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Eleventh Session FIRST COMMITTEE VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH MEETING Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 8 January 1957, at 10.30 a.m.

Mr. BELAUNDE

(Peru)

The Korean question $\sqrt{217}$ (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr.	Umana Bernal	(Colombia)
Mr.	Katz-Suchy	(Poland) (USSR)
Mr.	Tsarapkin	(USSR)
Sir	Leslie Munro	(New Zealand)

Note:

Chairman:

The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.819. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume. THE KOREAN QUESTION /Agenda item 21/ (continued)

- (a) REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
- (b) PROBLEM OF EX-PRISONERS OF THE KOREAN WAR: REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

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Mr. UMANA BERNAL (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation is extremely happy at the results of our efforts which led the Political Committee to discuss the Korean question first. Political as well as logical reasons led We did not want the Committee to our making the suggestion in the first place. to start its work with the study of subjects that were of dreadful topicality, which would obviously create a situation of tension and difficulty. Previously these same subjects had caused acrimonious debate which we felt should be avoided Our attitude has been supported by the way in which many delegations this time. have taken part in this debate. However, there were also political as well as psychological reasons in our suggestion, and that was to avoid a deterioration in the situation in Korea by postponing the Korean question on the agenda. We had to avoid a repetition of the old international policy of minimizing and gradually making unimportant serious problems, until gradually they drifted away from world public view and became de facto events by our overlooking their very Fortunately, this time this was not the case, and we are convinced existence. that it will not be the case in the future.

DR/ns

EIG/rh

(Mr. Umana Bernal, Colombia)

What reason would there be to relegate the Korean question this year to be item 5 of our agenda, as some delegations have suggested? Is this problem already solved, or does the present situation satisfy the norms laid down by the United Nations?

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Mention was made of saying that new things are required, though at times the most important thing is not to say new things but to repeat old ones, when their repetition is necessary. More interesting than to say new things would be to produce new solutions, if those that had been earlier suggested had been satisfied. That is the void that we note in this debate. No new solutions have been forthcoming to replace the proposal made by the representative of the United States. Where are these new proposals? What has happened to them? I listened very carefully to the extremely wise and intelligent statement made by the representative of India. As usual, Mr. Menon only said interesting things. At first it appeared that the entire Korean problem was going to dissolve in that very able play of words, but the representative of India preferred to hold back and not give us the solution that we all expected from him; and this is a shame, because we want a solution for the Korean question but we cannot find it; and those that have the password do not seem to want to pronounce it.

That being the case, the draft resolution submitted by the United States should be adopted. At least it is a new declaration of principle, another appeal to the Government -- not to the people -- of North Korea and a further effort in the already long line of efforts made by the General Assembly to reunify Korea into a unit having its own historical frontiers and form of Government.

The representative of Caylon spoke yesterday of the unjust treatment of North Korea because of the political philosophy of its present regime of Government. If I am not interpreting his words incorrectly, he said something of the nature that the United Nations wanted to establish the crime of opinion in international life. This is anti-democratic and if it were to be the case it would be in flagrant violation of the essential principles of our Organization. But may I allay the fears of the representative of Ceylon and tell him merely to look carefully at the picture. No one has been or can be excluded for political philosophical reasons. The trouble is that North Korea itself placed itself A/C.1/PV-819

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outside the pale of international law, not because of its political philosophy but because it unjustifiably rejected the norms, principles and appeals of the United Nations.

In my statement I do not intend to cover all aspects of this debate; I do not think I am called upon to do so. But I do want to repeat that the Colombian delegation is extremely happy at the results of its original suggestion. The debate has borne our position out, it has given us all the right in the world. We shall vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and we shall of course vote in favour of the very timely compliment suggested by the representatives of Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela.

<u>Mr. KATZ-SUCHY</u> (Poland): In the course of this debate many delegations have expressed their scepticism as to the possibility of reaching at the present session a solution of the Korean problem. Undoubtedly, such pessimism has its well founded roots in the past, especially in that part of it which concerns United Nations actions.

In spite of the undisputed success achieved in the termination of hostilities, many subsequent efforts devoted to this problem have not produced the expected results. On the contrary, the Korean problem became even more difficult to solve and still continues to be so. The tragic war, the sufferings of the Korean people, the ten years of existence as separate and isolated States have created tensions, generated passions, have sown bitterness and hostility which render such a solution more difficult to achieve.

Undoubtedly this is a difficult problem. Commensurately greater, therefore, is our responsibility for the finding of a just solution and the Korean problem is becoming all the more important from the point of view of international co-operation. The delegation of Poland agrees entirely with the opinion expressed by the representative of Canada that the aim of the present debate is not to pass historical judgement on the cause and the course of the war in Korea, in addition to which opinions on this issue have already been expressed and broadly discussed. The aim of this debate is to find appropriate ways and means which would lead to the final solution of the problem in the best interests of the Korean people.

EIG/rh

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(Mr. Katz-Suchy, Poland)

It has been justly pointed out during the debate that the main task which confronts us should be the unification of Korea within the framework of a unified and democratic State. We agree with the overwhelming majority of delegations that such a unification cannot be achieved by the use of force and it must come as a result of a concrete settlement. That is why it must be deeply regretted that again this year the representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea have not been allowed to take part in our debate, although they are one of the most interested parties in the problem. We should also bear in mind that if we really intend to achieve a peaceful solution of this problem and really strive to eliminate the present tensions in Korea, this can only be achieved by way of agreement on both sides.

Unification is essentially a problem of the Korean people itself. That is why any unilateral decision will remain a paper decision only and will be devoid of any true meaning if it is not based upon a prior agreement of the representatives of both sides in Korea. The delegation of Poland is bound also to express its regret because of the tone of the discussion which has been introduced here by some of the delegations who tried to substitute sound reasoning by abuse against a Government which they had previously excluded from the debate, thus depriving it of the possibility of answering the unjust allegations.

As I stated, the task which confronts us is clear. Cur goal should be the unification of Korea as a democratic and peaceful State. We should therefore endeavour to set up conditions in which the Korean people can create a unified democratic State and introduce such a form of government as would correspond to its will and its interests. The obstacles in its way should be removed gradually, step by step; we should initiate the steps which would develop co-operation between both parts of Korea, which would gradually remove the existing suspicions, animosity and bitterness accumulated during the tragic conflict. In our opinion the first condition for achieving this should be the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, thus giving to the Korean people the freedom to decide their own future. MA/1d

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(Mr. Katz-Suchy, Poland) The United Nations, by its decision, should encourage the two Governments of Korea to enter into economic co-operation, which would hasten the removal of war destruction and raise the standard of living. We should help them to develop cultural as well as social and political co-operation between both parts of Korea. We should facilitate an agreement on the movement of population between the two parts of the country and, within such an agreement, assist in

the reuniting of families separated during the hostilities. Of course, all these steps could be considered only as initial ones, but they would open the possibility for all-Korean elections internationally supervised and would create conditions necessary to overcome the obstacles which today prevent the solution of the main problem. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and political parties and social organizations in both parts of Korea representing the national and peaceful aspirations of the Korean people express themselves in favour of such co-operation. This desire has also been noted in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report of the Korean Commission Market Alexandree States and Social Commission

As I stated, the problem of the unification of Korea is first and foremost the responsibility of the Korean people themselves. The United Nations, however, has the possibility and indeed the duty to create proper international conditions which would facilitate this task. A step in this direction should be first of all to support the proposal envisaged in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement to convene a conference of all interested parties to elaborate the just principles of unification. The Chinese People's Republic, the great Asian Power which has played such an important role in the restoration of peace in Korea, has repeatedly seek acceptable solutions.

The draft resolutions. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.158) and a number of interventions in the present discussion have referred to the Geneva Conference as the political conference envisaged by the Armistice Agreement. I do not want to engage in a

discussion as to whether the Geneva Conference was the political conference within the meaning of the Armistice Agreement. But is it not obvious that the Armistice Agreement did not imply that a political conference should be one single isolated effort? Moreover, the failure of the Geneva Conference in this matter is directly

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connected to the fact that the sixteen States participating, the belligerents in Korea, have taken an intransigent position. Instead of looking for a compromise, they tried to impose their demand upon the other side.

The Polish delegation agrees with those representatives, who, in the course of this debate, appealed to the participants in the war in Korea to reject this unreasonable stubbornness and take a more flexible attitude. We appealed to them to take into consideration the changes which have taken place, and first of all to understand that the problem can be solved only by agreement and compromise. The present session, having the benefit of a certain period of improvement in international co-operation and conscious of the potential dangers, should recommend a new, bolder and broader approach which would be in conformity with the United Nations Charter.

I have spoken of the most immediate tasks. It seems to me that for the time being one of the most important is to undertake all measures to safeguard the Armistice Agreement. This Agreement concluded three years ago was a big international achievement, reaching in its repercussions far beyond Korean or even Asian problems. The armistice in Korea has contributed to the relaxation of tensions in the whole world.

No doubt we all remember what a serious danger the Korean conflict constituted to the cause of world peace. That is why we should initiate such steps as would safeguard the Armistice Agreement and ensure its proper functioning until the time of the unification of Korea. This is the reason why we look with certain misgivings and anxiety upon the approach of the Korean Commission and of some of the delegations to limit the scope of the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. This is why we cannot pass over in silence open threats on the part of the South Korean Government, which were expressed even before this Committee, to break the Armistice Agreement and renew hostilities.

In paragraph 7 of its report, UNCURK limits itself to stating, without any attempt to qualify this fact, that South Korea "continues...to press strongly for denunciation...of the Armistice Agreement". (A/3172) The Commission is seemingly not aware of the fact that the breaking of the Armistice Agreement cannot but mean a threat to renew hostilities and a threat of a new dangerous conflict. The

MA/la

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report of the Korean Commission, by merely describing the attitude of the South Korean Government which asks for the liquidation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and not appraising the activity and importance of the Commission or even mentioning that the attitude of South Korea amounts to a violation of the terms of the Armistice Agreement, seems to give support to such demands.

The Government of Poland, which, together with the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland, has undertaken the task of supervising the implementation of the Armistice Agreement, maintains the opinion that one of the basic means of securing peace in Korea and safeguarding that country against the renewal of hostilities is the existence and the activity of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. What is more, we think that in spite of difficult conditions and tremendous tasks confronting it, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has already played an important role. After surmounting the initial difficulties, in most instances the Commission has worked according to its rules of procedure and has adopted unanimous decisions on matters falling within its terms of reference. How difficult are the conditions under which the Commission is working can be seen from the fact that four of its members -- three Poles and one Swiss -- have lost their lives as a result of carrying out their duties. NR/ba

(Mr. Katz-Suchy, Poland)

The advisability of maintaining such a commission in spite of the differences in the assessment of its methods and activities has been recognized by all its members.

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The Polish delegation must reject the unfounded allegations that Polish and Czechoslovak officers hindered the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. If those representatives who asserted it here had the time and, of course, the will, they could have seen that the majority of inspection tours by the teams in both North and South Korea have been undertaken on the initiative of the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives in the groups and that during the last two years almost all decisions were unanimous.

I do not want to enter into details concerning the Commission's activities; I have spoken on this last year. We could quote here instances from its report, stressing that the Chinese Korean side, since the moment of the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, always abided by its letter and spirit and gave many-sided assistance to the Supervisory Commission. On the other hand, the Unified Command hindered, limited and sometimes rendered impossible the carrying out of the inspection activities in South Korea. The Unified Command tolerated attacks against the Commission's personnel, has refused to observe the principle unanimously accepted by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission of supplying prior information as to the exchange of arms and ammunition, and hindered the inspection of ports of entry in South Korea.

The purpose of all the accusations against the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, both in Korea and before the United Nations, is clear. The aim is to create excuses to initiate actions against inspection groups, the activities of which have made the rearming of the South Korean forces more difficult. The aim is directed against the Commission and, later, against the Armistice Agreement as such.

Basing itself upon those unfounded accusations against the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and rejecting the Swedish compromise proposal, the Unified Military Command on 31 May 1956 took a unilateral decision on the suspension of the implementation of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement which pertain to the activities of the Commission in the territory of South Korea. Under the threat of use of force, the Commission yielded and withdrew its inspection teams. I feel bound to say that this ultimatum, before which the

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Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had to submit, constitutes a serious violation of the Armistice Agreement.

The Government of Poland is of the opinion that no decision contrary to the Armistice Agreement can change the powers of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission or limit it in the discharge of its duties. Therefore, considering the withdrawal as temporary, the Polish Government reserves for itself the right to demand the readmission of inspection groups when it considers it proper and necessary.

Some delegations made reference to the alleged build-up of the military forces of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. They did not give any facts to support these accusations. The accusations were equally unsubstantiated before the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and are contrary to all information reaching us from North Korea. The Korean People's Democratic Republic, as was pointed out, reduced its armed forces. A great part of the Chinese volunteer units has been withdrawn. The whole people is engaged in the great task of reconstruction. We know what destruction was suffered by this young republic. We know what efforts were required to rebuild its economic life and its destroyed cities and how difficult it is for it to heal the wounds suffered in the fight for freedom.

We cannot help expressing our astonishment that similar accusations are mentioned even in the report of UNCURK, which in paragraph 7 mentions the alleged danger of a build-up of the North Korean armed forces.

In spite of our negative attitude towards this Commission, we expected at least a semblance of an objective approach. Is it not clear that the whole fable about the North Korean arms build-up is being used to justify the call for arms by the sabre-rattling authorities of South Korea? The constant build-up of forces in South Korea, as we know, is being continued. This is clear, even from the report of UNCURK, which in paragraph 52 states:

"The United States continues to supply assistance to the Government of the Republic of Korea under its mutual security programme in the Far East ...".

The purpose of such a build-up is clear in the light of the threats of the Syngman Rhee Government and of the military leaders directed against North Korea. I will refer only to the recent New Year's message by the President of South Korea A/C.1/PV.819 13-15

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calling again for the march to the north in order to liberate North Korea. We do not wish to quote too many such instances or to refer to all the material which this Committee has at its disposal. If we mention these problems, it is not for recriminatory purposes but in order to point out the existing dangers and once more to ask for a reiteration by the United Nations that it is determined to carry out the Armistice Agreement, with all its stipulations, and will not support any action aimed at infringing on this Agreement or at limiting its scope.

The Polish delegation, basing itself on the experience of the past, entertains doubts as to whether a further continuation of the Korea Commission will serve any useful purpose. Even from the present report it can be seen how very limited are its possibilities and how very insignificant is the role it can play. UNCURK has clearly demonstrated that it is not able to formulate a constructive programme and find proper solutions. Besides, we all know that it was set up in a completely different period, in different conditions and with different intentions. It seems to us today that its dissolution can only help in reaching an agreement. Its limitation by the resolution of the previous session also supports such a contention.

At the same time, while speaking on the advisability of dissolving the Commission, the Polish delegation does not, of course, exclude the possibility of the setting up by the international conference of another more appropriate body or agency for co-operation with both sides in order to facilitate the implementation of the tasks and aims which should be set before us.

NR/bd

BHS/mz

(Mr. Katz-Suchy, Poland)

It is quite clear to us that the present draft resolution before us does not contain any recommendation which would facilitate the achievement of desirable solutions. The draft resolution tries to substitute for previous United Nations resolutions, and especially for the agreed principles of the Armistice Agreement, the terms which the sixteen belligerents tried at Geneva to impose upon the other

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As regards paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, we cannot help but have the feeling that a unilateral decision concerning elections in North Korea, without even consulting its Government, may only result in further complications of the matter. The dangerous implications contained in this passage have already been referred to by the representative of India.

In conclusion, I should like to recall that the methods of achieving a final solution of the Korean problem have been outlined in the Armistice Agreement. In our opinion, the possibilities and machinery envisaged there have not been That is why we should seek recourse in the more concrete steps envisaged there. In particular, we should ask all countries to liquidate their military bases and withdraw their troops from Korea. We should appeal to both Korean States to enter gradually into co-operation. We should also decide to convene a political conference to outline the principles of further activities in this matter, principles which will help in the unification of Korea and which will eliminate from the international scene the dangerous source of tension and unrest which Korea constitutes today. A unified Korea, in our opinion, should then be admitted to the United Nations. Furthermore, we consider that our duty would then be to initiate a broad programme of overall economic and technical

assistance for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea. Poland, as a Member nation of the United Nations and as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, is ready to take part in these actions, and, accordingly, will aim as far as possible to contribute to the creation of conditions that will ensure, the successful outcome of our action.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration. BHS/mz

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The General Assembly has now been dealing with this question for ten years. It should be pointed out, in the interests of obtaining a proper consideration of the substance of this question, that the United States is attempting to make use of the United Nations to carry out its own policy. All attempts to impose from outside a settlement of the Korean question have failed. The attempts to settle the Korean problem on the basis of United States plans as set forth in a number of General Assembly resolutions which the United States succeeded in pushing through by the use of its voting machinery, have not furnished any positive results.

In this connexion, one should not forget the fact that the war in Korea, which was unleashed in 1950 and which lasted for more than three years despite the direct participation of large contingents of United States armed forces and the armed forces of a number of other States which invaded Korea, did not lead to a settlement of the Korean question.

The status of the Korean question may be clearly seen from the report of the Commission itself, in which we read:

"... the Korean question as such is unsettled. There has in fact been no basic change in the position since the Commission reported last year."

This conclusion is eloquent evidence of the fact that there can be no imposed solution, whether by force of arms of foreign interventionists or by the adoption of resolutions in the United Nations, to which the Korean people do not agree. All of this indicates that it is impossible to settle the Korean question without taking proper account of the situation which has developed in Korea.

The fact is that on the Korean peninsula there are two States at the present time, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north, and the so-called Republic of Korea, with its terroristic puppet regime of Syngman Rhee, in the south. These two States are based on different social, economic and political systems, which have placed a deep imprint on their development. That is the actual state of affairs in Korea. Therefore, any attempts to raise the question of unifying Korea with the aid of armed forces or by means of a mechanical transfer of the social, economic and political system from one part of Korea to the other, are inevitably doomed to failure. BHS/mz

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(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The political experience which we have all acquired from the Korean question -and from other questions -- over the past ten years indicates that a correct solution of the problems related to the unification of any country must be found by the peoples directly concerned. This belief is correct in respect of Korea as well.

In connexion with the role of the United Nations, its task does not consist of confusing the question and complicating it by adopting one or another resolution. Its task should be to attempt to assist the Korean people in solving their problems.

Since the conclusion of the armistice in Korea more than three years have passed. The experience of these three years has shown that it would be possible to establish an enduring peace in Korea if the United States Command and the authorities of South Korea would not create any obstacles. Let us take as an example the activity of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the establishment of contacts between North and South Korea. There is no doubt that each of these questions by itself is of primary importance for the establishment of a lasting peace in Korea. The first is of the greatest importance in the maintenance and strengthening of the armistice, and the second in the preparation of conditions for the peaceful unification of the country. AW/mtm

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Therefore, it is easy to verify, by the attitude of these questions of each of the parties, whether they stand for the maintenance and strengthening of peace in Korea, for the peaceful unification of the country, or whether they are attempting to violate peace in Korea for the purpose of trying to impose by force on the other side its political and social system. We know the firstrate political role in the strengthening and maintenance of the armistice in Korea which was played by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which was entrusted with observing the armistice conditions in Korea. Its inspection groups checked on the entry of arms into Korea. The Commission considered cases of violation of the Armistice and took steps to strengthen the armistice.

It is well known that the South Korean authorities adopted a hostile attitude to the activities of the inspection groups of the Commission inasmuch as those groups attempted to make sure that there was no build-up of arms and armed forces in Korea. The Syngman Rhee authorities insistently worked for an end to the activity of the inspection groups in South Korea. Unfortunately, we must note that the South Korean authorities succeeded in getting what they wanted. On 31 May 1956 the United States representative to the Military Armistice Commission in Korea stated that a decision, a one-sided decision, a unilateral decision, had been taken by the United States to send out of South Korea the permanent inspection groups of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

The implementation of this decision was undertaken by the American Command on an urgent basis, in spite of the fact that the Korean-Chinese side in the Military Armistice Commission proposed a compromise solution, namely to agree to the withdrawal of inspection groups to the demilitarized zone, but to maintain the right of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to send inspection groups periodically to certain points for checks, for verifications, if that were to prove necessary.

However, this proposal was not adopted by the United States Command and on 9 June all of the inspection groups were sent out of South Korea. The termination of the activity of the inspection groups of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in South Korea met with the complete approval of the South Korean authorities. The Acting Foreign Minister of the Syngman Rhee AW/mtm

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Government, Cho, Chang Whan, expressed gratitude to the American Command for sending the inspection groups of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission out of South Korea and insisted that further steps should be taken designed to cancel or to denounce the Armistice Agreement as a whole.

Now the question naturally arises, what purposes are served by the abovementioned measure of the United States Command for ending the activity of the Inspection groups of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in South Korea? A correct assessment of the measure taken by the American authorities can be given only in the light of the general policy of the Syngman Rhee Government in South Korea, taking account of the position of the South Korean authorities with respect to the observance of the armistice in Korea, and also by taking account of the position of the South Korean authorities with respect to the Korean Democratic People's Republic.

In the report submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly there is a direct reference to the fact that the Syngman Rhee Government objects to the observance of the Armistice Agreement and is prepared to resort to the use of armed force against the Korean Democratic People's Republic. There is direct reference to this fact in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Commission's Report In the light of such a position on the part of the authorities of South Korea with respect to the armistice in Korea and the Korean Democratic People's Republic, it is obvious that the unilateral acts of the United States Command, which took the form of the termination of the activity of the inspection groups of the Commission in South Korea, cannot be described otherwise than as directed against the armistice.

These acts of the Americans in Korea in fact assist the Syngman Rhee Government in Korea to carry out its adventuristic policy of military threats addressed to the Korean Democratic People's Republic.

In this connexion, it is necessary for the parties concerned to take immediate measures to ensure normal conditions for the accomplishment by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission of the functions entrusted to it by the Armistice Agreement. AW/mtm

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(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

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I wish to offer a few words now concerning the establishment of contacts between North and South Korea. We consider that the Korean question must be settled peacefully by the Korean people themselves. The Korean people will no doubt find a correct solution of the task of the peaceful unification of their country if they are not interfered with in this task. The most important premise for a solution of the Korean question is the gradual establishment by the Koreans themselves of political, economic and cultural links between both parts of the country. In this connexion it is appropriate to recall that the Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic in recent years has repeatedly made proposals for the establishment of such links, such contacts between the Korean Democratic People's Republic and South Korea.

At the Geneva Conference the delegation of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, for the purpose of creating conditions favourable to a rapprochement between North and South Korea, proposed to form an all-Korean Committee for the preparation and implementation of agreed measures for the establishment and development of economic and cultural contacts between the Korean Democratic People's Republic and the Korean Republic; and this referred to trade, financial accounts, transport, frontier relations, freedom of movement of the population and freedom of correspondence, as well as cultural and scientific links, and so on. This proposal was rejected by the South Korean authorities.

The eighth session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, in October 1954, sent to the National Assembly of South Korea accommunication to the political parties and public organizations, to the political leaders of various strata of the population and the entire people of South Korea a proposal to convene in Pyongyang or in Secul a joint conference of representatives of political parties, public organizations and various strata of the population of North and South Korea, or to call a joint session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean Democratic People's Republic and the National Assembly of the Korean Republic for the discussion of questions concerning the establishment of economic and cultural exchanges, trade, freedom of movement and correspondence between North and South Korea. The South Korean Government, on 29 October 1954, stated that it rejected that proposal of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. FGB/gd

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The Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Korean People's Democratic Republic stated that it was prepared to guarantee freedom of travel and activity throughout the territory of North Korea to leaders of South Korean parties, public organizations, deputies of the National Assembly, employers, merchants, clergy, officers and soldiers and representatives of all strata of the population who wished to come there for the purpose of expediting the peaceful unification of the country and the extension of economic and scientific exchanges between the

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populations of South Korea and North Korea. After that, other proposals were made. For example, the Minister of Communications of the Korean People's Democratic Republic offered the South Korean authorities a proposal for establishing postal relations between North and South Korea. The representatives of the Ministry of Communications of the Korean People's Democratic Republic went to Kaesong to take part in a conference on this question. However, the conference did not take place because of the failure of

South Korean representatives to appear. On 8 November 1955 the Minister of Electric Power of the Korean People's

Democratic Republic made a proposal to South Korea for the furnishing of the electric power required for peaceful industry and for the satisfaction of the material needs of the population of South Korea. However, this proposal, too,

was rejected by the South Korean authorities. On 12 July 1956 the Central Committee of the Korean Red Cross Society sent to

the Chairman of the South Korean Red Cross Society a telegram in which it proposed the furnishing of material assistance to its numerous fellow-countrymen in South Korea who had suffered as the result of floods. Society of the Korean People's Democratic Republic remained without a reply from

the South Korean Red Cross Society.

Thus, all attempts by the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic to establish political, economic and other contacts between North and South Korea have had no positive results because of the negative attitude of the South Korean authorities. However, the economic situation in South Korea is far from brilliant. The report (A/3172) now being considered by the Committee was drawn up with the evident intention on the part of its authors to conceal the true difficulty of the political and economic situation in South Korea and to dress it

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up as much as possible. However, from the information which we have received recently from South Korea, and reports published in the American Press, we may see that the country continues to be in a difficult economic situation which grows ever worse as the result of the continuing arms race and the arms build-up in South Korea. This constitutes a heavy and incommensurate burden on the economy of the country. More than 50 per cent of the budget of South Korea goes to military expenses which, by comparison with last year, have increased by 60 per cent. Things have gone so far that this year South Korea, one of the biggest exporters of rice as a rule, is compelled to import rice and other grains from abroad. The South Korean budget as a whole this year showed a deficit of almost 10,000 million hwan.

This is the real state of affairs so far as concerns the economy of South Korea, despite so-called aid from the United States which has taken the form of an enormous sum of more than 2,000 million dollars. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that this aid should have such sorrowful results since it is directed basically towards armaments and not towards developing the peaceful economy of South Korea.

It is obvious that for a peaceful development of Korea's economy it would be extremely useful to establish multilateral economic links between North Korea and South Korea. The establishment and development of contacts between the North and the South would have great usefulness for the Korean people. It would permit a more rational utilization of national resources in the interests of developing the economy of both parts of the country. It would promote the restoration of the links between the two parts of a single people, the growth of mutual trust and a rapprochement between the two regions. By means of the gradual development of mutual connexions the pre-conditions would be created for the unification of the country on the basis of an agreement between North Korea and South Korea, under conditions which would rule out foreign intervention and any kind of outside pressure. Such a solution of the question would be in the interests both of the Koreans themselves and of other peoples of the world inasmuch as it would promote a lessening of tension and a strengthening of peace in the Far East. FGB/gd

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(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The South Korean authorities do not wish to proceed along this path of restoring the national unity of Korea. However, no arguments worthy of consideration are advanced against the proposals of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. All its proposals are simply declared to be Communist propaganda and Communist manoeuvres. But that is no argument. At the same time, the Syngman Rhee authorities do not conceal the fact that they are preparing a new military campaign against the North and that they consider war the only means of unifying Korea. Quite recently, on New Year's Eve, Syngman Rhee, for the <u>n</u>th time, stated that South Korean troops were prepared to move towards the North in 1957.

The representative of the South Korean Syngman Rhee regime who spoke here yesterday of course made a statement full of lies and slander against the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union delegation does not consider it necessary to answer all his odious fabrications, lies and slander. However, we cannot help but note that this representative openly stated here that his Government was not seeking peace and calm for the Korean people but the renewal of war and foreign intervention in Korea. For this purpose he called on the General Assembly to liquidate the Armistice Agreement and to renew hostilities in Korea. Whereas the Korean People's Democratic Republic is attempting to strengthen the Armistice and to attain the unification of the country by peaceful means, having recently reduced its army by 80,000 men, the South Korean authorities keep twenty first-line divisions under arms as well as ten reserve divisions, and they are constantly engaging in sabre rattling and threatening the Korean People's Democratic Republic with a new armed attack.

There is no doubt that such an approach to the solution of the Korean problem cannot promote the restoration of the national unity of Korea. The Soviet Union has always considered, and continues to consider, that the solution of the problem of the unification of Korea cannot be attained by attempting to impose the regime of one side on the other side by force. A correct approach to the solution of this question consists in maintaining the Armistice and transforming it into a lasting peace, and also in the gradual establishment of political, economic and cultural contacts between the two parts of the country which, in the last analysis, should lead to the unification of Korea.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Now I should like to say a few words concerning the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation. That draft resolution contains both in its preamble and in its operative paragraphs provisions with which the Soviet delegation cannot agree. The draft resolution provides that we should take as a basis for the settlement of the Korean problem conditions which were set forth by the States which participated in the military intervention in Korea, States which were headed by the United States of America. Thus, by the adoption of this draft resolution they seek to impose upon the Koreans a solution which they were not able to impose by force of arms.

In the past, the General Assembly has repeatedly adopted similar resolutions which did not take account of the real situation. However, Korea still remains a divided country, and it follows from this that no resolutions can assist in the solution of the Korean problem if they deal with the forcible imposition of the regime of one part of Korea on the other part. Nor can any resolution succeed which ignores the facts that the peoples of both parts of Korea must agree among themselves with regard to the conditions for unification.

For these reasons, the Soviet delegation will vote against the draft resolution submitted by the United States delegation.

Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand): I regret that the speech to which we have just listened revealed no change in the Soviet attitude towards the problem we are now considering. There was in that speech the same intransigence, the same distortion of history and the same use of the Soviet dictionary, wherein words are turned topsy-turvy and the word "dictatorship", for example, appears as "democracy" and so on.

The representative of the Soviet Union said that the Korean war did not settle, the Korean question. I would have preferred not to go very much into the past, but I think that the speech of Mr. Tsarapkin impels me to make some comments. The Korean question existed before the war, and it existed because the Government of North Korea, at the direction of outside influences, converted the 38th parallel into an iron curtain. The operations of the United Nations forces were launched not so much to settle the Korean problem as to repel the invaders, those from North Korea and those from Communist China. In this, the United Nations forces succeeded. RSH/rd

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(Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand)

The representative of the Soviet Union has said that a correct solution of a problem such as the present one must be found by the peoples themselves. I agree and I think we all agree, but what does this form of words mean in the Soviet dictionary? Does it not mean a solution imposed by a ruthless foreigner on a subject people? Hungary is a grim example of what the representative of the Soviet Union must mean by his reference to a people's right to solve its own problems. The Northern Koreans are in no better case, with the Chinese Communists dominating their country, with the Chinese Communists, to quote the words of the representative of the Soviet Union himself, "imposing their system of government by force".

When the Korean question was considered by this Committee at the tenth session of the General Assembly, my delegation gave its full support to the two resolutions which were adopted. We have noted with satisfaction that on the question of the ex-prisoners of the Korean war, with which one of these resolutions dealt, substantial progress has been made. From the report of the Government of India, we learn that the majority of the ex-prisoners concerned have now been settled in countries of their choice and that negotiations are now in train for the settlement of a number of those remaining in India. Like most of us, I welcome this opportunity to reiterate my Government's appreciation of the part India has played in this problem of resettlement and of the generous offers by Latin American countries to provide homes for those former prisoners of war. We can, I believe, look forward with satisfaction to the early liquidation of this problem.

Unfortunately, I cannot speak with assurance of the prospects for a solution of the problem with which the other resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1955 was concerned. I refer, of course, to the problem of unification. Indeed, after reading the latest report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, my delegation is forced to the conclusion that there has been no measurable progress since the question was last discussed in this Committee.

In this situation, and like many other representatives round this table I deeply regret the lack of progress, we must consider once again what can be done to secure in Korea the objectives which the United Nations itself has endorsed. However frustrating and unproductive our debate may seem to the outside observer RSH/rd

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(Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand)

and, I suppose, to some of us, we cannot afford to allow our consideration of the Korean item to degenerate into a mere formality. We shall not solve this problem or other problems by turning our backs upon them. We can all think without too much difficulty of another problem with which the United Nations has been directly and deeply concerned for several years and which, over those years, was allowed to smoulder and smoulder until suddenly there was an explosion, from whose disastrous consequences we are still suffering.

This could happen in Korea, too. That is why my delegation opposed the proposal that this question, in which the United Nations has a clear responsibility, should be placed at the end of our agenda and that other matters, in which the right of the United Nations to intervene is disputed, should be brought to the fore. To deal perfunctorily with the Korean item, I suggest, would be a little too much like the lazy housewife who sweeps the dust under the carpet. It would not add to the prestige of this Organization and it would prejudice one of the United Nations objectives in Korea, the full restoration of peaceful conditions which, in the first instance, depends as others have said upon the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement.

Until a permanent settlement is reached, the General Assembly must continue, as is proposed in the United States draft resolution, to reaffirm its support of the Armistice Agreement, paragraph 62 of which provides that the Agreement:

"...shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement...."

Even if such a reaffirmation were the sole result of our debate, our time would not have been wasted. In fact, however, there is a second useful result which may flow from a fair and objective re-examination of the situation. It should be possible, I believe, to dispose once and for all of a serious misconception which has been sedulously fostered by the Communist delegations in the General Assembly ever since the Geneva Conference in 1954. That misconception is that the deadlock over Korean re-unification is caused by the insistence of the United Nations side on United Nations supervision of all-Korean elections. The reality of the situation is that there is a deadlock because the Communist side is unwilling, not only in Korea but anywhere, to accept genuinely free elections at all. RSH/rd

(Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand)

That this basic issue has been so thoroughly clouded in the case of Korea is a triumph for Communist propaganda. The truth may be seen more plainly in the case of Germany, where the question of United Nations supervision is not an issue. There it has been made perfectly plain that the Soviet Union is unwilling, under any conditions assuring genuine freedom of choice, to permit the people of East Germany to join freely with those of West Germany in electing a single Government. That this is the Communist position in Korea also should by now be quite plain.

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(Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand)

The story of Korea since the last world war is a tragic reminder of a development which has plagued Europe and Asia, the water-tight division of States, which are denied their historic right to unity. This dangerous division has been imposed by Communist policy on Germany, Indo-China and Korea, a partition setting up barriers which have lasted for many years and show no signs of crumbling. These barriers cripple trade, they impede where they do not wholly prevent travel, they separate family from family and have resulted in a totalitarian and drab dictatorship on one side observed.

drab dictatorship on one side characterized by shortages and iron repression. On the other side of the Communist barrier democracy has developed, is flourishing in Western Germany and displaying healthy vigour in Southern Vietnam and the Republic of Korea. We must all ask ourselves how long these unnatural divisions are to continue. There is not the slighest sign of determination of the separation between North and South Korea except on the basis, if the Communists have their way, that would destroy the Government of the Republic of Korea and impose a Communist dictatorship throughout the whole peninsula.

If the Communist Governments are in earnest in the proclamations of their wish to establish a sound foundation for world peace, they will show this by the withdrawal of their troops from the divided countries and by allowing genuinely free elections throughout the national entities. The Communists are not ready to do this. It seems only too clear that their dominating reason is their determination to maintain their system and their power in areas such as North Korea which they regard as essential to their strategic policies.

My delegation cannot regard the continuing division of Korea as other than an unsettling and dangerous element in the Pacific. Its existence amply justifies the consideration of the present item first on the The problem is urgent. agenda of this Committee and representatives of countries which come from the Pacific have some idea of the urgency. We may be in danger of considering the debate on the present item a matter of routine. This must not be our attitude. The division of Korea constitutes a great human and economic problem. poses a military problem, for a country condemned as an aggressor still maintains an immense army in North Korea and that country resolutely declines to negotiate -and I think we should remember this -- on the basis of the principles laid down by the United Nations. Under these circumstances it would have been a mockery of this Organization had we accepted the presence of the representative of a regime

(Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand)

which rejects and derides the principles to which the overwhelming majority of us here are pledged.

The item we are not debating must and will remain on the agenda. It is our duty to press untiringly for a just solution and to expose the hollowness of the claims of those who divide ancient nations and seek to subvert those which are fortunately beyond their power. The proposals made by the United Nations side at Geneva were just and fair. The proposals made by the other side at Geneva and elsewhere were and are dishonest. Their hidden purpose was and is to perpetuate and extend Communist rule throughout Korea. They have therefore consistently rejected the safeguards proposed by the United Nations to ensure genuinely free elections.

So far as my delegation is concerned, our position in regard to the supervision It was stated in this Committee last year and the of elections is well known. year before that and is close to that expressed by the representative of Canada. The essential point is that supervision should be effective so as to ensure that elections are genuinely free. The supervisory body must not be subjected to the veto on either side. Apart from that one overriding requirement, our position on the form of supervision is flexible. We would not rule out the possibility of establishing a supervisory body whose acceptability to the United Nations might be stated by a resolution of the General Assembly, but which need not itself be an organic part of the United Nations. The general acceptance of this position would, we feel, make possible the fruitful resumption of negotiations. Failing some such broad agreement in principle we see no value in the Communist proposals An international conference without prefor an international conference. A second failure surely would conditions was held in Geneva in 1954. It failed. only increase the existing tension and my delegation therefore cannot support the Communist proposal under present conditions.

We do support the moderate resolution proposed by the United States. It is appropriate that this initiative should have been taken by the United States, which led the way and carried much of the burden in repelling aggression in Korea. It is, moreover, the United States, as the report of UNCURK so clearly showed, which has shouldered by far the largest share of the immense task of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the war-torn Republic of Korea. The authority with which the United States speaks in this debate is fully earned. Limited though the scope

EIG/ns

EIG/ns

(Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand)

of the United States draft resolution may be, we regard it as an earnest of our determination to prevent the recurrence of fighting in Korea and to restore to the Korean people as a whole the unity and freedom which are the birthright of every nation.

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The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With the statement that we have just heard from the representative of New Zealand, we have reached the end of the general debate. I shall now call on the representative of Korea to make a statement of reply and to make some clarifications.

Mr. YANG (Republic of Korea): May I thank the Chairman and members of this Committee most sincerely, on behalf of the Korean delegation, for the courtesy shown us yesterday. I am particularly grateful for the generous time accorded me to present the case of a divided Korea to the United Nations. The friendly interest shown in the welfare of the Republic of Korea by so many of the speakers is deeply appreciated and warms the hearts of my war-ravaged countrymen.

Much of the discussion yesterday consisted of references to the past: why the United Nations went into Korea, what it did in Korea and the help it has been since the cessation of hostilities in rebuilding a country ruined by Communist aggression. These references in addition to the expressed confirmation by a majority of the speakers showing that the United Nations still has a moral obligation and responsibility to bring about the unification of Korea and praise for the draft resolution advanced by the United States of America and designed for that purpose, constituted the thoughtful and constructive remarks to which we listened.

(Mr. Yang, Kcrea)

Some of the discussion, as generally in most discussions, was otherwise. It would have public opinion believe at this late date that what happened in Korea was a civil war instead of a Communist invasion. It would have public opinion believe that there really are two Koreas today dating from 1945 instead of one Korea, which, prior to 1945, dated back for more than forty centuries. It would have public opinion accept the suggestion that the Republic of Korea Government desires the annulment of the armistice of 1953 so that it may immediately launch an attack upon North Korea as an attempt to unify our nation by force of arms.

In my brief remarks today I should like to answer these points. First, though, I wish to state that the United Nations itself came into Korea with clean hands, that itshands are still spotless and that all anyone wishing for clarity and honesty in the Korean picture needs to do is simply examine the official records of the United Nations up to this point. Consistency and decency will be seen walking hand in hand, and the role of the United Nations in the case of Korea will reflect to the highest degree the honorable purposes of the overwhelming majority of its Members. The Korean people have implicit faith that this Organization's code of conduct toward them will not suffer any alteration, for they regard themselves as the beneficiaries of a code as immutable as the Ten Commandments.

So much for the attempts to becloud the reasons why the United Nations entered the Korean conflict. So much for the efforts to cause public opinion to forget the noble objectives which actuated them. No miasmic mist of Communistcontrolled opinion can ever obscure or besmirch those objectives.

What happened in Korea in 1950 was not a civil war; it was a Communist invasion. It was Russian-inspired, Russian-equipped and Russian-directed. The proof of this exists one hundredfold. And the Chinese Communist invasion resorted to when the first onslaught had failed was the same. The proof of this is equally if not even more evident. Red China is still branded as an aggressor by the United Nations. That is the record. The record also shows unequivocally that the Korean war was fought by the United Nations and the Republic of Korea.

MA/bd

MA/bd

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(Mr. Yang, Korea)

A further inescapable fact is that the North Korean regime is a puppet regime imposed by force on the people by foreign Fowers, whereas the Republic of Korea was established by free elections carried out under the supervision of the United Nations and it functions today only by the free will of the people, as shown by successive elections. Nor are there two Koreas today. There is a Communist puppet regime in the north, which, with Chinese troops, the Russian and Chinese directors in charge, rules tyranically over the remaining three to five million people of the original ten million Korean inhabitants. Never before has a portion of a nation been so depopulated of its original and rightful owners so it might be repopulated by an invader. Thank God that a great part of our northern population was able to flee south to freedom since 1945, when our country was divided arbitrarily without our consultation or consent. But they prayerfully await the day when they may return to their lands and what is left of their homes. No, there never has been two Koreas and there never will be.

As to the implication that the Republic of Korea desired the armistice voided so that it might attack the north and force reunification, I thought I had made my Government's position perfectly clear yesterday, and I shall try not to repeat myself. The Armistice Agreement has been continuously violated by the Communists in their tremendous sea, air and land forces build-up. The United Nations Command has scrupulously observed every condition of the Agreement.

If one's country is divided, as is Korea, and one is aware that the invader is day and night increasing his war potential, what would any Government worthy of its salt seek to do? Stand meekly by to await the hour of doom? Would not a Government already once attacked fear these ominous increases as another threat to its freedom? Of course it would. All we want is the opportunity to protect our freedom with adequate arms and munitions. We know that freedom, when lulled to sleep, actually becomes an invitation to aggression. The concern over this possibility is not ours alone. It is shared by other Powers of the Free World which are sparing no expense and shouldering enormous taxes and debt burdens so that they may be constantly on guard against the ever-present threat of a Communist attack.

(Mr. Yang, Korea)

The Government of the Republic of Korea feels that it cannot discharge its full obligations to its citizens unless it assumes the primary responsibility of a Government, namely, to ensure to its citizens their protection, peace and security. Behind us and forever in our minds is the bloody picture of more than two million casualties as a result of the Red invasion. Yet we have been criticized because our budget is out of balance, because we spend over 50 per cent of our revenue for national defence. Does any same person think we want to spend that much of our tax returns for such a purpose? I am sure none does. But if it costs us that much to stand on guard at our frontier of freedom, I am sure the Korean people will bear the burden cheerfully.

By the way, we wonder just how much the Communists are spending. Unlike a free country where figures on expenditures are open and above board and any citizen can consult and compute them, and where regular public reports are available, the Communists make secrecy a fetish in this matter, as they do in their other activities. So we have no way of learning from where more than 700 planes, which they have in the north, came, although they had none at the time of the armistice. Nor shall we know how much they cost or from where the money came.

As to the possibility of elections and the manner in which they might be held, the Republic of Korea has always welcomed supervision of its elections by the United Nations. We do not know what is meant by some other "international body". As an international body, in truth the greatest of all international bodies, the United Nations assuredly is good enough for us. We know in advance that it will demand free, independent and democratic elections. The various Communist election suggestions on this basis are a fraud and a delusion. First of all, they assume that there are two Koreas. This is wrong and therefore is a wrong start. The United Nations supervised elections in the north, which would have assured unification, were barred not by the people but by the handful of Moscow-trained puppets and Soviet authorities. It is on the record. NR/mz

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(Mr. Yang, Korea)

Now the Communist effort is for an all-Korean commission with equal representation for both North and South Korea. The fact that there are only 3 to 5 million Koreans in the North as compared with 23 million in the South reveals the Communist conception of equality in such a way that even he who runs may read and understand.

International supervision of these elections is also a Communist proviso -international, mind you, but not United Nations. The international supervision they conceive will have a built-in veto power just as in the case of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the alleged enforcement of the armistice terms. However, the Korean people just cannot see the United Nations forfeiting its position in world affairs in any way, shape or form to some still nebulous international body.

In conclusion, may I take a few moments to express the profound gratitude of my Government to the Governments of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico and to Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, for their humanitarian efforts on behalf of the seventy-six Korean nationals included among the eighty-eight ex-prisoners of war whose position has been reported on by the Government of India.

My Government would also like to thank India for undertaking this difficult task.

It is a source of regret, however, that the report failed to mention the sending of any ex-prisoners of war back to the Republic of Korea, whereas it does tell of six transported to North Korea. I have in my files in Washington more than a score of letters from ex-prisoners of war expressing a fervent desire to return to their homeland, the Republic of Korea.

<u>Mr. GREENBAUM</u> (United States of America): I regret the necessity to intervene again in this debate. However, I cannot leave unchallenged certain remarks made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union regarding the action taken last summer by the United Nations Command in regard to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

The representative of Poland stated that the allegation that two members of that Commission hindered the work of the Commission was unfounded. Let us look at the record. It will show any clear-minded person, we submit, whether the allegations are or are not unfounded. The record shows that, almost from the

(Mr. Greenbaum, United States)

very day on which the work of the Supervisory Commission began, two of its members abused their positions. Instead of performing the duties entrusted to them, the Czechoslovak and Polish members not only failed in their appointed task of being neutral observers but, on the contrary, acted affirmatively as agents for the Communist side. At the same time, the Communist authorities in North Korea placed every conceivable obstacle in the path of the inspection teams, effectively preventing them from observing and inspecting in that area.

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The facts which clearly establish a long history of abuse of trust are contained in the Unified Command record of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, document A/3167 dated 16 August 1956. This record includes unimpeachable evidence from the Swiss and Swedish members of the Commission.

The wonder is not that the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was provisionally suspended in June 1956 but that this action was not taken long before. There is a limit to patience.

In view of the familiarity of the members of this Commission with this situation and the clear statement made by the representative of Australia in our debate yesterday, it is unnecessary for me to say anything further on this subject, which of course is but a diversionary tactic and not the real issue.

The real issue, as we all realize, is the reunification of Korea. That vital subject has been ably and constructively discussed in our debate. The preparation of our draft resolution was for the purpose of keeping that vital subject before the United Nations, and we hope that it will accomplish that purpose and lead to constructive results.

<u>The CHAIRMAN</u> (interpretation from Spanish): Does any representative wish to make use of his right of reply? I give the floor to the representative of Poland.

<u>Mr. KATZ-SUCHY</u> (Poland): What I really intend to use is not the right of reply but the right not to reply, because I believe that the statement by the representative of Poland and the statement by the representative of Czechoslovakia fully refuted the allegations which have been made here against the Polish and Czechoslovak members of the Commission.

NR/mz

NR/mz

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(Mr. Katz-Suchy, Poland)

In discussing this question last year, as you will remember, we submitted complete evidence to support our statements. I advise anyone who is interested in the question to look up the records of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which acted unanimously on almost all cases during the past two years and which agreed unanimously to oppose the abolition of the inspection teams.

I shall not enter into discussion describing under what conditions the inspection teams worked in South Korea, because I consider that such a discussion would not bring nearer a solution of the problem.

During my statement I resisted the temptation to reply to many allegations which have been made. I resisted it because I consider that it is not those statements or those parts of the statements making unjust accusations, recriminations and so cn -- like the one we have just heard and like the statements of some of the representatives in the general debate -- which bring nearer a solution of the problem. I believe rather that the statements that bring us nearer to a solution are those by the representatives of Ceylon, of India and of Canada, or even those parts of the statement by the representative of Australia in which he declared his readiness to listen to new solutions. It is such a statement as that by the representative of Czechoslovakia that will bring us nearer to a solution. Therefore, we would rather to listen to those representatives.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Does any other representative wish to make use of his right of reply?

<u>Mr. WINKLER</u> (Czechoslovakia): In the light of the statement just made by the representative of the United States, I should like simply to state that we maintain in full the views expressed in our statement here yesterday and particularly the statement by my Government quoted by me yesterday.

The Committee will have noted that the representative of the United States did not refer to any facts refuting the assertions made in our statement. He referred only to the report of the United Nations Command.

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(Mr. Winkler, Czechoslovakia)

I should like to remind the Committee that this report is the report of only one side of the belligerents, and the nature of the report remains the same even if it is submitted to the United Nations and distributed as a United Nations document.

This means, in my view, that the representative of the United States has preferred to refer to this one-sided report rather than to bring here any new facts to refute the statement made yesterday by my delegation.

THE CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As no other representative wishes to make use of his right of reply, we shall go on to the consideration of the draft resolutions. I now call upon the representative of Ceylon, who wishes to submit an amendment to the joint draft resolution submitted by Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela.

<u>Mr. GUNAWARDENE</u> (Ceylon): Speaking as the representative of Ceylon, I desire to associate myself with the tributes paid by various Member nations to the very commendable work done by the Government of India in connexion with the resettlement of the former prisoners of the Korean war. It was a task that required a tremendous amount of patience, skill and tact and a particular delicacy of treatment. That the task has been well done is unanimously accepted.

I desire to pay a tribute also to the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for the very ready co-operation extended by them in connexion with the resettlement of these unfortunate ex-prisoners.

The purpose of my brief intervention is to move a slight amendment to the joint draft resolution submitted by Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela, namely, the addition of the words "and requests Member States able to do so to complete the resettlement of the remaining ex-prisoners". There are still sixteen ex-prisoners in India. There is no doubt that several of them before long will be in other countries, such as Argentina and Mexico. I am sure that each of us would like to see this chapter closed. It is in that spirit that I have submitted the addition of these words. I hope that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution will be able to accept this amendment. THE CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to ask the representative of El Salvador for his views on the amendment suggested by the representative of Ceylon.

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<u>Mr. URQUIA</u> (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): The three sponsors of the joint draft resolution would be able to accept the amendment in the following form. Paragraph 2 of our joint draft resolution reads: "Expresses its gratitude to the Governments of India, Argentina and Brazil for their valuable co-operation in the settlement of the problem of ex-prisoners of sthe Korean war." We could add "and its hope that the ex-prisoners still remaining in India will be settled very soon with the co-operation of Member States". This wording really expresses the same idea. If there is no objection to it on the part of the representative of Ceylon, we would be willing to accept his amendment in the form in which I have indicated.

Mr. GUNAWARDENE (Ceylon): I accept that form.

<u>THE CHAIRMAN</u> (interpretation from Spanish): As the representative of Ceylon has no objection to the wording, the text will be distributed in the form just agreed to.

<u>Mr. TARAZI</u> (Syria) (interpretation from French): My delegation has not participated in the general debate, but this should not be taken to mean any lack of interest on our part in the Korean question. Our desire has been to expedite the conclusion of the debate, which is repeated here every year. I should like to express at this stage of the discussion the point of view of my delegation concerning the draft resolutions before us.

We have always favoured efforts undertaken to reunify the two parts of Korea. We have expressed the view on many occasions that the division of Korea along the 38th parallel was a temporary measure. However, that measure has remained in effect. BHS/mtm

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(Mr. Tarazi, Syria)

My delegation shares the view expressed yesterday by the representative of India concerning the concrete measures which should be taken to achieve the reunification of Korea. We believe, therefore, that the draft resolution submitted by the United States is inadequate in this respect. We would have preferred to see introduced the elements referred to by the representatives of India and Ceylon. My delegation will therefore abstain in the vote on the United States draft resolution.

In connexion with the joint draft resolution submitted by Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela, which has just been amended by the representative of Ceylon, my delegation will vote in favour of it since we share the views expressed therein.

<u>Mr. D. POPOVIC</u> (Yugoslavia): Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution before us reaffirms that "the objectives of the United Nations are to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea". My delegation is in complete agreement with this aim.

We regret, however, that we do not consider that the ways and means so far employed towards the realization of these aims are completely adequate. It is our belief that the objectives mentioned in the draft resolution cannot be achieved without the co-operation of the Government of North Korea. Having that in mind, my delegation voted in favour of the proposal to invite the Government of North Korea to take part in our deliberations. We regret that such an invitation has not been extended.

In these circumstances, and bearing in mind that the United States draft resolution contains a new element with regard to terms of reference of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, without even consulting the Government of North Korea, my delegation is not in a position to vote in favour of it. We shall, however, vote in favour of paragraph 1 and abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole. BHS/mtm

<u>Mr. GLEBKO</u> (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR did not participate in the general debate on the Korean question, although we continue to adhere to the position that Korea should be unified by peaceful means and on a democratic basis. For this reason, we should like at this stage of the discussion of the question to state our views on the United States draft resolution.

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(Mr. Glebko, Byelorussian SSR)

As was demonstrated convincingly by representatives of a number of countries, the United States draft resolution on the Korean question is in substance in no way different from the resolutions of past years which were designed to secure such a settlement of the Korean problem which was to the liking of a certain narrow group of States headed by the United States. At earlier sessions of the General Assembly, the United States succeeded in making use of the United Nations to obtain the approval of resolutions which in essence set forth the American version of a Korean settlement.

Judging from all the evidence available, the United States has the same intention at the present eleventh session of the General Assembly. But is it not clear that the annual mechanical approval of American resolutions cannot furnish any positive results? No such results will be obtained until the Korean Democratic People's Republic is admitted to a discussion of the Korean question. No such results can be achieved while the United States continues its attempts to foist upon the Korean people a settlement of the question with which that people is not in agreement.

This is the purpose pursued by the present United States draft resolution in which once again it is proposed to attain the reunification of Korea on the basis of principles which are unacceptable to the Korean people and which have been rejected repeatedly by them. The Korean people call for a solution. One cannot help noting that the representatives of almost all countries which participated in the general debate unanimously recognized such a situation as abnormal, a situation where Korea remains divided into two parts, where there are no economic, political and cultural contacts between the two parts of Korea, and where this has a negative effect on the life of the Korean people and creates a tense situation in this area.

Under these circumstances the task of the United Nations does not consist of adopting routine resolutions which in advance rule out the possibility of a peaceful unification of Korea on a democratic basis. Its task consists of assisting the Korean people in solving the Korean problem. It is especially clear that the only correct solution of the problem of the unification of Korea should be found by the Korean people themselves. For this it is necessary to secure a

AW/gd

(Mr. Glebko, Byelorussian SSR)

rapprochement of the two parts of Korea by the establishment between them of economic, political and cultural contacts, since the waterway between North and South Korea has gone not only along the thirty-eighth parallel but through the hearts and souls of the Korean people.

Only when North and South Korea can meet, and only when such a path is adopted, can it lead to the unification of Korea as a peace-loving democratic State.

The Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic has actively come out in favour of such a solution, and all those who are really seeking a peaceful solution of the Korean problem do likewise. Inasmuch as the United States draft resolution deliberately rejects this only correct and realistic path to the reunification of Korea, the Byelorussian delegation will vote against the draft resolution.

<u>Mr. TSIANG</u> (China): Of the eighty-eight ex-prisoners -- which is a subject of the tripartite draft resolution -- seventy-six were Koreans and twelve were Chinese. Last year in a debate in this Committee my delegation made a reservation in regard to the treatment of the twelve Chinese. This year, while we appreciate the motives of the three countries which are promoting this resolution and while we will vote for it, we maintain our reservation in regard to the treatment of the Chinese in that group.

Mr. GREENBAUM (United States of America): On Friday I expressed the deep appreciation of my Government for the efforts of India, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina in arranging for the resettlement of the ex-prisoners of war. I warmly welcome, therefore, the draft resolution sponsored jointly by Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela. I hope that the Committee will unanimously approve the draft resolution as amended by the suggestion of the representative of Ceylon and thus record its recognition for an extremely complicated and delicate job well done.

AW/gd

(Mr. Greenbaum, United States)

I wish therefore to add my Government's tribute to the countries named in this resolution for their success in this humanitarian effort and to give it the strongest support of my delegation.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of India has asked to speak, but since we do not have time to continue discussing the draft resolutions now, we shall do so this afternoon. Immediately after the debate on the resolutions is completed, we will proceed to the vote. Then after the vote we will hear the explanations of vote.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.