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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 40TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 57, 133, 136, 138 AND 139 (continued)

A draft resolution was introduced by:

Mr. Vraalsen (Norway) - A/C.1/37/L.67

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 57, 133, 136, 138 AND 139 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will continue this morning its consideration of and action upon draft resolutions under disarmament items.

As members of the Committee know, decisions will be taken in the course of today's meetings on the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1, L.3/Rev.2, L.4/Rev.1, L.6, L.12/Rev.1, L.13, L.14, L.17, L.29, L.30, L.32/Rev.1, L.43, L.47 and L.59. Before we start the voting I call upon the representative of Yugoslavia.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): The sponsors of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/37/L.11 and L.26, concerning the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament have been in contact during the last few days, guided by the desire to elaborate a draft resolution which would receive the support of both sides. It is my particular pleasure to inform the Committee that such endeavours have yielded results and that I now have the privilege of introducing the revised draft resolution in document A/C.1/37/L.26/Rev.1.

I should like to point out the amendments contained in our revised draft.

First, in the first line of the fifth preambular paragraph, after the words "the most urgent task is to halt", the following words are added: and reverse . In the last line of the same paragraph, the words "special obligations and responsibilities" have been replaced by "the primary responsibility", in order that the ending of the paragraph may be in accordance with the spirit and content of the Final Document of the first special session.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

Secondly, at the end of the preambular part of the first draft the following new paragraph is inserted:

"Recalling the commitment of States undertaken in various international agreements to negotiate on disarmament measures, in particular on nuclear disarmament,".

Thirdly, in the fourth line of operative paragraph 3 of the original draft, after the words "the first special session on disarmament", the word "and" is deleted and the following words are added:

"concerning nuclear disarmament, as well as".

The rest of the paragraph would stand as it is now. This change should contribute to bringing the text of this paragraph as close to the spirit of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament as possible.

Finally, in the second line of operative paragraph 4, after the words "accelerate disarmament negotiations", the following words are added: "in good faith".

In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to the sponsors of the two drafts -- in particular to the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, whose understanding and whose readiness to co-operate contributed most directly to the successful outcome of our consultations.

May I express our wish that the revised draft will receive general support and that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I wish to announce that, following the usual practice, my delegation has co-operated with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.26 and, as a result, we now have before us draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.26/Rev.1, just introduced by the representative of Yugoslavia.

The German Democratic Republic has become a sponsor of this revised text. We take this opportunity to thank the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.L/37/L.26 for their constructive co-operation. Under these circumstances the delegation of the German Democratic Republic does not insist on a vote on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.11

Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway): On behalf of the delegations of 42 countries from all regional groups, I take pleasure in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.67, concerning institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. For the sake of good order I should like to read out the names of the delegations. They are: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, the United Republic of Cameroon and Uruguay.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.67 is a combination of three draft resolutions that had previously been introduced in this Committee. It also includes the original draft decision concerning the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies as contained in document A/C.1/37/L.36.

The three draft resolutions to which I referred are: A/C.1/37/L.9, concerning the review of the membership of the Committee on disarmament; A/C.1/37/L.23, concerning the future status of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and A/C.1/37/L.60, concerning certain institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

(Mr. Vraalsen, Norway)

Compared to the texts of documents A/C.1/37/L.9, L.23, L.36 and L.60, the proposed changes are of an entirely editorial nature. Part I of the draft resolution concerns the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee is requested to report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly taking into account the relevant paragraphs of both the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and the Concluding Document of the second special session on disarmament.

In part II the Committee on Disarmament is commended to consider designating itself as a conference without prejudice to paragraph 120 of the Final Document. The revival of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies is referred to in part III. The Secretary-General is requested to revive that Board in line with his note A/37/550 and to entrust it with the functions listed therein, taking into account the provisions of part IV of the draft resolution and further relevant decisions of the General Assembly in this regard.

Part IV concerns the decision to make the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research a permanent autonomous institution with headquarters in Geneva. The Institute shall be funded by voluntary contributions from States as well as public and private organizations.

In part V the Secretary-General is requested to transform the Centre for Disarmament into a Department for Disarmament Affairs, headed by an Under-Secretary-General. Finally, the Secretary-General is requested to report to the thirty-eighth session on the practical implementation of this draft resolution.

(Mr. Vraalsen, Norway)

My delegation has thought it useful to weld together those draft resolutions and the draft decision that concern institutional arrangements, thereby simplifying and facilitating this Committee's work. The idea of an omnibus draft resolution has been discussed with the original sponsors of the various separate draft resolutions. Most of those delegations have supported the proposal; however, a few have indicated that, for various reasons, they do not wish to join in sponsoring the omnibus draft resolution. My delegation appreciates their position and remains thankful for the support received from them.

In conclusion, I express the hope that this draft resolution will be adopted by consensus by this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take up draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 under agenda item 133, entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: freeze on nuclear weapons". This draft resolution has four sponsors and was introduced by the representative of India at the First Committee's 37th meeting on 19 November 1982.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to read out the names of the sponsors.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): The sponsors are the German Democratic Republic, India, Liberia and Mali.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1.

I shall call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): As the Chairman has announced, in a short while this Committee will take action on draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1, L.3/Rev.2 and L.4/Rev.1, all of them dealing with nuclear matters. The characteristic of these draft resolutions is that they advocate a nuclear freeze and other moratorium ideas, as well as the non-use or non-first-use of nuclear weapons. These concepts also seem to permeate other draft resolutions which will come up for decision during the next few days. My delegation takes a critical view of the aforementioned concepts.

I should like at this juncture, by way of an explanation of vote, to clarify the underlying reasons for our vote in these matters. My statement relates directly to the analysis of the nuclear non-first-use proposal which I myself offered during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and to the statement of my delegation in the general debate on 27 October.

The prevention of nuclear war and, beyond that nuclear disarmament, are a vital concern of this day and age. I am deeply convinced that no Government represented in this room would ever consider the launching of a nuclear conflict as a tool of its own policy. We would all agree that the real purpose of our joint endeavour is not recrimination but the serious search for the best method of accomplishing the noble objective of preventing war, including a nuclear catastrophe. That is why rational debate and the achievement of substantial and verifiable results in negotiations are vitally important.

In seeking how war, including nuclear war, can best be prevented and nuclear disarmament most effectively promoted, my delegation, along with many others, follows these two overriding principles. First, all considerations must proceed from the principle of the renunciation of the use of force enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. Its main rationale is the prevention of war. It is, as the United Nations Disarmament Commission formulated it this year, "the most acute and pressing task of the present day". Armed conflict as such is banned - except in case of self-defence against an armed attack. Secondly, the objective of

(Mr. Wegener, Federal
Republic of Germany)

disarmament is to establish a solid foundation for lasting peace, to bring about stability and to ensure undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

Any disarmament measure or philosophy which fosters instability and thus insecurity is not a suitable recipe for the preservation of peace. This applies in particular to the relationship between the two major nuclear Powers where a stable balance at the lowest possible level is the best way to deter conflict and to contribute to international security.

I turn now to the freeze. In our view, the following arguments can be advanced against the freeze philosophy and can show its serious flaws.

A freeze could be justified only if the participants in a freeze decision would at that time fully enjoy and preserve their right to security; in other words, if there was a genuine balance, both in the global context and at relevant sub-global levels. If not, the freeze decision would be in direct contradiction of paragraph 29 of the Final Document. If that paragraph is taken seriously, the freeze decision should never be taken totally separated from a profound analysis of the underlying security situation and force relationships.

Secondly, proponents of the freeze assert that there is parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. This claim of parity is constantly repeated but rarely substantiated. In the context of the security situation in Europe, the Soviet Union, without any corresponding arms development on the Western side, has in the last couple of years deployed many hundreds of nuclear warheads of great destructive effect and have substantially reinforced its conventional capability. The Soviet Union claimed parity in 1978 and still pretends that it exists now - hundreds of Soviet nuclear warheads later. That is a logical impossibility. The difficulty with the freeze is that, in the absence of approximate parity, it would amount to unilateral disarmament and codify the superiority of one side at an arbitrarily chosen moment.

Thirdly, if the consequence of the freeze is a mere codification of imbalances, it destroys the incentive for deep cuts for genuine nuclear reduction. One of its psychological flaws is that it arbitrarily separates

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the two components of the concept of halting and reversing the arms race.

Fourthly, the freeze therefore leaves existing nuclear arsenals in place. In the East-West context, which depends on a balanced nuclear relationship between the two major Powers, the mere continued existence of such vastly superior arsenals in a region produces grave psychological results, instills fear and mistrust and deeply affects the general political atmosphere.

Fifthly, even if a freeze were based on a balanced situation and thus acceptable, it would need adequate verification embodied in firm contractual commitments. A freeze without such a basis would do nothing to allay fear and suspicion and would not be durable. Obviously, however, an agreement on a verified freeze could hardly be reached more rapidly than a much more urgently needed agreement on arms reduction.

Sixthly, the preparedness of Western Governments to embark on freeze moves is greatly complicated by the traumatic experiences with earlier unilateral or agreed moratoria. It is an uncontested fact that the Soviet Union has unilaterally abandoned the 1958-1961 moratorium on testing and, equally, that it has not responded to the unilateral United States renunciation of the production of chemical weapons in 1969.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic
of Germany)

Furthermore, in spite of the Soviet Union's declaration earlier this year that it would cease deploying SS-20 nuclear weapons, construction work on additional deployment sites has continued unabated.

In conclusion, I should like to restate our deep conviction that instead of freeze proposals at this juncture, instead of codification of existing balances, we need an effective reduction through balance and verifiable agreements and thus the establishment of a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible levels. Whoever is in favour of genuine arms control and arms limitation should work actively towards that end.

I now turn to the issue of the non-first use of nuclear weapons. My delegation has twice offered a critical analysis of commitments relating to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons at the 1981 session of the First Committee and again during the general debate of the present session. In parenthesis, I might add that unfortunately the argument contained in last year's statement and the arguments put forward at that time by some of the other Western delegations have not been reflected in the 1981 Disarmament Yearbook, making the presentation of these problems in the Yearbook somewhat lacking in balance.

In each of the two statements, my delegation has underlined that the concept of non-first-use must be judged by whether it meets the overriding exigency of preventing war. I do not wish to enumerate our arguments in full. Suffice it to recall the following two considerations that are of decisive importance for us. First, anyone who undertakes not to make first use of a specific type of weapon obviously intends to reserve the right to use other weapons. That is the attitude of a Power which feels it has superiority in those other weapons. Nobody can expect the inferior side to applaud such a position. Secondly, a declaration of intent not to make first use of certain weapons is insufficient and futile as long as those weapons remain ready for use. It is not possible to verify such a self-imposed obligation, because of its declaratory nature. It would only become clear whether the obligation was really being honoured in the event of a confrontation, at which point it could

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of Germany)

be too late for the international community to react. Therefore it is not enough to forswear the first use of nuclear weapons to meet the professed purpose. What we need is a strict observance of the comprehensive ban on the use of force, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

The time allotted to my delegation for this explanation of vote is running out. I have to limit myself to these few arguments. There are others. In conclusion, and before we proceed to the vote on the many nuclear resolutions before the Committee, I should like to express my regret that in our opinion many of the resolutions do not objectively promote the purposes they purport to serve.

In this universal body dealing with security and disarmament problems, I should like to reiterate the readiness of my delegation to join in any venture which in our view can make a more forceful and effective contribution to the prevention of war, including nuclear war. We have a broad range of possibilities to deal with in that subject, even below the level of the controversial strategic doctrine. We must be more imaginative in devising ways by mutual agreement to make the outbreak of nuclear war and war in general by accident or miscalculation impossible. We could do more to regulate the behaviour of States in the pre-war stage. Confidence-building measures in the nuclear rounds, including those just proposed by President Reagan, are among these possibilities.

My delegation, together with two other delegations, took an initiative in this direction at the second special session devoted to disarmament. We remain prepared to identify, within a suitable multilateral organizational framework, appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, provided that the context of war prevention in general is not lost.

My delegation regrets that the work of this Committee has not focused sufficiently on the preparation of a consensus text on this partial but vital topic. Yet there is hope that we shall shortly tread that more promising ground. That would certainly lead us further than many of the other resolutions to which I have had to voice my objections in this explanation of vote.

Mr. TAVARES BUISES (Portugal) (interpretation from French): In the general debate at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, my delegation declared that it was:

"... unable to support any vague proposals of questionable worth in the process of negotiating on measures to ensure effective and internationally verifiable control over armaments"

(A/C.1/36/PV.24, p. 27)

as part of the Portuguese political view, which today remains completely valid.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1, on which the Committee will be voting, falls into the category of measures which my Government is unable to support.

The freeze on nuclear weapons in the conditions outlined to the Committee, far from strengthening international peace and security, could have harmful effects, the opposite of those pursued. In particular, the most visible and immediate effect of the practical implementation of these and other proposals with the same objectives would be to consolidate the imbalances that are already obvious in Europe, especially after the deployment of the SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union. The superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in the area of conventional weapons, added to the advantage of the SS-20 missiles already deployed, would be further strengthened. In the circumstances, it is difficult to see what incentive there would be for the Soviet Union to continue the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations. On the contrary, it would have every interest in maintaining the status quo of the freeze.

That leads us to the conclusion that the draft project under consideration is not even in keeping with the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly that was adopted by consensus. In fact, paragraph 29 of that document states:

(Mr. Tevares Nunes, Portugal)

"The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces." (A/S-10/2, para. 29)

In the conditions in which the freeze of nuclear weapons is proposed, the objective of that paragraph would not be met. Moreover, it would be impossible to verify the freeze proposed and the proposal itself makes no mention of the need for verification of such a measure.

(Mr. Tavares Nunes, Portugal)

The possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war with the risk of the destruction of mankind is a source of concern to my country and to others, as it is to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1. However, it is our conviction that the objectives of disarmament would be more effectively attained if there were negotiations on precise, well-defined and balanced measures providing for adequate verification machinery.

For the reasons I have just set forth, we feel that this draft resolution is thoroughly destabilizing and will not strengthen international peace and security. These same considerations apply also to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 on the same subject. Consequently, my delegation will vote against draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 and A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): My delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 concerning nuclear-weapons freeze.

Indonesia is greatly alarmed by the present pace in the build-up of nuclear armaments which, at this stage, already has an overkill destructive capacity. As a matter of principle, therefore, we will continue to support concrete and practical measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, including a freeze, with adequate verification, in the development and production of nuclear weapons.

Action has indeed become even more pressing in view of the present strain and mutual distrust characterizing East-West relations, the deterioration of the international situation, the further escalation of the arms race and the stalemate in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Such a freeze, in our view, would constitute a step forward towards the reduction of nuclear arms.

I should like also to place on record that this explanation of vote also applies to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 on a nuclear arms freeze, on which the Committee will vote at a later stage.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now begin the voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: China, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Japan, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Somalia

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 was adopted by 105 votes to 16, with 8 abstentions.

* Subsequently the delegation of Somalia advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives wishing to explain their votes after the vote.

Mr. LIN Cheng (interpretation from Chinese): In general, to demand a freeze on nuclear weapons to stop the nuclear-arms race is understandable. However, the situation of the various nuclear States is quite different. The nuclear Powers possess massive nuclear arsenals. They use them to carry out a policy of nuclear threat and blackmail, while the countries with very small nuclear defence capacity and the many States without nuclear weapons are the victims of the nuclear threat.

In view of this situation an indiscriminate demand that all nuclear States should freeze nuclear weapons obviously can be only to the advantage of the nuclear Powers, thus legalizing their nuclear superiority over other countries and making their nuclear threat and blackmail legitimate, perpetrated and permanent. This is not in the interest of the security of States and world peace. That is why the Chinese delegation abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1.

Mr. C. LIDGARD (Sweden): Sweden has voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1. We share the view incorporated in that resolution that a freeze including all nuclear-weapon States is desirable and important. We should, however, like to add that we consider a nuclear-weapons freeze initiated by the two nuclear super-Powers, as proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 as more urgent. Such a freeze would also be an important contribution to bilateral negotiations aiming at large reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons of the two Powers, which have by far the largest arsenals of such weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: We have now completed our consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1. We will take up draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2, under agenda item 133 on the review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, on the topic of a nuclear arms freeze.

This draft resolution has four sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 38th meeting of the First Committee on 19 October 1982. I now call on the Secretary of the Committee to read out the list of its sponsors.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 are Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Sweden.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 . I shall now call on these representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote.

Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway): The draft resolution before us in document A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 on a nuclear arms freeze raises a number of important questions containing nuclear arms and their delivery vehicles. To clarify the position of the Norwegian Government on these questions I should like to make the following statement on Norwegian nuclear policy concerning the different aspects raised in the draft resolution.

The basic idea of a freeze is not new to the field of disarmament or arms control. Throughout the last 20 years various proposals about freezes, moratoriums or similar ideas have been put forward by all sides in disarmament negotiations. The idea of freezing or halting on a temporary or more lasting basis the development of new types of weapons while negotiations continue can in some instances be desirable in order to buy time while difficult and often technical questions are sorted out. From a conceptual point of view, however, there are at least three important problems connected to the general idea of a freeze.

First, a freeze would, by definition, keep the balance of power frozen in the state it is in from the moment the freeze enters into effect. It would thus also freeze present imbalances. In Europe there is, because of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and other missiles, a serious imbalance concerning intermediate-range nuclear forces. A freeze on nuclear forces in Europe at this stage would therefore only benefit one of the parties to the ongoing negotiations on these weapons.

A second problem is that a freeze could, in certain instances, stand in the way of a real reduction of nuclear arms. The proponents of a freeze argue that in order to start reductions you first have to stop. I can assure everyone that the Norwegian Government and people share the urgent hope that the momentum of the arms race can be stopped. In the present situation in Europe, however, there are no serious and delicate negotiations under way towards arriving at a real and substantial reduction of nuclear arms. The same is true at the strategic level

through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). We hope and believe that these negotiations will succeed not only in preventing deployment of new weapons but, even more importantly, in removing or reducing present systems.

A third problem related to a freeze concerns verification. A general freeze cannot be as well verified as arms control agreements arrived at through direct negotiations between the parties concerned which also include means of verification in order to ensure that all parties abide by the obligations they have accepted through the agreement itself. In the opinion of the Norwegian Government it is vitally important that arms-control and disarmament agreements should be properly verified. Without such verification suspicion and distrust may soon erase the gains obtained by the agreements themselves.

My delegation appreciates the efforts made by the authors of the present draft resolution to deal with the important question of verification. We nevertheless find these attempts somewhat lacking in this respect. The freeze proposal in document A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 deals with four elements in the production chain of nuclear weapons, that is, testing, production, deployment and cut-off of fissionable material. Concerning the question of the testing of nuclear weapons, Norway has long been on record as supporting a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and my delegation is therefore a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.40, which deals with this issue in further detail.

We also believe that an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. We are thus a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.48, which deals with this issue.

We cannot support the remaining parts of the present freeze proposal, those dealing with the testing of delivery vehicles and with the production and deployment aspects, as they would run counter to the positions taken by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, including Norway, both as regards the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the START talks. In the opinion of the Norwegian Government a freeze including these elements would seriously prejudice the outcome of the present INF negotiations in Geneva and detract from what must be our principal objective, that is, significant reductions of existing nuclear arms in the ongoing negotiations.

For these reasons Norway will vote against the present draft resolution.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): The Netherlands will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2 for reasons explained in my statement in the First Committee on 19 November 1982, when I commented on some draft resolutions pertaining to nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament.

I should like to quote what I said on the question of a freeze.

"The Netherlands position on the question of a freeze is that at this juncture a freeze of the development, production and/or deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles would legitimize the recent massive growth in missile weaponry of the Soviet Union and leave intact the resulting imbalance. Thus the West would be prevented from remedying the vulnerabilities which now exist. This holds true in particular for land-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons as well as for certain aspects of the strategic relation.

"For these reasons a 'freeze' under today's conditions would be equivalent to a consolidation of certain destabilizing aspects of the present East-West relationship.

All our endeavours should now concentrate on promoting a successful outcome of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations, for, contrary to a 'freeze', the START and INF talks both aim at achieving substantial reductions as well as a stable balance of forces.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

"One might note in passing that the detailed elaboration of an agreed 'freeze' would be just as complicated as that of a real reduction agreement and would call for the same kind of intrusive verification measures. It would seem that the main proponents of a 'freeze' ignore these problems. So as to avoid any misunderstanding, I should add that what I have said just now does not exclude that, once a more stable balance has been achieved, a certain agreed freeze might contribute to curbing the nuclear arms race." (A/C.1/37/PV.37, p. 22-25)

Unlike the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2, the Netherlands delegation is not firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since

"the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity".

In our opinion, accepting such a view would amount to locking in a dangerous and unacceptable status quo.

In any case, we hold that negotiations of a general agreement freezing nuclear forces at current levels is probably not practicable. To assume that far-reaching measures, as envisaged in operative paragraph 1, can be established by a mere proclamation of declaration, as is assumed in that paragraph, is tantamount to seriously underestimating the complexities involved. Unilateral restraint alone cannot produce a safer world. There must be joint co-operative action.

Moreover, the important elements of a general nuclear freeze at current levels would be extremely difficult to verify, and some would not be verifiable at all.

A positive factor, to a certain extent, is the mention in draft resolution L.3/Rev.2 of the need for relevant measures and procedures of verification. The verification measures and procedures agreed upon in the SALT I and SALT II Treaties would not suffice, however, for monitoring compliance with all the limitations and bans mentioned in the same operative paragraph.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

In short, we should like to be able to believe that the development of nuclear armaments could be stopped and the chances of nuclear war diminished, at the same time, by a sudden freeze. Instead, we are convinced that that is wishful thinking. A freeze now would lead not to a safer world but to a less stable situation, and thus increase rather than decrease the chances of a nuclear war.

There is no alternative to the difficult negotiations in Geneva.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation voted for draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 and will vote similarly for draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2, dealing with a nuclear arms freeze.

We believe that the threat from nuclear weapons is all-pervasive, and that efforts to eliminate the threat can be made at more than one level. This position is consistent with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which states that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

Pakistan accordingly voted in favour of draft resolution L.1/Rev.1 and will vote in favour of L.3/Rev.2.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2.
A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Somalia

The draft resolution was adopted by 103 votes to 17, with 6 abstentions*

* Subsequently the delegation of Malta advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes after the vote.

Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark): No responsible human being wants war. Every responsible human being wants the global arms race to be brought to an end. And every responsible human being supports the efforts to bring about real and substantial reductions of existing arms, in particular nuclear arms.

The Danish Government has given careful consideration to the draft resolutions on nuclear arms submitted in this Committee. In doing so, the Danish Government has paid particular attention to whether the proposals promote or impede the on-going Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva aiming at achieving substantial reductions of these weapons and at a stable balance of forces at a lower level.

The Danish Government looks with sympathy upon the basic idea of freezing the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. However, we would have preferred it if draft resolutions on this question had not been submitted at this stage, as we fear that they might have a negative impact on the on-going negotiations in Geneva. In our opinion, a freeze might legitimize the recent massive growth in the nuclear weaponry of the Soviet Union and leave intact the resulting imbalance.

Seen from a European point of view, the Soviet build-up of SS-20s gives rise to particular alarm.

We find that a freeze should not be the point of departure for, but the logical result of, the negotiations in Geneva. We all have an obligation to join in the efforts to promote a successful outcome of those negotiations. What is needed now, therefore, is true negotiations, with both parties showing willingness to consider carefully the other party's proposals.

Those considerations, weighed against the strong concern of the Danish public over the continuing nuclear arms race, led the Danish Government to abstain on draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 and A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2.

However, my Government would like to emphasize that our vote today on these proposals does not imply any change in the Danish Government's firm commitments to both elements in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's double-track decision of December 1979 or in Denmark's foreign and security policy.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): This morning the First Committee has taken action on two draft resolutions on a freeze on nuclear armaments - A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 and A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2. I wish to explain my delegation's position on both of them, for which my delegation has just voted.

Effective measures to eliminate or limit the danger of nuclear war require a minimum of understanding between the Powers that have those weapons at their disposal. The debate on those draft resolutions demonstrates that this is not the case. On the contrary, deep divisions persist between the nuclear Powers on this issue.

We see the draft resolutions before us as a response to the spontaneous movement in many countries anxious about the dangers of a nuclear war and concerned that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons are not making any real progress.

It is clear, however, that real results in this field can be achieved only in serious and substantive negotiations among the parties principally concerned. It is on this basis that we have voted in favour of those two draft resolutions, even if we have serious doubts about various elements in both texts, more particularly in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2, for the Soviet Union, in principle, takes a positive attitude to the idea of a freeze on nuclear weapons and stockpiles as a first step towards reducing these stockpiles, which should be followed up by real and tangible nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that the nuclear arms race must be halted once and for all. Therefore, all the nuclear Powers must participate in a freeze. We understand that this idea is set forth in the draft resolution we have just adopted. In this context the Soviet delegation does not oppose the fact that the first appeal for a freeze was addressed only to the Soviet Union and the United States of America. We also proceed from the premise that the freeze proposed in the draft resolution should be limited to a certain time frame and that the question of its continuation has to be settled taking into account the actions of other

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

nuclear States. As for verification of a freeze, this question requires further agreement through talks between the parties to it.

I should like to say just a few words about the idea of a freeze in connection with the statements made by some delegations in explanation of vote. It is a mark of the times that the idea of a freeze of nuclear stockpiles - even though there are many different views involved here - is supported by the overwhelming majority of Governments, something which has just been reflected in the vote. The broadest possible sectors of public opinion in the various countries also agree with this idea, but some, including some here in the First Committee - and this was heard in the statements of a number of representatives from countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - continue to maintain that a freeze on nuclear weapons would be beneficial or advantageous only to the Soviet Union on the grounds that it supposedly has nuclear superiority.

However, the facts show that what was agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and also between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO was that there existed approximate parity, and such parity still exists today both in the area of strategic and other nuclear weapons and in the area of conventional forces. The existence of this approximate parity has more than once - and I emphasize, more than once - been recognized by political and military leaders of the West, particularly by those who are well informed about the substance of this matter. This has been referred to by Presidents of the United States of America, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the State Secretaries and Ministers for Foreign Affairs of a number of Western countries. It has been regularly confirmed by specialists and, some three or four days ago, the Director of the London International Institute on Strategic Research, Mr. Robert O'Neil, said the same thing. The balance of forces was reflected in the Soviet-American agreements, including the second strategic arms limitations agreement (SALT II). There was approximate parity and the United States was not lagging behind; but claims to that effect were designed in order to cover up an unjustified build-up of nuclear weapons in the United States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Serious attention should not be given to affirmations such as we have heard today about the so-called violation by the Soviet Union of the moratorium on nuclear tests in the 1960s. The statements that the Soviet Union, despite its unilateral decision to stop deploying medium-range missiles aimed at Europe, is continuing to do so were totally groundless.

I should also like to recall something else, that is, the frequent unilateral steps we have taken to limit armaments, to which there has been no response from the Western States. These were concrete steps which included the withdrawal of 20,000 troops and thousands of tanks and other military equipment from the German Democratic Republic, a unilateral cessation of the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR, the reduction of a considerable number of those missiles, and other measures. The Soviet Union rejects, as a matter of principle, this argument about military superiority. We do not strive to achieve it and we do not recognize that it exists; we also do not recognize that anyone else should have that superiority. Parity is something that would be in the interests of preserving peace. However, it is not yet a guarantee that it would free mankind from the threat of war, particularly in conditions when the level of military confrontation is high.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It is essential to move on further and to reduce the level of arms. Military parity must be at the lowest possible level of arms. That is our approach to nuclear disarmament.

In a statement made yesterday in Moscow, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, stated:

"We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the West. We are in favour of parity, with regard for the interests of both parties, for honest agreements. This is what we are ready for."

He also emphasized:

"As to the nuclear strategic arms possessed by the USSR and the USA, the Soviet Union, as is known, agrees that the two sides should, as the first step on the way to a future agreement, freeze their arsenals and thus create more favourable conditions for the continuation of talks on the mutual reduction of these weapons."

That is the position of the Soviet Union on the question of a nuclear arms freeze.

Mr. GLEISSNER (Austria): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 and L.3/Rev.2 and wishes to explain its vote as follows.

Austria considers disarmament measures - and what the two draft resolutions envisage is in our view a disarmament measure - to be of doubtful value if they do not take the aspect of equilibrium into account. Austria is not in a position to make an assessment as to whether at present there exists an equilibrium between the great Powers in the field of armaments when all armament systems are taken into account. That is one of the reasons why Austria submitted its own disarmament proposal, aiming at more openness in this field. Nevertheless, Austria decided to cast a positive vote, because of the exceptional dangers posed by nuclear weapons and because a possibly existing disequilibrium could also be balanced by measures taken in the field of other types of weapons systems.

Mr. O'CONNOR (Ireland): Ireland voted in favour of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1 and L.3/Rev.2, which have just been adopted. I would recall that the Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Haughey, in his statement at the second special session on disarmament, and subsequently the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Collins, in the general debate at this session, put forward the idea of a freeze or moratorium on the introduction of new strategic weapons and delivery vehicles for an initial two-year period. We believed that a freeze on both sides could help to create a climate which would make negotiations on arms reductions easier.

Our proposal was limited in its aims in the hope that it would be initially more acceptable and that it could later be extended. The present proposals are rather broader in their aims than our approach, although the underlying idea is the same, namely, that both sides in the present nuclear competition should halt the deployment and development of new weapons in order to create a better climate for the negotiations on reductions, which are so urgently needed.

Accordingly, and taking account of the ideas put forward by our Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ireland voted in favour of both draft resolutions.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Freezes and moratoriums have had an unhappy history since the Second World War. It is in the nature of a freeze, of course, that it is non-binding and therefore just as it can be unilaterally assumed it can be unilaterally abandoned. It is this aspect that gives us particular trouble in dealing with any proposed freeze. In this respect it is analogous to moratoriums, as other speakers have pointed out, and as I have said, as history since the Second World War has demonstrated. Perhaps this is not of itself a sufficient reason to reject freeze proposals.

What is undeniable, however, is that a freeze proposal, particularly a comprehensive one, as this is, prejudices all the complex technical scientific, political, legal, and even economic issues, as well as the military issues, both strategic and tactical, both offensive and defensive, all the issues that are involved.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Such a proposal must necessarily be based on an assumption of total equilibrium, both in the specific sense and in its overall ambit, otherwise it would necessarily prejudice the position of one party in relation to the other. I wonder if anyone here can make that kind of judgement on all the aspects entailed in the kind of arms control negotiations that are going on either in the Committee on Disarmament or in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva. The very fact that those negotiations are taking place shows the need for them.

Thus, while we have considerable sympathy with the motives of those proposing a freeze - we have considerable difficulties, overriding difficulties, with the practical problems it would pose. We fear, indeed, that it could be a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing measure.

For those reasons, among others, while the draft resolution before us might well be looked upon as a useful, albeit perhaps partial, statement of objectives or checklist for a negotiated and verifiable arms control agreement of major import, we do not find it possible to support such proposals as freezes, other than as part of a negotiated treaty commitment.

In closing I would like to refer to the well-known Canadian provisions on certain types of freeze, for example, a negotiated freeze of technology, a negotiated freeze of the production of fissionable weapons material, so it is not the word "freeze" that frightens us or the notion of a freeze that troubles us. It is the particular type of freeze proposal with which we have to deal, and while we sympathize with the objectives and the honesty of purpose of the proponents we are unable to support it.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes our consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2. We turn now to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1, under agenda item 133, "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly", on the topic of "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". This draft resolution has 21 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of India at the 33rd meeting of the First Committee, on 15 November 1982.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to read out the list of sponsors.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the First Committee): Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Congo, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

The CHAIRMAN: I call now on the representative of Sweden, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote before the vote.

Mr. C. LIDGARD (Sweden): The Swedish Government attaches the greatest importance to measures aimed at preventing the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, it is vital for the very survival of mankind that such weapons are not used. There is also a logical link between non-use and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that must be kept in mind.

It is my Government's firm belief that more resolute efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament are urgently needed. This should be accomplished through a process of gradual and balanced reductions in nuclear weapons, with the aim of their total elimination. Measures on non-use have their natural place in this context.

(Mr. C. Lidgard, Sweden)

Sweden entirely shares the objectives of this draft resolution. It also shares the opinion that nuclear war most probably would have such effects as to constitute a crime against humanity. As the fifth preambular paragraph is worded, it makes a precise interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations which can be contested from a legal standpoint. We would, therefore, have preferred to have the fifth preambular paragraph, or parts of it, deleted. Unfortunately, such a deletion was not possible to achieve.

With that explicit reservation my delegation has nevertheless found the general thrust of the draft resolution so important that it has decided to vote in favour.

The CHAIRMAN: The voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1 will now begin.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic,

Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Malawi, Paraguay, Zaire

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1 was adopted by 103 votes to 17, with 9 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. MECALOKONOMOS (Greece): My country has always been in favour of both nuclear and conventional disarmament. We therefore would have been in favour of the ideas expressed in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1 if this text had foreseen a prohibition of any use of force, save in the common interest. In our opinion, that would have been more consistent with our Charter.

We firmly believe that if an international forum is to negotiate the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, that could be interpreted as meaning that the use of other, conventional, weapons is legal and permissible.

* Subsequently the delegations of Colombia and Costa Rica advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

(Mr. Megalokonomos, Greece)

That is why my delegation had to abstain in the voting on the resolution just adopted, having, of course, in mind not only the aforementioned juridical considerations but also the real dangers represented today and in the every-day life of all nations by conventional weapons.

Mr. O'CONNOR (Ireland): The total opposition of Ireland to any use of nuclear weapons scarcely needs stating in this Committee. Our position is clear. In our statement during the general debate in this Committee we emphasized that:

"... we want to see the firebreak which now exists between the use of nuclear weapons and that of any other kind of weapons strengthened in every way possible, because we consider that the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances would be the ultimate madness."

(A/C.1/37/PV.21, p. 53)

In these circumstances, it was with great regret that we felt obliged to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1. The present draft reaffirms in its final preambular paragraph resolutions which Ireland was unable to support. As we indicated at the time, we had difficulties regarding the approach adopted in those resolutions.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes the Committee's action on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1.

The Committee will now turn to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.6, under agenda item 138, "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". This draft resolution has 10 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 29th meeting of the First Committee, on 9 November 1982. I now call on the Secretary of the Committee to read out the list of sponsors.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the First Committee): Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6.

I call on the representative of China, who wishes to explain his vote before the vote.

Mr. LIN Cheng (China)(interpretation from Chinese): Many peace-loving countries out of a desire to oppose the nuclear arms race and prevent nuclear proliferation hope to see the early realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is fully understandable. It is our conviction that the cessation of nuclear tests should be a component part of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament process and should be carried out in close link with concrete nuclear disarmament measures in order to have some effect on halting the nuclear arms race. If there is only a cessation of tests but no cessation of the improvement and production of nuclear weapons, accompanied by substantial reduction, nuclear disarmament cannot be realized.

Today when the nuclear technology of the States with the largest nuclear arsenals has developed to the point that their emphasis is on raising their target precision and prevention-alert ability, a mere cessation of tests is certainly of no use in stopping the nuclear arms race. The 19-year history since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty fully demonstrates this point.

As a nuclear State, China shoulders an unshakable responsibility and obligation towards nuclear disarmament. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, China proposed that when the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals have stopped the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and have reduced by 50 per cent their arsenals of all types of nuclear weapons, then all nuclear States should stop nuclear tests and cease to improve and produce nuclear weapons. They should then reduce their own nuclear weapons according to reasonable proportions and procedures. We deem this to be a reasonable and feasible way for the realization of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and for nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Lin Cheng, China)

Now, a nuclear Power with the largest nuclear arsenals has submitted a proposal requesting the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests which has no connection whatsoever with nuclear disarmament; and it asks all nuclear States not to conduct any nuclear explosions pending the conclusion of such a treaty. It is worthy of note that that country not only has already conducted close to 500 nuclear test explosions but also this year alone has conducted more than a dozen nuclear tests. It has not slowed its pace in the nuclear arms race in the least.

In the past that country also made use of the so-called moratorium on tests, but facts show that that was for it but a pause between a number of nuclear tests, its purpose being for it to consolidate the achievements it had already gained in tests and to make better preparation for future tests.

Today when that country is feverishly pushing its nuclear arms race, maintaining its nuclear hegemony and fighting for its nuclear superiority, its submission of a draft resolution on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests cannot be taken to indicate a genuine desire for disarmament, nor is this in the interest of nuclear disarmament.

On the basis of the aforementioned position that I have just stated, the Chinese delegation will vote on the various draft resolutions on the prohibition of nuclear tests. We cannot but vote against draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6.

The CHAIRMAN: The voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6 will now begin.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

- In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire
- Against: China, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Turkey

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6 was adopted by 98 votes to 4, with 24 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. CHANANA (India): India voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6 in accordance with its consistent and long-standing support for the urgent conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. However, our affirmative vote does not in any way constitute an endorsement of the basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests submitted by the Soviet Union at this session. The Committee on Disarmament, which is undertaking multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban, must take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives which should be treated on an equal footing.

As far as India is concerned, it has been our consistent position that a treaty on a nuclear test ban must aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States, in all environments, for all time. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all testing of nuclear weapons.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina)(interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Argentina voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6 because its language is consistent with the basic principles of the Republic of Argentina in this matter. However, with reference to its operative paragraph 2 which would refer to the Committee on Disarmament the text of a treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, our delegation considers it altogether procedural in nature and our approval of the draft does not mean that we agree with each and every fundamental provision of an eventual treaty, as contained in the draft of a treaty to be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): The Belgian delegation has just abstained from voting on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6 and it will also abstain from voting on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.32/Rev.1. It will vote for draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.40. These positions taken by my delegation result from our determination to work in the most effective possible way to attain the goal of the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. Some of the proposals do not fit as closely as we could wish within the context of achieving that goal. We have serious doubts about the possibility of distinguishing between weapons tests and tests for peaceful purposes. The goal of a comprehensive test-ban seems to us to be more in the interests of the international community and more in accordance with the experience of the last two years as reflected in communication CD.130 addressed by the three nuclear-weapon States to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The verification of a comprehensive test ban is still one of the main problems to be settled. That is clearly demonstrated by the basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests introduced last month in the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko.

That was in fact the task that the Committee on Disarmament decided to undertake when it set up a working group to deal with that issue. The few hours that the working group spent on that difficult question during August of this year made it impossible for them to do more than touch on the problem. We therefore hope that the Committee on Disarmament can study the issue in greater depth with a view to determining the possibilities for agreement without delay.

When Belgium is working in the Committee on Disarmament next year, it will certainly give special attention to all proposals made on the question of the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban or that relate to that issue.

Mrs. de BARISH (Costa Rica) (interpretation from Spanish): Costa Rica supports the underlying principle of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6 on the immediate cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. However, it did not take part in the vote, because at a time when the two major Powers are preparing for talks in Geneva on the same subject, and the Committee on Disarmament is conducting negotiations on this delicate matter, the proposal from one of the two negotiating parties has a somewhat unilateral aspect. Nevertheless, the delegation of Costa Rica supports every effort to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests. That is reflected in our request to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.32/Rev.1, entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons", to accept Costa Rica as a sponsor. The other sponsors of that draft resolution are: Ecuador, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. We think that a proposal from neutral countries not in possession of nuclear weapons is more worthy of our support.

Mr. GARCIA MORENO (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation is in complete agreement with the observations made by the representative of Argentina in relation to draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6. With those observations in mind, my delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes the Committee's consideration of resolution A/C.1/37/L.6.

The Committee will now consider draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1 under agenda item 50, entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". This draft resolution has six sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 27th meeting of the First Committee on 5 November 1982.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to read out the list of sponsors.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee); The sponsors are: Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on those speakers who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet Union responds with understanding to the concern expressed by many delegations in the United Nations over the absence of any progress in the talks to limit and reduce strategic arms and to limit and reduce arms in Europe, talks that the Soviet Union is conducting with the United States. It appears that that concern is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1 now before the Committee. The reason for this situation in the bilateral talks has been explained in statements made both by Soviet leaders and also by Soviet representatives here in the United Nations.

The Soviet Union for its part has declared on more than one occasion that it is doing everything possible to make progress at these talks. It intends in future to continue to give its evaluation, in accordance with its principles on the situation at the talks in the manner it deems appropriate. However, in view of the nature of the talks, and of paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, we cannot take it upon ourselves to accept the obligation to deal with the situation as reflected in operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution, nor can we support operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

In view of what I have said, the Soviet delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom delegation attaches the highest importance to the success of the INF and START negotiations, which are at the heart of the world's efforts towards cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. I am confident that this view is widely shared, both in this Committee and in the world outside.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

My delegation has therefore considered the proposal before us primarily against the touchstone whether it will promote the success of the negotiations. We do not believe that it will do so. We do not believe that it is helpful and, indeed, we consider that it may be positively harmful to request the participants in such sensitive negotiations to transmit joint or separate reports to the General Assembly by arbitrary dates, nor do we believe that it is necessary to remind the negotiating parties that the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question.

We have recently heard an admirably full account of the position in the negotiations given to this Committee from the standpoint of the United States by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow, in his statement of 27 October and the corresponding statement from the Soviet standpoint made by Ambassador Petrovsky. There have also been speeches made at the highest level on both sides in other forums. We have every confidence that the negotiating parties will continue to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the progress of the negotiations and we are content to leave it to their good judgement as to when and how this should be done. We believe that these considerations might well justify a negative vote, but as the draft resolution is addressed directly to the parties involved in the INF and START talks, my delegation will abstain.

Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation will have to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1. We do so with regret because we would have liked to support this initiative relating to the primary responsibility of the United Nations in the area of disarmament and the provisions of the Final Document indicating that the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of negotiations.

In this case, under the terms of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1, these principles in which the French delegation firmly believes would be applied in a manner which we feel would go beyond what could normally be expected in the area of information on negotiations under way. This refers to the request for a report, jointly or separately, and the setting of a deadline for submission of the report and also the reference to consideration of the report by the General Assembly, which would lead one to believe that the negotiations under way could

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

be the subject of debate in the Assembly. These provisions, we feel, do not sufficiently take into account the actual conditions under which any negotiations take place or of the need not to affect their progress, a need that is explicitly recognized in the Final Document.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): Belgium will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1, which is now to be put to the vote. We regret that the Committee has to take a position on such an important matter as negotiations under way on strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range nuclear missiles without every effort being made to arrive at consensus. We would have hoped that delegations could have taken the necessary time to negotiate a meaningful text acceptable to all, particularly to the parties to the START and INF negotiations. These talks are of universal significance. Our Governments and public opinion are anxious to ensure the success of these talks and follow them with great interest.

Belgium fully supports paragraph 114 of the Final Document which requests that the United Nations be kept duly informed of all disarmament measures. But the Final Document also states that this information should be without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. This is the danger we see in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1. Belgium would hope that despite this vote consultations can still be held in such a manner that the General Assembly in plenary meeting can adopt a text that would express support for the negotiations rather than be prejudicial to them.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now begin the voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus,

Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1 was adopted by 99 votes to 1, with 28 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives wishing to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): The United States delegation deeply regrets that for the first time in its memory a draft resolution dealing with the most important subject of United States-USSR negotiations on nuclear arms was put to a vote despite the evident absence of consensus on it.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

As in previous years, we had been ready and willing to work with the sponsors to achieve a consensus resolution that all of us could support. The United States is committed to the principle stated in paragraph 27 of the Final Document adopted at the first special session on disarmament and cited in the preamble of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1. The Final Document states that:

"the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations". (resolution S-10/2)

We firmly believe, however, that this principle is an indivisible one, that the timing and scope of any information on such steps must not be arbitrary, but rather appropriate from the standpoint of what we trust is the general wish of all United Nations Members to advance rather than prejudice the progress of these sensitive negotiations, nor should this principle be applied selectively only to bilateral negotiations between specific States.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We fully understand and appreciate the great interest of the world community in the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions and on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The result of those negotiations will have a profound effect on world stability and indeed on international security. We have therefore endeavoured to provide this Committee, and through it the General Assembly of the United Nations, with as much information on those negotiations as would be consistent with the principle I have already mentioned and with our mutual understanding with the Soviet Union on the confidentiality of those negotiations. In his statement on 27 October in this Committee, Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the senior official in the United States Government responsible in this field, gave an authentic, official and as extensive a description as possible under present circumstances of the United States approach in the Geneva nuclear-arms negotiations, as well as of the correct state of affairs there. His information on this subject covered seven pages, in document A/C.1/37/PV/13. We intend to continue our endeavours in this regard in the future as well. In so doing, however, we shall always be mindful of the need to safeguard our paramount objective, that of achieving successful results in those negotiations. As experienced and wise diplomats and negotiators, representatives in this Committee know that in any negotiations, especially those on a highly complex and sensitive matter dealing with national security, there is always a trade-off between publicity and progress in negotiations. As I mentioned earlier, in the Geneva talks the two negotiating parties have agreed upon confidentiality necessary for real progress towards agreement. The United States did not enter those talks to propagandize the issues involved nor do we intend to play to the galleries and public forums. We entered those talks to seek real, verifiable and militarily significant arms reductions.

It is for these reasons that the United States cannot undertake in advance to provide information on the Geneva negotiations in a specific format or by a specific date. The nature and the timing of any information that could be released will clearly depend upon the status of those negotiations. Frankly, we hope that by 1 September of next year the respective delegations will have their hands full hammering out areas of agreement. We do not believe that anyone would wish to see their energies diverted to the preparation of reports which, apart from the risk they could entail for future progress, would also undoubtedly

be difficult and time-consuming projects. Neither my Government nor anyone in this room, I am sure, doubts the commitment of the peoples of the world to securing a lasting peace. The substance of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1 and the manner in which the draft resolution has been handled since it was first announced raise, however, questions as to how delegations represented here seek to achieve that goal.

The question we are faced with is not the objective itself, but the means by which we seek to achieve it. My Government does not believe that solemn calls for reports by deadline and for their subsequent debate is the means to achieve that vital end. The negotiations addressed in this draft resolution cover a subject recognized by all to be of the utmost importance and sensitivity. These negotiations are, by the very nature of the forces they seek to restrain, complex and difficult. By their very nature they require a degree of confidentiality. No serious advocate of progress in these negotiations should willingly pursue a course that could prove prejudicial or harmful to the progress of those negotiations. My Government cannot in good conscience accept such a course. For those reasons my Government was unable to support this draft resolution and we did so with a heavy heart.

In conclusion, the United States delegation cannot but reiterate its Government's sincere regret that the unfortunate approach embodied in this draft resolution has prevented consensus this year. We stand ready to work towards consensus on these vital subjects in the future.

Sadly, this option has been foreclosed to the Assembly in its thirty-seventh session.

Mr. SIBAY (Turkey): Though we agree with some of the sentiments expressed in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1, we abstained from voting on it. The United States and the USSR are involved in extremely serious negotiations concerning the world community at large and all of us individually as sovereign States. They have, on various occasions, presented their basic positions and the details of the proposals they have been exchanging. This has been done at various levels, including their respective heads of State and in many different forums. We are confident that they will do the same when they deem it possible and when the extremely difficult and sensitive negotiations that they are conducting allow them to do so.

(Mr. Sibay, Turkey)

This being the case, it is indeed doubtful that the action urged in operative paragraph 1 would contribute to the negotiating process or in any meaningful way respond to satisfying the public interest in the intermediate-range nuclear forces and strategic arms reduction negotiations.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Argentina voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1, consistent with what we said during the general debate about the need for multilateral bodies with competence in the area of disarmament to have adequate information regarding the progress of the negotiations that are taking place in Geneva. They should not have to rely solely on information in the press or on speeches which are frequently suspected of being biased. They must have appropriate information and my delegation continues to believe that it is possible for multilateral bodies to receive adequate information without this prejudicing the confidential, delicate nature of negotiations or their progress.

The draft resolution that we have adopted has to do with the General Assembly, but I would express the hope that bilateral negotiators will also find a way to provide adequate information to the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, the Committee on Disarmament. Nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear-arms race is one of its agenda items and it is vital that that body should have reliable information on what is happening in the bilateral framework.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation abstained, for the same reasons as the delegations of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Turkey, to cite only those. Obviously, we are torn between two conflicting interests - the interest of the international community in being as fully informed as possible about these vital negotiations and the interests of the negotiators, who need confidentiality to assure the orderly conduct of negotiations. My delegation fully understands that the two negotiating parties give a high place to the principle of confidentiality. It is also mentioned, of course, in paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which says that information should be given to the United Nations without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

The two negotiating parties have given very detailed and complete information during this very session. Here I specifically cite the speech of the United States representative, Mr. Rostow, who set out his country's position in a particularly elucidatory manner.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): My delegation fully understands the position taken by the United States and the Soviet Union on this serious matter, which is the subject of very delicate negotiations. However, we voted for the draft resolution because we believe that it will bring to the forefront what is happening in the negotiations which, in over 30 years, have led to no reduction in armaments. Indeed, the arms race has been escalating.

The draft resolution recalls that at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the Member States reiterated "their solemn commitment" to implement the Final Document of 1978, which emphasized the need for co-operation and negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States. What is the purpose of that co-operation and those negotiations? It is to make the United Nations system effective, to ensure that the resolutions of the Security Council are implemented, as the Charter intends. That is the field where the Soviet Union and the United States should negotiate first, agreeing to co-operate to render the United Nations effective. In that way they would proceed effectively towards disarmament.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

We understand the difficult position of those Powers. International security cannot be preserved if one disarms in a vacuum. One cannot disarm while the arms race goes on.

How can one stop the arms race? It cannot be stopped in a world of anarchy and insecurity. It can be stopped only if one provides an alternative to security from armaments, an alternative meeting the requirements of the system of international security provided for in the Charter. The Final Document emphasized prominently that one must first provide order and security through compliance with the system of international security laid down in the Charter, then proceeding to a speedy, substantial reduction in armaments.

There will be no system of international security, and there can be no agreements on disarmament, if we proceed to a substantial reduction of armaments without first complying with the call in the Final Document for co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States in rendering effective the security system provided for in the Charter. That system is based on the effective implementation of Security Council decisions, but, as we have seen recently in Lebanon, many of those decisions are contemptuously ignored.

We voted for the draft resolution because it emphasizes that the Soviet Union and the United States cannot negotiate successfully to reduce armaments while the arms race is going on. It will continue so long as there is no security and order in the world, which can be brought about by compliance with the Charter. It is in that respect that we ask those Powers to co-operate - to co-operate to render the United Nations effective as an instrument of international security and peace, as provided for in the Charter. When that happens, everything will fall into place.

Without such co-operation it is futile to try to agree on reducing armaments, when one increases armaments through the arms race and one cannot stop the arms race unless there is international security. That is why we voted for the draft resolution.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

We understand very well that the major Powers do not want to disclose what is happening in the negotiations. We do not want to disturb them in any way. We wish only to urge them to co-operate substantially to make the United Nations an effective instrument of international peace and security, as the Charter intends, instead of remaining an instrument that cannot implement its own decisions.

Mr. MEGALOKONOMOS (Greece): In voting on the draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1, our delegation found itself between two stools - understanding the need for adequate information but also wanting the success of delicate negotiations of such importance for mankind. After seeing the reaction of the two protagonist Powers, we were induced to abstain, because, even if it is only a remote possibility, we should not like to do anything to prejudice the negotiations.

Mr. TALIANI (Italy) (interpretation from French): The Italian delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1. While we appreciate what motivated the drawing up of the draft resolution, we regret that on issues of major importance, such as those with which it deals, the Committee was not given an opportunity to express itself on a text which could have been adopted by consensus.

My delegation confirms its support for the position expressed in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which called for adequate information to be given to the United Nations on progress in disarmament negotiations in any forum and also said that the negotiations should not be hampered in any way. We regret that the draft resolution does not meet those requirements, for the reasons given by many other delegations. That is why my delegation felt that it had to abstain.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes action on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1.

I now call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): The following countries have become sponsors of draft resolutions: A/C.1/37/L.6, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; L.9, Ghana; L.12/Rev.1, Ghana; L.17, Senegal, Kuwait, Ghana, Liberia and the United Republic of Cameroon; L.23, Ghana; L.26, the German Democratic Republic; L.27, Colombia; L.35, Egypt and Colombia; L.36, Ecuador; L.39, the Bahamas and Yugoslavia; L.41, Costa Rica; L.42, the Bahamas and Zaire; L.44, Colombia; L.45, the German Democratic Republic and Costa Rica; L.46, Romania; L.48, Indonesia and Romania; L.50, Ghana,; L.51, Ghana; L.52, Ghana; L.53, Ghana; L.54, the Federal Republic of Germany and Colombia; L.55, Liberia and Algeria; L.56, Colombia and Romania; L.59, Liberia; L.60, Romania and Ghana; L.61, the Federal Republic of Germany; L.62, Ghana, L.63, Colombia; L.64, Romania, Colombia and Ghana; and L.67, Rwanda.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany that its country was inadvertently omitted from document A/C.1/37/L.67. I have therefore asked the Secretariat to issue a corrigendum, which should be available before the end of the day.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.