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Eighth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Wednesday, 30 September 1953, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Fernand van LANGENHOVE

(Belgium)

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## STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): My first words will be words of thanks to the Committee for the honour it has done to my country and to myself in calling upon me to preside over its deliberations. I am aware of the difficulty of the task, and I would have had misgivings in undertaking it if it had not been for your goodwill and your co-operation, on which I count. With your support I shall try to follow in the footsteps of my eminent predecessor and friend, Ambassador Muniz.

I owe particular thanks to the representative of France who nominated me for this post and to the representative of Brazil who seconded that proposal. Both of them spoke in terms that were dictated by a friendship to which I was sensitive and to which I am thankful.

Before passing to the first item on our agenda, I should like to present -- although this is rather superfluous for most of you -- the Secretary of this Committee, Dr. Protitch, Principal Director of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. Those among you -- and I think there are many -- who have attended previous sessions of the General Assembly know that he is the embodiment, so to speak, of the First Committee.

## ELECTION OF THE VICE-CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): According to rule 103 of our rules of procedure, the officers of the Committee are "elected on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, experience and personal competence". Are there any nominations?

Mr. HOPPENOT (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation deems it an honour to nominate for the post of Vice-Chairman, Ambassador Urrutia, head of the delegation of Colombia. Mr. Urrutia has participated in our deliberations for five or six years now. In all the committees of which he was a

member, he has displayed his ability, his competence and at the same time his smiling authority. He has presided over the Security Council with a mastery which was noteworthy, and I think that this Committee could make no better choice than calling upon him to sit next to the Chairman in the post of Vice-Chairman of this Committee. I therefore propose to the First Committee that he be elected as Vice-Chairman, and I trust this wish will be met. I also hope that he will be elected unanimously and by acclamation.

Mr. WEBB (New Zealand): I have much pleasure in seconding the nomination of Mr. Urrutia, and in so doing I endorse what has been said by the representative of France.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): Are there any other nominations? There are none. In the absence of any other nominations and in conformity with our usual practice, I declare Mr. Urrutia, representative of Colombia, to have been elected Vice-Chairman of this Committee. I congratulate him and I invite him to take his seat at the table.

Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia): (Vice-Chairman) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to thank the representative of France for the very kind words which he addressed to the Committee concerning me, and the representative of New Zealand who was kind enough to support my nomination.

ELECTION OF THE RAPPORTEUR

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): We pass now to the second item on the agenda, the election of the Rapporteur.

Mr. PIMENTEL BRANDAO (Brazil) (interpretation from French): It is an honour and a privilege for the Brazilian delegation to propose the name of the representative of Iceland, Mr. Thor Thors, for the office of Rapporteur of the First Committee. Mr. Thors is too well known and esteemed by all for me to have to refer to his abilities and his qualities. Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, Canada, Argentina and Brazil, he has helped, with his experience and his brilliant mind, in many international meetings and especially in the United Nations ever since its inception in New York in 1946. I feel that it would be superfluous to remind the Committee that during three sessions of the General Assembly Mr. Thors has served as Rapporteur of this Committee with a devotion and a competence that has earned for him not only the admiration but also the gratitude of all his colleagues. The Brazilian delegation hopes that the representative of Iceland will be unanimously appointed Rapporteur of the First Committee.

Mr. COTE (Canada): It is a pleasure and an honour for me to second the nomination of the redoubtable Mr. Thor Thors as Rapporteur of this Committee. I say "redoubtable" because of Mr. Thors' long record of service in the exacting work of Rapporteur of the First Committee. The experience he has acquired and his own native objectivity and impartiality will, I am sure, commend him to all of us. For more years than he has been Rapporteur of the First Committee Mr. Thors has represented his country in Canada, where nearly 25,000 Canadians of Icelandic origin make him feel quite at home. In view of these links it gives me great pleasure to second the nomination of Mr. Thor Thors.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): In the absence of other nominations, and according to usage, I declare Mr. Thors, representative of Iceland, to have been elected Rapporteur of the First Committee, and I invite him to take his place at the Committee table. At the same time I should like to congratulate him upon his election to office.

Mr. THORS (Iceland) (Rapporteur): Allow me to thank you all for the honour that you have bestowed upon my country and upon me by once again appointing me Rapporteur of this important Committee. As I now take my place at this table for the fourth time as Rapporteur I can hardly say that I feel like a stranger here. I am looking forward to co-operating with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of this Committee, and I am particularly happy to have the opportunity once again to work with the distinguished and able representatives of the Secretariat who guide us and assist us in our efforts at this table. I am especially glad to be working again with my friend, Mr. Protitch, our popular and efficient Secretary.

It is you, gentlemen, who make the decisions in this Committee. I am to report to the General Assembly, which has been called "the Town Meeting of the World". I am, therefore, your messenger. I must tell the truth, and nothing but the truth. I shall endeavour to attend to my duties conscientiously and completely impartially.

This Committee may very well be called the most spectacular Committee of the General Assembly: that does mean that it is the most important. That title must be reserved for any Committee which performs the most constructive work in the service of our ideals.

Let us all remember that we are here to discuss world problems, not in order to widen the gulf of disagreement but in order to find some common ground, some little spot on each side to become the basis for a bridge.

Yours, as I have said gentlemen, is the power to decide; it is my duty to carry any message from you. I shall be happy to deliver your messages of conciliation and understanding which lead to agreement such as the world is anxiously awaiting and anxiously expecting from you.

AGENDA OF THE COMMITTEE: LETTERS DATED 18 AND 22 SEPTEMBER 1953 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE (A/C.1/742 AND A/C.1/743).

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): In passing to the third item of the agenda we come to the very object of our work. In the development of the international situation we have reached a stage the importance of which, I am sure, we all recognize. During the past few months some light has appeared on the horizon; the political climate has become more clement, and new hopes have arisen. One cannot, however, conceal the fact that the results achieved so far, although by no means insignificant, are nevertheless precarious. Doubtless the present moment has inherent in it potentialities of further progress; but at the same time it presents risks and dangers which, if they are not averted, might plunge us into a situation no less critical than that from which we have just emerged.

Thus, as we follow our path, we shall be confronted with a two-fold responsibility. On the one hand, we shall have to see to it that no remissness on our part jeopardizes the possibilities of progress which offer, and that, on the contrary, such possibilities are utilized. On the other hand, we shall have to ward off any dangers which may arise before us.

May we all, in the discharge of the task assigned to us, bear this two-fold responsibility always in mind. That is the wish which I venture to express as we begin our work. In accordance with rule 98 of the rules of procedure, the Committee itself decides the order of priority of the questions allocated to it. That is the point which the Committee will now discuss.

Mr. ECHEVERRI-CORTES (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Colombia feels that since the political conference is to meet on 28 October there is no justification for our discussing the already over-discussed question of Korea before that. Problems such as that of the unification of Korea and free elections to enable the Korean Republic to elect its own government by democratic methods are items that will have to be dealt with at the political conference where, we hope, they will be solved.

We see no reason, therefore, for the United Nations to deal with these items before they have been thoroughly discussed, and perhaps solved, at the political conference. We feel, furthermore, that when the moment is deemed to have arrived for considering these questions here we can then decide to change the order of the items on our agenda so as to give them priority. The Colombian delegation feels that it is assisting the First Committee in requesting an alteration in the order of the items on the agenda.

The sequence of items on the agenda now before us (A/C.1/742) is as follows:

1. The Korean question:
  - (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
2. Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission.
3. Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces of bacterial warfare.
4. Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China: report of the Government of the Union of Burma.
5. The Tunisian question.
6. The question of Morocco.

We should, however, like to suggest the following order:

1. The question of Morocco.
2. The Tunisian question.
3. Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces of bacterial warfare.
4. Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China: report of the Government of the Union of Burma.
5. Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission.
6. Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations.
7. The Korean question.

Thus, under our proposal items 3 and 4 will remain as they appear in document A/C.1/742, the letter from the President of the General Assembly. The order of the other items will be as we have given it.

That is the proposal which we make to the First Committee.



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Mr. KYROU (Greece): My delegation is in full agreement with the order of priority formally proposed by the representative of Colombia -- for the reasons that he has so eloquently explained to us.

As regards the Korean question, I think we are in fact bound not to consider it first, as a result of the decision adopted by the plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 22 September. Of course, if -- as we all hope and expect -- the international situation continues to show the improvement to which the Chairman referred in his eloquent statement, absolutely nothing in the rules of procedure prevents the Committee from giving the Korean question a higher order of priority.

I should like to make another observation. If the Committee approves the order of priority proposed by the representative of Colombia and thus decides to consider first the question of Morocco, we could agree, in conformity with the spirit in which we should like to work here -- that is, to reach agreement by conciliation and not to speak in haste -- not to begin the discussion of that Moroccan item for a few days in order that the interested delegations may have time for preparation of their statements.

Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): The Soviet Union delegation does not deny -- indeed does not intend to deny -- the importance of such items as the Tunisian question and the question of Morocco. We are fully aware of the First Committee's duty to display a proper interest in the consideration of those important items. They cannot, however, be considered in isolation; they must be viewed from the point of view of the totality of the international situation which now confronts us. That situation should have an influence on the decision we adopt concerning the sequence of items on our agenda.

The representative of Colombia has proposed that the Korean question should be moved to the very end of our agenda. In other words, he has acted in exactly the manner we had foreseen, with considerable misgivings, when we asked the General Committee to decide to include in the agenda an additional item, concerning the Secretary-General's <sup>report</sup> on the Korean question. At that time, we were told:

"It is not necessary to raise the question of the Secretary-General's report separately, since nothing will prevent the First Committee from considering the matter in conjunction with its consideration of the Korean question". At that time, also, I drew attention to the fact that there were rumours in the corridors that the Korean question would be removed from the top position in the agenda and relegated to the very end -- I could even say "chased" to the very end - in order to avoid the consideration of a matter which, I am sure no one will deny, is the most acute one requiring the attention of and action by the General Assembly.

It would appear that our worst fears have come true. Motives have been found to justify the new proposal. We are told that, since the political conference <sup>to convene</sup> on the Korean question is scheduled/on 28 October -- that is, approximately twenty-eight days from now -- the First Committee should not deal with the matter, that we should sit back and wait to see what will happen at that conference. After that, of course, nothing will prevent us from moving the matter even further down on the agenda -- under some professedly edifying and inspirational pretext.

Our delegation feels that the proposal which has been made is entirely unjustified and erroneous. It is erroneous because, as is well known, the question of the political conference has met with a number of complications. The Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Korean People's Democratic Republic have declared in their communications -- which have been distributed in Secretariat documents -- that they are unable to accept in its entirety the resolution adopted by the General Assembly.

For their part, they have offered a number of proposals which, they feel, can serve as a basis for an organization of the conference and which are likely to yield more favourable results.

We propose that this report, which was submitted to us in accordance with resolution 711 (VII) C, adopted at the third part of the seventh session of the General Assembly, instructing the Secretary-General to report as appropriate as soon as he had received answers from those Governments, should be considered. After all, if the Secretary-General is instructed to report and that report is not considered, then, I submit, this is not at all what a number of delegations had in mind when they voted in favour of that resolution -- and that includes my delegation.

If the question is put as it stands now with regard to the political conference on Korea, then it should be abundantly clear that if this previous question is not settled, there is no reason to hope that successful work will be done at the conference; in fact, there is no hope that the conference will even take place -- which would be quite a blow to our common cause. It would do considerable harm to the interests of the peace and security of peoples and to the cause of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question; it would do harm to the objective of making the armistice into a lasting peace, to diffusing it in the crucible of love for peace into a peace agreement, a peace treaty. That is how we see the situation.

Will anyone challenge the fact that we have run into difficulties on that score? Will this be challenged by those who have spoken just now and those who have spoken previously in favour of the thesis that, after all, we should not disturb the conference? How can anybody say we should not disturb the conference if there is no conference, and since, in the present circumstances, certainty as to the conference being able to take place has been shaken -- unless, that is, the hindrances which face us have been removed? And those hindrances are real enough.

One cannot close one's eyes, one cannot simply cross one's arms, sit back and wait: let things develop as they wish; we may muddle through and then, perhaps, we may decide to interfere. I know that some of those present will

describe my statement as propaganda, but I can assure them that I have no such purpose; this is not propaganda; I am not uttering one word of suspicion or reproach. I should like to join in this common cause in order to promote and foster further successful steps on the path which has already, presumably, been taken by the two sides which fought in Korea for three-odd years when they signed the Armistice Agreement. We should help them to remove these hindrances. This is a view which is apparently shared by those who have played a responsible role in this matter because of their own specific gravity. The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and France profess to understand that these obstacles have to be removed; they cannot just be ignored; and that, to remove them, will serve the interests of our cause. But how do they propose to do so? They propose that we should adopt a position which I might describe as non-resistance to evil; we should not resist the evil that would inure if the conference did not take place. But, since this is a purely negative position, it cannot be approved by us; in fact, we find great difficulty in even understanding it. We cannot accept the view of those who say that the United Nations should be only a sleeping beauty out of a fairy tale. We say that it should be an active participant in the settlement of such timely questions as the peace conference on Korea. None of those who feel that the United Nations should not be a sleeping beauty can accept this way of looking at the question; they feel that the United Nations should do something.

Mr. Lodge and Mr. Lloyd, and some other members of the group of sixteen, have said that the political conference should take place and that it should decide the question of its own composition. How can the conference do that? What possibility will there be for its doing so? What instructions and directives will be given to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France as they come to the conference? We do not know. Perhaps the desire to settle the question is so ardent in the hearts of those representatives and their Governments that they have already drafted the appropriate instructions regarding a proper settlement of the matter, instructions not to do anything that would delay the work of the conference by refusing to include any neutral States as proposed by the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic in their communications. Perhaps this is being kept secret from us for

diplomatic reasons. If this were so, we should be quite happy. I should not even ask to be told the nature of the secret if we just had a hint from certain parties that, at the conference, they would not object to a proper solution of the question and would not block the eventual expansion of the membership of the conference. But no; when I asked the question of Mr. Lodge in the General Committee he did not deem it fit to answer in words; he answered with a gesture. He shook his head. Therefore, the representatives of the United States will go to the conference with instructions based directly on the resolution adopted at the third part of the seventh session of the General Assembly. And if so, how can one imagine that it would be possible to settle the question? There may be ways of settling these differences and these ways are being kept secret. Of course, it is everyone's right to keep a secret, but I think in this case it might not be superfluous to allay our misgivings. There are certain fears as to the possibility of the conference taking place, and our anxiety to have it take place indicates our desire to have the question settled; and that is the reason why there is supposed to be a conference.

I do not have to mention other considerations, which might be untimely at the present juncture since we are only discussing a procedural matter. We are talking about the agenda rather than about questions of substance, but it seems to me that the representative of Colombia has reached a conclusion which is directly the reverse of what he should have reached on the basis of his own premise. Of course, the major premise was not stated. The major premise is that the political conference should take place on 28 October.

The second premise was that we should not discuss the Korean question. I submit that this is incompatible with the major premise because, as we all know, there is a third point there which the representative of Colombia and the representative of Greece unfortunately failed to mention. What is that third important point? Of course, the conference should take place. But there are some obstacles; hence, the conclusion should not be that, therefore, we should not discuss the question here. According to logic -- provided, of course, logic is made subject to some political considerations which not infrequently enter into conflict with logic -- we should say that, since there are obstacles to the event that it ought to take place on 28 October, therefore, one should not say that we should do nothing to remove the obstacles.

On the contrary, since there are obstacles, we should see to it that events should be able to supervene in order to remove these obstacles or, at least, in order to make an attempt to remove them. That is our position, and if this reasoning is valid, then I submit that the representatives of the countries which have insisted on the consideration of the Moroccan and Tunisian questions at the beginning will, I am sure, not assume the responsibility that the Korean question can be allowed to sit back and wait, and that the Moroccan and Tunisian questions ought not to yield their places to the Korean question.

It is known that the Moroccan and Tunisian questions have already been considered in the Security Council, where our delegation spoke in favour of the consideration of these questions in view of their urgency. We were then told by the very representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France that the questions were not within the competence of the Security Council, or, rather, of the United Nations as a whole, and, secondly, that these two questions were not urgent and they did not even want to consider the questions at all. Then the representative of Colombia, who also sat with us in the Security Council, told us that he did not want to consider the question because it was not an urgent one and, in fact, it was not of such a nature as to call for intervention by the United Nations. That is the manner in which the question was dealt with. Is that not so, Mr. Kyrour?

Now these representatives say that we should consider the question here and straight away, because it is very urgent. But, after all, one cannot do that. White is white and black is black; one cannot say that it is white today and black tomorrow. That, I submit, is white and black magic. I do not think it is advisable to deal with magic or tricks now in this Committee. Representatives here are not likely to be able to yield the magic wand, and white is not likely to become black nor black white. As we say in Russian, a roan stallion cannot be washed into a mottled mare. Therefore, we say that the Korean question should be considered first of all, and we say that for reasons which no one can deny. First of all, there is the extreme

importance of the question, and, secondly, there is the great urgency of the question because we are faced with a time limit which is running out. Moreover, obstacles have arisen with regard to the convening of this political conference. Therefore, the General Assembly, and particularly the **First Committee**, if truly interested in the ability of the United Nations to discharge its function and its responsibilities, which relate to the resolution of just such controversial questions, have no reasonable grounds to support the proposal put forward by the representative of Colombia and supported by the representative of Greece.

There is another circumstance which should not be overlooked. When I say that these hindrances and obstacles are of a serious nature, I cannot forget a number of statements which have been made and which still continue to be made by Syngman Rhee and his henchmen to the effect that if the conference does not yield any results, then they will settle the Korean question by the arbitrament of force, that they will wage war on North Korea. They have said so publicly. They have said that this would happen if the conference did not yield proper results within ninety days. They have said that in that case they will seek to fulfil these plans. I do not know whether they can fulfil these plans, but to some extent they may very well succeed in that shameful and criminal matter. But certainly they will be able to do so if the conference does not meet at all, because that would prove to them that obviously the whole conference had failed and that it was no use waiting for the end of the ninety days. It would prove to them that they might as well go ahead straight away.

I venture to draw the attention of the Committee to this set of circumstances because this is the kind of situation which, according to the Charter, calls for United Nations intervention and settlement. This is the kind of situation which is now noticeable in the case of Korea, under the circumstances which I have had the honour to set forth.

Closely linked with this question is the item submitted by the Soviet Union delegation, which calls for the consideration of measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations. I shall

not dwell further on this topic, the importance of which is clear to all. Arguments have been advanced against this item being considered early in our agenda. We consider, of course, that it should yield in importance to the Korean question, but we are told that all these are old proposals that have been considered and rejected repeatedly and that we should not deal with them. I submit that these arguments are fallacious. Despite the fact that there are some old elements in these proposals, there are some new ones also, and the old and the new cannot be separated because they are organically linked together.

Of course these proposals should not be considered first; the Korean question should come first. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the signing of the Armistice in Korea has already helped to ease international tension and, therefore, what we were told was impossible of consideration at a previous stage should not be so impossible of consideration at the present stage. On the Korean question, for two and one-half years proposals which were mutually unacceptable to the two sides were considered here, but now we are told that proposals which were considered before should not be reconsidered. If that were the attitude usually adopted, then with regard to Korea we should still be in the same predicament as that prior to the third part of the seventh session of the General Assembly. If arguments once said could never be reconsidered, then we should never be able to get anywhere. However, in Korea it was found to be possible to reach the position where an end could be put to hostilities. The shooting has finally come to an end, and this proves that solutions can be found, even if such solutions were impossible before.

All this militates against moving such questions to the end of our agenda. Besides that, politically speaking, questions which relate to the maintenance and strengthening of peace, whether the proposals are good or bad, are always important. Since these questions are of importance, they should be considered early in our agenda, because a relaxation of tension in international relations is manifestly important, just as the taking of measures to avert the threat of a new world war is important. The question of taking measures to put an end to the armaments race and the question of military bases are important questions, the more so now that the United States has signed an agreement with the Franco-Fascist Government concerning the building of additional bases in Spain, bases which have an obvious objective, which are designed to be included as a new



and might implement for dealing new and mighty blows in a well-known direction, a direction of which we are all aware and about which we have all talked before, that direction being, of course, first and foremost the Soviet Union.

For all these reasons, the question acquires particular significance. We do not, of course, say that all our proposals should necessarily be adopted. Of course, we shall press for the adoption of these proposals because we are convinced that they are reasonable, necessary and useful, but we are now dealing with procedure. However, we are told that it would be better to deal with these questions later. In other words, every question connected with the strengthening of peace and the restoration of friendly relations should be relegated to the background, but this will not do. That is why we feel that this item should be placed second on our agenda, and the Soviet Union is anxious that this should happen.

The question is of great importance for the United Nations and for the world. There are no logical grounds for relegating the question to the back. We therefore propose another kind of sequence. Mrs. Pandit's letter to this Committee carries the Korean question. The President of the General Assembly has already submitted to us a list which carries the Korean question first, and that is where it belongs. It should stay there. Then Mrs. Pandit sent another letter saying that we should consider the question of "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations". That should be item two. As for the others, let them remain in the present order. That would be the items dealing with the "Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments" and the "Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces of bacterial warfare" et cetera.

I crave the indulgence of the Committee for having taken up so much of its time and attention to listen to our views on this matter. I apologize for that. I did so because I felt that everything we have had to say was designed to help the cause which is at heart to all of us. Everything against that may well be designed to harm it.

Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): The subject matter before the Committee is one upon which I would like to make a few brief observations. The two questions that would seem to me to be important are, one, whether the Korean question should come first, or two, if it does not come first, whether this Committee retains for itself sufficient authority to restore it to its place in the list at any time it thinks fit.

No one would dispute the general statements made by the leader of the Soviet Union delegation that the issue was of supreme importance. It was so considered by this Committee and by its debates over a long period of time in which every aspect of this difficult problem was considered. We finally reached our decisions as expressed in the terms of the resolution which was communicated to the other side. Nobody disputes either that the matter is one of great urgency.

The representative of the Soviet Union has said that the time limit is running out. Indeed, if it is running out, it has been very largely due, it seems to me, to the actions of the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans themselves. I harbour the idea that they may well be desirous of it running out so that they may escape from the precise terms of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement, and then being able to argue that it no longer applies, proceed to argue that the question of the composition of the conference is at large and is in no way affected by the terms of the Armistice Agreement. I hope I prove to be wrong in respect of that, but I have just an idea that that is in their mind.

In any event, any question of urgency of the matter has not been raised by us; on the contrary, it has been raised by the nature of the replies which have been communicated to the Secretary-General by the Chinese and North Korean Communists. It is proper to say that those replies were communicated in the light of the full proceedings of this Committee, knowing very well that the very propositions which they returned had already been debated and considered by the Committee. It is true, too, that obstacles have arisen. But who has created the obstacles? As this Committee decided, we appointed those who were to represent our side. Unfortunately, there has sometimes been a tendency to depart from the terms of the Armistice Agreement even by those who supported the resolution of this Committee. But the truth of the matter is that we appointed those who represent our side and all that remained to be done was for the other side to indicate who should be their representatives. That they have failed and continue to fail to do.

Thus it is that in so far as the very substance of the argument of the representative of the Soviet Union is concerned, he has raised matters the solution of which lies not with us but with the other side.

May I say that as far as Australia is concerned, we are prepared to adopt the proposal put forward by the representative of Colombia and supported by the representative of Greece, which places the Korean question at the end of the items for consideration. But we are not, I regret to say, prepared to adopt it in the form in which it presently appears. In our view there is no reason at all, at this stage in any event, and I would have reservations at any stage, to reconsider the decisions which we have already made. But I am

not prepared to commit myself to the position that under no circumstances would we review the decisions we have made, although I have expressed my views on previous occasions and I do not in any way depart from those views. I think we should be under no misapprehension as to what the reason for the proposal of the Soviet Union is.

I have little doubt whatever that the purpose of the tactics <sup>of the</sup> /Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, however they may be expressed and whatever language may be employed, is to recommit this matter again to general debate in the Assembly for the additional purpose of creating divisions in the Assembly and of extracting on their party whatever political advantage they may be able to achieve by that course of conduct. But the truth of the matter is, whatever may be their purpose, the time is not yet ripe to give consideration to the Korean item, and therefore the time is not appropriate to place the Korean item as first on the list.

For no other reason than this, although many others could be advanced, the representatives of the United States of America have, pursuant to the authority of the General Assembly and pursuant to the authority given to them by the sixteen Powers who sent forces to Korea, have communicated to the Chinese Communists and to the North Koreans only recently, and to that there has been no reply whatever. Speaking for Australia, we do not see in what way it is appropriate to consider the Korean item until we at least have that reply in front of us. Then we can determine whatever course we propose to pursue, whether to make any variation of our previous deliberations or to stand fast upon our previous deliberations. They are matters which we then can consider. But the objection which we have to the proposal as presently put forward may be expressed in this way: If this proposal is carried as presently drafted, then the order upon which we agree, of priority for the consideration of items, cannot be altered, it seems to me, except by a two-thirds majority of this Committee.

I refer, to rule 122 which refers to when a proposal has been adopted or rejected it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the Committee, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides. In that event, there is a limitation upon debate which can take place, because permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall immediately be put to the vote. So by the terms of rule 122 there are limitations placed upon this Committee if and when it were considered necessary by some members of the Committee to debate whether the order in which the item on the resolution of Colombia presently appears, namely last on the list, should or should not be altered.

It seems to me that the word "proposal" has a clear enough meaning in this case. No one can doubt, in any event, that this is a matter of importance, but proposal, it seems to me, refers to a procedural proposal as well as to a proposal of substance, and even if it were confined to a procedural proposal, there is sufficient doubt in our minds, without any ruling from the Chair, to make it necessary for this Committee to indicate quite clearly that it will retain, by simple majority of those present and voting, control over its own proceedings, so that should the occasion arise we may adjust the items in the agenda in accordance with the occasion.

We do not think that it is proper or appropriate that Australia, speaking for itself, should allow the question as to whether at any particular time before the 28th October this matter should or should not be debated, to be vested in a minority of this Committee. In other words, we believe that the democratic rule upon this matter, being a question as to whether we should or should not at any particular time reconsider the order in which the Colombian resolution proposes to place these items, should be left to a simple majority of those present and voting.

For those reasons, we have introduced an amendment which does not affect the order in which the representative of Colombia has placed the item, but an amendment which is designed to give to the Committee that control and which is in the following words:

"It is agreed that this item"--which will follow the last item, which is the Korean question--"can be taken at any time if a simple majority of the members of the Committee present and voting so desire."

I have expressed our main reason for wishing that to be incorporated and I hope it will recommend itself to the Committee, but I have another reason: I do not want it able to be said by the Communist Governments of China or North Korea, or by Soviet Russia, or by any other Government, that we so tied our hands as to deliberately preclude the discussion of this matter before the 28th October. I think it is wiser in terms of public opinion throughout the world that we should make it quite clear at all times that we are dominus in respect of our own proceedings.

For these reasons I support the resolution moved by the representative of Colombia but with the amendment which I have indicated to the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I should like to say the following with regard to the proposal submitted by the representative of Australia. I do not know whether this proposal is really an amendment. I think it really seems to define the meaning of the decision that the Committee may take on the entire matter of the discussion of the Korean question. I think, if the Committee does not oppose this proposal, that it may be taken as part of the decision to be taken by the Committee in due course. Therefore, we should interpret that suggestion of the Australian representative in that way.

I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I apologize for intervening in this debate but I am compelled to do so because of the very circumstances noted by the Chairman, namely, the amendment of Australia. We have not seen that amendment, We have not seen its text. Nevertheless, we are already told that if there is no objection it shall be considered as incorporated. I must say that as long as we have not seen that amendment and it has not been distributed among representatives, we cannot adopt any decision.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): No decision has been adopted by the Committee on this matter and, of course, the Committee will decide.

I call upon the representative of Egypt.

Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) (interpretation from French): It goes without saying that we are sympathetic to the proposal that the Moroccan and Tunisian questions be promoted to the head of our agenda. The urgency and importance of these two items can but justify this move.

We submitted the Moroccan question to the Security Council stating that the situation prevailing in that country was of such a nature as to endanger international peace and security. Therefore, we are in favour of granting priority to these two questions in this Committee.

I must add, however, that there is much to be said in favour of the thesis of the representative of Greece to the effect that these two questions should be postponed for some time. Therefore, I say that while this promotion is an agreeable surprise for us, nevertheless it remains a surprise. The heads of delegations interested in this question are opposing because they thought that the sequence indicated in our provisional agenda would be adhered to. Therefore, I think that some delay should be granted in consideration of these questions. This could be done either by postponing the meetings of this Committee for some time, for instance a week, or by placing another item on the agenda before the questions of Tunisia and Morocco.

Mr. LCDGE (United States of America): The order of items proposed by the representative of Colombia and seconded by the representative of Greece is logical in construction and would be satisfactory to the United States.

As regards Korea, we have been doing everything in our power to induce the Communists to play their indispensable part in getting a political conference going. On 28 August the United Nations set up its side of the political conference and the United States proposed to the Communists a specific time and three specific places for the meeting of the political conference. The Communist response, first, has been to change their position as regards the composition of the conference from that established in the armistice agreement, without giving any reason for the change. Secondly, to engage in dilatory tactics in seeking vainly to have the United Nations re-debate and reconsider decisions which it made just a month ago.

This is a mere manoeuvre and is not the attitude of those who sincerely wish a peaceful settlement. We have tried to leave no stone unturned to show our

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complete good faith and our desire to get ahead with the conference. We actually offered to send a representative to meet face to face immediately with Communist representatives; and offer which was rejected by the representative of the Soviet Union, and not rejected after consideration and consultation with the Chinese Communists, but rejected instantly out of hand.

Really, one would have thought that the Chinese Communists could be assumed to be capable of speaking for themselves on this point without the, what shall I say, so-called good offices of the representative of the Soviet Union.



In view of the fact that a very complete discussion of the problem of Korea took place so recently, we believe that it would be inappropriate, to say the least, to discuss Korea in the United Nations while the negotiations are pending, and we therefore fully agree that the Korean item should be taken up at a later date. If, because of new developments, an immediate discussion of the Korean problem becomes desirable, the item could, of course, be advanced.

Another item whose consideration should, in our view, be deferred is the complaint by the Union of Burma concerning the presence of foreign forces on its territory. Our information leads us to believe that developments of the next several weeks may considerably alter this situation. The United States therefore feels that consideration of the matter should be deferred in the hope and expectation that these developments will materialize and will reduce the tension in that area.

The new item proposed by the Soviet Union is closely related, in the main, to the problem of disarmament, and the proposal before us in regard to the order of items very properly takes this into consideration and places the new Soviet Union item on the agenda immediately after the disarmament item.

The proposal of the representative of Colombia takes these factors into consideration, and it is therefore our view that it would furnish a satisfactory and constructive plan of work.

The representative of Egypt has said that those who have placed the Moroccan and Tunisian items on our agenda see no objection to placing them at the head of the agenda but would like a delay of several days before the Committee proceeds to consider them. We see no objection to this course of action and feel that we should extend this courtesy to the proponents of these items.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (interpretation from Russian): The Polish delegation seconds the proposal of the Soviet Union delegation that the item relating to the unification and rehabilitation of Korea keep first place in the order of items to be considered by the First Committee as given in the letter from the President of the General Assembly. The Polish delegation feels that the First Committee should proceed forthwith to the consideration of this item and to the adoption of the decisions that are called for. Our Committee, as its

name indicates, deals with political questions and questions relating to security. Therefore, special responsibility has been conferred upon this Committee for the solution of fundamental problems relating to the maintenance of peace and the improvement of relations among nations.

Although we are well aware of the importance and urgency of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions -- an awareness of which we have given repeated proof -- we consider that in the present state of international affairs the question that least brooks delay is the one relating to the peaceful settlement and final solution of the Korean conflict, which still presents a threat to peace in Asia and throughout the world.

Even the representative of Australia recognized here the exceptional urgency, as he called it, of that question. For some reason, however, he refused to take the next logical step and to draw the appropriate conclusions. On the contrary, the representative of Australia again tried to represent the Soviet Union proposal as a mere stratagem, although every impartial human being will realize that that proposal was dictated exclusively by a desire to see the Korean question settled as expeditiously as possible.

The signing of an armistice in Korea, which signified a victory for the peace-loving forces, nevertheless did not solve all questions relating to Korea, which has confronted the United Nations for years now as a crucial problem. It is the duty of the Committee to consider further problems relating to the peaceful unification of Korea, assistance to be given to the Korean people in reconstructing and rehabilitating their country, which has been devastated in the course of the hostilities, and a number of other relevant matters.

The fact that there is a resolution for the convening of a political conference between two sides -- a fact which has been mentioned despite the circumstance that that resolution was adopted in the face of the objections of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic and the objections of a number of Asian countries which are most directly interested in a peaceful solution of the problems of Asia and the Far East, that it was a resolution which caused considerable misgivings even among the States that supported it -- does not relieve the present session of the General Assembly, in the opinion of my delegation, from the duty of continuing further efforts to solve the Korean problem, particularly since new documents have appeared which call for

consideration, especially the memorandum of the Secretary-General, the letter from the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the letter from the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

The argument put forth by the representative of Colombia, who has submitted a proposal as to the sequence of items on our agenda, would have been valid if the question of the conference had already been solved through agreement by both sides. As we well know, however -- and unfortunate as this may be -- the state of affairs is quite different.

As the head of the Soviet Union delegation has recalled, a number of delegations objected when the Soviet Union delegation moved the inclusion of the question of the Korean political conference in the agenda. They said that the agenda already included an item relating to the Korean question and that that item made it possible to consider all problems relating to the political conference and all other aspects of the Korean question. We now find that attempts are being made to find other arguments to justify a new postponement of this question. But how long must we wait? After all, it is proposed that we consider the question of the conference not after the deadline for its convening has expired, but now, when the parties are still in the process of exchanging views concerning the organization of the conference. Specifically, immediate consideration of this question might make it possible to resolve the controversial problems that have remained outstanding and thus assure the convening of the conference and its eventual success.

Guided by the consideration that priority should be given to proposals designed to relax international tension, we support the proposal of the Soviet Union representative that second place on the agenda of our Committee should be assigned to the Soviet Union proposal calling for measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations. The Soviet Union proposal encompasses the fundamental problems of the international situation at this time. It is based on the premise that the conclusion of an armistice in Korea has opened the door to joint action on all questions which now complicate relations among the peoples. The Soviet Union proposal would enable the General Assembly to make its contribution to the reduction of international tension. A number of speakers who participated in the general debate emphasized

the necessity of taking further steps and making more headway in the matter of relaxing international tension, strengthening international confidence and improving the international situation. That was also the theme of our Chairman in his opening remarks today. We feel that consideration of the Soviet Union proposal would create the groundwork for such a relaxation of tension and for shifting our Organization on to the path of fostering international co-operation and confidence. The adoption of the Soviet Union proposal would create an atmosphere of trust, thus facilitating the attainment of agreed solutions of other problems which crowd the agenda of the present session, this to be done in the spirit of the Charter and of international co-operation. Consequently, we press for the inclusion of the Korean question at the head of our agenda, with the Soviet Union proposal for measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations being included as the second item to be taken up.

Mr. UNDEN (Sweden): In the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the Swedish delegation voted in favour of the proposal of the Soviet Union to place the Korean question on the agenda. Our motive was not a wish to have the question debated immediately, but we regarded it as a very important matter of principle that this question be placed on our agenda so as to indicate that the Assembly has not entirely delegated its powers in the matter to the sixteen countries that participated in the Korean war.

We have, however, taken due note of the declarations made by several representatives during the debate in the Assembly to the effect that since an item regarding Korea is already included in the agenda, that item can serve as the basis for a renewed discussion of the whole Korean problem. It is furthermore possible that additional information will be transmitted to the Assembly by the Secretariat and render a new debate necessary.

The Swedish delegation sees no reason to place the Korean question first on the Committee's agenda, since a debate seems to be premature, at any rate, before the Chinese Government has replied to the last communication of the United States, on behalf of the sixteen Governments.

The item can be placed at the end of the agenda, or at any other place -- that is rather immaterial -- but with the understanding just confirmed by the Chair that it can be taken up if a change in the situation makes it desirable for the First Committee to intervene.

Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation wholeheartedly supports the proposal of the delegation of the Soviet Union to the effect that the Korean question should be considered by the First Committee as the first item of the agenda. In supporting this point of view, the Czechoslovak delegation is guided by the following arguments.

The question of the peaceful settlement in Korea after the signing of the armistice holds the attention of peace-loving mankind and, in particular, of the peoples of Asia. The signing of the Armistice Agreement, which led to the cessation of hostilities in Korea, marked a milestone in the efforts of the peace-loving forces. It is the duty of all those who sincerely seek the final

triumph of those efforts to make further efforts toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It is therefore incumbent on the United Nations to play a major role in this matter.

The Korean question has been and continues to be the most important item on the agenda of the General Assembly. It has remained the most important item particularly because its successful solution would pave the way for the settlement of a number of other questions.

Will the United Nations truly contribute to the establishment of the prerequisites for the solution of the Korean question? If it does so, it will in fact establish the conditions for the solutions of other controversial questions on the agenda of the present session of the General Assembly.

At the present juncture, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is contingent upon the success of the political conference, which, according to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, should begin its deliberations not later than 28 October 1953. The time-limit for the convening of the political conference, therefore, is quickly drawing closer. We are therefore faced with the necessity of creating the conditions that would be most propitious for the successful completion of the work of that conference.

These questions call for rapid solution, the more so because the aggressive circles do not at all conceal their desire to resume hostilities in Korea. The danger of war in Korea has by no means been averted. Not one week passes without Syngman Rhee, the sworn enemy of any peaceful settlement in Korea, proclaiming his provocative demands for the forcible subjugation of North Korea and calling for the resumption of military operations to that end. In the circumstances, only the success of the political conference can prevent the resumption of hostilities.

Various obstacles have arisen to the convening of the political conference, and it is the duty of the General Assembly to do everything in its power to remove these obstacles. It is therefore important to confirm the agenda of the First Committee as it stands, thus ensuring that the question will come before the General Assembly as early as possible.

The question is: Is the General Assembly willing to consider the latest proposals of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, proposals contained in the cables from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or does the General Assembly wish to reject the consideration of these proposals? These proposals justifiably stress the interest and concern of the Asian peoples in the Korean political conference. They offer the possibility of the successful completion of the work of the conference.

A group of States, headed by the United States, has made every effort at this session to prevent the consideration by the General Assembly of the answers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. If the attempt is made to impose this action on the Assembly, it may lead to serious consequences. The refusal to consider these proposals within the time-limit will indicate not only discourtesy on the part of the United Nations, but would be in direct violation of the provisions of the Charter, according to which the States Members of the United Nations and, a fortiori, the United Nations as a whole, are obliged to settle all disputes peacefully, that is, first of all by way of negotiation.

The refusal to consider the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China can only be regarded as an attempt by the United Nations to impose pressure on those Governments in order to force them to give in. The result of this can only be the wrecking of the political conference altogether. Moreover, such a move is at variance with the spirit of resolution "C", which was adopted at the third part of the seventh session of the General Assembly. In this resolution the General Assembly expressed implicitly its willingness to consider the answer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China concerning the composition of the Korean political conference.

One of the motives advanced for the rejection of the Soviet Union proposal in the General Committee in connexion with resolution "C" of the third part of the seventh session, to consider the answers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, was that the Korean question was already on the agenda. Now that it is proposed that the First Committee should begin its deliberations with the consideration of the proposals submitted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, proposals which offer the possibility of resolving the critical predicament of the question of the political conference, the same Governments press for the postponement of the consideration of the Korean question until after 28 October, after the expiry of the time-limit within which the political conference is to be convened.



Not only is this an offensive move but it is unjust and irregular since it is in violation of previous decisions of the General Assembly and the overriding provisions of the Charter. This shows that the irreconcilable ones with respect to China and Korea are unwilling to ensure the success of the political conference. On the contrary, they already count on the failure of that conference. They want to doom it and give it the coup de grâce.

The United States has proposed that the conference should decide the question of its own composition and whether certain neutral States should be called upon to participate in that conference. The United States has also offered to send a representative to negotiate directly with the Korean-Chinese side. These suggestions, however, do not stand critical analysis. Can it be expected that the representatives of the sixteen belligerents who waged war in Korea under the flag of the United Nations, were negotiations to resume again between the two sides, would change the resolution of the General Assembly or fail to abide by it? Can it be expected that Syngman Rhee, who some weeks ago was preparing to resist the landing of Indian troops in Korea by force of arms, would agree to the participation of Asian neutral countries in the political conference? Would it not rather be more plausible for the General Assembly itself to decide how the political conference should be composed? The General Assembly has the best opportunity to do so right now. It is the duty of the Political Committee to commence its deliberations with the Korean question, the more so since another circumstance is noteworthy. That circumstance is the latest statements of Syngman Rhee showing that he and the United States are prepared to reach a mutual agreement to the effect that after ninety days they should walk out of the conference and thus wreck it. This is a serious warning indeed. It is also a warning to us against the kind of approach to the question which is proposed here by the United States and its supporters.

Having in mind the desire of certain circles again to unleash a war in Korea, the General Assembly should act forthwith. On all these grounds, the Korean question deserves absolute priority. It should be considered first. It is essential to realize that to ignore the point of view of the Chinese People's Republic, one of the five great Powers representing 500 million people, can only hinder the successful solution of the Korean question and lead to a deterioration

of the authority and prestige of the United Nations. Moreover, if the General Assembly should refuse to have a timely consideration of the Korean-Chinese proposals, peace-loving mankind will pin the blame on the United Nations and it will say that is the United Nations which hindered the convening of the political conference and the peaceful settlement in Korea. Therefore the Czechoslovak delegation resolutely supports the motion that the Korean question should be discussed first in the Political Committee.

In the general debate in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, the Czechoslovak delegation already had occasion to state its wholehearted support for the Soviet proposals entitled, "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations". The Czechoslovak delegation regards these proposals, which are based on a policy of peace which is unswervingly followed by the Soviet Union in order to remove the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace, as an important contribution to the cause of peace. It therefore feels that these proposals should be discussed by the Political Committee early in its agenda. Consideration of this item is timely, indeed urgent. It contains concrete proposals, the adoption of which would make it possible substantially to reduce international tension. This in turn would strengthen the cause of peace throughout the world.

The unconditional ban of the atomic and hydrogen weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, along with the imposition of strict control over the observance of that prohibition, could eliminate the greatest of dangers which looms over mankind. The Czechoslovak representative stressed, in the general debate, the importance of the solution of these questions.

The Soviet Union proposals do not only deal with this demand for a ban on weapons of mass destruction, the threat of the use of which has increased as a result of threats to use the hydrogen weapon, which the aggressive circles in the world say they are going to use in another conflict. These proposals go further and state that the five permanent members of the Security Council should reduce by one-third their conventional armaments and armed forces in one year. The Soviet Union proposals call on the Security Council to help in the achievement of this end. Such an approach would not only strengthen peace but

would reduce the heavy burden of armaments which is laid on the people of the capitalist countries by the armaments race. The Soviet proposals also seek to remove an important threat to the peace which is created by the establishment of a widespread network of air, naval and military bases throughout a number of foreign States, not for the defence of one's country but for obviously aggressive purposes. Moreover, they subvert the sovereignty of other States. These proposals also call for the elimination of this threat, which is implicit in the creation and building of military bases in foreign territories. They call on the Security Council to take the necessary measures for their dismantling.

The proposals of the Soviet Union also call for the condemnation of war propaganda conducted by certain ruling circles which are intent on kindling hate and hostility among the peoples. This demand is in accordance with the principles of our Organization. Moreover, it is designed to maintain peace, trust and a true friendship.

The Czechoslovak delegation is convinced that early consideration and adoption of the Soviet Union proposals would enable the United Nations to make best use of the opportunity now created for proving to the peoples of the world that this indeed is an Organization whose activity is designed to ensure peace and international security and to strengthen co-operation among the nations against the preparation of a new war. This is the best opportunity for the United Nations to show to the world that it stands guard over peace, defends the sovereign rights of large and small peoples and, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, seeks to foster peaceful co-existence.

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On 22 September the General Assembly recognized the propriety and necessity of considering measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Indeed, the General Assembly decided to put this item in its agenda as an additional item.

The Czechoslovak delegation is profoundly convinced that these peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union are entirely in line with the vital interests of the millions of toilers who have resolutely repudiated all types of military adventures. For these reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation feels that the item entitled "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations" is a highly important one by its very nature and that it therefore should be considered first by our Committee; in other words, it should be placed number 2 on our agenda, after the Korean question.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I have six more speeches on my list. In order not to prolong this debate unreasonably, I would appeal to my colleagues to limit their observations, in so far as possible, to the sequence of the items and to avoid discussing the substance of matters.

U MYINT THEIN (Burma): I hate to participate in the battle of the giants, and I do so from a respectable distance only because the representative of the United States has referred to item number 4 of our provisional agenda, which relates to the aggression against Burma by the Kuomintang forces. Most of us know that the talks in Bangkok have broken down. As far as we are concerned, we have no hope. We are grateful to friends like Mr. Lodge and the United States of America for doing their best, but, as I have said, personally I see no hope and I do not think that it would be advisable to postpone the consideration of the item to "the next several weeks", which Mr. Lodge referred to. As we are told by our friends that some efforts are being made, we are willing to wait but we should not like to wait indefinitely. I would request Mr. Lodge not to relegate my item to the bottom along with the items that he intends to relegate there. If you look at the provisional agenda you will ~~see~~ find that my item is about the only item in respect of which one might expect

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a conclusion in the course of this session. All the other items will probably take the next ten years or so, and I am under duty to report to the United Nations; I should like to do so and get it over with, but in deference to the wishes of my friends I am prepared not to insist upon my item being the first. I should like to see it either as the second or the third item. I shall be perfectly frank. In the event of a constructive resolution coming up, we should like to see whether it could be implemented and if there is no chance of these things being implemented we should like it to come up again here before the session's end. For these reasons, I hope that the representatives will not relegate my item to the bottom of the list, and also not for "the next several weeks".

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I call on the representative of the United States on a point of order.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): I should like to point out to the representative of Burma that under the proposal now before us the item on Burma would not be at the bottom of the list but would be item number 4.

Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The First Committee of the General Assembly has started its proceedings by considering the sequence of items. It is quite evident that priority in the consideration of items should be given to those items which touch upon the most vital aspects of contemporary international relations. Among those questions which call for early consideration are, of course, the Korean question and the proposal of the Soviet Union delegation for "measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations". Dangers exist in the present international situation; there are tensions which demand measures to reduce them. Thus, there are most urgent questions to which other problems, even though urgent, should yield.

The proposal of the United States, Australia and some others indicate that in certain countries there is an evident desire to eschew consideration of the Korean question at this session, and the same, of course, goes for the

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Soviet Union proposal. However, we will not be deluded concerning the nature of these intentions. We remember how, in a similar manner, at the sixth session of the General Assembly the delegation of the United States, and the delegations of countries which now tend to support the faulty United States position, dealt with the Korean question. At the beginning these delegations obdurately called for postponement of the Korean question, for having the Korean question placed at the end of the agenda. When the Assembly finally reached that item, these delegations avoided the consideration of the Korean question altogether and they saw to it quite successfully that the Assembly did not deal with the item at all. There we have an instructive example indeed which comes to mind in connexion with the present position of the United States and of certain supporting delegations.

The delegation of Australia tried to shift the blame for the difficulties that have arisen in connexion with the political conference onto the Korean-Chinese side. It is well known, however, that the answers of the Korean and Chinese Governments to the telegram of the Secretary-General contain concrete and clear proposals destined to facilitate the possibility of agreement concerning the political conference. Having in mind that the composition and the agenda of the political conference are of great importance for the adoption of agreed decisions, the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic propose that that conference be organized on the basis of the round table principle, that its composition be expanded by including such neutral countries as the Soviet Union, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma. These momentous proposals which would facilitate the reaching of understandings on the political conference cannot be overlooked. Nevertheless, a number of delegations, including the Australian delegation, prevented consideration by the General Assembly of the Korean and Chinese proposals. They prevented the inclusion in the agenda of the memorandum of the Secretary-General for the implementation of resolution C. It is therefore not the Korean-Chinese side, but the fifteen belligerents in Korea who fought on the United States side who create hindrances to the convening of the conference.

The Assembly should see to it that the political conference is so organized as to be able to reach a peaceful settlement in Korea. On that peace in the Far East depends. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR feels, therefore, that there are no valid reasons for postponing consideration of these questions. One of them touches directly upon the interests of the Korean people: the others concern the interests of millions of human beings in all parts of the world and in all States. These questions are very urgent and very important. They should be considered at the present session of the General Assembly, without delay and before other items.

On these grounds the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supports the proposal of the Soviet Union that the First Committee, at the eighth session of the General Assembly, should consider the Korean question first, and that the second item on the agenda should be that proposed by the Soviet Union on measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations.

Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): We have heard four speakers on this topic from what is usually described as "the Soviet bloc". I do not think that there is very much novelty or variety in the arguments deployed. Mr. Vyshinsky, in his speech, quoted a Russian saying that a roan stallion cannot become a mottled mare. I thought that that was very obvious in relation to the arguments as they developed. If I may use the terminology of "bebop" I am tempted to say of these speeches, "Dig that broken record" -- and I shall be very interested indeed to know how the interpreters succeed in interpreting that phrase.

On the establishment of the order of items I have no comment to make on the points put forward except that concerning the Korean item. Mr. Vyshinsky suggested that our attitude in supporting this order of items was what he had suspected might happen. As far as the United Kingdom delegation was concerned, I made it absolutely clear in my speech in the plenary Assembly on the report of the General Committee that I did not think that it was appropriate to debate the Korean item first. Our test is, "Will a public debate be conducive to a settlement?", and I think that there is no doubt that at this moment a public debate would not be conducive to a settlement. I do not think that anyone will

feel that this procedural discussion has assisted the setting up of the political conference, and I do not think that a public debate on the substance would do so either.

What are the reasons against it? First of all, we had a debate in August in which a great deal was said on the matter. Then, we have just had the recent general debate of the Assembly, and again most speakers did make some public reference to the question of Korea. Is it suggested that we ought to have a debate in order for some new proposals to be put forward? If anyone has any constructive initiative to put forward in this matter why must he wait for a public debate to do so? If Mr. Vyshinsky has constructive proposals to make why cannot they, too, be put forward through the normal diplomatic channels as speedily as possible. I hope that we must not understand from his speech that he was making a pronouncement or a statement that the political conference would not meet. That, I think, would be a very serious and lamentable proposition. We certainly hope very much that it will be possible to get that conference going.

Then, is it said that we have to have a public debate in order to clarify certain suggestions that have been put forward with regard to leaving the question of participation to the conference itself? It seemed to me that Mr. Vyshinsky wanted to know publicly or to debate publicly what instructions might be given to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the political conference. If there is any uncertainty or any desire for clarification again why cannot that be pursued through normal diplomatic channels? Mr. Vyshinsky's own rather contemptuous rejection of the two suggestions put forward by the representative of the United States in the General Committee is really an argument against discussing this matter further in public at the present time.

I think it is a situation of folly and danger, and almost of despair for the whole world, if we are forced into a position where we cannot carry forward negotiations on any topic except by public debate. I think that that is a bankruptcy of statesmanship in every country, because in many cases public debate, at particular stages, so far from helping settlement retards it. Therefore our attitude to a debate on the Korean question is that, although we do not exclude



the possibility at a later stage, we do not think that it is in the interest of peace to have such a debate as the first item on the agenda of this Committee. We think it is much better to put the Korean item at the bottom of the list, on the distinct understanding that it can be moved up. I am in agreement with what has been said on this subject by the representatives of Australia, the United States and Sweden. With regard to the proposal put forward by the representative of Australia, without prejudice to the legal aspect of the matter we can see no objection to what he said and it seems to us to be common sense. I hope, therefore, that this Committee will accept the proposal of the Colombian representative, subject to qualification, as need be, in the light of the Australian suggestion.

Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) (interpretation from French): I should like to propose an amendment to that part of the Colombian proposal which seeks to allocate to the Tunisian and Moroccan questions first and second place in the order of discussion. My proposed amendment is to the effect that the debate on these two items should be adjourned for ten days.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that it would be right to link the order of the items with the date on which the first question should be discussed. I feel that the Committee should decide upon the order first and then decide upon dates afterwards. I shall be making suggestions in that connexion later, and in order to avoid confusion in this debate I would request the representative of Egypt not to press the proposal he has just made.

Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) (interpretation from French): If the procedure suggested by the Chairman is designed to achieve the same result I shall, of course not press my proposal. It should be understood, however, that my delegation supports the Colombian proposal on the understanding that we should like to have the discussion of these two items postponed for about ten days.

Mr. WEBB (New Zealand): In the opinion of the New Zealand delegation it is desirable to get the political conference going as soon as possible, and if I thought that the prospects of doing so were as hopeless as the representative of the Soviet Union seems to think I should agree that the question should be discussed at once. But I am by no means as pessimistic as Mr. Vyshinsky seems to be, and I am a little disturbed about some of the implications that seemed to follow from his remarks. My delegation is still hopeful that the efforts that are now being made will prove successful, but, as the representative of the United Kingdom has said, if anyone has any proposals to put forward it would be better if they were put forward through normal diplomatic channels rather than by means of a public debate in this Assembly or in this Committee. I cannot conceive that any good whatever could come at this stage out of a rehashing of the debate that took place in the Assembly last month, and if there is a risk that the deadline date of 28 October will be reached before the political conference gets going I would say that that risk would be greatly increased if we began a debate now.

For these reasons, therefore, we are in favour of putting this item lower on the list, and we shall support the Colombian draft resolution together with the amendment, qualification or whatever it may be called that has been suggested by the representative of our neighbour, Australia. We want to make it clear that we understand that if the item is deferred it will be possible for this Committee, by a simple majority, to bring it forward at any time. On that understanding we support the proposal put forward by the Colombian representative as amended by the representative of Australia.

Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) (interpretation from French): During the discussion on 22 September in the General Committee, the Yugoslav delegation had occasion to point out that the question under consideration was both procedural and political in nature, and that the political aspect was paramount. Sufficient proof of that fact has been furnished today by the arguments which have been invoked: they have all been political.

Of course, we should not make much progress if we were to try to analyse, over and over again, the question of who is responsible for the new obstacles, the new difficulties.

The Yugoslav Delegation's viewpoint on the composition and nature of the political conference is on record. Our fundamental thought is that the role of the United Nations cannot be that of an armed camp -- political or ideological -- which is pitted against another armed camp. We are an international organization with the task of safeguarding peace. Peace is safeguarded through collective measures and the use of peaceful methods in the solution of disputes. That is a viewpoint to which we adhere.

During the discussion in the General Committee, the Yugoslav representative stated that the Korean question should be assigned its due priority. We still adhere to that opinion, also. It is a fact that no one is opposed to a public discussion of this question. The issue is when that public discussion should take place. The Yugoslav delegation does not believe that it would be dangerous to resume an examination of the question in the General Assembly -- all the more since my delegation hopes, and indeed is convinced, that, regardless of the outcome of that debate, none of the governments concerned will wish to assume the onus of postponing the political conference. My delegation therefore believes that it would be useful -- in fact necessary -- for the General Assembly to continue to deal directly with the development of the Korean question and that, in so doing, the Assembly should exert its influence towards achieving an affirmative solution to the problem.

Hence, without insisting that the Korean question should be placed at the very top of the agenda, we do believe that that question is highly important and should be assigned a place on the agenda commensurate with that importance.

Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The head of the Soviet Union delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, has submitted proposals to the effect that the Korean question should be given first place in this Committee's agenda, and that the item proposed by the Soviet Union delegation and entitled "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations" should be given second place. Mr. Vyshinsky has given carefully thought-out arguments to support those proposals. I shall seek briefly to supplement some of the points which he raised.

It is well known that world attention is now focused on the Korean question, and particularly on the forthcoming political conference. World public opinion welcomed the armistice, and now public attention is focused on the question of what will happen to the political conference.

The position of the United States on that score is well known: it seeks to keep out the neutrals. That position is at variance with world public opinion. Nevertheless, the United States persists.

I think it would be proper that this question should be considered anew -- in this Committee and in plenary meeting of the General Assembly -- with a view to reaching an understanding to the effect that the neutrals should be admitted to the political conference, as proposed by the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

Moreover, we should take account of the fact that recent statements issued by Syngman Rhee, the so-called President of South Korea, are becoming ever more provocative. This gentleman -- not for the first time, but for the nth time -- has come out with provocative statements, for the obvious purpose of wrecking the political conference on Korea and all possible solutions of the Korean problem.

As an example of what I have just said, I would quote the following statement which was made by Mr. Rhee and which appeared in The New York Times:

"By agreement with the United States, the Government of the Republic of Korea has postponed its determination to unify North and South Korea by military means, in order to see what may come out of a political conference. We have also entered into a mutual defence treaty with the United States. If, ninety days after the political conference opens, it has failed to achieve the objective of Korean unification, then, naturally, we shall resume the battle for our national independence and unity." (The New York Times, 28 September 1953)

I think that quotation is self-explanatory. Syngman Rhee, that puppet, is provoking a new war. He is obviously trying to wreck the political conference. That should be a matter of concern to representatives gathered in this room.

In answer to Mr. Lloyd, the representative of the United Kingdom, I must say that I think his Government should also have some misgivings about the developments of the last few days with regard to the Korean question. No such misgivings, however, were evident in Mr. Lloyd's statement to this Committee. Indeed, he has approached a most important question rather superficially. I suggest that he should take a more profound, a more serious approach to serious political issues.

That is why the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic believes that the Committee should consider the Korean question as the first item on the agenda. We also believe that the second place on the agenda should be assigned to the item proposed by the Soviet Union delegation and entitled "Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and to reduce tension in international relations". I do not think the importance of the latter item can be challenged. What is at issue now is the averting of a new world war. Millions of human beings throughout the world desire international peace and security. If, indeed, we reflect the views of our peoples, if we desire peace throughout the world, we must consider this matter profoundly and seriously and draw the appropriate conclusions.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic considers that the proposals of the head of the Soviet Union delegation are serious, valid and well founded and should be discussed first.

Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I shall endeavour briefly to set forth the views of the Soviet Union delegation on what has been said in this Committee during the past two hours. The arguments which have been put forward here can be broken down very easily; their fallaciousness is patent. The order in which I shall deal with them is the order in which they were made. First of all, the representative of Australia said that the answers received by the Secretary-General from the Governments of the Chinese and Korean People's Republics could be reduced to a refutation of paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. It is only necessary to read these letters, which have been distributed to all the representatives and which are, therefore, at their disposal, to realize that the answers received from the Foreign Minister of the Chinese People's Republic and the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Korean People's Republic do not contain any question of revoking paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. The same thought, in fact, was contained in the contribution of Mr. Lodge, the representative of the United States, who said that the Communists -- as he called the Governments of these two Republics -- had changed their position concerning the composition of the political conference, and that in so doing they had actually gone back on paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. Here, again, is an entirely unfounded allegation.

We remember paragraph 60. It says that the conference shall be convened by both sides and that the commanders of the two sides will recommend to the Governments concerned that a conference should be convened within such and such a time on a higher level, and that in that conference representatives nominated by both sides should take part in the settlement, through negotiation, of such questions as the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. That Agreement does not refute or reduce the rights of the United Nations and of the General Assembly to follow its own line and its own Charter and, in pursuance of that Charter, to fulfil the obligations conferred upon the United Nations and upon the General Assembly.

There is hardly any question as to whether the General Assembly is empowered to submit any recommendation and to nominate anyone it deems fit. Such a question could not be raised, since that would run directly counter to Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the Charter. The point is that the General Assembly has made its

recommendations to both sides, to both belligerents. Those recommendations were contained in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 28 August. One of the sides has said that, as regards those recommendations, it has some remarks to make and that the recommendations are not quite acceptable. One of the sides has said that it thinks the conference should be organized in the way they have indicated and, therefore, they beg that the General Assembly resolution be reviewed accordingly. Is not that perfectly regular and perfectly legitimate? We think it is. Sovereign States, which carry out their own will in foreign relations, can put the question in that manner; of course they can.

Is not the General Assembly duty bound to **hearken to** that voice and to pay heed to this statement? Of course it is. The same people say here that we had no business even asking for the views of the Communists in connexion with resolution C. They say it is no use asking for the views of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. That is what was said last month in connexion with resolution C. The General Assembly, however, decided otherwise. The General Assembly decided that its views should be communicated to the other side, **and that** their replies should be reported on as appropriate. That goes without saying. That would be so even without resolution C, because, after all, there has to be some agreement between the two sides as to how, when and where the conference should be convened and as to the composition of that conference.

If the General Assembly had not expressed views on the composition of the conference, then the situation would have been different, but the General Assembly intervened and displayed its interest in the matter. The General Assembly stated its views as to how the political conference should be organized. Those were the views of the United Nations, and, after all, sixteen States do not represent the United Nations, and that makes all the greater the need to consider the differences that have arisen as regards the organization of the political conference. If the question of the political conference is one which concerns not the sixteen States alone, but the United Nations as a whole, it would be inconceivable for the sixteen States to express their will and for that will to stand without appeal.



To state, therefore, that we merely face stratagems by the Chinese and the Koreans in an effort to revoke paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement is to put forward a fallacious argument. Paragraph 60 does not exclude the General Assembly from making recommendations. The General Assembly has already made recommendations, and has received an answer setting forth the views of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and Korea. A report on the subject has been made by the Secretary-General, and nothing should stand in the way of our consideration of this question. It is this question of the composition of the conference and of the whole Korean question which stands on our agenda.

A proposal that we discuss specifically the report of the Secretary-General was rejected on the grounds that the question was covered and could be discussed in connexion with the item on the Korean question. I say, all right, let us go. Then, however, we were told that it was not timely to do so, that the conference was to be convened, and so on. But the Soviet Union delegation does not call specifically for a consideration of the question of the political conference, but for a consideration of the Korean question, which is on the agenda. Therefore, I say that we are not trying to distort, revoke or annul paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. On the contrary. I submit that no valid reasons or arguments have been submitted to that effect.

Mr. Lodge stated that it had been proposed that a representative of the sixteen Powers should meet with representatives of the Koreans and the Chinese, and that they should discuss the place, the time, and so on of the conference on the spot. Mr. Lodge complained that the Soviet Union had rejected that out of hand. That is incorrect. The Soviet Union cannot reject or accept proposals that were not addressed to it, proposals that were addressed to the other side. However, the Soviet Union is entitled to express its views, just as others have expressed theirs. It was perfectly correct for the Soviet Union to express the views it ventured to express when we said that for the representatives to meet without some agreement as to the composition of the political conference would make the chances of success very precarious. Of course, there are the sides to which the proposal was directed. As long as they have not answered, one cannot say that the proposal has been rejected. We stated our views, and no more, though I dare say that this position of ours is shared by many.

We have been told that the Korean question should not be discussed here as long as negotiations go on. If that was not a mistranslation, then all I can say is that there are no negotiations. When there was a war we asked the General Assembly to discuss various questions relating to the cessation of hostilities, and then we were told that as long as the war goes on talk here can only hamper a peaceful settlement. We were told: let the military talk at Panmunjom, let them settle the question. But now there is no more war and there are no more hostilities, and we are told the same thing: It is not for the General Assembly to intervene, to help discuss these questions or to submit recommendations. We are told that as long as negotiations are taking place in Korea, we have nothing to do here. But there are no negotiations. There is no such thing at all. Finally we are told: oh, we can review our position. However, this rather weakens the position first established. First one sets up an agenda and then says: oh yes, but we can shift items.

I can reserve the right to submit every day proposals to review the previous decisions and, in so doing, to inaugurate a discussion which, as today's experience indicates, would go on and on. If you submit an amendment to the effect that <sup>at</sup> any proper time we may review the sequence of items, then I must say that I consider that the time has come right now to review the very proposal, even before it is adopted. But if you adopt that proposal, with its amendment, this of course cannot minimize or deprive us of the right to call for a reconsideration every day. On the contrary, your amendment is a symptom of your lack of assurance as to the propriety of your own position.

We propose -- and a number of delegations have supported us -- that there should be no pigeon-holing of this question, that the Korean question should be discussed forthwith, that this question should be given priority, because no matter what you may say, it is still of interest even to you now, and more vital than any other question. No amount of jokes or expressions or "bebop" cracks designed to perhaps offend certain delegations -- as was used by Mr. Lloyd -- can alter this situation. Mr. Lloyd of course did mention that the "record" which is being proposed today is "broken". Of course

a broken record is not a thing to listen to, but Mr. Lloyd did say after all: "Dig that broken record". I must say that our record, broken or otherwise, must be pretty good if he attaches such great importance to it.

How about the record which is not broken? In that case Mr. Lloyd would lose his composure altogether. Mr. Lloyd, previously, tried to mention our Russian proverbs. He said something about a cow which if it moos very much does not give very much milk. I mention that there is no such Russian proverb. But it does remind us of another proverb, or an aphorism, that an orator who speaks much is likely to be barren, to be sterile. Mr. Lloyd has shifted his ground. He now gives all sorts of comparisons, for which I congratulate him. If he is happy, I hope that this will give him consolation. I am not a mean person. I would not be happy maliciously at somebody else's discomfiture.

Mr. Lloyd said that if our proposals were adopted, this would be a bankruptcy, a failure of the whole matter because, he said, public discussion is less likely to lead to success in diplomatic negotiations. Then why is it that the General Assembly for two and a half years has kept discussing the matter? Why did not Mr. Lloyd warn us earlier? Why did he not tell us: Oh, let us stop public discussion, let us proceed to behind-the-scenes discussion? Why? Because he was not very sure himself that this new maxim was entirely justified.

I think that diplomatic negotiations are indeed useful. But one cannot put the question in terms of/black and white alternative. Both are good provided they do not run into each other, provided they are co-ordinated. If nothing is done by way of public discussions, secret or private consultations or meetings are resorted to. Far be it from us to adopt a fanatic point of view which gets stuck at one point without moving. I would rather warn Mr. Lloyd against that danger. I was rather scared when he placed the matter in that light of "either/or". We say "both/and". We do not exclude the possibility of reaching agreement with you outside of this hall, but this does not mean that once we have started a discussion of the Korean question here, we should not discuss it further.

There are a number of questions which require preliminary consultation. We do not deny the usefulness of that. If you do not, we do not either. But why simply at this point tell the public: please get out, we will stay here alone and discuss it. It would not be very courteous once one has commenced considering the question in the presence of everybody. Placing it as an absolute alternative is fallacious.

Mr. Lloyd said that a discussion of this matter in the Committee or in the General Assembly is not likely to yield good results. But I have had occasion -- and so did some of my colleagues -- to observe that we followed the reverse rule. We have discussed these questions here, and now that some of the Members of the United Nations feel that it is important to get some clarity, to discuss these questions here, at this very point we are told: oh no, nothing good will result. Of course nothing good will result if some people do not want it to result that way. Moreover, it has been suggested that I want to discuss here the nature of the instructions to be given to the United States representatives or to the United Kingdom representatives, far from it. The nature of their instructions is not of my affair, though of course it is a point of some interest. However, it is not my affair and far be it from me to impose this question on the Committee. But, if you propose that the conference itself should consider the question of the possibility of expanding its membership, then I ask, how do you square that proposal with the resolution of 28 August 1953, which specifies that composition expressis verbis?

If we are going to have businesslike discussions here, it must be recognized that in that case you would have to say that the General Assembly resolution of 28 August is not a categorical one, that it is not unconditional, that it is subject to modification or adjustment if agreement to that effect is reached at the conference by both sides. Moreover, the United States should say that, and Mr. Lloyd should say that, and Mr. Hoppenôt would have to say that, and the others of the sixteen States would have to say it.

As far as we are concerned, we will not hamper that. You would have to say, therefore, that you agree to modifying the resolution of 28 August.

If you state in public "We are prepared to modify the terms of the resolution of 28 August" if this were decided at the political conference then, of course, we would know where we stand. But in answer to my direct question in the General Committee, and Mr. Lodge will not forget that I asked specifically: "Are you prepared to give appropriate instructions?" and I did not ask what kind of instructions but instructions that would be in line with that suggestion, instructions to his representatives that they should not hinder consideration of the question of the eventual expansion of the conference, then we would know how we stood, but when I asked that question, Mr. Lodge, with some expressive mimicry, to which I must pay tribute, gave a negative answer. So what is the point of that whole thing? It is entirely pointless when you say that the conference should decide the question of its own composition, because you yourself have repudiated that possibility. That is not a serious way of looking at the question. That is why we object. We object, mind you, not the Korean People's Democratic Republic, not the Chinese People's Republic, but we. We have the right to state our views. If you are interested in the views of those who are the parties most directly concerned, go ahead and do as we suggest, invite them here and ask them, if you are interested. But at the same time you deny us the right to state our views on this matter and then, with a holier than thou attitude and with an air of complete born yesterday innocence, you say: "You are such evil people you want to wreck the conference."

One must be disingenuous indeed to do these things and to do the things which were described by the proverb which I mentioned and which gave such pleasure to Mr. Lodge. I hope that I will have further occasion to give such pleasure to Mr. Lodge.

(interpretation from French):

The CHAIRMAN/ We are not likely to wind up this matter this morning. A number of speakers are still on the agenda and, therefore, I propose the discussion be continued this afternoon.

The representative of the United States wishes to speak on a point of order.

Mr. LODGE (United States): I should like briefly to correct a misstatement which has just been made.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I suggest it would be preferable to do that this afternoon, because it is rather late now and there are a number of speakers on the agenda. We will, therefore, meet at 3 o'clock for a continuation of this debate.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.