



2020年1月27日也门问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

也门问题专家小组成员谨随函转递专家小组根据第2456(2019)号决议第6段编写的最后报告。

该报告于2019年12月27日提交给安全理事会第2140(2014)号决议所设委员会，该委员会于2020年1月10日审议了报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和报告并作为安理会文件分发给荷。

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* 由于技术原因于2020年2月10日重发。



也门问题专家小组的最后报告

摘要

在经历五年多的冲突后，也门的人道主义危机仍在继续。该国的许多冲突相互关联，无法再按照外部和内部行为体和事件明确划分。2019年，胡塞武装和也门政府为实现政治解决方案或决定性军事胜利方面进展甚微。从2018年开始，交战方继续开展经济战：将经济障碍和金融工具用作武器，使对手无法获得资金或物资。从冲突中牟利的现象在各地蔓延。

在南方，也门政府面临南方过渡委员会附属武装力量构成的军事挑战。委员会副主席 Hani Ali Salem Binbrek 使用武力颠覆也门政府在亚丁保留的些许权威，引发了一场冲突。阿比扬和夏卜瓦的边界冲突持续不断，《利雅得协定》的执行进展有限，表明南方局势依然动荡。

在北方，胡塞武装继续巩固政治和军事控制，特别是设立了无孔不入的情报机构，其中包括预防性安全机构以及新设的安全情报局。胡塞武装还参与了对部落反对派和政治异己的残酷镇压。也门问题专家小组查明了一个由设在萨那的刑事调查局局长 Sultan Zabin 领导的胡塞网络，该网络参与压制反对胡塞武装的妇女，包括为此使用性暴力。

在2019年的大部分时间里，胡塞武装继续开展并加强了对沙特阿拉伯的空袭。除了此前已知的武器系统外，他们还使用了一种新型的三角洲公司设计的无人驾驶飞行器，以及一种新型的地面攻击巡航导弹。专家小组调查了2019年9月14日对沙特阿美石油公司在艾卜盖格和胡赖斯的设施进行的高调袭击，并认定尽管存在指控，胡塞武装不可能是袭击的肇事方，因为所用武器系统的估测射程表明袭击并非来自胡塞控制区。尽管如此，对沙特阿拉伯的其他一些袭击显然可归责于胡塞武装。

在9月的袭击之后，胡塞武装公开提议停火。这一停火得到了广泛遵守。沙特阿拉伯和胡塞武装现在都公开表示正在进行讨论，而胡塞武装对沙特阿拉伯发动的远程无人驾驶飞行器和导弹袭击已经减少。

关于可能违反定向武器禁运的问题，专家小组观察到两大趋势：首先是将工业化国家的无人驾驶飞行器发动机、伺服致动器和电子元件等商用零部件通过中间人网络出口到也门的胡塞控制区，并利用这些零部件在当地组装无人驾驶飞行器和水上简易爆炸装置；其次是胡塞武装继续得到突击步枪、火箭推进榴弹发射器、反坦克导弹以及先进巡航导弹系统等军事支助。一些上述武器的技术特征与伊朗伊斯兰共和国制造的军火相似。就商业零部件和武器而言，主要走私路线似乎是从阿曼和也门南海岸经陆路通过也门政府控制区运至萨那。2019年11月25日在阿拉伯海高调扣押了一艘运载反坦克导弹和其他导弹部件的道船，这表明与往年一样，海上运输仍是可能违反定向武器禁运的一种形式。

也门缺乏法治和监督，少数掠夺性企业家得以非法致富，其中一些人在公共机构中担任公职。在这种情况下，由于缺乏问责，也门政府和胡塞武装官员的腐败行为使越来越多的国家财富和外部援助被挪用或损耗。作为经济战工具，各方对货物进口筹资设置障碍并阻扰运载进口物资的船只前往也门。

专家小组发现，有迹象表明亚丁的也门中央银行通过操纵外汇汇率非法获益。专家小组认定胡塞武装参与了违反资产冻结措施的案件，包括允许使用假合同挪用冻结资产和公共资金，为代表阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞(YEi.004)行事的个人谋利。负责后勤的胡塞将领 Saleh Mesfer Alshaer 也在挪用从胡塞反对者手中非法所得资金方面扮演了重要角色。

也门各方继续普遍违反国际人道法和国际人权法，并且未受惩罚。沙特阿拉伯领导的在也门支持合法性联盟发动的空袭以及胡塞武装滥用地雷等爆炸物的行为继续对平民和民用基础设施造成严重影响。也门政府、沙特阿拉伯、胡塞武装和阿拉伯联合酋长国附属部队继续对被拘留人实施任意逮捕和拘留、强迫失踪、虐待和酷刑。在亚丁，缺乏法治使阿拉伯联合酋长国附属武装团体得以实施此类侵害行为，并在也门政府控制外地区开展行动。在胡塞控制区，对人道主义工作者的威胁和暴力行为以及对提供援助施加的行政障碍正在增加。

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一. 引言

1. 本报告根据安全理事会第 2456(2019)号决议第 6 段提交安理会, 所述期间为 2019 年 1 月 1 日至 12 月 31 日, 其中载有也门问题专家小组 2019 年 6 月 25 日中期更新报告中所述持续调查的最新结果。专家小组在调查期间遵守了第 2456(2019)号决议第 11 段的规定, 该段涉及安全理事会制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组所建议的最佳做法和方法(见 S/2006/997)并保持了可实现的最高证据标准, 尽管专家小组无法在也门境内随意活动。¹ 也门境内的所有主要地点的拼写均遵循附件 2 中的联合国地理信息系统地图所用拼写。
2. 根据第 2456(2019)号决议第 7 段, 专家小组与分析支助和制裁监测组及索马里问题专家小组保持了合作。
3. 在调查过程中, 专家小组成员访问了吉布提、埃及、法国、希腊、伊朗伊斯兰共和国、以色列、约旦、黎巴嫩、阿曼、卡塔尔、沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国、美利坚合众国和也门。专家小组的两名专家参加了安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设委员会主席 2019 年 3 月 30 日至 4 月 5 日对伊朗伊斯兰共和国、约旦、阿曼和沙特阿拉伯的访问。
4. 在也门, 专家小组于 2019 年 4 月和 6 月对亚丁进行了两次访问。联合国因安全原因取消了专家小组 9 月和 11 月对也门的进一步访问。此外, 由于联合国内部后勤和能力的限制, 专家小组两名成员未能在 2019 年 6 月访问亚丁。联合国人道主义空运处自 6 月以来不让专家小组使用其飞机, 这限制了专家小组赴也门的能力。
5. 在亚丁, 专家小组与也门政府官员、民间社会成员及南方过渡委员会和其他南部团体举行了会议。6 月, 专家小组的两名成员访问了 Turbah, 会见了来自塔伊兹的军队、警察、情报官员和地方当局。
6. 专家小组向设在萨那的外交部发出了两份正式函件, 但仍然无法前往也门的胡塞控制区。² 在本报告所述期间, 胡塞武装没有答复专家小组的任何正式函件。
7. 专家小组对沙特阿拉伯进行了六次访问, 对阿拉伯联合酋长国进行了两次访问, 以举行会议和开展武器视察。2019 年 6 月和 9 月对亚丁的视察未能成行(见第 4 段)。为解决对保管链的潜在关切, 专家小组需要及时并尽可能在缴获或扣押地点附近检查在战场上缴获或在运输中扣押的武器。出于联合国的安全考虑, 大部分检查是在也门境外的地点进行的。专家小组注意到, 尽管向沙特阿拉伯提出了多次请求, 但一直无法对飞行记录仪或制导系统等目前调查工作中的重要特定物项进行检查。

¹ 关于所用方法和答复机会的信息见附件 1。

² 为避免混淆也门政府的部委和官员与胡塞武装的部门和任用人员, 并便于区分两者, 专家小组将使用大写字母描述也门政府的部委和官员, 使用小写字母描述胡塞武装的部门和任用人员。

8. 截至 2019 年 12 月 31 日，专家小组发出了 143 封公函，其中 103 封发给 28 个会员国，40 封发给 28 个实体、公司和个人，截至 2020 年 1 月 27 日，57 封公函仍待答复(见附件 3)。

二. 对也门和平、安全或稳定的挑战

A. 也门的冲突网络

9. 也门面临的各种问题并非孤立存在；该国的许多冲突相互关联，无法按照外部和内部行为体和事件明确划分。到 2019 年，这些冲突在也门境内的累积影响严重削弱了也门总统阿卜杜拉布·曼苏尔·哈迪本已薄弱的控制力。与南方的动荡相比，胡塞武装继续巩固控制，维持经济并展现统一的军事力量。

10. 许多武装团体正在试图实现两个主要目标：垄断控制区内的武装暴力行为以及控制收入来源。在此背景下，也门人民在经济大幅下滑的情况下挣扎求生。下文表 1 列出也门和平、安全与稳定面临的一系列政治和军事挑战。

表 1
2019 年挑战性质的变化

挑战	说明	国际关联	2019 年的变化
胡塞武装与也门政府交战	交战前线包括荷台达省、塔伊兹省、贝达省、马里卜省和焦夫省。冲突对民众产生了严重影响。	也门政府得到了在也门支持合法性联盟的支持。	没有重大变化。
胡塞武装与西海岸部队、安全地带部队和南部抵抗力量交战	限于达利和红海沿岸。对平民的影响巨大。	阿拉伯联合酋长国支持西海岸部队和安全地带部队。	阿拉伯联合酋长国已经基本撤出西海岸，但仍然支持西海岸部队的剩余人员。8 月 1 日之前，安全地带部队是阿拉伯联合酋长国的附属部队。8 月 7 日之后，他们投靠了南方过渡委员会。
胡塞武装与联军交战	有两条战线：沙特阿拉伯与也门边境的陆战以及涉及联军空袭和胡塞武装空袭沙特阿拉伯的空战。联军空袭对平民的影响巨大。胡塞武装对沙特阿拉伯的空袭也影响平民。	沙特阿拉伯得到了一个全球供应链的支持。尽管有定向武器禁运，胡塞武装还是保留了利用全球供应链的机会。	胡塞武装在 1 000 公里射程内对沙特阿拉伯境内的经济目标发动了袭击，意味着可能也具备袭击阿拉伯联合酋长国境内目标的潜在能力。9 月提出了胡塞武装与沙特阿拉伯之间的部分停火，但结果并不一致。双方目前正在讨论。
胡塞武装在哈杰、阿姆兰和伊卜与部落异己交战	自 2018 年以来零星交火。部落异己遭到残酷镇压，严重影响平民。	联军向哈杰的哈胡尔部落运送了武器等物资。	据报，胡塞控制区的部落异己虽遭残酷镇压，但人数有所增加。
南方过渡委员会附属的安全地带部队和夏卜瓦精锐部队与也门政府发生冲突	继 2018 年在亚丁 ^a 和 2019 年 6 月在阿塔格发生短暂冲突之后，8 月 7 日至 29 日左右，也门政府部队与南方过渡委员会附属部队在亚丁、阿比扬和夏卜瓦发生了大规模冲突。	安全地带部队和夏卜瓦精锐部队是阿拉伯联合酋长国附属部队，大部分资金、武器和培训来自阿联酋。南方过渡委员会也得到了阿拉伯联合酋长国的政治和军事支持。	到 8 月 10 日，南方过渡委员会附属部队将也门政府部队和大多数政治官员赶出了亚丁和阿比扬。在此期间，也门政府呼吁阿拉伯联合酋长国停止支持这些团体。11 月 5 日，沙特阿拉伯发起的会谈促成了《利雅得协定》。局势仍然动荡。

挑战	说明	国际关联	2019 年的变化
阿拉伯联合酋长国对也门政府部队发动空袭	8 月 29 日, 阿拉伯联合酋长国对亚丁 Alam 检查站和阿比扬 Dhofas 的也门政府先遣纵队发动了空袭。	阿拉伯联合酋长国。	这是阿拉伯联合酋长国对也门政府部队实施的第一次也是唯一一次承认的袭击。
第 35 旅和阿布·阿巴斯武装团体在塔伊兹与也门政府其他部队交战	在 3 月安全行动和 8 月亚丁事件之后的相对平静期后, 这些武装力量为争夺塔伊兹-亚丁公路控制权爆发了严重冲突。	阿布·阿巴斯团体、其次是第 35 旅得到了阿拉伯联合酋长国的支持。	经也门政府干预, 恢复了稳定; 但第 35 旅旅长在 12 月 2 日遇刺。紧张局势依然存在。
对阿拉伯半岛基地组织及伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)实施持续反恐行动	阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国未证明对也门构成重大威胁。反恐武装包括夏卜瓦精锐部队、安全地带部队、哈德拉毛精锐部队, 并在一定程度上包括也门政府部队。胡塞武装也声称打击恐怖主义, 但与阿拉伯半岛基地组织交换了囚犯。	反恐行动得到沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国和美国的支持。	官方数据显示, 对恐怖主义目标的无人驾驶飞行器袭击减少, 而至少有五名阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国头目被捕。 ^b
阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国之间的冲突	主要限于贝达的 Qayfah。	未知。	仍然存在零星的当地冲突。
试图控制马哈拉省跨境贸易引发的对抗	沙特阿拉伯附属武装力量领导的打击走私运动引发了边境附近部落人员的反应。这些行动的直接影响很小, 但对防止与阿曼边境沿线走私的潜在效益巨大。	沙特阿拉伯在马哈拉省驻有部队。	尽管紧张局势持续存在, 到 2019 年 6 月, 暴力对抗已经结束。
伊朗伊斯兰共和国对胡塞武装的支持力度	胡塞武装得到伊朗伊斯兰共和国的政治和军事支持; 但此类支持的规模不明。	专家小组确定了伊朗伊斯兰共和国向胡塞武装提供财政支助的潜在路线, 并发现了可能违反武器禁运的迹象。	政治支持逐步增加。
也门冲突与影响沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国的事件之间存在明显关联	对该区域的石油相关基础设施的陆地和海上袭击。	沙特阿拉伯、伊朗伊斯兰共和国和一些油轮。	自 9 月中旬以来, 胡塞武装利用无人驾驶飞行器和地面攻击巡航导弹对沙特阿拉伯的袭击有所减少。

^a 见人道主义事务协调厅, “也门: 亚丁的武装冲突升级”, 即刻更新, 2018 年 1 月 29 日。

^b 见 www.newamerica.org/international-security/blog/centcom-no-yemen-military-strikes-september-2019/。2018 年美国国防部报告的空袭总数为 36 次; 2019 年, 国防部报告的截至 10 月第一周的空袭次数为 8 次。

B. 胡塞武装与也门政府交战

11. 除了在也门支持合法性联盟附属武装力量在 2018 年年底向荷台达省大举推进外, 胡塞控制区没有明显变化。2019 年, 前线保持不变, 胡塞武装主要对沙特阿拉伯发动军事行动。联军继续支持也门政府与胡塞武装交战, 公开目标是协助也门政府恢复权力。然而, 联军未能实现这一目标, 有时还破坏了也门政府的行动(见第 34 段)。总体而言, 联军对也门政府正规军的支持不足, 导致政府没有能力开展重大军事行动。

12. 随着也门政府的军事能力继续退化，胡塞武装巩固了对武装力量和北方部落的控制(见第 20 段)。胡塞武装展现了一支统一的作战力量，能够残酷镇压异己。胡塞武装的高度权威在一定程度上是源自完善的情报结构，其中包括预防性安全机构、安全情报局以及扎纳比亚斯，详情如下。

1. 预防性安全机构

13. 预防性安全机构是胡塞控制区最有影响力的情报机构。它在阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫(YEi.003)死后声名鹊起。它在“国家”结构之外运作，并向阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞(YEi.004)报告。其领导人是胡塞武装最有权势的人物之一。更多信息见机密附件 4。

14. 预防性安全机构的重点是监控胡塞武装，保护其免受渗透。其他职责包括审查胡塞主管提交的报告；³ 确保作战人员不逃离前线或从前线带走武器；干预胡塞作战分子之间的冲突；逮捕和拘留从事颠覆行为的胡塞官员。专家小组约谈了一名妇女，她因抗议胡塞武装而被一名被确认来自预防性安全机构的官员剥夺自由并实施性骚扰。

2. 安全情报局

15. 2019 年 8 月，作为胡塞武装控制萨那以来最大规模的情报机构重组，国家安全局和政治安全局合并为新的安全情报局。⁴ 该局的职能是发现胡塞武装之外的潜在威胁。

16. 这次重组解散了阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫时代的上述两个重要网络，并清洗了一些情报官员。专家小组收到了国家安全局官员被捕的几起报告。⁵ 专家小组感兴趣的是国家安全局副局长 Motlaq Amer al-Marrani(又名 Abu Emad)涉嫌参与阻碍运送人道主义援助(另见第 89 段)。前内政部副部长阿卜杜勒·哈基姆·哈伊瓦尼(Abdul Hakim al-Khaiwani)现任安全情报局局长，前政治安全局局长阿卜杜勒·卡德尔·沙米(Abdul Qader al-Shami)被任命为安全情报局副局长。

3. 扎纳比亚斯

17. 扎纳比亚斯大多来自哈希姆家族，是一个针对妇女的情报机构。扎纳比亚斯的职责包括搜查妇女和房屋，向妇女灌输思想以及维持女子监狱的秩序。专家小组记录了扎纳比亚斯实施的侵害行为，包括在秘密拘留中心任意逮捕和拘留妇女、抢掠、性侵犯、殴打、酷刑以及为强奸提供便利(见附件 5 和 6)。⁶

³ 这些人是社区一级主管，被称为穆沙拉芬，曾在穆罕默德·阿里·胡塞(Mohammed Ali al-Houthi)领导的革命委员会工作。按照官方说法，革命委员会已不复存在，但有迹象表明，该委员会仍在继续运作。穆罕默德·阿里·胡塞于 2019 年 7 月 30 日被任命为最高政治理事会成员。

⁴ <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/171223>。

⁵ 与胡塞武装关系密切的消息人士。另见 www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/11/10/الحوثي-يعتقل-26-ضابطا-من-منتسبي-الامن-السياسي-في-صنعاء。

⁶ 约谈了遭遇过扎纳比亚斯的民间社会活动家和 10 名妇女。

18. 在本报告所述期间，胡塞武装继续任命长期附属人员担任重要的军事和文职职位，其中包括任命阿卜杜勒·马立克·胡塞的叔叔阿卜杜勒·卡里姆·阿米尔·丁·胡塞为内政部长。他们还任命阿卜杜勒·穆赫森·阿卜杜拉·卡西姆·阿塔乌斯(Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Qasim Attawoos)先担任国家人道主义事务和灾难恢复管理和协调局负责人，然后担任人道主义事务和国际合作管理协调最高委员会秘书长。阿塔乌斯是扎马尔省的一名总监，自 2004 年以来一直是胡塞武装的重要成员。其他高层任命见附件 7。

C. 胡塞武装镇压异己

19. 胡塞武装保持团结的主要原因之一是在胡塞控制区内镇压异己。2019 年，这包括来自部落的异己和政治活跃女性。

1. 镇压部落异己

20. 2019 年 1 月至 3 月，胡塞武装在哈杰与一些哈胡尔部落发生了冲突，导致在平民区使用重型武器，房屋毁坏，部落伤亡惨重，人员被拘留。⁷ 在战斗中，联军向部落提供了武器和物资⁸ 并开展空袭予以支援。⁹ 经过两个月的围困，胡塞武装于 2019 年 3 月 10 日击败了部落。在接下来的几天里，平民大量流离失所，拘留现象普遍，并出现了一些法外处决。上述冲突是 2019 年在胡塞控制区内发生的最大规模的反胡塞事件。据报，阿姆兰¹⁰ 和伊卜省¹¹ 也发生了其他的冲突和酋长被杀事件。

2. 压制妇女

21. 在胡塞控制区，当妇女对胡塞统治构成威胁或被视为构成威胁时，就直接或间接地沦为攻击目标。专家小组记录了日益加剧的压制妇女趋势。在专家小组记录的共计 11 起案件中，妇女因政治派别或参加政治活动或公众抗议而遭到逮捕、拘留、殴打、酷刑和(或)性虐待。这些妇女被威胁说，如果继续从事反胡塞活动就会受到卖淫或有组织犯罪的指控(见附件 5)。如安全理事会第 2467(2019)号决议等若干决议所述，对表达政治观点或参加示威的妇女的压制行为增加，影响了妇女参加解决冲突的相关努力和决策进程的能力。

⁷ 源自与受影响酋长和当地民间社会关于侵害行为的讨论。另见 2019 年 3 月 8 日也门常驻联合国代表给安全理事会主席的信(S/2019/220)以及也门驻地和人道主义协调员办公室的声明，见 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HC_Statement_Hajjah_11_March_2019.pdf。

⁸ <http://en.adenpress.news/news/2593>，得到酋长的确认。

⁹ 其中一次空袭击中一座民房。胡塞武装不顾当地人因可能空袭而提出的反对意见，在房子旁边停了一辆坦克。


¹⁰ 专家小组在阿姆兰的消息人士。另见 www.thenational.ae/world/mena/yemen-government-condemns-houthi-killing-of-tribal-leader-1.889829 和 apnews.com/3a0b4252b08b4ba8b0531e1eb13f26c2。

¹¹ 专家小组在伊卜省 Oud 的消息人士。另见 www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/06/24/اليمن-مقتل-وكيل-محافظة-اب-في-اشتباكات-حوادث-داخلية。

22. 专家小组正在调查萨那刑事侦察局局长 Sultan Zabin 涉嫌在确定的地点对一名女性政治活动家实施酷刑。¹² 专家小组查明了一个广泛网络，涉及以遏制卖淫为名进行政治压制(见图一)。专家小组还在调查阿卜杜勒·哈基姆·哈伊瓦尼的参与情况，他公开强调内政部、检方和法律当局在实施这些逮捕和拘留时密切配合(见附件 5)。

图 1

Sultan Zabin 经确定的从属关系



资料来源：专家小组。

23. 专家小组认定，野蛮镇压部落和政治异己会对也门的和平、安全和稳定构成威胁，从事压制活动的人可能符合指定标准。

D. 也门政府和(或)在也门支持合法性联盟控制区的军事态势变化

1. 阿拉伯联合酋长国撤离也门

24. 2019 年，阿拉伯联合酋长国在分两个阶段进行的重新部署中大幅削减了驻军人数。第一阶段是 6 月和 7 月的大规模缩编，将部队人数从几千人减至几

¹² 刑讯逼供的书证和证词。专家小组还收到文件，表明 Sultan Zabin 和(或)他的办公室参与了对其他妇女的逮捕、拘留和强迫失踪。见机密附件 6。

百人，但一些部队人员仍然驻留，支持该国在 2015 至 2019 年训练和装备的武装团体(见表 2)。第二阶段发生在 10 月第一周，阿拉伯联合酋长国将 Mukha、亚丁、巴尔哈夫、拉扬和 Socotra 的驻军人数减至最低水平。¹³ 与此同时，苏丹部队在喀土穆新政权建立后不久大幅削减人数。¹⁴ 2019 年 11 月签署利雅得协议后，阿拉伯联合酋长国将布里卡基地移交给沙特阿拉伯部队，从而完成了从亚丁的撤离。

2. 西海岸部队、安全地带部队和其他部队的变化

25. 专家小组认为西海岸部队、¹⁵ 安全地带部队、哈德拉毛精锐部队和夏卜瓦精锐部队是非国家武装团体。也门政府称，安全地带部队、夏卜瓦精锐部队和哈德拉毛精锐部队在组建后不受其指挥与控制。¹⁶ 表 2 显示了 2019 年 6 月阿拉伯联合酋长国重新部署部队人员之前的隶属关系。

26. 专家小组注意到，也门战斗人员现身沙特阿拉伯与也门边境两侧，在沙特阿拉伯指挥下作战，但地位因其所处地点而异。¹⁷

表 2

2019 年 6 月 1 日之前阿拉伯联合酋长国和也门政府的支持类型和控制程度(佐证见附件 8)

团体	特征
安全地带部队	非国家行为体，位于亚丁、拉赫季、阿比扬和达利 与阿拉伯联合酋长国的工作方式：阿拉伯联合酋长国组建部队，挑选指挥官，招募和训练部队，支付工资并提供武器、装备和后勤。该部队与阿拉伯联合酋长国合作开展联合或综合行动，并接受阿拉伯联合酋长国部队的具体命令和指示。
夏卜瓦精锐部队	非国家行为体，位于夏卜瓦省 与阿拉伯联合酋长国的工作方式：如上所述
哈德拉毛精锐部队	非国家行为体，位于哈德拉毛省 与阿拉伯联合酋长国的工作方式：如上所述

¹³ 专家小组的消息人士。

¹⁴ 见：www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/sudan-says-it-has-reduced-troops-in-yemen-to-5000-idUSKBN1YC0H4。

¹⁵ 阿姆贾德·哈立德领导的运输旅是一个例外，该旅隶属于也门政府总统保护旅。

¹⁶ 2019 年 9 月在利雅得与也门政府会晤，以及 2019 年 10 月 4 日也门政府的信。

¹⁷ 也门政府附属的一些战斗人员被认为隶属于也门政府国防部，在这种情况下，其军事单位被视为国家行为体。过境到沙特阿拉伯的战斗人员似乎被视为承包商。

团体	特征
西海岸部队 (Amjad Khaled 部队除外)	非国家行为体，位于摩卡和荷台达 与阿拉伯联合酋长国的工作方式：如上所述，但部队由阿拉伯联合酋长国和也门政府共同组建，阿拉伯联合酋长国在西海岸的行动中拥有完全的行动控制权。
阿布·阿巴斯团体	国家行为体，位于塔伊兹省 与阿拉伯联合酋长国的工作方式：阿拉伯联合酋长国只提供武器、装备和后勤。也门政府在 2019 年提供工资，该团体与也门政府军开展联合或综合行动。

资料来源：专家小组。

27. 表 2 所列部队在 2019 年 6 月至 11 月期间发生了变化，主要是位于亚丁的安全地带部队于 8 月投靠南方过渡委员会(见第 30 段)。此外，夏卜瓦精锐部队出现分裂(见第 32 段)。阿拉伯联合酋长国对夏卜瓦精锐部队和安全地带部队指挥官的直接控制程度目前尚不清楚，但阿拉伯联合酋长国仍有能力通过南方过渡委员会行使起码的指挥权。夏卜瓦精锐部队和也门政府军之间在夏卜瓦和阿比扬的紧张对峙持续到 2019 年 12 月。

28. 2019 年 6 月 9 日左右，西海岸部队的领导人在联合部队指挥架构下整合，这个架构由大约 11 名高级指挥官组成，其中包括来自 Amaliqah 旅、Tihamah 旅、共和国卫队和 Haytham Qasem 旅的指挥官(见附件 9)。这是否会确保各部队之间加强协调仍有待观察，这些部队此前需要阿拉伯联合酋长国的监督才能有效运作。各团体之间依然存在分歧。阿拉伯联合酋长国附属的西海岸部队基本没有参与南方的冲突。¹⁸ 11 月在利雅得讨论了将部分西海岸部队并入也门政府部队单位的问题。¹⁹

3. 也门政府与南方过渡委员会附属部队之间的冲突

29. 2019 年 8 月 1 日，位于布里卡的 Jala'营地发生爆炸，造成 Munair al-Yafae(又名“Abu Yamama”)准将死亡。胡塞武装声称实施了这次袭击，并称同时使用了无人驾驶飞行器和导弹；但专家小组未能发现动用了其中任何一种武器的迹象。2019 年 8 月 7 日发生了枪击事件，据报造成参加 Abu Yamama 葬礼的 3 人死亡，南方过渡委员会副主席 Hani Ali Salem Binbrek 随后公开呼吁攻占总统府。²⁰ 专家小组认为，Binbrek 利用委员会副主席的职权，动员安全地带部队等武装团体采取武力行动，削弱了也门政府在亚丁和阿比扬的控制和权威。

¹⁸ 2019 年 10 月，部分 Amaliqah 旅离开西海岸前往阿比扬。经西海岸部队确认。另见 <http://en.adenpress.news/news/13462>。

¹⁹ 参与讨论的个人和也门政府消息人士。

²⁰ 专家小组的存档电视讲话摘录。另见 www.stcaden.com/news/10094。

30. 也门政府部队的实力多年来一直在减弱(见 S/2018/594 和 S/2019/83), 在 4 天的冲突之后, 南方过渡委员会于 2019 年 8 月 10 日宣布完全控制亚丁。²¹ 位于亚丁的总统保护旅等也门政府部队战败, 哈迪总统在亚丁所剩无几的权力被扫荡。按照也门政府的说法, 安全地带部队甚至在 2019 年 6 月还在也门政府行动控制之下,²² 2019 年 8 月 7 日却投靠了南方过渡委员会。(见附件 8)。

31. 南方过渡委员会在阿比扬和拉赫季的部分地区(区域安全地带部队在这些地区已有强大的存在和控制力)的领土和军事征服迫使也门政府部队投降。2019 年 8 月第三周, 委员会的推进行动在夏卜瓦受阻(见第 33 段)。亚丁和阿塔克的战斗表明, 尽管两支部队都声称实力雄厚, 但都没有能力开展持久的军事行动。

32. 南方过渡委员会与也门政府的冲突存在 3 个具有广泛影响的转折点: 第一个转折点是在夏卜瓦省的对抗, 其意义之重相当于在亚丁的对抗。委员会附属团体向正规部队投降,²³ 很大程度上是因为夏卜瓦精锐部队出现分裂。夏卜瓦精锐部队第 3 旅和第 6 旅决定遵循部落决定, 不参与作战(见附件 9)。这一决定对委员会的伤害大于对也门政府的伤害。

33. 2019 年 6 月, 夏卜瓦精锐部队和也门政府也在夏卜瓦省发生了严重军事对抗, 这可能是亚丁事件的前兆, 可能增强了各部落防止惨剧重演的决心(见附件 10)。部落拒绝参战的另一个可能原因是不允许外部干涉其对产油区和输油区的领土控制。夏卜瓦战役表明, 也门政府和(或)联军控制区的武装团体之所以效忠, 可能主要是因为可获得经济资源, 而不是分离愿望或外部财政支持。

34. 第二个转折点是 2019 年 8 月 28 日和 29 日, 阿拉伯联合酋长国对准备夺回亚丁控制权的也门政府军事单位发动空袭。空袭阻止了也门政府军进入亚丁, 为南方过渡委员会创造了军事优势, 随后委员会重新控制了阿比扬。²⁴

35. 第三个转折点是签署《利雅得协定》。这份协定进一步削弱了也门政府在其部队中的权威, 因为联军司令部现在对军事决策实施直接监督权。与规定内政部享有安全部队自主监督权的安保安排附件不同, 军事安排附件严重限制和削弱了也门政府对部队重组及其武器的权力和控制。是否会与也门政府协商做出这方面的决定尚待观察。

36. 还有一个风险是, 协定设想将正规部队之前的对手编入其军事单位(例如在也门政府军取得胜利的夏卜瓦), 而这可能会遭到正规部队人员的抵制。²⁵ 也门政府和沙特阿拉伯希望建立一支由统一军事指挥部领导的联合部队, 而事实上南方过

²¹ 也门政府部队的零星抵抗持续存在。

²² 2018 年 10 月, 在亚丁与政府官员举行专家小组会议。

²³ 夏卜瓦正规部队有来自也门政府和(或)联军控制的其他地区的增援部队。

²⁴ 尽管专家小组提出了要求, 也门政府和阿拉伯联合酋长国都没有为独立核实各自说法提供关于这些空袭的信息。

²⁵ 夏卜瓦官方机密来源。

渡委员会附属武装团体则秉持其部落身份和族群利益，这两者之间的紧张关系始终存在。

4. 在塔伊兹的战斗

37. 8月亚丁事件发生后，也门政府部队内部在塔伊兹多次激烈交火，其中包括第35旅和阿布·阿巴斯部队与 Al-Hashd al-Sha'bi 武装团体(附属于也门改革集团)支持的第4山地步兵旅之间的冲突。这些事件反映了也门政府武装部队内部的分裂以及也门政府在控制部队方面面临的挑战。(见附件11和12)。²⁶

E. 针对阿拉伯半岛基地组织及伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国的持续反恐行动

38. 整个2019年，阿拉伯半岛基地组织及伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)都力求站稳脚跟，同时继续在贝达等地为争夺领土控制权和人员招募进行战斗。使用“阿拉伯半岛基地组织”名号的意义似乎是证明打击对手是正当之举，或者从反恐行动中获得支持(见表1)。

39. 贝达的一些酋长告诉专家小组，他们与阿拉伯半岛基地组织偶有联系，但这样做只是为了在没有也门政府支持的情况下保护其领土不受胡塞武装的攻击。²⁷ 接受了些许也门政府军事支持的贝达两个农村地区的社区称，防御形势令人担忧，所持武器不足以对抗胡塞武装和阿拉伯半岛基地组织及伊黎伊斯兰国。

40. 阿拉伯半岛基地组织力求与东道主社区接触，包括在认定对手原因方面争取共鸣。例如，为拉拢支持，阿拉伯半岛基地组织在贝达发表的一封信中详细阐述了阿拉伯联合酋长国附属部队据称对部落的侵犯行为，警告贝达部落也可能遭受同样的命运。相比之下，一些部落认为伊黎伊斯兰国比胡塞武装或阿拉伯半岛基地组织更为残暴。

41. 阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国受到抵制情况如表3所示。然而，2019年9月，胡塞武装在贝达与阿拉伯半岛基地组织进行了囚犯交换。²⁸ 在安全地带部队和部分夏卜瓦精锐部队投靠南方过渡委员会后，这些部队可能更注重巩固对领土的控制，而不是打击恐怖主义。

表3

2019年被逮捕的阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国领导人

姓名	职位	逮捕地点	逮捕实体	逮捕日期
Bialal Muhammad Ali al-Wafi(Abu al -Walid) ^a	伊黎伊斯兰国塔伊兹领导人	塔伊兹 Jebel Habshi	也门第17步兵旅特种部队	2019年5月18日
Abu Osama al-Muhajir ^b	伊黎伊斯兰国也门领导人	马哈拉省	沙特和也门特种部队	2019年6月3日

²⁶ 2019年12月2日，第35旅旅长 Adnan Hamadi 在塔伊兹被杀。

²⁷ 机密来源。

²⁸ www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/18/c_138401577.htm。专家小组收到了阿拉伯半岛基地组织被交换战斗人员的名单。

姓名	职位	逮捕地点	逮捕实体	逮捕日期
不详 ^c	伊黎伊斯兰国也门首席财务官	马哈拉省	沙特和也门特种部队	2019年6月3日
Majid al-Sarari	Abu Abdullah al-Masri 的同伴	未知	胡塞武装	萨那当局 2019年6月向专家组确认逮捕
Hashem Mohsen Aiderous al-Hamed ^d	阿拉伯半岛基地组织协助者	夏卜瓦省	夏卜瓦精锐部队	2019年8月17日；与 al-Hamed 一起被捕的一名已知同伙于 2019年12月获释

资料来源：专家组(关于在塔伊兹被捕的阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国个人，见机密附件 13)

^a <https://apnews.com/91fc48d39fed471a9ce0486482f54111>。

^b <https://apnews.com/6fc370591b2046b08e6845899c80d643>。

^c 也门政府情报人士和沙特消息人士证实了媒体报道。

^d 美国财政部消息。新闻稿见 www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0091.aspx。

F. 胡塞武装的外部联系

1. 胡塞武装与伊朗伊斯兰共和国的关系

42. 伊朗的官方立场是继续支持实施联合国斡旋达成的停火、人道主义援助和促进也门内部的和平对话。²⁹ 2018年8月，胡塞武装任命易卜拉欣·穆罕默德·戴拉米为也门驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国新任大使。2019年11月19日，伊朗伊斯兰共和国总统哈桑·鲁哈尼正式接受戴拉米担任也门大使，支持胡塞武装正式建立国际存在。³⁰ 伊斯兰革命卫队最近表示只提供咨询和意识形态支持。³¹ 不过，还应注意第 61 段所载信息。

2. 冲突与该地区不断增加的袭击事件之间的关联

43. 5月12日，阿拉伯联合酋长国海岸 Fujairah 附近的油轮遭到袭击，使对阿曼湾的安全关切加剧。两天后，沙特东西管道上的两个泵站遭到无人驾驶飞行器空袭，胡塞武装声称对空袭负责。随后，6月13日波斯湾的油轮遭袭，8月17日 Shaybah 的石油设施再次遭袭。当天，阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞声称对 Shaybah 的袭击是对阿拉伯联合酋长国的警告，并指出阿拉伯联合酋长国境内的目标如今在胡塞武装无人驾驶飞行器的射程内。这些事件似乎是9月14日无人驾驶飞行器和地面攻击巡航导弹协同攻击艾卜盖格和胡赖斯油田的导火索。不到一周后，9月20日，最高政治理事会主席 Mahdi al-Mashat 称，如果重新开放萨那机

²⁹ 2019年11月专家组在纽约与伊朗伊斯兰共和国的会议。

³⁰ <https://debrief.net/en/news-12795.html>。

³¹ www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2017/11/24/1582883/iran-providing-yemen-with-advisory-assistance-irgc-commander。

场并开放荷台达航运通道，胡塞武装将停止向沙特阿拉伯发射导弹，同时表示支持执行《斯德哥尔摩协议》。³²

G. 利雅得协定

44. 8月亚丁事件发生后，沙特阿拉伯邀请南方过渡委员会和也门政府代表前往吉达进行会谈。阿拉伯联合酋长国鼓励南方过渡委员会参加这些会谈。³³ 因此，2019年11月5日签署了《利雅得协定》。

45. 专家小组注意到，伊朗伊斯兰共和国和胡塞武装都拒绝接受该协定，指出协定将也门政府置于沙特阿拉伯的“托管”之下。这份协定削弱了也门政府对正规军的权威，因为沙特阿拉伯现在直接监督本是也门政府专属特权的军事决策(见第35和36段)。专家小组注意到，尽管签署协定在防止紧张局势进一步升级方面令人称道，但协定规定的时限基本上没有得到遵守。

46. 除了南方过渡委员会和也门政府寻求和解外，胡塞武装和沙特阿拉伯之间的讨论也在持续进行。10月和11月，联军对也门的空袭大幅减少，没有报道胡塞武装向沙特阿拉伯发动导弹或无人驾驶飞行器袭击。胡塞武装于9月30日释放了290名囚犯，沙特于11月28日释放了128名胡塞武装在押人员。³⁴ 同样在11月，沙特阿拉伯国防部副部长哈立德·本·萨勒曼前往马斯喀特，据报与胡塞武装代表进行了直接或间接会谈。³⁵ 由于沙特阿拉伯和胡塞武装现在都公开表示正在进行讨论，双方有可能开辟一条通往和平的道路。

H. 也门脆弱的经济

47. 也门与邻国建立牢固的经济关系对也门的和平、安全与稳定至关重要。这种关系的关键因素是移民劳工和汇款。冲突前，预计汇款总收入为33.5亿美元，³⁶ 其中90%是从海湾合作委员会进入也门。在总收入中，61.5%来自沙特阿拉伯。汇款流入规模大于援助流入规模。援助流入在20亿到40亿美元之间，海湾地区的捐助者是主要援助方。

48. 人们认为流入也门的汇款相对持稳，但汇款手段多种多样。这种多样性以及从银行和大型货币兑换公司转向非正式的汇款网络，使监测汇款变得困难。

49. 移民劳工劳动条件的特点并不简单。沙特阿拉伯当局认识到也门人面临的问题，2015年4月赦免了在沙特阿拉伯工作的无证也门人，并颁发每6个月可续的签证。然而，随之出现家属和许可证年费的上涨以及逐个部门的沙特归化

³² www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-saudi/yemens-houthis-propose-to-saudi-arabia-that-both-sides-halt-missile-strikes-idUSKBN1W5261 和 <https://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13980704000249>。

³³ 2019年9月在阿布扎比与阿拉伯联合酋长国官员举行的小组会议。

³⁴ www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-290-detainees-were-released-facilitation-international-committee-red-cross-icrc 和 www.icrc.org/en/document/128-detainees-repatriated-back-yemen-saudi-arabia。

³⁵ <https://gulffnews.com/world/gulf/oman/khalid-bin-salman-meets-sultan-qaboos-in-oman-1.67778812>。

³⁶ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=YE>。

裁决，目前对侨民汇款产生了严重负面影响。每个普通移民如今每年支付大约 2 500 美元的费用。³⁷

三. 武器以及定向武器禁运的执行情况

50. 根据安全理事会第 2216(2015)号决议第 14 至 17 段，专家小组重点关注一系列监测和调查活动，确定是否有任何违反定向武器禁运的行为，包括向安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议所设委员会指认的个人和实体或为这些个人和实体的利益直接或间接供应、出售或转让军火的行为。

51. 专家小组检查了在也门缴获的武器和军火相关材料，其中包括联军 2018 年 12 月 10 日在亚丁缴获的 56-1 型突击步枪、火箭榴弹(RPG-7)发射器和相关光学瞄准具(见第 61 段)。专家小组还检查了联军 2019 年 1 月下旬在焦夫缴获的一大批货物，其中包括制造 Qasef 和 Samad 系列武装无人驾驶飞行器的一些部件，这些货物在也门境内被发现之前曾运往阿曼。这证实了专家小组的分析，即途经也门焦夫和东南部的陆上走私路线仍然具有重要意义。专家小组还检查了 2018 年 11 月初在阿布扎比运往萨那途中缴获的一批伺服致动器，这些致动器可能用于建造无人驾驶飞行器和(或)水上简易爆炸装置(见第 63 段)。附件 18 中的地图概述了专家小组在本报告所述期间记录的胡塞武装的军火和相关物资供应网络。

52. 专家小组注意到媒体报道，即 2019 年 11 月 25 日，美国福雷斯特·谢尔曼号导弹驱逐舰(DDG-98)在阿拉伯海对一艘无国籍船只进行国旗核查时缴获了一批武器。³⁸ 专家小组检查了缴获的武器，指出其中包括 21 枚反坦克导弹(很可能是伊朗 Dehlavieh 版的 9M133 短号反坦克导弹)，2 枚以前未知的地对空导弹，以及 1 枚 Quds-1 地面攻击巡航导弹、1 枚 C802 反舰巡航导弹和第三枚型号不明巡航导弹的组件。这批货物还包括大量雷管、水上简易爆炸装置的组装部件、热光武器瞄准具和其他部件(见附件 20)。专家小组获悉，该船是一艘 12 米长的道船，有 11 名也门船员，该船后来被移交给也门海岸警卫队，驶往也门海岸。专家小组正在调查这批货物是否可能企图违反定向军火禁运，并要求提供更多信息，如缴获行动的坐标、船只名称及船员姓名、获取全球定位系统和卫星电话数据情况，以及与船员和登船者面谈的机会。目前正在等待答复。

53. 胡塞武装继续向也门战场以外地区动用武力，使用无人驾驶飞行器和地面攻击巡航导弹袭击沙特阿拉伯境内目标(见图二)。在本报告所述期间有两大明显趋势。胡塞武装主要依靠近程无人驾驶飞行器完成对沙特阿拉伯南部边界附近目标的袭击和对也门境内的空袭。专家小组认为这些无人机是在胡塞控制区制造的。这些袭击包括 2019 年 1 月 10 日对 Anad 空军基地阅兵队列的高调袭击，造成也


³⁷ 在沙特阿拉伯的也门外籍人员中，近一半的人每月收入不到 530 美元，因此每年 2 500 美元左右的费用是一个沉重负担。见：也门，规划及国际合作部，《2018 年也门社会经济最新动态》第 32 期，2018 年 2 月。见：https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/yseu32_english_final.pdf。

³⁸ www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-missiles-military-idUSKBN1Y82S1。

门政府至少 5 名士兵死亡，另有 20 名士兵受伤。³⁹ 这次袭击使用的是 1 枚 Qasef-2K 巡飞弹。第二个趋势是自 2019 年 5 月以来，部署更尖端、射程更远的无人驾驶飞行器和地面攻击巡航导弹，主要用于攻击沙特阿拉伯境内的目标。专家小组注意到，这些袭击恰逢《联合全面行动计划》引发区域和地缘政治紧张局势升级，似乎意在迫使沙特阿拉伯对胡塞武装采取更温和做法。

图二

经确认自 2019 年 5 月 14 日以来对沙特阿拉伯境内目标的空袭



注：该地图不包括使用 Qasef-2K 近程无人驾驶飞行器和 Badr-1 火箭炮对沙特阿拉伯南部边界地区目标的多次袭击，其中包括 2019 年 6 月 23 日对艾卜哈国际机场的致命袭击。

54. 胡塞武装声称对距离其领土 1 200 公里的目标的袭击负责，例如 2019 年 9 月 14 日对沙特阿美艾卜盖格工厂的空袭。专家小组怀疑，那次袭击中使用的无人驾驶飞行器和地面攻击巡航导弹是否有足够的射程从胡塞武装控制的也门领土发射(见附件 14)。然而，使用相同武器的其他袭击似乎确实发射自也门。专家小组认为这些相对尖端武器不是在也门研发和制造的，这意味着这些武器的进口违反了定向武器禁运。专家小组正在调查部件的保管链，以查明这两个系统的制造商(见附件 15 和 16)。这些袭击的有效性提高，也显示使用此类武器对全球军备控制和反扩散努力构成严峻挑战，因为这突出表明，关键基础设施尽管远离前线，却十分脆弱。袭击者只需要一个普通工业制造基地和从国外采购的高科技零部件，而这些零部件大部分不被归类为武器，甚至不是军民两用物品。

³⁹ www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/houthi-drone-attack-hits-military-base-yemen-reports-190110071518307.html。

55. 与前几年不同，胡塞武装没有成功进行海上袭击，2019 年试图使用水上简易爆炸装置实施的袭击次数大幅减少。联合国斡旋的荷台达港停火以及其他沿海基地被联军夺取似乎有助于减少对民用航运的袭击。

A. 无人驾驶飞行器

56. 专家小组注意到两种射程更远的新型无人驾驶飞行器，用于攻击沙特阿拉伯的目标。第一种是增程型无人驾驶飞行器-X (UAV-X)，⁴⁰ 其特点是在机身顶部增加了一个燃料箱，但在其他方面与原始版本基本相似。这种无人驾驶飞行器用于 2019 年 8 月 17 日袭击 Shaybah 油田。根据胡塞武装的说法，这次袭击行动名为“第一次经济威慑行动”，使用了 10 架这种类型的无人驾驶飞行器。⁴¹ 油田只遭受了有限的破坏，袭击的意义似乎在于 Shaybah 的位置，Shaybah 靠近阿拉伯联合酋长国边境，距离胡塞控制区 1 000 多公里。专家小组检查了这次袭击所用一架无人驾驶飞行器的残骸，注意到它似乎与胡塞武装附属媒体 2019 年 7 月 7 日展示的 Samad-3 型无人驾驶飞行器相似(见图三)。⁴² 根据这一名称，专家小组今后将把 UAV-X 称为 Samad 无人驾驶飞行器。⁴³

图三

胡塞武装展示的 Samad-3 型无人驾驶飞行器(上图)，专家小组在 Shaybah 袭击后检查的无人驾驶飞行器(下图)



资料来源：www.almasirah.net/ (上图)，专家小组(下图)。

⁴⁰ 胡塞武装于 2018 年首次使用 UAV-X 袭击沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国境内的目标(见 S/2019/83，第 84 段和附件 12)。

⁴¹ https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=8322&cat_id=1。

⁴² www.almasirah.net/。

⁴³ “Samad-1” 据称指的是武装无人机 Samad-2/UAV-X 的侦察版本。

57. 第二种新型无人驾驶飞行器目前尚未在胡塞附属媒体上展示。这种无人机由三角洲公司设计，翼展 215 厘米，长度 190-210 厘米。专家小组在沙特阿拉伯检查了若干这类无人驾驶飞行器的残骸，注意到机翼和机身结构包括碳纤维夹层。其内部遵循这类无人驾驶飞行器的标准设计，即机头锥包含弹头，之后是制导系统、燃料箱和后置推杆配置的转子发动机。制造质量整体上似乎明显好于更具“国产”质量的 Qasef-2K 和 Samad 等其他胡塞无人驾驶飞行器。附件 15 较详细概述了无人驾驶飞行器组件。这种迄今未命名的无人驾驶飞行器曾两次被用于袭击沙特阿拉伯：2019 年 5 月 14 日袭击东西输油管道上位于 Dawadimi 和 Afif 的两个泵站(见图四)，以及 2019 年 9 月 14 日高调袭击沙特阿美公司在艾卜盖格的工厂。后一次行动被胡塞发言人称为“第二次经济威慑行动”。⁴⁴ 附件 14 提供了这次袭击的详细案例研究。

图四

攻击 Afif 所用三角洲公司设计的无人驾驶飞行器的残骸



资料来源：专家小组。

B. 地面攻击巡航导弹

58. 专家小组检查了一种新型地面攻击巡航导弹碎片，其长度约为 5.6 米，直径 35 厘米，由碳纤维制成，经金属和其他材料部分加固。在至少四次对沙特阿拉伯平民目标的袭击中使用了这种武器：2019 年 6 月 12 日和 8 月 28 日对艾卜哈国际机场的两次袭击，2019 年 6 月 19 日对 Shuqaiq 咸水淡化厂的袭击，以及 2019 年 9 月 14 日对沙特阿美公司设施的袭击。专家小组认为，这些导弹基本上与 2019 年 6 月 7 日胡塞武装附属媒体首次公开展示的 Quds-1 地面攻击巡航导弹相同(见图五)。⁴⁵ 因此，专家小组将使用这个名称来指代该类型导弹。

⁴⁴ https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=8774&cat_id=1。

⁴⁵ www.almasirah.net。

图五
展示的 Quds-1 地面攻击巡航导弹(上图)与在沙特阿拉伯检查的导弹碎片(下图)



资料来源: www.almasirah.net/ (上图), 专家小组(下图)。

59. 专家小组注意到, Quds-1 以经典巡航导弹设计为基础, 具有圆柱形机身、两个固定翼、三个后置控制面和一个配备导弹弹头的机头锥。主发动机未经许可复制了捷克 PBS Velká Bíteš 生产的 TJ-100 涡轮喷气发动机,⁴⁶ 安装在外部。⁴⁷ 安装在后部的固体推进剂火箭助推器有四个固定稳定翼, 在发射阶段提供额外推力, 然后自动分离。导弹主体由独立的部分组成, 这些部分用数字标记, 可能是为了便于组装。

60. 专家小组根据制造质量认为 Quds-1 导弹并非在也门开发和生产。一些涡轮喷气发动机上标记的生产日期为 2019 年, 而且在 2019 年 6 月之前并未部署上述导弹, 专家小组据此认为, 这些导弹是违反定向武器禁运交给胡塞武装的。附件 16 概述了记录在案的导弹碎片部件。专家小组正在追踪这些部件的保管链, 以查明将这些部件组装到导弹中的个人或实体。

⁴⁶ 见 www.pbs.cz。

⁴⁷ 在胡塞武装附属媒体展示的图片中, 发动机安装在机身顶部; 但有一些迹象表明, 展示的导弹是“颠倒的”, 即涡轮喷气发动机实际安装在导弹机身下方, 就像伊朗的 Soumar 和 Ya Ali 巡航导弹一样, 该导弹可能由这两者演变而来。

C. 非法贩运小武器和轻武器

61. 专家小组继续调查联军部队 2018 年 12 月 10 日在亚丁扣押的小武器和轻武器的保管链以及预期接收人。根据阿拉伯联合酋长国提供的消息, 这批货物包括 178 支轻机枪、48 个火箭榴弹发射器和 45 个火箭榴弹发射器光学瞄准具。专家小组认为, 这些武器要么是运往名单所列人员控制下的武装团体(这将违反定向武器禁运), 要么是运往阿拉伯半岛基地组织和伊黎伊斯兰国等恐怖主义团体(这种情况将对也门的和平安全与稳定构成威胁)。迄今为止, 专家小组只能在阿布扎比检查这些武器中的样本(见附件 19), 出于专家小组无法控制的原因, 原计划对亚丁的两次检查访问被取消。根据样本, 专家小组确定这些步枪是 2018 年在中国生产的,⁴⁸ 而火箭榴弹发射器的技术特征与伊朗伊斯兰国生产的 RPG-7 发射器相似。专家小组已与中国和伊朗伊斯兰国联系, 要求提供有关这些武器保管链的信息。中国尚未作出回应, 但伊朗伊斯兰国已告知专家小组, RPG-7 发射器不符合伊朗武器的特征, 看起来像是“东欧集团”生产的发射器。关于光学瞄准具, 专家小组获得证据表明, 记录的七位数字序列号与 PGO-7V3 半拆卸套件上的编号相符, 这些套件由白俄罗斯生产, 并于 2016 年出口到德黑兰的 Paya Pardaz Asia, 从最终用户证书来看, 它们的目的地是伊朗伊斯兰国国防和武装部队后勤部。将光学瞄准具运往也门可能构成违反定向武器禁运。专家小组已与伊朗伊斯兰国联系并获悉, 经专家小组记录序列号的瞄准具已分发给伊朗的不同军事单位, 目前正在使用中。专家小组仍在调查此事。

D. 胡塞武装无人驾驶飞行器商用民用部件的供应模式

62. 专家小组仍然认为, Qasef 和 Samad 各型无人驾驶飞行器是在胡塞控制区制造的, 使用了当地现有材料(如用于制造机身和机翼的玻璃纤维以及制造载荷的炸药和滚珠轴承)和国外采购的高价值部件。对无人驾驶飞行器残骸的分析以及最近两次缴获的无人驾驶飞行器部件都支持了这一理论。2019 年 1 月, 在焦夫省缴获了近三吨部件。这批货物包括一些 DLE 110 和 DLE 170 发动机, 这些发动机已作为 Qasef 和 Samad 无人驾驶飞行器部件记录在案, 此外还有排气机、电子点火箱、副翼和大量螺旋桨, 以及其他用途尚未确定的设备。⁴⁹ 专家小组根据运输标签, 通过这批货物追溯到中国香港的一家公司, 该公司将货物出口到一家在马斯喀特的名为 Bahjat Alleqa'a 的实体。2019 年 12 月 2 日, 这批货物被人从马斯喀特国际机场提走, 一个月后再次出现在焦夫省, 因此 Bahjat Alleqa'a 可能是为转运提供便利的中间商。专家小组要求阿曼提供更多信息, 说明 Bahjat Alleqa'a 和(或)在机场提货的个人的身份, 但尚未收到答复。

63. 第二起案件涉及 2018 年 11 月初试图出口 60 台 SSPS-105 伺服致动器, 在这起案件中, 据推测相关民用技术将被用于制造武器化无人驾驶飞行器或水上简易爆炸

⁴⁸ 这些武器的特点类似于 2018 年 8 月 28 日美国海军 Jason Dunham 号(DDG-109)从也门沿海一艘小船上缴获的 2 500 多支突击步枪(见 S/2019/83 第 95 至 97 段)。专家小组曾联系中国, 要求提供有关这些武器保管链的信息, 中国告知专家小组“中国企业从未向也门出售过这些武器”。

⁴⁹ 专家小组记录了这批货物中可用于生产杀伤人员地雷引信的部件。

装置。⁵⁰ 这些货物从日本出口到阿布扎比名为 Saleh Mohsen Saed Saleh 的收货人，已知 Al-Bairaq 使用 Saleh Mohsen Saed Saleh 的电话号码进行国际陆路运输，Al-Bairaq 是一家在阿拉伯联合酋长国和也门之间提供运输服务的公司。⁵¹ 专家小组确定也门的进口商为 Al-Swari 贸易和进口公司，该公司地址和电子邮件与 Al-Swari 橡胶制造集团相同。一位名叫 Mohammed al-Swari 的人似乎与这两家公司以及第三家公司 Hashem 兄弟国际贸易公司有关联。根据 Hashem 兄弟国际贸易公司的网站，该公司专门供应军事装备，包括无人驾驶飞行器部件。

64. 这两起案件，以及专家小组 2018 年在两架早期型号 Samad 无人驾驶飞行器残骸中发现 3W-110iB2 无人驾驶飞行器发动机的案件(专家小组追查至 2015 年 7 月从德国经希腊和土耳其向物流公司 Giti Reslan Kala 出口的一批货物，该公司代表德黑兰 Tafe Gostar Atlas 公司接收了这批货物)(见 S/2019/83，第 87 段)，表明了这种供应模式(三起案件详情见附件 17)。工业化国家的商业制造商通过中间人网络将民用部件出口到胡塞控制区，之后民用部件被组装到无人驾驶飞行器和水上简易爆炸装置中，用于攻击平民目标。鉴于这些部件本身没有被归类为武器或两用物品，制造商和海关当局通常都没有意识到它们正被用于胡塞武装的武器系统，这阻碍了专家小组的调查工作，但有助于胡塞武装进行战备。

四. 经济背景和融资活动概况

65. 专家小组根据任务规定，继续调查名单所列个人及其网络继续违反制裁措施或采取可能符合指认标准的行动的经济背景。

A. 胡塞控制区的非法收入

66. 如专家小组上次报告(S/2019/83，第 100-102 段)所述，胡塞武装继续在受其控制的荷台达和萨利夫港征收关税。他们还继续在贯穿 A'far(贝达省)、扎马尔省、(阿姆兰省)和 Jabal Ra's(荷台达省)的主要公路上再次征收关税，几乎所有进口货物在从阿曼和沙特阿拉伯的陆地过境点以及穆卡拉和亚丁港口抵达也门后，都要经过这些公路。

1. 胡塞武装从燃料进口获得收入

67. 燃料进口一直被视为胡塞武装的主要收入来源；然而，专家小组注意到，根据专家小组 2018 年 1 月的报告估计，通过荷台达省进口的燃料仅占胡塞武装税收的 5.5%。⁵² 胡塞武装经济委员会报告说，2019 年 8 月至 10 月期间，通过荷台达

⁵⁰ 应当指出，专家小组迄今没有在胡塞部队使用的无人驾驶飞行器残骸中发现任何 SSPS-105 伺服致动器的记录。然而，专家小组在 2016 年 10 月在阿富汗坠毁的一架 Shahed-123 无人驾驶飞行器残骸以及 2019 年 11 月 25 日在阿拉伯海查获的货物中发现了相同制造商生产的伺服致动器。

⁵¹ 见 <https://transportation-service-2994.business.site/> 和 www.seiyun.net/TransportOfficeAssets/albairagtransport_wm.jpg。

⁵² 专家小组估计胡塞武装至少征收了 4 070 亿也门里亚尔(S/2018/594，第 127 段)。

省进口燃料的关税和税收收入达 20 660 750 367 也门里亚尔。⁵³ 专家小组使用这一数字以及联合国核查和视察机制的数据(该数据显示同期进口 508 300 吨, 2019 年 1 月至 11 月进口 1991 158 吨)表明, 2019 年全年进口总额为 225 亿也门里亚尔。⁵⁴ 这表明, 燃料进口税不是主要收入来源, 因此不应成为关于第 49(2019)号法令⁵⁵ 和《斯德哥尔摩协议》公务员薪金支付规定执行情况的主要讨论焦点。

68. 执行第 75(2018)号⁵⁶ 和第 49(2019)号法令一直被用作也门政府和胡塞武装之间的经济战工具, 特别是在 2019 年 7 月至 10 月期间, 并对平民产生了负面影响。也门政府通过联军延误了联军控制区的一些油轮行程, 理由是它们没有提供通过银行为货物付款的证据, 也没有在也门政府经济委员会指定的银行缴纳关税。⁵⁷ 胡塞武装的回应是, 如果油轮进口商遵守第 75 或 49 号法令, 就将拒绝其油轮入境。

69. 专家小组调查了油轮延误情况(见附件 21)。专家小组收到了也门政府和联军的确认, 即 8 月 13 日至 10 月 15 日, 联合国核查和视察机制放行的 11 艘油轮因未能遵守第 49 号法令而被联军延误。

2. 通过燃料进口获得外部融资

70. 如上次报告(S/2019/83)第 103 段所述, 专家小组继续调查外来资金资助的燃料进口案件, 此类燃料进口可能为代表阿卜杜勒马利克·胡塞行事的胡塞武装分子创收。

71. 专家小组收集了收货人(Matrix Oil、也门 Elaf 和 Albarakah)出具的文件, 表明四艘油轮运载的燃料在伊朗港口装船, 却谎称是在阿曼装船。详情见附件 22。

72. 2016 年 10 月 18 日至 2017 年 5 月 25 日, 上述托运人通过阿曼境内的货币兑换所和银行账户转账, 分 19 期支付了 21 095 922 阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拉姆(约合 5 743 200 美元)的租赁费。⁵⁸ 专家小组在致伊朗伊斯兰共和国⁵⁹ 和阿曼⁶⁰ 的公函中分享了这一信息, 寻求能够证明燃料并非捐赠而是出售的证据。伊朗伊斯兰共和国答复说, “它既没有出售任何运往也门的燃料, 也没有向该国转交任何

⁵³ 2019 年 11 月 11 日发布的声明, 见 www.saba.ye/ar/news3078500.htm。

⁵⁴ 专家小组估计平均每月征税 7 357 648 200 里亚尔。

⁵⁵ 第 49 号法令旨在迫使进口商为通过胡塞武装控制的港口(荷台达和萨利夫)进口的货物向也门政府支付关税。

⁵⁶ 第 75 号法令旨在遏制通过货币兑换所为进口融资。

⁵⁷ 距离荷台达约 140 海里的区域(见附件 21, 图 21.1)。

⁵⁸ 9 546 852 阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拉姆来自阿拉伯联合酋长国 Al Bader 货币兑换所, 3 169 980 阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拉姆来自阿拉伯联合酋长国 Abu Sumbol 一般贸易有限公司(Abu Sumbol General Trading LLC), 7 486 091 阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拉姆从 2017 年 2 月至 4 月分 6 期从阿曼的银行账户 0500005126001001 转账, 1 832 499 阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拉姆来自马斯喀特一家名为健康世界国际有限公司(Health world International LLC)(见 www.healthworld-international.com/)。

⁵⁹ 2019 年 10 月 29 日的信。

⁶⁰ 2019 年 5 月 29 日的信。

燃料”，“根据[该国]的技术分析，[专家小组]信中所附文件不实”。专家小组尚未收到阿曼的答复。专家小组继续调查这些交易中的阿曼主要行为体。

B. 非法融资

73. 专家小组正在调查与非法贩运武器出入也门有关的融资问题，这些武器的收入可为名单所列人员所用，或用于资助威胁也门和平与安全的行为。

74. 专家小组在上次报告(S/2018/193)第 80 段和附件 41 中提供了有关 2014 年和 2015 年为吉布提国防部购买 8 000 支巴西制造的金牛座左轮手枪的案件资料，其中 5 000 支抵达吉布提的 Ambouli 国际机场。上述进口是也门军火贩运人 Fares Mohammed Mana'a(列入根据安全理事会第 751(1992)号决议设立和维持的制裁名单，永久参考号为 SOi.008)作为中间人撮合完成的，他于 2014 年底被任命为萨达省省长，自 2016 年 7 月 28 日起，在胡塞武装控制的萨那担任国务部长。

75. 专家小组已在 Telegram 网站⁶¹ 上看到萨那军火贩运人销售广告中金牛座手枪的几张照片。照片上显示的手枪序列号为 TGZ50281、TGZ51161 和 TGZ51212(见附件 23)。专家小组有证据表明，第一支手枪于 2014 年 3 月 17 日送达吉布提。⁶² 专家小组正在寻求确认手枪的保管链，以及关于将手枪转运到也门的时间和可能将其出售给胡塞武装的情况说明。专家小组有一份 8 000 支手枪的订购单副本，上面写着 Mana'a 先生之子 Adeeb Mana'a 的名字，和一家与他们有关联的公司名字 Itkhan，传真号在也门。专家小组有证据表明，位于吉布提贸易大道的 Itkhan 普通贸易和狩猎公司在吉布提国际商业银行拥有一个账号 000010200451761，并用该账号支付购买武器的费用。

C. 与也门政府有关联的官员挪用公款

1. 也门政府官员收取的收入

76. 专家小组注意到，马里卜省、马哈拉省和哈德拉毛省收取的收入仍被官员侵吞，没有受到亚丁的也门中央银行的任何有效控制。专家小组收到也门官员提供的信息，指控地方领导人挪用马里卜省天然气销售以及马哈拉省港口和过境点关税所得资金，非法获益。

2. 操纵外汇汇率牟取利润

77. 专家小组调查了 2018 年末对也门中央银行进行外汇交易的相关腐败指控。也门政府经济委员会主席要求总理调查此案，⁶³ 此举强化了这一指控，当地媒体

⁶¹ <https://t.me/slah3568>。

⁶² 专家小组正在寻找其他两支左轮手枪的资料。

⁶³ 声称也门中央银行在 2018 年 11 月 4 日至 29 日期间因操纵外汇损失了 89.69 亿也门里亚尔。见 2019 年 1 月 20 日来文，可查阅 https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=241242340143182&id=100027722542809&sfnsn=mo。

对此广泛报道，导致也门中央银行行长于 2019 年 3 月 20 日被撤换。⁶⁴ 专家小组认为，正如也门 2005 年 11 月 7 日批准的 2003 年《联合国反腐败公约》所承认，腐败是对和平与安全的威胁。这种潜在腐败可能导致也门中央银行工作人员和也门政府官员非法获益，以及一些银行和货币兑换所在涉及利益冲突的情况下不当牟利。⁶⁵

78. 专家小组获得了可提供佐证的银行文件，证实也门中央银行在 2018 年 10 月 11 日至 12 月 28 日期间以 1 美元等值⁶⁶ 兑换 453 至 740 也门里亚尔的汇率进行了 69 笔外汇交易(15 笔出售沙特阿拉伯里亚尔，48 笔购买沙特阿拉伯里亚尔，6 笔购买美元)。⁶⁷ 专家小组确认，2018 年 12 月 31 日，也门中央银行的这些交易带来了 185 213 526 美元的等值资产(沙特阿拉伯里亚尔和美元)和 107 313 306 400 也门里亚尔的等值负债(见图六)。⁶⁸ 如果按当日市场汇率(1 沙特阿拉伯里亚尔兑换 131 也门里亚尔，1 美元兑 521 也门里亚尔)估值，也门中央银行的债务将会是 205 975 636 美元，从而在该投资组合中损失 20 762 110 美元，同时让承担投机风险的货币兑换所规避了亏损。上述大多数交易的汇率与萨那和亚丁市场上货币兑换所使用的汇率差距很大(见附件 24)。⁶⁹ 有关的私人银行告知专家小组，它们充当批发经纪行，利用外汇业务将现金从选定货币兑换所⁷⁰ 转至也门中央银行，经手的每个沙特阿拉伯里亚尔的最高对价为 1 也门里亚尔，即不到价值的 0.75%。他们解释说，与市场汇率有差异的原因是协议日期和交易记录之间有两到三天的间隔。⁷¹ 因此，商定汇率仍然可疑。

79. 虽然也门中央银行声称其行动使汇率得以稳定，但专家小组认为，汇率稳定的主要原因是加快开具由沙特保证金供资的信用证，该信用证的开具在 2018 年夏季陷入停滞。然而，这些交易使也门中央银行得以增加市场上的也门里亚尔流动性。胡塞武装禁止贸易商将现金转至亚丁的也门中央银行，而申请信用证要求

⁶⁴ Mohamed Zemam 自 2018 年 2 月 11 日以来担任也门中央银行行长，后由 Hafedh Mayad 接替，后者于 2019 年 9 月 19 日被 Ahmed Obaid al-Fadhli 接替；见 www.sabanew.net/viewstory/53794。Mayad 继续担任经济委员会主席和哈迪总统的顾问。

⁶⁵ 《联合国反腐败公约》将非法获益定义为“公职人员的资产显著增加，而本人无法用其合法收入作出合理解释。”

⁶⁶ 按 3.75 沙特阿拉伯里亚尔兑 1 美元的平均汇率计算。

⁶⁷ Al-Kuraimi 伊斯兰银行出售了 651 000 000 沙特阿拉伯里亚尔和 19 500 000 美元，购买了 147 006 200 沙特阿拉伯里亚尔。Tadhamon 国际伊斯兰银行出售了 109 760 000 沙特阿拉伯里亚尔。专家小组并没有指控上述银行挪用了任何资金。详情见附件 24，表 24.1.a 和 24.1.b。

⁶⁸ 发行的国家货币被认为是中央银行的负债。

⁶⁹ 没有已知的官方市场汇率；专家小组使用了货币兑换所在两个 Telegram 频道公布的汇率：也门外汇协会，<https://t.me/YEMENExchangersAssociation> 和 <https://t.me/NewsExchange>。


⁷⁰ 在 2018 年 10 月 21 日的一次会议上，就也门中央银行的外汇业务与经济委员会、Al-Kuraimi 伊斯兰银行、Tadhamon 国际伊斯兰银行、亚丁交易所公司、Al-Qutaibi 交易所公司和 Bin Awad 交易所公司达成了协议。

⁷¹ 这不符合行业规范，因为按照惯例，这种类型的外汇(即所谓即期外汇)在成交后的两个交易日后完成结算。

转移现金。申请信用证有助于套利；例如，2018年11月4日，某贸易商向亚丁中央银行售出2 000万沙特阿拉伯里亚尔，将获得38.1亿也门里亚尔(汇率为190.5)的贷项，并获得价值24 580 645沙特阿拉伯里亚尔的信用证(汇率为1沙特阿拉伯里亚尔兑155也门里亚尔)。⁷² 此外，同一银行在同一天回售给也门中央银行的2 000万沙特阿拉伯里亚尔将记录为借项37亿也门里亚尔，产生1.1亿也门里亚尔的额外套利。

图六

也门中央银行外汇业务资产负债表



⁷² 由沙特保证金供资的信用证适用的美元汇率从2018年10月9日开始为580也门里亚尔，从2018年11月20日开始为548也门里亚尔，从2018年11月22日开始为520也门里亚尔，从2018年12月4日开始为440也门里亚尔(数字来自也门中央银行告知贸易商的官方决定)。

80. 专家小组本来打算在 2019 年 11 月下旬访问亚丁，以便与也门中央银行接触，并获得关于其档案中特定账户的信息，同时与据报已对此案展开调查的中央控制和审计局接触。但出于安全原因，联合国取消了此次访问。

81. 此案表明，也门政府需要启动对也门中央银行的审计(上一次审计是在 2014 年)，并加强对重大金融交易的监督。《利雅得协定》多次提到打击腐败，佐证了存在对非法获益的关切。

D. 监测资产冻结措施

1. 侵吞资产冻结措施下的资金

82. 专家小组发现了一起也门银行不遵守资产冻结措施的案件，其中允许从萨利赫基金会持有的账户转账(该基金会的唯一受益人是艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫(YEi.005))，以致该基金会被胡塞武装侵吞。专家小组与相关银行进行了接触，告知它们有义务遵守制裁措施。然而，专家小组收到信息称，胡塞武装强迫银行将这些账户中的资金转给胡塞武装。

83. 专家小组收到的信息称，胡塞武装扣押了萨利赫家族在也门境内的资产，包括银行账户，这些资产由两名名单所列人员持有。胡塞武装正在利用完全没有对银行进行有效合规和控制的漏洞。亚丁的也门中央银行没有设立一个正常运作的金融调查股，也无法对总部处于胡塞武装控制下的银行施加任何影响。萨那的也门中央银行没有采取必要措施维护也门银行系统的健全性。这种情况可能进一步危及私人银行在管理对外支付进口款项、现金转移形式的人道主义援助以及汇款方面的信誉。几乎所有汇款业务都从银行转移到了货币兑换所进行，导致银行现在的转账资金数额不到冲突前的 20%。⁷³

2. 胡塞武装分子代表名单所列人员挪用资金

84. 专家小组认为，下列胡塞指挥官代表阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞 行事。安全理事会第 2216(2015)号决议关于对也门实施定向武器禁运的第 14 段规定，禁止为名单所列人员以及在也门代表他们或按照他们的指示行事的人提供与军事活动有关的财政或其他援助。

为战事洗钱

85. 专家小组获得的文件显示，胡塞武装通过订立没有有效预算控制的虚假供应合同，将公共资金转给战地指挥官。专家小组有文件显示，2016 年年中，萨那的也门中央银行向萨那一家名为 Levant Vision 的公司在萨那的一家私人银行的账户转账 48 亿也门里亚尔(2 200 万美元)，用于向革命委员会供应面粉(见附件 25)。Levant Vision 的现金流没有显示任何购买商品的付款，却显示向三名已知并非贸易商的人员转移了现金。现金流还显示，在现金从也门中央银行转到也门科威特银行一到两周内，有 4 559 000 000 也门里亚尔的现金被提取：Abdullah Abbas

⁷³ 对银行经理的约谈。

Abdullah Jahaf⁷⁴ 提取了 370 100 000 也门里亚尔，Ali Qassem Mohsen al-Ameer 提取了 2 098 900 000 也门里亚尔，Mohamed Abdullah Mohamed Hassan al-Moayed 提取了 2 090 000 000 也门里亚尔(见附件 25，表 25.1)。

胡塞武装非法侵吞

86. 专家小组在任务范围内调查了通过非法扣押资产为胡塞军事行动提供资金的问题。这些资产是从也门反对者手中没收的，这些反对者已被逮捕或被迫在也门境外避难。如此前一次报告(S/2018/594)第 154 段和附件 56 所述，胡塞武装成立了一个“查封叛徒资产委员会”，该委员会于 2017 年 12 月 23 日命令萨那的也门中央银行没收 1 223 名个人拥有的所有银行账户。此外，2019 年 9 月 14 日，萨那的特别刑事法院宣布没收 35 名不与胡塞武装结盟的也门议会议员拥有的资金。⁷⁵ 专家小组还认为，非法侵吞资金违反了适用的国际人权法和国际人道法。⁷⁶

87. 专家小组查明了一个网络，该网络参与转移源自非法侵吞私有资产的资金，包括根据安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议本应冻结的资产。被非法侵吞资金包括在也门工作的国际组织所资助项目的收入。

88. 该网络的主要行为体是 Saleh Mesfer Alshaer，据报，他在 2014 年之前是胡塞武装的军火商，⁷⁷ 与阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞关系密切。2018 年 9 月 15 日，他被任命为军事后勤支助部指挥官，⁷⁸ 军衔为少将(见图七)，并被任命为从胡塞武装反对派手中侵吞的资金和资产的司法保管人(见附件 26)。

⁷⁴ 据报，2019 年 2 月，名为 Abdullah Abbas Jahaf 的胡塞指挥官在哈杰的哈胡尔的战斗中被联军空袭打死。见 www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/02/01/-اليمن-مقتل-قيادي-حوثي-بغار-ات-للتحالف-في-حجة。

⁷⁵ <https://sabaanews.net/news3067799.htm>。

⁷⁶ 《世界人权宣言》第十七条(1948 年)；《阿拉伯人权宪章》第二十五条(1994 年)；1949 年 8 月 12 日日内瓦四公约关于保护非国际性武装冲突受害者的附加议定书第四条第二款第(七)项；红十字国际委员会关于习惯国际人道法规则 50 和 52 的研究报告(见 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul)。

⁷⁷ 专家小组有他的护照副本，包括 2013 年 10 月 7 日签发的一份注明其职业为贸易商的护照。另见 www.khlaasa.net/news168458.html。

⁷⁸ www.26sep.net/news_details.php?sid=141549。

图七

2018年9月15日, Saleh Mesfer Alshaer 少将在被任命为后勤支助部指挥官的仪式上



资料来源: www.26sep.net/news_details.php?sid=141549。

89. Alshaer 利用了一个位于萨那的网络, 该网络由家族成员、特别刑事法院、⁷⁹ 国家安全局、萨那的也门中央银行、贸易和工业部登记处以及一些私人银行组成。专家小组发现了他们的作案手法, 即敲诈、恐吓和非法逮捕公司经理和银行主管, 并胁迫他们遵守司法保管令, 否则就指控他们勾结敌人并从事间谍活动。国家安全局前副局长 Motlaq Amer al-Marrani 少将策划逮捕银行所有者、经理和工作人员, 在其中扮演了重要角色。⁸⁰ 表 4 列出了由专家小组收集证据的选定案件清单。该清单仅作为例证, 反映了可能旨在资助战事的广泛财务活动。

表 4

专家小组确定的被侵吞资产

侵吞对象	原所有者	查明收入
萨利赫基金会 ^a	艾哈迈德·阿里·阿布杜拉·萨利赫	艾哈迈德·阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫的资金
也门装甲公司 ^b	Ahmed Saleh Ali Arrahbi ^c	向一些联合国机构提供安保的费用 ^d
Twintech 理工大学 ^e	Khaled Rashad al-Alimi	学费
Sabafon	Al-Ahmar 家族, 包括 Hamed al-Ahmar	尚未查明

⁷⁹ 专家小组认定, 法院命令是在未经正当法律程序且受害者缺席的情况下签发的。此外, 专家小组没有在法院命令中看到任何措辞, 也没有收到任何证据表明“扣押[是]冲突所必需的”(见习惯国际人道法规则 50)。

⁸⁰ 这包括 2018 年 12 月初至 2019 年 2 月中旬、2019 年 3 月初至 4 月中旬和 2019 年 9 月初至 10 月下旬逮捕 Ahmed Saleh Ali Arrahbi 并施加酷刑, 及逮捕 Thdhamon 国际伊斯兰银行、也门科威特银行和也门国际银行的常务董事, 以及货币交易所的所有者(见附件 26, 第 3 段)。

侵吞对象	原所有者	查明收入
孤儿发展基金会， 又称 Al-Yateem ^f	Hamdi Zayad	救助儿童会的转账 ^g

^a 在侵吞基金会后，胡塞武装控制下的社会事务和劳工部未经合法董事会核准，于 2018 年 7 月 24 日将其更名为萨卜基金会。

^b www.yemenarmored.com/。

^c 2019 年 7 月 14 日，Arrahbi 先生致函联合国驻地协调员和其他联合国人员，称其遭到酷刑，公司被胡塞武装侵吞。

^d 专家小组掌握的文件显示，2018 年 10 月 25 日至 2019 年 6 月 26 日，联合国粮食及农业组织、联合国开发计划署(开发署)、联合国儿童基金会和世界卫生组织向也门装甲公司拥有的账户转账 3 215 235 美元。在 2019 年 7 月 24 日的信中与联合国驻也门驻地协调员分享了这一信息，以提高与也门装甲公司订约的联合国机构的意识。专家小组收到进一步信息称，开发署在 2019 年 10 月和 11 月期间分六期向也门装甲公司转账 995 197.35 美元(见图八)。开发署证实，自 2017 年以来与也门装甲公司签订了一项协议，其时 Arrahbi 先生担任公司主管，开发署还告知专家小组，在收到专家小组 2019 年 11 月 11 日的信之前，不知道也门装甲公司管理层发生了变化。

^e www.iutt.edu.ye/index.php/m/20。

^f www.yateemdev.org/。现代技术学院(<http://mtc-ye.net/>)和拉瓦福德培训和发展研究所(www.facebook.com/rawafed2013/)是已知附属机构(见图九)；拉瓦福德研究所和孤儿发展基金会报告了由援外社国际协会(见 www.yateemdev.org/?news=-معهد-روافد-للتدريب-والتنمية-يختتم-عدد)和澳大利亚人类呼吁(见 www.yateemdev.org/?news=-تمويل-من-هيئة-الأعمال-الخيرية-استرال)资助的项目。

^g 证据显示，给一个项目存款 2 400 万也门里亚尔(约 48 000 美元)。


图八
也门装甲公司账单，2019 年 11 月

Posting Date	Transaction Description	Value Date	Transaction Amount	Balance
01 Nov 19	Credit balance			3,155,536.33 CR
04 Nov 19	TRC 1341012135 TRF FROM U N D P XT16 TRF FROM ACC 0002-018621-002		241,543.45	3,397,079.78 CR
06 Nov 19	TRD 15276810 TO TAX AUTHORITY Z642 TRF TO ACC 0001-400802-840		-6,793.00	3,390,286.78 CR
06 Nov 19	TRD 15276811 TO TAX AUTHORITY Z642 TRF TO ACC 0001-400802-840		-46,045.00	3,344,241.78 CR
11 Nov 19	TRC 1341012256 TRF FROM U N D P XT16 TRF FROM ACC 0002-018621-002		237,543.45	3,581,785.23 CR
11 Nov 19	TRC 1341012257 TRF FROM U N D P XT16 TRF FROM ACC 0002-018621-002		4,000.00	3,585,785.23 CR
11 Nov 19	TRC 1341012258 TRF FROM U N D P XT16 TRF FROM ACC 0002-018621-002		29,023.55	3,614,808.78 CR
30 Nov 19	Credit balance			3,614,808.78 CR
Total Debits :			-52,838.00	
Total Credits :			512,110.45	

资料来源：保密。

图九


2019 年 7 月 16 日，孤儿发展基金会主席 Saleh Mesfer Alshaer 少将出席现代技术学院毕业典礼



资料来源: www.yateemdev.org/?news=برعاية-كريمة-من-رئيس-المؤسسة-اللواء-صا。

90. 该网络见下文图十，详情见附件 26，表 26.2。专家小组与 Alshaer 进行了沟通，请他对指控发表评论。他确认了这一信息，并承诺如有必要将答复专家小组。专家小组还与萨那的也门中央银行分享了该网络的名称和指控，并向胡塞武装控制的萨那外交部提供了一份副本。专家小组尚未得到答复。

图十
与 Saleh Mesfer Alshaer 有关联的网络



资料来源：专家小组基于官方文件所获信息。

注：大图见附件 26 的图 26.11。

五. 违反国际人道法和人权法的行为

91. 安全理事会第 2140(2014)号决议第 9 段促请所有各方履行国际法、包括有关国际人道法和国际人权法规定的义务。在结合第 2216(2015)号决议第 19 段一并解读的第 2140(2014)号决议第 17、18 和 21 段中，安理会进一步澄清了专家小组在调查违反国际人道法和国际人权法及侵犯人权行为以及调查阻碍提供和分发人道主义援助行为方面的责任。

92. 专家小组谨再次强调(见 S/2019/83，第 134 段)，也门各地媒体成员和人权捍卫者的安全持续面临风险。专家小组记录了此类人员因其工作受到威胁、逮捕和拘留的几起案件。

A. 归责于在也门支持合法性联盟和也门政府的行为和事件

1. 与联军空袭有关的违反国际人道法的行为

93. 专家小组调查了贝达、达利、扎马尔、萨达、萨那和塔伊兹的 8 次空袭，这些袭击造成约 146 人死亡，133 人受伤(见表 5)。专家小组已就这些事件致函沙特

阿拉伯，目前正在等待答复。专家小组赞赏在 2019 年 9 月访问利雅得期间得以与沙特阿拉伯当局及联合事件评估小组举行会议。然而，专家小组指出，自 2016 年以来就 40 多次空袭发出了 11 封信函，目前仍在等待答复。这使专家小组无法完成调查。

表 5
2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 12 月期间的空袭

案件	日期	地点	弹着点	受害者/损害
1	2018 年 12 月 16 日	北纬 14°28' 12.1" 东经 45°20' 08.8"	贝达, Sawadyah, 汽车	2 名儿童死亡
2	3 月 23 日	北纬 17°2' 4.32" 东经 44°6' 30.24"	萨达, 基塔夫, 加油站和医院	7 人死亡(包括 4 名儿童)、 6 人受伤
3	4 月 4 日	北纬 14°28' 03.3" 东经 45°20' 37.5"	贝达, Sawadyah, 汽车	4 人死亡
4	5 月 16 日	北纬 15°21' 31.14" 东经 44°11' 4.00"	萨那, 拉卡, 房屋	约 5 名儿童死亡, 约 78 人 受伤(包括 30 名儿童)
5	5 月 24 日	北纬 13°38' 25.2" 东经 44°22' 32.8"	塔伊兹, 马维耶, 加油站	7 人死亡(包括 5 名儿童)、 2 人受伤
6	6 月 28 日	北纬 13°24' 55.29" 东经 44°15' 03.08"	塔伊兹, 卡迪尔, Warzan, 房屋	7 人死亡(包括 4 名儿童)、 4 人受伤(包括 2 名儿童)
7	8 月 31 日	北纬 14°36' 52.82" 东经 44°21' 44.51"	扎马尔, 扎马尔社 区学院(用作监狱)	约 100 人死亡、40 人受伤
8	9 月 24 日	北纬 13°52' 53" 东经 44°34' 31.3"	达利, Qatabah, 房屋	14 人死亡(包括 7 名儿 童)、3 人受伤

案件摘要：扎马尔社区学院

94. 2019 年 8 月 31 日，一架飞机向扎马尔社区学院的建筑物投放了几枚炸弹(见图十一至十三)。⁸¹

95. 至少有一座上述建筑物被胡塞武装用作监狱。⁸² 红十字国际委员会的报告称，该设施关押了约 170 名被拘留者。⁸³ 事件造成至少 40 人受伤，至少 100 人死亡。联军证实了这次袭击，但声称该地点有胡塞武装和防空设备，因而具有军事性质。联军还认为，该地点没有被载入联合国禁止袭击名单，距离扎马尔的已登记监狱有 10 多公里，⁸⁴ 意味着联军不知道这个院子里有囚犯。然而，这一地点至少从

⁸¹ 专家小组有证据表明，至少有三次袭击击中了校区，目击者报告说发生了多达六次爆炸。

⁸² 保密来源。

⁸³ www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-scenes-devastation-every-single-detainee-either-killed-or-injured-attack。

⁸⁴ 见 www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1964154。

2017 年开始就被用作监狱，专家小组的上一次报告也提到这一点。⁸⁵ 此外，当地普遍知道这座建筑物里面关押了人员。

96. 根据国际人道法，冲突各方必须采取一切可行的防范措施，避免并尽量减少连带的平民死亡、平民伤害和民用物体损坏。⁸⁶ 这要求军事指挥官和其他参与袭击人员评估从掌握的所有来源获得的信息，并尽可能获得最佳情报。⁸⁷ 根据国际人道法，被拘留者(无论是平民还是伤兵)都应被初步视为没有参加敌对行动，因此受到保护，不受直接攻击。可能现场有一些胡塞警卫；然而，专家小组收到的资料表明，事件中约有 140 名被拘留者死伤。除非沙特阿拉伯向专家小组提供反证，否则专家小组的结论是，相称原则和防备原则没有得到遵守。附件 27 载有更多细节以及其他 7 起案件的详细情况。

97. 在被调查的所有案件中，根据专家小组收集的信息和证据得出的结论是，区分、防备或相称原则可能没有得到遵守。

图十一

对扎马尔社区学院进行空袭的地点(标示了关押囚犯的一座建筑物)



资料来源：谷歌地球。

⁸⁵ S/2018/594，第 176 段。当时，专家小组提到，该设施中囚犯人数在 25 人到 100 人之间。

⁸⁶ 习惯国际人道法规则 15。

⁸⁷ 见习惯国际人道法规则 15 和评注。

图十二
空袭炸弹在扎马尔社区学院校区两座不同建筑物的弹着点



资料来源：保密。

图十三
在也门支持合法性联盟袭击的扎马尔社区学院另一座建筑物的航拍图像



资料来源：联合事件评估小组，www.youtube.com/watch?v=btm40ud0y04。

98. 专家小组在 6 月访问亚丁期间获悉，检察官办公室依据军法就 2016 年 10 月 8 日萨那某殡仪馆遭到空袭事件对 3 人提出了指控(见 S/2018/193, 第 121-125 段)。专家小组已就此事向也门政府发出信函，现正在等待答复。

99. 联合事件评估小组在 9 月访问利雅得期间告知专家小组，其结论是，自 2015 年以来调查的 10 起事件中发生了技术故障，并已将另外 8 起案件移交军事检察官(见下文表 6 和表 7)。专家小组致函沙特阿拉伯，询问有关这些调查和随后法律程序的详细情况，目前正在等待答复。

表 6
技术故障

编号	案件	地点	日期
1	萨达街道	萨达	2015 年 6 月 2 日
2	沙姆水厂	哈杰	2015 年 8 月 30 日
3	萨巴大学	萨那	2015 年 7 月 16 日
4	萨贝区的 2 栋房屋	萨那	2015 年 9 月 22 日
5	法伊·阿坦的房屋 ^a	萨那	2017 年 8 月 25 日
6	Dar Saber 的建筑物	塔伊兹	2015 年 5 月 26 日
7	国防部附近的建筑物	萨那	2017 年 11 月 10 日
8	Hasabah 区	萨那	2015 年 12 月 21 日
9	基塔夫医院 ^a	萨达	2019 年 3 月 26 日
10	Qobari 区	萨那	2017 年 6 月 9 日

资料来源：联合事件评估小组。

^a 专家小组报告。

表 7
移交军事检察官的案件

编号	案件	地点	日期
1	Haydan 医院	萨达	2015 年 10 月 26 日
2	阿卜斯医院 ^a	阿卜斯	2016 年 8 月 5 日
3	大会堂 ^a	萨那	2016 年 10 月 8 日
4	萨丹井	萨那	2016 年 9 月 10 日
5	马里卜的汽车 ^a	马里卜	2017 年 9 月 16 日
6	大巴 ^a	萨达	2018 年 8 月 9 日
7	Bani Qees 婚礼 ^a	哈杰	2018 年 4 月 22 日
8	霍乱治疗设施	哈杰	2018 年 6 月 11 日

资料来源：联合事件评估小组。

^a 专家小组报告。

2. 归责于联军的违反国际人道法和国际人权法的拘留行为

100. 专家小组调查了阿拉伯联合酋长国和沙特阿拉伯违反国际人道法和国际人权法的 4 起案件，涉及任意逮捕和拘留、虐待、酷刑和强迫失踪。⁸⁸ 一人在夏卜瓦省阿塔克被夏卜瓦精锐部队逮捕，关押在巴尔哈夫，后转移到哈德拉毛省的拉扬。另一人在马哈拉省 Ghaydah 被沙特阿拉伯拘留，一人被阿拉伯联合酋长国逮捕并关押在其布里卡基地。此外，一人在阿比扬被捕，被 Shallal Ali Shaye 少将拘留，最后关押在布里卡。在这 4 人中，只有一人在 2018 年获释；据称他在阿拉伯联合酋长国布里卡基地被拘留期间遭受了酷刑。其他 3 人目前下落不明。更多信息见机密附件 28。专家小组已致函沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国，现正在等待答复。⁸⁹

101. 专家小组还调查了另外 13 起安全地带部队和夏卜瓦精锐部队任意逮捕、虐待、酷刑和强迫失踪案件。这些部队由阿拉伯联合酋长国创建，并从该国获得工资、培训和武器。考虑到阿拉伯联合酋长国与安全地带部队的密切关系，阿联酋有义务确保国际人道法得到遵守，包括对安全地带部队施加影响，预防和制止违反行为。⁹⁰ 阿拉伯联合酋长国还应尽职尽责，预防和制止安全地带部队的侵犯人权行为。更多信息见机密附件 28。

3. 归责于也门政府的违反国际人道法和国际人权法的行为

102. 专家小组调查了也门政府部队在塔伊兹、马里卜和夏卜瓦的任意逮捕和拘留、强迫失踪和杀害案件(更多信息见机密附件 29)。2019 年 10 月 3 日，在夏卜瓦省 Azzan，也门政府部队成员过度使用武力干预了看上去是平民示威的活动。在这次事件中，1 名平民被杀，2 人受伤；另有包括记者在内的 15 名平民被捕。

103. 专家小组记录了第 22 旅在塔伊兹任意逮捕和拘留及强迫失踪的 5 起案件。当事人家人在 10 个月到 2 年不等的的时间里没有亲人的消息。这些人现被关押在塔伊兹的一个已知地点。

104. 专家小组正在调查 2019 年 8 月 20 日在塔伊兹 Hajar 发生的炮击事件，该事件导致 2 名儿童死亡，另有 2 名儿童受伤，当时也门政府武装部队和也门政府武装部队第 35 旅发生了冲突。专家小组已致函也门政府，现正等待答复。更多信息见附件 30。

4. 归责于安全地带部队的违反国际人道法和侵犯人权的行

105. 专家小组收到了关于 2016 年至 2019 年在亚丁被安全地带部队任意逮捕和拘留并强迫失踪的 54 人的资料。专家小组在 11 起案件中收集了进一步证据。更多信息见机密附件 28。

⁸⁸ 见习惯国际人道法规则 90、98、99、100、117、123 和 126。另见《阿拉伯人权宪章》，第 3、5、6、8、13 和 16 条。

⁸⁹ 11 月 27 日，阿拉伯联合酋长国致函专家小组，称当局需要更多时间作出答复。

⁹⁰ 日内瓦四公约共同第一条以及尼加拉瓜境内和针对尼加拉瓜的军事和准军事活动(尼加拉瓜诉美利坚合众国)，案情实质，判决书，《1986 年国际法院案例汇编》，第 14 页，第 220 段。

106. 如第 25 段所述，安全地带部队不受也门政府控制。专家小组有两份 2018 年的文件，内政部在文件中要求亚丁的联军领导人和亚丁安全主管将 12 名被拘留者案件移交给检察官办公室；其中 2 人获释，10 人仍下落不明。安全地带部队并不总是遵守检察官办公室的命令。也门政府向专家小组证实，它对亚丁的两大监狱(Bir Ahmed 监狱和 Al-Mansoura 监狱)及穆卡拉的一个监狱没有指挥权。⁹¹

107. 这种情况使人们身处法律保护之外，被逮捕和拘留，其中有些人还遭受酷刑。许多人已经失踪数年，使其家人无法使用有效的法律追索手段。安全地带部队行使类似政府的职能，因此应受人权规范的约束。法治的缺乏导致形成了滋生侵犯人权行为的环境，并威胁到平民的安全。

108. 此外，8 月，专家小组收到信息和证据表明，一些平民男子来自北方省份，主要来自塔伊兹，没有身份证明或无法证明在亚丁居住，因而被安全地带部队塞进卡车逐出亚丁。专家小组还收到信息和证据表明，来自北方各省的平民的财产，特别是商店，在亚丁 Sheikh Othman 和 Mansoura 地区成为毁坏目标，专家小组还收到资料显示记者和其他人因在 2019 年 8 月 10 日之后反对南方过渡委员会而受到威胁(见第 30 段)。专家小组收到了关于 3 起此类案件的具体证据。

B. 归责于胡塞武装的行为和事件

1. 对平民滥用爆炸物

109. 专家小组收到了关于胡塞武装对平民使用爆炸物的 14 起事件的资料。专家小组完成了对其中 2 起案件的调查并认定这 2 起案件导致包括 2 名儿童在内的 3 名平民死亡，另有 16 人受伤，其中包括儿童。此外，在人口居住区使用非制导爆炸物带来了与遵守国际人道法适用规则有关的问题。迫击炮弹和其他炮弹具有高度的不精确性，对平民和民用物体附近的目标远程使用这些武器会增加滥杀滥伤的可能性。⁹² 2 起事件的详细情况见附件 31。

110. 专家小组还记录了胡塞武装声称对沙特阿拉伯阿布哈国际机场发动的三次袭击(见第 58 段)：⁹³

(a) 2019 年 6 月 12 日，一枚导弹击中机场，造成包括 3 名儿童在内的 26 名平民受伤，并对机场造成物质损失；

(b) 2019 年 6 月 23 日，一架无人驾驶飞机撞击机场，造成 1 名平民死亡，21 人受伤；

(c) 2019 年 7 月 2 日，一枚导弹击中机场，造成 10 名平民受伤，并对机场造成物质损失。

⁹¹ Bir Ahmed 监狱和 Al-Mansoura 监狱由安全地带部队控制，穆卡拉监狱由哈德拉毛精锐部队控制。2019 年 10 月 4 日也门政府的信函。另见 S/2018/594，第 180-182 段。

⁹² 见 1949 年日内瓦四公约共同第 3 条和习惯国际人道法规则 1。

⁹³ 专家小组从沙特阿拉伯收到了关于受害者人数、国籍和机场损失的资料。

2. 与剥夺自由有关的侵权行为

111. 专家小组正在调查胡塞武装实施的与拘留有关的 53 起违反国际人道法和人权规范案件，包括任意逮捕和拘留、虐待、酷刑和缺乏正当法律程序。在大多数案件中，被拘留者被关押在亲属不知道的地方长达 40 天至 4 年。在 1 起案件中，被拘留者的遭遇仍然不明。更多信息见机密附件 32。

112. 在这些案件中，专家小组调查了 2018 年 9 月至 11 月期间 10 人被捕的案件，直到这些人 2019 年 4 月 17 日在萨那的电视上出现，他们的家人才知道他们的下落。他们与其他 52 名也门和外国头目一起被指控涉嫌于 2018 年 4 月密谋杀害最高政治理事会主席萨利赫·阿里·穆罕默德·萨马德。2019 年 8 月 7 日，其中一名被拘留者死亡。他们的律师和家人不允许与其联系或进行探访，拘留地点不详。

113. 专家小组还调查了在 2015 年和 2016 年不同日期被捕并被拘留在萨那政治安全监狱的 36 人的案件。2019 年 7 月 9 日，萨那专门刑事法院判处其中 30 人死刑；这一裁决正在上诉过程中。专家小组收到的信息显示另有 6 人获释，但仅能核实其中 1 人获释。根据专家小组收到的书证和证词，其中一些人在拘留期间遭受了酷刑，得不到医疗保健，他们的律师受到威胁，无法去监狱探视。

114. 专家小组收到了包括司法文件在内的证据，表明胡塞武装控制下的法院不尊重司法保证。此外，被调查的案件显示，惯常做法是违反适用的国际人道法和人权准则，将被拘留者关押在秘密地点，施以酷刑，不允许与家人联系。⁹⁴

3. 与使用地雷和其他爆炸物有关的侵权行为

115. 根据专家小组收到的资料，包括地雷在内的爆炸物的受害者人数不断增加。⁹⁵ 专家小组在中期最新报告中还提出证据，表明胡塞武装在进口用于制造地雷的部件。

116. 专家小组记录了 23 起地雷对平民造成伤害的具体案件，包括 7 名儿童受伤，1 名男子和 7 名儿童死亡。这些案件发生在贝达、荷台达、夏卜瓦和塔伊兹。大多数受害者(11 起案件)是在荷台达，主要在 Durayhimi、Tuhayta' 和 Hays 区，5 起案件发生在塔伊兹。

117. 专家小组还收到证据表明，胡塞武装在西海岸部署了大量地雷，特别是在塔伊兹省祖巴卜和 Khawkhah 北部之间。例如，在 Ruways 村⁹⁶ 埋有数百枚地雷，

⁹⁴ 习惯国际人道法规则第 90、98、100、123 及 125 条。

⁹⁵ 这一模式似乎得到了其他组织的证实；见 <https://civilianimpact.activehosted.com/social/50905d7b2216bfecb5b41016357176b.1314>，www.acleddata.com/2019/01/30/how-houthi-planted-mines-are-killing-civilians-in-yemen/ 和 www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/22/yemen-houthi-landmines-kill-civilians-block-aid。

⁹⁶ 北纬 13°31'10.79"，东经 43°16'15.93"。

尽管实施了排雷行动，但仍有许多地雷留在原地，阻碍了此前被胡塞武装驱赶的平民返回家园。⁹⁷

C. 性别暴力

118. 专家小组收到的证据表明，特别是自 2017 年底以来，即阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫死后，胡塞武装把目标锁定为参与政治运动、参加示威或为非政府组织开展增强妇女权能项目，从而在公共空间发挥积极作用的妇女。专家小组记录了 11 名妇女被逮捕、拘留、虐待和(或)遭受酷刑的情况，其中 3 人在被胡塞武装拘留期间多次遭到强奸。专家小组还在调查 *zainabiyath* 在违反国际人道法和侵犯妇女人权行为中扮演的角色，以及萨那刑事调查局局长 Sultan Zabin 在这方面的角色(见第 22 段)。

119. 专家小组还收到若干人道主义行为体的证词，证明胡塞当局通常拒绝批准非政府组织关于妇女、和平与安全或增强妇女权能的项目。专家小组还调查了妇女因从事人道主义工作而被逮捕和拘留的案件。这些案件的共同特征是暴力侵害妇女，包括歧视、任意逮捕和拘留、包括酷刑和强奸在内的身体暴力行为以及缺乏正当程序。更多信息见附件 5。

D. 在武装冲突中招募和使用儿童

120. 专家小组收到了关于也门境内敌对活动中普遍使用儿童的资料。⁹⁸ 资料记录了胡塞武装在 2017 年和 2018 年使用 12 岁至 15 岁儿童作战的 3 起案件。在 2 起案件中，2 名儿童分别在家中和学校被绑架。在另一起案件中，一名儿童被胡塞分子引诱离家，胡塞分子说带他去参加一个为期 3 天的教育夏令营。这 3 名儿童被送往训练营 3 至 4 个月，在那里接受了关于意识形态和圣战的讲座培训及使用小武器的培训。之后，他们被派往塔伊兹和荷台达边界或马里卜前线，被迫执行包括战斗在内的各种任务。他们报告说，当地条件恶劣，他们被殴打且不能探望家人。他们均未领到款项或工资(详见附件 33)。专家小组还收到关于儿童在胡塞武装的一个中心和一座监狱所在地塔伊兹的萨利赫市接受训练的证词。⁹⁹

六. 阻碍运送和分发人道主义援助

121. 根据安全理事会第 2216(2015)号决议第 19 段，专家小组继续调查阻碍向也门提供人道主义援助，包括阻碍获得和分发此类援助的情况。

⁹⁷ 习惯国际人道法规则第 81、82 和 132 条。

⁹⁸ 联合国核对了 2013 年 4 月至 2018 年 12 月期间，也门冲突各方(主要是胡塞武装)招募和使用 3 034 名儿童的情况。然而实际数字可能高得多(S/2019/453，第 17-18 段)。

⁹⁹ 北纬 13°39'52.1"，东经 44°07'42.9"。

A. 阻碍运送人道主义援助

122. 专家小组对 9 批医疗和营养货物在亚丁港延误 16 至 169 天的情况进行了调查。也门政府证实了这些延误，但没有说明延误理由。当局有义务确保人道主义救援物资迅速无阻地通过，包括确保先让援助物资进入该国。¹⁰⁰

B. 阻碍分发人道主义援助

123. 根据专家小组收到的资料，胡塞控制区针对人道主义工作者的威胁和事件不断增加。

124. 专家小组继续收到以下资料：(a) 逮捕和恐吓人道主义工作者；(b) 在萨那非法扣押人道主义工作者的个人财产和属于人道主义组织的财产；(c) 不尊重人道主义组织的独立性；(d) 诸多行政和官僚障碍，包括拖延批准次级协议长达 11 个月，以及与国家人道主义事务和灾难恢复管理和协调局进行耗时的会议和谈判。例如，一个组织向专家小组报告说，这些会议占用了一些雇员多达 50% 的时间。操纵受益者名单和(或)施压分享这些名单的问题尤其令人关切。2019 年，在援助分发点使用暴力和胁迫的案件有所增加。

125. 一些人道主义行为体向专家小组报告说，他们由于拒绝分享受益人信息或本国工作人员的个人信息而被禁止进入某些地区或被拒发旅行许可。

126. 专家小组调查了 3 起在分发点为影响或控制分发而对人道主义工作者施暴的事件。在一起事件中，人道主义援助物品被洗劫，在另一起事件中，物品被挪用。专家小组还调查了 5 起包括妇女在内的人道主义工作者被捕和被拘留的案件(见机密附件 34)。

127. 11 月 6 日，胡塞武装当局成立了人道主义事务和国际合作管理协调最高委员会，以之取代国家人道主义事务和灾难恢复管理和协调局，胡塞武装领导人穆赫森·阿卜杜拉·卡西姆·阿塔乌斯被提名为该委员会主席(见第 18 段)。最近的这一事态发展使过渡期间的许多人道主义活动停止。特别令人关切的是，2019 年最高政治理事会第 201 号法令¹⁰¹ 第 13(3)条规定，每个经批准的人道主义项目预算的 2% 都将用于为该新实体提供资金。

七. 建议

128. 专家小组建议安全理事会：

(a) 在即将通过的决议中列入要求胡塞武装停止非法拨款和利用社会基金会作为军事后勤支助资金来源的措辞；立即采取措施，保护萨那的也门中央银行和也门私人银行反洗钱活动的完整性并确保它们的合规性，避免进一步损害它们在代理银行中的声誉；停止对也门银行经理和工作人员的非非法逮捕和恐吓；

¹⁰⁰ 习惯国际人道法规则 55。

¹⁰¹ 专家小组存档。

(b) 在即将通过的决议中列入谴责强迫失踪、性暴力和压制表达政治观点或参加示威的妇女的措辞，并表示拟对参与这些行为的人实施制裁；

(c) 在也门问题月度会议议程中，重点讨论也门妇女面临的挑战，包括性暴力和政治压迫方面的挑战，并审查妇女在多大程度上被切实纳入了 2018 年和 2019 年缔结的和平协议，如果没有，挑战是什么，克服这些挑战所用方法是什么，并考虑让联合国相关机构和处理妇女问题的其他也门利益攸关方参与这一讨论；

(d) 设立一个工作组，研究武装团体发展新型远程武器系统，如无人驾驶飞行器、水上简易爆炸装置和地面袭击巡航导弹对和平与安全构成的挑战，以及这些技术可能扩散到恐怖主义团体手中而构成的风险，并就会员国和业界为应对这些威胁而应执行的缓解措施提出建议；

(e) 在即将通过的决议中列入建立胡塞武装和其他受制裁个人和实体用来组装无人驾驶飞行器、水上简易爆炸装置和其他武器系统的商用部件(如发动机、伺服致动器和电子部件)清单的措辞，并请会员国利用该清单提高本国海关和出口管制当局对这些武器系统扩散造成的威胁的认识。

129. 专家小组建议委员会：

(a) 发布新闻稿，呼吁也门政府和在也门驻有军事力量的联军成员(沙特阿拉伯、苏丹和阿拉伯联合酋长国)提醒部队必须严格遵守国际人道法，调查和起诉各自部队中违反国际人道法的人员，并积极参与防止附属武装团体的违反行为；

(b) 发布新闻稿，呼吁胡塞武装和其他武装团体严格遵守国际人道法，并调查和起诉违反国际人道法的成员；

(c) 致函也门政府，鼓励其对本报告中指控的也门中央银行非法获益案展开调查，并指定一名协调人与专家小组分享关于潜在洗钱案件的信息；

(d) 致函也门政府，鼓励其在联合国相关机构的支持下建立机制，查明胡塞武装非法挪用的资金和资产，并向私人银行通报债务；该机制应有利于也门境外的也门个人报告财产损失信息；

(e) 致函秘书长办公室，要求其与联合国相关机构接触，立即采取必要措施，改善尽职调查机制，防止可能不遵守制裁措施的情况；其中应包括一个有效的“了解对方”数据库，该数据库应汇编数据并提供给在也门工作的联合国人员和人道主义行为体，帮助他们明确识别代表名单所列个人行事的个人和实体；

(f) 致函沙特阿拉伯，告知沙特保证金作为人道主义援助工具的重要性，并鼓励沙特改善保证金的使用方式，惠及所有也门人，并防止保证金被用作经济战工具。

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Annex 1. Methodology

1. Due to the fact that its report was leaked in January 2019, including with its confidential annexes, the Panel has refrained from including confidential annexes that have the potential to endanger sources and/or victims in the report. The Panel has agreed with the Secretariat that confidential annexes with relevant sensitive information will be made available to members of the Committee for viewing at the Secretariat's office.
2. The Panel used satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also used commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
3. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
4. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done on the basis of unanimity.
6. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are covered in this update. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

Appendix A to Annex 1: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity¹ in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or
 - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

¹ Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

Appendix B to Annex 1: Violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses investigative methodology

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting many places in Yemen. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, [S/2006/997](#), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as requested by paragraph 11 of resolution 2456(2019).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below:

- (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
- (b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
 - (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;
 - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel obtains copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
 - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of explosive events such as the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion;
 - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
 - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other information.
 - (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
 - (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
 - (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;
 - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground. (For example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area);
 - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
 - (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
 - (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;

- (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
 - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
 - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
 - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
 - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
 - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
 - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
 - (xx) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
 - (xxi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture.
 - (xxii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement and threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
 - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
 - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
 - (v) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (e) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt".
- (f) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel's findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel's standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.
- (g) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 8 of resolution 2456 (2019) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.

3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 2. Map of Yemen UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map



Map No. 3847 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

Annex 3. Summary of Panel correspondence (2019)

Table 3.1
Correspondence with Member States

<i>Ser.</i>	<i>Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters for which the response is due after 25 December 2019</i>
1	Australia	1		
2	Bahrain	1	1	
3	Belarus	2		
4	Brazil	1		
5	China	5	5	
6	Czech	7		
7	Djibouti	1	1	
8	Egypt	1		
9	Germany	1		
10	Greece	1		
11	Iran	5		
13	Ireland	2	1	
14	Italy	3		
15	Japan	4	1	
16	Jordan	1	1	
17	Korea	1	1	
18	KSA	18	8	Interim responses provided to 05 of the 08 outstanding letters.
19	Kuwait	2	1	
20	Oman	5	4	
21	Pakistan	1		
22	Sudan	1	1	
23	Sweden	2		
24	Switzerland	1	1	
25	Thailand	2		
26	UAE	8	3	An extension to reply requested for 01 of 03 outstanding letters.
27	USA	3		
28	Yemen	23	11	
28		103	40	

Table 3.2
Correspondence with Sana'a based authorities

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1	Sana'a based ministry of foreign affairs	4	4
2	CBY, Sana'a branch	2	2
3	NAMCHA	1	1
3		7	7

Table 3.3
Correspondence with international and regional organizations

<i>Ser.</i>	<i>Organization</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1	Masam	1		
2	Resident Coordinator Yemen	1	1	
3	Safelane	1	1	
4	Save the children	1		
5	UNDP	2		
6	UNICEF	1	1	
7	WFP	3	1	
7		10	4	

Table 3.4
Correspondence with Companies

<i>Ser.</i>	<i>Company</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1	Alswari	1		
2	Analog device	1	1	
3	Aviationeu	1		
4	BD Sensors	1	1	
5	Excell	1		
6	General Electric	1	1	
7	Glencoe	1	1	
8	IBY	3	1	
9	Kuraimi	1		
10	Leo Shipping	1		
11	R Shipping	1		
12	Sasco	1		
13	TIIB	3		
14	Maccon	2		
15	YKB	1		
16	TI Automotive	1	1	
16		21	6	

Table 3.5
Correspondence with Individuals

<i>Ser.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1	Hafedh Mayad (CBY)	1		
2	Mohamed Zemam (CBY)	1		
2		2		

Annex 4. Information on preventative security

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Annex 5. Opposition to dissent in Houthi controlled areas against women

I Methodology for the documentation of rape and other violence against women

1. The Panel complements herein the methodology adopted in annex I to this report. The Panel conducted bilateral and in-person interviews with eight women who were arrested and detained by the Houthis.² The Panel further had phone interviews with three women following their release from custody.
2. In cases of rape and torture, the Panel received copies of medical records that support the testimonies which are now in the Panel's possession,³ and observed marks of torture on some of the women who had been subjected to cuts or burns using electricity and flammable items. The Panel was also able to obtain independent verification of some of the locations where the women were held, the identifying information on the perpetrators at those locations, and the circumstances of arrest. The Panel also relied on official media of the Houthis to attribute statements to the Houthi-controlled authorities.
3. The incidents reflected in this annex fall within the Panel's mandate and within the designation criteria of resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015). The women were targeted because of their political opinions or participation in dissent, which may constitute a threat to peace, security and stability of Yemen and those responsible engaged in violence that amounts to violations of human right and humanitarian law, for example by engaging in sexual violence, arbitrary arrest and detention or torture. The Panel also finds that the designation criteria are met with respect to the arbitrary arrest and detention of women in the context of providing humanitarian assistance

II Background information

4. Traditionally, in Yemeni society, women were largely immune from search, arrest, and detention. As a result, when the war commenced the women in both the Northern and Southern governorates were at the forefront as human rights defenders, as mothers and relatives of detainees searching their whereabouts, and as leading protests. As men were increasingly targeted for activism on political and human rights-related issues, women started bridging the gap.
5. In Houthi-controlled territory, women are targeted both directly and indirectly when they are, or perceived to be, a threat to the Houthi rule, either because of their political affiliations, political opinion, expression or participation;⁴ their expression of dissent against Houthi policies and practices, or against its leaders;⁵ or their perceived support to, and from, the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition;⁶ or their standing in the community as influencers, activists, artists, and others able to create dissent; and, finally, any women who are perceived as being in alliance with any of the above-mentioned categories of women.
6. The Panel has observed in 2019, that the Houthis have begun to indirectly target those engaged in protection⁷ or humanitarian activities aimed exclusively at women.

III Reasons for arrest and detention

- ² In addition, the Panel conducted in-person interviews with some of the individuals to whom these women had given their testimonies to verify their detentions.
- ³ In accordance with the methodology of the Panel, for victims of rape and torture, the Panel does not consider contemporaneous medical evidence as a pre-requisite to identify rape or torture, in particular when the women or men are in prolonged custody of the detaining authorities at the time of the rapes and/or torture. In these cases, these individuals are either provided no treatment, or treatment is provided in hospitals under the control of the detaining authorities, which makes it impossible to obtain these medical reports. However, **in all three cases documented by the Panel, the women provided the Panel with medical reports and other evidence of the treatment of trauma associated with rape, obtained following their release.**
- ⁴ Seven women documented by the Panel supported Ali Abdullah Saleh or the General People's Congress (GPC).
- ⁵ One woman was arrested and sexually assaulted in custody for criticizing human rights abuses committed by a prominent Houthi leader. Two, were arrested for protesting the non-payment of salaries.
- ⁶ Four women interviewed by the Panel were accused of providing intelligence to the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition, and one was accused of receiving money from the Coalition, possibly to incite protests. One woman, who was arrested and since disappeared, was accused of receiving humanitarian assistance from the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition, because she distributed this assistance without informing the Houthis. This last woman is not included in the 11 women documented below, because the Panel did not have access to her as she was 'disappeared' by the Houthis.
- ⁷ The Panel documented the arrest of lawyers, brother/s and sisters of three individuals arrested. The detentions of sisters were used to pressure detainees to provide information.

7. In 2019, the Panel gathered evidence on the arrest, detention, and ill treatment of 11 women, from 2017 to 2019, and received further information on four women who were arrested in the latter half of 2019. The 11 women, mentioned above, were arrested, detained, tortured or raped in Houthi custody for their political participation and views. The Panel also documented the arrest and detention of one man for his participation in a political protest.

8. Based on interrogation questions, it appeared that violence against all 11 women was perpetrated because of their political activism or political views, or because they participated in demonstrations. These included:

- 1) Protests organized in 2017 and before the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh calling for peace negotiations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.⁸
- 2) Protests in December 2017 and January 2018 demanding the return of the body of the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (Yei003).
- 3) Gathering on 18 March 2018 (“the march of roses”) to commemorate the death of the former President.⁹
- 4) Gathering on 6 October 2018 (“starvation march”) to protest food insecurity in Houthi-controlled areas.¹⁰
- 5) Actual or perceived affiliations with General Congress Party or ISLAH, or women who expressed dissent against the Houthis.

9. The Panel also received information about three further arrests¹¹ and one release¹² of women between July and December 2019. The women were arrested for critiquing the Houthis; distributing humanitarian assistance allegedly provided by the Coalition; and for perceived refusal to indoctrinate students to Houthi ideology. Therefore, there is clear indication that these arrests and detention of women still continue.

IV Links to prostitution

10. Labelling women as prostitutes or criminals serves at minimum three purposes: It deters families from searching for and protesting the disappearance of the women due to the associated shame; It allows officials to conduct arrests, detentions and violations of these women with impunity; and The threat of being labelled deters these and additional women from participating in political activity or other forms of dissent.

11. In a televised documentary¹³ the Houthis justify their reasons for arresting the so-called prostitution networks. They argue this is on the basis of enforcing societal morals, because these “prostitutes” are being used for criminal activities, and Houthi enemies are using them to undermine Houthi authority. None of the women interviewed by the Panel were arrested for “prostitution” and a majority were arrested during or immediately after public protests against the Houthis, thus demonstrating a direct link between protests and arrests. It was only following these arrests that the Houthis threatened to label some of these women as prostitutes.¹⁴ For example, one woman interviewed by the Panel was told that unless she provided information she would be charged with prostitution and organ trafficking. When the family of another woman searched for information on her whereabouts, the family was told that she was a prostitute allegedly to deter them from continuing to search for her.

12. In two other incidents, women were told that they would be safe from prostitution or any other charges if they protested in demonstrations organized by the Houthis; and if they worked for the Houthis in gathering information on other individuals. In two other cases, Houthis obtained signed statements prior to release, that the women would not engage in protests against the Houthis.

⁸ Two women interviewed by the Panel.

⁹ <https://gulfnnews.com/world/gulf/yemen/al-houthis-disperse-pro-saleh-rally-in-sanaa-1.2192427>

¹⁰ Images with Panel.

¹¹ The Panel received information on these women from activists and the arrests were reported in the media. The whereabouts of these three women are currently unknown.

¹² The Panel received the testimony of this women immediately upon her release. However, as the woman is still under significant danger, information on her situation will not be further elaborated in this annex.

¹³ https://www.almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=25211

¹⁴ In what appear to be attempts to substantiate claims of prostitution, detaining authorities took naked pictures of two women interviewed by the Panel in compromising positions and threatened to expose these women as prostitutes, if they engaged in further “disobedience”.

13. The Panel has also received documentary evidence to support the above claims on arbitrary arrest and detention of women, see confidential annex 6.

V Rape as a Form of Violence Against Women in Houthi Detention

14. The Panel documented three cases of women raped during detention. Of the three women raped, two were asked to recite a prayer prior to the rape. This was a method of purification of the women, according to the perpetrators. One woman was raped in her room in a private house appropriated by the Houthis, and the other two were taken from the basement of the building in which they were detained to another floor by the women guards. Initially, as the women resisted rape, the women prison guards assisted to restrain the women. The women were subjected to rape by one to three men over a period of months.

15. The Panel was informed that women who became pregnant as a result of the rapes were forced to undergo abortions, either by taking pills provided by the Houthis or at a hospital.¹⁵

VI Places of Detention of Women

16. The women were held in at least three types of places of detention: under house arrest;¹⁶ in police stations and formal prisons;¹⁷ and in places of detention undisclosed to the public (undisclosed detention centers).¹⁸

17. The Panel noted that the circumstances of detention and interrogation practices increase the likelihood of sexual abuses. This risk is increased when women are detained in secret places. The Panel was informed of possible locations of three secret places of detention exclusively for women, where 10 – 20 women were held at the same time, for the above reasons. One such place was identified as a private home of a Houthi-opponent who fled Houthi territory. According to evidence thus far gathered by the Panel, the occurrence of sexual abuses, including rape, is higher in relation to women in secret places of detention when compared to official detention locations.¹⁹ Yet, even in these locations, the Panel does not discount the possibility of sexual abuse, as two women reported being taken individually, after midnight, for interrogation, by male officers.²⁰

VII Identified Perpetrators

1) The Panel documented the following perpetrators:

Figure 2:

Image of Sultan Zabin in the Houthi documentary relating to prostitution.



Source: https://www.almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=25211

¹⁵ Information provided by the women in detention centers. None of the women interviewed by the Panel were subjected to abortions. The Panel cannot independently verify outside these testimonies.

¹⁶ Two women were held under house arrest and in the case of Hashmi women, who are perceived as affiliated with the Houthis, they are more likely to be kept under house arrest when they express dissent, than to be taken to a detention center.

¹⁷ This included al Afifi police station.

¹⁸ Confidential annex 6.

¹⁹ Lawyers, human rights investigators, and women detainees.

²⁰ Confirmed by documentary evidence with the Panel. Evidence obtained by the Panel indicates that this maybe contrary to Yemeni law. See confidential annex 06.

Sultan Zabin:

18. Zabin is the director of CID, Sana'a. He was responsible for at least one undisclosed detention center for women, in an identified location.²¹ The Panel has evidence that at least one woman was raped in this location, with reports of others also being raped. He directly inflicted torture.²² Under his supervision, the CID appears to be in charge of curbing “prostitution” in Sana'a.²³ In a televised documentary, he stated that he had apprehended 28 prostitution networks involved in drugs, looting and other crimes.²⁴ In early 2019, a request for his arrest was transmitted, amongst other charges, because of his involvement in maintaining an undisclosed detention center for women.²⁵ He remains in office. The Panel received further evidence of his involvement in other human rights and humanitarian law violations, that will be presented in a confidential annex.²⁶

VIII Other identified Houthis

19. In the crackdown of the so called “prostitution” networks, Zabin has admitted to working closely with the prosecution and other security entities, see confidential annex 6. Abdulhakim al Khiyawani, the then deputy minister of interior, and current head of the security and intelligence bureau, highlighted the “powerful” relationships between the ministry of interior, security systems, prosecution and supreme judicial council in these arrests and detentions (identified networks of Sultan Zabin are at appendix i).²⁷

IX Preventative Security

20. A preventative security officer identified by his *nom de guerre* in the “preventative security” intelligence apparatus, sexually assaulted a woman and held her under arrest.²⁸ The Panel continues to investigate.

X Female perpetrators

21. In addition, unidentified female Houthi guards, identified as zainabiyath, aided and abetted the commission of rape by holding down women and engaged in torture of women, including during interrogations.

XI Protection issues

22. In view of the pervasive allegations of arbitrary arrests and detentions, sexual violence and torture, the Houthi leadership, including the minister and other senior officials the ministry of interior, that holds supervisory authority of the security forces and CID, should immediately launch an investigation into these and other open source multiple allegations concerning violations against women.

23. The fact that some women are detained in private houses instead of official detention centers increase the possibility that their location maybe targeted by airstrikes or they may be subject to other attacks by opposing parties due to the presence of Houthis and Houthi leaders in these places, as reported by the Panel’s sources. Sultan Zabin, for example, was present in one of these identified undisclosed detention centers for a period of more than a week.²⁹

²¹ Confidential annex 6.

²² More information in a confidential annex to prevent the identity of women.

²³ Documentary evidence with Panel.

²⁴ https://www.almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=25211

²⁵ Confidential annex 6.

²⁶ The Panel was informed by multiple sources that Sultan Zabin was arrested for his alleged involvement in sexual violations against women in 2018, detained for a few months and was subsequently released. The Panel continues to investigate.

²⁷ Two Houthi officers identified by name, and 4 officers identified by their *nom de guerre*.

²⁸ Further information is not provided to protect the identity of the woman.

²⁹ The Panel notes for example, in justifying its attacks on the Dhammar community college, the Coalition stated that the location was not on the no-strike list (see final report of the Panel). While the presence or not of civilian infrastructure in these so called “deconflicted lists” does not exempt the parties in their obligations to undertake the relevant precautionary measures, the Panel highlights the near impossibility of these undisclosed detention sites being entered into a no-strike-list. These undisclosed sites are by their nature secret.

24. The Panel is not aware if humanitarian organizations have visited these sites, however, it is clear that none visited during the detention of the women documented in this report.

25. The Houthis should facilitate humanitarian access to identified locations, at minimum, and ensure that the conditions of detention of women detainees are as required by law and that their detaining authorities respect IHL and human rights norms, including access to medical care and communication with families. This would also facilitate the deconfliction of all places of detention to provide some *prima facie* protection from direct attack.

XII Obstruction to humanitarian assistance directed at women

26. In 2019, the Panel documented 2 cases of women arrested and detained by Houthis because they were working on women empowerment projects with NGOs. The Panel also received several testimonies from humanitarians confirming that projects related to women, peace and security or to women empowerment are generally not approved by Houthi authorities. The Panel continues to investigate.

XIII Responsibility of Houthi commanders and superiors in Sexual and Gender-based Violence Against Women

27. The Panel, based on the interviews with the 11 woman and other information, concludes that there is possible targeting of women who are perceived as Houthi dissenters. This may also include women working for NGOs on women's empowerment projects in areas controlled by Houthis. Some of the sexual and gender-based violations documented by the Panel may amount to war crimes. Under superior responsibility, Houthi hierarchy, may be held responsible if not for ordering such violations, then for their failure to prevent, repress and report war crimes.³⁰ Given the high level admissions on the nature of the relationships between the ministry of interior, criminal investigation department, prosecution, ministry of justice, and supreme judicial/legal counsel,³¹ the Panel finds that all of these authorities have a responsibility to investigate allegations associated with these violations and the potential involvement of their officials in these violations. This responsibility is particularly strong on the ministry of interior, under whose authority the CID operates.


28. The Panel notes the statements of Abdulhakim al Khiyawani stating that “there is a strong relationship between the ministry of interior and the prosecution and between the security systems and the higher law council and the ministry of justice. The security systems do not implement any security procedures in the field unless being directed by the higher law council and prosecution and this is well noticed.”³² The Panel continues to investigate.

³⁰ CIHL rules 152 and 153.

³¹ https://www.almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=25211

³² https://www.almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=25211

Appendix I: Network and affiliations associated with Sultan Zabin



Source: Panel

Appendix 2: Summary of violations

The 11 women and one man interviewed by the Panel were subjected to following violations either during the protests or at the time of arrest, or during their detentions:

	Arbitrary arrest	Arbitrary detention	Torture	Ill treatment	Rape	Threat of sexual violence	Sexual abuse not rape	Forced labor	Verbal Abuse
W1	Y	Y		Y					
W2	Y	Y		Y		Y		Y	
W3	Y	Y		Y		Y			
W4	Y	Y		Y		Y		Y	
W5				Y		Y		Y	
W6	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	
W7	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
W8	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
W9	Y	Y		Y				Y	
W10	Y	Y		Y				Y	
W11	Y			Y				Y	
M1	Y	Y		Y				Y	

Annex 6. Further evidence on involvement of Sultan Zabin in violations

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Annex 7. Significant Houthi appointments in 2019

Table 7.1
Significant Houthi appointments in 2019

Position	Name	Dates of service	Predecessor
Head of national security bureau	Fawaz Hussein Nashwan	18 February 2019 to August 2019	Abdul Rahab Jarfan (Abu Taha)
Minister of interior	Abdul Karim Amir al-Din al-Houthi ³³	05 May	Abdul Hakim Maweri
Head of national authority for the management and coordination of humanitarian affairs and disaster response (NAMCHA)	Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Qasim Attawoos (Abu Adel) ³⁴	Around 06 July 2019 – November 2019	NA as new organization
Member of the SPC	Mohammed Ali al Houthi	30 July	NA
Head of security and intelligence bureau	Abdul Hakim al Kiyawani ³⁵	1 September	NA as new organization
Deputy head of security and intelligence bureau	Abdulqader Al-Shami	1 September	NA as new organization
Extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador to Iran	Ibrahim al Dailami	Late August 2019	
Governor of CBY Sana'a	Dr Rashid Aboud Shiryan Abu-Lahem ³⁶	25 August	
Advisor to SPC	Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed Moftah	25 September	NA
Advisor to the president with the rank of deputy prime minister	Hashim Ismail Ali Ahmed	06 October 2019	
Secretary general of the supreme council for administration and coordination of humanitarian affairs and international cooperation	Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Qasim Attawoos (Abu Adel)	November 2019	NA as new organization around 06 November by SPC decree 201 of 2019.

³³ SPC decree 90 of 2019.

³⁴ Tawoos was the former general supervisor (musharaf) of Dhammar. A general supervisor is usually at the rank of the governor and supervises the functions of the governor and also security matters. The Panel received information that he was dismissed from his position for his involvement in misappropriation of governate revenues, and threats against traders, while in Dhammar (see also <https://aawsat.com/home/article/1122366/الخفي-الحوثي-سلاح-الوقائي-الامن>). He was with the Houthis since 2004, during the conflicts it had with the GoY. GPC sources informed the Panel that he was involved in the death of Ali Abdullah Saleh.

³⁵ https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=8561&cat_id=1.

³⁶ He was appointed as finance minister on 26 February 2019, see <https://sabaanews.net/news527745.htm>.

Annex 8. Proliferation of armed groups in Yemen

I Terminology

1. Armed groups can either be State or a non-State armed group (NSAG). A State armed group can be defined as an entity that is an organ of a State according to its internal law and regulation.³⁷ The Panel notes the lack of a uniform definition for non-State armed groups under international law. For the purposes of this annex, this can include tribal or other armed groups, organized military units, and terrorist groups.

2. “Government of Yemen-affiliated forces”, “UAE-affiliated forces” or “KSA-affiliated forces” mean that forces that are affiliated to these States. These affiliations can range from the payment of salaries, to the provision of training, logistical and administrative support, provision of weapons and training, providing instructions and supervision of specific missions, to complete command and control over each military decision being taken by these forces. In each case, the types of responsibility of these States over the conduct of these forces differ in accordance with the level of command and control exercised over them. The uncontrolled proliferation of different armed groups within Yemen, with multiple affiliations, is a threat to peace, security, and stability of Yemen.

II Proliferation of armed groups and affiliations

3. As will be demonstrated below, the narrative that there are clear divisions in the lines of State command and control over the forces in Yemen, is false. A case in point is the shifting of Security Belt Forces (SBF) alliances and claims of alliances between 2016 – 2019.

Table 8.1

SBF and their affiliations

Dates	Claims of Command and Control over SBF	Actual Affiliations of SBF
2016	President Hadi appoints commanders by official decree in April 2016, according to the internal laws of Yemen, ³⁸ thus, making them a military unit under the GoY, under the command of the 4 th military axis.	GoY sources inform the Panel that UAE selected the commanders and President Hadi appointed them by decree. GoY military sources informed the Panel that the UAE was making the decisions on the recruitment and incorporation of individuals into the SBF. ³⁹ Yet, the GoY officially claimed at the time, that SBF were GoY State organs.
2016 – 07 August 2019	GoY and the UAE state that they are under the operational control of the GoY, ⁴⁰ (see below for an exception to this GoY position presented in March 2018). UAE provides only training and logistical support in counter-terrorism operations.	During this period, SBF were not under the operational control of the GoY. ⁴¹ The Panel received evidence that specific military operations were either conducted jointly or that persons arrested by SBF were immediately transferred to the UAE, in a manner that demonstrated a degree of operational control, at minimum for specific operations. ⁴² SBF informed the Panel that they received instructions and orders from the UAE, especially in relation to arrest and detention operations of alleged AQAP members. ⁴³

³⁷ An organ of a State “includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.” Article 4 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

³⁸ Decree No 53 of 2016 issued on 18 April 2016.

³⁹ Sources: GoY, SBF, and GoY-military in Aden. GoY letter to Panel on 04 October 2019.

⁴⁰ See Panel Reports, S/2018/193, S/2018/594, S/2019/83. Panel meeting with UAE in October 2019.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See also current report of the Panel of Experts.

⁴³ Confidential sources.

March 2018	GoY claims that they have no command and control over SBF but does not provide information on who does (makes no mention of the UAE as exercising command and control). ⁴⁴	
May 2018 – June 2019	GoY informs the Panel that these forces are once again under its complete command and control and measures have been taken to legally incorporate it into the GoY. ⁴⁵ The Panel requested but did not receive any documentation or other proof that the GoY was now paying their salaries, as was claimed. The GoY denied UAE involvement, except for training.	The above.
August 2019	SBF operationally affiliates themselves to the STC. SBF drops any pretenses to be a part of GoY.	STC exercises operational control over these forces in its attempts to take control over Aden and the South from the GoY.
28 and 29 August 2019	UAE launches air strikes. UAE informed the Panel that the air strikes were because of the activation of some dormant terrorist cells and the threat that it posed to the Coalition. ⁴⁶	The consequences were for the benefit of the STC-affiliated troops, including the SBF, as the GoY was attempting to regain control over Aden from the STC-affiliated SBF when the air strikes occurred.
September 2019	GoY informs the Panel that SBF had never been under its operational control, but that of the UAE. GoY states that the UAE appoints SBF commanders and give instructions and orders. ⁴⁷	
05 November 2019	KSA assumes direct supervision of SBF and other forces until they are incorporated into the Ministry of Defence of Yemen.	STC continues to exercise operational control over what is now considered as STC-affiliated forces.

⁴⁴ Letter to the Security Council on March 2018.

⁴⁵ Interview with Ministry of Interior Officials in Aden, May 2018 and June 2019

⁴⁶ The UAE stated in its letter to the Panel on 19 December 2019, that "... in response to threats against Coalition forces, two precision air strikes were launched on 28 and 29 August 2019, in Al Alam area. The first strike was a warning strike. The military operation was based on credible intelligence which indicated that terrorist elements, namely AQAP, intend to execute terrorist attacks against the Arab Coalition forces within the security zone in Aden. On 29 August 2019, terrorist elements seized the Al Alam area and as a result, dormant terrorist cells in and around Aden were activated. The security cordon was penetrated and attacked, and two members of the Coalition forces were wounded... The operation was carried out in conformity with the Coalition's rules of engagement..."

⁴⁷ Meeting in Riyadh, including with representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Human Rights. This was followed by GoY letter dated 04 October 2019.

08 December 2019	KSA has assumed direct supervision of SBF until SBF incorporation into the Ministry of Defence.	Through the Riyadh Agreement, legally, KSA has assumed direct supervision of SBF. De facto, SBF continue to operate under the STC to the extend to prevent the 1 st PPB to return to Masheeq Palace as stipulated in the Riyadh Agreement (information as at 08 December 2019). ⁴⁸
19 December 2019	UAE informed the Panel that it denies exercising any kind of leadership over the SBF and expressed its full support for the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement. ⁴⁹	

4. This is only an example of how the shifting alliances of these forces make peace prospects difficult in Yemen, and why an understanding of these forces and their alliances is a mandatory pre-requisite for a durable solution to the conflict in Yemen. An assessment of linkages for these arms groups is also relevant for determining the extent of UAE and GoY responsibilities for human rights and humanitarian law violations committed by these forces. The following attempts to place some of these armed groups in context.

III Typology of Prominent Armed Groups and Military Units in Yemen

5. Armed groups and military units that are affiliated to the Government in Yemen in 2019, included the following:

Table 8.2

GoY forces and their affiliations

Armed Group/ Military Unit	Affiliations in 2019
Presidential Protection Brigades (PPB)	Remained loyal to GoY through the events in Aden in August 2019. Commanders appointed by GoY.
GoY Regular Armed Forces, see annex 8 of S/2019/83	Remained loyal to GoY, but relies on KSA support for weapons, salaries and other logistical support.
Resistance Forces: for example, Al Baydah front groups.	Likely loyal to those providing salaries and military and logistical support. KSA provides support, including through the GoY.

Armed groups and military units affiliated to the UAE in Yemen, include the following:

Table 8.3

Armed groups and military units affiliated with the UAE on 01 June 2019

Name of Forces	Affiliations with UAE (as at 01 June 2019)	Other Affiliations
SBF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> See table above 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> See table above.
Shebwani Elite Forces (SEF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UAE created at minimum seven Brigades of SEF (confidential annex), based on tribal and geographical affiliations.⁵⁰ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None, except GoY claiming that these are GoY forces until September 2019 (with exception in March 2018).

⁴⁸ Confidential sources within the PPB.

⁴⁹ Letter from UAE to Panel received on 19 December 2019.

⁵⁰ For this section, unless specified sources include: SEF, GoY (political and military) including in Shabwah. See also S/2018/193, S/2018/594, S/2019/83.

Hydrami Elite Forces (HEF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Each group is subject to instructions and orders from the UAE.⁵¹ • UAE provides salaries, training and logistical support.⁵² • Conducted joint arrest/detention operations and detainee transfers with UAE.⁵³ • Formed in Mukalla by UAE.⁵⁵ • Salaries, training and logistical support.⁵⁶ • Coordinates detainee transfers.⁵⁷ • Receive instructions and orders from the UAE.⁵⁸ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From August 2017, some units affiliated themselves with STC, but continued to receive salaries from UAE.⁵⁴ • None, except for the GoY claims above. • There is no evidence to suggest that their affiliations to the UAE changed after the Aden events.
Abu al Abbas Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UAE provided logistical support.⁵⁹ • Local UAE leadership intervened in 2018 to protect military positions of Abu al Abbas.⁶⁰ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A battalion falling under the 35th Brigade but 35 Brigade said to have no command and control over Abu al Abbas. forces⁶¹
West Coast Fighters	<p>Guards of the Republic, Tihama and Giants:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UAE/ Coalition provides salaries, training, arms and logistical support.⁶² • UAE directs and controls all military operations in the West Coast, including deployment of forces.⁶³ • UAE/ Coalition appoints leaders to the Joint Operations Room (confidential annex).⁶⁴ • UAE leadership in Mocha resolves disputes between these forces and ensures coherence in military operations and coordination.⁶⁵ • These forces have fundamental differences in approach to battle and opinions, and do not always trust each other. The UAE is crucial to keeping these forces united against the Houthis.⁶⁶ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For Amjad Khalid forces that were in the West Coast: stated to be exclusively under GoY support and control. • Some Amalika and Tihama brigades claim loyalty to GoY.

7, Other changes to these groups in 2019, after 1 June 2019, are reflected in the main report.

IV Major Saudi-affiliated forces

⁵¹ GoY letter to Panel dated 04 October 2019.

⁵² UAE in its letter acknowledges training support only (19 December 2019).

⁵³ /2018/193, S/2018/594, S/2019/83 and current report.

⁵⁴ SEF sources. Information as at November 2019.

⁵⁵ GoY letter to Panel dated 04 October 2019.

⁵⁶ GoY letter to Panel dated 04 October 2019.

⁵⁷ S/2018/193.

⁵⁸ GoY letter to Panel dated 04 October 2019.

⁵⁹ Sources: 35th Brigade commanders, Abu al Abbas forces and Ta'izz military axis commanders.

⁶⁰ Document with Panel. Discussions with Yemeni commanders involved.

⁶¹ Verified document with Panel. In discussions in October 2019, both Abu al Abbas Brigade and the 35th Brigade confirmed the above.

⁶² West coast forces. GoY military and political sources.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Civil society actors.

8. Armed groups and military units affiliated to the KSA in Yemen, include:
 - a. The Yemeni fighters on the KSA-Yemen borders. This includes, for the purposes of this annex, only the fighters on the Yemen side of the border, as the Panel continues to investigate if those on the Saudi side of the border function as an armed group, or as private contractors.
 - b. During the period of the implementation of the Riyadh agreement, all the GoY forces and the STC-affiliated forces in the South falls under the direct supervision of KSA.

Annex 9. Names of individuals in identified armed groups

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Annex 10. The situation in Attaq, Shabwah (17 to 24 June 2019)

1. This incident was reported in the midterm update of the Panel. The Panel finds that the proximity of these clashes to the events in Aden in August 2019 and the level of collaboration between the STC and the SEF, makes these clashes relevant to understanding of the Aden incidents. For example, the Panel noted that the STC media on 18 May 2019, discusses the outcome of a meeting with the president of the STC and “all commanders” of the South. The conclusion of the meeting was that: “The meeting approved a number of important decisions and conclusions, including establishing combat and operational areas, military mobilization, unifying the command and control instruments, reinforcing all military fronts and creating a unified and integrated operations room for all southern security and military sectors.”⁶⁷ In June 2019, in the aftermath of these clashes, the Shebwani Elite Forces (SEF) informed the Panel that they envisage a unification of all southern forces, including the SEF and the Security Belt Forces (SBF).⁶⁸

I. Background to the escalation of tensions in Attaq

2. Attaq is in Shabwah (see figure 10.1). It has been under government control since 2015, following brief hostilities with Houthis. After the liberation of Attaq from the Houthis, the security arrangements had the SEF guarding the entrances to the city and fight terrorism, and the police providing security inside the city. The presence of security and military groups in Attaq in June 2019 was as follows:

Table 10.1

The security and military groups in Attaq in June 2019

Location/ Function	Type of force	Relevant commander
Entrances to the city	SEF	Relevant commanders included the Commander of the 4 th Brigade, Wajdi Baoum Al-Khulaifi, ⁶⁹ and Mohammed Salem Al-Buhair Al-Qamishi, the Commander of the Shabwani Elite, Azzan Axiz. ⁷⁰
Oil company outside Attaq city	21 st Brigade	Jahdal Hanash Al Awlaki
In Attaq	30 th Brigade	Brigadier General Aziz Nasser al-Ateeqi
In Attaq	Law enforcement	Brigadier General Awad Al-Dahboul, Director General of Shabwah Police

⁶⁷ <http://en.adenpress.news/news/4292>,

⁶⁸ Confidential sources. Also, in June 2019, authorities in Shabwah informed the Panel of the formation of 10 “brigades” of approximately 300 people called the southern resistance forces under the command of Hani Bin Brek, vice president of the STC.

⁶⁹ <https://t-alhadrami.com/هي-الشيوانية-النخبة-باوم-وجدي-المقدم-الجنوب-اخبار/>

⁷⁰ Interview with Al-buhair in his capacity as commander on November 2017, <https://al-omana.com/news65261.html>.

Figure 10.1
Map of Shabwah Province



Source: Open source

II. The clashes (19 and 20 June 2019)

3. On 17 June 2019, the SEF entered Ataq City, following which the 21st Brigade also entered the city.⁷¹ SEF sources also informed the Panel that they entered the city after 12 people had died, in what was likely a tribal-oriented dispute with GoY.⁷² Sources explained that the SEF considers the GoY military in Ataq as a wing of the Islah party,⁷³ a sentiment supported by the STC in its official statements.⁷⁴ Observers report that once the 21st Brigade entered the city, following the SEF, the issue was no longer a conflict limited to tribal elements, it had morphed into a wider dispute focusing on overall security control of Ataq city.

4. Also, on 17 June 2019, after entering the city, both the 21st Brigade and the SEF started establishing their own checkpoints across the city. The city entrances were subsequently blocked by the SEF, the GoY military forces could not receive reinforcements. The same day, the Governor of Shabwah sent an official letter to the UAE in Balhaf informing of the entry of the SEF into the city and the formation of new security checkpoints inside the areas of the operational responsibility of the police. See appendix 1. He warned that this may result in a confrontation between the forces and asked them to give urgent instructions to the Elite Forces to go back to their past positions, contain the situation...” (emphasis added).

⁷¹ Sources: SEF and Shebawah GoY representatives, 02 locals, and 01 tribal leader.

⁷² Source: SEF representative. Interview in June 2019.

⁷³ Ibid. See also facebook page for the SEF at <https://www.facebook.com/SOUTHARABNEWS/>. See for example, post on 04 July 2019.

⁷⁴ <http://aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=89526>, <https://aden-alhadath.info/news/59613>

Figure 10.2:
Military buildup in Attaq



Source: confidential.

5. On 19th June, at approximately 21.30 hours, armed clashes began within the city, when the GoY military began shooting at an SEF vehicle, which refused to stop for a GoY military checkpoint.⁷⁵ The clashes continued until 20 June 2019, including with tanks. For example, the GoY military fired shells which landed near the Shuhada (martyr's) camp of the SEF,⁷⁶ with no recorded casualties.

6. According to local sources, this resulted in damages to two military vehicles and some government infrastructure in the city. Four individuals from the GoY military and security forces, and one from the SEF were reportedly injured.⁷⁷

7. During the course of clashes, the commander and some soldiers of the SEF were surrounded by the GoY military in the local court. They were only allowed to leave following tribal mediation. The tribal mediators and local authorities agreed that both the 21st Brigade and the SEF would withdraw from the city to their pre-established positions. The parties agreed to a truce for five days, to allow time for the Governor of Shabwah to find a solution.⁷⁸

Table 10.2
Parties reportedly involved in clashes, 19 – 20 June 2019

Party	Entity	Comments
Government	30 th Brigade	Based in Qadas.
Military	21 st Brigade	Based outside Attaq city and responsible for the protection of oil installations.
Police	Elements of local law enforcement	Based in Attaq city (some referred to this as emergency police, as opposed to regular law enforcement)
SEF	SEF, in particular 4 th Brigade.	Fought on the same side with the so-called southern resistance forces.
“Southern resistance forces” ⁷⁹	Elements from Assaylan and Marha.	Fought on the same side as SEF

Source: Panel

⁷⁵ Sources: GoY and locals.

⁷⁶ <https://www.stcaden.com/news/9863>

⁷⁷ GoY

⁷⁸ Document with Panel. There were several conditions for the truce, which included both the SEF and the 21 Brigade to leave Attaq City and for the 21 Brigade to control the oil field and the SEF to control the entry points to the city, and to handover the security of the city to the Police. The Police were asked to request any of the two forces for reinforcements in case the other breaches the agreement.

⁷⁹ GoY and local sources claimed that the STC was recruiting and training separate elements called the “southern resistance forces” formed of 10 battalions of 300 people each

I. Escalation of tensions after the clashes

8. On 21 June 2019, an assassination attempt against the 21st Brigade Commander was widely reported.⁸⁰ On 22 June 2019, the STC issued a statement, rejecting “every northern military presence” in Shabwah and to direct the security tasking to the police and SEF.⁸¹ On 23 June 2019, the STC called for public protests in support of the SEF.

9. The Governor of Shabwah advised against the protests warning that the situation was already tense. A mediation committee, including the Governor, also stated that while they respected the political right of peaceful protest, the timing was inappropriate, because the security situation was already tense.⁸² Also, on 23 June 2019, a pipeline was blown up resulting in a leak. The oil company maintenance team were not allowed to fix the pipeline by the SEF.⁸³ The STC continued to encourage the protests and mass protests took place on 24 June 2019 in Attaq, without any incidents. The protestors carried banners supporting the re-entry of the SEF into Attaq. The situation remained tense until the events in Aden in August 2019.

Figure 10.3

STC-organised protest in Attaq Shabwah (note the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen flags)



⁸⁰ <https://aden-alyoum.com/من-في-اغتيال-لمحاولة-يتعرض-العولقي-حنش/سلايدر/>, and <https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/136825>

⁸¹ <https://www.stcaden.com/news/9863>, <https://www.stcaden.com/news/9862>, <http://en.adenpress.news/news/4309> and <http://en.adenpress.news/news/4292>

⁸² Document with Panel.

⁸³ Letter from oil company dated 24 June 2019

Appendix 1: Letter from Governor of Shabwa to the Leadership of the Arab Coalition in Balhaf (18 June 2019)

مكتب محافظة شبوة
الرقم القبطارية: (الصادر)
التاريخ: ٥٤ / ٥٣٣
المرفقات: ١٩١٦ / ١٨



الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الإدارة المحلية
محافظة شبوة
مكتب المحافظ

المحترمين

الأخوة / قيادة التحالف العربي محور بالحاف

خيه طيبه،

الموضوع: دخول قوات النخبة وتمركزها في مواقع الأمن والقوات المشتركة بعاصمة المحافظة عتق

في البدء نهدىكم أطيب التحايا متمنين لكم التوفيق والنجاح في مهامكم إشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه ، نطلعكم بقيام قوات النخبة الشبوانية بالدخول إلى العاصمة عتق يوم الاثنين (٢٠١٩/٠٦/١٧م) والتمركز في مواقع الأمن والقوات المشتركة وشرطة السير واستحداث نقاط جديدة داخل نطاق عمل الأمن مما نتج عنه إقلاق السكينة والذعر والهلع في أوساط المواطنين خوفاً من الاشتباكات بين الوحدات الأمنية وقوات النخبة الشبوانية ومثل هذه الأمور تزعزع الأمن والاستقرار بالمحافظة وقد تتطور الأمور إلى الاشتباكات وإلى ما لا يحمد عقباه لأن التوتر يسود الموقف .

وعليه:

تكرموا بالتوجيهات العاجلة للنخبة الشبوانية للعودة إلى مواقعها السابقة وأحتسوا الموقف وتجنيب المحافظة الصراعات وزعزعة الاستقرار داخل المدينة .

واكبر تقديرنا !!!

محمد صالح بن عليو
محافظ محافظة شبوة
رئيس المجلس المحلي




نسخة مع التحية :

- مكتب رئيس الجمهورية .
- رئيس مجلس الوزراء .
- قيادة التحالف العربي المنطقة الوسطى - الريان .

Annex 11. Map of Ta'izz Frontlines as at June 2019

Note: A high resolution copy is deposited with the Secretariat.



KEY OF THE MAP :

SIMPLE	MEANING	SIMPLE	POSITION NAME:	SIMPLE	MEANING
	AREAS UNDER CONTROL OF LEGITIMATE FORCES	1	AL-ROBAIAE		5TH PG Br. 5TH PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BRIGADE
	AREAS UNDER CONTROL OF HOUTHİ MILITIAS	2	MAFRAQ BANI AUON		4TH MONT Br. 4TH MOUNTANOUS INFANTRY BRIGADE
	AREAS OF POPULAR RESISTANCE	3	MAFRAQ AL-HASHAMAH		35 Ar Br. 35 ARMORED BRIGADE
	T55, T62 TANKS	4	AL-KASSARAH		22 MECH Br. 22ND MECHANICAL BRIGADE
	ARTILARY DEFFERENT CALIBERS	5	ALJANAD AIRPORT		170AD Br. 170 AIR DEFENSE
	BM 21	6	JABAL OMAN		17 INF Br. 17 INFANTRY BRIGADE
		7	JABAL AALI		145 INF Br. 145 INFANTRY BRIGADE
		8	SOFTEIL AND AL-SALLAL HIGH LANDS		

SCALE : 1:50000

Source: Information Provided to the Panel by the Government of Yemen Military Axis and Brigades in Ta'izz

Annex 12. The military leadership in Ta'izz and integration of resistance forces into GoY in Ta'izz

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Annex 13. Results of the security campaign in Ta'izz in 2019

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Annex 14. Case study on the attacks on the Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khureys on 14 September 2019

1. This case study provides an analysis of the attacks, by a combination of weaponized UAVs and LACMs, on the Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khureys in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 14 September 2019. The Houthi forces have, through their media, repeatedly claimed responsibility for the attacks.⁸⁴ Upon invitation by Saudi Arabia, the Panel has inspected both the damage to the oil facilities, as well as the weapon systems used in the attacks during two visits in September and November 2019.

2. As previously reported by the Panel, the Houthi forces have repeatedly targeted the vital oil sector of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through attacks on tankers operating in the Red Sea using both WBIEDs and anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as through attacks on oil installations using UAVs. However, prior to the attack on Abqaiq and Khureys on 14 September 2019, the impact of these attacks has largely been psychological, rather than material. While the attacks by Houthi forces on Saudi oil tankers in July 2018 led to a temporary shutdown of exports through the Red Sea, the number of seaborne attacks in the waters around Yemen has significantly decreased in 2019. In contrast, the Houthi forces have increased both the frequency and lethality of airborne attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia since mid-2018. However, until the attacks on 14 September 2019, despite a number of attacks on oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia, no significant production losses had been reported.

Attacks on the Saudi Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khureys

3. In the early morning hours of 14 September 2019, two key facilities of Saudi Arabia's national oil company Saudi Aramco were attacked almost simultaneously by a series of aerial strikes. One of the two facilities, the industrial complex at Abqaiq, a town some 60 kilometres Southwest of Dharan in the Eastern Province, is the largest crude oil stabilization plant in the world, according to Saudi Aramco. Stabilization refers to a process through which sour crude oil arriving from the different wells is converted to sweet crude oil through the removal of sulfur impurities, a necessary step before it can be refined further downstream. The stabilization plant in Abqaiq has a capacity of seven billion barrels of oil or about seven percent of global production. The second facility, the Khureys oil field, is located about 250 kilometres southwest of Dharan and produces some 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil per day.⁸⁵ Given the distance of more than 1,000 kilometres between the facilities and Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, which is near or beyond the range limit of known Houthi weapon systems, it seems likely that neither Saudi Aramco nor the government in Riyadh seriously anticipated aerial attacks from Yemen, even though the Panel observed the presence of short-range air defence batteries near Abqaiq during its visit in September 2019.

4. The attack on the Abqaiq plant started at 03.41 hours and ended nine minutes later at 03.50 hours, the facility sustained at least 18 hits from weaponized UAVs, with a number of structures being hit twice. The targets included two different parts of the refinery chain: (1) a number of stabilizer towers, which are large structures, supported by a framework of steel girders and beams. The function of those towers is to remove gasses and water from the crude oil. At the bottom of each tower are two re-heaters (A and B), vessels, which heat the crude oil before pumping it back to the top of tower. (2) a number of separator tanks, which are 28 meters in diameter and approximately 9 meters tall. The function of the separator tanks is to separate gasses from the crude oil. While the stabilizer towers were hit once, three out of a total of nine attacked separator tanks were hit twice. The Panel noted the precise distribution of the impact points on the tanks, which implies a high-level of accuracy in the targeting.

⁸⁴ https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=8774&cat_id=1

⁸⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49699429> and <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/drones-hit-saudi-aramco-facilities-fires-190914051900472.html>


Figure 14.1
Damaged separator tank in Abqaiq



Source: Panel

5. The Panel has analysed the position of the impact points on the stabilizer towers and the separator tanks at Abqaiq and found that the general direction of the attack was from North/North-West. In mid-December 2019, the Panel received information from a Member State stating that, based on the exploitation of one of the UAV's flight computers, it has established that one of the waypoints traversed by one of the UAV's attacking Abqaiq. The geographic coordinates of the waypoint are given as 27.00° N and 48.00° E, a location approximately 200 kilometres North-West of Abqaiq, see figure 14.9. The Panel cannot independently verify this information.

Figure 14.2
Schematic diagram of the separator tanks and impact points




Source: Panel

6. The facility in Khureys was attacked between 03.31 hours and 03.48 hours by at least four LACMs, which hit four (out of a total of five) stabilizer towers. During its inspection of the facility on 21 September 2019, the Panel noted that all four structures were hit at the precisely the same spot, in the lower third of the structure, roughly between re-boiler B and the stabilizer column, which are about three meters apart. It is not clear whether the attackers were aiming for the re-boiler, the stabilizer column or the feed pipe, which run from the re-heater to the tower. The kinetic energy of the missile's warhead must have been significant as it caused serious structural damage to the towers, as well as fires. The Panel has inspected a complete warhead of a similar cruise missile, see annex 18, which was seized from a dhow in the Arabian Sea on 25 November 2019 and has noted that the fragmentation observed in the damaged piping is consistent with the fragmentation visible in the warhead.

Figure 14.3

Damaged stabilizer tower in Khureys



Source: Panel

7. Based on the location of the impact area, the attacks came from North/North-East. The general direction of the attack was also confirmed by Saudi Aramco staff during the visit, as well as by footage from one of the facility's surveillance cameras, which shows the direction and shallow angle of the incoming missile.

Figure 14.4

Still picture from surveillance video in Khureys showing the moment before the impact




Source: Saudi Aramco

8. In addition to the 18 UAVs, which were used in the attack on Abqaiq and the four LACMs, which were used in the attack on the Khureys oil field, the Saudi authorities informed the Panel that the debris of three additional LACMs had been found in the desert, see figure 14.5 below. The location of the crash sites implies that at least some of them targeted the Abqaiq plant. The total number of weapon systems used during the attacks on 14 September 2019 is therefore at least 25: 18 weaponized UAVs and 7 LACMs. However, it is likely that the real number was even greater given that two (out of a total of 11) separator tanks in Abqaiq as well as one of the five stabilizer towers in Khureys did not sustain any damage. It is likely that additional UAVs and/or cruise missiles were launched but malfunctioned before reaching their target. The complexity and scale of the attacks is unprecedented and shows a high degree of military capacity.

Figure 14.5

Map showing the location of the three missiles, which crash-landed near Abqaiq



9. It should be noted that the Panel did not see any debris of the weapon systems on-site in Abqaiq and Khureys, as those had already been transported to Riyadh at the time of the visits on 20 and 21 September 2019. The Panel did see images showing the debris of the cruise missiles (see figure 14.6), which crash-landed close to Abqaiq and visited the location where missile #2 landed in the desert. At the time of the Panel's visit, the impact crater, as well as discolorations in the sand (likely from a fire caused by the impact) were still visible. The Panel also noted small debris fragments, likely from the missile, near the impact site. In contrast, the only physical remnants of the weapon systems visible at Khureys were small metal cubes, part of the fragmentation of the warhead, which were embedded in some of the damaged pipes. It is likely that some debris of the UAVs was still inside the separator tanks at the time of the Panel's visit, but access to the tanks was impossible. During a second visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2019, the Panel noted the presence of additional UAV parts which were covered in oil.

Figure 14.6

Missile debris in the desert near Abqaiq

**Source:** Saudi Arabia

10. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Saudi Aramco’s daily oil production fell from 9.8 million barrels to about 4.1 million barrels, which is a production loss of almost 60 percent overnight. This reduction represents about five percent of global oil production.⁸⁶ While international markets recovered fairly quickly from the initial shock after Saudi Arabia announced that it would make up the temporary production shortfall from reserves, and that the facilities would be repaired by the end of September, the impact of the attacks on Abqaiq and Khureys showed how vulnerable crucial oil installations are to well-planned and executed attacks.

Houthi claims of responsibility for the attacks

11. Shortly after the attack, the spokesman for the Houthi forces, brigadier Yahya Sare’e claimed in a televised statement that the group had carried out the strike with ten UAVs, calling the operation the “Second Deterrent Balance Operation”. He also mentioned that the attackers had support from “honourable and freedom-seeking people” within Saudi Arabia. Earlier in 2019, Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam had stated in a television interview that economic targets, such as oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia, would be targeted as this would represent a form of economic deterrence.⁸⁷

12. Just hours after the attacks on Abqaiq and Khureys, United States officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, expressed doubts that the strikes had been launched by the Houthi forces, stating that there was “no evidence the attacks came from Yemen” and instead blaming Iran for “an unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply”.⁸⁸ In response, the Houthi forces organized another press conference on 18 September 2019, where spokesman brigadier Yahya Sare’e claimed on the group’s television channel that the U.S. was using “fabricated satellite images” to portray the damage to the facility as less serious than it was. He also stated that attacks had been launched from three different locations, using a combination of upgraded Qasef and Samad UAVs, as well as a newly developed UAV, which uses cluster heads, capable of dropping four accurate, independently targeted bombs.⁸⁹ The Panel notes that so far the Houthis have not presented any video or still imagery of this “newly-developed UAV”, even though Yahya Sare’e stated that they would be presented “soon”.

Range analysis

⁸⁶ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/drone-strikes-spark-fires-at-saudi-oil-facilities-11568443375>

⁸⁷ http://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=6914&cat_id=1

⁸⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/14/pompeo-iran-saudi-arabia-oil-yemen-houthi>

⁸⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oMgGRU6B79s>

13. The Panel has analysed the range of both the UAV and the Quds-1 cruise missile which were used in the attacks, with the aim of determining whether the attack could have been launched from Yemeni territory under the control of the Houthi forces. Given that the Panel has only incomplete information about the weight and the aerodynamics of each weapon system, to estimate the range of each system, it employs a simple formula in which it divides the estimated fuel capacity by the fuel burn at cruise and then multiplies that number with the system's estimated airspeed. This very rough estimate provides a useful indication of the maximum range.

14. The Panel has analysed the fuel tank of the UAVs used in the attack on Abqaiq – the main fuel tank is an oval cylinder with two wings on either side to maximize the available space, which is located directly in front of the engine. The Panel finds that the volume of this tank is 25 litres.

15. In order to establish the burn rate of the Wankel engine, the Panel has used the performance of the original British version as the baseline. According to the manufacturer's data sheet⁹⁰, this engine delivers about 25 brake horse power (bhp) at cruise, operating at 7,000 RPM or about 70 percent of maximum power. This would result in a burn rate of 8.2 litres, which would put the endurance of the engine at about three hours. Based on a comparison with similar UAV designs, the Panel estimates the airspeed of the UAV to be between 180 and 210 kilometres per hour, which would put the maximum range between 540 and 630 kilometres. The Panel has received information from a Member State indicating the presence of a second fuel tank with an additional capacity of 10 litres. So far, the Panel has not seen any evidence for the existence of this tank among the debris, even though the UAV's fuselage would provide sufficient space and the UAV is clearly designed to maximize range. If the UAV's total tank capacity is 35 litres,⁹¹ the maximum range would be between 760 and 900 kilometres.

Figure 14.7
Schematic drawing of the Quds-1 cruise missile



Sections in blue have been inspected by the Panel in KSA

16. As far as the cruise missile is concerned, the Panel has noted that sections 2, 3 and 4 of the fuselage contain fuel tanks. The diameter of each section is 35 centimetres and the length of the tank in section 3 is approximately 106 centimetres, while the length of the tank in section 4 is approximately 40 centimetres. The Panel did not see section 2 of the missile in Saudi Arabia, but has been able to inspect parts of an identical missile, which was seized on 25 November from a Dhow in the Arabian Sea, which included sections 1 and 2. Based on the inspection of that missile, the Panel notes that the fuel tank in section 2 has a length of approximately 82 centimetres, see figure 14.9 below. A cable conduit with a diameter of approximately six centimetres runs through the three sections, so the total fuel capacity of three tanks would be a maximum of 212 litres. According to the manufacturer, the TJ-100 turbojet engine has a fuel burn of 3.12 litres per minute at maximum thrust⁹², which would allow for an endurance of about 68 minutes. Based on a comparison with other, similarly-sized cruise missiles, the Panel considers a maximum airspeed of about 0.6 Mach to be realistic, which equates about 735 kilometres per hour. This would mean that the maximum range of the missile would be around 800 kilometres. The Panel has taken note

⁹⁰ <https://uavenginesltd.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ar731.pdf>

⁹¹ The Panel has received information from a Member State stating that the fuel capacity of the UAV is 60 litres, however the Panel does not believe that the fuselage of the UAV could accommodate fuel tanks with this capacity.

⁹² See https://www.pbs.cz/getmedia/3bf0621d-4146-4c90-b8d0-08a875fe6380/PBS_Turbojet-engine_TJ100_EN.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf

of information received from several Member States, which put the range of the cruise missile at about 700 kilometres, which might be due to a lower speed at cruise.

Figure 14.8

Approximate length of the fuel tank in section 2 of the cruise missile



Source: Panel


Conclusions

17. The Panel notes that Abqaiq and Khureys were approached respectively from a North/North-Western and North/North-Eastern direction, rather than from the South, as one would expect in the case of a launch from Yemeni territory. It also takes note of the waypoint provided by a Member State, which lies in the same direction. Whereas both UAVs and cruise missiles are capable of flying a curve, this would add significantly to the fuel burn. However, even disregarding this factor, the distance between Abqaiq and Khureys and Houthi-held territory (approximately 1,200 kilometres and 1,000 kilometres respectively) are well beyond even the most optimistic range projections.

18. The scale and effectiveness of the attacks on the facilities in Abqaiq and Khureys represents a significant escalation compared with previous strikes attributed to the Houthi forces. Launching 25 or more UAVs and LACMs almost simultaneously and striking deep into enemy territory without detection or interference requires levels of technical and military know-how which the Houthi forces were not known to possess. The precision of the targeting also seems to indicate that the attackers used more advanced guidance systems than those previously observed by the Panel in Houthi weapon systems.

19. In theory, the attacks could have also been launched by Houthi forces either from within Saudi Arabia, from the territory of other countries, or even from sea or airborne launch platforms, but the complexity of the operation (and the fact that the Houthi forces do not have access to suitable platforms) makes such a scenario highly unlikely. The Panel therefore concludes that, despite their claims to the contrary, the Houthi forces did not launch the attacks on Abqaiq and Khureys on 14 September 2019.

Figure 14.9
Range calculations from Abqaiq and Khureys



Annex 15.Components of the Delta-design UAV

1. The Panel has inspected the debris of numerous engines – both from UAVs used in the May attacks on the pumping stations and from the attack on Abqaiq in September – and has noted that there are at least two different variants. Both variants seem to be unlicensed copies of the original AR731 – 38 BHP 208cc UAV target engine, which is produced by UAV Engines Ltd.⁹³ in the United Kingdom. According to the manufacturer, this Wankel engine has the highest power-to-weight ratio of any rotary engine in the world and has been specifically designed for small target drones and other short-life UAVs. One of the two variants observed among the debris in Saudi Arabia is cast steel, while the other one made out of cast alloy, with very finely cast curved cooling fins. The Panel believes that the two variants are likely made by different producers, possibly in different countries. Given the storage conditions of the debris in Saudi Arabia, it is not in all cases clear whether the Wankel engines inspected belong to the UAVs used in the attacks in May or in September 2019.

Figure 15.1

Different versions of the Wankel engine



Cast steel engine on the left, cast alloy engine on the right

Source: Panel.

2. The Panel has documented a variety of markings on the two engine variants: two of the cast steel engines have stenciled factory item numbers on the central cylinder casting, the item number on the third engine has been obliterated. On the inlet manifold itself, the engines have different cast numbers: 030 – 005 – 3C, 030 – 003 – 3C, 030 – 061 – 1C. The alloy engine uses the same size of the internal rotor and shares many of the external components, including the contactless magneto, carburetor and fuel flow regulator, however the Panel has not observed similar cast numbers.


3. The Panel has noted that the technical characteristics and markings on the cast steel engines are similar to the MDR-208 Single Rotor UAV engines, which are produced by Beijing MicroPilot Flight Control Systems (BMP) in Beijing, China.⁹⁴ The figures below show a visual comparison of the markings on the MDR-208 engine and the markings on the steel cast version of the UAV engine:

⁹³ <https://uavenginesltd.co.uk>


⁹⁴ http://www.uavstar.com/index/index_e.htm

Figure 15.2


Markings on the MDR-208 engine (left) and the cast steel engine (right)



Source: <https://detail.en.china.cn/provide/pic118073173.html> (left), Panel (right)



Source: <https://detail.en.china.cn/provide/pic118073173.html> (left), Panel (right)



Source: <https://detail.en.china.cn/provide/pic118073173.html> (left), Panel (right)

4. The Panel has noted the presence of the following individual marking on the rotor housing of the cast steel engines - S/N 2169 and an obliterated engine number, as well as S/N 2181 and engine number 1132. The Panel has written to China requesting information on the chain of custody of those engines, a reply is pending.

Figure 15.3

Engine number on one of the steel cast engines



Source: Panel

5. The Panel has also noted that a Wankel engine, which has very similar technical characteristics, has been displayed in the Iranian media on two separate occasions – during an ‘exhibition of achievement’ of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on 11 May 2014, which also featured the public display of a different UAV, as well as the ‘Ya Ali’ LACM. In this case, the engine was designated as ‘Shahed-783’ and presented as an indigenous development.⁹⁵ The second time, a similar engine was shown during the 5th Iranian National Aerospace Exhibition, which was held in October 2014 in Teheran. Here the engine was presented as having been produced by Iranian manufacturer ‘MADO’.⁹⁶ The Panel has contacted Iran requesting more information on those engines and was informed that the engines inspected by the Panel, as well as their serial numbers, do not conform to Wankel UAV engines produced in Iran. The relationship between the ‘Shahed-783’, the ‘MADO’ engine, the Chinese MDR-208, as well as the engines inspected in KSA remains unclear and the Panel continues to investigate.

6. Among the debris of the UAVs, the Panel has noted the presence of a black metal vertical gyroscope, which is labelled as ‘Model: V9 Serial: 5279’. This gyroscope seems to belong to the same family as the smaller V10 vertical gyroscope, which has been inspected repeatedly by the Panel among the debris of both Samad and Qasef UAVs, which have been used by the Houthi forces. The gyroscope has stickers showing the roll and pitch axis, as well as an expiration date. The manufacturer of the gyroscope remains unknown. The Panel has so far only seen the V9 model, in this case painted green, among the debris of a UAV, which is on display at the Iran Military Display (IMD) in Washington DC. According to the United States government, this specific UAV crash-landed in Afghanistan in October 2016 and is identified as an Iranian Shahed-123 UAV. The Panel cannot independently verify the origin or the chain of custody of the V9 vertical gyroscope on display at the IMD.

⁹⁵ <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/05/irgc-asf-exhibition-of-achievement.html>

⁹⁶ <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/11/takeaways-from-iranian-national.html>

Figure 15.4

Vertical gyroscope inspected by the Panel (top), gyroscopes at the IMD (bottom)



Source: Panel

7. The Panel has inspected the debris of at least two different kinds of munitions, which according to the Saudi Arabian military, were associated with the Delta-design UAVs. In June 2019, the Panel noted the presence of a munition, which consists of a large cylinder (550 millimeters x 145 millimeters) encircled by small, cubic fragmentation, as well as large copper shaped charge, which seems designed to penetrate heavy armor. It was labeled as coming from the 14 May 2019 attacks. During the inspection in November 2019, the Panel noticed a second munition, which was confusingly also labelled as coming from the May attacks. Unlike the industrially manufactured combined effects munition described above, this improvised munition consists of C4 high explosives poured into a fiberglass shell, which is embedded with steel fragmentation. The shell fits into the nose cone of the UAVs. It is not clear what kind of munition was used in the attack on Abqaiq, even though the damage seems to be more consistent with an improvised munition.

Figure 15.5

Different munitions documented among the debris of the Delta-design UAVs











Source: Panel

8. Beyond the engine, munition and gyroscope, the inspection of the debris of the UAVs showed that the unknown manufacturer relied on a number of commercial, off-the-shelf components from a range of countries, in particular in the fuel system, servos and the avionics. Figure 15.6 provides an overview over the components documented during the inspections in Saudi Arabia, as well as information on the chain of custody, where available.

Figure 15.6

Commercial components documented among the debris of the Delta-design UAV

Image	Item	Manufacturer	Country of origin	Last known custodian
	Fuel pump	TI Fluid System	United Kingdom/Poland	Response from company pending.
	AM7 ignition coils	Swedish Electro Magnets (SEM)	Sweden	180 units with batch numbers matching the inspected components were exported in 2016 to Excell Agency, Flat No. 101, Spring Blossom Apt., Pune, India. A response from the company is pending.
	'Petrol King' Carburetor Fuel Pressure Regulator	Officina Meccanica Malpassi	Italy	100 units with batch numbers matching the inspected components were exported in February 2018 to Glencoe Ltd., Drake Ave., Gresham Rd., Staines, Middlesex, United Kingdom. A response from the company is pending.
	LSF40 Flow Monitors	OVAL Corporation	Japan	Units with serial numbers matching inspected components were exported in July 2017 to a company in Hong Kong, which exported them to another company in Shenzhen. Another unit with a matching serial number was inspected in 2013 to a company in Singapore, which exported it to Malaysia.

	<p>HL-304F Carburettor</p>	<p>Tillotson</p>	<p>Ireland</p>	<p>500 units with batch numbers matching inspected components were produced in 2011. Units from this batch were sold in small lots as after-market parts to resellers across Europe and the USA.</p>
	<p>HS-M7990TH Monster Torque servo actuator</p>	<p>HiTec</p>	<p>Republic of Korea</p>	<p>Response from Member State pending.</p>
	<p>Inertial Measurement Sensor Unit</p>	<p>Analog Devices</p>	<p>USA</p>	<p>Response from company pending.</p>
	<p>Capacitor</p>	<p>General Electric</p>	<p>USA</p>	<p>Response from company pending.</p>

Source: Panel

Annex 16. Components of the ‘Quds-1’ LACM

1. The Quds-1 cruise missile is powered by an externally-mounted turbojet engine, which appears to be an unlicensed copy of the TJ-100 turbojet produced by PBS Velká Bíteš in the Czech Republic.⁹⁷ According to the manufacturer, with its compact design, comparatively low weight and a maximum thrust of 1,300 Newton, the engine was specifically designed for missiles, target drones and UAVs. The Panel has noted a number of differences in manufacturing, including the yellow color of anodizing on the fuel ramp and the rough casting of the inlet part, between the original TJ-100 engines and the engines, which have been inspected in Saudi Arabia. The TJ-100 turbojet has been exported to a wide number of countries, but no copies had previously known to exist. The Panel has inspected the turbojet engines from the debris of at least six different cruise missiles, some of which (coming from the missiles, which crash-landed on soft ground in the desert near Abqaiq) were in remarkably good condition. The Panel has noted a variety of markings, both externally and on the inside of the engines, which include the designation ‘Model T10S’, as well as a manufacturing date of ‘2019/04’. A second turbojet engine was marked with a manufacturing date of ‘2019/01’.

Figure 16.1

Turbojet engine documented among the debris of the LACM



Source: Panel

2. Among the debris of turbojet engines, the Panel has noted the presence of several original parts produced by PBS Velká Bíteš, i.e. two ignition boxes (serial numbers 203036.11 and 203036.15) as well as two bypass governors (serial number 216012.2 and 216013.2). The Panel believes that those original parts, belong to the turbojet engines of the missiles (marked as S/N 10025 and S/N 10031), which have crash-landed near Abqaiq. So far, the Panel has not been able to identify any original PBS Velká Bíteš components among the debris of the turbojet engines, which were used in the other attacks. It is possible that those two engines, despite the manufacturing date of 2019, represent an earlier, prototype version. Performance differences between this engine version, and the ones used in the other attacks, might also explain why the three cruise missiles landed short.

⁹⁷ See <https://www.pbs.cz>

Figure 16.2
Original PBS components



Source: Panel

3. The Panel has been able to partially trace the chain of custody for those four original parts⁹⁸ - the ignition box with the serial number 203036.15 and the bypass governor with the serial number 216012.2 were both part of an original PBS TJ100A engine with the serial number 185, which was produced in August 2010. The ignition box with the serial numbers 203036.11 was part of an original PBS TJ100A engine with the serial number 193, while the bypass governor with the serial number 216013.2 was part of an original PBS TJ100A engine with the serial number 195. Both, engines #193 and #195 were produced in October 2010. So, in total the Panel has documented parts from three original PBS turbojet engines, which were exported all to the same company – China Feixiang Aviation Science Technology Ltd. in Hong Kong during two separate transactions in August 2010 and in November 2011. In total, PBS exported 75 TJ100A turbojet engines to this customer. The Panel has contacted China requesting information on the chain of custody for those engines, a response is pending.

4. The Panel has also inspected a number of servo actuators, which are used to control the three, rear-mounted control surfaces in section 5 of the cruise missile. The Panel has noted a number of marking, for example F469-492 and MS7-21K0486. Among the debris of the servos, the Panel has documented a small motor, which seems to have been manufactured by Maxon Motor AG in Switzerland. Despite efforts to obliterate the markings on the motor, the Panel has been able to document a batch or serial number - V642530-1-2 / 51 1. The Panel has contacted Switzerland in order to establish the chain of custody of the motor. A response is pending.

⁹⁸ The Panel has documented an additional original PBS part on the turbojet engine of the LACM, which was seized on a dhow in the Arabian Sea on 25 November 2019. It has contacted the Czech Republic, requesting information on the chain of custody. A reply is pending.

Figure 16.3

Servo actuators documented among the debris of the LACM




Source: Panel

5. In addition to the turbojet engines and the servo actuators, the Panel has identified a number of other commercial components, mainly with regard to the fuel system of the LACM. These include an AMISCO EVI/5P coil system, which is manufactured in Italy, as well as 30.600 G OEM Pressure Transmitters, which are manufactured by BD Sensors in Germany. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of those components.

Figure 16.4

Commercial components documented as part of the LACM's fuel system



Source: Panel

6. The Panel has not been able to inspect sections 1 and 2 of the missile in Saudi Arabia, however the identical missile, which was seized on 25 November 2019 in the Arabian Sea did contain complete sections 1 and 2. The Panel has been able to inspect those sections and has noted that the missile's warhead (in section 1) contains fragmentation in the form of the same metal cubes, which the Panel has documented in the damaged piping at Khureys after the attack on 14 September 2019. With regard to section 2, the Panel did document the avionics of the missile, but was unable to open and further exploit them.

Figure 16.5
Warhead (section 1) and avionics (section 2)



Source: Panel

Annex 17. Houthi supply networks for commercial parts used in UAVs and WBIEDs

1. This annex provides more details on three cases, where commercial parts, which might be used in the assembly of UAVs and WBIEDs have been transferred to Houthi-controlled areas, or where such transfers have been stopped by seizures. They illustrate a pattern of supply networks, which includes manufacturers in numerous countries, as well as intermediaries, who, knowingly or unknowingly, are supporting the Houthi war efforts.

Case 1: UAV components, which were transferred from Hong Kong to Al Jawf in Yemen

Figure 17.1

DLE UAV engines seized in Al Jawf



Source: Panel.

Figure 17.2

DLE engine ignition boxes seized in Al Jawf



Source: Panel

Figure 17.3
Exhaust pipes for DLE UAV engines seized in Al Jawf



Source: Panel

Figure 17.4
Cardboard box containing propeller blades seized in Al Jawf



Source: Panel

Figure 17.5
Propeller blades of different sizes seized in Al Jawf



Source: Panel

Figure 17.6
UAV flight control ailerons seized in Al Jawf



Source: Panel

Figure 17.7
Components used in UAV guidance units in Al Jawf



Source: Panel

Figure 17.8
Detail of shipping label on the packaging in Al Jawf



Source: Panel

2. The Panel has been able to establish that the shipment was exported by a Guangzhou Nanyi Trade using the services of logistics company SMT-Global in Hong Kong, first via truck from mainland China to Hong Kong and then by air cargo via Bangkok to Muscat, where it was picked up on 2 December 2018. The consignee was Bahjat Alleqa'a with an address in Muscat in Oman, see figure 17.9.

Figure 17.9
Air Waybill for the shipment obtained by the Panel

910 BKK 12945402		910-12945402																																																																	
Shipper's Name and Address GUANGZHOU NANYI TRADE CO., LTD. C/O SMT GLOBAL LOGISTICS LTD UNIT 7 A & 7B 39/F, CABLE TV TOWER, NO. 9 HOI SHING ROAD, TSELEN WAN, N. T. H.K.		Shipper's Account Number Not Negotiable Air Waybill OMAN AIR Issued by																																																																	
Consignee's Name and Address BAHJAT ALLEQA'A S. O. OMAN - MUSCAT, ALKHAIR, 22H P.O. BOX 1816 TEL.: 009689030 1308 AL_LEQA'A113@HOTMAIL.COM		Consignee's Account Number It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in apparent good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREON BY THE SHIPPER, AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.																																																																	
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To My First Carrier BKK HX MCT WY Nov 28, 2018		Declared Value for Carriage N. Y. D. Declared Value for Customs AS PER INV.																																																																	
Handling Information TOTAL : ONE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE(141) PACKAGE(S) ONLY ORIGINAL INVOICE AND PACKING LIST ATTACHED, NO SOLID WOOD PACKING MATERIALS																																																																			
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>No. of Pieces ADP</th> <th>Gross Weight</th> <th>Size</th> <th>Commodity Item No.</th> <th>Chargeable Weight</th> <th>Rate Charge</th> <th>Total</th> <th>Notes and Quantity of Goods (Ind. Dimensions in Volume)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>141</td> <td>2957.0 K</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>2957.0</td> <td>39.170</td> <td>116417.09</td> <td>GRADING SCALE SCREWS DRILL TOOLS WIDENERS CONNECTORS POWER INVERTER WITHOUT BATTERY (103PKGS) BLUETOOTH HEADSET LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF PI 967 (38PKGS) T/S CARGO FM CHINA TO MCT VIA BKK BY TRUCK</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10x 110x 76x 120cm</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1, 76x 48x 73cm</td> <td>1, 2</td> <td>10x 30x 16cm</td> <td>2</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>83x 84x 24cm</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1, 76x 53x 43cm</td> <td>6,</td> <td>79x 54x 80cm</td> <td>1</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>308x 76x 86cm</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1, 131x 30x 33cm</td> <td>1,</td> <td>44x 37x 21cm</td> <td>16</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>42x 33x 27cm</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>10, 28x 28x 11cm</td> <td>36,</td> <td>53x 30x 30cm</td> <td>30</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>130x 30x 30cm</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>1, 32x 25x 17cm</td> <td>15,</td> <td>58x 40x 28cm</td> <td>1</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>65x 40x 25cm</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>5, 51x 30x 30cm</td> <td>30,</td> <td>41x 28x 26cm</td> <td>11</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				No. of Pieces ADP	Gross Weight	Size	Commodity Item No.	Chargeable Weight	Rate Charge	Total	Notes and Quantity of Goods (Ind. Dimensions in Volume)	141	2957.0 K			2957.0	39.170	116417.09	GRADING SCALE SCREWS DRILL TOOLS WIDENERS CONNECTORS POWER INVERTER WITHOUT BATTERY (103PKGS) BLUETOOTH HEADSET LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION II OF PI 967 (38PKGS) T/S CARGO FM CHINA TO MCT VIA BKK BY TRUCK	10x 110x 76x 120cm			1, 76x 48x 73cm	1, 2	10x 30x 16cm	2		83x 84x 24cm			1, 76x 53x 43cm	6,	79x 54x 80cm	1		308x 76x 86cm			1, 131x 30x 33cm	1,	44x 37x 21cm	16		42x 33x 27cm			10, 28x 28x 11cm	36,	53x 30x 30cm	30		130x 30x 30cm			1, 32x 25x 17cm	15,	58x 40x 28cm	1		65x 40x 25cm			5, 51x 30x 30cm	30,	41x 28x 26cm	11	
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Prepaid BKK116417.09		Other Charges ADC=13.00 TC=4967.80 MYC=8575.30																																																																	
Total Other Charges Due Agent BKK13556.10		Signature of Shipper or its Agent SMT GLOBAL LOGISTICS LTD / SPX																																																																	
Total Other Charges Due Carrier BKK129977.19		Date of Issue Nov 27, 2018 Issued at HONG KONG																																																																	
For Carrier's Use only at Destination Charges at Destination Total Other Charges		Signature of Issuing Office or its Agent SA: 16479																																																																	

Source: Confidential

Case 2: Servo actuators for use in UAVs and WBIEDs

Figure 17.10
SSPS 105 Servo actuators seized in the UAE



Source: Panel.

Figure 17.11
SSPS servo actuators in a ‘Shahed-123’ UAV (left) and in the steering box of a WBIED (right)



Source: Panel.

Figure 17.13

Commercial invoice for the export, showing that the buyer is Mohammed Alswari in Sana'a, Yemen

MARKS & NUMBERS		NO OF PKGS	DESCRIPTION OF GOOD	QUANTITY	UNIT VALUE	TOTAL VALUE
AS ADDRESSED		6	Radio Control Actuator SSPS105-24V±45° STD	60pcs	JP¥35,000.	JP¥2,100,000.
		6CTN				Total JP¥2,100,000.-

I DECLARE THAT ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS INVOICE TO BE TRUE AND CORRECT.

SIGNATURE OF SHIPPER/EXPORTER (TYPE NAME AND TITLE AND SIGN)

Please use only for peace.


Haruo Bando
HARUO BANDO

Date Oct. 22, 2018

Source: Confidential


3. The Panel has obtained information that Al Sawari Trading & Import, located at Dar Salm Bridge, Ta'izz Road, in Sana'a, Yemen, shares an address with two other companies, which seem to be associated with the Al Sawari family: Alswari Group for Rubber Industries, which manufactures rubber parts for cars, agricultural equipment and industrial use, as well as Hashem Brothers for International Trading, which supplies rubber and non-rubber parts for military equipment. According to its website, Hashem Brothers for International Trading also supplies UAV parts. The three companies seem to share the same address, as well as at least some e-mail addresses and telephone numbers. The Panel has noted that the website of Hashem Brothers seems to have been taken offline after the Panel started making inquiries, even though the company's Facebook site still exists.





Figure 17.14
Hashem Brothers for International Trading website (now defunct)



Source: <http://www.HBIT.weebly.com>


Figure 17.15
Hashem Brothers for International Trade Facebook site




 Gefällt mir
  Abonnieren
  Teilen
  ...


Info


Unternehmensinfos


 Erstellt am 23. Oktober 2012


 **Mission**
 supplying, installing the equipments, accessories and the spare parts used for developing, updating and maintaining the military machineries and equipment of different kinds also to supply the equipment's and tools

KONTAKTINFO


 Anrufen +967 733 778 887

 m.me/HashimBrothersforInternationalTrading ⓘ

 salman-mohammed@hotmail.com

 <http://www.HBIT.weebly.com>

WEITERE INFOS

 Hashem Brothers For International Trading Company is of the Leading companies in the Republic of Yemen specialized in the field of supplying the technical and fighting equipments & tools required for establishing and updating the security end developed systems as well as supplying of the accessories and the spare parts used for maintenance and updating the equipments tools and machineries belonged to the security and military units or the multi-purpose ubits (civil-military).

Source: https://www.facebook.com/pg/HashimBrothersforInternationalTrading/about/?ref=page_internal

Case 3: Chain of custody for 3W UAV engines documented among the debris of Samad-UAVs in 2018

Figure 17.16
3W-110iB2 engines inspected by the Panel



Source: Panel

Figure 17.17
Obliterated engine number on one of the 3W engines



Source: Panel

Figure 17.18
Delivery note for the transfer of the engines to Greece

3W-International GmbH

3W-International GmbH · Hollerstr. 12 · D-61350 Bad Homburg

Eurowings Aviation & Consulting Ltd.
12 Ventouri Street
15561 Holargos Athen
Greece



Delivery Note No. 2015-128




KUNDE

Customer No.: 60175
Processed by: cw
Delivery date: 22.06.2015
Date: 22.06.2015

Item	Qty.	Unit	Art.-No.	Weight kg	Description
1	21,0	pcs	10.001.420		3W-110i B2, tractor, counter clockwise gasoline engine incl. ignition
2	21,0	pcs	10.001.500		3W-112i B4, tractor, counter clockwise gasoline engine incl. ignition

Source: Confidential

Figure 17.19
Packing list showing the engine number



753.1 Packliste / Packing list

Kunde / Customer: EUROWINGS

Datum / Date: 23.06.15


AB-2248

Karton Nr. / Box no.	Menge / Qty.	Einheit / Unit	Artikelnummer / Article number	Seitennummer / Serial number	Kartongröße / Box Size	Gewicht / Weight (kg)	verpackt / packed
8	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.000.200	3W.112IB4 + 2 x Twinignition 35+45cm	1506271L		
9	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.000.200	3W.112IB4 + 2 x Twinignition 35+45cm	1506283L	H124	UW
	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.000.200	3W.112IB4 + 2 x Twinignition 35+45cm	1506272L		
10	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.000.200	3W.112IB4 + 2 x Twinignition 35+45cm	1506285L	H124	UW
	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.000.200	3W.112IB4 + 2 x Twinignition 35+45cm	1506288L		
11	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.000.200	3W.112IB4 + 2 x Twinignition 35+45cm	1506270L	H124	UW
	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561517B		
12	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561515B	H124	UW
	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561522B		
13	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561524B	H124	UW
	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561514B		
14	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561513B	H124	UW
	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561520B		
15	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561516B	H124	UW
	1	Stk / pcs Paar / pair	10.001.420	3W.110IB2+ Twinignition 35cm	1561512B		

Copyright Qualitätsmanagement 3W, Revision 1, Seite 1 von 2, Gültig ab: 15.12.2012

Source: 3W-International GmbH

Figure 17.20
Packing list showing the re-export from Greece to Iran



EUROWINGS AVIATION & CONSULTING LTD.
EORI NUMBER: GR 099289025
 12 Ventouri Street, Holargos, 15561 Athens, Greece
 Tel: (0030) 210 6525100, Fax: (0030) 210 6525125
 VAT No: GR 099289025, Email: info@eurowings.gr
 Web Site: http://www.eurowings.biz, www.eurowings.gr
 Bank Account Information: PIRAEUS BANK - ATHENS, GREECE IBAN NUMBER: GR9601720430005043061394728 SWIFT/BIC:PIRBGAA00X

PACKING LIST

Date	2/7/2015
Order #	GITI-1-0515
Invoice #	GITI/1/072015
Customer ID	GITI

Page 1/1

CUSTOMER	SHIP TO	SHIPPING DETAILS
GITI RESAN KALA CO. No.25, Ayatollah Kashani Blvd. TEHRAN / IRAN TEL: (+9821) 47230000-30 MOB: Email:	GITI RESAN KALA CO., No.25, Ayatollah Kashani Blvd, TEHRAN / IRAN Tel: (+9821) 47230000-30 PARTIAL SHIPMENT OF GOODS AS PER PROFORMA INVOICE # EW-GITI- PF1/0515	Freight Type (Air/Surface): Air Est Ship Date: Est Gross Weight: 231,0 kgr Est Cubic Weight: Total Packages(Qty): 21

PART NUMBER	UNIT OF MEASURE	PRODUCT/ SERVICE DESCRIPTION	TARIC	PACKAGE #	QTY SHIPPED
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	1	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	2	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	3	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	4	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	5	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	6	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	7	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	8	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	9	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	10	2
10.001.500	PIECE	3W-112IB4 model engine	84079010	11	1
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	11	1
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	12	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	13	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	14	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	15	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	16	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	17	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	18	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	19	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	20	2
10.001.420	PIECE	3W 110IB2 model engine	84079010	21	2
TOTAL UNITS					42

TERMS OF SALE AND OTHER COMMENTS
 Shipped goods are for MODEL AIRCRAFT and DO NOT FALL under EU Dual Use, EU Common Military List and National Export Controls.

ADDITIONAL DETAILS
 Country of Origin: EU originating products.
 Port of Embarkation: ATHENS, GREECE
 Port of Discharge: TEHRAN, IRAN
 Reason for Export:

I certify the above to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Constantine Hadjiethymilades
 Eurowings Aviation & Consulting Ltd.

Date: 2/7/2015

EUROWINGS
ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΕΣ & ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΕΣ
ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΕΣ ΕΠΕ
ΒΕΝΤΟΥΡΗ 12
15561 ΧΟΛΑΡΓΟΥΣ-ΑΘΗΝΑ
ΤΗΛ: 6525 100 FAX: 6525.125
ΑΦΜ: 099289025
ΔΟΥ: ΧΟΛΑΡΓΟΥ


Source: Confidential

Figure 17.21
Air Waybill for the re-export from Greece to Iran

235 ATH 0282 5270		235-0282 5270	
Shipper's Name and Address EUROWINGS AVIATION & CONSULTING LTD 12 VENTOUR STR 15561 ATHENS GREECE VAT EL099289025 TEL 2106525100		Shipper's account Number Not Negotiable TURKISH AIRLINES Air Waybill Issued by	
Consignee's Name and Address GITI RESSAN KALA CO. NO 25 AYATOLLAH KASHANI BLVD, TEHRAN, IRAN TEL (+9821) 47230000-30		Consignee's account Number It is agreed that the goods described herein are accepted in apparent good order and condition (except as noted) for carriage SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. ALL GOODS MAY BE CARRIED BY ANY OTHER MEANS INCLUDING ROAD OR ANY OTHER CARRIER UNLESS SPECIFIC CONTRARY INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN HEREBY BY THE SHIPPER, AND SHIPPER AGREES THAT THE SHIPMENT MAY BE CARRIED VIA INTERMEDIATE STOPPING PLACES WHICH THE CARRIER DEEMS APPROPRIATE. THE SHIPPER'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTICE CONCERNING CARRIER'S LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Shipper may increase such limitation of liability by declaring a higher value for carriage and paying a supplemental charge if required.	
Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City HARLAS INT'L TRANSPORT S.A., A/P BR EL. VENIZELOS ATHENS INT'L A/P BLDG VAT NUM: EL093354037		Accounting Information FREIGHT PREPAID VAT:	
Agent's IATA Code 27-4-7438/1056		Account No 1056	
Airport of Departure (Addr. of first Carrier) and requested Routing ATHENS ATH - IST - THR			
Airport of Destination TEHRAN		Declared Value for Carriage NVD	
Handling Information ENVELOPE ATTACHED, PSE INFORM CNEE UPON ARRIVAL TOP! TOP! URGENT! MUST FLY A		Declared Value for Customs NCV	
Insurance: If carrier offers insurance and such insurance is requested in accordance with conditions on reverse hereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked amount of insurance.			
No. of Pieces 21		Gross Weight 214,00 K	
Rate Class Q		Chargeable Weight 300,00	
Rate 2,10		Total 630,00	
Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume) AIRCRAFTS SPARE PARTS NOT RESTRICTED DIMS/CMS: 21 QTY 54x39x35 AS 300 KGS		STATUS T1	
ETA 14.40 LT		Amount of Insurance NIL	
Prepaid 630,00		Other Charges CCC : 10,00 FSC : 107,00 SEC : 32,10	
Weight Charge 630,00		Collect 630,00	
Valuation Charge 630,00		Tax 630,00	
Total other Charges Due Agent 149,10		Total other Charges Due Carrier 149,10	
Total prepaid 779,10		Total collect 779,10	
Currency Conversion Rates Charges at Destination		Executed on (Date) 2 JULY 2015	
For Carrier's Use only at Destination		Signature of the Agent HARLAS INT'L TRANSPORT S.A. BRANCH OFFICE LAGODIMOS GEORG	

Source: Confidential

Annex 18. Map of Houthi supply networks documented during the reporting period



Map No. 4602.5 UNITED NATIONS December 2019

Office of Information and Communications Technology Geospatial Information Section

Annex 19. Weapons and arms-related materials seized in Aden

Figure 19.1

Type 56-1 assault rifles seized in Aden



Source: Panel

Figure 19.2

Detail of the production stamp on the type 56-1 assault rifles



Source: Panel

Figure 19.3
Detail of serial numbers on the type 56-1 assault rifles



Source: Panel.

Figure 19.4
RPG-7 launcher seized by the Coalition in Aden, disassembled by the Panel



Source: Panel.

Figure 19.5

Serial numbers on RPG-7 launchers seized in Aden and inspected by the Panel

Ser.	Top row	Bottom row
1.	3295	9593295
2.	3325	9593325
3.	3466	9593466
4.	3511	9593511
5.	3737	9593737
6.	3781	9593781
7.	3823	9593823
8.	3826	9593826
9.	3850	9593850
10.	4081	9594081
11.	4107	9594107
12.	4144	9594144
13.	4221	9594221
14.	4333	9594333
15.	4349	9594349
16.	4365	9594365
17.	4376	9594376
18.	4386	9594386
19.	4389	9594389
20.	4504	9594504
21.	4540	9594540
22.	96090551	5841
23.	96090550	6188

Figure 19.6

PGO-7V3 optical sights for RPG launchers seized by the Coalition in Aden



Source: Panel

Figure 19.7

Serial numbers of PGO-7V3 optical sights seized in Aden and inspected by the Panel

Ser.	Front side serial number (stamped)	Aftermarket number (engraved)
1.	N1611053	3297
2.	N1611259	4233
3.	N1611996	4818
4.	N1611393	3352
5.	N1611362	3283
6.	N1612221	4232
7.	N1611812	4152
8.	N1612012	4579
9.	N1612717	3924
10.	N1612163	3777
1.	N1610594	4151
1.	N1612659	4138
1.	N1611167	3351
1.	N1612009	4564
1.	N1612038	4635
1.	N1612631	4234
1.	N1612036	4280
1.	N1612084	4261
1.	N1611195	4215
2.	N1611095	3340
2.	N1611015	3398
2.	N1611287	3912
2.	N1611221	3270
2.	N1610823	4171
2.	N1611295	3313

Annex 20. Weapons and arms-related materials seized from a dhow in the Arabian Sea

Figure 20.1
9M133 ‘Kornet’ ATGMs, which characteristics similar to the Iranian version ‘Dehlaviyeh’



The launch tubes with the red band contain the thermobaric version of the missile, in the back are the transport containers.

Source: Panel.

Figure 20.2

Comparison between the launch tubes for the original 'Kornet' version of the 9M133 ATGM (left) and the Iranian 'Dehlaviyeh' (right), these weapons were inspected in 2018 in KSA



Source: Panel

Figure 20.3

Markings on the seized ATGMs documented by the Panel


Type	Lot #	Date	Serial #
HEAT	64	2017	63
HEAT	64	2017	30
HEAT	64	2017	33
HEAT	55	2017	05
HEAT	55	2017	40
HEAT	55	2017	47
HEAT	55	2017	20
HEAT	55	2017	37
HEAT	55	2017	11
HEAT	55	2017	08
HEAT	55	2017	04
HEAT	55	2017	02
HEAT	55	2017	23
Thermobaric	43	2017	12
Thermobaric	43	2017	54
Thermobaric	43	2017	13
Thermobaric	43	2017	28
Thermobaric	43	2017	23
Thermobaric	43	2017	43
Thermobaric	75	2018	38
Training	--	--	--

Figure 20.4
Previously not documented cruise missile, possibly for Surface-to-Air (SAM) use



Source: Panel

Figure 20.5
Details of optical seeker (left) and V.10 vertical gyroscope (right) documented on the missile




Source: Panel

Figure 20.6
Detail of the front section of the missile



Source: Panel


Figure 20.7
Kerosene ignitors manufactured by Advanced Microturbines (AMT) Netherlands documented on the missile



Source: Panel

Figure 20.8

Detail of marking on the missile, implying a manufacturing date in 2019



Source: Panel


Figure 20.9

Sections of a C802 anti-ship cruise missile



Source: Panel

Figure 20.10
Sections of a Quds-1 LACM



Source: Panel

Figure 20.11
Computer Terminal, possibly associated with the missiles



Source: Panel

Figure 20.12
Non-electric detonators – a total of 13,700 in boxes of 50 each



Source: Panel

Figure 20.13
UAV engines and other related components



Source: Panel.

Figure 20.14
RU90 (top) and RU60 (bottom) thermo-optical sights and associated batteries



Source: Panel.

Figure 20.15
Parts for the conversion of boats to WBIEDs



Source: Panel

Annex 21. Delay of tankers proceeding to al Hudaydah port

1. Import of goods to Red Sea ports of al Hudaydah and Salif involves a three-step process. First, the importer applies for clearance through UNVIM which is usually delivered within 48 hours allowing the vessel to proceed to the Coalition Holding Area (CHA) about 140 nautical miles (260 km) North West of al Hudaydah. The vessel has then to hold in the CHA until it receives a clearance from the Coalition Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Cell (EHOC) in Riyadh, through a Coalition vessel, to proceed to the Anchorage Area (AA) at the entrance of al Hudaydah or Salif port. Statistics gathered by the Panel and information from importers has shown a lack of predictability in the delays in the CHA. Finally, the vessel waits in the anchorage area until it receives clearance from port authorities under Houthi control. The lack of transparency in this process has allowed GoY, the Coalition and the Houthis to wield significant leverage over importers by delaying their chartered vessels, forcing them to pay extra charges for demurrage. This leverage easily allows for corrupt practices by expediting clearance or extorting traders by delaying their vessels.

2. As reported in S/2019/83, al Hudaydah has been the only port allowed by the GoY to receive fuel in Houthi controlled areas. GoY started to implement decree 75 in June 2019 eliminating traders who could not submit justification of payment of their cargoes through bank transfers. In addition, GoY started to implement decree 49 in July 2019 requiring payment of import taxes before proceeding to the port of discharge. The Panel has copies of GoY documents requiring payment of a list of taxes with the amount to be deposited in specified USD, SAR and YER accounts in Aden, al Mukalla, Ma'rib, Nishtun and KSA. The total tax for 11,000 Mt of fuel amounted to around 320 million YER. Importers informed the Panel that prepayment of import taxes before the arrival to port was not legal, and incurred the additional risk of the cargo not reaching its intended port after such payment.

3. The Houthis and importers doing business in areas under their control have perceived the implementation of decrees 75 and 49 as a means of shifting imports of fuel from al Hudaydah to Aden where importers associated with the GoY have benefited from a monopoly situation. This resulted in a competition between the technical office of the Economic Committee of GoY and the Houthi external payment committee (Lajnat al Madfu'at) to compel importers to pay taxes in their respective areas. Though some importers obtained the required UNVIM clearances, usually within 48 hours, the technical committee, through the Coalition, denied clearance for their tankers to proceed to al Hudaydah. Similarly, some importers who complied with GoY requirements were denied entry to al Hudaydah by the Houthis.

4. Data gathered by the Panel on 58 tankers that applied for entry to al Hudaydah between 1 June and 30 November 2019, showed that the total delay was 865 days by the Coalition and 381 days by the Houthis. On average, each tanker was delayed for 15 days by the Coalition and for seven days by the Houthis. The cost of these unnecessary delays was financial loss payable by Yemeni consumers inside Houthi-controlled areas. The details are in table 21.1.

Table 21.1

Delays of tankers carrying fuel to al Hudaydah during six months (June to November 2019), as of 5 December 2019


Ref Tanker	Cargo (Mt)	Date Processing	Date CHA	Date Anchorage	Date Berthing	Delay CHA	Delay Anchorage
xxxx173	7,185	03-Jun-19	12-Jun-19	18-Jun-19	20-Jun-19	6	2
xxxx127	20,964	03-Jun-19	12-Jun-19	23-Jun-19	30-Jun-19	11	7
xxxx809	4,800	16-Jun-19	20-Jun-19	25-Jun-19	30-Jun-19	5	5
xxxx952	4,485	18-Jun-19	02-Jul-19	04-Jul-19	08-Jul-19	2	4
xxxx937	29,291	24-Jun-19	02-Jul-19	04-Jul-19	17-Jul-19	2	13
xxxx171	3,854	30-Jun-19	04-Jul-19	10-Jul-19	11-Jul-19	6	1
xxxx952	29,536	30-Jun-19	04-Jul-19	11-Jul-19	14-Jul-19	7	3
xxxx328	26,919	30-Jun-19	14-Jul-19	15-Jul-19	29-Jul-19	1	14
xxxx278	30,000	30-Jun-19	04-Jul-19	17-Jul-19	22-Jul-19	13	5
xxxx164	7,237	02-Jul-19	16-Jul-19	24-Jul-19	26-Jul-19	8	2
xxxx141	15,608	02-Jul-19	10-Jul-19	21-Jul-19	23-Jul-19	11	2
xxxx903	15,010	07-Jul-19	15-Jul-19	21-Jul-19	29-Jul-19	6	8
xxxx223	28,989	07-Jul-19	15-Jul-19	06-Aug-19	11-Sep-19	22	36
xxxx570	30,103	21-Jul-19	25-Jul-19	04-Aug-19	21-Aug-19	10	17
xxxx706	27,165	22-Jul-19	30-Jul-19	01-Aug-19	08-Aug-19	2	7
xxxx796	15,988	22-Jul-19	29-Jul-19	31-Jul-19	04-Aug-19	2	4
xxxx442	30,031	22-Jul-19	30-Jul-19	31-Jul-19	29-Aug-19	1	29
xxxx193	29,259	22-Jul-19	30-Jul-19	31-Jul-19	15-Aug-19	1	15
xxxx671	29,872	25-Jul-19	01-Aug-19	07-Aug-19	15-Aug-19	6	8
xxxx099	8,278	28-Jul-19	31-Jul-19	04-Aug	05-Aug-19	4	1
xxxx650	29,987	28-Jul-19	04-Aug-19	15-Aug-19	25-Aug-19	11	10
xxxx937	28,898	04-Aug-19	13-Aug-19	15-Aug-19	04-Sep-19	2	20
xxxx127	20,959	12-Aug-19	18-Aug-19	08-Oct-19	09-Oct-19	51	1
xxxx952	29,403	15-Aug-19	19-Aug-19	21-Aug-19	14-Sep-19	2	24
xxxx182	3,542	18-Aug-19	27-Aug-19	30-Aug-19	31-Aug-19	3	1
xxxx778	30,054	21-Aug-19	27-Aug-19	26-Sep-19	30-Sep-19	30	4
xxxx826	10,818	24-Aug-19	09-Sep-19	18-Oct-19	19-Oct-19	39	1
xxxx796	15,928	27-Aug-19	03-Sep-19	16-Oct-19	17-Oct-19	43	1
xxxx171	3,721	29-Aug-19	03-Sep-19	26-Sep-19	06-Oct-19	23	10
xxxx557	5,703	29-Aug-19	31-Aug-19	22-Sep-19	23-Sep-19	22	1
xxxx851	10,937	31-Aug-19	07-Sep-19	17-Oct-19	19-Oct-19	40	2
xxxx671	29,498	03-Sep-19	09-Sep-19	18-Oct-19	19-Oct-19	39	1
xxxx099	8,383	03-Sep-19	09-Sep-19	23-Sep-19	01-Oct-19	14	8
xxxx706	27,022	07-Sep-19	14-Sep-19	19-Oct-19	23-Oct-19	35	4
xxxx328	26,915	14-Sep-19	03-Oct-19	19-Oct-19	04-Nov-19	16	16
xxxx442	29,989	21-Sep-19	28-Sep-19	19-Oct-19	31-Oct-19	21	12
xxxx293	29,642	24-Sep-19	30-Sep-19	23-Oct-19	26-Oct-19	23	3
xxxx374	11,179	24-Sep-19	05-Oct-19	19-Oct-19	21-Oct-19	14	2
xxxx570	40,472	02-Oct-19	09-Oct-19	23-Nov-19	26-Nov-19	45	3
xxxx937	29,971	06-Oct-19	14-Oct-19	12-Nov-19	14-Nov-19	29	2
xxxx141	17,364	07-Oct-19	13-Oct-19	14-Nov-19	21-Nov-19	32	7
xxxx265	23,316	10-Oct-19	15-Oct-19	26-Oct-19	07-Nov-19	11	12

Ref Tanker	Cargo (Mt)	Date Processing	Date CHA	Date Anchorage	Date Berthing	Delay CHA	Delay Anchorage
xxxx952	29,528	14-Oct-19	22-Oct-19	12-Nov-19		21	23
xxxx063	7,493	21-Oct-19	26-Oct-19	31-Oct-19	02-Nov-19	5	2
xxxx815	19,718	23-Oct-19	27-Oct-19	14-Nov-19	19-Nov-19	18	5
xxxx099	6,213	23-Oct-19	29-Oct-19			37	
xxxx182	4,828	28-Oct-19	06-Nov-19	09-Nov-19	11-Nov-19	3	2
xxxx641	10,995	29-Oct-19	04-Nov-19	12-Nov-19	14-Nov-19	8	2
xxxx127	21,022	31-Oct-19	06-Nov-19	22-Nov-19	23-Nov-19	16	1
xxxx650	29,600	03-Nov-19	11-Nov-19			24	
xxxx255	24,854	06-Nov-19	16-Nov-19			19	
xxxx671	29,933	06-Nov-19	13-Nov-19	21-Nov-19	02-Dec-19	8	11
xxxx147	25,991	11-Nov-19	19-Nov-19			16	
xxxx796	15,809	11-Nov-19	17-Nov-19	21-Nov-19	24-Nov-19	4	3
xxxx293	29,695	16-Nov-19	23-Nov-19	01-Dec-19		8	4
xxxx706	27,467	21-Nov-19	01-Dec-19			4	
xxxx442	30,000	24-Nov-19	02-Dec-19			3	
xxxx473	27,672	26-Nov-19	05-Dec-19				
Total days						865	381
Days per tanker						15	7

Source: Panel based on UNVIM daily reports and vessels tracking from <https://maritime.ihs.com/>.

Figure 21.1

Tankers delayed at the Coalition Holding Area (CHA) and the Anchorage area as of 30 September 2019⁹⁹



Source: Panel using <https://maritime.ihs.com/>.

⁹⁹ During his briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Yemen, on 16 September 2019, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock announced that “As of today, the Government and the Coalition are blocking ten vessels with commercial fuel imports from entering Hudaydah. Together, these ships are carrying 163,000 metric tones of fuel – that’s more than an average month of fuel imports.”, see <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-mark-21>.

Annex 22. Documents indicating instructions to disguise the origin of the fuel

- 1) Several sources in the GoY, as well as confidential sources with links to the Houthis, informed the Panel that Mohammed Abdusalam Salah Fletah and his brother Salah Abdusalam Salah Fletah are the main actors within the network involved in channelling external financial support to the Houthis through fuel imports to Yemen.¹⁰⁰ Abdusalam Fletah, being the main interlocutor with the international community spends most of his time in Oman from where he travels to other destinations including Iran and Lebanon. According to several contacts, Abduslam Fletah has a very comfortable financial situation in Oman with a possibility of business activity in that country.
- 2) The Panel has gathered evidence, including bank transactions, that could help in tracing potential links between his business activities and external financial support to the Houthis and the financing of arms-related items found while being smuggled into Yemen via Oman. Transactions related to the payment of shipping fees for fuel imports to Yemen with fake documents to disguise their Iranian origin are also of interest.
- 3) The Panel received documents showing that the consignees in Yemen have instructed the shipping company to issue Bills of Lading (B/L) indicating that the fuel has been shipped from Oman instead of its real origin in Iran.

Table 22.1

Tankers with documents falsely indicating that the fuel was shipped from Oman

Tanker	Declared shipper	Port	date	Consignee	Evidence
MT Pvt Eagle	Al Ezz Al Arabiya Trading	Mahshahr	8/11/2016	Matrix Oil	Fin.2.1
MT Androussa	Sahool al Hojari Trading	Bandar Abbas	14/12/2016	Yemen Elaf	Fin.2.2
MR Nautilus	Sahool al Hojari Trading	Mahshahr	10/1/2017	Albarakah	Fin.2.3
MT Safe Sino	Sahool al Hojari Trading	Iran	27/3/2017	Albarakah	Fin.2.4


Source: Panel based on confidential documents.

¹⁰⁰ President Hadi, during his meeting with the Chair of the 2140 Committee in Riyadh, requested that Mohamed Abdulsalam be sanctioned. The Panel sent a letter to the GoY in this respect, a reply is still pending.

Figure 22.1.a

Letter from Matrix Oil for Import requesting MT PVT Eagle to issue a B/L mentioning Khassab as a port of lading, 13 October 2016

Note: The letter also mentions that Matrix Oil owns Al Ezz Al Arabiya



Source: Confidential.

Figure 22.1.b

Charter agreement for MT PVT Eagle indicating that the port of lading was Mahshahr, Iran

Page 1

Performing vessel : MT PVT EAGLE, Q88 as attached.

C/P FORM : SHELL TIME 4

REGISTERED OWNERS : SOUTHERN PETROLEUM TRANSPORTATION JSC

SPEED/ CONSUMPTIONS : LO consumption on Owner's account

L3C : NAPHTHA/PALM OIL/METHANOL

LAST 10 POC : to be reverted


H&M VALUE : USD 12,500,000.00

CHARTERERS : MATRIX OIL FOR IMPORT
SANAA, YEMEN

Please revert vessel arrival draft at discharge port basis

Gasoil (SG 0.83)	
25,000MT	10.9m draft
26,000MT	11.2m draft
27,000MT	11.5m draft

Page 2

1. DELIVERY APS Bandar - E – Mahshahr, IRAN 

DELIVERY NOTICE: 10/7/5/3/2/1 DAYS NOTICE

2. LAYCAN : 14-18 OCT 2016

3. ONE (01) TIME CHARTER TRIP WITH CARGO OF GASOIL (ALWAYS CLEAN, UNLEADED, UNDARKER 2.5NPA) VIA UAE OR IRAN TO YEMEN PICO – DURATIONS ABOUT 20/40 DAYS WOG

4. RE-DELIVERY DLOSP 1SP FUJAIRAH ATDNHINC

Redelivery: 10/7/5/3/2/1 day's notice

Source: Confidential.

Figure 22.2.a

Letter from Yemen Elaf for Import of Oil Derivatives requesting MT Androussa to issue a B/L mentioning Khassab as a port of lading, 8 December 2016

Note: The letter uses the same template the one used by al Barakah Republic Trading Company in Figures 22.3 and 22.4

يمن ايلاف لأستيراد المشتقات النفطية
YEMEN ELAF FOR IMPORT OF OIL DERIVATIVES
Elaf Yemen

8/12/2016

To.

Re :- MT Androussa

We hereby confirm the terms and conditions for charter of MT Androussa. We also confirm the relevant charter party.

As informed please note that the load port will be out of Iran.

We need a copy of Non – Negotiable bills of lading to state the following details. Please arrange to issue the same in due time.

Shipper – Sahool Al Hojari Trading & Cont. Co., P.O. Box 2589, Salalah, Sultanate of Oman

Consignee – Yemen Elaf for Import of Oil Derivatives, Sanaa Republic of Yemen

Notify Party – As above

Load port – Khasab

Discharge port – Ras Isa (Yemen)

Please note this bill of lading is not for purpose of negotiation. It is to be Non – Negotiable bills of lading only.

Regards,



For and on behalf of
Yemen Elaf

شارع تونس – صنعاء – الجمهورية اليمنية
TUNIS STREET, SANA'A, YEMEN. Email : yemenelaf@gmail.com

Source: Confidential.

Figure 22.2.b

Charter agreement for MT Androussa indicating that the port of lading was Bandar Abbas, Iran

C/P DTD 08/12/16
=====

Performing vessel : MT T ANDROUSSA
C/P FORM : SHELL TIME 4. + OWNERS ADDITIONAL TERMS AS PER BELOW
CHARTERERS : YEMEN ELAF FOR IMPORT OF OIL
DERIVATIVES,
SANAA,
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN


REGISTERED OWNERS: AS PER ATTACHED MATRIX
[REDACTED]

SPEED/CONSUMPTIONS : AS PER ATTACHED MATRIX

L3C : CLN UNLDD GASOIL / CLN UNLDD GASOLINE / CLN UNLDD GASOLINE

LAST 10 POC : AS PER ATTACHED

H&M VALUE : USD15MIO


- 
1. DELIVERY APS BANDAR ABBAS ATDNHSHINC
 2. LAYCAN :09-10.12.2016
 3. ONE (01) TIME CHARTER TRIP WITH CARGO OF GASOIL CLN UNLDD UND MAX 2.5 NPA VIA IRAN TO YEMEN PICO – DURATIONS ABOUT 30/40 DAYS WOG
 4. RE-DELIVERY DLOSP 1SP FUJAIRAH ATDNHSHINC
 5. HIRE USD 18,500 PDPR INCLOT
 6. CHARTERERS TO PAY HIRE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF BUNKERS TO OWNERS NOMINATED ACCOUNT IN USD OR UAE DIRHAM.
- CHRTRS CONFIRM THAT VESSEL WILL BE SUPPLIED WITH BUNKERS IN FUJAIRAH/KHORFAKAN FOR THE VOYAGE, but bunker used for loading operations and steaming to the Fujairah or Khor Fakkan for bunkering to be paid to owners . Charterers have right to deduct bunker payment made from last sufficient hire payment (as charterers are

Source: Confidential.

Figure 22.3.a

Letter from al Barakah Republic Trading Company requesting MT MR Nautilus to issue a B/L mentioning Khassab as the port of lading, 7 January 2017

Note: The letter uses the same template as the one used by Yemen Elaf for Import of Oil Derivatives in figure 22.2 above



Source: Confidential.

Figure 22.3.b

Charter agreement for MT Nautilus indicating that port of lading was Mahshahr, Iran

CP DATED 07 Jan 2017

CHARTERERS ALBARAKAH REPUBLIC TRADING COMPANY
HODEIDAH
YEMEN

[REDACTED]

CHARTER PARTY FORM ASBATANKVOY

VESSEL MT MR NATILUS , AS PER PROVIDED Q88


LAST 3 CARGOES GAS CONDENSATE / GAS CONDENSATE / GAS CONDENSATE

CARGO Gas Oil, 35000/40000 with 10pct molco. CHARTERERS' OPTION
UPTO FULL VSL SAFE CAPACITY.

SEGREGATION MAX 1 GRADE WVNS

HEAT VESSEL TO MAINTAIN LOADED TEMPERATURE

LAYCAN 7/8 Jan 2017 (0001 - 2359 HRS)

LOADING PORT(S) : 1P/1B MAHSHAHR, IRAN 

DISCHARGING PORT(S) : 1P/1B RAS ISA, YEMAN

FREIGHT RATE : USD 850,000 BSS 1:1 LUMP SUM NET TO OWNER

- THE RATE IS INCLUSIVE OF ADDITIONAL WAR RISK INSURANCE PREMIUM, KIDNAP AND RANSOM INSURANCE, ARM GAURDS LOSS OF HIRE INSURANCE AND CREW WAR.

PAYMENT TERMS PAYMENT TO BE MADE TO OWNERS NOMINATED ACCOUNT IN
USD/ UAE AED

OWNERS CONFIRM THAT VESSEL'S PNI COVERAGE IS VALID AS PER ATTACHED PNI CERT.

Charts nominated AGENT B ENDS / ALL MARINE DUES COSTS AND AGENCY FEE AT LOAD &

DISCHARGE PORT TO BE FOR OWNER.

ANY WHARFAGE OR CARGO DUES AT BENEDS TO BE ON CHARTERER'S ACCOUNT.

DEMURRAGE USD 16,500 PDPR

UNDISPUTED DEMURRAGE PAYABLE IN ADVANCE TO BE PAID IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING OWNERS DEMURRAGE INVOICE.



Source: Confidential.

Figure 22.4.a

Letter from al Barakah Republic Trading Company requesting MT Safe Sino to issue a B/L with mention of Khassab as the port of lading, 9 March 2017

Note: The letter uses the same template as the one used by Yemen Elaf for Import of Oil Derivatives in figure 22.2 above.

Date : 09 March 2017.

To,



Sub.: MT SAFE SINO - CHARTER

Dear Sirs,

We hereby confirm the terms and conditions for charter of MT SAFE SINO. We also confirm the relevant charter party.

As informed please note that the load port will be out of Iran.

Please arrange to issue a Non – Negotiable Bills of lading containing the following details.

Shipper – Sahool Al Hojari Trading & Cont. Co., P.O. Box 2589, Salalah, Sultanate of Oman

Consignee – Al Barakah Republic Trading Company, Hodeidah, Yemen

Notify Party – As above

Load port – Khasab

Discharge port – Ras Isa (Yemen)

Please note this bill of lading is not for purpose of negotiation. It is to be Non – Negotiable bills of lading only.

Thanks & regards



AL BARAKAH REPUBLIC TRADING COMPANY
HODEIDAH
YEMEN.

Source: Confidential.

Figure 22.4.b

Charter agreement for MT Safe Sino Eagle indicating that the port of lading was in Iran

Page 1C/P DTD 09th March 2017

=====

Performing vessel : MT SAFE SINO

C/P FORM : SHELL TIME 4.

CHARTERERS : ALBARAKAH REPUBLIC TRADING COMPANY
 HODEIDAH
 YEMEN

REGISTERED OWNERS : EASY CONNECT LIMITED OOS

SPEED/ CONSUMPTIONS :

Average speed in knots	Maximum average bunker consumption	
	Main propulsion fuel oil/diesel oil	Auxiliaries fuel oil/diesel oil
Laden 12.50 knots on	IFO380 25.50MT	2.5 MT the same for 13.00knots if ballast
11.50 knots on	IFO380 23.00MT	2.5 MT the same for 12.00knots if ballast

Navigation MGO 0.1 mt,

Loading IFO380 5.0mt,

Discharging IFO380 7.0mt plus 7.0mt MGO if IGS used

Tank Cleaning IFO 380 6.0mt

Vessel's Bunker tanks capacity Fuel Oil 1735m3 , MGO (DIESEL OIL) 161m3

L3C : PALM/MEOH/ CPP

LAST 10 POC : BIK/FUJAI RAH/HAMYRIA/ASSALUYEH/NANTONG/NINGBO/PASIR
 GUDANG/MUMBAI/KANDLA

H&M VALUE : USD14M



Page 2

1. DELIVERY APS 1SP FUJAIRAH ATDNHSHINC

2. LAYCAN : 14-18 MARCH.

Vessel arriving Mumbai ETB 1500LT today ETCD pm/9th

ETA Kandla am/10th ETCD am/12th if all going well

Master require about 2-3days tank washing in ballast to Fujairah

Thus ETA Fujairah 14-15/March for delivery

Owners will narrow into 3 days upon charters clean fixture confirmation

3. ONE (01) TIME CHARTER TRIP WITH CARGO OF gas oil VIA IRAN TO YEMEN PICO – DURATIONS ABOUT 30/40 DAYS WOG. ABOUT" MEANS PLUS OR MINUS 5DAYS WOG

4. RE-DELIVERY DLOSP 1SP FUJAIRAH ATDNHSHINC

CHARTERS TO GIVE MIN 12 DAYS REDELIVERY NOTICE THEREAFTER 7/5/3/2/1 DAYS REDELIVERY NOTICE

5. HIRE USD 17,000 PDPR INCLCOT

6. CHARTERERS TO PAY THE HIRE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF BUNKERS TO OWNERS NOMINATED ACCOUNT IN USD OR UAE DIRHAMS.

Source: Confidential.

Annex 23. Taurus pistols delivered for Djibouti security forces and found in the black market in Sana'a

Figure 23.1

Taurus PT 24/7 with serial number TGZ50281 for sale at a price of 2,800 USD on Telegram, by Abu Hashed Al Ghubary in Sana'a



Source: <https://t.me/slah3568>, 29 October 2019.

Figure 23.2

Taurus PT 24/7 with serial number TGZ51161 advertised for sale on Telegram, by an individual identified by phone number +967 771221102 in Sana'a, Yemen



Source: <https://t.me/slah3568>, 21 October 2019.

Figure 23.3

Taurus PT 24/7 with serial number TGZ51212 advertised for sale on Telegram, by an Ahmed Al Humaidi with phone number +967 771221102 in Sana'a, Yemen



Source: (@gunseller) tweeted at 0:15 AM on Mon, Jun 11, 2018, account removed from Twitter.

Annex 24. Alleged Forex manipulation

1. The Panel investigated the alleged manipulation of Forex rates within the financial system in Yemen. Forex has been a source of unjust enrichment since early 2015 when official movement of hard currency between Yemen and other countries ceased and several international banks stopped acting as correspondent banks for Yemeni banks. The Panel has reported in its midterm update to the Committee in July 2017 that:¹⁰¹

“The official exchange rate continues to be fixed at YER 250 per USD, however the market rates are YER 365 for cash and YER 400 for an LC. This has a major impact on humanitarian assistance agencies, which have to exchange at the official rate, but locally purchase aid at the market rate. This equates to an effective currency exchange loss of 32% and an equivalent loss of purchasing power.”

2. The Panel received information from individuals with connections to Yemeni private banks that a number of banks made a large profit at that time from handling cash transfers to Yemen for international organizations and UN programmes and agencies.¹⁰² One bank made a profit of more than 300 million USD for transferring one billion USD to Yemen. The YER rate to the USD in Yemeni markets started to move away from the official rates since early 2015,¹⁰³ see figure 24.1. The UN however, did not align its operational rate with the market until August 2017.¹⁰⁴

3. The Forex rate continued to increase reaching 500 YER to 1 USD in June 2019. The rate decreased in June probably following the first issuance of Letters of Credit (LC) by CBY Aden financed by the Saudi deposit. This event initiated the economic warfare between GoY, supported by KSA, and the Houthis. The Houthis started to see that the issuance of LC by CBY Aden as a means by GoY to syphon the liquidity from areas under their control to Aden.¹⁰⁵ This would have also allowed CBY Aden to be the sole entry point for remittances and external finance aid. The Houthis started to put pressure on banks and traders to prohibit any transfer of cash to CBY Aden or to use newly printed banknotes by GoY. Banks were only allowed to transfer funds by checks which, in reality, had lost their value as a mean of payment. Checks are settled in Yemen only through specific networks at less than 70% of their value.

4. In October 2017, there were indications that the financial position of CBY had improved with less pressure to seek hard currencies. The clearance process for LC funded by the Saudi deposit improved significantly, with about 245 million USD cleared between 27 October and 4 December 2018 compared to less than 37 million USD between June and October 2019, see figure 24.2 below. Moreover, beginning in November 2018, CBY was released from the burden of financing imports of fuel for the Aden's municipal electric power stations, since fuel had been donated in kind by KSA.¹⁰⁶

5. Within this context, CBY between October and December 2019 was in a better position to provide hard currency in the Forex market as a monetary policy tool - if it wanted to decrease the rate and stabilize the volatility. As it has been stated in this report and demonstrated below, the Panel observed the contrary where CBY purchased more and more hard currencies starting in late October 2018.

6. The Panel is aware that this allegation of Forex manipulation was a part of a publicized personal confrontation between Hafeedh Mayad, the head of the Economic Committee and advisor to President Hadi and Mohamed Zeman, the Governor of CBY with political agenda ramifications with other GoY officials. The Panel has therefore avoided using findings and justifications by either of the two officials. The Panel, in line with its methodology, attempted to use data which could be verifiable from the banks connected to this allegation. While these banks informed the Panel that they were ready to cooperate with any future investigations, GoY has so far not provided any information or observations with regards to access of CBY archives. Between the events of August 2019 in Aden and the date of submission of this report, there were, on occasions, reports that CBY Aden - without GoY control - had moved the archives to undisclosed locations.

¹⁰¹ See also paragraph 148 of S/2018/68.

¹⁰² This include cash transfers by UNDP and UNICEF funded by the International Development Association, see paragraph 111 (S/2019/83).

¹⁰³ 215 YER in early 2015, 250 YER in mid early 2017 until GoY decided to float its currency on 15 August 2017.

¹⁰⁴ <https://treasury.un.org/operationalrates/OperationalRates.php>.

¹⁰⁵ There were also cases of rejection by CBY and KSA of LC applications by traders from Houthi controlled areas, see paragraph 116 to 119 of (S/2019/83).

¹⁰⁶ See paragraph 123 of (S/2019/83). Donation of fuel by KSA was suspended in early 2019, reportedly as a result of difficulties in monitoring the distribution to electricity generation plants.

7. The Panel conducted its analysis using elements from the following table:


Reference	Reference
Hafedh Mayad posted a table comprising 28 Forex transactions by CBY from 4 to 29 November 2018 showing the difference between the market and the agreed rates which resulted to a loss by the bank of 8,969 million YER.	Figure 24.2.b Table 24.1.a Table 24.1.b
The Panel analysed 69 transactions comprising sales and purchases of hard currencies and used slightly different market rates obtained from a Telegram Chanel. The Panel also used a different methodology analysing the balance sheet of CBY for the Forex transactions. This analysis allowed to identify the loss of CBY by comparing the value in USD of the final amount of hard currencies held by CBY and the value in USD of its liability in YER. The Panel found that CBY lost 24,766,614 USD	Figure 24.3 Figures 24.4.a and b
The Panel compared the purchase and sale rate with market rate to identify the spread. The graphic also allowed to identify the effect of the rate applied for the application for LCs financed by the Saudi deposit	

Figure 24.1.a
Long term trends of Forex rate (YER to USD) in Yemen 2016 to 2019



Source: Economic Committee (GoY)

Figure 24.1.b
Approval of documentary credit from the Saudi deposit (July 2018 to May 2019)



Source: Panel based on data from the Economic Committee (GoY).

Figure 24.2.a

Letter from Hafedh Fakher Mayad, advisor to President Hadi and Head of the Economic Committee, to the Prime Minister of Yemen dated 6 December 2018

The letter requests the Prime Minister of Yemen to allow the Supreme National Authority for Combatting Corruption to investigate cases of corruption associated with the purchase and sale of hard currencies by CBY from 4 to 29 November 2018



Source: https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=241242340143182&id=100027722542809&sfnsn=mo.

Figure 24.2.b

Exchange transactions of SAR against YER between CBY main office Aden and Al-Kuraimi Islamic Bank from 11 October 6 December 2018

جدول الفوارق بين أسعار السوق وأسعار الشراء للعملة (ريال سعودي)

خلال الفترة ٢٠١٨/١١/٤ - ٢٠١٨/١١/٢٩ م

التاريخ	سعر السوق	سعر الشراء	الفارق	المبلغ المشتري	اجمالي الفارق
٢٠١٨/١١/٤	١٦٠	١٩٥	٣٥	١٦,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٥٦٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
٢٠١٨/١١/٥	١٦٩	١٩٧	٢٨	٢٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٥٦٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٦٩	١٨٧	١٨	٦,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	١٠٨,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
٢٠١٨/١١/١٩	١٥٣	١٧٧	٢٤	٣,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٧٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٥٣	١٧٩	٢٦	١,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٢٦,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
٢٠١٨/١١/٢١	١٤٠	١٥٢,٥	١٢,٥	٤,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٥٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٦١	٢١	٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٤٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٥٧	١٧	٦,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	١٠٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٦٣	٢٣	٢,٥٠٠,٠٠٠	٥٧,٥٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٦١	٢١	٣,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٦٣,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٦٢	٢٢	٣,٥٠٠,٠٠٠	٧٧,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٥٢,٥	١٢,٥	١٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	١٨٧,٥٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٦٢	٢٢	٨,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	١٧٦,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٥٢,٥	١٢,٥	٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٢٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٥٧	١٧	٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٣٤,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٥٦	١٦	٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٣٤,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٦٢	٢٢	١٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٢٦٤,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٠	١٥٧	١٧	١٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٢٤٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
٢٠١٨/١١/٢٢	١٤٤	١٦٢	١٨	٢٧,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٤٨٦,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٤	١٦٠	١٦	١,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	١٦,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٤٤	١٤٧,٥	٣,٥	١,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٣٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
٢٠١٨/١١/٢٩	١٢٢	١٤٢	٢٠	٣,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٦٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٢٢	١٤٢	٢٠	١٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٣٠٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٢٢	١٤٣	٢١	٣,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٦٣,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٢٢	١٤١	١٩	١٢,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٢٢٨,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٢٢	١٤٢	٢٠	٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	١٠٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٢٢	١٤٥	٢٣	١,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٢٣,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
	١٢٢	١٤٢	٢٠	١,٠٠٠,٠٠٠	٢٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠
					٨,٩٦٩,٠٠٠,٠٠٠

إجمالي مبلغ الفارق بين أسعار السوق وأسعار الشراء

Source: https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=241242340143182&id=100027722542809&sfnsn=mo.

Table 24.1.a

Transactions with Al-Kuraimi Islamic Bank from 11 October 6 December 2018 (Accounts Kuraimi at CBY)

Ser	Date request	Date Recording	Market rate ¹⁰⁷	Agreed rate	Sale USD	Purchase SAR	Sale SAR	Account in YER
1	11-Oct	11-Oct	189	190.5			(20,000,000)	3,810,000,000
2	11-Oct	13-Oct	189	190.5			(20,000,000)	3,810,000,000
3	11-Oct	11-Oct	189	185		20,000,000		(3,700,000,000)
4	28-Oct	5-Nov	196	197			(20,000,000)	3,940,000,000
5	30-Oct	31-Oct	196	197.5			(6,000,000)	1,185,000,000
6	30-Oct	31-Oct	196	198			(9,000,000)	1,782,000,000
7	4-Nov	4-Nov	160	195			(16,000,000)	3,120,000,000
8	5-Nov	5-Nov	170	187			(6,000,000)	1,122,000,000
9	6-Nov	8-Nov	180	167		5,000,000		(835,000,000)
10	7-Nov	8-Nov	170	168		2,500,000		(420,000,000)
11	7-Nov	11-Nov	170	168		10,000,000		(1,680,000,000)
12	14-Nov	15-Nov	174	170		9,000,000		(1,530,000,000)
13	15-Nov	19-Nov	173	180			(10,000,000)	1,800,000,000
14	17-Nov	19-Nov	158	177			(30,000,000)	5,310,000,000
15	20-Nov	21-Nov	140	163			(2,500,000)	407,500,000
16	20-Nov	21-Nov	140	161			(30,000,000)	4,830,000,000
17	20-Nov	21-Nov	140	162			(35,000,000)	5,670,000,000
18	20-Nov	21-Nov	140	161			(20,000,000)	3,220,000,000
19	20-Nov	21-Nov	140	156			(20,000,000)	3,120,000,000
20	20-Nov	22-Nov	140	162			(35,000,000)	5,670,000,000
21	20-Nov	22-Nov	140	160			(10,000,000)	1,600,000,000
22	21-Nov	21-Nov	140	152.5			(4,000,000)	610,000,000
23	21-Nov	21-Nov	140	157			(6,000,000)	942,000,000
24	21-Nov	21-Nov	140	152.5			(15,000,000)	2,287,500,000
25	21-Nov	21-Nov	140	157			(20,000,000)	3,140,000,000
26	21-Nov	21-Nov	138	162			(12,000,000)	1,944,000,000
27	21-Nov	21-Nov	140	157			(15,000,000)	2,355,000,000
28	21-Nov	21-Nov	140	571			(2,000,000)	1,142,000,000
29	22-Nov	22-Nov	144	147.5			(10,000,000)	1,475,000,000
30	25-Nov	25-Nov	143	143		15,000,000		(2,145,000,000)
31	26-Nov	29-Nov	138	143			(30,000,000)	4,290,000,000
32	26-Nov	29-Nov	138	142			(5,000,000)	710,000,000
33	26-Nov	29-Nov	138	145			(10,000,000)	1,450,000,000
34	26-Nov	29-Nov	138	142			(10,000,000)	1,420,000,000
35	26-Nov	29-Nov	517	539	(1,500,000)			808,500,000
36	27-Nov	29-Nov	130	142			(30,000,000)	4,260,000,000
37	27-Nov	29-Nov	130	142			(15,000,000)	2,130,000,000
38	27-Nov	29-Nov	130	141			(12,000,000)	1,692,000,000
39	27-Nov	3-Dec	130	142			(60,000,000)	8,520,000,000
40	27-Nov	3-Dec	487	534	(2,000,000)			1,068,000,000
41	28-Nov	3-Dec	110	136			(13,000,000)	1,768,000,000
42	28-Nov	9-Dec	110	136			(24,000,000)	3,264,000,000

¹⁰⁷ SAR exchange rate calculated based on USD exchange rate provided in **annex 9** and reportedly used by Al-Kuraimi as a market rate with its customers; SAR exchange rate = USD exchange rate / 3.75, as 1 USD = 3.75 SAR.

Ser	Date request	Date Recording	Market rate ¹⁰⁷	Agreed rate	Sale USD	Purchase SAR	Sale SAR	Account in YER
43	28-Nov	23-Dec	110	136			(40,000,000)	5,440,000,000
44	28-Nov	3-Dec	412	512	(8,500,000)			4,352,000,000
45	28-Nov	3-Dec	412	512	(1,500,000)			768,000,000
46	28-Nov	6-Dec	412	512	(3,000,000)			1,536,000,000
47	29-Nov	4-Dec	110	121			(1,500,000)	181,500,000
48	29-Nov	6-Dec	110	121			(15,000,000)	1,815,000,000
49	28-Nov	3-Dec	110	136			(12,000,000)	1,632,000,000
50	28-Nov	6-Dec	412	455	(3,000,000)			1,365,000,000
51	5-Dec	6-Dec	132	123		15,000,000		(1,845,000,000)
52	5-Dec	6-Dec	132	131		15,000,000		(1,965,000,000)
53	5-Dec	9-Dec	132	128		8,006,200		(1,024,793,600)
54	6-Dec	9-Dec	135	131		9,500,000		(1,244,500,000)
55	6-Dec	9-Dec	135	136		10,000,000		(1,360,000,000)
56	6-Dec	12-Dec	135	135		10,000,000		(1,350,000,000)
57	6-Dec	12-Dec	135	135		2,000,000		(1,350,000,000)
58	6-Dec	12-Dec	135	135		6,000,000		(270,000,000)
59	6-Dec	12-Dec	135	135		10,000,000		(810,000,000)
					(19,500,000)	147,006,200	(651,000,000)	91,232,706,400

Source: Panel based on documents obtained from confidential sources.

Table 24.1.b


Transactions with Tadhamon International Islamic Bank from 22 to 28 November 2018 (Accounts TIIB at CBY)

Ser	Date request	Date transaction	Market rate ¹⁰⁸	Agreed rate	Sale USD	Purchase SAR	Sale SAR	Account in YER
1	22-Nov	22-Nov	144	169			(10,000,000)	1,690,000,000
2	22-Nov	22-Nov	144	157			(11,800,000)	1,852,600,000
3	22-Nov	22-Nov	144	162			(6,200,000)	1,004,400,000
4	26-Nov	27-Nov	130	146			(10,000,000)	1,460,000,000
5	27-Nov	29-Nov	110	141			(4,200,000)	592,200,000
6	27-Nov	29-Nov	110	142			(40,000,000)	5,680,000,000
7	28-Nov	28-Nov	110	141			(10,000,000)	1,420,000,000
8	28-Nov	28-Nov	110	135			(6,000,000)	816,000,000
9	28-Nov	28-Nov	110	140			(800,000)	112,800,000
10	28-Nov	28-Nov	110	135			(10,760,000)	1,452,600,000
							(109,760,000)	16,080,600,000

Source: Panel based on documents obtained from confidential sources.

¹⁰⁸ Rate for YER from Telegram; SAR exchange rate = USD exchange rate/3.75, as 1 USD=3.75 SAR.


Figure 24.3
Comparison of Forex rates from October to December 2018



Source: Panel based on data of tables 24.1.a and b.

Figure 24.4.a


Correlation between the volume of Forex transactions and approval of LC from Saudi deposit



Source: Panel based on data from the Economic Committee (some dates are not known by the Panel).

Figure 24.4.b

Balance sheet of CBY Forex transactions portfolio October to December 2019



Source: Panel based on data of tables 24.1.a and b.

Figure 24.5

Last participation of the Economic Committee in the Intervention Committee, 12 November 2018

Translation highlighted text:

1. Rate on 12 November 2018: 1 SAR = 178.5 to 180 YER, 1 USD = 669.4 to 675 YER
2. The Economic Committee suspended its participation in the Intervention Committee and considered the CBY accountable for failures in implementing Decrees 75 and 76 and for allowing speculation by exchange companies.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم التاريخ: 2018/11/12

ملخص نتائج ممارسة اللجنة الاقتصادية لمهامها من العاصمة المؤقتة عدن لليوم

الواحد والأربعين

أولاً: متوسط أسعار الصرف و متابعات التغيرات في السوق:

اليوم	التاريخ	أسعار الصرف في عدن		أسعار الصرف في صنعاء	
		ريال سعودي	دولار أمريكي	ريال سعودي	دولار أمريكي
الأثنين	12-11-2018	178.5	669.4	180	675

تحسن سعر العملة في عدن و صنعاء بشكل طفيف كما يشير الجدول أعلاه بسبب اخبار تمرير بعض اعتمادات السلع الأساسية و توجه التجار لبيع جزء من رصيدهم من العملة الأجنبية في السوق ليتمكنوا من سداد قيمة تلك الاعتمادات بالريال اليمني إلى البنك المركزي.

ثانياً: اجتماعات اللجنة الاقتصادية:

عقدت اللجنة اجتماعها الدوري مع كبار الصرافين في مدينة عدن، برئاسة محافظ البنك المركزي، وبحضور أمين عام مجلس الوزراء، و تم مناقشة التطورات في السوق، و نتائج تطبيق القرارات التي تم الاتفاق عليها، و قد صرح محافظ البنك المركزي أمام الصرافين بأنه لن يقدم أي خدمات مالية أو مصرفية لتجار المشتقات النفطية، و أنه قدم خدماته فقط لشركة النفط اليمنية، و تاجر المشتقات أحمد العيسى و لن يقدم خدماته لغيرهما، و حمل اللجنة المسؤولية المصرفية لخدمة تجار المشتقات و تبعات تطبيق الية ضبط و إدارة تجارة المشتقات النفطية، و بشكل مخالف للقرار 75 و ضرباً بالحائط بكل مسؤوليات البنك المركزي في إدارة و ضبط القطاع المصرفي و إدارة السياسة النقدية للبلاد.

و عليه فقد قررت اللجنة التوقف عن حضور الاجتماعات الدورية مع الصرافين في مدينة عدن، و تحميل البنك المركزي مسؤولية تعطيل القرارات الحكومية 75 و 76 ، و عودة التجار للمضاربة في السوق السوداء، و حدوث أي انهيار جديد للعملة في المستقبل.

Source: Confidential

Annex 25. Levant Vision money laundering for the Houthis


1. The Panel found that Levant Vision, a company incorporated in Yemen on 20 September 2012 may have been involved since late 2015 in money laundering for the benefit of the Houthis forces. The trade certificate of the company indicates commercial activity for the supply of medicine, food, medical equipment, spare parts for transport, agriculture and electronic equipment, see figure 25.1.
2. The Panel has evidence that indicates the company has used its bank accounts at Yemen Kuwait Bank (YKB) to transfer funds from CBY, Sana'a which were withdrawn in cash for three individuals most likely Houthi leaders of the revolutionary committee or Houthi field commanders. These are Mohamed Abdullah Mohamed Hassan Al Moayed, Abdullah Abbas Abdullah Jahaf¹⁰⁹ and Ali Qassem Mohsen Al Ameer with family names indicating their Hashemite affiliation with sympathy with the Houthis.
3. Documents obtained by the Panel indicate that Levant Vision signed a contract, on 1 March 2016, with Salim Assaifi, a finance delegate for the security sector of the revolutionary committee in Sana'a, for the supply of wheat and rice at a price of 1.869,000,000 YER, see figure 25.2. The Panel also obtained a copy of a form used by the Yemeni ministry of finance as a justification for appropriation of funds from CBY, see figure 25.3.
4. The Panel has evidence that was used to establish the cash flow of two accounts 01394970013027 and 01394970023027 (YER and USD respectively) at YKB, see table 25.1. The Panel noted that the portfolio of these two accounts converted to USD showed significant movement of funds with a combined balance reaching about 12 million USD. The Panel also noted two transfers from CBY of 1,869,000,000 YER and 2,976,379,560 YER on 10 and 18 May 2016 (total 4,845,379,560 YER). The first amount corresponded exactly to the price of the contract mentioned above. The total value of the two transfers amounted to about 19 million USD at that time.
5. The cashflow also indicates that within a week or two of the transfer from CBY to YKB, 4,559,000,000 YER of cash has been withdrawn: 370,100,000 YER by Abdullah Abbas Abdullah Jahaf, 2,098,900,000 YER Ali Qassem Mohsen Al Ameer and 2,090,000,000 YER by Mohamed Abdullah Mohamed Hassan Al Moayed. The Panel could not identify if any of these three individuals were traders that could have supplied the wheat and rice for Levant Vision. Moreover, all indications are that the appropriation of funds from CBY by the ministry of finance for the benefit of the revolutionary committee considered as an armed group is completely illegal and was done without any respect of budgetary rules and procedures.
6. The Panel has therefore grounds to believe that the two transactions were fake with no supply of goods but only used as a cover up for diversion of state funds for the benefit of the Houthis. These transactions show how public officials from the ministry of finance and the management of CBY Sana'a have misused their authority and involve YKB in money laundering with the risk of damaging the credibility of the bank with a negative impact on its shareholders and customers.

¹⁰⁹ A Houthi commander under the name of Abdullah Abbas Jahaf was reportedly killed in February 2019 by a coalition airstrike while fighting in Hajour, Hajjah see <https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/02/01/-اليمن-مقتل-قيادي-حوثي-بغارات-للتحالف-في-حجة>.

Figure 25.2

Contract between Levant Vision and Salim Assaifi, finance delegate for security sector of the revolutionary committee for supply of wheat and rice for the price of 1.869,000,000 YER, 1 March 2016

الرقم:
التاريخ:
الموافق:



الجمهورية اليمنية
اللجان الثورية
الجانب الأمني

عقد اتفاق

تم الاتفاق بين كل من الجانب الأمني للجان الثورية في أمانة العاصمة صنعاء ويمثلها الأخ/ علي سالم الصيفي المسؤول المالي في الجانب الأمني ويشار إليها في هذا العقد بـ (الطرف الأول).

وبين الأخوة/ شركة ليفانت فيجن للاستيراد ومقرها صنعاء شارع القيادة وتحمل سجل تجاري رقم (9445) صادر من الامانة بتاريخ: 2012/09/30 ويمثلها المدير العام للشركة الأخ/صفوان أحمد لطف ويشار إليها في هذا العقد بـ (الطرف الثاني).

وقد اتفق الطرفان على الآتي:

- يلتزم الطرف الثاني بتوفير احتياجات الجبهات الأمنية من المواد الغذائية والاحتياجات الخاصة بالجبهات الأمنية في أمانة العاصمة والمحافظات في الجمهورية بحسب الجدول التالي:


الرقم	اسم الصنف	الكمية	سعر الوحدة	السعر الاجمالي
1	قمح استرالي عبوة 50 كيلو	200,000	5000	1,000,000,000
2	رز بسمتي درجة اولى عبوة 25 كيلو	86,900	10,000	869,000,000
اجمالي القيمة: فقط مليار وثمانمائة وتسعة وستين مليون ريال يمني لا غير				
1,869,000,000				

وعلى ان يتم التوريد بموجب رسالة رسمية محرره وموقعة من الطرف الأول يحدد فيها الأصناف والكميات والقيمة الاجمالية ومكان التسليم.

- اتفق الطرفان على أن تكون صلاحية المواد الموردة من الطرف الثاني صالحة لمدة عام واحد على الأقل.
- اتفق الطرفان على تحرير سند توريد مخزني من الطرف الأول لما تم توريده بعد فحص واستلام المواد مباشرة والتأكد من مواصفاتها المطلوبة من الطرف الثاني وفي حالة مخالفة المواصفات المطلوبة يتحمل الطرف الثاني المسؤولية ولا يتم استلامها منه.
- التزم الطرف الأول بصرف مبلغ وقدره (1,869,000,000) فقط مليار وثمانمائة وتسعة وستين مليون ريال يمني لاغير مقدما كعهد على الطرف الثاني بموجب شيك بنكي كضمان يتم اعادته للطرف الثاني بعد اخلاء عهدة الطرف الثاني بموجب سندات الاستلام المخزنية المحرره والمعمدة من الطرف الأول.
- مدة هذا العقد ثلاثة أشهر من تاريخ توقيع العقد.
- حرر هذا العقد بتاريخ 2016/03/01م من نسختين أصليتين بيد كل طرف نسخة.

بوالله الموفق

الطرف الثاني
صفوان أحمد لطف
مدير شركة ليفانت فيجن للاستيراد



الطرف الأول
علي سالم الصيفي
المسؤول المالي في الجانب الأمني



Source: Confidential.

Figure 25.3

Form model 44 number 181833 of the ministry of finance authenticating the delivery by Levant Vision of the agreed quantity of wheat and rice to the security sector of the revolutionary committee, received by Adnan Mohamed Yahya al Anbari on 10 May 2016

مستند استلام اصناف بالمخازن

الجمهورية العربية السورية
وزارة المالية

اسم الجهة: المخازن السورية
اسم المورد: شركة ليفان فيجن للاصناف

رقم النموذج (44) مخازن ط 2010
رقم 181833 بتاريخ 10 / 5 / 2016

وصل الى مخازن الخبز في محافظة حماة في امانة لعماد
شركة ليفان فيجن للاصناف

ملاحظات	رقم وتاريخ الفاتورة		اجمالي القيمة	سعر الوحدة	الكمية		الوحدة	رقم المنتج بالتفصيل	اسم الصنف	الرقم في دفتر اليومية الاسناد
	التاريخ	الرقم			جديد	مستعمل				
	11/9/16	119	1,333,300	27,300	-	50	كيلو كس		قمح اسبرالي	1
	11/9/16	119	879,300	1,000	87,900	20	كيلو كس		ارز يسهاتي دره جاكوي	2
جملة القيمة			2,212,600							

فقط مبلغ وقدره **٢٠٩٢٠٠٠٠** مليار ومائة وستون وثمانون
مليون ريال عراقي

تم استلام الاصناف المبينة اعلاه بعد فحصها من قبل لجنة الفحص وضيقت الى العهدة بالدفاتر المختصة
يعتمد ...

امين المخازن: **Adnan Mohamed Yahya al Anbari**
كاتب اليومية: **Adnan Mohamed Yahya al Anbari**
كاتب الاسناد (الشطب): **Adnan Mohamed Yahya al Anbari**
كاتب سجل عهدة المخزن: **Adnan Mohamed Yahya al Anbari**
مدير المشتريات والمخازن: **Adnan Mohamed Yahya al Anbari**
مدير عام الشؤون المالية: **Adnan Mohamed Yahya al Anbari**

Source: Confidential.

Table 25.1

Extract of the balance of cash flow of portfolio of two accounts owned by Levant Vision 01394970013027 and 01394970023027 at YKB (YER and USD respectively)

Date	Debit (YER)	Credit (YER)	Balance (YER)	Debit (USD)	Credit (USD)	Balance (USD)	Portfolio (USD)	Known reference
22/03/16			6,369		18,790	24,471	24,497	
22/03/16			6,369	18,526		5,944	5,970	Swift 111600233
03/04/16			6,369		23,000	28,879	28,905	
06/04/16			6,369	22,900		5,979	6,004	Swift 111600277
21/04/16			6,369		46,148	50,992	51,018	
24/04/16			6,369	33,868		17,124	17,149	Swift 111600320
10/05/16		1,869,000,000	1,869,006,369			16,473	7,492,499	CBY 10001/1015
11/05/16	400,000,000		1,469,006,369			16,473	5,892,499	Cash Mohamed Al Moayed
12/05/16	370,100,000		1,098,906,369			16,473	4,412,099	Cash Abdullah Abbas Jahaf
16/05/16	500,000,000		598,906,369			16,473	2,412,099	Cash Ali Qassem Al Ameer
16/05/16	598,900,000		6,369			16,473	16,499	Cash Ali Qassem Al Ameer
18/05/16		2,976,379,560	2,976,385,929			16,473	11,922,017	CBY 10001/1015
23/05/16	500,000,000		1,966,785,929			16,473	7,883,617	Cash Mohamed Al Moayed
23/05/16			1,946,285,929	10,050		6,423	7,791,567	Cash
23/05/16			1,946,285,929		68,250	74,673	7,859,817	
24/05/16	500,000,000		1,446,285,929			74,673	5,859,817	Cash Mohamed Al Moayed
29/05/16	5,000,000		1,438,378,929			74,673	5,828,189	
31/05/16	200,000,000		1,735,878,929			74,673	7,018,189	Cash Mohamed Al Moayed
05/06/16	490,000,000		1,245,477,929			74,673	5,056,585	Cash Mohamed Al Moayed
12/06/16	500,000,000		743,977,929			74,673	3,050,585	Cash Ali Qassem Al Ameer
12/06/16	500,000,000		243,977,929			74,673	1,050,585	Cash Ali Qassem Al Ameer

Source: Panel based on confidential documents

Annex 26. Unlawful appropriation by major general Saleh Mesfer Alshaer network

1. The Panel has information from documents and credible sources confirming that Saleh Mesfer Saleh Alshaer (also known as Abu Yasser) is the commander of the logistic support authority of the ex-Government of Yemen armed forces, which now fall under Houthi control and the *judicial custodian*¹¹⁰ of properties and funds owned by Houthis' opponents. The Panel's information shows that Saleh Mesfer Saleh Alshaer is involved in cases of widespread and unlawful appropriations of properties and funds owned by Houthi opponents who are either under arrest or who have taken refuge outside Yemen, without judicial due process, and in violation of applicable international human rights law (IHRL)¹¹¹ and international humanitarian law (IHL).¹¹²

2. The Panel gathered information that Saleh Mesfer Saleh Alshaer was not a member of the Yemeni Armed Forces before the Houthis took power in Yemen. The information in the media that he was a trader who facilitated the transfer of weapons for the Houthis during the six wars seems to be plausible.¹¹³ The Panel obtained copies of his passports with professions as worker in 2000 and as a trader in 2013, see figure 26.1. The Panel noted in Houthi media that he was presented as assistant minister of defense for logistics, 29 January 2018 with the rank of major general, see figure 26.2. He was then appointed as commander of the logistics support authority on 15 September 2018.¹¹⁴ The Panel has gathered a number of documents which show that a special criminal court of Sana'a has designated him as the judicial custodian of funds and assets appropriated from Houthi opponents. Saleh Alshaer is number 35 in the Saudi list of 40, with 5 million USD reward for information leading to his capture.¹¹⁵ The Panel also gathered documents signed by major general Saleh Alshaer with the seal of judicial custodian, see figure 26.3.

3. The Panel received testimonies from staff of banks, and money exchange agencies and private companies who indicated that they have been threatened by Abu Yasser when they failed to comply with some of his unlawful requests such as the performance of suspicious financial transactions or the provision of financial information on customers. As a judicial custodian, he was trying to identify the assets owned by Ali Abdullah Saleh (Yei.003) after his death on 4 December 2017. Some of these staff have been arrested at the national security bureau under the authority of Motlaq Amer al-Marrani (aka 'Abu Emad') for several weeks without any charge and without the possibility to communicate with their family. Some of these arrests have been made public by the media including that of the managing director and staff of al Kuraimi, TIIB and YKB, and led to a protest by Yemeni bankers.¹¹⁶ The Panel also noted media reports of detention of Ghassan Mohamed Abu Ghanem the director of Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank (CAC Bank) branch of Baghdad street, Sana'a from early December 2018 to March 2019.¹¹⁷ Family members of Ali Abdullah Saleh reportedly own bank accounts in that CAC bank branch.

¹¹⁰ Translation from Arabic of *al hariss al qada'i* (الحارس القضائي) used by Sana'a based authorities.

¹¹¹ Art. 17 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) and Art. 25 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1994)

¹¹² Additional Protocol II, Article 4(2)(g), Rules 50 and 52 of Customary International Humanitarian Law, see https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul, Also, under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, "destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict" and "pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault," constitute a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), Articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 8(2)(e)(xii), A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998.

¹¹³ The Panel has copies of his passports including one issued on 7 October 2013 with a profession as a trader. See also <http://www.khlaasa.net/news168458.html>.

¹¹⁴ http://www.26sep.net/news_details.php?sid=141549

¹¹⁵ <https://gulffnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/40-leaders-members-of-al-houthi-militant-group-listed-by-saudi-arabia-1.2119394>

¹¹⁶ <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/164185>. Mr. Ahmed Thabet Nouman Al-Absi, the managing director of International Bank of Yemen (IBY) was the latest to be arrested on 1 August 2019, and detained by the national security bureau in Sana'a alongside two IBY staff: Zouhair Al Aghbary and Najm Eddine, see <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/170191/amp>. The board of directors of IBY while maintaining that the bank continued to keep its integrity, could not provide the reason for the arrest. CBY Sana'a has not replied to two letters from the Panel containing a request for information on intimidation of bankers and money exchangers. The Panel is investigating whether Youssef Zebara, the deputy of CBY Sana'a was complicit with NSB and the judicial custodian.


¹¹⁷ <https://yemen-now.com/news3289756.html>

4. The Panel has identified a number of entities that have been unlawfully appropriated by major general Saleh Alshaer and are managed by members of his family who have been designated as the authorized signatories of the entities' bank accounts, see table 26.1. The Panel is investigating whether the unlawful appropriation of social foundations and education institutions aims at having access to funds from international donors as well as the possibility to disguise external financial support through funding of social and development programs. The Panel is investigating allegations that a Houthi affiliated organization under the name of Yemen Thabat¹¹⁸ was receiving funds from outside Yemen which are used as an incentive to attract and support Houthi combatants.

5. Banks have been compelled by Saleh Alshaer to authorize unlawful withdrawal of funds. These illegal withdrawals expose the banks to the risk of non-compliance with asset freeze measures, liability towards their initial account owners, and to complicity in money laundering and human rights violations associated with the unlawful appropriation. The Panel has identified a number of individuals associated with Saleh Alshaer and involved in facilitating the unlawful appropriation of assets and the diversion of funds, see table 26.2.

Figure 26.1

Information from two passports of Saleh Mesfer Saleh Alshaer



Source: Confidential.

Figure 26.2

Major general Saleh Mesfer Alshaer in a meeting as assistant minister of defense for logistics, 29 January 2018



Source: <https://www.nthnews.net/yemen/الرئيس-الصمد-يحضر-ورشة-عمل-لضباط-القو>

¹¹⁸ <http://www.yementhabat.org/>

Table 26.1

Entities appropriated by major Saleh Alshaer (identified by the Panel)

Appropriated	Original owner	Current link to Alshaer identified by the Panel
al Saleh Foundation ¹¹⁹	Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.005)	Name changed to al Shaab foundation with new authorized signatories, see figures 26.4.a to c
Orphans Development Foundation (ODF) ¹²⁰	Hamdi Zayad (Islah)	Major general Saleh Alshaer is president of the foundation, see figure 26.5
Yemen Armored	Ahmed Saleh Ali Arrahbi ¹²¹	Director: Abdullah Mesfer Saleh Alshaer (brother of major general Alshaer), see figure 26.6.a to c
Sabafon	Al Ahmar, family and others	Director: Abdullah Mesfer Saleh Alshaer(brother of major general Alshaer), see figure 26.7.a and b
University of Technology Twintech ¹²²	Khaled Rashad Al Alimi	Raed Hassan Mesfer Alshaer (nephew of major general Alshaer), see figure 26.8

Source: Panel based on analysis of documents and bank accounts.

Table 26.2

Individuals associated with major general Saleh Musfer Saleh Alshaer aka Abu Yasser (identified by the Panel)

Name	Involvement
Abdullah Musfer Alshaer (Abu Abdelmajeed)	Director Yemen Armored; Sabafon
Raed Hassan Musfer Alshaer	Director of University of Technology Twintech Beneficiary of accounts of Yemen Armored
Ussama Abdulmalik Abu Taleb	Delegate of the judicial custodian
Motlaq Amer al-Marrani (Abu Emad)	
Ahmed Mohamed Alkabsi	President Accounts Al Saleh Foundation
Akram Yahya Baker	Director Al Saleh Foundation
Abdu Ismael Hassan Rajeh	President of the special criminal court, Sana'a
Ahmed Addawrani	Director Orphan Development Foundation
Ahmed Abdullah Yahya Shamseddine	Beneficiary of accounts of Yemen Armored
Wael Abdelmoghni al Aghbari	Finance director Twintech

Source: Panel based on analysis of documents and bank accounts

¹¹⁹ Renamed as al Shaab foundation on 24 July 2018 by the ministry of social affairs and labour under Houthi control after its appropriation without approval of its legal board of directors, see figures 26.4 and 26.5.

¹²⁰ <http://www.yateemdev.org/> also known as al Yateem with known subsidiaries Modern Technology College (<http://mtc-ye.net/>) and Rawafed Institute for Training and Development (<https://www.facebook.com/rawafed2013/>), the latter reported projects funded by Care International and Human Appeal Australia see respectively:

<http://www.yateemdev.org/?news=معهد-روافد-للتدريب-والتنمية-يختتم-عدد>

<http://www.yateemdev.org/?news=بتمويل-من-هيئة-الأعمال-الخيرية-استرال>

¹²¹ He sent an email on 14 July 2019 to UN personnel informing that he has been tortured and that his company had been appropriated by the Houthis.

¹²² <https://www.iutt.edu.ye/index.php/m/20>.

Figure 26.3

Letter signed by major general Saleh Mesfer Alshaer designating himself as the guardian to levy funds from Houthi opponents to open accounts 0028-711724-022 and 0028-711724-048 at the International Bank of Yemen, in Yemeni Rial and US dollars respectively. The Panel has evidence that these accounts were used to receive deposits not related to any business but most likely as a result of extortion.



Source: Confidential.

Figure 26.4.a

Letter from Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEI. 005), as chairman of al Saleh Foundation designating the account signatory, 1 January 2006



Source: Confidential.

Figure 26.4.b

Letter from the ministry of social affairs and labor to the International Bank of Yemen (IBY) informing them that Ahmed Mohamed Alkabsi and Akram Yahya Baker are designated to have the power to withdraw funds from all accounts owned by the Al Saleh Foundation, 9 January 2018

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Ministry of Social Affairs & Labour
The Deputy Office
وزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية والعمل
المركزية العامة لخدمة الجمهور والمكاتب الإقليمية
الرياضية
الرقم : التاريخ :
مكتب الوكيل

الأخ / مدير عام بنك اليمن الدولي
تحية طيبة وبعد،،،

الموضوع / بشأن المخولين بعملية السحب من رصيد
مؤسسة الصالح الاجتماعية للتنمية

تهديكم وزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية والعمل أطيب التحايا
بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه... نود الإحاطة إلى أنه سبق فتح حساب
لديكم باسم المؤسسة المبينة أعلاه.

وعليه يرجى اعتماد المخولين بعملية السحب للأخوة التالية أسمائهم:

1. أحمد محمد الكيسسي رئيس المؤسسة
2. أكرم يحيى يساكر المدير العام

وعلى أن تكون عملية السحب معتمدة بختم المؤسسة الرسمي.
شاكرين تعاونكم معنا سلفاً
وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير،،،

علي صالح عبد الله
وكيل الوزارة للشؤون الاجتماعية

نسختة مع التحية لوجدة جمع المعلومات بالبنك المركزي

العنوان : صنعاء الصافية - تلفون : ٢٦٢٨٠٤ - ٢٦٢٨٠٧ - ٢٦٢٨٠٩ - ص.ب : (٦٠) ميدان التحرير - تلفون : ٢٧١٩١٢ - فاكس : ()
Address : Sana'a - Al-Safiah - Tel.: 262804 - 262807 - 262809 - P.O.Box : (60) Al-Tahreer - Tel.: 274912 - Fax : ()

Source: Confidential.

Figure 26.4.c

Letter by major general **Salah Mesfer Salah Alshaer** to Yemen Kuwait Bank (YKB) accusing its director of support to the enemy in starving the people by failing to comply with court orders and asking for transfer the interest from deposits of the al Saleh Foundation, 3 June 2018

The letter is asking for payment of expenses for Ramadan evaluated at YER 63 874 000 and YER 22 105 000 as pending payable by the foundation



Source: Confidential.

Figure 26.5

Major general Saleh Alshaer president of ODF attends the graduation ceremony of MTC, 16 July 2019

برعاية-كريمة-من-رئيس-المؤسسة-اللواء-صا- | yateemdev.org/?news=

برعاية كريمة من رئيس المؤسسة اللواء صالح الشاعر وبحضور المستشار الإقتصادي لرئاسة الجمهورية الدكتور عبد العزيز الترب و الأمين العام الأستاذ أحمد الزوراني: الإحتفال بتخرج دفعة أمل المستقبل من طلاب كلية التكنولوجيا الحديثة من جميع التخصصات التطبيقية

16 يوليو 2019 | لا توجد تعليقات



برعاية كريمة من اللواء صالح بن مسفر الشاعر رئيس المؤسسة

وبحضور المستشار الإقتصادي لرئاسة الجمهورية الدكتور عبد العزيز الترب وحضور الأمين العام الأستاذ أحمد الزوراني: الإحتفال بتخرج دفعة أمل المستقبل من طلاب كلية التكنولوجيا الحديثة من جميع التخصصات التطبيقية

احتفلت اليوم مؤسسة اليتيم التنموية بتخرج دفعة أمل المستقبل من كلية التكنولوجيا الحديثة التابعة للمؤسسة وذلك بتكريم طلاب الدفعة البالغ عددهم 64 طالب وطالبة من الأيتام واليتيمات في أكثر من سبعة تخصصات تطبيقية

Source: <http://www.yateemdev.org/?news=برعاية-كريمة-من-رئيس-المؤسسة-اللواء-صا> 16 July 2019.

Figure 26.6.a


New registration certificate of Yemen Armed with Abdullah Mesfer Saleh Alshaer (brother of Saleh Mesfer Saleh Alshaer) as a manging director instead of the original registration certificate below, 2 July 2019



Source: Confidential

Figure 26.6.b

Registration certificate of Yemen Armed with Ahmed Saleh Ali Arrahbi as a manging director, 3 March 2013



Source: Confidential

Figure 26.6.c

Order by the special criminal court, Sana'a to Yemen Armored, 4 July 2019


Translation:

Reference to:

Court orders dated 18 March, 24 July and 1 August 2018, which ordered the seizure of real estate and movable funds owned by traitors accused of crimes against the security of the state and collaboration with the enemy and spying for a foreign country; the appointment of major general Saleh Mesfer Alshaer as a judicial guardian, custodian and manager of these funds; and the letter from the judicial guardian dated 9 July 2019 referring to the price of renting armored cars for 2018 and up to June 2019

Orders:


Yemen Armored to issue and cash cheques with the amount of 932 000 USD and 2 100 000 USD to the order of Raed Hassan Mesfer al Saher



Source: Yemen Armored.

Figure 26.7.a

New registration certificate of Sabafon with Abdullah Mesfer Saleh Alshaer (brother of Saleh Mesfer Saleh Alshaer) as a managing director instead of the original registration certificate below, 29 July 2019



Source: Confidential.

Figure 26.7.b

Registration certificate of Sabafon with Hamdan Abdullah Hussein al Ahmar (brother of Hamed al Ahmer) as a managing director, 13 June 2017



Source: Confidential.

Figure 26.8

Letter from major general Saleh Mesfer Saleh Alshaer to Sultan Al Sami'i¹²³ related to the seizure of International University of Technology Wintech, 23 April 2019



Source: <http://www.yagency.net/164365>, Yemen press agency affiliated with the Houthis.

¹²³ Sultan al Sami'i, a socialist and member of the Houthi supreme political council, in a previous letter attempted to protect Wintech which was owned by a relative of Rashad Al Alimi, a former Minister of Interior appointed by president Hadi as his adviser. Sultan al Sami'i publicly attacked the Houthis for their ways in dealing with public finance, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2jdScKsVNwk>.

Figure 26.10

Email from the original owner of Yemen Armored to the UN informing that he has been tortured and that his company has been appropriated by the Houthis, 14 July 2019

From: [REDACTED]@yemenarmored.com>
Date: July 14, 2019 at 19:35:54 GMT+2
To: [REDACTED]@un.org, [REDACTED]@undss.org, [REDACTED]@undp.org, [REDACTED]@undss.org, [REDACTED]@un.org>, [REDACTED]@un.org, [REDACTED]@yemenarmored.com
Subject: Urgent Notice

Dear All,

Hope this email finds you all well

I would like to inform you that since the establishment of the company, we have been providing the best services to our clients away from any involvement within any political machinations
We continuously work hard to provide distinguished services not only for financial profits but to build a long-term partnership with our clients of humanitarian organizations that work in Yemen.
We valued all humanitarian efforts provided to Yemeni people during critical times that Yemen have been through.

Also for your knowledge, Yemen Armored have got a lot of demands by Huthis militias since 2015, they were insisting on the involving of some of their Armed personals to be participating with YAS teams who guards and protect DTF and Hadda compound as well, but despite all the temptations and intimidations which most of security companies capitulated to, we completely rejected it.

But ,after the incidents of 2nd of December 2017, Huthis militias found it as an opportunity to execute their plans and tried to engage YAS and its staff in which was happening and impose the theory that we are in Yemen Armored are following and supporting a certain side or party which was denied by all staff and armed personal in particular who endure to their places and duties despite of the difficulties and challenging situation and even with lack of food and other supplies .

They actually represented Yemen Armored Values and principles very well and this because they are simply members of Yemen Armored not a party Nor a group

Within all the violation acts of Huthis against me which I am sure you heard about what they have done to me. I have been imprisoned, severely tortured .which left traces on multiple parts of my body and effected my health

I was released many times but when I refused any of their interventions in .any of Yemen Armored business they send me back to prison again

Recently, my health collapsed and they prevented me from traveling for a .medical treatment , but I managed and I am now out of their reach

Source: Email forwarded by Yemen Armored manager after having left Sana'a.


Figure 26.10 continued

.Finally, I regret the fact that Huthis Militia have seized the company
They confiscated YAS properties and began with armored vehicles, which later leased to security
companies that are cooperating and facilitating information leaking of the movements of United Nations
personnel
More over, armed militias have issued illegal orders to acquire YAS bank .accounts which contains
approximately 4 Millions Dollars
As a result of that and In order to ensure that the company does not participate in financing any of these
religious militias actions against the Yemeni people who have been deprived of the basic rights to live in
dignity and freedom under the Militias control
For that, we would like you to stop transferring any amounts to the company account at Yemen
International Bank NO (0002-313106-002) till we provide you with new bank account.
It is also important to inform you that we are not responsible for any actions or violations that may be
directed against you or any other side by .the militias and their collaborators under the name of Yemen
Armored
As it is difficult to predict what may be done by such religious groups that raise a death slogan and do
not accept coexistence with anyone who dose not have the same believes, opinion, race or faith
Kindly note that we are going to establish new branches in other provinces till the time Sanaa regain its
freedom and return as we have known it a city of coexistence and peace.
I understand how frustrated you must be, but your cooperation and“ understanding is highly
appreciated

Ahmed Saleh

General manager

Figure 26.11
Network associated with Alshaer



Source: Panel based on official documents.

Annex 27. Cases of airstrikes between December 2018 and December 2019**Table 1**

Cases of airstrikes between December 2018 and December 2019

<i>Case</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Impact point</i>	<i>Victims</i>	<i>Appendix</i>
1	16 Dec. 2018	14°28'12.1"N 45°20'08.8"E	Truck, Al Sawadyah, Al Bayda	2 children killed	1
2	23 March	N 17° 2'4.32" E 44° 6'30.24"	Gas station and hospital, Kitaf, Sada'a	7 killed, including 4 children and 6 injured	2
3	4 April	14°28'03.3"N 45°20'37.5"E	Car, Al Sawadyah, Al Bayda	4 killed	1
4	16 May	N 15°21'31.14" E 44°11'4.00"	Houses, Raqqas, Sana'a	Approximately 5 children killed, and approximately 78 injured, including 30 children	3
5	24 May	N 13°38'25.2" E 44°22'32.8"	Gas Station, Mawiyah, Ta'izz	7 killed, including 5 children, 2 injured	4
6	28 June	N 13°24'55.29" E 44°15'03.08"	House, Warzan, Khadir, Ta'izz	7 killed, including 4 children and 4 wounded, including 2 children	5
7	31 August	N 14°36'52.82" E 44°21'44.51"	Dhamar Community College (used as a prison), Dhamar	Appr. 100 killed and 40 wounded	6
8	24 Sept.	N 13°52'53" E 44°34'31.3"	House, Qataba, Al Dhale	14 killed, including 7 children and 3 injured	7

Appendix 1: Case Study airstrikes against trucks in Al Sawadyah, Al Bayda on 16 December 2018 and 4 April 2019

I. Background


1. On 16 December 2018, at approximately 10:30 LT, in Al Sawadyah, Al Bayda (14°28'12.1"N 45°20'08.8"E), a truck was hit by an explosive ordinance launched from an aircraft killing two children. On 4 April 2019, at approximately 02:00 LT, another truck was hit on the same road, less than 1 km from the location of the first strike, killing 4 people (14°28'03.3"N 45°20'37.5"E).
2. According to testimonies received by the Panel, there is no water in this area and the trucks hit by the two airstrikes were tankers transporting water for civilians from the nearest water point (see figure 1).

II. Analysis of IHL violations

3. The Panel has not received evidence that civilians, who had lost their protection under IHL, were present at the locations and time of the incident.¹²⁴
4. The Panel notes that there are no visible buildings in the vicinity of the impact points of the two incidents.
5. Based on the information received by the Panel, the Panel concludes that prima facie the attack does not respect the principle of distinction that prohibits attacks against civilians and requires the parties to the conflict to, at all times distinguish between civilians and fighters.¹²⁵
6. In addition, considering that in the incident of 13 December 2018, the two victims were children, the Panel finds it unlikely that the principles of proportionality and precautions were respected.¹²⁶
7. The Panel sent a request for information to KSA concerning this incident and is still awaiting a reply.

Figure 1

Locations of the two incidents and of the nearest water point



Source: Google Earth

¹²⁴ CIHL rules 1, 3, 5 and 6.

¹²⁵ CIHL rule 1.

¹²⁶ CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Figure 2
Truck hit on 4 April 2019



Source: Confidential

Appendix 2: Case Study airstrike against a gas station, Kitaf, Sada'a, 23 March 2019

I. Background

1. On 23 March 2019, at approximately 10:30 LT, an explosive ordnance dropped from an aircraft hit a gas station in Kitaf, Sada'a (N 17° 2'4.32", E 44° 6'30.24") which is next to a hospital and a pharmacy.
2. The incident resulted in the death of seven persons, including four children, a hospital guard and a pharmacist, and the injury of six persons, including one child and a nurse. Damages were also caused to a pharmacy, two cars and to the hospital, see figure 1¹²⁷.
3. The Panel also received information that Houthis were present near the gas station at the moment of the attack and that some would have been killed but could not verify the information. The Panel sent a request for information to KSA about this incident and is awaiting a reply.

Figure 1

Gas station and hospital after the incident and damage inside the hospital



Source: Confidential

II. Statement by the Joint Incident Assessment Team

4. The Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) recognized that the attack was carried out and found a malfunction in the guided bomb used. This resulted in the bomb falling 100 meters away from the alleged target and in the destruction of a gas station and damage to the hospital.¹²⁸
5. In its press statement, JIAT recognised that “[t]he mission commander hastened the work procedures to ensure that the military advantage is not lost, which resulted in inaccuracies in the assessment of the possibility of entering the non-military environment within the side effects of targeting.”
6. The Panel received confirmation that the incident was due to a “bomb failure” but did not receive any further details.

III. Analysis of IHL violations

7. Under IHL, hospitals exclusively assigned to medical purposes must be respected and protected in all circumstances. Hospitals only lose their protection if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to

¹²⁷ See also videos online: <https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/other/yemens-war-kitaf-air-raid-kills-seven-including-four-children/vi-BBVhPxV>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sggZrozzmOE>.

¹²⁸ See online: <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1933922>. The Panel also received information about cases of malfunction of bombs, including this one, from the JIAT.

commit acts harmful to the enemy. Furthermore, protection of hospitals and medical units may cease only after a warning has been given that includes a reasonable time-limit.¹²⁹

8. The Panel understands from the information published by the Saudi Arabia Press Agency that the hospital was not the target of the attack and that a failure in the bomb caused it to hit the gas station near the hospital and the pharmacy.

9. However, the Panel recalls that IHL requires military commanders and those responsible for planning and executing decisions regarding attacks, to take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.¹³⁰

10. This includes all necessary verification of the material, aircraft and explosive devices to be used. This assessment has to be made on the basis of the information from all sources which are available to them at the relevant time. Commanders must also obtain the best possible intelligence.¹³¹ Information on the presence of civilians, and the proximity of a hospital and a pharmacy were available at the time of the attack. For example, the JIAT spokesperson recognized that the hospital was on the No Strike List of the Coalition Forces¹³².

11. The Panel noted that the JIAT recommended the following: “Accountability of the Task Commander for breaching the rules of engagement of the Coalition Forces, due to the inaccuracy in the assessment of the possibility of entering a non-military environment within the side-effects of the targeting”.¹³³

¹²⁹ Art. 3 common to the Geneva Convention, Art. 11 AP II and CIHL rule 28.

¹³⁰ See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

¹³¹ See Commentary to CIHL rule 15, on line : https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule15.

¹³² <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1933922>

¹³³ Idem.

Appendix 3: Case Study airstrike against houses, Raqqas, Sana'a, 16 May 2019

I. Background

1. On 16 May 2019, at approximately 08:00 LT, an explosion destroyed a building of nine apartments in a densely populated area in Sana'a (N 15°21'31.14", E 44°11'4.00") allegedly resulting in the death of five children and the injury of 78 persons, including 30 children and several women, see figure 1.
2. Information received by the Panel confirms that aeroplanes were heard at the time of the incident. Sources reported one strike on the area of Raqqas where the building is located and some more strikes in other areas of Sana'a. The ministry of information was also targeted that morning.¹³⁴

Figure 1

Site of the incident after explosion



Source: confidential.

II. Declaration by the Coalition

3. The Joint Forces Command of the Coalition stated that it had conducted a number of air operations on 16 May 2019.¹³⁵ It was also reported that the Coalition issued a statement saying that it launched an operation aimed at "neutralising the ability of the Houthi militia to carry out acts of aggression" and that civilians had been warned to avoid those targets.¹³⁶ It was further reported that the possibility of an accident had been referred to the JIAT.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ <https://sabaanews.net/news536379.htm> and <https://www.alalamtv.net/news/4221616/-ادانات-واسعة-في-اليمن-للمجزرة-السعودية-بصنعاء>

¹³⁵ See <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1924680>

¹³⁶ See <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/saudi-uae-coalition-carries-deadly-air-raids-yemen-sanaa-190516072613862.html>.

¹³⁷ <https://ru.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1SM0W8>.

III. Analysis of IHL violations

4. According to sources, there was no military presence or activities in the area.¹³⁸ The Panel has not received evidence that civilians, who had lost their protection under IHL, were present at the location of the incident.¹³⁹ Therefore, the Panel considers it likely that the principle of distinction was not respected.
5. In addition, considering the high number of civilian casualties and the extent of the damage to civilian habitation, the Panel finds it prima facie unlikely that the principles of proportionality and precautions were respected.¹⁴⁰
6. The Panel has sent a letter to KSA about this incident and is still awaiting a reply.

¹³⁸ On this incident, see also: <https://yemen.bellingcat.com/investigations/san2005-sanaa-residential-house-strike>

¹³⁹ CIHL rules 1, 3, 5 and 6.

¹⁴⁰ CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Appendix 4: Case Study airstrike on a petrol station, Maweyah district, Ta'izz, 24 May 2019

I. Background

1. On 24 May 2019 at approximately 12:15 LT, an explosive ordnance dropped from an aircraft hit a petrol station near the village of Hibil, Maweyah district, Ta'izz (N 13°38'25.2" E 44°22'32.8") resulting in the death of seven people, including five children and the injury of two more and the destruction of the petrol station, see figure 1.

Figure 1

Picture of the petrol station after the explosion



Source: Confidential

II. Analysis of IHL violation

According to the information received by the Panel, there is a military checkpoint controlled by Houthi forces located 60 meters West of the petrol station. The Panel notes that there are no other buildings visible in the vicinity of the petrol station (see figure 2).

However, considering the number of children killed in this incident, the Panel finds it prima facie unlikely that the principles of proportionality and precautions were respected.¹⁴¹

The Panel sent a request for information to KSA about this incident and is awaiting a reply.

Figure 2

Location of the incident and surrounding area (N 13°38'25.2" E 44°22'32.8")



Source: Google earth

¹⁴¹ CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Appendix 5: Case Study airstrike against civilian house, Warzan village, Khadir district, Ta'izz, 28 June 2019

I. Background

1. On 28 June 2019 between 16:30 and 17:15 LT, an ordinance launched from an aeroplane hit a large house in Warzan village (N 13°24'55.29" E 44°15'03.08"), Ta'izz, resulting in the death of six people, including three children. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, a second explosive device hit the location. The house is surrounded by farmland (see figures 1 and 2).
2. According to the information received by the Panel, there were no military activities or fighters in this house. The area is under Houthis control, but according to the information received by the Panel, there was no fighting preceding the time of the attack. The same location was hit by a second airstrike on 2 July 2019 at approximately 12:00 LT. There were no reported victims from the second incident.¹⁴²

II. Remnants

3. The Panel received photographic evidence of remnants of a munition found on the site of the incident after the airstrike (see figure 3).

III. IHL analysis

4. The Panel has not received evidence that civilians having lost their protection under IHL (i.e. fighters belonging to the Houthis or to another party to the conflict) were present at the location at the time of the incident.¹⁴³
5. The Panel notes that there are no other buildings in the vicinity of house.
6. Based on the information received by the Panel, the Panel concludes that prima facie the attack does not respect the principle of distinction prohibiting attacks against civilians and requiring the parties to the conflict to at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.¹⁴⁴
7. In addition, considering that half of the victims were children, the Panel finds it unlikely that the principles of proportionality and precautions were respected.¹⁴⁵ The Panel sent a request for information to KSA regarding this incident and is still awaiting a reply. The Panel stands ready to revise its conclusions on the basis of additional information provided to it.

Figure 1

Location of the incident



Source: Google map

¹⁴² Amnesty International also published a report on this incident: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/yemen-us-made-bomb-used-in-deadly-air-strike-on-civilians/>.

¹⁴³ CIHL rules 1, 3, 5 and 6.

¹⁴⁴ CIHL rule 1.

¹⁴⁵ CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Figure 2
House after the incident



Source: Confidential



Source: Confidential

Figure 3
Pictures of remnants



Source: Confidential

Appendix 6: Case Study airstrike against Community College compound, Dhamar city district, Dhamar, 31 August 2019

I. Background

1. On Saturday 31 August 2019, between approximately 23:45 and 00:20 LT, several explosive ordinances were dropped from aircraft¹⁴⁶ onto buildings of the Dhamar Community College compound, see figures 1 and 3.
2. The compound includes several buildings, at least one of which was used as a prison by Houthi forces.¹⁴⁷ The ICRC confirmed that the site was used as a detention facility and that the organisation had visited the prison which held about 170 detainees.¹⁴⁸ According to testimonies received by the Panel, the majority of detainees were held on the first floor of the main building. The incident resulted in the injury of at least 40 people and the deaths of at least 100 people.¹⁴⁹
3. This detention site was mentioned in Panel's previous report.¹⁵⁰
4. Sources mentioned to the Panel that the number of detainees had increased in the weeks before the incident in preparation for a prisoner exchange.¹⁵¹
5. Information received by the Panel confirms that there were a number of Houthis present at this location.
6. Former detainees who survived the incident told the Panel that Houthi forces decided to release them after the incident.

II. Declaration by the Saudi-Arabia led Coalition

7. The spokesperson, Col. Turki Al-Maliki, confirmed the strike in a press release, but claimed the site was of a military nature. He said that: "air defense equipment was present and secondary explosions were observed during the strike, confirming the presence of the explosives used to target civilians with UAVs." He also said that: "This site was not registered with the United Nations, was not on the No Strike List, and is over 10 kilometers from the registered prison in Dhamar,"¹⁵² implying that the Coalition did not know about the presence of detainees in that compound.
8. During a press conference, images of the targeted location were released.¹⁵³ On the video, only one strike is visible. It hits the westernmost building in the compound (see figure 2). Col. Al-Maliki said that the case would be investigated by JIAT.

¹⁴⁶ The Panel's sources were not able to confirm the exact number of strikes nor of the number aeroplanes involved. One witness told the Panel said he lost consciousness after the second strike. A report shared with the Panel mentions seven strikes. Witnesses contacted by the Panel mention up to six explosions. Images and video released by the coalition show one strike (see figure 2). Pictures received by the Panel clearly show bomb damage on at least two other buildings (see figure 3).

¹⁴⁷ The Panel has received information that the prisoners were held in one building (indicated in figure 1), however, it has been reported that some other prisoners were held in a second building within the compound, see <https://yemen.bellingcat.com/investigations/dha20001-the-dhamar-detention-center-strike>.

¹⁴⁸ See online: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-scenes-devastation-every-single-detainee-either-killed-or-injured-attack>.

¹⁴⁹ The Panel received a list of 160 victims but was unable to verify it, the Head of ICRC delegation in Yemen said that a "... safe presumption is that over 100 had been killed". On September 2, 2019, the Yemen UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed that 52 detainees were among the dead and that at least 68 detainees were still missing, see <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1045382>. On September 3, 2019, Mwatana for Human rights reported that the Yemeni Red Crescent Society had recovered 96 dead bodies and 40 injured, see <http://mwatana.org/en/airstrike-on-detention-center/>.

¹⁵⁰ See S/2018/68, para 176. At the time, the Panel mentioned that the number of prisoners in that facility varied between 25 and 100.

¹⁵¹ This was also reported in the media : <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-dhamar/saudi-led-coalition-bombs-yemen-prison-scores-killed-idUSKCN1VM0ZU>.

¹⁵² See online <https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1964154>.

¹⁵³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btm40ud0y04>.

III. Analysis of IHL violations

9. The Panel received information that Houthi members, including guards, were present on that site, but could not confirm their number. One witness told the Panel he saw weapons on the site but could not specify which kind of weapons.

10. The Panel sent a request for information to KSA about the military nature of the location targeted in this incident and is awaiting a reply.

11. Detainees, whether civilians or fighters hors de combat, shall be considered as not taking part in hostilities and as such are protected against direct attack under IHL.¹⁵⁴

12. Even if some Houthi fighters were present on the site, as well as weapons, considering the high number of people killed in the incident, and the fact that several buildings on the site were directly targeted (see figures 2 and 3), the Panel finds it prima facie unlikely that the principles of proportionality and precautions were respected.¹⁵⁵

13. The responsibility to do everything feasible to verify that the target is of a military nature is binding on each party to the conflict. This obligation, as well as the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects,¹⁵⁶ requires military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks to assess information from all sources available to them and to obtain the best intelligence possible.¹⁵⁷

14. The fact that this site was used as a prison was information available in the public domain¹⁵⁸ and was reported by the Panel in its previous report.¹⁵⁹

15. In addition, according to information received by the Panel, detainees were allowed to communicate with their family once a month and inform them of their location.

16. The Panel also spoke with people who had been held at that location for 18 months and two years, confirming that the location was not a new detention site. Therefore, the presence of detainees at that location was known and this information was available.

Figure 1

Location of the incident (the arrow indicates one of the building in which prisoners were)



Source: Google Earth

¹⁵⁴ Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, CIHL rule 6.

¹⁵⁵ CIHL rules 14 and 15.

¹⁵⁶ CIHL rule 15.

¹⁵⁷ See commentary to CIHL rule 15.

¹⁵⁸ See *Prisons and detention centers in Yemen during the war*, A report issued by the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights, for the period from September 2014 until July 2018.

¹⁵⁹ See 76 of S/2018/594

Figure 2

Aerial image of another building targeted by the Coalition



Source: JIAT, online <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btm40ud0y04>

Figure 3

Point of impact of aerial bomb in two different buildings



Source: Confidential

Appendix 7: Case Study airstrike against a farmhouse, Qa'ataba district, Al Dhale, 24 September 2019

I. Background

1. On 24 September 2019 at approximately 08:30 LT an ordnance launched from an aircraft hit a farmhouse in Qa'ataba, Al Dala (N 13°52'53" E 44°34'31.3").
2. Approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, a second airstrike hit a vehicle in the vicinity of the house. The car was carrying wounded people, see figure 2. This second incident resulted in the death of the driver. Both incidents resulted in the deaths of 14 people, including seven children, and four wounded.

II. Analysis of IHL violation

3. Sources contacted by the Panel said that there was no military activity in the farm, nor was there any presence of fighters or military equipment.
4. The Panel has not received evidence that civilians who had lost their protection under IHL were present at the location and time of the incident.¹⁶⁰
5. The Panel notes that there is no other building in the vicinity of the farm, see figure 1.
6. The Panel finds it prima facie unlikely that the principle of distinction was respected.¹⁶¹
7. In addition, considering the number of casualties, including of children, even if some fighters were present at the time of the attack, the Panel finds unlikely that the principles of proportionality and precautions were respected.¹⁶²
8. The Panel sent a request for information to KSA about in this incident and is awaiting a reply.

¹⁶⁰ CIHL rules 1, 3, 5 and 6.

¹⁶¹ CIHL rules 14 and 15.

¹⁶² CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Figure 1
Satellite image of the location of the farmhouse



Source: google map

Figure 2
Pictures of the farmhouse and vehicle after the incident



Source: Confidential

Annex 28. Violations in the context of detention by the Coalition and associated armed groups

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION

Annex 29. Violations in respect to detention attributed to the GoY

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION

Annex 30. Use of explosive ordnance in a civilian area attributed to the GoY, Al Hajar, Ta'izz, 20 August 2019

I. Background

1. On 20 August 2019, at approximately 18:00 LT, an explosive ordnance impacted on a civilian area in Al Hajar, Ta'izz (13°26'00.1"N 43°58'14.6"E) (see figures 1 and 2) resulting in the deaths of two children and the injuries to two more children.
2. The attack occurred during a period of clashes between the GoY forces in Ta'izz and the 35th Brigade of the GoY forces, under the control of Abu Al Abbas. The Panel received information that the ordnance was launched from the South. The Panel send a letter about this incident to the GoY and is awaiting a reply.

Figure 1

Location of the incident



Source: Google map

Figure 2
Remnant found at the location of the impact



Source: Confidential

II. Analysis of IHL violations

3. The Panel was unable to identify a military objective in the area of the impact and has not received any information which would lead toward the conclusion that civilians who had lost their protection under IHL were present at the time of the attack.
4. The use of explosive ordnance in populated areas raises issues with regard to compliance with the applicable rules of IHL. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have an inherent level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when used at long range at targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects.¹⁶³
5. Based on the information available, the Panel concludes *prima facie* that this incident constitutes an indiscriminate attack against civilians in violation of the applicable rules of IHL.¹⁶⁴
6. Even if civilians who had lost their protection under IHL were present at the time of the attack, the Panel concludes that, considering that all victims were children, it is unlikely that the principles of proportionality and precaution were respected.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Explosive weapons in populated areas. Humanitarian, legal, technical and military aspects*. Expert meeting, 24 and 25 February 2015. (Switzerland, June 2015). Available at https://shop.icrc.org/explosive-weapons-in-populated-areas-expert-meeting.html?__store=default, e-book.

¹⁶⁴ Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 13, Additional Protocol II.

¹⁶⁵ See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Annex 31. Use of explosive ordnance against civilian populated areas 2019 attributed to Houthi forces

1. The Panel investigated several incidents showing cases of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas in Yemen and was able to conclude investigations in two of these cases which resulted in the deaths of three civilians, including two children, and injuries to 16 others, including children, see table 1.
2. According to testimonies and evidence received by the Panel, all three incidents are attributable to the Houthis. The Panel sent a letter to Houthi authorities in that respect and is awaiting a reply.
3. Panel's investigation is based on independent investigations and information available in the public domain. The Panel has not identified a military objective in any of the case investigated nor the presence of civilians, who had lost their protection under IHL. However, if the Houthi political or military leadership can provide verifiable information on the military objectives targeted, or intended to be targeted, that may counter the Panel's preliminary findings, the Panel is ready to review them.

Table 1

Investigations concluded in 2019

Case	Date	Location	Impact point	Victims/damage
1	5 January	N 13°35'50.4" E 44°00'57.1"	Street, Ta'izz	2 killed, incl. 1 child and 10 injured
2	4 June	N 13° 28' 54" E 44° 0' 9"	Agricultural area, al Kadeen village, al Misrakh district, Ta'izz	1 child killed and 6 children injured

Appendix 1: Ta'izz (5 January 2019)

I. Background

1. On 5 January 2019 at approximately 18:00 LT, a mortar hit a street in Ta'izz (13°35'50.4" N 44°00'57.1"E).
2. The explosion resulted in the death of two civilians, including a 12 year-old boy and the injury of ten, including three minors,¹⁶⁶ see figure 1.
3. According to the information received by the Panel, the mortar was launched from the North of the 60th street, an area controlled by Houthis.

Figure 2

Impact of the mortar



Source: confidential.

II. Analysis of IHL violations

4. The Panel was unable to identify a military objective in the area of the impact and has not received any information which could lead towards the conclusion that civilians who had lost their protection under IHL were present at the time of the attack. The Panel welcomes any information in that respect.
5. The use of unguided explosive ordnance in populated areas raised issues with regard to compliance with the applicable rules of IHL. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have an inherent level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when used at long range at targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ The Panel received information from three different sources, as well as medical records and police report.

¹⁶⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Explosive weapons in populated areas. Humanitarian, legal, technical and military aspects*. Expert meeting, 24 and 25 February 2015. (Switzerland, June 2015).

6. Based on the information available, the Panel concludes that this incident constitutes an indiscriminate attack against civilians in violation of applicable rules of IHL.¹⁶⁸

7. Even if civilians having lost their protection under IHL were present at the time of the attack, the Panel concludes that considering the important number of victims, including children, it is unlikely that the principles of proportionality or precaution were respected.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 13, Additional Protocol II.

¹⁶⁹ See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Appendix 2: Al Kadeen village, Al Misrakh district (4 June 2019)

I. Background

1. On 4 June 2019 at approximately 06:00 LT, two explosive devices hit a agricultural area in Al Kadeen village, Al Misrakh district (13° 28' 54" N 44° 0' 9" E) see figure 1, at an interval of approximately 5 minutes.
2. The explosion resulted in the death of one child and the injury of six. All victims were between five and 11 years old.¹⁷⁰
3. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive devices were launched from Al Houban, an area under Houthi control.

Figure 1

Location of the impact



Source: Google

Figure 2

Pictures of the impacts



¹⁷⁰ Confidential source, and medical records on file with the Panel.



Source: Confidential

Figure 3
Debris from mortar used



Source: Confidential

II. Analysis of IHL violation

4. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military activities or presence of fighters in the area at the time of the attack and no civilian having lost his/her protection under IHL was present. The Panel finds it very unlikely that the victims, all children, had lost their protection under IHL against direct attack.

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5. The use of unguided explosive ordnance in populated areas raised issues with regard to compliance with the applicable rules of IHL. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have an inherent level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when used at long range at targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects.¹⁷¹
 6. Based on the information available, the Panel concludes that this incident constitutes an indiscriminate attack against civilians in violation of applicable rules of IHL.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Explosive weapons in populated areas. Humanitarian, legal, technical and military aspects*. Expert meeting, 24 and 25 February 2015. (Switzerland, June 2015).

¹⁷² Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 13, Additional Protocol II, and CIHL rules 14 and 15.

Annex 32. Violations in the context of detention attributed to the Houthis forces

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION

Annex 33. Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict

I. Introduction

1. The Panel received information about the endemic use of children in activities related to the conduct of hostilities in Yemen.¹⁷³ However, documentation of specific cases is difficult due to the need to protect the victims and their families, and the fact that many victims, relatives or witnesses are afraid to talk to the Panel and that the Panel is unable to travel to most parts of Yemen.
2. The Panel was able to document three specific cases of children aged between 12 and 15 used by Houthi forces to fight between 2017 and 2018.
3. The Panel continues to investigate to identify individual responsible for the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in Yemen as they would fall under the designation criteria contained in paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution 2140 (2014).

II. Cases

a. Child 1

4. At the end of 2017-beginning of 2018, at the age of 15, the child was taken by forces from his school in Amran, with approximately 15 other children, by a group led by someone called “Ahmed Ali” and affiliated to the Houthi forces. He was sent to Sana’a for three-months of training. The training center comprised of several tents. According to him, there was approximately 300 children in the camp. After the training, he was sent to fight on the West Coast on the border between Ta’izz and al Hudaydah. He was with approximately 20 other children at the front line. They were armed with small arms such as Kalashnikov rifles. He stayed one month on the front line. He did not receive a salary while he was fighting and would sell some ammunition when he needed money. He was able to escape during a day-off, which was given by his superior.

b. Child 2

5. In 2018, at the age of 12, the child was taken by force by the Houthi forces from his home in Sirwah, Ma’rib. Over 100 children from the region were also taken during that period. They brought him to a valley for three months of training. The two first months were mainly about ideology and jihad. During the third month, he received training on the use of small arms. During the first two months, the children were given very little food. During the last month, rice and chicken were added to their meals. After the training, he was sent to support the fighting against the GoY forces in Sirwah, Ma’rib. He was doing logistical work and was bringing food to the front. He was also asked to fight at the front line with approximately 25 other children. He was prohibited from seeing his family and was often beaten by Houthis members. He stayed there for approximately one and a half years. One night, he managed to escape and to cross the front line to join his family. He was not given a salary. His family received threats after he escaped from the Houthis.

c. Child 3

6. In July 2017, at the age of 13, the child was recruited in Nihm district, Sana’a. Someone called “Abu Ahmed” and seven other Houthi members were looking to recruit children at that time. They told him he would receive a three-day educational training. They took him to a camp in a valley. There were approximately 100 people in the camp, the majority of whom were children. Once there, he was kept by force. He received a three-month training. The first month was about ideology and jihad and the two last months concerned the use of small arms. After this, he was sent to the front line at the border between Sana’a and Ma’rib. He stayed there for four months. He was used for logistical tasks, but when there were attacks, he was sent to fight to the front line with other children. The children were the first to be sent to the front. There were approximately 40 children at that front. He was not allowed to see his family. He managed to escape when a family member negotiated a three-day leave for him. He was not given any salary.

¹⁷³ Although the number is probably much higher, between April 2013 and December 2018, the United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 3,034 children by parties to the conflict in Yemen, mostly by Houthi forces. See S/2019/453, para. 17.

III. Analysis of IHL violations

7. Under IHL, children under 15 years old must not be recruited in the armed forces of the parties to the conflict and must not be allowed to take part in hostilities.¹⁷⁴ The Panel notes that, since 2007, Yemen is party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Under article 4 of the Optional protocol, armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.

8. The three cases documented by the Panel all concern children below 15 years old and demonstrate clear violations of the rules of IHL and human rights norms prohibiting the recruitment of children and their use in hostilities.

9. The forced recruitment of children in armed forces is a form of slavery¹⁷⁵ and nearly always constitute trafficking in persons.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Additional Protocol II, Article 4(3)(c), CIHL rules 136 and 137, Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 38 (3).

¹⁷⁵ CIHL rule 94.

¹⁷⁶ UNHCR, Annual report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, A/HRC/37/47, paras 15-16 and UNODC, *Trafficking in person in the context of armed conflict*, 2018, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GloTIP2018_BOOKLET_2_Conflict.pdf.

Annex 34. Cases of obstruction to the distribution of humanitarian assistance

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Annex 35. Full list of abbreviations

AED	United Arab Emirates dirham
aka	Also known as
al-Kuraimi	Al-Kuraimi Islamic Bank
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
Aramco	Arabian Oil Company KSA
ATGM	Anti-tank guided missile
B/L	Bill of Lading
BHP	Brake Horse Power
BMP	Beijing MicroPilot Flight Control Systems
CAC	Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank of Yemen
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CHA	Coalition holding area
CID	Criminal investigation department
CIHL	Customary International Humanitarian Law
DDG	Destroyer Designated Guided (Guided Missile Destroyer)
E	East
Forex	Foreign exchange
GIS	UN Geographical Information System
GoY	Government of Yemen
GPS	Global Positioning System
HEF	Hadramaut Elite Forces
IBY	International Bank of Yemen
ICC	International Criminal Court
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMD	Iran Military Display
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
JIAT	Joint Investigation and Assessment Team
Km	Kilometre
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LACM	land attack cruise missile
LC	Letter of credit
Mt	Metric tonne
N	North
NAMCHA	National authority for the management and coordination of humanitarian affairs and disaster recovery
NSB	National security bureau
ODF	Orphans Development Foundation
PBS	První brněnská strojírna
PPB	Presidential Protection Brigades
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
RPM	Revolution per minute
SAM	Surface-to-Air missile
SAR	Saudi Arabia Rial
SBF	Security Belt Forces in Southern Governorates
SEF	Shabwani Elite Forces in Shabwa
SPC	Supreme political council (Houthi)
STC	Southern Transitional Council

TIIB	Tadhamon International Islamic Bank
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNVIM	UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism
USA	United States of America
USD	US Dollar
WBIED	Waterborne improvised explosive device
WFP	World Food Programme
YER	Yemeni Rial
YKB	Yemen Kuwait Bank
