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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEASECURITY COUNCIL  
Thirty-seventh year

Letter dated 15 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations, addressed to the  
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, the military results of the 1982 rainy season (May-September 1982), excerpt of the communiqué issued by the High Command of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea on 15 October 1982.

I would appreciate it if this letter and its enclosure could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 20, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative  
of Democratic Kampuchea

ANNEX

MILITARY RESULTS OF THE 1982 RAINY SEASON  
(May - September 1982)

Excerpt of the Communique issued by the High Command  
of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea

- 15 October 1982 -

I - MILITARY RESULTS

1. Vietnamese enemy forces wiped out : 22,000, including 13,000 killed or definitively put out of action.
2. Vietnamese enemy positions destroyed or captured by the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea :
  - a- Independent positions : 196
    - at platoon level : 90
    - at company level : 64
    - at battalion level : 27
    - at regiment level : 12
    - at division level : 3
  - b- Positions within enemy fortification networks : 66
    - 18 platoon positions defending a network of battalion level
    - 9 company positions defending a network of battalion level
    - 15 platoon positions defending a network of regiment level
    - 18 company positions defending a network of regiment level
    - 6 battalion positions defending a network of regiment level
3. Vietnamese intervention units put into rout : 259 times, including :
  - units at platoon level : 160 times
  - units at company level : 74 times
  - units at battalion level : 22 times

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- units at regiment level : 3 times

4. Vietnamese enemy supply and transport units put into rout : 32 times, including :

- units at platoon level : 22 times
- units at company level : 10 times
- 123 Vietnamese enemy transport trucks destroyed
- 14 Vietnamese enemy transport canoes and boats destroyed
- 3 enemy transport lines of wagons and locomotives destroyed

5. Villages and communes liberated :

- 122 villages
- 9 communes

6. Vietnamese enemy transport and communication strategic lines cut-off during the 1982 rainy season :

- roads cut-off in 430 places, totalizing 6,891 meters
- railway lines cut-off in 278 places, totalizing 11,680 meters
- 70 bridges and pipes of all sizes, totalizing 436 meters

7. Vietnamese enemy soldiers deserting their ranks : 2,859

8. Vietnamese enemy soldiers killed or wounded in mutinies : 209

9. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded in revolts by Kampuchean soldiers and self-defence guards forcibly enlisted : 603

10. Vietnamese soldiers killed or wounded by Kampuchean population : 215

11. Kampuchean soldiers and self-defence guards forcibly enlisted by the Vietnamese enemy deserting so as to join the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea : 907

12. 6,425 Kampuchean people including men, women, elderly and children were killed by the Vietnamese enemy

13. 419 Kampuchean administrative cadres forcibly installed by the Vietnamese enemy were imprisoned.

14. During this rainy season, especially in July, August and September 1982, Vietnamese enemy sent 23,000 fresh supply troops to Kampuchea.

## II - OBSERVATIONS BY THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

During the past rainy season, the Military High Command of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea noted on the battlefields of Kampuchea the following facts :

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1. The Vietnamese enemy is deeper and deeper bogged down in all fields : military, political, economic ; food, logistic, transportation, medicine, etc... The moral of its army is lower and lower with more desertion and rebellion.

In Vietnam itself, the situation of the Vietnamese enemy has been further deteriorated. For instance, during last July, 1Kg of rice cost 22 Dongs, the Vietnamese worker monthly salary was 40 Dongs. Thus, in one month a Vietnamese worker could not even afford to buy 2 Kg of rice.

The complete dilemma of the Vietnamese war of aggression in Kampuchea has become clearer during these last 4 rainy seasons and 4 dry seasons. In the next fifth, sixth rainy or dry seasons or more to come, the Vietnamese enemy forces will further be heading downwards.

2. The shortage of Vietnamese fighting forces in the Western front of Kampuchea, which they consider as their strategic front, has become more and more critical. The only way out for them in reinforcing their fighting forces is to send more new recruits from Vietnam. Most of them are forcibly recruited from South-Vietnam, while some are from North-Vietnam. They are not from regular unit forces and are very young. 20 to 25 per-cent of these forces have already deserted and fled back to Vietnam.

At the same time, during this entire 1982 rainy season, throughout Kampuchea, the Vietnamese aggressors have done everything they could to forcibly enlist Kampuchean people into the army, from 13 up to 50 years old, to serve their policy of aggression, expansion, annexation and racial extermination in Kampuchea. But their criminal attempts have totally failed because :

- firstly, the Kampuchean youth and people have fought back against this Vietnamese enlistment,
- secondly, 60 to 100 per-cent of those who had been forcibly enlisted have deserted.

3. In this last 1982 rainy season, more Vietnamese enemy strategic supply and transport lines were cut-off repeatedly. This caused more difficulties to them than the previous seasons in supply lines, transports and communications.

4. As for the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea, they have further developed their capacity of fighting :

- they are better organized in all units,
- their guerrilla attacks have been increased and more effective, particularly in their implementation of guerrilla tactics of fighting in squad or group level,

- thanks to this effectiveness, the forces of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea with their present number have become more powerful and active in their fighting against the Vietnamese forces of aggression all throughout the country. They have been carrying out their activities everywhere. Our forces were then not wasted in the company, battalion or regiment units as they had been before,

- bullets and weapons have been better used and spared. That is

a very important factor for such an army of a poor and small country like ours.

In this situation, we are able to wage a protracted war if the Vietnamese aggressors compel us to do so. Besides, our military cadres, at all levels, division, regiment, battalion, company or platoon commanders, especially at squad and group level, have better implemented the guerrilla tactics of fighting and improved their skill in waging this people's war.

Now, more and more, our National Army and guerrillas have succeeded in moving to attack the Vietnamese forces deeper inside their strategic areas temporarily controlled by enemy, wiping out and wearing out the enemy's forces, neutralizing or splitting their forces so as to create within their ranks more confusion than in the previous seasons.

5. Though they are heading downwards through systematic and inextricable difficulties in all fields created by the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea, the Vietnamese aggressors are still very stubborn and, from their true nature of land-grabbers and racial exterminators, they will carry on all kinds of criminal schemes during this fifth dry season (1982-1983) :

- They will try by all means to replace the forces they had lost in Kampuchean front -although they are shattered forces and have no moral to fight- so as to carry on some military activities in this forthcoming dry season and prolong their war of aggression and expansion in Kampuchea. Their aim is to have time so that they can carry on more deceitful diplomatic and other manoeuvres.

- In this fifth dry season, the Vietnamese enemy will more intensively use chemical and biological weapons to supply the deficiency of their effectives and to defend themselves from the attacks of the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea. We should recall that during the last 4th 1981-1982's dry season, the Vietnamese aggressors used chemical and biological weapons in Kampuchea, killing 1,214 persons, including 42 entire families and poisoning 414 persons.

- In this 5th dry season, the Vietnamese aggressors may try to use aircrafts in some places to supply the deficiency of their troops, despite they have difficulties in getting fuel and spare parts.

- They will continue to create so-called independent resistance groups by giving them Khmer names so as to use them to attack from behind and furthermore to guide the Vietnamese forces of aggression to attack our National Army and guerrillas. Their objective is to serve their military and mainly political purpose to attack our National Army and guerrillas through the appearance of "Kampuchean fight Kampuchean" and to deceive us into their pitfall. Through this trick, they aim at lessening the sacred meaning of the Democratic Kampuchea's slogans "Kampuchean does not fight Kampuchean", "Kampuchean are united to fight the Vietnamese aggressors". But this Vietnamese scheme cannot deceive the Kampuchean people and the National Army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea.

- They will continue to use small intelligence or commando units to attack us in the flanks or in the rear, aiming at preventing us from moving forward and attacking them powerfully according to our plan.

However through past experiences, once we hold aloft our vigilance and combined the use of traditional weapons and mines for our defence lines and kept a close eye on these defence lines, the Vietnamese intelligence units could not get away from these weapons.

6. The Vietnamese aggressors will continue actively their diplomatic manoeuvres and all sorts of tricks together with their allies and followers to break the Kampuchean tripartite coalition forces.

But during these past four dry seasons and four rainy seasons the all kinds of Vietnamese deceitful tricks and manoeuvres have shown to the Kampuchean people and all peoples the world over how cynical, perfidious and criminal the Vietnamese aggressors are. Therefore, no one would be deceived by them, except a handful of their allies and followers with the Soviet Union as the master.

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