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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Tuesday, 19 February 1957, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru)

Question of Cyprus [55] (continued)

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Noble	(United Kingdom)
Mr. Mackay	(Canada)
Mr. Nincic	(Yugoslavia)
Mr. Serrano	(Philippines)
Mr. Averoff-Tossizza	(Greece)

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QUESTION OF CYPRUS: (a) APPLICATION, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES IN THE CASE OF THE POPULATION OF THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS; (b) COMPLAINT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND OF SUPPORT FROM GREECE FOR TERRORISM IN CYPRUS (A/3120 and Add.1, A/3204 and Add.1; A/C.1/L.168, L.169, L.170)

Agenda item 55 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call upon the representative of the United Kingdom to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): With permission, I should like to make a very brief statement arising from some of the remarks of the Foreign Minister of Greece this morning.

If I understood him correctly, Mr. Averoff-Tossizza claimed that certain British officials, or members of what he called the British Intelligence Service, had on various occasions tried to inveigle Greek nationals into committing illegal acts which it was intended would be later exploited by the British Government as evidence of Greek complicity in the supply of arms to the terrorists in Cyprus. I understood him to say that the documents on those charges would be circulated to the Committee. I shall, of course, have more to say on this matter when I see those documents, but I think that the Committee will understand the astonishment with which I heard those charges made. And I must confess that I also feel some surprise that if the Greek Government had in its possession information to the effect that British officials in Greece were behaving in an improper manner it did not at once bring this to the attention of our Ambassador in Athens.

I must also say something about another point in the Foreign Minister's speech. He said that he had a dossier about atrocities in Cyprus which, if I understood him correctly, he was lodging confidentially with the Secretary-General, while reserving the right to publish it at a later stage. This seems to me to be a most extraordinary and unprecedented procedure. The Assembly, in recent months, has conferred many difficult and unpleasant tasks upon the Secretary-General, but

surely it has never been suggested until now that he should be the unwilling recipient of confidential information which is said to be of a kind damaging to one of the Member States.

I do not wish to appear unresponsive to what Mr. Averoff-Tossizza said about further envenoming the debate, but I am sure that members of this Committee will agree with me that my delegation cannot be expected to countenance an arrangement by which documents of that sort are left hanging over it. Either they must be published, or they must be withdrawn. If the Greek delegation proposes to deposit any documents within the United Nations which affect the course of this debate, we must ask that they be circulated to the Committee.

Mr. MACKAY (Canada): I am reluctant, as I am sure are all of the friends and allies of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, to intervene in the debate on this unfortunate subject. But after hearing the speeches made by the representatives of those three countries in the Committee, and after long study of the problem, I feel it necessary to make a few points.

The first, which seems to me obvious, is that the problem of Cyprus is highly complex from the point of view of international law, of geography, and of ethnic, linguistic, religious and strategic considerations. It is not a question to which any one of us could give a quick and facile answer. Cyprus, in ancient, medieval and modern history, has proved a bone of contention. We must be cautious about suggesting solutions which might stir up further strife, even if this Committee really felt it had the competence to do so.

The second point which stands out in our examination of this question is the inescapable conclusion that the Cypriots would have best served their own good by accepting constitutional development in Cyprus along the lines offered by the United Kingdom Government. In particular, it does seem to us that the off-hand dismissal by the Greek Government of the proposals made by that eminent jurist, Lord Radcliffe, without any serious study, was not an act which could conceivably be described as intended to help towards a solution of the question.

I was sorry to hear some of the charges levelled at the United Kingdom Government by the Foreign Minister of Greece. We in Canada who know so well the history of the development of the British Empire into a Commonwealth of Nations, find it difficult to believe that any people under British rule would not be able gradually and peacefully to work out their own destiny. We recognize that the Radcliffe constitution and previous offers did not immediately give complete self-government to Cyprus. Indeed in the present circumstances that would be highly unrealistic. But it did give a very great measure of self-government to the people of Cyprus and if this constitution were the point of departure, I think it would direct the peoples of Cyprus, no matter what their origin, towards a better, more peaceful and prosperous existence. And I ask the people of Cyprus to study carefully the history of the development of the Commonwealth of Nations to see if the United Kingdom, having in good faith on both sides started a people on the path to self-government, has ever thwarted it in its subsequent development.

(Mr. MacKay, Canada)

In the past my Government has believed, and continues to do so, that a solution to the problem of Cyprus must be worked out by the parties principally concerned. I do not think an airing of the dispute in this body is likely to help. In addition, we do not think that the continuance of the near state of civil war in Cyprus, and its encouragement from abroad, nor the stirring up of animosity and hatred on racial lines in this small island is the way to solve the problem. It is of the greatest importance for the sincere friends of all three of the disputants in this question that it be settled as quickly as possible with the minimum of public contention. Above all, any further deterioration in the relations between Greece and Turkey on the one hand and between Greece and the United Kingdom on the other can only add to the unsettled conditions in the Middle East.

As regards the charges and counter-charges about terrorism in Cyprus, it is clearly difficult to decide when such activity is criminal and when it is heroic. But no matter how one labels it, the end result is misery for the people, and under no circumstances can we condone the aid and encouragement given to these activities from the mainland of Greece. This again surely is a question which can and should be settled amicably by the Powers concerned and my delegation cannot believe that the United Nations can play a useful role in this issue.

Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia): When the item "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus" first came before the General Assembly at its ninth session, many of us were already beginning to view with serious concern the events on this Island which is situated in a particularly sensitive area of world politics. The Assembly decided, however, on that occasion to postpone any action "for the time being". It decided to do so in the expectation that the determined efforts by all concerned would soon bring about a change for the better in what already was becoming a highly disturbing situation.

(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

It was the same expectation, the same hope, that led a majority of the Assembly to prefer not to include this item in the agenda of the tenth regular session. It was felt, despite the not altogether encouraging experience of the years that have just elapsed, that some advance towards a settlement would be achieved and that it might be wiser for the Assembly to refrain even from discussing this question.

Many of us, and my delegation, it will be recalled, voted at the time for the inclusion of this item on the agenda. Many of us were not without serious misgivings about the advisability of the United Nations relinquishing, even if temporarily, its responsibility with regard to what was fast becoming a major and obviously explosive international issue. We were, however, prepared to share in the expectation that this act of faith on the part of the Assembly would provide an incentive to those most directly responsible for the situation, that it would encourage them to take the steps that had long been overdue and make a serious endeavour for the establishment of conditions in which a peaceful, equitable and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question would become possible.

This expectation has, unfortunately, remained unfulfilled. No improvement in this situation is discernible. No progress, however modest, appears to have been achieved.

(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

On the contrary, a settlement seems further away than ever before. There has clearly been a steady deterioration in the situation. Conditions have become worse in Cyprus itself. The clash between the population, or what is clearly a substantial majority of the population, and the British authorities is increasing in violence. The struggle of the Greek Cypriots against the existing order of things on the island is, according to all the evidence available, gaining both in scope and in momentum. All sections of the Greek Cypriot population -- that is to say, some three-fourths of the entire population -- are joining in this struggle, regardless of age, of sex or of political beliefs.

I am not, for the moment, going into the causes of this movement. What I wish to point out is that we are confronted in Cyprus with a vast and genuine national movement -- a movement such as we have been witnessing in so many parts of the world during the last decade or so, constituting one of the outstanding features of our times.

On the other hand, the measures which the British authorities have been taking to cope with this movement have become increasingly stringent. It is not my intention to describe these measures here; they are generally known. It is obvious, however, that these measures not only have failed to achieve their avowed purpose -- the re-establishment of order -- but have had a steadily aggravating effect on the situation. The state of turmoil on the island is thus being perpetuated, and the prospects of a political settlement appear to be receding accordingly.

To this headlong clash between the authorities and the majority of the population, a further and ominous element has now been added: the growing strife between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority. The Greek and the Turkish parts of the population are, we know, interspersed throughout the island. They have, history tells us, been living and working side by side in peace and friendship over the centuries. There now appears to be growing bitterness between them. There are raids and reprisal raids, with a mounting toll of innocent victims.

(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

The same grim pattern that we have known in other areas of the world now seems to be unfolding in Cyprus, also. Here, again, I do not wish to analyse the causes of this alarming state of affairs. It is surely evident, however, that these developments bode no good for the future of Cyprus. Indeed, if a halt is not soon called to trends of this nature, the Cyprus problem will become immeasurably more difficult of solution.

Such are the facts, as we see them, of the situation in Cyprus itself. No less alarming, however, are the broader international implications of these developments. The persistence and aggravation of the Cyprus problem have maintained an additional element of discord and tension in an area which has already come to be looked upon as one of the world's major danger spots. Relations among three countries, which had long been cordial, have taken a sharp turn for the worse, and there is little prospect that these relations will improve so long as the Cyprus question subsists as a bone of contention. This state of affairs can only be to the gravest detriment of all concerned.

These events have, I may say, been viewed with much concern by my Government, which cannot but follow with close attention the developments in a region both geographically and politically adjacent to our own -- all the more since these developments affect the relations between countries with which Yugoslavia maintains extremely friendly ties and to two of which Yugoslavia is bound by an alliance.

We therefore feel that the General Assembly must now take a more direct interest than hitherto in the alarming situation arising from the trend of events in Cyprus. The first thing about which it is, I think, essential to be clear is the intrinsic nature of the problem with which we are faced. In my delegation's opinion, the problem boils down to this: There is a powerful popular movement in Cyprus, born out of the striving of a large majority of the population to shape its own destiny. In other words, there can be no doubt, in our opinion, that the problem is one of applying the principle of self-determination, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, to the population of Cyprus. We have always considered this principle of self-determination to be one of the basic tenets of the Charter and one of the essential requirements of peace and orderly progress in our age. We have, accordingly, always felt it to be one of this



(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

Organization's primary duties to seek to ensure conditions in which a peaceful implementation of the right of self-determination is possible.

We have studied with great care the various arguments that have been adduced to demonstrate that the Cyprus problem is either not one of self-determination at all or one where the application of this right is not possible in existing circumstances. We have not been convinced by these arguments. It is said that self-determination is merely a pretext, a camouflage for Enosis, for the union of Cyprus with Greece, for the territorial aggrandizement of Greece. This is claimed despite the fact that the Greek Government has itself made it perfectly clear that what that Government seeks is simply the establishment of conditions in which the people of Cyprus will be able freely to pronounce themselves on their future status. Whether they will choose independence or union with Greece is, I submit, of little relevance from the point of view of the exercise of the right of self-determination. The important, the essential point is that it should be made possible for the people of Cyprus to exercise this right in freedom and without any form of pressure.

It is further asserted that the question of Cyprus has been artificially created -- invented, as it were -- by Greece, and that the liberation movement in Cyprus is not really a liberation movement at all, but merely the result of the activities of a handful of extremists aided and abetted from outside. All the evidence available hardly seems to bear out this contention. The very magnitude of the movement against the existing dispensation in Cyprus would seem peremptorily to militate against a facile explanation of this kind. This magnitude is not denied, but is ascribed to intimidation by the terrorists or to incitement from Athens. It is hard indeed to persuade oneself that the thousands of crack British troops in Cyprus would not act as an effective deterrent to the activities of a small band of terrorists or to the exhortations -- which, moreover, appear to be successfully jammed -- of the Greek radio, if there was not really more to it than that. To explain a popular movement like the one in Cyprus in terms of intimidation or foreign immixture is, it seems to us, as dangerous as it is misleading. It is dangerous because it tends to obscure and distort the true elements of the problem and thus make far more difficult the quest for a genuine solution.

(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

One of the legal arguments often brought forward in opposition to the claim of self-determination for Cyprus is that the question of the status of this island has been settled by the relevant articles of the Treaty of Lausanne. I must confess that we find some difficulty in comprehending this line of thinking. It is true that the Treaty of Lausanne did provide for the cession of Cyprus by Turkey to Great Britain, but that, however, is not proof. Most territorial settlements, including those instituting a colonial status, have some contractual or legal basis. Surely, even apart from Article 103 of the Charter, this should not preclude the enjoyment of the right of self-determination by a population, otherwise the domain of self-determination would be limited indeed.

The right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination no longer appears to be denied in principle. This in itself is a matter for gratification. The application of this right, however, is made dependent upon a number of circumstances which are not considered to be present at this time. The United Kingdom representative yesterday quoted the statement made by the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons on 19 December 1956. Mr. Lennox-Boyd was quoted as having said:

"Her Majesty's Government have already affirmed their recognition of the principle of self-determination. When the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to review the question of the application of self-determination."

(A/C.1/PV.848, p. 16)

Now, to my knowledge neither the Cypriots nor the Greek Government have demanded the immediate implementation of the right to self-determination. What they have asked for, and in our opinion what they are entitled to ask for, is that this right should be given recognition and that some progress should be made towards the establishment of conditions in which it could be put into effect. However, some of the conditions that have been put forward, especially the strategic considerations that are frequently invoked, would, it seems to us, be of a nature to preclude any real advance towards self-determination in the foreseeable future.

(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

I should like to say a few words at this point with regard to the strategic considerations. Generally speaking, for our part we have never been inclined to accept the thesis that reasons of a military or strategic order can outweigh the application of one of the basic principles of our Charter and the new law of nations. In this particular case, the recent events in the area and the role that Cyprus has been called upon to play in these events would seem to deprive the strategic argument of any validity it might previously have claimed. The essential point is that we should be offered some evidence of progress towards conditions in which the people of Cyprus would be able freely to determine their own future. Such evidence has so far been lacking, and that, of course, is the basic reason why the situation has been deteriorating.

Instead of the realistic political approach which the problem required, there has been a tendency to rely primarily on military and police measures. Such political proposals as have been made were either subordinated to the military necessities or obviously inadequate to meet the needs of the situation. It is not my intention to analyse the various proposals that have been made in the course of the last few years, but two things seem to stand out fairly clearly.

In the first place, a settlement can only be reached in co-operation with and with the full assent of the people of Cyprus themselves. In other words, there must be negotiations with representatives enjoying the support and the confidence of the population. Negotiations of this kind appear to have been initiated last year, but they were most unfortunately interrupted by the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. We are compelled to note in this connexion that, generally speaking, the Cypriot side so far has displayed a greater degree of readiness to seek a compromise than the other side. The Yugoslav Secretary of State, Mr. Popovic, pointed to this fact in his statement in the general debate of the General Assembly on 28 November 1956. He was referring both to Algeria and Cyprus when he said:

"It is neither the Algerians nor the Cypriots who are preventing such a compromise from being reached. It is the governments of the old colonial Powers who are opposing it." (A/PV.599, p. 62)

In the second place, by now it should have become abundantly clear that the majority of the Cypriot population will not rest content with the maintenance of their colonial status, even if it be an improved and more enlightened colonial status. Indeed, how could they be expected to do so

(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

at a time when the entire structure of colonialism is crumbling throughout the world. It may be added here that one could only wish that the United Kingdom would, in the case of Cyprus, display the same realistic responsiveness to the realities of our time that it has shown in other areas of the world and with regard to other no less complex problems.

This, of course, is not the place for any of us to go into the practical aspects or the details of a future settlement in Cyprus. There is one point, however, which I should like to mention, more especially because it has often been referred to as one of the major stumbling blocks in the way of a settlement and one of the main impediments to the application of self-determination in Cyprus. This is the question of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. In the opinion of my Government, this minority is entitled to full and clearly defined guarantees as to its future status. The need for such guarantees is recognized by all, not least by the Greek Government. In view of the good relations that have existed between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus in the past, once the present abnormal conditions have been done away with, it should not prove too difficult to devise a system whereby the minority could be assured of its rights without the majority being deprived of its rights.

As I said a moment ago, the time has come for the General Assembly to make a more effective contribution with regard to the question of Cyprus than it has so far done. What should we do? In our opinion, we can do no less than we have done in other similar cases. In other words, we should affirm our concern about this problem, indicate the principles on the basis of which a solution should be sought, and suggest methods whereby such a solution should be sought. The principles can only be the principles of the United Nations Charter, and, as we all know, the Charter explicitly provides for the principle of self-determination. As to the methods, they can only be those recognized by the Charter and, in the first place, the method indicated is that of negotiations. It is in the light of these considerations that my delegation has examined the draft resolutions that have been placed before the Committee.

The first draft resolution, proposed by the delegation of Greece, does no more than cover the facts of the situation and requests that the situation be dealt with in accordance with the principles, purposes and explicit provisions of the United Nations Charter. In other words, this draft resolution impresses us as providing a generally satisfactory answer to the question posed in

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(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

sub-item (a) of the item we are now considering. My delegation therefore will support this draft resolution.

With regard to sub-item (b), there are two draft resolutions before us. One of these draft resolutions has been submitted by the United Kingdom delegation, and we have carefully studied this draft resolution. We cannot, I am afraid, escape the impression that its adoption would imply a condemnation of Greece for intervention in Cypriot affairs, on the basis of evidence produced by one side only, evidence which has been strongly disputed by the other side.

(Mr. Nincic, Yugoslavia)

Yugoslavia, for its part, has never been inclined to endorse condemnations of this kind, condemnations which are not based on an impartial investigation of a complaint. We shall, therefore, not be able to vote in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution.

The second draft resolution, presented by Greece and contained in document A/C.1/L.170, provides us, on the other hand, with what seems to be a satisfactory procedure for investigating the serious charges that have been raised by the United Kingdom, and I am sure that the United Kingdom would be the first to welcome this procedure. My delegation will therefore support the second draft resolution submitted by the Greek delegation.

In concluding, I should like to say this. It is the hope of my delegation that our discussion of the Cyprus question in this Assembly will be conducted in a constructive manner, in a spirit of realism and in an atmosphere of moderation. If such be the case, the Assembly may well effectively assist in removing a dangerous source of discord from an area the political climate of which is already so alarmingly charged with tension. I need hardly say that my delegation will be happy to contribute to the best of its ability to any effort directed towards this goal.

Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): The Philippine delegation welcomes this fresh opportunity provided our Committee to explore once more the question of Cyprus and re-examine the possibilities of a just and fair solution to it.

Since April 1955, intense and violent strife has characterized daily life on the embattled island -- a situation which has not only caused undesirable repercussions in contiguous countries but has also hampered steadier progress on negotiations currently underway.

The full restoration of peace and order, and with it the re-establishment of mutual faith and confidence, is clearly of the essence. We hope that the initial efforts of this Committee will be directed towards this end, realizing as we must that any attempt at bridging the gap that divides the parties can only succeed in an atmosphere of understanding and goodwill. The Philippine delegation is prepared to throw its complete support to any and all moves in this direction.

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

In spite of the apparent deadlock between the Greek population of Cyprus and the United Kingdom, the problem of Cyprus has one encouraging aspect. And this is the fact -- by now amply established -- that neither side is willing merely to let matters stand as they are, as indeed it is no longer possible to do, but to press ahead in an attempt to reach mutually acceptable schemes of agreement. Since the last consideration of this item by this Committee, three major efforts at solution have taken place -- the Tripartite Conference of 1955, the Harding-Makarios conversations from 4 October 1955 to 5 March 1956, and the offer of the Radcliffe Constitution last December as a basis of discussion for the future of Cyprus.

As we know, the first two attempts ended in failure, while the third has been initially rejected both by the Government of Greece and the Greek Cypriots.

The difficulty of a satisfactory solution stems from the fact that a multitude of interests regarded as vital by all parties are involved. Some of these are as follows:

1. The Greek Cypriots who desire to exercise the right of self-determination as guaranteed in the Charter of the United Nations;
2. The Government of Greece which regards Cyprus as historically and culturally bound to Greece and is naturally desirous of consummating this link into a political and legal fact;
3. The Turkish Cypriots who, as a minority, understandably fear for their status, if Cyprus decides to incorporate itself with Greece;
4. The Government of Turkey which views a change in the political status of Cyprus as a threat to her security, principally to the route of supplies from the West; and finally,
5. The United Kingdom which in Cyprus holds the last of its major footholds in the Mediterranean and which it regards not only as vital to her security but also as a stabilizing factor in that critical area of the world.

There is a further complication to this already complicated problem and that is that three of the parties to the dispute -- Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom -- are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It must be obvious that continued dissension among them will materially weaken the position not only of NATO but also of the entire free world in a region adjacent to the combustible Middle East.

(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

My delegation does not discount the enormous difficulties of reaching a just settlement, but it does remain firmly convinced that, complex as the problem is, a solution based on compromise and fairness to all parties concerned is neither hopeless nor impracticable.

The Philippines, by policy and tradition, will not hesitate to support the principle of self-determination for peoples whenever it is convinced that there exists a clear and unequivocal demand for it and whenever a people desiring it demonstrates its capacity to discharge the responsibilities of freedom.

At the same time, we clearly recognize that the problem of Cyprus as it stands today has been considerably affected by various factors the more cogent of which may place in jeopardy the security of the free world's community and, not the least, that of the Cypriots themselves.

This view, happily, is not my delegation's alone but is shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by the very parties in dispute.

In this context, it is gratifying to note that, in conformity with the liberal traditions of the United Kingdom, its Government, through its responsible spokesmen, has more than once affirmed its recognition of the application of the principle of self-determination to the people of Cyprus. On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, consistent with its right to determine its destiny, the people of Cyprus would be willing, as it had repeatedly manifested in the recent past, to ensure the security requirements of the free world in the Mediterranean and recognize the legitimate interests of the United Kingdom.

At this juncture, it appears imperative to note that, apart from the difficulties inherent in the problem, there exists one stumbling block which to our mind has unhappily deterred effective negotiations, and this is the continued exile of the recognized leader of the Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios. It has become increasingly clear that his detention has not achieved its original purpose of curbing the unrest in Cyprus; on the contrary, it has served to stiffen popular resentment and given rise to the form of extremism now bitterly deplored by the British Government.



(Mr. Serrano, Philippines)

The release of Archbishop Makarios would, in our view, constitute an essential preliminary step in any negotiations which might follow. The fact that the Cypriot leader was consulted regarding the Radcliffe Constitution prior to its presentation to the Cypriots attests to the belief of the United Kingdom itself that Archbishop Makarios is a vital key to the course and the ultimate outcome of any negotiations which may hope for success.

It is the view of my delegation that it would be neither wise nor expedient for the United Nations to take any action which might tend to exacerbate the gravely strained relations among the parties. Our task is to compromise and conciliate, and we believe that it could be both promising and rewarding if we allowed the parties the widest latitude in reaching a solution.

It is in this spirit, we trust, that the Committee will view and evaluate the draft resolutions pending before it. If we are to proceed to a satisfactory solution of the problem, we must assist in creating among the parties a disposition to goodwill and understanding rather than hatred and recrimination.

For this reason, the Philippine delegation suggests the adoption of a draft resolution which would: first, call upon the parties to co-operate in the restoration of peace and order in Cyprus; secondly, call upon the parties to negotiate on a form of interim government for Cyprus which would be mutually acceptable to both parties; and, thirdly, request the parties to report on the progress of negotiations to the twelfth session of the General Assembly.

The terms of such a draft resolution are, in our view, sufficiently broad to permit ample room for negotiation. We trust that it may result ultimately in a satisfactory peace in which the aspirations of the people of Cyprus will realize gradual and eventual fulfillment in a manner which will ensure a happy reconciliation with the legitimate interests of the other parties concerned and of the free world's community.

Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece)(interpretation from French): I have heard the remarks of the representative of the United Kingdom with reference to the 237 documents which I have just submitted to the Secretary-General and I do not believe that I can change my position in this matter. I do not think that my position is illogical. I have no wish to envenom the already tense situation, but I cannot conceal these documents which 237 persons, risking the worst, have signed. I have, therefore, placed them at the disposal of the Secretariat of the United Nations so that a neutral committee can examine them. I do not wish to use these documents as propaganda, and when I said this morning that I reserved my right to make them public, I did not mean to say that, in every case, these papers would be made public. In any case, the responsibility for their publication cannot be taken by me, here, but by my Government in Athens.

As far as I am concerned, I have done what my conscience required: not to bury these documents; not to make them public; and to take the responsibility if neutral persons said that the documents were not absolutely truthful.

I expected the representative of the United Kingdom to be grateful for this courtesy, which proves that I am aware of my responsibility and how little it is based on publicity. In any case, I consider that the attitude which I have taken is the best in the interest of future favourable relations between our two countries, relations which, I sincerely hope, will improve.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to place our present situation before the Committee and to ask for its help and co-operation.

I have no more speakers on the list for this afternoon. The Committee will meet both morning and afternoon tomorrow. There will be also plenary meetings of the General Assembly, but the matters on its agenda are not subjects pertaining to the agenda of this Committee; therefore, in accordance with the rules of procedure, as well as established practice, we must hold our meetings.

There are very few speakers on my list for tomorrow. May I remind the Committee very respectfully that the closing date of the session has been decided by the General Assembly.

(The Chairman)

I wish also to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that we have before us three draft resolutions, which were submitted yesterday. Therefore, delegations have had time to study them and to decide on the stand which they will take with regard to them. The question of Cyprus has been submitted in the detailed statements made by all the parties concerned. Therefore, the Committee should be ready to continue the debate on the subject, since it is better prepared in this matter than it has been when dealing with some other items. Once the general statements of the parties concerned have been heard, the replies given, and three draft resolutions submitted -- and a fourth has been suggested today by the representative of the Philippines -- the Committee is surely in possession of sufficient information.

Therefore, may I take the liberty of suggesting, if there is no objection by the Committee, that the list of speakers be closed tomorrow at 1 p.m.. I know that representatives are aware that my suggestion is not meant, either directly or indirectly, to suggest closing the debate. I am only attempting to urge those delegations, which are in possession of the documents and have studied them, to have their names inscribed on the speaker's list. Therefore, if there is no objection on the part of the Committee, I invite any and all representatives to have their names placed on the speaker's list, which I shall declare closed at 1 p.m. tomorrow.

Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand): Speaking for myself and my delegation, I have not, of course, the slightest objection to the Chairman's proposal to close the list by 1 p.m. tomorrow; the name of my delegation is already on that list.

I would, however, make only two observations: first, although we have the draft resolutions before us, they deal with matters of considerable importance to which we are entitled to pay some attention and for which, I suppose, we need some time. Nevertheless, I am prepared to speak tomorrow. This is not a subject, of course, which concerns merely the representatives of the three Powers who have spoken at some length; it concerns many of us intimately and it does require from us all considerable study.

It does so happen that the General Assembly will commence tomorrow its debate on the report of the Credentials Committee, of which I happen to be Chairman,

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(Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand)

so it will be impossible for me -- and I want to illustrate my own difficulty, which may affect others also -- to speak immediately or, I really think, until that debate is over. But you can be very sure, Mr. Chairman -- and I have no doubt that other representatives will do the same -- that I will fit in with the requirements, if I may use that word, which you have laid down. I would ask you, however, to extend some indulgence to those of us who are affected by engagements in the General Assembly tomorrow; and I know that I have only to make that appeal to you, Mr. Chairman for you to heed it.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall definitely take note of the situation of the representative of New Zealand and I shall endeavour to put him in such a place on the speakers' list as will be convenient for him. But I trust that the other speakers will accept this situation, in view of the explanation just given to us by the representative of New Zealand, so that I can assure Sir Leslie Munro that I shall not call on him until the afternoon, when he is able to join us in the Committee.

Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria): It is not my intention to object to the suggestion made by the Chair, but I would like to ask the Chairman if he would graciously consider that this question of Cyprus is of interest to more than the parties which have already spoken. The question of Cyprus naturally interests the United Kingdom and the people of Cyprus primarily. It also interests Greece and the United Kingdom, particularly in respect of part (b) of the item. But there are other Governments, particularly the Turkish Government, which are interested in this question and, if I may say so, Syria is also interested owing to the proximity of Cyprus to Syria and to many considerations of security which are important to us as well as to the other Arab States in the area. We would like to wait until we have heard the various points of view before we decide on the course we shall take, and may also have to get in touch with our Governments. It might be difficult for some delegations to decide by one o'clock tomorrow whether or not they wish to speak on this question. They might also wish to hear the views of other delegations.

I would therefore like to ask the Chairman graciously to extend the time from one o'clock until the end of the afternoon tomorrow for closing the list of speakers.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): When the Chair makes a suggestion to the Committee, it does so simply in order to hear the views of the different delegations. Naturally, I think that the reasons adduced by the representative of Syria -- which I think are quite understandable -- should be taken into account; and, unless the Committee decides otherwise, I am quite ready to extend until six o'clock tomorrow the time for closing the list of speakers.

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(The Chairman)

Before adjourning the meeting, I would like to urge all delegations to include their names on the speakers' list so that we can get ahead with our discussion of this matter as quickly as possible.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.