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Letter dated 27 December 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Having served as Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, I am pleased to forward to you herewith the report on the activities of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2018 (see annex).

Given that members of the Working Group have been consulted on the text but could not reach consensus, I am submitting the present request for circulation in my national capacity.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Léon Houadja Kacou **Adom**
Ambassador



Annex to the letter dated 27 December 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Report on the activities of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2018

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a summary of statements or interventions made by briefers and representatives of Member States during meetings of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. Its content is not intended to reflect the consensus position of the Security Council on peacekeeping issues.

2. Between 1 January and 31 December 2018, the Working Group held five meetings aimed at promoting triangular cooperation between the Security Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat, with a view to improving coordination between peacekeeping partners. At those meetings, which were facilitated by representatives of the Secretariat, United Nations peacekeeping missions and other institutions, including a non-resident Senior Fellow at the International Peace Institute, Alexandra Novosseloff, participants focused on the following themes:

- (a) Protection of civilians in challenging environments;
- (b) Strategic force generation and capacity planning;
- (c) Women and peace and security in peacekeeping operations;
- (d) Safety, security and performance of peacekeepers in asymmetric environments: a whole-of-mission approach;
- (e) Learning from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: understanding the conditions for successful peacekeeping.

II. Protection of civilians in challenging environments

3. On 23 March 2018, the Working Group held a meeting on the protection of civilians in challenging environments. Discussions were focused on the following questions, as proposed by the Chair in the concept note for the meeting:

- (a) How can the mandate of a peacekeeping mission better reflect the evolving operational environment relating to the protection of civilians, given the serious protection-related challenges posed within current peacekeeping operations?
- (b) How can the Security Council, in coordination with the Secretariat, host Governments and relevant regional partners, strengthen civilian protection?
- (c) How can missions be supported so that they are adaptable and able to implement different protection mandates, and have the necessary resources to do so?
- (d) Is there a need to better understand and analyse the comparative advantages of different United Nations entities and the responsibilities of each in complex and challenging environments?
- (e) Has the right balance been struck between civilian and military responses to civilian protection?

(f) How can the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat ensure that an inclusive and substantive exchange is held on the relationship between threat assessment, conflict analysis and dialogue for new and existing mandates?

(g) How can the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries better manage peacekeeping expectations?

4. The Working Group invited the Director of the Africa I Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,¹ Michael Kingsley-Nyinah, an expert on civilian protection from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Eveline Rooijmans, an expert on civilian protection from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Koffi Wogomebou, and an expert on civilian protection from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Anne Kröning, to discuss those issues and share their expertise.

5. In his briefing, Mr. Kingsley-Nyinah said that the protection of civilians was the main task of peacekeeping operations. A total of 95 per cent of troops were dedicated to the protection of civilians, a priority that was set out in the mandates of 8 of the 14 United Nations missions deployed around the world. There were many challenges to the successful implementation of those broad and ambitious mandates at the strategic level, in the definition of scope and priorities, at the political level, with regard to political solutions and the responsibilities of the host State, and at the operational level, in terms of capacities, adequacy of resources and willingness of United Nations personnel, including military personnel.

6. In Mr. Kingsley-Nyinah's view, current challenges included limited State presence in certain areas, persistent political crises and asymmetric threats from armed groups and transnational criminal networks, which added to the complexity of the environment in which peacekeeping operations were deployed. He noted that United Nations missions could not protect all civilians everywhere. Consequently, expectations regarding peacekeeping operations must be based on a clear understanding of what could or should be done, given that peacekeepers might be unable to respond to eventual mass and large-scale violence or abuse by any party against civilians. Questions were also raised about the extent of and limits to the actions that peacekeepers could take in response to an increase in crime rates. It was important to understand the precise meaning of "protection of civilians" and to be able to adapt its implementation to the specific environment of each peacekeeping operation.

7. Mr. Kingsley-Nyinah noted that civilian protection strategies must include support for political dialogue and the monitoring, prevention and resolution of community violence. From that perspective, the role of protection of civilians officers appeared to be critical and their efforts should be aimed at prioritizing protection needs and adapting those needs to the resources and capabilities of peacekeeping operations. In closing, he stressed that, as threats to civilians and protection strategies evolved, the search for long-term political solutions based on a shared vision and the collective engagement of all stakeholders was more urgent than ever for peacekeeping operations.

8. In her briefing, Ms. Rooijmans said that the electoral period in the Democratic Republic of the Congo could be marked by an increase in violence and that a rapid response to requests for protection from the civilian population would be a challenge that would require both a comprehensive approach and a "protection through projection" approach by United Nations forces. She said that it was necessary to make

¹ As from 1 January 2019, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was replaced by the Department of Peace Operations.

the best possible use of the tools available in order to address the challenges posed by armed groups. Civilian components could anchor the protection efforts of MONUSCO within political objectives that could be supported by the army. For example, the army could place increased pressure on armed groups by targeting leaders or cutting off their resources, while political and civilian components attempted to negotiate a ceasefire through mediation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, among other means.

9. Ms. Rooijmans also provided details on the “protection through projection” model, a pilot project that was currently under development at MONUSCO. According to that model, the Mission’s static presence was reduced and supplemented by rapidly deployable battalions, which could deploy to high-risk areas at short notice in consultation and collaboration with civilian sections. Rapid deployments had already taken place in Ituri and Kasai, although in some areas (such as Kivu), the Mission had decided that a static presence remained the best means of protecting civilians. The aim of the protection through projection model was to cover a large area, with two thirds of the three available battalions to be deployed in the field and one third to remain on standby. Ms. Rooijmans concluded by stressing the importance of analytical and communication skills within missions.

10. Mr. Wogomebou said that the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians lay with the host State, which, in carrying out that task, benefited from the support of the United Nations mission. He highlighted the challenges involved in protecting civilians in the framework of MINUSCA, including the State’s limited resources and power to control the entire Central African Republic (which led to vigilantism and violence by armed groups) and the lack of understanding of the Mission’s mandate. He therefore called for consistent support for the establishment of State authority across the country, capacity development for the Forces armées centrafricaines and improved early warning systems to prevent, or intervene in, cases of violence against civilians. In the report on the independent special investigation led by Brigadier General (retired) Fernand Amoussou into the incidents that occurred in the south-east of the Central African Republic between 1 May and 31 August 2017, emphasis had been placed on the risk of failure to protect civilians owing to the Mission’s limited capacities and the weak presence of the State in many regions.

11. Ms. Kröning described the civilian protection component of the mandate of the United Nations forces in Mali, within a context in which conflict was spreading to the centre of the country, a densely populated area with limited State presence. The region had become a stronghold for armed groups, which had directly targeted civilians who were suspected of collaborating with the Government, the Mission, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies. Ms. Kröning also referred to the support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and for developing the capacity of the Malian armed forces and strengthening judicial institutions with a view to combating violent extremism, which was conducive to terrorism. She concluded by referring to the key role of civil society in combating all forms of violence against civilians.

12. In the ensuing discussion, experts from the States members of the Working Group stressed that the protection of civilians was not the responsibility of a single component, but should rather be seen in the context of the cross-cutting nature of United Nations missions, namely, civilian, military and police components. They recognized the primary responsibility of the host State and the necessity of adhering to its priorities, the need for transparency and consistency in decision-making mechanisms within missions and the importance of establishing a culture of protection of civilians within missions. They also emphasized the importance of mandates adapted to developments in the host State. Other key points raised by member States were the importance of performance in the protection of civilians,

which they considered to be a shared responsibility. Some also stressed the need to manage expectations on the ground, given the difficult conditions and the limited presence of the Government in some areas.

13. In response to the experts' comments, Mr. Kingsley-Nyinah said that the protection of civilians could create space for political processes by alleviating the suffering that made it more difficult to achieve political solutions. He also stated that joint efforts by Security Council members to resolve crises were the ultimate civilian protection mechanism.

14. The briefers echoed Mr. Wogomebou's point on the importance of establishing early warning systems and providing appropriate training for United Nations troops, taking into account the complexity of the security challenges in the host country.

15. Concurring with that recommendation, Ms. Rooijmans stressed the importance of continuous training and the monitoring of troops on the ground to ensure that their mindset was adapted to the difficult terrain. She also addressed the importance of threat analysis, the need to address budgetary issues related to troop deployments and the central role of strategic communication.

16. Some participants also stressed the need for the protection of civilians to be a routine activity of peacekeepers and the importance of balancing the protection of peacekeepers with the protection of civilians, while ensuring that the performance of peacekeeping operations was in line with the budgetary resources made available to them. They concluded that the protection of civilians in the context of peacekeeping operations and their effectiveness must be addressed cohesively.

III. Triangular partnership: strategic force generation and capacity planning

17. On 26 June 2018, the Working Group held its second meeting, on strategic force generation and capacity planning. The briefings and exchanges were aimed at answering the following questions, as proposed by the Chair in the concept note for the meeting:

(a) What innovative approaches can the Secretariat, the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries adopt to ensure the diversity of contributors that provide the necessary United Nations peacekeeping capabilities?

(b) How can the Security Council ensure that the momentum and progress in strategic force generation and capacity planning achieved in recent years is maintained?

(c) How can we ensure that troop- and police-contributing countries fully participate in discussions on strategic force generation and are able to meet relevant standards?

(d) What approaches can Member States adopt to broaden and better target their support for training and capacity-building efforts, including through bilateral training efforts and triangular partnerships with the Secretariat?

18. In response to those questions, the Co-Chair of the Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support,² Oliver Ulich, outlined the four key objectives of strategic force generation: proactive, coordinated, forward-looking and sustained engagement with Member States for the purpose of capacity-building; a more complete and concrete understanding of the

² As from 1 January 2019, the Department of Field Support was replaced by the Department of Operational Support.

capacities of individual Member States and their potential to contribute to United Nations missions; support for the systematic planning of future capacity needs; and improved performance evaluation and related decision-making.

19. Mr. Ulich also described a number of key activities by the Planning Cell, including the organization and follow-up of peacekeeping summits and ministerial conferences on defence; the management and improvement of the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, including an improved website translated into French; the organization of a mission-specific force generation conference; the quarterly publication of uniformed capability requirements; the coordination of work in support of rapid deployment, including associated compensation and the development of guidelines; training facilitation and support for capacity-building; and support for improving performance evaluation, decision-making and strategic engagement, including through a knowledge-management system. He also highlighted the success of the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System in the preparation and deployment processes of former and new troop- and police-contributing countries, the value of the 41 assessment and advisory visits conducted to provide a more detailed understanding of the capabilities offered and the successful mapping of bilateral donors with the aim of providing additional support when gaps were identified, as well as the more than 50 rapid deployment level pledges in the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

20. The Chief of the Integrated Training Service of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, Mark Pedersen, referred to the footprint, accountability, mindset and capacity of troops to be deployed in peacekeeping missions. He stressed the importance of ensuring the operational readiness of troops, which must be trained according to precise standards. Troop-contributing countries must provide an operational readiness assurance certificate, a type of contract between the troop-contributing country and the Secretariat. They must also monitor the performance improvement policy, to ensure that troops are organized in accordance with the requirements of United Nations peacekeepers; are ready to perform the tasks provided for in the general concept of operations, rules of engagement and operations orders; and have the resources and equipment they need. Peacekeepers must comply with predeployment training, in accordance with United Nations standards and specifications. They should be screened for sexual exploitation and abuse and receive training in United Nations standards of conduct and discipline; be prepared and tested through self-assessments and field training exercises; and be able and willing to operate in accordance with peacekeeping tactics, techniques and procedures, in order to achieve the objectives and fulfil the mandate of the United Nations mission.

21. Mr. Pedersen explained that Lieutenant General (retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, in his report on improving the security of United Nations peacekeepers, set out the following four key issues: footprint, accountability, mindset and capacity. Most of the problems identified were related to the basic professional skills, such as those concerning weapons handling, patrols, radio communications, first aid exercises and counter-ambush tactics. Those shortcomings were the result of weaknesses that included a lack of knowledge of the troop preparation process; a shortage of resources and knowledge, in particular at the higher levels of command and control of troops; deployment aspirations that exceeded capabilities; and insufficient and misdirected external support.

22. To bridge those gaps, Mr. Pedersen advocated an approach that emphasized compliance with United Nations standards for strategic force generation and troop training, including updated predeployment training guidelines; better alignment of external training support; training for African training centres; and training, exercises and drills during missions. He called on bilateral training providers to work upstream with the national entities responsible for the preparation of strategic forces, with a

view to enhancing national capability through training, force generation, skills drawn from experience and strengthening autonomous national capacities.

23. Mr. Pedersen also called on training and capacity-building providers to deliver consistent assistance rather than one-off training; to conduct training in line with United Nations standards and gender requirements; and to be prepared to share information on the predeployment training needs of troop-contributing countries with other bilateral training providers. Training providers were also encouraged to share their training services with troop-contributing countries and to work with other bilateral training providers.

24. In that regard, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support placed particular emphasis on the infantry battalion command course, the military skills course for personnel on mission and the enhanced courses for sector, police and emergency relief commanders.

25. Mr. Ulich insisted on the need to assess and identify the requirements of force commands. The purpose in that context was also to ensure gender parity, even though women currently account for only 11 per cent at that level. Other key points raised by Member States included the need for more smart pledges, the importance of triangular partnerships, the need to monitor pledge implementation and the need to employ performance data.

26. While acknowledging the importance of providing training to civilian components, Mr. Ulich also insisted on the need for an integrated approach involving all components of peacekeeping missions. He explained that such training was currently given only to battalions. Strategic force generation had become a collective effort that should involve all peacekeeping partners. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support should adopt the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System as their strategic force generation tool.

27. Member States stressed the need to strengthen the links between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries to create coordination mechanisms aimed at aligning training needs and proposals and ensuring the ongoing monitoring and effectiveness of pledges. With regard to coordination mechanisms, the representative of Ethiopia said that the strategic force generation process should also be linked to regional forces, citing the African Standby Force. Reflecting on the use of data collection mechanisms to better link supply and demand, the representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and South Africa insisted on the need to strengthen specialized police teams and civilian components to ensure their contributions to peace. The representative of the Netherlands, emphasizing the significance of the gender dimension, said that training supply and demand must be aligned.

IV. Women and peace and security in peacekeeping operations

28. On 1 August 2018, the Working Group convened its third meeting, on women and peace and security in peacekeeping operations. The briefings and discussions with experts from Member States were focused on the following questions, as proposed by the Chair in the concept note for the meeting:

(a) How can the Security Council and Member States coordinate with the Secretariat and regional partners on the implementation of women and peace and security in peacekeeping operations?

(b) How can the work of the Security Council ensure that peacekeeping mandates continue to reflect the important role of women and peace and security in peacekeeping operations?

29. Invited to give a briefing, the Chief of the Gender Unit and Senior Gender Adviser of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, Njoki Rahab Kinyanjui noted that the meeting of the Working Group was taking place in the post-2015 context, a period marked by the review of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security. She noted that the focus of resolution [2242 \(2015\)](#), in which the Security Council sought to improve the implementation of mandates on women and peace and security, was on the following objectives:

- (a) Strengthening women's leadership and empowerment;
- (b) Strengthening the monitoring and analysis of proof;
- (c) Strengthening partnerships with stakeholders in the women and peace and security agenda;
- (d) Building the capacity of personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support.

30. With regard to the leadership and responsibility of women in peace and security, Ms. Kinyanjui focused on four aspects in her briefing, namely, 2018 policy frameworks; leadership commitment; gender architecture; and measures and benchmarks. She clarified that the analysis and generation of proof would be based on priority areas, namely the establishment of an evidence base (monitoring platform); an analysis of gender-based conflicts; and a stronger engagement in the context of the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security.

31. Ms. Kinyanjui also addressed the issue of partnerships, which were essential for coherence and collaboration on key initiatives undertaken by relevant stakeholders. She noted the need for a strengthened partnership and synergy of action among regional and intergovernmental partners (including the African Union), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, the Peacebuilding Support Office and civil society organizations. Ms. Kinyanjui recognized that the challenges to implementation of the women and peace and security agenda were complex, but not insurmountable. She therefore focused on a few proposals, namely, appropriate tools, specific advice and systematic training.

32. At the end of her briefing, Ms. Kinyanjui noted some lessons learned, emphasizing that gains in the area of women and peace and security could be undermined in the absence of inclusive processes. She emphasized the importance of conducting an in-depth analysis, the results of which, she suggested, could be considered by the Security Council, in particular in the development of mandates that took into account the gender dimension of peacekeeping operations and the optimization of partnerships to achieve the expected results.

33. In the discussion that followed the briefing, a number of Member States recognized and emphasized the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution, including in the context of peacekeeping operations. They stressed that the joint high-level visit to Chad, the Niger and South Sudan in July 2018, led by the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security, had been useful for drawing the attention of the Security Council to that issue.

34. Some Member States also expressed their support for initiatives to strengthen the gender dimension in peacekeeping operations in terms of both decision-making and strategy, and they called for a strengthening of the role of gender advisers in peacekeeping operations.

35. In addition, several experts emphasized the importance of training military and civilian personnel, in order to improve the integration of the gender dimension in the mandates of peacekeeping operations, and stressed the important role of civil society organizations and gender advisers in the offices of the special representatives of the Secretary-General. The importance of strategic partnerships with regional and subregional organizations in promoting the women and peace and security agenda was also stressed.

36. The representative of the Russian Federation said that there was no “one size fits all” approach to the issue of women and peace and security. It was important to take a balanced approach, since the women and peace and security programme was just as important as other programmes promoting peace and security.

37. In response to comments and questions from experts, Ms. Kinyanjui made the following remarks:

(a) In connection with the need to preserve expertise within peacekeeping missions, despite budgetary constraints, and within country teams in the event of the withdrawal of a mission, she commended Canada for its support for the funding of extrabudgetary posts;

(b) She encouraged high-level visits from members of the Council and the Secretariat, citing as an example the visit to the Central African Republic by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bintou Keita, during which Ms. Keita had spoken about the role of women in electoral processes and crisis recovery;

(c) The training of civilian and military personnel should cover the whole spectrum of the life of a mission, including the redeployment phase, and she advocated the inclusion of constraints relating to troop rotation, the need to go beyond a doctrinal approach and the increased use of guides and training materials;

(d) She also advocated the systematization of meetings with regional blocs in the context of partnerships to strengthen capacities in the area of women and peace and security;

(e) In relation to interaction with women’s organizations, she recognized the need to avoid the fragmentation of such organizations and noted that cooperation with the African Union should allow for the systematic inclusion of all of that organization’s mechanisms in the current discussions and political processes for crisis recovery.

V. Safety, security and performance of peacekeepers in asymmetric environments: a whole-of-mission approach

38. On 7 November 2018, the Working Group held its fourth meeting, on the theme “Safety, security and performance of peacekeepers in asymmetric environments: a whole-of-mission approach”. The points for discussion, as proposed by the Chair in the concept note for the meeting, were as follows:

(a) Safety, security and performance of peacekeepers in asymmetric environments: a whole-of-mission approach – what does this mean and how can it be accomplished?

(b) How can peacekeeping operations adapt to an asymmetric environment?

(c) How can we draw upon enhanced partnerships to better address safety, security and performance issues?

39. The two speakers were the Head of the Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships, Major General Jai Shanker Menon, and the Deputy Military Adviser in

the Office of Military Affairs, Major General Hugh Van Roosen. The United Nations Police Adviser, Luís Carrilho, also delivered brief remarks.

40. Major General Menon outlined the challenges posed by asymmetric warfare to peacekeeping operations and described the measures taken by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in response to those challenges. The measures included those taken as part of the action plan for peacekeeping operations, which was based on the recommendations in the report on improving the security of United Nations peacekeepers, including the creation of integrated implementation support teams and work undertaken on developing a revised action plan. Major General Menon emphasized that the measures were already bearing results. In Mali, Major General Menon reported, measures had been taken to improve situational awareness, bolster base defences and enhance the detection and destruction of improvised explosive devices.

41. Major General Menon reported that, in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA was taking active measures despite an overstretched military component and remote force deployments. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Intervention Brigade was adjusting to asymmetric threats, and efforts had been taken to enhance situational awareness and to provide “protection through projection”. He emphasized the importance of bolstering training and capacity-building for troop- and police-contributing countries, strengthening leadership at all levels, refining tactics and techniques, promoting proactive engagement with communities and securing political commitments from all stakeholders, especially in the light of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.

42. Major General Van Roosen said that Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), the above-mentioned action plan and the Action for Peacekeeping initiative had galvanized existing efforts by the Office of Military Affairs to reduce and eliminate the loss of life and injury. He pointed out that, compared with the same period in 2017, a decrease of 23 per cent in hostile acts, 28 per cent in injuries and 50 per cent in fatalities had been recorded in the first 10 months of 2018. He said that the initiative had strengthened the Secretariat’s authority to make changes to the way in which military components were evaluated, including through pre-mission visits and individual and headquarters evaluations. He outlined additional measures taken to enhance performance evaluation, emphasizing that many of those would be shared directly with troop- and police-contributing countries.

43. Mr. Carrilho said that police peacekeepers found themselves at the forefront of asymmetric threats, pointing to the presentations given by the United Nations Police Division to the Security Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that week. He outlined measures taken by United Nations police, including engaging with host State authorities to build up capabilities when authorized by their mandate. He added that their resources were limited, subject to a specific directive on the use of force. He outlined measures taken to ensure that police officers and formed police units met requirements and were able to uphold their mandates, including predeployment visits, mission-wide planning, standardized inspections and mandatory training.

44. The representative of Ireland said that, in line with the endorsement by Ireland of the Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, it was deploying a mobile training team to Burkina Faso to provide predeployment training on countering improvised explosive devices.

45. The representative of France welcomed the action plan and the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, saying that they would help to address asymmetric threats. He emphasized the need for situational awareness, training and partnerships and said that

the casualty evacuation policy was well built and effective if applied. The delegate asked about command and control with regard to tasking authority for helicopters.

46. The representative of the Netherlands welcomed the action plan, the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and the Secretary-General's reforms, adding that her country's experience in MINUSMA demonstrated the importance of situational awareness. The delegate added that training and "peacekeeping-intelligence/information gathering and analysis"³ were vital and that casualty evacuation and standards were key issues.

47. The representative of Morocco asked how the Secretariat envisioned the role of troop- and police-contributing countries in the implementation of the action plan and shared his country's view that the revised action plan had not been shared with those countries. The representative also asked about steps taken to integrate asymmetric threats into training, adding that there was no specific training material on such threats.

48. The representative of Ethiopia said that asymmetric threats required a new approach, adding that peacekeepers could not be indifferent in the face of threats to themselves and to civilians. He said that in that environment, pragmatic and flexible interpretations of the basic principles of peacekeeping were needed. The delegate added that clear mandates and rules of engagement were needed and should be based on solid threat assessments. Missions needed the ability to deter peace spoilers and to ensure that peacekeepers had adequate training and equipment. He added that performance was the responsibility of all stakeholders, and not simply a matter for troop- and police-contributing countries.

49. The representative of the United States of America said that her country wholeheartedly supported the action plan. She added that the United States was providing \$1 billion in training to build up the capabilities of troop-contributing countries. The delegate named six key areas: securing camps; reinforcing integrated planning; extended use of early warning; mitigating the threat of improvised explosive devices; improving casualty and medical evacuations; and deploying more agile capabilities to protect peacekeepers and civilians.

50. The representative of Guatemala emphasized the importance of addressing caveats, asserting that they had an impact on missions, as they restricted the action of commanders. The representative asked how the Secretariat planned to address caveats. He questioned the "protection through projection" approach, saying that, during the most recent visit of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, local interlocutors were not in favour of the approach and stating that community engagement was key. He also asked how the Secretariat was dealing with situations in which it was operating without the support of the host country.

51. The representative of Indonesia said that the Working Group would grow in importance and become more strategic as it worked to track issues related to the reforms, the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and the action plan. The delegate said that performance was ultimately about mandates and achieving sequenced and prioritized mandates to ensure that implementation was possible. He asked how the Secretariat would draw on the experience and insight of troop-contributing countries to improve peacekeeping mandates. He also asked about the Secretariat's view on

³ The Chair notes that there is no Security Council consensus definition of this terminology, although the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly defined "peacekeeping-intelligence/information gathering and analysis" in the report of its 2018 substantive session (A/72/19) as "the non-clandestine acquisition, verification, processing, analysis and dissemination of information by a United Nations peacekeeping mission within a specific, directed cycle, and within its mandate and area of operation". The Chair further notes that, since the 7 November 2018 meeting of the Working Group, the Secretariat has promulgated the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy (2019).

using triangular partnerships and co-deployment to help with gaps in capabilities and about the possibility of involving host countries in triangular partnerships.

52. The representative of India emphasized that performance evaluation must include every step, from the formulation of the mandate to its implementation by the Secretariat and on the ground, and asked how the comprehensive performance assessment system came together with other elements to form an integrated performance policy framework. The representative also said that it was vital to abandon caveats and underscored the need to counter improvised explosive devices. He asked about measures taken to defend camps and if the “protection to projection” method was a success, noting that troop reductions in MONUSCO had left the forces blind.

53. The representative of Norway voiced his country’s support for peacekeeping-intelligence/information gathering and analysis, the implementation of the action plan and improved training and equipment. He also announced that, as part of its commitment to the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, Norway would extend its multinational rotation concept until 2022 and would deploy one C-130 transport plane in May 2019.

54. The representative of Egypt said that a comprehensive approach was necessary to evaluate performance, with a particular focus on contributions, mandates, partnerships, the primacy of politics, and training and equipment. He added that the Action for Peacekeeping initiative would be crucial, as it included a comprehensive approach, which the delegate claimed was lacking in resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#). The representative of Japan said that it was vital to share best practices, emphasizing the importance of triangular partnerships.

55. The representative of Sweden said that performance evaluation needed to include evaluations of strategic communications and planning. The delegate also said that peacekeeping intelligence was vital to clarifying the nature of actors on the ground. He added that military helicopters should not be put under civilian command and that some should be allowed to remain on standby for casualty evacuation.

56. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia emphasized the importance of integrating the mitigation of the threat of improvised explosive devices early in the planning and organization of missions, adding that the best way to mitigate the threat was to plan. He asked whether the standards on such mitigation, set up in 2017, played a role in planning missions.

57. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland emphasized the importance of proper capabilities and peacekeeping-intelligence/information gathering and analysis in ensuring the safety and security of both peacekeepers and the civilians they are mandated to protect. She added that performance was inextricably linked to safety and security and that robust performance data were key to evaluating units. She said that it was essential for all partners to work together on training and support to address gaps and urged the establishment of a light-touch coordination mechanism in that regard.

58. The representative of China said that it was necessary to have an integrated policy in enhancing safety and security and to have clear and practical mandates, drafted with input from troop-contributing countries. She said that peacekeeping missions should not be involved in counter-terrorism. Training should be targeted to the challenges found in a mission, while operations should have early warning systems, information-sharing, medical evacuation policies and facilities. Trilateral cooperation was vital, especially to help troop-contributing countries. The representative emphasized the need to uphold the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. She also voiced her country’s support for the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.

59. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the action plan appeared to have helped to reduce casualties; however, the action plan and other documents had been applied without approval from the Security Council. He believed that the action plan went beyond the administrative framework of the Secretariat and that troop-contributing countries could not be asked to implement such a document. The same logic applied to the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, in that although a large number of States had endorsed it, they could not be asked to implement it as a whole; Member States would need to discuss it.

60. Regarding peacekeeping-intelligence/information gathering and analysis, the representative said that Member States had decided two years earlier to carry it out. However, they were still waiting for the Secretariat to draft a document. He said that the safety challenges facing peacekeepers stemmed from robust mandates.

61. The representative of Senegal asked what concrete measures the United Nations was taking to facilitate the sharing of experience and best practices among troop-contributing countries.

62. The discussions were also focused on the following aspects of the issue:

(a) **Casualty evacuation.** Major General Menon said that a new casualty evacuation policy had been under review for one year. He said that civilian helicopters had been contracted specifically for casualty evacuations and that military utility helicopters were increasingly used for logistics because of weak road infrastructure. He said that the bigger problem in casualty evacuation was limited night capabilities. He said that the Secretariat was considering a more effective and decentralized system. Major General Van Roosen said that, although the intention was to implement the 10-1-2 casualty response principle, it was not possible to do so in most missions. Instead, the Secretariat was working to set up aerial medical evacuation teams that could bring significant medical capabilities to the patient. He said that casualty evacuation benefited from mission-to-mission flexibility;

(b) **Revised action plan.** Major General Menon said that a revised action plan was being prepared and would be shared with troop- and police-contributing countries as soon as it was ready;

(c) **Protection through projection.** Major General Van Roosen said that “protection through projection” aimed to provide protection in as wide an area as possible with limited means. He claimed that it was a departure from a strategy focused on small, isolated units spread out over wide distances. Established bases had led to disciplinary problems, as well as encouraged internally displaced persons to congregate. “Projection through projection”, however, depended on airlift capabilities or on an ability to rapidly build roads;

(d) **Camp defences.** Major General Menon said that significant improvements had been carried out to defend camps, including through technology. He emphasized that peacekeepers needed to abandon a reactive mindset and instead become more proactive and able to dominate the area outside their camps. Major General Van Roosen linked camp defences to peacekeeping-intelligence/information gathering and analysis, adding that he was proud of the work accomplished on the issue. He said that the Secretariat was working on a new force protection strategy that would clarify roles on the issue, adding that leadership played a key role;

(e) **Improvised explosive devices.** Major General Menon said that improvised explosive devices were particularly a problem for MINUSMA but that the arrival of specialized troops from Egypt and Sri Lanka would help to protect MINUSMA convoys. Major General Van Roosen said that the number of such devices detected and disarmed had gone up, leading to a decrease in injuries and deaths. He

said that the change could be attributed to predeployment and in-mission training on improvised explosive devices and the limited use of mine protection vehicles;

(f) **Caveats.** Major General Menon said that caveats were particularly debilitating, especially when they were not made transparent to commanders. He asked troop- and police-contributing countries to be transparent about caveats, adding that his office was ready to assist in discussion thereon between missions and countries;

(g) **Partnerships.** Major General Menon considered collaboration vital to ensuring that equipment provided to troop- and police-contributing countries could be adequately maintained. In many cases, the equipment was provided without spare parts or the technical expertise needed to repair or maintain it.

VI. Learning from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: understanding the conditions for successful peacekeeping

63. On 7 December 2018, the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations, Léon Houadja Kacou Adom (Chair), opened the meeting by paying tribute to the 151 blue helmets who had lost their lives in the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Côte d'Ivoire expressed its gratitude to Member States that participated in the Working Group. The Chair declared the agenda of the meeting adopted and introduced the special report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI (S/2018/958), which draws on the experiences of the peacekeeping operation and the best practices and lessons learned in Côte d'Ivoire.

64. The Director of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, David Haeri, spoke about organizational learning at the Secretariat and the lessons and best practices learned from the special report.

65. Mr. Haeri stated that the methodology for writing the report included the review of more than 300 internal documents in a span of two weeks, as well as 80 interviews with members of the diplomatic community, government officials, the United Nations country team and representatives of Ivorian civil society. Drawing on the lessons learned could help to inform the reforms taking place at the Secretariat and to understand the reasons for the success of the activities, including political mediation, carried out by UNOCI in implementing its mandate. The release of the report could improve the role of the United Nations during transition in other missions that would draw down to a close. He expressed the view that collective shared responsibility is important in peacekeeping and that the Action for Peacekeeping initiative is one of the initiatives continuing that collective effort.

66. The Director of the Africa II Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Jack Christofides, mentioned various actions taken by UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire with regard to rehatting; use of force; consent; certification of elections; political resolution; reconciliation; transition; and human rights and accountability.

67. On the matter of consent, Mr. Christofides argued that, at the beginning of the mission, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire had given scant consent to UNOCI actions, making it more difficult for UNOCI to function logistically, operationally and programmatically. With time, and as the Government changed, UNOCI became more welcome. Strong relations between UNOCI and the Government later in its mandate were part of the reason for the mission's success in Côte d'Ivoire.

68. On the use of force, Mr. Christofides stated that it was necessary to use force because people, especially opposition leaders, had been threatened by their own Government's forces. On certification, he mentioned that what was requested from UNOCI was unlike anything that missions had been asked to do before. Ivorians

themselves decided that the United Nations was the only entity that could certify the elections; it was a third party that had such power within a sovereign State.

69. On the primacy of politics, there were many important lessons to draw on, including support for and emphasis on politics by Ivorian parties, subregional organizations and the Security Council. On human rights and monitoring, an entity recorded all violations committed in Côte d'Ivoire; coming to terms with the past and seeing who did what was very important for reconciliation. On transitions, although the transition started in 2012, neither the United Nations system nor the host Government was fully prepared for the disruption caused by the transition. One of the remaining challenges was the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, which was still not completed owing to the lack of financial resources. Finally, peacekeeping did not mean handing over, but rather engaging with the authorities of the host Government so that they could organically take over the work.

70. Ms. Novosseloff said that host State consent was important in support of the mission. She also stressed the role of regional and subregional actors in the implementation of a sanctions regime and the importance of engaging with them. She mentioned the vital role that UNOCI played in peacekeeping and how it worked closely with France. She also mentioned the sharing of capacity with Liberia, which meant tapping into the interdependence of missions and their collective efforts. Some strategies that were aimed at stabilizing the situation in Côte d'Ivoire included: (a) the establishment of a radio station to create a more balanced debate; and (b) the joint plan. Nonetheless, the United Nations was only a tool; it was incumbent upon a country to sustain peace, and peacekeeping operations thus needed to withdraw in due course.

71. In response to the presentations made by the briefers, the representative of France noted that Ivorian cooperation was important for the success of the mission. Owing to the heavy French military involvement in the mission, including the assignment of a French senior officer, the representative shared the following three lessons learned from a military perspective:

(a) In terms of military and political strategy, the key factors for success were the increase in power of the country's army, the focus on the protection of civilians and the fact that United Nations military peacekeepers were able to communicate with the local army without language barriers; furthermore, the defence reform identified by the Security Council was key to the exit strategy;

(b) In terms of operational strategies, the innovative quick-reaction force proved to be effective, and training and vetting during the predeployment phase led to better performance;

(c) In terms of tactical strategies, it was often hard to train in such a harsh environment, but the strong relations with the Government made it easier.

72. The representative of the Netherlands commended the Secretary-General for his report and stated that strong leadership was needed to respond proactively to such issues as sexual exploitation and abuse. Missions should also build on public trust to pull resources. When peacekeeping operations were adequately resourced, they became more successful. She added that both the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and the Declaration of Shared Commitments contained the commitment to match resources with mandates for peacekeeping operations, although the country team in Côte d'Ivoire did not have the resources or capacities. Finally, lessons learned from UNOCI should be used in other mission transitions, such as for UNAMID.

73. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stated that national ownership was key to achieving sustainable peace. Peacekeeping operations could achieve their objectives when the host Government was cooperative. Peacekeeping operations needed to promote reconciliation despite the challenges.

74. The representative of Morocco recognized that political processes were essential for transition. He also stressed the importance of tripartite dialogue. For instance, in Côte d'Ivoire the tripartite dialogue between forces in the north and the south and the United Nations allowed parties to sit at the negotiating table and discuss a peace settlement. Radio UNOCI was also a good platform for peacekeepers and Ivorians. Finally, the importance of the experience in UNOCI for the United Nations was mentioned, as was the importance of Ivorian participation in peace.

75. The representative of Peru stated that there should be more collaboration in peacebuilding, and not just in peacekeeping. For instance, to move from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the underlying economic problems should be scrutinized, and a focus on social inclusion, especially in politics, and the enforcement of the rule of law was needed. International involvement and cooperation, including with regional and subregional actors, were also necessary.

76. The representative of Indonesia noted that UNOCI was a success story for sustaining peace, that the primacy of politics should be at the heart of any political strategy and that the capabilities of peacekeepers needed to be strengthened to better help the political processes of the mission. A smooth transition, such as in Côte d'Ivoire, was important and was due to good coordination between the members of the Security Council. There needed to be a focus on the exit strategy and drawdown of missions.

77. The representative of the Russian Federation touched on a few problems, including: (a) the fact that the United Nations mandate cycle, in many instances, including those regarding the use of force, was not a peacekeeping operation, but a peace enforcement operation; (b) there was excessive dependence on the mission and a lack of coordination between United Nations forces and other forces, such as the French forces; (c) the quick-reaction forces approved by the Security Council were repeatedly used for different purposes than those for which they had been established.

78. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stated that the lessons learned from UNOCI should be used to benefit other missions and noted that the report of the Secretary-General had shed light on important matters such as transitions, as well as the importance of the involvement of the Security Council early in the life of a peacekeeping mission. She also asked the briefers what conclusions the international community should draw from the Côte d'Ivoire transition in its particular circumstances. In addition, the representative, noting that capacity remained limited in peacekeeping operations, asked the briefers how that obstacle might be overcome.

79. The representative of China mentioned that peacekeeping operations were an essential tool of the United Nations but that they needed constant improvement, including in the following areas: (a) peacekeeping operations needed to respect the sovereignty of States and maintain a strong relationship with and the consent of the host Government; (b) peacekeeping operations should adjust their mandates to reach completion and drawdown and finally withdraw; and (c) communication between regional and subregional organizations needed to be enhanced. As for the quick-reaction force, the Security Council had mandated such actions on a case-by-case basis. She asked the briefers to elucidate the lessons learned during the deployment of the quick-reaction force in Côte d'Ivoire, noting that China had always supported African countries solving African issues the African way.

80. In response to the comment by the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mr. Christofides said that the transitions started early but that there was a lack of financial resources; the donations from Member States had been cut, as the mission was going through a transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. There was a willingness to pay for peacekeeping, which did not

translate into a willingness to pay for peacebuilding. The question of how much donors were willing to pay as a country transitioned from conflict was also raised.

81. In response to the comments by the representatives of the Russian Federation and China, Mr. Christofides noted the importance of the quick-reaction force in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. As UNOCI was closing, the force was meant to be transitioned to Mali. The mandate of the quick-reaction force also included consideration of the use of force in UNMIL, but was not needed. Quick-reaction forces needed to be improved to reach the mobility and capacities that Member States expected of them. Regarding the use of force, resolution [1975 \(2011\)](#) further showed the Security Council's unity behind the mission's mandate and its use of force and clarified the debate on whether the context was one of peacekeeping or one transitioning to peace enforcement. The use of attack helicopters was deemed to be necessary.

82. As at 31 December 2018, the Working Group had successfully organized five meetings with the overall objective of promoting triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop- and police-contributing countries. This would not have been possible without the crucial support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at every stage and the insightful presentations by the briefers.

83. The Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations and Chair of the Working Group expresses his sincere appreciation to the aforementioned experts, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council Affairs Division and all relevant United Nations services for helping with the successful implementation of the program of work for 2018.
