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Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 16 October 1957, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ABDOH (Iran)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international Convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction [24] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Walker	(Australia)
Mr. Rocha	(Colombia)
Mr. David	(Czechoslovakia)

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AGENDA ITEM 24

REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS; CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

(a) REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

(b) EXPANSION OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AND OF ITS SUB-COMMITTEE

(c) COLLECTIVE ACTION TO INFORM AND ENLIGHTEN THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AS TO THE DANGERS OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE, AND PARTICULARLY AS TO THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF MODERN WEAPONS

(d) DISCONTINUANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TESTS OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS

Mr. WALKER (Australia): First, Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate you on your election. It is indeed a very great pleasure for me personally to sit under your Chairmanship, bearing in mind our close association as former colleagues in the Security Council.

I should also like to congratulate the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Barros, and the Rapporteur, Mr. Matsch, on their election to their important offices.

It is with a sense of deep responsibility that I address the Committee on the subject of disarmament. The importance and urgency of this matter is emphasized by the fact that the Committee has given it pricrity over all other items on our agenda. If speakers have been slow in coming forward, I think it is because we have all desired to hear the statements of the great Powers on the past year's work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee and to reflect upon those statements; we have desired to consider carefully the contribution that we, as spokesmen of smaller Powers but nevertheless representatives of the people of our countries, might be able to make to the discussion of this crucial complex problem.

I speak today as one who, as a representative on the Disarmament Commission for nearly two years past, has been in a position to follow fairly closely the work of the Sub-Committee. I speak also as a representative of a country that does not possess nuclear weapons and is not likely to manufacture them in the near future,

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although Australia has provided sites for the testing of nuclear weapons and guided missiles. Moreover, Australia is a country situated on the very edge of Asia, a part of the world where many countries' problems of national security are overshadowed by the disproportionate weight of Communist Chinese manpower. Every country will naturally evaluate the disarmament proposals from two points of view, namely, their probable contribution to the cause of general peace throughout the world and, secondly, the impact of those proposals upon their own particular problems of national security and defence. The Australian Government, apart from its primary responsibility for the defence of our own people against any aggression, has obligations toward our fellow members of the British Commonwealth and those countries which are associated with us in defence treaties -- New Zealand, the United States, and some of our Asian neighbours. Viewing the problems of defence against aggression in the part of the world in which we live, we have never considered it realistic in any disarmament plans to draw a sharp distinction between conventional forces and weapons on the one hand and nuclear weapons on the other. In the Disarmament Commission we have maintained the view that the prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective international control should go hand in hand with major reductions in conventional weapons and forces to agreed levels. Agreements developed mainly against a background of the security problems of the great Powers may require adjustment to take account of the effects of proposed arrangements upon the security of smaller countries in various parts of the world, and upon the forces those smaller countries would themselves need to maintain. In particular, we in Australia feel that a disarmament agreement that did not impose suitable obligations upon Communist China would not be of much use in our part of the world -- and this is one of the problems that lie ahead.

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In referring to such particular concerns of my Government, I do not intend to raise further difficulties and complications in an already difficult and complicated problem. But there is no point in pretending that the negotiation of disarmament agreements is not complicated by the preoccupations of individual countries with their own security problems -- problems that vary from one region of the world to another. From this point of view, it is not surprising that progress is slow or that negotiations become highly technical.

This Committee is not the place, of course, for detailed technical discussions. Of that I am convinced. But I have been asking myself, in the last few days, just what this Committee should endeavour to do at this stage in the United Nations consideration of disarmament. In a nutshell, I suppose our task here is to take stock of the work done in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee; to see just how far those bodies have got; and, then, to give them guidance and, I would hope, encouragement in their further efforts.

Inevitably, in the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee, it is very often the defence technicians of various countries who are speaking through their national delegations. The views put forward in the Commission and the Sub-Committee inevitably reflect the appreciations that have been made by these defence experts of the possible impact that the implementation of various disarmament proposals would have upon the security of their own country. Inevitably, every proposal will be scrutinized by those who carry the heavy burden of planning the defence of their own country and their own people, so that any dangers to their national security can be exposed and taken account of in the position of their own representatives on the specialized disarmament bodies. But here, in this First Committee of the General Assembly, it is above all the voice of humanity that must be heard. We must express the aspirations and, if need be, the fears of the people of our countries in terms that are comprehensible to the ordinary man. We must endeavour to reach conclusions in terms that the ordinary man can understand, conclusions that he would recognize as common sense.

There can be no doubt as to what the voice of humanity is saying today: "Deliver us from the fear of war". Everybody agrees that the concentration of so much of human resources, scientific research and national wealth on an arms race is a major factor in the world's present insecurity, and that knowledge of

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the efforts which other countries are putting into armaments is itself a cause of the mutual fear and suspicion between nations. Everybody knows, too, that the world's armaments represent a colossal waste of economic resources -- a waste which the people of the world cannot afford while millions go short of the elementary necessities of life. These simple facts are advertised and brought home to the consciousness of people everywhere by the testing of nuclear weapons and missiles. From the viewpoint of the human race as a whole, competition in armaments at this stage of the world's scientific and technical development may well be described as suicidal folly. Yet -- and this, I believe, is the crux of the problem for each of our countries -- the maintenance and development of our defences is justified by our fear of other people's intentions towards us. As has so often been said, the fundamental problem is a lack of mutual confidence.

This mutual suspicion has all along bedevilled disarmament discussions -- in the days of the League of Nations and today in the United Nations. Running through all disarmament negotiations is the constant fear lest one agree to something that would make it easier for those in whom one has no confidence to wage war, a fear of being tricked into accepting a reduction in national security.

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This is why the problem of disarmament cannot be separated from the problem of international supervision and control. This is why mere agreements to renounce the use of nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons, or to reduce the level of forces or to suspend testing of new weapons, offer no security unless they are backed by adequate and effective systems of international inspection and control.

Agreement on international inspection and control entails two things: firstly, an acceptance of the principle of inspection and control and, secondly, readiness to undertake the detailed technical examination of the proposed control measures. Here, I believe, we reach the fundamental difference between the approach of the Soviet Union and that of the Western Powers towards the problem of disarmament, namely the reluctance of the Soviet Union to accept international inspection and control in principle and its unwillingness to participate in the necessary technical discussions that would be an essential preliminary to the establishment of any really effective system of inspection and control.

I do not wish to exaggerate this difficulty. In fact, I believe the Soviet Union has come some of the way towards recognizing the fact that there will be no general agreement on disarmament in the absence of agreement on control. The Soviet has even made some suggestions itself about control. But -- and I believe this is true -- it has never accepted the challenge of trying to work out, in Mr. Moch's words, the maximum degree of disarmament that can be controlled.

I must say I found Mr. Moch's formulation of the problem last year thoroughly convincing. Neither disarmament without control; nor control without disarmament; but the maximum of disarmament that can be controlled. To me this seems flawless; why cannot the Soviet Union accept it and settle down to working it out in concrete terms?

Some people say it is because the Soviet does not really want general disarmament; that its purpose is to weaken the defences of the West to the point at which the Soviet would no longer fear the outcome of any war that its policies, or the policies of others, might produce. If such were indeed the Soviet purpose, it would be natural for them to concentrate on propagandist measures of broad popular appeal irrespective of whether their implementation could be effectively policed, and on proposals aimed at improving the Soviet Union's military position

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vis-à-vis the West, and at the same time to resist any proposals that would entail opening up any activities of the Soviet Union to international observation.

Others again have suggested that the real reason why the Soviet Union is so cold towards proposals for international inspection and control of disarmament measures is that the Soviet political and social system is one that cannot tolerate the full glare of publicity; that even though the Soviet Union may not have things to hide in the shape of aggressive intentions and military preparations directed against the outside world, it has many other things to hide in the field of economic conditions, civil rights and the working of its governmental machine, things which must be hidden not only from the outside world, but also from the citizens of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. If this is true, there may be some anxiety on the part of the Soviet authorities that international inspectors -- living among their people throughout their great country and free to inspect everything in their inspection areas -- might provide dangerous focal points for discontent.

Yet again it is suggested, and evidence for this can be found in some Russian statements, that the main reason why they are so reluctant to accept international inspection as part of a disarmament plan is that they cannot conceive of such international inspection being directed objectively and honestly towards its avowed purposes, but consider it must really be disguised espionage conducted by and for the enemies of the Soviet Union.

It is not for me to say what truth there may be in any of these hypothetical explanations of the Soviet attitude on inspection and control. I can only express the hope that the Soviet's desire for disarmament is genuine and that whatever its fears and suspicions towards the West, it will approach this problem in a practical manner. If it does, I believe that real progress can be made in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

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In any case, whatever the sources of the Soviet Union's difficulties over inspection and control, it is still for members of this Committee to form their own views and to place them on record. It seems to me that the choice before us is a simple one. Do the members of this Committee desire to see a disarmament agreement consisting of a series of declarations and promises in the field of nuclear and conventional armaments, with no effective machinery to ensure that promises are carried out and that the security of all is protected against the infidelity of any one? I am sure that we were all impressed by Mr. Noble's exposure the other day of the contradictions between bland Soviet Union demands for a simple ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and other statements by Soviet leaders, making it clear that in the event of war they would, of course, use nuclear weapons. Or does the Committee wish to see a disarmament agreement that does not merely rest on confidence, but rather, because of the protection it offers against bad faith, would build confidence and promote security? If this is what we want in the United Nations, let us say so.

The Australian delegation has joined with a number of others in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/L.179 because we believe that this represents the most useful action that the General Assembly can take at this stage, apart from publicly debating the issues involved, which is also valuable.

This draft resolution proposes no new machinery and no new principles. It endeavours rather to indicate the directions in which we think the work of the Disarmament Commission can most usefully and most hopefully be pushed in the coming year. Mr. Gromyko has already stigmatized this draft resolution as useless, seeing in it an attempt to continue ad infinitum futile discussions. We would not be sponsoring this draft resolution if we considered the discussions of the Sub-Committee to be futile.

Mr. Lodge, speaking on 10 October for the United States, observed that the Disarmament Sub-Committee "is a body in which serious negotiations can take place, and have taken place" (A/C.1/PV.866, p. 7), and then went on to say that the Sub-Committee "is of course not complete proof against temptations to score propaganda points". (Ibid.)

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This is also the impression of the Australian delegation. As we see it, the report which we have received from the Sub-Committee on Disarmament does contain real evidence that it proved itself a practical body for serious negotiations, but also, unfortunately, some evidence that at times the temptation to score propaganda points proved irresistible. I think that the discussions in this Committee should help us all to sort out the efforts at real negotiation from the exercises in propaganda.

Mr. Lodge pointed out very clearly the steps taken by the Soviet representative in the Sub-Committee towards meeting the positions put forward by the United States and other members of the Sub-Committee; he also set out a number of changes which the Western members of the Sub-Committee made in their own position to meet the Soviet position. Nowhere in Mr. Lodge's statement could I find any indication that the Western members of the Sub-Committee treated the Soviet Union's participation in the Sub-Committee's work as essentially hypocritical and propagandist. On the contrary, Mr. Lodge emphasized his belief that the Soviet Union was willing, within the framework of the Sub-Committee, to engage in serious discussions on disarmament, and indeed at times appeared anxious to take steps that would make the chances of agreement on disarmament more likely.

However, the serious proposals put forward by Western members of the Sub-Committee in their working paper of 29 August were brushed aside by the Soviet representative without his Government's even having studied them. For Australia's part, I must say quite bluntly that, at the least, this action caused us shock and dismay. Mr. Gromyko's statement in the First Committee on 10 October provided little to reassure us. Our impression is that since the end of August, for some reason, the Soviet approach to this subject has swung back to a purely propagandist line which, I regret to say, seems to play upon the fears and suspicions and, at times, the natural, if mistaken, anxieties of ordinary people.

What lies behind this, I cannot say. But I do hope the Soviet representatives will listen to the voice of the United Nations, and will return to the Sub-Committee in a more constructive frame of mind, so that serious negotiations may be resumed.

Negotiations, about what in particular? The draft resolution sets out six points which should be covered in a disarmament agreement, taking into account the present world situation.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

The first of these is immediate suspension of nuclear weapons tests with prompt installation of effective international control. This comes first because it is uppermost in so many people's minds at the present time. As the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. R.G. Casey, told the Disarmament Commission on 30 September:

> "There is, of course, a danger that the attention of some people may be diverted away from the basic issues of disarmament to the question of suspending nuclear weapons tests...this problem would fall readily into place -- and, I believe, its solution would present relatively little difficulty -- if we could reach agreement upon a fool-proof and knave-proof system of warning against surprise attack". (DC/PV.63, pages 49-50)

However, as Mr. Casey said, the problem of suspending tests is of wide human interest, and no only because of fears on the scope of health, but also because the continuance of tests is a reminder of the continuing insecurity of the world in this age of nuclear weapons.

So this problem figures first in our six points -- not, however, in the form of a mere promise to have no more tests, but with provision for inspection in parts of the world where tests have taken place. In this connexion I would like to refer to an important declaration which Mr. Casey issued on behalf of the Australian Government on 10 October in New York. Mr. Casey announced at that time that we would be prepared to accept in principle the establishment in Australia of international inspection posts as provided in the Western draft proposals. This would be part of a general international system, applicable to all countries with atomic potential, including of course the Soviet Union. Mr. Casey made it clear that Australia could not commit itself to any inspection system that does not include potential aggressors, and Australia's readiness to accept such an inspection system applies only in the context of the Western draft proposal. It implies no commitment in respect of the Soviet proposal. Mr. Casey's announcement refers, of course, to the acceptance only of the principle of inspection posts. It will be appreciated that if posts were actually to be established, Australian security requirements would have to be met, and we would expect close consultation in the event of any technical discussions related to the establishment of inspection procedures.

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This proposal for the suspension of nuclear tests with inspection is, of course, not advanced separately. We see it as part of a final stage of a disarmament agreement. Mr. Noble, in his lucid speech last month, gave most convincing reasons why the United Kingdom Government could accept suspension of tests only within the framework of a first stage agreement on disarmament. This is also the Australian position.

The second point suggested for a disarmament agreement is the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons and the complete devotion of future production to non-weapons purposes, under effective international control. We would all like to see international agreement in nuclear disarmament carried beyond this. But as a first step we must be sure that our agreement is one that can be subject to international supervision and control. If this measure to terminate the production of nuclear weapons can be embodied in a disarmament agreement it will provide the foundation for further steps in the direction of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons when the problems of international inspection and control of such a prohibition have been solved.

The third point might be called the demobilizing of nuclear weapons through the reconversion of stocks of fissionable material from weapons uses to non-weapons uses. Here again emphasis is laid upon the need for a system of international supervision as part of the plan. This third point is a further step towards the removal of the spectre of atomic warfare.

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The fourth point, namely, the reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate safeguard arrangements, is, of course, familiar, yet none the less important for that. I would ask the Committee again to note the stress laid upon the provision of adequate safeguard arrangements and to bear in mind the remarks I made about the particular problems in the field of conventional armaments in the region of Asia.

Now we come to the fifth and sixth points that should be covered by a disarmament agreement. These, I believe, are the most vital of all. Though the list of six points begins with the ones that are uppermost in many peoples' minds, the list moves along through a crescendo to two concluding points of profound importance. One is the establishment of open inspection with both ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of a surprise attack. As already stated by Mr. Casey in the Disarmament Commission, we believe this is the only practicable way of breaking the vicious circle in which lack of confidence prevents progress on disarmament, and the lack of progress on disarmament is hampering the growth of confidence. Until international confidence can be established, we must concentrate on doing those things that are practicable even in the absence of confidence. We believe that the adoption of an effective system of warning against surprise attack will do much to allay the fear of war, and will make possible further progress in the field of disarmament as well as towards the solution of other outstanding political problems.

I do not understand the complexities of this task of evolving such an effective protection against surprise attack. Indeed, it may be that current scientific developments are even now adding new complications. This is all the more reason for endeavouring to solve the problem while it is still capable of solution.

The Soviet reaction to Western proposals in this field has not been encouraging. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has already changed its position so many times on aerial and ground inspection that a further change towards a more reasonable position would not appear to be out of the question.

Finally, we come to the sixth and last point of this resolution, namely, the proposals for a current study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and

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scientific purposes. Today the first artificial satellite soars through the heavens, no doubt the first of many. Who among us can estimate the further advances in man's conquest of nature which this achievement brings nearer? Who among us dares to measure its frightful possibilities for evil if no system of control can be designed and established? Our proposal at this stage covers only the study of the problems involved. But this is the first step. In subsequent years, we hope that this study will yield concrete measures to guard against the dangers inherent in these new devices.

In the light of this general statement which I have made on behalf of the Australian delegation, I should like to commend to the Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.179, which Australia has joined in co-sponsoring. As I have said earlier in my statement, Australia regards the primary task of this session in the disarmament field as the taking of the necessary steps to sort out, both in United Nations terms and in simple terms that can be readily understood by all the people of the world, the serious proposals that have been advanced from the propagandist proposals put forward mainly to exploit natural if uninformed fears.

The Australian delegation looks forward to hearing the views of other members of the Committee on these important matters and reserves its right to intervene again later in this debate when, we believe, the issues before us will have been clarified. We shall also reserve our comments on the interesting draft resolutions submitted by Japan, Belgium and India until a later stage.

Mr. ROCHA (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Colombia has co-sponsored the proposal contained in document A/C.1/L.179, and we should like to explain the reasons for it.

The agreement suggested in that document follows the lines drawn by the United States of America and the other Western Powers members of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament. The story of their work is narrated to us in document DC/112 of 1 August 1957 and DC/113 of 11 September 1957. Our decision to co-sponsor the draft resolution on disarmament is based on fundamental reasons. It is not a hasty decision taken on the spur of the moment. As far as we are concerned -- and no doubt as far as the eighty-two Members of the United Nations are concerned -- it

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is a truism to say that total warfare with atomic and hydrogen weapons would destroy civilization and the culture that humanity has achieved thus far. Perhaps in less than one day two or even three years of constant progress would be wiped out.

The position of Colombia must be taken into account because it is a small and peace-loving nation which is, geographically, relatively distant from the places where the shock of atomic war might most be felt. We do not have nor do we want to have atomic weapons, so that we certainly have no axe to grind. This permits us to judge serenely and objectively the vital urgency of disarmament in the world. The fact that even though all arms programmes have been rejected we now encourage the adoption of a draft for true disarmament proves that we do not see history as a violent struggle for power and predominance, but rather as a process the aim of which is the realization of spiritual values -- that is to say, the increase of culture and the progress of civilization, particularly in its greatest orders, religion, morality, art, science, techniques and philosophy. As far as we are concerned, we have always admired and always borne in mind not the War of Troy but the Iliad, not Troy itself but Homer. We abominate war, especially in its universal aspects and its annihilating effects, not simply because of its destructive powers, but because we feel it is clumsy. We are not moved only by the loss of material objects, cities, factories and lines of communications, for example. We are much more concerned with the fact that it is assuredly going to bring about a retrogression of the spirit to the time of barbarism, a jump backward towards prehistoric times, which undoubtedly would be the consequence of a modern conflagration. It will mean the extinction of non-fighting masses.

More than material misery, it is the spiritual misery that would most hurt us. We are living in extremely intense moments, because the world is hanging in a balance which can easily be thrown out of equilibrium and throw us all to either sure death or a life that would be impossible to lead. However, if the world is led in the right direction, we would be led toward a life so full of energy that the welfare and power of man's honour would be ensured and multiplied for good.

We understood full well that humanity is full of a spirit of solidarity and that culture and civilization are the joint work of all, so that the loss suffered by one must be suffered by all. But at the same time, the good accruing to one must also accrue to all. Any destruction or loss, although it may appear remote, would very soon be felt by all.

Our Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the statement he made to the General Assembly, emphatically outlined the capital objectives and ideas which Colombia follows in its national, social and political life, namely the strengthening and progressive enriching and developing of the human person. Anything that will lead to that noble end is decisive to us. It is obvious that a world conflagration would bring about as its ineluctable consequence the brutalization, that is to say, the depersonalization of the human being.

Undoubtedly, the question of disarmament must raise extremely complex problems for the great Powers, and it is not easy to state them, nor to understand them clearly. It is obviously much more difficult to try to solve them, and only persons who are exceptionally wise can do this. In other words, only very well-trained experts and specialists can take on such a responsibility. Therefore, we can quite easly state that nations which do not have equipment and organizations of the first scientific, technical and military importance are not in a position and cannot be expected to be in a position to give a substantive opinion on the details which may be vital to the policy of disarmament, nor can they really propose practical solutions to the problem of disarmament which would be effective and on a wide scale. But at least we can make known our views which should be taken into account, especially since from pure techniques and the great complicatior of the structure of modern weapons , we go immediately into the field of political

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ideals and ideas and moral values. There we do have certain experience and certain wisdom, and because we are only observers, we are able perhaps better to focus and judge the essential questions in valuable form.

If we leave aside the purely technical and military aspects of the drafts and the discussions on disarmament, the first question which jumps to our mind is that the fundamental basis for a solution of this problem is to eliminate the mistrust and the reciprocal dissimulation, so that any agreement arrived at will be based on loyalty and good faith. It is obvious that without good faith and without loyalty and belief in what one says and hopes to fulfil, it would be not only useless, but dangerous and damaging to agree to anything. Good faith is one of the institutional principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and so far it has been respected.

The same circumstances that have led to a lack of total agreement, and not only to total agreement but even to partial agreement on the integral parts of this disarmament matter -- ever since 1946 when the great Powers started holding conversations on disarmament, and especially during the last seventy-two meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London -- proves that the high parties, which have to carry the responsibility of the arms policy, have not lost their goodwill, have not wanted to be deceitful. Otherwise, they would have been able to agree to something by now.

Therefore, the first thing that must be done is to create an atmosphere of confidence between the great Powers. The lack of confidence, which so far has been mutual, is not the existence of bad faith. Whilst this factor of mistrust exists, we will see the great Powers moving in a vicious circle, because if they have to disarm in order to have confidence in one another, mutual distrust will not permit them to disarm.

This is an obvious impression held by the small States and caused by the tremendous dialectics contained in the speeches on this matter, and in addition, those making the speeches, and negotiating, have recognized that this is true. The truth of the matter is that the other countries do not have the right to censure any of the great Powers because they feel mutual fear of a surprise attack on the part of a rival or because they have to subordinate their own security to the calculated measures of control and foresight.

(Mr. Roch, Colombia)

Mr. Sobolev told us on 30 September, in his statement to the Disarmament Commission, that the joint plan outlined by the General Assembly in November of 1956 for the future work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee was of such a nature as necessarily to imply that no State needs to fear for its security. Reference can be made to this in document DC/PV.63. It was therefore quite natural that the General Assembly of the United Nations should foresee, as a directive or as a line of conduct to be followed in order to achieve an agreement, that the measures, steps and methods contained in the draft agreement on disarmament must be objective. Yet they must be subjected to the complete and subjective feeling, which is after all another definition of mistrust and fear on the part of the great Powers, that their security will be complete in the course of the negotiations on disarmament, during disarmament, and when disarmament becomes a fact.

The countries which today are not great Powers, as regards domination or war, do not find themselves, nor can they find themselves -- because they are so far from achieving the great know-how for building the diabolical machinery of modern war -- in a position to judge on their own, and isolatedly, the feelings of intimate security of the great Powers. Therefore, it is no mistake to say the small nations are present at this impressive spectacle wherein the great Powers of the world are discussing the very future of the world. We appear as honoured guests, and that is all, since the factor of confidence must be set up between the States that have the weapons and by the possession of them cause mistrust in others. To a certain extent, we might also say that for the small countries it is almost foolhardy to judge when a disarmament proposal is only a propagandist weapon, of which the other party accuses the proposer, or when it is a really necessary measure to achieve an effective step forward on the road toward disarmament.

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Besides, the countries which are Members of this Organization that do not have access to the secrets and techniques of armaments are for geographical, historical, racial, cultural and religious reasons within one or the other of the spheres of influence of the two great tendencies and ideologies, of two social systems, of two techniques, of the Christian world and the Communist world. These two worlds apparently cannot merge in one sole world and they naturally come to grow or to diminish, but always at the cost of the other.

I would say that it was quite natural that if the smaller countries are truly impotent to understand and to delve deeply into the secrets and the techniques of modern warfare, they nevertheless are not impotent to fear and to suffer its fatal effects. Therefore, the smaller nations must obviously stand behind the shelter of power, of calculating the future and judging themselves what is closest to their ideology and what will more likely safeguard their individual defences.

Within this same order of ideas, the nations within the Western sphere of influence, which peacefully have held to an ideology that came before the struggle for predominance that we are now watching, the nations that previously held that belief and hope to continue in that belief, the nations which believes in Christianity and freedom in democracy cannot overlook a sociological reality: when for a long time you are in possession of a certain truth which you have known for centuries, a truth that is in our conviction, that truth, that conscience tends to stabilize and to restrain its own movement because of its own weight; it tends to lose its power of expansion, its impulse to grow and its desire to convert others to its belief. It is a purely biological phenomenon such as the ripe fruit which bears within it the seeds which substitute for it.

The democratic idea seems thus to have arrived now at the full state of its own maturity and conservation.

On the other hand, the new ideologies, carrying with them first steps and first experiments desire to perfect themselves, to grow, to expand and to struggle -- and therefore to conquer. The efforts to impose itself, to dominate and its ambition to which it gives rise are intense and are constantly renewed, are constantly begun anew. With that vigour it wants to expand Communism all over the world. Thus Communism is a more impulsive strength for struggle and dominance

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than that of the mature democracies. But this impulse to expand itself is an aggressive movement because of its very nature while the classical democracies remain a defensive movement.

But we have already gone our way. Our position in the world has been taken. We do not wish to be, nor could we be, Communists. Our position is also defensive because of its very nature, and thus we stay within the orbit of Western philosophy, whose fate has been deeply etched by twenty centuries of history. As far as we personally are concerned, there are certain special reasons which lead us to support wholeheartedly the decision, the methods and the controlled stages of disarmament proposed by the United States and the Western Powers. The Western Powers and the Soviet Union have made known their different points of view. They have also outlined their positions taken yesterday and their present position, the steps that they have taken forward and the steps that they have taken backward in the debates that took place in the Sub-Committee in London, as well as in the statements made in United Nations Headquarters. We appreciate the efforts made on both sides, and we realize also the great difficulties inherent in arriving at a satisfactory solution.

In his statement of 30 September in the Disarmament Commission (DC/PV.63), Mr. Lodge explained to us that the suspension of the production of fissionable material for military purposes and its natural consequence of the suspension of the stockpiling of nuclear weapons is a purpose which is intimately linked to the need to suspend at the same time nuclear test explosions. In that policy the United States is supported by France, the United Kingdom and Canada since they too see the logical and necessary link between the test explosions and the production of nuclear weapons because if these tests were to stop, they still would not put an end to the threat inherent in the constant stockpiling of nuclear weapons in certain countries. Mr. Lodge told us, using a very graphic expression, that the danger was not at the top of the tremendous iceberg where, literally speaking, he placed nuclear test explosions, but the danger was in the profound and lower hidden mass of the iceberg which lay under the sea where he placed, in his metaphor, the stockpiling of such weapons. As far as the United States is concerned, to separate these two measures would be tantamount to forcing it to consider itself always in a position of perpetual defence.

(Mr. Rocha, Colombia)

When Mr. Lodge again referred to this partial aspect of disarmament on 10 October in the First Committee, he insisted on considering that the nuclear test explosions carried out by his country as being "for defensive purposes". The text of his thought and his views are contained in document A/C.1/PV.866.

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Mr. Lodge said the following:

"...The United States believes that a solution to this problem can be found. Our tests are carried on for defensive purposes. We would not conduct them if we were not deeply convinced that under present circumstances they were necessary for the security of the free world and of our own country, the United States. The danger of war will only increase if offensive capabilities are allowed further to outstrip defensive capabilities. Without moving into a discussion of political issues, it seems fair to say that the United States Government is looked to not alone by the American people, but by the peoples of many other free countries as well as a safeguard of their security against possible military attack. We cannot carry out the responsibility which has fallen upon us if we are less strong than the potential attacker. That is the basic reason for all of our military defence activities, all of it, including that involving the tests of nuclear weapons." (A/C.1/PV.866, page 8)

The representatives of the Soviet Union, on their part, consider that the United States method of viewing this problem is an aggressive one. Mr. Gromyko recalled the positions taken by his Government at the various stages of negotiation, and stated that the complete and absolute prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons without the destruction of stockpiles would only serve to loosen the hands of a potential aggressor and to make him free to use atomic weapons, which would contribute to increasing the dangers of an atomic war.

We have before us a working document which contains a complete picture of the discussions which have taken place. My country does not at all anticipate any act of aggression from the Western Powers, owing to the historical factors which are involved. However, we must consider the possibility of an act of aggression from outside the continent which might be perpetrated against the United States and which might possibly place my country and the other countries of Latin America in a position provided for under article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was signed in 1947 at Rio de Janeiro. A wide security belt is set up in that article, and an act of aggression against one American State is considered as an act of aggression against all the American States.

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Although aggression from outside the continent against one of the twenty-one American States within this zone of security -- besides Canada, whose territory is included in this zone even though Canada is not a party to the agreement -- was submitted as a hypothesis within the dialectics of a discussion which we link to the Mutual Assistance Pact, we cannot turn it down as being impossible. We must recognize it as a possibility, although it may not be probable. However, its possibility was suggested by a serious and friendly nation and it was considered by the other interested States. It was related to international commitments, which were also taken on a formal basis. My delegation represents a Government of 11 million inhabitants, and we must therefore consider all these possibilities and probabilities.

The peoples of America coexist on one continent surrounded by two oceans. All the things which we have in common cause us to follow one path in the present and one path in the future. The Organization of American States has been the natural outgrowth of this. The General Assembly of the United Nations can be sure that the friendship and confidence of these peoples are the greatest of their virtues and the best guarantees for their solidarity. This has been much easier to achieve since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who set in motion the good neighbour policy which introduced an era of international renaissance to the American continent.

Furthermore, my delegation co-operated in the drafting of document A/C.1/L.179, and we were very eager to sponsor the final text, which calls for the immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons with prompt installation of effective international control, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a programme of transfer of stocks of fissionable material from weapons to non-weapons uses, all under effective international control. These three measures complement each other and have the advantage that the control feature would eliminate the element of mistrust, which has up to now resulted in the present stalemate.

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The provision for the reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate safeguarded arrangements and the provision for the progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attack, also contribute to the elimination of mistrust. To this we have the added provision -- and I may say that this was suggested in the Disarmament Commission by our own Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sanz de Santamaria -- for a joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. We believe that this plan provides a gaurantee for all, since what it seeks is total disarmament.

The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Noble, analysed this draft resolution very clearly and logically. His country has been one of the members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee which has participated throughout all the discussions on these subjects. I think I have made clear the reasons why my delegation has co-sponsored the draft resolution before us.

I should now like to refer to the last part of the draft resolution. The admirable and impressive fact that man has been able to create and launch artificial planets clearly shows that the human mind is transforming itself into a superior organ. We are obviously no longer limited to the sphere of the earth.

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The dimensions of space now open up fields of action that go far beyond those of the purely superficial space where, on earth and close to the earth, international life has developed. In addition to the artificial satellite achievement, there is the Geophysical Year, the world congress of scientists from all parts of the world which outlined the completely revolutionary thesis that man must take total and effective possession of the earth.

These two tremendous steps taken by human intelligence and science show that a very strange and profound transformation is taking place in the human race. In a very short time the concept of the world and of life may become something which will eclipse all that man has so far been able even to imagine. It does not seem to be the design of God that, in this tremendous moment, we should nevertheless continue with the sad and paradoxical contrary solution -- that of annihilating war. Otherwise we could well believe that the fate of man resided in petty ambitions, and in the incongruity existing between our knowledge and our moral principles, the true root of which can be found only in the diabolical judgement that bad faith is fruitful and the only true expression of intelligence.

I deny that. I refuse to believe it. The great intelligence that helps the United Nations in its work denies that, and on the basis of good faith and with the spirit of co-operation and of utilizing the newly-discovered energy man is now in a position to begin a truly new era -- an era unparalleled and unprecedented for its greatness in power and efficiency, an era that will outstrip the greatest and most illustrious times of history and will be greater than anything human beings today can imagine.

Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia)(interpretation from Russian): First of all, I should like to congratulate the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on their election to their respective posts, and to wish them success in the responsible tasks that they have undertaken.

Before I proceed to the main part of my statement on the disarmament question, I should like to dwell on the outstanding event of recent days, the launching of the first artificial earth satellite, an achievement of the Soviet Union carried out on 4 October of this year. Peace-loving peoples throughout the world have welcomed the brilliant success of Soviet socialist science and technology with a

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feeling of enthusiasm and profound joy since they realize that Soviet science and technology directs its efforts to the welfare of all mankind, serving the cause of peace and progress. The exceptional interest of world opinion and of scientists of all countries in the launching of an artificial earth satellite and, also, in the scientific and technical consequences of this event, is clear evidence of the fact that mankind wants immediately to note the achievement of international co-operation in the struggle for further mastery of the forces of nature.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to congratulate, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation and the whole Czechoslovak people, the Soviet scientists and the whole Soviet people for the great historical achievement and success and the great contribution to the cause of peace and the development of friendly co-operation between all peoples.

But the victory of creative human toil, and the vast prospects opened by it, emphasize even further the necessity of a solution of the disarmament problem, the result of which would be that all resources at the disposal of mankind would be concentrated exclusively on work for the general welfare and progress, and would no longer serve for the building of more and more destructive types of weapons. The armaments race, the testing of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of military budgets, the policy of forging aggressive blocs and the establishment of numerous military bases in the territory of foreign States -- a policy engaged in by the aggressive circles of the Western Powers -- and propaganda of a new war against the peace-loving peoples loom together as a spectre barring the path towards efforts for strengthening peace and security throughout the world and developing co-operation between the peoples in all realms of human endeavour on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

All the peoples demand the cessation of the senseless armaments race, the reduction of the numbers of armed forces and armaments, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. They make this demand with increasing insistence. The solution of these problems would free mankind from the threat of war -- especially atomic war -- and would create conditions for a new increase in constructive, peaceful toil. This would eliminate the heavy burden which weighs upon the shoulders of the broad working masses as the result of armaments. It

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would release considerable resources for the development of peoples' economies, especially in under-developed countries, and for the raising of the living and welfare standards of peoples. That is why the question of disarmament was, quite properly, placed first on the agenda of the First Committee.

It is now our task to look into the reasons for which, in so important an issue, not the least amount of agreement has so far been reached after twelve years of deliberation in the United Nations. It is our duty to draw such concrete conclusions and to adopt such decisions as would be of assistance in removing the disarmament problem from its present impasse. The notion of disarmament was embodied, in the form of its basic principle, in the Charter of the United Nations, and it found more concrete shape in the well-known resolutions of the General Assembly voted in 1946 and 1954.

The existing situation serves to emphasize that an agreement on disarmament must be achieved as a principal and fundamental objective, and that it must be coupled with a substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, and the institution of a reliable and effective system of control over the consistent implementation of those measures.

In the course of twelve years of negotiation on disarmament in the United Nations the Soviet Union, true to its consistent policy of peace, has submitted a number of proposals guided by the very principles which could serve as a good basis for achieving agreement on disarmament.

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Proceeding from the premise that an agreement can be reached only if the interests of all participating countries are respected, the Soviet Union always took into account proposals presented by other countries that were parties to the negotiations. However, the Western Powers, for their part, never sought to achieve this end. They even went back gradually on proposals which they themselves had presented in the past, proposals whose adoption they had stubbornly sought to achieve. In that manner, they prevented and continue to prevent any progress on the question of disarmament. This was the pattern of their behaviour, for example, in the negotiations on the setting of stages for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and the setting of ceilings for the armed forces of the five great Powers.

In the course of the negotiations, the United States and its allies in the Atlantic bloc put forward more and more new preliminary conditions and made the adoption of individual proposals dependent upon the acceptance of these preliminary conditions, which they themselves kept piling up, and in this manner they systematically thwarted the achievement of an agreement.

At the meetings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London, they again used the same stratagem, the same methods, although they thought up new variations. In analysing the position of the Western Powers, one can only reach the conclusion that the United States and its allies in reality want no agreement at all on disarmament. Negotiations and talks on the question of disarmament only serve to delude world public opinion or to calm down the public. They serve as a camouflage for the continuance of the armaments race, which brings increasing profits to the monopolists.

Documents published in official United States publications in June of this year make it clear that from 1950 to 1956, inclusive, the military expenditures in the United States budget were increased more than three-fold. The lion's share in so radical a growth of expenditures for armaments belongs to atomic weapons. Detachments and units of the United States Army are being armed at a feverish pace with all types of atomic weapons. At the same time, the numbers of armed forces and the quantities of other armaments are growing apace. According to official information, the land forces of the United States in the period from 1950 to 1956

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were increased by almost one half, the number of naval vessels was increased by more than 50 per cent, and the number of military aircraft in the United States Air Force was increased almost twice. On the basis of military pacts and various agreements, the United States has dragged into its military plans more than two score States, and has established hundreds of military bases of all kinds in all continents. The United States supplies its bases on the territories of foreign countries, and likewise the armed forces of the aggressive blocs, with atomic weapons, which serve further to aggravate the international situation and increase international tension and the danger of atomic warfare. The ruling circles of the United States are consistently seeking the establishment of an aggressive front armed to the teeth and directed against the socialist countries.

This policy based on military threats is most clearly embodied in the attitude of the United States to the touchstone of disarmament, the question of the prohibition of the nuclear weapon. In the proposals of 29 August, and likewise in the draft resolution presented by the United States, jointly with other delegations, in document A/C.1/L.179, the United States does not have one word about the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even though the General Assembly has for years sponsored negotiations to this end and, in previous resolutions, confirmed the desirability of a general agreement, an inseparable part of which would be the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Nuclear weapons have become the foundation stone of the foreign political and military strategy of the United States. For this reason, and not because these weapons are required for defence, as is alleged here, the United States has systematically turned down proposals for the prohibition of these weapons and has announced its unwillingness to eliminate them from the armaments of States.

Moreover, the Western Powers have made agreement on disarmament contingent on the previous solution of certain political questions, such as the questions of Germany and of the Near and Middle East. This may be seen in the joint statement of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, dated 29 July of this year, in which it is stated in so many words that a comprehensive disarmament agreement presupposes the previous solution of the question of the reunification of Germany. But it is perfectly well known that it is precisely the United States and its allies which have frustrated the

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reunification of Germany on a peaceful basis, even though the Potsdam Agreement obliges the United States to foster such an agreement. At the present time, the establishment of a unified, peace-loving and democratic Germany is being frustrated, first of all, by the militarist and anti-democratic developments in Western Germany, which are sponsored and supported by the United States. It is being frustrated, moreover, by the fact that this part of Germany is ever more fully being drawn into the Western aggressive grouping. The Western Powers systematically ignore the fact that two German States exist, after all, on the territory of Germany, and that their unification is the affair of the Germans themselves and of no one else. If, notwithstanding this state of affairs, the United States persists in announcing that it will not agree to disarmament as long as the German question has not been solved -- and, incidentally, the Adenauer Government opposes the peaceful reunification of Germany with all means in its power -- then, in that case, this whole game of hide and seek is nothing but, on the one hand, incitement and encouragement to the Western militarists, and, on the other hand, the frustration of any disarmament agreement. This position is not conducive either to a solution of the disarmament question or to a solution of the question of the reunification of Germany. It serves only the purposes of the aggressive circles of the Western Powers and of the Federal Republic of Germany, and it works to the detriment of the interests of the German people, of the peoples of Europe, and of peace in general.

So far as the Near and Middle East are concerned, aggressive circles of the imperialist Powers have created there a situation of continuing tension. Forcibly interfering in the internal affairs of the countries of the region, exerting all sorts of pressure and voicing all kinds of threats, they seek to suppress the people's liberation movements of the Arab peoples, they seek to liquidate their national independence.

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The ruling circles of the United States of America, which seek to acquire a controlling position in that area and to transform the area into a large-scale United States military base, have utilized their allies in the North Atlantic bloc as so many tools in the carrying out of military provocations. They have recently concentrated on Syria, which has refused to accept the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine and which is alleged to endanger its neighbours. It is clear to everyone how preposterous are the allegations which are being made. Syria is a peace-loving State, which threatens no one and which is eager peacefully to develop its national life. It is essential that the imperialists should forego their threats and intervention in the internal affairs of Syria and other countries of the Near and Middle East. They must abandon their continuing threats against the freedom and independence of these countries. Placing the solution of the disarmament problem in a condition of dependence on the settlement of the situation in the Near and Middle East, or on a settlement of the German problem, is tantamount to dooming these negotiations to failure.

When it became evident that the Western Powers repudiated and rejected the conclusion of a comprehensive disarmament agreement, the Soviet Union came forward with proposals for the conclusion of a partial disarmament agreement, the adoption of partial measures in the disarmament field. It is quite clear that we prefer as comprehensive a disarmament agreement as is feasible. Undoubtedly, that would be the most reliable way to exorcise the danger of military conflict and provide the peoples with prospects of a peaceful and constructive existence. If, however, a comprehensive disarmament agreement is not feasible in the present situation, then at least the first steps -- albeit partial steps -- in that direction might well be taken.

The negotiations which took place a month ago demonstrated that the Western Powers are systematically frustrating the achievement of an agreement on disarmament, and even on any real partial disarmament measures. Last year, in a statement to the Disarmament Commission, the representative of Canada said that the carrying out of partial measures would have a political effect which would surely establish a favourable atmosphere for negotiations on the settlement of broader political problems, and these negotiations would, in turn, make it possible to take further disarmament measures.

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No sooner, however, had the USSR proposed a broad programme of partial disarmament measures than the Western Powers lost interest in such measures, reverting to an interdependent, mutually conditional system of disarmament measures. In the proposals which they presented to the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee on 29 August 1957, the Western Powers categorically linked together the various measures of a partial disarmament agreement. They even made it clear that the various provisions of the proposed agreement are inseparable, adding that they would not agree to assume any obligations under the individual headings of their proposals so long as all the other provisions had not been accepted. In so stating, the Western Powers have come out against the adoption of concrete partial measures in the field of disarmament.

The adoption and rapid implementation of effective partial measures would be of signal importance in the present circumstances. It would surely enhance confidence between the peoples and thereby would create better conditions for the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme.

One of the key questions in the entire disarmament problem is agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The character of these weapons and the fact that the weapons and the propaganda concerning atomic warfare which is linked to them have been primary factors in aggravating international tension indicate how urgent such a measure is. Inasmuch as the Western Powers, for well-known reasons to which I have already referred, are unwilling to accept the prohibition of the nuclear weapon, the Czechoslovak delegation regards as particularly urgent the USSR proposal that:

> "the States possessing nuclear weapons...assume, as a first step, a temporary obligation not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, it being understood that if at the end of five years no comprehensive international agreement on the disarmament problem has been reached, the question of an obligation by States to renounce the use of nuclear weapons will again be considered by the United Nations" (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1).

The Czechoslovak delegation regards the conclusion of a temporary agreement as proposed by the USSR as an independent matter, not conditional on other measures and as a constructive and useful contribution. The achievement of such an agreement, albeit temporary, would create the necessary conditions for achieving a broader agreement in the future on the whole disarmament question, including the

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complete prohibition of the thermonuclear weapon and its elimination from the armaments of States. It is likewise essential to take account of the significance of the achievement of such an agreement in terms of relaxing international tension and enhancing confidence among the States -- factors which surely are necessary to the acceptance and enforcement of further disarmament measures.

Of particular significance and urgency at the present juncture is the question of the cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. If the very fact of the existence and stockpiling of these weapons poses a threat, the testing of the weapons in the present circumstances spells danger for the health and lives of human beings throughout the world. In the opinion of many scientists in the United States and the United Kingdom, the danger of increasing radioactivity as a result of test explosions will in the near future become greater, even if the tests were to be stopped right now. The reassurances of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom to the effect that the reverse is true and their attempts to minimize the true danger to which we are all exposed are designed to justify and give a semblance of legitimacy to their unwillingness to agree to the immediate and unconditional prohibition of further atomic and hydrogen test detonations.

If, in the present situation, the Western Powers are unwilling to put an end to the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons, the USSR proposal to cease testing for only two or three years, starting on 1 January 1958, to establish an international commission and to take other measures to control the observance of an agreement on this question surely constitutes a constructive and efficient approach to a solution of the problem. Of course, an agreement on the suspension of nuclear and hydrogen test explosions, if only a temporary suspension, would not remove the dangers flowing from the very existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons. What would be stopped, however, would be the trend towards the further perfecting of these weapons. What would be stopped would be the further increase in background radioactivity which is taking place as a result of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons. That, in turn, would exert a favourable influence and would create favourable conditions for the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and on disarmament in general. This measure would contribute to the establishment and gradual strengthening of confidence among the States and would also relax international tension.

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In the light of those facts, which are generally recognized, we must repudiate the following statement made to this Committee last Monday by the United Kingdom representative:

"...the suspension of tests as an isolated measure would tend to endanger the balance of security..." (A/C.1/PV.869, page 17).

The Czechoslovak delegation has repeatedly stated that it favours the unconditional and immediate cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

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The National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic, in its statement of 1 August 1956 expressing the will of the Czechoslovak people, unanimously supported this demand. The demand for the immediate and unconditional cessation of the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons was supported at this session of the General Assembly by a number of delegations. The representative of Japan, a country which has endured the horrible consequences of atomic warfare on its own soil, speaking in this Committee a few days ago, emphasized the urgency of the prohibition of nuclear and hydrogen weapons and the cessation of testing. It is well known that the Japanese people demand the immediate and unconditional prohibition of further test explosions of nuclear weapons. It is a matter of regret, however, that the obvious conclusions to be drawn from this premise have not been properly reflected in the draft resolution presented by the delegation of Japan.

In general, the Japanese proposals, unfortunately, as well as the proposals of the Western Powers, make the cessation of test explosions conditional upon other aspects of the disarmament problem. The important factor which runs counter to the swift achievement of an agreement on so urgent a problem for all mankind is the point of view of the Western Powers, and of the United States in particular, which refuses to seek a solution of this problem on its own, by linking it with the solution of other problems of disarmament. In his statement on 10 October, the representative of the United States overtly refused to support a separate approach to the problem of nuclear weapons, and he conceded the possibility of agreeing upon the cessation of test explosions only within the general context of the Western Powers' proposals of 29 August. These proposals place in the forefront, as a preliminary condition, the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes.

A cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, in the form proposed by the Western Powers, would not in the slightest presuppose a cessation of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons out of the existing stockpiles of fissionable materials. This would mean that the number of atomic and hydrogen bombs, instead of decreasing, would continue to grow. Moreover, these proposals do not contain a word about the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Thus, in essence, they would serve to legalize the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and if the Western Powers' proposals were accepted, the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, let alone their

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complete elimination from the arsenals of States, would be rendered more difficult. Only if the cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes were linked with the prohibition of the production and use of such weapons, together with an undertaking completely to liquidate the stockpiles, would a step forward be made towards eliminating the danger of an atomic war.

However, in reality the proposals of the Western Powers on this question constitute a screen behind which it is proposed to continue the further stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The solution of the problem of nuclear weapons is substantially complicated and rendered more difficult by the fact that at the present time the United States is engaged in placing its so-called tactical nuclear weapons beyond the borders of the United States itself. The United States is busily engaged in arming American military units in bases situated on foreign territories, and in the framework of aggressive military blocs, especially NATO, the United States is working on plans to deliver nuclear weapons to other countries as well.

These measures only serve to aggravate the international situation and they pose a new threat to general peace. It is essential that States possessing nuclear weapons should accept and undertake an obligation, such as that proposed in the Soviet Government's memorandum, an obligation jointly and mutually binding, not to allow the stationing of military units or of any types of nuclear and hydrogen weapons beyond their own national frontiers and not to make these weapons available to other States or to military blocs. The implementation of this partial measure would mean a substantial reduction of the danger which flows from atomic armaments, and at the same time it would constitute a great step forward towards the achievement of a broader agreement on a solution of the problem of nuclear weapons as a whole.

As I have already stated in the general debate in the General Assembly, the Czechoslovak Government welcomes the initiative of the Government of the People's Republic of Poland which proposes to abandon or renounce the production and stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory, on the condition that the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic agree to apply this provision to the entire territory of Germany, in accordance with the previously made proposals of the German Democratic Republic. In the interests of the relaxation of international tension and of securing peace in the Europe, the Czechoslovak Government has expressed its readiness to join in the proposals of the Government

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of People's Republic of Poland and, under the conditions stated by the Polish Government, to renounce the production and stationing of atomic weapons in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.

In taking this attitude, the Czechoslovak Government proceeds from the premise that atomic bases of foreign States exist in one section of Germany, and in that section there is open talk about plans to arm the West German Army with atomic weapons. More than that, plans are being worked out there under which the Federal Republic of Germany, in the face of all the existing obligations, will be given an opportunity and facilities for the production of atomic weapons. Having early fallen victim to the expansion of German imperialism, Czechoslovakia is fully alive to the danger to its security and to peace in Europe which is contained in a policy of stationing atomic bases in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and of arming the West German Army with atomic weapons. This policy runs absolutely counter to the interests of peace and constitutes a direct threat to all European peoples. The other neighbours of Germany should be the first to realize the truth of this statement.

The Western Powers which actively support this policy count on the West German Army for carring out their strategic plans. They count on the West German Army as a paramount factor in any subsequent military conflict. West Germany is being turned into a base for atomic aggression in Europe, and that is why Poland and Czechoslovakia, as neighbours of Germany and as countries which have suffered much from the aggression of German imperialism during the Second World War, consider it their direct duty to do everything in their power to forestall the danger of a repetition of such aggression. We are convinced that the expressed readiness of the People's Republic of Poland and of the Republic of Czechoslovakia to assume these obligations can facilitate the achievement of an agreement, and that, of course, would be a fact of signal significance.

The very fact that nuclear weapons would no longer be produced or stationed in the territories of all Germany, of Poland and of Czechoslovakia would create a situation of great importance for the entire European area. It would mean a substantial reduction of tension in Europe and in the world at large. The carrying out of such a concrete measure, the proposal for which has been broadly welcomed by public opinion in West Germany as well, in reality would signify the

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actual exclusion of a substantial portion of Europe from the realm of atomic armaments and it could help in carrying out disarmament at large and in liquidating nuclear weapons on a world scale.

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We believe that all peace-loving peoples, especially the European peoples who, in the past, experienced terrible ordeals, as we did, will welcome the initiative of the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic and will extend their support to this initiative.

We fully support other proposals for partial measures called for in the memorandum of the Soviet Union Government, designed to strengthen peace and security in Europe. In particular, we welcome the proposal of the Soviet Union to the effect that the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, situated in the territory of Germany, should be reduced by one-third or down to some other agreed level. We likewise support the appeal for the conclusion of an agreement for the reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territories of States that are members of NATO, and also of the armed forces of the USSR situated in the territories of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

We extend our wholehearted support to the other proposals of the Soviet Government for the consideration of the question of dismantling foreign military bases in the territories of other States. The solution of this problem is all the more urgent in the present circumstances inasmuch as atomic units and atomic weapons are being stationed, or have already been stationed or are planned for at many of these bases, and this, of course, increases the danger of atomic war.

The Czechoslovak delegation is fully alive to the significance of the proposals for a substantial reduction of the armed forces of the great Powers in three stages: the reduction for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach a level of 1.7 million men and, for the United Kingdom and France, a level of 650,000 men each. We further note with satisfaction the proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments and of military budgets by 15 per cent in the first stage of the reduction of the level of armaments.

These proposals are likewise contained in the memorandum of the USSR Government and give the lie to the mendacious allegations made by the Western Powers to the effect that the proposals of the Soviet Union for the prohibition of nuclear weapons are motivated by its interest in maintaining its advantage in conventional armaments. On the contrary, these proposals are evidence of the

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good will displayed by the Soviet Union in meeting half-way the proposals of the Western Powers. They are a substantial contribution to the solution of the general disarmament problem.

So far as the problem of control is concerned, the Western Powers have been exploiting this question in order to frustrate the adoption of concrete disarmament measures. They have been utilizing this problem of control as a pretext in order to block any progress whatever on the disarmament problem. It is universally known that the carrying out of disarmament measures must be ensured by way of suitable international control and, with that aim in view, the Soviet Union has made the necessary proposals for the institution of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council. Under these proposals, during the implementation of the first disarmament stage, on the basis of reciprocity, there should be established control posts in large ports, railway centres and on highways, and these posts would have to be on guard in order to ensure that no dangerous concentrations of military forces or armaments would take place.

As for aerial photography, it is essential to make it clear that, by itself, this measure is in no way capable of solving the problem of control over disarmament; nor is it capable even of forestalling or preventing sudden attack. Far from it. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, both of these questions must necessarily be solved in close connexion with the problem of the creation of the necessary atmosphere of confidence between all States in general and the great Powers in particular. The elimination of the existing mistrust in relations between States and the creation of the necessary modicum of confidence between them would be substantially encouraged by the cessation of war propaganda, a measure already called for by the General Assembly's resolution of 1947. In particular, the cessation of atomic war propaganda would play a significant role in improving mutual relations between States. It would make it possible to expand mutually beneficial co-operation, especially in the economic field. The restoration of normal trade relations without discrimination would lay a sound foundation for true and genuinely peaceful coexistence between all States. A great role in this respect can be played also

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by the expansion of cultural and scientific ties, as recommended by the recently adopted resolution by the Third Committee at this session of the Assembly. The broad expansion of comprehensive relations and ties between States would create a more favourable and sound atmosphere in international relations in which it would be possible to solve the complex problems of disarmament.

In seeking ways and means of ensuring more favourable conditions for further negotiations in the disarmament problem, we cannot fail to mention the necessity of improving the composition and working methods of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. For example, the existing membership of these organs -- particularly the fact that in the Sub-Committee, in addition to the Soviet Union, only members of the North Atlantic bloc participate in its work, countries which are linked with each other by virtue of their objective and the plans of that aggressive military bloc -- does not contribute to the development of agreements which would be acceptable for all. There can be no doubt that the inclusion in the Sub-Committee of other States Members truly interested in disarmament and the strengthening of peace would contribute greatly to the improvement of its work. The memorandum of the Soviet Union Government on partial disarmament measures opens the door wide for the immediate achievement of agreement on any one of the partial measures.

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The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes and wholeheartedly supports these proposals for partial measures inasmuch as what is involved here are proposals for concrete measures. The carrying out of these measures would contribute to the solution of the disarmament problem and to a relaxation of international tension. It would create the necessary atmosphere of confidence between the States.

The Czechoslovak delegation has bent every effort to strengthen and to foster the consistent campaign against the preparation of a new war and to strengthen peaceful coexistence between the peoples. My Government wishes to contribute to a solution of the disarmament problem. In 1955 and 1956 the Czechoslovak Republic reduced the effectives of its armed forces.

The time has come to call a halt to further fruitless and dilatory talks on disarmament, and to proceed seriously to the concrete solution of this question. It is only regrettable that the Western Powers have displayed no readiness or eagerness to proceed to substantial negotiations. How else can one construe or account for the position of the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom in the past discussions which characterized the proposals of the USSR as being so much propaganda material.

In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation the proposals of the USSR are perfectly clear, fully capable of implementation and designed fundamentally to dispose of the disarmament problem. They are likewise comprehensible to broad public opinion. Inasmuch as they meet the desire and the demand of the peoples that disarmament should be carried out, they have enlisted broad support and sympathy from the public. The Czechoslovak Government has always supported and continues to support all proposals designed truly to achieve a solution of the disarmament problem which would be in line with the interests of peaceful coexistence. We likewise want to achieve a prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the elimination of these weapons from the armaments of States.

The Czechoslovak Government has consistently emphasized its readiness to take part in effective and fair measures designed to achieve this end. In this spirit, my delegation will at this session bend every effort to ensure that our negotiations are crowned with success and that the twelfth session of the General Assembly will spell a turning point in the disarmament negotiations, one which would be of great importance to the cause of peace.