



General Assembly

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First Committee

17th meeting

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Official Records

Chair: Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Bolivia (Plurinational State of))

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security.

Agenda items 89 to 105 (continued)

Thematic discussions on specific subjects and introduction and consideration of draft resolutions and decisions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair: In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee will first hear a video presentation by Ambassador Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota of Brazil, Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security, followed by a briefing by Ambassador Jürg Lauber of Switzerland, Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, whom I welcome to the rostrum. Thereafter, the Committee will resume its consideration of the cluster “Other disarmament measures and international security”.

I now invite the Committee to hear a pre-recorded video presentation by Ambassador de Aguiar Patriota.

Mr. De Aguiar Patriota (Brazil): I thank the Chair for this opportunity to brief the Committee on the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security. As the Committee is aware, in 2018 the General Assembly adopted resolution 73/266, by which it requested that the Secretary-General establish a new Group of Governmental Experts on

This sixth iteration of the GGE on this issue since 2004 will carry out its work from 2019 to 2021 and will hold its first formal session in New York from 9 to 13 December, preceded by informal consultations on 5 and 6 December to which all States Members of the United Nations are invited. The new GGE will work in parallel with the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, established by General Assembly resolution 73/27, chaired by Ambassador Jürg Lauber of Switzerland. Both of these processes, taking place in a similar time frame on similar issues, reflect differences in perspectives, but also a recognition of the critical importance of addressing cybersecurity as the world moves towards overarching digitalization and interconnectedness. I am convinced it is in all of our best interests to consider the two resolutions as a huge opportunity for convergence, complementarity and the universalization of measures and norms. The need for different voices in creating solutions to emerging threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace cannot be overstated. A plurality of views helps to create solutions that are more effective, legitimate and agreeable to many.

It is my hope that with the engagement of different groups of actors, we can come to a common understanding about the risks and opportunities we are facing and build the collective will to make new progress at the United Nations. We should return to a path towards constructive and substantial

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understandings on cybersecurity, picking up from where we left off when the General Assembly, through its resolution 70/237, endorsed the consensus report containing the recommendations of the 2014-2015 GGE (see A/70/174). The forthcoming GGE is composed of 25 experts, chosen based on equitable geographic balance. The Group will continue to study possible cooperative measures to address existing and potential threats in the area of information and communications technologies (ICTs), with a view to deepening our collective perception of issues and working to increase the effective implementation of the principles, norms and confidence-building measures agreed to in the previous successful GGEs of 2010, 2013 and 2015.

The cumulative outcomes of the previous GGEs have laid out a nascent normative framework, first, for addressing existing and emerging cyberthreats, secondly, for applying international law in the use of ICTs, thirdly, for instituting voluntary, non-binding norms for responsible State behaviour and, fourthly, for creating a comprehensive set of measures for confidence- and capacity-building. It is key that we refrain from revisiting or going back on the progress made on all that has been agreed, which represents an *acquis* of more than a decade of collective multilateral work that should be considered sacrosanct. The forthcoming GGE is designed differently from its predecessors. It has a clear mandate to consult with the wider community of States, particularly at the regional level.

Accordingly, I have so far participated in consultations with the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its dialogue partners, the European Union, the Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. I should say that all of those consultations have been tremendously enlightening in their own unique ways. It is clear that different regions have different priorities and interests. Some, like the Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, underscored key developments in regional confidence- and capacity-building measures. Consultations with the African Union yielded valuable concrete measures for taking forward the establishment of commitments and institutions on cybersecurity. The ASEAN region has made headway on voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour, and among other things the European

Union provided forward-looking undertakings for how international law applies in cyberspace.

I believe that the ongoing work at the regional level constitutes important input for the GGE. In accordance with the regional building-block approach embedded in resolution 73/266, I have committed to ensuring continued communication through regional organizations. At the informal consultations of the GGE that will take place on 5 and 6 December in New York, it is my intention to bring together representatives of States at the regional level, as well as regional organizations and think tanks, with a view to taking the next step in these discussions. I sincerely hope that we can resume our serious consideration of cybersecurity at the multilateral level through a supportive mix of technical consensus-building in the GGE and broader open-ended discussions in the Open-ended Working Group.

The GGE's task is a challenging one. I will do my best to guide its work towards a meaningful outcome that takes forward the ICT security agenda at the global level. As it gets ready to initiate its formal work on 9 December, it will already have an array of diverse but equally important perspectives to draw on from different regions regarding the issues under the mandate of the GGE. However, I also look forward to hearing the views of all States Members of the United Nations on the Group's mandate, including at the informal consultations on 5 and 6 December. It is my hope that those important inputs will provide an excellent starting point for the Group's deliberations in the coming years. I count on the support of the First Committee.

The Chair: I now give the floor to Ambassador Lauber.

Mr. Lauber (Switzerland): I would like to thank you, Mr. Chair, and your colleagues for this opportunity to brief the First Committee on the current situation of the discussions in the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. My colleague Ambassador de Aguiar Patriota has just outlined the background to the two groups that deal with cybersecurity — the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security and the Open-ended Working Group — and I fully subscribe to the way in which he outlined the tasks and the opportunities ahead of us.

The Open-ended Working Group held its first substantive session from 9 to 13 September in New York. I recognize some familiar faces in the room here today and I apologize to those who were here in September, as they are not going to hear much that is new, but it is still good to be able to brief the other members of the First Committee. In the September session we had two days of a general exchange of views, during which more than 70 Member States from all regions — which is quite a high turnout, even for an event held in New York — took the floor to identify the issues that they consider most urgent and to express their expectations about what the Working Group should achieve by its final substantive session in July 2020.

That general exchange of views was followed by six half-day sessions of interactive discussions, each of them with a focus on one item on the Open-ended Working Group's agenda. I will quickly remind the Committee about what the items are, although they are very similar to those that Ambassador de Aguiar Patriota cited for the GGE. The six items are, first, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them; secondly, how international law applies to the use of information and telecommunication technologies by States; thirdly, rules, norms and principles for the responsible behaviour of States and ways to implement them; fourthly, regular institutional dialogue; fifthly, confidence-building measures; and sixthly, capacity-building. In their discussions, the members of the Working Group recognized the matters within their mandate as urgent and relevant to all of us, and they emphasized the need for an inclusive and transparent process. Many expressed the wish to focus the Group's work on areas of convergence while still remaining ambitious in our work.

In my closing remarks at the final meeting of the session, I presented to the members of the Open-ended Working Group a work plan along the following lines. By the end of this year, I intend to send delegations a document that will help them to prepare for the second substantive session of the Working Group, which will take place from 10 to 14 February 2020 in New York. That document will not be a draft of a report by the Open-ended Working Group, but it will suggest a structure for the report and reflect the concepts and ideas that were presented and discussed during the first substantive session. The document will also

include additional information from the Secretariat as requested by delegations.

Following the second substantive session in February, I intend to submit to the members of the Working Group what I call an initial pre-draft of the Working Group's final report. From 2 to 3 April next year, I will hold an informal intersessional exchange with the members of the Working Group in order to hear their comments on the pre-draft. Based on those comments, I will submit a revised pre-draft and hold another informal intersessional exchange on 26 and 27 May 2020. In early June, I intend to issue a zero draft of the report in preparation of the third and final substantive session of the Working Group from 6 to 10 July 2020 in New York. I expect that the next session in February will give us the opportunity to deepen our interactive discussions by going into further detail and addressing many of the proposals made by members, thereby identifying further areas of convergence. In the meantime, which is at any time during this process, the members of the Working Group are invited to provide documents and written contributions on the issues covered by the mandate of the Group. However, in the spirit of transparency and inclusiveness, I would ask delegations that submit documents to also present them in person at some point during the sessions. I think it is very important that all who are participating in the process be aware of the proposals and have a chance to listen to and discuss them.

Since my election as Chair of the Open-ended Working Group, I attended four rounds of the GGE regional consultations that Ambassador de Aguiar Patriota just mentioned. I was in Bratislava for the regional meeting with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; I attended the Organization of American States consultations in Washington, D.C.; I was with the member States and dialogue partners of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Singapore; and I attended the African Union Commission meetings in Addis Ababa. Being present at those regional consultations enabled me to learn more about specific regional priorities, concerns and requirements with regard to developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. I think it also offered opportunities for Ambassador de Aguiar Patriota and me to get to know each other and build a working relationship that will help the two processes — the GGE and the Open-ended Working Group — to develop side by side in a

complementary fashion and to the benefit of all Member States. The latter point on the complementarity between the two processes has been a consistent demand from Member States in all the meetings that I have attended as Chair of the Open-ended Working Group, including a number of bilateral meetings with regional delegations. At those meetings Member States also made it very clear that they welcome both processes and are willing to overcome the differences of the past in order to enable both to succeed.

Finally, the Open-ended Working Group mandate also foresees the holding of informal intersessional multi-stakeholder consultative meetings with interested parties from business, non-governmental organizations and academia, in order to share views on the issues within the Group's mandate. We have scheduled an intersessional meeting from 2 to 4 December in New York. While the meeting will be held at my initiative, it will be chaired by Singapore, and I thank the delegation of Singapore for taking on the task. We decided on that solution in order to emphasize the informal nature of the event, which is quite different from the actual meetings of the Open-ended Working Group. I am confident that the intersessional meeting will be as inclusive as possible, with participants from all regions and sectors of society, and that it will give all participants the opportunity to share their views on the issues under the Group's mandate. I encourage all Member States to also join us in this exchange, as well as to reach out to their relevant national industry and non-governmental organizations and academic institutions to encourage their attendance and active participation in that meeting. I will provide further information on it in the next few days and would also like to refer the Committee to the website of the Open-ended Working Group, which is accessible via the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs site and very easy to find.

The Chair: On behalf of all delegations, I thank Ambassador Jürg Lauber of Switzerland, Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, not just for his statement but also for his commitment and his hard work on this issue.

In keeping with the Committee's established practice, I will now suspend the meeting to afford delegations the opportunity to have an interactive

discussion on the briefings we have just heard through an informal question-and-answer session.

The meeting was suspended at 9.25 a.m. and resumed at 9.30 a.m.

The Chair: The Committee will now resume its consideration of the cluster "Other disarmament measures and international security". We have a long list of speakers, so I appeal for the full cooperation of all delegations in respecting the time limits in order to enable the Committee to avoid falling behind schedule.

Mr. Gafoor (Singapore): I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

At the outset, we would like to thank Ambassadors Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota and Jürg Lauber for their presentations and for their good work in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security and in the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. This statement will focus on cybersecurity, and we want to make three points in that regard.

First, ASEAN's vision is one of a peaceful, secure, and resilient cyberspace that serves as an enabler of economic progress, enhanced regional connectivity and the improvement of living standards for all. The digital transformation will have tremendous benefits and opportunities for our region. At the same time, we are cognizant that there are pervasive, ever-evolving and transboundary cyberthreats that have the potential to undermine international peace and security. In that connection, ASEAN believes that cybersecurity requires coordinated expertise from multiple stakeholders from across different domains in order to effectively mitigate threats, build trust and realize the benefits of technology.

Secondly, ASEAN is of the view that no individual Government alone can deal with the growing sophistication and transboundary nature of cyberthreats. Regional collaboration is imperative, and ASEAN has taken concrete, practical steps to that end. At the thirty-fourth ASEAN Summit earlier this year, our leaders reiterated ASEAN's commitment to enhancing cybersecurity cooperation and the building of an open, secure, stable, accessible and resilient cyberspace to support the digital economy of

the ASEAN region. At the third ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity, held in September 2018, ASEAN became the first and so far only regional group to subscribe to the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms recommended in the 2015 report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (see A/70/174). In October, at the fourth Ministerial Conference, participants agreed to establish a working-level committee to consider the development of a long-term regional action plan to ensure the effective and practical implementation of those norms. ASEAN will also continue its focus on regional capacity-building efforts, including by supporting the cybersecurity activities and training programmes of the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence, which is located in Singapore, and the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity-Building Centre, in Bangkok.

Thirdly, ASEAN reaffirms its view that the United Nations must continue to play a key role in discussions on cybersecurity. We support the efforts of both the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts, and we hope that the two mechanisms can work closely with their own mandates. ASEAN welcomes the Secretary-General's agenda for disarmament, which affirms the commitment to fostering a culture of accountability and adherence to norms, rules and principles for responsible behaviour in cyberspace. ASEAN recognizes the need to further develop voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace on a basis of consensus, as well as ways to implement them. We affirm that international law, particularly the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful information and communications technology environment.

We welcome the joint commitment of ASEAN and the United Nations to enhancing training in and support for cybersecurity cooperation, as reflected in the plan of action to implement the Joint Declaration on the Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the United Nations. We look forward to more concrete cooperation in the development of the next ASEAN-United Nations partnership for the period from 2021 to 2025.

In conclusion, ASEAN reaffirms the importance of a rules-based cyberspace as a key enabler of social and

economic progress for our people. We will continue to deepen our cooperation regionally and internationally to achieve a peaceful, secure and resilient cyberspace. I will now add a few comments in my national capacity as the representative of Singapore.

As a small and highly connected nation, Singapore benefits greatly from technology, but we are also the target of cyberattacks. That is why cybersecurity is one of the key pillars of our Smart Nation initiative. Our digital economy can flourish only when it is underpinned by a safe and trusted cyberspace. At its heart, cybersecurity is an issue of managing the global commons, which requires a global approach, based on international norms and rules, and we think that the United Nations has an important role to play in that regard. Singapore therefore welcomes the establishment of both the Open-ended Working Group and the GGE. It is important, indeed imperative that both processes complement each other's work and build on the work of the five previous GGEs, the first of which was established in 2004. We need both processes to succeed and deliver meaningful outcomes. Singapore will contribute actively and constructively to both, and we look forward to chairing the intersessional consultative meeting of the Open-ended Working Group, which will bring together industry partners and non-governmental organizations in December, as Ambassador Lauber announced just now.

Singapore will continue to facilitate inclusive conversations among global policymakers, thought leaders and industry experts on the norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, as well as cybersecurity capacity-building and confidence-building measures. Singapore has been organizing an annual Singapore International Cyber Week since 2016. In recent years, we have welcomed the participation of Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Under-Secretary-General Fabrizio Hochschild Drummond, who attended its most recent meeting in September.

Within ASEAN, Singapore has been supporting capacity-building programmes, including through the establishment of the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence as an extension of the ASEAN cybersecurity capacity-building programme, to which Singapore is very committed. We believe that the Centre in Singapore will be an important resource for helping countries in our region better prepare for emerging

cyberthreats through the sharing of information, best practices and mutual assistance.

Singapore looks forward to working with the international community and all delegations here to build a rules-based international order for cyberspace and realize the benefits of a common and connected digital future.

Mr. Baumann (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): The rapid evolution of science and technology is increasingly shaping our world, and artificial intelligence represents a major development in that regard. It is seeing a rapid expansion and already has applications in many areas. At the same time, the increasing autonomy of artificial-intelligence systems is putting existing legal frameworks and the rule of law to the test and raising significant ethical questions. Switzerland believes that there should be closer cooperation between the scientific and diplomatic arenas as innovation continues at an accelerating rate. Such interdisciplinary cooperation is key to addressing shared challenges and ensuring that all segments of society benefit equally from such innovations.

Within the framework of the new Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator foundation, Switzerland is seeking to explore innovative ways to anticipate developments in the areas of digital technology, biotechnology and ecology. We are working to ensure that advances in digitalization are used for the benefit of humankind and that cyberspace remains open, free and secure and serves as a multiplier for human rights and economic development.

We welcomed the report of the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation established by the Secretary-General entitled *The Age of Digital Interdependence*. We consider the follow-up activities and implementation of the Panel's recommendations very important, and we count on the continued leadership of the Secretary-General in that process. We commend the fact that the High-level Panel's report refers to the Geneva Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace, initiated by Switzerland in 2018. The Dialogue aims to discuss key actors' responsibilities with regard to helping to strengthening security and stability in cyberspace.

Switzerland welcomes the efforts of the United Nations to promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and supports the two processes of the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of

international security and the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which underscore the importance of multilateralism in that regard. Switzerland believes that coherence between the processes will be crucial in order to avoid duplication and ensure their mutual reinforcement. We were encouraged by the constructive tone at the first substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group.

Switzerland underscores the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach and of including civil society in the discussions within the Open-ended Working Group, which is not starting from scratch but is able to build on the considerable progress made by previous Groups of Governmental Experts. Cyberspace is not without rules. States in that arena are subject to the same legal obligations that exist in other realms offline, particularly those to which they must adhere under the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international customary law. Furthermore, the relevant legal framework is complemented by voluntary norms and the rules and principles of responsible State behaviour, as well as confidence- and capacity-building measures.

Switzerland firmly believes that a rules-based approach is key to fully harnessing the potential of scientific and technological developments and to meeting new challenges in a sustainable way that strengthens international peace and security.

Mr. Horne (Australia): We all benefit from an open, free and secure cyberspace that keeps our economies growing, our infrastructure operating and our Governments functioning. While increased connectivity is integral to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, it also presents new and complex international security challenges. Australia is concerned about the increasing scope, scale and severity of international cyberincidents perpetrated by State actors and their proxies. We welcome the increased international attention focused on responsible State behaviour in cyberspace as we work to meet those challenges collectively.

Our discussions last year produced two bodies — the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and the Group of

Governmental Experts (GGE) on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security — to assist us in taking that work forward. Fortunately, there is already a significant base on which to build. Member States have already affirmed by consensus that international law applies to State conduct in cyberspace and have articulated 11 norms of responsible State behaviour. Australia reaffirms its commitment to acting in accordance with the reports of the 2010, 2013 and 2015 GGEs (see A/65/201, A/68/98 and A/70/174), all of which were agreed by consensus among experts and endorsed by consensus among Member States.

These reports cumulatively set out a framework for responsible State behaviour, comprising international law, voluntary non-binding norms and confidence-building measures. Australia is committed to all four pillars of the framework and submitted a national paper of the Open-ended Working Group in September to be transparent regarding our implementation efforts.

We were pleased by the broad participation in the Open-ended Working Group and the positive and constructive manner in which Member States engaged. In addition to our active participation in the Open-ended Working Group, Australia is also a member of the GGE, and we expect the shared ambition for a successful outcome of the Open-ended Working Group will carry through to the GGE.

While the Open-ended Working Group and the GGE are separate processes and enjoy separate mandates, composition and time frames, we expect the two Groups to operate collaboratively and we welcome the efforts of Ambassador Lauber and Ambassador De Aguiar Patriota to achieve that complementarity. We also welcome the broad participation of business, non-governmental organizations and academia in those processes.

Australia continues to work diligently with all Member States to find a path to consensus on cyberissues in this Committee. We are engaging constructively on both draft resolutions that have been submitted, and we urge all countries to join in continuing the goodwill and collaborative spirit of the first meeting of the Open-ended Working Group in these discussions. As more States seek to exert power through cyberspace, there is an increased potential for activities by State and non-State actors to lead to misperception, miscalculation,

escalation and, in extreme cases, conflict. It is only by working together that the international community will rise to the challenge and ensure that we can harness cyberspace for the benefit of all.

Mr. Bravaco (United States of America): Regarding information and telecommunications in the context of international security, the 2018 National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America commits the United States to promoting a framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace built upon international law, adherence to voluntary non-binding norms of State behaviour that apply during peacetime, and the consideration of practical confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict.

Broad international consensus around those three elements — international law, peacetime norms and confidence-building measures — is the signature accomplishment of international cyberdiplomacy discussions over the past decade. The consensus reports of the 2010, 2013 and 2015 Group of Governmental Experts (see A/65/201, A/68/98 and A/70/174) present the elements of that framework. The General Assembly, through its resolutions of 2015, 2016 and 2018 (resolutions 70/237, 71/28 and 73/27), reaffirmed that all States should follow the reports' recommendations. We believe now is the time to prioritize universalization and implementation of the framework for responsible State behaviour because doing so is in the interests of all States.

In 2018, the General Assembly began two new processes on cybersecurity in the context of international security — the sixth round of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the first Open-ended Working Group. Our Deputy Secretary of State recently referred to the Open-ended Working Group and the GGE as two opportunities to refine critical guidance to States and identify ways to improve capacity across the board in the area of cybersecurity. Our goal for both venues is to universalize the recommendations made by consensus and welcomed by the General Assembly in the three successful GGE reports.

We look forward to the start of the new round of the GGE. We believe this GGE, as a group of experts, should aim to provide in-depth considerations and guidance to support the implementation of the recommendations contained in the three consensus GGE reports. Previous successful rounds of the GGE have demonstrated the

value of consensus-driven, expert-level negotiation on this topic within the United Nations.

Despite voting against the resolution that created the Open-ended Working Group (resolution 73/27), the United States has committed to contributing constructively to its work. We believe that the Open-ended Working Group, which is open to all Member States, provides an ideal complementary venue to broaden awareness of the framework of responsible State behaviour and to discuss ways in which we can provide capacity-building to help States implement and uphold it.

The Open-ended Working Group and the GGE are two distinct but related processes, mandated by separate resolutions and each with their own schedules and guidelines. Therefore, we believe that it would be appropriate for the First Committee to have two distinct but complementary texts on cybersecurity in the context of international security this year to reflect that each of these processes has started its work.

The remainder of my remarks and the full statement will be uploaded to the PaperSmart portal.

Mr. Hassan (Egypt): Egypt reiterates that non-discriminatory multilateral legally binding instruments are the most effective measures for achieving sustainable progress in the field of disarmament and international security. We stress that the continued commitment by all States to previously agreed undertakings and to the rule of law at the international level, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, is a necessary condition for maintaining international peace and security and avoiding chaos.

Taking into consideration the rapid scientific and technological developments in several strategic fields, there are several domains with a direct impact on international security that are left without any internationally agreed rules to prevent them from turning into scenes of arms races and armed conflicts and to ensure the reliable continuation of the relevant technologies to development and welfare. Cyberspace, outer space and the weaponization applications of artificial intelligence are prominent examples of such domains.

The lack of progress in addressing the severe security threats that arise in such domains is clearly due not to the lack of technical expertise on the part of

the international community but rather to the continued misguided belief by some States that an absolute dominance in such domains can be maintained, thereby resisting any effort towards the development of equitable rules-based international regimes that prohibit the malicious uses and weaponization of such technologies. In a multipolar world where the relevant technologies are available and accessible to many State and non-State actors, such an approach can lead only to an arms race that no one can win, while international security continues to severely deteriorate.

In the area of cybersecurity and the possible malicious use of information and telecommunications technologies as a means of warfare, achieving meaningful progress towards establishing a reliable regime based on agreed rules and norms has been stalled for more than a decade. In that context, we look forward to making real progress within the framework of the Open-ended Working Group established by resolution 73/27.

We believe that it is time to move forward in the most inclusive and action-oriented manner to develop legally binding rules in all these strategic domains. Non-binding norms and voluntary confidence-building measures are internal steps that cannot provide sufficient guarantees in the area of international security and arms control in the long term.

The full version of my statement will be uploaded to the PaperSmart portal.

Mr. Ahmed (Pakistan): The relentless pace of the emergence of new weapons, driven by never-ending strategic competition, constantly facilitated by new scientific innovations, carries serious implications. The rapid development of new weapons systems and enabling technologies poses a threat to peace, security and stability at the regional and global levels. Governing and regulating the development and use of such weapons under international law is proving to be a major challenge.

The development of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) has emerged as a major concern. LAWS are rightly being described as the next revolution in military affairs that would fundamentally change the nature of war. Their introduction would lower the threshold of armed conflict and affect progress on disarmament and non-proliferation.

Any weapons system that delegates life-and-death decisions to machines is by nature unethical and cannot fully comply with international humanitarian law. The issue of LAWS does not only have legal, ethical and technical dimensions but also carries serious implications for regional and global security. The developments in the field of artificial intelligence need to be appropriately regulated in all its dimensions. They should not outpace the evolution of regulations governing them. Pakistan therefore supports the development of an international legally binding instrument that stipulates appropriate prohibitions and regulations regarding LAWS.

The process launched six years ago within the framework of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) can be sustained only if it yields concrete results, heeding the concerns of all States. Besides the CCW, the international security dimensions of LAWS should be comprehensively addressed by the United Nations disarmament machinery, including by the Conference on Disarmament.

Cyberwarfare is another area requiring immediate attention. The first substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which convened in September this year, provided Member States with a good opportunity to identify commonalities and divisions. Among other things, it became clear that everyone agreed that cyberspace was not an unregulated space for States. We hope that the forthcoming sessions of the Working Group will help to develop a common understanding for further normative efforts to prevent cyberspace from becoming the next theatre of conflict. Given the unique attributes of information and communications technologies, additional norms should be developed in a universal setting, and the Conference on Disarmament remains an appropriate venue for further multilateral work on the topic.

Our delegation recognizes the need for maintaining coordination and complementarity between the Open-ended Working Group and the parallel process being undertaken in a separate, limited-membership Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security. However, we underscore the importance

attached by the broader United Nations membership to the Open-ended Working Group as an inclusive and universal mechanism. A full version of my statement will be available on PaperSmart.

Mr. Incarnato (Italy): Italy aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16), and I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity.

Cyberspace and the Internet together represent one of the greatest human achievements of all time. They have already reshaped our lives by offering unprecedented opportunities that can thrive only in a global, open, free, equal, stable and secure cyberspace. Italy is therefore committed to supporting the efforts of the international community to achieve a cyberspace based on respect for international law in which security, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights fully apply and are all intertwined. We are constantly stepping up our commitment in domestic policy and diplomacy in the cyber arena. Participation in international forums and compliance with the norms of responsible behaviour by States in cyberspace are an essential part of Italy's cybersecurity action plan.

We value the work done by the Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) in this area and would like to recall that the General Assembly endorsed the conclusions of the 2013 and 2015 GGE reports (see A/68/98 and A/70/174) and has called on Member States to be guided in their use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) by the 2015 report. We share the positive assessments of the first substantial session of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and look forward to continuing to engage constructively in it. Complementarity between the work and results of the Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security is essential. We call on all States to work together to that end in a spirit of consensus and mutual respect. Those efforts will help us to reach out, raise awareness and exchange views and perspectives on the progress of that work with the entire membership and other stakeholders in order to build a stronger consensus on achieved results.

With regard to the merits of information and communications technologies in the context of

international security, malicious cyberactivities and incidents are on the rise and are a reason for serious concern. Such activities could have a destabilizing effect on international peace and security. International cooperation and multilateralism continue to be the tools for achieving our common goals. At the same time, a truly universal cybersecurity framework must be based on existing international norms. We should devote more attention to the effective implementation of existing rules rather than engaging in lengthy negotiations that could create uncertainty about the applicable legal framework. Confidence-building measures are of paramount importance in an ever-changing cyberenvironment and the relatively new territory it represents. Such measures can help to reduce the risks of conflict resulting from the use of ICTs by promoting further transparency and cooperation among States.

Mr. Penaranda (Philippines): The Philippines associates itself with the statements by the representatives of Singapore, on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16).

The importance for the Philippines of information security is reflected not just in our national cybersecurity plan but our national security strategy as well. The programmes under our national plan aim to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure, the Government itself, businesses and supply chains, as well as individuals. On the other hand, our national strategy lays down the Government's strategic actions on cybersecurity, which include our Cyber Security Plan 2022. We also have in place the requisite laws to address issues related to information security.

International cooperation on cybercrime, including cooperative efforts to develop effective national legislation, is a major focus for national efforts. Such cooperation is crucial given cybercrime's transnational nature and the close relationship between crime and national security in cyberspace. While the international community has therefore seen the development of a number of multilateral instruments, they are sometimes cooperative and sometimes competing. While we see the importance of efforts to collectively deal with disruptive global cyberthreats, we also recognize the challenges in addressing divergent interests and forging a common approach. The Philippines proposes that we pursue the following elements.

We should continue our international and regional dialogue with the aim of reducing and anticipating the risks and protecting critical infrastructures. We should implement existing norms such as those adopted by previous Groups of Governmental Experts and nurture synergies in the work of the newly established Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security. Where possible, we should aim for the standardization and universalization of countries' legislation by sharing and comparing good practices on a global scale and facilitate the engagement of leaders from industry, academia and civil society, together with Governments, in order to prevent cyberconflict, restrict offensive cyberoperations by non-State actors and mitigate the daily threats to the global economy. We need an approach that is inclusive, comprehensive and responsive. We should also make the attribution of cyberincidents easier. That will ensure that States are held responsible for what happens in their cyber realm, while at the same time ensuring observance of international legal principles such as non-interference in the internal affairs of States. Lastly, we should facilitate the provision of assistance to States that lack the capacity to thwart cyberthreats.

In order for us to move forward, my delegation believes that we must focus as much as possible on building trust and confidence in order to facilitate our work.

Mrs. Pejanović Đurišić (Montenegro): Montenegro aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16), and I would like to add some brief remarks in my national capacity.

All over the globe, we stand to benefit from the exponentially rapid growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs), reaping important social and economic incentives and opportunities from being connected and a part of the emerging Internet-based economy. However, while our societies rely more and more on digital infrastructure, technology is still vulnerable. The privacy, integrity and availability of the relevant infrastructure is increasingly being challenged by rapidly evolving cyberthreats from the malicious use of information and communications technologies by all kinds of actors present in cyberspace. Once they were

just hackers, but nowadays they are criminals, terrorists and different kinds of State and non-State actors.

Cybercrimes and threats do not just undermine the safety of network users. They disrupt economic and commercial activities up to and including affecting countries' military effectiveness and transferring the actual arena of conflicts directly into cyberspace. With new technologies, classical warfare has already taken the form of a hybrid warfare destabilizing the international security landscape. In such circumstances, the multilateral approach represents the optimal response to maintain the transformational power of ICTs in their role as a social and economic development catalyst while preventing the erosion of citizens' and countries' trust and confidence in their use.

Montenegro is fully committed to contributing to creating the necessary conditions for achieving a free, stable, transparent and secure cyberspace. Based on our own specific experiences, we are supporting a multisectoral and multi-stakeholder approach to protecting the cyberenvironment as well as the assets of organizations, institutions and citizens. In essence, it has to be a holistic approach, with human security at its centre, which will make it possible to effectively tackle risks associated with cybercrime and more sophisticated cyberthreats, while taking into account the rule of law and good governance. It is also important to emphasize that any process that might eventually affect the ability of any individual to benefit from ICTs, for national or other security reasons, has to be transparent, inclusive and accountable.

We support the coordinated work of the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security and the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, and we will take part in their ongoing discussions. It is vital to maintain the momentum of the first substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group, and we will continue to engage in those efforts on the basis of the schedule presented by its Chair, while working on creating and promoting a comprehensive framework to advance peace and stability.

Ms. Sánchez Rodríguez (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on

behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16).

We share the objective of general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, as the highest priority in this area, but at the same time we must also implement other international disarmament and security measures. We should move forward on legally binding, multilaterally agreed initiatives to prohibit the militarization of outer space, cyberspace and autonomous lethal weapons, as well as to regulate military attack drones. We should demand that the major arms producers prioritize the security and well-being of their citizens over the petty interests of the military-industrial complex. We must reduce the current record global military spending, which has now reached \$1.82 trillion, as well as the scientific and technological advances that are being used to develop weapons, and redirect those efforts towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In implementing the relevant international agreements, we must respect international norms on climate change. We must preserve multilateralism as a basic principle of disarmament negotiations. The establishment of the first Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security is highly relevant as we confront the proliferation of the illicit use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the increasing militarization of cyberspace. It is a very serious issue that the 2018 cyberstrategy of the United States Department of Defense authorized the use of offensive cyberweapons and cyberattack operations, including the possibility of launching pre-emptive cyberattacks. We repudiate these aggressive, belligerent and threatening doctrines, which view the use of force as a legitimate response to the malicious use of ICTs. We reiterate that the hostile use of telecommunications with the declared or covert purpose of subverting the legal and political order of States, such as the establishment by the United States of the Cuba Internet Task Force, is a violation of internationally agreed norms.

Mr. Horne (Australia), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

We reject attacks on Cuba's radio-electronic space through illegal radio and television transmissions. In 2019, 1,865 hours a week of illegal transmissions on 21 frequencies have been directed at Cuba from the territory of the United States, in violation of the purposes

and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We demand the immediate lifting of the unilateral coercive measures that limit Cubans' access to information and communication technologies as well as their use and enjoyment of them, such as the economic, commercial and financial embargo and the Helms-Burton Act, which the United States has imposed on Cuba.

Mr. Leopoldino (Brazil): As highlighted by the Secretary-General in his agenda for disarmament, advances in science and technology can have a game-changing impact on our future security, but our joint efforts in this area will also have a game-changing preventive impact. Given their transformative and revolutionary effects, emerging technologies with a potential impact on international security must be appropriately regulated before that impact is felt in full force. We cannot afford to wait for a catastrophe to motivate and focus our efforts.

The rampant malicious use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their increasing weaponization by States in particular is an issue of enormous concern. Given the ubiquitous and fundamental importance of ICTs for modern societies, we can no longer countenance unchecked behaviour in cyberspace without putting our shared values of peace, security, democracy and human rights in peril. This is one of the most pressing and serious security challenges of our time. Brazil has long supported and actively participated in discussions on the issue and has favoured the establishment within the United Nations framework of principles, norms and rules for the responsible behaviour of States in the use of ICTs. We have participated in three of the five Groups of Governmental Experts convened by the General Assembly on the issue, and a Brazilian expert chaired the Group's 2014-2015 session, which was the last to succeed in adopting a substantive report (see A/70/174) by consensus. In addition, in the context of the Third Committee, Brazil has been presenting an annual draft resolution since 2013 on the right to privacy in the digital age, together with Germany (resolution 73/179).

Brazil believes that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, applies to cyberspace. However, that applicability should not be understood as a way of legitimizing the transformation of the cyberenvironment into an arena for military conflict. On the contrary, that understanding should encourage restraint on the part of all States and contribute to the maintenance of a

safe, secure, stable and prosperous ICT environment. Similarly, stating that existing international law applies in cyberspace does not imply that no new norms are needed. In Brazil's view there is an urgent need to further develop the existing normative and regulatory framework at the international level.

At last year's session of the First Committee, not only was the long-standing practice of decision by consensus on this issue broken, but two competing draft resolutions were adopted, establishing bodies with different mandates and formats for follow-up discussions on the matter. Despite that inauspicious backdrop, there is an opportunity for working towards complementarity and convergence. The Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security can and should work harmoniously with a view to re-establishing the much-needed consensus on the treatment of this issue in the context of the United Nations. As the country whose expert has been chosen to chair the Group of Governmental Experts, Brazil is ready to contribute to that effort. It is therefore crucial that in both Groups we all display the greatest possible flexibility and work for the greatest possible consensus with a view to ensuring that their reports and recommendations contribute to strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of cybersecurity. We especially hope that as the work of both Groups progresses, the First Committee will resume its practice of adopting a single draft resolution by consensus.

Mr. Sánchez Kiesslich (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): It is possible to preserve and guarantee the legitimate and peaceful uses of cyberspace, resilience in the digital environment and the potential of information technologies as enablers of sustainable development only if we do it multilaterally. The commencement of the substantive work of both the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and the new Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security provides us with an invaluable opportunity to move from abstract deliberations to a common understanding that points the way forward.

While the mandates of the two groups differ in certain respects, we must seek to achieve substantive results and even aim at complementary objectives in both processes. There are many expectations, but the challenges and threats will be even greater if we fail to guarantee the architecture for the digital environment of the future. These two channels must be interpreted as a clear sign of confidence in the primary role of the United Nations and of multilateralism. As for many other delegations, for Mexico the starting point is advancing the implementation of what was agreed on in the previous Groups of Governmental Experts. That of course includes the norms, rules and principles for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, but it also covers confidence-building and transparency measures as well as the promotion of international cooperation and capacity-building plans.

While the agreements reached so far are neither exhaustive nor sufficient, they are the most solid basis we have on which to build a multidimensional approach that seeks a balance from the perspectives of international security, human rights and development. Let us also build on the progress made at the regional level, especially through regional bodies. International law is fully applicable in cyberspace, and we should refer to the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law, international humanitarian law and even to sources of case law and customary law considered to be a source of international law.

Finally, it is important to note that the deliberations of Member States must necessarily draw on the experiences and concerns of all relevant actors, including from the private sector, civil society and academia. The outcomes we achieve will be the responsibility of Governments, large technology companies, service providers, civil-society organizations, academia and all citizens.

Mr. Dev Nath (Bangladesh): Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16). I will deliver an abridged version of my statement owing to the time constraints, and the full version will be uploaded to PaperSmart.

We envision transforming Bangladesh into a digitally advanced country by 2021. We have identified information and communication technologies (ICT) as a key vehicle for implementing the 2030

Agenda for Sustainable Development. In that regard, we stress the critical importance of promoting international cooperation to ensure information security, including through appropriate transparency and confidence-building measures. We welcome the opportunities for developing countries to voice their concerns and priorities through the work of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security in the areas of norms, rules and principles for responsible State behaviour, threat management, attribution, the balance between rights and responsibilities and cybercapacity-building. We look forward to doing our part to achieve a successful outcome for the Open-ended Working Group. We also value the work of the current Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security, and of its predecessors. Going forward, we would appreciate it if the two parallel processes could converge on important future rules of the road for developments in this field. We appreciate the fact that in their briefings to this Committee this morning, the Chairs of both Groups highlighted the importance of building consensus and complementarities, as well as continuing to keep our ambitions aimed high.

The potential threat posed by the ability of terrorists to use ICTs to compromise international security and thereby do widespread harm underscores the importance of further reviewing the existing legal regime applicable to this domain and strengthening it as needed. We therefore emphasize how vital it is to factor into the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) potential threats in the cybersphere, including new developments in artificial intelligence and other related fields. It will be a critical challenge for the international community to prevent the virtual platform and related technologies and services enabled by ICTs from being exploited by terrorists and other unauthorized entities for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Auväärt (Estonia): Estonia aligns itself with the statement by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16), and we would also like to make some additional remarks in our national capacity.

Cybersecurity has become an integral part of the wider international security context. The increasing interdependence of our rapidly evolving cyberspace

poses a complex challenge to the stability of our economies and to issues of privacy and human rights.

The United Nations has served as a platform for the international community to address international peace, stability and security in combination with the development and use of information and communication technologies. The reports of the successive Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) endorsed by the General Assembly and by the efforts of regional organizations have established a robust normative framework for international stability in cyberspace. In Estonia's view, the norms that have already been agreed on regarding responsible State behaviour, together with existing international law, regional confidence-building measures and capacity-building mechanisms, provide the structure we need for a framework for stability in cyberspace. We are also pleased that 28 States signed the joint statement on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace that was presented during the high-level week of the General Assembly in September.

The Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security provides another opportunity for further advancing the global understanding on the framework of international stability in cyberspace. In our view, the two processes should develop in a complementary manner, proceeding from the reports of the previous GGEs that were adopted by consensus. The first session of the Open-ended Working Group demonstrated the importance of ensuring the engagement of all relevant stakeholders, including civil society, academia and the private sector, in addressing cybersecurity issues. A safe and stable cyberspace cannot be achieved without an inclusive, multi-stakeholder approach.

In conclusion, Estonia is determined to contribute to global efforts to strengthen the international law and rules-based order and to the application of existing international law to cyberspace. We would like to stress that we need to expand the global understanding on the framework of international stability in cyberspace and proceed to the implementation of the norms set out in the 2013 and 2015 GGE reports (see A/68/98 and A/70/174). Estonia remains committed to promoting an open, free, secure, stable and accessible cyberspace for all, where the application of international law, fundamental freedoms and human rights is protected online.

Mr. Ham Sang Wook (Republic of Korea): The development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has integrated the virtual and physical space around us. Combined with developments such as artificial intelligence and digital interference capabilities, State and non-State behaviour in cyberspace has further complicated the international security landscape. In that regard, my delegation believes that it is essential to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace. The Republic of Korea welcomes the launch this year of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and the re-establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security. In order for the two processes to be productive and successful, we want their efforts to be complementary and cooperative, based on what we have already achieved. In that regard, I would like to highlight three points.

First, it is time to focus on the implementation of what was agreed on by consensus in the previous GGEs. Indeed, the General Assembly's resolutions 70/237 and 71/28, adopted by consensus in 2015 and 2016, called on all countries to be guided in their use of ICTs by the GGE reports. The Republic of Korea believes that the Open-ended Working Group represents an opportunity to build common understanding and provide practical guidance on the implementation of agreed rules and norms.

Secondly, it is crucial to develop and implement practical confidence-building measures. The journey towards a consensus on rules and norms took more than two decades, and there are still some issues to address. In that context, the Republic of Korea believes that confidence-building measures can limit the risk of conflict derived from misunderstandings or miscalculations, and we should continue to develop and implement such measures in order to move forward in a peaceful and stable cyberspace.

Last but not least, confidence-building must be followed by capacity-building. Malicious actors tend to target developing countries as transit routes for attacks within the global cyber ecosystem. It is crucial that States develop their own defence and resilience capabilities in cyberspace and support one another in responding jointly to cyberthreats. As one of the leading countries in the area of ICTs, the Republic of

Korea will continue to participate actively in the efforts to bridge gaps in cybercapabilities.

In conclusion, we reaffirm our readiness to contribute to the international community's efforts to ensure a secure and peaceful cyberspace, including through the deliberations in the GGE and the Open-ended Working Group.

Mr. Hwang (France) (*spoke in French*): France aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16).

A year ago, France issued an appeal to the international community, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, reaffirming our efforts to make cyberspace open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful. We are very pleased that it has received broad support. A total of 68 States, 358 private-sector actors and 142 organizations have joined us in affirming that the use of information and communications technology is subject to international law. Every State must therefore respect the obligation to resolve its international disputes through peaceful means, provided that does not negate its right to take countermeasures in response to unlawful actions perpetrated against it, with the sole objective of putting an end to such actions in compliance with international law. In addition, in order to ensure that people's rights are respected and protected online just as they are in the physical world, States must work not just together with one another but also with private-sector partners, the research community and civil society.

For many years now, cyberspace has been a place of confrontation. That is why France has chosen to adopt a doctrine for using its defensive and offensive cyberwarfare capabilities. In September we published a report that outlines France's position with regard to the application of international law to operations in cyberspace. France encourages every State to publicly present their interpretations of how international law should be applied in cyberspace or to publish their doctrines for the use of cyber capabilities.

France has actively participated in the various Groups of Governmental Experts on cybersecurity, which have facilitated progress on the issue of the applicability of international law in cyberspace and on the development of norms and recommendations for responsible behaviour by States in this area. Every State now has a responsibility to implement those recommendations. France welcomes the resumption

of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security and is fully engaged in the negotiations of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which will contribute to a better understanding of threats and solutions. The composition of the Group has enabled it to include in its deliberations the private sector, the research community and international organizations, that is, all the stakeholders that play a role in these issues.

The full version of my statement will be available on PaperSmart.

Ms. Claringbould (Netherlands): In addition to the statement by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16), the Netherlands would like to make some remarks in its national capacity.

The invisible ties that bind our world ever more closely are largely made up of ones and zeroes. When we talk about such buzzwords as "connectivity", we must recognize that it is the Internet that facilitates most of the connections involved. Information technology facilitates the sharing of ideas beyond borders. Actions in cyberspace have a direct impact on the physical world. When cyberoperations are directed against critical infrastructure, Governments or societies, the artificial barrier between online and offline does not matter. When cyberoperations make vital services unavailable to the public or cyberattacks disrupt societies, the harmful effects are felt immediately and widely, threatening international peace and security. In order to ensure that States can reap the benefits of the digital transformation, they must cooperate to protect the rules-based international order. The duty to advance the international rules-based order is enshrined in the Constitution of the Netherlands. Existing international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable to cyberspace and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting a free, open and secure cyberspace. The General Assembly has acknowledged that fact by consensus.

This year, both the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security have

started working on the important task of furthering the global understanding of responsible State behaviour. The Netherlands welcomed the constructive and rich discussions in the first substantive meeting of the Open-ended Working Group. We look forward to continuing the discussions on implementing the GGE reports, further developing confidence-building measures and carrying out the important work of capacity-building. We are equally committed to furthering this framework through expert discussions in the GGE. Both the Open-ended Working Group and the GGE can count on the Netherlands' constructive desire to ensure that both processes arrive at consensus outcomes. We urge all States to be constructive in moving the discussion forward.

The Netherlands believes in the importance and effectiveness of capacity-building to expand the international support base for a free, open and secure Internet. Building capacity for cybersecurity is also crucial to ensuring sustainable development. This topic is rightly a central one for both the Open-ended Working Group and the GGE. The Netherlands believes it is important to walk the talk on capacity-building. Based on our Minister's announcement during the high-level week, the Netherlands will contribute €1 million to the World Bank Digital Development Partnership Trust Fund, in addition to our work in the context of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise. The Netherlands calls on all States to join our efforts.

The full version of my statement will be uploaded to PaperSmart.

Mr. Li Nan (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): With the rapid advances being made in information and communication technologies, States have become highly dependent on the Internet and such technologies. Cyberspace has become a community with a shared future in which all States are deeply interconnected. At the same time, the uncertainty and the destabilizing factors in cyberspace are growing. Cyberattacks, cybercrime and cyberterrorism are on the rise, fake news is pervasive and significant vulnerabilities are threatening our critical information infrastructure. Cyberspace is a home to us all. It is in all our interests to work together to face the challenges and threats, as well as to promote peace and prosperity in cyberspace. By acting on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, countries should build a community with a shared future in cyberspace through dialogue and cooperation.

First, we must firmly uphold peace in cyberspace, maintain its peaceful nature and prevent any kind of cyber arms race. All parties should stay committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially those of sovereign equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, refraining from the use or threat of use of force and the settlement of international disputes through peaceful means. The core interests and major concerns of countries should be respected.

Secondly, we must stay committed to win-win cooperation. States should pursue shared prosperity and shared responsibility, seeking common security through dialogue and cooperation, and turn cyberspace into a new arena for cooperation.

Thirdly, we must establish a fair and just framework of international rules and norms in cyberspace, and the United Nations should play a leading role in the formulation of universally accepted international rules and norms in this area. This year, the United Nations has started the dual process of the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts, highlighting the need for and urgency of strengthening the international discussion and building consensus. In the long term, we should establish an open, inclusive and permanent process within the framework of the United Nations, so as to involve more countries in the process of international cyberspace rules development.

Fourthly, we must promote security and development in a balanced manner. We should continue to promote development by addressing security challenges, striving ever more diligently to bridge the digital gap and taking concrete steps to address disparities in development. At the same time, we should create a fair, just and non-discriminatory environment for information and communications technology applications. China calls for international dialogue and cooperation in cyberspace, and we are ready to work with other countries to foster prosperity and stability and make tireless efforts to build the cyberspace of a shared future.

Mr. Balouji (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation associates itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16).

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) represent enormous opportunities for the

common good of humankind. The irresponsible use of these technologies by States creates serious threats to the world's security and stability. The rules and norms for the responsible behaviour of States in information and communication technologies environments should therefore be seen as a way to balance the security and development of all nations.

Following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 73/27 and the holding of the first substantive meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, we are pleased that the Working Group has become the best forum we have for involving State actors in an issue that has an overarching influence on all aspects of human life. We remain hopeful that the Group's report will direct us towards the hoped-for outcomes by aligning all previous efforts in this area, including those of the relevant Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs), with the will and aspirations of the international community. With the creation of the Open-ended Working Group, the need and justification for a parallel GGE working under the same mandate has been eliminated, and the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security serves simply as a vehicle for maintaining the current status quo in cyberspace. Maintaining the status quo serves the interests of only a few States that seek dominance, militarization and superiority in cyberspace. They reject any step forward in developing international legal norms, as that would limit their freedom in the application of their offensive cybercapabilities.

Like some other nations, Iran has been the victim of irresponsible State behaviour in cyberspace. In 2010, the United States, in collaboration with the Israeli regime, developed and used a computer virus known as Stuxnet against Iran's critical infrastructure. The United States is militarizing cyberspace. Many Member States have continued to see reports in the United States press over the past couple of months with headlines such as "United States military carried out cyberattack on Iran" or "United States Administration weighs and plans cyberattack on Iran". No one should condone such brazen and irresponsible behaviour. Today it is Iran's turn; tomorrow others will be the target of such attacks.

Iran strongly supports the establishment of international legal norms and rules concerning the prevention of the use of ICT and cyberspace for

malicious purposes and believes that the following general considerations must be taken into account in developing such norms and rules.

Multilateralism, including the role of the United Nations, is the core principle of negotiations. International cooperation should be at the top of the agenda of any envisaged United Nations-led process. Cyberspace activities shall not undermine the public order and security of countries. Any rules, norms and principles aimed at ensuring the responsible behaviour of States in the ICT environment shall not undermine the sovereign rights of States. Human rights in the ICT environment should be realized, while the values and security of individuals, societies and States should be ensured.

Mr. Belousov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Last year, a major step was taken towards establishing a peaceful, secure and equitable world order in the digital sphere.

At Russia's initiative, the General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution 73/27, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security". The text contains an initial set of 13 norms, rules and principles for responsible State behaviour in the digital sphere. Their purpose is to lay the foundations for peaceful cooperation among States and to ensure the prevention of war, confrontation or any aggression.

In order to make the negotiations on international information security democratic, inclusive and transparent, for the first time ever, the Open-ended Working Group, in whose work all United Nations Member States can participate, was established. The majority of States Members of the United Nations took part in its two meetings. That is a positive signal.

At the first substantive meeting of the Open-ended Working Group in September this year, the international community was almost unanimous in its support for restoring consensus on international information security. We fully support such a position. To that end, we have submitted to the First Committee the updated draft text of our annual resolution, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" (A/C.1/74/L.50/Rev.1).

At a time when the negotiations on international information security within the United Nations are at a

crucial stage, genuine consensus on this issue is needed. Such a result can be achieved only on the basis of a common document anchored in a peaceful, constructive and balanced approach. It is necessary to develop general language that could serve as a guiding principle for the deliberations on international information security in the coming years. Unfortunately, our attempts to reach an agreement are encountering intrigue. There is now talk of each group needing its own resolution. That is supposedly the consensus for which everyone is striving. Such ideas are just an attempt to mislead the international community. It is clearly a divisive tactic.

However, the United States of America and their allies continue to try to sway the international community towards their own interests. We are called on to compromise, but what kind of compromise is it if we are talking about the undiplomatic dilution of our draft text? We are being asked to include in the draft resolution a provision that removes the main idea of constructive and non-confrontational collaboration between the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts.

Nevertheless, we are not closing the door. We are still open to compromise. The decisions that the General Assembly will take this year should not fragment the negotiation process on international information security and force countries to once again divide. That negative situation would undermine our common goal to develop mutually acceptable measures in that regard for many years to come. We call on Member States to support our draft resolution and to co-sponsor it.

Ms. Rodríguez Martínez (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): Venezuela aligns its statement with the position expressed by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16).

Venezuela considers information and communication technologies (ICTs) as essential tools for development. For that reason, my country believes that nothing in the context of these discussions can question or undermine the inalienable rights of States to develop and use information and communications technologies for peaceful purposes.

My delegation emphasizes that the use of such technologies must be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular with regard to respect for the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference

in internal affairs, refraining from the threat or use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, peaceful coexistence among States and avoiding the implementation of unilateral coercive measures.

Venezuela expresses its deep concern over the militarization of cyberspace and the use of ICTs as instruments of war to violate the sovereignty of countries, attacking their critical infrastructure and indiscriminately impacting their populations, all for the realization of geopolitical goals. We are also concerned about the increasing threats posed by cyberterrorism and cybercrime. For that reason, Venezuela encourages States to strengthen measures aimed at increasing security in the use of ICTs. We therefore urge the full implementation of the norms, rules and principles for responsible State behaviour as a way of reducing the risk of the illegal or malicious use of such technologies.

Venezuela welcomes the establishment of the Open-ended Working Group, in which all Members of the Organization participate actively and equally, as an appropriate space for promoting open, frank, transparent and inclusive dialogue so as to develop common ground that will enable us to move forward in establishing binding norms, rules, principles and practices applicable in this field.

My delegation also acknowledges the work done by the Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security in its 2013 and 2015 reports (A/68/98 and A/70/174). Venezuela appreciates the complementary efforts of both platforms.

In conclusion, we stress that the discussions aimed at developing a framework for responsible behaviour must ensure the active and equal participation of all States.

Ms. Rose (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom aligns itself with the statement by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16). I add the following remarks in a national capacity.

The United Kingdom is committed to advancing responsible State behaviour in a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace. Our economic prosperity and social well-being increasingly depend on the openness and security of networks beyond our own borders. We have a shared responsibility in improving our collective cybersecurity. Together we must uphold the rules-

based international system in all domains, including cyberspace. The United Nations has a central role to play. We welcome the start of the work of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security and the Group of Government Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security and will engage actively and positively with both processes. We very much welcome the involvement of diverse voices in both processes, including Member States with different perspectives and non-Government stakeholders. All Member States have affirmed in the General Assembly that existing international law applies to cyberspace and have agreed on a set of voluntary, non-binding norms. The Human Rights Council and the General Assembly have also affirmed that human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the relevant international instruments, must be respected and upheld equally online and offline.

To foster greater transparency, we call on all States to set out their understanding of international law in this area, as our own Attorney General did last year when he emphasized that cyberspace is not and must never be a lawless world. States and individuals are governed by law in cyberspace just as they are in any other domain. It is the responsibility of all States, as authors and subjects of international law, to be clear about how that extends to cyberspace. Confidence-building measures and international capacity-building are crucial to maintaining security and stability. The United Kingdom is one of the most active cyberdonors in the world. We have invested more than \$46 million with partners in more than 100 countries across six continents since 2012. Funding international capacity-building on cyberissues is an urgent collective priority, and we strongly advocate wider engagement across the international community on those issues.

But as well as assisting and supporting each other in applying, respecting and upholding the rules and values that we all share, as responsible States we must also be resolute in defending them and in taking action when we believe they have been broken. It is therefore important that we hold States accountable for irresponsible and malicious cyberactivity and impose consequences when they do not behave responsibly. In that way, working together, we can realize the potential of a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace.

The full version of this statement will be posted on PaperSmart.

Mr. Nakai (Japan): Cyberspace keeps growing and expanding through the initiatives of diverse stakeholders, many of them in the private sector. It is becoming a foundation of dynamic socioeconomic development and a frontier in creating new values. Our position on cyberissues is based on three pillars and aimed at maintaining a free, fair, open and secure cyberspace.

The first pillar is the promotion of the rule of law. Japan firmly believes that existing international law, the right to self-defence and international humanitarian law all apply in cyberspace and that the 11 norms recommended in the 2015 report of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (see A/70/174) provide a solid foundation. The second pillar is the development of confidence-building measures such as the promotion of information-sharing. The third is capacity-building. Japan has worked actively on capacity-building projects in the field of cybersecurity.

The GGEs in this area have affirmed the applicability of existing international laws and developed voluntary norms for responsible State behaviour, while the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security has also provided an opportunity to discuss this important issue. We believe that significant progress was made at the first meeting of the Open-ended Working Group last month, when most members affirmed that the previous GGE reports should be the basis for further discussions, and we hope that the new Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security and the Open-ended Working Group will complement each other. Japan supports international engagement in developing a consensus on responsible State behaviour, and we believe that through cooperation in upholding the rules-based international order in cyberspace, all States can enjoy its benefits.

Turning to the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation education, we believe that quality education exposes people to a variety of ideas and viewpoints and enables them to analyse situations critically. Critical thinking is key to fostering dialogue

and bridging political differences, attitudes that are essential to breaking the current stalemate and advancing nuclear disarmament. The active engagement of the younger generation is essential. Japan welcomed the Secretary-General's agenda for disarmament, which emphasizes the importance of empowering younger generations, as reflected in action 38, and we are happy to be championing it.

Japan also reaffirms the significance of the 34 recommendations in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124) and encourages all Member States to put them into practice. We appreciate the support expressed by 55 States parties for Japan's statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education at the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and we are planning a new statement at the upcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons aimed at promoting the importance of education with like-minded States parties.

Ms. Bavdaž Kuret (Slovenia): Slovenia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16), and I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity.

Advances in communications technology have provided us with new challenges as well as fresh opportunities. Addressing those challenges is especially important for democratic societies, which rely on a free and open flow of information. In Slovenia we strongly believe in the need for a cyberspace that is both global and secure. In our view, that security should be based on existing international law, including the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, as well as on international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Accordingly, we do not see the necessity for a new international body of law on cyberissues. We support the implementation of the norms and measures already agreed on in the General Assembly and regional organizations. We are also in favour of cooperation among States in building capacities to address cyberthreats.

Slovenia is engaged in sharing best practices with the other countries of the Western Balkans. That cooperation includes the management of classified data and wider cyberissues. Our national cybersecurity incident response centre is training computer

emergency-response teams from the region. Similarly, the Ljubljana-based Centre for European Perspective has been running a special programme on digital diplomacy for participants from the region, with a particular focus on disinformation, which we believe could serve as a possible model for other regions as well.

Slovenia is also in the process of upgrading its own national crisis-response system in the area of cybersecurity. A new specialized agency is being set up. Slovenia has joined the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, and we are in the process of joining the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, in Tallinn. We believe that will provide us with additional know-how and expertise to assist us and others in advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security.

Mr. Sánchez de Lerín García-Ovies (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would first like to associate myself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/74/PV.16). The full text of my statement will be available on PaperSmart.

Multilateralism, the defence of an international order based on the rule of law and the framework of the United Nations are excellent premises for addressing the challenges we face in cyberspace, an environment characterized chiefly by a global and open Internet that must be kept stable and secure and has already become an essential component of our societies' sustainable and inclusive development and economic prosperity. It is also an environment where respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law must prevail, as affirmed by both the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.

In that regard, we want to reiterate our concern about the exponential increase in malicious and illegal activities in the cyberarena, which has high political, social and economic costs and creates risks to international peace and security. We should make a priority of acting to urgently address the multiplication of these malicious and illegal incidents in cyberspace.

In that context, the work of the various Groups of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, detailed in their reports of 2010, 2013 and 2015 (see A/65/201, A/68/98 and A/70/174) and recognized by the General Assembly as fundamental references, is a valuable asset as we continue to build

on our efforts. I would like to recall here the words of the Secretary-General in his agenda for disarmament, in which he noted the progress made by the Group of Governmental Experts on the norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour and urged all who have agreed to such practices to implement them. The Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which began its work in September in a commendably constructive environment, also aligns with this. These two valid parallel processes require a special effort on the part of all of us in terms of coherence, coordination and complementarity. Similarly, the work of both processes should be guided by a spirit of transparency, democracy and inclusiveness. In that regard, we believe that it is necessary to maintain a dialogue and hold consultations with the private sector, academia and civil society.

Finally, we want to stress the importance of capacity-building in promoting cybersecurity in an interconnected world that knows no borders, where the insecurity of a few can affect the security of many. Overcoming our vulnerabilities is essential if we are to confront the challenges posed by the growing digitalization of our societies, including cyberattacks, cybercrime and terrorists' use of the Internet.

Mr. Ahmad Tajuddin (Malaysia): Malaysia associates itself with the statements delivered by the representatives of Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16), and Singapore, on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The evolution of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has brought both tremendous opportunities and complex challenges. The advancement of new technologies in cyberspace is revolutionizing every aspect of our lives. Such technologies not only contribute to economic growth and the improvement of living conditions; they also protect national security interests. But ICTs are dual-use technologies. While they can be used for legitimate purposes, they also increase the nature and level of threats. The emerging threats in cyberspace are rapidly evolving and increasingly sophisticated. The weaponization of ICTs should be rejected, as it risks triggering a new arms race between nations.

On that note, Malaysia reaffirms that the United Nations must continue to demonstrate leadership in the

field of cybersecurity, which today affects the work of Governments, private sectors and ordinary individuals to an unprecedented degree. We support the endeavour by the Secretary-General in his agenda for disarmament to engage with Member States to help foster a culture of accountability and adherence to norms, rules and principles on responsible behaviour in cyberspace.

Malaysia is amplifying its national efforts in addressing cyberrisks and threats from both the operational and policy perspectives as a way to increase its expertise, capacities and capabilities in tackling this issue domestically, as well as to cope with the development and ongoing discussions of this matter on a global scale. In that context, Malaysia would like to inform the Committee that we will be implementing a new cybersecurity strategy, to come into effect in 2020. The five-year strategy encompasses every aspect of Malaysia's cybersecurity concerns, including governance, legislation and enforcement, innovation, industry development, technology security and research and development, capacity-building and awareness-raising, as well as international engagement and cooperation. It sends a message about our determination in recognizing cybersecurity as one of the main priorities on our national security agenda.

Malaysia affirms the need for multilateral cooperation in charting the way forward. We call on all parties to find common ground in addressing an area of great concern to the international community as a whole. It is imperative that all parties ensure that the use of technologies complies fully with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Respect for the sovereignty of all nations, as well as human rights, should be enshrined as a basic principle in developing such technologies.

Mr. Hajnoczi (Austria): Austria fully aligns itself with the statement by the observer of the European Union (EU) (see A/C.1/74/PV.16).

Austria welcomes the very constructive and interactive debates in September in the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, under the expert chairmanship of Ambassador Lauber, whose approach we fully support. We welcome the emerging consensus on the reports of the various Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) in this area as the basis for our work, as well as on the application of existing international law and the Charter

of the United Nations in its entirety in cyberspace. Human rights, fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian law are a central part of this package. We welcome the multi-stakeholder event to be held in early December and strongly favour a much broader involvement of all stakeholders during the Open-ended Working Group's sessions. Coherence and consistency are essential between the parallel tracks of the Open-ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security.

The widespread concern about cybercrime threats was notable during the Open-ended Working Group session. Although it is not strictly speaking on the agenda, we need to find a link to the work done in Vienna by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime without duplicating it. We will therefore support UNODC in presenting its work at the upcoming session of the Open-ended Working Group on helping countries to set up effective structures to fight cybercrime.

What we also need most, in order to move forward in a situation where trust is wearing thin, is practical steps. Concrete confidence-building measures such as those established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum should be considered in every region and connected at the global level. By offering transparency and predictability, such measures also strengthen expectations that international law will be adhered to. We now need to build a common understanding based on the work of the previous GGEs, breaking down the way in which the implementation of the rules, norms and principles of responsible State behaviour can best be achieved in each individual State by comparing models of best practices.

Guiding principles could also be considered in the context of cybersecurity. Capacity-building is central to safeguarding cybersecurity. The EU and its member States strongly support a range of programmes to assist countries with capacity-building and best practice exchanges. Cybersecurity has become a global public good that should be strengthened if we are all to enjoy the benefits of an open, stable and secure cyberspace. Fighting malicious cyberactivities that cause great damage to intended and unintended victims alike must not serve as a pretext for tightening control over

citizens or users, which would undermine basic human rights such as the right to privacy and the freedom of expression.

The full version of my statement is available on PaperSmart.

Mr. Fiallo Karolys (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): In addition to what was expressed by my delegation in the general debate (see A/C.1/74.PV.9), there are three points I would like to emphasize.

The first is unmanned aerial vehicles and artificial intelligence. Ecuador rejects the increasing use and improvement of unmanned armed aerial vehicles, as well as lethal autonomous weapons. The international community, in its various regional and universal forums, must continue to expand its consideration of the implications of such weapons for international humanitarian law and human rights law, including providing for their prohibition. The militarization of artificial intelligence represents a challenge for international security, including in relation to transparency, control, proportionality and responsibility. We cannot ignore the reports that have been produced in the United Nations system or the information on this issue included in them, including from the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. My delegation supports the work that has been done in this area under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. However, we do not consider that the regulation of the trade in such weapons is sufficient on its own. We must redouble our efforts in this area so that the United Nations can have satisfactory results.

Secondly, while Ecuador defends the responsible and peaceful use of information and communications technologies, we stress the importance of promoting and ensuring security in cyberspace. In that connection, my delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16). Nothing should be exempt from the scope of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We emphasize the efforts of the Group of Governmental Experts on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security and the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, as well as their

complementarity, and we appreciate the briefing given to the Committee this morning.

Thirdly, within the framework of Disarmament Week at the United Nations, which concludes tomorrow, Ecuador recognizes the effective role of civil society in the progress that the Organization has made, as was recently reflected in the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in 2017 to the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. In that context as well as more generally, the creative force of youth plays a vital role. That is also why my country has decided to become a sponsor of the very pertinent draft resolution (A/C.1/74/L.48) submitted by the Republic of Korea on “Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation”. Furthermore, we must strengthen and expand the participation of women in all disarmament processes. I urge Committee members to consider the statement by Ambassador Luis Gallegos Chiriboga, Permanent Representative of Ecuador, at the Security Council’s open debate on women and peace and security (see S/PV.8649 (Resumption 2)).

Mr. Situmorang (Indonesia): Indonesia aligns itself with the statement that we delivered on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16) and that made by the representative of Singapore on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have rapidly changed the landscape of our lives. They create opportunity by increasing our connectivity, open up alternative sources of prosperity and encourage innovation and entrepreneurship. On the other hand, they create challenges in terms of peace and security and safety. In 2018, we recorded almost 12 million cyberattacks, including more than 500,000 occurrences of malware targeting our infrastructures and hampering our economy. Cyberspace has also been a preferred platform for spreading hatred and radical ideologies. On top of that, we are seeing potential inter-State conflicts spread into the ICT environment. Indonesia is concerned about the possibility that misunderstandings in cyberspace could lead to conflicts in the real world. It is therefore time that we updated our efforts in order to cope with this increasingly challenging trend. My delegation would like to highlight three points in that regard.

First, the norms of cyberspace should be inclusive so that they represent the interests of all States

Members of the United Nations, whether developed or developing countries. That inclusiveness was embodied in September at the first substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, which we commend. The fact that many Member States contributed to it in a very interactive and candid manner is an achievement that we must build on.

Secondly, we should harness the different and unique features of the various processes in the United Nations that can contribute to achieving peace and security in the ICT environment. Indonesia also welcomes the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security. We hope it will have a tangible and substantial outcome that complements the work of the Open-ended Working Group. The various processes should all be judged on their own merits. That is a position of principle that is independent from representation in the GGE. Whether in the Open-ended Working Group or the GGE, our work should be built on the recommendations of the previous GGEs and should not backtrack on their past achievements, including in identifying and developing further norms and finding ways to promote the implementation of those norms.

Thirdly, Indonesia is ready for further discussions of the application of existing international law in cyberspace, including the possibility of having a *lex specialis*, without prejudging the outcomes of our discussion.

It is our hope that we can synchronize and harmonize the work of the Open-ended Working Group and the GGE in a single draft resolution this year. It will not be easy, but we are here to do what may seem impossible. Indonesia stands ready to work with our various partners towards that goal.

Our complete statement will be available on PaperSmart.

The Acting Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of India to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15.

Mr. Sharma (India): On behalf of the delegation of India, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15, entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and

disarmament". We are encouraged by the support that Member States gave during the past two sessions to the consensus adoption of this resolution, and we thank the sponsors for their strong support.

As mandated by resolution 73/32, of 2018, the Secretary-General has submitted an updated report this year on recent developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts (A/74/122). The report touches on a range of topics such as autonomous technologies, unmanned aerial vehicles, biology and chemistry, advanced missile technologies, space-based technologies, materials technologies and information and communication technologies. The report coherently synthesizes developments across the various multilateral forums, providing a much-needed system-wide assessment in this era of rapidly accelerating technological change.

In fulfilment of the mandate in the 2018 resolution, a one-day seminar on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament was convened by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva on 19 August. India was joined by the Governments of Germany, Qatar and Switzerland in supporting the seminar through voluntary contributions. The seminar was well-attended, attracting participation from representatives of academia and industry as well as multilateral disarmament experts. It recognized the importance of holding more such events so as to foster dialogue between policymakers and practitioners, diplomats and technocrats and Governments and the private sector. With that aim in mind, in this year's draft resolution we propose that Member States organize events such as conferences, seminars, workshops and exhibitions at the national, regional and international levels in order to facilitate dialogue among the relevant stakeholders. We hope that such initiatives will facilitate a greater understanding and that Member States can benefit from shared experiential learning.

In these challenging times, we believe that science and technology can bring us all together to overcome our differences. Given the significance of this cross-cutting subject, we would like to ask fellow Member States to become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.15 and join the consensus on its adoption. My full statement will be made available on PaperSmart.

The Acting Chair: The Committee has now heard from the last speaker on the cluster "Other disarmament measures and international security".

The Committee will now begin its consideration of the cluster "Outer space (disarmament aspects)". We have a long list of speakers, so I appeal for the full cooperation of all delegations in respecting the time limits to enable the Committee to avoid falling behind schedule.

Mr. Situmorang (Indonesia): I am pleased to speak on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM).

NAM recognizes the common interests of all humankind and the inalienable, legitimate sovereign rights of all States in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. We reaffirm our position on opposing and rejecting any acts that deny or violate that principle and emphasize that ensuring the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including by banning the deployment or use of weapons in it, would help to eliminate a grave danger to international peace and security.

NAM emphasizes the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms-limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, as well as with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. We also call for the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. NAM rejects the announcement made by the United States in 2018 that it considers space to be an arena where wars can be fought or the next battlefield, and we therefore once again emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, among other things, including by establishing an ad hoc committee under this agenda item as soon as possible and taking note of the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer-space objects presented jointly by Russia and China in the CD on 12 February 2008 and updated in 2014.

Taking note of the substantive progress made by the discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, established pursuant to resolution 72/250, as reflected in the Group's draft final

report, and expressing its strong disappointment that consensus on the draft final report was blocked by the Group's member from the United States, NAM notes that it could have represented a good basis for further negotiations on adopting an international legally binding instrument.

NAM continues to be concerned about the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic-missile defence systems and the threat of the weaponization of outer space that among other things have contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to strengthening international security. The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems brought new challenges to international peace and stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. NAM remains seriously concerned about the negative security consequences of the deployment of strategic missile-defence systems, which could trigger an arms race and lead to the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. We continue to reaffirm the need for a universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory multilateral approach to the issue of missiles in all its aspects, negotiated multilaterally within the United Nations. Any initiative on that subject should take into account the security concerns of all States and their inherent right to the peaceful uses of space technologies.

Mr. Laouani (Tunisia) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to note that the Group of Arab States associates itself with the statement just made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The Arab Group believes in the importance of restricting the uses of outer space mainly to peaceful purposes and of banning all types of armaments or armed conflict in outer space. The relevant existing international conventions have played a positive role in promoting the peaceful use of outer space and governing activities in it. However, it will be important to continue updating the conventions specifically to reflect recent developments and the announcements by a number of countries that they have built capacity either to deploy weapons in outer space or to launch armed attacks on satellites and other assets in outer space. We stress that the priorities of the Arab Group in that regard are based on the following principles.

First, outer space is the common property of humankind. All activities in outer space must therefore be governed by the United Nations in order to ensure compliance with the principles of inclusiveness, universality and international consensus in that vital realm. We need a binding international instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Secondly, any attempt to govern activities in outer space must be geared to preserving the interests of all States and should not in any way prevent them from exercising their inherent right to use outer space for legitimate peaceful purposes unrelated to armaments.

Thirdly, the Arab Group emphasizes the importance of ensuring that outer space remains a peaceful realm free from conflict. The legally binding international instrument that we need to prevent an arms race in outer space must therefore include banning the deployment of weapons, whether offensive or defensive, in outer space, as well as banning any armed attack on objects in outer space or any actions designed to damage them deliberately. It should also ban the development or testing of any weapons or technologies whose sole purpose is launching armed attacks on objects in outer space, while establishing the necessary mechanisms and procedures for verifying the fulfilment of those obligations in a multilateral context.

Fourthly, we stress the importance of promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and for working to integrate developing States into the system of States using and benefiting from space applications and activities.

The Arab League welcomes the progress made in the substantive discussions on identifying objective elements for a legally binding instrument of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with its mandate under General Assembly resolution 72/250, which could represent an important contribution to future negotiations in that regard. The Arab States call for continuing the work of initiating negotiations within the United Nations to conclude a multilateral legally binding instrument on this subject with the aim of closing the existing gaps in the international legal system that governs the activities of States in outer space. This would help to counter the increasing threats in this area in the light of our ongoing and growing reliance on outer-space technologies in a number of vital and strategically important areas, along

with the escalating tensions and military rivalries that we are seeing at the international level.

Ms. Tiwet (Malaysia): I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that is, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and my own country, Malaysia.

ASEAN recognizes access to outer space as an inalienable right of all States. We believe that the exploration and use of outer space should be exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it is to the collective benefit of humankind. It is therefore imperative that all activities in outer space be carried out in accordance with international law and the principle of the non-appropriation of outer space. We reaffirm the vital importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and its weaponization. In that context, we urge all Member States to respect and ensure the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 73/91 and previous resolutions on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. ASEAN welcomed the establishment pursuant to resolution 72/25 of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in which one ASEAN member State, Malaysia, participated. While we note the substantive progress that was made during the GGE's deliberations in August 2018 and March 2019, we regret its failure to reach a consensus on its draft final report. We believe that the substantive discussions in the GGE could serve as a good basis for further negotiations on adopting an international legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race and the placement of weapons in outer space.

ASEAN remains committed to the work of the relevant multilateral bodies such as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, which serve as important platforms for promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses of outer space. In that regard, ASEAN supports deliberations on the Space2030 agenda and its implementation plan. We emphasize the need for the agenda to be implemented through concrete measures, with the objective of narrowing gaps in space technology between space-faring and emerging space-faring nations in favourable terms and on a non-discriminatory basis. In doing so, the agenda will create conditions for the sustainable and inclusive

development of space activities in support of the Sustainable Development Goals. While it is incumbent upon all States to ensure that the use and exploration of outer space is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the General Assembly must play an important role in fostering continued dialogue on current issues and challenges in this field.

In this connection, ASEAN emphasizes the need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including through the establishment of an ad hoc committee under this agenda item without further delay. We believe that the immediate commencement of such work in the CD will help sustain the momentum that has been built up on this issue to date.

As recognized by the international community through General Assembly resolution 72/56, confidence-building measures play a critical role in preventing an arms race in outer space. In that regard, ASEAN will continue to support initiatives of this nature through existing platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. To date, three Forum workshops on space security have been convened to explore critical issues in this field, among others, on space security threats and hazards, as well as transparency and confidence-building measures.

The world has witnessed a great deal of change since the dawn of the space age about six decades ago. The international community has benefited immensely from enhancements in the telecommunications and financial sectors that have been made possible by space-based technology. Moving forward, activities in outer space should not remain the exclusive preserve of a small group of States. ASEAN encourages the strengthening of capacity-building programmes, with particular emphasis on developing countries, to ensure that outer space is, both in principle and in practice, a truly global commons of which all States can avail themselves.

Undoubtedly, with increased access to outer space come greater responsibilities for the entire United Nations membership. This further underscores the need for shared understanding and the acceptance of norms developed through multilateral engagement. As we navigate the complexities at hand, ASEAN calls for continued action in mitigating the effects of space debris through the relevant multilateral forums, and we

stand ready to engage with all parties in moving this agenda forward.

The Acting Chair: I now give the floor to the observer of the European Union.

Ms. Homolkova (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its member States.

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, the country of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

The EU and its member States continue to promote the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. We regard outer space as a global common good. We continue to stress the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures and the need to advocate responsible behaviour in outer space, notably in the framework of the United Nations.

In this regard, we would like to express our satisfaction at the fact that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) adopted a preamble and 21 guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer-space activities. We look forward to continuing this work with the prospect of possible new guidelines.

The EU underlines the fact that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and other applicable international law, as well as the guiding principles developed in the framework of the United Nations, constitute the cornerstone of the global governance of outer space. We appreciate the fact that the members of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space took a comprehensive approach in an effort to build bridges between various positions. It was unfortunate that the GGE could not reach consensus on a final report. Nevertheless, there is a need to elaborate what constitutes the safe, secure and sustainable use of outer space and what kind of behaviour cannot be considered peaceful.

The EU and its member States remain strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are concerned about the continued development of all anti-satellite weapons and capabilities, including Earth-based ones. We call on all

States to refrain from the destruction of space objects that generate space debris, notably multiple long-lived debris.

A future framework for arms control in outer space should involve effective and verifiable instruments designed to cover all relevant threats, be they Earth-to-space, space-to-space or space-to-Earth. It could start with transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) and consensus-building regarding responsible behaviour in outer space, without excluding legally binding instruments in future, for example by agreeing on a test moratorium on anti-satellite weapons, the prohibition of the deliberate creation of space debris, notably multiple long-lived debris, and norms on close-proximity orbital operations. The current draft treaty promoted by the Russian Federation and China does not constitute a sufficient basis in this regard. We note that both proponents of the treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space are among those States that already possess and are developing further capabilities, including Earth-based anti-satellite capabilities, which are not included in the draft treaty.

We also believe that the initiative on the no first placement of weapons in outer space does not meet the criteria for TCBMs as agreed in the 2013 consensus report by the GGE on TCBMs (see A/68/189). Again, this initiative does not address Earth-based weapons targeting outer-space assets. The definitional ambiguity regarding the question of what constitutes a weapon in space will affect all objects placed in space or possessing the capability to affect objects in outer space that could be considered to be a weapon. Furthermore, the no first placement initiative contains no mechanism to effectively verify a State's political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space. For those reasons, the EU and its member States are not in a position to support the proposed draft resolution on no first placement (A/C.1/74/L.59).

We believe that it is important to develop initiatives that will increase confidence and mutual trust. A legally binding instrument could be an option; however, we believe that the most realistic near-term prospect lies in agreeing on a voluntary instrument or voluntary norms to establish standards of responsible behaviour across the full range of space activities and related challenges, such as the intentional creation, mitigation and remediation of space debris, the conduct of proximity operations and the coordination of collision

avoidance. The idea is not to replace but to complement the COPUOS long-term sustainability guidelines. A voluntary instrument could include a political commitment by States and create a more structured cooperative framework. Compliance with existing international law as well as with TCBMs, as developed in the framework of the United Nations, would have to be ensured.

The idea of launching discussions on a voluntary instrument or voluntary norms, supported and mandated by States Members of the United Nations in the General Assembly, could be a way to deliver on these objectives.

A full version of this EU statement will be published online.

Mr. Masmejean (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): It is high time to strengthen international norms by developing new instruments that are legally or politically binding in order to prevent space from becoming a theatre of military confrontation.

We deplore the fact that the international community has made scant progress in this respect this year. While processes within the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space have not led to the desired results, recent discussions show that there has been some progress in terms of conceptual approaches and underlying ideas.

First, we believe that it is increasingly agreed that States must develop a common understanding of what constitutes responsible behaviour in outer space. Several measures could be considered aimed at restraining certain activities, including an agreement prohibiting the use of force against space systems or a restriction on certain activities having specific effects on foreign space objects or the orbital environment. For instance, the intentional creation of space debris should be prohibited.

Secondly, we would deem it appropriate to focus our attention on the drafting of a norm banning anti-satellite tests that create long-lived debris. The elaboration of such a norm would be relatively easy, notably because such tests can be monitored and detected.

Thirdly, interesting processes of reflection have been undertaken on the importance and challenges of

verification, an issue that certainly requires further study in connection with any treaty prohibiting specific types of systems or actions. Interesting proposals have been made to formulate rules that would not require verification, because they would regulate behaviour in space rather than specific capabilities. Switzerland is of the view that some of those areas and approaches could bear fruit and could be further developed. We hope that the Committee will be able to generate positive momentum in that regard.

We welcome the fact that in June the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) adopted 21 guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer-space activities. We should emphasize that some of the topics discussed in COPUOS are directly related to the security of space activities. We therefore look forward to the joint meeting of the First and Fourth Committees with a view to better identifying such cross-cutting issues and enabling the disarmament community and the space community to take a coordinated approach to them.

I will stop here. The full statement will be made available on PaperSmart.

Mr. Edmondson (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom aligns itself with the statement just made by the observer of the European Union, and I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity.

Our societies increasingly rely on space. We are seeing things today that we did not previously think possible, such as in-orbit servicing and an improved ability to understand what is happening in space. Those advances give us hope. But challenges to our ability to operate safely and securely in space are proliferating. The jamming of positioning signals threatens navigation and potentially our economies. Capabilities have been developed to hold satellites at risk. For 50 years, the international legal framework, including the Outer Space Treaty, has served us well in addressing the challenges of operating in space, but we need to ensure that the international framework keeps up with our evolving use of space. Some nations have proposed a draft treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in space, but it is too narrow, fails to resolve serious political, technological and practical challenges and cannot be effectively verified.

We need a broad approach that addresses all of those concerns, accounts for the rapid development of new technologies and recognizes the equity that

civil, commercial and military actors hold in space. In March we saw the conclusion of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in which the United Kingdom played an active and constructive role. In April, the United Kingdom organized a Wilton Park conference entitled “Operating in space: towards developing protocols”, with experts representing most of the active spacefaring nations. In June we welcomed the adoption of 21 guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which we look forward to seeing implemented by all nations.

We now need to discuss a new set of questions, including how to better communicate in normal times and times of heightened tension and how to clearly demonstrate our intent and explain our behaviour. We are clear that we must move beyond the outdated concept of the placement of weapons in space, work with new direction and build a new political consensus. We should build trust in each other’s actions, define acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, establish norms on the use of on-Earth technologies that can affect satellites and improve our techniques for verifying capability and intent and for attributing attacks. We do not rule out the possibility of agreeing on a legally binding treaty on outer space in the future. But in order to move forward, we have to find ways to reduce the risks to operating in space. The United Kingdom would be interested in exploring a new approach, and we hope that all States will join us.

The Acting Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of the United States to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.55.

Mr. Desautels (United States of America): Today the world is increasingly reliant on space assets for prosperity and security, which bring tremendous benefits for all nations. The United States believes that we have a common interest in maintaining peace and security in outer space for the benefit of all. We therefore support existing international law in this area, in particular the Outer Space Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, which continue to serve as an essential framework of principles ensuring that all nations benefit from outer space.

At the same time, we are conscious of the desire of all countries to reduce risks to space-system operations. In order to effectively address those risks, we have to

move beyond a single focus on the placement of weapons in space and towards practical methods of mitigating the risks of misperceptions and miscalculations. Those efforts are essential in the face of the efforts by some countries to develop, stockpile and use weapon systems that threaten to deny other States the use of space. For example, Russia has announced the deployment of a ground-based laser weapon designed, in its words, to fight satellites. Moreover, the United States has significant questions about a Russian satellite whose behaviour is inconsistent with anything seen before and that appears to directly contradict Russia’s proposed draft resolution on the no first placement of weapons in outer space. Here we see the main proponents of the no-first-placement draft resolution (A/C.1/74/L.59) actively proclaiming their capability to attack satellites, with no explanation of how that system is consistent with its push for arms control in space.

Then there is China, which in 2007 launched a ground-based missile that intentionally created 3,000 pieces of debris when it destroyed a Chinese satellite. That system is in operation today. So what can we do to reduce those risks? The United States believes that we can reduce them by cooperating in developing non-legally-binding measures that avoid risking the stability and security of the outer-space environment, including through effective communication, which can enhance international confidence in outer-space operations. That is why we seek to advance multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures that build on the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (see A/68/189).

To that end, we were hoping to have a single consensus draft resolution for the Committee to consider this year on transparency and confidence-building measures, but unfortunately we have not been able to engage in meaningful discussions with our Russian and Chinese colleagues. We have therefore submitted a separate draft resolution. Draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.55, entitled “Advancing transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities”, provides more meaningful and practical methods of mitigating the risks of misperceptions and miscalculations. We also want to note the adoption of 21 guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer-space activities by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

My full remarks will be available on PaperSmart.

The Acting Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.3.

Mr. Hassan (Egypt): In today's world, almost all aspects of human activities on Earth are either directly or indirectly dependent on outer-space technologies. Considering the extreme volatility of the outer-space environment, it must not be allowed to become a scene of military conflicts, which could have catastrophic implications. Without prejudice to the possible value of transparency and confidence-building measures as interim measures in the short term, there is a clear need for a legally binding instrument to complement the existing international legal framework by preventing an arms race in outer space and filling the existing legal gaps in this area.

Such a legally binding instrument should have a comprehensive scope that primarily includes a ban on the placement of any weapons, defensive or offensive, in outer space, as well as a ban on any armed attacks on satellites or other outer-space assets. We believe that such prohibitions could be subjected to specific verification measures by using a diversified set of tools that could be supplemented by transparency measures. In that context, Egypt welcomed the substantive progress made during the discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, established pursuant to resolution 72/250, which achieved a remarkable level of depth in its discussions of all the controversial legal and technical aspects.

Sri Lanka and Egypt have submitted draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.3, this year's version of their annual joint resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". We count on the support of all States Members of the United Nations for this important draft resolution, which attempts to bridge the gaps and create common ground for further progress on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Mr. Situmorang (Indonesia): Indonesia reaffirms the statements just delivered by my delegation, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and by the representative of Malaysia, on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Putting energy into new frontiers in order to fight conflicts in new ways is the last thing that we need. We have to resolve conflicts and decrease hostilities instead. Everyone must ensure that outer space and

its celestial bodies, which are the common heritage of humankind, are used, explored and exploited exclusively for the benefit and interests of all. As important as bilateral arms limitations, voluntary mechanisms, confidence-building measures and other such tools are in countering an arms race in outer space, they cannot replace a universal legally binding instrument. Furthermore, with the current stalemate in disarmament progress and a volatile international security environment that has yet to plateau, this challenge requires the urgent attention of all.

In that context, I want to highlight several pertinent points. First, as stipulated in Indonesia's space legislation, we affirm the aim of the relevant international treaty, which is that the exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies should be for peaceful purposes only and should be carried out in the interests of all countries. Indonesia has banned the use of celestial bodies for military purposes and the placement and testing of weapons of mass destruction in space, as well as activities that threaten the safety and security of space operations or have a negative environmental impact.

Secondly, Indonesia reiterates its long-standing commitment to actively promoting international cooperation at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels in order to enhance their contribution to space, science, technology and their application in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the betterment of humankind.

Thirdly, we underscore the importance of creating a universal legally binding instrument for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The negotiation of any code of conduct for outer-space activities should be consistent with the respective mandates of all the relevant United Nations bodies and should be convened in a format of inclusive, transparent and consensus-based multilateral negotiations within the United Nations framework. To that end, we underline the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including through the establishment of an ad hoc committee. We call on all Member States to display the necessary political will and to work together actively to realize a universal legally binding instrument on this important issue.

Mr. Ngundze (South Africa): For my delegation, cooperation with Member States on mutually beneficial

and peaceful uses of outer space, with a focus on extending the benefits of space technology to developing countries, will go a long way towards helping us to achieve the African Space Policy and Strategy, adopted by the African Union in 2016 to ensure that space, science and technology can serve as key drivers for inclusive and sustainable development in Africa.

In view of the vast benefits provided by the outer-space environment, it is our obligation as responsible space stakeholders to ensure that outer space and other celestial bodies remain an area for exclusively peaceful purposes. My delegation considers it vital to ensure that space does not become yet another frontier for war and conflict. It is self-evident that the weaponization of space by one actor would be followed by others, thereby creating an environment ripe for an arms race. Beyond the vast waste of resources that this would entail, the weaponization of space would result in a proliferation of space debris, which remains an issue of concern to us all. It would also undoubtedly undermine international and national security.

It is in that context that South Africa reiterates its support for the draft treaty presented by China and Russia in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer-space objects. The proposal could serve as a useful basis for further discussions in terms of the elements and scope of future legally binding instruments. Furthermore, we hope that the outcome of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space can contribute to the commencement as soon as possible of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding instrument or instruments on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. That would be another crucial reason for CD member States to show greater flexibility and a willingness to move beyond narrow interests to ensure progress and end the impasse in the Conference.

Mr. Ahmed (Pakistan): Outer space is being explored and used by an increasing number of States for both civilian and military purposes. While our dependence on outer-space applications is on the rise, the risk of its weaponization is also growing. We are increasingly concerned about the threats posed by anti-satellite capabilities to regional and global stability, as well as to the long-term sustainability of outer space.

We saw a demonstration of those capabilities early this year in our region, in the absence of strong legal instruments that can regulate the testing, development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Other States might also demonstrate such capabilities, while the potential integration of anti-ballistic-missile systems and their components into space assets adds another worrying dimension to this matter.

There is an urgent need for preventing outer space from emerging as a new realm for conflict and an arms race. As a strong proponent of the non-weaponization of outer space, Pakistan reiterates its call to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to immediately commence negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in order to comprehensively address the gaps in the international legal regime governing the exploration and use of outer space.

The issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the CD's agenda for more than three and a half decades. It is eminently ripe for the commencement of negotiations on a legally binding treaty. The draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer-space objects submitted jointly by China and Russia provides a useful basis for the start of negotiations. The countries that currently dominate in outer space should not be blinded by that situation. Their current technological prowess will not last forever. Other countries are catching up rapidly, and this time the developing countries will neither carry the burden of non-proliferation nor accept any discriminatory restrictions that hamper their pursuits in outer space. We must evolve universal and equitable regulations that can guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of outer space before it turns into an arena for security competition.

The Outer Space Treaty recognized that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of and in the interests of all countries. The Treaty prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, but it is silent on the placement of other types of weapons, including conventional weapons. Moreover, it does not prohibit the use of force against outer-space objects from Earth. This issue needs to be addressed in a comprehensive treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space negotiated in the CD.

The General Assembly will also be adopting another important draft resolution (A/C.1/74/L.59), spearheaded by the Russian Federation and sponsored every year by Pakistan, on no first placement of weapons in outer space. On 28 May the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Russia signed a joint statement on this issue, in a practical manifestation of our commitment to refrain from being the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space.

The full version of our statement will be uploaded to PaperSmart.

Mr. Incarnato (Italy): Italy aligns itself with the statement made earlier by the observer of the European Union, and I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity.

Today's space-based applications offer all of us unique resources, including in the areas of economic growth and innovation. Space enables many services that have become essential to the proper functioning of our economies and societies. The increasing number of objects in space, together with our reliance on space resources, is among the main reasons why a comprehensive and effective international regulatory environment should be formulated and put in place. States must work together for the long-term sustainability, safety and security of the space environment.

Italy commends the establishment of the dedicated Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In particular, we appreciate the important work on the long-term sustainability of outer-space activities and the adoption of a preamble and 21 guidelines. That could represent a solid basis for a more comprehensive voluntary instrument simultaneously covering substantive aspects of safety, security and sustainability, which would contribute to nations' political commitments to sharing global principles and should cover long-term goals across the full range of space activities.

It will be important to develop initiatives to increase confidence and mutual trust between current and future space actors. In that regard, transparency and confidence-building measures are a crucial step. They should include, first, mechanisms on information-sharing related to national space strategies, policies and programmes; secondly, notifications when undertaking space missions and manoeuvres, with a view to reducing the risk of miscommunication and

improving space traffic management, and thirdly, consultations with a view to decreasing the risk of disputes.

Working on disarmament and security, we have the great responsibility of ensuring a proper framework for technological developments in outer space. In that connection, Italy is fully committed to preventing any dangerous or negative use of technology in order to avoid an arms race in outer space. Outer space should never become an area of conflict. We actively participated in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was unfortunate that the Group could not reach consensus on a final report. Nevertheless, it helped to narrow our differences, and we hope that those efforts will in turn advance the work of the Conference on Disarmament in this important domain.

While not excluding the objective of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the long run, there would be value in agreeing to a comprehensive voluntary instrument within the framework of the United Nations. We therefore encourage further international cooperation in formulating agreed principles of responsible behaviour in outer space.

Mr. Bukayev (Kazakhstan): Confidence-building measures remain essential to the process of developing general considerations for preventing the militarization of outer space. In that regard, we see great value in draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.59, on no first placement of weapons in outer space. We also support draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.55, on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer-space activities, as well as other draft resolutions submitted by the United States and Egypt. However, we would like to see them focus more sharply on how to prevent any possibility of an arms race in space. It is extremely important to continue the good tradition of organizing joint meetings of the First and Fourth Committees aimed at discussing every possible challenge and threat to security and sustainability. The focus, scope and objectives of the draft resolutions of the two Committees should be clearly delineated without complicating or duplicating each other.

Kazakhstan has been actively engaged in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We regret that the Group could not adopt

its outcome document, which was supported by almost all the members of the Group.

Kazakhstan hosts the Baikonur space-launch site on its territory and has been actively participating in peaceful space-exploration programmes with Russia, France and some other countries. We understand that at present there is no legally binding ban on putting weapons in outer space and that all the existing international treaties have an advisory character. Space technologies are developing at a dynamic pace, and there is a dangerous potential threat that an arms race in outer space could begin. In that regard, we believe it is vital to have further discussions on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space by involving other international bodies engaged in this issue. In order to facilitate the start of such negotiations, we endorse the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space submitted by China and the Russian Federation.

This year Kazakhstan initiated a round-table discussion on the creation of a wide range of practical measures on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. This event is being organized in the framework of the international forum entitled "Space Days in Kazakhstan", to be held from 12 to 13 November in Nur-Sultan. We encourage all interested States to support this initiative and to participate in the event. We also hope that the meeting in Nur-Sultan can come up with solutions to this issue and present us with an opportunity to reach a productive and forward-looking agreement among the States Members of the United Nations.

In conclusion, Kazakhstan, as a responsible international actor and a unilateral adherent to the principles and guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, would like to emphasize that our common goal is to ensure that space remains an arena for cooperation free from weapons, to be used for human development, well-being and advancement.

Mr. Rodrigo (Sri Lanka): At the outset, Sri Lanka would like to join all other delegations in congratulating the Chair and the other members of the Bureau on their election and wishing them every success in the work ahead.

My delegation would also like to associate itself with the statement delivered earlier on this agenda item by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

From the dawn of time, humankind has looked to the heavens and the stars above. To use a popular phrase from science fiction, space is the final frontier. It is the last frontier that needs protection, and for which we need to ensure equal opportunities for all of humankind in exploring and utilizing it for peaceful purposes for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. Sri Lanka would like to stress that outer space is part of the common heritage of humanity. It is our global commons. We have to ensure that it is free of conflict, and it is imperative that we prevent any militarization and weaponization of space.

It was for those reasons that in 1982, some 37 years ago, Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution on the subject and, together with Egypt, has been pleased to alternate our submission of this annual resolution for almost four decades. At one point the resolution, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", enjoyed consensus and broad global support. This year we have submitted it as draft resolution A/C.1/74/L.3. We seek support for this important draft resolution, which calls for the negotiation of a multilateral instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I thank the delegations that attended our presentation this year, and we hope the text will be able to garner a larger following. I would like to clarify that there was a technical problem with an older version of the draft resolution. The final draft version is dated 17 October and is on the e-deleGATE web portal. This was pointed out to the Secretariat, and action has been taken to correct the document to reflect the correct text. I just wanted to bring that point to the Committee's attention in case some countries were concerned about the text.

Sri Lanka welcomed the work and substantial discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, established by resolution 72/250, and regrets that the Group failed to agree on a final report.

Ms. Castro Loredó (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Cuba associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/74/PV.16).

We champion the legitimate right of all States to equal and non-discriminatory access to outer space and to benefit from cooperation in training on and the transfer of space applications and technology. The threat of an arms race in outer space, the continuing development

and improvement of space weaponry and the presence of war materiel in that environment undermine smaller countries' ability to realize their aspirations to benefit from the potential of space technologies.

We reject the assertion made by the United States representative that space is an arena for fighting wars, just as we reject attempts to make it the next battlefield. The United States' creation of a Space Force and its militarization of outer space and cyberspace pose a serious threat to the security of all and the future of humankind. We are very concerned about the use of space technologies to the detriment of the security of nations, including the current extensive network of spy satellites, which, in addition to being incompatible with peace and development, continue to fill geostationary orbits with large amounts of space debris.

There is an urgent need to strengthen the relevant legal regime with the adoption of a multilateral treaty to prevent and prohibit the placement of weapons in space. The draft treaty presented by Russia and China in the Conference on Disarmament is a good basis for negotiations.

We regret that consensus was blocked in the adoption of the final report of the Group of Governmental Experts established by the General

Assembly to consider and make recommendations on substantive elements of an international legally binding instrument for the prevention and prohibition of an arms race in space. While we acknowledge the practical value of voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space, they are no substitute for a legally binding instrument. Cuba supports and promotes a policy of no first placement of weapons of any kind in that environment. We encourage the preservation of outer space as the common heritage of humankind and the implementation of our political commitments in accordance with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The Acting Chair: We have exhausted the time available for this meeting. The next meeting of the Committee will be held this afternoon at 3 p.m. sharp in this conference room. The Committee will first hear a pre-recorded video presentation by Ambassador Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota of Brazil, Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Thereafter the Committee will continue its consideration of cluster 3, "Outer space (disarmament aspects)".

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.