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Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 18 October 1957, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ABDON

(Iran)

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international Convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction [24] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Winiewicz	(Poland)
Mr. Pelaez	(Philippines)
Mr. Schurmann	(Netherlands)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.875. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.

AGENDA ITEM 24

REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS; CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION (TREATY) ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC, HYDROGEN AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (continued)

- (a) REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
- (b) EXPANSION OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AND OF ITS SUB-COMMITTEE
- (c) COLLECTIVE ACTION TO INFORM AND ENLIGHTEN THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AS TO THE DANGERS OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE, AND PARTICULARLY AS TO THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF MODERN WEAPONS
- (d) DISCONTINUANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TESTS OF ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS

Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland): We have not yet had the opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on your election. We do it gladly today. I think that some of your efforts, Mr. Chairman, have already achieved results. I have been told that there are many more speakers on our list today than there have been on previous days.

The present discussion on the disarmament problem should, in our opinion, basically serve the following aims: an analysis of the report of the Disarmament Commission, an evaluation of the results hitherto achieved by the Disarmament Sub-Committee and the preparation of new directives to both these organs. However, it should also lead to certain decisions of the General Assembly to which immediate effect could be given -- and in this respect it ought to differ and could differ from the discussions of previous years.

I do not propose to deal with the whole complex of the problems involved. The Polish delegation in the general debate in the plenary meetings has already very clearly defined its attitude on the outcome of the recent deliberations of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. We stated in unequivocal terms why, in our opinion, their work did not bring the desired and expected results. We fully maintain the views then expressed. At present, we should like to limit ourselves to outlining the most important tasks concerning the future and to considering the possibilities of certain actions which could already contribute now to better conditions for further disarmament negotiations.

About twelve years ago, the world stood on the threshold of the atomic era. Since then we have witnessed a tremendous development of war techniques and strategic concepts based upon it. However, we have been unable to keep pace in working out forms and methods of international co-operation so that modern technical achievements could really serve humanity and not threaten it with destruction. What is worse, the gap between the rearmament race and progress in the disarmament discussions has been growing wider year by year.

It is disarmament through which an atmosphere of mutual confidence in international relations is to be created, the basis for peaceful constructive coexistence strengthened and the threat of a new war averted. Articles 11 and 26 of the Charter have envisaged these as the real purposes of armaments reductions. In the past year, these provisions have, regretfully, not become a living reality.

The growth of armaments has retarded the development of many countries and has had a serious effect upon the living standards of the people. For modern armaments involve such costs that even budgets of well-to-do countries can hardly sustain them. At the same time, hundreds of millions of people subsist in dire poverty. It suffices to point to the report of the Secretary-General to the twenty-fourth session of the Economic and Social Council, which indicates that the total of bilateral and multilateral aid for economically under-developed countries in the period between 1954-1956 amounted to about \$5.2 billion. This figure, compared with the \$85 billion spent every year on armaments as mentioned in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, demonstrates that a reduction of military budgets even by 15 per cent would allow us to increase more than seven times the yearly appropriations in aid to under-developed countries. Military expenditures of some States exceed 60 per cent of their budgets, which could be spent for different purposes, of course, in particular for the increase of the standard of living of their own citizens.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

The time lost cannot be made up. No generation regains its youth. It is necessary, however, to be aware of this imperative truth: the disparity between the progress of military technology, which finds its expression in the growth of armaments and the development of peaceful international co-operation, of which disarmament constitutes an important element, has reached dangerous proportions. We must not allow this disparity to grow any further.

There are no other alternatives. For no one can seriously claim that it is possible to build lasting peace and to establish peaceful international co-operation on the basis of the nuclear armaments race, with the maintenance at the same time of large modern armies in a state of combat readiness, with a continuous setting up of new military bases, especially on foreign territory. Both from the political and economic point of view this is an obvious absurdity.

For these reasons every State, even the smallest, has a basic interest in the disarmament problem; its own security and whole future depend on the settlement of the disarmament problem on a world scale. And we do venture to say that in this the interests of Poland fully coincide with the interests of all nations of the world, irrespective of their social systems, and irrespective of their political alignments.

What path are we then to follow?

In the considered view of the Polish delegation, first of all we must strive for realistic and concrete steps to arrest this dangerous process, the costs of which -- although in varying degree -- we all have to bear. What has been neglected or even destroyed must be gradually and systematically restored. In view of the difficulty of reaching complete disarmament agreements within a reasonably short period of time, partial solutions have to be considered to serve the cause of progress, of mankind, of peace.

There are among the solutions which could be immediately implemented solutions concerning problems of a world-wide scope; others concern especially sensitive areas, limited in the geographical sense. Poland attaches at present special importance to the following: to a temporary ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, and the possible establishment of zones of limited armaments.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

We are well aware of the fact that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons represents a qualitatively different danger which can result from armed conflict than the one mankind experienced during the last war. Meanwhile everything indicates that the world has reached a stage where nuclear weapons are becoming ever more widespread. Until recently nuclear weapons were referred to as exclusively of a strategical character. At present they are being introduced to serve tactical purposes. Armies of the big Powers are not only being equipped with nuclear arms, but the whole organization and the whole structure of those armies is being adapted to atomic equipment. Stockpiles of atomic and thermonuclear weapons have been set up on the territories of many States. Military personnel is undergoing a thorough nuclear training and armed forces of countries which do not produce the most modern of weapons are being supplied with them by their stronger allies. Of course we Poles are especially concerned and follow with misgivings the plans to equip the West German Army with atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

Should pertinent international agreements not be forthcoming, States which have hitherto used only conventional armaments will ultimately be dragged into this race, irrespective of the economic burden involved in the re-equipment of armies with atomic and thermonuclear weapons. The result of this can be on the one hand a much heavier burden of the cost of armaments, on the other hand the increase of the imminent danger of atomic and thermonuclear destruction, even in local wars.

Nations are fully aware of the dangers involved. The trouble is not that the people of the world are insufficiently conscious of the facts but that we here are not paying enough attention to the voice of awakened public opinion. Is it necessary to recall here in support of this contention one of the resolutions passed at the Bandung Conference? This resolution stressed that:

"...disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons are imperative to save mankind from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction".

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

When in the course of previous years, at the successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the disarmament problem was discussed, the resolutions adopted have always stressed -- although we know with different and varying emphasis -- the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of disarmament discussion. However, the proposals of the Western Powers presented at the recent session of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London in fact admit the possibility of nuclear warfare. They do admit the right to transfer nuclear weapons to third States, thus envisaging the extension of nuclear armaments.

The draft resolution submitted to our Committee -- I think now by twenty-four States -- also does not mention the ban or elimination of nuclear weapons. It only puts forward some suggestions concerning the cessation of future production of fissionable material and their partial transfer from weapons to non-weapons uses. This could only, I submit, again mean a step backwards as compared with the directives previously outlined by the United Nations, for instance with the provisions contained in the resolution of the ninth session in 1954 which clearly recommended to undertake further efforts to reach agreement for:

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

"Total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes".

This directive should be maintained in view of the character and danger of nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction. Therefore more radical solutions than the ones suggested in document A/C.1/L.179 should be sought. Should we really permit ourselves to be led into the delusion that the danger of total annihilation is diminished by a mechanical reduction, say a 10-15 per cent reduction, of the present considerable stockpiles of atomic and thermonuclear weapons through a gradual transfer of fissionable material for peaceful purposes, if at the same time the remaining part could be used for military purposes, freely and without restrictions?

Any plans of atomic and thermonuclear disarmament should therefore aim at the prohibition and the elimination of such types of weapons. Only such a solution will allow us ultimately to break away from this vicious circle of the atomic and thermonuclear armaments race which we witness at present.

The characteristics of this race constitute a search for atomic and thermonuclear equilibrium by some States which already produce such weapons and very obvious and unmistakable efforts to enter into the "atomic club" by those who do not as yet produce them. The representatives of Western Powers in our Committee offered an example of this reasoning by explaining the need for the retention of thermonuclear weapons allegedly by the requirements of self-defence, by requirements of counterbalancing the superiority of the other side, by requirements of maintaining what has been called here the balance of security. I submit: neither the motives nor the logic of such reasoning is convincing.

Firstly, how can one stress the necessity of counterbalancing the superiority of the other side, if in case of a disarmament agreement the numerical strength of armed forces and of armaments will be balanced for both sides and the prohibition of nuclear weapons will be equally binding upon all?

Secondly, we should not delude ourselves that the arguments favouring the need for an equilibrium in armaments means in the practice of many States anything else but an attempt to secure superiority for themselves. This again acts as a stimulus for the continuation of the armaments race, the very thing which we precisely want to eliminate. As one of the prominent scholars in international affairs rightly stated a few years ago: "There is therefore no objective measure of the balance... The Foreign Offices therefore seek alliances, the Ministries of Defense bases and more effective weapons".

It is indeed difficult to conduct disarmament negotiations from such positions. For one cannot sincerely discuss and design disarmament plans while keeping in mind constantly, as some Powers do, the thought of superiority in a future war.

What we need here are therefore acts of resolute courage and faith in order to contribute towards relaxation of international tension and to dispel the atmosphere of mutual distrust. What we need is a positive act of mutual confidence. This could become, in our deep and very sincere belief, the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, even for a given period of time only.

For these reasons, the Soviet proposal calling upon the States possessing nuclear weapons to assume a temporary obligation not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, seems to us opportune and worthy of support. Its acceptance would amount to renunciation by the Powers of the use of such weapons initially for the period of the next five years, until such time when a broader disarmament agreement, including, of course, the question of control, is reached.

Indeed, such a nuclear moratorium, such a nuclear armaments truce, would prejudge neither the scope nor the contents of future disarmament agreements; it would constitute one of these partial solutions which I mentioned in my opening remarks. As an act of mutual confidence it could undoubtedly create a better international atmosphere for the continuation of the disarmament negotiations and for the search of best ways and means to solve the undoubtedly most difficult questions, such as those of total prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons and proper control measures.

At the same time it would lead us also towards the solution of the problem of the latest development in the field of intercontinental missiles. For such missiles can threaten mankind mainly when provided with nuclear warheads. Their application for military purposes would be too expensive and pointless with the use of outdated trotyl. Neither can artificial "moons" threaten mankind if solely equipped with instruments serving science and not nuclear destruction.

Another very important, although again partial, solution of disarmament problems could be, in our opinion, an unconditional even though temporary suspension of nuclear tests. In the present discussion the representative of the United Kingdom expressed the view that the suspension of tests should not be

considered as a disarmament measure. We beg to disagree. For tests are not being carried out in order to convert nuclear energy into implements of peace, but simply with a view on military, and therefore destructive, purposes.

A suspension of tests, therefore, could have a restraining effect on the atomic and thermonuclear race and could become an important measure to halt the quest for even more deadly types of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed no one can be convinced by arguments which attempt to justify the continuation of tests by the necessity to carry out experiments to produce ever more "clean" bombs. The representative of India has already subjected these arguments to devastating criticism. Whatever these bombs may be, no one will produce such bombs which will kill only soldiers and spare civilians or will kill only Communists and spare Capitalists. All of us face the danger of the bombs being used. All of us are imperiled by the deathly consequences of the increased radiation resulting from an increasing number of test explosions.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

The suspension of tests would meet the call issued by prominent scientists of all countries. It would constitute the answer of the United Nations to the appeals by Dr. Albert Schweitzer, by 2,000 American professors, German professors, Polish professors and many others.

Besides, in supporting the suspension of tests, we would like to stress the importance of such a step -- though limited in time -- for the deepening of mutual confidence and for the creation of a better international climate which would facilitate further disarmament discussions.

On the basis of our discussions here in this Committee, and judging from the interest shown by several delegations which have submitted their own draft resolutions concerning the suspension of atomic and thermonuclear tests, one could readily assume that our Committee could, within a relatively short time, adopt a positive resolution on this subnect. May we stress, however, that the best way towards an agreement on this subject would be to present such a text -- in the form of a draft resolution -- as would make it possible to implement this aim within the shortest possible time. As in the case of a moratorium concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons, we are concerned with a temporary measure which ought to help in solving the other disarmament problems. We should not, therefore, link the temporary suspension of tests with other more complicated disarmament problems. We consider the temporary suspension of tests for a given period of time as an initial, partial solution, to be followed in a not far distant future, let us hope, by other measures.

I turn, finally, to the views of the Polish delegation on the possibilities of partial disarmament measures in our geographical region -- in Europe -- where the central problem to us is Germany. The present world armaments race favours the development in the German Federal Republic of militarist, revisionist and revanchist tendencies. Along with the progressing remilitarization new plans are set forth to arm military units of the German Federal Republic with atomic and thermonuclear weapons. Such a development of events cannot leave us indifferent.

Having the desire to contribute, within our possibilities, to the reduction of the danger of an atomic and thermonuclear war, the Polish delegation, through its chairman Foreign Minister Rapacki, has in the course of the general debate

presented on behalf of the Government of the Polish People's Republic a declaration in which Poland expressed readiness to introduce on its territory a ban on the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, provided the two German States agree to undertake similar measures on their territories. Our initiative was immediately upheld by Czechoslovakia, a neighbour of both Poland and the two German States. A positive attitude in this matter was taken also by the German Democratic Republic. The implementation of our initiative depends now on the German Federal Republic. We maintain our proposal, and we think it could save the centre of Europe from becoming one big nuclear powder keg.

Our proposal has been the subject of consultation with all members of the Warsaw Treaty, with which we are allied for defence purposes. One might expect the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with which the German Federal Republic is associated, not to oppose the acceptance of our proposal by the Federal Republic. That would make it possible to stop the nuclear armaments race, at least at the meeting ground of the two great political and military groups in the centre of Europe, and to prevent an armaments race which will be bound to gain in speed should the plans for equipping the West German Army with nuclear weapons materialize. I repeat once again that we do intend to avoid that.

We attach the greatest importance to such solutions as the setting up in Europe of an area of limited armaments, to which the Polish delegation has already referred during the disarmament discussion at the eleventh session of the General Assembly. We are ready to co-operate in preparing plans for such a zone, to contribute towards common decisions on its establishment, and to subject the territory of our State to agreed measures of control should the boundaries of the zone of limited armaments embrace Poland or part of its territory. Such a zone of limited armaments could, in our opinion, be an example to be followed in other regions.

Finally, we think that a serious step speeding up the solution of the European disarmament and security problem would be the gradual withdrawal of foreign garrisons and the winding up of foreign bases on German territory and the territories of other States, members of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty, a proposal which was put forward here so clearly by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, and suggested on another occasion and in a different context by the representative of Ireland.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

The question of Europe and of Germany occupies an important place in the disarmament problem -- and this not only from the point of view of the interests of Poland or other countries bordering on Germany. I should like to remind the Committee that the last two wars which originated in Europe became world wars. The fate of Europe involved not only Asia, Australia and Africa, but also both Americas. Therefore, even within the framework of partial disarmament measures, it would be advisable to agree on specific steps concerning the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe, either within the framework of a general disarmament agreement or independently of it.

The Polish delegation wishes to reserve the right to speak on the draft resolution at a later stage of the discussion, but we should like to express now our conviction that it is unthinkable that, on such important matters involving vital interests of the big Powers, this Committee -- or indeed, the Assembly as a whole -- could reach any positive results through imposing resolutions by one side upon the other. We would express our regret that some speakers in the present debate have presented the proposals of the four Powers of 29 August, and the resultant draft resolution which is now before us, as if they constituted an ultimatum. This is the more so since those proposals in fact stop at the threshold of the most vital and most important problems without even touching upon them.

(Mr. Winiewicz, Poland)

It is our understanding that no proposals here can be considered as final. Only an agreement which will come as the result of the rapprochement of views, first of all, of the great Powers can meet our ultimate needs. The long silence on the part of many delegations of the smaller nations during the present session, the fact that they are waiting to hear first the statements of the participants in the London discussions, is to us significant, and maybe we are right in assuming that it is significant as an expression of the recognition of the paramount role played in the disarmament discussions by Powers disposing of the greatest military potential. However, we also assume that the silence of many delegations cannot be construed as the result of any hopelessness, resignation, or conviction that all arguments in our discussion have already been exhausted.

The great Powers should, in our opinion, seek new ways which could lead to more fruitful negotiations than those conducted in London by the Disarmament Sub-Committee. It is our task to assist them in this respect. The Polish delegation would like to voice the hope that the present discussion in our Committee will be concluded by the adoption of resolutions which will not impede further disarmament negotiations but, on the contrary, may facilitate their successful development.

Mr. PELAEZ (Philippines): The Philippine delegation would first like to congratulate the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Committee on their election to these positions of great responsibility. We have no doubt that, under the Chairman's able guidance and leadership, the Committee will discharge its functions with efficiency and distinction.

The Philippine delegation enters the debate on the question of disarmament not without some misgivings. Our discussion is being held against a fantastic backdrop formed by the inter-continental ballistic missile, the artificial earth moon, and the bold newspaper headlines about the menace of war in the Middle East. One can easily understand the seeming reluctance of delegations to speak on disarmament at this time of mounting crisis, when the disappointment which we feel over the lack of agreement among the great Powers in this field is compounded by the very real fear of impending catastrophe.

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

Yet it is well to remind ourselves that the crisis in the Middle East which overshadows our present deliberations has been submitted to the United Nations by common consent of the interested parties. This is a tribute not only to the good sense of the parties involved but also to the position of respect and responsibility which the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, has come to occupy in the mind and conscience of the world. The submission of the Middle East crisis to the United Nations machinery of discussion and conciliation thus serves to reinforce the wisdom of the continued consideration by the General Assembly of the question of disarmament. It should encourage us in our efforts to undertake this review with renewed determination as a task whose crucial importance each specific threat of war in any part of the world merely serves to underline.

The Philippine delegation makes this statement as a co-sponsor of the 24-Power draft resolution. But we hope that this intervention will also be accepted as the frank and simple testimony of a small nation which is overawed by the gravity and complexity of the problems of disarmament, yet not so overawed by them that it must remain mute before the danger of universal extinction which confronts humanity.

What can the small nations say here, in the presence of the "two atomic colossi" that are eyeing each other malevolently "across a trembling world" -- what can they say that is likely to influence the course of events and facilitate an agreement on disarmament? We can speak of the agonizing fear that grips our hearts, but our fear of annihilation is no greater than theirs. We can tell them of our desire to live in peace in the tiny corner of the planet which destiny has assigned to each of us, but they assure us that their desire to do the same is no less intense than ours.

In what way, then, can we, the small nations, make a useful contribution? We must candidly ask ourselves this question because the problem of disarmament has been brought to the floor of the General Assembly with the mutual consent of the Powers principally concerned, in the apparent expectation that, after hearing what we have to say, they will resume their negotiations under the pressure of our earnest solicitations.

In his statement before this Committee on 10 October, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, said:

"...permit me to express the hope that the discussion in the Assembly of the questions relating to disarmament will help to achieve concrete solutions and that thereby we shall succeed in justifying to some extent the hopes of millions and millions of people who are expecting deeds and not words in the field of disarmament". (A/C.1/PV.867, p. 42)

A few hours before, Ambassador Lodge, speaking for the United States, referred with real concern to the:

"small nations of the world, whose prospects for a peaceful life lie, not in their own armed might, but in their hope for an ordered world, a world of openness, a world of confidence, free from the fear of sudden and overwhelming attack". (A/C.1/PV.866, p. 17)

We ought not to doubt, then, that the interest of the great Powers in what we have to say is genuine. We ought not to think that their purpose is merely to score another propaganda triumph or to roll up a big majority for any given resolution. We accept the generous implication of their decision to come and hold counsel with us before resuming the negotiations on whose successful outcome all our hopes and our very lives depend.

But, if our discussions are to serve this great purpose, we must endeavour here to speak frankly and truthfully, humbly yet firmly. For, just as there is no place to hide from the terrible weapons of modern war, so, by the same token, there is no reason to conceal our thoughts on disarmament or the reasons why we hold them.

I do not propose to analyze in detail the proposals contained in the 24-Power resolution. This has been done by the other sponsors of the resolution with admirable technical knowledge and skill. I propose instead to address myself to the basic issues as a citizen of a small country that happens to be located where it is by the ineluctable dictates of geography, that has no covetous designs on any other, that cherishes its freedom and its way of life and prefers these values to any other. We are a free nation of twenty millions in a part of the world where more than six hundred million other people have fallen under totalitarian rule, and where many other millions are in danger of succumbing to the same fate. Because we

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prefer freedom to tyranny, and because our country lies in the path of advancing international Communism, we have entered into a defensive treaty with the United States and formed with seven other countries in Southeast Asia an organization for collective defence. To give effect to these defensive arrangements, we have agreed to the establishment of American bases in the Philippines.

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

There is no mystery about these matters. We are free; we like to be free; and we are determined to remain free. All the measures we have taken to this end have been and are intended solely and exclusively to strengthen our national security and to defend our freedom. If there are countries that prefer to be otherwise than free or that prefer to seek their security by means other than defensive arrangements with other Powers, that is their privilege. We cannot, we do not, question their right to choose. But we, too, have exercised our right of choice, and that choice has led us to entrust our security to a defensive alliance of the free world which stands between us and the menace of communist subversion and attack.

The Soviet Union urges that all of us accept the principle of peaceful coexistence. As a corollary, it proposes, as a first step in disarmament, that States possessing nuclear weapons should temporarily but unconditionally renounce, for a period of five years, the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons. As for the regulation of conventional armaments, the disposal of existing stockpiles of atomic and nuclear weapons, the production of fissionable material, and the establishment of an effective system of inspection and control covering these various matters -- all these can presumably be discussed during the five-year period within which the great Powers are expected to forge a comprehensive international agreement on disarmament.

One might ask the following question: Since there is unanimous agreement here that mutual distrust and suspicion are at the root of the disarmament impasse, how could we expect the principal parties concerned to accept a naked declaration to assume an obligation not to use atomic and hydrogen weapons, without the establishment of a system of mutual checks and inspection that would ensure faithful compliance with such an obligation?

This proposed initial approach to the disarmament problem, made against the alluring background of peaceful coexistence, is clearly calculated to appeal to the instincts of a bemused and frightened humanity. But it soon reveals itself as a snare and a delusion when subjected to critical examination.

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

It is obvious that we cannot have peaceful coexistence before disarmament. Until they disarm to safe and reasonable levels, the Powers cannot coexist peacefully together, all pious preachments to the contrary notwithstanding. When disarmament comes, we shall have peaceful coexistence without the need of propaganda slogans. Therefore, the renewed Soviet peace offensive must be regarded as an attempt to create the illusion that a just and durable peace can be achieved today or tomorrow, quite apart from the arduous effort which the conclusion of a disarmament agreement entails.

It is equally obvious that this Soviet proposal continues to rest on the same principle that disarmament or the reduction of armaments can be treated separately from the problem of international inspection and control. We are gratified by the Soviet concessions during the London negotiations, to which both Foreign Minister Gromyko and Mr. Lodge have drawn our attention. But, when the import and scope of these concessions are examined closely, we must conclude, sadly, that the Soviet Union has not abandoned its original bedrock doctrine that the actual disarmament proposals can and should be dealt with separately from the establishment of a satisfactory system of inspection and controls. This, then, continues to be the heart of the problem.

Ten years ago, the Soviet Union first demanded the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons, without inspection and controls. Despite the appearance of concessions, it still demands the same thing today, having added meanwhile the new idea of the immediate suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons -- also without the prompt establishment of a system of inspection and controls. One is bound, indeed, to wonder whether the idea of immediacy would not have been better served if it had been set aside during the negotiations of the past ten years and if, instead, a resolute attempt had been made to work out a solution to the practical problems of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. We should not have had immediate prohibition, but we might well have had disarmament.

The proposal to suspend forthwith the testing of nuclear weapons could suffer the same fate unless we forego the facile but illusory notion of immediacy. For it is, in fact, this idea of immediacy, with its powerful propaganda appeal, which distracted the Soviet negotiators from a gradual and workmanlike effort

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

to forge a disarmament agreement that would allay the Western Powers' fear of surprise attack. My country fully shares this fear.

If the Soviet Union, by refusing to allay that fear, forces the countries of the free world to make the fateful choice between the danger of forfeiting the means to defend their freedom and the danger of forfeiting their lives in a universal holocaust, then the Soviet Union must assume responsibility for the awful consequences that could result from the determination of these free countries to remain free.

My delegation refuses to believe that the Soviet Union desires to push the free world to this dire extremity. We should rather like to believe that the Soviet Union, whose people would perish with the rest of us in the final and irreversible tragedy of a nuclear war, and which today, through its outer-space satellite, has the potential to inspect and spy upon the whole face of the earth, will cease to insist upon its opposition to the prompt installation of a system of inspection and controls as a concomitant of disarmament and the suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons.

Today, the Soviet Union is in the rare and enviable position of being able to dispense benevolence with power. We submit that, being in this position, the Soviet Union can agree to resume the suspended disarmament negotiations on the basis of the principles which are proposed in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

Some objection has been raised to the draft resolution on the ground that it does not embrace the total prohibition and elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Philippine delegation understands that the measures referred to in the draft resolution are but initial steps towards a comprehensive international agreement on disarmament. We believe that it would be unrealistic at this moment to insist on such total prohibition, when the parties concerned have not been able to agree even on initial steps. We wish to make it clear that we are for the total elimination and prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of genuine and earnest disarmament. And certainly it is far from the mind of the Philippine delegation, as a co-sponsor of the twenty-four-Power draft

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

resolution, to intend that that draft resolution should be considered as an ultimatum. The Philippine delegation believes in the consideration and approval of the draft resolution, not as an ultimatum, but as a workable basis upon which the Powers concerned could resume their negotiations and ultimately reach a comprehensive agreement on disarmament.

The need to create an auspicious atmosphere for such negotiations is generally recognized. The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed that there is an urgent need for a joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes. It has been suggested that it might be desirable to detach this proposal and make it the subject of a separate agreement. Since this would represent an encouraging forward step at a time when it is most necessary to develop a measure of confidence and optimism, the suggestion appears to have everything to recommend it.

(Mr. Pelaez, Philippines)

My delegation does not believe that the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee is either wise or necessary at the present time. We consider that the hierarchy and the composition of the organs dealing with disarmament already in existence, which include the Sub-Committee, the Commission, and the General Assembly itself, are adequate for every conceivable purpose. The eighty-two Member States of the United Nations will be heard in the course of our present discussion, and it can hardly be said that the presence of one, two or three additional members of the Sub-Committee and of the Commission will ensure that the views of the seventy-five or ~~seventy-seven~~ non-atomic Powers will be fairly represented or that their counsel will be heeded where ours in this Assembly may be disregarded.

In his speech during the general debate, Mr. Romulo, the chairman of the Philippine delegation, said that the indefinite adjournment of the disarmament talks in London would be "a grave disservice to mankind ... at a time when the possibility of agreement is brighter than it has been in many years." (A/PV.691, page 11). I should add that such indefinite adjournment would be a most cruel dereliction of responsibility at a time when scientific progress in the development of armaments threatens to outstrip yet even more our readiness and capacity for negotiation.

We should not permit this gap to widen. We must earnestly call upon the great Powers, after they shall have listened to what we say here, once more to sit down and discuss together how best and most quickly they can reach a disarmament agreement that will safeguard the security of each of them and the freedom and existence of all.

Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, before making a few brief remarks on the subject before us, I should like to associate my delegation with those preceding speakers who have expressed their sincere satisfaction at meeting here under your guidance. Your experience and wisdom ensure that our meetings will be conducted in a worthy manner. The fact that you are assisted in your responsible task by such capable officers as Mr. de Barros and Mr. Matsch is an additional reason for anticipating an efficient despatch of the Committee's business once we have overcome the conspiracy of silence which seems to have held us back at the

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start. I am sure that you will appreciate that what has made my delegation reluctant to speak at an early stage of debate is a due sense of proportion which has made us -- and doubtless many other delegations as well -- realize that, in a matter where success is in the first place dependant on agreement being reached between the great Powers, our task can only be the auxiliary one of trying to encourage such an agreement.

The fact that the General Assembly is again considering the question of disarmament at a time when it appears that the road to agreement among the great Powers is still blocked by serious obstacles could seem to be a cause for discouragement. It is only natural to wonder whether we are not pursuing an unattainable dream. We have become used to seeing new proposals, which appeared to constitute a step forward, followed by rejections that brought the argument back to where it stood before. Especially this year, after the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission at times seemed so near to a beginning of agreement and the hope of the world was kindled in an unprecedented way, only to be dashed by the uncompromising reaction of the Soviet delegation, both in London and here, it is difficult to retain one's optimism.

The Netherlands delegation, however, remains confident that all is not lost. We are deeply disappointed by the course of events in the Sub-Committee, and what we have heard so far from the Soviet Union and those who support it certainly does little if anything at all to allay certain misgivings. Although recent developments in this question have been discouraging, we are inclined to attach greater importance to the fact that for some time in London a meeting of minds seemed possible. The discussions in the Sub-Committee and the proposals which were submitted by the Western Powers and by the Soviet Union have proved not only the usefulness of the Sub-Committee in its present composition, but have also demonstrated very clearly that on many important issues the positions of both sides have come very close to each other. The final reply of the Soviet Union to the Western proposals was an unpleasant surprise, but one which should not discourage us because, in fact, we cannot afford to be discouraged. For what is at stake is not just the drafting of treaties, but, as the representative of India said the other day, the problem of human survival. What this Committee is doing and, more important, what the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee will be doing in

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the near future, is more than to specify various details of disarmament programmes. It is in fact to provide an answer to the question whether the peoples of the world shall live in peace and security, without the nameless fear of annihilation by nuclear or conventional arms -- whichever of the two does not make really much difference -- or whether humanity will slowly but surely pronounce and carry out its own death sentence.

Of course, there is really no choice. Consequently, what is required of the nations in general and of this Committee right now in particular, is a sense of reality. It is with that requirement in mind that my delegation would endeavour to evaluate the possibilities of the situation. On a realistic basis we have seen with satisfaction that the great Powers, members of the Sub-Committee, have abandoned their attempts to establish a general and comprehensive disarmament programme and that they have instead decided first to seek agreement on an initial plan, focussed on some of the aspects which would seem to be capable of prompt harmonization. We are also encouraged by the fact that the Sub-Committee has decided to view those aspects separately instead of jointly, since this method, too, would seem to us to promise better results. This was proved to be true when the Sub-Committee found itself in agreement on a number of subjects and very near to agreement on certain others. In our opinion, the Sub-Committee should continue to follow this procedure which, provided there is a sincere desire for a solution on both sides, can lead to the ultimate goal.

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As we see it, the General Assembly has the duty to enable the Sub-Committee to carry on where it left off, by giving it guidance and by providing it with a clear indication of the primary objectives to be achieved. Disarmament, of course, is not an aim in itself; it is only a means by which we can contribute towards the establishment of peace and security. Peace, as we know it at this moment, does not provide the world with a sense of security. On the contrary: the absence of real security has caused world peace to be the unstable situation in which we live today.

The present feeling of insecurity which exists in practically all parts of the world may be partly due to the fact that, during the past years, there has been a certain lack of equilibrium between the great Powers. This in turn has, not unnaturally, caused these Powers to hesitate before committing themselves to any kind of disarmament, which would in fact, maintain that lack of equilibrium or might even increase it. It would seem to my delegation that at present a balance has been struck and that, therefore, gradual disarmament on a basis of reciprocity would leave this balance intact. If that really should be so, then we would at last have reached a real starting point.

Now perhaps, for the first time, it may be possible for the countries most directly concerned to initiate a programme which would leave them their sense of security while, at the same time, slowing down and eventually stopping the armaments race and, in particular, the competition for nuclear supremacy.

This is what the peoples of the world demand: real disarmament, real efforts to remove fear and, if possible, distrust -- and that, not by words, but by acts. It follows that any initial agreement on disarmament should not merely look attractive and encouraging on paper, but that it must contain the conditions for strengthening world security. We should be aware of creating a false impression of impending success, such as would ensue if the Assembly were to endorse the idea that the suspension of nuclear tests would in itself, without being connected in any way with the problem of disarmament, constitute an important achievement.

(Mr. Schurmann, Netherlands)

This does not mean that we in the Netherlands would like to see the continuation of such tests. It is true that the effects of the radioactivity created by the test explosions have not yet been authoritatively established. The other day the representative of India gave us some impressive, and indeed disquieting, information on this subject. On the other hand, there are many other highly qualified experts who maintain that this radioactivity is less dangerous than is generally supposed. Whatever the truth may be -- and we are looking forward to receiving the report of the United Nations Committee on Radiation on this matter -- it cannot be denied that this is a question which causes many people in the world acute worry and fear.

But that does not mean that the statesmen who have a specific responsibility for dealing with this question should allow themselves to be overtaken by panic. Indeed, the tests must be suspended; that is the desire of my Government too. We are equally convinced, however, that the suspension of tests as an isolated measure, such as has been proposed to this Committee, would do nothing to improve world security. On the contrary, as has been explained by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, the mere suspension of tests would leave the nuclear Powers free to continue their production of nuclear weapons and to increase their present stockpiles; it would even allow other countries to start manufacturing and stockpiling these weapons. Thus we would remove the fear of radiation -- and, as I have said, it still remains to be seen to what extent this fear is well founded -- but we would replace that fear with a much greater anxiety, for, while no more nuclear devices would be exploded, the destructive potential in the world would remain unaffected, and indeed would grow bigger all the time.

For these reasons my delegation is convinced that the suspension of nuclear tests must be brought into some relationship with what should be considered the basic disarmament issue, namely, the cessation of nuclear production for military purposes and the decrease of existing stocks by a gradual transfer of fissionable material from military to peaceful uses.

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There is another example of what I would call the unrealistic approach. That is the proposal that the nuclear Powers should solemnly declare their willingness not to use nuclear weapons. The present state of world affairs, as we all know, is marked by a deep-rooted distrust between the major Powers. That is highly regrettable, but it is nevertheless a fact. In those circumstances one cannot see what real value could be attached to such a declaration, which contains, of course, a moral obligation, but does not provide the means for its enforcement.

There is another aspect to this question. As I said before, at present a certain equilibrium between the major Powers obtains, due to the possession of nuclear armaments. The assumption of an obligation not to use the nuclear weapons in any circumstances would disturb this equilibrium since it would clearly benefit the side which is strongest in conventional arms. This means that those countries that are weaker in the conventional field would feel less secure, and the ultimate result would be perhaps even an increase in distrust. Nobody could maintain convincingly that such a situation would be helpful, either in contributing to the solution of the disarmament problem or as a stabilizing element in international relations.

Finally, it must be admitted that all attempts at reaching agreement on disarmament will fail if we should lose sight of the imperative necessity of ensuring adequate inspection and control. In our opinion, control is a prerequisite for any disarmament programme. Inspection and control, if carefully defined and prepared, can be an essential factor in the creation of mutual confidence that must be established if any disarmament plan is to succeed in the long run.

In the view of my delegation, it cannot possibly be contended that such control would constitute an infringement of any country's sovereign rights. One might as well say that if that were the case then disarmament itself would be such an infringement. On the contrary, inspection and control, if organized on a truly international basis, can never be regarded as an attempt at domination or espionage, but should be seen as an insurance against violations of agreements and, consequently, as a matter of security. It is encouraging to note that on the principle of control the Western Powers and the Soviet Union find themselves in agreement. It must be recognized, however, that this in itself is not enough, for this agreement in principle has a real significance only if the actual arrangements for setting up inspection and control are made. Since we are first of all dealing with the problem of how to remove the causes for distrust, we must agree that the necessary atmosphere of mutual confidence can be achieved only if the parties know exactly to what extent it will be possible to make sure that the other side will carry out its commitments. Therefore, my delegation regrets and even finds it difficult to understand why during the London talks the Soviet Union failed to react favourably to the proposal for discussion of the appointment of experts for the preparation of control arrangements, which to us would seem to be the logical precondition for an agreement on the disarmament question itself.

In this connexion I should like to refer briefly to the draft resolution introduced by the delegation of Belgium which emphasizes the importance of control and which at the same time envisages the dissemination of information on this subject in all parts of the world. We may have more to say about this subject at a later stage, but I wish now to welcome that Belgium initiative at this point because it has a highly relevant bearing on what I have just said.

I have mentioned some approaches to the solution of the disarmament problem which, in the opinion of my delegation, are not realistic, would not help in achieving world-wide disarmament, but would undoubtedly continue the present feeling of insecurity and perhaps even increase it. There is, on the other hand, a possibility at least to make a beginning with the solution of this question by setting out some limited objectives -- objectives, moreover, on which, in the Sub-Committee, a meeting of minds was achieved or nearly achieved. The

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Netherlands delegation has joined with twenty-three other delegations in introducing a draft resolution which would urge the Sub-Committee to renew its efforts along the lines it followed earlier this year. Our decision to co-sponsor this draft resolution was inspired by a sincere conviction that the ideas laid down in that document provide a solid and workable basis for negotiations and perhaps for ultimate agreement. Disarmament is a matter of vital importance for the Netherlands as for all other countries. It is a foundation on which every citizen of my country is building his hopes for the future, not only for himself but for following generations. Our role in the great disarmament debate here and elsewhere is necessarily limited, but at least we can contribute the strength of our conviction. That conviction is that an agreement along the lines laid down in our draft resolution is feasible and, what is more, that this proposal represents a sincere attempt at providing a workable basis for such an agreement. We regard it as a medium for bringing the nuclear menace under control. This will not only remove the present fears of the world and establish an atmosphere in which further progress will be possible but will also open a wide perspective for the use of atomic power for peaceful purposes. The opportunity for reaping this double benefit for mankind must not be lost.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): We have completed the list of speakers for today. As there are no other speakers, I intend to adjourn the meeting. Before doing so, as I stated at the last meeting, I should like to remind the Committee that I intend, with its agreement, of course, to close the list of speakers on Tuesday at 6 p.m. Those who would like to participate in the general debate are asked to have their names included in the list as soon as possible and to make their desires known to the Secretariat.

We shall meet again on Monday at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.