
**Réunion des États parties à la Convention
sur l'interdiction de la mise au point,
de la fabrication et du stockage des
armes bactériologiques (biologiques)
ou à toxines et sur leur destruction**

27 août 2015
Français
Original : anglais

Réunion de 2015

Genève, 14-18 décembre 2015

Réunion d'experts

Genève, 10-14 août 2015

Point 9 de l'ordre du jour

**Adoption du rapport factuel rendant compte
des travaux de la réunion**

Rapport de la Réunion d'experts

Document soumis par le Président

I. Introduction

1. Le Document final de la Septième Conférence des États parties chargée de l'examen de la Convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines et sur leur destruction (BWC/CONF.VII/7) contenait, dans la section traitant des décisions et des recommandations, les décisions suivantes :

« 5. Réaffirmant l'utilité des programmes intersessions précédents de 2003 à 2010, la Conférence décide de conserver les modalités en place, à savoir la tenue de réunions annuelles des États parties précédées de réunions annuelles d'experts.

6. Le programme intersessions a pour but de débattre des points que la septième Conférence d'examen a décidé d'inclure dans le programme intersessions, et de contribuer à l'adoption de vues communes et à la prise de mesures effectives à leur sujet.

7. Consciente de la nécessité de mesurer ses ambitions d'amélioration du programme intersessions compte tenu des contraintes – en termes de moyens financiers et de ressources humaines – auxquelles les États parties se heurtent, la Conférence décide de continuer d'allouer chaque année dix journées au programme intersessions.

8. La Conférence décide que les questions ci-après seront inscrites à titre permanent à l'ordre du jour et examinées lors des séances des réunions d'experts comme des réunions des États parties, et ce, chaque année durant la période 2012-2015 :

a) Coopération et assistance, l'accent étant mis sur le renforcement de la coopération et de l'assistance au titre de l'article X;



- b) Examen des évolutions survenues dans le domaine de la science et de la technologie présentant un intérêt pour la Convention;
 - c) Renforcement de l'application nationale.
9. La Conférence décide que les autres sujets de discussion ci-après seront abordés durant le programme intersessions, au cours des années indiquées :
- a) Moyens de garantir une participation accrue aux mesures de confiance (2012 et 2013);
 - b) Moyens de renforcer l'application de l'article VII, y compris l'examen de procédures et mécanismes détaillés pour l'apport d'une assistance et d'une coopération par les États parties (2014 et 2015).
10. Les réunions d'experts, réorganisées, se dérouleront sur cinq jours, et la durée des réunions des États parties sera également de cinq jours.
11. Les réunions de la première année seront présidées par un membre du Groupe des États non alignés et autres États, celles de la deuxième par un membre du Groupe des États d'Europe orientale, celles de la troisième par un membre du Groupe occidental, et celles de la quatrième par un membre du Groupe des États non alignés et autres États. Chaque année, le Président sera secondé par deux Vice-Présidents, membres de chacun des deux autres groupes régionaux.
12. Chaque réunion d'experts établira, pour examen par la Réunion des États parties, un rapport factuel rendant compte de ses débats. Il y sera fait état des travaux menés sur les trois points permanents de l'ordre du jour, ainsi que de tout autre point dont il aura été prévu de débattre en cours d'année.
13. Outre le rapport de la Réunion d'experts, la Réunion des États parties examinera également, chaque année, les progrès accomplis sur la voie de l'universalisation de la Convention ainsi que les rapports annuels de l'Unité d'appui à l'application. En 2012 et 2013, la Réunion des États parties examinera également le rapport de la Réunion d'experts sur les mesures de confiance et, en 2014 et 2015, celui de la Réunion d'experts sur l'article VII.
14. Toutes les réunions, tant celles d'experts que celles des États parties, adopteront toutes conclusions ou entérineront tous résultats par consensus.
15. La Huitième Conférence d'examen examinera les travaux de ces réunions et les documents qui en seront issus, et décidera de toute suite à donner ».
2. Par sa résolution 69/82, adoptée le 2 décembre 2014 sans avoir été mise aux voix, l'Assemblée générale a notamment prié le Secrétaire général de continuer de prêter l'assistance voulue aux gouvernements dépositaires de la Convention, de fournir les services nécessaires pour l'application des décisions et recommandations issues des conférences d'examen, et de prêter l'assistance voulue et fournir les services nécessaires à la tenue des réunions d'experts et réunions des États parties durant le processus intersessions en cours.

II. Organisation de la Réunion d'experts

3. Conformément aux décisions prises à la Septième Conférence d'examen et à la Réunion d'experts de 2014, la Réunion d'experts de 2015 s'est tenue au Palais des Nations, à Genève, du 10 au 14 août 2015, sous la présidence de M. Mazlan Muhammad, Ambassadeur de Malaisie, la vice-présidence étant assurée par M. Henk Cor van der Kwast, Ambassadeur et Représentant permanent des Pays-Bas à la

Conférence du désarmement et M. György Molnár, Ambassadeur de Hongrie et Représentant spécial du Ministre hongrois des affaires étrangères pour les questions de maîtrise des armements, de désarmement et de non-prolifération.

4. À sa 1^{re} séance, le 10 août 2015, la Réunion d'experts a adopté son ordre du jour (BWC/MSP/2015/MX/1) et son programme de travail (BWC/MSP/2015/MX/2/Rev.1) tels que proposés par le Président. Le Président a appelé l'attention des délégations sur trois documents d'information qu'avait établis l'Unité d'appui à l'application (BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.2, BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.3 et BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.4).

5. À la même séance, la Réunion d'experts a décidé, comme l'avait suggéré le Président, d'appliquer, *mutatis mutandis*, le Règlement intérieur de la Septième Conférence d'examen, tel qu'il figure à l'annexe III du Document final de la Conférence d'examen (BWC/CONF.VII/7).

6. M. Daniel Feakes, Chef de l'Unité d'appui à l'application, au Bureau des affaires de désarmement à Genève, a fait fonction de Secrétaire de la Réunion d'experts. M^{me} Ngoc Phuong van der Blij, spécialiste des questions politiques à l'Unité d'appui à l'application, a fait fonction de Secrétaire adjointe.

III. Participation à la Réunion d'experts

7. Les 100 États parties à la Convention dont le nom suit ont participé à la Réunion d'experts : Afrique du Sud, Albanie, Algérie, Allemagne, Arabie saoudite, Argentine, Arménie, Australie, Autriche, Bahreïn, Bangladesh, Bélarus, Belgique, Brésil, Bulgarie, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodge, Cameroun, Canada, Chili, Chine, Chypre, Colombie, Croatie, Cuba, Danemark, El Salvador, Émirats arabes unis, Équateur, Espagne, Estonie, États-Unis d'Amérique, Fédération de Russie, Finlande, France, Géorgie, Ghana, Grèce, Guatemala, Honduras, Hongrie, Inde, Indonésie, Iran (République islamique d'), Iraq, Irlande, Italie, Japon, Jordanie, Kenya, Koweït, Libye, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaisie, Malte, Maroc, Maurice, Mexique, Mongolie, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Norvège, Nouvelle-Zélande, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Pays-Bas, Pérou, Philippines, Pologne, Portugal, Qatar, République de Corée, République démocratique populaire lao, République de Moldova, République tchèque, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Saint-Siège, Sénégal, Serbie, Slovaquie, Slovénie, Soudan, Sri Lanka, Suède, Suisse, Tadjikistan, Thaïlande, Tunisie, Turquie, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela (République bolivarienne du), Yémen, Zambie et Zimbabwe.

8. En outre, trois États qui avaient signé la Convention mais ne l'avaient pas encore ratifiée – la Côte d'Ivoire, la République arabe syrienne et la République-Unie de Tanzanie – ont participé à la Réunion d'experts sans prendre part à la prise de décisions, conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 1 de l'article 44 du Règlement intérieur.

9. Un État – la Guinée – qui n'était ni partie à la Convention ni signataire de celle-ci a participé à la réunion en qualité d'observateur, en application des dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'article 44.

10. Des organes de l'ONU, dont le Bureau des affaires de désarmement, le Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 1540 (2004) du Conseil de sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, l'Équipe spéciale de lutte contre le terrorisme (CTITF), l'Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement (UNIDIR), l'Institut interrégional de recherche des Nations Unies sur la criminalité et la justice (UNICRI) et le Secrétariat interinstitutions de la Stratégie internationale de prévention des catastrophes (UNISDR) se sont fait représenter à la Réunion d'experts en application du paragraphe 3 de l'article 44.

11. Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR), la Fédération internationale des sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge (FICR), l'Organisation internationale de police criminelle (INTERPOL), l'Organisation mondiale de la Santé (OMS), l'Organisation mondiale de la santé animale (OIE), l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC) et l'Union européenne se sont vu accorder le statut d'observateur, en application du paragraphe 4 de l'article 44.

12. En outre, eu égard à la nature particulière des points à l'examen lors de la Réunion, sur invitation du Président et sans que cela crée de précédent, huit organisations scientifiques, professionnelles, commerciales et universitaires et experts ont participé aux échanges informels tenus lors des séances à participation libre, en qualité d'invités de la Réunion d'experts : l'Académie mondiale des sciences, les Centres de lutte contre la maladie/Institut ougandais de recherche en virologie, le Georgia Institute of Technology, le Groupe interacadémies sur les questions internationales (IAP), l'Organisation des industries de biotechnologie (BIO), le Réseau des fabricants de vaccin des pays en développement (DCVMN), l'Université de Bradford et le Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).

13. Treize organisations non gouvernementales et instituts de recherche ont participé à la Réunion d'experts, en application du paragraphe 5 de l'article 44.

14. La liste exhaustive de tous les participants à la Réunion d'experts est publiée sous la cote BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.5.

IV. Travaux de la Réunion d'experts

15. Conformément au programme de travail (BWC/MSP/2015/MX/2/Rev.1), les 19 États parties ci-après ont fait des déclarations liminaires à la Réunion d'experts : Iran (République islamique d') (au nom du Groupe des États non alignés et autres États), Fédération de Russie, Danemark, Bangladesh, États-Unis d'Amérique, France, Pakistan, Malaisie, Brésil, Mexique, Chine, Italie, Inde, Cuba, Australie, Argentine, Libye, Ghana et Pays-Bas.

16. Entre le 10 et le 14 août, la Réunion d'experts a tenu deux séances consacrées à chacun des points permanents de l'ordre du jour, à savoir : coopération et assistance, l'accent étant mis sur le renforcement de la coopération et de l'assistance au titre de l'article X; examen des évolutions survenues dans le domaine de la science et de la technologie présentant un intérêt pour la Convention; et renforcement de l'application nationale (points 5 à 7 de l'ordre du jour). Elle a aussi tenu deux séances consacrées au point biennal de l'ordre du jour sur les moyens de renforcer l'application de l'article VII, y compris l'examen de procédures et mécanismes détaillés pour l'apport d'une assistance et d'une coopération par les États parties (point 8 de l'ordre du jour). Au cours de ces séances, 80 États parties, 7 organisations internationales et 8 invités de la Réunion d'experts ont fait des exposés ou des déclarations.

17. Le Président, agissant de sa propre initiative et sous sa propre responsabilité, a établi une liste écrite des considérations, enseignements, perspectives, recommandations, conclusions et propositions dégagés des exposés, déclarations, interventions et documents de travail portant sur les points de l'ordre du jour examinés pendant la Réunion. La Réunion d'experts a relevé que ce texte n'avait pas été approuvé et n'avait pas de statut. Selon le Président, ce texte pouvait aider les délégations à se préparer en vue de la Réunion des États parties de décembre 2015 et à débattre des moyens les plus indiqués d'examiner les points abordés et de « contribuer à l'adoption de vues communes et à la prise de mesures effectives » à leur sujet, conformément à la décision prise à la Septième Conférence d'examen. Le texte établi par le Président est joint au présent rapport en tant qu'annexe I (en anglais seulement).

18. La Réunion d'experts a pu articuler ses travaux autour de plusieurs documents de travail présentés par les États parties et des organisations internationales, ainsi que des déclarations et exposés que les États parties, des organisations internationales et des invités avaient faits et dont le texte avait été distribué pendant la Réunion.

V. Documentation

19. La liste des documents officiels de la Réunion d'experts, y compris les documents de travail présentés par les États parties, se trouve à l'annexe II du présent rapport. Tous les documents énumérés peuvent être consultés sur le site Web de l'Unité d'appui à l'application de la Convention (<http://www.unog.ch/bwc>) et sur celui du Système de diffusion électronique des documents de l'ONU (<http://documents.un.org>).

VI. Conclusion de la Réunion d'experts

20. À sa séance de clôture, le 14 août 2015, la Réunion d'experts a noté que l'ordre du jour et le programme de travail provisoires de la Réunion des États parties qui se tiendrait du 14 au 18 décembre 2015 seraient établis par le Président et soumis pour approbation et adoption à cette réunion.

21. À la même séance, la Réunion d'experts a adopté par consensus son rapport (BWC/MSP/2015/MX/CRP.1 à CRP.3), tel que modifié oralement. Le texte définitif du rapport est publié sous la cote BWC/MSP/2015/MX/3.

Annexe I

[Anglais seulement]

Considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting

Note: the source is given using the following codes: P = presentation (with date); S = statement (with date); WP = working paper (with number). See also the list of abbreviations at the end of this annex. For each sub-item below, working papers are presented first (in numerical order), then contributions by States Parties (in chronological order and order of speaking), and then contributions from international organizations and guests of the meeting.

Agenda item 5:

Standing agenda item: cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X

1. Challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology, including equipment and material, for peaceful purposes to their full potential, and possible means of overcoming these

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	[...] the new developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention shall, in no way, be the pretext to impose any trade limitations (sanctions) or hamper the economic or technological development of the States Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Consequently, any unilateral, bilateral or multilateral restrictions and /or sanctions on medicines, vaccines and diagnostic production or trade against States Parties is contrary to the object and purposes of the Convention and once again we emphasizes that full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention is an integral and essential part of compliance with the Convention for the realization of international cooperation for production and trade of vaccines, medicines and diagnostic equipment and, in the light of new science and technology developments, international efforts should be enhanced in order to bridge the increasing gaps in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related disciplines between developed and developing countries.	WP.15

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	It is imperative that any export control measures adopted by States Parties at a national level should be in full conformity with the Convention obligations and create an environment conducive to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all Convention provisions, and should not adversely affect the rights and obligations of States Parties under the Convention. Non-proliferation efforts through maintaining export controls are best addressed through multilaterally, non-discriminatory negotiated guidelines to preserve the integrity and the delicate balance that exists in the Convention.	S 10/8 AM
China	“cooperation” means breaking the barrier between the North and the South so that the development of biological science and technology can benefit all States Parties, especially the developing countries. The Chinese delegation calls on the States Parties to actively implement the Article X of the Convention, abandon double standards and discriminatory practices, take into full account developing countries’ legitimate needs for bio-technology, materials and equipment, improve States Parties’ capabilities for implementation and facilitate healthy and sustained development of the Convention. China is opposed to usurping other countries’ bio-information and resources by using one’s own technological advantages under the banner of cooperation.	S 10/8 AM
Pakistan	The potential dual-use nature of emerging technologies in itself should not be used as a pretext for prescribing or restricting their availability to developing countries for peaceful purposes.	S 10/8 AM
Brazil	[...] proposal to establish a mechanism to ensure full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X. Strengthening cooperation under the BWC will serve as an incentive for more States to adhere to the Convention and to guarantee biological substances will be exclusively used for peaceful purposes.	S 10/8 AM
Brazil	Brazil opposes attempts to establish preconditions to the implementation of Article X, which is unambiguous when it says that the Convention “shall be implemented in a manner to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties”.	S 10/8 AM
Brazil	The provision of Article I of the Convention should not serve as a pretext to prevent transfer of technology, materials and equipment for peaceful purposes, particular in the fields of sanitary control, detection, diagnosis and control of infectious diseases, production of vaccines and other biological materials.	S 10/8 AM
Italy	Italy considers exchanges in biological sciences and technology, including equipment and material for peaceful purposes, as legitimate goals under the BWC, as well as important elements of international cooperation, as foreseen by Article X. At the same time, we believe in	S 10/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	the need to ensure that only activities for peaceful purposes not prohibited by the Convention are undertaken, in accordance with Article III. As a consequence we are convinced that appropriate export controls are compatible with the provisions of Article X. The legitimate needs of cooperation in biological sciences or in the economic and technological fields should not turn into illegal assistance in the development of biological weapons.	
India	[...] In our view measures taken to mitigate biological risks should be proportional to the assessed risk and not hamper legitimate peaceful activities including international cooperation. Further, there should be no hindrance to peaceful activities such as vaccine development, which are important for developing countries for meeting their public health needs.	S 10/8 AM
India	India supports the full and effective implementation of Article X as an integral and essential part of compliance of the Convention. There is need for efforts to identify and overcome obstacles in implementation of Article X to generate equitable benefits for States Parties, in particular for developing countries.	S 10/8 AM
Cuba	We reiterate that there should not exist any conditions to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention. Cuba reaffirms that international cooperation to promote economic and technological development is an obligation of the States Parties. In this regard, developed countries need to eliminate once and for all restrictions to the free exchange of equipment, material and scientific information and technology destined for the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins.	S 10/8 AM
Cuba	We express concern at the attempt by some countries aimed at conditioning the international cooperation through the creation and promotion of arbitrary mechanisms export control and transfers.	S 10/8 AM
Ghana	Low participation from African countries in BWC meetings: we must find a way to support their participation.	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] one of the main challenges for the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X is the existence of unjustified restrictions and or limitations, particularly the politically motivated ones, imposed against States Parties in contravention of the provisions and inconsistent with the spirit of the Convention. There is an urgent need for the removal of any such restrictions. States Parties should work together to develop procedures to promote the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X and the settlement of disputes arising from concerns about the implementation of Article X.	S 11/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	[...] national implementation measures should not create undue restrictions among States Parties that would hinder	S 11/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
(NAM)	the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X. There should be no hindrance to peaceful activities, such as vaccine development, which are important for developing countries for meeting their public health needs. There is need for equitable benefits from international cooperation in this area, keeping in mind the need for ensuring appropriate and affordable support for developing countries. We also are of the view that the developing countries need to meet their needs for cost-effective, affordable and quality assured medicines and vaccines including through provisions such as compulsory licensing or price controls.	
Ecuador	International cooperation and assistance pursuant to the full implementation of Article X should enable a more full exchange and access between States of equipment, materials, scientific personnel, publications and scientific and technological information, in the field of life sciences and related areas destined for peaceful purposes. In order to not curtail or restrict the right of all countries to have access to international cooperation and assistance in accordance with the intents and purposes of the Convention, Article X must be unconditionally implemented by States, that is, without conditioning the access to the cooperation with certain informal bilateral arrangements regarding the control of dual use biological agents exports.	S 11/8 AM
India	However difficulties continue in accessing advanced technologies for application in peaceful purposes [...] There are instances where we find that there were no adequate or equitable benefits from international cooperation even in cases where samples are taken from developing countries. [...] The outbreak of Ebola last year has highlighted the need to ensure timely access to affordable drugs and vaccines and related diagnostic, preventive and therapeutic equipment to affected people, especially in developing countries.	S 11/8 AM
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Recalled the continuing relevance of the UK's national statement on Article X made at the 2014 Meeting of Experts – its core points were and remain that Article X is already being fully implemented and that there is thus no need for an Article X implementing mechanism.	S 11/8 AM
United States of America	The drafters of the Convention could scarcely have imagined the degree of international exchange in information, material and technology that exists today. [...] The internet is perhaps the single greatest contribution in history to the goals of Article X. It has brought us access to vast repositories of scientific information, and a global market for laboratory and public health materials and equipment; free, open-access scientific publications and online courses; and email and other communication and collaboration tools that have facilitated joint research -- one only has to look at the lists of authors on scientific papers in any major journal to see that such collaboration is a norm rather than an	S 11/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	exception.	
United States of America	The costs of innovative technologies continue to fall dramatically -- it is now possible to sequence a human genome in a matter of days, for about a thousand dollars, dramatically increasing access to a crucial enabling technology.	S 11/8 AM
Cuba	The Convention does not have an adequate mechanism to facilitate the wider exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the pacific use of biological agents and toxins. In this regard, Cuba recalls that NAM and Other States Parties to the Convention presented a proposal of a Plan of Action for the implementation of Article X in the context of the Seventh Review Conference (a mechanism for the implementation of the aforementioned Article in the context of the Seventh Conference) and that an additional proposal was presented recently by the group, with detailed procedures to approach the solution of disputes stemming from the non-application of Article X.	S 11/8 PM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	There should be no hindrance to the peaceful activities of the States Parties, such as vaccines development, medicines and diagnostic equipment, which are essential for developing countries for meeting their public health needs. There is need for equitable benefits from international cooperation in this area, keeping in mind the need to ensuring appropriate and affordable support for developing countries.	S 12/8 AM
India	There is need for more mutuality of benefit from international cooperation, keeping in mind the need for ensuring appropriate and affordable support for the needs of developing countries.	S 12/8 AM

2. A range of specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of Article X taking into account all of its provisions, including facilitation of cooperation and assistance, including in terms of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, and identification of critical gaps and needs in these areas

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	International initiatives for the development and application of scientific advances for the global prevention of disease, or for sustainable food supply and security are significant in the implementation of Article X.	WP.12
Cuba	Avoiding obstacles that hinder economic and technological development is an obligation of States Parties.	WP.20
Cuba	States Parties able to do so, and upon request of the interested parties may implement, among others, the following measures, as a contribution especially to developing countries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) To help create an appropriate national system of health care that can respond effectively to disease outbreaks; b) To contribute to the training of necessary human resources 	WP.22

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	to fight outbreaks of diseases;	
	c) To transfer technologies to help improve national capacities for diagnosis, research and response to disease outbreaks, including means of protection;	
	d) To promote the academic and scientific exchange between national experts related to biosafety.	
Ghana	Improve Article X in a full and comprehensive manner, particularly in transfer of technology and equipment.	S 10/8 AM
Bangladesh	[...] call for effective implementation of Article X of the BWC through enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchanges in toxins, biological agents equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.	S 10/8 AM
Bangladesh	There is need for effective mechanism to ensure the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X.	S 10/8 AM
Bangladesh	The development of database system to facilitate requests for and offers exchange of assistance and cooperation among States Parties as per the decision of the 7th RevCon, is indeed an important achievement. We appreciate the ISU success in this regard.	S 10/8 AM
Malaysia	Articles VII and X of the Convention can be implemented in such a way as to allow all states to undertake, facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific, and technological information and at the same time ensure efficient mobilization and maximum utilization of resources.	S 10/8 AM
Cuba	All unilateral restrictions that constitute a violation of Article X must be abolished.	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] developing an action plan for the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X is crucial.	S 11/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	From a humanitarian point of view, it is essential that developing countries receive full and timely cooperation and assistance in the form of medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and related equipment and materials for peaceful purposes as enshrined in Article X.	S 11/8 AM
Ecuador	We support the consolidation and adoption of common understandings that reflect, amongst others, the following ideas and propositions for a successful implementation of Article X: - Continue and increase the use of the database for cooperation and assistance hosted on the website of the ISU to improve the results of the exchange, and strengthen national capacities; - Encourage long-term, sustainable cooperation that meets the needs of the receiving countries; - Ensure a better interoperability and effectiveness of the regulatory standards, such as in the case of Emergency Use	S 11/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>Authorizations, and the transfer of clinical samples;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promote free access to scientific publications through the reduction of possible barriers imposed by the high costs of subscriptions; - Share relevant information about the opportunities and challenges resulting from scientific advances in the life sciences and in biotechnology, disease outbreaks, biological custody and healthcare; - Ensure that the States Parties have access to the benefits of advances in life sciences, in order to take advantage of recent advances including new technologies, production or development of vaccines, biological production technologies, equipment and training for high-containment laboratories, and taking into account the necessity for developing countries to address challenges related to public health. 	
United States of America	<p>International exchange in the life sciences is not only --- in fact, not primarily an activity of governments, but of citizens, scholars, and businesses. Export licensing measures are therefore a critical means of ensuring that this widespread international exchange does not contribute to proliferation. Effective controls, as described in a 2014 working paper on this topic, are fully consistent with the Convention and critical to achieving the aims of both Article X and Article III. Intergovernmental cooperation is nevertheless also an important element of Article X - and perhaps never more important than in the past year, as the international community mobilized to assist West Africa in confronting the worst Ebola outbreak in history.</p>	S 11/8 AM
Russian Federation	<p>[...] development of clear criteria for assistance provision under the BWC. This is extremely important from the point of view of strengthening the Convention's regime and preventing it from being replaced by other mechanisms which are located under the supervision of other organizations. We should not forget that the main aim of the BWC is to prevent the use of pathogens as a weapon.</p>	S 11/8 AM
Russian Federation	<p>There is a need to strengthen the role of the BWC as a coordinator of the assistance under the Convention, which is provided under other formats. The BWC is the only legally binding multilateral mechanism prohibiting the development and production of biological and toxin weapons. So, efforts to support countries in using the knowledge, information, technology, material and equipment under Article X, but which is launched under other formats, such as the global partnership or the global programme on health protection, should be agreed and closely coordinated with the BWC. Moreover, these initiatives should be geared not towards the individual State, but towards the Convention to strengthen the central role of BWC in the global architecture of prohibiting biological weapons.</p>	S 11/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Malaysia	<p>The way forward:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Continue simulations/exercises involving all stakeholders (including academia and private sector); - Continue education and awareness programmes on biosecurity and biothreats to public; - Collaborations with international partners to enhance capabilities and capacities. 	P 11/8 AM
Japan	The infectious disease crisis such as acts of bioterrorism and pandemic influenza may exceed the public health capacity and should be responded as a national security issues. Therefore, efforts to sustain such “legacies” may be helpful for future such issues.	P 11/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	There should be no hindrance to peaceful activities, such as vaccine development, which are important for developing countries for meeting their public health needs. There is need for equitable benefits from international cooperation in this area, keeping in mind the need for ensuring appropriate and affordable support for developing countries.	S 11/8 PM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	National export controls aiming at making them more effective and ubiquitous among States Parties, should be assessed in terms of their advantages and disadvantages that how they ultimately aimed at denial among States Parties. In our view, which is shared among Developing States Parties, denial strategies have serious disadvantages.	S 11/8 PM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	By contrast, the non-proliferation measures, directed towards reassurance can play a vital role in increasing confidence and trust among States Parties.	S 11/8 PM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] the Group stresses the importance of the adoption of a plan for active and fullest exchange of knowledge and technology in areas related to enabling and new technologies between developed and developing countries to ensure the unhindered flow of scientific information and technology.	S 12/8 AM
India	We are not convinced of the need to bring issues on which other organisations, such WHO, WIPO or WTO have the relevant mandate into BWC. Developing countries need to meet their needs for cost-effective, affordable and quality assured medicines and vaccines including through provisions such as compulsory licensing or price controls. Bringing into the BWC issues of patents and domestic measures for international trade and investments, as we heard from one delegation, gives the impression that additional obstacles are sought to be created regarding international cooperation and assistance in peaceful uses of biological science.	S 12/8 PM

3. Ways and means to target and mobilize resources, including financial resources, to address gaps and needs for assistance and cooperation, in particular from developed to developing States Parties, and from international and regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders.

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Ghana	Ghana has been a beneficiary State Party of some very useful assistance from the Governments of Canada, the US, Japan and the EU, just to name a few. However, we believe that this support needs also to take into perspective the West African Sub-Saharan Regions as a whole. We need to focus on regions and sub-regions through the establishments of Centres of Excellence, with high security laboratories and facilities to train, monitor, manage and eradicate any potential exposure of toxins. BWC States Parties need to agree on regional implementation plans across the world with consent and involvement of States concerned.	S 10/8 AM
Ghana	We must take into serious consideration, the extension of support to the developing countries to increase the level of participation in all meetings of the BWC. Year after year we register very low participation, particularly from Africa. We may have to find a more effective approach to the extension of support to those countries that stand in need.	S 10/8 AM
Ghana	We must also endeavor to promote the relevance of the Convention to both signatories and non- State Parties that, rarely, participate in the meetings of the BWC. As it stands now, the Convention is lopsided and needs an urgent fix, bearing in mind, the common interest we share to prevent any outbreak of infections resulting from the exposure of toxins anywhere in the world.	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	States Parties should work together to mobilize resources to address needs for assistance and cooperation, in particular from developed to developing States Parties, and from international and regional organizations. In light of rapid developments in the life sciences, there is a need to strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to bridge the ever-increasing gaps in the fields of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas between the developed and developing countries. The submission of clear, specific, and timely national reports on the implementation of Article X as agreed at the Seventh Review Conference and also for effective utilization of the electronic database for international cooperate in the context of Article X of the Convention is essential.	S 11/8 AM
Ghana	We, therefore, need to take a decision as a body to cover developing regions of the world, comprehensively, with high security laboratories, requisite training, and other essential facilities. We believe this goal can be achieved, through the creation of regional and sub-regional centres of excellence across the world. Many State Parties need assistance to enable them implement the Convention, and this remains a statement of fact. For some developing countries, the BWC only becomes a subject of concern only during accidents, as the world observed when the Ebola Virus Disease struck some countries in West Africa. The Convention needs a much more coherent coordination mechanism for effective	S 11/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	implementation across the world. The Coordination mechanism at our disposal, currently, remains weak and for that reason holds gaps for potentially dangerous accidents to occur in many parts of the world. Ghana believes, that the need to establish a well-resourced organisation to coordinate the implementation of the BWC is necessary and must be taken into serious consideration.	
India	The cooperation and assistance database established in pursuance of the decision of the 7th review Conference could be utilized for targeting resources by State Parties offering assistance and cooperation by making concrete offers in areas directly relevant to the Convention.	S 11/8 AM
Russian Federation	The activities of BWC Member States on the transfer of knowledge, information technology, materials and equipment, are geared towards combatting infectious diseases and they should be open and transparent in nature regardless of the source of this funding. [...] The need to provide full information about such activity, and particularly concerning the aims, tasks and expected results by donor countries so as to improve the quality of laboratory services of other countries. We believe this is necessary to avoid the dual use assistance where technical support is handed over in the form of funds which are partially geared towards undeclared aims, or aims which contribute to the donor's own national security.	S 11/8 AM
United States of America	The Ebola outbreak is a painful illustration of the importance of the Global Health Security Agenda, which sets ambitious targets for capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease. The GHSA seeks to accelerate progress toward implementation of the WHO's International Health Regulations and other frameworks, such as the World Organization for Animal Health's Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway.	S 11/8 AM
Japan	Lessons for cooperation and assistance: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - continuous international support is required for developing IHR core capacity that is the basis for responding to infectious disease disasters for any cause; - In responding to the outbreak, only endemic countries tend to draw large attention, especially from the scientific interest. However, there will be more surrounding countries to be prepared and use this opportunity for developing capacity. Thus, opportunities for cooperation and assistance for surrounding non-endemic countries should not be neglected; - Safety and security for dispatching experts to affected countries is a challenge even in such a natural outbreak. Thus, we do need more efforts on capacity development concerning safety and security of personnel. It was an important lesson for the assistance under Article VII. 	P 11/8 AM

4. Education, training, exchange and twinning programmes and other means of developing human resources in the biological sciences and technology relevant to the implementation of the Convention, particularly in developing countries.

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Cuba	As coordinated by its Ministry of Public Health, Cuba has given national and international professional upgrading courses including the following: 18 national courses on epidemic outbreak research in primary healthcare practice, laboratory quality management, biosafety management in the Cuban national health system, Ebola prevention and control, malaria, syphilis and STD diagnosis and enteroviruses, among others, attended by 1,134 students; and 12 international courses like an international training course to fight Ebola, and updates on TB and human immunodeficiency virus co-infections. Other courses have been taught in 29 countries (Jamaica, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Venezuela, Congo, Gabon, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Guyana, Dominica, St. Lucia, Brazil, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Ecuador, St. Kitts and Nevis, La Tortuga, Grenada, Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras, Haiti and Mozambique) to 411 participants.	WP.21
Cuba	In 2014, Cuba hosted a coordinating meeting of the ALBA countries and a technical meeting of experts from the ALBA-CELAC countries on the combat against the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). Also, in April 2015, the Ebola Symposium/2015 Health Convention was held.	WP.21
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	NAM and Other States Parties believe that exchanges in education and training are of fundamental importance for the development of human resources in the field of biological sciences. It is only through international cooperation in education and training that we will be able to bridge the gap between the capabilities of developing and developed countries.	S 11/8 AM
TWAS	TWAS provides a voice for science in the Global South. It has 1,148 elected Fellows with more than 80 percent coming from developing countries. 119 are women, 15 are Nobel Laureates, 94 countries and 124 young affiliates.	P 11/8 PM
TWAS	TWAS provides 727 Fellowships per year, including 463 PhD Fellowships. More than 200 scholars from the developing world have earned their PhDs since 2004 thanks to TWAS. TWAS also provides about USD 1.5 million annually in research grants to scientists in the developing world.	P 11/8 PM

5. Capacity-building, through international cooperation, in biosafety and biosecurity, and for detecting, reporting, and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks, including in the areas of preparedness, response, and crisis management and mitigation.

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States of America	Recent disease outbreaks—such as Ebola, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and influenza—demonstrate the ever-present risk of the spread of infectious diseases through increased global trade and travel. These outbreaks reinforce the need for a continued and concerted international effort to build countries’ capacities to effectively mitigate the risk posed to global health security by pathogenic microorganisms.	WP.4
United States of America	One response to [the need to build countries’ capacity] has been a significant increase in the number of high-containment laboratories (HCLs). This is in some respects a positive development, as it often reflects improvements in laboratory biosafety standards and practices, and increased diagnostic and other capabilities needed to address the challenges of emerging infectious diseases. [The increase in HLCs also posed challenges which] were outlined in Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories (the report of an international workshop conducted in 2011), and in a working paper submitted by the United Kingdom. [...] While there is a legitimate need for biocontainment facilities worldwide, the inherent dual-use potential of these facilities and related equipment – as well as of the pathogens they contain and the skills developed through hands-on work – merit scrutiny in a world where terrorism and the proliferation of weapons-relevant materials, technologies, and expertise pose genuine threats.	WP.4
United States of America	The importance of minimizing the number of facilities storing dangerous pathogens while enhancing global biosurveillance and public health capabilities. In this context it is important to recognize that scientific advances, including rapid and culture-free diagnostic methods, can reduce the need for HCLs while allowing for bioscience research to take place safely, sustainably, and securely at lower levels of containment than was previously possible.	WP.4
United States of America	[When an HCL review is conducted] five key factors are used to make a determination on a proposed laboratory: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There has to be a demonstrated need for the biocontainment facility in a foreign country, taking into account “differing national circumstances”; - The recipient of the laboratory or related equipment must demonstrate the commitment and ability to operate, maintain, and sustain the facility in a safe and secure manner upon its completion, consistent with the 2012 MSP’s emphasis on the challenge of providing “sustainable biosafety and biosecurity capabilities, including in low-resource settings”; - The recipient country must demonstrate a commitment to non-proliferation. Factors including the quality of the 	WP.4

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>recipient country's export controls and adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention are included in this review;</p> <p>- Departments and agencies also review proposals to ensure that they do not pose any other risks [...] factors related to biological risk management are considered, including biosafety and physical security measures that are currently implemented or planned at the facility;</p> <p>- Factors related to biological risk management are considered, including biosafety and physical security measures that are currently implemented or planned at the facility.</p>	
United States of America	The new HCL policy illustrates that a single review process can help to ensure that international cooperation is responsive to the needs of the recipient, coordinated with other efforts, sustainable, and consistent with nonproliferation-related undertakings and objectives.	WP.4
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	The NAM and Other States Parties also attach importance to South-South cooperation in the field of capacity building. NAM has already proposed measures to facilitate capacity building in our previous meetings which are still valid and relevant.	S 11/8 AM
Ukraine	On implementation of Article X we concentrate our efforts at the national level on prevention, detection and combating infectious diseases for public health and veterinary medicines. [...] We try to use integral and systematic approach for the creation of National Biosafety system having in mind many components.	S 11/8 AM
Cuba	It is unacceptable any attempt to condition international cooperation through the creation and promotion of arbitrary mechanisms of export control and transfers. There cannot be established unilateral, discriminatory and selective export controls and transfers outside the framework of the Convention.	S 11/8 AM
TWAS	Together IAP and TWAS have the expertise, global reach and credibility to help implement the human resource training, awareness raising and capacity building agenda of the Biological Weapons Convention.	P 11/8 PM

6. Coordination of cooperation with other relevant international and regional organizations, and other relevant stakeholders.

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	NAM and Other States Parties believe that relevant international and regional organizations such as WHO and OIE play an important role in disease surveillance, prevention, detection and response and there is merit in coordination of cooperation with them in accordance with their respective mandates. However, the unique role of the BWC, as a Convention which deals with security related issues, needs to be recognized and further efforts should be made for full and effective implementation of Article X within the Convention	S 11/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	itself. Any measures identified within the framework of the Convention to mitigate biological risks should be implemented in a manner to ensure that legitimate peaceful activities including international cooperation would not be hampered.	
United States of America	This is perhaps somewhere we (States Parties) can consider these challenges. We all recognize the importance of ensuring the access to vaccines. With that in mind perhaps we could agree on the value of regulatory organizations coming together with industry and the value of trying to ensure effective regulations that could maximize the output we are looking for.	S 11/8 PM
Netherlands	Cooperation and assistance is key to assure full implementation of the Convention. We will continue our cooperation with other States Parties to not only share best practices but also to learn from each other.	S 11/8 PM
OIE	Key messages from the "OIE Global Conference on Biological Threat Reduction" held on 30 June to 2 July 2015 in collaboration with the WHO: - Leverage experience; - Continue to collaborate amongst each other even though there is no umbrella organizations; - Implement standards; - Investments are important. They are costly but doing nothing is even more costly.	P 11/8 PM
OIE	The following two recommendations of the 18 recommendations adopted, best describe the crux of the Conference: 1. The strength and governance of national animal and public health services must be improved globally to reduce threats and consequences of infectious disease that result from nature, laboratory accidents, and the malicious use of biological agents. To achieve this, public and private sector animal and public health policies together with investments in the systems needed to support these policies should be considered a priority in all countries; 2. At a national level, animal health, public health and security sectors should engage with each other to discuss areas of mutual interest, to share resources where appropriate, and to ensure that biological threat reduction is a cross-cutting national agenda item.	P 11/8 PM
OIE	With other collaborators, the OIE will consider holding similar conferences in an effort to build on the cooperation and engagement arising from this Conference.	P 11/8 PM
TWAS	What is "science diplomacy"? - Science in diplomacy – Informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice;	P 11/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diplomacy for science – Facilitating international science cooperation; - Science for diplomacy – Using science to improve international relations between countries. 	
TWAS	<p>TWAS Science Diplomacy programme:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To bring together the scientific and policy/diplomatic communities and to make each community aware of the work and implications of the work – of the other; - To build the capacity of young scientists to consider the potential policy/diplomatic consequences of their work, e.g. through interactions with “science diplomacy ambassadors”; - To publish case studies and discussion documents that investigate and review scientific issues with transboundary consequences. 	P 11/8 PM
TWAS	<p>Despite many countries massive expenditure on military resources, the major challenges facing the world today – climate change, emerging diseases, poverty etc. – cannot be solved by military intervention. Science diplomacy must be part of the answer.</p>	P 11/8 PM
BIO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Actively develop novel vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics; - Invest in new platform technologies that can speed identification, investigation, development and production of vaccines and other products; - Serve as an intersection between government, academia and NGOs in the identification and prioritization of needs for therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics; - Support healthcare delivery infrastructure; - Educate policy makers and clinicians about healthcare issues. 	P 11/8 PM
BIO	<p>Possible roles of industry partners in response activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Act as a vital partner in the research, development and production of new vaccines, therapies and diagnostics; - Where feasible, assist in the development of technical expertise within countries; - Help facilitate the delivery of doses or medicines to countries in need of assistance through donation programs, as appropriate. 	P 11/8 PM
BIO	<p>Opportunities for coordination to help with preparedness and response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Global threat assessment and prioritization could help industry best understand where to focus limited resources and allow for clearer public-private partnerships; - Continued efforts to harmonize regulatory systems, particularly for emergency, pandemic and outbreak products, 	P 11/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>is a vital step to reducing the time and burden of delivering new vaccines and therapeutics;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Global funding mechanisms to share the risk of development of both classical Medical countermeasures and emerging infectious disease products are needed to offset a lack of funds; - Possible regional procurement or stockpiling strategies could clarify the economic value of investing; - Efforts to reduce other regulatory barriers, such as export permission for products or unclear customs regulations, would speed outbreak response for all medicines. 	
DCVMN	<p>Interviews and extensive discussions were conducted with stakeholders, and four initiatives were recommended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Engaging in quality (of manufacturing facilities and systems for priority vaccines); - Engaging our people (Train-the-trainer workshops for industry professionals); - Engaging in dialogue (with industry professionals and regulatory experts, to discuss solutions for global challenges); - Engaging expertise (create an expert consultants' database for DCVMN members). 	P 11/8 PM
DCVMN	<p>Challenges to develop vaccines in the emerging markets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quality standards and quality practices: We experienced that technology transfer is useful but if the technology is not transferred with the appropriate knowledge to control for quality then the technology transfer could actually be a risk. So the challenge is to develop technology transfer with the proper control and management; - Funding: The challenge in developing countries is also to find the funding to do the research. Developing countries do not have the same reserves to fund these programmes and contribute to expensive research and technology programmes. 	P 11/8 PM
DCVMN	<p>Regulatory challenges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of dialogue between regulatory authorities and manufacturers: Many of the regulatory authorities do not want to be seen as protecting too much the industry or interests of industry; - In the past there were very big divisions: physically, manufacturers could not attend and participate in meetings for regulatory authorities. Similarly, when meetings were organized for manufacturers, regulatory authorities then chose not to come; - To overcome this barrier and foster a dialogue, our approach: to organize at least once a year an informal forum where industry and regulators meet to discuss one topic, usually a topic that is very concrete and usually around one type of vaccine. 	P 11/8 PM

Agenda item 6:**Standing agenda item: Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention**

1. Advances in production, dispersal and delivery technologies of biological agents and toxins

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States of America	[...] any assessment of risk posed by new scientific knowledge and technology requires a comparison to the established knowledge and technology. If risk is the product of likelihood and consequence, then we must also learn the incentives (and disincentives) for using new technologies and how the consequence of their use differs from the consequence of using established technologies. Such deliberations will require scientific expertise; we suggest that a working group of scientific experts could perform the relevant analyses and keep delegations up to date on the latest scientific advances with potential implications for the Convention.	WP.5
United States of America	<p>Using microorganisms to produce novel materials is desirable for several reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They quickly multiply to large numbers; - They can be engineered to produce versions of products that are safer and more effective for humans; - The engineering of microorganisms is more socially and ethically acceptable than using or engineering animals for production; - Their potential to increase production of rare natural products could lower costs. <p>Advances in production technologies such as those described above exemplify creative, peaceful uses that aim to benefit humankind.</p>	WP.5
United States of America	Advances in technology to improve delivery of drugs and vaccines could offer several advantages. For example, use of microneedles would reduce material requirements and waste (no separate syringe and vial necessary), provide a surface to stabilize the drug or vaccine, and allow for efficiencies due to a lack of need for cold storage (access to more remote locations). Technologies that improve delivery may ultimately result in higher vaccination rates and enable self-administration of drugs that would otherwise require visits to a healthcare professional.	WP.5
United States of America	Theoretically, these technologies could also be used to produce or administer products harmful to humans. It has long been possible to purify toxins from wild-type bacteria and microorganisms themselves were grown and stored in large quantities for past state-sponsored offensive biological weapons programs.	WP.5

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	<p>[...] examples of progress in production technologies include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [...] increasing demand for single-use bioreactor systems in commercial production processes [...] offer advantages such as quicker turnaround time, contamination risk reduction, operational flexibility, reduced validation requirements, no need for cleaning and sterilization and significant cost savings. Advanced automation and modular system design can allow several bioreactors to be controlled from a single control unit, ensuring process control and data management; - [...] developments in transgenic animals and plants as a means of producing therapeutics and vaccines. [...] the engineering of transgenic goats to produce milk with enhanced antimicrobial properties [...] production of pharmaceutical proteins in transgenic plants, for example, ZMapp, the experimental drug used to treat several aid workers infected during the Ebola outbreak; - advances in peptide production [...] including process improvements, more favourable sourcing of raw materials and solvents, and advanced protection and coupling chemistries. These have led to lower costs and to synthetic chemistry predominating peptide drug manufacture; however, purification and lyophilisation remain costly; - 3-D printing technology may have implications for the production of biological agents and toxins in the future so should continue to be monitored. It can be applied to assembly of bacterial biofilms and enable studies to increase understanding of characteristics such as enhanced antibiotic resistance and the impact on infection. A 3-D laser printer technology has been developed to produce DNA on a commercial basis, with the potential to make it significantly quicker and more affordable. 3-D printing could also potentially be used to make equipment or components utilised in biological production; - Portable biological containment systems [...] enable the production of biological agents away from designated and controlled high containment facilities. During infectious disease outbreaks, portable biocontainment systems can be quickly distributed to locations where there are no scientific centres with appropriate capabilities. 	WP.12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	<p>Advances in dispersal technologies include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [...] field trials on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles [...] have shown that spray application and deposition rates are comparable to those obtained in manned aerial spraying, and ease of deployment was also demonstrated, leading to the conclusion that UAVs can be successfully deployed in speciality crop spraying; - Techniques for analysis of aerosolised droplets have also been investigated to determine the optimal methods to provide accurate droplet size from spray nozzles for use in efficacy testing and drift assessments. [...] Developments in modelling have facilitated measurement of human exposure to airborne spray and ground deposits; - [...] biological control measures using antagonistic agents 	WP.12

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	against plant pathogens, including new formulations with improved viability and persistence, continue to lead to the manufacture and registration of biological control products, which minimise the need for use of chemical pesticides.	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	<p>Examples of advances in delivery technologies are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [...] development of a nanoparticle system for needle-free vaccine delivery to the lungs by aerosol or nasal delivery; - [...] the use of many other nanomaterials in drug delivery [...] potential benefits such as reduced dosing enhanced solubility and targeted delivery; - Nanomaterial based approaches also have the potential for delivery of genetic elements, for example in gene therapy. [...] the potential use of gelatin nanoparticles for the targeted delivery of medicines to the brain. These can be administered nasally, providing a non-invasive and direct route to the brain, by-passing the blood-brain barrier; - DNA origami [...] for the design and fabrication of self-assembled nanodevices. Such structures have the potential to transport biomolecules to targets within the body and thus for development as drug delivery systems; - [...] increased understanding of the mechanism by which anthrax toxin enters cells. A component that facilitates cell entry was isolated and bound to other therapeutic proteins, which could then be delivered effectively into target cancer cells to cause their destruction. 	WP.12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] the potential benefit in combating disease and in agriculture and food production; such examples embody the prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes for biological agents and toxins stated in Article I. The development of improved methods to design and produce vaccines and therapeutics rapidly and cost-effectively, and to increase efficient delivery within the host, will have significant impact on global efforts in preventing and responding to infectious disease outbreaks. Novel delivery methods may also be of relevance for therapy of many other diseases... Advances of relevance to agriculture, such as improved biological control methods to combat plant pests and diseases, and approaches to improve production of food components, also have the potential for global impact.	WP.12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The nature and breadth [of advances in production, dispersal and delivery technologies of biological agents and toxins] again emphasize the importance of bringing in relevant experts from academia and industry to assist in our assessments, and we recommend that efforts to promote greater collaboration with the CWC be continued in light of the growing convergence between the fields of chemistry and biology.	S 12/8 AM
India	Our aim should also be to seek greater clarity on aspects of range of types and quantities of such agents and toxins, whether naturally occurring or altered which potentially could pose a risk to the Convention, for the purpose of reaching common understandings on criteria for assessing risks of relevance to the Convention.	S 12/8 AM

2. New science and technology developments that have potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States of America	<p>When faced with new scientific knowledge and technology, States Parties should critically ask:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How might these new developments increase risk of harm to humans compared to older, established knowledge or technology? - What are the incentives and disincentives for using a new technology, what are the consequences that accompany its use, and how do they compare with consequences of the older, established technology? <p>In other words, we must seek to identify transformative knowledge and technology that is likely to be different enough from the status quo as to significantly change our calculation of risk.</p>	WP.5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	<p>As with many fields in the life sciences and related subjects, some advances described here have the potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention. Developments in production technologies which improve yield, speed, flexibility, cost- effectiveness, portability, availability and safety would also be applicable for the production of biological or toxin weapons agents. Improved dispersal and delivery methods also have the potential to be misused for hostile purposes, and information from modeling systems could be used to inform the development of methods for the dissemination and delivery of biological or toxin agents. However, such offensive applications are clearly prohibited by Article I of the Convention and States Parties have a commitment to take the necessary national measures to prohibit and prevent the misuse of science. Measures for the governance and oversight of such advances need to be designed to prevent prohibited activities without having adverse effects on legitimate developments.</p>	WP.12
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands and the United States	<p>The BWC captures the need to prohibit use [of life sciences] for hostile purposes (in Article I) while promoting peaceful uses (in Article X). The collective national measures of States Parties to implement this Convention represent the world's strongest efforts to prevent hostile uses of the life sciences. But we must turn our attention to preventing the misuse of life sciences research that is conducted for peaceful purposes with particular focus on the riskiest types of dual use research. Several States Parties across geographic regions have taken a variety of national measures to address the risks posed by dual use research in the life sciences.</p>	WP.19
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	<p>[...] there have been recent advances demonstrating the increasing sophistication of synthetic biology, together with other enabling technologies, which have benefits, together with the potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention. All states must conduct such activities in a transparent manner, in order to build the confidence of other States Parties. There is a need to regulate these activities, to ensure that they do not lead to any concerns related to ethics,</p>	S 10/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	safety and security as well as any uses contrary to the Convention.	
Pakistan	The recent advances in synthetic biology raise immediate concerns related to ethics, safety and security. In this regard, States should raise immediate concerns related to ethics, safety and security. In this regard, States should employ utmost transparency and confidence building measures during all their activities related to Synthetic biology, to ensure that it does not lead to any concerns related to safety and security as well as incidents of proliferation that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.	S 10/8 AM
Pakistan	The threats posed by the dual-use nature of biotechnology are real and cannot be over-stated. We are witnessing the growing marginalization of the need to possess real scientific information on the internet.	S 10/8 AM
China	[...] At present, the development of biological science and technology has entered the fast lane, with emerging new technologies and means as well as expanding scope of the research. The ensuing accumulated risks for misusing biological science and technology constitute potential challenges for the bright prospect of utilizing biological science and technology. "Balance" means attaching importance to both development and supervision, and to reduce the risks for the misuse of biological science and technology. The continuous development of biological science and technology has raised the requirement for the supervising and monitoring of bio-safety and security. China supports the efforts of States Parties to improve their capacity building for bio-safety and security according to their specific situations, to raise their level of management and transparency for dual-use bio-science and technology research, to establish risk assessment and early warning systems for the misuse of bio-science and technology and to raise awareness of research personnel concerning bio-safety and security. We also support the sharing of useful experience on bio-risk management among countries, to evaluate in time the impact of the development of bio-science and technology on the Convention, so as to ensure that the implementation of the Convention keep up with the progress of biological science and technology.	S 10/8 AM
Russian Federation	At the current stage of development of biotechnology, we have reached such a level that a whole range of research could be described use research which could be used for purposes that contradict the BWC. The lack of criteria for identifying research as being in competition to the BWC prevents us from giving a timely assessment of the results of this work and stops us from preventing wide ranges of people having access to this dangerous information. We have already said that the analysis of work published in the last five years can help to determine some areas that we should pursue in this sensitive area	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	Gene drives and the dual use problem: Potential risks:	P 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - With gene editing, there is no longer the ability to really track engineered products; - It will be hard to detect whether something has been mutated conventionally or genetically engineered; - It has a risk of irreversibility – and unintended or hard-to-calculate consequences for other species; - The democratization of genome editing through CRISPR could have unexpected and undesirable outcomes. 	
Brazil	Biological weapons proliferation is a major threat to international security due to the fact that, in contrast to the nuclear and chemical arms control regimes, there is no multilateral mechanism to verify compliance with the biological disarmament norm. We are convinced that the effectiveness of the BWC could be greatly enhanced through the adoption of a universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding verification mechanism. Oversight of life sciences research is not an effective measure to pursue if we are to determine whether the provisions of the BWC are being complied with. In order to rise up to that challenge, we must start addressing options to settle pending issues of the Convention, in particular the need to resume negotiations of a verification Protocol.	S 12/8 AM

3. New science and technology developments that have potential benefits for the Convention, including those of special relevance to disease surveillance, diagnosis and mitigation

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Scientific and technological developments in production methods for biological agents and toxins may have implications for any future review of Confidence Building Measures. In particular, emergence of new production methods that are not based on traditional fermentation methods, or do not need to be performed in containment facilities would be of relevance to the types of facilities of most interest in the future.	WP.12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] the potential benefit in combating disease and in agriculture and food production; such examples embody the prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes for biological agents and toxins stated in Article I. The development of improved methods to design and produce vaccines and therapeutics rapidly and cost-effectively, and to increase efficient delivery within the host, will have significant impact on global efforts in preventing and responding to infectious disease outbreaks. Novel delivery methods may also be of relevance for therapy of many other diseases. ... Advances of relevance to agriculture, such as improved biological control methods to combat plant pests and diseases, and approaches to improve production of food components, also have the potential for global impact.	WP.12

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	The scope of bio sciences including the scientific study of living organisms-such as microorganisms, plants, animals and human beings and new developments in the biology, technological advances in molecular biology and biotechnology can promote and facilitate the implementation of Article X of the Convention.	WP.15
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	The new developments in the field of science and technology should help the WHO and States Parties to BWC, as appropriate and in full conformity with its mandate, in fight against the emerging and reemerging communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Malaria, Tuberculosis, MERS-CoV, influenza and other infectious diseases. There is no doubt that the new developments in the field of science and technology can help the States Parties in their review and establishment of new public, animal, plants, health and environmental policies.	WP.15
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	[...] the new advances and researches in biology, biotechnology, bioengineering and biomedical engineering, in particular, developments in enabling technologies including high-throughput systems for sequencing, synthesizing and analyzing DNA, bioinformatics and computational tools and systems biology, host-pathogen interactions should provide opportunities for enhanced cooperation and making vaccines, medicines and diagnostics production simpler, faster, cheaper and more efficient in developing countries.	WP.15
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] there have been recent advances demonstrating the increasing sophistication of synthetic biology, together with other enabling technologies, which have benefits, together with the potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention. All states must conduct such activities in a transparent manner, in order to build the confidence of other States Parties.	S 12/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	The rapid development of science and technology has created significant opportunities for international cooperation to narrow increasing gaps persisting in the fields of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related disciplines between developed and developing countries. NAM highlights the importance of continued deliberations within the standing agenda item on S&T to promote common understanding and effective actions which would help states parties to benefit from these developments.	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	[...] such a technique could be used to wipe out disease-carrying mosquitoes or ticks, eliminate invasive plants or eradicate herbicide resistance.	P 12/8 AM
Switzerland	Recently described advances in immunology are also highly relevant for our deliberations. As briefly discussed at last year's meetings, the so-called CRISPR/Cas system – a component of the bacterial immune system – can be exploited to edit, silence and activate genes at any given site in virtually any kind of genome, including human cells. It promises to become a very powerful genomic engineering tool with both enormous benefits and significant risks.	P 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Georgia Institute of Technology	Microneedle technology can significantly reduce the resources and time necessary in mass vaccination campaigns while still achieving the same levels of protection. Microneedle technology has the potential to simplify and improve the logistics of mass vaccination campaigns while providing populations with immunological protection similar to or possibly better than that achieved currently by standard injection. This is because microneedles have a small footprint, are sharps-free after their use, exhibit good thermal stability which may lead to cold chain elimination, and are easy to use, allowing administration by minimally-trained personnel or possibly self-administration.	P 12/8 PM

4. Possible measures for strengthening national biological risk management, as appropriate, in research and development involving new science and technology developments of relevance to the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] States Parties have a commitment to take the necessary national measures to prohibit and prevent the misuse of science. Measures for the governance and oversight of such advances need to be designed to prevent prohibited activities without having adverse effects on legitimate developments.	WP.12
Indonesia, Malaysia, Netherlands and United States	Last December, States Parties “noted the value of continued discussion at future meetings on oversight of dual-use research of concern, including specific approaches to: identifying relevant criteria; assessing both risks and possible benefits; and mitigating identified risks.” [BWC/MSP/2014/5]. We suggest comprehensive examination of appropriate oversight criteria, of optimal methods to assess risks and benefits, and of optimal approaches to mitigating identified risks at BWC meetings.	WP.19
Denmark	In 2014, the Danish Centre of Biosecurity and Biopreparedness introduced additional requirements to regulate dual-use immaterial technology in the form of sensitive know-how and skills that may be misused in the context of biological weapons development. Not only are we trying to mitigate the risk of dangerous biological agents being stolen or abused, and production materials ending up in the wrong hands but we are also taking the necessary steps to ensure that emerging dual-use technologies are only used for legitimate purposes. This regulation has to be balanced against the need to continue free research and the need to share information across borders to ensure continuing growth and economic development in all parts of the world.	S 10/8 AM
Russian Federation	In order to further strengthen the Convention and in the context of preparations for the Eighth BWC Review Conference we believe it would be appropriate, as part of the preparatory process, to work at the expert level to develop criteria. These will be criteria on whether research applies to the BWC. These very criteria could serve as a starting point for organizing a system of control measures, of oversight measures, by the international community for the purposes of monitoring dual-use research, which could present a risk of	S 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	the development of biological weapons.	
India	Measures taken to mitigate biological risk should be proportional to assessed risk and not hamper peaceful activities including international cooperation. [...] peaceful activities such as vaccine development, which are important for developing countries for meeting their public health needs, should not be unnecessarily highlighted as posing risk for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention.	S 12/8 AM
Netherlands	Specific instruments that the Netherlands have developed include the sounding procedure, where the export control authorities are able to advise early in a process on the feasibility of specific projects. Also, the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences developed a code of conduct for biosecurity, to help individual researchers in their assessment of risks and benefits.	S 12/8 PM

5. Voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] the need to bring in a diverse range of expertise from academia and industry when relevant to assist us in identifying and reviewing significant advances, and in considering their implications for implementation of various aspects of the Convention.	WP.12
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] the Codes of Conduct remain the prerogative of the States Parties to decide on the development, content, promulgation and adoption of the code in accordance with relevant national laws, regulations and policies, consistent with the provisions of the Convention.	S 12/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	Codes of Conduct should avoid any restrictions on exchange of scientific discoveries in the field of biology for prevention of disease and other peaceful purposes. Subjecting scientific research and the free flow of scientific information to undue restrictions may amount to a violation of obligations undertaken under Article X of the BWC.	S 12/8 AM
Cuba	Cuba considers the scientific codes could be beneficial, but they alone cannot resolve the problem of the menace of biological weapons. They also cannot be imposed upon the international community, but rather need to be the result of a democratic exercise, inclusive within the multilateral mechanisms of the United Nations and in accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention. To accomplish this, the political will of all the States Parties is essential.	S 12/8 AM
Netherlands	It is clear that biosecurity awareness raising is not only important for professionals, but also for semi-professionals, like student iGEM teams and the do-it-yourself (DIY) biology community.	S 13/8 PM
Ecuador	[...] Codes of Conduct should avoid any restrictions to the exchange of information relating to new scientific discoveries in the field of biology, in a manner consistent with the	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	objectives of the Convention. ... these could constitute a helpful and valuable reference tool for States Parties to ensure improved safekeeping of biological agents and their means of delivery by scientists working with toxins and biological agents.	
Ecuador	[...] the implementation of a Research Ethics Code and a Code of Conduct for scientists help to strengthen the prevention of development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, and are necessary for the adequate protection of society and the environment. Scientific research is a productive process. Nevertheless, it can also be hazardous and so entails responsibilities and obligations. Those engaging in scientific research must be subject to oversight with regards to their scientific conduct, so that the implementation of a Code of Conduct would be beneficial. At a national level, all of the scientific entities, both private and public, must become acquainted with this Code of Conduct and adequately implement it within the framework of the constitution and existing legislation.	S 13/8 AM

6. Education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Argentina	Regarding scientific and technological developments related to the Convention, the continuous and accelerating rate of progress in knowledge imply the necessity of deepening a culture of responsible use of this knowledge, which takes into account biological disarmament without undermining pacific uses. We believe, however, that from this perspective, the main challenge is the tension between the speed and scope of the diffusion of this knowledge and technology with regards to the objectives of disarmament. Because of this, we propose to continue working through education and the diffusion of best practices.	S 10/8 AM
Netherlands	Gain of function research is indispensable for future common health. With these experiments we are able to determine the possible current and future risks of a virus or pathogen. By knowing these risks in advance, we can take the necessary measures to protect society. Doing nothing is not an option as viruses will develop naturally and outrun us. At the same time we cannot ignore the dual use character of life sciences. It is our shared responsibility to prevent hostile uses. We have to take into account science, security interests and public health. Awareness-raising and education in an early stage is necessary.	S 12/8 PM

7. Science- and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations such as the WHO, OIE, FAO, IPPC and OPCW

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Switzerland	[...] an overlap between the disciplines is not a new development. However, certain scientific advances in this overlap continue to blur even further the boundaries between what constitutes biology and chemistry. [...] How far and at what speed such advances will progress depends largely on developments in other disciplines acting as enabling technologies. These include data computation and management of large databases, nanotechnology, robotics, systems automation and many others. The resulting scientific and technological advances will open up new areas of application of chemistry and biology in society.	WP.8
Switzerland	Applications of ‘Convergence’ [between biology and chemistry] will assist in developing new means of protection against toxic chemicals and infectious diseases: methods for their detection, diagnostics and identification, pre- or post-exposure medical treatment and countermeasures as well as decontamination. But ‘Convergence’ will also permit the production of known toxic chemicals, including toxins, by different new methods, and it may lead to novel toxic chemicals.	WP.8
Switzerland	Toxic chemicals and infectious organisms will remain prohibited as weapons through the provisions of the BTWC and the CWC. But the impact that ‘Convergence’ has on the provisions of the two regimes needs to be kept under review to avoid gaps opening.	WP.8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	In particular, those aspects related to the increasing convergence of chemistry and biology underline the importance of continuing to build and sustain coordination between the BTWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention to assist analysis of the potential benefits and risks resulting from advances in scientific and technological areas of mutual interest.	WP.12
OPCW	Chemicals being produced increasingly by bio mediated processes (e.g. fermentation). Estimated approximately 10 percent of chemical production will use such processes by 2020. Expansion of data and knowledge will lead to non-linear progress in future, outpacing CWC and BWC treaty review cycles. Recommended that advances in the life sciences should be monitored constantly. Convergence of chemistry and biology will impact on verification.	P 12/8 PM

8. Any other science and technology developments of relevance to the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United States of America	An expert S&T working group can thoroughly review the relevant scientific literature and, through reports and presentations, keep delegations up-to-date on the latest scientific advances with potential implications for the Convention. Routine review of the scientific literature in search of relevant advances is just the beginning of a process that would enable States Parties to reach common	WP.5

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	understandings and take effective action. Deliberations like these require scientific expertise, high-quality data, time, and effort. [...] An expert S&T working group, equipped with the highest quality data available, could perform useful analyses to support States Parties as they consider these essential questions. If the products of an expert S&T working group promote common understanding of the technical details, then States Parties could focus on effective actions, if risk is assessed to be increased by particular new knowledge or technology.	
United States of America	Understanding the role of tacit knowledge in biological weapons production is critical for States Parties to accurately assess the risk of proliferation and devise appropriate strategies of prevention. While preventing the illicit spread of materials and equipment is imperative, successful proliferation requires not only the acquisition of biological materials and equipment, but also the direct involvement of individual scientists with the knowledge necessary to craft the weapons.	WP.6
United States of America	[...] written knowledge alone may be insufficient for a party to develop biological weapons, and that the acquisition of tacit knowledge may well be necessary. Tacit knowledge may therefore significantly impact overall proliferation risk. Lack of tacit knowledge can decrease the risk that a proliferator can produce biological weapons, as possession of biological materials, equipment, and methods in the absence of individuals with tacit knowledge greatly stymies development of such a weapon.	WP.6
United States of America	Tacit knowledge, defined as the set of skills and understanding gained only through direct experience, is an important consideration in assessing the risk of biological weapons production and proliferation. Tacit knowledge serves as a risk modulator. The proliferation of this kind of knowledge, even without the corresponding proliferation of materials, may increase the overall risk of biological weapons proliferation, while its temporal nature may decrease the associated risks. Advances in the automation of biological processes may eventually render some sets of tacit knowledge obsolete, but in the interim the learning of additional technologies creates new forms of tacit knowledge. The transfer of tacit knowledge related to biological weapons production remains a potential threat to international security, and States Parties should address the concept in order to effectively develop strategies to mitigate its proliferation.	WP.6
United States of America	Sharing a common understanding of what constitutes tacit knowledge can serve as a foundation for future discussions on the risks stemming from developments in science and technology.	WP.6
Switzerland	[...] advances in the life sciences, in related technologies and industrial application require constant monitoring. Given the pace and complexity of current scientific and technological advances, today's review mechanisms, even if executed in best faith, may lack sufficient breadth, depth and quality of expertise to provide dependable results.	WP.8

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Amongst the lessons identified by assessments of the international response to the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa is the need to expand investment in research and development on diagnostics, drugs and vaccines [...] and to ensure access to such medical countermeasures whenever and wherever they are needed. [...] Any effective results of such research and development will contribute to efforts to prevent, detect and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease, whether natural, accidental or deliberate. Hence, all such scientific and technological advances are of relevance to the strengthening of Article VII, in providing assistance to any State Party exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The implications of scientific and technological issues [...] emphasise the need for a structured and systematic ongoing process for the review of relevant advances, with the flexibility to address emerging issues as they arise, and link them with particular provisions of the Convention. This could be reflected in the report of the 2015 Meeting of States Parties to inform decisions at the Eighth Review Conference on the future role of scientific and technological reviews.	WP.9
Switzerland	Developments in science and technology play a pivotal role in the continued relevance of this treaty, identifying new opportunities for furthering its aims and objectives, and expending every effort to ensure that the life sciences and biotechnology are not used to develop weapons. BWC States Parties must reflect this importance by providing proportionate time and resources to address this challenge. A technical body under the BWC dedicated to reviewing S&T developments will provide a more robust and comprehensive technical basis on which to base policy decisions and a firmer foundation for the future evolution of this important treaty.	WP.11
Switzerland	[...] A dedicated process would help to insulate technical discussions from policy considerations and free up time during an already overloaded intersessional work programme. Making such a process expert-led will help to ensure that discussions remain technical, that the conclusions reached are factual, and that any recommendations made would have a scientific basis. That would leave BWC States Parties well placed for the resulting policy discussions in the framework of the broader intersessional work programme. [...] As a result, there will be an ongoing need for such a process. The Eighth Review Conference should decide to put in place a suitable, standing arrangement -- supported by realistic resources -- for a structured, sustained, systematic and systemic dialogue on S&T developments.	WP.11
Switzerland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Scientific and technological developments to be reviewed are occurring at an increasing rate. To keep pace, such a process would need to meet on a regular basis; - These developments are complex and technical. It will be necessary for such efforts to be undertaken by suitable technical experts. Relevant expertise exists both inside and outside of governments and in public and private sectors; - Differences in opinion as to relevance or potential impact of 	WP.11

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>advances are to be expected and encouraged and as a result an environment conducive to interaction and debate will be required;</p> <p>- Separating such a process from plenary sessions of the intersessional work programme will help to provide such an environment.</p>	
United States of America	Our emphasis is on identifying areas where there may be a need for Parties to take action and on promoting convergence of views on such matters (discussion of developments in the life sciences, including how to mitigate the risks of dual-use and gain-of-function research).	S 10/8 AM
Pakistan	[...] the importance of holding regular reviews of the developments in science and technology related to the Convention. These reviews should provide impetus not only to enhanced awareness regarding new technology related to the Convention but also towards enhanced cooperation and sharing of such technology.	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	The Group reiterates its position that the dual use nature of these technologies by itself should not in anyway hamper the free and fullest exchange of technologies between the parties to the Convention especially when some developed countries are freely engaged in many activities that rest in the domain of these new technologies in the framework of their bio-defense programs.	S 12/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	States Parties should undertake all efforts to prevent actions and decisions with the BWC that would raise obstacles to the development of biological sciences in the developing countries. The need to prevent harmful activities should never hamper scientific evolution for peaceful purposes and life-saving achievements like vaccines development.	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	<p>[...] there is a need for a more systematic and sustainable approach. A technical body in the BWC framework dedicated to reviewing S&T developments would provide a more robust and comprehensive foundation on which to base our policy decisions to ensure the continued effective implementation of the treaty.</p> <p>- Science and technology developments are technical in nature, and so should be the process through which they are identified and their implications assessed;</p> <p>- A dedicated process in contrary would help to separate technical discussions from policy considerations. It would contribute to keep discussions on science and technology technical and to ensure that the recommendations made have a scientific basis.</p>	S 12/8 AM
Switzerland	The convergence of biology and chemistry provides a telling example of a scientific and technological development with enormous potential benefits, but also of one that poses significant challenges to the BWC; challenges that need to be addressed if we are committed to the goals and objectives of the treaty.	S 12/8 AM
United States of America	- an open- ended working group, composed of S&T experts, can perform such a review and through reports and	S 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>presentations, keep States Parties apprised of the latest advances with potential implications for the Convention;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - such a review is just a beginning of a process that would enable States Parties to reach common understandings and take effective action; - Beyond it lie questions that an open-ended working group could help us to answer: Have expanded knowledge and technology changed the risk of harm by making biological weapons more virulent, cheaper or easier to produce? Will these advances somehow embolden bad actors? And do answers to any of these questions suggest 'effective actions' that States Parties should undertake? - These considerations seem to us to be highly relevant in light of our obligations under Article XII. 	
Cuba	<p>We cannot forget that the new tendency related to the necessity of tacit knowledge for work in the life sciences creates restrictions and limitations to the full transparency of scientific publications, the exchange of knowledge within the scientific community and imposes additional costs on developing countries in the reproduction of existing research, widening the gap between developed and developing countries. The dual nature of new scientific discoveries in science and technology should not be used as a pretense to impede their exchange.</p>	S 12/8 AM
Cuba	<p>The States Parties need to maintain transparency in performing these activities [that have the potential to be used for ends contrary to the Convention] and need to account for them with strict national regulations, all of this without hindering scientific developments for pacific purposes.</p>	S 12/8 AM
Cuba	<p>All of the activities related to biological agents, components and products resulting from biological synthesis, as well as the convergence of biology and chemistry, which could entail risks for human health and the environment, must from the start be subject to a rigorous process of risk evaluation. In order for there to not remain concerns related to the ethics, biosecurity and biological custody and uses contrary to the Convention, it is necessary to regulate the developments in science and technology, as well as Convergence, and maintain verification of the said regulation especially in the light of reports on experiments with highly virulent strains of avian flu, like H5N1. Recent events associated with developments in science and technology highlights once again the importance of coming to an agreement on a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement that includes all articles of the Convention, in a balanced and comprehensive manner.</p>	S 12/8 AM
India	<p>We sense a large measure of support for addressing S&T developments on a continuing basis through an appropriate mechanism established for this purpose. We had presented a Working Paper in this regard at the 7th Review Conference. In the run-up to the last Review Conference, we had suggested that such a review could be carried out through a panel composed of experts nominated by States Parties and we would be ready to further explore this as well as other ideas. [...] However we continue to believe that it is essential</p>	S 12/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	that the S&T Review Process be led and driven by States Parties to the BWC.	
IAP	The IAP has already commissioned a review of relevant developments that could further the aims of this treaty as well those that could be applied to uses contrary to its purposes. In September 2015, we will convene an international meeting of scientists, technologists and national technical experts to further examine these issues. Preliminary findings will be ready to feed into the Meeting of States Parties in December. We hope that our efforts will help States Parties in their work under the relevant standing agenda item this year and assist in preparations for the Review Conference next year.	S 12/8 PM

Agenda item 7:

Standing agenda item: Strengthening national implementation

1. A range of specific measures for the full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention, especially Articles III and IV

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Thailand	<p>Additional unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures can provide further reassurance about effective implementation of the BWC. We encourage States Parties to enact, enforce and review national implementation measures, and to provide comprehensive reports on such activities (under Articles III, IV and V). These measures include, inter alia:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Domestic legislation, including the criminalisation of the prohibitions contained in the BWC; - Regulations on the transfers of BWC relevant materials, equipment and information, including an effective national export control licensing system; - National biosecurity measures. <p>Where national capacity to undertake such measures is limited, the following are some of the options available to seek external assistance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The offers of assistance provided by States Parties through the BWC ISU assistance database; - The offer by States Parties which have export licensing measures in place to provide assistance on implementation of export controls for chemical and biological transfers; - Regional cooperation. 	WP.16
Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,	<p>[...] effective systems for processing requests for government permission for transfers of tangible and intangible goods and technologies generally have six key elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Laws and regulations that are sufficiently clear and comprehensive, and that establish necessary legal authorities and appropriate penalties for violations; - Clearly established procedures and mechanisms for appealing licensing decisions, investigating possible 	WP.18

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America	<p>violations, and enforcing rules and penalties;</p> <p>- A list of items subject to control that is clearly written and focused on the materials and technologies needed to develop, produce, or stockpile biological weapons, such as the list set out by the United Nations in S/2006/853 (“List of chemical and biological items, materials, equipment, goods and technologies related to other weapons of mass destruction programmes, as approved by the Committee pursuant to paragraph 8(a)(ii) of resolution 1718 (2006)”). Such lists should be regularly reviewed and updated as necessary;</p> <p>- Controls on technology directly associated with listed items, including transfers of such technology in intangible form and via intangible means;</p> <p>- A “catch-all” provision that obligates exporters to seek government permission for an export if they have reason, either from government communication or in the course of business, to suspect the export is intended to contribute to the development, production, or stockpiling of biological weapons;</p> <p>- Regular outreach to life science researchers and the biotechnology industry concerning these requirements to ensure awareness and compliance, e.g. through publication of regulatory handbooks and other guidance and resource documents, making such materials available online, and arranging or taking part in seminars and workshops to inform industry and academia.</p> <p>We believe that support for using these elements and indicators is now strong enough that the 2015 MSP should adopt a common understanding that these are key elements of an effective national export control system, as called for by the Seventh Review Conference, that fulfill the obligations of the BWC’s Article III.</p>	
India	[...] we believe that strengthened implementation of Article III would ensure that the cooperation envisaged under Article X is taken forward in mutual confidence it will not be abused. Thus effective national export controls are important tools to prevent the misuse of biological agents and toxins for purposes prohibited by the Convention or falling into the hands of the terrorists, which is a major concern for the international community. In this regard it is important to build broad based support in the BWC for establishing common standards of national export controls as part of our effort to strengthen implementation of Article III of the Convention.	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	NAM stresses that national implementation of the Convention as required under Article IV of the Convention requires commitments towards the implementation of all provisions of the Convention. In this regard, NAM is of the view that the full and effective implementation of Article X is of high importance.	S 13/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	Compliance with the Convention is a concept different from national implementation. In an international legal instrument such as the BWC, the assurance of compliance with the Convention’s provisions has to be undertaken collectively	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	through appropriate multilateral verification arrangements.	
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] there exists a delicate balance between various provisions of the Convention. Hence, we are of the firm belief that our efforts towards strengthening the implementations of the Convention shall be made in manner to strengthen the Convention in its entirety.	S 13/8 AM
Mongolia	We understand that education, biosecurity and biosafety are very important elements and we need to consolidate our efforts at the national level for strengthening capacity building and raising awareness of the issue.	S 13/8 AM
Canada	[...] the implementation of Article IV requires effective legislation which includes laws but also efficient regulations that emanate from them, and the necessary enforcement which must follow.[...] Effective regulations should have the following characteristics: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Be written in clear, simple language so that those under regulations can easily understand and apply them; 2. Regulations should be comprehensive and apply to all laboratories; 3. They should be balanced: So that the regulations do not constitute a too high burden for those under regulation; 4. They should also contain an element of flexibility. As we see almost daily, developments in science keep opening the door to technology and knowledge which in some cases could be used for nefarious ends. Consequently regulations must allow for the regulating agency to easily modify them should objective circumstances require it; 5. They must be enforceable: This means ensuring that along with developing the regulations, States must develop and then ensure their effective implementation, and enforcement when necessary; 6. [...] Effective compliance promotion through outreach and stakeholder engagement is critical component to a strong and effective national implementation framework. 	S 13/8 AM
Australia	[...] key challenge is to provide reassurance to other States Parties that the basic obligations of the BWC are being met. [...] Reassurance can be achieved by increased transparency and practical demonstrations of continued commitment to the Convention.	S 13/8 AM
India	Effective national export controls are important tools to prevent the misuse of biological agents and toxins for purposes prohibited by the Convention or falling into the hands of terrorists, which is a major concern for the international community. In this regard, it is important to build broad based support in the BWC for establishing common standards of national export controls as part of our effort to strengthen implementation of Article III of the Convention.	S 13/8 AM
Cuba	We believe that we could make better and more productive use of this standing agenda item by sharing national experiences and practices learned from the effective	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	implementation of the Convention, instead of debating over mechanisms for its revision.	
United States of America	It is also important that Parties develop more of a shared understanding of the key elements of effective implementation. Parties recognize that among these elements are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. appropriate and effective laws, regulations and policies regarding the use of relevant biological agents and equipment, including biosafety and biosecurity; 2. controls on exports of such items; 3. criminalization of prohibited activities; 4. oversight on research that can be misused for weapons. However it is evident that more work is required.	S 13/8 AM
Colombia	Colombia highlights the importance of effectively implementing the points agreed upon in the Intersessional Programme, especially those related to assistance and cooperation, new developments in the field of science and technology, and the strengthening of national capacity.	S 13/8 PM
University of Bradford	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education is an integral element for full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention; - Biosecurity education and training are essential requirements for all those engaged in the life sciences; - States Parties are urged to report annually on activities undertaken nationally on biosecurity education; - States Parties are encouraged to agree and establish an international standard for biosecurity education; - States Parties should establish an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN) modelled on the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) to promote biosecurity education; - States Parties should agree a Biosecurity Education Action Plan with clear guidelines, milestones and targets to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of the Convention. 	P 13/8 PM

2. ways and means to enhance national implementation, sharing best practices and experiences, including the voluntary exchange of information among States Parties on their national implementation, enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Republic of	Effective implementation of the BWC includes but is not limited to effective national legislation, domestic biosecurity regulations and capabilities and export controls on sensitive materials (in some cases, developed through bilateral and regional cooperative efforts). These measures can all work in a complementary manner to enhance biological security globally, reduce the possibility of BW proliferation, and raise barriers to bioterrorism. These measures can also help to improve detection and response capabilities for natural,	WP.16

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Korea, Thailand	accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, and facilitate exchange in the life sciences for peaceful purposes.	
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Thailand	In the context of the BWC, reassurance can be achieved by increased transparency and practical demonstrations of continued commitment to the Convention. Annual CBM reports already provide a level of reassurance by those States Parties that provide these reports. We also encourage greater sharing of experience and capacity to ensure that initiatives to strengthen national implementation are effective and visible to other States Parties.	WP.16
Denmark	Denmark and Kenya have established a close cooperation through the partnership programme on biosecurity in East Africa. [...] Developing an educational book addressed to authorities within the area of biosecurity could be a useful way of highlighting a whole of government biosecurity model and making the Danish experiences available. The book describes a full biosecurity system from the legislative process to agency building and guidelines on best practice in biosecurity management.	S 10/8 AM
Denmark	In order to strengthen European biosecurity, the [European Biosecurity Regulators Forum] will first conduct a gap analysis with the aim of establishing a baseline for biosecurity, as well as the establishment of an overview of points of contact for regulatory agencies.	S 10/8 AM
Mexico	CBMs - Need to improve participation of States Parties, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, as it contributes in enhancing transparency.	S 10/8 AM
Italy	[...] CBMs remain an essential instrument to promote the purposes of the BWC, as they help demonstrating compliance with the Convention and are key to increasing mutual trust and transparency. [...] Renewed efforts are needed to increase the participation in the CBM process. We also support further consideration of innovative approaches to enhance the national implementation and build mutual trust such as voluntary exchanges of information and best practices, for example through the proposed peer review mechanism.	S 10/8 AM
Argentina	Argentina recalls the necessity of a global approach of the Convention for each of the State Parties, in which the common vision of the obstacles and difficulties caused by both multilateral and regional cooperation, plays a main role. It is not sufficient to accede to the Convention and approve its laws and necessary regulations, if this is not accompanied by budgetary measures, educational and operational, with the participation of all of the national actors, that are considered necessary for the full achievement of the objectives of the Convention.	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	The case of H5N1 showed that we still have controversy around the areas that relate to the national implementation of the Convention and that some countries still don't have a clear picture about the authorized and unauthorized activities in the framework of the BWC. We believe that this case is very complex and important and its examination should be	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	carefully continued in the meetings of the BWC as it covers different aspects that might affect the implementation of the Convention.	
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] it is necessary for States Parties to work together for enhancing national implementation by sharing best practices and experiences, exchange of information on enforcement of national legislation, on possible ways for strengthening national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions and finally building national capacity through international cooperation.	S 13/8 AM
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	<p>- Effective national implementation: the need for penal provisions in national implementing legislation to translate the prohibitions in Article I into domestic law;</p> <p>- Biosafety Legislation: on Genetically Modified Organisms... The regulations are concerned with the prevention of harm to human health that arises from contained use involving genetically modified micro-organisms, genetically modified animals and plants, and the prevention of harm to the environment arising from contained use involving genetically modified micro-organisms. The consolidation process has made the regulations more risk based and proportionate, while maintaining the necessary level of protection for people and the environment. UK regulations take account of relevant advances in technology, for example synthetic biology is largely encompassed by the definitions and is likely to remain so within the foreseeable future;</p> <p>- Managing risks of research misuse: Three key life science research bodies in the UK have implemented five key provisions in their grant application processes and funding requirements to help ensure that risks of misuse associated with research proposals are identified and assessed during the grant funding process, where it is possible to do so. These are: guidance for funding committees and the process for assessing cases of concern; modification of guidelines on good practice in research to include specific reference to risks of misuse; a requirement to notify funders, and other relevant authorities, of unexpected outcomes or new risks emerging that were not originally anticipated. We would commend these procedures to others as an example that their own research communities might wish to consider, follow or copy.</p>	S 13/8 AM
Canada	[...] Canada is committed to international cooperation and encourages all States Parties in a position to do so to provide assistance to other States Parties to strengthen all aspects of the implementation of the Convention. Such cooperation can take the form of exchange of information and training in the fields of biosafety, biosecurity, export controls or legislative and regulatory oversight of laboratory activities conducted with pathogens.	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Japan	Participation in CBMs is one important way to provide reassurance to States Parties that basic BWC obligations are being met. Japan would like to encourage all States Parties to submit comprehensive annual CBMs. At the same time, we have recognized that there are several countries which have had difficulties in submitting CBM forms in a timely and comprehensive manner. In this connection Japan would like to reintroduce the 2013 Working Paper no 7 on the 'Step by Step Approach in CBM participation'. [...] Japan anticipates States Parties that have never submitted a CBM return or have difficulties in submitting forms annually will voluntarily use this approach and take advantage of an opportunity to demonstrate its continued commitment so that the level of reassurance on BWC implementation through CBM participation will increase.	S 13/8 AM
Republic of Korea	The effective national implementation is viable when accompanied by strong confidence building measures and continuous capacity-building.	S 13/8 AM
China	[...] to strengthen national measures to implement the Convention, it is important to guarantee for countries to implement their obligations and increase the effectiveness of the Convention. Support should be given to countries on a gradual and voluntary basis and in line with the national circumstances and strengthen their national mechanism of implementation. [...] We support the sharing of national experiences. Fairness is the soul of the compliance mechanism of the Convention, which is the basis for the Convention's authority and effectiveness.	S 13/8 AM
Switzerland	The CBM mechanism provides useful information concerning compliance with, and implementation of, the BWC and, in doing so, a level of reassurances by those States Parties that provide these reports. The quality and scope of the information provided in annual returns play an important role in effectively fostering transparency and confidence. Such information is also essential to identify areas of need for the targeted provision of implementation assistance. At the moment, however, the utility of the CBMs as a means to reinforce implementation, confidence and transparency is undermined by the limited level of meaningful participation.	S 13/8 AM
India	We see CBMs as a tool for building transparency, trust and confidence among States Parties in the implementation of the Convention. We believe that it would not be productive to reopen the debates of the Review Conference regarding the role of the CBMs in the BWC regime. CBMs are not declarations and cannot be a tool to assess compliance, for which the only method is a legally binding mechanism with verification provisions.	S 13/8 AM
United States of America	[...] continue to encourage States Parties to make their CBM returns publicly available on the ISU website.	S 13/8 PM
United States of America	[...] Parties should use the opportunities of the Eighth Review Conference to remedy this problem [of low submissions of CBMs], and we plan to offer proposals on this topic as well.	S 13/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	With regards to the BENELUX paper, the UK believes this shows the possibility of multiplicity of approaches to Confidence Building Measures. There are different ways of demonstrating how one is going about fulfilling the obligations of the Convention.	S 13/8 PM
Burundi	<p>1. To avoid breaking the ongoing process and ensuring better continuity of inclusive activities for all stakeholders, the delegation of Burundi proposes that the solidarity of the international community provide the necessary financial resources to States in need and that have requested them. This proposal was previously voiced by the delegation of Ghana, which noted the very low representation of the African continent;</p> <p>2. The delegation of Burundi further proposed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To increase exchanges of experiences and good practices; - Development of the national resources of States Parties and of countries in need, that have made a request; - The construction of infrastructure and the provision of equipment necessary for the optimal implementation of the Convention, as emphasized by several delegations of the NAM. 	S 13/8 AM
Netherlands	Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg wish to contribute to the debate on the value of the peer review concept and have decided to jointly organize a peer review pilot exercise. By conducting the exercise, the Benelux countries aim to improve the national implementation of the Convention while also contributing to build confidence between States Parties.	S 13/8 PM
Netherlands	CBMs represent a unique instrument to help increase mutual trust and generate transparency. It is for this reason that the Benelux countries have decided to give the CBMs a role in the peer review exercise. National experts from the three countries will consult on the basis of each other's annual CBMs by means of questions and answers.	S 13/8 PM

3. Regional and sub-regional cooperation that can assist national implementation of the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Kenya	We appreciate the support from the two States Parties [Denmark and USA] and wish to encourage more such collaboration initiatives, particularly at a regional level, since biosafety and biosecurity issues cut across borders. Kenya therefore looks forward to the strengthening of a global, systematic and long-term approach to the provision of cooperate and assistance. States Parties providing or receiving assistance should target to work across sectors within governments to identify, harmonize and address logistical, legal and regulatory barriers. We also look forward to the development of a global legislative and regulatory environment that facilitates exchange and sharing of information on international assistance.	S 11/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Burundi	Our delegation echoes the wish to promote regional cooperation as proposed by other delegations through improved methods that facilitate the effective implementation of the Convention at the national level. We have given illustrations as regards the work on Ebola in East-African countries and information exchanges. Cooperation is essential to combat terrorism in the sub-region and other mechanisms are being established in other parts of the world, as well as the necessary measures to promote biosecurity and biosafety.	S 13/8 AM

4. National, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and security of pathogens and toxins

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Italy, Panama and Spain	[...] in order to improve the implementation and compliance [...] at the domestic level, it would be desirable to establish a regime that seeks the best custody of biological agents and their vectors (biosecurity). A broad concept of national security should take into account biosecurity aspects of facilities that handle biological agents. Both biological agents and related equipment and materials, and the premises' inside and outside, should be subject to the appropriate physical protection, the main objective would be to prevent these facilities, agents, equipment or materials to be subject to sabotage, theft or diversion for abuse.	WP.17
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Italy, Panama and Spain	The biosecurity measures directed at the prevention of illicit acts should be designed to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dissuade these acts; - Detect and impede access that is not authorised or the loss or theft of materials and biological agents; - Rapidly evaluate the events that could have suggested an irregular situation and/or the disruption of the biosecurity measures in the facility and in handling the materials and biological agents in order to permit a swift reaction to mitigate the corresponding effects; - Make a provision of the elements that may allow a swift response in the event of a disruption of the biosecurity measures. 	WP.17
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Italy, Panama and Spain	Biological and toxin agents and associated material of dual use must be subject to export control and therefore correctly inventoried. Mechanisms will be established which will permit the ACBC exerting tutelage and control over tangible and intangible transfers of technology without depleting a desirable scientific and technological development. A mechanism will be established which would permit ACBC to supervise the potential dual use of advances in scientific and technological research to impede a possible use of illicit intentions.	WP.17
Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Italy, Panama and Spain	The biological facilities should have a biosecurity system guaranteeing the existence of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Protection elements which would dissuade a possible attacker from materialising the threats against the facility; 	WP.17

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>(b) All the necessary organisational, human, technical and material means which are compatible with the normal development of the facility operation, to counter the threat;</p> <p>(c) The personnel, technical means or a combination of both, which serve to quickly detect any attempt of intrusion in the facility's security areas, and moreover evaluate the conditions, circumstances and capacities with which the attempted intrusion is happening;</p> <p>(d) Physical barriers and repeated access controls that would delay the entrance of unauthorised persons and vehicles to protected areas preventing accessibility to vital zones or where the materials or biological agents are stockpiled until the State Security Forces arrive;</p> <p>(e) A supervision service with personnel duly accredited, trained, equipped and structured hierarchically with sufficient and proportioned capacity to prevent the materialisation of the threat until the State Security Forces arrive;</p> <p>(f) The means and procedures necessary to guarantee that information can be communicated and interchanged with the State Security Forces adequately to coordinate response actions;</p> <p>(g) A Personnel Record at the facility as well as any external personnel who, due to the functions they perform, need to have access to areas of the facility or to sensitive information as regards biosecurity, hence the person responsible for the facility is obliged to maintain it updated and to inform the ACBC beforehand of any inscription or withdrawal in the Personnel Record, so that the necessary verifications can be made as regards the objectives of biosecurity of the materials or biological agents and the facility. The personnel who appear in the Personnel Record must be accredited by the competent authority as regards national security;</p> <p>(h) Contingency and emergency plans to respond to the unauthorised withdrawal or sabotage of materials or biological agents in biological facilities;</p> <p>(i) Means of protection and compliance to confidentiality criteria of all information related to the biosecurity of the materials or biological agents and of the facility;</p> <p>(j) Indicators that may assure the establishment of adequate physical security in the facility;</p> <p>(k) The establishment and application of an education programme and continued training of the staff organising the biosecurity of the facility;</p> <p>(l) Explicit authorisation from the ACBC, who sanctions that the biosecurity measures put into effect by the facility are adequate.</p>	
Indonesia, Malaysia, Netherlands and United States of	We would welcome other States Parties in a position to do so to offer presentations about their current or future national measures to address dual use research. We encourage States Parties to express their views about the risks and benefits of dual use research, even if their governments have not yet	WP.19

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
America	undertaken national measures. We believe it is important that States Parties share their ideas about how best to manage dual use risks, whether those ideas will be implemented or not. [...] We suggest comprehensive examination of appropriate oversight criteria, of optimal methods to assess risks and benefits, and of optimal approaches to mitigating identified risks at BWC meetings.	
Indonesia, Malaysia, Netherlands and United States of America	The BWC captures the need to prohibit use for hostile purposes (in Article I) while promoting peaceful uses (in Article X). The collective national measures of States Parties to implement this Convention represent the world's strongest efforts to prevent hostile uses of the life sciences. But we must turn our attention to preventing the misuse of life sciences research that is conducted for peaceful purposes with particular focus on the riskiest types of dual use research. Several States Parties across geographic regions have taken a variety of national measures to address the risks posed by dual use research in the life sciences.	WP.19
China	It is necessary to adhere to a biosafety and security concept featuring balance, cooperation, mutual assistance and equity, and to earnestly strengthen the effectiveness and authority of the Convention so as to create a community of common destiny for global biosafety and security.	S 10/8 AM
China	The continuous development of biological science and technology has raised the requirement for the supervising and monitoring of biosafety and security. States Parties (should) improve their capacity building for biosafety and security according to their specific situations, to raise their level of management and transparency for dual-use bioscience and technology research, to establish risk assessment and early warning systems for the misuse of bioscience and technology, and to raise awareness of research personnel concerning biosafety and security.	S 10/8 AM
European Union	In supporting improvements in biosafety and biosecurity around the globe: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Through the expertise of WHO, supporting projects aimed at promoting biorisk awareness, laboratory biorisk management; - Developing Centres of Excellence, mobilising resources to develop coherent and adequate CBRN policies; - Current projects are focused at knowledge management, strengthening laboratory procedures, development of laboratory ISO-bank system, creation of an international network of universities and institutes to raise awareness on the dual-use dimension of biotechnology. <p>The Global Partnership, as well as initiatives such as the Global Health Security Agenda, are helpful in addressing and improving global response to health security threats.</p>	S 10/8 AM
Netherlands	Malaysia, Indonesia, The Netherlands and the United States participated this afternoon in a side event to present our national measures and to foster discussion of how States Parties can best manage these risks while preserving the benefits of peaceful use. The impetus was to stimulate discussion about measures already in place and ideas for the	S 12/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	future efforts in this area.	
Malaysia	[...] We have found that it is important for there to be an approach of the state promoting guidelines, while at the same time continue fostering education, outreach and awareness amongst the biosecurity and biosafety community.	S 13/8 AM
France	Microorganisms and Toxins (MOT), bases of the system: - The authorization is given with certain conditions and can contain special conditions; - The authorization is given with a maximum duration of 5 years renewable on demand; - The authorization cannot be transferred to someone else.	P 13/8 PM
France	Different kinds of authorizations: - Detention authorization; - use authorization; - Authorization of acquisition/transfer/transport/multi-transfer; - Authorization of import/export.	P 13/8 PM
France	Three goals of regulation: - Allow the safety (biosafety and biosecurity) use of MOT on known sites; - Identify the people that hold, use and exchange MOT or whom have the potential to analyze MOT in samples; - Ensure the traceability of exchanges of MOT's and of the responsibility of holders.	P 13/8 PM
Netherlands	To further strengthen the implementation of the BTWC in the Netherlands, we have been implementing a coordinated biosecurity regime. The biosecurity regime seeks to foster expertise on biosecurity in a variety of ways. In the framework of Article VII and Article X we consider the outreach activities of the Netherlands Biosecurity Office as an appropriate and useful tool, which might serve as an example to other States Parties.	S 13/8 PM
Netherlands	The Dutch biosecurity regime works bottom-up rather than top down. Within this approach, each stakeholder has its own responsibility, which involves awareness, education, and risk management in the field of biosecurity, biosafety and non-proliferation. The role of the government is to stimulate and facilitate. [...] The Biosecurity Office also developed an informative biosecurity film in which all the biosecurity pillars are addressed in a comprehensive way. The film is available on the website of the Biosecurity Office and is useful for anyone that are directly or indirectly involved in handling dangerous pathogens and high risk biological material.	S 13/8 PM
University of Bradford	- Biosecurity Education is essential to improve laboratory biosafety and security of pathogens and toxins; - States Parties should create an international mechanism for funding and coordination of biosecurity education and	P 13/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>awareness-raising activities;</p> <p>- States Parties should promote the establishment of regional institutes for delivery of biosecurity education and training at different levels;</p> <p>- States Parties should implement plans to move from the present deficiency of biosecurity awareness to a situation in which there is a global biosecurity norm;</p> <p>- Such advances in biosecurity education will bring benefits to States Parties in both health and security.</p>	

5. Any potential further measures, as appropriate, relevant for implementation of the Convention

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Russian Federation and Belarus	Greater use should be made of subsidiary bodies established to enhance efficiency of work at meetings.	WP.3
Russian Federation and Belarus	If a delegation requests that its statement, presentation, etc be treated as an official document of a meeting, the Secretariat should process and issue it under official nomenclature. All documentation issued by the Secretariat under official nomenclature should also be uploaded on the BWC's website including, inter alia, Conference Room Papers.	WP.3
Russian Federation and Belarus	During sessions, textual proposals and official-series documents should normally be circulated by the Secretariat in all official languages of the BWC meetings. In some situations, if and when so required by genuine necessity, exceptions from this general rule might be made.	WP.3
Russian Federation and Belarus	All textual proposals and substantive amendments should clearly have an ownership of a delegation/delegations putting them forward and/or joining them as co-sponsors at a later stage. Unless consensus of all participants is ensured, proposals should be included in a draft in square brackets.	WP.3
Russian Federation and Belarus	All textual proposals put forward by delegations should be included in a clean/bracketed form in the rolling text under discussion. Delegations making proposals for substantive elements of the report should make effort to introduce and explain them so that their interlocutors become better positioned to consider them on their merits.	WP.3
Russian Federation and Belarus	Negotiations must be conducted transparently and inclusively by applying the same standard to all participants. Informal bilateral/multilateral consultations may certainly take place in parallel but they must not substitute a meeting's working process, interrupt or distract from normal proceedings. [...] No effort should be spared to negotiate in good faith a substantive outcome of a meeting and delegations may benefit from their disposition towards compromise.	WP.3
Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands	There is a growing need to create tools to enable States Parties to demonstrate their compliance.	WP.13

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands	CBMs represent a unique instrument to help increase mutual trust and generate transparency. It is for this reason that the Benelux countries have decided to give the CBMs a role in the peer review exercise. They will form the basis of the respective national implementation evaluation.	WP.13
Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands	<p>The BENELUX BTWC Peer Review pursues several concrete objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - By mutually reviewing elements of national implementation by qualified experts and sharing best practices, the Benelux countries can further improve their national implementation; - The exercise will raise awareness about the BTWC with national stakeholders and incentivizing their willingness to participate in related interagency efforts; - The Benelux countries envisage to contribute their experiences with declarations, consultations and on-site visits for consideration at the 8th BTWC Review Conference in 2016; - The peer review allows feedback on CBMs and increases their role as declaration tool within the Convention. Also, the increased transparency generated by the peer review will strengthen the mutual confidence regarding implementation of the BTWC between the Benelux countries; - The peer review helps to maintain the otherwise moderately institutionalized Convention as a living instrument and allows to explore ways to increase international cooperation. 	WP.13
Russian Federation	<p>[...] an Open-ended Working Group open to all States Parties sharing its objective. The objective of this Open-ended Working Group shall be to elaborate on a basis of consensus appropriate measures and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. In this context the Open-ended Working Group shall consider the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the incorporation of existing and potentially further enhanced confidence building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime; - measures to promote national implementation of the Convention; - measures for monitoring developments in areas of science and technology relevant to the Convention; - measures for strengthening international co-operation for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article X of the Convention; - procedures and mechanisms for assistance and protection against biological weapons in accordance with Article VII of the Convention; - mechanism for investigating alleged use of biological weapons (to be initiated by the affected State and conducted on its territory) pursuant to Article VI of the Convention. <p>Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner</p>	WP.14

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>designed to avoid any negative impact on scientific research, international co-operation and industrial development.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the first session of the Open-ended Working Group should be held in Geneva from [...] 2017; - The session will be devoted to procedural matters and will decide the Group's methods of work, including the adoption, by consensus, of its Rules of Procedure. The Group will hold additional sessions as appropriate; - It will complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States Parties, to be considered at the Special Conference or the Ninth Review Conference; - The Group will be chaired by its Chairman who will be assisted by two Vice-Chairs, to be elected by the Group; - the Convention's Secretariat (the Implementation Support Unit) to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the convening and activities of the Open-ended Working Group. 	
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Thailand	<p>Reassurance that all BWC provisions are implemented effectively is important – not only those related to National Implementation. Such reassurance can be achieved by demonstrating a willingness to co-operate with other States Parties in resolving alleged breaches (Article V or VI), and to assist other States Parties in the event of a biological incident whether a natural outbreak, accidental release of biological agents, or a deliberate use of biological weapons (Article VII). Proposed initiatives worth further consideration include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - building an operational capability (i.e. through generating a list of experts) that could be called upon to assist in responding to a biological incident, in the absence of a full-time inspectorate; - extending the UN Secretary General's Special Mechanism to investigate suspected biological weapons facilities and allegations of use, drawing on experiences with the investigations of chemical weapon use in Syria. 	WP.16
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Thailand	<p>Reassurance would be further enhanced through greater transparency of BWC relevant activities undertaken by industry and academic and research institutions. This could include their support to domestic arrangements in States Parties' jurisdictions facilitating the fullest possible exchange of relevant equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, and for those States Parties in a position to do so, contribute to international cooperation in the life sciences for peaceful purposes (Article X).</p>	WP.16
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	<p>[...] highlighted that the BTWC forms a whole and that, although it is possible to consider certain aspects separately, it is critical to deal with all of the issues interrelated to this Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner.</p>	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	<p>The group re-emphasizes that multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding a non-discriminatory, legally binding agreement, dealing with all Articles of the Convention, in a</p>	S 10/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
(NAM)	balanced and comprehensive manner, would sustainably strengthen the Convention.	
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] the need to conclude a legally binding agreement on appropriate multilateral verification arrangements. In the past, useful work has been done in this regard under the BWC in the Ad hoc Group and NAM continues to attach high importance to preserving and eventually resuming that work.	S 10/8 AM
Russian Federation	Established practice in the BWC has been ignored unfortunately. One of the reasons of the meager results at previous Review Conferences was that there was no fully fleshed preparatory process (in comparison with CWC or NPT). By December this year, we must consider how we might change the situation for the better.	S 10/8 AM
Netherlands	[...] Several States are currently trying to initiate a broader debate on compliance issues while confronted with a growing need to create new tools to enable States Parties to demonstrate their compliance. [...] the Netherlands attaches importance to an effective and substantial preparation process towards the 2016 RevCon. All stakeholders should be involved on discussion on the best way forward.	S 10/8 AM
Netherlands	[...] attaches importance to an effective and substantial preparation process towards the 2016 RevCon. All stakeholders should be involved on discussion on the best way forward. In order to be able to reach a positive and substantive outcome at the RevCon we suggested last year setting up informal open ended meetings with all interested States Parties to build further on efforts in areas where common understanding and consensus exists.	S 10/8 AM
Netherlands	[...] it is currently neither possible nor politically feasible to return to negotiations on a legally binding additional protocol to the BTWC. There is no consensus on how to take this forward. We are willing to work towards identifying options that could achieve similar goals.	S 10/8 AM
Netherlands	[...] The current intersessional process offers an opportunity to identify new approaches, to enhance national implementation through voluntary exchanges of information, such as the peer review mechanism. In the follow-up to the French peer-review, the Netherlands is conducting this year a BENELUX Peer review exercise, with Belgium and Luxembourg.	S 10/8 AM
United States of America	[...] these goals (transparency and confidence) can be best served through increased availability of information about national implementation and a more common understanding of what effective implementation involves. Another critical aspect of implementation is effective bio-risk management.	S 10/8 AM
China	Investigation of alleged use of biological weapons is a complex and sensitive matter and should be handled in strict accordance with the relevant provisions, namely, States Parties may lodge a complaint under Article VI with the Security Council, which should in turn decide upon and preside over any possible investigation.	S 10/8 AM
China	States parties must remain vigilant to the threats posed by conventional biological weapons, and enhance the	S 10/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	cooperation between the Convention and the 1540 Committee and other relevant mechanisms, in order to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and bio-terrorism.	
Australia	With a view towards making progress in the lead up to next year's RevCon, BWC States Parties have the opportunity now to cooperate, in the ISP and in preparations for the 8th RevCon in 2016, to advance the cause of building a safer world free of the threat of biological weapons. Initiatives that are cross-regional, spanning various groups, and achieving broad ranging support in key issues such as national implementation, are a positive step forwards.	S 10/8 AM
Brazil	We are convinced that the effectiveness of the BWC could be greatly enhanced through the adoption of a universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding verification mechanism.	S 10/8 AM
Brazil	Oversight of life sciences research is not an effective measure to pursue if we are to determine whether the provisions of the BWC are being complied with. In order to rise up to that challenge, we must start addressing options to settle pending issues of the Convention, in particular the need to resume negotiations of a verification Protocol.	S 10/8 AM
Brazil	Brazil supports the establishment of an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, which would contribute not only to restore the credibility of the BWC, but also to foster international cooperation in the life sciences and related fields.	S 10/8 AM
Italy	With the 8th Review Conference of the BWC fast approaching, we - like others - would support the establishment of a transparent and inclusive preparatory process aimed at consolidating common understandings on the proposals to strengthen the convention that have emerged from the intersessional meetings. These will form the basis of the road map that the RevCon will have to outline for the next intersessional cycle.	S 10/8 AM
India	[...] India shares the widespread interest amongst States Parties to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention through the negotiation and conclusion of a Protocol for that purpose covering all provisions of the Convention. [...] We believe that only a multilaterally agreed mechanism for verification of compliance can provide the assurance of compliance by States Parties of obligations under the Convention and act as a deterrent against non-compliance.	S 10/8 AM
Cuba	[...] it is necessary to have a legally binding multilateral protocol, that strengthens in a balanced and comprehensive way the Convention and its basic principles, notably that of assistance and cooperation. The previous Meeting of Experts that took place from the 1st to the 5th of December also demonstrated the necessity of improving the working methods.	S 10/8 AM
Ukraine	Ukraine has several times proposed that, at the Eighth Review Conference in 2016, State Parties should consider creating an Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) of experts. Such OEWG of experts should be set up in close cooperation with	S 11/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	the ISU to consider appropriate steps to enhance the regime and report annually on the implications for the BWC. Other State Parties have expressed support for such an approach.	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Global Health Security Agenda Pilot assessment: its nature and objective were not far removed from the way in which the French BTWC peer review concept has been developed, applied and reported by France. The essential aim is to see how states are performing in key areas – assess capabilities and identify areas for self-improvement.	S 13/8 AM
Cameroon	In view of the upsurge of terrorists acts in the world, and especially in Africa, any State should anticipate the possibility of biological or bacteriological attacks with tragic consequences on civilians and the environment.	S 13/8 AM
China	China has a positive evaluation towards the recommendation of Russia to relaunch the negotiation on the protocol. China is of the view and is always of the view that to reach a protocol including verifications of through negotiations is the best compliance mechanism under the Convention.	S 13/8 AM
Switzerland	The Convention is in need of stronger mechanisms for resolving concerns about its implementation and about States Parties' compliance with its provisions. The 8th Review Conference will provide the opportunity to address this question in its many aspects. It will be important to explore the different options in this area ahead of the Review Conference so that it is in a position to make the necessary decision.	S 13/8 AM
Switzerland	Many of the necessary steps to strengthen the Convention can be achieved through the application of existing BWC procedures as well as through voluntary or politically-binding approaches and the demonstration of goodwill. [...] It is important to strengthen the CBMs and other transparency measures, improve the BWC's science and technology review process, and to pursue exploratory approaches, such as the compliance assessment initiative or the peer-review mechanism.	S 13/8 AM
India	[...] only a multilateral legally binding mechanism for verification of compliance can provide the assurance of observation of compliance obligations by States Parties and act as a non-discriminatory, balanced and objective deterrent against non-compliance. A great deal of work has been done on the Convention in this regard in the past, and it should be seen how that work could be revived. The success of the CWC reminds us of the value of a legally binding verification protocol to strengthen the BWC.	S 13/8 AM
India	The peer review concept is only at a nascent stage and it would be difficult to draw any definitive conclusions on its utility.	S 13/8 AM
India	We believe that some of the ideas put forward as steps for assurance of compliance are half-measures that may serve to distract us from the objective supported by an overwhelming number of States Parties to the BWC – that of a Protocol to strengthen the Convention and improve its effectiveness.	S 13/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Cuba	The initiatives that were presented as tools to reinforce the national implementation of the Convention do not enjoy consensus and are more focused on the evaluation of compliance, a topic that is not part of the agenda items of this meeting. The only acceptable method to evaluate compliance to the Convention would be a legally binding protocol with verification provisions.	S 13/8 AM
United States of America	Initiatives by groups of Parties, such as on peer review and compliance assessment, and through voluntary visits to relevant facilities, as well as activities held on a regional basis for the purpose of strengthening implementation by participants, also enhance transparency.	S 13/8 AM
United States of America	Some seem to view a legally-binding protocol as a universal cure for whatever ails the BWC. Such an all-or-nothing exercise, where nothing is agreed until everything agreed, is a recipe for deadlock, frustration, and delay.	S 13/8 AM
France	We are convinced that [peer review] is pertinent for the following reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It would allow a better understanding of measures implemented by the hosting country; - It would contribute in enhancing the level of confidence between States Parties, through increased transparency; - It would allow exchange of information and share of good practice; - It would allow promotion of the development of international cooperation through the networking of experts from various States Parties; - It is an opportunity to commit national actors in the field of biological sciences, around the objectives of the Convention; - The concept is flexible and respects the sovereignty of States, as the hosting country decides which State Party to invite and which topic to highlight. 	S 13/8 AM
Netherlands	There is a growing need to create tools to enable States Parties to demonstrate their compliance. [...] The Benelux peer review will cover the following aspects of national implementation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National biological defense research and development programs and research centers and laboratories (as declared in Form A of the CBM); - National legislation, regulations and other measures related to BTWC-implementation (as declared in Form E of the CBM) with particular focus on national oversight of biosafety/biosecurity. 	S 13/8 PM
UNSCR 1540 Committee	The more knowledgeable points of contacts are [...] the better able they will be able to facilitate effective implementation. [...] A training programme may benefit especially points of contact that have been newly appointed and have particular value because officials identified as points of contact frequently rotate.	P 13/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
OIE	In support of the FAO-OIE rinderpest post-eradication activities, Resolution No. 25 was adopted at the 83rd General Session in May 2015 which designated five laboratories as rinderpest virus holding facilities or rinderpest vaccine holding facilities. These facilities will undergo re-evaluation every three years. The OIE resolution can be found at http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About_us/docs/pdf/Session/A_RESO_2015_public.pdf#page40	P 13/8 PM
VERTIC	States should designate a national point of contact or a “national champion” who is responsible for the implementation process.	S 13/8 PM
VERTIC	[...] a comprehensive analysis of a State’s existing legal framework to implement the BWC is useful for identifying the obligations that are already covered and the gaps that remain to be filled. [...] A national policy for the legislative implementation process is key: States may choose to implement the Convention through a stand-alone BWC law or an omnibus CBRN or weapons of mass destruction law, or through several relevant laws and regulations.	S 13/8 PM
VERTIC	[...] awareness-raising with parliamentarians is often important to ensure that submission of the bill is received with appropriate attention and understanding and so that its adoption will be more certain.	S 13/8 PM

Agenda item 8:

How to strengthen implementation of Article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States Parties

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The proposed South African guidelines for States Parties requesting Article VII assistance, up-dated and expanded, should be adopted now as an interim measure.	WP.1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Looking to the period beyond the Eighth Review Conference, we should be placing Article VII as a central element for further discussions.	WP.1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	An unprecedented international (and national) response was required to contain the recent outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). Had such an outbreak been the result of a deliberate release of a biological agent, the response measures to contain and mitigate the effects and the requirements for future defences and responses may not have looked very much different. It is essential for any future comparable outbreaks to prepare for a rapid response with clear lines of command, control, communication and coordination.	WP.1

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] we must also consider some potential differences in a scenario of deliberate release of a biological agent, where the medical, veterinary, phytosanitary and humanitarian response may have to operate in a potentially hostile environment and/or alongside a subsequent national or international investigation of the incident with a need to collect and preserve forensic evidence. There is some relevant experience here from OPCW exercises held under Article X of the CWC as well as at national level.	WP.1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The response to the West African EDV outbreak required in the end a massive national and international effort with the UN obliged to take a leading coordinating role - UNMEER; we think that a response to an outbreak that was the result of a deliberate release and on a comparable scale would very likely require the same level of reaction that we have seen in West Africa.	WP.1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Since it may not be evident initially (or indeed for some considerable time afterwards) that an outbreak was the result of a deliberate release, it is very likely that the response will be driven in the first instance by humanitarian considerations and by factors other than a need to invoke Article VII. It is highly unlikely that any event of this sort could be addressed solely within the context of the BTWC.	WP.1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	In view of the efforts going into the lessons learned process for WHO post EDV, it seems clear that there is no need to create a duplicate capability purely for Article VII. Requests for assistance under Article VII would in all probability be redirected to UN Member States and the relevant international governmental and non-governmental organisations that are organised, resourced, equipped and trained to deal with outbreaks of infectious disease.	WP.1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The following questions need to be considered in any discussion on operationalisation of Article VII: (a) If a BTWC State Party wished to seek assistance under Article VII, how would it do so? The South African Working Paper submitted in 2014 contained helpful suggested guidelines for requesting assistance [...] Would such a format be best submitted to the ISU instead of the UNSG (or should it be done in parallel) for onward transmission to all States Parties and relevant international organisations and NGOs? (b) What additional resources would the ISU require to enable it to perform an effective clearing-house role for Article VII assistance requests? What is a realistic role for the ISU? (c) How would assistance efforts be coordinated with an on-going or subsequently launched investigation into an allegation of use under Article VI of the Convention, under the UNSGM or by domestic law enforcement agencies? How would the humanitarian and investigative efforts be harmonised? (d) In future, which agency or entity should take the leading role? What machinery could be put in place ahead of time to take into account all the likely requirements? What is the role and nature of partnerships (cross-disciplinary and at state and	WP.1

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	IGO/NGO level) in this context?	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] further detailed deliberation on Article VII should be a central topic with sufficient time allocated to it in a future revised intersessional work programme.	WP.1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A resilient health system to stop natural occurring outbreaks of infectious disease has the same attributes needed to prevent, detect and respond to the deliberate use of a biological agent.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	We conclude that the BTWC should not look to duplicate mechanisms that are better managed by other organizations, but that their development should be seen as contributions to and consistent with commitments under Article VII and X.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] the need to address fully the command, control and coordination of multi-agency assets during an initial response and as the mitigation operation progresses.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Command and control- the organization, management, and tasking of the response especially in the initial stages when first responders arrive on the scene and are trying to determine the nature and scale of the problem, is thus a critical capability in ensuring early identification of the nature of the hazards and of the measures required to save lives.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Executing effective command and control under stressful conditions, especially in conditions where information is either lacking or is incomplete, requires that assistance teams have a special set of skills and considerable experience and capabilities.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] the need for effective rapid first responses for future outbreaks of the disease that may constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. This is needed to prevent transmission rates escalating, when the tasks of containing the effects become much more of a challenge and cost more lives and social and economic disruption. Command, control and coordination of a multiagency response (national, international governmental, other states, aid and charity organisations) from the outset are thus essential.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A need for rapid response teams: - It is critical to ensure we have a rapid and responsive deployment workforce- by the establishment of a rapid response team within WHO that is properly resourced, trained and equipped to deploy immediately at the first signs of an outbreak that, if left to its own devices, could quickly spiral out of control with massive loss of life, social and economic damage. [...] . In the case of infectious diseases such as Ebola, it is essential to identify cases early and isolate them quickly, so that an epidemic can be controlled in a relatively short period of time. Comparable capabilities would also be required in the OIE and FAO given the importance of the ‘One Health Concept’; - It is essential that the WHO has the means and mandate to	WP.2

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>move quickly to put in place resources, skills and capabilities to tackle future outbreaks and emergencies;</p> <p>The Ebola response also highlights the importance of social anthropological understanding of cultural norms to ensure rapid engagement with local communities when international response teams arrive on the scene.</p>	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	There is a continuing requirement for a sustained focus on surveillance to detect outbreaks in the first place, followed by capacities for social mobilisation, scaled-up contact tracing (especially on tackling cross-border transmission) and case investigation should they occur.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	There needs to be a greater focus on information sharing (currently combined with enhancing regional preparedness), focussing on strengthening mechanisms to share disease surveillance information and analysis, including data gathering for vulnerable and high-risk populations, such as migrants or communities living in disputed areas or conflict.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Effective command, control and communications functions at district level need to be responsive to local flare ups of disease.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Support is required for capacity development to augment prevention, preparedness and response in case of outbreaks and other biosecurity relevant events, including supporting the implementation of the International Health Regulations core capacities and the Global Health Security Agenda action package targets.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	There is a need for more emphasis on multi-sectoral co-operation in a crisis caused by outbreaks of infectious disease – effective responses are not just down to the public health sector. The ‘One Health’ concept is especially important in this context; this concept is based on an awareness of the major opportunities that exist to protect public health through policies to prevent and control pathogens at the level of animal populations, at the interface between humans, animals and the environment.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The WHO leadership statement on the Ebola response and WHO reforms called upon world leaders to invest in research and development for the neglected diseases with outbreak potential, particularly on diagnostics, drugs and vaccines. This would require innovative financing mechanism and public-private partnerships. There is also a need to clarify the regulatory pathways for developing new tools and approaches in the context of such outbreaks.	WP.2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	To be effective, responses have to be immediate as the West African experience has shown; and for that reason the statement made by the Seventh Review Conference that, should a request for assistance under Article VII be made, it be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided remains all the more valid. It is thus essential in preparing for any comparable future outbreaks that the response needs to be rapid and with a single controlling mind for coordination as a cardinal principle for effective command and control. In the	WP.2

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	United Kingdom view, the coordination is best located with the WHO (or OIE and FAO when dealing with major outbreaks of animal and plant disease). We should not attempt to create a parallel structure purely in the context of Article VII of the BTWC.	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] our collective aim must be to build capacities to prevent and detect outbreaks of infectious disease; and, should they occur, ensure that we are in position to respond rapidly to contain any such outbreak thereby preventing further adverse humanitarian, societal and economic impacts. States must build an integrated response capability at the national and international level working with the relevant international entities such as the WHO. This offers a practical way of giving effect to the aspirations in Articles VII and X.	WP.2
France and India	The implementation of Article VII is recognized as a key obligation under the Convention. However as acknowledged by previous outcome documents and discussions in the BWC, there is a lack of detailed procedures or mechanisms for its implementation. Thus there is need to set up an effective way to facilitate provision of assistance to ensure timely and adequate response to a situation involving the implementation of the provisions of Article VII. It is also essential to underline the concrete benefits of accession to the Convention.	WP.7
France and India	It is widely recognized that international assistance should be considered in case of a biological outbreak, but this assistance would not necessarily need to be channeled through the BWC, as the outbreak might not be due to a biological weapon. The provisions of Article VII refer to the specific situation in which the Security Council has decided that a State party has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention.	WP.7
France and India	It is proposed that the ISU establishes and administers a database open to all States Parties, for assistance under Article VII. [...]. It would respond to a specific need, which is fully relevant to the scope of the BWC, for developing effective measures for the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant international organizations to respond to the use of a biological or toxin weapon.	WP.7
France and India	The dedicated database could be established on the BWC website and maintained by the ISU, along the same lines as the database established for assistance under Article X, but separate from it. Its purpose would be to provide for a confidential clearing-house tool for assistance requests and offers. It would be easily searchable and accessible to States Parties and could provide both for national points of contact, able to promptly examine demands in accordance with domestic procedures and/or for specific offers for assistance. [...] The assistance offers could emanate from States parties, individually or together with other States, as well as relevant international organizations. The database could also include agreed procedures for States Parties to seek and receive assistance. This proposal would not require additional resources within the ISU as it would mainly rely on the information provided by States-parties. It could therefore be	WP.7

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	easily and quickly implemented. A voluntary fund could also be considered for assistance under Article VII.	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Rapid advances in the throughput, resolution, scalability and affordability of high-throughput sequencing (HTS) technologies have facilitated whole genome sequencing and the capability for epidemiological tracking in infectious disease outbreak investigations. [...] Real-time monitoring of viral evolution is crucial to determine if there is any impact on diagnostic and therapeutic targets, and to help in investigation of the source and transmission of the virus.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Advances in nanopore sequencing have resulted in a promising technology for application in the field. [...] a portable, palm-sized gene sequencer that plugs into a laptop via a USB and can read long sequences in rapid timescales, is capable of performing at the front lines of an infectious disease outbreak investigation.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The challenges of providing effective, reliable and rapid diagnostic capabilities during the EVD outbreak underlined the need for developments in rapid diagnostics, including point-of-care tests. A number of immunoassay test kits [...] have been found to perform well in an operational setting, with minimal training and providing results in 15-20 minutes.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Recent developments in PCR systems show potential to improve performance for field applications, for example, mobility in vehicles, push-button operation by locally trained technicians, and electronic real-time reporting in less than 90 minutes. Such features [...] could enable more rapid and effective responses to contain future outbreaks.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Progress in the response to the EVD outbreak was hampered by the lack of vaccines and therapeutics to protect against and treat the disease. This has resulted in a surge in research and fast-tracked design and evaluation processes. [...] development of vaccines that can be designed, constructed and produced rapidly in response to an emerging threat, or that can be produced without biological containment and in geographically dispersed facilities, could significantly enhance the capability for provision of effective, lower cost, rapidly manufactured and widely accessible vaccines. Advances that avoid the need for cold chain handling and for administration by trained personnel reduce costs and logistical burden, and help get effective vaccines to where they are needed most.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The rapid evolution of the EVD outbreak underlined the need to expedite the necessary regulatory and ethical approvals for novel therapeutics and vaccines in such circumstances. This has included collaboration with the countries concerned to devise accelerated processes such as joint reviews and real-time information exchange, as well as logistical and technical support to operationalise clinical trials.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Several therapeutic approaches are under consideration [...] ZMapp, the experimental monoclonal antibody therapy produced in transgenic tobacco plants; [...] short interfering RNAs encapsulated in lipid nanoparticles. [...] potential as a treatment that might be rapidly adapted during an outbreak to	WP.9

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	address changes in viral strains; [...] a small class of molecules called diazachrysenes have been found to exhibit potent antiviral activity.	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] repurposing approved drugs for emerging infections is a critical resource for potential anti-viral therapies. [...] has the advantage that their safety in humans has been established, they have proven manufacturing and feasibility, and supplies may be readily available in the event of an outbreak.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The provision of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information, including portable biocontainment systems and genomic surveillance facilities, has allowed the development of in-country capabilities for the analysis of infected samples and the provision of novel therapies for the care of EVD patients. If adequately sustained, such capabilities, along with access to expertise in-country, could improve the response to future outbreaks of EVD or other infectious diseases.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] it is essential to ensure that data is readily accessible to the relevant communities to allow its optimum exploitation in outbreak responses. Modern technologies such as rapid sequencing, combined with new ways to collect clinical and epidemiological data, could transform the response to outbreaks. However, this requires the means to share the potentially vast quantities of data generated as widely and rapidly as possible, which may require the development of appropriate guidelines and safeguards. [...] Real-time genomic sequencing and analysis shared rapidly with research teams around the world may provide insight into the origin of the outbreak and also track the evolution of the virus over time to inform the development of diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	The call for investment in research and development on diagnostics, drugs and vaccines, and any benefits resulting from work in this area will have positive implications also for assistance under Article VII.	WP.9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	[...] it will be essential also to take account of regulatory and ethical issues.	WP.9
South Africa	Principle. Due to the humanitarian objective of this article the provision of assistance should not be subjected to an investigation of alleged use, while it is accepted that an investigation of alleged use should follow the provision of assistance. Time will be of essence in the provision of assistance and since it will already be subjected to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval, there is no need for an investigation to confirm the need for assistance. Furthermore, an investigation of alleged use may take so long that the assistance will be too late when finally approved.	WP.10
South Africa	Guidelines. The information provided to the UNSC with the request for assistance will play a crucial role in helping the UNSC to come to a speedy decision. The requesting process followed to apply for assistance as well as the information provided to support the application is the prerogative of the	WP.10

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>State Party requiring the assistance. The following information could be useful for such an application:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Name of the State Party; - National Point of Contact of State Party; - Date and place of the first reported case. If there was a related event, a description of the event. To the extent possible, the date and time, when the alleged event(s) took place and/or became apparent to the requesting State Party and, if possible, the duration of the alleged event(s); - Severity of the event. Number of cases and the number of fatalities, if any; - Symptoms and signs – diagnosis if possible. Information on the initial treatment and the preliminary results of the treatment of the disease; - A description of the area involved; - All available epidemiological information; - Actions taken to manage the outbreak; - International organisations already involved in providing assistance; - States already involved in providing assistance; - Indications of why the outbreak is considered to be the result of a biological attack; - Characteristics of the agent involved, if available; - Types and scope of assistance required; - Indication of any investigations conducted or being conducted; - Contact details for coordination of assistance if different from National Point of Contact; - Licensing requirements for health care personnel and measures to address such requirements. 	
South Africa	<p>COMMAND AND CONTROL</p> <p>Principle. The State Party remains primarily responsible for the health care of its population and, hence it should be in overall control of all response activities.</p> <p>Guideline on Levels of Response. The level of response will depend on the nature of the disease, the geographical area where the outbreak occurred, the status of the public health system of the State and the potential of international effects. Generally it can be accepted that the health systems (human, veterinary and plant) of the State will always be the first line of response. Responses from neighboring states, regional and international actors will be determined by the factors listed above. International organizations particularly the WHO and OIE will become involved at an early stage due to their presence and their involvement with States. In most cases assistance in accordance with Article VII will be additional to and following the assistance provided by international</p>	WP.10

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	organizations. The State may at any time request an international organization (WHO, OIE) or other state to assume command on its behalf.	
	Licensing of Medical Personnel. The requesting State Party should provide temporary licenses to health care personnel upon arrival if required.	
South Africa	LABORATORY SAMPLES	WP.10
	Guideline. The existing procedures for sample handling should be utilized during Article VII assistance. The State Party remains the owner of all samples collected during the provision of assistance.	
Cuba	While recognizing the contribution of the United Nations and specialized international organizations such as WHO, OIE and FAO on the capacity-building for disease surveillance, Cuba considers that the role of these organizations is in accordance with their respective mandates and do not replace the role of the Convention, nor can they interfere with its mandate.	WP.22
Cuba	States Parties should continue working to increase national capacities to respond to the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of diseases as a contribution to strengthening the international capacities.	WP.22
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	Providing and/or supporting timely assistance in accordance with Article VII is a legal obligation of States Parties. While noting that States Parties' national preparedness contributes to international capabilities for response, investigation and mitigation of outbreaks of disease, [...] this should not be imposed as a precondition for either provision or receipt of assistance. To this end, a detailed procedure and mechanism for a timely, effective and adequate response needs to be developed.	S 10/8 AM
United States of America	The world's experience with Ebola reminds us that these challenges (related to Article VII) are significant, as BWC Parties, we must consider how we would deal with the even horrific scenario of an outbreak caused intentionally.	S 10/8 AM
France	In the case of alleged use, it is essential to identify the origin of the occurrence, as well as putting into place as quick as possible necessary and relevant assistance measures.	S 10/8 AM
Pakistan	We note with regret, however, that unlike the CWC, the BWC has no equivalent mechanism to investigate alleged use. The absence of a dedicated verification mechanism for the BTWC, to ensure compliance with the Convention, also remains a source of concern. While the SG mechanism is the only existing tool for investigation after an actual "use" of biological and toxin weapons has occurred, the SG mechanism, however, does not substitute the need for a dedicated verification mechanism for the Convention.	S 10/8 AM
Italy	This debate [on Article VII] would greatly benefit from the lessons learned from the response to the Ebola outbreak of 2014.	S 10/8 AM
Italy	National preparedness contributes to international capabilities for response, investigation and mitigation of disease outbreaks, be they of natural, accidental or deliberate	S 10/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	character. Also, any response to the use of threats of use of biological and toxin weapons requires the effective implementation of the BWC at the national level.	
India	India views Article VII assistance as a legal responsibilities of States Parties, as laid out in the Convention and as agreed in previous Review Conference documents. An event relating to violation of the BWC is more than a public health emergency under the IHR (2005). While coordination and cooperation with relevant UN bodies such as the WHO, FAO, OIE etc. are important complementary measures, it is clear that the lack of comprehensive Protocol to strengthen implementation of all aspects of the BWC has created a gap in the international community's capacity to respond effectively and provide assistance to States Parties to the BWC. Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive Protocol, a separate database on Assistance under Article VII could be a first step in bridging this gap.	S 10/8 AM
India	Though there is nothing to suggest that [the Ebola virus disease outbreak] was an event of concern to the BWC, we believe it holds important lessons for the international community.	S 10/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] a detailed procedure and mechanism for a timely, effective and adequate response needs to be developed. In this context the following elements may, amongst others, be considered in the development of such a mechanism: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - preparing an inventory of the types of assistance that the States Parties could provide; - establishing a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons; - information on the kind of assistance that the States Parties could provide in response to a request for assistance; - providing the equipment related to that means of protection against the use of biological weapons to the requesting States Parties in particular to developing countries; - promoting capacity building through more active cooperation with relevant regional and sub-regional organizations that have mandates relevant to assistance and protection against biological weapons. Such cooperation could include joint exercises and training, including by the use of e-learning modules. 	S 14/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	NAM strongly reaffirms that national preparedness of State Parties and their prompt access to new methods and novel diagnostic technologies and equipment for detection and quick response to any possible biological attack or diseases outbreak play an important role in providing assistance to States Parties. The rapid pace of novel bio-threats against humans, animals and plants requires rapid responses and enhanced national capacity prior to any biological attack against the States Parties.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	The UN and other international organizations could play an important role in coordinating and mobilizing the required	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
(NAM)	support and assistance. In this respect, upon the request of the concerned State Party, the capacities and experiences of UN and relevant international organizations should be identified and used, within their mandates. To mitigate the consequences of the use of biological and toxin weapons, the national capacity of States Parties in particular developing countries, should also be developed and strengthened. [...] Towards this end, developed countries should assist developing States Parties through providing required technology and resources as well as sharing experiences, expertise and laboratory cooperation.	
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] timely assistance under Article VII is a legal obligation of the States Parties. While noting that States Parties' national preparedness contributes to international capabilities for response, investigation and mitigation of outbreaks of disease, NAM reaffirms that this should not be imposed as precondition for either provision or receipt of assistance.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	NAM believes that the lack of comprehensive Protocol to strengthen implementation of all aspects of the Convention has created a gap in the provision of prompt and effective assistance under Article VII to States Parties to the BWC.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of) (NAM)	[...] The main objective of [Article VII] is to provide assistance to the affected people and to minimize and contain the risks to the health, safety and security of others, in close collaboration with the State Party. However the best way to prevent such incidents is to ensure full compliance with the prohibition on the development, stockpiling and use of such weapons, including through the establishment of a compliance and verification mechanism under the Convention.	S 14/8 AM
Russian Federation	The existence of an effective mechanism to provide assistance to an affected State where there is use of biological weapons should facilitate a reduction in the contaminating effect of biological weapons and thus discourage the potential aggressor from developing biological warfare because of its ineffectiveness.	S 14/8 AM
Russian Federation	Providing assistance under Article VII is an independent obligation ensuing from the provisions of our Convention. The obligations under Article VII exist separately from those under Article X, which speaks of international cooperation to combat disease. On that basis, implementation of Article VII deserves a separate mechanism with its own independent, extremely great significance.	S 14/8 AM
Russian Federation	[...] we believe that the proposal by the Republic of South Africa of a list of information is a very useful one. This list of information that the effected State would send to the United Nations Security Council, together with its application for assistance. However, this useful proposal by South Africa does not remove from the agenda the question as to the criteria, principles and procedures that could guide the Security Council in taking decisions regarding the provision of assistance to States in danger as a result of a violation of our Convention. We take the view that application for assistance could be sent by the affected State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for urgent distribution to the	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	Security Council. Simultaneously, a copy of the application could usefully be sent to the depository of the Convention to inform the States Parties of the use of the provisions of Article VII. The Russian Federation bases itself on the fact that where the Security Council takes a decision to provide assistance, an appropriate Resolution should be adopted by the Security Council. Under that Resolution a special mission would need to be appointed with broad powers which would then deal with all of the issues connected with organizing and practically implementing the procedures for assistance to the effected State.	
India	We consider, like others, Article VII as a legal obligation of States Parties as clearly laid out in the Convention and as agreed in previous review conferences. Assurance of prompt emergency and humanitarian assistance to an affected State Party is one of the key pillars of the Convention and is essential to underline the concrete benefits of accession to the Convention and thus is relevant for its universality.	S 14/8 AM
India	We also believe that assistance should be broadly defined as coordination and delivery to States Parties requesting assistance including the following: detection equipment, including biosensors, alarm equipment, protective equipment, decontamination equipment, decontaminants for prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic medical measures and materials and associated equipment and exchange of information and technology regarding assistance.	S 14/8 AM
India	We could also look at the idea of a trust fund or a voluntary fund or even table-top exercises to improve coordination. There are a lot of possibilities: we are only giving these as examples. We could obviously look at fleshing them out and seeing how they could be incorporated into the context of cooperation under BWC.	S 14/8 AM
India	[...] we of course always benefit from the presence of NGOs, both in the academic field and the advocacy field and they are always welcome and they are represented in good measure here and they are part of this larger BWC community. The Ebola outbreak ensured that there were other NGOs who were active in the field and they did some very commendable work. We especially made reference to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Médecin Sans Frontières who were there during very difficult times when there was not enough international attention in Ebola in the affected countries.	S 14/8 AM
Canada	[...] note the importance given to strengthening States Parties' capacity building. Notably in the coordination of the different agencies involved in a response under Article VII and in the necessary coordination of international mechanisms, particularly the Secretary General's investigation mechanism. This mechanism is a tool at the disposal of our community of united states against the proliferation and the use of biological weapons, which allows the impartial verification of alleged use of biological weapons.	S 14/8 AM
Canada	Canada supports cooperation and coordination between States Parties to strengthen biodefense capacity in order to counter	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	potential violations of the Convention.	
Switzerland	The work undertaken last year concerning Article VII notably highlighted the importance of the existence of national response and assistance capacities. These constitute the first line of defense of any State in case of a disease outbreak, whether it is natural or related to the use of biological weapons. These are also essential because they contribute to the means of assistance if the international community has to come to the assistance of one of its members.	S 14/8 AM
Switzerland	Switzerland pays special attention to the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism and will organize a series of workshops about the necessary measures needed to create a network of designated laboratories that the Secretary-General could rely upon for the analysis of samples taken during an investigation.	S 14/8 AM
Switzerland	We also believe that a fund of voluntary contributions would enable us to dispose of resources in view of providing assistance to a State Party exposed to danger. Such a mechanism could receive contributions and be ready to be used in cases where assistance needs to be provided under Article VII. Finally, it would be useful to clearly define the role of the ISU in a mechanism of this nature.	S 14/8 AM
China	China maintains that the provisions of Article VII, clearly apply only to situations of violations of the Convention, for example when States Parties are exposed to an attack with biological weapons and provisions of assistance is based on the request from the State Party under threat. Assistance concerning ordinary biosafety incidents should not be discussed in the framework of the Convention, nor should it be linked with investigations concerning violations of the Convention.	S 14/8 AM
China	Investigations concerning violation of the Convention and determination of its nature should strictly follow the provisions of the Convention and should be decided upon the deliberations and presided over by the Security Council to ensure the objectivity and impartiality of the process and result.	S 14/8 AM
China	Concerning command and control on the issue of assistance, in our view, at the national level the States Parties should play the leading role.	S 14/8 AM
China	We call upon States Parties to actively implement the Article X to provide necessary assistance to the developing countries in capacity building for biosafety and biosecurity. At the international level, the assistance should proceed, within the framework of the Convention. The Convention should take the leading role.	S 14/8 AM
Pakistan	[...] the provision of assistance should not be conditional on the action or finding by the UN Security Council with respect to the investigation of alleged use. Assistance should be provided promptly on the basis of the request by the affected state. This requires a detailed procedure and mechanism for a timely, effective and adequate response in order to be prepared to cater to such requests.	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Pakistan	We note with regret, however, that unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BWC has no equivalent mechanism to investigate alleged use. Also, a legally binding verification mechanism to ensure compliance with BWC would go a long way in ensuring that Article VII is never invoked. Similarly, full, effective and non-discriminatory application of Article X will facilitate assistance and support to States Parties for rapid and timely surveillance, detection, containment, diagnosis, treatment and mitigation of diseases, whether occurring naturally or caused deliberately, thereby complementing Article VII.	S 14/8 AM
United States of America	A critical first step is the development, in all States Parties, of the public health, crisis management, and coordination capacities needed to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks and the other public health emergencies.	S 14/8 AM
United States of America	Putting in place the capabilities required by the International Health Regulations does not mean that further international assistance will not be required - but it means that an affected country will be positioned to identify a problem sooner, to better identify its needs and to better guide international assistance efforts.	S 14/8 AM
United States of America	It is also essential to support and strengthen the international response architecture for major disease outbreaks. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa has driven home the need for reforms, and underscored the importance of fast, effective, and coordinated action.	S 14/8 AM
United States of America	Action is also needed at the national level to address impediments to international response: as we have explained in the past working papers, States Parties should review their national laws, regulations and practices to ensure that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A workable mechanism for coordinating and managing offers of assistance is in place; - A process exists to mobilize and coordinate the provision of assistance to other countries; - Legal, regulatory, and logistical roadblocks that would prevent or delay the provision and distribution of medical countermeasures or the use of appropriately qualified foreign medical personnel have been identified and addressed. 	S 14/8 AM
United States of America	Efforts to strengthen Article VII, if they are to be effective, must be placed within the context of the wider international public health and humanitarian response system. We must work to strengthen national capacities and the overall system, and we must ensure that specific measures to implement Article VII are coordinated with and reinforce, rather than hamper, the rest of this system.	S 14/8 AM
United States of America	We welcome South Africa's proposals regarding suggested information to be provided to the UN Security Council and BWC States Parties in a request for assistance. Since speed is essential in outbreak response, helping countries to identify the information that would be most useful in ensuring a rapid determination and in identifying assistance needs seems to be a practical, common sense measure.	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Australia	[...] If we can build up global resilience, particularly in relation to more vulnerable economies, this would involve, by definition, an immediate strengthening of our global Article VII response mechanism.	S 14/8 AM
Australia	The UNSG mechanism is also a key element in relation to framing a response. In this respect, we commend the current efforts by states parties to promote the capacity of the UNSG Special Mechanism, including the provision of training sessions, and seminars to broaden awareness of the potential for the UNSG Special Mechanism to be called upon in the event of an international disease outbreak.	S 14/8 AM
Australia	[...] we should be cognizant of the important lessons arising from the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The need for a rapid response is critical, as well as the earliest provision of effective healthcare and vaccinations as possible, the sending in of qualified well equipped teams, implementation of relevant protocols, the siting of clinics and medical facilities, to name just a few. [...] it may be that the other actors, beyond the health sector, will need to be incorporated into any response planning, and this includes a critical role that military could play in many countries response.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Iran attaches great importance to the implementation of Article VII, in particular as being a victim of chemical weapons extensive use that has been a very bitter experience that we hope never ever would happen to other States Parties as a result of biological or chemical weapons use. In this connection we believe that Article VII requires reliable procedure for victim States to be able to request for assistance and there would be rapid response for the request that Article VII is lacking.	S 14/8 AM
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	The point that this delegation would like to emphasize is the importance of urgency of delivery of assistance to victim States. We should have to have a clear understanding on humanitarian assistance mobilization that should be structured on the basis of assistance of other international organizations. But, emergency assistance we feel is the responsibility of BWC States Parties community that we should work and take into consideration very carefully.	S 14/8 AM
Belarus	[...] the existing situation under our Convention demonstrates a crisis of the so-called institutional model of implementation of the Convention proposed following the blockage of the negotiations on a protocol. ... States Parties may no longer rely purely on the implementation of certain objectives and the coordination of those objectives, fulfillment of obligations and delegation of certain powers to WHO, FAO, OIE, Interpol and so forth. These international organizations have their own mandates, in particular we would point out that WHO is now in the process of a complex organizational reform.	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
Belarus	[...] a complex solution to strengthening Article VII may only be resolved within an appropriate legally binding agreement, in other words an additional protocol to the Convention. Therefore we wholeheartedly support the proposal by the Russian Federation to create a working group on approval of appropriate mechanisms to strengthen the Convention within which we might be able to find a way to properly strengthen Article VII.	S 14/8 AM
Netherlands	Like others, we welcome further proposals which seek to make Article VII more operational as a response mechanism. We consider the papers by South Africa, in particular the one on guidelines and the Indian-French paper for a database, as very helpful and good possibilities to move forward. We should be careful not to duplicate, but with the help of the ISU this could be avoided. We support further follow-up on the proposals mentioned.	S 14/8 AM
India	As agreed in past review conferences, a request for investigation is separate from, but parallel to, requests for assistance. The information listed in the South African guidelines give the impression that the details needed for assistance are almost the same as that needed for investigation. In fact, the set of information needed for the former would be quite distinct. The second issue with the South African paper is that it assumes that the application for assistance would be made to the UNSC. Article VII requires States Parties to provide assistance, not the UNSC. There is an indirect linkage, but successive Review Conferences have created more space between the two. Conceptually, the two need to be separated.	S 14/8 AM
India	It is clear that the lack of a comprehensive Protocol to strengthen implementation of all aspects of the BWC has created a gap in the international community's capacity to respond effectively to provide assistance to States Parties to the BWC. An event relating to violation of the BWC is more than a public health emergency under the IHR (2005).	S 14/8 AM
India	[...] ideas that could be considered, such as establishment of a trust Fund or voluntary Fund. States Parties in cooperation with relevant international organizations could also consider a table top exercise to improve coordination, awareness and improve response times in case of actual events of requests for assistance under Article VII.	S 14/8 AM
India	We had raised this issue in the hope that we would gain 'lessons-learned' of relevance to the BWC, including those Articles which are on the agenda of this meeting. [...] it is too early to draw definitive conclusions but we have to take into account some important trends— namely, lack of ready operational capacity which was widely felt, delay in mounting an effective international response (the outbreak was visible in March and international assistance arrived only by October), and the need for change in the research and development model to ensure timely, accessible and affordable medical support for affected populations at a time when major pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to invest in relevant drugs and vaccines before there is an assured market. While this issue is being considered elsewhere, including at the	S 14/8 AM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	WHO, the BWC should also remain engaged in this regard.	
European Union	Regarding how to strengthen the implementation of Article VII [...] note that improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems provides the first line of defence against cases of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons.	S 10/8 AM
European Union	On making Article VII operational, we need to take into account relevant actions that are being taken elsewhere, especially in the WHO, to build effective response capabilities to deal with future major outbreaks of infectious disease.	S 10/8 AM
ICRC	<p>CBRN operational response approach:</p> <p>Key objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimise risks to staff health, safety, security; - Ensure continuation of activities; - Provide assistance to affected people. <p>Risk Management – risk assessment is the key approach: Accidental (industrial or military), conflict related (intentional consequence) or terrorism;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emphasize should be on prevention; - A contingency plan should be built; - Side activities should be considered (ie pumping out latrines); - Last minute logistical constraints should not encourage concessions on safety. <p>At all times adapt protection measures of staff to the actual risk of exposure. (A tool was developed –presence in contaminated environment, type of exposure, time).</p>	P 10/8 PM
ICRC	States should keep the focus on victims of the outbreak while ensuring security.	P 10/8 PM
ICRC	States should ensure access of aid agencies at all times.	P 10/8 PM
IFRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Experience from international assistance in natural disasters and health emergencies shows that there is a need for clear domestic rules and procedures, developed before disaster strikes, to ensure smooth cooperation. Unfortunately, very few states currently have them; - Of possible particular concern for BWC purposes could be the entry and operation of foreign physicians and other types of technical experts who may require licensing under local law, facilitation (but also oversight) of the importation of medications and medical equipment, protective equipment (some of which may be impacted by rules against “dual-use items”), and also the exportation of samples; - However, consideration should be given to including most aspects relevant to assistance in biological incidents into the context of more general (“multi-hazard”) rules related to international disaster assistance (which are likely to be more frequently exercised, thus used and understood). More general issues that would be common to any kind of international 	P 10/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<p>assistance in the case of disaster would include focal point arrangements, coordination and communication expectations, registration requirements (including for assistance from non-governmental entities, which may very well play an important role), liability (including third-party liability) issues, and any special treatment of military or other security related personnel or initiatives;</p> <p>- At the international level, while it is clear that some particular considerations are needed to implement the Convention, consideration should also be given to avoiding any unnecessary “coordination silo” under the theme of biological weapons, in light of the many existing international mechanisms for international disaster assistance.</p>	
IFRC	<p>The lack of legal preparedness for international assistance results in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Barriers: visas, customs, taxes etc; - Oversight gaps: inappropriate items, disregard for standards, poor coordination; <p>Bottom line: a slower, more expensive, less effective; states do not feel that they are in the driver’s seat.</p>	P 10/8 PM
OPCW	<p>Role of the Technical Secretariat in case of a request for assistance under Article X of the CWC, the OPCW has two main tasks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To investigate whether CW have been used; - To determine what assistance is required and coordinate the provision of assistance made available by the OPCW. 	P 10/8 PM
OPCW	<p>Assistance Coordination and Assessment Team (ACAT) maintains a state of readiness within the Technical Secretariat to respond to a request for assistance from a State Party attacked or threatened by chemical weapons.</p>	P 10/8 PM
UNISDR	<p>UNISDR will work with key partners to support countries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Systematically integrate of disaster risk reduction in national health policies and plans and vice versa; - Integrate disaster risk reduction into health education and training and strengthen capacity building of health workers in disaster risk reduction; - Incorporate disasters-related mortality, morbidity and disability data into multi-hazards early warning system, health core indicators and in national risk profiling; - Advocate for and support cross-sectoral and transboundary collaboration for all hazards, including biological hazards, through compiling and disseminating of best practices, case studies and exchange of knowledge and experiences to enable policy and planning; - Promote coherence and further development of national and local strategies and plans as well as frameworks for laws, regulations and public policies. 	P 10/8 PM
UNISDR	<p>Key points:</p>	P 10/8 PM

<i>Delegation</i>	<i>Text</i>	<i>Source</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Sendai Framework has fully embraced the multisectoral, interdisciplinary and cross-cutting nature of natural disaster reduction and also the concept of health resilience as a key focus for disaster risk reduction of all hazards, including biological threats, in the immediate future if we are to succeed in reducing existing levels of risk and to avoid the creation of new risk; - We can't prepare during an outbreak or crisis. We have to do the work in advance and we have to test it; - And most importantly, we do need the institutions of the kind represented here to work together, continue interaction, cooperation and partnerships to achieve jointly agreed DRR goals and priorities. 	
UNCTITF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTITF WMD Working Group Project on ensuring effective inter-agency interoperability and Coordinated Communication in case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks. Twenty United Nations offices and other agencies participate in the Project. In the absence of a lead agency bearing the overall responsibility for response to possible terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological weapons, this Project is aimed at ensuring ability of different agencies to work together effectively and to coordinate communication to the public in responding to such an attack. - Without necessarily creating new inter-agency response coordination mechanisms, the project examines how best to make use of the existing ones and how to fill gaps that might prevent agencies from inter-operating, including as regards external communication in crisis situations. 	S 10/8 PM
UNODA	<p>SGM key features:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legitimate, effective and proven international tool for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons; - Built upon the high level of expertise (experts and laboratories) provided by Member States and international organizations; - Cooperation between international organizations; - Enhancement of the SGM requires additional efforts in particular training of experts and SGM operational capabilities. 	P 14/8 AM
UNODA	<p>Mission in Syria - Lessons Learned and Principle:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The SGM is an effective mechanism to investigate alleged use of chemical, biological and/or toxin weapons; - The important role of international organizations; - Areas for strengthening preparedness of the SGM including partnerships and cooperation; information-sharing and training. 	P 14/8 AM

List of abbreviations

BIO	Biotechnology Industry Organization
DCVMN	Developing Countries Vaccine Manufacturers Network
IAP	InterAcademy Partnership
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
NAM	Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the BWC
OIE	World Organization for Animal Health
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
SGM	United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism for investigation of alleged use of biological and chemical weapons
TWAS	The World Academy of Sciences
UNCTITF	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
VERTIC	Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
WHO	World Health Organization

Annexe II

Liste des documents

<i>Cote</i>	<i>Titre</i>
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/1	Ordre du jour provisoire de la Réunion d'experts. Soumis par le Président.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/2/Rev.1	Programme de travail provisoire révisé de la Réunion d'experts. Document soumis par le Président.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/3	Rapport de la Réunion d'experts.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.1 [Anglais seulement]	Making Article VII effective: Some core assumptions and key questions. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.2 [Anglais seulement]	Making Article VII effective: Relevant lessons and follow-up action from the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.3 [Anglais seulement]	Improving methods of work at the Biological Weapons Convention meetings. Submitted by Belarus and the Russian Federation.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.4 [Anglais seulement]	The United States of America high containment laboratory policy. Submitted by the United States of America.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.5 [Anglais seulement]	Advances in science and technology: Production and delivery. Submitted by the United States of America.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.6 [Anglais seulement]	Tacit knowledge: The concept and its implications for biological weapons proliferation. Submitted by the United States of America.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.7 [Anglais seulement]	Proposal for establishment of a database for assistance in the framework of Article VII of the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by France and India.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.8 et Corr.1 [Anglais seulement]	Convergence between biology and chemistry: Latest findings of relevance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Submitted by Switzerland.

<i>Cote</i>	<i>Titre</i>
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.9 [Anglais seulement]	Advances in science and technology: impact on response to infectious disease outbreaks and relevance to Article VII. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.10 [Anglais seulement]	Implementation of Article VII. Submitted by South Africa.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.11 [Anglais seulement]	Reviewing developments in science and technology: Parameters and considerations for a dedicated process. Submitted by Switzerland.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.12/ Rev.1 [Anglais seulement]	Advances in science and technology: Production, dispersal and delivery technologies. Submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.13/ Rev.1 [Anglais seulement]	BENELUX BTWC Peer Review. Outline of key features and objectives. Submitted by Belgium Luxembourg and Netherlands.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.14	Proposal by the Russian Federation for inclusion in the final document of the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention. Submitted by the Russian Federation.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.15 [Anglais seulement]	Review of developments in the field of science and technology and Article X of the Convention. Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.16 [Anglais seulement]	Providing Reassurance on Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Implementation. Submitted by Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Republic of Korea and Thailand.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.17 [Espagnol seulement; une traduction non officielle en anglais figure à la suite du texte en espagnol]	Consideraciones y medidas para mejorar la biocustodia de los materiales y agentes biológicos y de las instalaciones biológicas. Presentado por Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, España, Italia y Panamá.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.18 [Anglais seulement]	Measures to implement Article III: Elements of an effective national export control system. Submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

<i>Cote</i>	<i>Titre</i>
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.18/ Corr.1 [Anglais seulement]	Measures to implement Article III: Elements of an effective national export control system. Submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.19 [Anglais seulement]	National Measures to Address Dual Use Research. Submitted by Indonesia, Malaysia, Netherlands and the United States of America.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.20 [Espagnol seulement; une traduction non officielle en anglais figure à la suite du texte en espagnol]	Dificultades y obstáculos que enfrenta Cuba para la plena aplicación de la CABT y en particular para el desarrollo al máximo de la cooperación, la asistencia y el intercambio internacionales en ciencias biológicas y tecnología, incluidos los equipos y materiales, con fines pacíficos. Presentado por Cuba.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.21 [Espagnol seulement; une traduction non officielle en anglais figure à la suite du texte en espagnol]	Experiencias de Cuba en la aplicación del Artículo X de la CABT. Presentado por Cuba.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.22 (Espagnol seulement)	Consideraciones de Cuba sobre cómo fortalecer la aplicación del artículo VII, incluida la consideración de procedimientos y mecanismos detallados para la prestación de asistencia y la cooperación de los Estados partes. Presentado por Cuba.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.23 [Espagnol seulement; une traduction non officielle en anglais figure à la suite du texte en espagnol]	Ofrecimientos y solicitudes de Cooperación internacional y Asistencia a la Base de Datos de Cooperación Internacional para el Artículo X de la CABT. Presentado por Cuba.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.1 [Anglais seulement]	2014 Implementation of BWC Article X (Cooperation and Assistance). Submitted by Australia.

<i>Cote</i>	<i>Titre</i>
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.2	Accords et ententes conclus antérieurement dans le cadre de la Convention et ayant un rapport avec le renforcement de l'application de l'article VII, y compris l'examen de procédures et mécanismes détaillés pour l'apport d'une assistance et d'une coopération par les États parties. Document soumis par l'Unité d'appui à l'application de la Convention.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.3	Document d'information sur les difficultés et obstacles que l'on continue de rencontrer dans le développement de la coopération, de l'assistance et des échanges internationaux. Soumis par l'Unité d'appui à l'application de la Convention.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.4 et Corr.1	Organisations internationales susceptibles de participer à la fourniture et à la coordination d'une assistance au titre de l'article VII. Document soumis par l'Unité d'appui à l'application de la Convention.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/INF.5	Liste des participants
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/CRP.1 [Anglais seulement]	Draft Report of the Meeting of Experts. Submitted by the Chairman.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/CRP.2 [Anglais seulement]	Draft elements for the compilation of the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/CRP.3 [Anglais seulement]	Draft elements for the compilation of the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topics under discussion at the Meeting.
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/MISC.1 [Anglais/espagnol/français seulement]	Liste provisoire des participants.