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Twelfth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 5 November 1957, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ABDOH

(Iran)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international Convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction [24] (continued)

Note:

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AGENDA ITEM 24

REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS; CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

- (a) REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
- (b) EXPANSION OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AND OF ITS SUB-COMMITTEE
- (c) COLLECTIVE ACTION TO INFORM AND ENLIGHTEN THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AS TO THE DANGERS OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE, AND PARTICULARLY AS TO THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF MODERN WEAPONS
- (d) DISCONTINUANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TESTS OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that two meetings are scheduled in today's Journal, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Since the Security Council is meeting in the afternoon, we shall not call a meeting at that time. Therefore, today we will have only one meeting, the morning meeting. The next meeting of the First Committee will take place tomorrow morning.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): As one of the sponsors of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, I wish to make some observations on some of the other draft resolutions before the Committee. I also desire to comment on the declaration which the Soviet representative made yesterday in the Committee.

The Soviet Union's declaration that it will not participate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee in their present composition is in my view an attempt to intimidate the members of this Committee. The Soviet Union knows that all Members of the United Nations earnestly desire to see progress in disarmament and that they would view the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from current negotiations as a severe blow to their hopes and indeed to the hopes of all mankind.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

The Soviet Union no doubt expects that some members of the Committee will be so intimidated as to withdraw their support from the twenty-four-Power draft resolution which the Soviet Union has so harshly attacked and vote instead for some other resolutions more palatable to the Soviet Union.

The ordinary people of the world, however, will not view the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Disarmament Commission in such a light. The ordinary people of the world will regard the Soviet Union's withdrawal shortly after the announcement of the Soviet possession of new weapons and its demonstration of its advances in rocketry as an ominous threat to the future peace of the world. Whatever arguments the Soviet Union may advance to justify its action, the ordinary man will judge the Soviet Union by its deeds, not its words. If this threat is carried out, it will be the Soviet Union and no other country that will be leaving the Disarmament Commission and bringing about the collapse of its endeavours. What a way Mr. Kuznetsov, to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of your revolution.

Now I do not believe that many members of the Committee, if any at all, will be influenced in their voting by the Soviet threat. I believe most delegations have seriously examined the issues and have arrived at their conclusions honestly. This is true whether or not we are all in agreement. I know that several of the other draft resolutions that I cannot myself support represent none the less an honest endeavour to advance the work of the United Nations in this important field; and I respect the efforts that lie behind such draft resolutions.

For instance, I know from my own personal experience in Japan how deeply and strongly the people as well as the Government of Japan feel on the question of nuclear weapons and on the suspension of nuclear tests. The strength of Japanese feelings on this matter is perfectly understandable and the approach adopted in the Japanese draft resolution is in many ways reasonable except for one vital flaw, namely, the singling out of the suspension of tests for separate action before there is any assurance that agreement can be reached on the inspected prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons. I wish we could bring immediately to the Japanese people and to the people of all other countries the feeling of greater security that would accompany a decision to suspend nuclear tests. But would it not be a false security if this suspension were not part of a wider agreement and of an inspection system to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons being actually used against

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(Mr. Walker, Australia)

them in the future? No, much as we respect what lies behind the Japanese draft resolution, the Australian delegation cannot vote for it for reasons similar to those given by Mr. Lodge and others.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

Similarly, the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4) on the suspension of nuclear tests is, in itself, and considered in isolation from the overall problem of disarmament, a well-drafted, well-conceived attempt to deal with this single question. Its weakness, in our eyes, lies just in the fact that it would abstract the question of tests from the overall problem, and we do not believe the world can take this risk at the present time.

There are two other Indian draft resolutions which also reflect great efforts towards the reconciliation of diverging views of different parties. I do not underestimate the importance of India's efforts in that direction. But the more substantive Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.178/Rev.2) differs too much from our own draft resolution, the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, for us to give it any support. The other Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.177) on the constitution of the Disarmament Commission is an interesting and bold attempt to break the present deadlock in the Sub-Committee by adding to the membership of the Commission and its Sub-Committee.

This is a suggestion that merits careful consideration. I would not myself expect the existing machinery to be adequate for all phases of disarmament negotiations. Once we begin to make some real progress, I think it may well be necessary to bring certain other countries into the negotiations on particular issues. This will obviously be the case, for instance, in connexion with agreed reductions in the levels of forces in various regions of the world. But would it facilitate progress at the present stage if we brought more countries into the negotiations that must take place between the great military Powers which at present form the Sub-Committee?

Unless these Powers can work out the initial agreements that will satisfy their own need for security, as well as reducing their armaments, what hope is there that some other countries can show them the path to agreement? But we would be prepared to consider this question again later as negotiations develop.

As we see it, the work of the Disarmament Commission and the work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in particular is basically different from the work of this First Committee of the General Assembly, although the subject is the same. Here in the First Committee we discuss the general problem from a world viewpoint and we make recommendations, by two-thirds majority vote, in accordance

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

with the Charter and in accordance with our rules of procedure. Votes and recommendations in this Committee can be influential, but not majority votes in the Disarmament Sub-Committee. It has to negotiate agreements, unanimous agreements among those immediately concerned. A majority vote in the Sub-Committee would have little significance. The Disarmament Commission again is in an intermediate position between the General Assembly and the Sub-Committee. I would see an increasingly active role for the Commission at some later stage, because, as I have said before, more countries will then have to be brought into the actual negotiations, as distinct from general discussions and broad recommendations, that affect their particular security problems.

The Soviet proposal on machinery, which is in effect to substitute a committee of the whole Assembly for the Disarmament Commission -- they call it a permanent Disarmament Commission -- seems to reflect an altogether different idea of what is involved in negotiating an international agreement. I find it difficult to take this Soviet proposal seriously, particularly when I reflect on the Soviet Union's lack of enthusiasm, to say the least, for the Interim Committee of the General Assembly.

At the same time, may I observe that I do not think we should necessarily strive for unanimity in this First Committee, or at least not at the price of ignoring real differences of views on such important questions as the principles and procedures involved in reaching a satisfactory disarmament agreement. I think that this Committee should not hesitate to record a majority view and to make substantive recommendations to the Powers represented on the Sub-Committee. There will still be much hard arguing to be done in the Sub-Committee, and perhaps even conflict there, but why should not the majority views of the General Assembly be expressed? Why should it not exercise some influence on the Powers that are members of the Sub-Committee?

We have conflicting draft resolutions before us today. Surely the best course is for the Committee to record its views on them, rather than to try to synthesize them into some procedural formula that might command unanimity. At least so it seems to my delegation at the present stage of our work on disarmament.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

Then the Sub-Committee would get the resolutions we passed, and they could also refer to the procès verbal and take account of other suggestions that have been ventilated here if they wish. But mainly they have to settle down and seek agreement among themselves on practical steps towards disarmament.

In our view, it is the twenty-four-Power draft resolution that should be adopted by the Assembly this year, and I again commend it to the Committee. We welcome the amendment proposed by Norway and Pakistan. Indeed, I may say that if nobody had moved something along these lines, the Australian delegation would have brought forth a proposal of its own. For in Australia we feel that this question of inspection and control is basic and that it will prove complicated in practice. Australia therefore considers that no time should be lost in setting up technical working parties, as soon as agreement is reached in principle upon various disarmament measures. Certainly, no control without disarmament; but do not let us delay any measure of agreed disarmament by failing to explore in advance the technical problems involved in its inspection and control.

I would again appeal to the Soviet Union not to act impulsively in this matter that was referred to yesterday, but to accept in a democratic spirit the way this Assembly works. We need their co-operation and I trust they will not withhold it.

Finally, I would like to say that Australia will vote for the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) also.

Mr. SHTYLLA (Albania) (interpretation from French): My delegation considers that the discussion that has taken place in this Committee on disarmament has been extremely useful. It has also echoed the fears and thoughts of mankind regarding the arms race and the danger to humanity from such a race. The discussion has also pointed up the imperative need to end this arms race. Furthermore, it has shown that at the present stage partial agreements on certain aspects of the disarmament problem are entirely possible and that such agreements should be arrived at through mutual understanding and mutual concession on the basis of the principle of equality between the parties concerned.

The Soviet delegation, once again persevering in its policy for peace and in the determination of its Government to come to an agreement on disarmament so as to relieve the peoples of the ever increasing weight of the expenditures for the arms race and to safeguard the world from the scourge of a new world war, has submitted very constructive and conciliatory proposals which should be acceptable to all parties. However, the Western Powers, and primarily the United States of America, have once again shown the absence of a desire to come to an agreement, reaffirming their negative attitude and carrying on their policy of war preparations and their desire to continue the armaments race. The profound contrast between the highly conciliatory and positive attitude of the Soviet Union and the completely negative attitude of the United Kingdom, the United States and France can only be modified if the Western Powers realize that it is time that they showed the same spirit of conciliation and the same spirit of good will as has been shown by the Soviet Union.

The Committee has before it numerous resolutions, and the delegation of the Albanian People's Republic would like to refer to them separately. As we said in our first statement in the Committee on this matter, we consider that the best path and the best method which will best lead to an agreement on disarmament is to follow the line drawn by the resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union, whether it is the document submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union on partial agreement on disarmament or in the draft resolution submitted later by the delegation of the Soviet Union to this Committee. The basic characteristic of these proposals is the sincere desire for agreement which inspires them, their conciliatory character, their clarity and the ease of

(Mr. Shtylla, Albania)

implementation of such resolutions. In document A/3674 the Soviet Union suggests the suspension of nuclear tests under international control for a period of two to three years. In document A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1, the Soviet Union calls for an agreement which would bind the negotiators not to use atomic or hydrogen weapons for five years if no comprehensive international agreement has been arrived at. We feel that these proposals are practical, feasible and enforceable. They follow one of the imperative needs of our day, and they also fulfil one of the aspirations of the world.

It is now up to the Western Powers to realize the dangers of radioactive fall-out caused by nuclear tests, and this has been very clearly stated and proved. One of the characteristics of weapons of mass destruction is this fall-out, and the peoples of the world insist that a prohibition on the use of atomic and hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction should be put into effect. Once again, the Soviet Union has proposed a complete prohibition on the manufacture and testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The peoples of the world highly appreciate this attitude of the Soviet Union.

The proposals that we have before us were made in a spirit of compromise. But the Western Powers are not in favour of complete prohibition. We feel that the adoption of these two draft resolutions by the General Assembly of the United Nations will greatly facilitate the achievement of other agreements. These have been suggested in the documents of the Soviet Union which I mentioned earlier, and they will have a very healthy and positive effect on all international relations.

We will, on the other hand, vote against the draft resolution of the twenty-four Powers which basically contains only the resolutions submitted by the Western Powers in the Sub-Committee in London in order to forestall any possibility of an agreement on this matter. Practically speaking, this proposal certainly does not open the door to any understanding or agreement. The great Powers of the West have declared themselves openly against a suspension of nuclear tests, against the agreement not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons even for an experimental period of four or five years. They condition arrival at an agreement on the solution of political difficulties which have nothing whatever to do with disarmament, and they are trying and will try to impose their point of view on the General Assembly

(Mr. Shtylla, Albania)

The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, despite their so-called flexibility and despite the so-called applicability of their proposals, have submitted an ultimatum of "Take it or leave it". We consider that even if they manage to win a majority for their draft resolutions, they will certainly have not made one single step forward towards a disarmament agreement. On the contrary, they will merely make greater the separation between the East and the West and make agreement more and more difficult to be reached. This attitude of the Western Powers has already led the disarmament negotiations into a stalemate. Their proposals to submit this question to the Disarmament Commission is certainly not constructive in any way. Thus acting under the guise of continuing negotiations, what they are trying to do is to hoodwink world public opinion while continuing the arms race with impunity.

The facts have proved that the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee are not the competent or the correct authorities to lead the United Nations to a solution of the disarmament question. Some delegations have quite rightly stressed the insignificant role of the Disarmament Commission, and the last session of the Sub-Committee has proved that with its present composition that body is not only the right one to help, but also it can obviously not lead to any positive solution at all. As is well known, in the Sub-Committee, apart from the Soviet Union, which wants to come to an agreement, there are Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, all members of the NATO family bloc which want as their name implies, to block any agreement. The Western Powers have tried to give the Sub-Committee, which was set up as a United Nations body, the character of a NATO organ which is set up only to carry out their own policies. We believe that this is a situation that is anomalous and which should be corrected. We should try to get out of the impasse by finding some other method of work, a new procedure which will favour the conclusion of agreements.

(Mr. Shtylla, Albania)

In our view, the draft resolution (A/C.1/797) submitted by the Soviet Union, which proposes the establishment of a permanent Disarmament Commission whose work would be carried on in public, meets this need admirably. The creation of such a Commission, in the work of which all Members of the United Nations would take part, would put an end to the narrow and limited character of the Sub-Committee, as well as to the secrecy of its discussions, thus enabling public opinion to know the truth and, above all, making it possible for all countries to contribute to the solution of the problem.

In the course of the present discussion a number of delegations have expressed their concern with regard to the present composition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, and have asked for the enlargement of those bodies. It seems useful to us to recall that quite a number of representatives of small and medium Powers, while recognizing the responsibility and the preponderant role of the great Powers in the conclusion of a disarmament agreement, have not failed to stress that the problem is of vital interest to all peoples, large or small, and that all countries have something to say on the subject.

The Soviet proposal to have all Member States of the United Nations take part in a permanent Disarmament Commission would be of undeniable value in reaching an agreement. We do not understand why the United States and the other Western Powers, if they entertain the least desire to reach agreement and if they respect the opinions and the capabilities of other Member States, should oppose the creation of such a Commission and even the Indian proposal designed to expand the existing bodies.

Yesterday we heard the representative of the Soviet Union make a very important statement on behalf of his Government. The Soviet Government declared that it would no longer participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee as those bodies are at present composed. We consider that this statement is very serious and very important, yet we entirely approve it. Contrary to the allegations of the representatives of the United States and France, and to those of the representative of Australia this morning, this statement is neither an ultimatum nor a propaganda gesture; it is the expression of the interest and seriousness with which the Soviet Union views the problem of disarmament, and the expression of its will to do everything necessary in order

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for the discussions to emerge from the present deadlock and to create new possibilities of reaching an agreement. On the contrary, it is the Western Powers themselves which, adhering to their negative and obstructionist attitude, are endeavouring to impose upon the General Assembly a draft resolution which does not open the way to any agreement but, on the contrary, would create new obstacles in the way of future negotiations, could serve only as an instrument of propaganda, and thus reveals the aggressive policy of the Powers concerned. On the other hand, the statement of the Soviet Government is a genuine contribution to the efforts undertaken with a view to bringing about real disarmament, and no distortion of facts can conceal its positive and important portent.

My delegation will vote in favour of the Soviet Union draft resolution. It trusts that all who are sincerely desirous of seeing agreement on the disarmament problem will not fail to give it their support also.

The Committee has before it a number of other draft resolutions. Our vote on them will be determined by our delegation's attitude to the disarmament problem -- an attitude which we have already outlined to the Committee. I would merely add that we appreciate very much the efforts of the Polish delegation to make the Belgian draft resolution acceptable. As originally drafted, the Belgian text cannot contribute in any way to the solution of the disarmament problem; it might even serve to legitimize the armaments race. Nevertheless if the Polish amendments are adopted my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole as thus amended.

Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): Before this Committee begins the voting on the various draft resolutions and amendments, my delegation wishes to make a few brief remarks chiefly, at this stage, on some aspects of a procedural character. A number of the delegations which have co-sponsored the twenty-four Power draft resolution have indicated support for prior voting on that draft resolution. To my knowledge the reason for this has never been adequately explained. My delegation, therefore, will not be able to support such a motion.

The United Nations must be a place where all draft resolutions are on an equal footing and where all views are given an equal opportunity of expression. My delegation will ask this Committee to take a vote on the Japanese draft resolution. We ask this because we believe that the consensus of this Committee should be taken on the minority opinion as well as the majority opinion. My delegation believes this course to be eminently fair and desirable, not only in the interests of maintaining democratic procedure but also in the interest of upholding the prestige of this Committee.

May I take this opportunity to state my delegation's position on some of the draft resolutions and amendments on which we have not yet commented? Although my delegation has expressed its reservations on the twenty-four Power draft resolution as a whole, we look with favour on the amendment proposed by Norway and Pakistan in document A/C.1/L.184. We earnestly hope that the creation of the technical group will, through the work of that body, help to facilitate the disarmament negotiations.

As for the amendment (A/C.1/L.181) proposed by Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay, my delegation concurs with its purport, and therefore will be glad to support it.

I want at this juncture to pay our tribute to the sponsors of these amendments.

My delegation views with no little regret the statement made by the Soviet representative here yesterday to the effect that his country will not sit on the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee as those bodies are at present composed. In view of the fact that both the Commission and the Sub-Committee were established by resolution of the General Assembly we hope that the Soviet Union will respect the decisions and recommendations of the Assembly once they are made, and co-operate in the important task of disarmament.

(Mr. Matsudaira, Japan)

At the same time, my delegation fails to understand the Soviet proposal to enlarge the Disarmament Commission to include the entire membership of the United Nations. Inasmuch as this First Committee already exists to reflect the views of all Member States of the United Nations we see no point in enlarging the Disarmament Commission beyond a reasonable size to provide for adequate representation, although surely the Commission could be enlarged by a few Members so that it might better reflect views of the small Powers of the all-important problem of disarmament. I have already indicated in this connexion our position on the Indian draft resolution.

Mr. ENGEN (Norway): With permission I should like to say a few words in connexion with the amendment which my delegation had the honour to submit, together with the delegation of Pakistan, in document A/C.1/L.184.

In my statement in the general debate in this Committee, I made an appeal to the Powers principally concerned to give earnest consideration to the possibility of taking one step forward, however modest, towards real disarmament. I took the liberty of pointing out that in the field of nuclear weapons the crux of the matter was really the achievement of a controlled halt of production of fissionable materials for weapons use. In our view, therefore, an effort should be made to single out from the whole complex of problems this particular problem together with the question of suspension of tests, and give priority consideration to this "small package" of disarmament measures.

The response to our suggestions has not been very encouraging. The Soviet Union, for its part, has in fact replied that a controlled halt of production of fissionable materials has no significance because there exist today large stocks of nuclear fuel which can be used for weapons production and which cannot be controlled or detected. Unless there also was a ban on the production and use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would not be interested in considering such a cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons use. This attitude reflects in our view a position of "all or nothing" which, particularly under present circumstances, seems to be somewhat less than conducive to progress in this field.

(Mr. Engen, Norway)

However, we realize the difficulties of the present situation and we have no desire to complicate this situation further by pressing now for something which the principal negotiating Powers do not feel they can accept, at least at this stage.

On the other hand, we are painfully aware that there will be general and widespread disappointment in the world if this session of the General Assembly adjourns without pointing out one field, however small, or one single initial action in the direction of disarmament on which the major parties concerned can agree to embark immediately and unconditionally.

These considerations have prompted our participation in the tabling of this amendment to the 24-Power resolution. As we see it, there is today agreement in principle between the major Powers that certain measures towards disarmament ought to be taken, and I shall single out three measures in particular: (1) controlled cessation of tests, (2) controlled conventional disarmament, and (3) inspection against surprise attacks. There still is disagreement today -- and we are sorry to take note of this -- as to the implementation of these measures.

What we suggest, then, in our amendment is that the control and inspection measures, which will have to be discussed later in any case, should be discussed right away. In short, we want to establish more clearly how to do the things that we are agreed to do under circumstances upon which we are not yet agreed.

We consider these proposals as being something more than proposals of a merely procedural nature. We hope -- and we believe that we have some reason to hope -- that, when everyone concerned has a clearer picture of how these necessary control systems would work, what machinery would be necessary, etc., it might well be that the disarmament measures with which they are connected will appear in a different light as far as their implementation is concerned. I endorse particularly the views on this point expressed by the representative of Sweden in the general debate in this Committee.

(Mr. Engen, Norway)

We believe that, in any case, we should use these days of apparent deadlock in the disarmament negotiations to some useful purpose, so that it may not be said, when the day arrives -- soon, we hope -- when political circumstances permit further progress, that the actual implementation of planned disarmament must be delayed because technical problems were left unsolved when we had plenty of time to take them up for study.

We hope to see the major Powers accept our suggestion to establish expert groups for inspection systems as soon as possible, as we have stressed in our amendment. And let me say that we are gratified by the response which we have already heard from some of these Powers and from other delegations in this Committee. Our proposal would mean a small step forward, but we feel that it could form a useful basis for real progress.

I reserve my right to intervene again with respect to other proposals before the Committee and with respect to other matters which may be pertinent to the situation in the Committee.

Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to offer some comments on the various draft resolutions now before the Committee. We consider that the Committee should first focus its attention on proposals devoted to concrete questions which require urgent solution. At its past sessions, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions which set general principles and the general approach to disarmament. Consequently, what is needed now is not merely the adoption of resolutions that would reiterate these general principles, but practical decisions on at least some practical steps in the field of disarmament.

The Soviet delegation has presented a plan for measures which would call for a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments, a reduction of the burden of military expenditures, and freeing the peoples from the danger of atomic war. As a first measure, it is proposed that the General Assembly at this session should adopt a decision for the immediate cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons for at least two or three years, that proposal being found in

(Mr. Palamarchuk, Ukrainian SSR)

document A/3674/Rev.1, and also for the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons for five years, it being understood that, after the lapse of that five-year period, the question would again be considered in the United Nations, that proposal being found in document A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1. Adoption of these proposals by the General Assembly would create favourable conditions for broader understandings in the realm of disarmament, including the question of the definitive prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. It goes without saying that this would exert a vast and favourable impact on the international situation and would remove the danger of atomic war.

It is manifest, however, that the Western Powers will not even hear of the adoption of any practical measures for the prohibition of the nuclear weapons or the cessation of test explosions thereof. The United States, the United Kingdom and France keep saying that they will not forego the atomic and hydrogen weapons, that they propose to continue perfecting these weapons, on the ground that they regard these weapons as a deterrent which makes it easier for them to carry out the policy of proceeding from positions of strength. This is the view reflected in the draft resolution presented by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other Powers in document A/C.1/L.179/Rev.1. Underlying the 24-Power draft resolution are the proposals of the Western Powers contained ⁱⁿ the working paper of 29 August of this year presented in London, which, as the experience of negotiations in the Sub-Committee has shown, will not serve the interests of the achievement of an agreement.

It should first be noted that neither the working paper of 29 August nor the 24-Power draft resolution calls for any measures designed to bring about a prohibition of the atomic weapon. The prohibition of the atomic weapon is mentioned neither as a proximate objective nor as a remote objective.

It is true that in his statement yesterday Mr. Moch tried to represent matters as though the prohibition of atomic weapons remains an ultimate objective of the Western Powers. But in that case why is it that the 24-Power draft resolution does not breathe a word about the prohibition of the atomic weapon or at least about the prohibition of the use of the atomic weapon?

(Mr. Palamarchuk, Ukrainian SSR)

The point is that four of the members of the Sub-Committee, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, have, jointly and severally, taken the stand -- and they adhere to that stand -- of non-disarmament, of piling up military might and inflating it.

As regards the testing of nuclear weapons, it would appear at first glance that paragraph 1 (a) of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution does call for the immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons. But this is a mere semblance of reality, because the cessation of test explosions is linked to the whole complex of problems relating to disarmament -- and these, in turn, are made dependent upon the prior solution of political problems. The cessation of tests is not in the plans of the United Kingdom and the United States. Yesterday, the United States representative said that nuclear tests were essential in order, as he put it, to strengthen the forces of the non-Soviet world.

The twenty-four-Power draft resolution replaces measures for the cessation of test explosions and the prohibition of nuclear weapons by measures for the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. My delegation wishes to stress that, in the absence of the prohibition of nuclear and hydrogen weapons, in the absence of the elimination of such weapons from the armaments of States, in the absence of the destruction of the existing stockpiles of these weapons, in the absence of the cessation of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons from existing stockpiles of fissionable materials, this cut-off of the production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes not only is devoid of any practical significance in the sense of removing the threat of atomic war, but actually seeks to achieve the purpose of legitimizing the production and use of weapons for the mass extermination of human beings.

Thus, the Western proposal on atomic and hydrogen weapons constitutes an attempt to bury, to put a cross on, decisions of the General Assembly, and especially the decision of the ninth session of the Assembly which called upon States Members of the United Nations to seek agreement on the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

This same tendency is reflected in the proposals relating to conventional armaments. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its ninth session states that it is essential to seek agreement on the major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments. The draft resolution submitted to this Committee by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and some other

States replaces this clear demand by a vague formula designed to legitimize the refusal of the Western Powers to carry out any substantial reduction of their armed forces and armaments. That is the true meaning of the proposals on ceilings or levels of armed forces contained in the working paper of 29 August 1957.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from all this? It is that, far from furthering the cause of disarmament, the twenty-four-Power draft resolution erects insuperable barriers on the path to a mutually acceptable agreement. This is no accident. The Western Powers sidestep any agreement because they dread disarmament, for reasons into which I need not go any further at this point. Small wonder, therefore, that no sooner had this Committee proceeded to the examination of the draft resolutions before it than a violent attack was launched against the proposals of all other States, and particularly those of the Soviet Union. The demand for the granting of priority to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution is not procedural pedantry; it is a deliberate stratagem designed to throw overboard proposals which displease the opponents of disarmament. But the problem of disarmament cannot be solved by a procedural game or by procedural methods. The point about disarmament is that agreement must be achieved.

I should now like to say a few words on the Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.180). There is no doubt that, in submitting its draft resolution, the Yugoslav delegation was guided by good intentions and positions. This draft resolution, however, is difficult to support. We feel that the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, without the prohibition of the atomic weapon and its elimination from the armaments of States, would not serve to solve the question of the elimination of the danger of atomic war.

Progress in the field of disarmament would be furthered by an alteration in the procedure and modalities for discussing disarmament problems in the United Nations. The idea is that the organ dealing with this vital problem should have a broad and representative character, should be so set up as to ensure that all States may take an active part in its deliberations. The Soviet Union delegation has submitted a proposal for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission comprising all States Members of the United Nations. This permanent disarmament commission would operate continuously. It would systematically

examine the disarmament proposals of all States and would draft appropriate recommendations for consideration by sessions of the General Assembly. The necessity for the establishment of such an organ has become urgent since the Disarmament Commission, with its present membership of twelve, and the Sub-Committee, with its present membership of five, have proved to be incapable of solving the problems assigned to them by the General Assembly.

One of the reasons for the lack of success of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee is that the consideration of disarmament problems in those organs has been confined to a narrow group of States. Seventy States Members of the United Nations, whose peoples are as interested in a swift solution of the disarmament problem as are the peoples of other States, are kept out of the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

Equally unsatisfactory is the manner of work of the Sub-Committee, which makes it possible to conceal from world public opinion the truth about the course of the negotiations. This procedure has led to the position where the disarmament problem, which touches upon the interests of all mankind, is considered in secrecy, behind closed doors. Many States have not been kept informed of the course of events in the Sub-Committee, and world public opinion has been kept in ignorance of what is happening and sometimes has been even misinformed.

It has been properly pointed out in this Committee that the consideration of the disarmament problem should not be confined to a narrow group of States. Even though, because of their particular situation, the great Powers bear the primary responsibility for solving this problem, the small and medium-sized States should be given an opportunity to take part in the negotiations, instead of merely attending, in a decorative way, debates on the need for disarmament. Therefore, access to organs dealing with disarmament should be open to all States, large and small alike. Those States should be given an opportunity to contribute their meed to the achievement of agreement on the cessation of the armaments race and the elimination of the threat of another war.

For all those reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of the Soviet Union proposal for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the States Members of the United Nations. We shall vote against the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

Mr. BOLAND (Ireland): I should like to explain as briefly as I possibly can the attitude which my delegation adopts towards some of the principal proposals before the Committee, as well as the broad reasons for our attitude in each case.

Although, as I endeavoured to explain in my statement to the Committee on 24 October, we feel that any plan for public propaganda in favour of disarmament presents a danger in that it might encourage people in countries in which public opinion is free to express itself to express themselves in favour of cuts in defence expenditures and reduced national armaments, irrespective of world conditions which necessitate the maintenance of national defences at a safe level, we propose to vote in favour of the draft resolution standing before the Committee in the name of Belgium. We feel that, against the potential disadvantage we apprehend, which we admit is potential and contingent, there must be placed the high-minded idealism to which the Belgian draft resolution gives expression and the sincere devotion to the cause of world peace which obviously inspired those sentiments we both respect and share, all the more so when, as in this case, they form the basis of a proposal by a country which has twice within a generation suffered so grievously and so **undeservedly** from the scourge of war.

As our Foreign Minister said in the debate in the General Assembly, and as I endeavoured to explain again in my statement before this Committee on 24 October, it is our deep and abiding conviction that an essential preliminary to the success of any further negotiations on disarmament is some relaxation of the existing international tension, at least at its points of greatest friction. If, as a result of diplomatic discussions between the major Powers concerned, some progress could be made towards reducing tension and obviating the risk of clashes in certain vital areas, the gain in **mutual** confidence would be such that negotiations on disarmament could be renewed with a new prospect of success, and the outlook for world peace would be enormously improved. We are unable to feel any real confidence that, as long as the political atmosphere in the world remains as it is today, any resolutions we may pass here or any further discussions on the disarmament problem we are likely to undertake will carry us much further towards the goal we are all anxious to reach. It is, however, clear that whenever and in whatever circumstances further disarmament negotiations are undertaken, they are bound to be concerned with just the same issues as we have

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been discussing in this Committee for the past three weeks -- the suspension of tests, the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the importance of arrangements for effective supervision and control, the provision of safeguards against surprise attack. Any disarmament agreement, whenever and in whatever circumstances it is negotiated, must attempt to deal with these points not only severally, but in their relationship with one another, and it is only natural, therefore, that this Committee, having discussed these points so exhaustively for such a length of time, should wish, even in the absence of unanimity, to come to some conclusion with regard to them.

What we are all anxious to help to bring about, of course, is an agreement on the principal outstanding issues between the countries principally concerned. No resolution which this Committee can pass can take the place of such an agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, moreover, no resolution passed by this Committee or, indeed, by any committee or commission representative of the membership of the United Nations as a whole, can have any inflexible or final character or represent more than a suggestion as to the lines on which negotiations with a view to final agreement between the Powers principally concerned might be pursued.

We have carefully studied from this point of view the various draft resolutions dealing with what I may call the substance of the disarmament problem. Conscious of the limitations of our technical knowledge, we have studied them conscientiously in a desire to arrive at an objective judgement as to which of the various sets of principles put forward can claim, with the greatest justice, to afford a fair, reasonable and realistic basis for at least a partial disarmament agreement. Although many of the other draft resolutions before the Committee contain specific proposals with which we are in full agreement and which we would be glad to see incorporated in an ultimate disarmament convention, we consider that, taken as a whole, the proposal which best satisfied the criteria which I have just mentioned is the draft resolution standing in the name of twenty-four countries, as amended in accordance with the proposal of Norway and Pakistan. We propose, accordingly, to vote in favour of that draft resolution.

(Mr. Boland, Ireland)

We will be unable to vote for other draft resolutions which seem to us to be in direct conflict with this or which, by attempting to deal with particular measures of disarmament in isolation, ignore the essential interdependence of the different aspects of the disarmament problem and the factor of internal balance which any disarmament plan, to be acceptable, must present.

I should like to add a word about the draft resolutions before the Committee which deal with procedural matters, particularly the proposal to enlarge the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and the proposal to abolish the present Commission and to replace it with a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the Members of the United Nations. We find ourselves, to our regret, unable to support either of these proposals. Whatever other methods may temporarily be resorted to, in our view the achievement of a disarmament agreement must depend ultimately on the method of sincere and painstaking negotiations between the countries principally concerned. Public debate, in our view, can contribute little. If public debate is required, we have ample opportunity for it in the General Assembly and in this Committee. Further provision for it is hardly required. Certainly, in our view, it is not necessary to provide further facilities for it by abolishing the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, considering that the Sub-Committee affords the only formal provision in the structure of the United Nations for the kind of detailed, technical discussions between the States principally concerned in private and in a spirit of negotiation and compromise which are so important and necessary if mutual agreement, which is the only means of solving the disarmament problem, is to be achieved.

For that reason, we regret sincerely that the Soviet Union should have felt it necessary to withdraw from participation in the work of the Sub-Committee. Nor, I am afraid, do we fully grasp the exact point of the argument on which the action of the Soviet Union is based. We wonder, for example, if the term "ultimatum" can be properly applied to the majority decisions of this Committee, whether it cannot be applied with equal force to any decisions of the proposed permanent disarmament commission which the Government of the Soviet Union felt unable to approve. In company with many other members of the Committee, I am sure, we will continue to hope that the Soviet Union will see its way to revise its decision.

Mr. PELAZ (Philippines): The Philippine delegation wishes to explain its position on the different draft resolutions now before the Committee. We should like to refer first to the question of the composition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, which yesterday caused the Soviet Union to tell us bluntly that "it will not participate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee in their present composition". (A/C.1/PV.890, p.11) The attitude of the Soviet Union is to be deplored because it appears to us of the Philippine delegation to be an attempt to exert pressure upon the members of the Committee to change the composition of the Commission in conformity with the wishes of the Soviet Union.

While the Soviet Union was complaining about the presentation of the proposals of the Western Powers in a manner which, according to it, constituted an ultimatum, the Soviet Union was itself guilty of delivering an ultimatum to the members of this Committee, for how else could we reasonably interpret the Soviet Union's advance announcement of non-participation in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee in their present composition, even while we are still considering the different proposals affecting the composition of these bodies and weighing the merits of the proposed changes against those of keeping the status quo? The Soviet Union practically tells us that we can go ahead approving any resolution, voice the sentiments of our peoples against the armaments race, put forward our reasons for our convictions -- yes, we can do all this -- but no resolution which the General Assembly may approve will convince it or move it to continue with the disarmament negotiations unless, of course, we do as it wishes.

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

We beg to submit that this attitude undermines the very integrity of our proceedings; for here, in this great forum, we must have freedom to act in accordance with truth, reason and justice and in accordance with the dictates of our conscience. Reciprocally we must respect that freedom in others. Threats of boycott cannot be, in any sense, regarded as legitimate persuasion. This is not the first time that the United Nations has met with such threats. Certainly we cannot allow them to sway us from acting in accordance with our convictions.

On the other hand, we do hope that the Soviet Union will not persist in its attitude and will instead continue with the difficult task of seeking a solution to the disarmament problem, so that, in the words of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, "we shall succeed in justifying to some extent the hopes of millions and millions of people who are expecting deeds and not words in the field of disarmament". (A/C.1/PV.867, page 42)

Going now specifically to the proposal of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/797) to discard the present Commission and its Sub-Committee and, in their stead, to establish a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all the States Members of the United Nations, we submit that the stand taken by the Soviet Union yesterday is the best proof of the inefficacy of the proposal; for whether we have the present Commission or a commission to which some members are added, or the eighty-two member commission envisaged by the Soviet Union, the central fact is that the principal parties concerned have a de facto veto power on the negotiations, as the Soviet Union clearly proved by its statement yesterday afternoon.

To put it in another way: will the Soviet Union tell us that if a permanent disarmament commission of eighty-two members is created, the Soviet Union will not exercise the veto and will abide by the recommendations of a majority of such a commission? Hardly. The success of the negotiations must, therefore, continue to depend on the attitude of the principal parties themselves. A change in the Commission or its Sub-Committee will not alter this fact. Moreover, as we have said in the general debate, an earnest, workmanlike approach to the disarmament problem would be more likely to produce an agreement. This approach

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

would certainly be impossible in a body of eighty-two members. We can foresee that in such a body much of the time which the principal parties concerned could devote to tackling the intricate issues involved would be frittered away in propaganda-making and in efforts to persuade as many of the eighty-two members as possible to vote one way or another. The Philippine delegation, therefore, cannot support the Soviet Union's proposal for the creation of an eighty-two member permanent commission on disarmament.

The Philippine delegation also regrets that it is unable to support the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.177). To begin with, we note that the Indian draft resolution leaves blank the number of States which it would add both to the Disarmament Commission and to its Sub-Committee. Nor does this draft resolution state how or on what basis the additional Member States are to be chosen. But even if these details were filled in, the reasons which we have adduced against the Soviet proposal to create an eighty-two member permanent disarmament commission apply with equal logic to the Indian draft resolution.

In the course of the debate reference has been made to the suggestion of Mexico that a person of high prestige and repute be designated as mediator or conciliator between the principal parties involved. Although this has not been submitted as a formal proposal, we should like to say that we agree with the representative of Peru, Mr. Belaunde, that the matter of designating such a person should depend entirely on the principal parties concerned. If both sides agree that such a mediator or conciliator is necessary and, moreover, if they can agree on a person who enjoys the confidence of both sides, then we shall favour such a proposal. But if the suggestion is not acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, then it would be idle for the rest of us to impose such a mediator or conciliator upon them.

The Philippine delegation will vote for the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1). We should like to associate ourselves with the views expressed here that, as presently worded, this draft resolution is not concerned in any way with the political issues that have divided us here and that it would be best to leave the text as it is. However, we believe that the second Polish

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

amendment, which would replace the remaining words after "and of the necessity", in paragraph 3 of the preamble, by the words "of reaching a disarmament agreement with effective measures of control provided for", is an improvement in style which strengthens the draft resolution and is, therefore, acceptable.

We share the fears just expressed by the representative of Ireland as to the possible misuse of the campaign provided for in the Belgian draft resolution. Nevertheless, we shall vote for it in the hope that, once approved -- and unanimously, we trust -- the campaign to acquaint all the peoples of the world with the dangers of the armaments race will not be used by any Member State to serve its own ends, but that every Member State will afford its people the fullest freedom to know the truth about the implications of the armaments race, on the basis of which alone an enlightened public opinion on the subject can be formed.

What should be the recommendations which the General Assembly ought to make to the parties concerned? We think that the Assembly should recommend, with a unanimous voice, that the negotiations on disarmament be resumed. There is a divergence of opinion as to the specific points that should be offered by the Assembly as a guide for future disarmament negotiations.

On this aspect of the matter there are four categories of proposals before us. The first proposal would single out the question of nuclear tests and calls for their suspension as an independent, isolated step. Japan, India and the Soviet Union are the principal proponents of this measure.

The second proposal -- that of the Soviet Union -- would call upon States possessing nuclear weapons to assume a temporary obligation not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons for five years, during which attempts would be made to arrive at a comprehensive international disarmament agreement.

The third proposal, that advanced in the twenty-four Power draft resolution, calls for the immediate suspension of nuclear tests upon the emergence of an agreement in principle on a number of initial steps which are vital to the commencement of genuine and effective disarmament.

The fourth proposal, that contained in the Yugoslav draft resolution, lumps together most of the points mentioned in the three proposals just referred to, but separates them, thus rejecting the unified approach in the twenty-four Power proposal.

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

Much as it shares the fears and apprehensions of the proponents of the idea of having nuclear tests suspended at the earliest possible date, the Philippine delegation feels that the General Assembly would be remiss in its duty to a world threatened by the possible unleashing of existing and already tested weapons of mass destruction to a much greater extent than by the radioactive fallout by present controlled tests if the General Assembly should embody and emphasize in its resolution only a recommendation in favour of the suspension of nuclear tests without reference to the really vital aspects of disarmament such as the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the transfer of stocks of fissionable materials from weapons to non-weapons uses and the reduction of armed forces and armaments.

It is true that the suspension of nuclear tests would quiet fears of the deleterious consequences of the radioactive fallout caused by such tests. But would we not thereby be simply deluding humanity, leading it to believe that since nuclear tests will cease it has been spared the danger of atomic warfare, when in truth we shall not have moved one step forward in stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons which, with the present know-how and without the need for further tests, can be made many times as deadly as the comparatively puny atom bombs which caused the horrible holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? The Philippine delegation feels that a recommendation that nuclear tests be suspended standing alone would be grossly inadequate and could mislead the world to a false sense of security. Consequently, after a conscientious study of the proposals in this regard, we cannot lend our support to them.

We need not repeat here the cogent arguments already put forward against the Soviet Union's proposal for a bare declaration by the States possessing nuclear weapons not to use them. Let us be candid about this. Such a declaration would constitute only a gentleman's agreement with nothing but a gentleman's word to bind the parties. Unfortunately, the parties on either side do not trust each other. With mutual confidence, such a declaration would be unnecessary; without mutual confidence, it would be worthless.

Mr. Gromyko has repeatedly told us that the world expects deeds, not words. By this very standard offered by the Soviet Union, its proposal to solve the disarmament problem by mere words must be rejected.

(Mr. Palaez, Philippines)

We appreciate the efforts exerted by Yugoslavia to offer a draft resolution seeking to encompass the different views. While the effort is commendable, it must be pointed out that the draft proposal fails to give any definite orientation for future negotiations. On the other hand, the conglomeration of details included in the draft resolution, by their very number and often contradictory nature, would merely provide fertile ground for disagreement, thereby dooming future negotiations to failure. There is a Spanish saying which I find rather apt here: Quien mucho abarca, poco aprieta. That, in our humble opinion, is the weakness of the Yugoslav draft resolution. Because it encompasses too many details and embodies different approaches to the problem, it fails to establish a definite line of action which the General Assembly could and should recommend to the negotiating parties.

The Philippine delegation submits that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution furnishes such a definite, simple and consistent line of action which could launch the resumed disarmament talks towards realistic and obtainable objectives. The Soviet Union has protested that the proposal embodied in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution is tied to political conditions. We fail to understand why this argument has been repeatedly put forward. No such conditions are to be found in the draft resolution. Since it must be judged by what its text says, we must conclude that no such conditions have been or are intended to be part of the draft resolution. Moreover, the representative of the United States, Ambassador Lodge, has categorically stated here that his Government and the Western Powers are prepared to enter into an agreement on the initial steps enumerated in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution without any political conditions. We have no reason to doubt that statement.

The Soviet Union and others have also objected to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution on the ground that it is too rigid and that one item is so interlinked with the other that the prospects of agreement are nil. We have carefully considered this objection. I believe, however, that at this stage of the debate all such doubts have been clarified.

In our first intervention, when the allegation that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was an ultimatum was first advanced by the representative of Poland, we stated that the draft resolution was being offered as a workable basis upon which

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the Powers concerned could resume negotiations and come to a fruitful agreement on disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The representative of Canada subsequently stated that it was not Canada's view that the particular proposals "with which we are now associated are the only means by which some progress can be made towards disarmament." (A/C.1/PV.878, p.12) Yesterday, the representatives of the United States and France expressly confirmed these views. It is therefore far-fetched to suppose, as the Soviet Union has supposed, that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution is an inflexible rigid ultimatum by which its co-sponsors would wish to straitjacket the forthcoming negotiations. We reject that view.

The Philippine delegation believes that while the draft resolution does point out some desirable avenues along which those who support the draft resolution believe the disarmament talks could be effectively channelled toward the ultimate goal of comprehensive disarmament, it does not in any manner curtail the freedom of the negotiating parties in presenting other proposals or counter-proposals or adopting other measures and agreements in the course of their negotiation. The provisions of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution are not necessarily the last word, its sponsors have repeatedly stressed. We are gratified to note that yesterday the representative of France, whose dedication to the difficult task of finding an answer to this stubborn problem before us is known by everyone, went out of his way to assure us of his Government's readiness to explore fresh approaches during the negotiations once they are resumed.

Two amendments have been offered to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution which, in our view, would improve it. The first is the amendment offered by Norway and Pakistan in document A/C.1/L.184, which would request the Disarmament Commission to invite its Sub-Committee to give priority to the establishment of a body or bodies of technical experts to study inspection systems for disarmament measures on which the Sub-Committee may reach agreement in principle. This would provide a ready machinery to work out the technical problems of disarmament and would give impetus to the speedy implementation of such agreement which the parties may reach in principle.

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Finally, we are happy to associate ourselves with the amendment (A/C.1/L.181) offered by Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay, recommending that the States concerned consider the possibility of devoting funds made available as a result of disarmament to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world, particularly in the less developed countries. We are for this amendment, either as presently worded or as amended, as some States have proposed, to take into account the stand of some members.

While the Philippines, which is an under-developed country, would presumably be among the beneficiaries of such a programme, it would also be in the enlightened self-interest of the countries called upon to help the under-developed areas to do so. For in the world we envision, where all peoples of this earth will live together as members of the human family, prosperity and well-being will be for all.

May we not express the hope that the genius of man, which has now sent a dog soaring around the world in the vast reaches of outer space, shall apply itself with equal passion to the problem of human survival. The Soviet Union, which has achieved the first of these miracles, cannot refuse to share with the rest of us the responsibility of achieving the far more necessary miracle of human survival. We refuse to believe that it will withhold its wisdom and its counsel from this common task.

Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): Mr. Chairman, may I join with the other speakers in offering my cordial congratulations and those of my delegation to you and to the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on your unanimous elections to the high and responsible positions in this most important Committee.

It is a particular source of joy to the delegation of Thailand that, for the first time, the Chairman of the Political Committee of the General Assembly is an Asian. This is not only a tribute to your outstanding personal qualities, but an evidence of the growing importance of the role played by Asian and African delegations in the United Nations and, I may also add, an evidence of the growing confidence which the Asian and African group now enjoys.

For, indeed, we work as a group and not as a bloc. The Asian and African delegations meet as a group for mutual consultations, in the course of which we naturally endeavour to reach common solutions if we can, and as far as we can, but each delegation reserves its right to offer its own solution and to vote as it sees fit.

(Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thailand)

Thus, in this matter of disarmament now under our consideration, we have a proposal from Japan, three proposals from India, and Laos, Liberia, Philippines and Tunisia are co-sponsors of the twenty-four-Power joint draft resolution. We all share a common objective in promoting the cause of peace by endeavouring to bring about a step forward in the matter of disarmament.

What do the peoples of the world want? They want peace. They want to avoid war, because the next war, which will be a nuclear war, will be far worse than a "scourge" that our Charter speaks of: it will spell annihilation for mankind. The peoples would, therefore, welcome disarmament as a step in the maintenance of international peace and security or, in other words, as a step in the prevention of war.

There can well be unilateral acts of disarmament as, indeed, there have been unilateral acts in the reduction of the armed forces of certain countries. But these unilateral acts have not allayed the fear of war in the minds of the peoples of the world. What the peoples want is rather an agreement in disarmament. I therefore lay particular stress on the agreement aspect of the problem and I am borne out in this by Article 26 of the Charter which provides for plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. That, of course, would undoubtedly involve an international agreement of a very elaborate nature.

The problem of disarmament is certainly a most complex one, because the object of disarmament is not just to reduce armaments but to bring about security and prevent war, and the various component parts of the problem, even in its initial stage, have to be dealt with together as a whole before they are dealt with separately in detail.

That is why my delegation is in agreement with the twenty-four-Power joint draft resolution both as regards the contents of a priority disarmament agreement and the procedure to be adopted.

As regards the contents, I ask myself this question. If sub-paragraph (a) is deleted, will the peoples feel that there is sufficient security to allay the fear of war? And I ask myself the same question in regard to the other sub-paragraphs.

Sub-paragraph (a), concerning the suspension of testing of nuclear weapons, obviously cannot be deleted, because an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests is certainly desired by the peoples all over the world.

(Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thailand)

Nor can sub-paragraph (b) concerning the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the complete devotion of future production to non-weapons purposes, and sub-paragraph (c) concerning the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a programme of transfer of stocks of fissionable material from weapons to non-weapons uses, be deleted, because they are the corollaries of sub-paragraph (a).

Sub-paragraph (b), concerning reduction of armed forces and armaments, cannot be deleted, because, without such reduction, there would still be fear of war in the popular mind.

The same applies to sub-paragraph (e) concerning the progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attack. This cannot be deleted, because an agreement on this point would reassure world public opinion.

Finally, there is sub-paragraph (f) concerning joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. The necessity of including this item in a priority disarmament agreement is not so clear, but it should be noticed that only a joint study is to be made and that the agreement sought in this priority disarmament agreement would be an agreement on general principles only. Therefore, my delegation does not object to the inclusion of sub-paragraph (f).

(Prince Wan Waithayakon,
Thailand)

Now as regards the procedure, my delegation is of the opinion that the present arrangement is well calculated to meet the requirements of the case. At each session of the General Assembly, there is a full discussion of the disarmament problem in all its aspects and every delegation is at liberty to put forward its ideas and its proposals. Then the matter is entrusted to the Disarmament Commission and, for purposes of negotiations, to the Disarmament Sub-Committee. But nothing prevents the Disarmament Commission from playing a more active role, and it is my hope that the Disarmament Commission will do so.

And now I shall deal with the question of the suspension of nuclear weapons tests which is to be found in the draft resolution of Japan and the revised draft resolution of India and the cessation of such tests which is to be found in the draft resolution of Yugoslavia.

From the draft resolution which the delegation of Yugoslavia has submitted in document A/C.1/L.180, it would appear that in the opinion of that delegation the matter of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests could form the object of an agreement separate from an agreement or agreements on other matters of disarmament.

I have already stated that my delegation is in agreement with the twenty-four Power joint draft resolution that in a disarmament agreement there should be provisions concerning the immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons coupled with provisions concerning the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the complete devotion of future production to non-weapons purposes, and coupled also with provisions concerning the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a programme of transfer of stocks of fissionable material from weapons to non-weapons uses.

That is why I do not think that the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests could form the object of an agreement separate from an agreement in principle on the other two connected matters.

However, I take the word "suspension" in the twenty-four Power joint draft resolution to refer to a long-term suspension or what the Yugoslav delegation refers to as "cessation". I could well conceive of a temporary suspension or what the representative of Sweden calls a moratorium.

(Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thailand)

It is in this light that I have examined the draft resolution of Japan in document A/C.1/L.174. It calls upon the Member States concerned (a) to suspend all nuclear test explosions from the time an agreement is reached in principle on a supervision and inspection system necessary to verify the suspension of tests until the discussions on the report of the Disarmament Commission at the next regular session of the General Assembly have been concluded.

My difficulty with this draft resolution is that it does not leave the Member States concerned sufficient liberty of action in determining the conditions on which an agreement for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests may be concluded. In fact, it is an appeal to suspend the tests and not an appeal to the Member States concerned to come to an agreement for the suspension of the tests.

I find a similar difficulty with the draft resolution of India in document A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4 which says:

"3. Appeals to the States concerned to agree without delay to suspend tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and to inform the Secretary-General of their willingness to do so."

The word "agree" here does not mean "to come to an agreement" but "to consent to".

In the opinion of my delegation, we should appeal to the Member States concerned to come to an agreement for an immediate temporary suspension of nuclear weapons tests as a measure to allay the concern of mankind and expedite a disarmament agreement.

I believe that a temporary suspension of nuclear weapons tests is sincerely desired by the peoples of the world. I believe that it is possible, but how and on what conditions should be left to the Member States concerned to agree upon. They should know best how an agreement could be reached. We, especially the representatives of the small countries, should voice the peoples' desire for a temporary suspension of such tests, so that the great Powers concerned may feel their responsibilities in this matter all the more keenly, and our earnest and urgent appeal to them should also serve as a clear testimony of the confidence we place in them and in their endeavours in response to world opinion.

Finally, I should like to state that my delegation supports the draft resolution of Belgium in document A/3630/Corr.1 and the five-Power amendment to the joint draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.181.

Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): More than ten draft resolutions have been submitted on the disarmament problem in this Committee, and the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR wishes to state its views on these draft resolutions.

The draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 28 October of this year recommends the establishment of a permanent Disarmament Commission to comprise all States Members of the United Nations, abolishing the present United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. This proposal is due to the fact that the ten-year activity of the Disarmament Commission and the four-year activity of its Sub-Committee have yielded no fruit and have not furthered the solution of the disarmament problem by one whit. The common people are tired of talk about disarmament, of beautiful sounding promises and of diplomatic stratagems and dilatory manoeuvres. They say that such things as the hydrogen bomb are not fit subjects for jokes. They want peace and they stand firmly for peace.

Expressing these feelings, the representative of the USSR in his speech of 4 November of this year stated on behalf of the Soviet Government that all attempts to utilize the Sub-Committee for productive work have been exhausted. Under the circumstances, the Soviet Government sees no point in any further participation in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

This statement was no accident. It was a deeply thought-through statement and position based on a comprehensive and lengthy study of the situation which has arisen in the consideration of the disarmament problem.

(Mr. Kiselev, Byelorussian SSR)

The present narrow composition of the Sub-Committee consisting, on the one hand, of four States parties to the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty, and, on the other hand, of the Soviet Union, gives no opportunity to many countries to take part in the consideration of the disarmament problem. We find that the work of the Sub-Committee has turned out to be quite fruitless, while the Commission itself has in reality played the role of a mail box, sui generis, as the representative of India very aptly pointed out.

Ruling circles of the United States, Britain, France and Canada do not want to disarm, and they have been using the Sub-Committee to camouflage the continuing armaments race in the NATO countries. They need talk of disarmament in order to publicize themselves as champions of disarmament and in order to delude world public opinion and lull vigilance. It is quite evident that the existing procedure for the consideration of disarmament problems in the Sub-Committee, which was closed and almost secret in character, could not contribute to a successful solution of those problems.

In his address yesterday, the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, endeavoured to represent matters as if closed consideration of disarmament problems by a narrow circle of countries that happen to be members of the Sub-Committee was something that had yielded favourable results. Unfortunately, that does not correspond to reality. The Sub-Committee held seventy-one closed meetings this year, but those meetings have borne no fruit and have been of no use.

The United States representative sought to distort the Soviet Union representative's statement by asserting that the Soviet Union was unwilling to consider the disarmament problem further. The statement of the United States representative was wholeheartedly endorsed by the French representative, Mr. Moch.

In reality, however, things are quite different. The latest proposal of the Soviet Union, calling for the institution of a permanent United Nations Disarmament Commission, is dictated by the Soviet Government's ardent desire to get the disarmament problem out of its present impasse and to enable all Members of the Organization to take part in its solution.

(Mr. Kiselev, Byelorussian SSR)

The debates in this Committee on the question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces and on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons have shown convincingly that the majority of the Member States of the United Nations are genuinely alarmed at the lack of progress in the solution of this problem. Many delegations have pointed out very aptly that the disarmament problem must be solved without delay if we wish to exorcize the danger of a destructive nuclear war -- a danger which is lowering over the peoples.

We have heard various proposals on ways and means of expediting and facilitating the solution of this most important problem of our time. There have been many such proposals. Some delegations have pointed out, very correctly, that expansion of the circle of States that participate in the disarmament negotiations would be an important contribution to a swift solution and to agreement on disarmament. It is surely abnormal that the representatives of seventy countries should be kept away from participation in the solution of the disarmament problem. The Governments of those countries have displayed great interest in the solution of that problem. They have submitted various proposals the consideration of which could be helpful in bringing the positions of the countries concerned closer together, especially where this contribution would be made by small countries. But at the present time such proposals, are, in reality, neither considered nor studied in the Sub-Committee.

Taking all these points into consideration, we feel that the Soviet proposal for the institution of a permanent Disarmament Commission is a timely one and a step which deserves full approval. The relevant draft resolution specifies the composition of the permanent Commission, its terms of reference and its working procedure. Adoption of the Soviet proposal would spell the elimination of the serious drawbacks implicit in the present United Nations organs and procedures on disarmament which I have mentioned. That is why the Byelorussian delegation supports the Soviet proposal for the establishment of a permanent Disarmament Commission, and appeals to other members of the First Committee to support it too. We are convinced that its adoption would greatly assist in successfully solving the disarmament problem.

The same purpose would be served by the First Committee's approval of the Soviet Union's draft resolution providing that the States which possess nuclear weapons should assume an obligation, temporary in the first place, not to use nuclear and hydrogen weapons for five years, and the proposal which calls for a cessation of nuclear weapons tests for two or three years beginning on 1 January 1958. We have dealt with those draft resolutions in detail during the general debate, and shall therefore not touch upon them any more.

I should like now to refer briefly to the other draft resolutions before the Committee. We consider that the proposal presented by Belgium serves no useful purpose in its present form in connexion with the solution of the fundamental issue before us, which is the attainment of agreement on the disarmament problem. The dissemination of information or publicity on the armaments race, which is mentioned in the Belgian draft resolution, would not remove the danger of war one whit. At this time the task is to concentrate all efforts on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons, and therefore the Byelorussian delegation will be able to support the Belgian draft resolution only if the amendment to it proposed by Poland are incorporated in it. Those amendments would substantially improve the Belgian idea and would make the draft resolution a purposeful and useful instrument.

As for the Japanese draft resolution, we have already indicated that its defects and drawbacks have remained unaltered. Appealing for and recognizing the necessity of the cessation of nuclear and hydrogen weapons tests, the Japanese draft resolution nevertheless makes the solution of this question conditional on the achievement of an agreement on other disarmament problems, and this, as experience has shown, leads in reality to the prevention of any agreement on so important and urgent problem as the immediate cessation of these tests. One cannot fail to realize that the position set forth in the draft resolution of the twenty-four Powers is similar.

Given this approach to the disarmament problem, no agreement is within reach either on the problems of disarmament as a whole or on so limited a problem as the cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons, and this is precisely the situation which the twenty-four Power draft resolution, presented by countries headed by the United States, is designed to achieve.

An attempt is made here to impose the position of one side, which does not seek to further the achievement of a disarmament agreement, on the other side. We consider that an approach of this kind will only complicate any further search for agreement on disarmament, and for this reason we will certainly vote against the draft resolution of the twenty-four Powers.

These are our brief comments on some of the draft resolutions which are before the Committee. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR expresses the hope that the Committee will endorse the new Soviet proposals, designed as they are to bring about the swift solution of the disarmament problem, the relaxation of international tension, the cessation of the cold war and the establishment of confidence between States.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria)(interpretation from French): The resolutions on the question of disarmament that have been submitted to the Committee and the debate on this question have been rather confused and they have certainly not tended to link this matter up. The interpretations given in the statements made on these resolutions, and by the sponsors of the resolutions, permit us to a large extent to see what goal is going to be arrived at by their practical application, once these resolutions are adopted.

Generally speaking, what have we been able to gather, what have we been able to conclude, at the present stage of the debate?

First, if war was a calamity in the past and through all of humanity's history, then, during the present period, when atomic and hydrogen weapons are used, it will be a complete disaster not only for the countries involved but for all humanity. The very existence of these atomic and thermonuclear weapons in the arsenals of States is an ever-present threat and menace to entire populations in certain regions of the world and will lead to complete destruction and annihilation in the case of generalized warfare.

Second, the peoples of the world -- the more advanced countries as well as the most under-developed countries -- unanimously feel that the question of disarmament is the most important question of all international questions at present and is at the same time the matter which most urgently requires solution.

Third, the radioactive effects of these atomic and thermonuclear tests, which have not been sufficiently studied, are an ever-increasing danger to humanity. The very fact that all the effects of radiation are not as yet completely known must obviously force us to take some measures to cease such tests.

If we are to eliminate atomic and thermonuclear weapons from the arsenals of countries, then we have to come to an agreement, and the small countries and all the peoples of the world will have to show their deep concern for such an agreement. The small countries and the peoples of such countries are so concerned because they may become the innocent victims of a general conflagration wherein atomic and thermonuclear weapons would be used. We know that in the present state of affairs these are the weapons that would be used.

World public opinion is far ahead of the expressions of opinion voiced in this Committee regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and also in the field of the cessation of test explosions.

Furthermore, it has been unanimously noted that in view of the tremendous difficulties inherent in a general disarmament agreement, due primarily to the lack of confidence on the part of the States concerned, it would be more logical to start with partial agreements on the subjects upon which, in the view of the parties, agreement in principle does exist.

These are some of the conclusions that we can gather from the very lengthy but extremely important debate that has been held at the present session of the General Assembly.

The resolutions submitted on this question must answer the call of the great masses of the world, must satisfy the aspirations of the peoples of the world. It is in the light of such conclusions that the resolutions submitted must be discussed and considered.

The twenty-four-Power draft resolution, document A/C.1/L.179/Rev.1, expresses the point of view of the four NATO Powers that are members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. The very wording is culled from the proposals made by the NATO representatives at the Sub-Committee meetings in London on 29 August, and it contains nothing new. These proposals are known to the world. They were

characterized here by the statements made by the Western Powers that are co-sponsors of this draft. The representative of the United States told this Committee on 10 October 1957 that his Government could not shirk its responsibility and therefore, if any State or group of States became more powerful than the United States, it would be shirking its responsibility. The United States representative then talked about the potential aggressors. But the United States Government is doing all in its power to assure itself of military supremacy, because all the foreign policy of the United States is based upon the policy of force and positions of strength and on the famous "brinkmanship" policy that has been invented and followed by the Secretary of State. The partners of the United States in the Sub-Committee and their allies in NATO certainly were not very far behind. The representatives of the United Kingdom in the Disarmament Sub-Committee and during the present session of the General Assembly have also expressed their fears that certain peoples may try to exploit the play of circumstances and create an air of impatience, such an atmosphere as might be referred to as follows: that the Assembly "will have to act and will have to take any measures possible". The fear of such a favourable atmosphere being set up that will permit the taking of measures that will lead to disarmament -- all this has led these representatives to take a stand which undermines world security and is based upon the idea that such measures should be taken so as to ensure the defence of their positions.

I do not think that their arguments hold any water regarding the question of suspension of nuclear tests, and that is why they are trying to prove that the dangers "that might be inherent in these tests -- the dangers to the health of the world -- cannot be underestimated". Well, let them ask the inhabitants of Hiroshima, of Nagasaki and of other islands in the Pacific, and let them find out what the danger is.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The draft resolution submitted by twenty four Powers links the suspension of nuclear tests with other questions. In contradiction with all the resolutions on disarmament already adopted by the General Assembly, this draft resolution of the Western Powers avoids any reference to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a solemn undertaking not to use such weapons. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would certainly have the effect of giving strong support to public opinion in all countries, including those producing nuclear weapons, against the manufacture of these armaments of mass destruction, which would no longer be used. This is certainly what is feared by the circles interested in the production of nuclear weapons. That is why all reference to this question is avoided in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

For the first time since the United Nations was established, attempts are being made to use the Organization to impose an ultimatum on disarmament, to impose the opinion of one of the parties on the other party, through the adoption of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. It is, however, obvious that it is not through ultimatums that a solution of this problem will be facilitated, in the present state of the development of civilization and techniques. Why, then, is there this insistence on the adoption of a proposal which will render the solution of the problem much more difficult and which will block any possibility of negotiations and disarmament? The answer is that the entire policy of the States members of NATO is constructed on their alleged supremacy in nuclear weapons and on positions of strength. The recent decisions of the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom confirm this fact. The essential purpose of the forthcoming conference of the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been clearly defined --

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I am sorry to interrupt the representative of Bulgaria, but I must draw his attention to the fact that this Committee is now discussing the draft resolutions and the amendments thereto. We have already had an extended general debate, during which the representative of Bulgaria had an opportunity to set forth his point of view. I should therefore be grateful if he would limit his remarks to an examination of the draft resolutions and the relevant amendments.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I am addressing myself to the draft resolutions, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to outline and define some of the positions set forth in those draft resolutions.

The decision to hold the abovementioned conference has been taken because of Soviet peaceful scientific achievements -- and, on behalf of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, we wish to congratulate the Soviet Union for these achievements, of which advantage must be taken for peaceful progress. The decision to hold the conference is indicative of the frame of mind of the ruling circles of certain NATO countries.

The explanations offered to this Committee by the representatives of the Western Powers regarding the future cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes constitute additional proof of the lack of sincerity of those representatives as regards the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We have been told that there should be a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. But we have been told nothing about an agreement or even an undertaking or commitment to prohibit nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, to outlaw those weapons and to eliminate them from the armaments of States. This position and the Western position on test explosions can only be designed to increase the future production of nuclear weapons and to continue the nuclear armaments race.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is quite unable to support a draft resolution designed to divide the Assembly and to ensure supremacy for certain militaristic circles among the Western Powers. The twenty-four-Power draft resolution is clearly designed to create insurmountable difficulties on the path to disarmament.

Inasmuch as the disarmament problem is of vital concern to all peoples and all countries and inasmuch as all countries, both large and small, should be given an opportunity to participate in the discussion and solution of this problem and to contribute actively to the achievement of general disarmament, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and its delegation here welcome with gratification the idea put forward in the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/797) for the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission which would

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

study on a continuing basis all the proposals submitted to it and would report to the General Assembly.

During the general debate, attempts were made to reject all suggestions for the expansion of the disarmament talks. We were told that it is easier to work in a small body than in an assembly of eighty-two. We were told that it is easier to achieve results in an intimate and secretive atmosphere than under the floodlights of public opinion. Is it not, however, evident that if the discussions take place before the gaze of the peoples, who ardently desire the achievement of genuine results on disarmament, some delegations at any rate will be encouraged to meet those desires of the peoples? Fears that publicity may hamper the work of the Disarmament Commission are not justified. Ten years of work in the shadows of secrecy have yielded no tangible results in the achievement of disarmament. Quite the contrary: nuclear armaments are increasing dangerously, as are war budgets.

A permanent commission of eighty-two members would, we have been told, serve propaganda purposes. But why is there this fear of propaganda in favour of disarmament? Why is there this fear of propaganda against war? Does not this very Committee have before it a resolution which is supported by the principal NATO countries and which is assertedly designed to propagandize the notion of the destruction that would be occasioned by nuclear war? Or is propaganda welcomed only when it lends itself to or is likely to be exploited for the purposes of the imperialists? Is there some fear of allowing all States to express themselves on disarmament and peace? Is that dangerous propaganda? A permanent disarmament commission which would enable all countries to express their views freely, to make suggestions and to have an opportunity to defend those views and suggestions would certainly not be a waste of time.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Quite the contrary, it would make it possible to avoid a repetition of stale arguments in a sub-committee in which there are only two parties confronting each other, the NATO representatives, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. Participation in disarmament discussions by all countries, including the countries whose populations are most directly menaced by nuclear radiation, would cause these discussions to gain a new impetus towards the solution of this problem which is so vital for the destinies of mankind.

On the other hand, the Soviet proposal does not rule out direct contact between the representatives of the great Powers and also between the small countries. Quite the contrary; in fact, it presupposes this and provides facilities to that end in stating that the officers of the permanent commission shall be responsible for co-operating with States Members in organizing consultations, meetings, and so on.

There is also the Soviet proposal contained in document A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1 which:

"Calls upon the States possessing nuclear weapons to assume, as a first step, a temporary obligation not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, it being understood that if at the end of five years no comprehensive international agreement on the disarmament problem has been reached, the question of an obligation by States to renounce the use of nuclear weapons will again be considered by the United Nations."

This proposal has attracted great attention. It is designed to provide a partial measure of disarmament and it responds to the wish universally felt for the great Powers to move along the path of disarmament in general and of nuclear disarmament in particular.

The Soviet proposal contained in document A/3674/Rev.1, which calls for the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear and hydrogen weapons tests, falls into the same category. Taking account of the great desire of the peoples that the poisoning of the atmosphere by the fall-out of test explosions should be stopped, at the same time it seeks to stop the perfecting of these death-dealing weapons which are designed to exterminate most efficiently millions of human beings. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will vote in favour of these two Soviet proposals, since they would provide an impetus for action and create an atmosphere of confidence which would make it possible to continue our work with success and ultimately achieve a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

On the other hand, we cannot endorse the Japanese proposal contained in document A/C.1/L.174. This proposal contains the idea that the testing of nuclear weapons must be stopped -- which is good, -- but then for no good reason it links the cessation of test explosions of nuclear and hydrogen weapons with all the other difficult or even insoluble problems of disarmament, the very problems which the Western Powers, in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, sought to use as obstacles against the solution of the problem.

The Belgian proposal contained in document A/3630/Corr.1 refers to the question of the unprecedented devastation which might be inflicted upon the entire world and to the necessity of informing the world about it. This could be useful if it were not used to appease the fears of the people about the dangers of test explosions and the nuclear weapons race. We should bear in mind another United Nations resolution, adopted in 1947, which prohibited propaganda for a new war. However, there are Western countries in which interested circles continue their propaganda for a new war. In view of this precedent, it is to be feared that the Belgian draft resolution might meet the same end. Moreover, the preamble of this draft resolution lends itself to ambiguity and to interpretations at variance with the operative part of the resolution. The preamble of the draft resolution is clearly linked with the purposes sought in the twenty-four Power draft resolution, and we therefore have some apprehensions with regard to the opportunities that might be given under this draft resolution to publicize the conceptions of the Western representatives, or some of them, who have declared here that there is no danger for mankind in the continuation of test explosions.

If the Belgian draft resolution were amended to make its purposes clear, as proposed by the Polish amendment, we could well vote in favour of it, but if it is retained in its present form we cannot be a party to a resolution which might be designed to drown the principal question of disarmament in a flood of propaganda, to justify the continuation of test explosions and the institution of controls where controls are not only unnecessary but, in fact, superfluous.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

That is the position of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on some of the draft resolutions before the Committee. It is also an explanation of the considerations which will guide our votes.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The representative of Mexico has expressed a desire to speak today in order to make use of his right of reply. Although the hour is late, if there is no objection, I shall call upon the representative of Mexico.

Mr. de la COLINA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I shall be as brief as possible. In view of the constant references that have been so kindly made in the course of this debate to the suggestion voiced by the chairman of my delegation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Padilla Nervo, and also in view of the fact that in some of those references I gathered that the suggestion was not fully understood, I would make the following clarifying remarks.

In his statement in the Political Committee on 29 October, Mr. Garcia Robles, speaking on behalf of my delegation, said:

"According to the idea put forward by Mr. Padilla Nervo, this person"-- the High Commissioner -- "would be a statesman of outstanding international prestige who would be appointed by the General Assembly upon the unanimous recommendation of the members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. He would act as a mediator, whose essential functions would be those of helping the members of that Sub-Committee in their negotiations and, with this purpose in view, he would maintain constant contact with them, in order to submit privately for their consideration the proposals which he felt were relevant in helping to conciliate their points of difference, and, in general, to make the road to the attainment of agreement smoother. ...

"Not only would the General Assembly be represented in the person of that commissioner, but he would be able to bring to the great Powers the opinions, suggestions and studies which could be of great help in the gradual solution of the problems of disarmament for the common good."

(A/C.1/PV.884, page 51)

RSH/mtm

A/C.1/FV.891

74-75

(Mr. de la Colina, Mexico)

It is obvious that it would be indispensable and essential for the great Powers to unanimously recommend this statesman for appointment by the General Assembly, in a manner similar to the method adopted in the appointment of the Secretary-General.

(Mr. de la Colina, Mexico)

The draft resolution which I would submit if these conditions were fulfilled would read as follows:

"The General Assembly, convinced that an agreement on disarmament is both necessary and possible; considering that it is urgent to intensify efforts and to seek additional procedures in order to reconcile divergent points of view; requests the Governments of Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, when they deem it appropriate, to consider the desirability and possibility of unanimously recommending a statesman of high international prestige to be appointed by the General Assembly to assist them in their negotiations and, to this effect, to consult with them, to submit for their consideration, and in private, the proposals which he may see fit to present, and in general to promote agreement among them; and requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary facilities to implement the present resolution."

It is obvious, as I said earlier, that for our idea to be understood correctly and applied usefully, the great Powers must recommend it unanimously. If this is not the case, then Mr. Padilla Nervo's idea of a disarmament commissioner will be only a suggestion.

The events of the last few days have only strengthened our conviction that this is not only a useful idea, but one that is both urgent and necessary: that the General Assembly should nominate a mediator or commissioner on disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I call on the representative of France on a point of order.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): It will only take a moment to present this point of order.

Three speakers this morning -- the representatives of Albania, the Ukrainian SSR and Bulgaria -- spoke in terms of ultimatums, and one of them spoke of an ultimatum presented by militarist and imperialist circles.

The repetition of inaccuracies does not breed the truth and if instances were needed, I would recall the abominable campaign about the alleged launching of poisoned flies and poisoned candies in Korea, which was continued for months and then dropped suddenly because everybody knew that it was false from beginning to end. The same thing goes on today.

(Mr. Moch, France)

Everybody in a certain group speaks of ultimatums. I am not qualified to speak on behalf of any group, but only on behalf of the French delegation, and I should like to recall that I said that in tomorrow's negotiations, which will be opened if the Soviet Union does not reject them, France will seek, as it did yesterday, the conciliation of bringing closer together the points of view. I added yesterday that there was, therefore, no intransigence in our attitude, but only a great eagerness for clarity. We leave the ultimatums to others. We want the negotiations of tomorrow to go on and we shall do everything in our power to bring this about.

I have found it necessary to confront a thrice-repeated inaccuracy with the truth of our attitude.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I must tell the representative of France that that was not exactly a point of order, but I am sure that he was merely exercising his right of reply, and that is why I did not interrupt him.

A number of other representatives have expressed their desire to speak and they wish to do so tomorrow morning. After that, with the consent of the Committee, I propose to put the draft resolutions to a vote.

The Committee will meet tomorrow morning at 10.30.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.