a ..... anni.
- il veicolo dispone della seguente dotazione.....
- il veicolo è completo della seguente documentazione: .....
- certificato C.O.C.,  libretto di manutenzione ordinaria,  .....
- qualsiasi modifica eseguita al veicolo è stata autorizzata con conforme immatricolazione avvenuta
- vengono consegnati nr..... chiavi

Il contratto è soggetto alle disposizioni del C.C.

Lanciano, 27 dicembre 2017

**Firma venditore**



**firma acquirente**



Source: The Panel

Annex 40: Shipping documents of Mercedes to Hong Kong

1 <b>SENDER</b> (optional, name, addr) Expeditor (name, address, postal) Absender (Name, Anschrift, Land)  EUROPEAN CARS & MORE SRL - VIA DEL MARE 141 - LANCIANO, CHIETI, PRESSO LS LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL, VIALE CHARLES LENORMANT 236-00122 ROMA		Codice internazionale Code international Code of carrier Code Praticien N.					
2 <b>DESTINATION</b> (optional, name, addr) Destinataire (name, address, postal) Empfänger (Name, Anschrift, Land)  LS LOGISTICS & SHIPPING LTD - SUITE 2301, 23V CHENAMEN HOLLYWOOD, HONG KONG		LETTERA DI VETTURA INTERNAZIONALE LETTRE DE VOTURE INTERNATIONALE INTERNATIONAL CONSIGNMENT NOTE FRACHTBRIEF - TRANSPORTDOKUMENT  <b>CMR</b>  N. 272721					
3 <b>LOGO</b> (optional, name, addr) Logo (name, address, postal) Zeichnung (Name, Anschrift, Land)  ROTTERDAM PER IMBARCO VIA NAVE		16 <b>TRANSPORT</b> (optional, name, addr) Transporteur (name, address, postal) Frachtkaufmann (Name, Anschrift, Land)  SCL CARGO - WAALSTRAAD 4, 3077 BL ROTTERDAM - 3110427796					
4 <b>INDICI</b> (optional, name, addr) Indices (name, address, postal) Anzeiger (Name, Anschrift, Land)  CHIETI - LANCIANO 19/02/2018		17 <b>TRAVEL</b> (optional, name, addr) Transporteur (name, address, postal) Frachtkaufmann (Name, Anschrift, Land)  VIA NAVE - MSC					
5 <b>DOCUMENTS</b> (optional) Documents (optional) Dokumente (optional)  FATTURA COMMERCIALE		18 <b>RESERVE</b> (optional, name, addr) Reserve (name, address, postal) Vorbehalt (Name, Anschrift, Land)					
6 <b>CONTINENT</b> (optional) Continent (optional) Kontinent (optional)	7 <b>NUMBER</b> (optional) Number (optional) Nummer (optional)	8 <b>WEIGHT</b> (optional) Weight (optional) Gewicht (optional)	9 <b>DESCRIPTION</b> (optional) Description (optional) Beschreibung (optional)	10 <b>NET WEIGHT</b> (optional) Net weight (optional) Nettogewicht (optional)	11 <b>NET WEIGHT</b> (optional) Net weight (optional) Nettogewicht (optional)	12 <b>TOTAL</b> (optional) Total (optional) Gesamt (optional)	
13 <b>INSTRUCTIONS</b> (optional) Instructions (optional) Anweisungen (optional)  MERCE INVIATA VIA CAMION A ROTTERDAM PER FUTURO IMBARCO NAVE CON DESTINAZIONE HONG KONG		19 <b>EXTRA</b> (optional) Extra (optional) Zusatz (optional)		20 <b>REMARKS</b> (optional) Remarks (optional) Bemerkungen (optional)		15 <b>DATE</b> (optional) Date (optional) Datum (optional)	
21 <b>COMPLIANT</b> (optional) Compliant (optional) Angehört (optional)  MARCO TURONE		22 <b>LOGISTICA &amp; SPEDIZIONI S.r.l.</b> V.le Charles Lenormant, 236/240 00139 Roma (RM) Tel. 06 5652268 - Fax 06 5650933 C.F. 01747060967		23 <b>DATE</b> (optional) Date (optional) Datum (optional)  CHIETI - 19/02/2018		14 <b>EXTRA</b> (optional) Extra (optional) Zusatz (optional)	

Source: The Panel

## Annex 41: T Specialist and its link with a DPRK national

On 26 June 2020, the Singapore authorities charged Sherly Muliawan, shipping manager at T Specialist (79 counts) and Lam Hon Lan, secretary at SCN (43 counts) under its domestic law to implement relevant UNSCRs (Annexes 42 and 43). In June 2020 the sentence was handed down to Li Hyon, national of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, son of Pyongyang-based Li Ik. He served as his DPRK-based father's business representative in Singapore and, as charged, facilitated at least 14 orders of luxury goods worth over 400,000 SGD (\$280,000) through T Specialist and SCN, making orders and payments, monitoring shipments, and even hand-delivering the goods to DPRK.<sup>32</sup> He received a jail sentence, which has already been served by that time, and in July 2020 departed Singapore.<sup>33</sup>

*Source:* The Panel

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<sup>32</sup> <https://www.nknews.org/2020/06/north-korean-receives-four-week-jail-sentence-in-singaporean-luxury-goods-case/?t=1592987812340>

<sup>33</sup> For the court sentence, see State Courts of the Republic of Singapore, *Public Prosecutor v. Ng Kheng Wah, T Specialist International (S) Pte. Ltd. and Wang Zhiguo*, Case No. [2019] SGDC 249, Judgment, 22 November 2019.

## Annex 42: The letter from the Permanent Mission of Singapore to the UN



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE  
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

15 July 2020

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator  
Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

[REDACTED]

I refer to our previous letter dated 13 May 2020 to the Panel, which updated the Panel that the Singapore authorities were taking action against SCN Singapore Pte Ltd ("SCN") for supplying luxury goods to the DPRK in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, and our correspondence with the Panel since 2017 in respect of SCN, T Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd ("T Specialist"), and related entities and individuals.

On 26 June 2020, the Singapore authorities charged Sherly Muliawan, shipping manager at T Specialist (79 counts) and Lam Hon Lan, secretary at SCN (43 counts) under Regulation 14(1)(c)(i) read with Regulation 16(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 for failing to provide information to the Singapore authorities in respect of the supply of prohibited luxury goods to the DPRK. The charge sheets for Sherly Muliawan and Lam Hon Lan are enclosed.

We hope the information provided will be helpful to the work of the Panel. Singapore remains committed in our efforts to implement our obligations under the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and will continue to be of assistance to the Panel where possible.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. Tang'.

**JOPHIE TANG**  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enc.

318 East 48th Street, New York, NY 10017, United States of America | T +1 (212) 826 0840 | F +1 (212) 826 2964 | [info.gps@newyork.org](mailto:info.gps@newyork.org)

Source: Member State

## Annex 43: Press-release by Singaporean Police force

### TWO PERSONS CHARGED WITH FAILURE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION RELATING TO THE SUPPLY OF DESIGNATED LUXURY ITEMS TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Two women, a 40-year-old Singaporean and a 41-year-old Singapore Permanent Resident, were charged in court on 26 June 2020 with failure to provide information to the Police relating to the supply of designated luxury items to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in contravention of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010.

Investigations by the Commercial Affairs Department revealed that SCN Singapore Pte Ltd, Laurich International Pte Ltd and Sindok Trading Pte Ltd, had supplied designated luxury items, which included precious jewellery and watches with precious metals, to the DPRK on 43 occasions between 27 December 2010 and 18 November 2016. The 40-year-old woman was an employee of SCN Singapore Pte Ltd and handled administrative work for Laurich International Pte Ltd and Sindok Trading Pte Ltd. The 41-year-old woman was an employee of T Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd, which had supplied designated luxury items to the DPRK on 79 occasions between 23 November 2010 and 5 January 2017.

Despite having information about the prohibited transactions made by the companies which they worked for, both women failed to provide the Police with the information. They were charged with 43 and 79 counts of breaches of Regulation 14(1)(c)(i) read with Regulation 16(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 respectively. T Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd had earlier been fined \$380,000 on 22 November 2019 while the court proceedings for the three other companies are ongoing.

The United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 prohibits any person in Singapore or citizen of Singapore outside Singapore from supplying, selling or transferring, directly or indirectly, any designated luxury item to any person in the DPRK. Anyone in Singapore and any citizen of Singapore outside Singapore who has information about any property of persons designated by the United Nations, any transaction of such property or any transaction prohibited by the Regulations should immediately inform the Police and provide such information relating to the transaction. If convicted of an offence under the United Nations Act for breaching these regulations, the accused person can be jailed for up to five years (if the offence was committed before 10 March 2014) or 10 years (if the offence was committed on or after 10 March 2014); or fined; or both.

Anyone with information relating to such cases may call the Police hotline at 1800- 255-0000, or submit information online at [www.police.gov.sg/iwitness](http://www.police.gov.sg/iwitness). Please dial '999' if you require urgent Police assistance.

Singapore takes its obligations under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions seriously. We will not hesitate to take action against any individual or entity that breaches our laws and regulations.

**PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT**  
**SINGAPORE POLICE FORCE**  
26 June 2020 @ 5:00 PM

*Source:* Member State

**Annex 44: Travel record of Kim Tong Chol**

According to Angola, Kim Tong Chol entered Angolan territory on 8 August 2018, covered by the official visa 000459212/CNB/18. He came from Ethiopia, on the Ethiopian Airlines flight ET854, which arrived at 1:11 pm. He left Namibia on 24 August 2018 on the Air Namibia flight SW173 to Windhoek, that departed at 9:10am.

The DPRK passport information used by Mr. Kim for entry to Angola is as follows:

Passport number: 108120258

Issued date: 14 February 2018

Expiration date: 14 February 2023

To address this issue, Angola took additional internal measures to prevent similar situations from occurring in the future.

**Reference: immigration record of Kim Tong Chol**

Date	Entry/Exit	Passport number	Passport type
23/09/2017	Exit from Namibia	927234267	Ordinary
<b>08/08/2018</b>	<b>Exit from Ethiopia</b>	Not confirmed	Not confirmed
<b>08/08/2018</b>	<b>Enter to Angola</b>	<b>108120258</b>	<b>Service</b>
<b>24/08/2018</b>	<b>Exit from Angola</b>	<b>108120258</b>	<b>Service</b>
24/08/2018	Entry to Namibia	108120258	Service
30/04/2019	Exit from Namibia	108120258	Service
07/05/2019	Entry to Namibia	108120258	Service
17/05/2019	Exit from Namibia	108120258	Service

Note: bold items were newly confirmed by a Member State

Source: The Panel, Member States

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**Annex 45: Possible procurement of statue in Benin and Guinea****Benin**

The Panel obtained information indicating that Mansudae is involved in a project to build a 15-30-meter-high bronze statue in Benin, which is intended to be completed in August 2020. The company is likely to have used another name and identity for this contract. The Panel has not received reply to its enquiry to Benin.

**Guinea**

According to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea planned to sell a bronze statue of former President Ahmed Sékou Touré to Guinea. The cost of the statue was believed to be approximately USD 50,000 and it was to be constructed outside of Guinea and transported via Conakry Port for installation in Guinea. The delivery was likely to be mid-2020. The Panel considers Mansudae may be involved in this project, obfuscating its identity. The Panel has not received reply to its enquiry to Guinea.

## Annex 46: List of DPRK trading corporations subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department (MID, KPe.028)

Kuryonggang Trading Corporation (구룡강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Ryungseong Trading Corporation (룡성무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Tangun Trading Corporation (단군무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Hangryon Trading Corporation (항련무역회사)	
Ryonbong General Corporation (련봉총회사)	*alias of KPe.002
5 Trading Corporation (5 무역회사)	
Pugang Trading Corporation (부강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.038
Mirae Trading Corporation (미래무역회사)	
Ryonhap Trading Corporation (련합무역회사)	
Advanced Technology Trading Corporation (첨단기술무역회사)	
Jinhung Joint Production Corporation (진흥합작회사)	
Sobaeksu United Corporation (소백수련합회사)	
Pihosan Trading Corporation (비호산무역회사)	
Sinhung IT Trading Corporation (신흥정보기술무역회사)	
Chonryong Trading General Corporation (천룡무역총회사)	
Taesong Trading Corporation (태성무역회사)	*alias of KPe.041
Peace Motors Corporation (평화자동차회사)	
Taeryonggang Trading Corporation (대령강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.004
Korea Changgwangsan Trading Corporation	

*Source:* Member States, The Panel

\*KPe.008: Korea Tangun Trading Corporation (조선단군무역회사)

\*KPe.002: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (조선련봉무역회사)

\*KPe.038: Korea Pugang Trading Corporation (조선부강무역회사)

\*KPe.041: Korea Taesong Trading Corporation (조선태성무역회사)

\*KPe.004: Namchongang Trading Corporation (남천강무역회사)



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**Annex 47: Member State information on *modus operandi* of DPRK IT workers in China and Russia**

According to information from a Member State, as of December 2019, groups of information technology workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea – usually composed of ten to twenty individuals – were earning USD 100,000 or more per month in China. According to the information, many additional instances of information technology workers subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department entering China were observed in 2019, and hundreds of them were still working in China as of March 2020, illicitly gaining access to freelance platform accounts in the names of third country individuals.

According to information from the Member State, multiple groups of Democratic People's Republic of Korea workers including information technology workers subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department entered Russia in 2019 for the purposes of work and continued to work in 2020. According to the information, as of late 2019, groups of IT workers in Russia were averaging a per-person monthly revenue of \$5,000-\$6,000, and reportedly utilize false, foreign identities in order to access information technology work freelance platforms, cryptocurrency exchanges, and payment websites.

*Source:* Member State


#### **Annex 48: Roles of the DPRK's General Staff Department, Reconnaissance General Bureau, and the Ministry of State Security in DPRK cyber operations**

According to information from a Member State, the General Staff Department, the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Ministry of State Security have different roles in planning and execution of cyberattacks by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The General Staff Department is the umbrella organization of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and does not conduct malicious cyber activities itself. The Reconnaissance General Bureau conducts hacking activities for the purpose of information theft and financial gain, and the Ministry of State Security mainly carries out cyber campaigns against Democratic People's Republic of Korea refugees and relevant organizations to steal information related to the security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Ministry of State Security are assumed to have different targets based on their duties, and no case has been found where the two entities have divided or coordinated their roles in planning or initiating cyberattacks.

*Source:* Member State


**Annex 49: Documents concerning Mr. Han Kwang Song's contracts****(1) Email dated 25 February 2020 from Juventus to al-Duhail concerning transfer fee**

However, in accordance with the Transfer Agreement dated 7 January 2020 and signed by our Clubs, the payment of Euro 7.000.000,00 already fell due on 6 February 2020.

Therefore we hereby request the immediate payment of the above mentioned sum.

Source: The Panel

(2) Contract of Mr. Han Kwang Song with Al-Duhail for total amount of EUR. 4,310, 000 NET payment and bonuses dated 5 January 2020 (excerpt)



**شركة نادي الدحيل الرياضي**  
**ALDUHAIL SC CO.**  
 Email : duhailsc@duhailsc.qa | www.duhailsc.com

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**Football Player's Contract SCHEDULE**

1. The Club shall pay to the Player the total amount of EUR, 4,3 10,000 NET (Four Million Three Hundred and Ten Thousand Euros) as follows:

**FIRST SEASON: (2019/2020)**

(i) A monthly salary of EUR 90,000 NET (Ninety Thousand Euros) shall be paid through equal and 5 monthly instalments by the Club to the Player on or before the end of each calendar month from 01/02/2019 through 30/06/2020;

**SECOND SEASON: (2020/2021)**

(iii) An advanced payment of EUR 300,000 NET (Three Hundred Thousand Euros) shall be paid by the Club to the Player on 01/09/2020;

(iv) A monthly salary of EUR 66,500 NET (Sixty Six Thousand Five Hundred Euros) shall be paid through equal and 10 monthly instalments by the Club to the Player on or before the end of each calendar month from 01/08/2020 through 30/05/2021;

**THIRD SEASON: (2021/2022)**

(v) An advanced payment of EUR 300,000 NET (Three Hundred Thousand Euros) shall be paid by the Club to the Player on 01/09/2020;

(vi) A monthly salary of EUR 66,500 NET (Sixty Six Thousand Five Hundred Euros) shall be paid through equal and 10 monthly instalments by the Club to the Player on or before the end of each calendar month from 01/08/2021 through 30/05/2022;

**FOURTH SEASON: (2022/2023)**


(v) An advanced payment of EUR 300,000 NET (Three Hundred Thousand Euros) shall be paid by the Club to the Player on 01/09/2022;

(vi) A monthly salary of EUR 66,500 NET (Sixty Six Thousand Five Hundred Euros) shall be paid through equal and 10 monthly instalments by the Club to the Player on or before the end of each calendar month from 01/08/2022 through 30/05/2023;

**FIFTH SEASON: (2023/2024)**

(v) An advanced payment of EUR 300,000 NET (Three Hundred Thousand Euros) shall be paid by the Club to the Player on 01/09/2023;

(vi) A monthly salary of EUR 66,500 NET (Sixty Six Thousand Five Hundred Euros) shall be paid through equal and 10 monthly instalments by the Club to the Player on or before the end of each calendar month from 01/08/2023 through 30/05/2024;



**ALDUHAIL SC**

**شركة نادي الدحيل الرياضي**  
**ALDUHAIL SC CO.**  
 Email : duhailsc@duhailsc.qa | www.duhailsc.com

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2. The Player shall also be entitled to the following bonuses provided that he has participated in the competition:

- (i) EUR 30,000 (Thirty Thousand Euros) in the event the Club becomes the winner (champion) of Qatar Star League;
- (ii) EUR 15,000 (Fifteen Thousand Euros) in the event the Club becomes the winner (champion) of Emir Cup;
- (iii) EUR 60,000 (Sixty Thousand Euros) in the event the Club becomes the winner (champion) of the Asian Champions League;
- (iv) EUR 15,000 (Fifteen Thousand Euros) in the event the Player Scores 15 goals in official league matches for the (QNB League ).
- (v) EUR 15,000 (Fifteen Thousand Euros) in the even the Player assists 15 goals in official league matches for the (QNB League ).

Both Parties agree that all the above-mentioned bonuses will be entirely awarded to the Player if the Club terminates this Contract without just cause, or in case of termination for just cause or with settlement agreement if such objective is achieved. In this case, bonuses will be paid after the date of termination of this Contract.

Bonuses are paid 30 days after the achievement of the objective.


3. The Club will purchase 4 (Four) business class return air tickets from Doha to North Korea to be used by the Player and his family.

4. Throughout the duration of this Contract, the Club will provide reasonably suitable furnished accommodation including utilities (not including telephone, cable subscriptions or internet) in Doha for the use of the Player and (if applicable) his spouse and his children while this Contract is still in force. Should the player prefer, a housing allowance of 20,000 Qatari Riyals per month can instead be provided.

5. The Club while this Contract is in force, shall provide the Player with a suitable vehicle for transportation, for use by the Player during his employment by the Club.


6. The Club shall not be entitled to make any Qatar income tax deductions from the Player's financial entitlements under this Contract. "Qatar income tax" shall mean "tax that may be levied by the Government of the State of Qatar on the income of individuals in the State of Qatar". The Parties acknowledge that presently, there is no Qatar income tax enforced in the State of Qatar.

In concluding this Contract, the following have acted as intermediary of the Player.



**AL DUHAIL SPORT CLUB**

Doha, 5<sup>th</sup> January 2020



Mr. [Redacted]  
 Intermediary of the Player

**Kwang Song Han**

Source: The Panel

**(3) Transfer of Mr. Han Kwang Song's payment from February to April 2020**

*Translated from Arabic*

**Alduhail SC Co.**

Date: 22 April 2020  
Ref.: *alif mim* 2397/2020

Subject: Bank transfer

Sir,

Alduhail Sports Club Company presents its warmest compliments to you. With regard to the above-mentioned subject, please ask your competent officials to transfer the sum of €270,000 (two hundred and seventy thousand euros) to cover salary for the months of February, March and April 2020 from the account that Alduhail Sports Club maintains with you [REDACTED] to:

<i>Player name</i>	<i>Bank name</i>	<i>A/C number EUR</i>	<i>Amount €</i>
Kwang Song Han	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	270,000

Please advise that you have received this and that the transfer has been carried out.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], Alduhail Sports Club Company

Source: The Panel

(4) Pledge submitted by Mr. Han Kwang Song to a Qatari bank, at which he has an account, not to transfer money to the DPRK

Date: 01/02/2020

**To whom it concern**

**Subject: Endorsement and pledged**

**To : Masraf Al Rayan**

With reference to the above subject, I,

**Mr. KWANG SONG HAN**



Nationality/ People's Republic of Korea( North Korea)  
- Passport No. / 108132871,

Declared that I will not work to transfer any money  
cost or amount to North Korea in any cases.

I acknowledge to the above mentioned ....

Thanks .....

Name: *HAN Kwang Song*

Signature:  

Source: The Panel





## Annex 50: Profile of Mr. Pak Kwang Ryong on team website as of June 2020

DATEN		
<b>PROFIS</b> MANNSCHAFT	<b>1,88 M</b> KÖRPERGRÖSSE	<b>1992-09-27</b> GEBURTSDATUM
<b>19</b> RÜCKENNUMMER	<b>-</b> GEWICHT	<b>WAAGE</b> STERNZEICHEN
<b>2017</b> SPIELER SEIT	<b>PYONGJANG</b> GEBURTSORT	<b>LAUSANNE SPORT</b> VORHERIGER VEREIN

WEITERE PROFIS

Source: website of SKN St. Pölten, <https://www.skn-stpoelten.at/de/teams/profis/kader/66243590-85a6-4e87-a418-3aaaf1e1d6c2> (accessed on 3 June 2020)

## **Annex 51: Repatriation of DPRK nationals conducted by Angolan government**

In a letter dated 17 July 2020, Angola replied to the Panel with the following information concerning medical workers and other DPRK nationals earning income in Angola.

### **(1) Renunciation of bilateral cooperation with the DPRK in the health sector**

According to Angola, based on a bilateral cooperation agreement in the health sector with the DPRK, DPRK doctors of various specialties were hired in Angola to provide services to the national health system.

However, in compliance with the relevant resolutions, in particular paragraph 8 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), Angola renounced the bilateral cooperation agreement in the field of health with the DPRK and consequently, repatriated the doctors, other professionals and their families.

### **(2) Repatriation of the DPRK nationals earning income overseas**

Between November 2019 and February 2020, Angola repatriated 296 DPRK nationals according to resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#) . In addition, the authorities have implemented more strict administrative measures to prevent the issuance of work visas for DPRK nationals.

With the aim of adapting national migration procedures to current requirements, Angola approved Law 13/19 (23 May 2019) on the Legal Framework for Foreign Citizens in Angola, which reinforces the additional requirements for citizens of countries under international sanctions, in line with Security Council resolutions.

Also, Presidential Decrees No. 79/17 (24 April 2017) and 43/17 (6 March 2017) which alter some provisions of the General Labor Law, establish new rules applicable to the Professional Activity of Non-Resident Foreign Workers.

As of 14 July 2020, there is no record of DPRK citizens exercising lucrative professional activities (medical and other) in Angola.

## (3) List of DPRK nationals repatriated from Angola

Nº	NOME	APELIDO	Nº PASSAPORTE	NACIONALIDADE	LOCAL DE SAÍDA	DATA DE SAÍDA	HORA	DESTINO	NUMERO DO BILHETE
1	YONG OK	PAK	108335854	N.COREANA	LUANDA	30.10.2019	16:27		
2	KYONG CHAE	KANG	108232013	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:31	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987643-1
3	JI YONG	RI	108335720	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:33	DUBAI	04:45
4	JONG OK	PAK	654434405	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:36	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987615-1
5	HO CHOL	RI	108439320	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	04:45
6	MI OK	JONG	745434581	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:37	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK0308 1762415027002-2
7	NAM CHOL	RI	7453342266	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987648-1
8	YONG AE	RO	745436816	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:39		
9	SONG CHOL	PAK	8362389164	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:48		
10	UN HUI	SONG	745431173	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:52	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987609-1
11	SONG GOL	KIM	1083356404	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:52	DUBAI	EK794
12	HYE SUK	KANG	108335875	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:53	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987603-1
13	SONG CHOL	RO	745335682	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:08	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987607-1
14	HYONG THAE	JONG	7453356911	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987612.1
15	JONG OK	PAK	7454368371	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762411887615-1
16	HWA SUK	JANG	1084393275	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987610-1
17	CHANG HO	RIM	1084393264	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK794 1762411987606
18	JONG HO	KIM	7453341922 6	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK0308 1762411987613-2
19	MYONG HWA	SONG	745431155	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:10	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK794 1762415027082
20	JANG SIK	SIN	745334195	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:12	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK308 1762415027074
21	TOK JAE	HO	745334239	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:12	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK/ETKT 1762415027069
22	SON	JONG	745431168	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:14	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
23	YONG SUK	KIM	8361306065	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:15	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK794 1762415027071
24	CHAN GO	JON	927134579	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:16	DUBAI	04:45
25	CHANG SIK	MUN	927134049	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:19	DUBAI	EK/ETKT 1762415027088
26	CHUN WOL	SIN	927134049	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:20	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK794
27	HYANG RAN	RI	108335855	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:21	DUBAI	04:45
28	JONG HWA	KIM	745334451	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:24	DUBAI	04:45
29	SONG GWON	JANG	745334213	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:24	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK794 1762425027111
30	YONG SU	HAN	7453356922	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:45	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
31	MYONG CHOL	MUN	108230436	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:29	DUBAI	04:45
32	HYON SUK	RI	745436801	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:39	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK308 1762415027100
33	MUN SAM	PAK	745334205	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:30	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK794 1762425027209
34	YONG HO	KIM	745334196	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:30	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK794 1762415027087
35	YONG HUI	KIM	745436822	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:31	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK/ETKT 1762415027079
36	HYON SUK	JANG	745436805	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	16:32	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027084
37	TO MIN	CHOE	745334244	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:16	DUBAI	EK794
38	MOK RAN	HYON	836434652	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:16	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027152-1
39	OK SUN	KIM	745431166	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:17	DUBAI	
40	KANG CHOL	HAN	836237966	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:17	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027149-1
41	CHAN OK	RI	7454368393	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	
42	HUN SONG	KO	7453342185	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027122-1
43	KUM OK	KIM	836131964	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:24	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027200-1
44	JONG AE	RYANG	7454368212	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027162-1
45	KWANG SIK	HWANG	745334164	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:25	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027159-1
46	HUI RYOL	SONG	745431135	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:27	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027163-1
47	UNG IL	CHOE	7453342451	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794
48	MYONG CHOL	HONG	7453342026	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027196-1
49	KWANG CHOL	HYON	7453342004	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:305	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027151-1
50	UN HAN	HONG	7454368186	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794
51	HYANG RAN	KIM	7454368304	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027199-1

52	MYONG SIK	KIM	745334201	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	15:35	DUBAI	EK794
53	TAE HUNG	KIM	7454358071	N.COREANA	LUANDA	01.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027161-1
54	SONG HUI	CHOE	1083358800	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027207-1
55	HYON SIK	RI	1083355784	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027232-1
56	SUN OK	SONU	108335888	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	14:46	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027235-1
57	HYON CHOL	HWANG	108335584	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	14:47	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027208-1
58	KYE RYONG	JONG	108335586	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	14:54	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027229-1
59	HONG RAN	SIN	108335879	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	14:55	DUBAI	EK0308 1762415027234-2
60	KYONG AE	HAN	927433862	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:02	DUBAI	EK0308 1762415027221-2
61	HUI CHOL	KIM	927433863	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:03	DUBAI	K794 1762415027223-1
62	RAK JU	PAK	745334227	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:05	DUBAI	04:45
63	YONG SIL	PAK	745436813	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:07	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027231-1
64	SONG HWAN	JO	108335580	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:11	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027228-1
65	SUN AE	RI	654434404	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:12	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027233-1
66	YONG SUK	RI	108335868	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:12	DUBAI	
67	WON JUN	PYON	108335723	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:14	DUBAI	EK308
68	JONG HWA	KIM	108335864	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:20	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027224-1
69	MYONG NAM	HONG	927134041	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:21	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027222-1
70	SUK HUI	CHOE	108335862	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:21	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027220-1
71	SANG IL	RI	927134039	N.COREANA	LUANDA	03.12.2019	15:22	DUBAI	EK794 1762415027226-1
72	YONG NAM	KIM	836130060	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:10		
73	JONG HO	KIM	927231186	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:10	DUBAI/BEIJING	EK0308 17624119876132
74	HYE SUN	JU	927339400	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:10		
75	SON OK	KIM	836131966	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:12		
76	SUN HUI	AN	165900032	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:12		
77	IN SUN	O	927334851	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:15		
78	SONG OK	KIM	745336371	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:15		
79	JONG GIL	HAN	927134580	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:19		
80	JONG HO	JANG	108232006	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:19		
81	SONG HUI	KIM	745431150	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:20		
82	KYONG HUI	MUN	927339390	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:21		
83	SONG HAK	RI	927231184	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:22		

84	HYON SU	KIM	745436836	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
85	MYONG SOK	HAN	927134054	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:23		
86	HYE SUN	PAK	836130610	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:25	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
87	MYONG SUK	SON	108232026	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:26		
88	CHANG SUK	HO	165900029	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:27		
89	YONG HO	MUN	927134040	N.COREANA	LUANDA	08.12.2019	15:29		
90	JONG HUN	PAK	9273337042	N.COREANA	LUANDA	15.12.2019	09:55		
91	SUB OK	YUN	8362377332	N.COREANA	LUANDA	15.12.2019	09:56		
92	KWANG HO	HAN	8362388961	N.COREANA	LUANDA	15.12.2019	09:56		
93	TONG CHOL	HYON	8362382567	N.COREANA	LUANDA	15.12.2019	09:58		
94	TOK MAN	KIM	9273337019	N.COREANA	LUANDA	15.12.2019	10:00		
95	HYON SU	PAK	927433717	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:20	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
96	SONG HI	RIM	927339392	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:20	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
97	HONG RYOL	CHOE	927234015	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:22	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
98	HO IL	RI	927231182	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:22		
99	HYE JONG	KIM	108334775	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:24	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
100	KYONG IL	YUN	927231181	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:25	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
101	TONG HUN	PAK	927134517	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:25	DUBAI	04:45
102	CHUN HWA	PAK	108335859	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:28		
104	TONG SU	AN	836238249	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:31	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
105	KWANG SU	PAK	108232016	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:35	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
106	YONG SUK	CHA	108232027	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:35	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
107	KI HONG	RA	745431677	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:43	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
108	OK GUM	KIM	836131965	N.COREANA	LUANDA	16.12.2019	15:43	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
109	SONG GUK	CHOE	927134042	N.COREANA	LUANDA	17.12.2019	15:05	DUBAI	04:45
110	SONG CHAN	KIM	108232010	N.COREANA	LUANDA	17.12.2019	15:05	DUBAI	04:45
111	CHONG DOK	HA	836238871	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	11:25	ADDIS ABABA	
112	IN GYU	KANG	927134052	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:46	ADDIS ABABA	
113	HYE YONG	SON	836135809	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:48	ADDIS ABABA	
114	CHOL	IM	836238901	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:50	ADDIS ABABA/BEIJING	17:20
115	HO SONG	KIM	836238251	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:51	ADDIS ABABA	

116	KUN YE	KIM	745434597	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:51	ADDIS ABABA/BEIJING	17:20
117	UN CHOL	KIM	745334179	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:53	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
118	IL SUNG	PAK	745130600	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:54	ADDIS ABABA/BEIJING	17:20
119	KYUN YO	JANG	836135810	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:55	ADDIS ABABA	
120	THAE YONG	AN	836135811	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:56	ADDIS ABABA	
121	KYONG HUN	RO	836238252	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:56		
122	SUN CHOL	HYON	745334246	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	12:57	ADDIS ABABA	
123	KYONG CHOL	KIM	836238904	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:00	ADDIS ABABA	
124	YONG NAM	SONG	836238910	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:01	ADDIS ABABA	
125	HUI OK	KIM	836131962	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:04	ADDIS ABABA	
126	IL NAM	KIM	745335690	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:04	ADDIS ABABA	
127	IL NAM	HONG	836238519	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:05	ADDIS ABABA	
128	PONG HUI	HAM	836434648	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:05	ADDIS ABABA	
129	SONG HUI	HONG	836434644	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:27	ADDIS ABABA/BEIJING	17:20
130	HYOK CHOL	SON	836238514	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:28	ADDIS ABABA	
131	THAE WON	CHOE	927134050	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:28	ADDIS ABABA	
132	JONG SIL	WI	836131088	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:29	ADDIS ABABA	
133	CHUN WOL	KIM	836130609	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:29	ADDIS ABABA	
134	PYONG JUN	YUN	836238255	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:30	ADDIS ABABA	
135	YONG GUK	JO	836237968	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:31	ADDIS ABABA	
136	KUM SIL	JANG	836434645	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:31	ADDIS ABABA	
137	KWANG CHOL	RI	108439317	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:33	ADDIS ABABA	
138	SANG CHOL	KIM	836238895	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:33	ADDIS ABABA	
139	SU GYONG	SON	108439318	N.COREANA	LUANDA	19.12.2019	13:38	ADDIS ABABA	
140	HYOK CHOL	KIM	927435733	N.COREANA	LUANDA	22.12.2019	15:48	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
141	CHANG HO	KIM	108330109	N.COREANA	LUANDA	22.12.2019	15:49	DUBAI	04:45
142	MIN CHOL	KIM	927134581	N.COREANA	LUANDA	22.12.2019	16:22		
143	SONG CHOL	PAK	109110062	N.COREANA	LUANDA	15.12.2019	07:45	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
144	YONG SUK	CHOE	745436817	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.12.2019	15:04	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30

145	HYE RIM	SUNG	745436811	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.12.2019	15:04	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
146	UN OK	CHOE	927339401	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.11.2019	15:05	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
147	MYONG CHOL	KIM	745334214	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.11.2019	15:10	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
148	JONG SUK	PAK	836130607	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.11.2019	15:11	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
149	YONG BOK	YUN	927231185	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.11.2019	15:11	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
150	CHOL YONG	KANG	745334228	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.11.2019	15:16	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
151	CHANG SIK	JONG	927134044	N.COREANA	LUANDA	24.11.2019	15:16	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
152	JONG HYANG	RYU	745436842	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:22	DUBAI	04:45
153	SONG JIN	RI	108439321	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	15:24	DUBAI	04:45
154	YUN GYONG	JANG	9274336536	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794
155	JONG SU	KYE	9274336525	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	04:45
156	MYONG HUI	RI	1082320240	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	EK794 1762411987647-1
157	HYE YONG	O	7454311713	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	04:45
158	IN YONG	PAK	6544344114	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	04:45
159	KUM BOK	HAN	7454368201	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI	04:45
160	JON GHO	RIM	745334192	N.COREANA	LUANDA	26.11.2019	16:36	DUBAI	04:45
161	HYON SU	KIM	745334232	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:28	DUBAI	04:45
162	SUNG HAK	HONG	745436814	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
163	SUNG RYONG	PAEK	9271345160	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	18:05	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
164	SU SON	RI	7451306200	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:34	DUBAI	04:45
165	YONG NAM	KIM	745130605	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:49	DUBAI	04:45
166	YONG RIM	KIM	7453342314	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:52	DUBAI	04:45
167	SON YONG	KANG	7454368094	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:53	DUBAI	04:45
168	SON YONG	RI	7454346009	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:55	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
169	HYE SUK	YANG	927339386	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:58	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
170	SONG IL	MUN	7453342417	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	15:59	DUBAI	04:45
171	SUN HUI	HYON	745436799	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:03	DUBAI	04:45
172	KWANG SU	RI	9271340383	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:07	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
173	JUN HO	CHOE	7453341719	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:09	DUBAI	04:45
174	MYONG HWAN	KIM	7453341971	N.COREANA	LUANDA	28.11.2019	16:32	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30
175	KUM SON	CHOE	745431172	N.COREANA	LUANDA	29.11.2019	11:13		
176	CHOL U	RI	108232007	N.COREANA	LUANDA	29.11.2019	11:14	DUBAI/BEIJING	22:30

Source: The Panel

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**Annex 52: Medical workers in Province of Pichincha, Ecuador**

The Panel requested information from Ecuador concerning agreement to invite medical workers from the DPRK. The Government of Pichincha province replied to the Panel that the exchange is based on the “International Cooperation Agreement to Strengthen Relations between the Korean Institute of International Cultural Relations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Decentralized Autonomous Government of the Province of Pichincha, and the Board of Trustees of Pichincha” originally agreed in 2012.

In May 2018, the delegation of three DPRK acupuncturists and three translators arrived at Ecuador to provide their services in a public company, Misión Pichincha in Pichincha province. Their mission was supposed to end in May 2020, and as of April 2020 no renewal was planned. Pichincha province emphasized that it was unaware of the obligation to repatriate DPRK nationals earning income overseas as it was not notified by the Ecuadorian Government.

### **Annex 53: DPRK medical workers in Mozambique**

Mozambique replied to the Panel that a DPRK doctor, Dr. Jong Il Son, assigned to the Pemba Provincial Hospital for medical cooperation, used his residence in Pemba, Cabo Delgado Province, as a private clinic without government authorization. His residence was leased by Mozambique government, and equipment was misappropriated from the provincial hospital. The government ordered the closure of the clinic and preventive suspension of the doctor, followed by immediate termination of his employment contract and repatriation.

According to Mozambique, as of March 2020, 97 DPRK doctors worked in Mozambique, based on bilateral medical cooperation. Although medical exchange is not prohibited by the relevant resolutions, Mozambique decided cancellation of exchange and is planning to reduce the number of DPRK doctors by not renewing contracts. The Panel obtained the contract information for 89 doctors and noted that these contracts will be terminated in 2020 or 2021.

Mozambique further replied to the Panel “The Government understands that it is not viable to immediately terminate contracts in order to avoid the discontinuation of medical assistance in remote areas, however, internal diligences are taking place with a view to identifying potential partners who may provide support in replacing the doctors.”



**Annex 54: DPRK visa numbers published by the Russian Federation in April 2020**

Invitations issued	Visas issued	MIGRATION REGISTRATION									
		The number of facts of registration with the migration register of Ig and LBG	including:								
			at the place of residence	at the place of stay	including:						
					primary	of which by purpose of entry:					
						tourism	study	job	private	other	
1,738	1,596	9,377	10	9,367	6,956	3,067	1,975	753	403	758	

Source: Website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation <<https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/Deljatelnost/statistics/migracionnaya/item/20020743/>>. (accessed on 24 April 2020)

**Annex 55: Reply from the Russian Federation concerning the number of the DPRK nationals in the Russian Federation**

*Translated from Russian*

As a result of the checks carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it has been established that the validity period of the work permits, invitations and work visas previously issued to citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not extend beyond 22 December 2019. No invitations to perform work, work visas or work permits have been processed for citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2020.

The information on the official website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning 753 instances of citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being included in the migration register for their place of residence, with "work" indicated as the purpose of entry into the country, was posted owing to errors in departmental statistical reporting by the Ministry's local agencies. Specifically, the data concerning citizenship and purpose of entry were incorrectly stated. The necessary corrections have been made to the statistical data on the Ministry's official website, which now shows that no one entered Russia from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the first quarter of 2020 for the purpose of "work".

The checks also revealed that the 511 North Korean migrant workers who were unable to return to their home country after 22 December 2019 owing to restrictions related to the coronavirus pandemic also included persons who had entered the country on business visas, with the purpose of their visit indicated as "crew member" or "maintenance", whose activities are not covered by Security Council resolutions [2375 \(2017\)](#) and [2397 \(2017\)](#).

In fact, only 160 nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had work permits valid up to 22 December 2019 (they are now present in the territory of the Russian Federation without valid work visas, work permits or appropriate employment contracts). Their repatriation continues to be blocked by the restrictions imposed by Pyongyang on transport links with other countries on account of the coronavirus pandemic.


## Annex 56: Laundering virtual currency into a fiat currency

According to recent U.S. legal proceedings,<sup>34</sup> the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea relied on over-the-counter brokering services to convert more than USD 200 million worth of cryptocurrencies stolen in 2017, 2018, and 2019,<sup>35</sup> to fiat currency. The U.S. indictment alleges that two Chinese nationals employed several obfuscation techniques to facilitate the conversion, ultimately depositing the proceeds into nine financial institutions.<sup>36</sup>

The laundering process involved transferring cryptocurrency from the hack to accounts held at four cryptocurrency exchange houses.<sup>37</sup> This entailed thousands of smaller transactions, known as a “peel chain”, whereby unspent value (i.e., the remainder or “change” from a transaction) is transferred to a separate address. This process continues until there is no remaining unspent value, ultimately resulting in thousands of separate transactions (see figure 1). Consequently, “peel chains” can make tracking cryptocurrency payments through its blockchain difficult.

Information contained in the indictment shows that fraudulent identification was used to thwart identity verification procedures at some of the exchange houses and that other exchange houses were targeted specifically for their lack of know-your-customer requirements.

Figure 1. Example of a “peel chain”



Source: The Panel

<sup>34</sup> See, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1253486/download>

<sup>35</sup> See paragraphs 62-63 of S/2019/691

<sup>36</sup> The US indictment is an allegation and parties are presumed innocent until proven guilty. In response to the allegations, one party to the indictment claimed to not be aware that the cryptocurrency was from the DPRK theft (see, <https://www.chaindd.com/3284691.html>)

<sup>37</sup> The laundered cryptocurrencies include Bitcoin, Zcash, Dogecoin, Ripple, Litecoin, Ethereum, and Ethereum Classic.

## Annex 57: Korea Narae Trading Corporation


The Korea Narae Trading Corporation is a Pyongyang-based entity that facilitates the “the acquisition of equipment and technology in various sectors, such as mining and hydrocarbons, in exchange for offering technical labour or work in the field (farming workers), as well as the export of North Korean food products and rare earths, among other products,” according to a Member State. The Member State also reported to the Panel that Alejandro Cao de Benos, a Spanish national, is KNTC’s official representative and “carries out activities as an intermediary between KNTC and foreign companies.” The following individuals are believed to be KNTC corporate officers:

- Kim Chol-rong, President
- Pak Chol-ho, Vice President
- Pae Chong-song, Marketing Manager
- Kang Hyon-gyu, Foreign Investment and Public Relations Manager
- Li Jong, Legal Manager
- Ri Kang, Associate
- Kang Son-gun, Associate

Per open source reporting, Mr. de Benos is also the President of the Korea Friendship Association (KFA)<sup>38</sup> and is believed to have organized the 2019 cryptocurrency conference held in Pyongyang (see S/2020/151, para. 180) on behalf of KFA.<sup>39</sup>

A second Member State reported that in 2019, KNTC— along with other members of the Korea Friendship Association— attempted to form a tourism-related joint venture or cooperative entity in Uganda (see figure 1). This effort was reportedly led by DPRK national Ri Kang, according to the same Member State. Uganda responded that it did not find any information.

Figure 1. Members of Korea Friendship Association proposing a joint venture



Source: The Panel


<sup>38</sup> According to Korea Friendship Association’s website, the organization “...was founded on November of the year 2000 with the purpose of building international ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It has members from 120 countries. The KFA has full recognition from the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is the world-wide leading organization of its supporters. It has offices in DPR Korea, Spain.” <https://www.korea-dpr.com/kfa.html>.

<sup>39</sup> According to one Member State, Mr. de Benos recommended obfuscation techniques for individuals planning to attend the conference. The Panel confirmed this assessment through an interview conducted with an individual who attended the April 2019 cryptocurrency conference in Pyongyang. See also, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-05-01/wanna-do-business-in-pyongyang-call-north-korea-s-guy-in-spain>.

Sometime in October 2019, an Italian national (ITA-1) who attended the 2019 cryptocurrency conference in Pyongyang, entered into a contractual agreement with KNTC, whereby KNTC agreed to develop diagnostic software for a specific medical procedure, using artificial intelligence (see figure 2) (ITA-1 was introduced to KNTC at the 2019 cryptocurrency conference). The Panel assesses, based on interviews, Member State information, and open source data, that an objective of the 2019 cryptocurrency conference was to introduce foreign attendees to trading companies for the purpose of establishing joint ventures or cooperative entities.

The contract lists ITA-1 and Mr. de Benos as “counterparty A” and “Renato Song and R&D Team” as “counterparty B.” Because Mr. de Benos is an official representative of KNTC, is jointly listed with ITA-1 on the contract, and received payments related to the agreement, the Panel assesses this to be a joint venture or cooperative entity or an attempt to form a joint venture or cooperative entity, in name or substance.<sup>40</sup> The Panel is continuing to investigate KNTC and its associates for possible sanctions-evasion activities.

Figure 2. KNTC Contract to Perform IT Services



Source: The Panel

<sup>40</sup> The Panel notes that while the development of the IT project was meant as an open source project, the project was not submitted to the 1718 Committee, per paragraph 18 of resolution [2375 \(2017\)](#).

According to the contract, the project was to proceed in three phases, with a budget of 7,000 EUR. KNTC issued two invoices dated 14 August 2019 and 29 October 2019 (figure 3 and figure 4). On or about 14 August 2019, ITA-1 remitted an initial payment of 2,100 EUR to an account held by Mr. de Benos at a Lithuanian bank. On or about 6 November 2019, ITN-1 remitted a second payment totalling 3,000 EUR, to an account held by Mr. de Benos at a German bank. For the first payment, the wire transfer noted "IT Medical Software". For the second payment, the wire transfer noted "Computer Programming." According to financial records provided by a Member State, Mr. de Benos uses these accounts in his own name, and co-mingles funds received from activities associated with the Korea Friendship Association with funds related to KNTC (see Annex F6). According to ITA-1, the remaining balance was never transferred due to KNTC's failure to complete the contract, as specified.

Figure 3. KNTC Invoice, 14 August 2019



### Proforma Invoice

Proforma Invoice No.: 3001/8-2019

Date: August 14, 2019



**Concept:**



Development of IT software for medical use.

**Amount to be paid:**

#2,100# EURO

(Representing a 30% advance payment of total agreed cost of 7,000 EURO)

Source: The Panel


Figure 4. KNTC Invoice, 29 October 2019



### Proforma Invoice

Proforma Invoice No.: 3002/10-2019

Date: October 29, 2019

**Concept:**Development of IT software for medical use. 2<sup>nd</sup> stage.**Amount to be paid:**

#3,000# EURO

*Source:* The Panel

According to records obtained by the Panel, Renato Song employed several DPRK overseas workers in China to support the project. These accounts used fraudulent documentation to open several accounts at various “freelance” websites. The Panel is continuing to investigate overseas workers, joint ventures and cooperative entities associated with KNTC, its members, and its affiliated partners.

**Annex 58: Reply from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN  
(excerpt)**

**I. Trade statistics**

**(2) OC. 72**

Firstly, China has always been strictly implementing sectoral provisions of the Security Council resolutions. The Security Council prohibited importing iron and iron ore from the DPRK. China did not import these prohibited items from the DPRK in the time frame of October to December of 2019 and March of 2020, which is mentioned in the letter. Import of iron or steel articles (HS code 73) is not prohibited. Ferro-silicon is not a prohibited item either, and importing and re-exporting ferro-silicon does not violate Security Council resolutions. The Security Council prohibited importing textiles from the DPRK. China imported a batch of commodities under the HS code 5302 in October 2019. They are raw materials, not textiles prohibited by the Security Council resolutions. We hope that the Panel has an accurate understanding of the resolutions, especially the prohibition categories, and does not arbitrarily expand the scope.

Secondly, China attaches great importance to humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, and the Chinese Customs has taken active measures to provide maximum assistance for customs clearance of relevant humanitarian goods. The steel, copper and other metals exported to the DPRK between October and December 2019, and the industrial machinery exported to the DPRK between January and March 2020, were all humanitarian goods exempted by the 1718 Committee and diplomatic goods ordered by foreign missions in the DPRK. Among them, 5 batches of goods were from the UNICEF, 3 batches of goods were from the ICRC, 8 batches of goods were from different NGOs, and 12 batches of goods were ordered by diplomatic missions in the DPRK.

China hopes that the Panel carefully checks relevant data based on the humanitarian exemptions published on the 1718 Committee website. The Security Council resolutions do not ask for inspections on humanitarian goods. China believes that for the humanitarian goods which have been exempted by the 1718 Committee, no additional inspection measures are needed.



### **3. Finance**

#### **(1) OC. 90**

Cyber theft is not within the category of the Security Council sanctions against the DPRK, and China doesn't understand why the Panel is following this case. China notes that the two individuals have been illegally, unilaterally sanctioned by the US Treasury Department and under abusive long-arm jurisdiction. This is inconsistent with the principles of international law and the Security Council resolutions. We hope that the Panel could concentrate on its work within the mandate of the resolutions.

#### **(2) OC.90**

The financial institutions are always sensitive to risks. All financial institutions in China have a legal compliance office, whose job is to ensure the institutions' compliance with the Security Council resolutions. On this case, the Panel neither elaborated the relationship between generating income for the DPRK and implementation of the Security Council resolutions, nor provided solid evidence on the connection between Liyou Ding and designated entities and individuals. We do not understand the necessity, rationality and legitimacy of the Panel's asking for the Chinese side to provide related information. To conduct investigation and provide information without reliable evidence is not only a waste of administrative resources, but also an infringement of citizen's privacy. We hope that the Panel will provide additional solid evidence as soon as possible.

### **4. Workers (OC. 71)**

China has faithfully implemented the provision of Security Council's resolution on repatriating all DPRK nationals earning income abroad. All DPRK nationals' employment contracts in China had expired by 22 December 2019. China has also submitted reports on the implementation of paragraph 8 of UNSC resolution 2397. China is still investigating the case of DPRK workers in Yanbian Silver Star Network Science and Technology Co. Ltd.

### **5. Dalian Myonghae (OC. 92)**

Beer is a common beverage, not a luxury good subject to the UNSC's embargo. Certain country regards beer as a luxury good based on its national policy. However, this should not serve as the basis for the Panel's work. Based on what the Panel has provided, China has not found any suspected violation of UNSC resolutions.

*Source:* Member State

## **Annex 59: Recent statements by UN officials related to COVID-19 and sanctions**

### **Media Statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (extracts by the Panel)**

GENEVA/SEOUL (9 June 2020) - The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) recommends several concrete actions to the Government of DPRK and the international community in order to protect human rights of people in the DPRK amid efforts to contain COVID-19.

#### **HEALTH**

On 21 January 2020, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suspended all travel in and out of the country, imposed travel restriction between cities and regions and introduced strict quarantine measures. Together with extensive public health information campaigns, focusing on the Government's prevention efforts, these measures aimed to protect North Koreans from COVID-19. However, further information about quarantined people, treatment of patients with possible symptoms and protection of vulnerable groups has not been accessible. Of special concern is the limited capacity of hospitals. The obstacles facing international humanitarian actors in the country also risks negatively impacting the right to access to health care.

"I welcome efforts made by the Government of the DPRK and encourage it to comply with the COVID-19 Guidance issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which calls for solidarity and cooperation to tackle the virus, and to mitigate the effects of measures designed to halt its spread. This pandemic concerns the whole world, and no single country can avoid its consequences", the Special Rapporteur said.

In addition, he recommended the Government of the DPRK (i) to further seek international assistance for testing and make public and transparent disaggregated data related to the pandemic, at a minimum by sex, age, and disability, necessary to inform health responses and identify those most at risk of being left behind; (ii) to respect the freedom to seek and receive information and contents through any media and regardless of frontiers, especially by allowing the use of electronic communication needed during lockdowns, quarantines or other special measures. People have a right to access to full and unbiased news that directly affect their lives; and (iii) within the containment measures against COVID-19, to facilitate access to the country by international organizations providing humanitarian assistance.

#### **FOOD INSECURITY**

The Special Rapporteur expressed concern that the impact of COVID-19 measures on the economy, is causing further difficulties for people who are already in vulnerable situations. DPRK's trade with China in March and April declined by over 90 per cent following the border shutdown. Hence, many people in the border areas in the North have lost their income from commercial activities. The situation in inland could be worse. There have been reports of an increase of homeless people, including *kotjebi* (street children), in large cities. In some places, the price of medicines has reportedly skyrocketed.

Over 40 per cent of people were already food insecure prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, many of them suffering malnutrition and stunted growth. Only one third of children aged 6 to 23 months received the minimum acceptable diet, and pregnant and lactating women were particularly affected by malnutrition. The Food and Agriculture Organization has designated the DPRK as a country facing food shortages. Those who have lost their income do not have money to buy food in the market. The public distribution system continues to be dysfunctional. It was reported that an increasing number of families eat only twice a day, or eat only corn, and there are reports that some are starving. Soldiers reportedly also suffer from food shortages.

"Under the pervasive discrimination in the public distribution system, ordinary citizens, including farmers, do not receive rations. Lack of food had a devastating impact in DPRK in the 1990s, and prospects of a further deepening of food shortages and widespread food insecurity is alarming. The Government must take swift action on this matter by prioritizing allocations of financial resources and allowing the humanitarian aid to be delivered on the ground

without restrictions”, stressed the Special Rapporteur, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.

## **PRISONERS**

Prisoners in the DPRK receive very little and poor quality food, and malnutrition is common in prisons. In many cases, prisoners depend on food brought by their families. Access to safe water is limited, sanitation facilities are inadequate, and health services barely exist. While COVID-19 cases have not been reported in the country, the potential impact of any future outbreak is a serious concern.

“The Government should follow the guidelines in the UN Joint Statement on COVID-19 in prisons and other closed settings, and abide with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules)” underscored the Special Rapporteur. “In particular, the secrecy surrounding the political prison camps (*kwanliso*) remains of the utmost concern. Accounts refer to frequent deaths of prisoners due to hard work, lack of food, contagious diseases and overcrowding. The Government of the DPRK must provide information about these prisoners and allow independent monitoring. Their status amounts to enforced disappearance of persons.”

The Special Rapporteur called once again for the consideration of release of prisoners in particular those in vulnerable conditions: older, ill and undernourished persons, persons with disabilities, children, pregnant and lactating mothers and nursing parents. In addition, alternatives to detention should be implemented to mitigate the risk of harm within places of detention, including for persons who have committed minor, petty and non-violent offenses or those with imminent release dates. “Other countries have also released prisoners to prevent COVID-19; North Korea should follow suit” he remarked.

## **REUNION OF SEPARATED FAMILIES**

The Special Rapporteur urged the Government of the DPRK to promptly resume engagement with the Republic of Korea on the reunion of separated families. Despite commitments made, no reunion event has taken place since August 2018, and aged family members cannot wait any longer.

“COVID-19 is not an excuse to neglect contacts between the families. Even before the pandemic, the technology was conveniently installed for video communications. For aged family members this could be the last opportunity to have a much needed exchange with relatives”, said the Special Rapporteur. “Humanitarian grounds, but also human rights of families realized in article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, should brush away any pretended political obstacles that have frustrated reunions”, he further emphasized.

## **HUMANITARIAN AID AND IMPACT OF SANCTIONS**

Humanitarian actors in the country, including the UN Country Team, are facing difficulties in their operations due to suspended access outside of Pyongyang, lack of information, stranded humanitarian assistance items including vaccination stocks on the border, and shortages of staff members in the country.

The Government should provide unhindered access to humanitarian actors who are already in Pyongyang as well as those who are willing to come and assist. The UN Sanctions Committee has accelerated the exemption process for COVID-19 related humanitarian assistance, but such assistance continues to be subject to sanctions.

The COVID-19 crisis once again brings to the Special Rapporteur’s attention the economic hardships facing people in the DPRK, and the detrimental impact of sanctions on the fulfilment of basic economic and social rights. The international community should no longer overlook how the impact of sanctions on energy is affecting agricultural production by affecting transportation, machinery, and production of fertilizers. The way some sectorial exports bans are leading to unemployment in the textile, mining and seafood industries must also be considered. The lack of income for individuals affected undermines the fulfilment of the right to food and other rights.

“In a context where the COVID-19 is bringing drastic economic hardship worldwide, any sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council that impact on the livelihood of people and hinder the Government’s capacity to respond to

COVID-19 should be sincerely reconsidered”, the Special Rapporteur stated, echoing calls made by the Secretary General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The international community, in particular some permanent members of the Security Council, should no longer rest on the paradox of sanctioning inputs needed to increase food production, while then offering food relief. Any gains from lifting of sanctions should be channeled towards the most vulnerable, including by strengthening the right to food and to health”, he closed.

## **COOPERATION AND PEACE**

While the Government’s prompt and decisive measures in responding to COVID-19 may have helped to contain the outbreak in the country, the Government should not further isolate itself from the international community. On the contrary, the DPRK should embrace international cooperation and solidarity to combat the pandemic, and participate without hesitation in the health response, and in all relevant issues, including human rights.

“This spirit of unity and cooperation emerging worldwide to address the COVID-19 challenges, should also inspire stakeholders to search for a peaceful end to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, born during a war which this year will mark the 70th anniversary”, stated the Special Rapporteur. “Such an initiative to search for peaceful end of the war will generate the atmosphere and space needed to further discuss denuclearization, less isolation, more access, and human rights improvements”, he concluded.

*Source:* <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25929&LangID=E>

## **Secretary-General Urges G20 Countries to Suppress COVID-19 Transmission, Keep Households Afloat, amid Pandemic’s ‘Human Crisis’**

**26 March 2020**

Following are UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ remarks to the Group of 20 (G20) virtual summit on the COVID-19 pandemic, in New York today:

Thank you, Your Majesty, for convening this meeting. We are at war with a virus — and not winning it. It took the world three months to reach 100,000 confirmed cases of infection. The next 100,000 happened in just 12 days. The third took four days. The fourth, just one and a half. This is exponential growth and only the tip of the iceberg.

This war needs a war-time plan to fight it. Solidarity is essential, among the G20 and with the developing world – including countries in conflict. That is why I appealed for a global ceasefire.

Allow me to highlight three critical areas for concerted G20 action. First, to suppress the transmission of COVID-19 as quickly as possible. That must be our common strategy. It requires a coordinated G20 response mechanism guided by the World Health Organization (WHO).

All countries must be able to combine systematic testing, tracing, quarantining and treatment with restrictions on movement and contact — aiming to suppress transmission of the virus. And they have to coordinate the exit strategy to keep it suppressed until a vaccine becomes available.

At the same time, we need massive support to increase the response capacity of developing countries. The United Nations system has a well-established supply-chain network, and we stand ready to place it at your disposal.

Second, we must work together to minimize the social and economic impact. The G20 came of age in the 2008 financial crisis. The challenges before us dwarf those of 2008. And what we face today is not a banking crisis, it is a human crisis.

While the liquidity of the financial system must be assured, our emphasis must be on the human dimension. We need to concentrate on people, keeping households afloat and businesses solvent, able to protect jobs.

This will require a global response reaching double-digit percentages of the global economy. I welcome infusions of liquidity and social and economic support in developed countries — with direct transfer of resources to people and businesses. But, a stimulus package to help developing countries with the same objectives also requires a massive investment.

For this, we need greater resources for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions, a meaningful emission of special drawing rights, coordinated swaps between central banks and steps to alleviate debt, such as a waiver of interest payments.

I also appeal for the waiving of sanctions that can undermine countries' capacity to respond to the pandemic.

Third, we must work together now to set the stage for a recovery that builds a more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economy, guided by our shared promise — the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Let us do what it takes, urgently and together.

*Source:* <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20024.doc.htm>

### **UN High Commissioner for Human Rights statement: Bachelet calls for easing of sanctions to enable medical systems to fight COVID-19 and limit global contagion**

GENEVA (24 March 2020) – Broad sectoral sanctions should urgently be re-evaluated in countries facing the coronavirus pandemic, in light of their potentially debilitating impact on the health sector and human rights, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said Tuesday.

"It is vital to avoid the collapse of any country's medical system – given the explosive impact that will have on death, suffering and wider contagion," Bachelet said. "At this crucial time, both for global public health reasons, and to support the rights and lives of millions of people in these countries, sectoral sanctions should be eased or suspended. In a context of global pandemic, impeding medical efforts in one country heightens the risk for all of us."

"Humanitarian exemptions to sanctions measures should be given broad and practical effect, with prompt, flexible authorization for essential medical equipment and supplies," Bachelet said.

For example, in Iran, where at least 1,800 people have died from COVID-19, human rights reports have repeatedly emphasized the impact of sectoral sanctions on access to essential medicines and medical equipment – including respirators and protective equipment for health-care workers.

More than 50 Iranian medics have died since the first cases of the COVID-19 coronavirus were detected five weeks ago. The epidemic in Iran is also spreading to neighbouring countries which will strain health services in countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.

A variety of sanctions may also impede medical efforts in Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, Bachelet said. "The majority of these states have frail or weak health systems. Progress in upholding human rights is essential to improve those systems – but obstacles to the import of vital medical supplies, including over-compliance with sanctions by banks, will create long-lasting harm to vulnerable communities. The populations in these countries are in no way responsible for the policies being targeted by sanctions, and to varying degrees have already been living in a precarious situation for prolonged periods."

In Venezuela, some hospitals regularly suffer water and electricity cutoffs and lack medicines, equipment, disinfectant and soap. While this situation pre-dates the imposition of sectoral sanctions, easing them could mean more resources could be allocated to treating and preventing the epidemic.

"It is especially important to protect the health of health-workers themselves, and medical professionals should never be punished by the authorities for pointing out deficiencies in the response to the crisis," Bachelet said. "Doctors, medics and all those working in health structures are in the front line, protecting us all."

She called for world leaders to come together. "International cooperation and solidarity are essential at all times, to advance human rights; they are also vital to advancing every country's national interests at this time."

Bachelet also noted that the countries under sanctions should provide transparent information, accept offers of necessary humanitarian assistance, and prioritize the needs and rights of vulnerable people. They should also adopt measures to guarantee national and international organizations can carry out their humanitarian work unhindered.

"No country can effectively combat this epidemic on its own. We need to act with solidarity, cooperation and care," she said – echoing last week's call by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for "coordinated, decisive, and innovative policy action" to counter the spread of COVID-19.

*Source:* <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25744&LangID=E>

## Annex 60: Response to COVID-19 and Humanitarian Operations

The DPRK's COVID-19-related closure of its land borders, reduction in maritime shipments, and the suspension of air travel since January 2020 contributed to a reduction of DPRK imports (in April DPRK banned "non-essential" imports) and supplies of non-sanctioned goods, while illegal channels were sealed due to strict quarantine.<sup>41</sup> Open source reports have also suggested some food shortages, price spikes, some panic buying, decreased availability of medical services, and shortages of many basic medical supplies. Member States, as well as humanitarian aid organizations have also reported reductions in on-the-ground capacity due to travel restrictions and the prohibition on foreign nationals returning to the DPRK, including humanitarian personnel.<sup>42</sup> Although humanitarian aid remains a critical lifeline for a significant portion of population,<sup>43</sup> DPRK authorities demonstrated lukewarm attitude towards receiving the aid and have rejected several offers by Member States and humanitarian organizations. This has meant that UN operations and NGOs have been prevented from carrying out humanitarian operations.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> See "Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19" <https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Global-Humanitarian-Response-Plan-COVID-19.pdf>. See also "2020 DPRK Needs and Priorities" plan Consolidated by OCHA on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities-2020-issued-april-2020>

<sup>42</sup> <https://www.nknews.org/2020/06/as-expat-community-shrinks-in-north-korea-new-arrivals-are-suspended/?t=1600612929359>

<sup>43</sup> According to OCHA, there are approximately 10.4 million people in need in the DPRK (approximately 44 percent of the population). The 2020 Needs and Priorities plan targets the provision of humanitarian assistance to 5.5 million people most in need. OCHA has also assessed that approximately \$39.7 million is required to fight COVID-19 pandemics (See 2020 DPRK Needs and Priorities" plan Consolidated by OCHA on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities-2020-issued-april-2020>)

<sup>44</sup> According to information provided by one Member State, travel outside of Pyongyang by embassy and humanitarian personnel has also been restricted, further hampering monitoring activities.

## **Annex 61: COVID-19 impact on humanitarian operations with the DPRK**

In order to assess the impact of COVID-19 on humanitarian organizations operating within the DPRK, the Panel surveyed 37 organizations. These included both UN organizations as well as Non-Governmental Organizations that applied for exemption requests either directly to the 1718 Committee, or through a Member State or the UN Resident Coordinator in the DPRK. Response to the Panel's inquiry was optional and has no bearing on the exemption approval processes.

The Panel requested made the following inquiries:

1. Please provide detailed information and data on whether your organization experienced delays in shipments or reductions in operational capacity due to issues related to quarantine measures in the DPRK and/ or (please specify) implementation of UN sanctions.
2. To what extent have COVID-19 related delays impacted your humanitarian operations, including monitor-ing?
3. Do you anticipate further delays or reductions in operations, and if so on what grounds?
4. What is your assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic within the DPRK, and in what way has it influenced the overall humanitarian situation? Please include details of the evidence on which your as-sessment is based;
5. If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What, if anything, could be improved upon in the exemption process, or in the implementation of UN sanctions, to better meet your operational needs and objectives?

Pending further responses, the Panel will include summaries in its Final report.



## Annex 62: Consolidated list of recommendations

(Maritime)

1. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee agree upon a conversion rate between tons and barrels for refined petroleum products.<sup>45</sup>
2. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States report any known transfers of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in full conformity with resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#).

To the Committee

3. The Panel recommends the designation of the following vessel for violation of paragraph 5 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#):

- *New Konk* (IMO No. 9036387), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged

4. The Panel reiterates its recommendation, contained in paragraph 44 of document [S/2020/151](#), for the designation of listed vessels in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#). Other than the *Viet Tin 01* (IMO No. 8508838), which is being detained,<sup>46</sup> and the *Vifine* (also known as *Tealway FV*) (IMO No. 9045962), the following vessels listed in paragraph 44 of document [S/2020/151](#) each continued to deliver refined petroleum to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the observed time frame between January and May 2020, in further violation of paragraph 5 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#):<sup>47</sup>

- *Bonvoy 3* (IMO No. 8978784), flag unknown
- *Diamond 8* (IMO No. 9132612), Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Hokong* (IMO No. 9006758), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Kwang Chon 2* (formerly *Sen Lin 01*) (IMO No. 8910378), Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged
- *Sin P(h)yeong 2* (formerly *Tianyou*) (IMO No. 8817007), Democratic People's Republic of Korea-flagged
- *Subblic* (IMO No. 8126082), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Unica* (IMO No. 8514306), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
- *Yun Hong 8* (maritime mobile service identity No. 413459380), Chinese-flagged

To Member States, on best practices with regard to the activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

*On information-sharing among flag States*

5. The Panel recommends that flag registries consider joining the Registry Information-Sharing Compact, an industry initiative of Panama, the Marshall Islands and Liberia<sup>48</sup> that formalizes information-sharing to alert flag States to vessels that could pose sanctions-related concerns so as to potentially deny the vessels' applications.

<sup>45</sup> Two experts are of the view that there is no need to reiterate recommendations that are already under the Committee's agenda.

<sup>46</sup> As of December 2019.

<sup>47</sup> Two experts are of the view that there is no need to reiterate recommendations that are already under the Committee's agenda.

<sup>48</sup> RISC is also joined by St Kitts and Nevis, Comoros, Honduras, Palau and Vanuatu registries as on April 2020.

*On promoting transparency*

6. **The Panel recalls its recommendation that Member States endeavour to collect identifying and contact information for each individual that owns or exerts control over the foreign entity to which each vessel belongs, and to share the information, when requested, with the Panel in order to facilitate investigations into sanctions evasion networks through the use of shell companies as registered owners.**

*On automatic identification systems and long-range identification and tracking of ships*

7. **The Panel recommends that Member States encourage their shipping industry to follow best practice measures already adopted by related sectors, including vessel insurance and reinsurance businesses, commodity trading companies, banks and flag registries, that investigate signs and reports of automatic identification system and/or long-range identification and tracking system transponder manipulation before entering into new contracts or when reviewing ongoing business.**

8. **The Panel also recommends that Member States encourage port State control, maritime and vessel traffic services authorities to promulgate and police the requirement to maintain automatic identification system broadcasts by tankers and bulk carriers arriving in and leaving their jurisdictions, consistent with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and to consider investigating the validity of vessels suspected of tampering with their identifiers along with their activity to ensure that they are not in violation of sanctions resolutions.**

*On heightening scrutiny*

9. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States ensure that port and relevant authorities engage in higher scrutiny of lighters and floating cranes in view of their use in ship-to-ship transfers with Democratic People's Republic of Korea vessels, including verification of the origin and documentation of their cargo, particularly in locations that have registered the presence of Democratic People's Republic of Korea vessels.**

10. **The Panel recommends that any Member State receiving coal shipments for delivery or trans-shipment take enhanced measures to validate the documentation accompanying those shipments.**

11. **The Panel recommends that Member States remain vigilant regarding the movement of vessels trading in restricted or banned commodities, in particular in waters where illicit ship-to-ship transfers have been known to occur.**

(Misuse of embassy properties)

12. **The Panel recommends that Member States be alert to possible efforts by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea diplomatic missions to use their property for extracting illegal revenues.**

(Luxury goods)

13. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee prepare a more detailed list of prohibited luxury goods (where possible, with specific Harmonized System commodity codes) for consideration by the Council.**

14. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent resale to sanctioned jurisdictions.

15. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States harmonize their export control lists to reflect the list of prohibited luxury goods.

16. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States and relevant organizations encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide thorough systems for checking consignees, bearing in mind the risk of trans-shipment.

(Labour)

17. Member States should continue to exercise vigilance in screening all categories of visa applications by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and to exercise vigilance throughout the staying period, in order to prevent the circumvention of the requirement to repatriate nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea earning income overseas.

18. As current legal and administrative frameworks did not enable several Member States to implement the obligations pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#), the Panel recommends that, if considered applicable, Member States should take the necessary legal steps, including the amendment of existing legislation or the adoption of new legislation, to enable the implementation of these obligations.

19. Noting that in paragraph 8 of resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#) the Security Council required Member States to submit final reports by March 2020, the Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States submit implementation reports pursuant to the requirement in that paragraph and encourages each Member State to include substantive information in its implementation report.

(Finance)

20. The Panel encourages Member States to implement the Financial Action Task Force standards, with special attention given to recommendation 15, that to manage and mitigate the risks emerging from virtual assets, countries should ensure that virtual asset service providers are regulated for anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing purposes, and licensed or registered and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant measures called for in the Financial Action Task Force recommendations.

21. The Panel continues to recommend that Member States work to address opaque corporate registration rules and regulations that may afford anonymity to entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(Unintended impact of sanctions)

22. The Committee should continue its efforts for the prompt resumption of a stable banking channel for humanitarian activities by identifying several options for bank transfers.

23. The Panel notes the usefulness of biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations entities on the unintended impact of sanctions on the civilian population and on their

operations within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.

24. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that affect the mitigation of the unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations to benefit the vulnerable population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

25. The Committee should continue to streamline the processes and procedures for applying for exemptions under the terms of Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7, as well as updating the Implementation Assistance Notice when appropriate.

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