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Chairman: Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission [22] (continued)

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REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS: CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (DC.83; A/C.1/783, 784; A/C.1/L.160, L.161, L.162, L.163, L.164 /Agenda item 22/ (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): This morning, because of the lateness of the hour, I was unable to call on the representative of Israel, who had asked for the floor in order to exercise his right of reply, a right which he had reserved at a previous meeting. I call on him now for that purpose.

Mr. COMAY (Israel): I am grateful to the Chairman for granting me the right of reply to certain comments that have been made in this debate concerning the application of disarmament to the problems of the Middle East. I wish immediately to assure the Committee that I shall be brief, avoid polemics, and try to outline a constructive approach to this matter within the framework of the item we are now discussing.

My delegation shares the general dismay that the United Nations has so far failed to bring under control forces that may destroy the world. In fact, it has failed to register agreement on any single aspect of the problems involved. Yet the search for an escape from this deadly paralysis must go on at all costs.

While the United Nations has been discussing disarmament for a decade, the emphasis has shifted within the last two years. The watershed was the so-called Summit Conference of 1955. Until then, the various disarmament proposals consisted of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans involving all three major elements of disarmament: the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the problem of control and inspection. Since that time, however, there have been a number of proposals of a limited or partial nature put forward in the hope that agreement on some "initial step" might open the way, politically and psychologically, for a global plan. Most of these proposals have been listed in the latest draft resolution put before us, and therefore I need not refer to them in detail.

None of these limited proposals have been accepted, perhaps because of the one basic feature that they have in common. They focus attention on the agreement of the "Powers principally concerned" to limitations which would apply directly, and in the first instance, to their own forces and their own weapons. The reason for this is obvious: Mankind is threatened by means of destruction which are at the disposal of great Powers and not at the disposal of small Powers. Yet, must the search for some point of advance be confined exclusively to this type of limited agreement?

In the view of my Government, the United Nations should not ignore the possibility of an agreed scheme for arms limitation in respect of a local "situation of conflict" -- a situation which may involve the interests of great Powers but in which the parties principally concerned are a group of smaller countries. My delegation suggests that the Israel-Arab conflict would provide an appropriate local setting for such a scheme. We believe that is so for a number of reasons:

Firstly, this is the most critical and explosive local conflict now confronting the United Nations.

Secondly, unrestrained arms supply into the area has played a conspicuous and sinister part in creating the fears and tensions which have led directly to the present crisis.

Thirdly, the special complexities regarding nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction do not arise at all as far as the States within the area are concerned.

Fourthly, the States concerned are unable to produce even conventional weapons of the heavier and more lethal types, which have to be supplied from outside.

Fifthly, inspection and control should be relatively simple, compared to territories with dense populations, advanced economies and highly developed munitions industries and communications systems.

Sixthly -- and maybe most important of all -- these are, on the whole, poor and backward countries that cannot afford the present forced pace of rearmament. The development and progress which can in time bring stability to the area is quite inconsistent with the diversion of a large part of the resources of our neighbours and ourselves into military expenditures.

(Mr. Comay, Israel)

In this connexion, I would quote a few sentences from the statement of the Israel Foreign Minister to the General Assembly on 5 December last:

"The countries of the Middle East are rightly listed in the category of the 'under-developed'. The standard of living, disease, illiteracy of the masses of people, the undeveloped lands, desert and swamp, all these cry out desperately for minds, hands, financial means and technical ability. Can we envisage what a state of peace between Israel and her neighbours during the past eight years would have meant for all of us? Can we try to translate fighter planes into irrigation pipes and tractors for the people in these lands? Can we, in our imagination, replace gun emplacements with schools and hospitals? The many hundreds of millions of dollars spent on armaments could surely have been put to a more constructive purpose. Substitute co-operation between Israel and her neighbours for sterile hatred and ardour for destruction, and you give life and hope and happiness to all its peoples."

(Mr. Comay, Israel)

Such a scheme could take the form of a convention worked out between Israel and those Arab States which are in conflict with it, with the assistance of the Disarmament Commission, and it could be endorsed by the United Nations and guaranteed in any appropriate way. It could and should also reaffirm a complete renunciation of war and a renewed pledge to refrain from active hostility and belligerency in all its forms, on land, on sea and in the air.

I would like here to address a quiet word to the representative of Iraq, who in the course of this debate demanded that Israel, and Israel alone, should be denied the means of self-defence. It would be no great problem for my delegation to refute this startling proposition, and I could produce plenty of evidence regarding Iraq's murky record in this whole conflict. I feel it would be more helpful, Mr. Chairman, and more in keeping with the tone you have so ably tried to preserve in the debate, if I avoided sterile controversy with Dr. Jamali. Instead, I would ask him in all earnestness whether he too would not like to see our region relieved of its present crushing burden of armament, so that we could all turn our hands, our minds and our revenues to more hopeful causes.

It would be premature to put forward a detailed scheme at this stage. But if some of the practical measures and techniques which have been mooted in the Disarmament Commission and in this Committee could be adapted on a local scale to such a scheme, it would serve as a valuable pilot plan for a wider sphere.

My Government would gladly co-operate in any attempt to produce a local arms limitation plan which would reduce tension and relieve economic strains. We have aggressive designs against no one. We wish to live and work in peace, to use our meagre resources for the betterment of our people, and to help secure these ends for our region as a whole. If our neighbours share this view, there might be a single constructive approach to two of the major problems with which the United Nations has been seized almost since its inception: the Arab-Israel conflict, and the need to make a start somewhere with the actual process of halting and reversing rearmament.

(Mr. Comay, Israel)

I am not suggesting this would be easy. But can any of us point to an easy starting point? If there had been one, some disarmament plan would surely have been put into practice during the existence of the United Nations, or before that during the existence of the League of Nations. Why then should we not seek to bring about the world's first pilot scheme of disarmament in the very area which has been of late the world's tensest trouble spot?

After all, it was at that very spot that one of my forefathers in the land of Israel put forward the first disarmament proposal in the imperishable words which are engraved on the stone wall facing this United Nations building:

"And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

My delegation commends this approach to the good sense of the Committee and to the earnest attention of the Disarmament Commission afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We will now begin our examination of the draft resolutions.

Mr. de GRIPENBERG (Finland): As it now seems certain that the draft resolutions introduced in this Committee, as well as all other proposals, suggestions and views which have been put forward during the debate, will be referred to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, the Finnish delegation, which is not represented in that body, is anxious to address an urgent appeal to the Commission. The Finnish delegation wants to also add its voice to what has already been said by several other delegations. We feel that we are duty-bound to express the deep concern and very grave apprehensions which are felt in our country as the years go by without an agreement being reached by the world Powers on nuclear disarmament.

Our delegation is anxious to stress its fervent hope that the Disarmament Commission will find -- and will find very soon -- the way to an international agreement regarding the cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons. We are, of course, fully aware of the extreme complexity of the problems involved in the Disarmament discussions and particularly of the problems which are connected with

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the appalling menace of nuclear arms. But surely it cannot be beyond human ingenuity to find means of escaping the perils which already now, when peace is still prevailing, threatens humanity.

In this respect the Finnish delegation fully associates itself with the proposal put forward by the Soviet delegation: that the test explosions of nuclear weapons be discontinued forthwith. An implementation of this proposal seems to be the only safe way of avoiding the dangers to the health and life of the people of the world inherent in the repeated atomic and hydrogen tests. If, however, the Disarmament Commission would not find it possible, within the very near or reasonable future, to reach an international agreement on this point, the Finnish delegation wishes to take this opportunity to urge the Commission to do whatever it can to bring about an agreement on a moratorium in the testing of nuclear weapons -- as proposed a few days ago by the representative of Sweden -- or to bring about an agreement on establishing a system of registration of test explosions, as has been proposed in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.162) tabled by Canada, Japan and Norway.

Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia): The general debate on this important question of disarmament has again shown that our discussions here serve essentially the purpose of a summing up. But this year the general debate served also to re-emphasize the urgent need for achieving some practical results now. Indeed, this need was already expressed in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1955, whereby the States concerned, and particularly those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, were urged to give priority to early agreement on and implementation of "all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible". Today, the need for and in fact the possibilities of practical steps in this direction are greater than ever.

On all three essential components of an international disarmament convention -- that is, conventional armaments and armed forces; nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction; and effective international control -- there seems to exist now a sufficient consensus of opinion to warrant early agreement on and implementation of at least the first phase of disarmament.

(Mr. Hanifah, Indonesia)

In the opinion of my delegation, this opportunity for working out practical achievements should not be lost. Accordingly, it is in the light of attaining this immediate, though limited, goal -- while continuing the endeavour to reach agreement on general disarmament -- that my delegation views the draft resolutions before this Committee.

The two draft resolutions concerning nuclear test explosions are aimed at doing something now about one of the most terrifying aspects of the present arms race. On the one hand, the joint draft resolution of Canada, Japan and Norway looks towards the establishment, as a preliminary step, of a safe system for registering with the United Nations nuclear test explosions. Certainly this is a step in the right direction; but, while we deeply respect the intentions of the sponsors, it seems to my delegation that this proposal does not come close enough to the heart of the problem. As was pointed out by the representative of Sweden, the crux of the matter is that we do not know the harm being done to humanity by the continuation of nuclear test explosions. But, while we do not know what the long-range effects may be, it is a scientific fact that every increase in the amount of radiation is harmful. Therefore, a system for registration of future nuclear test explosions, even if, under pressure of informed world public opinion, it led to some sort of self-imposed limitation of such tests by the States concerned, would not guarantee the prevention of tragic consequences for the health and security of mankind. On the other hand, it is also quite conceivable that a system for registration of future nuclear test explosions might even lead to an acceleration of the present pace of such tests by the States concerned.

The fact is that the three-Power joint draft resolution is based on the approach that nuclear test explosions should be limited or curtailed after the facts of the radiation situation are established -- and not before or until they are established. In the opinion of my delegation, however, this is a rather unscientific and dangerous approach. After all, before being scientifically tested, one does not swallow toxic medicine in indiscriminate quantities on the assumption that one will adjust to the safe minimum once the scientific facts are known, disregarding in this way the irremediable damage that may be done in the interval. One does not even take such medicine in small quantities since

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measurement has no meaning until limits have been established. Surely, then, it is not unreasonable to expect at least this amount of precaution in a matter which concerns the health and welfare of the whole human race.

This brings me to the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation. It calls for the cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons "forthwith". That is a practical step which is desired by all the peoples of the world and one which, we believe, can be implemented now. In our discussions during the tenth session of the General Assembly I stated that an agreement to suspend experimental explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would answer the needs of mankind. At that time, too, I recalled that, as early as the spring of 1954, the Government of Indonesia joined the Governments of Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan in urging that no further explosions of nuclear weapons should take place. And since that time, we have made repeated efforts to secure this end. Therefore, we welcome the initiative taken this year by the Soviet Union in submitting its draft resolution calling for an immediate discontinuation of such experimental explosions.

I am aware of the argument that a suspension in the testing of nuclear weapons would mean also a suspension of experimental explosions for peaceful purposes until an international control system and the radiation situation have been established. However, it should not be overlooked that it is the small and the under-developed countries -- those which are most desirous of harnessing the atom for peaceful purposes -- which are calling for such a suspension. Certainly, we want and we need progress in this field, but not progress at any cost -- not at the cost of the annihilation of mankind. Progress cannot be an end in itself; it is a means for the attainment of maximum satisfaction of needs in the interest of mankind. Indeed, we are hopeful that a cessation in the testing of nuclear weapons would have the additional benefit of accelerating the search for that formula which would allow tests for peaceful scientific purposes under international control.

In this connexion, too, I should like to refer once more to the draft resolutions before this Committee on the question of nuclear test explosions. It may be said that both draft resolutions are extreme in opposite directions. On the one hand, the three-Power draft resolution may be too limited and preliminary a step for some, while, on the other hand, the Soviet draft resolution

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goes too far and too fast for others. If this is true, then it seems to my delegation that a compromise acceptable to all may be found in taking a temporary step, such as that suggested by the representative of Sweden; in other words, an agreement by the States concerned on a standstill or moratorium in the testing of nuclear weapons until the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, established by General Assembly resolution 913 (X), has reported its findings and the Assembly has acted upon them.

We believe that this informal proposal of Sweden has two important merits: first, it is a practical measure which can be implemented now, without endangering the security of any State; secondly, responsive to the universal desire and need of mankind, it would, when implemented, create a much better political and psychological climate which, in turn, would be conducive to the implementation of other measures of disarmament as are now feasible. Therefore, while we ourselves are not submitting any formal proposal at this time, we would certainly welcome any proposal on these lines. At the very least, we believe that the temporary step suggested by Sweden deserves, as a matter of priority, the most serious consideration.

Turning to the draft resolution of the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.161, my delegation has some doubts as to the usefulness of convening a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, as called for in paragraph 3 of that draft resolution. We agree with the objections to such a procedure, in the absence of any plan or concrete proposals on disarmament, which have already been voiced by many delegations. However, we would certainly have no objection to the calling of a special session of the Assembly if, in the opinion of the members of the Disarmament Commission, such a move were warranted by new developments. On the contrary, we would be very happy to note such an indication of progress on the question of disarmament.

My delegation, therefore, welcomes the invitation to members of the Disarmament Commission, as found in paragraph 8 of the twelve-Power joint draft resolution, to consider the advisability of convening such a special session, or a general disarmament conference, at the appropriate time. We also consider that the recommendation to the Sub-Committee to prepare a progress report for consideration by the Disarmament Commission not later than 1 August 1957 responds

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to the universal desire to achieve early progress in agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament. Indeed, the joint twelve-Power draft resolution, as a whole, may be said to be a businesslike, forward-looking and positive document.

In particular, however, we welcome this draft resolution as its sponsors include, among others, the great Powers upon which rests primary responsibility for the solution of this problem. It gives us renewed hope of achieving a peaceful and secure world, in which peoples may live full and prosperous lives, freed from the scourge and sorrow of war. So let us, in the coming year, realize this hope of mankind. Let us move forward from common understanding to common action.

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Owing to my delegation's commitments to this Organization during the last few days in other spheres, it has not been possible for us to participate in this discussion as has been our wont in previous years.

In the report that is before the Committee, and that has been circulated to Member States, is the submission of the Government of India, made in July of last year, with regard to what it considers to be the immediately practicable and necessary steps which would work in the direction of disarmament. Again, the draft resolution that we have before us in document A/C.1/L.163 has, as everyone at this table realizes, had a long period of incubation, and my delegation did not consider that the appropriate moment to intervene in this debate was before the results -- which fortunately have proved to be happy results -- as we see them now before us.

Fortunately, the nature of the draft resolution is such that no procedural difficulties arise in making submissions on the problem as a whole, because its paragraph 5 covers all the proposals before the Assembly and, what is more, its paragraph 7 asks for a transmission of the records of these meetings of the First Committee to the Disarmament Commission. The implication and the inference from that is that whatever has to be said before that rather exclusive body has to be written into the record as best possible so that the views of the world outside those countries may become known.

We meet a year after the general discussion and some eleven years after the United Nations, by the resolution of the Security Council, first entered into this problem. The Disarmament Commission, set up in 1952, has been reporting to us year after year, and a part of the function of the Commission itself has been confined to reporting, the main discussions taking place in the Disarmament Sub-Committee.

This is one of those matters wherein it is our bounden duty to register the agreements and to register progress, and even to be content sometimes with a position of agreeing to disagree, so that we may move forward. I think that it would be doing injustice to ourselves and to world public opinion if we did not realize that each year we have met here we have met in the context of greater armaments than in the previous year, of newer weapons of destruction, of new fears and, in most years, of increasing tension.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Some months ago it was the hope of our Government, and I believe of many others, that in view of the improved conditions in the world it would be possible this year to make a long stride towards the objective of world disarmament, which itself is only an intermediate objective because the real objective is the outlawry of war. But, unfortunately for all of us, the developments in the Middle East, the situation in Hungary and the re-emergence of the phraseology of the cold war have intervened to mar that movement towards the relaxation of tensions. Nevertheless, it is some indication of the gravity with which this problem is considered that, in spite of these adverse factors, there is before us a draft resolution which is sponsored on a representative basis. Therefore, in submitting the observations of my Government to the Committee, I would deal with the draft resolution as it stands and all its implications, which include the other draft resolutions that are before us.

I would like to say that, in spite of what I said a while ago, this debate itself and the procedures on this item in this Committee began under good auspices. My Government desires to express its appreciation of the opening statement of Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, when he said to this Committee, "My statement today...will look more to the future than to the past". (A/C.1/PV.821, page 2). That approach, if it were possible to make it in the Committee or in the Disarmament Commission, might yield better results than the greater insistence that has prevailed in the past on what was said on a previous occasion and on how either those commitments were not honoured or some other commitments were necessary.

It is not possible in the context of social and political affairs to look in two directions at once. Indeed, if that optical experiment were performed the person concerned would lose his vision. If that is so in the case of the human eye, it is far more so in the case of the social or the political eye. We must choose between these two courses: on the one hand, we can draw from the past all the recrimination and convert a committee into an inquest; or, on the other hand, we can look to the future.

My Government also wants me to express its appreciation of the fact that, in spite of the tensions that exist, correspondence and an exchange of thoughts and communications has taken place between two great Powers which, we repeat without reserve, are principally concerned in accomplishing disarmament. It is quite true

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that we move proposals -- and we may even flatter ourselves, or sometimes say with truth, that those proposals may have merit -- but the arms, the conclusive arms, are in the possession of the two great Powers, and it is on their agreement and, what is more, on their shedding of the fear of each other or finding adjustments where their co-existence in this world is imperative, that disarmament becomes possible.

My Government also desires me to express its appreciation -- and I am happy to do this on my own behalf also -- of the great contribution made by President Eisenhower's special adviser on disarmament, Mr. Harold Stassen, who, in spite of the fact that we are not members of the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee, has, both in New York and in London, kept our Government closely informed and been willing to respect the views of others. The same applies to the different Soviet representatives who have participated in the work of the Sub-Committee. We have had the equal privilege of sharing in the sense of being informed and kept in the circle of thinking by the representative of the Canadian Government in London, and sometimes by its representatives in Ottawa.

For all these reasons, while it has not been possible -- owing to various procedural circumstances and, in one or two instances, to an exclusive outlook on the part of the Disarmament Sub-Committee -- to enter into discussions straight away, the Government of India has been able to implement its desires to do its best to bring about this change in the state of affairs.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The contribution made by the United States, which inaugurated the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and many other efforts in that field, the response of the Soviet Union in connexion with the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the co-operation of many other countries have assisted in furthering the problem of disarmament in many indirect respects. I shall refer to some of these aspects -- not as regards substance, because the problem of the peaceful uses of atomic energy is by no means the same as the problem of disarmament, but as regards the methods which we may have to employ for international co-operation.

A number of draft resolutions on the present item are before the First Committee. Paragraph 5 of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) recommends that all of these proposals should be referred to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

I have a responsibility to my Government to deal particularly with the proposals which we have placed before this Assembly in the past and which, as early as 1954, the Assembly graciously asked the Disarmament Commission to take into consideration. My Government has shown considerable interest in -- and, what is more, is deeply concerned about -- the results of radioactivity. We are concerned about the exclusion of large areas of the world from the discussion of these matters. We are situated in a continent which contains a very large country, with a considerable army and fighting strength, that is excluded from the confabulations of the United Nations. Now, my country -- placed as it is in the way I have described -- found it impossible to make itself heard in the Disarmament Commission for eighteen months: from 1954 to the middle of 1956.

After that, we presented our proposals to the Commission. The proposals were circulated to Member Governments, and a summary -- which I am afraid does not convey the purposes that we had in mind -- is also included in the report to the Assembly. I had the responsibility of presenting my Government's views to the Disarmament Commission.

It is necessary that the Assembly should know what happens when it adopts resolutions transmitting documents to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. Unless it is possible to exert one's influence by the back door --

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

and I have no particular objections to the back door, provided one can get in with one's ideas -- these appearances amount to nothing more than command performances.

I had the opportunity to go before the Disarmament Commission, and I must express my appreciation of the laudatory and flattering terms with which my delegation was received and the very kind statements which are made in the report. We are, however, dealing with a political problem. My Government had expected that the submissions on our side would not have been regarded as a memorial, but -- either at that meeting of the Disarmament Commission or at a later stage -- would have been discussed. Apart from the general thanks that were expressed, we are indebted to Mr. Jules Moch, the representative of France, for at least giving consideration to our submissions.

I should like, however, to say this: I did not speak from a written script when I addressed the Disarmament Commission. Hence, no one had any idea of what the Government of India was going to say. But the answer to my speech was circulated before I began to speak. Now, in politics, intelligent anticipation is regarded as a piece of wisdom -- provided it is anticipation and is intelligent. The reply made by Mr. Jules Moch -- and I hope he will not mind my referring to him by name; the other day I made a request and it was regarded as a command, which proves that there certainly must be something wrong with this translation system -- was in many respects highly complimentary to the submission we made, and in fact was in principle an acceptance of it. But we were told, if my memory serves me aright, that Mr. Moch was speaking on behalf of the entente -- that is, the United Kingdom and France.

What mainly concerns us, however -- and I shall refer to this later -- is the United Kingdom proposal in connexion with nuclear weapons tests; it is on this proposal that our opposition this afternoon will be concentrated.

In this connexion, I would say the following. When, through its Prime Minister, the Government of India first made the announcement of its policy to the Indian Parliament in 1954, it did not ask for the abandonment of nuclear weapons tests. We believe in placing matters in the context that things do change. My Government asked for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests. I shall not take the Committee

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through the entire development in this respect, but I would say this: When this suggestion was made, it was received not only with ridicule, but also with a great deal of political recrimination. We have now passed on to the stage when the discussion of the abandonment or suspension of nuclear weapons tests, of removing these matters from a state of anarchy, has become respectable. Indeed, it is so respectable that in one great country, I believe, there is some argument about who made the suggestion first.

The discussion of this question has begun to gather momentum outside the confines of this august body. Without any disrespect to anyone, I would say that it is good for all of us to realize that, while we have the votes and can submit draft resolutions without listening to the arguments -- and, indeed, can marshall votes before the draft resolutions are presented -- there are in the outside world millions of people whose fortunes are affected by the problems that we are considering. While, today, these people can make no impact upon our thinking, the time is rapidly coming when world public opinion will have to be listened to more than it is listened to at present with regard to the action we take. A recognition of this fact is reflected in the statement made by Mr. Lodge here. That statement reflected the necessary psychological or emotional approach towards the desire, the passion for a settlement. This is not to say that we agree with everything that Mr. Lodge said in his statement; he, himself, has said that these matters require examination.

My Prime Minister said only the other day that the President of the United States appeared to him to be dedicated to peaceful purposes. It is our business to see to it that President Eisenhower and others who have responsibilities in the conduct of the affairs of powerful countries are able to translate their dedication into objective terms capable of implementation.

We had hoped, when the disarmament Sub-Committee was first established, that the presence of our very close friends of Canada -- which, irrespective of NATO, maintains a degree of objectivity -- would perhaps provide either a bridge or a no man's land where non-sanguinary conflict could take place. That was indeed the position in the early days of the Sub-Committee's work. In Ottawa the other day,

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in the presence of the Foreign Minister, I said, on behalf of my Government, that our part of the world looked to Canada, this great new country, very sparsely populated but very powerful, to make a very great contribution in this matter, because it understood American opinion -- by which I mean the opinion of that continent which stretches from the North to the South Pole; in my geography, I read all of that as America -- because it had an Anglo-Saxon and Celtic ancestry; and because, being one of the countries of our Commonwealth which has no racial objections to Asian peoples, it would be able to understand the various points of view, even though it thought that the Government of China could not be the Government which represented 600 million people.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

We have been disappointed in the results so far, but not in the sense that we have given up hope in this direction. My Government desires me, in public, to place this responsibility of reconciliation squarely on the shoulders of the one country which, chosen from outside the Security Council, was introduced into the Disarmament Commission. I am quite aware that in making this observation I am laying myself open to what will follow in a few minutes, and which I can anticipate from the glare which the Foreign Secretary is directing in my direction.

Mr. Jules Moch's statement in the Committee, once we have taken out all the very kind and generous comments which, with characteristic French generosity, he bestowed on us, concentrates upon this particular problem which was incubated in a little island in the Atlantic and brought over here, and which killed the proposal for the suspension of nuclear tests. It is far better to face a position that is straightforward than to be faced with something that looks like something different. Mr. Anthony Nutting, then Minister of State in the United Kingdom, proposed to the Disarmament Commission that the suspension of tests was not possible because the explosions cannot be detected, and the evidence given for this was that some British scientists had said so. But I have been a student of British history for longer than I care to remember. What is more, I spent three years studying the British political thought of the 17th century, that is, the time when the bishops produced the philosophies for the discourse of the kings, Today, the scientists produce the philosophies.

We decline to accept the view -- and I shall produce sufficient scientific evidence -- that it is possible to explode these bombs secretly in somebody's posket. That was the burden of the argument which Mr. Jules Moch, with the passion which he brings into this question and with the great reputation he enjoys in this matter of disarmament, played to the full.

What were we told? He said that it was not possible to conceal a megaton bomb, but that one could conceal a kiloton bomb. I consider that to be an ex parte statement. Assuming that that was correct, then the further argument is that this kiloton bomb can trigger a hydrogen bomb and, therefore, any agreement about suspension which enabled the concealment of the explosion of a kiloton bomb really reduces the question of suspension to nothing.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Then, further, the French representative went on to say that the same argument extended to missiles. We thought, in our comparatively ill-developed knowledge of these matters, that missiles could be detected by modern apparatus, but what have we been told? We were told, in all sincerity, that it is possible to detect a missile up to 6,000 metres in the stratosphere, but not beyond, and that, therefore, detection is defective. But I have never been able to understand how a missile could get beyond 6,000 metres without going through the first 6,000 metres. If a missile can be detected in the first 6,000 metres, I do not see why detection becomes impossible. I draw upon this because my Government has the most positive and rational reason for what we regard as sound objections to the proposal which has now been put forward as a substitute for the suspension of tests, and I want to substantiate this by political, scientific, moral and practical reasons.

To regulate tests and to say that you can kill so much, you can pollute so much and not so much more, is to license evil. My Government regards all these weapons of mass destruction as undiluted evil. Therefore, as has been said repeatedly by this Assembly in our various resolutions -- I believe there are some references to this, and since I was one of the sponsors I ought to know -- our aim is the prohibition of these weapons. If they were good, we would not prohibit them. That is why they brought back things after prohibition, because they thought they were good. Therefore, if the thing is evil in itself, and, what is more, cannot by its very nature be restrained to the small limits proposed by limitation, then the limitation makes moral, makes legal, makes acceptable, and gives the cachet of the United Nations to, something that we should get rid of.

I will not give analogies in this public body, but it appears to me that this would be the licensing of something which we think is inherently bad. Therefore, it is necessary for those who want to see the end of this race towards atomic destruction to concentrate upon obtaining the total suspension of these explosions. I hope that no one will direct the charge against us -- I say that I hope, but probably it will happen -- that we are asking, like impractical people, for all or for nothing. That is not the position.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

We admit that the explosion of five bombs in the air spreads less radioactivity than the explosion of fifty, but we are not able to admit that the explosion of five bombs in the air, over what has been exploded already, is not adequate to bring about all the evils that arise from ionizing radiation.

Secondly, and this is a worse difficulty, the whole of the disarmament discussion has been developed by the argument about which comes first, the act of throwing away the arms or the establishment of the machinery for discovering whether or not they have been thrown away. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Security Council and, therefore of the Disarmament Commission, and as one of the elder statesmen of the United Nations, you will appreciate that this has been our common stock-in-trade. One party would say that they would give something up, and another party would ask how they would know that it had been given up. The next year they would turn round the other way, so that this conflict between inspection and control, between verification and discovery, on the one hand, and the actual process of disarmament, on the other, has gone on.

Therefore, what I say I say in all seriousness. I do not suppose that at this moment it is possible to persuade the members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, but, as I said in another place yesterday, the purposes of speaking in a body of this kind are twofold. One is in the lingering hope of persuasion; the other is in order to register ones voice so that at some future time, either in our lives or in those of posterity, it may be of some value.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

I should like to be enlightened, particularly by my colleagues from Canada, Norway and Japan, as to whether the proposals that they make, as they are now printed, are less objectionable on the surface of it than how it was canvassed, how regulation and limitation is to be achieved without the establishment of inspection and control beforehand. If you can get the machinery of inspection and control beforehand and if that is generally accepted by everybody, then we have gone through the whole problem of disarmament and the remainder is only minutiae, is only a technical detail. My submission is this: once this problem is put in this way of regulation and limitation -- and let us not forget that these are the very words we are using in regard to the major problem -- then we are up against it altogether. I do not for one moment suggest that that is the purpose of this proposal. Other people may think so but my mind does not go so far. Therefore, from a practical point of view this runs contrary to the other proposal. The other proposal is put forward as something that is easily possible without danger to the two contending parties which are now in possession of these weapons of mass destruction, and unless it can be conclusively proved -- by this I do not mean a body of scientists who are attached to particular Governments but by liberal scientific opinion; for example, here where opinion is free to be expressed -- that any large scale deviations from this are possible -- not that some **miniature** bomb for some experimental laboratory purposes cannot be made; it may be possible, but I do not know as I am not a scientist -- then it means that we have to accept this position.

I now want, therefore, to turn from the impossibility of establishing it and why this apparently mild form of format is not a question of difference in quantity. It is not a question of how many more bombs or how many less bombs there are. You are dealing with an entirely different proposition and inviting the whole of the controversy in regard to disarmament. and thereby knocking the bomb out of the idea of "Let us do what is immediately possible in order that the stricken world might believe that each year we study the question we are not talking about the new weapons discovered last year, but about some little step that has been taken in this direction."

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

My Government set out a large number of reasons why this should be done. The main reason that we put forward last year, apart from the political aspect of disarmament, was the humanitarian one -- that is to say, the effects of this radiation are such that if there are any more explosions than are being held at present, then it would be to the injury of humanity not as at present living but for suceeding generations. And the only answer that came forward in that meeting of any weighty character was a Blue Book issued by Her Majesty's Stationery Office which contained the conclusions of the Council of Scientific Research.

These reports of scientists on politically controversial questions are judgements of the supreme courts in various countries. They never deal with the main issues but the same might be said on either side. Therefore, despite that, in view of the regard that we have for British scientists and the sponsorship of this report, which I myself quoted in the first instance, received from the United Kingdom representative, I should like to read just one sentence out of it. I am not going to read long extracts because of the fact that the Chairman wishes to close this debate today. This report says that those who are responsible for the conduct of affairs have to think very far and very deep before they commit themselves to the consequences unknown and ungovernable -- that is to say, this is something which is on the side of those people who want to continue explosions -- I don't mean it is partisan, but in their opinion they say that the consequences are unknown and ungovernable. If that alone stood, we would have to ask ourselves whether the Governments of 1957 have the right to release forces whose consequences are unknown and ungovernable. In view of all received knowledge of consequences on posterity if these forces should be so released, I therefore submit that whatever weight there might be in that report is removed by that one clause: the realms of the unknown. But as against that, we have the authority of the distinguished United States scientists whom I quote not from odd statements but from serious submissions made to the Operational Sub-Committee of the United States Congress. Dr. Lapp told the Committee on 20 June 1956 -- and there is no reason to think that radioactivity has become less potent since then -- that a progressive increase in such tests -- and this is one of the factors that we have to bear in mind -- will release enough dangerous radiation by 1962 to give everyone in the world the maximum possible amount. If that is not conclusive, I do not know what is.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

That position is supported by the British report which says that damage to genetic materials, which is what affects succeeding generations, is cumulative and irreparable. Cumulative means that once the harm is done a process of chain reaction is released. I pointed out at that time the results of the explosions that had already taken place, and Mr. Moch assisted me very much by the further explanations he made. But after both of the statements that I have made and his explanations, the position remains unaltered, that the explosions that were detonated in 1954 are still contaminating the waters of the ocean.

Here is what the United States National Academy of Sciences says: thirteen months after the hydrogen bomb tests in Bikini in 1954, the contaminated water mass of the Pacific Ocean, as the scene of the explosion, has spread over one million square miles. It is quite true that at the time of the explosion the radioactivity was a million times greater than normal. But has the natural radiation slowed down? Four months later it became three times the natural radiation and spread about 1,500 miles from the test area. But what is important is to notice that the artificial activity has been reduced to about one-fifth of the natural activity. Still it is one-fifth of the natural activity, and if there are five such explosions the natural activity will be doubled. If you want to see the consequences of that, we have to go to the later evidence which shows what is the maximum that is possible.

The representative of the United Kingdom, the Ambassador to the United Nations, has told us time and again in this Assembly that this radioactivity -- ionizing radiation -- is nothing new, that it is in the air, in the food you eat, that you are subjected to it when you take X-rays and things of that character. Well, the answer is that every time we breathe we take in an instalment of carbon dioxide. But that is no justification for having to breath in a chamber full of carbon dioxide. It is a very poor argument.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Each of us, I am told, carries many pounds of atmospheric weight on his shoulders, but if another hundred pounds were put on, it would not be so convenient. Therefore it is not sufficient to say that we are already exposed to radioactivity. The concern of my Government, advised by its scientists, is mainly in regard to the distribution -- I suppose this is a very polite word -- and I would like to hear the representative of Canada on this question, because he is an expert on this matter regarding the distribution of strontium-90. I think the world ought to know, because the public only hear about explosions, mushrooms and so on.

Now this particular infection of our planet -- not of the air but of the planet -- was made possible only after an atomic explosion. There was no radioactive strontium danger in the world at all before the atomic explosion. And a member of the American Congress has said that the unique nature of the hazard is indicated by the fact that one ounce of radio strontium, or about a teaspoonful, contains the equivalent of the maximum permissible amount for every person on this earth. The number of atoms in an ounce of material is so astronomical, even when divided by the population of the earth, that it amounts to 70 trillion per person. Many pounds of radio strontium, not ounces -- and this is the important part -- are produced in a super-bomb explosion.

Then we hear from another scientist, one of those men who is responsible for looking after those who are affected by the consequences of atomic war, a military surgeon -- and I think it is greatly to the credit of our age, and particularly to a country where there is freedom of expression of opinion, that these men who still hold office in the Government come and speak out -- and this is what Colonel Victor Burns of the American Army says to the Association of Military Surgeons. He was not addressing a mothers' meeting, he was speaking to other technicians and scientists.

He said that an atom bomb produces coagulation of the tissues and the mechanical destruction of the colloid in the retina by converting the tissue fluids into steam and thereby exploding the retina. This is the prospect of atomic explosions.

I will quote another member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission who said that one of the nuclear products released by nuclear explosions is a substance that is called radioactive strontium and unlike ordinary strontium this strontium gives out beta radiation. This is one of the three kinds of radiation

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emitted by radium. Prior to the atomic age there was no radioactive strontium in the atmosphere of the earth.

There is here enough evidence to show that the continuation of these experimental explosions -- I want to be quite frank and fair about this : we are referring to the kind of things that have been happening in the Soviet Union and have been sponsored by the United States of America, the two great Powers capable of doing this -- have made the air polluted with radioactive substances.

I came late in the debate and therefore I must confine myself in these observations to the minimum necessary for proving my case, which is in the draft resolution; and I make an appeal to Mr. Moch to take this other view into account, that this limitation of explosion is going to give this evil a longer span of life; it is going to give it the kind of moral backing of this Organization, which it should never have.

It is necessary for me, as far as I can, to controvert the view that is held -- a view for which I have very great respect -- because my Government believes that the whole of the disarmament problem is affected by fear and suspicion of each other and therefore if there is this fear of non-detection, then it may be impossible for one party or the other to subscribe to it. And that is what my friend Mr. Lodge refers to in the second of the principles which he regards as necessary to provide against any surprise attack and thus reduce the danger of a major war. That is the language of the spokesman of a powerful country; to a weakling like myself what is important is to rid the world of the fear of being struck down, and that is the way I look at it.

But here is the Chairman of the atomic scientists of Chicago, with his collaborator who is the chairman of the Disarmament Committee of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago telling us that no country today can explode a sizable nuclear weapon -- this only applies to hydrogen weapons -- without the knowledge of the outside world. The resulting earth shock and airborne radioactivity testify unambiguously to a nuclear explosion. The test of any weapon too small to be detected would be of comparatively minor military interest. That is one of the points on which Mr. Jules Moch reflected, that small tests may be necessary for some other purpose, and may I deal with that point here?

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

My Government recognizes the march of science in these things and as I said before it was on the initiative taken two years ago in the General Assembly by the President of the United States of America that we have now moved forward to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency and any kind of experiments of that kind would legitimately and properly come under that body. Therefore any question of these small explosions which are of no military value would not arise. But speaking of small explosions I want to refer back to Mr. Jules Moch's kilotons. He says that these smaller explosions should be permitted. I say that if you look at these coral islands of the sea and realize that this huge land mass as it is now, probably weighing millions and millions of tons, has all been made by the small contributions of little insects, then one realizes that the small kilotons, if there are enough of them, can destroy the world. It depends upon how many there are.

The maintenance of the moratorium in tests, that is what we ask for -- we do not ask for their abolition because that could only come with the prohibition of tests -- and we stand in the same position as the representative of Sweden: suspend them now that you know enough for your own purposes.

The maintenance of a moratorium in tests will be guaranteed not by reliance on any nation's word -- and I agree in this with my colleague Mr. Lodge because he has, very rightly from his point of view, very often asked, in the years that I have known him here: how can we rely on this? And suppose everybody else says this, perhaps not as frankly as he does? The maintenance of the moratorium in tests will be guaranteed not by reliance on any nation's word but by the objective impossibility of reaching agreement in secret.

What could be more forcibly stated by a body of scientists? And then this Bulletin which is a learned journal consulted by Governments and authorities, goes on to deal with this point which I mentioned a while ago by saying that the testing of thermonuclear weapons is one part of the armaments race which could be effectively controlled without resorting to national inspection.

From the point of view of my Government, in view of the state of the world -- unhappy as it is -- we have to do what is possible, not as a substitute for what is necessary but as the beginning of what is necessary. In this stricken world,

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any little step that is taken such as the announcement of the United States on the one hand and of the Soviet Union and the British Government on the other that they were going to reduce their forces by a certain number -- and I will come to that in a moment -- stimulates public opinion and arouses hopes.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The statement goes on:

"Explosions can be detected by long-range monitoring methods without resort to roving international inspectors."

I therefore submit that any violation of the agreement would be instantly known to the world.

I have here a rather longer extract which, in view of the time it would take, I do not propose to read, but I would ask that it be included in the record. It is a recent statement of the whole case in regard to missiles, explosive weapons and all other matters in connexion with this. I will not take the Committee's time to read it if the Chairman will permit the document to be included in the record.

(Following is the text of the document)

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

I should now like to read out some excerpts from an article dealing with this problem and appearing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a review published in the United States:

"It is by now generally known that testing of thermonuclear weapons cannot be concealed from the world; its cessation therefore will not need verification by international inspection, which has been the bone of contention between West and East ever since United Nations negotiations concerning the control of atomic energy began in 1945. The testing of inter-continental missiles is not equally easily detected from outside the testing country -- if the latter has at its disposal the land masses of Siberia, or the wide reaches of the Pacific. However, a relatively small number of extra-territorial, internationally manned radar stations within each large country would probably suffice to make the concealment of such tests impossible. It can be suggested, therefore, that foolproof control of the perfection of IBMs, as such, as well as that of nuclear warheads, is technically feasible without excessive interference with national sovereignties. The possibility of freezing the arms race, in the way suggested ...; thus depends only on whether the United States and the Soviet Union want this to happen, and not on technical difficulties which stand in the way of an agreed and controlled elimination of existing weapons ....

"... Furthermore, they argue, only such a freeze can prevent nations not now in the van of the arms race from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The acquisition of atomic weapons by smaller powers is bound to create a multilateral danger, less predictable and less controllable than the present danger of the outbreak of atomic war by one of the two armed camps ...

"... He believes that the suggested attempt to stop the race will have to be made within the next few months -- otherwise, it will be too late, technological progress having put the mastery of the ultimate terror weapons irrevocably in the hands of man.

"/This/ is not a proposal to shift the blame for the arms race to the other side. It is deeply serious. Their belief that we are now offered literally the last opportunity to avoid an irrevocable deadlock of mutual

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terror is a sober estimate of reality, and not an exaggeration to whip up support for a pet disarmament plan. It is, in fact, now or never." (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. XII, No. 6, June 1956, pages 186 and 187)

I also want to quote from the statement of another scientist in the same publication, as follows:

"A world-wide nuclear test ban agreement is the simplest possible step of guaranteed arms limitation and would prevent the rise of other nuclear powers, or at least minimize their potential effectiveness. It is the simplest step because it requires only a minimum deviation from conventional diplomatic and military attitudes, upon which our present partial security is based. It leaves us with our present nuclear weapons and the freedom to build more of them to keep the stalemate effective. It merely interferes with the rate of development of new weapons, treating the great Powers equally so that neither can gain a decisive advantage. The step is simple also because it does not require the admission of inspectors with free access throughout the various countries.

"The step is guaranteed against significant evasion because nuclear tests can be detected from afar. It is necessary to consider, at greater length than we shall here, the possibilities of special evasions, the limits of small air bursts that might not be detected by monitoring atmospheric radioactivity, the dependability of seismological detection of deep underground tests, and so forth. It seems very likely that a complete study would show that technically possible evasion would be of a minor nature and would not upset the stalemate. If it should, nevertheless, be deemed necessary, special provisions could be made to cover this difficulty which would only slightly complicate the otherwise simple scheme, such admission of inspectors to seismic observatories at a few agreed spots in large countries." (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1956, page 197)

Now, the latter part is in regard to detection of explosions.

(Mr. Krishna Menon continued)

The draft resolution that stands in the name of Canada, Japan and Norway, while it is a better version than we had feared, asks for registration. How do we check on registration without any machinery of inspection and control? Then the whole thing comes up. My Government is not against inspection. We subscribe to, and I believe we initiated, the proposals at Bandung -- along with our friends from Indonesia -- for disarmament under proper international inspection and control, proposals which were unanimously accepted by the countries represented there. Each year, we have come forward and supported resolutions calling for inspection. All that we have tried to do is to prevent this thing from becoming a see-saw arrangement and getting caught in a vicious circle. This, then, is one of the things that can be done immediately.

Before I leave this, I want to give to the Committee such knowledge as we have derived, second-hand, through scientists, as to what is the maximum of radio-strontium that this world can take. Here is a statement made before the International Congress of Radiology:

"We estimate that the total injection of Strontium-90, through 1956, is 40 megatons, or 15 per cent of our stratospheric limit."

That is to say, the injection is already 15 per cent of the stratospheric limit.

The statement then goes on:

"This statement takes into account the Soviet tests of 1955 and 1956 and the United States Redwing series."

That is, it takes into account what they have been able to check.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

That is our position in regard to these explosions.

We are in entire agreement with what was said by the representative of France after our statement in the Disarmament Commission: that the prohibition of weapons is closely related to the suspension of tests. In fact, there would be no meaning in suspending these tests unless there were prohibition of weapons.

We therefore say that there are at least six reasons why the suspension of these tests would be beneficial, is called for, and indeed is imperative.

The first is the one I have referred to all along: the effects of ionizing radiation. If the majority of peoples in the world who vote for governments were conscious of these matters, I think we should probably get this stopped sooner than we think.

The next reason is that a step in this direction, as the representative of the United States has said in another context, would be a contribution toward reversing this process of competitive armaments. It could also contribute, to a very considerable extent, to the relaxation of tension and the creation of confidence in large areas of the world that are not directly concerned in the armaments race.

There are various other reasons, which are all part of the documents that have been circulated to Member States in the statement made before.

I now leave this problem of the proposals made by Canada, Japan and Norway. My Government deeply regrets the support of Japan for this proposition. But they have been the worst victims, and one can understand that a person who suffers in that way would say that anything that limits is perhaps better than nothing at all -- if we do not take the other things into consideration.

There is another aspect of this draft resolution which worries us. It speaks of "a strong desire among people of all nations that steps be taken to provide safeguards against radioactive contamination of man and his surroundings by increased atomic activity". In so far as this relates to atomic refuse in industrial development, in so far as it may relate to the consequences of any accidents of future atom-propelled planes in the air, or anything of that kind, we completely support that position. As a measure of civil defence in many countries, we support that. But if this preamble means that what the people

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really want is a nice kind of encirclement by radioactivity -- in other words, the lambs being led to slaughter are to be properly garlanded beforehand -- if that is the purpose of this paragraph, then I am afraid we cannot go that far. But we recognize and support the concern that is felt among all mankind.

Our monitoring stations today record very considerable information which is of a disquieting kind, arising from the explosions in different parts of the world. Even this week, we heard about the explosions in the Soviet Union. It does not make any difference to us where they take place; what we are concerned about is ionizing radiation and its effect on mankind.

I now want to refer to the point I made in my opening observations: that, each time we come here, there is something new. My Government wishes me to express its deep concern that proposals are going around the world for the distribution of atomic weapons of a junior character as part of the conventional equipment of the armies of the world. There are the great countries of Eastern Europe, which are tied together in the Warsaw Pact and which presumably can be supplied with these weapons by the Soviet Union. The other side which is capable of producing these weapons also has very considerable alliances, very much larger and certainly more spread out, and where the relations are very much better known -- and we cannot see a country like the United Kingdom or the United States, where parliamentary opinion will express itself, being able to say to one of its military allies that it cannot have the best of weapons.

We have now moved on to a stage which is far, far removed from 1946. We are not dealing with the possible stockpiling of atom bombs; we are now dealing with a situation in which, if these fears ever become a reality, the prospect of ionizing radiation opens itself out even in the case of the small fracas that might take place anywhere. If this had now been the practice, we might have been confronted with it in some recent incidents. After all, let us not forget that Mussolini sprayed mustard-gas over the Abyssinians. Therefore, who is to say that, in any operation of what a country regards as its domestic business, these weapons would not be used? It is quite true that these countries would take care that the quantity was small and they would console themselves -- that is all we can say, and we do not say it in any disrespectful sense -- with the motives which affect them.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

That is why we subscribe to the view these questions cannot be totally isolated; indeed, they cannot be solved with isolation from the political questions and the distribution of political and military power in the world. That is why we are moving into a situation where unless we take vast steps, and very material steps, in the way of disarmament, we shall be faced with a position where any step at all will be impossible.

Although I have them all here, I do not propose to go into the other detailed proposals that have been made. I want to refer to the advances, and considerable advances have been made. There are common spheres of agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on various matters, especially in the way of preliminary disarmament. Whether it be for reasons of disarmament or otherwise -- but if the newspaper reports are true, the United Kingdom also intends to reduce some of its forces. But it is very difficult for us to speak to our people about 2.5 million troops, as a small army, whether it be the Russian Army or the American Army. It is very difficult for us to understand why the United Kingdom -- which is only one-fourteenth of the size of my country and has the benefit of the isolation by the sea, and has a very law-abiding population and innumerable friends in the world -- should have an army of 700,000, unless it is deployed for colonial purposes.

I think the same example might be spread to others also, who are perhaps even more sensitive on this matter than our colleagues of the United Kingdom. They are accustomed to us and we are accustomed to them.

My delegation disagrees with the position put forward by the representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government when he says that the proposal made originally by President Eisenhower, but responded to in a limited form by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, is an unsuitable suggestion. This, in our opinion, is a considerable advance, because when we met last year -- and I believe the year before, and ever since the Geneva Conference -- one of the gulfs that divided these two sides -- and so far as we are concerned, whoever has these differences we assume they are honest differences -- was this question of aerial inspection. The United States has done very considerable educative propaganda in this direction. We ourselves have seen what they regard as the possible results of this.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Sometime last year the proposal was made for trying this out or making a beginning in a limited area. I say at once, on behalf of my Government, that the actual limitation of the area, the extent of the area, is a matter for discussion. People are always willing for other people's countries to be inspected, but unless we are willing to have our own countries inspected, it does not carry conviction.

But now we are dealing with a principle. My friend Commander Noble, in his statement -- which I do not propose to quote, it is all in the text -- objected to this apparently on principle. I would like to know sometime whether the British Government has changed its mind on this question, because at Geneva, Sir Anthony Eden -- who on many occasions through his long and distinguished career has made notable contributions by very practical and definite suggestions, and resolved tangles -- made this suggestion:

> "I suggest that we should consider whether we cannot set up a simple joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe. It should not be impossible to decide that over a specified area" -- I repeat, "that over a specified area" -- "to be agreed between us, extending perhaps for a fixed depth or either side of the line which now divides East and West Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by the military commands on both sides".

I submit that for the first time one of the partners of these summit meetings put forward a definite suggestion to have what may be called "a pilot experiment" in international inspection. The Assembly will appreciate that last year the Minister of State who preceded my friend who is present here, made a great point, and he insisted on including this in one of the proposals to be considered by the Disarmament Commission. He wanted this idea of random samples, so to say, to be a serious proposition. Now, thanks to the insistence on the one hand of the United States for this kind of inspection, the general education of world public opinion and the responses of the Soviet Government -- limited as it be from the United States point of view -- for the first time this particular difficulty in point of principle seems to be gotten over. And it is applied in the context of a suggestion made by another participant of the Geneva Conference.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Therefore, my Government desires to place on record the fact that when the Disarmament Commission takes this into account, it should consider the contribution made by the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom -- ingenious as it was thought at that time -- in the way of this sample inspection, of making a beginning in the way of international control, which he said at that time, and which his representative said here, would help to provide the experience, the machinery, to warn us of the pitfalls and to discover how far the nations would co-operate in the way of looking at each other.

Therefore, I submit that unless there has been a serious change in this matter, there must be some error in this, and I hope it will be possible for my distinguished colleague to withdraw his objections to this particular matter in the way it is going before the Disarmament Commission.

My Government is deeply concerned about greater speed going into the work of the Disarmament Commission. It is difficult to explain in Parliament that the Disarmament Commission meets at odd intervals and that it says to the General Assembly, in no uncertain terms, that all it did was to receive the reports and send it over here -- which does not correspond to the importance of the proposition before it.

Therefore, among the proposals that we made at that time was more frequent meetings of the Disarmament Commission and, by whatever the formal method was, its capacity, its right and its amenability -- and the last is not the least important in view of the observation made by the representative of France this morning -- of including in it those others who have propositions to make. That is the practice of the Security Council.

We have ourselves put forward no resolution. We suggested this in 1954 in the resolution that was referred to the Disarmament Commission. The Government of India repeated this submission before the Disarmament Commission. As the Committee know, the representative of the Government of India was never questioned, was never examined; there were no debates on this matter. We were treated to the extreme courtesy of a reply from the representative of France, who spoke for his colleague from the Government of the United Kingdom. And there it was.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Therefore, it is for all these reasons that my Government has been happy to join with others as regards the draft resolution that is now befcre the Committee. We approve the initiative taken in this matter, the part that has been played by the members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, and particularly that those who are regarded as at the two ends of the pole, the United States and the Soviet Union, have joined in this.

But it should not be forgotten that this is a procedural motion. It depends entirely upon the Disarmament Sub-Committee in the first instance, and the Commission, and I suppose the enlightened public opinion of the world, to see to it that this does not become a cold storage resolution.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

From the tempo of the speech of the representative of the United States and the response in the latter part of Mr. Kuznetsov's speech, it is quite obvious to us that both these countries, which, between them, have the survival of the world in their decision, are anxious at this time to make progress on things that are possible. Therefore, my delegation very gladly joins in this initiative, excluding from the draft resolution any matters on which we are divided.

I have spoken at length on the opposition to the limitation of tests, but my Government does not object -- indeed cannot object -- to its full consideration by the Disarmament Commission. I am not at all sure that we did not suggest its inclusion ourselves, but, at any rate, whatever proposals there are of a serious character and which are not vexatious or put forward irresponsibly -- as no one would -- should go to the Disarmament Commission. But, at the same time, if the Committee, as a result of that, becomes a kind of general receptacle and just turns it around in the hope that some pattern will be presented, then I do not think that, so far as we are concerned, we would be doing justice to the intent and the purpose of the draft resolution.

We should like to express our appreciation of the five principal power-countries which have the responsibility in these matters for allowing this initiative to gather momentum. In fact, it was the brief given to my delegation by our Government that, in view of the cold-war situation, in view of the consequences of the developments in the Middle East and Hungary, and the atmosphere generated in the General Assembly, any attempt at a positive solution of any problem at this time would probably have the reverse effect and, therefore, if agreement could be obtained to confer, that would be a great advance.

It is in that spirit that we have joined with others in this draft resolution. We are happy and grateful, as a country outside the realm of the powerful, to have been permitted to assist in this process, but, whether we had sponsored this draft resolution or not, whether the Disarmament Commission seeks to implement the desires of a considerable section of the United Nations in the submission that we have made in regard to its own composition, our Government, through all possible channels, including those of the countries which are near and very close to us politically or geographically, would try to convey such ideas or contributions as it could make towards this problem.

Mr. SAWADA (Japan): We have before us a twelve-Power draft resolution which is of a procedural nature. For two weeks past we have heard here representatives emphasizing the importance, the difficulties and the need of disarmament, and elaborating on various proposals on the reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and nuclear weapons. We all agree that it is an impossible proposition to work out in this Committee a detailed programme of the general scheme of disarmament. It is therefore appropriate that the General Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee at an early date to give prompt attention to all the proposals which have emerged from the discussions up to the present time, with a view to finding a basis of agreement. I trust that the joint draft resolution will be upheld unanimously by this Committee.

I shall now comment very briefly on the draft resolution in relation to the tripartite proposal of Canada, Norway and Japan on nuclear tests. I do not intend to reiterate what we believe to be the merits of the proposal. My delegation is pleased and grateful for the warm support extended to the tripartite proposal by many representatives. Our proposal is a substantive one, moderate and reasonable enough to be accepted by all the States concerned. If adopted by the General Assembly, it will be the first concrete step towards eventual agreement on general disarmament and the first sign of encouragement for those of us who live in fear of radioactivity and nuclear warfare. My delegation is encouraged to find overwhelming support for the tripartite draft resolution, which testifies to its wisdom and merits and which is, we consider, tantamount to its acceptance by the General Assembly.

The delegation of Japan has carefully weighed the prevailing situation in this Committee. With a view to ascertaining the course of action which would best serve the objective of the tripartite draft resolution, and desirous of facilitating subsequent discussions in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, we have finally decided in favour of the twelve-Power draft resolution. In these circumstances, I wish to have it recorded that it is the strong desire of the Government of Japan that the problem of advance registration of all nuclear test explosions and the study of the actual and expected radiation situation of the world should be given urgent and immediate attention by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. We are entitled, I submit, to expect a concrete and useful report from them at an early date.

(Mr. Sawada, Japan)

Accordingly, my delegation will vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution which it has the honour to co-sponsor.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): The pending draft resolution is co-sponsored by twelve nations of diverse points of view. All of the members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission are among the co-sponsors. It is a product of the conciliation and spirit of compromise which, we hope, will accompany our future efforts. It is deliberately non-controversial. It refers a number of past and more recent proposals to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for study. We believe that these bodies, expressly created for this purpose, are the best place to continue the detailed and technical discussions which are necessary.

We believe that a unanimous adoption of the draft resolution which we have co-sponsored will help to set the stage for successful negotiations. We believe also that, in the negotiations to come, there is no substitute for hard work, for mutual goodwill, and for patience. The unfortunate fact that ten years of discussion have not produced an agreement must not deter us. We must continue to seek new ways to reach an agreement.

We believe that progress has been made in the past years; even though the progress has not been as much as we would like, we welcome it such as it is.

We think that the proposals which the United States presented to this Committee on 14 January can serve as a sound basis for progress. The United States will continue its search for even modest steps which can be agreed on and which will help us to reverse the trend towards greater and greater stockpiles of armaments. We hope, by this search, to make plain to the world our perservance and our realism.

(Mr. Lodge, United States)

I should like to comment briefly on four proposals which have been made during the course of this debate. Two proposals are on the question of nuclear testing. The two resolutions before us, in documents A/C.1/L.160 and A/C.1/L.162, will be referred to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for consideration.

Let me explain again the position of the United States on the issues involved in these proposals.

The Soviet resolution (A/C.1/L.160) calls for the immediate and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons testing. Our position on this general matter has been put forward clearly in this Committee. In short, the United States favours the limitation and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons testing as a part of a safeguarded system of disarmament. We oppose any prohibition of weapons testing that does not at the same time strike at the heart of the problem, that is, the continued production of nuclear weapons themselves.

The United States is prepared to give its full endorsement to the proposal put forth by Canada, Japan and Norway in document A/C.1/L.162, which is also being referred to the Disarmament Commission for consideration. Although this proposal is only a preliminary step, we find it to be both realistic and constructive. We shall give this suggestion our support in the Sub-Committee and we hope that it will be put into effect at an early date. The United States is ready to participate in any registration system agreed upon among the States concerned.

The contribution of Japan in this field makes it particularly painful for us to learn that a dispatch brings the news of the death today of former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu of Japan. Only a few weeks ago he was here among us as Foreign Minister to be present as Japan entered the United Nations. It was dramatic and very moving for us who remembered his dignified and significant part in the ending of hostilities almost twelve years ago to see him standing outside the delegates' entrance, raising his hand as his country's flag was hoisted at the United Nations. Let me express to my friend, Ambassador Sawada, our personal expressions of sympathy to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu's family and the official condolences of the United States on the passing of a patriot and a statesman.

(Mr. Lodge, United States)

The next matter, raised by several delegations relates to a special session of the General Assembly to consider the question of disarmament. In this connexion, we can look with profit upon the experience we gained as a result of the successful negotiations leading to the adoption of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. When agreement among a number of the principal nations involved in the field of the peaceful use of atomic energy was achieved, a general conference of States proved to be both proper and highly useful. The United States has long held that, after agreement among the major armed Powers was achieved, the subject of disarmament should be considered by a general conference with wide international participation. We think that it would be premature to decide upon the convening of such a conference or a special session of the General Assembly now.

The progress that has been made so far in disarmament unfortunately does not justify doing so. But we are willing to have the Disarmament Commission consider the advisability of recommending the convening of either a special session of the General Assembly or a general disarmament conference at an appropriate time. Our present conviction is that such a conference would serve no purpose now; it might, indeed, simply increase the difficulties we face. The convening of such a conference should await the time when a large measure of agreement among those States whose participation is essential to any effective disarmament agreement is achieved.

Finally, there is the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. Document A/C.1/L.164 deals with this question. We believe that any changes in the membership of the Disarmament Commission should correspond to and be conditional upon changes resulting from the proposed enlargement of the Security Council.

Please note that the participation of other States in the consideration of disarmament is assured in two ways: first, in the debates of the General Assembly and, second, in the Disarmament Commission, which often hears representatives of States which are not Commission members.

(Mr. Lodge, United States)

With regard to the proposal for enlargement of the Sub-Committee, we believe that this would be an unfortunate departure from the sound principle that agreement in the first instance must be achieved among the major armed Powers. We are convinced that efforts to achieve initial agreement in the larger group would only complicate the problem and make negotiations more difficult.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before calling on the next speaker, I must convey to the Committee the news of the death of the former Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Shigemitsu, as you have just heard from Mr. Lodge. You all saw him in the dramatic moment when Japan was unanimously admitted to membership in the United Nations. Mr. Shigemitsu left the most dramatic feelings with all the representatives in the Assembly, and we wish to express our sympathy to the representative of Japan at the death of such a great statesman. I beg him to convey our condolences to the Government of Japan and to the family of the late Mr. Shigemitsu, and I assure him that we share with him these moments of sadness of his country.

Mr. SAWADA (Japan): Mr. Shigemitsu was a strong champion of freedom and of the independence of all nations and he was a true friend of the free world. Now we have this very sad news of his passing. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the tribute you have paid him and I thank the representative of the United States especially for his sincere tribute. I shall not fail to convey to his bereaved wife and family the sincere sense of condolence of the whole Committee as expressed by you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): First of all, may I associate myself, my delegation and my Government with the expressions of sympathy and condolence that have already been expressed by representatives and by yourself, Mr. Chairman, on the death of the former Foreign Minister of Japan.

The original authors of this draft resolution have made a great effort to meet the different views expressed around this table, and I hope that the draft resolution will receive unanimous support in the Committee. That would be a good omen for the discussions in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee during 1957. It is, of course, in these bodies, and especially in the small private discussions of the Sub-Committee, that there is the most chance of resolving the difficulties that still prevent the conclusion of a disarmament agreement.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

Whilst my delegation will welcome a unanimous decision by this Committee today, it would be unrealistic to suggest that agreement on this largely procedural draft resolution means that all the outstanding problems are solved. Mr. Moch, in his brilliant discourse this morning, explained lucidly the different problems that remain to be solved. In my opening statement I also mentioned some of them, such as nuclear control, aerial inspection and the rights of the control organization.

Unfortunately, these problems have not been cleared up in the discussion in this Committee. I only hope that they will be cleared up in the forthcoming meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, because, of course, without agreement on them, no disarmament pact can be signed.

My Government hopes that this year the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee will move beyond abstract discussion of rival plans and will begin to concentrate on specific problems. We believe that this offers the best hope of making real progress. For example, my Government feels that the Sub-Committee should give detailed attention to the problem of reductions in armaments.

I believe that in relation to some of the most modern weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, we have an opportunity to act while they are still only in the development stage, an opportunity which may never recur.

Reductions in military manpower without reductions in armaments provide no real security, and Mr. Moch emphasized this point this morning. Furthermore, in our view progress in reduction of the nuclear threat must be related to progress in conventional disarmament. My Government will be ready to offer certain specific suggestions in the Sub-Committee on the way in which reductions in armaments can be related to reductions in military manpower.

Secondly, we suggest that the Sub-Committee should pay detailed attention to the unresolved questions of control. In particular, we believe that the Sub-Committee should explore further than it has been possible to do in this Committee the idea of conducting practical experiments in both ground and air control in mutually agreed areas of the world.

I can assure Mr. Menon that my Government's desire to experiment in the techniques of control has not dwindled in any way, providing of course that these experiments are carried out in areas where all the parties concerned have given their consent. The Israeli representative made an interesting suggestion in this connexion today.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

I must say to my Soviet colleague, however, that we have no intention of proposing control without disarmament. We only want to speed up a solution of the unresolved questions of control so that world-wide disarmament can become a fact more quickly.

Thirdly, we consider that the Sub-Committee should give urgent attention to the question of nuclear test explosions. My delegation is well aware of the widespread concern felt about this subject. We appreciate the anxiety in Japan, and we have listened with interest to the statements made by the Japanese representative in this Committee, which we shall certainly take into consideration.

We are ready to support the draft resolution introduced by the delegations of Norway, Japan and Canada suggesting an agreement on the registration of all nuclear test explosions. We regard this as only a first step. The next logical step would be limitation, and this in turn should lead to the cessation of all tests.

It is not correct to suggest, as Mr. Menon did this afternoon, that my Government advocated the substitution of cessation or suspension of tests by limitation of tests. We have already indicated in the Anglo-French plan, as Mr. Menon well knows, how such tests might be first limited and eventually prohibited as part of a disarmament plan.

My Government, in addition, has indicated, and my Prime Minister repeated in the House of Commons on 22 January, that we are also ready to consider separately from any disarmament agreement the possibility of limiting nuclear test explosions. The United Kingdom Government has been studying all aspects of this complicated problem during recent months. The working out of a detailed system of limitation and control is full of difficulties, but my Government hopes to be able to develop certain views on this question in the Disarmament Sub-Committee.

The Soviet representative and others have suggested enlarging the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, and I should like to clarify the views of my Government on this question. We fully agree that every Government must have an adequate opportunity to express its views on disarmament. Before any general disarmament convention is signed, we have always stressed that a world disarmament conference must be held. The difficulty in making progress on disarmament is not due to any shortage of views. It is due to the complexity of the subject and the fact that it so directly affects the vital interests of every State.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

Moreover, the great Powers have a special responsibility in this matter. The Prime Minister of India recently emphasized this in his letter to Mr. Bulganin. Mr. Nehru said: The question of disarmament affects mainly the great Powers which have at their disposal considerable armed forces and large quantities of arms of all kinds, and effective measures can be taken by them alone. This was precisely the kind of reasoning which led to the formation of the present Disarmament Sub-Committee. We think that at this stage -- and I repeat, at this stage -- it would not be fruitful to enlarge the discussions in that Sub-Committee.

As for the Disarmament Commission itself, we feel that its membership should continue to follow the membership of the Security Council. When agreement is reached on enlarging the Security Council, the Commission should also be enlarged. In the meantime, the rules of procedure of the Commission provide adequate opportunity for any country to be heard when its interests are especially affected. There was no difficulty whatever, for example, in enabling Mr. Krishna Menon, as he himself has said this afternoon, to expound the views of the Indian Government before the Commission when he requested the opportunity to do so last July. May I assure Mr. Menon that these views, and those which he expressed this afternoon, will not be ignored when the Disarmament Sub-Committee takes up the questions involved.

For these reasons my delegation is against the proposal to change the membership of the Disarmament Commission or the Disarmament Sub-Committee at the present time.

In conclusion, I should like to say that I share the view of my Soviet colleague that the twelve-Power draft resolution now before us is a positive element. I also hope that the same good will and co-operation which created it will be evident in the detailed discussions in the Disarmament Sub-Committee. I can assure this Committee that the United Kingdom, for its part, certainly approaches these discussions with an ardent desire for progress and with a renewed hope.

Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): I wish to express the position of my delegation on the five draft resolutions now before the Committee.

In connexion with the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.160), which calls for the immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, my delegation has noted that it does not in any way provide for a system of international control of this discontinuance. On the other hand, as we stated in our main intervention on this question of disarmament, it has been the view of the big Powers concerned that the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests is necessarily connected with the over-all disarmament problem. The question of whether this is practicable now is, therefore, at issue, and, there being no unanimous opinion in this respect, we feel that we shall be constrained to abstain in the voting on this draft resolution. We agree with the cessation of these tests as an ultimate goal, but to the extent that the big Powers feel that it is not timely for the present, and that it is connected with the question of their own respective national securities, we shall, as I have said, abstain.

With regard to the draft resolution presented by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.161, which calls for the reference of all disarmament proposals to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, and for the calling of a special session of the General Assembly, I note that its operative paragraph 2 is already covered by operative paragraph 5 of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163), of which the Soviet Union is also a co-sponsor. In the same way, operative paragraph 3 of this Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.161) is also embodied in operative paragraph 8 of the twelve-Power draft resolution. In view of this it is my view that the Soviet Union may not press this draft resolution at all. If it should do so, however, my delegation would again be constrained to abstain on the ground that the calling of a special session now is, in our view, premature. My delegation associates itself with the views of the representative of the United States that in this respect the example afforded by the consideration of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency is quite a good one. As soon as the Powers principally involved had come to a substantial agreement on this issue, then we should deem it wise to consider the possibility of calling a special session or an international conference on the matter. For this reason, I repeat, we shall abstain in the voting on this draft resolution.

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

On the draft resolution presented by the delegations of Canada, Japan and Norway in document A/C.1/L.162 we take the position that, as we view it, this should have gone a little further still, as we had proposed in our intervention, perhaps at least in respect of providing for a preliminary or initial organization to supervise the tests. But since it is not believed possible for the moment among the big Powers we consider that the establishment of a system of registration of these tests is a necessary initial step, and for that reason we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution. However, I would present now a verbal amendment to it for consideration by this Committee. I propose that between the words "for" and "registration" in the penultimate line of operative paragraph 1 the word "advance" should be inserted, so that the paragraph would then read:

"Recommends that the States concerned and particularly those on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission give particular and urgent attention to the question of establishing, as a preliminary step, a system for advance registration with the United Nations of nuclear test explosions;".

We feel from reading this draft resolution that that is its intent as a whole. Our purpose is merely to express that purpose and to avoid any possibility of misinterpretation in its application in actual cases. We shall, therefore, vote in favour of the draft resolution, with the amendment which we have proposed.

My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163) presented by the twelve Powers, and we are happy to note that some of the recommendations which were contained in our intervention have been embodied therein. Specifically I have in mind operative paragraph 6, which calls for the preparation of a progress report to be considered by the Disarmament Commission not later than 1 August 1957. It should be noted that in our main intervention we had sought the revival of the Australian-Philippine plan for the preparation of a summary, objective statement on proposals heretofore presented to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. This progress report, in our view, partakes of the character of that statement; it is a progress report, and will necessarily embody the proposals already submitted. We are also happy to note that the suggestions, whether in the form of formal proposals or informal ones, voiced before this Committee are referred by this draft resolution to the

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee when it speaks of the transmission to the Commission for its consideration of the records of the meetings of the First Committee. We shall, therefore, as I have said, vote in favour of this draft resolution.

With regard to the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.164) presented by the Soviet Union, which calls for --

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): May I point out to the representative of the Philippines that it appears from the statements that have been made that approval of the twelve-Power draft resolution would be contingent upon and linked to the fact that the other draft resolutions were not voted upon but referred directly to the Sub-Committee. In view of this it may be unnecessary for him to refer to these other draft resolutions.

Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): Since that is merely a contingency, and since we cannot determine at present what will be the disposition of this Committee on the twelve-Power draft resolution, I think that it might be as well for the Philippine delegation to express its view in case the result of the voting is not as expected.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If the representative of the Philippines feels that the expressions of views that have been heard from the representatives here do not suffice, naturally he may continue.

Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): I wish to conclude merely by stating that if the draft resolution presented by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.164, calling for the expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission, is put to a vote we shall be obliged to vote against it because we feel that it departs from the original principle governing the composition of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): I have been mentioned a few times, very civilly and very courteously moreover, by Mr. Menon in the course of what purported to be an explanation of vote. I believe that we must take many statements very seriously, but very few tragically. I take all of Mr. Menon's statements seriously, but he will forgive me if I do not take tragically the one he made today. He touched on many subjects, some of which had been dealt with in his absence -- for which, of course, I do not reproach him since he was taken by other obligations -- and he referred to a meeting of the Disarmament Commission at which, as I understood the interpretation, he said that he had had difficulty in getting himself heard. I must say that we were happy to hear the representative of India as soon as he made a request. But, again if I heard correctly, Mr. Menon said that a reply was made even before he had spoken on that occasion.

I think that he was wrong. It was in the Security Council that a draft resolution was submitted before he had completed a record speech. But in the Disarmament Commission I spoke after him. I have the text of the verbatim record before me. The statement of Mr. Menon takes forty-seven pages of the French text, and mine begins on page forty-eight. Therefore, I did listen to Mr. Menon. It happens that I had studied the same questions as he had and that I anticipated from his earlier statements what he was going to tell us in the Commission, so that therefore I was in a position to reply to him immediately. I did not feel the need, as did some of our colleagues, to ask for a delay of two or three days before replying to him.

(Mr. Moch, France)

What did I say at that meeting? I used the hypothesis that explosions would continue, but that every precaution would be taken to avoid lamentable incidents like that of Bikini. I eliminated the effects of war-time explosions -- which we all know are catastrophic -- and accidental effects which were produced on one occasion only and had never reoccurred. I based myself on some scientific documents, in particular the report of the British Medical Research Council. Mr. Menon had also referred to that report; since neither of us is a technician, we use the same sources. I pointed out that, for millions of years, man had been subjected to radiation -- some external, coming from cosmic rays or gamma rays in the earth; others internal, coming from certain radioactive parts of the human body. I said that the total amount of this radiation could be measured, and that all the bombs which had been exploded since the very beginning -- that is, from 1945 to the time when I was making my speech, July 1956 -- had involved for the British people an increase in radioactivity which in the fifty years to come, assuming that there were no other explosions, would amount to two to four ten-thousandths of natural radioactivity. I emphasize that fraction: two to four ten-thousandths. In other words, the amount would be lower than the amount which man has added to natural radioactivity with instruments which he has been using for sixty years -- for example, watches with luminous dials or radios.

These figures are taken from a scientific document of the utmost reliability. I felt called upon to refer to them at that meeting of the Disarmament Commission so that there would be no doubt -- and, above all, no panic. It is because I hope that we here will not take a unanimous vote based on feelings of panic that I now refer once again to these facts reported by the British Medical Research Council.

Of course, the above-mentioned report contains some reservations whose importance I have not overlooked -- especially as regards radioactive strontium. Although I did not understand Mr. Menon's reference, a moment ago, to the stratospheric limit of radioactive strontium, I should like to recall that radioactive strontium has a long life. In five years, it loses half of its radioactivity and, consequently, particles which fall a long time after an

(Mr. Moch, France)

explosion may contain this type of strontium. Now, what do the British scientists have to say on this point? They say that at the present rate of explosions, there is absolutely no risk. They add that, if the number of explosions were increased or if their power were multiplied -- and I now quote from the report -- "our knowledge is still too small to know if, during the lifetime of the present generation, we should approach a level dangerous to a small part of the population".

I should like these words to be understood correctly. They are based on the assumption that there will be a considerable increase either in the power or in the number of the explosions. And I would point out that these same scientists have affirmed that at the present rate there is no danger at all.

I should like to make another rectification which also seems to me to be important. Can we control the cessation of explosions, as Mr. Menon contended before the Disarmament Commission on 12 July 1956 and as he has repeated, in a somewhat attenuated form, today? I have said and I repeat, after having studied the question, that at least two types of explosions cannot be detected from afar.

One of the two types of explosions consists of those with small power. Mr. Menon joked about the distinction which I had drawn between kiloton and megaton explosions. My point is not -- as Mr. Menon said it was today -- that small explosions should be authorized, but that small explosions of the order of magnitude of a kiloton cannot be controlled from afar and are sufficient to perfect the manufacture of much more powerful bombs.

There is a second type of explosion which cannot be controlled -- or at least I would imagine so -- at the present stage of our knowledge. I refer to powerful explosions -- much more powerful than those which I have just mentioned -- carried out under water, in remote seas and at such great depths that no radiation can get into the atmosphere. Such explosions would, of course, contaminate a certain area of the water, some fish and some algae, but, if only those who are carrying out the explosions are in the environs of the explosions, no one will know anything about it because no radioactive fall-out will be carried into the atmosphere.

(Mr. Moch, France)

That is why I have said that we must be careful, and that is why I have added that it is probable that uncontrolled tests of the two types to which I have just referred would be sufficient for a country with enough scientists to proceed to the manufacture of bombs.

I do not want to go over what has already been said on the subject of radar. I would merely repeat that it is a proven fact today that even airplanes -- I am not speaking of stratospheric rockets -- are not detected by the most modern radar equipment if those airplanes are flying high enough. I do not want to quote any limit, but I would indicate that, in the permanent struggle between the cannon and armour that is evident in every field, the offensive weapon has scored a point. Airplanes now exist and fly which can go to altitudes higher than those where their presence can be registered. Now, these airplanes are flying in the atmosphere, by definition, since they need oxygen. A fortiori, stratospheric rockets cannot be detected by any kind of radar equipment which now exists, or probably by any kind which will be invented in the future.

Finally, I said, and I repeat -- I think that on this point Mr. Menon and I agree -- that explosions can have considerable scientific interest. As an example, the series of tests which has just been carried out by the Russian scientist, Shertakov, and on which he has given a very full report to his colleagues at Harwell -- I have read the record of that report -- is a positively striking experiment with infinitely small thermonuclear explosions in a very diluted gaseous plasma, and can open the way to scientific discoveries having no common yardstick with anything we now know. Such tests should be not only authorized but encouraged, and, if possible, carried out on an international scale.

Thus, I have referred to a certain number of the problems which arise when one speaks too simply of the prohibition of tests.

(Mr. Moch, France)

Today, questions are more complicated than they appear to be, and if I had to draw a conclusion, I would say that technical questions such as these cannot be usefully discussed by non-scientists, such as Mr. Menon who has much talent, or by me, who have less, before large assemblies. Therefore, the very friendly debate which has just occurred between Mr. Menon and myself illustrates the position of the French delegation which I set forth this morning, that the number of members of the Commission should not be increased.

Mr. PERERA (Ceylon): It is with a certain amount of trepidation that my delegation intervenes at this late hour in the discussion of this momentous subject. My delegation does so for two reasons.

In the first place, we feel that the suggestion made by the Soviet representative in his speech of 14 January, in which he referred to the Soviet proposals of 17 November of last year, have not been sufficiently placed before this Committee. Perhaps I may be permitted to make my point clear. I refer to the suggestion made by the Soviet delegation in document A/3366, in which it is stated:

> "Considering that the present international situation imperatively calls for immediate measures to prevent war and terminate the armaments race, the Soviet Government believes that it would be expedient to convene a conference of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and India, as proposed by the President of the Swiss Confederation. Such a conference could facilitate the reaching of agreements on questions related to the problem of disarmament. The success of the conference of the five Heads of Government could pave the way for a broader conference on these questions, in which the Heads of Government of all States parties to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty could take part. The Soviet Government considers it desirable that such a conference should also be attended by the Heads of Government of a number of other countries, and especially the People's Republic of China, India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Burma, which are not parties either to the Warsaw Treaty or to such military groupings as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact." (A/3366, p.9)

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

Mr. Kuznetsov, in making his proposals, repeated this and expressed the hope that the proposal made by the President of the Swiss Confederation could be brought to some point where it could be discussed as a matter of practical politics. I am speaking as the representative of a small Power which, as the representative of Denmark stated, has nothing to offer in the way of disarmament, but, nevertheless, we are not precluded from making some contribution to the climate of opinion which must ultimately prevail. May I say that, as a matter of practical politics, my delegation feels that the point is worthy of consideration. No doubt the great Powers, and the other Powers co-sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.163 consider that the draft resolution is a measure that in some way would meet the proposal of the Soviet delegation. However, we feel that in the discussion of the various proposals by the Disarmament Commission, this particular proposal should be given priority.

The second question on which my delegation would like to speak is that contained in draft resolution A/C.1/L.164, in which a proposal is made to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission. We have no illusions as to in whose hands lies the ultimate decisive power in these matters. We have no illusions for the simple reason that it is the great Powers which ultimately must decide this question. Nevertheless, although the great Powers may decide, we who live in the shadow of the great Powers also live in the shadow of fear, and it is for that reason that the small Powers, when they have the opportunity, as I must say they do have in the General Assembly, should express their views on a subject like this.

Speaker after speaker, no doubt for certain reasons, have expressed the view that it would be most impracticable to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission. But, if I may say so with great respect, I have noticed one thing, the emphasis has always been that the subject of disarmament is a matter which is confined to certain western Powers. With great respect, I disagree. I disagree because although we have nothing to offer in the way of disarmament, nevertheless, disarmament is a subject which touches the peoples of the world at large. It is in that spirit, I think, that the Soviet delegation, as a first step, has proposed an increase in the membership of the Disarmament Commission. The draft resolution proposed accords with our own views, because some emphasis has been given to the representation of countries from Africa and from Asia.

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

If I may say so, in the course of the discussion many speakers have laid increasing emphasis on the fact that wars have always been fought to defend civilization, western civilization. May I say that there are civilizations other than western civilization, and we would like to defend those civilizations that are dear to our hearts. It is in that spirit that the draft resolution to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission has been brought forward, because there are other civilizations and other peoples in the world who would like to participate and, perhaps, also make their contribution to the general problem of the disarmament. It is for that reason that we strongly support the draft resolution to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission.

I also listened with admiration and great respect to the experts, if I may use that word, like Mr. Jules Moch. I have seen the brilliant way in which he handled the intricacies of the subject, and those who are uninitiated and those to whom the subject is difficult know that with Mr. Moch it is the voice of reason speaking. At the same time, we also feel that although unanimity has been reached to a certain degree on the draft resolution I mentioned earlier, which has so many co-sponsors, by which the various proposals will be submitted to the Disarmament Commission, nevertheless, if the opportunity is not grasped when the opportune moment arrives when we should really do something, we would again fail. I am afraid that even the most brilliant efforts of men like Mr. Jules Moch would be like a beautiful angel ineffectually beating his wings in the void in vain.

It is on that ground that I appeal to the great Powers. This draft resolution satisfies us to a great extent because it is the voice of a small Power, and it is a voice not only of my country, but of those who have really nothing to disarm and from whom neither the great nor small Powers have anything to fear. I therefore submit, in this context, that we should support this on the principle that civilization is really one particular term. The eighty nations in this General Assembly today represent so many types of civilizations and so many types of social and political systems, living peacefully and coexisting peacefully among themselves. It is for that reason that we are convinced that we need not wait until the world has perhaps accepted one political philosophy to accept disarmament. On the contrary.

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

If I may, in conclusion, I should like to ask the representatives in this Committee to consider one particular aspect of history which I shall cite to show that unless common agreement is followed by an earnest desire to disarm, then our efforts will have been fruitless. I refer in the first instance to the Geneva Protocol of 1924. This was submitted on the proposal of the then United Kingdom Labour Government, but rejected by the Government which succeeded it. That Protocol provided for automatic sanctions against an aggressor in the old League of Nations. I also refer to the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which was not followed by a wider scope of disarmament proposals and, therefore, it failed. Therefore, in this climate of opinion, if a particular proposal is not carried immediately to its logical conclusion, I am afraid the results will be the same. It is in that spirit that my delegation strongly supports the resolutions we have mentioned.

With regard to the other draft resolutions, the draft resolution dealing with nuclear weapons, which has been submitted by the Soviet delegation, meets our requirements and, I think, the requirements of the entire world. I do not think that anyone could cavil at that, because, after all, it represents the sum total of scientific wisdom, if I may put it that way, because the alternative would be ultimate destruction. We appreciate the draft resolution moved by the representatives of Canada, Japan and Norway, although perhaps it does not go far enough. However, the principle is the same; if it is only a measure of some achievement, we are with them.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The First Committee has before it a draft resolution jointly submitted by twelve countries. In the statements of a number of representatives it was greeted as a positive development, particularly the fact that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and Canada -- the States which make up the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and which belong to the Disarmament Commission, the body which has been entrusted with the task of preparing an agreement on disarmament. May I express my conviction that this draft resolution will be unanimously approved by the members of the First Committee.

In an attempt to promote the unanimous adoption of this draft resolution, the Soviet delegation will not press for a vote on the draft resolution submitted by it on 14 January 1957 (A/C.1/L.161), and it withdraws that draft resolution.

Inasmuch as the Soviet delegation agrees that the draft resolution submitted by it on the cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.160), as well as its draft resolution dealing with the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission (A/C.1/L.164), should be referred to the Disarmament Commission, the Soviet delegation will not press for a vote on these draft resolutions.

We should like to express the hope that the method of negotiation which was used in agreeing upon the twelve-Power draft resolution will be utilized further in the work on the problem of disarmament. The Soviet delegation is convinced that the proposals made by the Soviet Union, both with respect to the general programme of disarmament as well as the partial measures envisaged in this field, may constitute a good basis for the reaching of agreement. The Soviet delegation expects that the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee will pay due attention to the Soviet proposals submitted to the United Nations. For its part, the Soviet Union will henceforth exert its efforts as well, without further delay, to find a practical solution to the problem of disarmament which will lead to a considerable reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments and to the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): I wish to make a very brief statement on two of the draft resolutions before us.

I should like to say, in the first place, that I support the procedure which has just been outlined by the representative of the Soviet Union and the views that he has expressed in putting forward those suggestions regarding procedure.

I hope that my friend, Mr. Krishna Menon, will forgive me, but I am afraid that I will not be able to deal with many of the points that he brought up in his interesting statement, some of which were directed to Canada. I should like to say just one word, however, about his references to the Sub-Committee and our position on that Sub-Committee.

Mr. Menon referred to the Sub-Committee as an exclusive organization. It is of course exclusive but only in the sense that it is small and it is select -- only in the sense that it has been selected by a larger body to which it is responsible and to which it reports -- in order that its members might meet in that informal, frank and very confidential manner that I think is best for this kind of preliminary negotiation between those States -- and among them I did not include Canada -- which have the greatest responsibility for disarmament because they have the most to disarm -- and that irrespective of their type of civilization. Because of that fact, perhaps the membership of the Sub-Committee could be even smaller rather than larger.

Our own membership was in a sense accidental. I think we got in by that back door to which Mr. Menon referred this afternoon; I may call the atomic entrance a back door, but we would be very glad, if it advanced the cause which we all have at heart, to withdraw through the front door.

Mr. Menon was good enough to make a generous observation about Canada's work on the Sub-Committee. He said that notwithstanding our membership in NATO we had something to contribute and had, he was good enough to say, contributed something to the work of the Sub-Committee. We have never felt that our membership in NATO and our membership in the Sub-Committee are inconsistent in any way. We feel that in both those agencies we are working for international peace and security. Indeed, Mr. Menon suggested that in the Sub-Committee we occupied, as he put it, a sort of no-man's land. My own experience between 1914 and 1918 taught me that no-man's land was a very dangerous place to be, a place where often you were shot at from both sides and where you acquired an irrestible tendency to hide in

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the nearest hole. I hope, however, that will not be our approach to the problems before the Sub-Committee as long as we remain members of that body.

In my opening statement I dealt in some detail with the proposal for registering nuclear test explosions with the United Nations, a proposal presented by Canada, Japan and Norway. I still feel after the discussion that has taken place that this is a practical and reasonable and useful first step, one which the General Assembly might well have endorsed if it had come to a vote.

However, there is another draft resolution of which my delegation is also a sponsor, a resolution now before the Committee. This is essentially a procedural resolution referring to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee all the proposals before us, including the three-Power proposal which I have just mentioned.

In these circumstances, the Canadian delegation, and in this matter I am honoured to speak on behalf of the Norwegian and Japanese delegations as well,

agreed that it will not be necessary or desirable to press this draft resolution to a vote. However, a few moments ago the representative of the Philippines did suggest a change to our draft resolution by which we would put the word "advance" before registration in paragraph 1, and the sponsors of this draft resolution think that that would be an improvement and are very glad to adopt that change and would be happy to submit the draft resolution to the Sub-Committee with that alteration.

The draft resolution submitted by the twelve delegations will require the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to give prompt attention to this and to the other proposals, and I hope it will do so. Since the countries at present conducting tests are all members of the Sub-Committee, our objective, we think, is equally well-achieved by this procedure than if we debated and decided on the resolution at this stage in this Committee.

I welcome the fact very sincerely that all members of the disarmament Sub-Committee, together with a number of other delegations, have been able to reach agreement on a draft resolution and to co-sponsor it in this Committee. It is true that the agreement is on procedure only and not on substance, and therefore we would be unwise to withdraw any extravagantly optimistic conclusions from our

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agreement. But, nevertheless, it is a hopeful augury for the discussions before us. They will, I think, now be conducted on a better basis than that perhaps which has been possible previously. I am, therefore, confident that this draft resolution of the twelve delegations will receive the unanimous support of this Committee.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): As a member of the Disarmament Commission and one of the sponsors of the draft resolution now before us, I desire to commend it briefly to the Committee. Having addressed the Committee at some length this morning, I do not propose to traverse the various proposals submitted to us, but in view of the wide range of these proposals we believe that the procedure envisaged in this draft resolution is a sensible one and we hope that it will receive the unanimous endorsement of the Committee.

May I be permitted, in conclusion, to associate the Australian delegation with the deep regret expressed by you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the Committee, on the death of former Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu of Japan. I am sure it would be the wish of the Australian Government that I should associate ourselves with you in this way. To me personally this sad news has come as a great shock, for in the course of my stay in Japan as the representative of my country I was privileged to know Mr. Shigemitsu well, first as the distinguished leader of one of the opposition parties in Parliament and later as the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

I shall never forget the warmth and deep conviction with which Mr. Shigemitsu, in our first conversation, said to me: "Whatever may have happened during and as a consequence of the war, there is today no bitterness or resentment in the hearts of the Japanese people towards Australia." I have personal knowledge of how devotedly Mr. Shigemitsu worked to renew and rebuild friendships for his country and how tireless were his efforts to bring about Japan's admission to the United Nations. His passing is a sad loss both to Japan and to the world and I desire to offer our deep sympathy to Ambassador Sawada, Ambassador Kase and other members of the Japanese delegation and through them to members of Mr. Shigemitsu's family.

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Before I speak on the points for which I asked for the floor, I would like to associate my delegation with the sentiments that have been expressed by previous speakers in regard to the former Foreign Minister of Japan. During the very short stay I had in Tokyo, I had the privilege of seeing him. He was a Japanese statesman who was well known in my country and the grief of the Japanese people in losing a man of such great ability and such a great sense of restraint and courage which was exhibited best at times of

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

adversity, will be shared in considerable measure in my own country. I would like to convey the sympathy of my delegation and my Government both to the Japanese people and their Government at this time and to the late Foreign Minister's family.

It was not my intention to intervene a second time in this debate, but I have had the privilege of receiving the kind attention of my friend Mr. Noble and the very eminent disarmament expert Mr. Jules Moch and later -- largely as a matter of habit -- of the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada. Even when we have our differences, one is entitled to feel somewhat flattered. At any rate, I did not send anybody to sleep, they were all listening.

I want, for the purposes of the record, to correct certain errors of fact as we see them, not errors of mine. The Minister of State of the United Kingdom said that these limitations of tests were not suggested in substitution of suspension, which was submitted by the Government of India. I request the reference to the records of this meeting, to the three-stage disarmament plan submitted by the French and British Governments; there is not one word in that disarmament plan in reference to substitution of tests. This idea was put forward by the then Minister of State after I had spoken and said we asked for suspension. It appeared to me an extremely deft political operation, it was not a total opposition. Therefore I maintained, and I repeat, that these proposals were the substitute proposals of the United Kingdom for the suspension of tests. We knew that the United Kingdom had very strong objections to the suspension of tests. I said at that time that our proposals had no relation to the proximate tests of the British hydrogen weapon somewhere in the Indian Ocean -- we have no monopoly over the Indian Ocean although I believe it is near our country -- so I would like to say that the statement made by the Minister of State does not correspond either with the record of the proceedings or with the plan of disarmament as put forward.

This plan, as put forward, is in three stages and certainly refers to the prohibition of atomic weapons, otherwise it would not be a complete plan of disarmament -- and this Assembly has had its forward and backward steps for a very long time.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The next point to which Mr. Noble referred in a rather patronizing way was how much we were always welcomed in his country and received with extreme friendliness -- in fact we do not always realize we are away from home when we are there. But so far as the facts in this matter are concerned, again it is necessary to put this record straight. For myself, I am prepared to make allowances for the fact that this matter has been handled by different people, as far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned. The facts are that the Indian resolution came in the ninth session of the General Assembly and this is the eleventh session, and the Assembly specifically referred that resolution to the Disarmament Sub-Committee; and you may remember, Mr. Chairman, that you were one of the people who promoted this reference. That resolution was moved by the great Powers, I believe, but at any rate it was unanimously adopted by the Assembly -- that resolution referring this proposal to the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Thus, if the Government of India had not moved one finger, the Disarmament Commission had an obligation in making enquiries about proposals we had made, especially as it had been said in the course of the debate that the details might be left for further consideration because, as usual, we were short of time. The resolution referred to is to be found in document A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1 and it contains specific proposals and is printed as an annex in the Assembly records.

Resolution 809 (IX) B, which is the main resolution of the Assembly of the ninth session, also referred to the Indian draft proposal for referring it to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration. During the intervening period the status of the Sub-Committee has not been and is not now very clear as to whether it is merely a sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission or whether it emerges from a decision of the General Assembly. Our understanding of the facts is that this decision to establish a sub-committee was a major political decision initiated by my delegation -- and I propose to read the record on this -- against the considerable opposition of the United Kingdom delegation. It was officially accepted and all those tributes to which the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs referred -- and I think his staff must be very good because they are documented from our speech on the subject and I feel highly flattered -- are in the very words of my speech.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

We asked for the deletion of the word "small" in connexion with that Sub-Committee, and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, who in those days performed a great deal of the conciliatory functions among various sections of people here, obtained the deletion of that word. There was no suggestion at that time that that Sub-Committee should be more than what it is now. Indeed, it was understood that its composition would be like that. But someone suggested it would be a slight to the Disarmament Commission for the Assembly to appoint it straight away. So, while the wishes of the Assembly were known, it was proposed that the actual formal appointment might be made by the Disarmament Commission. During the period between the ninth and tenth sessions of the General Assembly, the Government of India, in view of the undefined status of the Sub-Committee, made various approaches through friendly channels to have this matter considered. I am not revealing anything that one should not; I think the representative of the United Kingdom will be able to verify this from those who have occupied this position in the three or four years preceding the present. After that, we referred to this fact at the tenth session of the General Assembly. The Indian delegation pointed out that the resolution of the General Assembly in this matter had not been carried out, that no attention had been paid to these suggestions, and that it was very wrong -- in fact, it was not the Indian delegation so much as others -- to have resolutions referred to a committee and have no attention paid to them. If there is any substance in the word -- which is not a very happy one -- that I used about an "exclusive" group, it is that kind of thing that reflects it.

So we came to the tenth session. Since then, the permanent representative made several informal approaches. The Government of India, from Delhi, made two formal approaches, or maybe three -- but I prefer to be on the conservative side -- I am not a conservative myself, but I prefer to be on the conservative side on this and say that we made two formal approaches by way of communications to the Disarmament Commission. And it was only after the second communication and a fair amount of subsequent lobbying about it that the Government of India was invited to send a representative. Although it was an extremely inconvenient time for us, it was set -- and what is more, the Disarmament Commission did not take into account the fact that we were a Government at some distance and gave us very short notice. But still we appeared.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

I do not want any impression conveyed that we are making a grievance of not being asked. We are talking about the progress of this matter. And the progress of this matter, in many respects -- apart from the newspapers, which seem to get everything that is secret while Member States do not -- has been extremely esoteric.

That is the second point I have to deal with.

There is a great deal more I could have said with regard to my colleague from the United Kingdom, for whose friendly references to me I am extremely grateful. That arises from our personal friendship -- but that does not wish away matters of political importance, which have to be frankly stated.

I do not know why I provoke Mr. Jules Moch in this way. It must be something wrong with me.

I have here a report of the Disarmament Commission. It is slightly unpleasant for anyone to cast reflections on the honesty of a statement that has been made -- and, fortunately for me, these are proved by the records in the case. I spoke before the Disarmament Commission and the record shows that Mr. Moch followed me; there were no speakers at all in between. Mr. Moch's speech covered several pages, and we happened to have the script of the speech distributed to us even when I was speaking. Obviously, the speech could not have been prepared in some sort of fourth dimensional time, previous to when I was speaking. Therefore, the answer to my statement was prepared beforehand.

It is a very good answer. It is full of compliments to me. I think that Mr. Moch must have changed his mind on these questions. He said:

> "In our opinion, this is the logical way we must follow up Mr. Krishna Menon's brilliant talk, while thanking him and his Government for the effective part they have played in building up a durable peace."

I do not think a greater compliment has been paid by one Government to another in this particular matter, for which I am profoundly grateful.

In the whole of the submissions I made here, I said that the differences between the French answer and ours was in regard to this particular matter that we are discussing now -- that is, limitation and suspension -- and that is a matter of profound importance.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

I am a representative who is a layman in dealing with scientific matters. The Committee will be aware that in not one scientific matter have I spoken my own opinion; I have simply quoted the words of distinguished scientists. Mr. Moch relies for his remarks about strontium on the report of the British Medical Research Council. I am not going to go into the question of the scientific standing of various bodies in the world or even in any particular country. But if it is correct to quote the research in one country, it is equally correct to quote the research in another country. I quoted from a large number of American authors. I did not quote from my own scientists. There is a whole volume printed by the Government of India on this subject, but I did not want to quote from it because I thought it would not carry the same weight inasmuch as we are parties in this matter. Now, what does the British Medical Research Council say about strontium? They say this:

"The importance of radioactive strontium, compared with other long-lived fission products produced by exploding nuclear weapons, derives from four factors: its relative abundance among the fission products, its facility for following calcium through the human food chain, the ease with which it is absorbed, and the fact that, once absorbed, it is stored for long periods in the bones of the body. In bones it forms more or less localized deposits which, judging by animal experiments and according to analogy with the action of radium compounds on human subjects, can if present in sufficient amounts give rise to bone tumours or, by irradiating the neighbouring bone marrow, to aplastic anaemia or leukaemia. There is evidence that the young are more susceptible to its action than adults. Such measuresments as have been made of Strontium-90 in human bone suggest that the highest levels are at present about a thousand times less than is considered permissible for those occupationally exposed."

But this paragraph has to be read along with a statement in the conclusions of the report which reads:

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

"Nevertheless, recognizing all the inadequacy of our present knowledge, we cannot ignore the possibility that, if the rate of firing increases and particularly if greater numbers of thermonuclear weapons are used, we could within the life-time of some now living" -- in the life-time of some people now living -- "be approaching levels at which ill-effects might be produced in a small number of the population."

After all, this is a British document -- and you must expect it to be a masterpiece of understatement.

As against that, we have direct answers to questions by Dr. Lapp.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

He was asked the question about damage to this generation right now. He was asked what kind of damage this would cause, if we went over that limit. Dr. Lapp replied:

"The cycle that is involved here, Mr. Amrine, is a cycle which we might paraphrase as the bomb-to-bone sequence. When it is formed in the fire ball, some of this radioactive material which ultimately becomes strontium, having a half-life of twenty-eight years, goes to the stratosphere, then sifts down gradually onto the pasture, lands in Wisconsin, Kentucky, and on the Steppes of Siberia.

"This material then comes into the food chain through the dairy cattle, it comes in through milk, dairy products. It is then deposited out in the bone, just as it resembles calcium, and calcium goes to the bone, so does this radioactive strontium go to the bone. This is not theory, Mr. Amrine. We now have, through the measurements of the Atomic Energy Commission's Project Sunshine, and through measurements made by the British scientists and other scientists, we now have specific data on how much is accumulating in people today, how much that will be as the result of material yet to fall out from the stratosphere, but very few people have looked at how much may come down from future tests. And it is the future tests which concern me. I have not made a statement that the amount so far liberated is dangerous to humans, but its ultimate effect, when it accumulates in the bone in sufficient quantity, is to produce bone tumor and cancer."

If that is not enough, and since the matter has been thrown back to us, I would mention that only the other day there was printed an extract from an American navy scientist which said the following:

"...there is now a 'permanent background' of radioactivity in the air here caused by U. S. atomic bomb tests in Nevada and Soviet tests of such weapons in Russia.

"Dr. L.B. Lockhart of the Naval Research Laboratory made the disclosure as the Navy announced a program for setting up 10 to 12 stations along the 80th meridian west from Greenland to Antarctica to test for natural and man-made radioactivity.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

"The Navy said data obtained by the monitoring stations would help biophysicists to evaluate the 'possible hazards associated with the fallout of fission products.'

"Lockhart said that after each bomb test here or in Russia the percentage of radioactivity in the air increases for a time, and then drops off until the next test. But the percentage never goes down to zero -- that is, the cumulative effect -- as it formerly did, he said."

Therefore, I do not want to reopen this subject, but the amount of accumulating evidence shows that, first of all, at best what we are doing is something the consequences of which are ominous. The representative of France referred to the comparative doubtful value of my delegation seeking to deal with scientific matters. I looked through the record of Mr. Jules Moch's statement in the Disarmament Commission. And what do I find? He quotes one lot of scientists, and that is the British scientists. Then, for support, he goes to what he himself calls "para-scientific studies" and tells us that they are not reliable because they are often put in that way in order to sell books.

I think that we being a very old world people are far more conservative in these matters and go to the best available authority, in France, in Britain and in the United States, where these things are said, and to various other observations that people themselves have made. The accumulation of such information as we have, put in a more popular way, is contained in the publications of the Government of India, which have been transmitted to the United Nations.

With regard to these missiles, one does not want to be ridiculous in these matters any more than one's opponent does, but what I said was that the representative of France had said that radar detection was effective only up to 6,000 metres. I believe the time is too late to revise this text; it must be done in seven days. This is a text of a disarmament report. He says that in some cases detection by radar of these things travelling in the stratosphere was only effective up to 6,000 metres of the stratosphere. Whether the stratosphere is from the ground, it is taken from the stratosphere. And therefore, the contention we made that there were methods of detection reasonably good, that was wrong; they could not be relied upon.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The question I posed to the Assembly, and not to Mr. Moch, was: How could a missile go beyond the 6,000 metre limit without going through the first 6,000 metres? And if you can detect it in the first 6,000 metres, it means it can be detected. Assuming that the French delegation argument is correct, that radar cannot be detected beyond 6,000 metres -- which I am not prepared either to accept or to deny; we would refer it to our scientists -- it is admitted that up to 6,000 metres it is possible to detect it. How does a missile go into stratosphere above the 6,000 metres without travelling through the intermediate 6,000? No Yoga performance could do that. There must be a continuity of this business. Therefore, radar could be detected in that 6,000 metres. If the answer is that it passes too rapidly, my answer is that radar registers rapidly.

I have not the slightest objection to the repartee or to his making any observations if he wishes, but I do not want the records of the Committee to contain something that is uncontradicted in this matter as regards the observations we have made. I will read from the record, since there has been some doubt about it. This is what Mr. Moch said:

> "Mr. Menon referred to radar. Here, let us be sure that there is no confusion. Incidentally, Mr. Menon was clear on this point: He said that radar could make it possible to detect rockets."-- that is what I said -- "It is true that, to some extent, rockets can be detected by radar if those rockets do not go too high into the stratosphere." (DC/PV.58, page 61)

That is the fallacy of the argument. If I had been guilty of fallacy in argument, the world would understand, because my people are not logical. But how can you say that of a Frenchman? Mr. Moch went on:

> "It is true that, to some extent, rockets can be detected by radar if those rockets do not go too high in the stratosphere." (Ibid.)

Then Mr. Moch goes on to say:

> "I believe" -- that is all he has siad here; he has not asserted -- "that radar is totally ineffective as regards intercontinental rockets moving at a speed of 5,000 to 8,000 kilometres an hour in the stratosphere; but within certain limits, rockets moving in the atmosphere may be detected.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

This, however, is true whether the rockets have conventional warheads, atomic warheads ... " (Ibid.)

So that at some stage it can be detected, whatever height it goes into. I may have made a mistake about it; I do not profess to be the expert on this matter; it is not my business. My business is to draw the attention of this Committee to it; and what is more, being a non-atomic country and being a likely victim and not a likely donor of atomic radiation, I have only to prove a prima facie case that I am being placed in jeopardy. That is all you have to prove anywhere. And we are being placed in jeopardy, if nothing else than by the British scientific commitment that we do not know enough about it. Yet, when they go on the genetic side, there is a considerable amount of material here where experiments have been performed on unfortunate animals which have eaten some grass from these places and their bones have been calcified and they suffered from cancer, in the first generation.

Therefore, I submit that this question is not to be easily dismissed as though we are a little boy and do not know anything about this sort of business. We are all entitled to present our views on this matter and to quote proper scientific authority, and my delegation has taken very good care to be as objective as one possibly can.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

It is our regret that the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which was appointed last year as a result of the initiative of the United States and Indian Governments, while it is still working, has not placed before us adequate and sufficient material. This is no reflection on the Committee, but we do not have that material. Therefore, we take the view of the Swedish representative, who corroborated what I have just said. Mr. Sandler, speaking before this Committee on 21 January, said:

"...something must be done about the continuation of the tests of nuclear weapons. The situation is not so harmless as it is usually presented. It takes years before the radiation effects of the fallout from the stratosphere can be measured, as was stated a few minutes ago by the representative of Japan..."

An old man died two days ago in Japan. He was three miles away from the explosion in Hiroshima and was not affected at that time; but now, eleven years after, he was stricken with cancer of the blood.

Mr. Sandler continued:

"It is not sufficient to establish such effects on an average as there may be considerable local differences. This has recently been verified through measurements in Scandinavia. Such a dangerous fission product as Strontium-90" --

And the British say that there is plenty of this Strontium-90 --

"can concentrate on grazing cattle and from them pass over into milk and human bones. From the genetic point of view there is unanimity among scientists that every increase in the sum of radiation is harmful, and it is the sum that counts. The most important thing we know now is that we do not know. And indeed we know all too little about those genetic consequences. But at a time when we know more, in what way could we undo the harm possibly done today?" (A/C.1/PV.824, page 41)

Can there be any more logical question?

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall put to a vote the twelve-Power draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.163. The other four draft resolutions -- A/C.1/L.160, A/C.1/L.161, A/C.1/L.162 and A/C.1/L.164 -- have either been withdrawn or will be referred by this draft resolution, if it is adopted, for consideration in the Sub-Committee. I might point out that the amendment proposed by the delegation of the Philippines to the draft resolution in A/C.1/L.162 has been accepted by the sponsors, Canada, Japan and Norway.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.163 was adopted unanimously.

Mr. TIOULONG (Cambodia)(interpretation from French): I apologize for asking to speak at the last moment, but the news of the death of Mr. Shigemitsu has moved us and, as Ambassador of Cambodia to Japan, I should like to associate myself with the regrets and condolences expressed by the Chairman, as well as those of my colleagues who had the news before it reached me.

Mr. Shigemitsu was the principal architect of the treaty of freindship between my country and Japan, and I must express my profound regret at his passing.

The CHAIRMAN (Interpretation from Spanish): As I said earlier, the feelings which I expressed were not only those of the Chair, but also of the entire Committee.

The next item to be discussed by this Committee will be the question of Algeria, and the Journal will carry the announcement of the date of our next meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.