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INDEX
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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 30 September 1953, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Fernand van LANGENHOVE (Belgium)

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AGENDA OF THE COMMITTEE: LETTERS DATED 18 AND 22 SEPTEMBER 1953 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/C.1/742 and A/C.1/743) (continued)

Mr. TSIANG (China): Since so much has already been said in support of the proposal of the representative of Colombia, I wish only to indicate that my delegation finds it well conceived and helpful. My delegation will support the proposal in its entirety, including the allocation of fourth place to the Burmese complaint against my Government.

Mr. ALI (Pakistan): My delegation supports the proposal of the representative of Egypt to discuss the question of Morocco not earlier than ten days hence. I need not explain the reasons because they have already been very ably explained by the representative of Egypt. I would add, however, that the head of my delegation, who is now away, is expected back within the next ten days, and therefore we would not like to see this item discussed earlier.

A number of delegations feel that the immediate discussion of the Korean item might be harmful to the cause of peace and might create difficulties in the way of the peaceful solution of the Korean On the other hand, there are some delegations which consider the immediate discussion of this item more desirable.

My delegation would not like to see the pitch queered at this stage. However, if it became necessary, when all attempts at the diplomatic level had failed, we would take up the discussion of this item. My delegation, therefore, supports the suggestion to defer discussion of Korea until a later date since it is hoped that the moment would then be more opportune for debating this very difficult question.

already been undertaken by way of diplomatic notes, and we hope in the future more directly, with a view to organizing this conference. The French delegation therefore entirely agrees with the position already set forth by a number of representatives in favour of postponing the Korean question to the end of our agenda. My delegation states its agreement, however, with the understanding already expressed by the representatives of Australia and New Zealand, among others. In other words, we feel that it would be desirable that, if any new developments or the international situation should warrant it, this question should have the opportunity of being reconsidered at any moment in the weeks to come in the General Assembly or in the Committee without any procedural obstacles being raised against it and without necessitating a two-thirds vote. We agree with the interpretation which the Chairman gave this morning and we hope that this understanding will be at least tacitly accepted by the whole of this Committee.

I should like to answer briefly one or two questions raised by Mr. Vyshinsky this morning concerning the position of France at the next political conference as regards the possible broadening of the composition of that conference. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the British, French and American representatives will arrive at the political conference bound by a previous resolution of the General Assembly which they could not violate without, in so doing, repudiating themselves and the Assembly. I must say that I do not entirely agree with him. As far as the French delegation sees it, the resolution of 28 August did not adopt a decision as regards the composition of the conference as a whole. It merely determined the membership of the representation of the United Nations at that conference. It left the other side free to determine its representation. Neither negatively nor positively did it pronounce itself as regards the participation in that conference of any other Powers with the exception of the Soviet Union. It is therefore inaccurate to say that the representatives of the United Nations, those Powers which contributed to the armed-effort and which therefore will have the right to be represented at the conference, do not retain full freedom, despite the resolution of 28 August, to call for an expansion of the conference by way of admitting new members to it.

The resolution of 28 August is not an obstacle to that.

In the second place, Mr. Vyshinsky displayed some curiosity which I regard as entirely legitimate, in which he limited himself to asking in very discreet terms what would be the nature of the instructions to be given to the various delegations on this point. I am sorry to be unable to give him satisfaction as far as the French Government is concerned. I do not know what the instructions to my delegation will be; I do not think that they have been drafted. I can only refer him to the words pronounced in the plenary Assembly by Mr. Maurice Schumann, Secretary of State and head of my delegation, who indicated the spirit that will govern the French Government and its representatives at the political conference in dealing with this question. I shall read the words of Mr. Schumann. He was speaking about the Korean problem and its examination, and he said:

"Useful advice in this connexion might have been offered by certain Asian Powers, especially by India. If it is not possible, unfortunately, to include from the beginning that country among those to be represented at the political conference on Korea, my Government will do everything in its power to ensure that, in the near future, India may be invited by the conference to join with it in the study of problems with which it is directly concerned, problems which extend beyond that of Korea and which concern all questions connected with the re-establishment of peace in the Far East." (A/PV.445, page 23)

This means that the French Government and the French delegation at the political conference will tackle the problem of the expansion of the membership of the conference in a spirit which should fully meet and allay the legitimate concern voiced by the representative of the Soviet Union at this morning's meeting.

Mr. MENON (India): In the proposals made this morning and in the debate that has followed, we are called upon to consider a variety of subjects. First of all, we are called upon to decide at what time the actual proceedings of this Committee, by way of consideration of items, should begin because one of the proposals is that we should not take up any work for a week or ten days, as the case may be. Next, there is the question of priority on the items of Morocco and Tunisia. Thirdly, there is the suggestion of the United States that Burma should have a place on the agenda somewhat lower down, if not very much lower down. It requires clarification. Then there is the question of the placing of the other items apart from Korea. Finally, there is the question of Korea itself.

We are most anxious not to intervene in this debate by way of arguing the merits of the Korean question. The position of my delegation in regard to the time and discussion of this item was indicated in the observations I made in the course of the general debate two days ago. That position still remains. We think it would be deplorable if the Committee did not function for a long time -- deplorable for two reasons. First of all, it is deplorable from the point of view of public policy; secondly, we have this year a situation thanks to the Secretary-General's proposal, the amendment of procedures, that the Assembly will come to an end on a specific date. We have not set a target date but a final date. We therefore have to work our agenda within that period, and if we are going to lose a considerable amount of time it may well happen that some items on the agenda will go over to the next Assembly unless we amend the rules of procedure. It is therefore very important that we conserve our time. For those two reasons the idea of having a fallow period does not appeal to my delegation. At the same time, we appreciate that if Tunisia and Morocco are to have priority, it is not only courteous but politically necessary that those who are vitally interested in the presentation of the problem must have the time they have asked for.

With regard to Burma, we fully and without reservation support the position of the representative of Burma. We share his misgivings about the prospect of anything satisfactory happening in the near future unless the Assembly takes further steps, but we are always hoping that something good will happen. In any event, the idea of relegating Burma to a very much lower place in the agenda would mean the continuance of the depredations of the Kuomintang invaders of that country over a longer period without let or hindrance.

One finally comes to the question of Korea. There is no concealing the fact that those who are strongest in their opinion that this item should not be considered too quickly have the idea that we should not discuss Korea. With great respect, I should like to ask the Committee, "What have we been doing all morning?" Each time we say we should not discuss Korea we are discussing not only Korea on the limited aspect that is presented to us but the whole of the issue. That is the nature of this problem and it is not, if I may say so with great respect, part of political wisdom or political realism to believe that just because we won't talk about it this great problem, this difficult problem, will solve itself. At the same time, we are inclined to believe that the correspondence that is now going on might be allowed to develop for a short period. The People's Republic of China and the Government of North Korea have addressed communications to the Secretary-General. We have requested the Secretary-General at the last sitting of the previous session to communicate the resolutions and the proceedings of that debate to the two Governments concerned. It has been done and a reply has come. I say without reservation that it is an Assembly document which should be discussed. And it will be discussed. I do not see how the Secretary-General can be asked to report on a particular matter and we ignore it. Equally, it is not only discourteous, it is most improper and unwise not to answer the People's Republic of China and the North Korean Government on the communication they have made to the Secretary-General. I have reason to believe -- and I say this deliberately --

that the lack of a reply on this matter, even by way of a preliminary one, is creating difficulties in negotiation.

At this stage, I should like to remind the Committee of the observation made by the representative of the Soviet Union in dealing with the general theory of the place of diplomatic talk and public discussion. He, if I may say so, very wisely said that private discussion and public discussion should be co-ordinated for the attainment of the desirable end. I subscribe to that, and for that reason we would be in favour of not moving any postponement of the Korean item being considered a little later, in order that the Secretary-General's communication to Governments may be completed, that he may have time to reply and so on.

The Committee ought to take into account, when being impatient about not receiving a reply from the other side, that the General Assembly's seventh session ended on 28 August. The communication of the United Nations Command was delivered to the Government of the People's Republic of China on 5 September; that took about eight days. The communication from the Chinese Government was received on 15 September, ten days later. It can be seen, therefore, that a communication from one side to the other and back takes about eighteen days.

We should take these delays into account. There is also the fact that the representative of the United States made a statement in the General Committee which my delegation regarded, and so stated in the general debate, as indicating a degree of flexibility to meet the two points of view. The objective which we have before us and which we all desire -- it was so stated by the representative of the United State and by all the other representatives of States that took part in the Korean campaign, and it was so stated by the representative of the Soviet Union and others who spoke this morning -- is to get a conference started on Korea and to get a peace in Korea.

If that is so, we should not permit any diplomatic or other approaches that are being made to be in anyway prejudiced by what is being said here out of turn. At the same time, they should not be prejudiced by the fact that there is an appearance of the whole matter being ignored.

For these reasons, my delegation will definitely oppose any suggestion to place the Korean item at the end of the agenda. If, by the turn of events, it should so take place, that would be a different matter.

I say very deliberately and with some knowledge of the facts that a proclamation by the First Committee, a proclamation by the United Nations, that it proposes to put the Korean item at the end of the agenda, would be an act calculated to prejudice a settlement. It is calculated to create the impression upon the Chinese that the United Nations is taking a view of the situation which is not one that leads to reconciliation.

My delegation is the first to recognize that sometimes time has to elapse, and we are prepared for that time to elapse. On the other hand, if the General Assembly, in its wisdom, wants to debate the Korean issue tomorrow, we shall offer no opposition.

In conclusion, therefore, our position in relation to this matter is that we think it would be practical and wise to allow the Korean item to come up a little later, but that there should be nothing done which confines it to the bottom of the agenda.

We are not happy about the Australian amendment. This amendment states that if there is a majority decision, then the question can come back here. I think it is better to decide the matter by a majority decision rather than by a two-thirds majority decision. That provision is wise. But I am afraid that in the temper of the Committee, as it is at times, and in the comparative lack of knowledge of what might be happening all around and not publicly expressed, it may not always be possible to obtain even that majority. It may be that after the debate one might not be able to obtain a majority. The Australian amendment, while it is an improvement over the necessity of obtaining a two-thirds majority, does not satisfy the whole situation. We feel, therefore, that the best solution would be for us to decide to take one or two items, and to progress piecemeal. There is no need for us to plan the whole of the agenda. There is a provisional plan, and we are making changes in it. Why there should be a complete series of alterations is beyond me.

There is one final point that I should like to make. If the item is to be relegated to the end of the agenda, the Committee should have in mind some idea of the calendar dates. The Neutral Repatriation Committee will finish its work on 23 December, that is when the 90 days will be over. The General Assembly will conclude this session on 8 December. I think it is a little optimistic to assume that if the item comes up somewhere near the end, on 3, 4, 5 or 6 December, or whatever the date, there would be enough time between those two dates to deal with any difficulties that may arise.

On the other hand, it is quite likely that we may have satisfactory results and that the Secretary-General may be able to report that a political conference is being convened. If that should be so, we should not be tied by the fact that the item has been placed at the bottom of the agenda.

We are not by any manner of means prepared to subscribe to two views that are continually cropping up. One is that we can avoid the debate on the Korean question. We believe that the Secretary-General's report is entitled to be debated. We owe it to the Secretary-General and we owe it to ourselves to debate it. Secondly, we are not prepared -- and I repeat this -- at any time to accept the view that the fifteen Powers that constitute the United Nations Command supercede the General Assembly or that they can by themselves assume the powers of negotiation.

Reference is continually being made -- on the last occasion it was made by the representative of France -- that in some way and at some stage India should be permitted to enter the conference. That is not the issue. India's position has been very clearly stated. India has not been and is not canvassing for this position. Let there be no illusion on this -- no one is conferring any privileges on India. If we shall be of service and if we shall be desired by both sides, it will be our obligation to China, to ourselves and to the world to enter into the conversations.

For these reasons, we shall vote against any suggestion that places the Korean item at the bottom of the agenda. We shall support, for reasons of practicability, any move that would permit the Korean item to come at a reasonably early period and to be decided in accordance with the development of events.

Meanwhile, we hope that the Secretary-General will be able to make some communication which will make these matters a little easier.

Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina)(interpretation from Spanish): It appears that a majority of the Committee is in favour of the proposal made by the representative of Colombia in connexion with the order of agenda items. Speaking generally, my delegation would not be opposed to the acceptance of such an order.

We agree with the statement of the representative of Egypt that ten days should be allowed to elapse before considering the questions in which that delegation is most interested, namely the questions of Morocco and Tunisia.

We also agree with the statement made by the representative of Burma that item 4 should not be postponed too long.

With regard to the position of the Korean question, I gather that the majority feeling of the Committee is that this item should not be the first item of the agenda. At the same time, the majority would like to give every opportunity to the Committee to have the matter debated whenever it desired to do so. Perhaps we might find some type of formula to facilitate the early consideration of the Korean question. Unfortunately, my delegation feels that such a formula cannot be found in the interpretations attached to rule 122 of the rules of procedure. That rule may not be the most perfect one and it may not be the one we want, but nevertheless it exists. My delegation believes that if we want to change that rule we must change it in accordance with the rules of procedure, in which case we would have to refer to rule 126. In any event, it would be the General Assembly that would decide to change the rule and not this Committee, since these are the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

This does not mean that the First Committee has no way of solving the problem. I believe that we may discuss the Korean question, avoiding a restrictive clause in the rules of procedure. There are many ways of doing this, and my delegation would prefer to see a procedure adopted that would be in keeping with the rules of procedure. The representative of Pakistan, for example, has suggested that the Committee decide on some of its agenda items. The Committee may decide on the first three agenda items only and hold the rest in abeyance. That would be a quite legal and correct method of solving the problem. Another way would be for the Committee not to decide at this moment the place to be given in the agenda to the Korean question. Rule 98 gives the Committee this right. This rule states that the main committees will adopt their own priorities. It is not obligatory to do so. In other words, we do not have to decide, for the moment, on the place to be given this item. That would be one way of avoiding the two-thirds majority required. It would also facilitate our discussion of the Korean question when we decide to consider it.

My delegation wishes to emphasize its opinion that the rules of procedure must be respected. There would be no reason for having them if they were not respected. Sometimes, it is politically necessary to overlook them or to get round them, but that must be done in a legal way. We cannot modify the rules of procedure unless we go through the regular channels. We cannot decide now, a priori, to modify the rules merely because there might be a subsequent need to do so.

In conclusion, I would suggest that the Committee should agree to defer a decision on the place which the Korean question should have in the agenda. The item will remain on the agenda -- neither at the beginning nor at the end -- and the Committee will discuss it when events call for such a discussion.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I should like, first, to repeat for the benefit of the representative of India something which I said earlier; that is, that the item on Burma is not at the end of our agenda: it is in fourth place.

In his second statement today, the Soviet Union representative challenged my earlier assertion that the Chinese Communists had changed their opinion on the composition of the political conference. On 25 August last, the Soviet Union representative, referring to the Communist views on the composition of the conference, said that he had been unable to find statements on the subject by General Nam Il. At that time, I found the statements for him and read them out. In view of what the Soviet Union representative said this morning, I think I had better do that again.

According to the official transcript of the armistice proceedings dated 19 February 1952, General Nam Il -- who, it will be remembered, was the negotiator for the Communist side -- said:

"The draft of the principles submitted by our side on the fifth item of the agenda is very clear in itself. There can be no misunderstanding whatever. By 'the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides' in our draft is naturally meant the Governments of the countries concerned on the part of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the Governments of the countries concerned on the side of the Unified Command."

On 10 February, General Nam Il said:

"Next, your proposal employs the term 'UN'. But, as everybody knows, not all Members of the UN have sent troops to Korea to take part in the war. On the contrary, a considerable number of nations are opposed to sending troops to Korea, and a considerable number of nations have not sent any troops. Therefore, it is not appropriate to nominate the UN as a whole. On the other hand, the wording 'Governments of the countries concerned of the UN' in our proposal conforms precisely to the obtaining circumstances. We see no reason for adopting the simple term 'UN'."

In other words, in both statements General Nam Il, speaking for the Communist side, made it perfectly clear that that side envisaged and supported the idea of a conference which would consist of the former belligerents on both sides. Now the Chinese Communists urge that the political conference should be constituted in a way which is totally at variance with the official Communist position, as declared by General Nam Il. That is what I meant when I said that there had been a complete change of attitude. There has been such a change, and no reason for it has been given to the world.

We are reluctant to think that some sort of international filibuster is in progress, an effort to delay and delay and delay so that, after a while, the thoroughly fallacious argument can be made that the Armistice Agreement has run out. We do not want to think that, but current tactics certainly lead one to have that impression. Nevertheless, we hope for peace, and we shall continue to do everything to achieve it.

Mr. FRANCO y FRANCO (Dominican Republic) (interpretation from Spanish):
I shall be extremely brief.

The delegation of the Dominican Republic has decided that the proposal made by the Colombian representative is a good proposal. We believe that the order of priority suggested is the correct one. The proposal takes into account the various aspects of the questions before us. We believe it was submitted in conformity with the principle by which we should all be guided; namely, that we should complete our work as successfully and expeditiously as possible and should

turn our backs on delay, procrastination and efforts further to complicate matters which are already complicated enough.

As regards the place to be given the Korean question in our agenda, we believe that, if we wish to do any useful work on the subject, it would not be correct to discuss it until we knew exactly what was happening with respect to the political conference. My delegation therefore thinks that the consideration of the Korean question should be postponed and that that question should appear in our agenda as item 7. We also think that the item should be discussed sooner, if that is necessary.

Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): To a certain extent, my delegation expressed its position on the matter now before the Committee when that matter was discussed in the General Assembly. We said then that we believed it was impossible to discuss the Korean question before the political conference had been organized and convened. I believe that that position is still applicable. Furthermore, it is a position which the majority of members of this Committee have taken. Two bodies cannot be exercising their jurisdiction on the same subject at the same time. If we decide to discuss the Korean question now and to include in that discussion the matter of the composition of the political conference, there will be two bodies exercising jurisdiction over the same question, since the United States representative, supported by the United Kingdom representative, has put forward the very felicitous suggestion that the political conference itself should decide the question of its composition.

I, however, should like to view the matter from a higher level. Leaving aside the question of the incompatibility of the two bodies exercising jurisdiction, I view the matter from the political standpoint. Negotiations concerning the convening of the political conference are to take place. They will be based on rather wide interpretations. During those negotiations, there will be practical differences, not merely theoretical differences as to jurisdiction.

What are we to decide? Are we to attempt to solve the question of the composition of the political conference by means of long debate here, or shall we leave it to be solved through the normal processes of negotiation? I think the choice is clear.

We must choose action, negotiation, consultation, readjustment from the point of view of the two sides; we must bring the two sides together in negotiation and not waste our time in a sterile discussion that would result in only one thing -- a wider gap between the two points of view. For these commonsense and logical reasons, I feel that it would be prudent for the First Committee not to discuss the question of Korea. The representative of Colombia has proposed that the question should be placed at the end of the agenda, and I do not think that it would be fair or just to interpret this proposal as meaning that we are relegating it to the realm of forgotten things, that the Committee is washing its hands of the subject.

As I stated in the General Assembly, the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Korean question is such that whenever a difficulty arises which may make it imperative for the Committee to take cognizance of the matter, it can do so. I do not think that there should be any rigidity concerning the order of items on the agenda. The agenda should be flexible, and if it is decided now that the question of Korea should not be discussed for the moment, it would not mean that the question was to be shelved. I believe that, following the rules of procedure and taking precedent into account, some way will be found for the Committee to take up the question of Korea when it considers it necessary and appropriate as well as timely. It could be left to the discretion of the Chairman. Since he is in contact with all delegations and aware of any events which take place, no doubt he would know when the subject should be discussed in the Committee. It is the opinion of my delegation that it would be advisable for the Committee to leave it to the Chairman to decide on this point, which he will do in accordance with the rules of procedure.

It is the desire of all that the political conference should take place and should be successful in its consultations, negotiations and exchanges of views. There is a psychological factor involved. I believe that it was the representative of New Zealand who referred to it, and I think it should be borne in mind. A discussion here would be not only incompatible with the jurisdiction that has been granted to the political conference as to its composition, nor would it be politically incompatible with the negotiations that are to take place; but psychologically it might create an obstacle

which would hamper the very beginning of the conference because, naturally, the two sides, referred to in article 60 of the Armistice Agreement, that are going to discuss the composition would be awaiting the result of a debate which would be taking place here at the same time. However, if the General Assembly does not wash its hands of the Korean question, if it does not say it is not competent to discuss the matter, but allows the political conference to decide, then that psychological factor will not exist and the political conference will begin its work. It will have to face the world and explain that it has decided, on its own responsibility, not to meet. In other words, the General Assembly would have said to the conference: it is you who have decide on the composition of your own conference. If you do not begin your work, it is you who are not carrying on. We have not stopped it. If you do not begin your discussions, then the responsibility is yours. Responsibility for the failure of the conference will be yours. It will be you who have placed obstacles in the way of the conference.

This is the reason why I do not wish to go into the rules of procedure; I do not wish to be legalistic about the matter. I suggest that, once we have set up a certain order of priority -- and let me remind the Committee that such priorities have never been rigid; we have always been permitted to change the order of the items since we have never considered that the various items were cemented into the agenda -- it must not be considered as inflexible. On the contrary, delegations have always reserved the right to propose a change in the order of items on the agenda; and that is logical. We cannot see what is going to happen; we do not know what the United Nations is going to have to face. We can adopt an agenda, but we can only give provisional priority to the items. Perhaps something may happen tomorrow that will call for a change in the order. It would be unreasonable and imprudent to set up a priority to which we should have to adhere in spite of everything.

Other points have been mentioned which should also be borne in mind. If a delegation says that it is not ready to discuss a certain matter, I think it is only courteous to make as generous an allowance as possible. If a delegation states that an item submitted by it should not be relegated to the end of the agenda, his statement should be taken into account. And the

representative of the United States, as usual, has seen the justice of the request that a certain item should not be postponed indefinitely. In this connexion I think that the Chairman, basing his action on precedents already established in the Committee, can hear the different views and suggest to the Committee that it should try to find a common denominator of opinions. The question does not have to be item 1, 2, or 3; it could be 6. But, bearing in mind that, in view of circumstances which may arise, the Chairman has the right to suggest to the Committee a change in the order of items on the agenda, the matter could be left to his discretion.

May I refer to this morning's meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee? Tranquillity prevailed in that committee, possibly because the matter under discussion was of less importance than the one before us here. It was, however, necessary to decide on the priority of the items on the agenda, and it was left to the Chairman to decide, or at least to exercise his right to propose to the Committee a change in the order of items on the agenda. My delegation believes that that was a good solution, and I propose that the same procedure should be followed here. I hope that we shall find a common denominator based on courtesy and understanding of our various points of view. If we do find a common denominator in this particular matter, then perhaps we may find one in more important situations.

Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I think it is essential for me to address the Committee again in order to clarify a number of points which were raised this afternoon. First I should like to comment on the statement made by the representative of France. Mr. Hoppenot stated that resolution 711 (VII) adopted by the General Assembly on 28 August did not constitute a decision as to the composition of the political conference and that that resolution, therefore, was not binding on the representatives of the sixteen States who would attend the political conference on Korea. However, I think that this view is erroneous. Mr. Hoppenot seems to have lost sight of a number of circumstances which, had he taken them into account, would have prevented him from reaching this conclusion.

Now, what did the resolution of 28 August represent? That resolution speaks of the representatives of one side being the representatives of the countries that contributed armed forces in the war in Korea. What is the identity of this side mentioned in the resolution? The resolution states: "The side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea shall have as participants in the conference those among the Member States contributing armed forces pursuant to the call of the United Nations which desire to be represented, together with the Republic of Korea."

The question therefore arises: what is the identity of this side? Can it be suggested that this side is sixteen of the sixty Members of the United Nations, or is the flag of the United Nations being used, as a resolution the Security Council suggested, for the Organization in Korea? After all, the United Nations does not consist of sixteen States which have banded together. No, the United Nations, legally and accurately speaking, is one side. It is the side, presumably, which allowed the American Command to act on behalf of and under the flag of the United Nations.

Now an attempt is made to find another interpretation. It now appears that it is no longer claimed that the United Nations Organization is a side. Now some representatives have changed their minds. They say that one side consists only of those countries which contributed armed forces. In other words, the

remaining forty-four nations which did not contribute armed forces are no longer included in the term "the side", which, of course, raises a number of delicate and embarrassing political questions with regard to those States Members of the United Nations which were against United Nations participation in the war. However, that is not the issue before us, although of course it could be considered in due course. That question is not directly relevant now.

When the resolution of 28 August refers to "the side" does that mean the United Nations or only the sixteen countries which were empowered to act by the United Nations? Mr. Hoppenot apparently failed to pay attention to this issue. When the resolution refers to a "side" it refers to the United Nations. What is the United Nations? What does it represent? It is the highest organ. I ask that question of Mr. Bellaunde, who is the authority on such questions. Is it not the General Assembly? Can one regard as representative of the United Nations a separate group of Members of that Organization? Let us look at the resolutions which have so far been adopted on the Korean question. There is, for instance, resolution 376 (V) on the problem of the independence of Korea. That resolution contains the words "Having in mind that United armed forces", it does not say "of a group of Members of the United Nations, but it states that "United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations Nations ...". The resolution goes on to recommend that under the guidance of the United Nations various steps should be undertaken.

I could quote many such documents, but that would be unnecessary because I am sure that the representatives in this Committee remember them. I had to mention this point, however, in order to dispel the erroneous views voiced by some representatives whose ability, capacity for logic, and political acumen I would be the last to challenge. These capacities and abilities, notwithstanding they have allowed themselves to be induced into a dangerous and unfortunate error under which they would seem to claim that the resolution of 28 August does not bind those who voted for that resolution. Of course, we voted against that resolution. It does not bind us, but it does bind all those who voted in favour of it.

If I had voted in favour of resolution A, it would have been binding on me, because the resolution does not speak of the sixteen States, it speaks of the States Members of the United Nations; it speaks of the United Nations. In one paragraph, of course, it singles out those Member States which contributed armed forces, and this has led to the suggestion that those States alone are empowered to represent the United Nations. In that respect, then, Mr. Menon was right when he said that they assume for themselves the role of standing over and above the United Nations. Therefore, when Mr. Hoppenot claims that those who speak on behalf of the sixteen States are not bound by resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August, his argument is erroneous. It does not square with the terms of that resolution, a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations which envisages the United Nations, as such, as one of the sides.

It may be argued, however, that after all only sixteen of the Member States of the United Nations participated in the war in Korea. One can participate with a battalion or a division or an army, but that nevertheless does not mean that all questions relating to the activities of such armed forces are only of interest to those armed forces themselves. At least, they are of interest to the States which have that allegiance. That would be the first explanation of their meaning.

It has also been said that the other side can add whomever it wishes. It has been said that the other side can appoint the Chinese and the Koreans and, in addition, as many neutrals as they wish. Therefore, it is not just a matter of considering the belligerents as alone empowered to be represented at the conference. That brings us back to paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. I would beg Mr. Lodge, Mr. Lloyd, or Mr. Hoppenot to meet my request just once. Where, in paragraph 60, is there one word, even one comma, which would confirm the statement that that paragraph contemplates the participation in that conference only of those States which contributed troops and whose armed forces actually took part in the war. Go ahead, and find at least one line, one word, to that effect. Permit me to read that paragraph once more, because perhaps some representatives have not paid due attention to the circumstance, which is an important one. You can follow it. I know English, perhaps, better than you know Russian. The paragraph reads:

"In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." (A/2431, page 25)

Where does it say in that paragraph that only such representatives can be sent as have contributed troops? Go ahead, Mr. Lodge, show it to me, at least in English. Perhaps I shall be able to find my way among those words. Mr. Lodge has just handed me a paper which contains a reproduction of the statement made by General Nam Il, a statement made on 19 February 1952, of all things. All right, General Nam Il did make that statement, but what possible relevance does that have for this General Assembly?

Did General Nam Il speak on our behalf? Or did he speak on your behalf? He made the statement on his own behalf. At best he made a statement on behalf of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and its allies, the gallant Chinese People's volunteers. What relevance does that have to the question before us? General Nam Il said, up to that time, that they should be appointed by both sides. Of course paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement says that they should be nominated by "both sides". Does that mean that such nominations can only be extended to nations which contributed troops? Particularly where we speak of the side of the United Nations, does that only cover such Members of the United Nations as actually contributed troops? No. Because the name and flag of the United Nations may be used by 16 States in Korea, but those 16 States are not the United Nations. The United Nations is composed of 60 States, as long as they have not been stripped of their right to vote, I suppose.

Therefore, there is no contradiction between paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement on the one hand and the possibility of there being represented at the conference not only States who have contributed troops but also other States. It speaks of representatives appointed by both sides, and one of the sides is the United Nations and not just the 16 belligerents. Of course Mr. Lodge calls them "communists". Of course they are communists; in fact they are good communists. To say nowever, as Mr. Lodge does, that they distort paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement or went back on it, is erroneous. Mr. Lodge is ill-advised when he says that. They are acting directly in accord with the letter and spirit of that paragraph.

As to the position of the Chinese Government, I should like to draw attention to a section of the cablegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic to Mr. Dag Hammarskjold dated 13 September 1953, which strikes me as being a bit more up to date and a bit more authoritative, closer to us in point of time. What does paragraph 2 of the cablegram say? It says the following:

"It must be pointed out that, in rejecting the proposal of the Soviet Union based on the form of round table conference and adopting the fifteen nation proposal which is based on the form

of negotiations held by the two belligerent sides and would confine the membership of the political conference to the nations on the two belligerent sides, the General Assembly at its 430th plenary meeting made an injurious distortion of paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement. It is utterly impossible to derive from paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement the implication that membership of the political conference is to be limited to those nations who participated in the Korean war with their armed forces and that no other nations concerned may take part in this conference." (A/2469, paragraph 2)

No such interpretation can be drawn from paragraph 60. This is an authoritative statement and a well-advised statement of the leader of the foreign policies of the Chinese People's Republic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chou En-lai, who says that paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement does not lend itself to this conclusion of yours, Mr. Lodge, and of your supporters and helpers in this matter. Your interpretation is a distortion of paragraph 60. Your assertions are so many departures from paragraph 60 and if one could count on any impartiality in the consideration of this question on the part of my antagonists, I suppose they would have to concede that the idea that only those countries which contributed troops could participate is an entirely erroneous interpretation which is not derivable from the terms of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, which is in fact contradictory to paragraph 60.

We are told: Well then, let the Korean-Chinese side nominate any neutrals it may wish. That again is an error. Of course this was rather facetious. All of us like to joke once in a while, but this is serious, this matter of the round table. I think it was the Herald Tribune or The New York Times which had some sort of a cartoon showing both sides hovering or crouching around a round table while at the same time trying to saw off its legs. But of course there are amateur carpenters all over, in the United States, in the United Kingdom, as well as in any other country, and witticisms are of course not relevant. These wits are serving their chiefs. Of course I would not say that they do their work under the pressure of their salaries, although this may exert a certain influence.

But we here are not joksters or punsters and it is not our task to preen ourselves on our witticisms. This point of substance is essential, one which is overlooked by Mr. Belaunde today when he apparently attaches no significance at all as to the side on which India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan or any other country should participate. Why is it that Mr. Lodge so insistently demands that his point of view should be adopted according to which if the Korean-Chinese side wishes to appoint a neutral State, let it appoint those neutral States as representatives of their side, of the Korean-Chinese side. He knows that neither Burma, nor India, nor Pakistan, nor Indonesia, would be willing to figure in the conference as belligerents or as representatives or advocates of one of the belligerents. They want to figure there as representatives of countries not interested in a solution of the question which would derive from and flow from a war. They want to be there as spokesmen and harbingers of peace. That is why we speak of a round table conference.

Mr. Lodge wishes to shift the conference to a military ground. He wants a military atmosphere: the belligerents. We want to exclude a military atmosphere, military circumstances. We want to exclude the possibility of having both sides still considering themselves as being members of hostile camps who will come there to glare at each other and only thinking of doing the other side something wrong or even engaging in some foul play,

This circumstances must be borne in mind, Mr. Belaunde.. India, Indonesia and the Soviet Union, as neutrals, want to be regarded as such. They are Members of the United Nations at the same time and they are unwilling to countenance a situation where the rights and the name of the United Nations would be monopolized by a group of Powers. They do not wish to countenance a situation where the United Nations will become a tool and instrument of the foreign policy of a State or group of States or Powers. The United Nations must stand by itself. It must not be anybody else's tool or instrument. Countries such as India, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan will therefore not tolerate their being included in the conference as advocates or defenders of the other side, though they may and will feel themselves, I am confident, as representatives and spokesmen for the good cause, which is not on the side of the sixteen, mind you. This is another circumstance which should be borne in mind.

Now in what situation will the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France's Mr. Hoppenot, who spoke quite a while ago, be, if faced with an intact General Assembly resolution, a resolution which would not have been changed, amended or improved? If faced with that resolution, they would face the situation of whether or not they should admit any other participants. Of course, their position would be highly embarrassing because, after all, they are your representatives. The resolution of 28 August, which will be their frame of reference, says "those among the Member States contributing armed forces will represent the United Nations side". We say "United Nations side" as just that, any State Member of the United Nations. I would say that the United Nations could be represented by any and all Members of the United Nations, and not just those which contributed troops. There is our difference in principle. This is a difference which is substantial. We are, therefore, not convinced by certain arguments which I might describe as not being very serious. Arguments to the effect that the Chinese and the Korean side has violated paragraph 60. These people so violate paragraph 60 when they say that the representation of the United Nations shall only be among the belligerent States. But, on the other hand, they now try to shift the blame, saying that the Chinese-Korean side is the violator. At the same time, they say: "We are not opposed to peoples being represented provided the conference so decides"

The resolution of 28 August, which is a clear text, limits and excludes the participation of other States. You cannot just expunge that from the record. I apologize for my candour, which I suppose is never an obstacle, except perhaps in diplomatic negotiations. You will pardon me for saying candidly that you yourselves are fully alive to the erroneousness of this approach. That is why you now cling to the Australian amendment. You have also welcomed the proposal to postpone the discussion for ten days, leaving the Korean question in abeyance. I welcome Mr. Belaunde's candour in saying that we should not have the impression that Korea has been relegated somewhere in the background -- pigeonholed. This is why this is being done, not to create the unfortunate position that Korea is not being relegated in the background while it is being relegated in the background.

To prevent us from considering the Korean question, it is said that discussion is harmful. There has been discussion, and discussion without an end. Apparently there has been no harm done. Why did the Chairman not make some ruling to stop these harmful proceedings, since proceedings here are said to be harmful? After all, one should oppose evil. All of a sudden they discover that these discussions are harmful. If you wish to leave this question in abeyance, Mr. Belaundez, then you will create exactly the same impression you wish to avoid, the impression, and the correct impression, that you are trying to chase this question somewhere into the background -- pigeonhole it.

You say on it that at any moment, whenever necessary, we can resume the discussion. At what time? At what juncture? Well, you say when circumstances will require, but how can it be admitted that circumstances should ever warrant resort to a harmful kind of procedure? After all, you say the discussion is harmful. It is harmful today. Will it all of a sudden become useful on the twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth of October? I suggest that on 28 October it would do as much good as medicine applied to a dead man.

I trust that this will not happen. That the conference will foregather. It is up to us to see to it. It is our job to see to it here that the conference should meet on time, but in order to achieve that, measures must be taken and they must be taken now, measures which will display some sort of regard for the views of the other side, since both sides are interested in the settlement of the Korean question.

It is not sufficient to confine ourselves to cablegrams. You are afraid to admit those people here, as though their appearance here would immediately spell the failure of your plans. If you had admitted them here we should have been able to reach agreement on all those questions which are the subjects of controversy here. We could have solved those questions twenty thousand times over. You are afraid to admit them here. You are afraid to discuss here whether the new Korean-Chinese proposals are any good. Why are you afraid of that? Of course, you can discuss them as you wish. You can decide as you wish. You do not even want to touch them. You shy away from any discussion, but you do feel, in your heart of hearts, that if that is not done you will get into difficulty.

One cannot, if one has a peace conference, simply disregard the point of view of the other side. It is rather poor diplomacy and poor politics to disregard the views of one's counterpart, or antagonist, if you regard him as an antagonist. That is why you say: "We are going to have a little amendment". A little amendment to the effect that once things get ahead, once you feel the hot breath down your collars, we will resume consideration of the question. In the meantime, you will be pondering the matter for twenty-seven days. I submit you could spend those twenty-seven days more usefully. We have here in this room, after all, writers, philosophers and many eminent diplomats. This room teems with able persons, and it is the first time I have heard so highly qualified an assembly being afraid to consider these questions. They say they cannot consider this question before the madding crowd. Let us consider this question in private, in quiet, because once the madding crowd is there, once the public is there, we should not be able to discuss this in a businesslike manner. I say we are not opposed to discussing this in a group of two, three, or in an intimate group of four, but this should not be considered as excluding action by the United Nations, or participation, discussion and decision by the United Nations as an organization.

Mr. Belaunde, you say, after all, that the decision should be of such a nature as to create a good impression, but is that not rather a circumlocution -- perhaps here the translation -- but you essentially said "let us entrust this matter of shifting the Korean question forward or backward to the Chairman". Let us not decide it number one, number five, or number six. Let us leave it somewhere up in the air. I have looked up to see whether there was a chandelier where we could hang that question. According to Mr. Belaunde's question I do not find it. It is not here, but you may find it, it is up there, and it shall be Mr. van Langenhove, the Chairman, you shall decide on behalf of us, you shall take that responsibility of the sixty sitting here who are not able or capable to do that. You should tell them as you deem fit. Of course, I have great confidence in your capacity, but I think this should be based on some sort of mutuality. I trust your reason. You, I think, should trust ours.

This amendment bespeaks a lack of confidence in the propriety of your own position. You want to be able to tack and veer when the winds change, when circumstances shift, when you find out all of a sudden that what you have done

was wrong from the very beginning, I submit that this approach is ill-advised. It would be more appropriate to look at the Korean question as it stands. The Korean question is the most important one. Put it as number one on the agenda. Let us leave aside witticisms and demagogy and needling of each other. Let us stop that. Let us stop this exchange of telegrams and cablegrams. Perhaps we will agree. Perhaps we will not agree. But let us try. Let us do our best to clear the way so as to lay lasting and solid foundations for a lofty and important cause, the cause of peace in Korea.

I am convinced that all of you want peace in Korea. All the peoples want it. But we would be hampering peace if we displayed this sort of shyness, this sort of fear, this attempt to look for byways and back roads, instead of following the broad main stream, the broad way of open humanitarian channels and objective decisions, which the world expects us to adopt, which all mankind expects us to adopt, because it is our duty.

Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador)(interpretation from Spanish): This preliminary debate in the Political Committee, which should be purely procedural since after all we are only discussing procedural matters as to the Priority to be given the different items before the Committee, has become a debate on the substance of a subject: the composition of the political conference on Korea. This need not surprise us too much. In August, when the question of the composition of the conference was discussed, a majority of the Assembly voted in favour of resolution "C" which requested the Secretary-General to communicate the proposals on the Korean question submitted to the resumed meetings of the seventh session and recommended by the Assembly, together with the record of the relevant proceedings of the Assembly, to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and to report as appropriate. Now, there were many delegations, amongst them my own, which opposed that resolution. We made known our feelings on 28 August when we explained our votes. We said that when the other side, the Governments of Communist China and North Korea, were notified of the agreements arrived at and the debates that took place both in the Committee and in the General Assembly, it might open the door to a new effort on the part of those Governments to reopen a public debate through the medium of communications with the Secretary-General, a debate which we felt could only be held on the decision of the General Assembly and in which no Government alien to the United Nations could take part.

The interpretation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement is really quite simple because it is drawn up in clear, short words. With all his dialectical juggling and all his great wit, Mr. Vyshinsky still could not make the reading of that paragraph turn black into white and white into black, to use his favourite colour scheme. Paragraph 60 is drafted in Spanish, English and all the other languages. It states in part as follows:

"In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives..."

Since I have the Spanish text in front of me, I invite all my Spanish-speaking colleagues to read this again. It says "of a higher level of both sides". This means that it is a bilateral conference. If it does not mean this then I do not quite know what it means or I do not know how one would say bilateral conference. If we turn to the English text of paragraph 60, we find that it states:

(continued in English)

"...a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions..."

(continued in Spanish)

In other words, it will be a political conference of a higher level. The word "respectively" means that one side will designate its representatives and the other side will designate its representatives. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, both the English and the Spanish texts agree. The idea is quite clear that this is to be a bilateral conference.

That is why time after time, in the general debate in the General Assembly during this session, my delegation has maintained the view that the Governments of Communist China and North Korea have completely changed their points of view because, as we all know, it was they who proposed the adoption of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom. Therefore, it was they who suggested the adoption of the idea of the two sides. Since that is the case, then the United Nations, together with South Korea -- which is one side -- are the only ones empowered to designate their representatives as representing the side of the United Nations and South Korea. I also freely admit that it is for Communist China and North Korea to designate their representatives to the political conference.

Resolution "C" of 28 August left the door wide open to counter proposals, which, incidentally, we consider to be entirely out of order. These counter proposals submitted by Communist Governments speak of the possible participation of five countries which these Communist Governments feel are neutral Governments. At the head of these neutral Governments, they place the Soviet Union. I think that we do not have to accomplish a great feat of memory to recall that in resolution "B", the General Assembly recommended that the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics participate in the Korean political conference provided the other side desires it. This last sentence has been publicly interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union will participate on the Communist side since it could not participate on any other side as there are only two sides to the conference.

Now, with regard to the other countries -- India, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan -- they are neutral from the point of view of the Communist Governments. However, if we are to interpret the word "neutral" correctly -- and I must say that Mr. Vyshinsky at certain moments in his discussion seemed, strangely enough, to agree with us on this point -- can we admit in this case of Korea that in the United Nations there are belligerent and neutral States? Is this compatible? If these Governments or countries are all Members of the United Nations and the Security Council first of all and later the General Assembly have taken decisions and made recommendations by virtue of which a certain number of countries, on the appeal of the United Nations, have sent troops to carry out action of collective security on behalf of the United Nations under the Unified Command -- how are these facts compatible with the idea that certain States, Members of the United Nations, consider themselves neutral? If they are Members of the United Nations and the United Nations took part in that collective action, how can they, a part of the whole, be neutral? Yet they still insist that the sixteen countries that sent troops to Korea are belligerents and that those which did not send troops are neutral. Were that to be the case then the very meaning of the word neutral would make it impossible for them to participate in the conference because, according to paragraph 60, it is a conference between belligerents.

Technically speaking, then, there would be no need and no right to include neutrals among the members of that conference. However, if we accept the idea that there is such a thing as neutral States, these States do not have to be turned to by the United Nations to represent it. I say that the United Nations could not nominate some of these States to participate.

May I remind the Committee, however, that the United Nations has no need to call upon the so-called neutral States to represent it since, after all, the conference will be discussing the collective action in which this Organization as a whole took part. But let us go further into this thesis concerning neutral States. In the recent debate in the General Assembly we maintained that if these neutral States were to take part in the conference they would not do so as members of one side or as parties because the sides comprise the United Nations as a whole and South Korea, on the one hand, and North Korea and Communist China on the other hand. I do not deny that these neutral States could participate or that they might offer contributions in the way of possible suggestions and solutions. But they would not be taking part as parties to the conference. Let us be consistent in our ideas, our concepts and our words. They could take part as mediators, perhaps. The representatives of India, Indonesia, Pakistan and other countries could participate as individuals placing their political tact, their diplomacy and their experience at the disposal of both parties to the conference in such a way as to guide them towards the best road to success. That is why we regard as acceptable the idea so often voiced here to the effect that it is not the General Assembly which has to designate these mediators or neutral States. That must be left to the political conference itself to decide.

The decision could very easily be reached before the conference opened officially by way of diplomatic consultations, or, alternatively, it could be reached by the conference itself after it had begun its work. But the fact that they are to act as neutrals or mediators leads us to feel that it is not indispensable that they should be designated before the conference begins since, after all, they are not to be called upon to take part in a meeting as parties to a dispute which is to be discussed by that meeting.

To return to the point under discussion, which is the question of priority, my delegation cannot accept the idea that we should, here and now, place the Korean item at the very end of our agenda with the idea in mind that in due course we might, by simple majority, decide to place it elsewhere on the list. As the representative of Argentina stated earlier, although there may be precedents for such a procedure it would be in open violation of rule 122 of the

rules of procedure. Even if there were political or other reasons for leaving open the possibility of dealing with the Korean question earlier or later than originally planned, we might have to work out some other way and not take the line of least resistance/^{to}which, unfortunately, the rules of procedure are usually sacrificed. Rule 98 of the rules of procedure, which deals with priorities, says:

"Each Main Committee, taking into account the target date for the closing of the session fixed by the General Assembly...shall adopt its own priorities and meet as may be necessary to complete the consideration of the items referred to it."

But this is not obligatory. It does not compel a committee to decide, at its very first meeting, the priority to be accorded to all the items before it. I agree with those who have suggested that we might very easily decide upon the priority of one or two items, just to keep the Committee busy, and leave the decision on the other items until later. I repeat that rule 98 does not oblige the Committee to decide an order of priority for all six or seven items. The Committee can very well say, "We shall first of all discuss item x, or items x and y, and so far as the other items are concerned they will be decided upon in due course according to the circumstances which may obtain at the time". In this way we should not be violating any rule of procedure and should be taking account of the possibility of changed circumstances. Again, we should not be precluding the possibility of changing a priority or of establishing a new one. If we were to establish a rigid order of priority it would be much more difficult to change it.

My delegation supports the ideas expressed by the representative of Egypt and the representative of France. In connexion with the proposal of the representative of Egypt that we should postpone for a while the discussion of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions we feel that there is no reason to deny such a postponement if the delegations concerned are awaiting further information or if they have private reasons for requesting a delay. As far as concerns the Burmese request that the item concerning Burma should not be placed at the very end of the agenda, I think that that too is quite understandable.

Summing up the ideas put forward by the representative of Argentina, I suggest that we should take a decision with regard to one or two items. I do not know whether the Burmese delegation would agree, but we might take first the item which now appears in fourth place on the agenda, namely, "Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China: report of the Government of the Union of Burma". If that were agreed the discussion of that item would provide the delay necessary to satisfy the representative of Egypt, and we could then take up the Tunisian and Moroccan questions or any other item. Then, should circumstances require -- circumstances such, for example, as a radical change in the situation in Korea, or certain developments in the progress of the political conference making further discussion of the problem necessary here -- we should always be in a position to take the Korean question as item 3 or 4 of our agenda.

Mr. KYROU (Greece): I am very sorry to intervene in this debate for a second time, and I promise to be very brief. I should simply like to refer to a point put forward by the representative of India. He warned us that, if we put the Korean item in too low a position on the agenda, we would prove ourselves disrespectful to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and thus would not help them to contribute to the setting up of the political conference before 28 October.

I am sorry not to be able to agree with the representative of India. Quite on the contrary, what we really owe to these two Governments, in my humble opinion, is to be completely sincere with them. I think that our elementary duty is to give them as clear a picture of the situation as possible and not to contribute to the creation of confusion in their minds upon the issue.

What is this issue that is before us? The Secretary-General, conforming religiously to our request in resolution 711 C of 28 August, has communicated to these two Governments the proposals adopted at the third part of the seventh session, that is to say, he has transmitted to these two Governments the substantive resolutions 711 A and 711 B. If we now reopen discussion on the question of participation in the conference, we shall help to create in the minds of the two Governments in question the idea that the General Assembly was not sincere in adopting these two resolutions and that it has not yet made up its mind.

Prince Wan WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): On the question of substance, my delegation is in agreement with the proposal of the representative of Colombia and also with that of the representative of Egypt, that is to say, that the questions of Tunisia and Morocco should become items 1 and 2 on our agenda but should not be discussed before ten days have passed. The Burmese item would then remain as item 4, and the Korean question would come last, on the understanding that at any appropriate moment the Committee might, by a simple majority, move up the Korean item.

I should now like to say a few words on the question of the rules of procedure. The rule to be applied, of course, is rule 98, which states:

"Each Main Committee, taking into account the target date for the closing of the session fixed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the General Committee, shall adopt its own priorities...".

I shall not necessarily make a point of the plural word "priorities", but the spirit of the provision in rule 98 appears to me to be clear: that the priority order laid down by the Committee is relative and not absolute. I prefer to use the word "relative" and not the word "provisional" which was used by the representative of Peru. He made a distinction between "provisional" and "final" decisions. I think a better distinction would be that the decisions that the Committee may make at any time as regards its priorities, or the order of the questions to be considered, are relative. Relative to what? Well, in the first place, relative to the target date. I would also say that it is possible that this Committee may have new or additional items: that is still possible, I say. If such an additional item is sent to our Committee, should we not review and, if necessary, revise our order of priorities?

In other words, what I maintain is that the spirit of rule 98 is that the Committee may revise the order of priority that it has formerly determined. This is in accordance with the practice of many committees, and I think it flows from the provisions of rule 98 itself. I prefer such an interpretation to that which involves suspending or leaving in abeyance certain items, such as the Korean item, for instance. I would find it more difficult to support the idea of leaving an item in abeyance or suspension, because the item has not yet come under discussion and it would therefore create a difficulty in my mind if the principle of leaving in abeyance or suspension were to be adopted.

I think that the explanation given by the Chairman this morning was quite correct: the clarification of rule 98 would allow this Committee at a later stage, by a simple majority, to move up any item -- in the present case, of course, the Korean item. That is why my delegation will vote for the proposal of Colombia in its entirety.

Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru)(interpretation from Spanish): I am compelled to intervene in the debate again because of an observation concerning me made by Mr. Vyshinsky.

In the first place, the Peruvian delegation wishes to avoid reopening a discussion on the substance of the matter, on which, furthermore, our attitude has always been very clear. We have always said that the United Nations gave a mandate to the sixteen countries on the military plane, and that in that way we gave them a mandate to represent us at the peace conference, with full powers. Therefore, any discussion dealing with belligerents or neutrals, or with the interpretation of the Armistice Agreement, is not relevant and would in no way affect our position. I repeat that the United Nations gave a military mandate and has extended that mandate to cover the political conference.

I wish now to reply to an observation addressed to me. As a matter of fact, there is more than a mandate; there is a delegation of power. As a result the sixteen countries of the political conference are our representatives. They have full powers and, if they are confronted with a proposal from the other side, they can accept it. In that case, the delegation of the country chosen would stand not as a representative of the other party or the enemy but, in the fulfilment of this mandate or this representation coming from us, that country would represent us personally. So much for the substance of the matter.

With regard to the suggestion I made that we should not give the impression that we are shelving or abandoning the Korean question, I did not say this because I wanted us to give a different impression from that which would be gathered from our discussions. I said it because, since we want the question of Korea to be discussed here if the political conference fails, we should not give any opinion other than that.

Furthermore, as to my suggestion that we make the agenda more flexible and decide on priorities provisionally, I did not say that the Chairman should decide or resolve the question.

I did not place on the Chairman the responsibility of deciding on this matter. Far from it. I said that because the Chairman would be in close contact with the political situation, because he is in contact with the other delegations and because he has a duty to listen to the opinions of all the delegations he is in a better position to give us the initiative, to suggest to us that we change the priority. That is what I said and that is what I repeat. The Chairman would merely be fulfilling the functions the Chairman always fulfills -- and that is to suggest procedures to the Committee.

I want to thank the representative of Thailand for the constructive contribution that he has just made to this discussion. I do not think that we would be violating rule 122 if we provisionally adopted an order of priority. We changed that order, according to the Colombian proposal. We do not need a majority to decide on that because the agenda is provisional; it always has been provisional, and I don't see why it is going to become rigid today. It is quite contrary to jurisprudence and to precedents; it is quite contrary to rule 98 to give this agenda a rigid aspect. We are right when we adopt our priority by a simple majority; we can do that any time we desire. I do not consider that there is any confusion here nor that a mistake has been made.

I think that this matter has been sufficiently discussed. We might easily have adopted the Colombian proposal, with the reservation that we accept it out of courtesy and solidarity towards the delegations of Egypt and Pakistan, which suggested to us that those matters of Tunisia and Morocco should not be considered later and that Burma should be considered earlier. We can very well discuss the question of disarmament, or the question of bacterial warfare or the complaint of the Union of Burma. We could discuss any of those three right away and leave the Korean question for later, on the understanding that by a simple majority we could decide, because of information before the Committee or following the initiative or suggestion of the Chairman or of any other member of the Committee, to discuss a question earlier.

The CHAIRMAN:(interpretation from French): I shall now call upon the representative of Colombia who is the last speaker on our list. I think that this debate has taken up our entire day, and I also think that it has been sufficiently ample. I do not think that we need prolong this debate until tomorrow. I see the representative of the Soviet Union has just asked to speak. Well, if the Committee agrees, those two speakers will be the last in this debate.

Mr. ECHEVERRI-CORTES (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): I shall be extremely brief. I want to thank the representative of Greece and the other representatives who supported the proposal submitted by me on the order of priority of the agenda. I should like to tell the Committee that I am very gratified by the optimism shown by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky, on the holding of the political conference on 27 October.

Mr. Vyshinsky spoke to us of white magic and black magic. I think that white magic and black magic should be applied in the political conference in order to reach agreement, but I do not think that we ever tried to practice either of those two types of magic here.

It is logic, and elementary logic, that the work of this Committee will not be as fluid as it can be and will not run as easily while the Korean question stands as an obstacle. We can, however, overcome this problem if we put the Korean question at the end of the debate, especially as there is no real reason for discussing it first.

When Colombia suggested the priorities it did suggest, it had two ideas in mind: one was to facilitate and expedite matters in the Committee, and in turn of the eighth session of the General Assembly, and also to help to hold the political conference within the delay foreseen in the Armistice Agreement. We felt that both these purposes would be fulfilled if we postponed consideration of the Korean question.

Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to say just a few words in answer to the last observations of Mr. Belaunde. Mr. Belaunde referred to legal authority as the basis for his interpretation. I have the highest respect for his legal authorities, and of course no exception can be made in this case. But I must say that there is no decision of the General Assembly which would empower any State or group of States to fight in Korea as representing the United Nations. There is no decision to confer authority to represent the United Nations, and no such decision was adopted with regard to the Korean war. If you have in mind some decision which relates to this question other than that referred to by Mr. Belaunde, you can only have in mind the decision of the Security Council of 27 June 1950 and the decision of the Security Council of 7 July 1950, which recommended to all States Members of the United Nations that they make available their armed forces or other assistance to South Korea, which was alleged in that resolution to have fallen victim to aggression. But this cannot be construed either as conferring of full powers on behalf of the United Nations because -- and I should like to draw the attention of the jurists around here to that -- this decision of 27 June was, to begin with, an entirely illegal resolution of the Security Council, and we will never recognize it as legal. It was an entirely illegal decision of the Security Council because it was adopted in the absence of two of the permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic which, under the Charter, alone is to represent China, which is a permanent member of the Security Council.

Therefore there is no such decision on the part of the Security Council or the General Assembly as claimed by Mr. Belaunde. One cannot regard the sixteen States as acting on behalf of or under the authority of the United Nations. They are acting under the flag and in the name of the United Nations, but this cannot be confused with full powers legitimately conferred upon them. No such powers were ever conferred and therefore they cannot avail themselves of any such powers, as these powers must be legitimately exercised on the basis of documents and decisions which can confer such powers legitimately.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): Before we pass to the vote, I should like to clarify the situation. We have before us two principal proposals. The first one was moved by the representative of Colombia. According to this proposal, the sequence would be as follows: 1. Morocco; 2. Tunisia; 3. the question of impartial investigation of charges of bacterial warfare; 4. complaint by the Union of Burma against China; 5. disarmament; 6. measures to avert the threat of a new world war and 7. Korea. In connexion with this Colombian proposal, an interpretive motion has been moved by Australia. In this connexion, some of my colleagues whose views I respect pointed out that the proposal was inherently incompatible with the rules of procedure. Since it is the duty of the Chair to apply the rules of procedure, I am obliged to set forth my views on this topic. In my view, if the Australian motion is adopted, it would be in some way incorporated in the Colombian proposal, the result being that ^{if} within the framework of the proposal a suggestion was subsequently made to modify the place of the Korean question such a proposal to modify the place of the Korean question would constitute not a proposal to reconsider the Colombian proposal, but it would be an application of that same proposal, the case being provided by the resolution itself; therefore, rule 122 would be inoperative. The precedents concerning the application of rule 122 are contradictory. The representative of Thailand has offered a point of view on this subject which I think we should carefully consider.

These are all reasons which make it impossible for me to rule the Australian motion out of order.

In the circumstances, since this interpretive motion is a previous question, I intend to put it to the vote first.

The second main proposal is the one moved by the representative of the Soviet Union. That proposal states that the questions would be discussed in the following order: (1) The Korean question, (2) Measures to avert the threat of a new world war, (3) The bacterial warfare question, (4) The complaint by the Union of Burma, (5) The Tunisian question, and (6) The question of Morocco.

I shall therefore put to the vote first the interpretive motion submitted by the delegation of Australia, which reads:

"It is agreed that the Korean question can be taken at any time if a simple majority of the Members of the Committee present and voting so desire."

The Australian motion was adopted by 49 votes to 7, with 4 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The Australian motion will therefore be incorporated in the Colombian proposal.

The Committee will now vote on the Colombian proposal.

The proposal was adopted by 48 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The Committee will doubtless agree that it would be pointless to put the Soviet Union proposal to the vote since the Colombian proposal which has just been adopted excludes the Soviet Union proposal.

Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) (interpretation from French): I should like to ask a question and at the same time explain my abstention.

I abstained in the vote on the Colombian proposal because I did not know whether the Chairman had accepted the interpretation given by the representative of Egypt. Now that the vote has taken place, I should like to raise the following question: Did the Chairman accept the interpretation offered by

the representative of Egypt that the Moroccan question would not be considered until about ten days had elapsed? Since this was not clear to me, I abstained in the vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): As I stated this morning, after the adoption of the Colombian proposal I intended to consult the Committee with regard to the time when the first item would come up for discussion. Therefore, I propose to put this matter to the Committee.

With a view to expediting this discussion, I suggest that the question should be considered on Tuesday afternoon of next week.

Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) (interpretation from French): I submitted an amendment this morning that if these two questions were to be discussed first, we should be given about ten days grace. The Chairman stated that he would take our views into account when deciding on the date for consideration of these questions. It was on the basis of that statement by the Chairman that I withdrew my amendment.

I want to thank the representative of Iran for having raised this question. I intended to wait until the Chairman decided on the date for the discussion of the two questions before speaking again.

If the date of Tuesday of next week is set, that does not give the ten days that I requested. The heads of the delegations concerned are not present, and I should therefore like at least eight days' delay.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): Then let us schedule the first meeting on the Moroccan question Wednesday afternoon of next week.

Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) (interpretation from French): What I had in mind was eight working days' delay.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): Perhaps the representative of Egypt will agree to the compromise.

It is so decided; the next meeting will take place on Wednesday afternoon of next week.

Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): I believe that every delegation has the right to explain its vote, and I speak now for that purpose.

It is quite clear why we voted against the Colombian proposal. I have given our views on the matter at length and repeatedly. I should, however, like to add the following observation to what has already been said.

One of the main considerations to be borne in mind when deciding on the question of priority is the urgency of the items to be discussed. I must therefore express some surprise at the fact that, having attached an alleged importance to a question, the Committee immediately decides to postpone the consideration of that question for eight days. How urgent can a question be if it is not urgent enough to discuss it immediately?

Thus, the First Committee is flying in the face of the most elementary requirements of ordinary logic. Its decision only serves to confirm our position that it is simply unwilling to consider a truly important and urgent question: the Korean question. The secret was exposed by Mr. Belaunde, who said that the Committee should not create the wrong impression, the impression that the Korean question was to be pigeon-holed. Now the Committee has taken a decision designed to create the impression that the Korean question is not at the end of the agenda, but that there are more important and urgent questions on the agenda which should be given priority. Nevertheless, having granted those questions priority, the Committee has decided to postpone their consideration.

Mr. MENON (India): Since we are now hearing explanations of vote, I should like to explain that the Indian delegation's abstention from the vote on the Colombian proposal does not in the slightest degree mean that we are indifferent to the problem of the position of the Korean item at the end of the agenda. Our opposition to placing that item at the end of the agenda remains and is unqualified.

We voted for the Australian motion, because it represented the lesser of two evils. Under it, the Committee retains the power to bring up the Korean question at any time. In our opinion, since the Australian motion was adopted

by a very large majority, the Colombian proposal should not have been put to the vote. The Chairman, however, ruled that the two proposals were parts of one whole. We did not wish to contest that ruling, but we maintain our view that with the adoption of the Australian motion the Colombian proposal lost its raison d'être. For those reasons, the only course open to us was to abstain from the vote on the Colombian proposal.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): It is precisely because we think that the Korean question is so urgent and is a matter of stark reality that we do not believe its solution will be advanced by oratory and propaganda tactics here. If the Communists are sincere in their desire to treat the Korean question as an urgent one and to come to constructive grips with it, the way is open for them to meet our representatives at any one of the places which we have mentioned and get on with the business of organizing the political conference. That -- and not various political gestures here -- is the way to show that the matter is regarded as urgent.

Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Lodge's last observation was not addressed to the right party. The United States should address itself to the party with which it must meet, and not to the Soviet Union.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.