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Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Wednesday, 30 October 1957, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ABDOH

(Iran)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international Convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction [24] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Krishna Menon	(India)
Mr. Moch	(France)
Mr. Kuznetsov	(USSR)
Mr. Matsudaira	(Japan)

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## AGENDA ITEM 24

REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS; CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

- (a) REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
- (b) EXPANSION OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AND OF ITS SUB-COMMITTEE
- (c) COLLECTIVE ACTION TO INFORM AND ENLIGHTEN THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AS TO THE DANGERS OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE, AND PARTICULARLY AS TO THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF MODERN WEAPONS
- (d) DISCONTINUANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TESTS OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): When I made my first and preliminary intervention in this debate on disarmament, I felt it my duty to mention that it is to this Assembly that the world looks for some progress in the direction of disarmament. There were many speakers during the general debate in the General Assembly, notably the Prime Minister of Canada, who expressed the hope that this Assembly might be known in future years as the "Disarmament Assembly". In my first intervention I also said that my delegation would have preferred to intervene in the debate after it had heard all the representatives on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, particularly the representative of France. I wish to express my regret that I was not present in the Committee when Mr. Jules Moch made his statement. This was not due to any lack of courtesy, but because I was engaged in another place. However, I studied his speech very fully.

A great part of the statement from the French delegation was addressed to the arguments which I presented to the Assembly, and it also went to the root of the problem of disarmament and discussed how we should tackle it at the present time and also the role of the General Assembly, which is a significant one. Therefore, I hope the representative of France will forgive me if I make very full use of his statement. Much of that statement was in favour of what has been presented by my delegation; at least, the arguments were but the conclusions were not always so.

Mr. Moch said:

"The need for a disarmed peace has never been as deeply felt as at this time when, in the case of a conflict, the advanced lines of former times would stretch across the whole world. Disarmament was never so meticulously studied as it was during the last six-month session of the Sub-Committee in London, nor has there ever been as much hope as there was then to turn into reality the spirit of Geneva. Therefore, never was the disillusionment as great as it was on the morning after our recent adjournment." (A/C.1/PV.877, page 2)

I ask with very great respect, if the need for disarmed peace has never been as deeply felt and if in the case of a conflict the advanced lines of former times would stretch across the world, is the disillusionment the answer or the contention that should be put before this Assembly? The two parts of his argument somehow do not seem to fit in together. My delegation in its initial statement said that what we were really discussing under the item of disarmament was really the survival of civilization, as we know it. That is putting the same statement in another way.

From there the statement went on to refer to our debates here, and this is a matter of very great importance because in the submission we originally made we stated, with respect to all Members of this Assembly, that here was an issue in which we must if necessary think in fresh terms, not merely in terms of party or political alignment. The issues were so vital for the survival of the human race that even at the risk of changing our original view, it was necessary for us to make a fresh approach.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

In all that, my delegation took the view that the Disarmament Commission itself had ceased to function and had become merely a post office. The Sub-Committee on Disarmament had laboured long and zealously, and it had not produced agreement. But, at the same time, as Mr. Lodge pointed out, areas of agreement had been reached at various times. It was as though they met on a level plateau near each other and that drifts of suspicion came between them and separated them again. But the main point which we made was that this is one of those occasions when world public opinion, Governments large and small, irrespective of their prestige, irrespective of their economic or political power, had the same responsibility, not to find a solution, not in order to produce the knowledge that the great Powers have, but the same responsibility towards pressing forward and not sharing in the disillusionment.

But what are we told? We are told that because of the work in London, according to Mr. Moch, "All this necessarily limits the role of our Assembly". The role of this Assembly cannot be limited by anybody except the Assembly itself. "We must examine the situation objectively, and not as we would have it," said Mr. Moch. That is what the Assembly is supposed to do. Mr. Moch continued

"One fact is immediately apparent: seventy-one official meetings of the Sub-Committee and many private meetings between heads of delegations have been unable to bring about the draft of any agreement...even after the different points of view had been brought considerably closer, as Mr. Cabot Lodge correctly stressed. Among the five members of the Sub-Committee are the four Powers which alone must bear the responsibility for taking the first disarmament measures..." (Ibid)

My delegation has time after time, year after year, stated that unless these great Powers agreed, there could be no disarmament in the world. Therefore we do not disagree with it. It may be true that they should take the first disarmament measures, but, at the same time, is it not the Assembly's responsibility to have a policy and the necessary expression of opinion and the influence which it might exert in that way? Mr. Moch went on to say:

"... none of us can reasonably expect an agreement, provisionally deferred after lengthy negotiations between five States, suddenly to emerge after a brief discussion between eighty-two States..." (Ibid)

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

If this is the case, then what was the purpose of submitting the report of the Disarmament Commission, because what is said here is that for three months, at seventy-one meetings, the matter was discussed in great detail; they are the people who know all about it and they could not reach agreement, and therefore we cannot reach agreement. Therefore, the representative of France, with all his experience, and in his wisdom, advises us:

"... Let us regretfully discard the idea of unanimity on the substance of the problem..." (Ibid., p. 3-5)

And that is the most damaging statement that could be made to a person like myself.

"...This year, the Assembly will have to decide by a majority vote despite the serious difficulties inherent in the absence of unanimity that Mr. Krishna Menon so appropriately brought out." (Ibid.)

If we are told that on the four Powers alone rests the responsibility of disarmament, and if, at the same time, we are told that the four Powers do not agree and, therefore, we must depend upon the three of them in order to bring about a decision, how do we square these two things? On the one hand, we are told that there must be agreement among the four. We have not got that agreement and, therefore, instead of putting any barrier to further measures towards reaching agreement, the Assembly is asked to take the view that there cannot be unanimity; we must discard this idea in regard to the substance of the problem: "...the Assembly will have to decide by a majority vote despite the serious difficulties inherent in the absence of unanimity..."

No one has a higher respect than I have for the representative of France, for his very steadfast and devoted work in this cause and the great knowledge and experience which he brings to bear upon it. He tells us that in this matter, in spite of the political vicissitudes that may happen in a system of democratic government, he has conducted these negotiations for years and his own person lives, therefore, in the continuity of French policy in regard to that. I do not question all this. But let us be clear about this one thing, that it is not possible for the Assembly at any time to consider that there are not occasions when deadlocks can be reached which may be resolved one way or another. The General Assembly has many experiences where this has happened. To this I shall refer later, with concrete instances. This is the approach that is made.



(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Then in the next part of his speech, the representative of France prescribes to the General Assembly what is its role. What is the role of the General Assembly? There are three roles as prescribed to us by Mr. Moch:

"First of all, each of its Members individually can submit his own suggestions..."

That, I think, is the right that rests in us as sovereign States. In any case, any communications will be received by the International Postal System. The paragraph continues:

"...We shall receive these with rejoicing because we are aware that, despite our seventy-one working meetings, undoubtedly we may have overlooked certain aspects of the problem." (Ibid., p. 7)

That, Mr. Moch, does not square again with the idea that no other influence should be brought to bear upon the considerations between Assemblies in regard to this problem. Mr. Moch continued:

"Secondly, the Assembly collectively must soothe human fear with a note of hope, of confidence in the wisdom of man..."

How would the General Assembly "soothe human fear with a note of hope, of confidence" when we are told that there can be no unanimity and no agreement and that, therefore, one must vote with the majority? On the one hand, we are asked to endorse the non-agreed findings of the Sub-Committee, and then we are to go to the world and "soothe human fear with a note of hope, of confidence in the wisdom of man". Mr. Moch went on to say:

"Finally, this year the Assembly must make a choice: at least two roads are open to us..."

I submit that there is only one road with regard to this, and that is to disarm. And then comes the most tragic sentence of all:

"... For the moment, a synthesis seems to be impossible..."

The representative of France was the author of this idea of synthesis two or three years ago. The sentence goes on:

"...and I say this sadly since in the course of our long years of work I have always done everything in my power to bring about the necessary conciliation. I am not giving up. Still, to continue with it, a better time must be awaited than that which follows the long London session. Our first task is to make known the feelings of the United Nations, that is to say, to choose between the two main concepts, to take a majority stand..." (Ibid.)

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

With very great respect for the twenty-four countries that have sponsored the draft resolution and for Mr. Jules Moch himself, I submit the view of my Government that it would not be a contribution to negotiation to get the endorsement of this Assembly to a non-agreed view of the Commission. This has nothing to do with whether one proposal is more meritorious than the other. The essence of success in disarmament work is agreement. Therefore if the power of the Assembly is rallied behind one view -- whether it be the view of the majority or the minority makes no difference -- then the next stage of negotiation becomes more difficult. The representative of France questions this and thinks that if the Assembly endorsed a non-agreed view then that non-agreed view might become an agreed view later on. We feel, on our part, that it would be unwise to tighten this deadlock and put the weight of the Assembly behind disagreements. This is a centre for harmonizing interests and not for disharmonizing them.

This is not meant in disrespect of the labours of the Commission. This is no final disagreement with regard to the proposals put forward, but simply to point out that the work we have to do here is not in any way to put the Disarmament Commission in cold storage or to make its further meetings more difficult by being met with an initial objection -- that is, an Assembly mandate to proceed in a particular way.

In the statements we made, I submitted to you, Mr. Chairman, and under your guidance that this was not the time to deal with resolutions, but generally with the main sub-headings so that the general debate will cover the whole issue. The first of these items to which we address ourselves is the draft resolution of Belgium. My delegation is in sympathy with this draft resolution (A/3630), but we should like to say this: that while we are in sympathy with this draft resolution, if the dissemination of knowledge simply means another period of delay and, what is more, from all the discussions and the contradictions made by the representative of France himself with regard to the scientific data that is put forward, if the dissemination of knowledge becomes only another instrument for saying that armaments are no danger and that disarmament is not necessary, then the dissemination of information will serve little purpose. With that reservation we should like to express our support for the view that is put forward by the Belgian delegation because in the last analysis it is the public opinion of the world that will bring pressure upon all of us.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The next item I would like to deal with is the question of these explosions. We are told that we have now "come to the crucial point." (A/C.1/PV.877, p.21)

The representative of France states:

"... the isolated suspension of nuclear tests, the supreme hope of the Soviet delegation, -- a battlefield wisely chosen where the passionate and the rational meet. ... He has received the support of Mr. Krishna Menon who, I hasten to add, has not taken upon himself to repeat all those imputations and whose ardent address calls for the most careful reflection." (Ibid.)

I am most grateful for the kind references to me by the representative of France. But I think it is my duty to state the position of my Government. As early as 1954, this proposal for a moratorium on tests was made, long before the Soviet Union had agreed or had agreed tentatively or had expressed its view on a suspension of tests. What is more, by itself, one country supporting or opposing a proposition is not a measure of its merit. If support of the suspension of explosions is regarded as a political move then I think we shall stand in this Assembly with the great majority of opinion in the world. We shall take first of all the United States of America where recently,

"In a nation-wide survey just completed by the American Institute of Public Opinion, a dramatic change in the public's thinking on calling a halt to further hydrogen bomb tests is noted. Sixty-three per cent of those questioned believe that this country should agree to stop making any more tests of nuclear weapons -- if all nations, including Russia, agree to do so.

When the issue was first raised in April, 1954" -- that is when we brought it up -- "only 20 per cent were in favour of calling off tests."

We read the following in The New York Times of 19 May 1957:

"Throughout Scandinavia just about everybody wants to see an end of nuclear explosion tests. In Norway's larger cities such as Oslo, Bergen and Stavanger, people have been standing by hundreds in queues awaiting a chance to sign a public round robin saying simply, 'We think Albert Schweitzer is right.'

Norwegian newspaper editorials have been saying for weeks now, as did Oslo's Arbeiderbladet -- a Government mouthpiece -- recently that 'the increasing rate of nuclear explosions is proof enough that they must be stopped -- now and while there is yet time'".

There are similar opinions expressed in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries.



(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Then we come to what may be called a totally non-political opinion in a statement made by the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches on 5 August 1957. I am not saying that the World Council of Churches is an expert on atomic science, but we are now talking about public opinion. This statement reads:

"We are bound to ask whether any nation is justified in continuing the testing of nuclear weapons while the magnitude of the dangers is so little known and while effective means of protection against these dangers are lacking. We must ask further whether any nation is justified in deciding on its own responsibility to conduct such tests when the people of other nations in all parts of the world who have not agreed may have to bear the consequences.

But we urge that as a first step Governments conducting tests should forego them, at least for a trial period, either together, or individually in the hope that the others will do the same, a new confidence be born, and foundations be laid for reliable agreements."

I read these out because it is always possible to draw across any argument a political red herring in this way.

The position of the Government of India in regard to suspension of tests is something which is fundamental, which India regards as necessary in view of the danger, as I shall show very soon, and in view of its importance in relation to the whole of the disarmament problem on which we hold views diametrically opposed to those expressed by the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom and because we think that any step in this direction will be a contribution toward disarmament itself. Further, we do not think that any of the objections raised in this regard are any longer true. Nor does the suspension of tests -- I would like to make this new point -- handicap one group of countries as against the other. The handicaps are even. In regard to all this, I propose to place before the Committee such evidence as we have.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The representative of New Zealand, speaking in the debate, said:

"We need no reminding that many earnest people throughout the world feel that the possible hazards from test explosions should override all other considerations in determining the attitude of Governments and of this Assembly towards the testing of nuclear weapons. Their genuine apprehensions arise from uncertainty about the long-term effects of radiation if tests are not brought to an end. We have heard an eloquent exposition of this point of view from the distinguished representative of India." -- I am grateful for this kind reference -- "On the other hand, Mr. Moch, with all his experience, reassured us yesterday as to the effects of radiation, and I must say that I found his statement very convincing."

(A/C.1/PV.879, p. 43-45)

This reaction that has been created in the Assembly either in full or in part has imposed upon me a responsibility, in spite of all the respect I have for the representative of France, to answer each of the points that have been raised.

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

The representative of France says:

"Let us dwell no longer on the possibility of chain reactions destroying the planet as the result of peace-time test explosions. All this has been scientifically proved and I shall not harp upon it again. At any rate, the most powerful nuclear explosions release a thousand times less energy than the most powerful earthquakes, and only just about as much as the tropical cyclones, with which I am sure members are acquainted. Therefore, their danger need not be taken into account at all." (A/C.1/PV.877, page 23)

Here is a member of the Disarmament Commission saying that the danger need not be taken into account at all and that therefore it is not a question that tests should be suspended now or later. I should like to say that I have read through what I have said and I do not recollect my saying that explosions are likely to create a chain reaction and destroy the world. I said that it is possible to conceive of a situation in which the advance of knowledge and the success of further experiments might mean the finding of methods whereby whatever they do with the atom can create chain reactions, as was said at the Scientific Conference in Geneva that was convened by the United Nations itself.

Be that as it may, we are told that an atomic explosion is much less powerful than a powerful earthquake. But we do not make the earthquakes; we have no control over them; they are natural calamities. However, we make the explosions. That is the difference. The same thing applies to cyclones. Earthquakes and cyclones are not man-made affairs. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the advice given me by our scientific advisers is that one of these big bombs that is exploded either by the Soviet Union or by the United States has as much explosive power as all the explosives used by humanity during all time. Therefore, to suggest that a powerful earthquake is more powerful than one of these weapons and that therefore their danger need not be taken into account at all comes to me as a great surprise.

If we are to apply this argument logically, this could equally apply to war. All the explosions in war, whether atomic or otherwise, would be less powerful than the powerful earthquakes, if the statement is true, and therefore we could equally apply this argument in this way. It does not matter very much that if we have a earthquake there is much more trouble in the world. Each of the

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test explosions conducted by the United States in March 1954 and 1956 and by the Soviet Union in November 1955 produced far more explosive energy than the total explosive energy released by mankind in all its history.

Because one reads out this kind of evidence one is charged with what has been called science fiction stories. I shall come to these science fiction stories, but let me quote again responsible opinion.

The Chairman of the Special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress says the following:

"My Sub-Committee heard a great deal of testimony from eminent scientists on the probable biological damage to be expected from various amounts of internally deposited radioactive substances . . . . As a layman I was somewhat shocked to find out how much the experts admitted they did not know. In fact, when I thought over how little is known for sure, I wondered how some Government officials could be so positive that bomb tests were so safe....

"The Atomic Energy Commission has continually given out assurances that we had nothing to worry about and yet we find, from testimony of their own experts, that there is reason to worry."

Now we come to what I am sure the representative of France will consider it is my duty to deal with. Because he regards the presentation of the effects of radiation and the effects of these explosions, apart from all the political consequences, as not being as calamitous as I might have presented them, he suggests that we have not got to the scientific reality. I am not trying to contradict him because we have been criticized. We have to get down to the root of this matter. The representative of France says: "I am not awed by science fiction stories." (A/C.1/PV.877, page 23) I shall not read the rest of it. What are these science fiction stories? Who are the fiction writers? I shall not name all the authorities I have quoted before this Committee, but the following are some: the Committee on Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, a Committee of eighteen members including one Nobel Prize winner in genetics; the Radiation Hazards Committee of the United Kingdom Atomic Scientists Association, including one Nobel Prize winner in physics;

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Professor Price of the University of Pennsylvania; Professor Miyake, Director of the Geochemical Laboratory of Tokyo; Professor Parisot of France, President of the ninth World Health Assembly; Professor Sievert of the Karolinska Hospital, Sweden, whose evidence I read here the other day; Professor Compton of Chicago, a Nobel Prize winner; Professor Haddow of the Cancer Research Institute of London; Professor Crow of the University of Wisconsin; Dr. Lapp of the University of Chicago; and, finally, Dr. Libby, of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, on Strontium 90.

I read out Dr. Libby's name because I had to place before the Committee a contradiction of the contradictions submitted by the French representative.

So these are the fiction writers. I say this because my delegation has not sought to trade on fear or on the passions and emotions that have been aroused in this matter. We have, as far as we could, used the approach of a layman to this problem, and I think that in this particular matter a layman's approach is more important, because the majority of the people in the world are laymen, and we have tried to present to the Assembly what are the known and the unknown hazards arising from radiation, either biological or otherwise. We never suggested that there should be any panicking in this matter. Panic is no answer, we entirely agree.

These are the main contradictions. I hope the Committee will bear with me for going into this in detail because the details have been dealt with in both these speeches.

The main substance of an injurious nature that has been referred to year after year is Strontium 90. The representative of France has done me the honour of reading quotations from what I said in regard to this. He said:

"Mr. Menon is dismayed by the fact that by 1970, radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear explosions will have raised the amount of radiation in human bones from 9 per cent to 45 per cent higher than is normally present owing to natural background radiation. But to this we must add -- and Mr. Menon did not do so -- that in the view of the experts the amount of Strontium present in the bones is at present so far below the margin of safety that, even in 1970, after the addition which will have occurred by that time, it would still be forty times less than that limit." (A/C.1/PV.877, page 22)



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He also stated:

"I want to say that Dr. Libby, the American scientist quoted by Mr. Menon, ends a lengthy study on Strontium 90 by indicating that the entire increase in the absorption of this element by man, following all the explosions already carried out, is equal to the natural radiation increase resulting from an insignificant elevation in altitude of a few hundred metres."  
(A/C.1/PV.877, page 22)

I should like to submit that it is not the whole of the story. First of all, there are no established safety margins in regard to this. If I may, I would submit with great respect that there is some confusion here with regard to the radiation effects of Strontium and the effects of Strontium on bones and blood, and we were referring to that at that time.

With regard to Dr. Libby's own opinion, that seems to have changed a little. Dr. Harrison Brown, Professor of Geo-Chemistry at the California Institute of Technology, who was associated with the Manhattan Project during the war, has the following to say about the so-called small risk:

"The Atomic Energy Commission is convinced that continued testing of H-bombs is necessary for the defence of the United States. Upon Dr. Willard Libby's shoulders has fallen the task of assuring the world that continued testing is safe. It has been next to impossible for anyone of any consequence to voice doubts or fears concerning radiation hazards and H-bomb testing without a new letter or article from Dr. Libby quickly appearing, assuring the reader in carefully worded sentences that everything will be all right. Dr. Schweitzer is the latest addition to a long list of distinguished individuals who have received such reassurance ...

"For a long time Dr. Libby contended that there were no dangers of any consequence involved in H-bomb fallout, if we continued testing at the present rate. Recently, however, there has been a change of tone. In his letter to Dr. Schweitzer he admits that there is some risk, although he hastily adds that the risk is 'extremely small compared with other risks which persons everywhere take as a normal part of their lives.' ...

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"Dr. Libby's letter to Dr. Schweitzer begs at least two major questions. Do we really know what the risks are in sufficient detail so that we can be as confident as Dr. Libby appears to be? And what does he mean when he says that the risk is 'extremely small'? ....

"Dr. Libby has stated that the present concentration of Strontium-90 in children in the United States is 'somewhat less than 1 per cent of the maximum permissible concentration for the population.' The latter in turn is one-tenth the permissible amount of Strontium-90 for atomic energy workers in the United States. If we assume that 20 per cent of all existing leukemia has been induced by radiation, then it can be shown that in the absence of further explosions, the leukemia rate will go up about 0.1 per cent.

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"If testing continues at the present rate for the next few decades, the leukemia rate may increase by about 0.5 per cent. If we are to permit tests at a rate such that doses of strontium-90 were received equal to that which have been declared 'safe' for the population as a whole by a committee of the National Academy of Sciences, leukemia incidence might increase 10 per cent.

"When we say that the leukemia rate is increasing by only 0.5 per cent, the number appears small. But when we say that 10,000 individuals are killed each year -- individuals of all nationalities who work, love and laugh and who want to live as much as do you and I -- the number suddenly seems very large.

"We would not dream of lining thousands of people against a wall and shooting them down in order to test a new machine-gun. But this, in effect, is what the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom do when they test these fantastic new weapons. We do not know who the people are who are afflicted, but we know that with little question many people are killed as a result of these actions.

"I believe that in this area we must be guided as much by our ignorance as by our knowledge.

That is to say, when we do not know what harm we are doing, we have no right to inflict that harm.

"There is as much yet to be learned concerning both the immediate and long-range effects of radiation fallout. And I cannot help feeling that as the testing nations follow their present path, as their actions result indiscriminately in the deaths of persons all over the world, and as they continue to pursue an elusive security, they lose what is perhaps the most important element of true security -- their human dignity."

(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

There is another bit of confusion which is cleared up by the evidence given in the summary of the hearings of the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy of the United States, from 27 - 29 May and from 3 - 7 June of this year, on the nature of radioactive fallout and its effect on man. In this official record there will be found another version of Dr. Libby's views. It is not as though the increase in strontium-90 deposits is one-fortieth of the permissible margin, but according to him it varies from 3.5 to 9 if stratospheric fallout is uniform; 5 to 12 if existing fallout pattern is maintained; and 10 to 25 if predicted increase in banding of stratospheric fallout in latitudes of Northeastern United States occurs. Therefore, it is not one-fortieth, as suggested, but one-fourth the increase; and that is considerably more. The rest of the information points to the fact that if this increase is one-tenth, and not one-fourth, that will be dangerous.

In this document which is submitted by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, there is a summary of the key points made. In that summary there was general agreement that any amount of radiation, no matter how small the dose, increases the rate of genetic mutation population. There was, on the other hand, a difference of opinion as to whether a small dose of radiation would produce similar increased incidences of such somatic conditions as leukemia, bone cancer, or a decrease of life expectancy.

We have to make a difference between somatic effects and biological effects in regard to this. I would submit to the Committee that there is no such thing as a safe level as far as genetic effects are concerned. What the Committee has to take into account is that any dose, any increase of radiation, however slight, has some effect. Therefore, it is quite true, as Mr. Lodge pointed out, that there is radiation out of radium dial watches, and what not. That is true, But there is no reason to add to it, where consequences are not known, and therefore we cannot accept the fact that there is nothing to worry about. There were differences of opinion on how to forecast the consequence of further testing effects of radiation. Then this document goes on to say that pending a resolution of the differences, it would appear from the information presented that the consequence of further testing over the next several generations at the level of testing of the past five years could constitute a hazard to the world's population. It is very difficult, if not impossible to forecast the real position of the number of people that will be so affected. No one has suggested that we could forecast the position.

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Another aspect of this which has to be thought of is that especially in view of the emergence of what are called "clean bombs", which are exploded from great heights, the fallout of this particular substance will take many years to come down. Therefore, to speak about its somatic effects, as we know it in a month or two afterwards, does not appear from the scientific evidence to be warranted.

Twenty of the world's famous scientists, including Professor Lacassagne of the Radium Institute of Paris, three Nobel Prize winners -- Professor Muller of Indiana, Professor Yukawa of Japan, and Professor Powell of England, as well as other scientists, including Dr. Chisholm of Canada, former Director-General of the World Health Organization, after a meeting in Committee, came to the same conclusions:

"A principle effect is due to strontium-90 ... We estimate that tests conducted over the past six years will be responsible for an increase of about one per cent over the natural incidence of leukemia and bone cancer during the next few decades. Over the next thirty years, this increase would amount to about a hundred thousand additional cases of leukemia and bone cancer. The correct numbers may be several times larger or smaller. These additional cases could, however, not be identified among the 10 million or so normal cases of the same diseases."

It is true that when you take ten million cases in the world, 100,000 cases would appear small. But then, if you are continuing these tests in this way, to what extent they can increase no one can forecast. Their report continues:

"A second principal effect of global fallout consists of genetic mutations. We estimate that these will cause serious injury to about as many individuals as those in whom leukemia or bone cancer will be produced ...

"With regard to fallout effects from tests, it should be recognized that the effects are global, and exerted upon citizens of all countries, regardless of whether they or their Governments have approved the holding of tests. In these circumstances, the usual criteria as to whether a given hazard is justifiable cannot be applied.

"It should also be realized that appreciable areas of the world will experience higher than average effects from fallout.

"In this age of atomic weapons, the objective of all nations must be the abolition of war and even the threat of war from the life of mankind. War must be eliminated, not merely regulated by limiting the weapons to be used."



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Of course, that is not a scientific conclusion, but there it is.

Therefore, when my delegation is regarded as having submitted material that relies more on passion than on rational elements, it is only right to point out that as regards the scientific evidence that we have submitted, as the representative of Mexico said, there is only one test to apply to it: how many people say it is so and how many not? As Professor Charles Price of the University of Pennsylvania said: When the difference of opinion is one-hundred to one then it should be declared no contest. It is mostly the scientists that belong to these atomic energy organizations, from whom official opinions come, he says, that give these contradictions.

The Radiation Hazards Committee of the Federation of American Scientists has published a document entitled "The Biological Hazards of Nuclear Weapon Testing". The Committee has as its Chairman, Professor Selove of the University of Pennsylvania, and has a very distinguished membership. Its report says:

"The quantity of strontium-90 in human bones has been measured both by the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the British Atomic Energy Authority Observers ... the largest value observed was .2 times background."

Here now we are dealing with radiation.

"This is one-fifth of the background and not one-fortieth."

That is what was said in regard to Dr. Libby. This is one-fifth of the background and not one-fortieth.

"It has been estimated that if no further explosion takes place, the average radiation concentration of strontium-90 in human bones will rise, by about 1970, to a maximum which will give a dose of about one-tenth of background."

This does not conform to what came from the representative of France.

"If nuclear explosions continue at the rate of about ten megatons a year, the strontium-90 concentration will gradually rise to an average, by the year 2000, of about six times the level predicted for 1970. ... The radiation level reached by 1970, if there are no further tests, will cause about 1000 deaths per year throughout the world (estimates based on United States statistics and on Lewis' work); the level estimated for the year 2000, if the present rate of testing continues, will cause about 5000 deaths per year. ... If the cancer-producing effect is proportional to the dose, as it may be, the average exposure of about one-tenth of background that will result from all tests conducted up through 1956 may be expected to result in leukemia or bone cancer in 60,000 persons."

Therefore, from what I have read out it is quite clear that whatever Dr. Libby might have said somewhere about one-fortieth, it is not borne out either by the evidence presented to Congress or by these other British, American and Scandinavian scientists. The increase is much greater than it was supposed. I would submit that we should not mix up the somatic effects of this question with the radiation effects. It is quite true that the increase in the radiation effects are small, but since the substance has a half-life of many years and it comes down little by little, since it is eaten by cattle or goes into vegetables and enters into the human body, it becomes a menace to humanity as a whole.

We have said so much about the actual effects of radiation because, apart from all other considerations, there is the one of what it does immediately to people who are in no way responsible for the explosions -- indeed, their countries might be against it -- and they are the sufferers in this way.

What are the other reasons why there should be a suspension or a moratorium on these tests? At the present time, only the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are conducting these explosions. We were told the other day: "Who can deny to other countries the sovereign right to explode bombs?" Our answer is, theoretically no one, but I suppose there are other ways of exercising one's sovereignty. In this connexion, it should be remembered that these three countries are well advanced in these experimentations and that they

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are continually adding to their knowledge and, thereby, according to their own statements -- according to the United States statement -- bringing down the effects of radiation. Although the effect is being brought down it is, as I pointed out the other day, still considerable. If there is no suspension of tests and other countries come into the picture, they come in without that experience and they would therefore experiment with more crude bombs. If there is to be any use of them, there would be greater harm caused by the fusion effects and by the larger quantity of fall-out.

Dr. Selove, Chairman of the Radiation Hazards Committee of the American Federation of Scientists, and Associate Professor of Physics of the University of Pennsylvania, said to the Joint Congressional Committee on 5 June this year:

"As new nations enter the nuclear testing program, it can be expected that they will be interested in testing bomb types which produce a great deal of fallout. There are two dominant reasons for this: First, about the most economical way possible to increase the yield of a large bomb is to use an outer shell of natural uranium. This leads to an inexpensive large energy release, but also to a large release of fission products - the worst kind of fallout. Second, a large amount of fallout increases the devastating power of a nuclear bomb. The addition of a shell of natural uranium to a large thermonuclear bomb can increase the devastating fallout to a very much greater degree, for example, than the addition of cobalt to make a 'cobalt bomb', and, moreover, can at the same time increase the energy release by a large amount, which a cobalt shell will not do."

If there is no suspension of explosions, experimentation by other countries can increase, and that experimentation will lead not only to an increase of radiation of the same rate as that produced by the advanced countries, but, according to the evidence which I read out to the Committee, it is possible and highly probable that they would experiment with bombs of a different character which will add disproportionately in terms of the improved bombs to the amount of radiation.

That takes us to the next issue, which is partly political but which certainly must be judged from a scientific basis as well, namely, whether it is advisable to pursue our desire for the suspension of thermonuclear and nuclear bomb testing except in the context of an entire disarmament programme.

I submit with great respect that I have not been able to understand why, if we get disarmament and the abandonment of the atomic weapon, then why bother about these explosions because nobody will test the bombs if they cannot make them. The idea is neither logical nor does it make sense. When it was first put forward it was with the idea that it could be done quickly with the amount of control that is easily possible so that some beginning could be made in the field of disarmament. Now, for the first time this year, thanks to the initiative of the United Kingdom, we were told before the Assembly that the abandonment of nuclear testing is not disarmament and, what is more, that it should not be done. The speeches made from that quarter were not only that they should not be discontinued, but that they should be continued in the interests of policies. But on this matter there is a considerable body of scientific evidence which deals with the problem which must be in the minds of the politicians who have to <sup>deal with</sup> this question.

It is natural and legitimate to expect that any country would take into consideration the fact whether the suspension of bomb testing and the evasion of it by anybody else, or the suspension of bomb testing at any particular time, would prove a handicap to itself and not to others. Here I wish to cite the evidence of the Council of the Federation of American Scientists, given in February of this year:

"The Council of the Federation of American Scientists urges the Administration to seek worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests without making this contingent on achieving more far-reaching goals in arms limitation. Because stopping these tests would slow down the development of even swifter and more easily hidden weapons for devastating surprise attack..."

We have never presented this argument. One of the legitimate fears that a country would have is that other atomic countries may launch a surprise attack. But here we have the scientists saying that the more you allow them to test these weapons the more you will enable them to produce weapons of surprise attack.

"and because it would further contribute to world stability by helping to confine the production of nuclear weapons to three nations (Britain, the United States, the USSR), this alone would be a substantial step toward a rational solution of the world crisis brought about by nuclear armaments.

All available evidence assures us that this constructive step would handicap the military preparations of our competitors at least as much as our own, and that a test ban could be adequately monitored by a United Nations monitoring agency without requiring free access for inspectors within national boundaries."

I shall deal more with this when we come to the question of detection.



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Therefore, the Federation of American Scientists and another body of 2,000 scientists who have also pronounced on this all point out that it does not impose a handicap on one side which is discriminatory as against the other. Secondly, it has the merit that it prevents further development and production of bombs which will be potent for surprise attack. This second body of 2,000 scientists from California says:

"An international agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs could serve as a first step towards a more general disarmament and ultimate effective abolition of nuclear weapons, averting the possibility of nuclear war which would be a catastrophe for all humanity.

"We have, in common with our fellow men, a deep concern for the welfare of all human beings. As scientists, we have knowledge of the dangers involved and, therefore, a special responsibility to make these dangers known. We deem it imperative that immediate action be taken to effect the international agreement to stop the testing of weapons".

Then we come to the question of detection. When the Government of India first submitted these proposals in the Disarmament Commission -- not his year after the Soviet resolution, but in 1954 -- there was, as I said on the last occasion, as we understood it, a fair degree of sympathy and support for them as a possible idea. But a few months later we were informed that it was possible to have secret explosions of these bombs. In fact, one could explode them in one's pocket and they could not be detected. This did create a problem, because if the bombs could be so secretly exploded then each country would suspect the other of conducting the explosions while having itself, in honesty, to pass a self-denying ordinance.

All the evidence that my Government has -- from its own sources and as the result of its own investigations -- is to the effect that atomic, nuclear and thermo-nuclear explosions, under proper arrangements, are detectable. While I have no authority to disclose the source of this information, it is now well established by European investigation that it is possible to construct reliable stationary instruments for convenience in location and recording of very low radiation levels with an accuracy permitting changes of a few per cent to be detected.

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Such an instrument, constructed for gamma radiation by the institute of radio physics in a particular country, consists of a flashlight device giving one flash per micro-roentgen -- that is, about one flash per five minutes -- in the case of normal background radiation. The records are made on a circular core, which has to be changed either weekly or monthly, etc. A world-wide system of control by means of battery-driven, hermetically enclosed apparatus, sealed by some kind of international organization, seems not to involve any serious technical difficulties.

Therefore, not only from such investigation as we have made ourselves and from such advice as is given us, but also from the experiments that are made in countries in Europe where atomic science is considerably advanced, although they are not making the bombs, we have every reason to think that there is the possibility of detection. No one can say that it would be 100 per cent detection, but the evasion of detection today is almost impossible. That is why we have suggested that, instead of one side saying that the bombs can be secretly exploded and the other side saying that they cannot, there being so many doubts, it should be possible for those who have differing views to provide scientific and technical experts to go into this question and establish the kind of machinery against evasion that is required and put it forward.

I am sorry to say that the answer to that from the representative of France is, to me, very confusing. He says that he does not agree to this tripartite division of the world, and I quote him as follows:

"It would ... be difficult for me to agree to the tripartite formula of India: first of all, because I cannot resign myself to the present three-way division of humanity, nor to its being given legal existence in the United Nations; furthermore, because a committee thus set up could not supplant the Powers primarily concerned, nor could it impose upon them any line of conduct." (A/C.1/PV.877, page 6)

I want to make it perfectly clear that any submission we have made is not intended in any way -- and this has been very carefully and fully pointed out without any ambiguity -- to supersede the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee. What we propose is purely a machinery for assisting the decisions which the Commission wants to reach or which it could have reached. Therefore, there is no question of

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supplanting the Powers primarily concerned. And, if I may say so with respect, if we could spend these explosions effectively and satisfactorily to all I am sure the Powers would not mind what may appear like supplanting them in this way.

Then comes the statement by Mr. Moch, "I cannot resign myself to the present three-way division of humanity". Nor can we. We do not want to see the division of humanity in any way, but it so happens that the world today is largely divided between two Power blocs and other people who want to keep out of it -- not keep out of it by saying, "A plague upon both your houses", but keep out of it in the hope that by their non-commitment they may make more or less a contribution to a peace area in the world, and that the friction as between the others themselves might not be as sharp as otherwise.

Therefore, there is no suggestion that there should be a tripartite division of the world. In fact the very idea of the introduction of a tripartite element to the extent of preventing a head-on collision between two points of view -- an idea which Mr. Jules Moch himself has referred to, saying that there could not be any synthesis but that there must be support of a majority view -- is to remove that danger, and it was put forward in the hope that this could be done.

Now this is purely an academic exercise, and as such has very little value. But I would like to ask the Committee, and particularly the delegation of the United States of America, to look into the history of the Atomic Energy Agency. When first the proposal was brought here that body was to be an exclusive club of eight countries, selected by whomever was to select them, and no one was to enter it unless they themselves agreed. In the first session the exclusion was given up, thanks largely to the wisdom of the initiators of the proposal; but that is not the most important point. When the twelve or fourteen countries which formed the preparatory commission for this purpose sat week after week, and month after month, to produce the Statute of the Atomic Energy Agency, it was found that it was the lack of that body's division -- in the way in which, unfortunately, the Sub-Committee has found itself divided -- into a majority and a minority view that enabled the overcoming of a large number of problems from day to day. Though the difficulties were serious, they were surmounted.

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There the question was not whether a country was large or small. Sometimes a small country is able to function in a way in which a large country cannot. India was a member of the Preparatory Commission of the Atomic Energy Agency, the experience of which has been one where this introduction of what may be called a more representative element of consultation, and of giving and taking in this way, has led to results.

Thus, in this particular suggestion we have submitted, on the one hand there is no attempt to supersede either the Security Council, the Disarmament Commission of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. There is no attempt to suggest to the great Powers, "You do not know what you are doing; we will find you a way". That is not at all its meaning. It simply means that there is a deadlock, and the experience of the Commission for a long time has been that of presenting two points of view and the difficulty of resolving them. Sometimes they are resolved after a long period of argument. I do not say that it cannot be done in that way. But, as I say, there is no attempt here as far as we are concerned to disregard the authority of the Security Council or the Disarmament Commission, or in any way to suggest that any body of people but the great Powers -- notably the United States and the Soviet Union -- can really bring about disarmament. We therefore regret that there should be any suggestion that this is likely to lead to any further division of world opinion. Its purpose is altogether to the contrary.

I have dealt with this matter again briefly, and have not used all the material that is at hand with regard to the considerable harmful effects and the fact that the suspension of these tests is not open to the objection that there is non-detectability and, therefore, a handicapping in someone's favour. On the other hand, I have produced scientific evidence to point out that the suspension of tests would lead, on the one hand, to prevention of the development of weapons which might be more formidable than those which exist today, and which might be more dangerous, particularly to the Powers which suspect the others -- that is, for surprise attack and things of that character. I have also drawn attention to the great danger of large numbers of countries, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, engaging in such manufacture. After all, the manufacture of arms has been part of the industry in the world for a long time, and it may spread with disastrous results.



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Finally, I have pointed out that, while we do not regard the suspension of nuclear tests as disarmament itself, we think it is a first step toward disarmament. It creates a climate of opinion; it creates that hope and confidence in the world to which Mr. Moch has referred and which he says it is the function of this Assembly to transmit. It makes public opinion of the world think that at last something is moving not in an illusory way. And, what is more, when there is the process of inspection and the functioning of the machinery of detection, and consultations in regard to all these matters are carried on from day to day, we will have created something like a pilot plant in the way of working together on this matter. So, even from that point of view, the suspension of tests has a political value and a very serious contribution to disarmament.

My delegation has not suggested that we should just suspend these explosions and sit back and do nothing. The question of the suspension of explosions -- in the same way, for example, as the submission of military budgets of countries -- was regarded as an item which could be brought about more easily than the others. We have never at any time suggested that it is a substitute either for the abandonment of fresh manufacture or for the dismantling of existing bombs or for the cut-off of use -- that is to say, the eventual elimination of the nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, which is the declared policy of the United Nations.

The main objection to this is that the only thing that is concretely asked for is the suspension -- that a commitment on suspension is asked for while, with regard to all the others, there is merely an expression of sentiment. To a certain extent, if this is a characteristic, it also appears in regard to the main proposals that are before us -- that is, there is no suggestion that the cut-off date in regard to further production should be effective before the suspension of explosions. Mr. Lodge, speaking on behalf of his country, said they were prepared to agree to the suspension provided that there was agreement in principle -- or words to that effect -- in regard to the other. I submit that the proposal we have placed before the Committee -- that in the same way, by having some other views added, they should work for cut-off dates in regard to



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fresh production, in regard to dismantling of bombs, and also toward finding a cut-off of the use of this thing altogether, because that is in consonance with the declared policy of the United Nations from the time we began dealing with this question.

The main objection to this has been that we are asked to rely on faith. "How can you trust somebody else if he is not to be trusted?" -- that is the question. Well, that is a very logical question to ask. If you know that the other person is bound to break his promise, then it would be very foolish to trust him. There is no doubt about that. But, if those are the premises on which we are arguing, then the whole of the disarmament question, including the twenty-four-Power resolution, is out of court. Every proposal that is made, however large or small, does rely on contract, does rely on commitment. Therefore, if it is possible to accept a commitment -- if it is possible, as the representative of the United States himself pointed out, to get areas of agreement in some ways -- and the other side can do the same in some fields, there is no reason why it should not be extended to another.

This is not to suggest that a mere element of blind faith is sufficient. As the representative of France rightly points out, the establishment of control and the machinery of inspection cultivate this faith. That is why we have suggested that, instead of merely saying that there must be inspection and there must be control, we must, as in the case of the Preparatory Commission of the Atomic Energy Agency, try to work out these details in this way.

Therefore, it is not as though the suspension resolution hangs in the air by itself and the rest of disarmament is forgotten. All that is sought to be done is that the fact that we do not have comprehensive disarmament should not prevent us from doing anything at all. There is every reason to believe that, once some progress is made in this way, then it is possible that further progress may follow.

We fully believe the position taken up by the representative of Ireland: that, despite all procedural methods that you might try, unless there is a lowering of world tension, it is not possible to get to disarmament. I do not think that anybody can quarrel with that proposition. But it is possible that,

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if there were agreement in one sphere, as we said two years ago, there might be agreement in another. That is possible. It is quite true that there must be a change of heart, a change of approach, a willingness to negotiate, and that one must remove those elements which, in the mind of the representative of France, have created this great disastrous disillusionment. We therefore appeal particularly to the two most powerful countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, that in this particular matter the time has come to give the world a lead where a beginning is being made. We do not ask that any proposition that is put forward by either of them has to be rescinded here. We believe that the marshalling of the force of the Assembly behind an agreed proposition is likely to jam the machine more than anything else. This is not in any way a surrender<sup>^</sup> to a minority view or a triumph of a majority view. It is sheer common sense that, if a matter has been discussed fully, the members of the Sub-Committee, the Powers concerned, know quite well what is the majority opinion in the world. The registering of a decision would not in itself do anything but create a kind of restriction upon ourselves.

Therefore, it is our submission that, while these resolutions do not represent and cannot represent an agreed view, and are not an attempt toward that, they should not be pushed at this time but should be further considered by the Disarmament Commission.

We have submitted these other propositions not as a substitute for them. They are not full and complete suggestions in regard to the bringing about of disarmament. They are, in our view, practical steps toward accomplishing the initial achievements toward bringing about disarmament.

There is another matter on which my delegation spent some time the other day, and that is the emergence of tactical weapons. Here, I believe, I may have laid myself open to misunderstanding. I did not say at any time that it was possible today to produce tactical weapons of a small kind such as machine guns or revolvers or anything of that character. What I said was that, once you move from this in the tactical field, the advance of science is such that the time may come -- how soon we do not know -- when they will be so small and so portable that they will be all over the world. That was speculation -- legitimate speculation, in view of the advance of humanity.

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We are told that these weapons -- I mean, 150 tons or something like that -- cannot be moved, and so on and so forth. Now, I have here a whole list of these weapons: guided missiles -- surface to surface, air to air, ground to air, and so on, with all double-purpose weapons. They all carry atomic warheads. The USSR has announced that it has an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead that is capable of delivering a nuclear warhead at any point. The New York Herald Tribune of 16 May 1956 also reported that the Russians have a 203-millimetre gun which can hurl an atomic shell sixteen miles, while they have a heavy 240-millimetre mortar which can use atomic warheads.

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I do not intend to go into speculative reports in this connexion. Anyone who so wisely may study the particulars of these weapons, which are all published; in fact, I believe that some of the weapons are on exhibition and even on sale.

The fact is that, while at the present time these are heavy guns, they are still tactical weapons. If tactical weapons become the order of the day and if, as an Army commander has stated somewhere, they become part of the normal equipment of an army, then the danger arises of a wider spread of atomic radiation, with all its consequences.

The British, too, have developed some of these weapons. Their atomic test at Montebello Island in Australia in May 1956 was a test of a tactical surface-to-air missile.

General Magruder of the United States Army said, in February of this year, before the Senate Armed Services Committee that in three to five years the United States Army would have enough tactical atomic weapons to reduce the use of conventional weapons by 25 per cent.

This brings me to some of the statements which have been made here concerning these scientific aspects of the matter. The representative of France said:

"No Minister of Defence -- and I have been a Minister of Defence -- will arm his troops with the atomic machine guns and revolvers cooked up by these [science fiction story] writers or mentioned here by Mr. Menon, because, taking into account the critical mass below which the chain reaction is no longer brought about, each projectile for these devices would have to weigh about 10 kilogrammes." (A/C.1/PV.877, page 23-25)

I am not a physicist; the representative of France is. Nevertheless, I submit that he was in error, scientifically speaking, in making the above statement.

He went on:

"Therefore, for sixty seconds of machine-gun fire, approximately ten tons of ammunition would be required, and the magazine of a revolver would alone weigh approximately 100 kilogrammes...". (Ibid.)

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I shall not go into the second part of the above-quoted statement by Mr. Moch, because, as I have said, it relates to the realm of speculation. With regard to the question of critical mass, however, I would say this: No direct evidence in this field can be obtained, because no Government will publish details concerning the size of a critical mass. In a country like the United States, however, it is not possible to withhold information from the public, and, therefore, a certain amount of information has appeared from which inferences can be drawn.

The United States Atomic Energy Commission has invited comment on a proposed regulation to guard against accidental conditions of criticality in the shipment of special nuclear material. Limits would be placed in the proposed regulation on the amounts of plutonium, uranium-233 and uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235 which a licensee might transport or deliver to a carrier for a single shipment. In the case of uranium-233 and plutonium, the limit for transportation by a licensee would be 200 grammes -- not 10 kilogrammes -- and the limit for delivery to a carrier would be 60 grammes. It will be noted that the proposed limits on amounts which might be delivered to a carrier are considerably lower than the amounts which might be transported by a licensee. The distinction is based on amounts of material needed to create a critical mass.

If the critical mass of uranium-233 or plutonium is nearly 200 grammes, as would appear from the above-mentioned Atomic Energy Commission release, it would sooner or later be possible to produce weapons of weights much smaller than 10 kilogrammes.

We have other scientific information concerning the attainment of the critical mass -- and, again, the authority is the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Actually, there is no absolute size or weight in this respect. The critical mass depends on a large number of circumstances. For a nuclear explosion to take place, according to a publication of the Atomic Energy Commission, the weapon must contain a sufficient amount of uranium or plutonium for it to exceed the critical mass in the existing circumstances. The critical mass depends, among other things, on the shape of the material, the composition and the presence of impurities which can remove neutrons in non-fission reactions. By surrounding the fissionable material with a suitable neutron "reflector", the loss of neutrons by escape can be reduced and the critical mass can thus be decreased.



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When we referred to the dangers of these tactical weapons, we were not drawing upon our imagination; we also had obtained advice. These weapons can develop in a large way. While, today, some of these weapons are forty- and fifty-feet long and require several freight airplanes to transport them, the time will come when smaller weapons can be produced.

In any case, I have already referred to the Atomic Energy Commission publication which states that the critical mass depends on a number of things, including the shape of the material, the composition, the presence of impurities, the provision of a suitable neutron "reflector" and so forth. Thus, we have no idea to what extent science will advance in this respect. There is, therefore, some justification for the warning that to enter into the field of atomic tactical weapons is to create the danger of greater, more widespread atomic warfare than that involving the use of these bombs about which we have been speaking.

Furthermore, the newspapers the other day contained reports about atomic depth charges which go several thousand feet under the sea and the impact of which spreads, presumably, for miles. Now, no one is living under the sea except the fish, but these depth charges irradiate the water. We have heard evidence from United States sources, both in this Committee and in other Committees, concerning the explosions which took place in the Marshall Islands. The material in this respect which has come from Japanese sources refers to radiation that must have largely been caused by bombs exploded in the Soviet Union. However that may be, the fact is that, in addition to the old type of bomb exploded on the ground and in the air, there is now talk of these depth charges for bringing out submarines, and the widespread use of such depth charges would contaminate the oceans of the world, as well. This cannot be regarded as a "panicky" argument, because we have had evidence of the number of square miles of water which were contaminated after the Bikini explosions.

It is not my delegation's intention to go into greater detail now with regard to the draft resolutions before the Committee. We have already submitted our views, with great respect, to the members of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, whose labours have been so prolonged. So far as we are concerned, we do not think

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that any country deliberately wants to jeopardize disarmament. The obstructions which exist in this field arise from all the considerations of distrust and fear and, in our view, the mistaken conception that peace can rest on what is called a balance of power. Despite these difficulties, however, we do not take the view that these great nations which bear the responsibility for the survival of the human race and the prevention of atomic warfare will turn a deaf ear to submissions from any quarter.

We make this submission, just as we have done in previous years, to those who, alone, can achieve results in disarmament. There is no doubt that these draft resolutions which are supported by members of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament can obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. But it is not majority votes that will bring about disarmament: it is agreement that will bring about disarmament. That is not in any way to say that a minority can hold others to ransom. But that minority will have with it the pressure of other countries which are not under any obligation to respect views with which they are not in agreement.

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Therefore, in this second intervention in this matter I should like to submit to the Committee that we are now in a critical phase, especially since the world has made a further advance in the field of science with the opening up of the inter-planetary regions. It is time for us to seek the ways of co-operation and to end the ways of competition in this matter. Some day there has to be agreement if we are not to destroy each other. If there is no agreement, then the piling up of armaments will remain the kind of baneful enterprise which deprives the world of much of the substance it requires to make it more happy and comfortable.

I have spent much time in dealing with the statement made by the representative of France, largely out of respect for the views he expressed and also because, in some of those facts, we had to present, in our interests, the other point of view. I hope that the Committee will give the proposals submitted by the Government of India the consideration they usually give to them, and we hope that a step forward, however small, will be taken by this Assembly so that we may convey to the world that message of hope and freedom from fear to which Mr. Moch referred. We would then have made an advance, but otherwise the proceedings of this Committee and of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly that will follow would not represent progress on disarmament, but would be the beginning of the chapter to which the representative of France referred when he said we must leave sympathies on one side and we must rely on the majority view.

We cannot get disarmament by legislation or passing resolutions; we must seek agreement. That is not to put a premium on obstructionism of any kind, it is to put a premium on the capacity for preservation and for patience. However well-intentioned may be the resolutions, to argue against that can only lead to a tightening of the deadlocks.

It is this view that led my delegation to take the time of the Committee in order to go into a large number of details in this matter and, perhaps, to repeat some of the arguments, but we hope that we have met some of the objections that were raised. I have deliberately refrained from going into the argument about the clean bomb -- we have not heard a great deal about it lately -- but we do think that as each day goes on the danger increases. World public opinion is far more advanced than we appear to be in coming to decisions, and in every

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country in the world today there is an increasing desire to see some steps taken in this direction. If the United Nations were to disregard that opinion, were to be more concerned about their alignments and more concerned about their fears than their hopes, then it would not be likely that we should take a step forward. It is in that spirit that I have made this submission.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): I shall not tax the patience of this Committee for more than five minutes, and I shall keep my eye on the clock. I shall not enter into polemics with the representatives of India. He has always been extremely courteous, and I do not want to get into a scientific argument that without doubt would definitely surpass the critical mass of the attention of the Committee. I shall limit myself to three very brief remarks.

Firstly, with regard to the role of the General Assembly. I said in my previous statement that we had reached a **stalemate**, and Mr. Krishna Menon at one point said that my statement was dramatic and at another time he said it was deplorable. My statement, however, was quite in keeping with the facts. There were seventy-one meetings of the Sub-Committee in London, as well as many informal meetings, yet we were unable to get out of the stalemate. Therefore, it is hardly feasible that this discussion will actually advance us along the lines we had hoped for. We will have to discuss matters with our Governments and also ponder upon what is said. We also have to feel that certain ideas on one thing or the other will have to change because of the progress of science.

Secondly, when I referred to science fiction, I was not in any way casting doubt on the experts who specialize in different scientific fields. They are, perhaps, very great scientists and experts in one specialized field, but less so on others. I referred to the talk about the chain reaction that would cause the destruction of the world and to the stories of atomic machine guns and atomic revolvers, and I do not want words attributed to me that I did not utter.

When I referred to Dr. Libby, who is an authority on strontium-90, I am afraid that I was misunderstood by some representatives. Dr. Libby said, and I shall quote the actual text:

"If in the next five years the tests are continued at the present rate, it might lead in the United States to a concentration of strontium-90 in human

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bones of between four and fifteen units."

The present safety level recommended is one hundred units, in other words, in five years, if the tests continue at the present rate, the level will be between four and fifteen units, whereas the safety level is one hundred. I am not passing any judgement on that statement made by a specifically qualified expert. Therefore, after hearing Mr. Menon's speech, I do not want anyone to think that I was guilty of complicity in genocide. I do not want to pose here as a man who wants to maintain the test explosions, but I do want to say that what I said was very carefully thought out and reflected the French proposal. I said that if there was a risk, no matter however small, of increasing the mortality rate of the human species, we had no right to let humanity run such risks. Therefore, I said, without losing our heads, we had to take all the measures possible to eliminate such a risk.

So far as I am concerned, these measures are the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials and the use of such fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, and the cessation of test explosions. Therefore, I should like my colleagues to consider my statement of 22 October and, if they have the patience, to re-read it so that they may find the answer to what has been said about me. I do not feel called upon to change one solitary line of what I said then.

Mr. KUZNETSOV' (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Now that the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and of some other Western Powers have outlined at the present session of the General Assembly the attitude of their respective Governments toward the disarmament problem, it has become even more obvious that the fruitless outcome of the negotiations in the Sub-Committee was not accidental. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have confirmed once again that at present their Governments have no intention of accepting any agreements on the reduction of armed forces and armaments and on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. However regrettable it is, this is the main conclusion which we can and must draw in order not to create any illusions with regard to the true state of affairs.



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Since the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have tried here to misrepresent the attitude of the USSR towards the question of disarmament, the Soviet delegation considers it to be its duty to dwell once again on certain problems raised during the discussion.

Facts show that the designs of the Western Powers, and primarily of the United States, are directed not at disarming and renouncing the atomic weapons, but at trying to achieve military superiority over all other countries -- and certainly, in the first place, over the USSR.

This fact is confirmed by numerous statements of the United States political leaders. For example, the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Nixon, speaking on 15 October at the International Industrial Development Conference in San Francisco, said: "Let us resolve once and for all that the absolute necessity of maintaining our superiority in military strength must always take priority..." These words belong, not to a newspaper reporter or to a private person, but they reflect the official attitude of the United States Government. If the ambitions of the United States regarding military superiority serve as a basis for all activities, then how can the United States even think of disarmament?

In conformity with this policy of the Western Powers, led by the United States, endless attempts are being made in the course of negotiations to impose on the Soviet Union such agreements as would place it in an unequal position and would be detrimental to its security. But those who act in such a way betray themselves as enemies of peace, and they appear before the peoples as advocates of the policy of force and of the armaments race.

Such a policy cannot have -- and in fact it does not have -- the support of the peoples because, in the long run, it leads to a new destructive war. The sponsors of this policy cannot help reckoning with this fact; that is why they try to conceal their true objectives and intentions from public opinion and from the peoples. A huge machinery is being maintained and a great deal of money spent in the United States and other Western countries to conceal the truth from the people and to justify the armaments race, which is profitable only to capitalist monopolies, by false talk of the so-called "communist threat" allegedly emanating from the Soviet Union. Even such an event as the launching of a satellite into outer space by the Soviet Union -- this greatest scientific event of our time -- was used by the United States as an excuse to step up the armaments race and thus to increase the burden of taxation.

The history of negotiations on disarmament, over a period of ten years, is marked by attempts on the part of the United States and its partners to evade concrete proposals on disarmament and, having complicated this matter, to put the blame for the failure of negotiations on the Soviet Union.

When the United States and its partners submitted various proposals from time to time, they did so expecting in advance that other interested parties -- first of all, the Soviet Union -- would not accept them. But when the Soviet Union, despite their expectations, accepted the proposals of the Western Powers in order to reach agreement, they went back on them. Whenever it was possible to reach an agreement based on equality, the United States, followed by the United Kingdom and France, artificially created new obstacles and repudiated their own proposals. That is how matters stand at present as well.

Mr. Lodge, together with other representatives of Member States in the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, tries to make it appear as if the Soviet representative in the Sub-Committee, without even having studied the proposals made by the Western Powers on 29 August, has rejected them. This does not correspond to reality; and, in our view, this is not a proper place for light-minded exercises of that nature. Mr. Lodge, more than anyone else, knows that the Western proposals had been discussed thoroughly for a long time before they were presented in their final form to the Sub-Committee on 29 August. Trying to delay as long as possible private negotiations and to make it appear that something was being done, the Western Powers presented their proposals to the Sub-Committee part by part over almost three months. During this period a thorough exchange of views took place at the Sub-Committee meetings and at informal meetings between the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. The delegations were privately exchanging working documents. In the course of the above-mentioned discussion the Soviet representative made known the stand of the Soviet Government on all these proposals.

On 27 August there was made public a detailed statement of the Soviet Government on this question, which was disclosed in the Sub-Committee by the Soviet representative. Thus, at the moment when the so-called joint proposals of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada were submitted, they did not constitute anything new or unknown and, besides, they had been fully examined in the Sub-Committee.

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These proposals of the Western Powers, presented now as a draft resolution, do not, unfortunately, constitute a basis for an agreement on the reduction of armaments. The United States, the United Kingdom and France are still adhering to the position which hampers the adoption of concrete steps on disarmament. The adoption of the Western draft resolution by the Assembly undoubtedly can only hinder further negotiations and complicate the matter. Is it not time to seek the way to such an agreement as would correspond in equal measure to the interests of security of all the States and would put an end to the armaments race?

The duty of the United Nations is to assist in finding such ways. We fully agree with the view expressed here by the representatives of many States of Asia, Europe, Africa and other regions to the effect that the disarmament problem is a problem which affects all the countries, large and small, on any continent, irrespective of their political and social regime. If each country tries to make its positive contribution to the solution of this vital problem, then the cause of peace and international security will only benefit as a result of this.

The representative of the United States spoke here about ensuring the security of States. Touching upon this subject, one should stress, first of all, that in solving any international problem affecting various countries, there cannot be such a situation in which the security of any one country should be recognized as more essential than that of any other country. To ensure security, one should proceed from equal approach to all States. Without this approach, any negotiations on disarmament mean a dangerous delay, a dangerous waste of time. It is in vain that certain people entertain illusions that it is possible, by means of different doubtful combinations, to confuse and outwit another State and thereby to place it in an unequal position. No sovereign State will ever voluntarily agree to its security being impaired.

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The Soviet Union stands for disarmament negotiations on the basis of equality so that in the course of these negotiations equal account is taken of the measures to ensure security of all States, of all interested parties.

The United States and its NATO associates adhere to an entirely different position. They proceeded and proceed in the disarmament negotiations from the premises that other negotiating parties should sacrifice their national interests and weaken their security. But it is a one-sided and selfish method which can in no way contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations.

There are examples close at hand.

Let us take the question of nuclear weapons which is of great concern to all the peoples.

The United States, Britain and France oppose the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and their elimination from the armaments of States. They want to have nuclear weapons at their disposal and to use atomic and hydrogen bombs as a deterrent against other Powers.

This is confirmed by the whole history of negotiations on prohibiting nuclear weapons. As far back as in 1946, the Soviet Union, in the interests of delivering mankind from the threat of a destructive atomic war, proposed to conclude an agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

What was the attitude of the United States toward this proposal? It rejected even the very idea of prohibiting nuclear weapons. The United States made it appear that the Soviet Union was allegedly proposing to prohibit nuclear weapons only because it did not possess such weapons. In effect, the ruling quarters of the United States did not want to lose their monopoly of the atomic bomb and tried to use it as an instrument of political intimidation against other Powers; precisely at that time there emerged the so-called "atomic diplomacy".

Moreover, even at that time the United States tried to legalize for the future their full monopoly not only with regard to atomic weapons but also with regard to atomic energy. A special plan known as the "Baruch plan" was worked out in the United States. It is quite appropriate to recall here, in particular to Mr. Noble, certain provisions of this plan because they have direct bearing on the question under discussion.

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The United States representative in his report at the first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June 1946, said:

"The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material".

This "international" trust which would be in fact an American enterprise, because the United States would be its main shareholder and partner, was to be granted very extensive rights. It was proposed to place in its competence, in particular, the following:

- "1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Power to control, inspect, and licence all other atomic activities. ...
- <sup>4</sup><sub>3</sub>. To be effective, the authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development..."

The American plan did not provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons either in the immediate or more remote future. Statements to justify this plan pointed out that it would be possible to eliminate atomic weapons from the armaments only when "an adequate system for control", advantageous and suitable to the United States and unacceptable to other sovereign States "has been agreed upon and put into effective operation" -- that is, in fact, never.

As you can see, this plan was in no way aimed at delivering mankind from the threat of a new war with the use of destructive nuclear weapons. And this is quite understandable since the plan was sponsored by the United States where the doctrine of force became the prevailing doctrine of official policy. You can imagine what grave consequences to the cause of peace the implementation of this plan would bring about. Naturally, this plan could not be adopted.

As to the Soviet Union, at that period as well as later when the United States no longer had the monopoly in the field of nuclear weapons, it insisted on concluding an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union also adheres to this position at present since the peaceful objectives of its foreign policy are neither of a temporary nature nor are they based on the considerations of the moment. The Soviet delegation shares the view expressed here by the representatives of Indonesia and some other States to the effect that complete and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons would correspond in the best way to the interests of peoples. The Soviet Union has the intention in the



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future as well to seek persistently the cessation of the armaments race, the prohibition and elimination of thermonuclear weapons and the deliverance of mankind from the threat of an atomic war.

Has anything changed during the past twelve years in the attitude of the United States toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons? No, in substance nothing has changed. During further negotiations the United States adopted, as in 1946, the same one-sided attitude, unacceptable to other States. The only "new element" was that additional false arguments were being invented to keep these weapons in the arsenal of the American strategists of the "policy of force".

One of these arguments was that the Soviet Union allegedly maintained a numerically bigger army and that the United States needed the atomic bomb to keep "the balance of force". This theory was advanced here by the representatives of Britain and France as well. The false nature of this invented motive was exposed in the course of the negotiations. Everybody knows the relevant facts. The Western Powers proposed that the armed forces of the great Powers be reduced to agreed levels, having promised to accept in such a case the ban on atomic weapons. They proposed in 1952 and then in 1955 the following levels: For the Soviet Union, the United States and the People's Republic of China -- 1 - 1,5 million men for each of these countries and 650,000 men each for Britain and France. It was pointed out that the agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons would enter into force after armed forces and conventional armaments had been reduced by three quarters of the agreed plan to cut down the armed forces of five Powers.

However, subsequent acts of the Western Powers have shown that their proposals were not serious and that they counted on the fact that the Soviet Union would not accept these proposals. They were playing with disarmament to sidetrack public opinion.

As soon as the Soviet Union agreed to the levels proposed by the Western Powers themselves, the United States, Britain and France went back both on the agreement to reduce the armed forces and on the agreement to ban nuclear weapons. Does this approach to disarmament contribute to strengthening confidence between the negotiating parties and, in particular, between the USSR and the United States? Certainly not. Those who are trying here to shift the blame for lack of adequate confidence between States to the Soviet Union, would be well advised to think of the true reasons for such a situation.

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How do matters stand today? The political leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France do not even want to hear anything about prohibiting nuclear weapons.

The United States openly asserts that it will not accept such a prohibition and has the intention to use thermonuclear weapons at its own discretion. On 30 September, Mr. Lodge frankly declared in the United Nations Disarmament Commission: "We will accept no ban on the use of these weapons".

The same negative attitude was adopted by the representative of the United Kingdom in his statement on 14 October. He said:

"...we have always regarded this" -- that is, a complete ban on nuclear weapons -- "as a quite unacceptable and unrealistic method of seeking disarmament... All this applies equally, of course, to the proposal for a five-year ban. It means nothing at all". (A/C.1/PV.869, pp.22-23)

The representative of France, Mr. Moch, in his statement on 22 October fully shared the view expressed by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom

All these statements testify to the fact that the United States, United Kingdom and France are going back on the resolution unanimously adopted by the ninth session of the General Assembly, which calls upon the United Nations Member States to seek an agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

The joint draft resolution of the United States and other Western Powers submitted to the present session of the General Assembly does not even mention the need for banning nuclear weapons either at present or in the future. Moreover, the United States and its close NATO associates want to legalize, with the assistance of the United Nations, the right to use nuclear weapons. The so-called joint document presented on 29 August to the Sub-Committee by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada points out that nuclear weapons can be used in case of any military conflict when a country chooses to declare itself in a state of individual or collective defence.

Does this not remind us of the times when aggressors considered it as their right to use weapons at their own discretion and attacked other countries under the pretext of self-defence? Now attempts are being made to extend this formula to nuclear weapons as well, which threatens to plunge the world into a destructive nuclear war.

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The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France do not want to reckon with the principal requirements of the United Nations Charter. They refuse to accept the formula put forward by the Soviet Union in conformity with the United Nations Charter to the effect that the use of nuclear weapons can be permitted for defence purposes only by the decision of the Security Council.

The United States, the United Kingdom and France do not want to accept even the minimum proposal of the Soviet Government to conclude, as an initial step, an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons for a period of five years and to reconsider this question thereafter in the United Nations.

This suggested provisional agreement would create favourable conditions for the achievement of broader understanding on the questions of disarmament, including the final prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. The acceptance of such a commitment would undoubtedly have a tremendous positive impact on the improvement of the international situation and the removal of the threat of an atomic war.

To mislead the peoples who demand that atomic weapons be prohibited the Western Powers, in the Committee as well as outside it, advertise in different ways their proposal on the so-called cessation of the production of fissionable materials. But one would have to be a simpleton or deliberately deceive oneself to think that this proposal is some kind of new approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. In fact this is a new obstacle invented with a view to camouflaging the real intentions, which are to frustrate any agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and to continue the armaments race.

If the Western Powers wished to stop the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to lessen the threat of a new destructive war, they should not escape the question of an immediate ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles from the armaments of States.

The danger of an atomic war is in no way reduced when big stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs remain in the depots and there is no ban on their use.

In fact, this was confirmed by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles. Speaking on television on 22 July, he said that at present there are already so many larger nuclear weapons that their use in a large-scale war could constitute a threat to life in any part of the globe. The Western proposal to stop the manufacture of fissionable materials in no way means the

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reduction of the stockpiles of atomic weapons; it does not affect the right to produce more nuclear weapons from already available materials. This proposal leads not to the reduction but to a further increase in the stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons.

The cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, according to the calculations of American specialists, should give an advantage to the United States and place other Powers in an unequal position. In this manner the United States expects to have more bombs by making use of already stockpiled fissionable materials. At the same time the United States seeks to establish in its interests a broad control over the extraction of raw materials and the production of basic nuclear materials, as well as over the nuclear weapons plants in other countries.

One cannot fail to admit that this proposal has the traits of the old well-known plan put forward by the United States in 1946. Therefore, it is not fortuitous that Mr. Lodge drew a comparison between the system of international control over the stopping of the production of fissionable materials proposed by him and the above-mentioned plan.

The plan to solve the problem of nuclear weapons proposed by the United States cannot fail to put everyone on the alert. Its aim is to legalize the preparation for a nuclear war and to encourage the forces which come out for the unleashing of such a war. The Soviet Union cannot be a partner to such a plan.

The complete and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and their elimination from the armaments of States -- these measures correspond to the interests of peace. A provisional commitment by States not to use atomic and nuclear weapons at least for a period of five years could be an important step along this road. The general advantages of such an approach to disarmament are obvious. It does not infringe the interests of the security of any country; it is based on the principles of equality.

The suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons could be an important step towards the complete prohibition of such weapons.

The statements by the representatives of the Western Powers and their draft resolutions testify to the fact that the United States, the United Kingdom and France are opposed to calling a halt to these test explosions and even to their temporary suspension.

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Thus, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Noble, asserted on 14 October that he could not share the view that "the suspension of tests could facilitate negotiations on disarmament." He said, referring to the suspension of tests:

"...to my mind, ... this measure... could well have an adverse effect on world security". (A/C.1/PV.869, pp.17,18-20)

Where can we find here logic and common sense? According to Mr. Noble, it turns out that the continuation of the testing of nuclear weapons is a boon, and the suspension of these tests would be an evil. Such an attitude is in flagrant contradiction of the insistent demands of hundreds of millions of people -- scientists, workers, peasants, employees -- that the tests of these lethal weapons of mass destruction should be stopped.



There is no specific need to prove that the suspension of the tests of nuclear weapons would prevent further increase in atomic radiation, dangerous to human health. It would hamper to a certain extent further perfection of nuclear weapons, would prevent the creation of new more destructive types of such weapons and would hinder to a certain degree the continuation of atomic armaments race. The Governments of the Western Powers, including the United Kingdom, are well aware of this fact.

Finally, the discontinuance of the tests of atomic weapons or, at least, their temporary suspension would be the first important step towards complete prohibition of the weapons of mass destruction.

The United States, the United Kingdom and France do not want to discontinue the tests of nuclear weapons; that is why, trying to mislead public opinion, they link up this simple question with other more complicated and difficult questions the solution of which is opposed by the Western Powers themselves. They made the achievement of agreement on the suspension of the tests conditional upon the solution of such questions as the discontinuance of the production of fissionable materials without prohibiting nuclear weapons and eliminating the stockpiles of nuclear bombs from armaments of States and the reduction of armed forces. They made it also conditional upon the settlement of political problems which in their view is a necessary step for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. As you see, the Western Powers have piled the question of the suspension of the tests of nuclear weapons, which is quite clear and could easily be solved, on a heap of unsolved questions and are now seeking to bury it completely.

One cannot ignore one more really astounding argument put forward by the United States to justify the refusal to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons. Of late it has become fashionable to talk about "a clean bomb" the creation of which, it is asserted, requires further tests. Mr. Dulles tried to make it appear that the continuation of the tests is a humane step allegedly dictated by care for humanity's future.

A question arises: can anything be more cynical and hypocritical than such an approach to the question which affects the lives of millions of people? Will

it be easier for people to die and suffer the horrors of a nuclear war if the bomb is called clean? The peoples of Europe remember very well the atrocities committed by the Hitlerites when they barbarously -- and according to their terminology humanely -- annihilated hundreds of thousands of people. Was there any great difference that in some cases Hitlerite henchmen exterminated human beings in death chambers and then cremated them and in other cases they simply shot or hanged them. Up to now the very recollections of these "humane" nightmares make everybody's flesh creep. Hitlerite violence and mockery at generally recognized laws and humaneness have been condemned by mankind.

Any extermination of peaceful populaces is anti-humane. It does not become humane because of the fact that the nuclear weapons are called "clean". Only the most aggressive representatives of the so-called "free world" are capable of working out such "humane" plans. The centre of gravity of the problem under discussion does not lie in arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of some or other types of atomic weapons, but in relieving humanity, once and for all, from the threat of these horrible weapons and from the harm caused by their tests.

The Soviet Union proposes that a decision should be immediately adopted on the discontinuance of the tests of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government, being aware of the importance of this question, suggested that the latter be singled out of the general plan for disarmament and be solved without linking it up with agreement on other questions of disarmament. Taking into account that the Western Powers oppose complete discontinuance of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Government submitted to the General Assembly a proposal that the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons be suspended, at least temporarily, for a period of two or three years, starting 1 January 1958, along with the establishment of an appropriate international control.

The immediate suspension of the tests of atomic weapons is a vital demand advanced by the peoples. Owing to the influence of the peoples this demand is backed up by the governments and parliaments in many countries. Specifically the Government and Parliament of Japan have repeatedly declared their support for this demand. However, one cannot but be surprised by the fact that in the resolution (A/C.1/L.174) submitted by the Japanese delegation to the present

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session, the question of suspending the tests is made conditional on an agreement on a number of other disarmament questions, as is the case with the proposals set forth by the United States, United Kingdom and France. Consequently, the Japanese draft resolution does not tend to solve the question of suspending the tests. Moreover, the period for the duration of which the tests are to be stopped, is very limited in the Japanese proposal. Thus, the resolution submitted by the Japanese delegation stands in obvious contradiction with a number of statements made earlier by the Parliament and Government of Japan, in which an immediate and unconditional suspension of the tests of nuclear weapons was called for.

Let me express the confidence that the delegation of Japan will speak out in favour of an immediate discontinuance of the tests of nuclear weapons without any strings attached. In our view, this approach would correspond to the demands of the Japanese people who, undoubtedly, are interested in the suspension of the tests of nuclear weapons no less than other peoples.

The Soviet delegation believes that the Committee and the General Assembly cannot escape the solution of the important and urgent question of discontinuing the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

We do not lose hope that the delegations which take part in the work of the Committee and, in the first place, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom being aware of the great responsibility before the peoples of their countries, will give due attention to this question and will display good will and the desire to co-operate, which are so necessary for the achievement of its positive solution.

In the course of debate on the disarmament problem, the representative of the United Kingdom has grossly distorted the position of the Soviet Union on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Contrary to the facts, the United Kingdom representative alleged that the Soviet Union had not carried out any reduction of its armed forces in the post-war period.

It is common knowledge, however, that immediately after the termination of the Second World War, the Soviet Union demobilized recruits of all ages except

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for those who had been drafted under the current conscription. Reports about this appeared in the Press and in connexion with this there was a relevant exchange of notes between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United Kingdom.

Does Mr. Noble know that in 1955-56 the Soviet Union again reduced its armed forces by 1,840,000 men? Surely he does. But why then did Mr. Noble have to distort the well-known facts?

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The falsification of the facts to which representatives of certain countries of the North Atlantic bloc resort here is indispensable to them because they do not want to reduce their armed forces, conventional armaments and military budgets. At the same time, proceeding from the strategy of the notorious policy of "positions of strength", they are not reluctant in this question again to try to gain certain military advantages for themselves, to try to place the Soviet Union in an unequal position and to impair its security.

In this connexion, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the so-called "proposals for partial measures of disarmament" submitted to the Sub-Committee on 29 August on behalf of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada. In this document the four Powers proposed the following levels of reduction at the first stage: for the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France, down to 750,000 men respectively; for the Soviet Union and the United States, down to 2.5 million men. It is also pointed out that the States will enter into negotiations on the further reduction of their armed forces, down to the levels of 2.1 and 1.7 million men for the Soviet Union and the United States respectively and down to 700,000 and 650,000 men for the United Kingdom and France, at the second and third stages, but only if a number of conditions are fulfilled, among them if "there has been progress toward the solution of political issues".

It is not difficult to see that the reduction provided for by the second and third stages is completely unreal since the Western Powers are heaping insurmountable obstacles in the way of carrying it out.

The head of the Soviet delegation to the Assembly has already made clear the attitude of the Soviet Union towards such political issues raised by the Western Powers as the German question and the problems of the Near and Middle East. The way in which Syria's complaint about the threat to its security and to international peace is being examined at present testifies to the fact that the United States and its partners are carrying out an imperialist policy which is profoundly hostile to the peoples of this area and that they are unwilling to alter this policy.



Things do not stand better with regard to other political problems whose settlement is put forth by the Western Powers as an obligatory precondition for disarmament. Let us take, for example, the Far Eastern problem mentioned by Mr. Moch. The United States and its partners are engaged in a clearly aggressive policy in the Far East and maintain an atmosphere of tension there. They prevent the peoples of the Far East, who have embarked on the road of independent development, from exercising their sovereign rights.

Eight years have elapsed since the United States troops occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan, turned it into a base for engineering armed provocations against the Chinese People's Republic. The United States has made itself at home in South Korea and South Viet-Nam. Backed by the United States, the South Korean authorities violate the armistice agreement and are preparing for a new war against the Korean People's Democratic Republic. They refuse to fulfil the provisions of the armistice concerning the holding of general elections and the unification of the country. South Viet-Nam has been transformed by the United States into a base for aggressive action against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and other peaceful States located in that area.

In addition, the representative of the United Kingdom also named other political issues, linking them to the disarmament problem. He said that the Western Powers had started to arm and that now they do not want to stop the armaments race because they do not seem to like what has occurred in some countries. And in these countries, as is well known, the following things occurred: the peoples took power into their own hands, they decided to build life on new democratic principles and they proved that they are ready to pay any price in order to defend their freedom and independence from all outside encroachments.

Mr. Noble alleged further that the Western Powers pursue the policy of acting from positions of strength and carry on the armaments race because of "the ideological struggle that dominates the world". One can infer from this that certain leaders of Western Powers are ready to call a halt to the armaments race and to conclude an agreement on disarmament only if one ideology remains in the world, that is the ideology shared by the ruling circles of these Powers.

Those people who pose the question in this manner prove once again that they are very far from understanding the real conditions in which we live. There is no statesmanlike wisdom in refusing to recognize with persistence which is worthy of better application those obvious political, economic and cultural changes that have taken place on the globe for the past forty years.

A realistic approach to the whole thing would imply not trying to go against the facts, not imposing one's ways on others, not striving to gain advantage at the expense of others. In this case it could be possible to solve the problem of disarmament as well. Agreement on this question can be easily achieved if it is based on full equality of the parties, if one proceeds from mutual recognition of the coexistence of States irrespective of the differences in their social systems. Any other approach to any international problem, including disarmament, is doomed to an obvious failure.

The linking up of the disarmament problem with political questions can pursue only one aim: to evade the solution of the disarmament problem in general and, in particular, to dodge the reduction of armed forces even within those limits that have been set in the Western proposals for the second and third stages.

As for the proposal to reduce the armed forces at the first stage to 2.5 million men for the United States and to 750,000 men for France and the United Kingdom is, as has already been stated, not serious. This may be seen, for example, from the fact that no actual reduction in the strength of the armed forces has taken place either in the United States or in the United Kingdom. Moreover, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it is proposed to legalize the increase in the strength of the armed forces under the guise of reduction. Thus, we witness here an attempt to outwit the partner in negotiations and to force upon him disadvantageous conditions in the field of conventional armaments.

The Western Powers do not want to recognize the fact that in determining the strength of the armed forces one should take into account the peculiarities of the political and geographical position of every Power, if no harm is to be inflicted on the security of any one of them. It is for such an agreement, based on mutual account of the interests, that the Soviet Government is striving.

I should like to call your attention once again to the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the reduction of armed forces, explained in the memorandum of 20 September and circulated as an official document of the Assembly.

The Soviet Government is willing to reduce its armed forces in three stages to the aforementioned levels provided the Western Powers withdraw the reservations and political conditions advanced by them for the transition from one stage of the reduction of armed forces to another. It stands to reason that, at the same time, it is necessary to reach an understanding on certain measures in the field of nuclear weapons, and, first of all, on the repudiation or renunciation of their use by States. The reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union to the same level as that of the armed forces of the United States constitutes a certain risk. The Soviet Union, however, is ready to accept this if other Powers, parties to the negotiations, also display confidence and readiness to come to an agreement.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Now it is up to the United States, Britain and France. It is necessary that they, for their part, in the same way as the USSR, should proceed in the negotiations from the recognition of the need to ensure an equal degree of security for all States participating in the negotiations, and show willingness to co-operate. In that event no serious difficulties will be encountered on our way to reducing armed forces substantially.

The dismantling of foreign military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other countries would be of great significance for the strengthening of peace and security and for creating an atmosphere of confidence between States.

The United States has built up a ramified network of military bases outside its own boundaries. From 1951 to 1957 alone the number of military air bases of NATO has increased in Europe more than tenfold. Measures are being carried out feverishly in the NATO countries to equip all kinds of troops with atomic weapons and rockets.

And all this is accompanied by allegations about the defence of the West and about the desire to ensure security. One needs to be a completely confused politician or to calculate on completely naive people in order to make assurances that military bases on foreign territories are created for the preservation of peace.

No one can be convinced by the assertion of the United States representative that the United States military bases in Europe, located at a distance of several thousand miles from American territory, are indispensable for the security of the United States. These bases are born of the policy from the positions of strength, and they are necessary for the continuation of this policy towards peace-loving countries.

At the same time it would be naive to think that the creation of American military bases on the territory of Europe as well as on other continents is beneficial to the countries concerned. The statesmen of those countries are carelessly playing with the destiny of their countries and peoples if they think that by making their territories available to be used as foreign military bases and to be turned into barracks for foreign troops they guarantee themselves from a military catastrophe.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The existence of foreign military bases, designed for atomic warfare, threatens these countries with involvement, contrary to their will and desires, in a destructive atomic war which is being prepared by the aggressive circles of the United States and their NATO partners.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the liquidation of foreign military bases on the territories of other States would be of paramount significance for the strengthening of peace and would meet the interests of all countries and nations and, in the first place, those of the peoples of Europe. The same purpose would be served by an agreement on the withdrawal of the troops of the four Powers stationed on the territory of Germany, as well as the reduction of the armed forces of those Powers stationed on the territory of NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

But, as is known, the Western Powers have refused to support these proposals of the Soviet Union. They maintain silence with regard to these questions in their proposals of 29 August, and in the draft resolution submitted to this Assembly as well.

It is now up to the United States and other Western Powers to make their positive contribution in this direction.

Throughout the course of disarmament negotiations the Western Powers have been endlessly and in all possible ways manipulating the question of control. In so doing they completely distort the position of the Soviet Union and make attempts to use the problem of control for frustrating agreement on concrete disarmament measures. As soon as the Soviet point of view and the Soviet proposals on control are mentioned the representatives of the United States, Britain and France turn a deaf ear. This was the case before and this is the case now at the present session of the General Assembly.

The Soviet Union has never opposed and is not opposing control. The Soviet Government has repeatedly proposed concrete and practical measures of control over the reduction of armaments and armed forces, over the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and over the suspension of the tests of these weapons. In this connexion reference may be made to our proposals of 10 May 1955, 27 March 1956 and 18 March 1957, as well as to the proposals which are now being considered by the General Assembly.



(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

The Soviet Union stands not for a paper control over something unknown, but for genuine control over the implementation of genuine concrete measures on disarmament.

Is it possible now on the basis of the Soviet proposals to come to an agreement on the establishment of an appropriate control if this is to be considered in combination with concrete measures on disarmament? The answer is, "Yes, it is". In all its proposals the Soviet Union emphasizes that even in the atmosphere which exists now in relations between States it is possible to start carrying out practical steps in the field of disarmament with appropriate control.

The Soviet Government proposes that already during the implementation of the first partial measures on disarmament control posts in large ports, at railway junctions and on motor highways should be set up on the basis of reciprocity on the territories of States; these posts will see to it that no dangerous concentrations of armed forces and armaments take place. Since it is partial measures of disarmament that are dealt with the question of control posts must be solved accordingly. At the first stage control posts must be set up in the western frontier regions of the USSR, on the territory of France, Britain and other NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries and also in the eastern part of the United States. Functions of control could be exercised, through agreement between the parties, by a control body established for this purpose within the framework of the Security Council.

The Soviet Government also agreed to aerial photography in certain areas indicated in the Soviet proposals of 30 April 1957. No sooner had this happened than the Western Powers lost interest in these proposals on aerial photography, even though they had been compiled with due account for the United States position.

The Soviet Union considers that partial measures in the field of disarmament, with an appropriate control, must and can be implemented without delay. They can play an important role in increasing confidence between States, which is so necessary for the solution of the disarmament problem as a whole and for consolidating universal peace.

Almost all those who spoke in the debates pointed out that at the present time there is lacking the necessary confidence between States and, primarily, between the great Powers. It is completely unrealistic to expect that distrust between States would disappear at once or in a short period of time and be replaced by trust and confidence.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

It will take time and concrete measures to increase confidence. And in this one cannot start by carrying out such measures as are possible only when a large degree of confidence already exists, because this may merely complicate the achievement of an agreement.

Things will look different when practical measures have been carried into effect aimed at promoting confidence -- in particular, when a partial disarmament programme has been brought into being, and when barriers which stand in the way of developing co-operation between States and peoples have been removed. Under these conditions one can expect a decisive improvement of relations between States and peoples to supervene, and this, in its turn, will result in favourable conditions for the implementation of the broad disarmament programme with a broad and effective control.

If the Western Powers have serious intentions of negotiating concrete measures on disarmament and control over disarmament the Soviet proposals submitted to the present session provide the necessary basis for the achievement of an appropriate agreement.

I consider it necessary to dwell on the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the setting up of a permanent Disarmament Commission which was submitted on 27 October. The Soviet Union attaches great significance to this proposal and believes that the General Assembly will consider it with all due attention.

The United Nations, which is called upon to bring about international co-operation in the interests of peace and security of all peoples, must undertake new and more effective efforts to solve the disarmament problem. This demand is especially imperative at the present time when the race in the production of weapons of mass destruction -- atomic and hydrogen -- is being intensified, and when there have been created intercontinental rockets which make every part of the globe vulnerable.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Meanwhile, as has been justly pointed out by many delegations, the organs of the United Nations -- the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee -- have not yet achieved any concrete results in the field of disarmament. Despite many years of negotiations, the disarmament problem has not progressed one jot; not a single agreement has been concluded which would lead to a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, which would contribute to the removal of the threat of a thermonuclear war. In fact, the negotiations have come to a stalemate and the Commission and its Sub-Committee have turned into a screen for the improper activities of the opponents of disarmament. To be satisfied with the results of the activities of these bodies would represent a very dangerous complacency.

One of the reasons for the lamentable results mentioned by many delegations lies in the fact that the discussion of the disarmament problem was confined to a limited group of States represented in the above bodies. If one takes into consideration that the functions of the Commission were in fact reduced to the submission of the Sub-Committee's reports to the General Assembly, then this group is limited to only five Powers: the Soviet Union on the one hand and the four Powers, members of NATO, on the other. All other Members of the United Nations -- that is, seventy-seven States -- have actually been left out of the negotiations.

Though the achievement of a disarmament agreement largely depends on those Powers which have at their disposal the biggest armed forces and which possess the atomic and hydrogen weapons, all States and all peoples are equally interested in a positive solution of the disarmament problem. Therefore, in order to solve this problem successfully, it is necessary to take into account the considerations of all Member States of the United Nations and especially of those which resolutely oppose the armaments race and the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and which come out for the suspension of the tests.

In the present circumstances, it is expedient that a Permanent Commission on Disarmament, made up of the representatives of all Member States of the United Nations, be set up. The task of this permanently functioning Commission would be to consider all proposals on disarmament coming to the United Nations and to prepare appropriate recommendations for the sessions of the General Assembly.

The activity of this Commission must not be confined to any definite period of time. The Commission must function incessantly, as a permanent body of the United Nations.

Changes are required not only in the composition of the bodies which deal with disarmament problems but also in the character of the work of these bodies. Many States have expressed dissatisfaction with the present practice of talks behind closed doors in the Sub-Committee. And indeed this practice leads to the fact that world public opinion actually remains in the dark as to what is going on in the Sub-Committee, since information on the negotiations is released only at the discretion of the negotiating States. The private character of the work results in directly misleading the public, when certain circles in the Western countries deliberately spread fables about the serious results allegedly achieved in the Sub-Committee whereas, in fact, the work remains at dead centre. Thus, false illusions are disseminated, and the peoples are misled -- those peoples, mind you, who do not desire lip service to disarmament but who want and need real measures to halt the armaments race and to remove the threat of a new war waged with nuclear weapons.

An end should be put to the vicious practice of artificial secrecy in examining disarmament questions, a practice which proved so detrimental to the cause of disarmament. Unlike the present state of affairs, the activities of the Permanent Commission on Disarmament should be public. This will make it possible to keep the peoples fully informed about the state of disarmament negotiations and about the positions of various Powers and will create conditions such that the disarmament question, as the most vital question of our time, will constantly be at the centre of public attention.

The setting up of a Permanent Commission on Disarmament does not exclude the possibility of discussion, mutual consultations, and so forth, on disarmament questions between various States or groups of States. On the contrary, it may be presumed that broad and public discussion of different proposals in the Permanent Commission will ensure favourable conditions for greater activity on the part of States and will extend consultations, meetings, and other forms of contacts and relations between them. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the

Commission, besides conducting the current activities, would be entrusted with the task of assisting States in carrying out the above-mentioned mutual consultations and meetings and other contacts on the question of disarmament.

The Soviet delegation expects that its proposal on the setting up of a Permanent Commission on Disarmament, prompted by the desire to speed up a positive solution of the problem of disarmament through the mobilization of the efforts of all Members of the United Nations, will be duly supported by other delegations. The setting up of the Permanent Commission would be a positive contribution of the present session of the General Assembly to the problem of disarmament.

Summing up the results of the discussion in the Committee and objectively evaluating all the previous work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, one can draw the conclusion that there are two lines with regard to the problem of disarmament. One line, pursued by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, proceeds from the policy of the positions of strength in international relations, of which the armaments race and the preparation of a new war are consequential. This line is aimed at barring any agreement on concrete measures in the field of disarmament and at endangering the security of the peaceful States and, in the first place, of the States belonging to the socialist camp.

At the same time, attempts are being made to complicate the matter by various invented machinations and distortions, to mislead the peoples and to shift the responsibility for the failure in negotiations to the Soviet Union. It is not surprising that so well informed an American politician as the former Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Acheson, in his recent criticism of the United States Government's position on disarmament, said:

"I am so confused about these negotiations that I simply do not know where we stand or what we are trying to get."



(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

But there is another line, and this line is pursued by the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States. It is aimed at easing international tension; at putting an end to the cold war and the armaments race, which is so dangerous to peace; at prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons; at averting a new destructive war; and at ensuring a peaceful and tranquil life for all the peoples.

Only twelve years separate us from the horrors of the Second World War, which we cannot and must not forget if we want to deliver humanity from the fear of a new war. The Soviet Union suffered especially heavy losses and sacrifices in that war. Millions and millions of Soviet people sacrificed the most valuable possession they had -- their lives -- in order to defend the freedom and independence of their country and to save humanity from the threat of fascist enslavement. The Soviet people hate war and are ready to do everything in their power to prevent the outbreak of another, still more horrible catastrophe. The Soviet Union, guided by its peaceful policy, has been making serious efforts to reach an agreement on disarmament.

During the negotiations, the Soviet Government submitted many constructive proposals aimed at the rapid achievement of an agreement to halt the armaments race, to ban nuclear weapons and to remove the threat of a new war. In its proposals, the Soviet Union has taken due account of the views of the Western Powers. This has been recognized by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in their statements. It is not the fault of the Soviet Government that the Western Powers went back on their own proposals as soon as the Soviet Union had accepted them.

The Soviet Union has the right to expect that the Western Powers, for their part, will also show a willingness to achieve agreement and will take appropriate steps to meet the position of the Soviet Union. But, judging from the experience of the negotiations which have been going on for ten years and from the discussion which is taking place here, certain quarters in the United States, the United Kingdom and France adhere to a different point of view. Not only have they failed to make any attempts to meet the Soviet Union half way, but they have been trying to make use of the negotiations to ensure the military superiority of their countries and to undermine the security of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

is conducting the negotiations frankly and openly, without any ulterior motives, without any intention of placing its partners in an unequal position or of undermining the security of any State. The Soviet Union demands from the Western Powers very little -- only that they should show the same attitude towards the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union shows towards them.

The Soviet proposals which have been submitted to the present session of the Assembly correspond to the interest of strengthening peace and ensuring the security of all States. The proposals formulated in the so-called "twenty-four-Power draft resolution" cannot serve as a basis for an agreement on disarmament. This is but another resolution which will be of no use whatsoever.

It is deeds that are needed, not mere resolutions. The peoples of all countries, large and small, expect the present session of the General Assembly to produce first of all deeds, real steps in the field of disarmament. To achieve agreement at the present session on at least some questions would mean to do away with endless discussions and to pass from words to deeds.

There is no doubt that if the Western Powers show their willingness to embark upon the road of carrying out real measures, it will be possible to turn this session into a session of the first practical steps in the field of disarmament and in preventing a new war. The delegation of the Soviet Union appeals to the delegations of all countries, and specifically those of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, to join in these efforts.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The general debate is now over. I shall, however, call on the representative of Japan to exercise his right of reply, in accordance with the rules of procedure.

Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): Using my right of reply, I should like to say a few words concerning the statement made by the representative of France on 22 October. The purpose of my intervention is to clarify our position. I shall do so briefly and with all respect to the representative of France.

I should also like to touch upon some comments made today by the representative of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Matsudaira, Japan)

In his statement on 22 October, the representative of France said:

"In fact, the Japanese delegation suggests in that proposal" --  
that is, the proposal submitted by my delegation --

"that we should suspend all nuclear test explosions from the time an agreement is reached in principle on the control of this suspension until a report is submitted to the next Assembly. In this interim, negotiations will be undertaken on the functioning of the control body.

"Were we to accept these views, the suspension of tests would be immediate, the Soviet Union having accepted the principle of control. The suspension, therefore, would last, as we suggest in our proposal, approximately twelve months -- a period which would be used to discuss the setting up of control. May I add that this last -- the setting up of control -- is much more complex than is generally supposed. ...

"The French delegation would like to make a warm appeal to the Japanese delegation that, in the light of these explanations and in full awareness of our intentions, it should be willing to see our point of view, which is wider than the mere anti-nuclear campaign." (A/C.1/PV.877, page 28-30)  
My delegation has three observations to make.

First, the Soviet Union has accepted the principle of control, as the French representative has said. There is, however, no formal agreement on the subject. Our draft resolution presupposes "an agreement in principle" -- in other words, a formal agreement concerning the principle of control. So far as my delegation is aware, no such formal agreement is in existence, contrary to what the representative of France has said.

My second point is this: The statement of the representative of France to the effect that the Japanese draft resolution is similar to the Soviet Union's proposal is not, if I may say so, correct. The Japanese proposal is different in that it does not separate the test suspension issue from the other phases of disarmament.

(Mr. Matsudaira, Japan)

It does insist that endeavours should be continued to arrive at some agreement on those issues other than test suspension. I think that this is the most outstanding difference between the Japanese draft resolution and that of the Soviet Union. In other words, under the Japanese plan the moratorium on the nuclear arms race, the cut-off of production, and so on, are to be discussed while testing is suspended. This will, I hope, answer the criticism against my Government and my delegation which has just been made by the representative of the Soviet Union in his statement. For the rest of his criticism, I should like to refer him to my reply to statements made by the representatives of Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

I would now refer to my third point. The French representative said that the setting up of controls over test suspension was more complex than is generally supposed. If that is so, why did he say in his statement on 22 October:

"In substance, we have said to the Soviet representative, 'We accept a suspension of nuclear tests as from the day of the entry into force of the treaty, even before the setting up of control over this suspension, based on the only principle on which we agree. We agree not to delay the suspension of explosions awaiting the signature of a technical, practical agreement that will permit the setting up of control. Let us, during the first twelve months of suspension, discuss that. If it is set up before the twelfth month, the agreement can be renewed for a second year.'" (A/C.1/PV.877, page 27).

In the Japanese draft resolution, almost a full year is allowed for the purpose of working out a system of supervision and inspection. This period of time should be sufficient for that purpose, and, even if it is not, the period can be extended by mutual agreement if the prospect for the installation of an inspection system is deemed good. If not, the suspension could be ended. In any case, the least one can say is that the period of one year would be adequate to some extent to test the good faith of all the parties concerned.

To conclude, I should like to say that the Japanese proposal is a practical proposal which calls for the suspension of tests under such conditions and for the continuation of disarmament negotiations on the other unsettled points. It is our humble submission that once the suspension is agreed upon, even for one year, it would certainly create an atmosphere that would facilitate the extension of the duration at the next session of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The general debate on the disarmament question is now closed. At our next meeting we will take up the question of the draft resolutions which have been submitted to the Committee. The next meeting will take place tomorrow afternoon, unless there is a plenary meeting of the General Assembly at that time. If that is the case, the next meeting of the First Committee will be announced in the Journal.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.