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Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 7 January 1957, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru)

The Korean question [21] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

| | |
|------------------------|---------------|
| Mr. Urquia | (El Salvador) |
| Mr. Jamali | (Iraq) |
| Mr. Serrano | (Philippines) |
| Mr. Krishna Menon | (India) |
| Sir Percy Spender | (Australia) |
| Mr. Perera | (Ceylon) |
| Mr. Carbajal-Victorica | (Uruguay) |
| Mr. Bayulken | (Turkey) |
| Mr. Mezincescu | (Romania) |
| Mr. Schiff | (Netherlands) |
| Mr. Perez-Perez | (Venezuela) |
| Mr. de Guiringaud | (France) |

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THE KOREAN QUESTION [Agenda item 21] (continued)

- (a) REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
- (b) PROBLEM OF EX-PRISONERS OF THE KOREAN WAR: REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to apologize to the first speaker of the afternoon, because I am obliged to call upon the representative of El Salvador at this time. The representative of El Salvador wishes formally to put before the Committee the joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.159, which is being circulated at the moment.

Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling on me at this time. When I made reference this morning to the United States draft resolution on Korea, I took the liberty of saying that my delegation was of the opinion that it would be only just and courteous for the General Assembly to indicate its appreciation and thanks to the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil for the help which they have given and are still giving toward the solution of the problem of the ex-prisoners of the Korean war.

My idea, which was first mentioned this morning, received very favourable attention from the delegations of Ecuador and Venezuela. Therefore, my delegation, together with these two delegations, is sponsoring the joint draft resolution to which you made reference, Mr. Chairman, and which is now being distributed in document A/C.1/L.159. It is an extremely simple draft resolution and it reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having taken note of the report of the Government of India on the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war (A/3203),

"Expresses its gratitude to the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil for their valuable co-operation in the settlement of the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war."

(Mr. Urquia, El Salvador)

I think that the resolution is self-explanatory and that I need not give any reasons why we feel that it should be considered by the Committee. At first my delegation had intended to submit this idea as an amendment to the United States draft resolution, but after taking into account the very nature of the United States resolution, which bears on the political problem of Korea, and then following some very interesting suggestions made by Ambassador Perez-Perez of Venezuela, I, together with Ambassador Perez-Perez and Ambassador Trujillo of Ecuador, decided to submit a joint draft resolution simply expressing the ideas which my delegation had voiced this morning.

Therefore, our draft resolution, instead of referring to a political problem, makes reference to the humanitarian problem. We merely refer to the ex-prisoners of the Korean war and do not touch on the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. I really do not see how anyone can oppose this joint draft resolution. We feel it only fair to recognize the fact that the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil have shown humanitarian concern for the ex-prisoners of the Korean war.

Mr. JAMALI (Iraq): The Iraqi delegation has consistently hailed the United Nations intervention in Korea as a step consonant with the principles and aims of the Charter and as a great contribution to world peace and security. Were it not for the United Nations intervention in Korea the world might have experienced several other Koreas. We only regret that the United Nations has not been able to apply the same principle of taking quick action, of meeting armed aggression with arms, everywhere in the world. Had the Israel invasion of Egypt, for example, been met immediately with armed intervention, as was done in the case of Korea, the situation in the Middle East today would have been quite different.

Korea's partition was one of the tragedies of World War II. But the perpetuation of this partition, however, is directly due to Communist designs for penetration and expansion in the world. Through subversion, penetration and aggression, communism wants to gain more areas and more territories in the

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(Mr. Jamali, Iraq)

world. It is due to communist denial of any free democratic practice, and their practice of foreign penetration, that Korea has been and still is divided into North and South. Korea, as well as Germany and Viet-Nam, provide typical patterns of communist domination. These countries have been sadly partitioned, not by the free desire of their own people but in spite of the wishes and the best judgement of the inhabitants.

(Mr. Jamali, Iraq)

The patriotic Koreans certainly wish to see their country united and democratic, as do also the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations. But communism stands in the way of achieving these aims. Communism wishes to have a united Korea, but united under communism -- an independent Korea, which means turning Korea into a satellite of Communist China. Communism does not understand the term "democratic" as we understand it in the United Nations. Democracy, to communism, means the dictatorship of the few. Therefore, it is no surprise to us to read on the first page of the Commission's report: "There has in fact been no basic change in the position since the Commission reported last year." (A/3172) And last year the Commission stated that it was still unable to contribute to the realization of its fundamental objective, the unification of Korea.

We are distressed to read on page 2 of the Commission's report that there has been no evidence during the year that the attitude of the authorities in North Korea has undergone any basic change. They have been reported as expressing a wish for contacts between North and South Korea, but have shown no sign of acceptance of the principles on which the United Nations believes that progress can be based. They have supported moves for a conference outside the framework of the United Nations to discuss settlement of the Korean question.

In view of this situation, my delegation deems it necessary that the United Nations should maintain the following principles. First, impress on the communists everywhere that aggression does not pay, that the United Nations is not ready to tolerate aggression anywhere in the world, including Korea; therefore, any amassing of arms to prepare a mighty force for aggression will not lead to a settlement. Secondly, the United Nations, while observing the armistice terms, must always be ready and vigilant to protect the Republic of Korea from another invasion from the North; for Korea has become a symbol of United Nations reaction to aggression. Korea must always be protected and guarded by this Organization against aggression from the North. Thirdly, North Korea and Communist China must be persuaded that they cannot impose their views on the United Nations by force; nor can they make any gains or achieve their ends by aggression.

(Mr. Jamali, Iraq)

We believe that the Soviet Union, if it would prove its good intentions with regard to world peace and its respect for this Organization, could very well advise Communist China and North Korea to change their hearts and minds and yield to United Nations principles and resolutions.

We believe that the Commission should continue its work and that no relaxation of efforts towards peace and no yielding to communist defiance should be permitted.

We are heartened to read in the Commission's report, on page 2, paragraph 15, the following:

"Despite the failure so far to reach a solution to the Korean question, the Republic of Korea has succeeded during the period under review in further consolidating its position as a national state. It has expanded considerably its diplomatic representation and has been taking an increasingly active part in international organizations and conferences."

It is our firm belief that had there been no communist domination in North Korea, the Republic of Korea would truly represent the national aspirations of all the people of Korea. It is for this reason that we sincerely hope that Korea, like Germany and Viet-Nam, should soon take their seats among us without waiting for a final settlement with communism. It is my delegation's conviction that, if the communists are genuine in their claim regarding co-existence with the non-communist world, they should effect a complete withdrawal of foreign volunteer forces from North Korea. After that, free elections throughout Korea, under the auspices of the United Nations, should be carried out.

To achieve these ends, we wholeheartedly support the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the United States, and we welcome the draft resolution just submitted by the delegations of Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela. We would also welcome any amendments to the United States draft resolution which might improve it or add to its effectiveness.

Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): The Philippines delegation wishes to associate itself with the other members of this Committee in expressing appreciation at the happy outcome of the problem of the eighty-eight ex-prisoners of the Korean war under the temporary custody of the Government of India. The report which was

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

circulated by that Government makes it clear that the disposition of the ex-prisoners is now in the concluding process of successful negotiation and that an end to this vexing issue is definitely within sight.

We wish that it were possible to assure ourselves of a similar happy prospect in the solution of the protracted and infinitely difficult Korean question. But, while this is not the time for self-accusation, the painful fact is that there has been little, if any, substantial progress towards achieving the declared aim of this Organization to reunify Korea on the basis of free elections under United Nations supervision.

The current report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is pathetically revealing in this respect. It states, quite categorically, that "There has been no evidence during the year that the attitude of the authorities in North Korea has undergone any basic change". (A/3172, page 2) Although the North Koreans have been reported as expressing a wish for contact with the Republic of Korea, they have not shown, so the report states, any sign of willingness to accept the principles upon which the United Nations believes that progress towards the declared goal could be achieved.

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

On the other hand, the report expresses the deep concern of the United Nations Command over the continued default of the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in their adherence to the relevant provisions of the armistice. It is for this reason that it has seen fit to suspend provisionally on 31 May 1956 the inspection teams in the areas of the Republic of Korea with a view undoubtedly to removing military restraint on the one side where similar military restraint could not be successfully imposed upon the other.

We are thus no further than we were before. Time, it would seem, has not blunted Communist intransigence and has served only to harden attitudes in their original hostile mould. In the meantime, we are confronted with a possibility which we in the United Nations who fought to preserve the unity and integrity of the Korean people do not even yet dare to face. And that is the possibility that as time lengthens the artificial division at the 38th parallel may become permanent and eternally divide a people against its own brothers. It would be a tragic day for the United Nations if this sombre prospect were to become a reality through our sufferance or default.

The Philippine delegation cannot, therefore, contemplate this future without a pang of uneasy conscience. Nor can anyone in this Organization who swears by the principle of freedom and stands ready to keep it inviolate. We are convinced that the Korean problem has lost none of its gravity and that the question of Korea's unification remains paramount among the issues of war and peace confronting the world today.

We in the United Nations -- to repeat what we have so often said of ourselves -- bear a heavy load of responsibility in this regard. And our responsibility has not been lightened by the knowledge of the forbidding failure of the Geneva Korean political conference to achieve any practical results. That conference was by no means a fiasco, for it was a triumphant reassertion of our desire to create a "unified, independent and democratic Korea". But it did end in an impasse which we have, unfortunately, been unable thus far to break.

Perhaps it should be recalled in this connexion that the present form of North Korean intransigence assumed definite shape in the Geneva conference. Where, before, the Communist bloc had recognized the primacy of United Nations interest in Korea and granted its right to supervise free elections there, at

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

Geneva it openly repudiated these fundamental principles and thus destroyed at one stroke the bases on which an agreement on the unification of Korea could be achieved.

Neither North Korea nor the Soviet Union, its principal instigator and protector, has shown any indication of budging from its current position. But there has been a wilful capriciousness in their stand which makes it difficult for us to guess their intentions at any given moment, except apparently for the central design of blocking agreement and converting into an accomplished fact the present temporary division of Korea.

At the moment Korea no longer lies in the eddy of world developments. Our attentions are centred, with a great deal of justification, on issues which pose a more immediate danger to the peace and security of mankind. But by no means should we allow ourselves to indulge in the extreme luxury of self-complacency in so far as Korea is concerned.

Four years after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement the ingredients for war remain vividly present in the little peninsula. There has been, by all accounts, a continuous military build-up in North Korea in clear violation of the Armistice Agreement -- a build-up which in turn has prompted the Republic of Korea to appeal for arms to keep the military situation in balance. The danger to which the North Korean action could lead is only too patent and does not require any elaboration.

At the same time, the lack of an effective machinery for checking on these violations further emphasizes the hazards inherent in the situation. The need, therefore, for a reconstituted Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which last year became inoperative, is great and is doubly so under the present conditions and while the Armistice Agreement is in force.

Although an immediate solution to the Korean problem admittedly taxes the collective powers of the United Nations, the Philippine delegation is convinced that our present choice lies in neither complacency nor despair. It believes that we must continuously and purposefully probe all along the line, seeking those openings which must eventually bring us into a gradual or final solution to the intractable problem of Korea.

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

There is one hopeful note, however, in the report of UNCURK this year. It states that:

"Despite the failure so far to reach a solution to the Korean question, the Republic of Korea has succeeded ... in further consolidating its position as a national state. It has expanded considerably its diplomatic representation and has been taking an increasingly active part in international organizations and conferences." (A/3172, para.15)

The success of the Republic of Korea provides a true measure of wisdom of the United Nations in sponsoring the infant Republic and guiding its first faltering steps along the road to a sound democratic order. More significantly in this context, the success of the Republic of Korea constitutes a powerful argument for the democratization of the entire peninsula and would point up to the North Koreans more strongly than words can the solid advantages which inhere in a government run by the people and for the people in the spirit of recognized processes of ordered liberty.

The Philippine delegation believes that this is a valid cause fully worthy of being promoted under United Nations auspices. Under present circumstances, we can further add the necessary momentum by admitting the Republic of Korea into the fold of this world Organization.

Certainly, the case for the admission of the Republic of Korea is a strong one. In approving the establishment of the Republic in Korea in 1948, the United Nations itself characterized the new Government as the "only legal government of Korea". Twice in its short history it successfully conducted free elections and has, since its establishment, amply demonstrated its capacity for representative government. Finally, on the testimony of UNCURK, it is approaching economic stability, while further consolidating "its position as a national state".

In the considered view of my delegation, the admission of Korea into the fold of this Organization will serve as effective notice to the world that we will not permit to float beyond our orbit a country and a people we have helped, saved and built. It too may serve to pave the way to the ultimate solution of the problem of Korean unification, hopefully by the quick process of free elections throughout Korea if circumstances would so permit, or inevitably by the gradual process of assimilation of the North Korean people who share undoubtedly within their hearts the yearnings for freedom of the South Koreans.

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

I am therefore pleased to announce the position of the Philippine delegation on the Korean question, as follows.

First, we shall support the United States draft resolution -- whatever its final form may be -- to the extent that it urges the continuation of efforts to achieve the repeatedly declared objective of establishing by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and fully restoring international peace and security in the area; and also to the extent that it calls upon the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with existing resolutions of the General Assembly.

Secondly, we suggest the advisability of exploring the need for reconstituting the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, to the end that it may effectively carry out its functions under the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

Thirdly, we urge the admission of the Republic of Korea to membership of the United Nations, not only as an official act of recognition of what our Organization has done for that country, but also as a possible transitional step to bring about the eventual unification of Korea.

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Although it is now several days since the First Committee began its regular work, this is the first time that my delegation is addressing the Committee on one of the main problems on its agenda. I should therefore like to convey to Mr. Belaunde my delegation's congratulations and good wishes on his election to the high office of Chairman of the First Committee.

The Korean item is divided into two parts: (a) and (b). I shall deal first with part (b), in which my Government is more intimately concerned than others, and shall then proceed to a consideration of the general proposition.

Part (b) of the present item refers to the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war and a report on the subject by the Government of India which has been circulated to Members of the Assembly. I should like to say here and now that this expression "ex-prisoners" is purely descriptive. The Government of India has never agreed that the persons involved are ex-prisoners: they are people who were brought over from Korea under conditions in which we, as custodians, had no other option. In resolution 910 B (X), which the General Assembly adopted on

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

29 November 1955, the Assembly requested

"Member States able to do so to assist in bringing about a full solution of this problem [of the remaining prisoners] by accepting for resettlement those ex-prisoners not covered by the present offers" --

that is, the offers which had been made at that time.

The present position is the following. The Government of India has submitted a report (A/3203), dated 5 October 1956, which has been circulated to Members of the Assembly. Out of a total of eighty-eight prisoners, two were repatriated to China and six to North Korea; fifty-five were sent to Brazil, in accordance with their option and the generous acceptance of the Brazilian Government last year, after a long period of negotiations; nine were sent to Argentina, again in accordance with their option. Thus, since these prisoners have been sent to China, North Korea, Brazil and Argentina, sixteen former prisoners remain in India. I should like to make clear the position in regard to those remaining prisoners, because there seems to be some misunderstanding on that score, even here in the General Assembly.

Nine of these remaining prisoners have opted for Mexico; two have opted for Argentina, but have been found medically unfit; and five have opted for India. The five who have opted for India will, if they still desire to do so, remain in India. But the nine who have opted for Mexico are also still in India. We would request the Secretary-General to pursue the discussions on this matter so that there may be no further delay. When prisoners have opted for a particular country, it is difficult to retain them. We have no machinery for exercising discipline over them. The number of former prisoners now remaining in India is very small; of that number, as I have said, nine have opted for Mexico, and two for Argentina. If the two who have opted for Argentina are medically unfit to go there, I would presume that their condition would be the same if they remained in any other country. We have requested Argentina to accept two other ex-prisoners, in place of the two who were found medically unfit. Five of the nine ex-prisoners who opted for Mexico have now expressed a desire to go to Argentina instead. The Government of India takes no responsibility for the change of will of these ex-prisoners; this seems to be a constant feature with them. We have been in continuous touch with the Government of Mexico, through diplomatic channels,

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

the permanent missions to the United Nations in New York and the Secretary-General. In our report to the General Assembly, we express the hope that the Mexican Government will take a favourable decision on this question without further delay, especially since the number of prisoners who have opted for Mexico is very small. The Government of Mexico was one of those Governments which, during the seventh session of the General Assembly, urged that prisoners of the Korean war should be resettled in countries not directly involved in the conflict. Mexico took a considerable initiative in regard to this problem. In fact, it submitted a draft resolution, although the latter was not actually put to the vote. I therefore hope that it will soon be possible for Mexico to take a favourable decision on this question.

Those were the remarks which I wished to make on part (b) of the present item.

There is, however, another part of this item which, although it does not appear on the agenda, is in the background of the entire question. For the purposes of the record, my Government wishes to state its position so that there will be no misunderstanding if this problem should at any time have to be raised. I refer to the report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. That report has not been discussed by the General Assembly at any time. The Government of India has on various occasions suggested a discussion, but, in view of the fact that such a discussion might lead to acrimonious controversy which might not assist in resolving the Korean question, we have been willing to leave the matter in suspense. At the same time, however, we should not like this report, which we have the obligation to make, to be regarded as having lapsed. Hence, on behalf of the Government of India, I should like to state that the NNRC report is still before the United Nations and should be taken up at an appropriate time, when such a discussion will assist in solving the problem.

I come now to the main question before the Committee, part (a) of the present item: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. We have now reached the stage of the general debate, and a draft resolution has been submitted to the Committee. I think that I should be failing in my duty if I did not say that, in my delegation's opinion, the draft resolution which has been presented by the United States of America -- although conceived, from the point of view of the United States delegation, for the purpose of achieving the objective -- is not likely to achieve the objective.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

As I said in my brief intervention, there have been no consultations so far as we are concerned. As I indicated, we tried to discuss with the United States delegation whether it was possible to improve, from our point of view, the draft resolution in such a way as to make its support possible. Unfortunately, we failed in our attempts at persuasion. The United States delegation appears to think that the draft resolution is in the proper form in which it should be put before the Assembly, and my delegation, after deep consideration, decided not to move any amendments.

The amendments we would have proposed would have made the resolution flexible and in such a form as not to create another barrier in this problem. We decided not to move the amendments, not because we think they are without merit, but because we are anxious that there should be as little controversy as possible on this question. We do not think that this draft resolution will make any difference to the problem. A similar resolution -- a slightly better one -- was passed last year and one was passed in the year before that. The problem of the unification of Korea has to be settled by a political discussion on a realistic basis, and that, I think, will be best promoted by our not taking any part in forcing a division on amendments.

Knowing the constitution of this Committee and the position that the United States holds in the world, as well as the leader of the United Nations Command, there is very little doubt that any amendments moved without their consent would be defeated. The effect of moving these amendments would be to sharpen the controversy, and my Government and I have no desire to sharpen these controversies or to lose such capacities as we may still have, even after the draft resolution is adopted, to discuss these matters.

At the same time, it is necessary for us to point out what we think of the draft resolution. The draft resolution recalls previous resolutions, and in so far as that is a recital, no one can object. But, at the same time, it should be remembered that this recalling of previous resolutions means registering approval of the majority decision at Geneva. The main difficulty with regard to this draft resolution is to be found in operative paragraphs 2 and 3.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

In operative paragraph 2, the principle of free and general elections in Korea, which my Government heartily supports as, if not essential to, at least one of the best ways of unification, is limited by a particular method in which those elections are to take place. At the end of the Geneva Conference, that method was embodied in the final declaration of the Conference. However, the results of that Conference should not be assessed merely by its final declaration, as I propose to show in a moment, because among the sixteen Powers that contributed forces in Korea, there was considerable difference of opinion as to how this should be approached. Our own position is very similar to the Canadian position submitted to the Committee the other day, so that if the second paragraph had merely stopped at saying that continuing efforts should be made to achieve these objectives, or that they should be made in accordance with the Charter, the door would have been left more open than it is, and I have no doubt that the door will have to be open if the result is to be achieved.

Operative paragraph 2 limits the election to one method, and that is under United Nations supervision. It is not a problem so much of what we think of the United Nations; it is a problem of achieving the objective, and that objective is to bring together the two parts of Korea. One part of Korea was declared an aggressor and war was waged against it by the United Nations.

Operative paragraph 3 reads as follows:

"Calls upon the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with existing resolutions of the General Assembly and to observe and report on elections throughout Korea, and upon all States and authorities to facilitate this activity by the Commission."

In operative paragraph 2, United Nations supervision is provided for, but when we come to operative paragraph 3 we go even further than we have done in previous years, and nominate the United Nations Commission as the supervising authority. This decision, taken in a resolution of this character, is not in our view calculated either to promote the purposes of the United Nations or to achieve Korean unification.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has presented a report, mainly concerned with South Korea. It is a commission created by the United Nations and, therefore, its legal status is beyond question. But for us, in a resolution of this character, to create an election commission just as though it were a by-product of the resolution is, in my opinion, a very great mistake. It is even more of a mistake when one looks at the resolution, because it is not going to work, and the question of supervision has to be decided after the political discussion.

I should like the Committee to know that so far as form is concerned, we would be moving back to the position we were in in 1950, when this Commission was appointed to supervise elections all over Korea. The Northerners then refused to let the Commission in, and since then there has been war and, as a result of that war, an armistice. Now all that would be forgotten, and we would be back in the position we were in in 1950.

Secondly, this Commission is then asked to report on the elections throughout Korea; in other words, they are to report on something that has not been provided for. What can they report about? All the States and authorities are asked to facilitate the activity of the Commission. That is to say, we are to subscribe to it. We would have to assist the Commission to go into North Korea, to force their way in there, or whatever it may be. If it is to be a matter of persuasion, the power of that persuasion would already been barred by this draft resolution.

I submit, with great respect, that whoever drafted paragraph 3 either gave a very little thought to these matters or was in error. In taking this view, my delegation does not wish to move any amendments for the simple reason that we will try to make what little contribution we can make to harmony, and since this matter to a very considerable extent has moved outside the sphere of discussion here, it can only be brought into effective achievement by the meeting of minds of the two sides.

A great deal has been said about the prestige of the United Nations and about established principles. My Government yields to no other in its respect for the principles of the Charter, but we do make a difference between the principles of the Charter and any resolution adopted at any particular time by the United Nations.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

It is a well-known doctrine of international law that any decision that is made must work in the context of that time. When time changes, other factors come into existence.

That has nothing to do with what my colleague from Iraq has said, with his usual éloquence, about the morality of the situation or about the sins of the North Korean people. What we are concerned with is to bring to this unhappy land a sense of national unity. For fifty or sixty years before the war, Korea was under the thrall of the ruthless imperialism of Japan, and the people extricated themselves from it as a result of the world war. Then, through no sins of their own, but as a result of the conflict and the vicissitudes of power politics of the great Powers, their country became divided.

It is an unfortunate experience of our time that if a line is drawn across a country it becomes a barrier and nothing else. That has happened in Korea and in other places. I hope that my colleague from South Korea will not misunderstand me when I say that the future of Korea does not lie in either the North or the South being pawns in this game of the power politics of the world. Their future lies very largely in the North and South coming together. No unity is possible in Korea without the consent of their peoples.

That is a general statement, but let me come back to the United Nations position in this matter. As I said the other day, the division of Korea into North and South Korea was not brought about either by the Koreans or by the United Nations, nor was it brought about by the war. Korea was divided as a result of the events that took place towards the end of the war with Japan. The Russian and the United States armies came to an agreement to stop at a particular place. It is not my business to go into the wisdom or otherwise of this matter or into the circumstances around it. If it was a bad thing, everybody concerned was responsible, and if it was a good thing, everybody equally receives the credit.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

At any rate, the division of North and South Korea was not brought about by the war. Secondly, the United Nations action in Korea, following the Truman Declaration and the result of the Security Council's decision in this matter and the moving of the American fleet first and the armies of the United Nations afterwards, did not have as its aim the conquest of North Korea. There is no decision, there is no statement by any Member State of the United Nations at any time, from the beginning until now, which speak of the unification of Korea by force. In fact, all these decisions of ours have this phrase: the objectives of the United Nations are to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent, democratic Korea. That has been our position, with a variation of words, ever since we began to consider this problem.

The only party in the whole Korean dispute, so far as we know, which talks about unification by force, is the Republic of Korea -- and I am prepared to quote the statements made by that representative before us. I had intended to quote to the Assembly the statements made before the United States Congress and to the United States Press by the President of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Syngman Rhee, during his visit last year. I will refrain from doing so because, even as a quotation in the sense of repeating some other phraseology, I consider it would be improper to use those words in regard to the United States. I will therefore not do so, but I think it is worthwhile to refer to that period when the President called upon the peoples, particularly the American people, to bring about this unification by force and charged them with cowardice for not doing so.

The Korean question, says this report before us, has to do with this fundamental objective of the United Nations in Korea, that is, unification. I have already said that we have proceeded all along in this matter -- whether it be in all the elaborate discussions about a cease-fire in 1950 or the discussions that took place in this very room in the autumn of 1952 in order to establish an armistice, where, after very prolonged debate and negotiations the Assembly was able to come to a decision by an overwhelming vote to lay down a plan of the armistice -- we have proceeded upon the basis of two Koreas, not two Koreas forever but two Koreas de facto, to be brought together as an accomplishment of the future. That has been our position.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

What is the present situation? The present position is that we are free from war in that area. Why? Because there is an armistice, an armistice to which the Republic of Korea is not a party and what is more, only forty-eight hours ago the Republic of Korea reiterated in this room that the armistice should be wiped out. Now, if the United Nations, led by the United States and the United Nations Command of sixteen Powers whose actions have been endorsed by the United Nations in so far as the armistice is concerned, have drawn up an armistice; and if one of the parties concerned wants the wiping out of that decision, then we have indeed a very grave situation and I must say that it is only the very firm stand taken by the United States which has prevented the termination of that armistice in the last twenty-four or thirty-six months, ever since the conclusion of the armistice. The Republic of Korea did not sign the armistice, although it was one of the belligerents, so strictly speaking it is at war with North Korea and North Korea is at war with South Korea because there is no peace between them. The civil war in law continues, and we of the United Nations are the people who want unification.

As a first step to unification we want the cessation of hostilities. The cessation of hostilities was accomplished by the Armistice Agreement. That agreement is before us to read, and it is based on the conception that the two States must maintain the armistice. The Military Armistice Commission, which is a responsible body, is composed of the two Commands. No international body comes in between, and unless these two sides agree to keep the peace there will be no peace and there will be an outbreak of hostilities all over again.

Then we come to the decision of this Committee in the autumn of 1952. The whole of the Armistice Agreement, the peace plans as far as Korea is concerned -- with which my Government has had something to do -- were based upon this conception; not whether South Korea was right or wrong, whether it was an aggressor or otherwise. We were terminating a war, and if you terminate a war you do not say whether the other man is right or wrong. We did establish an armistice on that basis; but if we regarded the interests of North Korea as immoral, as not to be taken into account at all, then our duty would have been to exterminate the position of North Korea by war at that time. But the United Nations wisely decided that was not the position. It went into Korea, in expressed terms in order to halt aggression at the thirty-eighth parallel. That was its objective,

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and the representative of Canada drew attention to the statement I made the other day that its purpose was to halt aggression. He said:

"On the means of achieving such a union, however, we need not be so rigid. It is the end result, not the means of achieving it, that matters. To achieve the unification that we all so devoutly wish for, it seems to us that we must recognize certain inescapable factors in the situation. The United Nations, as the representative of India pointed out yesterday, did not fight in Korea to achieve this unification by force. It fought there for the declared purpose of repelling aggression." (A/C.1/FV.816, p. 7)

When it had turned the armies back from the line, or very near it, it decided to stop the war to avoid further killing and bloodshed as a first step towards unification, and the armistice is based upon that position. This is not in any way to go into the merits of the North Korean action but simply to look at the facts as they are. Now if the United Nations accomplishment of unity is to be made, it is necessary to have direct negotiations between the two sides, between both Koreas and nobody else. South Korea suffers from the position that a great part of its country is not within its reach and the same applies to North Korea. Their economies are complementary and their development is dependent upon their unity. They suffered greatly in the war -- two or three million people killed and homes destroyed, more particularly in the North -- and therefore either they must directly talk to each other, and must be assisted by us, or we must lay down plans and bases whereby such negotiations are possible.

I submit to the Committee, and particularly draw the attention of the United States to the fact, that there is not a great deal of difficulty in doing this. It is now a long time after the war and the representative of Belgium in Geneva -- the present Foreign Minister of Belgium -- at the conclusion of his observations said:

"I believe that after a time, when the inevitable passions stirred up by the fighting and cruel war which has divided Korea have died down, the parties will be able to meet again and renew discussions together."

So one of the sixteen nations which went to war did not think there was anything immoral in the two parties getting together to renew the discussions, and the representative of Belgium went on to say: "...and I believe even that our efforts here during these past few weeks will not have been entirely in vain."

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I find on looking through these records that there were many suggestions made at that time which clearly indicate that the final declaration that developed merely shows the position of incompatibility between the positions then of the North Korean Government and South Korea which resulted in that formulation. But I would invite the attention of the representative of the United States, which is responsible for this draft resolution, to what the then Foreign Minister of France said to the Conference. He said:

For the moment, in the same conciliatory spirit of which it has already given ample proof in the course of the parallel negotiations over Indo-China, the French delegation lends its support in principle to the ideas already expressed here by one of our Chairmen and which can be summarized as follows: (a) Korea should be unified within its historical frontiers, as a free, independent and democratic State; (b) for this purpose elections should be held throughout the whole Korean territory to set up a single and truly representative government for the whole of Korea; (c) the elections should be carried out in conditions of genuine freedom under international supervision; (d) the settlement of the Korean question should provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops; (e) once unification is achieved" -- this is an important paragraph -- "under proper conditions, the United Nations should be called on to give their approval to the settlement thus reached."

I submit that this is a wise approach to this problem, and it is a pity that in the heat of Geneva, although some satisfactory results were achieved by the Conference, this did not come to pass.

I also refer to the statement made by the representative of Canada at that meeting. The Canadian representative, whose country also contributed troops to the war in Korea and who yields to no one in his opposition to Communism or to Russian policies or to anything of that kind -- in fact, I believe that at that time his Government did not even have diplomatic relations with Russia -- said:

"As the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs stated recently in the House of Commons, we believe that Korean elections 'should be supervised by an international agency agreed on, if possible, by the Geneva Conference but acceptable to the United Nations. In order to ensure maximum objectivity -- and that is going quite a long way to meet the views of the other side -- we felt that this supervisory agency might consist of nations which did not belong to the Communist bloc and which did not participate in military operations in Korea.' It cannot be said that our attitude on this is rigid -- we are prepared to go a long way to make sure that such a commission is genuinely neutral. We believe it is possible that countries which are accustomed to approach international problems freely and objectively can provide neutral supervision."

What are the elements that are required for this unification? I think it is common ground in the United Nations -- irrespective of our countries or political affiliations or the views held, or even of power conflicts -- that that unification can be achieved only on the basis of the whole of Korea going into that united state, and that also has to be based on free elections. My Government regards the secret ballot, freedom of propaganda, universal suffrage and sufficient time for campaigning as essential to a free election. We would support any proposal on that basis. Equally, we think that in view of the passions that have been aroused and particularly the view that is held in the South that the way to unify is to absorb the North, and the action of the North in the past in transgressing beyond the thirty-eighth parallel by war, it is necessary to have supervision. But we believe it is supervision that is important, and not necessarily creating a form which would make that supervision difficult. We believe international supervision is adequate. But at the same time it would be unwise to create a juxtaposition between international supervision and United

Nations supervision. I submit that United Nations supervision is one form of international supervision. And I submit further that United Nations supervision itself, if we study it objectively, is capable of various forms which can be made acceptable to the other side.

In our opinion, the supervision, which is now the stumbling block -- I am discussing this on a formal basis, and I will come to the difficulties afterward -- the supervision by a body of nations which are acceptable to both sides, and where the question of a veto will not arise, is always possible. To a certain extent, that is the way that repatriation problems have been dealt with, that problems have been dealt with in Indo-China and everywhere else.

It should not be impossible to find a method whereby, once a supervisory body is agreed upon, it is authorized in some way by the United Nations. That is a situation in which the North Koreans will have to make compromises and not regard this as a real loss of prestige, because they claim to respect the United Nations and its principles although they do not agree with its decisions in this matter.

Therefore, it should be possible to afford international supervision, with a composition and with rules and everything else that are acceptable to both sides. Otherwise, it is not possible to carry on elections. Elections are a peaceful process -- and there is no meaning unless they are a peaceful process. It therefore means that there must be co-operation, and that co-operation is possible only if the machinery of administration -- I do not say the Government, but only the machinery of administration -- on either side co-operates.

I think that this problem of the dignity of the United Nations can be met by the exercise of a degree of forbearance and wisdom. There is nothing here that is an insurmountable barrier. The real problem is a meeting of minds. In my submission -- and I say this with a sense of responsibility -- it is a mistake to say that the parties involved in this matter are two, North Korea and the United Nations. It is North Korea, South Korea and the United Nations.

The statement made here by the representative of the Republic of Korea was a very mild statement as compared to others that have been made by his Government. It contained no words of abuse directed against my Government, as these statements usually do, and for that we are extremely grateful. The representative of South Korea said before the Committee this morning:

"The Committee will recall that the Government of the Republic of Korea has never been a party to the Armistice Agreement, nor has it approved of its conclusion." (A/C.1/PV.817, page 7-10)

He is quite right about that, as a matter of historic fact. He then went on to say:

"It was, and still is, of the firm conviction that the Armistice Agreement only served the Communists' scheme to perpetuate the division of Korea as long as they wished, and thus this Agreement is one of the biggest blocks on the road to the unification of Korea." (Ibid.)

Now, there are two ideas that ought to be considered. Do we consider the Armistice Agreement as something that promotes the Communists' scheme? If that is so, I am afraid we are a guilty party, because we promoted the Armistice Agreement. We think the Armistice in Korea was a great blessing. It brought three years of war to an end; it repelled an aggression. Time after time, representatives here have spoken about the great collective action in Korea. If we accept this position of South Korea, we repudiate all that. My delegation, then, does not take the view that the Armistice Agreement was a curse; it was the beginning of a blessing -- but one that has not yet been accomplished.

The representative of South Korea said that the Armistice Agreement was "one of the biggest blocks on the road to the unification of Korea". On the contrary, it was a roadblock on the way to war. That is not simply the opinion of my delegation. It is the opinion of the United Nations in a resolution which was passed last year on the initiative of the United States itself. In that resolution, we are told that in paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement it is stated that there should be no change in the status of the two parts except by common consent -- and to a certain extent it is reaffirmed, although not in terms, in this year's resolution. We do not quarrel about that. Last year, there were reasons for reaffirming it in extenso. It would be a good thing if it were done this year -- but, even if it is not, the Assembly reaffirms the Armistice Agreement and therefore reaffirms paragraph 62.

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There is no feeling on our part, then, that this is a roadblock in the way of unification of Korea. It is a stepping-stone to the unification of Korea. Remove the Armistice Agreement, and you have either anarchy or war. I think that, once the Armistice Agreement is removed, the obligations and the restraint that are now existing on North Korea -- whatever may be the arguments here used about arming and not arming, and all that -- and I think we are not going to go into that position -- members of the Neutral Nations Commission will deal with that, as Sweden and Poland spoke about those things last year. We therefore believe that it is a step toward the establishment of peace rather than an obstruction on the way to peace.

I would like my colleague from the United States also to convey to his Government certain questions concerning this problem of the election itself. Now, a resolution does not matter because it would not do very much, but if we take a decision to order an election and thereby Korea is going to be unified, one might very well ask the legitimate question -- if I should not, Mr. Chairman, you will rule me out of order -- To what do we elect? We do not just elect people to be elected. We must elect them to some body. What is that body to which they are being elected?

The South Korean Government has no difficulty in this matter. They say, "We will elect them to our Parliament", and therefore for them it is only a process of absorption. But that is not our position. If that were our position, as I said once before, it would have been internationally wrong to conclude an armistice agreement, to accomplish Korea's unification or to obtain the surrender if we could. Therefore, when we say that the Commission must supervise the elections and so on, I ask with great respect: Are we speaking with a sense of responsibility? To what do we elect? The only thing to which we can elect is some form of constituent assembly or some form of preparatory body which can create a constitution. It is not necessary to put that in the resolution -- I am not arguing that -- but it means that it is necessary to have the consent of the other side.

The problem is so simple -- either you unify with consent by persuasion or you unify by force or imposition or you do what is now fashionable, divide countries and leave them to their fate. This is the position. Therefore, when we speak about these matters we have to have this realization in mind.

As a nation coming from that part of the world, my country is deeply concerned with the implications of this problem, with the impact that it would have in the Far East. It appears to us that to allow this thing to fester or to allow the joints never to be united again because they have become so hardened would be a great tragedy.

The prosperity of Korea lies in its unification. Apart from all political considerations, the economies of these two parts are complementary. They could not live without foreign dependence unless they were united. The North has a particular kind of economy which is necessary for the South and vice versa. Its political

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prejudices, the legacies of the past, the impact of other problems and our incapacity to be magnanimous where magnanimity is not only a virtue but is essential for the prosperity of the people concerned -- it is these that are standing in the way.

In the view of my Government there are no insurmountable practical difficulties. I believe it would be possible so far as the Northern side is concerned -- and I hope it is possible with regard to the South -- to have free elections based on a secret ballot and to have freedom of political campaigning without reprisals and victimization of opponents, and this applies to both sides; and it should be possible to conduct these elections under international supervision according to previously established rules and accepted standards.

We should be able -- and I say this with a sense of responsibility -- to overcome one of the main obstacles with respect to a free election with regard to the quantum of representation from either side. If there is going to be a one-nation State, then, whatever may be the feelings of North Korea on the matter, there is only one way of deciding on this quantum, and that is roughly on the basis of population. North Korea has a small population; South Korea has a larger population. It is up to the two parties, through their plenipotentiaries sitting either at separate tables or at the same table, to come to some agreement as to how many members each of them should have. I have no doubt that, if everything else goes, the pressure of world public opinion on North Korea would be such that they would accept, if they have not hitherto rejected after the Geneva Conference, that the quantum should be related to their size. Then you would have a constituent assembly in which the two sides would be represented in relation to the size of their territory and their population and in which they would decide either to accept one of the two constitutions or to find some other method, with the two administrations carrying on in the interim. Therefore, nothing would be lost while the period of unification supervened. This, we believe, is the proper and adequate approach to the Korean problem.

Much has been said about freedom on one side and no freedom on the other. My delegation not only must admit but must point out that it is difficult for the United Nations to have information on what goes on in North Korea because it is still enlisted as a belligerent. Its ally, China, is not allowed to come here;

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it is not admitted. There has been a great deal of talk during this Assembly about the admission of Korea to the United Nations. Are we to understand, on the one hand, that by this process of admission of one part of Korea we propose to keep this division permanent? Or, on the other hand, are we by implication subscribing to the view that one part really is the whole? If that is so, let us say so in fact. Let the world know where we stand. So far as my Government is concerned, we subscribed to the admission of the new Members last year on the basis that they did not include any countries where there was a problem of division. That applied to Germany, Viet-Nam and Korea.

Therefore we cannot have any real idea as to what is going on in North Korea. They claim they are democratic and they are called a democratic republic. But names do not necessarily mean that the contents are the same. I am not only free to admit it, but I would like to point it out.

Equally, it is often necessary to make enquiries on the other side. Therefore, even at the risk of boring the Committee, I would like to read out something which comes from a source which would not be within the sphere of suspicion. It comes from the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington. These people -- I would not like to use any names -- apparently are the people concerned with the affairs of the Republic of Korea and therefore cannot be regarded as a body with any animus towards them. This is signed "Dorothy W. Allan" of the Korean Affairs Institute, Washington. I do not propose to read all of it because it is long, but there are certain parts which it is worthwhile reading. I do not have the intention of suppressing any part. The entire statement is available to everybody and it was printed in the Washington Post of 21 May 1956. She says:

"There is nothing 'historically ridiculous' about the statement that Dr. Rhee tried to frustrate the truce. Everyone knows that his unilateral release of some 25,000 prisoners of war on June 18, 1953, prolonged the fighting for forty days during which U.N. casualties, alone, amounted to some 600 a day. U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold commented the same day that these 'grave developments are not only in clear contradiction of the United Nations position, but come strangely from a government of a country... which has for years been the beneficiary of so much effort and sacrifice by Members of the United Nations'.

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"The name 'Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission' was simply the designation for the supervisory group chosen jointly by the United Nations and Communist commands at the time of the Armistice Agreement. Much dissatisfaction has been voiced over the NNSC and efforts are being made to iron out its problems, but Dr. Rhee's effort last summer to oust NNSC members by force was clearly out of order.

Commented Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: 'Under the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement there is an obligation upon the United Nations Command to give protection to the Members of these teams'-- of the Commission.-- "That is an obligation which we expect to carry out and we do not believe that it is an obligation which the South Koreans ought to try to challenge by force, as they are now seeming to do."

This comes from the United States and not from me. We all know what happened in the Commission. But the most important part of this letter is the questions which we ought to address to ourselves. This was written in reply to a letter which had previously appeared in the Washington Post, so, this lady asks:

"A little later he" -- meaning the previous correspondent -- "wondered 'whether a thorough investigation of Korean-American relations is not in order, as a part of the appraisal of American foreign policy in Asia. I think it might be wise for the State Department to look into the following questions:'-- I want to make clear that I am only reading this and I am not saying what the State Department should do. That would come under Article 2, paragraph 7. I am only reading what is written here. --

"First. How free is the Korean election of May 15? "-- you might well ask --

"Second, What part do President Rhee's police force and military play in his election campaign?

"Third. How widespread is corruption in the handling of American aid?

"Fourth. Are the Korean people voting for President Rhee's re-election because he has led them to believe that American aid will be cut off unless he is re-elected, as indicated in The Post editorial?

"Fifth. Why has he so frequently altered the Korean Constitution?

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"'Sixth. Is there actual congressional immunity for those who would criticize President Rhee in the National Assembly?

"'Seventh. Does he in fact completely control the Press, radio, and other mediums of public information?

"'Eighth. Has the Rhee administration succeeded in exercising undue influence upon some American officials administering our program in Korea?

"'Ninth. Has the Rhee administration discriminated against American businessmen, as some allege?

"'Tenth. Is there a heavily financed Korea lobby operating in the United States seeking to influence American public opinion?...'"

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Then she goes on to say:

"I believe our Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, should investigate the policies of any Government which receives our aid...".

The main point about that is this. While none of these are proved -- these are only questions, and I do not propose to provide the answers, because I do not know them -- what I am saying is that the United Nations would not be right in assuming that there is freedom on one side and no freedom on the other. We can assume that there is no freedom on the other, because that is the enemy side, we have no information about it, we have no access to it, and it can be argued that the very fact of non-access is perhaps a negation of freedom.

Therefore, in the question of the unification of Korea, the practical steps to be undertaken are that the United States, in its wisdom, if it is found possible, through diplomatic and various other available methods, might give encouragement to the idea of informal contacts between these two sides with a view to developing and uniting their common country. Secondly, we should agree on what is the essential basis of an election, and I submit that that is what I have stated before the Assembly: there must be secret ballots, freedom of campaign, universal suffrage, proportional representation according to population and territory, or some composition of that kind, and international supervision, and -- this last factor which is creating such a difficulty but which I am sure would not be beyond the wisdom of the statesmen of the United States, who are the responsible people in this matter -- a method should be found whereby on the one hand the prestige of the United Nations and on the other the reality of the situation can be reconciled.

This is the submission of my delegation. Out of good-will to the United States delegation and in order to avoid conflict and wrangling about this matter, we have expressly refrained from moving any amendments -- not that they would have been carried, but they would have meant acrimonious debate. Secondly, I do not think it is a matter of formal amendments and finding words. The real problem is whether there are two parties or three parties in this matter. Until we have a situation where both North Korea and South Korea are willing to unify, recognizing the differences that at present exist between them and that have to be reconciled, and get rid of the idea of destroying the Armistice Agreement and of asking for atomic weapons, as only a few days ago the President of the Republic of Korea asked the United States to supply to its army, and of relying in the North, as is alleged, on the stockpiling of arms and in the South on reinforcements and added strength

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in the Western world, these factors can only destroy this unhappy country which has lived in history for 3,000 or 4,000 years but whose modern history is unhappy and whose people have not been granted an opportunity of independence.

My delegation therefore hopes that, while we shall have no decisions on record in this matter, these observations I have made will in the special circumstances of the situation receive some attention. You will admit that there are special circumstances in this Korean question. Whilst it is a United Nations responsibility, it has been largely in the hands of the United Nations Command, and the United Nations Command is the United States, and the draft resolution is in the name of the United States. We have shown that we have no desire to score debating points or to move amendments. We have tried our best to obtain reconciliation in private. I suggest that, if it is not possible for me privately to persuade the United States delegation, it is less possible for me to persuade them publicly. A great Power is never persuaded publicly. Small Powers may be, but a great Power is never persuaded publicly, because that looks as though someone else might know something.

Therefore, since I have not been able to persuade them privately, we accept their position that they have difficulties. We accept their position that they are not fully convinced by what is being said. But this task must go on, because to leave Korea divided in this way, with foreign troops presumably on both sides, with even the United Nations side champing at the bit and capable of bursting forth at any time, is to add one more point of explosion at a stage of activity in this world.

Therefore, irrespective of the passing of the resolution, which I again say goes much further in the way of an impediment of a settlement than the resolution of last year, deleting the parts that are important and adding parts that make difficulties, my delegation hopes that these observations I have submitted will receive some attention in the appropriate quarters.

Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): In any discussion of this item I believe it is necessary at the outset to establish the special nature of the problems which confront us. From its very beginning, the question of Korea has been a matter belonging peculiarly to the United Nations.

It is to the everlasting credit of the United Nations as an organization that it there took its firmest action and served notice on world communism that unprovoked aggression could no longer be resorted to as a means to political ends without incurring the resistance of lovers of liberty throughout the world. It is necessary to say this in order to give the Korean question its appropriate place in world history.

There are a few around this table who would have us forget the circumstances in which the Korean war began, who would try to gloss over the events which preceded that war, who would try to throw a smokescreen over the actual beginnings of the conflict and who would now try to persuade us to accept the original aggressor in that war as an equal voice in this Committee to determine our attitude to a settlement which we have been seeking for years with tragically too little success.

The United Nations entered into the war in Korea with noble objectives. The passage of time has not changed the original validity of those objectives, nor should the passage of time be allowed to reduce our determination to achieve those objectives. It is no more appropriate now than it was when the conflict began to permit ourselves to be persuaded into some second-rate bargain with the communists, the only result of which would be to deliver another country into complete bondage through rigged elections with the figure of fear standing beside every ballot box.

At the outset let me observe that I do not expect to say anything very new in the course of my remarks. The representative of Poland said that he expected that those who sought debate on this matter as the first item in our agenda would advance new proposals -- seemingly because the proposals of past years have not yet borne fruit. This attitude of the Polish representative is not surprising to anyone who has observed communist tactics in the past. Despite the expression of views by the Assembly in past years by overwhelming majorities on the objectives and purposes of the United Nations in this problem, the North Korean authorities, acting with the support, if not the direction, of the communist

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powers, have not only ignored the views of the United Nations but have frequently and grossly violated the terms of the Armistice Agreement they solemnly undertook to perform.

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Now the Communist tactics are to say: "Since we refuse to accept the views of the United Nations expressed in the resolutions of passed years, you now make new proposals". What the minority really want us to do is to move closer to their views and their objectives and, having done so, to compel us later, if they can, by similar arguments, to move closer still, until they bring us, they hope, to their own point of view and to the objectives which clearly they have in mind -- a Communist state in the whole of Korea, not free and independent but the typical police state which we all know so well as already in force in North Korea. If we listen to their arguments and bend to them, we will have sounded the death knell of the Republic of Korea -- which we in the United Nations established -- and render as a useless sacrifice all our efforts in Korea and the many thousands of dead who gave their lives there in defence of the purposes of the United Nations.

I do not propose to engage in a year by year summary of the Korean question. It should be sufficient to recall the Armistice Agreement which entered into force on 27 July 1953. Many of those representatives who, like myself, took part in the debates of the General Assembly in 1952, which set the foundations for the Armistice will, I think, accept the proposition that the armistice document was a very fair one indeed. It provided ways and means of meeting the demands of both sides in the Korean conflict. Given good faith from both sides it might well have worked.

In point of fact, of course, it was never accorded good faith from the Communist side. Worse, it was distorted and abused, but for the moment I shall not pursue that matter. I shall return to it later in order to support my contention that this whole question of a Korean settlement demands the utmost caution from the point of view of this Organization.

In so far as United Nations objectives in Korea were concerned, the Armistice Agreement confined itself to the recommendation in article 60 that a political conference should be held "to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question..."

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The Korean Political Conference took place in Geneva between April and June 1954, and the report of the fifteen United Nations Governments which attended was contained in document A/2786. This report recorded that the proposals put forward by the three Communist delegations on the subject of elections were, briefly, that:

- (1) Elections in Korea should be prepared and conducted by an "all Korean Commission" in which North and South Korea would have equal representation and which would function only by agreement between the two.
- (2) International supervision of the elections must be limited to a "neutral nations supervisory commission" composed of an equal number of Communist and non-Communist nations to be designated by the Conference and operating only by unanimous agreement.

Nobody could have been surprised by these Communist proposals, for they were essentially Communist policy, the purpose of which would be to take over a divided State by political penetration. The fifteen-nation report correctly characterized the Communist proposals as a repudiation of the competence of the United Nations and inherently unworkable.

The United Nations delegations had, on the other hand, sought agreement with the Communists on the basis of two fundamental principles, the second of which, looking towards the future, was enunciated thus:

"In order to establish a unified independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision for representatives in a national assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population of all parts of Korea." Something very similar was said by the representative of India.

I need hardly remind this Committee that this principle is firmly based upon the aims which the United Nations has maintained with admirable consistency from the very beginnings of the Korean problem. This is no question of power politics, to use the phrase of my colleague from India. It is the enunciation of a principle which states the conscience of this Organization.

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Although the Geneva Political Conference may be called a failure in that it secured no understanding with the Communists, it did indeed serve two useful purposes. One was to confirm the solidarity of the United Nations delegations in support of United Nations principles, and the other was to show, for all the world to see, the cynical approach of the Communist delegations to any attempted solution of the Korean problem

The unswerving nature of the United Nations delegations' position received further confirmation in the declaration of the sixteen Powers dated 15 June 1954, which reaffirmed their position regarding unification of the divided country.

In the fourteen months which have elapsed since this matter was last before this Committee there has been no substantial change in the position. It is true that the United Nations Command in Korea has seen fit to withdraw the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission teams into the demilitarized zone -- and I may say that this was an action which had the full approval of my Government. But the only Communist proposals with which we have to deal are those which call for equal representation of each side in the conflict on the so-called "all Korean Commission" to prepare and conduct elections, which has to be upon a unanimous basis.

No one will be deceived into believing that this proposal has any other purpose than to frustrate attempts at a solution of the problem. I have described the Communist attitude as cynical. I also say that it insults our intelligence by expecting us to concede to the aggressor the right to reject all efforts to solve the question by permitting him to "rig" negotiations in advance, so that they can only lead to a "solution" such as the world has seen first in Czechoslovakia and more recently, in its most brutal form, in Hungary. The Communist approach is a transparent device which they calculate can have but one outcome, that is the eventual delivery of the whole of Korea into Communist hands. I maintain that the United Nations must have no part in such a procedure.

The Communist purpose is clearly to make us forget. The West, in its usual desire, and indeed sometimes impatience, to achieve settlements, must not lose the trial of patience and purpose in regard to the Korean problem. Settlements are always available to those who give in and abandon their principles,

(Sir Percy Spender, Australia)

but was the war in Korea fought for nothing? It is plainly part of the Communist tactics to achieve stalemate and delay to test our patience against theirs. But they are deluding themselves if they believe that the memories of those who took part in the conflict are becoming clouded by the passage of time.

If the Communists themselves have any proposals which would permit the reunification of Korea through free elections under supervision acceptable to the United Nations, and which would not impose upon the Koreans a form of society not of their own choosing, then surely they have ways and means of making such proposals known. My delegation is not adopting an intractable position. If there is some alternative approach to those already offered which will secure under some acceptable form of United Nations supervision an impartial and objective expression of the wishes of the people of both North and South Korea, we will give it the closest consideration.

Do the Communist representatives here say publicly that they have so little faith in this Organization of which they are Members, so great a contempt for the views of the great majority, that there is no form of any kind of United Nations supervision which is acceptable to them? If so -- and I think it is so -- let them have the courage to say so unequivocally. And by the same token, if by strange and happy chance there is some form of United Nations supervision which they are prepared to accept, let them have the decency, in fairness to this Committee, to say so, and to say so in plain and understandable terms.

We do not have an unalterable position on the machinery that might be used, but we are determined that the outcome must be consonant with the aims which compelled us to enter into the conflict in the first place.

The Communist formula for international supervision of Korean elections is hopelessly at variance with the views of the United Nations Powers which took part in the Korean war. This formula would give us a body "international" in name but committed to continuing deadlock and wholly ineffective because of equal Communist and non-Communist representation.

(Sir Percy Spender, Australia)

I have mentioned earlier the need for United Nations caution in the matter. Our experiences in recent years of the way in which Communist ingenuity can destroy arrangements of an international character which might have worked in an atmosphere of good faith have been many. The Korean Armistice Agreement itself is as good or as bad an example as any.

Without going into a detailed exposition of Communist violations of the Agreement, it is perhaps enough to point once again to the well-established breaches in respect of the provisions regarding the introduction of service personnel and weapons of war into North Korea. This has been dramatically exposed by the representative of the United States in his opening statement to the Committee. The combat strength of the forces available to the Communists have been substantially increased while obstructions were put in the way of the supervisory organs created under the Armistice Agreement. At the same time Communist reports to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission have been less than adequate -- to use language of gross understatement.

All this, to my mind, establishes the charge of lack of good faith against the Communist side. Indeed I am ready to go further and say that there has been a cold, cynical and deliberate disregard of the Armistice Agreement. It has been treated as a mere scrap of paper whose provisions are honoured only to the extent that they may suit the Communist purpose, and that purpose, in Korea as in all divided countries, is to work to achieve the swamping of the anti-communist majority by the Communist minority in a unified State under Communist control.

In such circumstances can we be blamed for being wary and for insisting first and foremost upon a satisfactory performance by the Communists under the Armistice Agreement before committing ourselves to further negotiations? As I see it, until the Communist side moves towards real observance of the Armistice Agreement and shows some recognition of the principles for which the United Nations fought in Korea, so far as permitting self-determination for the Korean people is concerned, there can be no sense in talking of a further Korean political conference. Most of us have grown a little weary with the years in hearing the Soviet and other Communist representatives speak of their belief in self-determination, non-interference in the affairs of other nations

(Sir Percy Spender, Australia)

and political freedom. How hollow, how false these protestations are is revealed today in the sad tragedy of Hungary. So far as Australia is concerned, therefore, our position must rest on the grounds set out in the Declaration by the sixteen Powers of 15 June 1954.

Although the North Koreans have refused to co-operate in good faith with the agencies established under the Korean Armistice Agreement, we know perfectly well -- in particular from document A/3167, the report of the Unified Command on the breakdown of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission -- that the Communists have fundamentally and in a very serious manner violated the terms of paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement, in particular sections c and d thereof. The North Koreans, with of course direct outside Communist support, as I have said, introduced considerable numbers of jet aircraft which were not at their disposal at the time the Armistice was signed and have greatly increased the strength of their armed forces.

This is hardly the atmosphere in which the cruel passions stirred by war can be obliterated between North and South Korea. I think that attention must be drawn to these violations of the terms of the Armistice Agreement which are designed to create a disparity of armed strength between the two sides. They should not pass unnoticed, nor should the Communists expect that they can continue their violations with impunity indefinitely or that no redress will be sought by the United Nations side.

Australia is not wedded for all time to the precise terms of the Geneva declaration but there can be no question of giving or making concessions to gain a political objective -- even one so important as a settlement in Korea -- unless the other party to the bargain has shown itself willing to make reasonable concessions and willing and prepared to abide by its undertakings.

As anxious as I am to see this question settled, I cannot escape the conclusion that absolutely no solid evidence has been adduced to indicate that the North Korean and Chinese Communists who set in motion and together maintained the aggression in Korea are at all likely to meet these apparently simple conditions.

(Sir Percy Spender, Australia)

In these circumstances Australia has no alternative but to adhere strictly to the terms of the two documents to which we have set our hand, namely the Armistice Agreement and the Geneva Declaration. It is up to the other side to change our minds by demonstrating unmistakably that they are willing to pay some heed to the principles laid down by the United Nations for a settlement.

In the light of what I have had to say, it will be clear that the United States draft resolution now before the Committee will have our approval. As a member of UNCURK, Australia supports the recommendation that this body, which represents the United Nations in Korea, should continue its important work. We believe it is important for the United Nations to continue to be represented in Korea, until a settlement is reached. Australia will continue to contribute as constructively as possible to UNCURK's work.

In conclusion, I would like to reserve my right to speak again, if necessary, when the time comes for detailed discussion of any resolutions before the Committee.

Mr. PERERA (Ceylon): In making this intervention may I preface my remarks by referring to the fact that my delegation supported the Indian amendment on this question of inviting representatives from South and North Korea. We did so because we felt that no solution to this problem could be reached unless we heard both sides of the case.

This morning, after listening to the representative of the South Korean Republic, we are fortified by the fact that our convictions were correct, because when I listened to the very lengthy speech of the South Korean representative, I looked in vain to see whether there was any fresh material on which we could arrive at certain decisions. I must confess that there was nothing forthcoming in that speech. On the contrary, it was one long indictment of Communist philosophy and Communist strategy.

May I assure the representative of South Korea that the desire for peace and the desire for democracy is not the monopoly of non-Communist countries. I myself represent a country which has accepted democracy as a solution for political affairs and it is for that reason that I say that when we did invite him, by a majority decision of this Committee, we thought that we would have at least

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

an amplification of the material placed before us in the report. The question itself, as it strikes my delegation -- and I think the representatives will agree with me -- implies the existence of two Koreas. On the documents placed before us and the material which has been made available, my delegation feels that we must support in principle the draft resolution moved by the representative of the United States on the principle that it stands for the unification of Korea. On that we do not make any qualification.

On the other hand, we feel -- and in this sense I associate myself with the remarks made by the representative of India -- that the draft resolution itself does not go far enough. It is for that reason that my delegation proposes to offer, not certain amendments, but suggestions, and we trust that the political committee will perhaps give further consideration to the question. To plead the question on an ex parte basis is both futile and fraught with peril for the Far East. The Armistice Agreement recognized this fact, as provided by paragraph 62 which reads as follows:

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

"The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement will remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides."

The Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953 and it remains in effect, as we have been so reminded by the draft resolution of the United States. The fact that for three-and-a-half years hostilities have not been resumed -- nor, for that matter, has there been a denunciation of the Armistice Agreement -- is surely ground for hope and a test of the desire of North Korea to settle the question peacefully. To conjecture about the future and to imagine that North Korea is a possible aggressor defeats the purpose for which the United Nations originally enforced the Armistice Agreement.

It has been said that in Korea, geography is the father of international politics. It would appear that, since the end of the Second World War, in this unfortunate country there has been growing realization that foreign rivalry affects it most, and thereby there is awareness of political realism.

There was a time when Korea was bound by a provision of the strategy of its powerful neighbours. That is no longer the case. Although powerful forces have attempted to seduce the two Koreas for this great Power or that, the Korean appears to have rejected that facile but dangerous theory: be absorbed or die.

The future of Korean independence is not bleak, in the view of my delegation.

My delegation, in the debate on the draft resolution to invite representatives of the two Koreas, took the line that no useful purpose would be served by granting permission only to South Korea because this would have led only to hardening of opinion in North Korea, and that what was a dispute which could have been settled would never be settled perhaps within the time that was available. My delegation now goes even further and points out that the spirit and the letter of the resolutions which have been referred to in the draft resolution, namely, 811 (IX) and 910 (X), could not be observed unless efforts are made to negotiate with North Korea.

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

The Charter, it will be considered, is paramount and, in the ultimate analysis, the sanction for United Nations action and United Nations policy. We cannot argue that small nations have a right to independence and, in the same breath, insist that there is a higher right of the larger nations to peace and tranquillity within the scope of their boundaries. Freedom for nations large or small is a relative term and has meaning only in the context of a particular time and place. There is nothing absolute or final about the concept except that, like equality, it is only for equals. Similarly, freedom is only for the free. To exclude any one section of Korea on the grounds of political ideology is a contradiction in terms. It is also an argument which, I say with great respect to the representative of the United States, is rather dated. Were we to accept the argument, there would be a questioning of the very foundations of the Charter of the United Nations.

My delegation hesitates to go into what must surely be an argument of those principles. Surely the criteria applicable now in this instance would be, in the first place: is Korea to remain a pawn forever? Secondly, is the present attitude of treating South Korea as the only Korea wise and just? Thirdly, is not the problem one of removing a source of tension in what must surely be a vital area in international politics? And lastly, can we hope for a durable peace, a peace which is uncontradictory, without North Korea being brought into the discussion?

There is a tendency to put all the blame for the present state on the North Koreans. Is this the whole truth? As stated in paragraph 7 of the Commission's report, South Korea "refused to sign the Armistice Agreement", and its intransigence has not diminished with time. If, as South Korea asserts, there has been "a menacing build-up of men and particularly weapons", in North Korea, would that position have continued for three and a half years, if not four, without a general flare-up?

Equally, paragraph 9 of the report does not rule out a solution. If I may, I shall read that paragraph:

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

"There has been no evidence during the year that the attitude of the authorities in North Korea has undergone any basic change. They have been reported as expressing a wish for contacts between the north and the south, but have shown no signs of acceptance of the principles on which the United Nations believes progress can be based. They have supported moves for a conference outside the framework of the United Nations to discuss settlement of the Korean question."

Paragraph 10 reads as follows:

"A more recent move by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, in its own name and also that of the North Korean regime, for a conference of the nations concerned to discuss the question of the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and of the peaceful unification of Korea was not accepted by the Governments of the United Nations Command, as it failed to indicate a willingness to negotiate on the basis of the principles already laid down by the United Nations. These Governments restated their readiness to discuss unification on the basis of such principles."

That paragraph, I believe, is also pertinent.

I pose the question before this Committee: whether paragraphs 9 and 10, read together, do not indicate the lines on which a solution could be worked out. They do not for a moment suggest that the door is closed finally.

My delegation is of the opinion that paragraph 3 of the operative part of the United States draft resolution does not take into account the developments as reported by the Commission in its report. Elections in a country are not the only test of freedom or of the desire of its people to be free.

Moreover, I also pose what appears to be a very important question: how is it possible to observe and report on elections "throughout Korea" -- the words are used in the report and presumably, therefore, include North Korea -- unless there is understanding with that section of the country, whereas the fundamental approach has been that, because of the particular political philosophy which prevails in North Korea, it must always be outside the pale of civilization? Is this not a contradiction in terms? Should there not be a mutual regard, if not of respect, towards North Korea? Should there not be a desire to treat the two Koreas as equals, and thereby dispel all ideas of partisanship?

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

The material provided in the report on the internal conditions of South Korea, in the view of my delegation, is perhaps a basis on which conclusions may be drawn. My delegation, equally, is not convinced that all is well in South Korea. Stability has been entirely the creation of this Organization, the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and of the aid which it has received from other nations. The political trends clearly reveal not government by the people, but government by a coterie of persons. The mere forms of representative government do not imply democracy. Are the people really sovereign? Do conditions prevail which make for the flowering of democratic institutions? Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Commission's report are hardly a source from which one could draw any inspiration for the future of democracy in South Korea. While we wish South Korea well in its efforts to retain economic stability and political tranquillity, we are not impressed by the argument that it could work out its salvation or, for that matter, determine its future outside North Korea -- or outside Korea as a geographical and historical whole.

If any pragmatic purpose is to be served by the present draft resolution submitted by the United States, then the scope of paragraph 3 of the operative part should be expanded to take in and include concrete programmes which would grant North Korea the same status as South Korea. My delegation makes the suggestion -- confident that so long as we have the great Powers in the Security Council, which perhaps determine more than any other Power in the general body what should be the future of the world -- that the great Powers would act in the same spirit which made the Summit Conference in Geneva so famous.

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

My delegation suggests, therefore, that this is no longer a time when we should discuss these first principles, for all too clearly it is seen that the dead hand of the past is ruling us from the grave. I need hardly remind this Committee, therefore, that in the view of my delegation a summit-type conference might solve the problem which for years now has defied solution. If I may be permitted to draw the parallel, the same was said about the problem of Indochina before it was solved. It was said that the problem of Indochina was a running sore in the international body politic which defied solution, and yet it was solved. Korea, I submit, is of that importance. It demands that same type of action. No doubt the limitations set on the Commission are great, and advisedly so. No doubt the Commission, with the best of intentions, will continue its efforts, but are not the sands of time running out? Is not the Korean problem affecting other issues in the Far East? The United Nations did intervene in Korea -- in defence of the Charter, not so much to prevent aggression. Is not the need for intervention greater now that there is a glimmer of hope for a lasting peace? The political liquidation of North Korea -- whether by non-recognition, as sought hitherto, or by armed force -- is not the solution.

Finally, may I draw the Committee's attention to what must be a **grave** error of judgement on the part of the Commission. In paragraph 9 of its report (A/3172) there appears the sentence:

"They have supported moves for a conference outside the framework of the United Nations to discuss settlement of the Korean question."

It is, to say the least, a note of complaint, if I may so comment, but if what is stated there is the desire of the North Korean people, in what manner is it in conflict with clause 60 of the Armistice Agreement? I quote from clause 60:

"In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc."

(Mr. Perera, Ceylon)

If, therefore, that is not in conflict with clause 60 of the Armistice Agreement, then is there anything unreasonable in the North Koreans insisting that they must be brought into these councils before a final settlement is arrived at?

I submit, in conclusion, that the present conditions demand such a conference, the more so as what is required is a reappraisal of the question in the light of political developments, especially the rise of the People's Republic of China in the Far East. It would be absurd, if I may use the word, to ignore the existence of the People's Republic and still find a final solution to the problem of Korea. In the spirit of compromise, therefore, my delegation suggests -- although we shall not put forward a formal amendment -- that the great Powers which are sitting in this Committee should consider the proposal that a conference similar to that held in Geneva in 1954 be held and perhaps work out the final solution.

Mr. CARBAJAL-VICTORICA (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): The Uruguayan delegation will support the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.158) submitted by the United States of America. We are not mistaken regarding the true importance of this draft resolution. We know full well that it is not the panacea and the great solution to the Korean question. We know that it will not and does not lead us to the so often desired reunification of Korea. We defend this draft resolution because of its importance as an affirmation of principle. We are convinced that it is not the achievement of the future for Korea, nor do we think that it will bring about as the ineluctable corollary a series of events that will lead to the unification of Korea. But since we are confronted with the situation of Korea, since we do have to try to overcome the serious obstacles caused by war, by the bloody intervention, by the permanent threat, we do believe that this draft resolution states the will to fight, and it also crystallizes the aim and the goal in our minds, which is independent, democratic Korea with representative form of government.

In other words, we are very much in favour of the unification, but we cannot turn our backs on the flag that had been held up before; in other words, without treading under foot the principles that earlier we had defended. We feel that the importance given the elections in Korea as the democratic way of expressing the will of a people is most worthy of appreciation and of encomium.

(Mr. Carbajal-Victorica, Uruguay)

After all, this is a principle that underlies our very Charter and our existence as an international organization. I feel that it is also quite correct to entrust to the United Nations Commission the task of supervising these elections and informing us with regard to them.

This draft resolution wants unification, but not under despotism. We want a solution of the Korean question, but we do not want totalitarianism to be given a help in Korea. Summing up, no novelty is offered us here and we are giving no proof of weakness. On the contrary, it is a determined desire to face and overcome all resistance -- once again to reaffirm the principles of our Organization.

That is why I feel that some of the statements that have been made here were, to put it flatly, inappropriate. These speeches have knocked very loudly, but at the wrong doors. As far as Uruguay is concerned, we are trying to set the groundwork for possible events in the future. I agree with many of the expressions that fell from the lips of the representative of Australia. I would say that, as far as we are concerned, it is impossible for us to change our way unless we suffer from total amnesia or unless we were suffering from a complete loss of all thinking ability.

We must and we do bear very much in mind the entire historical process of the Korean question and of Korea itself -- the war of conquest, the bloody intervention and over-running of Korea, the constant and continuing threat that exists. Now the solution that some are upholding -- with perhaps naive good intentions -- might have been found from the moment of the breaking out of hostilities if they had been willing to fish in the waters of appeasement. If the United Nations was willing to surrender then, the United Nations could have avoided a problem. If we had accepted the iron yoke of a communist dictatorship then, naturally, all quarrels would have been avoided. But though the path that we have chosen may be a more difficult, we nevertheless feel that we must continue this more difficult path. This greater hill will have to be climbed, for this way, if the happy solution does not appear soon, at least we know, at least we are convinced, that we shall not fall into the serious error and the dangerous mistake of being misled and misguided and being led into a system that will ultimately rule the world with an iron hand.

(Mr. Carbajal-Victorica, Uruguay)

In present circumstances, the only draft resolution which could be drawn up is the one which the United States delegation has submitted to this Committee.

It should be a categorical imperative in the minds of all that the Korean question cannot be solved by opening further horizons to totalitarianism. Were circumstances to change, if the atmosphere were to become more propitious, then -- and only then -- would it be the right time to try to find other solutions of more general scope. For the moment, however, this draft resolution is our only answer.

Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): Once again this year, we witness with a heavy heart the fact that the primary objective of the United Nations in Korea -- that is, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government for all Korea -- still remains unfulfilled. We regretfully note from the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, submitted to the eleventh session of the General Assembly, that:

"There has been no evidence during the year that the attitude of the authorities in North Korea has undergone any basic change.

They... have shown no signs of acceptance of the principles on which the United Nations believes progress can be based". (A/3172, paragraph 9)

I think that it is hardly necessary to dwell at length on the circumstances which have so far continued to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem. These circumstances are well known to all of us and need no repetition. As the delegation of one of the Governments, however, which participated in the Korean Conference in Geneva on behalf of the United Nations, my delegation wishes once again to affirm its adherence to the principles enunciated by those Governments in Geneva. Although the North Korean authorities and the Chinese communist regime have not as yet heeded the recommendations of the General Assembly, which endorsed these principles by an overwhelming majority, we sincerely believe that the principles still provide a basis for an equitable solution of the Korean problem.

Despite the fact that we are dismayed at the failure to achieve an early and just settlement of the Korean problem, the basic circumstance remains that the fulfilment of the United Nations objectives in Korea is of vital concern to our

(Mr. Bayulken, Turkey)

Organization. It was in Korea that the United Nations for the first time in its history resisted aggression by collective action and successfully repelled the aggressors. If the heroic sacrifices of the Korean people and the Member States which sent their youth to Korea in the defence of freedom and security are not to have been in vain, the United Nations should not shirk its responsibility and should persevere in its efforts to achieve the peaceful unification of Korea, in conformity with the Organization's objectives.

The present situation in Korea cannot be described as one conducive to world peace. That is why we regard an early and just solution of this problem as important. The realization of such a solution not only will compensate the Korean people for the sacrifices they have already made in their struggle, but will also be yet another factor in lessening tension in the Far East and promoting world peace.

As regards the Armistice Agreement, the Turkish delegation -- like many other delegations -- pointed out last year that, although the Agreement remained in effect so far as the cease fire was concerned, the application of some of its important provisions was far from being satisfactory and that those provisions were being violated by the North Korean authorities. The build-up of land forces in North Korea, in contradiction to the specific stipulations of the Armistice Agreement, and the prevention of the orderly and efficient functioning of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are examples of the serious violations in question. The report of the Unified Command on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (A/3167) gives relevant data on this subject and explains the reasons which prompted the temporary withdrawal of the Commission's inspection teams from South and North Korea into the demilitarized zone. We think that these violations are a matter of concern and should retain the General Assembly's attention.

Another problem on which I wish to touch is that of the illegal detention of United Nations military and civilian personnel by the Communist Chinese and North Korean authorities. Last year, my delegation made known its views on this problem. I shall therefore not repeat those views now. I wish, however, once again to emphasize the concern with which the Turkish Governments regards this matter. We are particularly concerned over the fate of 166 Turkish soldiers missing in action in Korea and so far unaccounted for by the communist authorities.

(Mr. Bayulken, Turkey)

With regard to the report of the Government of India on the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war, my delegation feels gratified to note that, of the eighty-eight ex-prisoners of war originally brought to India from Korea, nearly all were or are being settled, thanks to the generous attitude of the receiving countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and India; and to the efforts of the Secretary-General of this Organization.

Before concluding, I wish to say that my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation. In our view, this draft resolution is in full accordance with the line of action so far taken by the United Nations with regard to the Korean problem and is a reaffirmation of the United Nations objectives in Korea. My delegation will also be glad to support the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.159) submitted by the delegations of Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania)(interpretation from French): It is to be very much regretted that, once again, the United Nations is discussing the Korean question in the absence of representatives of one of the parties legitimately concerned in the solution of this problem -- that is, in the absence of representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

The essence of the Korean problem is to be found in the need to find the most appropriate ways and means for ensuring Korean national unity in an independent and democratic State. No solution can be found to such a problem -- or, for that matter, to any problem -- by deliberately ignoring these real facts.

This is, however, exactly what happens each year when the First Committee discusses the Korean problem, and the cause is the position adopted by the United States and other countries. Can the First Committee -- or any other organ of the General Assembly -- find a peaceful solution to the problem of the unification of Korea if it ignores the incontestable fact that north of the thirty-eighth parallel in Korea there exists an independent State which exercises its sovereign rights over a territory of about 110,000 square kilometres and with about 15 million inhabitants? Of course it cannot. A solution prepared without the co-operation and agreement of the two parties concerned can have no chance of being implemented by peaceful means.

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(Mr. Mezincescu, Romania)

The unrealistic attitude towards this problem, the attempt to ignore the existence of two States with different economic and social regimes and to impose by force on one of the parties the wishes of the other party have failed in the past and have no chance of succeeding in the future. This unrealistic way of approaching the Korean problem prejudices the interests of the peace and security of peoples and reflects the position of those circles which are interested in the maintenance of sources of increasing international tension.

The South Korean Government obstinately maintains a point of view, completely lacking in realism, that the South Korean regime must be extended by force of arms to all of Korea.

The Romanian delegation asked permission to speak this morning in order to raise a point of order. We did this because of the fact that the representative of South Korea was invited here not only in order to make statements, but also to furnish certain clarifications to the First Committee. Our point of view was not shared by the Chairman. The Romanian delegation, however, considers that the principal reason for the presence of a representative of South Korea is not to allow that representative an opportunity of making general policy statements, but to give an opportunity for members of the Political Committee to obtain the explanations and clarifications which they think are necessary.

In order to bring out the true aspects of the Korean problem, the Political Committee should consider the fact that recently Syngman Rhee, the principal figure in the South Korean political regime, declared in his New Year's message, as reported in Le Monde on 2 January, that the time would soon come for the South Korean armies to invade the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. The armed forces of South Korea, Syngman Rhee pointed out, were continuing their preparations with a view to a march towards the north.

The representative of South Korea made a long statement in this Committee on the devotion of his Government to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. He then launched attacks and calumnies against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and against some Members of the United Nations. I would ask the representative of South Korea to explain to the Political Committee how he can reconcile the bellicose statements of the head of his Government and his own aggressive statements here with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. How can one reconcile that alleged devotion to the purposes and principles of the United Nations with the actions and declarations of the Government of South Korea, which wishes to break the armistice agreement in Korea, an agreement which was signed by representatives of forces fighting under the United Nations banner?

It is obvious that the Government of South Korea is carrying out a policy of duplicity. Here in the United Nations it attempts to mislead the Members and world public opinion, while another policy is practised and proclaimed in its own country. Behind this policy of duplicity, the Government of South Korea hopes to carry out its plans in the Far East. Under such circumstances, the decision imposed on the Political Committee by a majority following the United States is a dangerous encouragement to the aggressive circles in South Korea.

In the view of the Romanian delegation, the Political Committee must also consider very closely the fact that the rulers of South Korea do not confine themselves to making aggressive statements. The South Korean Government directs all of the country's economy towards the preparation and the launching of a new war. According to official information, which probably gives less than the true figure, the South Korean Government maintains about 650,000 men under arms, which places South Korea in the fourth place in the world with regard to military forces, and that is in striking contrast to the economic resources of the country. More than 54 per cent of the budget of South Korea, and almost all the United States assistance, which amounts to millions of dollars, are assigned to military expenditures. The disastrous effects of this policy from the economic point of view are mentioned in the documents submitted to the eleventh session of the General Assembly, although these documents are intended to improve upon reality.

In striking contrast, the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea is carrying out a consistent policy for the unification of Korea. The People's Democratic Republic has solemnly declared that it will not use its armed forces against South Korea so long as South Korea does not launch a war against it. By a decision dated 31 May 1956, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea reduced its armed forces by 80,000 men.

The support furnished by the United States for the aggressive policy carried out by the South Korean Government runs counter to the desirable objective of transforming the present armistice into a durable peace. The fact is that the repeated violations of the armistice agreement on the United States

and South Korean side and the suspension of the neutral nations body constitute so many dangerous steps towards a breach of the armistice agreement.

With regard to the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation, the Romanian delegation considers that it is a new confirmation of the old unrealistic policy. A decision to expand the powers of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea for the purpose of observing elections throughout Korea -- a decision taken in the absence of and without the agreement of representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea -- would not make a positive contribution to the solution of the problem of the unification of Korea, but would only tend to aggravate the existing tensions. To any objective person, it is obvious that the direction in which the United States would lead the United Nations with respect to the Korean problem cannot bring about an equitable solution. In order to make a solution of this problem possible, all efforts must be concentrated in the first place on eliminating the foreign interference which constitutes the main obstacle against the realization of the desire of the Korean people for unification. The problem of the unification of Korea concerns all peace-loving peoples throughout the world, and it is in the interest of general peace that an equitable solution must be found. However, in the first place it is a problem for the Korean people, who are directly concerned in its solution.

On the basis of the real facts of the problem, it is clear that the restoration of Korean national unity in a democratic and independent State can be achieved only by the Korean people themselves. It can be achieved only by a rapprochement between the two parts of the country which now constitute separate States and by co-operation between the two parts of Korea. In order that the Korean people may freely manifest their will, it is absolutely necessary that there should be a withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korea as soon as possible, including the United States military forces and the Chinese volunteer detachments. An end must be put to foreign interference in the domestic affairs of Korea.

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(Mr. Mezincescu, Romania)

The Korean people have a culture that is thousands of years old. They have had great experience in the struggle for independence and national freedom, and there is no doubt that they are fully capable of solving their own problems without any interference from outside and without any interference at all.

The Romanian delegation considers that a peaceful solution of the Korean question would represent an important step forward in the consolidation of peace in the Far East and would make an important contribution to the maintenance of world peace by eliminating a source of international tension.

(Mr. Mezincescu, Romania)

The Romanian people and the Government of the Romanian People's Republic regard with special sympathy and support the efforts of the Korean Democratic People's Republic and the Korean people towards the peaceful unification of Korea, as has been emphasized during the visit to Bucharest of the governmental delegation of the Korean People's Republic. Relations between the Romanian People's Republic and the Korean Republic are being established on the basis of complete understanding, reciprocal respect and fraternal co-operation. Such relations correspond fully to the interests of both peoples and the interest of strengthening peace throughout the world.

Estimating at its true value the importance of a solution of the Korean problem, the Romanian delegation will vote against the United States draft resolution and will support any initiative based on a realistic estimate of the situation designed to create the conditions necessary for the Korean people to manifest its legitimate will for unity and national independence free of all foreign interference.

Mr. SCHIFF (Netherlands): During our discussions on this item of our agenda some statements have been made which gave the impression that there was some doubt as to the usefulness of a debate on the Korean question. This Committee, however, decided to start its work with the consideration of this item and in the opinion of the Netherlands delegation this decision reflected quite properly both the importance of the question and the sustained interest of the United Nations in the fate of Korea.

With regard to Korea, the United Nations assumed a particularly responsible mission when it first stopped aggression and then turned its efforts towards achieving a peaceful settlement. Its aim is to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified Korea, independent and democratic, under a representative form of government and the restoration of peace and security in that area.

In Geneva the States participating in the Korean Conference on behalf of the United Nations formulated two principles which they believed fundamental for our efforts towards reaching these objectives: firstly, that the United Nations has complete authority to take part in attempts to settle the Korean question; and, secondly, the establishment of a free and united Korean State must be based

(Mr. Schiff, Netherlands)

on free elections held under the supervision of the United Nations for representatives to the National Assembly in direct proportion to the population in Korea. The fact that our effort to reach these objectives in conformity with the two principles I mentioned have so far failed to succeed cannot possibly be blamed on a too rigid attitude on the part of the United Nations.

Is there, in all fairness, anything in our aims which would not be acceptable to any country sincerely concerned in solving the Korean question in accordance with the best interests of the Korean people? No, the blame for the Korean stalemate lies squarely with the other side. It claims to strive for the same results but has shown all too clearly that it has only in mind an extension of the North Korean regime over South Korea. The Communist side refuses to acknowledge the authority of the United Nations; it refuses to accept our objective except under its own interpretation; it refuses the idea of free elections and the democratic form of government. At the same time we are invited to participate in a conference to settle the question once and for all, that is, to settle it on Communist terms.

Can anybody say that the United Nations is rigid in its refusal to meet on terms which in themselves are a denial of its basic position? The situation leaves the United Nations no choice but to reaffirm its objectives, to maintain the armistice and to continue rendering to our friends in the Republic of Korea such assistance as they may need on the road to full development on which they have already made such gratifying progress. We must do so even though there is nothing in the present situation in Korea to warrant any optimism on our side as to the possibility of early success.

Above all, the United Nations should not diminish its interest in Korea nor waver in its determination to achieve what it has set out to do. If we were to act differently we should risk losing by default what we have for many years been trying to win by our concerted efforts. Events in other parts of the world, developments fraught with the danger of international conflict, require our attention, but this should not lead us to fail in maintaining our responsibilities towards the people of Korea.

These views of my delegation find reflection in the draft resolution introduced by the representative of the United States and we shall give the draft resolution our support.

(Mr. Schiff, Netherlands)

Finally, I should like to say a few words in connexion with the question of the ex-prisoners of war. My delegation has noted with interest the report of the Government of India and the statement made by the representative of India this afternoon on the progress made so far in solving this problem. It is most gratifying to see that a final solution is at hand due to the valuable co-operation of the Government of Argentina and Brazil and, last but by no means least, to the efforts of the Government of India itself which has earned the gratitude not only of the former prisoners themselves but also of the United Nations.

We are indebted to the delegations of Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela for having expressed these sentiments in their draft resolution, and the Netherlands delegation will vote for it.

Mr. PEREZ-PEREZ (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): In taking part in this discussion on the question of Korea, my delegation is convinced of the great importance of this subject. The General Assembly has considered this problem at a number of sessions without having been able to solve it but we do not feel that this in any way lessens the importance of the question or the interest that we have in its solution. We have adopted extremely important resolutions for the maintenance of peace and international security in that part of the world, which proves that our interest is still very great.

My delegation is extremely sorry to see us meeting again without having a satisfactory solution of the Korean question offered to us, but it is sufficient just to read the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to understand the immense difficulties that are constantly being thrown in the path of our Organization in its endeavour to fulfil the tasks that have been entrusted to it. If the North Korean authorities do not co-operate with the Commission in carrying out the work which has been entrusted to it, that Commission can do but little and therefore only very little progress can be made towards solving the problem as a whole. It is therefore perfectly logical that we must make a new appeal that there should be no more interference, that no more obstacles be put in the path of the United Nations.

The report states that on the part of the North Korean authorities certain efforts were made to contact the South Korean authorities. Proposals were made to settle the Korean question at a conference outside the United Nations, but even

(Mr. Perez-Perez, Venezuela)

if these proposals were accepted any discussion of this problem should be based upon the principles set forth in the 1954 Geneva Conference which in due course were reiterated by our own General Assembly, and this is what the draft resolution submitted by the United States tries to do.

This draft resolution is a faithful reflection of what was decided upon by the General Assembly at previous sessions. Since the objectives for the solution of the Korean question are the same as they have been before, it is obvious that the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should continue its work in accordance with existing resolutions. My delegation will of course vote in favour of the United States draft resolution. We also trust that in the course of this year the Commission will at least be able to progress in its work on the Korean question.

My Government has given economic aid for the rehabilitation of Korea and from the report that we have heard we are happy to know that the Republic of Korea is rising out of the sufferings it has undergone and is reorganizing its international life. My delegation trusts that very soon the Republic of Korea will take its seat in the Assembly and enjoy all the rights of membership.

We have also taken careful note of the report submitted by the Government of India on the question of ex-prisoners of the Korean war. Today, once again, we should like to pay tribute to the Government of India for the humanitarian efforts it has put forward, which have almost been crowned with success. We should also like to thank the Governments of Brazil and Argentina, which were kind and generous enough to take in these ex-prisoners of war and thus helped to solve this problem. My delegation agrees entirely with what was said this morning by the representative of El Salvador when he submitted the joint draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.159, which expresses the gratitude of the General Assembly to the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil. After my delegation and the delegation of El Salvador had talked this matter over with the delegation of Ecuador, the three delegations submitted a joint draft resolution which, they believe, embodies the feelings expressed by a number of delegations in the Committee in regard to the co-operation received from the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil in the solution of the problem of the ex-prisoners of the Korean war. We hope that the majority of the Committee will support our joint draft resolution.

Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (interpretation from French): Since 1954, our Committee has been attempting to find a solution to the Korean problem. The other day, the representative of the United States very rightly recalled the two fundamental principles adopted at the Geneva Conference, from which it would appear that the unification of Korea by free elections remains one of the objectives of our Organization. The position of the French Government with respect to the Korean question is well known to this Committee, and it appears to me unnecessary to make a long statement in this connexion. As the French Foreign Minister emphasized in 1954, we remain devoted to the principle of free elections on both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel under the safeguard of international supervision, so as to allow the creation of a single and truly representative Korean Government. This position, as I have said, is not a new one. It was also the position of the majority of Members of this Organization, as appears from the resolutions adopted during previous sessions.

It has been said here on several occasions that these resolutions are a dead letter. Of course, we know the responsibility in this situation of those States which have persistently refused to implement the intentions and wishes of the General Assembly. We nevertheless very much regret that our Organization has so far been unable in Korea, as elsewhere, to reach a practical solution of the problem.

We have two resolutions before us today. The first, due to the initiative of the United States delegation, deals with the fundamental question of unification. It begins by recalling the principles in the name of which France, together with fourteen other countries, fought in Korea to repel aggression. It then calls for the implementation of these principles, which have been reaffirmed on various occasions by the General Assembly. Finally, it calls upon the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in that direction. This is a modest but real step toward what we consider the desirable goal.

The second draft resolution, which has just been submitted by the delegations of Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela, deals with the humanitarian question of prisoners of war. It pays tribute to the generous initiative of the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil and expresses the gratitude of the General Assembly for their valuable co-operation in the settlement of the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war.

The French delegation supports both of these draft resolutions and will vote in favour of them.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

