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Held at Headquarters, New York,  
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Chairman: Mr. GUNewardENE (Vice-Chairman) (Ceylon)

Question of Algeria [62] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. DeJany (Saudi Arabia)  
Mr. Hanifah (Indonesia)

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## QUESTION OF ALGERIA (A/3197; A/C.1/L.165)/Agenda item 62 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: I have on the list of speakers for this afternoon Saudi Arabia, France and Indonesia. The list of speakers was closed, as you know, at one o'clock. The list as I have it, from tomorrow on, is as follows: Egypt, Guatemala, Ceylon, Italy, Turkey, Iraq, Ecuador, Sudan, Canada, Yemen, Belgium, Syria, Greece, Japan, Uruguay, USSR, Brazil, Romania, New Zealand, Chile, Ukrainian SSR, Pakistan, Thailand, Poland, Iran, Colombia, Nepal, Byelorussian SSR, Bolivia, Jordan, Bulgaria, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Costa Rica, Yugoslavia, Israel, Albania, El Salvador, India, Lebanon, France.

Mr. DEJANY (Saudi Arabia): It is hardly necessary for me to say that the people and the Government of my country have been following the events of Algeria with the greatest anxiety and apprehension. This anxiety and apprehension have been with us from the beginning of this most recent outbreak of the struggle of the Algerian people for freedom and independence in November 1954.

The brutal manner in which the French sought to smother this liberation movement from the start led my delegation, at the behest of his Majesty King Saud, to bring this situation to the attention of the Security Council. On 5 January 1955 my delegation drew the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation in Algeria as one which might lead to international friction and was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security within the meaning of Article 35 of the Charter.

We drew attention to the fact that the French were already describing the conflict in Algeria as a little war. A few weeks after the commencement of the little war, the French Minister of the Interior announced in the French National Assembly that France had more than 70,000 troops in Algeria and that that number was not too great to assert France's intention to hold Algeria. The French Press estimated the number of the Algerian nationalists involved in the fighting at around 4,000. The French Minister of the Interior stated before the Interior Committee of the National Assembly that the only negotiation with the Algerian nationalists was war, on with that negotiation they went.

That was the situation a little over two years ago. Since that time it has deteriorated very greatly, steadily and rapidly. As matters stand today, instead of

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

a small war there is a full-scale gruesome war. Instead of the 70,000 troops there are close to 600,000 French soldiers and police. Instead of 4,000 Algerian patriots, it would seem that the number of these dauntless warriors is endless. The world is confronted with a ghastly colonial war that is costing the French Government over \$3,000,000 a day and an appalling loss of life and massive destruction of property.

During the past two years various attempts were made to bring about some moderation and modification in the official French attitude on Algeria. In the beginning some States hesitated to approach France. Some were inclined to believe the French assertions that Algeria was really a part of France and that the nationalist uprising was of a minor and limited nature and would be quickly crushed. Others did not wish to embarrass France. But, as the little war grew bigger and bigger and as more and more military reinforcements from France failed to check the nationalist upsurge, it became evident that the seriousness of the situation could no longer be overlooked or delayed.

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

Late in April, 29 Asian-African countries, meeting at Bandung, discussed, among other things, the Algerian situation. At the end of their meeting, the conference declared its support of the right of the people of Algeria to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay. Thus, the representatives of more than half the people of the world upheld the right of the Algerians to self-determination and independence. It was the first positive international action to cast a heavy shadow on France's fictitious claim that Algeria was part and parcel of France.

There was no desire, however, to embarrass France. The unified sentiment was in favour of a peaceful settlement, by negotiation, with the true representatives of the Algerian people. France, however, paid no attention to this new trend in world public opinion -- a trend which revealed the concern of a large segment of humanity for the welfare of the Algerian people and support for their natural right to self-determination and independence. On the contrary, this new trend seemed only to give the French Government a greater determination to stamp out the nationalist movement more ruthlessly and utterly.

Consequently, the delegations of fourteen Asian-African countries, including my own, requested the Secretary-General, on 26 July 1955, to include the question of Algeria in the agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly. It is well known how the General Committee recommended to the General Assembly not to include the question of Algeria in the agenda of the tenth session. It is also well known how, after a long debate, the General Assembly rejected the recommendation of the General Committee and decided to include the item in its agenda.

That event, in itself -- the reversal of the General Committee's recommendation -- was the second positive international recognition of the existence of the situation in Algeria. It was an expression of a wider and more varied international sentiment, including several European and Latin American States. This larger and wider sentiment supported a free and open discussion of the question which France continued to insist was taboo.

The events which followed the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda of the tenth session need not be recalled. It is sufficient to point out, however, that the sponsors of the inclusion of the item continued to reflect a spirit of co-operation and went along with the other delegations to delay a full discussion of the Algerian question. Some delegations were eager to afford France some more time to settle the problem peacefully. Many of us did not wish to obstruct any possible chance to reach a peaceful settlement.

The results of the elections in France early in 1956 gave some of us new hope. They brought into power leaders who had condemned the policy of force and intimidation. The preliminary plans of the new French Government seemed to veer slightly from the rigid position of using force to maintain the policy of assimilation and the theory that Algeria was an integral part of France. But no sooner had the Government taken control, and a few sidelights on its new approach become known, than the French residents in Algeria attacked the new policy. The visit of the French Premier to Algeria and his reception there by the French residents seemed to have brought a quick and dramatic end to the new trend of realistic appraisal which was discernible from the utterances of the leaders who took charge of the French Government. The appointment of a Municipal Resident in place of the Governor General, which was intended to improve the situation, brought exactly the opposite result. Instead of the liberal General first chosen for the task, Algeria was placed at the mercy of Mr. Lacoste. He steadily built up the French armed might in Algeria until it reached the fantastic stage where there were two French soldiers for the protection of every three French civilians. Mr. Lacoste built up his monstrous armed might in rapid stages. Every time he asked for additional soldiers and military supplies, he coupled it with the false assertion that he had practically crushed the Algerian patriots and that the additional aid was being asked to make the end complete and decisive. But the war is still going on, with much greater intensity than ever before.

That is why the delegations of thirteen Asian-African countries, including my own, brought the question of Algeria before the Security Council in June 1956. The representative of Iran, Ambassador Abdoh, as spokesman for the sponsors, made a splendid presentation of the case before the Security Council. Unfortunately,

however, the Council seemed reluctant even to include the question of Algeria in the agenda. Most of the members of the Security Council seemed desirous of affording France a little more time.

As the situation continued to worsen, the representatives of the fifteen Asian-African States requested the Secretary-General, on 1 October 1956, to include the question of Algeria in the agenda of the current session.

I shall omit the historical background, except for a few facts. Algeria is an Arab country. Its people are predominantly Moslem. It lies next to three other Arab countries -- Tunisia and Libya on the east, Morocco on the west.

Despite the allegations that there was no conquest of Algeria by the French, there are numerous French authorities who describe it as a slow and devastating conquest. Following the destruction and plunder, the French authorities confiscated the best lands in the country and allotted them to the French colonists who invaded Algeria behind their armed forces. The Algerians say that it was never a question of two communities living together in Algeria, exploiting its riches together. The establishment and administration of all public services took into consideration essentially the existence of the colonist and his needs. The Algerian says that he benefited only incidentally. The country was his, but the colonists were its people. The Algerian people, however, were very brave and very patient. They never gave up the fight against the French. Throughout the last 125 years, Algerian uprisings were periodical. The French, for their part, true to their colonizing mission, stamped out one uprising after another with as much ruthlessness as was within their power. Those military actions were occasionally followed by promises of relief from the grievances. So little ever came of the promised relief, however, that no one -- not even the French people -- now takes them very seriously.

As an accompaniment of this military regime and the policy of perpetuating the subservience of the Algerian people, the French introduced into Algeria the policy of assimilation. It aimed at the gradual, but complete and subtle, obliteration of the national, cultural and religious characteristics of Algeria. All means and all policies were brought to bear to effect this complete transformation of a people with an ancient and recognized culture, language and religion to one which is entirely different from their own. In this process, the

French destroyed many mosques while converting others into churches, museums and administrative and military centres. They took over all the real and personal property which was dedicated in trust for the maintenance of the places of worship and the Moslem charitable institutions. They even censored the ceremonies which were to be given in the mosques with the Friday prayers. They banned the teaching of Arabic, the people's mother tongue, as they prohibited its use in all government departments and records. It was decreed to be a foreign language and, to this very day, most of the earlier restrictions on the teaching and use of Arabic, we understand, are effective -- despite the comments of the representative of France.

All this was done, together with scores of other devices, to undermine the bases and national characteristics of the Algerian society. It was the expectation of the French that, having stripped the people of their cultural and religious heritage, it would become possible to remould them into a new and different one. It apparently dawned on the authors of this policy that, if the elements which generate nationalism were effaced, the Algerians would be automatically disarmed of the strongest weapon in the battle for their domination. This policy, however, turned out to be a dismal failure. Whether it was a wise or an unwise policy, and whether it would have succeeded if the French had shown greater reasonableness and readiness in time in regard to the urgently needed reforms, is beside the point.

The important factor was that the French Government, under the great influence of the colonists, irrespective of the other motives or causes, have put off all moves to end the grievances of the Algerian people for a very, very long time.

At the end of the Second World War in Europe, the Algerian people foresaw the advent of an era to end the period of exploitation, discrimination and inequality which they had had to endure by force for such a long time. They placed their hopes in the Atlantic Charter and what was being said about the aims and principles of the United Nations. Their spirits were lifted by the repeated affirmations by leading international personalities about the right of all people to freedom, liberty and self-determination. They felt that they had contributed in no small way to the Allied victory for the cause of peace and freedom. They also contributed, aside from their strategic territory and all that went with it, in the neighbourhood of 200,000 troops. They suffered over 45,000 killed and some 30,000 disabled. One of the saddest and darkest chapters in French history in Algeria was written as the Algerians celebrated the Allied victory in Europe while they were in this mood.

The Algerians report that on 8 May 1945 a riot developed around Constantine between Algerian hopefuls for freedom and the colons. This clash ended the life of two Algerian Boy Scouts. The Algerians charged the colons, killing a number of them. During the following forty-eight hours the French troops joined the colons and the Government forces in giving effect to the orders of the Government of Constantine to hunt the Arabs. They used tanks, guns and planes in their attempt to erase the neighbouring villages with their inhabitants. Forty-five thousand Algerians were slaughtered in this fashion; French sources put the figure at between 11,000 and 30,000. Sixty villages were destroyed. What a tragic price to pay for the celebration of the victory of the "four freedoms".

That horrible act of genocide, however, epitomizes the position of the two groups in Algeria, the Algerians and the colonists. The first seeks freedom, the second blocks its chance. To the first group it is the only hope for a secure, decent future; to the second it spells out doom and the end of a unique era of unlimited exploitation.

The rising tides of nationalism that expressed themselves at the end of the Second World War and the emancipation movements in Africa and Asia, particularly Algeria's sister States in North Africa, must have had their effect on the Algerian people. The provisions of the United Nations Charter relating to the dependent peoples seem to have had their effect also on their thinking. These trends met head-on with the French policy which seemed as rigid and as much at dead centre as ever as a result of the pull from opposite directions. Many Frenchmen recognized the danger of ignoring the new trends, but the power of the colonists seemed to neutralize every effort to make any decisive move. Whatever was put on paper was cancelled out in actual fact in the phase of administration or was just left there as if to give positive credence to the "false promises" theory.

On 1 November 1954 the Algerian people once again expressed their disgust and mistrust of the French rule in Algeria, but on a very large scale. That expression was in the form of an organized wave of Algerian patriots which struck simultaneously in the three Algerian Provinces against the military and police posts, on various centres of government installations and means of communication. Within a few weeks it became evident to the French authorities that the Algerians had lost patience and given up all hope.

The nationalist uprising developed momentum very rapidly. This was primarily due to the ruthless measures with which the French Government sought to bring the Algerian patriots to terms. One of the most outrageous practices, which in the French administration Macquires as important a role and a measure of necessity as the military operations, is the famous policy of oppression or "pacification". The former French Minister of the Interior, Mr. Mitterand, frankly defined the two missions which fall on the French forces in Algeria to be the following: first, to carry on the war against the rebels and second, to execute a mission of repression. In this phase of the French military mission, perhaps the greatest indiscriminate destruction came from the use of its air force. Hundreds of villages were destroyed in this manner and thousands of innocent people murdered. The extensive use of this arm of the French military forces became more evident from the statements made on 29 November 1956 before the French Senate by Max Lejeune and Henri Laforest, the Secretary of State for Military Affairs in which it was stated that the air force has played and is playing a great role in the

(Mr. Dejanya, Saudi Arabia)

Algerian campaign and during the month of October alone the air force carried out 4,900 missions over Algerian territory. The editor of Temoignag Chretien described on 8 August 1956 what comes under the category of "pacification" and repression. He wrote:

"Great numbers of Moslems have been victims of "operation pacification'. In the Gergour, Palestro, in Kabylie, units (of the French army) have practised, as in the conquest or the repression of 1871, a policy of 'scorched earth'. Numerous letters from returning soldiers, from seminarists, militant Christians, bear witness to it, in describing to us the mopping up operations, the killing of hostages, the tortures inflicted on suspects or prisoners, the raping, the fires of villages and metchas. The excesses of our troops have succeeded in persuading the Algerians that the policy of pacification was in fact a policy of brutal extermination of the Algerian people."

The same issue carried a typical letter from a French officer. He wrote:

"all the (French) flags which are being displayed on the municipalities buildings or the police stations should be taken down. What is happening under their roofs is often disgusting. To fight a war consists for us (French) to encircle villages during the night, to check identities, to bring in the suspects when they are not executed on the spot. The suspects are always young men... For any shot fired, and one never knows if it is an enemy or one of us who fired it -- we shoot some mortar shots at the villages ... For any ambush or refusal by the Algerians to shelter our troops, we resort to reprisals. It is naturally the women and children who remain behind and who are massacred."

This French policy of pacification and repression brought protests and condemnation from religious leaders, ministers of the Moslem faith and muftis of the mosques of the Department of Algiers.

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

In a letter addressed to the President of the French Republic, the French Premier and others, they wrote:

"On the basis of grievances addressed to us without cease from all parts of the country, as a result of the unbelievable atrocities inflicted by military forces on an innocent population; not able for these reasons to remain insensible to the terrible events occurring in Algeria during the period already passing, the second year, it is our solemn duty to deplore the injustices and violence of all sorts committed daily. These acts can only create hatred, awake passions and compromise irredeemably the desire for fraternity and coexistence of peoples. This degradation and these attacks on human dignity constitute the horrifying spectacle of humanity humiliated, of people murdered unjustifiably in the flesh and in the soul; affirm that we together, with all Moslems of this country, consider the present policy of the Government, the so-called policy of pacification as a war waged upon weak and defenceless peoples, in particular against a civilian population urban and rural, who are thus victimized without knowing of what act they are accused; calls upon the French Government to renounce a policy which can only lead to disastrous conclusions."

Another voice was heard from one of the Algerian moderates whom the French approached, seeking his co-operation to participation in the new administration commissions which are being created as a substitute for the dissolved General Council. The gentleman is Mr. Ould-Aoudia, a lawyer and former member of the Algerian Assembly, so there can be no doubt about his former attitude. He wrote Mr. Vignon, the prefect:

"I feel very strongly that I would betray the confidence of the people if I accepted to represent them against their will in the Commission. They would find it difficult to conceive that I should speak in their name at a moment when they are suffering the terrible results of the so-called pacification. I know for a fact that the inhabitants of many villages have been compelled to leave their homes, taking nothing with them. After this, their homes have been burned and bombed, and the sick caught at home have been led off no one knows where. A number of peasants from these villages have been killed even in the fields or after being arrested in their homes. All traffic on the roads has been prohibited, making it impossible to obtain needed provisions. Therefore, these methods are sure to lead to its economic asphyxiation by an organized famine."

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

The voice of this Algerian, who co-operated with the French in the past and whom they expected would co-operate with them again, must give some sobering thoughts to the French. They must awake to the reality that the Algerian revolt is real, as much against their past injustices as it is against their current reign of terror. The voice of the spiritual leaders also must put an end to any thought that there can be in Algeria any respectable Algerian who could put up with repetitions of eighteenth and nineteenth century French colonial means of subjugating peoples and crushing their national aspirations. These sobering voices of warning and condemnation have not been limited to the Algerians. The newspaper L'Express, which reflects the views of Mr. Mendes-France, stated in its issue of 22 December 1955 that the Algerian drama was the result of:

"the criminal policy which the Government conducts in the name of France. This policy is one of naked, collective and blind repression which has succeeded in arousing the whole Algerian people against our country."

Mr. Mendes-France referred to this French policy of pacification in L'Express of 9 November 1956. He said that this "so-called prerequisite for the re-establishment of order has been a fiasco. It is clear today that the chances of a peaceful settlement of the Algerian conflict are far less than they were a year ago, more than they were six months before. But there does exist a prerequisite, an honest effort to arrive at a reconciliation and definite proof given by us that this is our sole aim. This implies a total revision of our local policy, of our administration, of the men who are in charge and the renunciation of the methods of Government and of repression which arouses against us even those upon whose friendship we could still count yesterday."

What is most discouraging in this respect, however, is the change which has developed in the attitude of some of the French leaders once those leaders, who so strongly condemned this policy of repression and pacification, arrive at a position to do something about it. Perhaps some of the sternest of such warnings and the strongest of condemnations came from some of the leaders who are at present in charge of the drafting of French Government policy. The French Premier on a number of occasions condemned this policy. He wrote in L'Espoir de Pas de Calais late in December 1955:

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

"The first duty of the Government will be to re-establish peace. Each day more of our young men fall and mothers and wives wonder what can we do. First of all, put a stop to the lies, avoid repetition of the mistakes of Indo-China, of Tunisia and Morocco. We must also stop this insane and blind repression. The men of these countries once asked only to be Frenchmen, our equals, in a Republic really based on liberty, equality and fraternity. They believed in this. We have lied to them. They believe no longer."

One wonders how could it be that the French Premier could not accept his very own advice. How is it possible that within two months of the publication of those words of admission and advice, Mr. Mollet embarks on a policy which breaks and does offence to them? His own words and contradictory acts seem to explain better than anything else why the Algerians lost faith in France and can trust it no more. The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Pineau, according to the Paris Presse of 27 July 1955, also spoke words of wisdom then about the use of force as an instrument of policy. Such was his wise counsel. He said:

"There are many French who see the use of force as the sole means for ending our troubles in North Africa. What do they actually mean? Not an operation to maintain order, of which the only objective is to ensure the safety of persons or property, but offensive stands against the native population intended to intimidate them and to subjugate them, since one has given up trying to convince them. It is the use of force in the sense intended when French planes bombard a native village on the pretext that the population has shown some sympathy for the rebels or when Europeans are permitted to attack the natives without police interference. In Indo-China the failure of this method has been complete. Hatred was stronger than fear and the Viet-Minh found the best of their elements in the areas which we believed had been subjugated by our brutality. In reality, the use of force creates an embroilment from which it is impossible to withdraw. Has France the means to employ force over a longer period, not only in Algeria but in all the overseas territories? Can she contemplate a rule for others by terror over millions of men while assuring security of her own frontiers and maintaining her economic and financial equilibrium? Actually, <sup>when</sup> one wants to employ force, one

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

must commence by having it under pain of becoming not only odious but, which is equally grave, ridiculous rodomontades and understand that the era of conquest and violence is finished for us."

It was words like this which gave some people hope when the Socialists took control of the French Government at the beginning of 1956. But look at the situation today as compared with the time when those words were printed. The military force, which was around 150,000 then, has almost quadrupled now.

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

The nature of the atrocities and terrorist acts of this overwhelming military force may be gleaned from the following report. A number of French liberals called on Mr. Robert Lacoste in connexion with the Government's pacification policy and the atrocities inflicted on the Algerian people. According to the newspaper Témoignage Chrétien of 26 June 1956 those atrocities were referred to as "certain crimes of French soldiers which would make your hair stand on end".

This is the French policy which united the Algerian people, as nothing else could, behind their fighting leadership. This is the policy which reveals the real feelings of the French. This is the policy which served as a decisive test to lead many Algerians who trusted France to turn away in horror and disgust. This is the policy that awakened those Algerians who thought they were French to the fact that the process had been superficial and that there was no honour or glory in severing one's ties with one's race and national heritage. This is the policy which truly made the Algerian people more determined than ever to put an end to a seemingly perpetual age of oppression and of terror. This is the policy which contributed to the superior courage and fighting power of the Algerian patriots. This is the policy which won them fame and sympathy throughout the world. This is the policy which requires the United Nations to discuss the situation in Algeria with a view to putting an end to the war and its threat to international peace and security.

No one can pretend today that a state of war does not exist in Algeria. It would be ridiculous to assert that what necessitated the mobilization of the French army and the build-up of some 600,000 French troops in Algeria was not a big and devastating war. Its bigness may be gauged from its daily cost, which is about \$3 million. Its seriousness may be understood from the fact that the French troops were transferred to Algeria at the risk of weakening the defence and security of France itself and of Western Europe. The story of the damage and destruction is one that may never be told in full.

Although the exact number of casualties has never been revealed, what is known in that connexion justifies every effort by the United Nations to bring an end to this catastrophic war. In connexion with the number of casualties, our attention has been drawn to a Reuters report from Algiers which gives further insight into the intolerable cleavage between the Algerians and the colonists, and the depth of that cleavage. The report in question appeared in The New York Times of 5 August 1956, and it stated that the French military authorities would stop publishing figures of insurgents killed in Algeria. The official reason for the ban was stated to be because "a daily list of Algerians killed would shock French public opinion since the Government has been resolving to pacify Algeria". Can anything be more brutal than this explanation, which was so considerate of the sensibilities of those who might be shocked by the extent of the daily slaughter of the Algerians, but had no concern whatsoever for the sensibilities of the second class of French citizenry who provide the heads for the daily slaughter? Can anything be more contemptible and disgusting than such a pretentious sense of finesse and delicacy towards one class of Frenchmen and an utterly inhuman attitude towards the sensibilities of the other class? Does not this explanation -- no matter how one may wish to look at it -- reveal the inner feeling of these Frenchmen and the genuine relationship which, in their hearts, exists between them and the Algerian people whom they are trying to convince that they are their fellow citizens.

The second reason advanced by the French authorities, according to Reuters, was that "the figures might help the nationalists who are accusing France of carrying out an extermination campaign with its 400,000 soldiers in Algeria". Indeed, the nationalists need not make any accusations at all. The French authorities themselves have recognized how shocked their countrymen would be if the true figures were to become known to the French people -- that is to the real French people. This is a frank and unqualified admission of how very disturbing would be the disclosure of the correct figures. The nationalists need make no further assertions to prove the existence of an extermination campaign against the Algerian people. The French authorities have confirmed it in such an emphatic, though disgusting, manner as the nationalists could never hope to equal.

Despite all that, however, two official lists of casualties were released by the French during the past six weeks which confirmed that reliable figures could not be expected from French officials. On 3 January 1957 The New York Times printed a Reuters dispatch from Algiers which stated:

"French forces killed 18,060 Algerian rebels during 1956 and lost 2,435 of their own men, it was announced here tonight. About 614 European civilians were known to have been killed during the same period."

According to The New York Times of 7 December 1956:

"Robert Lacoste, Minister Residing in Algeria, denounced today the 'enormous lies' spread in the United States and elsewhere against France's action in Algeria ...

"The Minister also countered a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri T. Shepilov to the United Nations November 19, according to which 48,000 Algerians had been killed by French troops.

"M. Lacoste declared that from November 1, 1954, when the rebellion broke out, until October 30, 1956, the rebels had lost 16,450. He gave no casualty figures for the French."

There is a third official list published in Paris on 18 October 1955.

According to The New York Times that list gave the number of rebels killed from 1 November 1954 to 30 September 1955 as 2,176. When we add the number of rebels killed in 1956, which appeared in the first list, to the number of those killed from the beginning of the war until 30 September 1955, which appeared in the third list, we arrive at a total of 20,236 killed in the period of twenty-three months from the time the war began until the end of 1956, excluding the months of October to December 1955, for which no figures are known.

How can this figure tally with that given by Mr. Lacoste, who stated that the number killed from the beginning of the war until 30 October 1956, a period of twenty-four months, was only 16,450?. There can be no explanation for this discrepancy in the two totals -- a discrepancy which amounts to 4,000 -- unless the French authorities wish to state officially that that was the number of rebels killed during November and December of 1956. That is the trouble with the official figures; they are contradictory and confusing, as is everything official about the French policy in Algeria.

The Algerians estimate the number of killed in their ranks since the beginning of the war as over 50,000. This figure cannot be very far from correct since the French officials themselves admit that 18,000 Algerian patriots were killed in one year.

While speaking of official casualties, may I draw attention also to the large number of Algerians who have been kept in gaol thus contributing further to the hardship and disintegration of the Algerian native society. According to Mr. Lacoste, 600 Algerian political prisoners were to be released as a New Year's goodwill gesture. He indicated that that would reduce the number of political prisoners by some 6 to 7 per cent. That proportion places the minimum number of Algerians in prison admitted by the French authorities at some 10,000, against none of whom any criminal charges exist.

Another important figure which reflects the extensiveness of this campaign is its cost in money. In a story published by The New York Herald Tribune of 26 July 1956 about the vote of confidence won by the French Government in connexion with the civil budget, the newspaper stated:

"The Algerian rebellion is reported to have cost surprisingly high 250,000,000,000 francs (\$720,000,000) for the first six month of 1956." That is, around \$120 million a month, or \$4 million a day.

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

It should be recalled that, for most of that period, the size of the French army in Algeria was less than half its present size.

These figures tell the story of this war of extermination in Algeria more emphatically and realistically than words ever could. Four million dollars a day are being spent on acts of destruction of Algerian life and property.

Is it realistic to contend that the United Nations is not competent to deal with racist wars of annihilation and devastation? Is it realistic to tell France to carry on? Is it realistic to overlook the fact that this situation has grown in intensity and gravity and has become a genuine threat to international peace and security?

In the light of that background of the situation, in the light of the size and extent of the conflict, the question arises: Why is the war still raging, and what are the contentions of the parties?

The position of the Algerians may be summed up very simply. They say that the French invaded their country and have been exploiting the country and its people for the last 127 years. At the end of that period, the Algerian people found themselves in an intolerable position. Having sought in vain, by all peaceful means, the rectification of their grievances against France, they finally rebelled. The Algerian people insist that France should recognize their right to self-determination. That is one of the basic rights recognized in the United Nations Charter; it is a right of which the Algerians have been unjustly deprived for a very long time. The right to self-determination naturally embodies the right to independence. The Algerian people are prepared and anxious to negotiate a settlement with France on that basis. Upon the recognition by France of the Algerians' right to self-determination and independence, negotiations could be started -- under the auspices of the United Nations or otherwise -- between the French Government and the representatives of the Algerian people for a cease fire and an expression of self-determination.

The main points in the French position may perhaps be dealt with more systematically on the lines put forward by the French Premier on 9 January 1957. On that date, the French Premier said that the legal situation admitted of no equivocation, that the drama which was tearing Algeria apart was a French drama. We have, in fact, seen that the legal argument does not hold water. Neither can we

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

accept the conclusion that the drama is entirely French. Or perhaps the drama is French, and so are its directors; but its subjects -- the main party concerned, the Algerian people -- certainly do not accept that characterization. They reject and dispute the characterization; and it is exactly that rejection which is the crux of the matter.

France wants the Algerian people to be regarded as Frenchmen, in order to dispose of the cause of the trouble in France's own way. The Algerians feel that they have had enough of this in 125 years and are anxious to develop their own national being, in the same, natural way as other peoples have done. No reflection is being cast by anyone in connexion with the fact that the Algerians decline to be regarded as French. We do not live any longer in a world where the nationals of one country are superior or inferior to the nationals of another. On the contrary, when a whole people becomes instrumental in subordinating and eliminating its national character, culture and heritage, that people may be deemed to be as unworthy of the new as it was of the old.

The facts must be kept straight. We have been accused of upholding the views of the extremists. We feel that we are upholding the views of the overwhelming majority of the Algerian people. No one can accuse the pro-French Algerians, members of the Algerian Assembly and deputies in the French National Assembly of being extremists. On 26 September 1955, the overwhelming majority of the Algerian Assembly signed a historic document, along with ten out of fifteen Moslem deputies in the French National Assembly, five out of a total of seven Moslem members of the French Senate, and four out of seven councillors of the French Union. These Algerians were regarded as representing the last line of defence for France in Algeria. In that document, the signatories -- in addition to denouncing and formally condemning the blind policy of repression -- state:

"Having analysed the underlying reasons of the present trouble, they formally affirm that they are essentially of a political nature. Thus, they are led to ascertain that the said policy of integration, which was never sincerely applied in spite of the reiterated demands of the members of the second college, is no longer acceptable. The large majority of the population is now won to the idea of an Algerian nation. As loyal interpreters of this wish, the undersigned deem it their duty to direct their action towards the realization of this aspiration."

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

That is the declaration of the pro-French Moslem Algerians, the French authorities' hand-picked representatives of the Algerian people. It is they who have pronounced that integration is dead. It is these pro-French representatives who have asserted that the large majority of the Algerian people stands for the idea of an Algerian nation -- the negation of the theory that Algeria is an integral part of France, that Algerians are Frenchmen and that the boundaries of Algeria are the boundaries of France. The Foreign Minister of France, who laid so much stress on the question of representation, cannot disown this group of Algerian representatives or describe their views as extremist or excessive. These pro-French Algerian representatives do not share the Foreign Minister's view that they are genuine Frenchmen and that the boundaries of their country -- Algeria -- are the boundaries of France.

It is important to note in this connexion that even official French thinking is progressing in this direction. France's theory that Algeria is an integral part of France -- a theory on which French officials strongly insisted in 1954 -- has gradually given way to a recognition by the Government of the individuality and personality of Algeria. The French Premier himself has been using these terms. If we connect this with the fact that assimilation was never meant to be complete -- as is evident from the various and continuing discriminatory practices as between the Algerians and the French -- we reach the conclusion that there never was a genuine integration and assimilation. Hence, Algeria was never in fact an integral part of France. Even legally, France cannot claim the existence of this integration, because the French authorities themselves never implemented it. On the contrary, they were the very ones who undermined its foundations.

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

The French, who obstructed its implementation, cannot speak now of its existence. Consequently, they cannot rely on it as a ground to prove the lack of competence of the General Assembly.

Reference has been made to Algeria's individual character and to the problem of ensuring the coexistence of its two communities without either one being able to oppress the other. One can readily agree with the principle of coexistence, if it is fair and just. One also must not overlook in passing the origin of the two communities, one being the Algerians, the indigenous inhabitants of the country, and the other mainly French, a community which went into Algeria to exploit the country to the complete disadvantage of the Algerian community. It is important to remember how these two communities were made to exist for 127 years under a type of coexistence that the French Government has nurtured and maintained by force. One is tempted to think that perhaps it is an unclear conscience about the maintenance of such an unjust and oppressive existence for the Algerians that has made the French afraid that the Algerian people might respond in kind towards their exploiters and oppressors.

There is no need for France to harbour any fears on this score. This very argument is already shabby and unbecoming. They used it with much drama and emphasis to discredit any thought of granting Tunisia and Morocco their independence. They sought to disparage the ability of these two sister States to practice tolerance and administer justice. No one can say that Tunisia and Morocco have failed to justify the world's confidence in this or any other respect.

No one here could disagree about the need of securing the rights and interests of all the people of Algeria, but no one could advocate the granting of the privilege to any minority to veto the right of the majority for self-determination and independence. The representatives of Algeria have repeatedly stated their readiness and determination to grant absolute equality to all the French and European residents of Algeria who opt for Algerian citizenship. They have likewise declared their readiness to work out ways and means to protect and secure the legitimate rights and interests of all those who prefer to retain their French or other European nationalities. Surely no one can advocate greater rights for this minority in Algeria than would accrue to them on the basis of absolute equality with the rest of the Algerian people, or greater privileges than are conferred on minorities in the most liberal of countries.

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

We support this right for absolute individual equality, no more and no less. We have no doubt that the Algerians will honour this undertaking, as their brothers in Tunisia and Morocco have honoured it before them. If it is only a matter of asserting a lack of confidence and mistrust, there is great justification for the Algerians making that assertion. The residents, however, have not given the Algerians a chance. If the assertions of the colons are to be given consideration, the assertions of the Algerians deserve greater consideration, for their assertions are based on fact.

It was very interesting to hear the French leaders stress the point that France will never use force to impose on Algeria the concepts of only one segment of its population, and that they will never allow the Algerians of European origin to abuse their present economic advantages by seeking to exploit the Moslems. One wonders if France recognizes only now that such a policy of imposing concepts on only one segment of the population by force and the exploitation of it by the other is wrong. Is not this an open admission by France of the wickedness of the policy which it has maintained in Algeria during the past 127 years, when it not only allowed the complete exploitation of the Algerians by the colonists, but was a major force behind it. Was it not by sheer force during the past thirteen decades that France imposed the concepts of the French residents on the Algerian people? Such a belated undertaking by the French leaders was another one of numerous others which have been made before to calm nationalist uprisings. Similar promises and undertakings have been made in the past, but they were never kept.

While all of us are in favour of free negotiations and the discussion of this problem between the representatives of France and those of Algeria, we do not understand the French Premier's advocacy of France being in the best position to act as arbiter. How can France maintain the double role of judge and contestant? We were surprised to hear him say that negotiations would have been held and a peaceful solution would have been reached, had it not been for the interference of other nations, who sow hatred and support armed insurrection. With all respect, this assertion is so far-fetched as to sound very absurd. The French have had 127 years to rectify the wrongs which were committed or permitted against the Algerian people. They have had a century and a quarter to choose the time and even the basis for the negotiations. Why did they not hold any negotiations before

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

the nationalists revolted? It was this kind of evasive talk which led the Algerian patriots to give up hope and to seek the attainment of their national aspirations by means other than the outmoded means which have brought them no relief during the past 125 years.

We were very surprised at the remark made by the French Premier that "in the Algerian affair France is the plaintiff, she is even the accuser before the United Nations". We do not feel that the United Nations is a court of law where one side takes the position of a plaintiff against the other, as the defendant, or that one side comes as an accuser and the other as the accused. For our part, I am sure we had no such thoughts at any time. At no time have we approached the problem of Algeria in this spirit or with this aim in mind. Every time my delegation, whether alone or jointly with the Afro-Asian countries, has brought the question of Algeria before the United Nations, our objective has been that, by means of reasonable discussions and diligent deliberations, ways and means might be found to put an end to the current bloodshed by arrangements for negotiations between the French Government and the Algerian people.

It was our hope, as it was in the case of Tunisia and Morocco, that such a reasonable discussion in the General Assembly or in the Security Council would influence the thinking of the French Government and people and make them recognize the legitimate rights and aspirations of the North African territories under French control. It may be recalled that the French Government was just as furious when the questions of Tunisia and Morocco were brought before the United Nations as they were at the last session of the General Assembly in the case of Algeria.

The inclusion of these items was rejected in the Security Council, but from the discussion which ensued later in the Committee and in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly it was evident that no delegation had the intention of accusing France or of harming its interests. It was shown that, despite the resistance of the French Government with regard to the competence of the General Assembly to deal with those problems, the sponsors had complete justification for bringing them for discussion to the General Assembly.

What has taken place in Tunisia and Morocco since the first attempt was made to bring these two items before the United Nations demonstrates in a most convincing manner that the French policy of resisting discussion was completely unjustified. No one can claim with any justification that the improvement which

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(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

has been brought about in Tunisia and Morocco was not due, in a major part, to the concern shown by the United Nations about the situations in those areas. No one could assert that the improvement was contrary to the interests of France. The forces which were unleashed in France to scuttle every attempt by the French Government to inch forward and to meet the legitimate demands of the Tunisian and Moroccan people are still fresh and vivid in our minds.

The concern of the United Nations strengthened the hand of those in France, who saw that it was not in the interests of France in the long run to continue its policy of oppression against the native people, while upholding the selfish interests of the French colonists.

In joining with the fifteen Asian-African delegations in bringing the question of Algeria here, my delegation had the same motives as we had in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco. In the case of Algeria, however, there was greater justification and urgency for United Nations consideration of the problem because of the devastating war which was tearing the country asunder. It was this aspect of the problem which seemed to our delegation to be the over-riding consideration in favour of discussion by the General Assembly of the Algerian question as a matter of extreme urgency.

If we were to adhere to the French proposal of having a plaintiff and a defendant, an accuser and an accused, we do not believe that France would have a chance of being either plaintiff or accuser. It was puzzling how a country could speak so bluntly of military aid to one of the parties to the conflict. Our information indicates that the French allegations that the Algerians were receiving military aid are sheer fabrications. There is abundant evidence that the arms in the hands of the patriots are of French origin and of the NATO type. Furthermore, the markets for small arms such as the Algerian patriots use are very many and are wide open everywhere in Europe. We assume that France, which helped itself to the NATO armaments -- the armaments which were earmarked for the defence of the cause of peace and of Western democracies -- would be the last country to complain about the effect of military aid to the Algerian patriots. For France was converting tremendous quantities of NATO weapons intended for the defence of the cause of freedom and democracy in Western Europe to crush the cause of freedom and liberty in Algeria.

Closely related to this direct source of foreign military aid, which naturally raises the issue of internationalization of the Algerian question, is another indirect source of no lesser military significance. This indirect source centres on the NATO armed forces, which, with a significant French contribution in manpower, are charged with maintaining the defences of Western Europe, including France. France would not have transferred so many of its armed forces to Algeria

had it not been for the presence of other NATO forces in Western Europe. France thus was directly aided in maintaining the defence of its metropolitan area with foreign troops. If it was not for these foreign troops France would not have risked endangering the security of metropolitan France. If France had been deprived of this source of manpower, it could not have transferred so many of its troops to Algeria. Without this huge number of French troops in Algeria the weight and pressure of the nationalist revolution would have been brought to bear on the French Government to reconsider the matter of negotiating a settlement. Thus this aspect of foreign aid is a major factor in determining the course of the conflict in Algeria. It provided direct relief to France in its dual task -- defence at home and war in Algeria. No one can dismiss lightly this international involvement in the Algerian war.

I would like to refer now to the French attitude with regard to the representatives of the Algerian people. It is very discouraging and disquieting, to say the least, It is the same old story, repeated again and again. The French allege that the country is divided, factions are many, opinions are divergent and, consequently, France has no one group representative of the people with which to negotiate. The truth is that this division and the factions and the divergence of opinion are greatly exaggerated. The truth is that France is most anxious to bring about such a situation and to nurture and perpetuate such divisions and factions. This is the sacred colonial practice, French and otherwise. That was precisely the argument which France used in the case of Morocco. Who can forget the emphasis which France laid then on the division of the population and the absence of leadership and rest of that line? It is unnecessary for France now to disparage the aspirations and the leadership of the Algerian people. Indeed, it would seem very remarkable that a fully equipped modern French army of some 600,000 men has not been able to bring to submission the nationalist forces that are allegedly without leadership. If the military might of France in Algeria, at the stupendous cost of \$3 million a day, has failed in twenty-seven months of ruthless military action, massive destruction, wholesale reprisals and collective punishment, to crack up this nationalist movement, the only conclusion that any reasonable person can reach is that, having successfully challenged this overwhelming might of the French Army, these nationalist patriots must be superbly led, organized, provisioned and disciplined. To state that the successful

challenge to this French military might is without leadership is to make these Algerian patriots supermen, super in every respect. It is unworthy of the French not to recognize this valour and courage, this determination and tenacity, this patriotism and sacrifice of the Algerian patriots and people. I have no doubt that they have captured the imagination, admiration and respect of the whole world.

It is a pity that France, which was in a position to know the splendid fibres of which these people are made, has failed to cultivate these inherent outstanding characteristics of the Algerian people, as well as their friendship. How many an opportunity it could have had during the past 125 years if it was not for the obsession of colonialism and the egoism of the French settlers.

Surely no reasonable person would believe that such a movement could be without leadership or that a country of some 10 million impoverished Algerians could maintain such a solidarity under the crushing burdens of such a war if they were not inspired by the loftiness and significance of the battle for liberation and independence and if they did not have absolute faith and confidence in their leaders.

France knows very well who are the real leaders of the Algerian people. It would be most unfortunate if France resorted again to the policy of ignoring the genuine nationalist leaders and representatives in favour of the hirelings under the pretense of the existence of numerous factions. The French Government cannot claim that the Governments of Morocco and Tunisia, the countries which lie on either side of Algeria, are so ignorant of the state of affairs which prevails in their sister State, Algeria, to the extent that they do not know the leaders of the Algerian Nationalist Movement. If we were to go this far, it would become unnecessary to reason at all.

These two neighbouring countries, as is well known, were approached or encouraged by the French Government to intervene with the Algerian leaders to work out an acceptable solution for Algeria. The French Government blessed the endeavour. His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco invited some of these leaders to a conference. The Government of Morocco recognized their leadership and responsibility both in carrying on the war as well as working out a peaceful settlement for the future of Algeria. Both Morocco and Tunisia recognized these leaders.

These leaders, who were the guests of His Majesty the Sultan in October of last year, were on their way to a joint conference in Tunis when the French authorities abducted them in mid-air over international waters. There can be no doubt that if the French were not absolutely sure that those five Algerian leaders represented the mass of the nationalist movement in war as well as in peace, France would not have gone to the extent of committing such an outrageous international blunder as the abduction of the guests of His Majesty the Sultan while His Majesty was undertaking a mediation effort in the interests of France. Indeed, the French official and unofficial boasting that with the arrest of the five leaders the entire resistance movement will crack up is further evidence that the French Government knows very well the leaders and the true representatives of Algeria. The repercussions which followed this outrageous act in Morocco and Tunis, as well as in France, and the reaction to it of the Government and people of several far-away lands refute the French allegations of the non-existence of a leadership in and representatives of the Algerian nationalists. The conduct and utterances of France, both officially and unofficially, tend only to emphasize the extent to which France attempts officially to go in order to keep away from the realities of the situation. Indeed it is very puzzling and difficult to comprehend the contradiction in the utterances and the deeds of the French leaders. This is one factor which tends to reduce any optimistic inclination or ground for hope when other encouraging signs appear.

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

I have in mind, in this respect, a statement of the Premier of France which appeared in Le Populaire, 9 September 1956, where he said:

"In each of the interested countries, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, we must allow a national elite to express itself freely and it is with them that it would be possible to negotiate a treaty of association."

Here were five Algerian leaders who sought nothing but to negotiate with France. Is this the intended meaning of the free expression to which the French Premier referred? Does the free expression of the elite have to flow from behind the prison iron bars in France, and from exiled leaders far from their motherland?

If the will is there on the part of France and it has become convinced of the wisdom and advantages of settling the problem on the basis of negotiation, the process should not be hitched, and the atmosphere should not be rendered more tense than it is at present, on the basis of leadership and representation that has been raised in the circumstances.

Why should France all of a sudden now insist on a perfectionist state of affairs with respect to representation, when it did not permit even a shade of it during its last 125 years of administration in Algeria? Were the Algerian 10 million Moslems, as Frenchmen, fairly represented by fifteen deputies in the National Assembly of 544 deputies representing 40 million Frenchmen? Was it a true and fair representation which allowed the 10 million Algerian Moslems fifteen deputies in the National Assembly while allowing an equal number of fifteen deputies to the one million French residents of Algeria? Was it a fair and democratic representation which allowed the 10 million Moslems an equal number of representatives with the one million of French residents in the Algerian Assembly? Was it a fair and democratic representation which automatically allowed the French residents three-fifths of the seats in city and town councils, while allowing the Moslem Algerians two-fifths of the seats, even when the Algerians constitute the overwhelming majority in the community?

Were those true representatives of the Algerian people whose election was brought about, according to responsible French authorities, whereby the voter "must be told how to fill in his voting paper, and if he chooses wrong in spite

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

of that, we must be able to correct the results."? (Herbert Luethy, "France Against Herself", p. 249). Were those true representatives of the Algerian people who received 800 votes out of a total of 500 electors, or 862 votes out of a total of 372 electors?

This inequality in the representation of the so-called two communities was imposed by France under French constitutional and legislative processes. That sort of election was not supervised by the Algerians but by the French Government and authorities. This state of affairs has been going on in Algeria for decades. This has been rather the state of affairs which has been imposed on Algeria by force during all that time.

I did not bring out these facts for the purpose of criticism. I brought them out merely to show that if such an atrocious state of affairs was not merely tolerated, but imposed and maintained, by the French Government for so long, then surely they could tolerate an Algerian representation now which is not 100 per cent perfect, for the purpose of negotiating a peaceful settlement.

No one would say that normally, any representation could be better than one resulting from truly free and correct elections. That would be the case under normal circumstances, but unfortunately that is not possible under the present circumstances in Algeria. Furthermore, it is inconceivable to normalize the situation without greatly prejudicing the position of the Algerian nationalists. The insistence on such a procedure would only reveal the lack of good faith on the part of the French Government. It would confirm that the Government is using it merely as a pretext, and that it has no desire really to negotiate on the basis of equality. On the contrary the insistence on this procedure implies the rejection of the principles of settlement on the basis of negotiated agreement, because it makes the bases for the negotiations entirely unreasonable and unjust.

Nor could anyone find disagreement, normally, with the principle of a cease-fire to precede the negotiated settlement. One finds much justification, however, for the position taken by the Algerians, under the present circumstances. If the cease-fire is to come first, then the elections and finally the negotiations, what would be the position of the Algerians if the French Government should balk

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

at the negotiations and refuse to grant any of the demands of the nationalists? What recourse will the latter have? Their fighting set-up will have been liquidated.

We return to the same old story and the position which existed before this rebellion started. Surely one must keep a balance between what is normally legitimate and correct and what is justified in the circumstances. Everyone knows that, if the French proposition is accepted, the fighting force of the nationalists would be liquidated even before elections are held. One cannot in all fairness call on the nationalists to lay down their arms, when their opponents maintain in the country an armed force of some 600,000 men.

While on this point it may be appropriate to address a question to the French delegation and to those delegations who support its view that elections shall be held three months after the cease-fire.

In the event that such a development should come about, is France prepared to declare that it will honour the majority views of those elected representatives, freely arrived at? Is France prepared to declare that if the majority of the representatives should stand for the independence of Algeria and relationships with France similar to those which are being negotiated between France and Morocco, and between France and Tunisia, that France will honour that stand and will agree to negotiate a settlement on that basis? Or does it mean that those elected representatives will have to limit their choice to alternative proposals advanced by France?

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

The answers to these questions might be very helpful; now in the circumstances they are unavoidable. A great deal has been said and published about what the French propose to introduce in the way of reforms in Algeria. The French Premier, and again the Foreign Minister of France, spoke liberally of these alleged reforms. If one is to consider these reforms in the light of French official and unofficial statements about their intended effectiveness and in the light of similar reforms previously promised, one will find it unnecessary even to look into the proposed reforms. One of these statements was made by the former French Premier, Mr. Mendes-France, and was published in L'Express on 9 November 1956. He said:

"The latest declaration by the President of the Council with regard to this issue is deceptive. It is no longer today a question of making promises for a far distant future. Such promises, made and broken too often in the past, are not listened to by the Algerian population. The time has passed for empty words; it is the time for action, immediate and decisive, which alone can evoke the confidence of a population which suffers in its dignity and has lost all faith in us."

Another was made by the former Governor-General of Algeria, Mr. Soustelle, according to Le Monde of 10 January 1957. He said:

"Algeria is fed up with declarations, promises and plans and knows only too well that the instability of our political system makes such declarations meaningless."

If that is not authoritative enough, perhaps the following will leave no doubt about the position of the French Government on the matter. The New York Times of 12 December 1956 carried a story about the French Government's decision to dissolve Algeria's City Councils because they are automatically European-controlled. The Europeans have a statutory right to three-fifths of the seats and the Arabs to two-fifths. The Mayors of eighty-two cities revolted, according to the story, and warned the Government that if that decision were carried out it would result in the loss of Algeria. At a meeting, the Mayors heard the report of a delegation sent to Paris to put their views before the French Government. Here is what The New York Times wrote about that report:

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

"Claude Lecoq, a member of the delegation, said that Mr. Lacoste in private conversation had described the Government's decision as heresy. Another member of the delegation, Henri Paretaud, reported that Premier Guy Mollet had explained the decision by saying that the Government had to do something constructive for display at the United Nations so as to win favourable votes and the abstention of the United States on the Algerian issue."

There is enough in these utterances of responsible French leaders to explain why the Algerians have revolted. There is indeed enough, enough to explain why the Algerians and even the French no longer believe in them. If that is the reaction of responsible French leaders about promises and reforms, who could blame the Algerian nationalists if they rejected them? For 125 years they have been forced to swallow this line; after every uprising they have been forced to be content with these and other similar promises that were never fulfilled.

There is, however, in the statements of the French Premier and of Mr. Lacoste an important disclosure of great significance for the United Nations. It shows that the concern of the United Nations has forced the hand of the Government and has made it do something even if it is only for display, which the Government, in the face of the colonist's position, have been unable to do. It shows that this United Nations concern is being used by the Government as an argument to dislodge the colonists from the rigid position from which the Government failed to move them in the past despite its earlier utterances of determination to do so. If the Government is therefore sincerely desirous of seeking a peaceful settlement in Algeria, it should not object to the role being played by the United Nations in bringing about such a settlement, because the task of preparing for a settlement is being facilitated by the harmonizing role played by the United Nations. This is one development, already evident and admitted, which refutes the French Government's argument against the competence of the General Assembly and which, on the other hand, justifies our action in bringing the Algerian question to the United Nations.

I shall now briefly address myself to the question of competence. The main ground on which the French delegation attempts to base its argument against discussion of the Algerian question by the United Nations is that Algeria, since

1834, has formed an integral part of metropolitan France. The representative of France used this argument at the last session of the General Assembly and has used it in the Security Council, and continues to insist on it now. France feels that the whole question falls within its domestic jurisdiction. During the last session of the General Assembly, and in the course of the last few meetings of this Committee, arguments, facts and figures have been advanced to refute this main premise of the French argument. For the sake of brevity, I shall not repeat those arguments. One can, however, sum up all those features on which France attempts to base its case that Algeria is an integral part of France in four words -- "It is sheer fiction". France has been using this legal umbrella and has been hiding under it all the laws and practices which most violently refute the existence of such a relationship. It is evident that the French position, the technical and the allegedly legal defence behind which it desires to reserve for itself complete freedom of action in Algeria, is a shield for warding off United Nations competence. The weakness of the facts on which the French argument is based has been emphasized repeatedly during the past two years by French Government policies and French official and unofficial utterances.

The French Government has dissolved all the governmental representative bodies in Algeria in recognition of the fact that in them the representation was farcical. Statements and promises were made on numerous occasions to the effect that the shameful basis of inequality of citizenship, representation and association between Algeria and France had been retained much too long, but there is now more confusion in France than at any other time in the past as to just how far the French people are prepared to remove the barriers which have been making Algeria both constitutionally and administratively so glaringly unlike any other part of France. The vagueness in the Government's position regarding the rectification of these matters and the reaction of the various political parties and factions to these proposals is amply proved when they admit that what they allege has existed all along did not in fact exist at any time. They do not even know whether they would be prepared to effect it now if afforded the opportunity.

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

So it becomes absurd to keep harping on this "integral part" theory that Algerians are Frenchmen like the French. The facts speak for themselves and so do the admissions of French official and unofficial leaders. Making the Algerian question a matter of French domestic jurisdiction on such grounds, and barring the competence of the General Assembly on that basis, has no justification in fact whatsoever. On the contrary, all the facts tend to show that Algeria is in fact a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter.

At the tenth session I pointed out to the General Assembly how often France itself has classified Algeria as a non-self-governing Territory. That is evident from the classification of the African territories in the Statistical Yearbook put out by the United Nations as non-self-governing territories to which the domestic jurisdiction clause, Article 2(7), does not apply.

The General Assembly is competent to discuss the question of Algeria and to make recommendations to the parties on a number of grounds, some of which will stand irrespective of what has been said in connexion with the "integral part of France" theory. One of those grounds is on the basis of Article 35, in that the situation in Algeria is one of which the continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of France opposed the inclusion of the Algerian question on the agenda of the Security Council on the ground that the situation in Algeria was not one of a nature likely to lead to international friction or the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

The French Premier, however, spoke emphatically, on 9 January, of the existence of such international friction between his country and a number of other countries, arising from the situation in Algeria. He attributed it to the upholding by the other countries of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence.

He is, of course, in the best position to know how France feels. The French Premier expressed the feeling of France and left no doubt about the existence of that international friction.

That the continuance of that international friction was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security was amply illustrated and confirmed by the French aggression against Egypt last November. It has become a matter of common knowledge -- and the international press has referred to this repeatedly -- that one of the main reasons why France conspired with the United Kingdom and Israel in launching the aggression against Egypt was to get even with Egypt with regard to Algeria. It might be said that that was not the only reason, but certainly it was an important one. The French were disturbed by the moral support which they say was supplied to the Algerian patriots by the Voice of the Arabs and other radio stations. It was the friction engendered by the French attitude on this matter that was responsible in no small degree for the tripartite aggression against Egypt -- or, at least, for France's role in it. No one can underrate the greater threat to international peace and security which that act of aggression posed.

It becomes evident that the French Premier's own assertions, in the absence of all other grounds to substantiate the competence of the United Nations, are sufficient to confirm the competence of both the Security Council and the General Assembly within the meaning of Article 11, paragraph 2, and Articles 34 and 35, of the Charter.

In line with that argument, reference should also be made to the French authorities' abduction of the five Algerian nationalist leaders who were guests of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco. That action on the part of France at once impaired the friendly relations which existed between it, on the one hand, and Morocco and Tunisia, on the other. There was a disruption of the diplomatic

(Mr. Dejanya, Saudi Arabia)

relations between these States and France, which were not resumed, in the case of Tunisia, until some two weeks ago. In the case of Morocco, the Foreign Minister was seeking adjudication of the matter before the International Court of Justice. The reaction of the other Arab countries to this act and the friction which it engendered in their relations with France has been referred to. It is important to keep in mind that the friction of which Article 34 speaks is not one which should necessarily be immediate and result as a consequence of a certain policy, action or inaction. It is friction which might gain momentum gradually as a result of a series of such acts and policies. The effect of such acts will accordingly have to be viewed in the light of the whole state of affairs prevailing.

It follows that many of the acts and utterances relating to Algeria, which ordinarily, and in themselves, might be of little significance, will acquire great significance when the groundwork for them has been laid. The situation in Algeria has reached that stage at which the acts and utterances are continually adding to the sharpness and heat of the friction.

In fact, irrespective of the individual feeling of the countries which object to the French policy in Algeria, or of those countries which sponsored the inclusion of the Algerian item in the agenda, the bitter words of the French Premier, spoken on 9 January, in regard to the States which he called prejudiced and whose judgement, in his view, is of little value, are proof of the deep feelings engendered by the Algerian situation and of how that situation has charged and intensified the atmosphere of international relations.

One can also say, in connexion with the location of Algeria in relation to Morocco and Tunisia, and in the light of the racial, religious and cultural ties between them, and in view of the pacification campaign conducted by the French army against the Algerians, that it would be unrealistic to expect Morocco and Tunisia not to show grave concern about the situation in Algeria, or to expect those two sister States to be able to control the activities of their nationals in relation to the Algerian nationalists. It would be ridiculous to recognize the interest of France in Algeria to the exclusion of its neighbouring sister States, Tunisia and Morocco. Surely, peace and security in Algeria are of no lesser importance to them than to France, although for different reasons. The French

policy in Algeria indirectly affects the peace and security of Tunisia and Morocco. The recent utterances of the French Premier and others about the attitude of Tunisia and Morocco to Algeria are further proof that the situation in Algeria could no longer be localized or viewed as being solely within the domestic jurisdiction of France.

It is a fact that France itself has recognized the impossibility of maintaining a monopoly over what goes on in Algeria, now that Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria's immediate neighbours, have become independent. France has recognized the right and interest of these two States in the development of a peaceful settlement of the Algerian question. Mr. Mendes-France said on 9 November 1956, according to L'Express: "Algeria is exactly this: a common problem facing France, Morocco and Tunisia". Surely any problem which is admittedly a common problem of three independent States could not be construed as being essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France.

Professor André Philip, member of the Executive Committee of the French Socialist Party, sheds further light on the international aspects of the Algerian question as they were accentuated by the French abduction of the five Algerian leaders. In his article in Le Monde of 28-29 October 1956, we read:

"On the other hand, our relations with Morocco and Tunisia have been seriously aggravated ... A popular revolt, extremely difficult to canalize, threatens to erupt. This revolt endangers the very existence of those Frenchmen residing in these countries and could oblige us to resort to armed intervention to assure their protection. We thus risk being dragged into new military operations aimed at a reconquest of Morocco and Tunisia. We may well ask if this was not the real goal of those responsible for this act...".

No one can overlook the implications of this analysis in the light of what is known about the background of this plot. It is evident that the repercussions of what goes on in Algeria have become international and can no longer be said to remain within the domestic jurisdiction of France.

The General Assembly should therefore concern itself with formulating ways and means which will bring about, by peaceful means, the realization of the national

aspirations of the Algerian people, in accordance with the purposes and provisions of the Charter, by affording them an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination, which includes the right to independence. In this manner the United Nations will put an end to a situation which is increasingly endangering the maintenance of international peace and security.

One of the Articles of the Charter which ensure the General Assembly's competence is Article 10. It has often been referred to as the key to the whole role of the General Assembly. It authorizes the General Assembly to "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter... and... make recommendations...". That scope of the Charter includes the preamble and the principles embodied in it, as well as the Articles. Many representatives and commentators have said that it is difficult to think of a single matter within the sphere of international relations, or affecting relations between States, which cannot be brought within the scope of these comprehensive purposes. I shall not elaborate further, because of the lateness of the hour, on the application of this Article.

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

The General Assembly can act also under Article 14. This Article declares the General Assembly competent to discuss and recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.

Most of what was said in connexion with international friction under Articles 34 and 35 is equally applicable under Article 14. Situations which might lead to international friction, and situations whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, are surely situations that are likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.

This Article also includes situations resulting from violations of the provisions of the Charter, which naturally include the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Almost every situation which has been discussed by the General Assembly since the establishment of the United Nations and to which objections were raised under Article 2 (7) was admitted on the basis of Article 10 or Article 14, or both. In some instances they constituted the main authority for Assembly action; in others, they served to provide additional support. On the whole, they have been given a very wide and liberal interpretation.

There are other grounds for removing the Algerian question from the purview of Article 2 (7). There is the view that matters within domestic jurisdiction cease to be "essentially" so if they have international repercussions, even though they do not constitute an existing threat to peace. The international repercussions of the war in Algeria are quite obvious from what I have already stated.

Another ground which weakens the argument of domestic jurisdiction could be formulated on the basis of the development of international relations. In its famous Advisory Opinion in relation to the Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, the Permanent Court of International Justice laid down a general principle for determining domestic jurisdiction. It said that whether or not a particular question is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State is essentially a relative question depending on the development of international relations; that actions which would have been quite permissible a hundred years ago would today be considered an outrage against international law.

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

This principle was elaborated upon in the Ad Hoc Political Committee during the discussion of the item of racial discrimination in South Africa by the Foreign Minister of Sweden at the seventh session of the General Assembly. He gave the pertinent illustration of how colonial questions which were, in principle, domestic matters of the administering Powers some years ago had now acquired international character.

It has become a recognized and an established practice in the United Nations that the domestic jurisdiction clause should not be interpreted to render other Articles ineffective in matters which create international repercussions. That was the sense of the majority in most of the cases which were challenged on the grounds of Article 2 (7).

These are some of the arguments which affirm the competence of the General Assembly in the Algerian question beyond any doubt. We do not see how it would be possible to refute them all. We have no doubt that the General Assembly is competent. The precedents do not leave any grounds for hesitation. If the General Assembly is to be consistent, and if the rule of law which emerges from the process of precedents is not to be undermined, then surely the challenge of competence would be rejected. In these circumstances the General Assembly is duty-bound to act.

In conclusion, we would like to stress that it is not for us here to assess the contributions which France alleges it has made in Algeria. Nor is it for us to decide how the Algerian people should react to the promised political and economic reforms in Algeria. That is not our function. It is as difficult to assess the alleged past contributions as it is to place any weight on future promises.

The Algerian people is the only people to decide these matters for itself. Our attention should not be distracted from the main issue by past accomplishments or promised developments. United Nations concern should not be shifted from the process of pacification unleashed by the French Government and armed forces to suppress and influence the right of the Algerian people to decide these matters for **itself**. This is the core of the Algerian problem. The Algerians have expressed themselves emphatically, through the representatives of the Algerian people who were picked by France as well as through the present leaders of the nationalist movement.

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

Those issues are, therefore, secondary. The primary issue is the bloody clash between the Algerians, who insist on making their own choice, and the French, who, by force, are trying to dictate to the Algerians what their choice should be. That is the primary cause of the revolution and the war which is widespread in Algeria.

It is not befitting to attribute this unified will and determination of the Algerian people for self-determination and independence to communist influences. In spite of what many peoples may think of communism, there are many other peoples who will be greatly impressed by the backing and support of that or any other movement for the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, liberty and freedom. Such an approach to a nationalistic movement at this time is not advisable. It is not in the interests of either of the parties concerned; nor is it, indeed, in the interests of peace or the United Nations.

My delegation does not agree with those who label our approach as one which will endanger the common relations and interests of France and Algeria. We do not advocate any such prospect. We only insist that France recognize the right of the Algerian people itself to decide upon the nature of those relations and interests and how best they may be secured. We believe that it is in the interests of France to minimize the elements of discord and mistrust in its approach to this problem.

It would be no victory for France to rely on force to bring about a settlement or to influence such a settlement. France would be repeating the same mistakes of the past seventy-five years of its administration of Algeria; it would be only a matter of degree. The more just and liberal the French approach to the problem, the stronger and steadier would be the basis of its future friendship and relationship with Algeria. The alternative would, perhaps, be as Professor Raymond Aaron has put it before the Council for Atlantic Union. According to Le Monde of 18 November 1956 he said:

"If we persist obstinately in continuing our present policy, we are heading for a national catastrophe of such proportions that the Treaty of Paris of 1763 will seem glorious in comparison."

(Mr. Dejany, Saudi Arabia)

The General Assembly is not being called upon to intervene in the domestic affairs of France. The General Assembly is being urged to contribute its moral influence to the termination of a situation which has led to grave instances of international friction, and which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace.

(Mr. DeJany, Saudi Arabia)

The General Assembly is being urged to contribute to the termination of a reign of terror in Algeria, and to the realization by the Algerian people of the exercise of the right of self-determination in accordance with the spirit and provisions of the Charter.

The General Assembly cannot turn its eyes away from the realities of the Algerian question. It cannot overlook the way in which the conflict has developed and grown during the past two years. It cannot ignore the consequences which that development can have for Algeria, France and international peace and security. It cannot overlook the possible future aggravation and intensification of the development of these and all other aspects of the situation. The General Assembly will be failing in its responsibilities if it does not uphold the purposes and provisions of the Charter with respect to the question of Algeria.

Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia): Although the question of Algeria is not new, in the sense that the militant struggle for liberation has been waged there since 1 November 1954, and in the sense that the question was brought to the United Nations for its consideration as early as July 1955, this is the first time that this Organization is seriously examining the Algerian problem, which is of such vital concern not only to the peoples directly involved, but also to the peoples of the whole world, who wish to see peace and freedom restored to that area.

My delegation is therefore grateful that the question of Algeria is now finally receiving the attention and concern it deserves. We are also happy to have the opportunity, this time, to hear the views of the French delegation, a party intimately concerned with this question. Certainly, this can only operate towards a better understanding of the issues involved and, eventually, towards the restoration of peace in that area of the world.

The entire background of this question and the events presently transpiring in that unhappy country have been comprehensively and brilliantly analyzed in the statements made by the representative of Syria and other representatives who have preceded me in this debate. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister of France has given us his Government's views on the situation in Algeria. Mr. Pineau told us of the reforms for Algeria planned by his Government. He spoke about Algeria's special status, about the French thesis of pacification and about his Government's

(Mr. Hanifah, Indonesia)

basic principles for a solution of the Algerian question. In general terms, Mr. Pineau also touched upon the question of nationalism and its place in the modern world.

As regards the reforms in Algeria, we should have been happy to hear about them fifty years ago, and even twenty years ago. If there is anything in Mr. Pineau's statement with which my delegation can wholeheartedly agree, it is that reforms in Algeria should have been undertaken earlier -- much earlier. But to speak about reforms now, to speak about reforms when the people are asking for the right of self-determination, is not only a sad confession of past neglect, but also a dangerous blindness to the spirit of freedom and liberty sweeping across Asia and Africa. Surely, it is nothing less than self-destructive to remain insensible to the fact that the time has come to dismantle and discard the obsolete, discredited colonial machinery in Algeria, as in other parts of the world, instead of trying to patch that machinery up and make it seem respectable with reforms, when the people are demanding the right to govern themselves in freedom.

It may be true that reforms are needed in Algeria -- indeed, they are needed generally in countries which have long suffered under colonial rule. But it may be asked why such reforms should not be carried out by an independent, sovereign Algeria, with the friendly co-operation and assistance of the community of nations, and, in particular, France. It was, however, in defence of the continuance of French colonialism in Algeria that Mr. Pineau made the statement to this Committee that, on the economic level, France could if necessary live without Algeria, but Algeria could not live without France. It is indeed unfortunate still to hear such a statement in this day and age -- all the more when such a statement is made in the United Nations, where efforts are being made to promote economic co-operation and assistance among independent and sovereign nations for the general well-being of this inter-dependent world. This United Nations way is, in our opinion, the enlightened and present-day way of conducting relations among equal peoples, and it is the only way consistent with the dignity of the human personality, as laid down in the United Nations Charter. But, of course, the prerequisite for this is full recognition of the legitimate national aspirations of the peoples.

(Mr. Hanifah, Indonesia)

As regards the national aspirations of the Algerian people, we have heard the argument that those aspirations cannot be satisfied because of the special situation prevailing in that country. Algeria, according to this argument, has a status all its own, a status different from that which Morocco and Tunisia had before they became independent States -- although the essential character of this special Algerian status is never made clear, but is veiled in confusion. Perhaps the best answer we can have in this respect is contained in a statement by Mr. Charles Ronsac, who, with reference to the inequalities between the French and the Algerians, was quoted in the French Socialist newspaper, Franc-Tireur, as having described the so-called integration of Algeria with France as "a fiction that will collapse if we do not find something else". That fiction, I am afraid, has already collapsed, and I would humbly suggest that the "something else" to be found is the establishment of friendly, co-operative and peaceful relations between France and Algeria, on the basis of a recognition of the Algerian nation's right to independence and self-government.

There also seems to be some confusion regarding the legality of the French occupation of Algeria. Mr. Pineau, in his statement to this Committee, asserted that France was in Algeria not by right of conquest but by some strange right of legitimate occupation of a sort of no-man's land. Yet, only last year, the French Resident Minister in Algeria, Mr. Robert Lacoste, declared to an enthusiastic Chamber of Deputies that France would not be "chased from a land where she implanted herself by the dubious right of arms". Is this not conquest? Mr. Lacoste went on to justify this dubious conquest by arms on the grounds of a "civilizing mission of humanity and generosity". While not wishing to question any of the benefits that France may have conferred upon Algeria by virtue of France's occupation of that country, I must say that to justify conquest and occupation on the grounds of a mission sacrée is to use a rather tired refrain from an age long past. And I may add that, while during the long colonial subjugation of my country the attempt was made to suppress the national language and culture of my people, the Dutch at least were never so civilized and generous as to try to make us into fictionalized Dutch-Moslems.

However, even if the so-called special status of Algeria seems to be cloaked in confusion -- although to our minds there is no question but that Algeria is a colony fighting for its freedom and independence -- the representative of France has made it very clear that the reason why Algeria should not become an independent State, like its two neighbours, Tunisia and Morocco, is the presence of two large communities living there, that is, the minority of European origin and the majority of Algerians. However, my delegation fails to understand this kind of reasoning. The presence of a minority -- whether large or small -- cannot take away from the majority the legitimate right to be free and self-governing. In fact, is it not much more reasonable and logical that the minority of European origin which, as the representative of France has informed us, has struck deep roots in the country, should become Algerian? Why should the majority, the Algerians, become French-Moslems? Why not give the opportunity of Algerian nationality to the European minority which has made Algeria its own country? Indeed, the question of two communities living in Algeria is one for which a **just** and reasonable solution can only be found within the framework of an independent, sovereign Algeria.

In this connexion, I should like to call to the attention of the members of this Committee another very disturbing element behind the propagation of a conception whereby the minority should be allowed to suppress the legitimate national aspirations of the majority. It is, in essence, the idea that, whereas the minority of European origin can protect the rights of the majority, the majority of non-European origin is somehow incapable of protecting the rights of the minority. Aside from the question of how well the minority of European origin has protected the rights of the majority, of the Algerian masses who today are still impoverished, largely uneducated and burdened by inequalities and repressions, the continued propagation of this fallacy of the colonial mind obviously cannot be helpful towards promoting better understanding between, on the one hand, Asia and Africa and, on the other hand, the West. It can only do harm in the end to those who insist upon clinging to it. What is obviously most needed in the world today is to dispel old distrust and to build upon a new foundation of mutual understanding and trust.

(Mr. Hanifah, Indonesia)

Therefore, my delegation deeply regrets this formulation of a concept of mistrust, which seems to mark so strongly the whole attitude of France towards Algeria, a country with which, when it is free, it should have the closest and friendliest of relations. We find this attitude of distrust also when we examine that part of the statement of the representative of France which dealt with the national movement for independence in Algeria. Of course, we are no longer surprised to find such great emphasis placed upon the activities of the Algerian Communist Party, despite the well known fact that in all countries which have fought or are still fighting for their national liberation, the national parties -- from the extreme right to the extreme left -- are united in the common pursuit of achieving the goal of independence and self-government.

Yet, it is rather strange for France to stress this aspect of the national movement for independence in Algeria. Not only is the Algerian Communist Party an offshoot of the French Communist Party, but, whether we consider it as something good or bad, its alleged activities and growing strength can only be attributed to the continued denial of the national aspirations of the Algerian people. This is the only conclusion to be drawn from the statement of the representative of France, and, if there is a desire to do something about these alleged activities of the Algerian Communist Party, the answer is very simple and obvious: grant the Algerian people the right to self-determination and satisfy their national aspirations.

Indeed, it seems almost as if we are being asked to accept the thesis that whereas a communist party is dangerous in a colony -- whether it was Morocco and Tunisia yesterday or Algeria today -- it is not dangerous in an independent country such as France, which boasts quite a large and very strong Communist Party. But if we accept this thesis at its face value and do not read into it a colonial conception, such as a higher maturity or wisdom on the part of the colonial Power, if we accept the thesis that communism is a danger in Algeria as long as it remains a French colony, then, as I said before, the answer is very simple: give freedom and independence to Algeria, like its two neighbouring States, where the so-called "communist menace" seems to have miraculously disappeared with the advent of self-government and sovereignty.

We are also confronted with the French thesis of pacification in Algeria; a thesis based on the stationing of a half million French troops in Algeria and a daily toll of bloodshed and killings, which already has run into thousands of victims for freedom -- military personnel and civilians alike. In passing, I might point out also that these French troops fighting against freedom in Algeria are composed of troops of the Foreign Legion and, in particular, of NATO contingents, so that it seems to many of us that NATO itself has become indirectly involved in the repressions in Algeria. Algerian freedom fighters are even at this time being shot down and murdered by NATO weapons -- by NATO defensive weapons. But defence against what? Defence against freedom and the right to self-government?

This thesis of pacification, as we Indonesians know well from experience, means nothing less than all-out war against a populace demanding nothing more than the right to govern itself and to live as a free people among the community of nations. In Indonesia, there were so-called campaigns of pacification during 1945 to 1946, and again in 1948, campaigns which in reality were wars against the Indonesian freedom fighters in a vain attempt to reverse the proclamation of Indonesian independence.

But the attempt to reverse the trend of history failed in Indonesia, and it will fail, too, in Algeria. About this, we have no doubts. The national aspirations of a whole people cannot be crushed even by half a million French troops, nor can they be pacified, whatever that may mean. They can only be granted. As the representative of Ireland has pointed out, there is a force at work in Algeria which ultimately cannot be denied, the force of nationalism. And I believe one cannot repeat often enough the statement made by the representative of Ireland in reply to the assertion of the representative of France that "nationalism has no future". He said:

"Countries whose nationality is not disputed may be able to look beyond nationalism to wider forms of association and co-operation. But countries whose nationality is denied are not able to look beyond nationalism: in those countries, nationalism has a future; indeed, it is bound to dominate the whole outlook and thinking of the countries concerned, until its essential demands are recognized and satisfied." (A/C.1/FV.833, p.52)

Let us remember these wise words. Let us remember that, whether we call it a disease or a blessing, nationalism will absorb all the attention and energies of a conquered nation until it has regained its freedom and independence.

It should also be noted that nationalism, when expressed in the sense of consciousness and even of pride in the best of one's national culture and tradition, and in the desire to share this heritage with the other nations of the world, then surely it serves also to enrich the international community and is fully compatible with the necessity for an international outlook.

(Mr. Hanifah, Indonesia)

But such a constructive and enlightened nationalism can only be enjoyed by free peoples, whose national aspirations have found full expression and satisfaction. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, twenty-nine countries of free Asia and Africa met together in the desire not only to seek a better understanding of matters of common concern, but also to develop a true consciousness of the inter-dependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth. Yes, among free nations and peoples, nationalism and internationalism - consciousness of one's national identity and recognition of the need for international co-operation -- go together and, indeed, enrich one another. It is only when nationalism is frustrated or suppressed that it is diverted into narrow, unproductive and even destructive channels in the struggle to recover national liberty and function.

The free nations of Asia and Africa, by their enthusiastic participation in the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and at the Bandung Conference, have shown that they fully recognize the fact that we are living today in an era in which regional and world co-operation are a necessity for the continued well-being and survival of mankind. But the essential thing to note is that such common action must be based on the free association of free and equal nations; it must be based, as revolutionary France has taught us, on consent freely given by free peoples.

While trying indiscriminately to discredit nationalism, the representative of France also made some reference to my country, Indonesia. We regret these remarks and, in fact, do not understand what possible connexion they have with the item under consideration, the question of Algeria. Therefore, I do not wish to dwell on them at any length, but let me just say this: Indonesia is faced with many problems -- with problems common to other so-called under-developed countries and new nations, and with problems that are the heritage of the crippling and destructive effects of centuries of colonial subjugation and years of colonial warfare. We are convinced, however, that by our own efforts and, we hope, with the sympathetic understanding of other nations, we can find the right solution to all these problems, which, one might say, reflect merely the growing-pains of our newly recovered nationhood -- a

phenomenon, I venture to add, not unknown to other older nations of the world. But all that is relevant here is the fact that we ourselves can tackle and solve these problems because we have won our national independence and liberation, because our people have regained that dignity and purpose in life, which can only come with the restoration of freedom and independence.

We have no doubts that the Algerian people, too, will achieve their legitimate national aspirations. The only issue at stake is: How much more bloodshed and destruction must take place, how much more hatred and enmity must be built up, before reason shall prevail? The only concern of my delegation is to find the way towards constructive co-operation and understanding and a just peace in that unhappy, war-torn country as speedily as possible.

My delegation suggests, therefore, that the first step towards a solution of the Algerian problem is a clear and unequivocal statement by France recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-government and freedom. This is the first and indispensable step. After that, there should be negotiations between the true representatives of the Algerian people and France, on the basis of French recognition of Algeria's nationhood, and, at the same time, an agreement for cease-fire. This cease-fire agreement, we believe, should be implemented and guaranteed by a provisional Algerian Government and by France. Thirdly, this provisional Algerian Government and France should then negotiate and work out an agreement on the future relationship between these two equal and independent States. Finally, after such an agreement has been worked out, free and democratic elections can be held for an Algerian national government. In this connexion, I wish to stress that my delegation does not believe that such elections can be held before the other steps, which I have just outlined, are implemented. Elections in a country not only at war, but under the domination of another Power -- and, in fact, a Power which is a party to the conflict and has vital interests at stake -- cannot be free and democratic. Such elections would have no meaning as regards the real issue involved: the re-emergence of the Algerian nation and the restoration of human dignity to the Algerian people.

(Mr. Hanifah, Indonesia)

In conclusion, I wish again to appeal to the Government of France to recognize the tide of history and to move forward with it towards an equitable solution of this tragic problem, consonant with the irresistible forces for national freedom and liberty sweeping across the face of Africa and Asia. Algeria will be free, but it is for France to decide how that freedom will be won -- with a legacy of suffering and hatred or in a new spirit of mutual understanding and respect. In this decision, let the voice of this Organization be clearly heard in reaffirmation of the dignity and worth of the human person, of the equal right of all nations and peoples to freedom and self-government.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.